Today is Monday, July 31, 2017

Custom Search

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-31685 July 31, 1975

RAMON A. GONZALES, petitioner,

vs.
IMELDA R. MARCOS, as Chairman of the Cultural Center of
the Philippines, Father HORACIO DE LA COSTA, I. P.
SOLIONGCO, ERNESTO RUFINO, ANTONIO MADRIGAL, and
ANDRES SORIANO, as Members thereof, respondents.
Ramon A. Gonzales in his own behalf.

Acting Solicitor General Hugo E. Gutierrez; Jr. and Assistant

Solicitor General Reynato S. Puno for respondent Imelda R.
Marcos.

Siguion Reyna, Montecillo, Beto and Ongsiako for respondents.

FERNANDO, J.:

It was the novelty of the constitutional question raised,

there being an imputation by petitioner Ramon A. Gonzales
of an impermissible encroachment by the President of the
Philippines on the legislative prerogative, that led this
Tribunal to give due course to an appeal by certiorari from
an order of dismissal by the Court of First Instance of
Manila.1 More specifically, the issue centered on the validity
of the creation in Executive Order No. 30 of a trust for the
benefit of the Filipino people under the name and style of
the Cultural Center of the Philippines entrusted with the
task to construct a national theatre, a national music hall,
an arts building and facilities, to awaken our people's
consciousness in the nation's cultural heritage and to
encourage its assistance in the preservation, promotion,
enhancement and development thereof, with the Board of
Trustees to be appointed by the President, the Center
having as its estate the real and personal property vested in
it as well as donations received, financial commitments
that could thereafter be collected, and gifts that may be
forthcoming in the future. 2 It was likewise alleged that the
Board of Trustees did accept donations from the private
sector and did secure from the Chemical Bank of New York
a loan of $5 million guaranteed by the National Investment
& Development Corporation as well as $3.5 million received
from President Johnson of the United States in the concept
of war damage funds, all intended for the construction of
the Cultural Center building estimated to cost P48 million.
The Board of Trustees has as its Chairman the First Lady,
Imelda Romualdez Marcos, who is named as the principal
respondent.3 In an order of dismissal by the then Judge,
now Justice of the Court of Appeals, Jose G. Bautista of a
suit for prohibition filed in the Court of First Instance of
Manila, stress was laid on the funds administered by the
Center as coming from donations and contributions, with
not a single centavo raised by taxation, and the absence of
any pecuniary or monetary interest of petitioner that could
in any wise be prejudiced distinct from those of the general
public. Moreover, reference was made to the admission by
petitioner of the desirability of the objective of Executive
Order No. 30, his objection arising from the alleged illegality
of its issuance.4
There was a motion of respondents to file a motion to
dismiss this appeal by certiorari, and it was granted in a
resolution of March 5, 1970. Such a pleading was
submitted to this Court twelve days later, where it was
contended that Executive Order No. 30 represented the
legitimate exercise of executive power, there being no
invasion of the legislative domain and that it was
supplementary to rather than a disregard of Republic Act
No. 4165 creating the National Commission on Culture. In
this exhaustive motion to dismiss, the point was likewise
raised that petitioner did not have the requisite personality
to contest as a taxpayer the validity of the executive order
in question, as the funds held by the Cultural Center came
from donations and contributions, not one centavo being
raised by taxation.5 Thereafter, a manifestation was filed by
the then Solicitor General, now Associate Justice, Felix Q.
Antonio, adopting "the Motion to Dismiss the Petition dated
February 25, 1970, filed by respondents with this Honorable
Court."6 There was an opposition to such motion to dismiss
on the part of petitioner.7 That was the status of the case,
there being no further pleadings filed except two motions
for extension of time to file answer submitted by the
Solicitor General and granted by this Court, when on July
22, 1975, there was a second motion to dismiss on the part
of respondents through the Acting Solicitor General Hugo
E. Gutierrez Jr. and Assistant Solicitor General Reynato S.
Puno. It is therein set forth: "(1) As stated in the petition
itself its undeniable quintessence is [the allegation of] "an
executive usurpation of legislative powers, hence,
respondents in enforcing the same, are acting without
jurisdiction, hence, are restrainable by prohibition." ... (2) On
October 5, 1972, Presidential Decree No. 15 ... was
promulgated creating the Cultural Center of the Philippines,
defining its objectives, powers and functions and other
purposes. Section 4, thereof was amended by Presidential
Decree No. 179 ... enacted on April 26, 1973. It is submitted
that it is now moot and academic to discuss the
constitutionality of Executive Order No. 30 considering the
promulgation of PD Nos. 15 and 179, done by the President
in the exercise of legislative powers under martial law.
Executive Order No. 30 has ceased to exist while PD Nos.
15 and 179 meet all the constitutional arguments raised in
the petition at bar."8

It would thus appear that the petition cannot succeed.

There is no justification for setting aside the order of
dismissal. Notwithstanding the exhaustive and scholarly
pleadings submitted by petitioner on his own behalf, the
burden of persuasion to warrant a reversal of the action of
the lower court was not met. Both on procedural and
substantive grounds, a case for prohibition was not made
out, notwithstanding the valiant efforts of petitioner. With
this latest manifestation, that Executive Order No. 30 had
been superseded by Presidential Decree Nos. 15 and 179,
the moot and academic character of this appeal by
certiorari became rather obvious. To repeat, the petition
must fail.

1. It may not be amiss though to consider briefly both the

procedural and substantive grounds that led to the lower
court's order of dismissal. It was therein pointed out as
"one more valid reason" why such an outcome was
unavoidable that "the funds administered by the President
of the Philippines came from donations [and] contributions
[not] by taxation." Accordingly, there was that absence of
the "requisite pecuniary or monetary interest." 9 The stand of the
lower court finds support in judicial precedents. 10 This is not to retreat from the
liberal approach followed in Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works, 11 foreshadowed by
People v. Vera, 12 where the doctrine of standing was first fully discussed. It is only to
make clear that petitioner, judged by orthodox legal learning, has not satisfied the
elemental requisite for a taxpayer's suit. Moreover, even on the assumption that
public funds raised by taxation were involved, it does not necessarily follow that
such kind of an action to assail the validity of a legislative or executive act has to be
passed upon. This Court, as held in the recent case of Tan v. Macapagal, 13 "is not
devoid of discretion as to whether or not it should be entertained." 14 The lower court
thus did not err in so viewing the situation.

2. Nor was the lower court any more impressed by the

contention that there was an encroachment on the
legislative prerogative discernible in the issuance of
Executive Order No. 30. It first took note of the exchange of
diplomatic notes between the Republic of the Philippines
and the United States as to the use of a special fund
coming from the latter for a Philippine cultural development
project. Then, as set forth in the order of dismissal, it
explained why no constitutional objection could be validly
interposed. Thus: "When the President, therefore, acted by
disposing of a matter of general concern (Section 63, Rev.
Adm. Code) in accord with the constitutional injunction to
promote arts and letters (Section 4, Article XIV, Constitution
of the Philippines) and issued Executive Order No. 30, he
simply carried out the purpose of the trust in establishing
the Cultural Center of the Philippines as the instrumentality
through which this agreement between the two
governments would be realized. Needless to state, the
President alone cannot and need not personally handle the
duties of a trustee for and in behalf of the Filipino people in
relation with this trust. He can do this by means of an
executive order by creating as he did, a group of persons,
who would receive and administer the trust estate,
responsible to the President. As head of the State, as chief
executive, as spokesman in domestic and foreign affairs, in
behalf of the estate as parens patriae, it cannot be
successfully questioned that the President has authority to
implement for the benefit of the Filipino people by creating
the Cultural Center consisting of private citizens to
administer the private contributions and donations given
not only by the United States government but also by
private persons." 15

There is impressive juridical support for the stand taken by

the lower court. Justice Malcolm in Government of the
Philippine Islands v. Springer 16 took pains to emphasize:
"Just as surely as the duty of caring for governmental
property is neither judicial nor legislative in character is it
as surely executive." 17 It Would be an unduly narrow or
restrictive view of such a principle if the public funds that
accrued by way of donation from the United States and
financial contributions for the Cultural Center project could
not be legally considered as "governmental property." They
may be acquired under the concept of dominium, the state
as a persona in law not being deprived of such an attribute,
thereafter to be administered by virtue of its prerogative of
imperium. 18 What is a more appropriate agency for
assuring that they be not wasted or frittered away than the
Executive, the department precisely entrusted with
management functions? It would thus appear that for the
President to refrain from taking positive steps and await the
action of the then Congress could be tantamount to
dereliction of duty. He had to act; time was of the essence.
Delay was far from conducive to public interest. It was as
simple as that. Certainly then, it could be only under the
most strained construction of executive power to conclude
that in taking the step he took, he transgressed on terrain
constitutionally reserved for Congress.

This is not to preclude legislative action in the premises.

While to the Presidency under the 1935 Constitution was
entrusted the responsibility for administering public
property, the then Congress could provide guidelines for
such a task. Relevant in this connection is the excerpt from
an opinion of Justice Jackson in Youngstown Sheet & Tube
Co. v. Sawyer: 19 "When the President acts in absence of
either a congressional grant or denial of authority, he can
only rely upon his own independent powers, but there is a
zone of twilight in which he and Congress may have
concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is
uncertain. Therefore, congressional inertia, indifference or
quiescence may sometimes, at least as a practical matter,
enable, if not invite, measures on independent presidential
responsibility. In this area, any actual test of power is likely
to depend on the imperative of events and contemporary
imponderables rather than on abstract theories of law." 20
To vary the phraseology, to recall Thomas Reed Powell, if
Congress would continue to keep its peace notwithstanding
the action taken by the executive department, it may be
considered as silently vocal. In plainer language, it could be
an instance of silence meaning consent. The Executive
Order assailed was issued on June 25, 1966. Congress until
the time of the filing of the petition on August 26, 1969
remained quiescent. Parenthetically, it may be observed
that petitioner waited until almost the day of inaugurating
the Cultural Center on September 11, 1969 before filing his
petition in the lower court. However worthy of
commendation was his resolute determination to keep the
Presidency within the bounds of its competence, it cannot
be denied that the remedy, if any, could be supplied by
Congress asserting itself in the premises. Instead, there
was apparent conformity on its part to the way the
President saw fit to administer such governmental
property.

3. The futility of this appeal by certiorari becomes even

more apparent with the issuance of Presidential Decree No.
15 on October 5, 1972. As contended by the Solicitor
General, the matter, as of that date, became moot and
academic. Executive Order No. 30 was thus superseded.
The institution known as the Cultural Center is other than
that assailed in this suit. In that sense a coup de grace was
administered to this proceeding. The labored attempt of
petitioner could thus be set at rest. This particular litigation
is at an end. There is, too, relevance in the observation that
the aforesaid decree is part of the law of the land. So the
Constitution provides. 21

4. It only remains to be added that respondents as trustees

lived up fully to the weighty responsibility entrusted to
them. The task imposed on them was performed with
competence, fidelity, and dedication. That was to be
expected. From the inception of the Marcos Administration,
the First Lady has given unsparingly of herself in the
encouragement and support of literary, musical, and artistic
endeavors and in the appreciation of our rich and diverse
cultural heritage. The rest of the then Board of Trustees,
named as the other respondents, were equally deserving of
their being chosen for this worthy project. One of them, the
late I.P Soliongco, was in his lifetime one of the most gifted
men of letters. Father Horacio de la Costa is a historian and
scholar of international repute. Respondents Ernesto
Rufino, Antonio Madrigal and Andres Soriano, all men of
substance, have contributed in time and money to civic
efforts. It is not surprising then that the Cultural Center
became a reality, the massive and imposing structure
constructed at a shorter period and at a lower cost than at
first thought possible. What is of even greater significance,
with a portion thereof being accessible at modest
admission prices, musical and artistic performances of all
kinds are within reach of the lower-income groups. Only
thus may meaning be imparted to the Constitutional
provision that arts and letters shall be under State
patronage. 22 For equally important as the encouragement
and support for talented Filipinos with a creative spark is
the diffusion of the opportunity for the rest of their
countrymen to savour the finer things in life. Who knows, if
state efforts along these lines are diligently pursued, that
what was said by Justice Holmes about France could apply
to the Philippines. Thus: "We have not that respect for art
that is one of the glories of France." 23 In justice to
petitioner Gonzales, it may be noted that he did not
question the wisdom or soundness of the goal of having a
Cultural Center or the disbursement of the funds by
respondents. It is the absence of statutory authority that
bothered him. The lower court did not see things in the
same light. It is easily understandable why, as the
preceding discussion has made clear, it cannot be said that
such a conclusion suffered from legal infirmity. What is
more, with the issuance of Presidential Decree No. 15, the
suit, to repeat, has assumed a moot and academic
character.

WHEREFORE, this appeal by certiorari to review the lower

court's order of dismissal dated December 4, 1969 is
dismissed.

No costs.

Makalintal, C.J., Barredo, Esguerra, Muoz Palma, Aquino,

Concepcion Jr. and Martin JJ., concur.

Castro and Makasiar, JJ., took no part.

Teehankee and Antonio, JJ., are on leave.

Footnotes

1 Resolution of February 27, 1970.

2 Petition, par. 1.

3 The other respondents are Father Horacio de la

Costa, 1. P. Soliongco, who died during the pendency
of the suit, Ernesto Rufino, Antonio Madrigal and
Andres Soriano.

4 Petition, Annex F. Nor was the other objection that

there was a repugnancy between such order and a
statute creating a National Commission on Culture
sustained. Republic Act No. 4165 (1964).

5 Motion to Dismiss dated March 17, 1970,

submitted by the law firm of Siguion Reyna,
Montecillo, Belo & Ongsiako and signed by Attorney
Edgardo Angara. In support of the last point,
reference was made to the following state cases:
Barber v. Housing Authority, 5 SE 2d 425 (1939);
Price v. Mattoon, 4 NE 2d 850 (1936); Mathaei v.
Housing Authority, 9 A 2d 835 (1939);Hanrahan v.
Corron, 12 NYS 2d 536 (1938); Warm v. Cincinnati,
11 NE 2d 281 (1937); McKinney v. Watson, 145 P.
266 (1915); Hazelwood v. Cooper, 87 SW 2d 776
(1935); Jenkins v. Cooper, 87 SW 2d 778 (1935);
Young v. Taylor, 92 SW 2d 1075 (1935); Powell v.
Baird, 132 SW 2d 464 (1939).

6 Manifestation of March 18, 1970. The then

Assistant Solicitor General, now Judge, Ricardo L.
Pronove, Jr. as well as Solicitor Vicente A. Torres, Jr.
filed such manifestation.

7 Opposition to Respondent's Motion to Dismiss

dated March 23, 1970..

8 Second Motion to Dismiss dated July 22, 1975.

9 Petition, Annex F, 7.

10 Cf. McKinney v. Watson, 145 P 266, 267 (1915);

Hazelwood v. City of Cooper, 87 SW (2d) 776 (1935);
Jenkins v. Cooper, 87 SW (2d) 778 (1935); Price v.
City of Mattoon, 4 NE (2d) 850 (1936); Young v.
Taylor, 92 SW (2d) 1075 (1936); Warm v. Cincinnati,
11 NE (2d) 281 (1937); Barber v. Housing Authority, 5
SE (2d) 425 (1939); and Powell v. City of Baird, 132
SW (2d) 464 (1939).

11 110 Phil. 331 (1960)..

12 65 Phil. 56 (1937).

13 L-34161, February 29, 1972, 43 SCRA 677.

14 Ibid, 680.

15 Petition, Annex F, 3.

16 50 Phil. 259 (1927).

17 Ibid, 290.

18 Cf. Lee Hong Hock v. David, L-30389, December

27, 1972, 48 SCRA 372.

19 343 US 579 (1952).

20 Ibid, 637.

21 According to Article XVII, Section 3, par. (2) of the

Constitution: "All proclamations, orders, decrees,
instructions, and acts promulgated, issued, or done
by the incumbent President shall be part of the law
of the land, and shall remain valid, legal, binding, and
effective even after lifting of martial law or the
ratification of this Constitution, unless modified,
revoked, or superseded by subsequent
proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions, or other
acts of the incumbent President, or unless expressly
and explicitly modified or repealed by the regular
National Assembly."

22 According to Article XIV, Section 4 of the 1935

 Constitution: "Arts and letters shall be under [the
State's] patronage." Such a provision is now found in
Article XV, Section 9, par. (2) of the present Charter
and reads: "Filipino culture shall be preserved and
developed for national identity. Arts and letters shall
be under the patronage of the State."

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation