Notes ISLAMIC STATE IN THE KORASAN

Middle East Institute The Islamic State in Afghanistan

The Islamic State in Khorasan initially grew with surprising strength and speed. However, recent
losses, at the hands of both the Taliban and U.S.-backed Afghan forces, have imperiled the Islamic
States future in Afghanistan. The radical group has struggled to establish a foothold in the country,
and is largely seen by locals as a foreign force. Continued pressure brought by targeted U.S.
airstrikes have further eroded the Islamic States capabilities in Afghanistan. [intro]

Key point: Through lack of respect for Afghan history and its policy of extreme brutality, IS Khorasan
is seen as an outside force in Afghanistan. [intro]

The Islamic State currently boasts thousands of fighters and supporters in both Afghanistan and
Pakistan. Its fighters consists of former Tehrik-e Taliban and Afghan Taliban defectors, as well as
elements of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and other foreign militant groups. [1]

Longstanding problems have prevented IS from becoming the jihadist threat policymakers in
Washington and Kabul fear. Its lack of local roots, waning recruitment, and consistent losses on the
battlefield have created numerous obstacles to ISs ascent in the region. [1]

The groups brutality and inflexible ideology alienated most local Afghans and caused defections
within its own ranks. It is losing ground from a combination of Taliban pushback, Afghan security
force operations, and U.S.-targeted airstrikes. In March 2016, Afghan President Ashraf Ghani
declared that Afghanistan would be a graveyard for the Islamic State. [1]

Many Taliban defectors to IS appear to have been persuaded by the groups generous resources,
which supplied fighters with laptops, pickup trucks, and ample funds to support their families,
rather than its rigid worldview and ideology [which implies that they can be bribed to realign]. [3]

Islamic State-aligned fighters incorporated the brutal tactics of the organization in Iraq and Syria in
order to establish its brand in Afghanistan and attract more recruits, which achieved middling
success. In February 2015, a group of Hazara travelers were kidnapped from a bus. The sectarian
attack an anomaly in present-day Afghanistan is similar to IS trademark attacks elsewhere. [3]

Rather than attempting to co-opt the Taliban and al-Qaeda, IS leaders instead tried to discredit the
local groups in Afghanistan. ... The Islamic State was at a disadvantage trying to expand in a country
where the Taliban have been fighting on the ground and living among the Afghan people for two
decades. The Taliban is an Afghan-based militancy, and its fighters draw support from their families,
tribal relationships, and ethnic ties. The Islamic State comes off as another foreign entity trying to
encroach on the Afghan space. The nature of ISs international aim to establish a global caliphate
of Muslims did not resonate with many Afghans focused on a national insurgency. [4]

Clashes turned particularly brutal as IS wrestled with Taliban fighters for its positions in districts
along the provinces southern border with Pakistan, culminating in IS fighters capturing and
beheading ten Taliban commanders in June 2015. [5] In the east, IS repeatedly clashed with
Taliban fighters, attacked Afghan security forces, and terrorized civilians with violence and brutality.
In a video from August 2015, IS executed ten Shinwari village elders by an I.E.D., an uncommon
execution tactic in Afghanistan that was sure to gain attention and spread fear about the group. [6-7]

IS was certainly able to carry out limited destructive attacks in Afghanistan. However, IS never had
the ability to threaten the Afghan governments hold on district centers or cities like Jalalabad. The
Taliban, meanwhile, made unprecedented gains in multiple districts in the south and overran the city
of Kunduz. The Talibans successes mean fighters will have little incentive to defect. [7]

Two former IS commanders said that they joined IS for a steady monthly income rather than the
appeal of the groups ideology. According to reports, IS lured fighters to its ranks with signing
bonuses of as much as 400-500 dollar, compared to the Taliban average 300 dollar monthly salary.
[8] IS defectors say they were ultimately turned off by the organizations cruelty against civilians and
community elders. The organizations public disregard for Pashtunwali, the tribal code for Pashtuns,
will likely turn other fighters back to Afghan militant groups. [8]

In 2016, a U.S.-led mission in Afghanistan began carrying out airstrikes against IS. The U.S. launched
70-80 airstrikes against Islamic State militants between January/February. [8] The joint air campaign
and ground operations reportedly pushed many IS fighters out of their held villages into the
mountainous regions near the Pakistani border. Local village leaders have raised militias with
support from the Afghan gov. to hold these villages, guarding against IS possible return.[8]

In Syria and Iraq, IS appealed to groups with grievances against tyrannical or sectarian regimes. In
Afghanistan, however, the foundings of an IS branch appears to have been driven by the defections
of high-ranking Taliban looking to rebrand under a different and successful name. In a February
briefing, Brigadier General Wilson Shofner for U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan said that IS in
Afghanistans leadership only consists of former T.T.P. who believe pledging to [IS} will further their
interests in some way. [9] [Important: this means they can be bribed (?)]

IS in Afghanistan has been deemed a low level threat to Afghan stability as well as to U.S. and
Western interests in the region in 2016 by Director of National Intelligence James Clapper. [10]

See proposed policy option 1: Continue military pressure where IS has a presence in the country. [11]

United States Institute of Peace The Islamic State in Afghanistan: Assessing the Threat

Although the size of IS-K has been reduced, the resurgence of a fractured Taliban and a rise in intra-
sectarian tensions could open up new space for IS-K, especially if it continues to be well funded both
within/outside Afghanistan and is able to leverage greed and grievance motives to win recruits. [1]

Khorasan is a medieval name for a territory comprising most of modern Afghanistan and parts of
Iran and Pakistan. [1]

Number of fighters: estimated by U.S. Department of Defense to be 1,000-3,000 as of early 2016. [2]

IS-K is seated in Nangarhar, one of the few areas in Afghanistan with Salafist communities [1] and
where Taliban presence has historically been weak. [2]

The Quetta Shura Taliban view IS-K as a competitor for resources and recruits and have carried out
an active and generally successful counterinsurgency campaign against them [Anbar parallels!] [2].

Another parallel: the brutal violence that diminished the attractiveness of IS-K as an alternative to
the Taliban. First it presented itself as a religious alternative to the impurity of the Taliban and was
mostly focused on nonviolent outreach. This approach was replaced by violent operations
characterized by the execution of elders, the destruction of shrines, and prohibitions on growing
opium poppy [Al Qaeda in Iraq was also very violent, executing tribal chieftains, etc.]. [3]

Many structural factors in Afghanistan namely, the absence of strong sectarian divisions and a
history of conservative but not necessarily fundamentalist Islamic practice will continue to check
Islamic States expansion in the region. [3] Nonetheless, IS-K will remain problematic in the near term
for several reasons. First, the group is well funded. Second continued splits among Taliban leadership
will provide a supply of fighters and commanders whose loyalty can be easily bought. Third, weak
government control will facilitate the movement of fighters and funds. Finally, IS has the ability to
establish fronts outside of Nangarhar as long as leadership and access to resources are available. [3]

United States Institute of Peace 2

A regionally supported political settlement with the Taliban should continue to be a focus. The
fight against IS-K, while important, is a distraction from the main line of effort: peace and stability
through a regionally supported political settlement with the Afghan Taliban. [14]