Canon 3-4

1. Ricardo M. Gutierrez v Hon Arsenion Santos, Etc.

Illegally constructed dams, dikes and other obstructions across navigable waters,
waterways, rivers and communal fishing grounds located in Barrio San Esteban,
Macabebe, Pampanga.

Respondent de la Rosa filed a motion to disqualify the Hon. Arsenio Santos from trying
and deciding the case, upon the ground that sometime in 1948 he had acted as counsel
for fishpond owners

Such being the case, the presiding judge is inclined to grant the motion, by disqualifying
himself to sit in this case, not because he has been a counsel for the abovenamed
petitioner, which is entirely false, neither because of "extremada delicadeza", but
because his opinion given in the aforesaid letter might, some way or another, influence
on his decision in the case at bar. While this would be a too remote possibility, yet it is
the duty of the court to administer justice without any suspicion of bias and prejudice,
otherwise a party litigant might lose confidence in the judiciary that must be avoided as
much as possible for the purpose of preserving its dignity

2. In Re Flordeliza

Six members of the bar of Sorsogon who, together, make claim to at least 50 per cent of
the law practice of that province, have filed a verified petition in this court praying for the
removal from office of the Honorable Tomas Flordeliza, Judge of First Instance of the
Sixteenth Judicial District. The charges laid against the respondent Judge are, in general:
(1) That on different occasions the respondent certified falsely as to the status of the cases
pending decision before him, in violation of section 129 of the Administrative Code (2)
that the respondent is guilty of delay and lack of diligence in the disposition of the cases
pending before him, in violation of section 165 of the Administrative Code, and generally
accepted principles which determine judicial standards and (3) that the respondents is
guilty of partiality in the performance of his official duties.

One of the proposed canons for a decalogue for the judiciary is this: "The judge must
cultivate a capacity for quick decision. Habits of indecision must be sedulously overcome.
He must not deny by slothfulness of mind or body the judgment to which a party is
entitled." We write down our conformity.

In conclusion, therefore, we have decided to pay no particular attention to the general

charges of partiality and negligence which have been filed against Judge Flordeliza. We
do find, however, that he has not displayed that interest in his office which stops not at
the minimum of the day's labors fixed by law, and which ceases not at the expiration of
official sessions, but which proceeds diligently on holidays and by artificial light and even
into vacation periods. Only thus can he do his part in the great work of speeding up the
administration of justice and of rehabilitating the judiciary in the estimation of the people.
 The mountain of six or seven hundred pending cases in Sorsogon could be removed by a
judge of first instance of alert mind and quick decision, not afraid of work, with the aid of
a helpful bar and a sympathetic government. As willful and intentional wrongdoing in
receiving compensation has not been demonstrated, we are not prepared to find that
sufficient cause exists in our judgment involving serious misconduct or inefficiency as
warrants us in recommending the removal of the respondent Judge to the Governor-
General. We will take such a step if future derelictions of duty of this character recur.

3. Kilat vs Hon. Macias

This is an administrative complaint charging respondent Judge Mariano S. Macias,

Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 28, Liloy, Zamboanga del Norte, with
immorality, conduct unbecoming of a judicial officer, rape, and violation of the AntiChild
Abuse Law.

Respondent issued an order for the arrest of the persons named in the information. [13]
The next day, accused moved for the inhibition of respondent from the criminal case on
the ground that respondent is directly involved in the said case. Respondent thus issued
an order inhibiting himself from the criminal proceedings and recommended to the Court
that another judge be designated in his place.

On the charge of abuse of authority, the Investigating Justice opined that respondent
should be held administratively liable for issuing the warrant of arrest in Criminal Case
No. L00727. According to him, respondent should have voluntarily inhibited himself from
the case, as per Sec. 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court, his wife being one of the accused
therein. Moreover, the rest of the accused were the very same persons implicated by
herein complainant as those who instigated the present administrative complaint. His
belated inhibition, after he had issued the arrest warrant, is indicative of the propensity
to use his office to get back at those responsible for filing the administrative charges
against him. The Investigating Justice recommended the penalty of fine in the amount of
P20,000.00 in accordance with Secs. 9 and 11 (B), Rule 40 of the Rules of Court.

4. Salcedo vs. Judge Bollozos

We pass upon the verified LetterComplaint, dated August 29, 2008, filed by Ruben N.
Salcedo (complainant), charging Judge Gil G. Bollozos (respondent judge), Presiding
Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 21, Cagayan de Oro City, with Grave Misconduct and
Ignorance of the Law

In his complaint, the complainant questions the issuance of the Writ of Amparo which he
claims had been unusually issued with haste. The complainant claims that the
handwritten petition did not give any ground to warrant the issuance of the Writ of
Amparo that the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion, bias, and
obvious partiality, and in grave disregard of the Rules and the rule of law when he acted
upon and granted the letterpetition for the issuance of the Writ of Amparo. The
complainant also alleges that the respondent judge accommodated the issuance of the
Writ of Amparo because he and Atty. Francis Ku (Tanmalacks counsel) are members of
the Masonic fraternity.

Plainly, the errors attributed to respondent judge pertain to the exercise of his
adjudicative functions. As a matter of policy, in the absence of fraud, dishonesty, and
corruption, the acts of a judge in his official capacity are not subject to disciplinary action.
He cannot be subjected to liability civil, criminal, or administrative for any of his official
acts, no matter how erroneous, as long as he acts in good faith. Only judicial errors tainted
with fraud, dishonesty, gross ignorance, bad faith, or deliberate intent to do an injustice
will be administratively sanctioned. Settled is the rule that errors committed by a judge
in the exercise of his adjudicative functions cannot be corrected through administrative
proceedings, but should instead be assailed through judicial remedies.

We note, too, that although the respondent judge erred in issuing the Writ of Amparo,
we find, as the OCA did, that there is no evidence on record that supports the
complainants allegation that the issuance was tainted with manifest bias and partiality,
bad faith, or gross ignorance of the law. The fact that the respondent judge and Atty.
Francis Ku are members of the Masonic fraternity does not justify or prove that the former
acted with bias and partiality. Bias and partiality can never be presumed and must be
proved with clear and convincing evidence. While palpable error may be inferred from
respondent judges issuance of the Writ of Amparo, there is no evidence on record that
would justify a finding of partiality or bias. The complainants allegation of partiality will
not suffice in the absence of a clear and convincing proof that will overcome the
presumption that the respondent judge dispensed justice according to law and evidence,
without fear or favor. [11] Likewise, bad faith or malice cannot be inferred simply because
the judgment is adverse to a party. To hold a judge administratively accountable simply
because he erred in his judgment has never been the intent of the law reasonable
competence and good faith judgments, not complete infallibility, are what the law
requires.

We take this occasion, however, to remind the respondent judge that under Canon 1.01
of the Code of Judicial Conduct, a judge must be "the embodiment of competence,
integrity and independence." A judge is called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory
acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules it is imperative that he be conversant
with basic legal principles and be aware of wellsettled authoritative doctrines. He owes
to the public and to this Court the duty to be proficient in the law. He is expected to keep
abreast of laws and prevailing jurisprudence. Judges must not only render just, correct,
and impartial decisions, resolutions, and orders, but must do so in a manner free of any
suspicion as to their fairness, impartiality, and integrity, for good judges are men who
have mastery of the principles of law and who discharge their duties in accordance with
law. [14] We mentioned all these to emphasize to the respondent judge the need to be
 more judicious and circumspect in the issuance of extraordinary writs such as the Writ of
Amparo.

5. Belen vs Belen

The mere possession of a thing is sufficient to insure respect to the possessor while no
other person appears to show and prove better right, according to the doctrine of the
courts. (Art. 446, Civil Code.) The defendant has proved that he has been for many years
in possession of the lands in question under title of ownership, and therefore, whether
the proof of his right of ownership be or be not sufficient, so long as no other person
appears with a better right, he is entitled thereto. Article 448 of the same code provides:
The possessor by virtue of ownership has in his favor the legal presumption that he holds
possession by reason of a sufficient title and he can not be forced to show it. In case No.
3819, entitled Sanchez Mellado vs. The Municipality of Tacloban (9 Phil. Rep., 92), this
court held that In an action to recover possession of real estate under an alleged titled
of ownership, the plaintiff must rely upon the strength of his own title and not upon the
weakness of that of the defendant, and must establish his allegations by a preponderance
of evidence. Counsel for the plaintiffs did not satisfactorily prove his allegations, so that
the judge, after considering the evidence adduced by both parties, found that the
preponderance of the same was in favor of the defendant, and this clearly appears from
the case. It is an old and wellsettled rule of the courts that the burden of proving the
action is upon the plaintiff, and that if he fails satisfactorily to show the facts upon which
he bases his claim, the defendant is under no obligation to prove his exceptions. This rule
is in harmony with the provisions of section 297 of the Code of Civil Procedure holding
that each party must prove his own affirmative allegations, etc.

6. Judge Macias vs Macias

Due process is the very essence of justice itself. Where the rule of law is the bedrock of our free
society, justice is its very lifeblood. Denial of due process is thus no less than a denial of justice.

On February 6, 2001, Judge Mariano Joaquin S. Macias (herein petitioner) filed with the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 11, Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte, a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage against Margie Corpus Macias (herein respondent), docketed as Civil Case No. S6

This Court will not countenance a denial of ones fundamental right to due process, which is a
cornerstone of our legal system. [4] In the case at bar, the trial court did not observe the
rudimentary principle of due process enshrined in our Constitution. Neither did it comply with
pertinent procedural rules. More to the point, the trial court, without even waiting for
respondents motion for reconsideration of the April 19, 2001 Order denying her motion to
dismiss, hurriedly set the case for hearing. Also, without allowing the respondent to file her
answer to the petition and knowing there was no joinder of issues as yet, the trial court hastily
authorized petitioner to present his evidence exparte.
 In Uy vs. Court of Appeals, we ruled that (a) decision is void for lack of due process if, as a result,
a party (as in this case) is deprived of the opportunity of being heard. A void decision may be
assailed or impugned at any time either directly or collaterally, by means of a separate action, or
by resisting such decision in any action or proceeding where it is invoked. [6] Indeed, in depriving
respondent her constitutional and procedural right to due process, the trial court gravely abused
its discretion. It is, therefore, imperative that the instant case for declaration of nullity of marriage
be litigated anew in accordance with the Rules

7. Burias vs Judge Valencia

In a verified complaint dated 19 August 2005, Perla Burias (complainant) charged Judge Mirafe B.
Valencia (respondent), then Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Irosin, Sorsogon,
of gross misconduct

With respect to the charge of borrowing money in exchange for a favorable judgment, Rule 5.02,
Canon 5 of the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that a judge shall refrain from financial and
business dealings that tend to reflect adversely on the courts impartiality, interfere with the
proper performance of judicial activities, or increase involvement with lawyers or persons likely
to come before the court. A judge should so manage investments and other financial interests as
to minimize the number of cases giving grounds for disqualification.

Under Rule 5.04 of Canon 5, a judge may obtain a loan if no law prohibits such loan. However, the
law prohibits a judge from engaging in financial transactions with a partylitigant. Respondent
admitted borrowing money from complainant during the pendency of the case. This act alone is
patently inappropriate. [20] The impression that respondent would rule in favor of complainant
because the former is indebted to the latter is what the Court seeks to avoid. A judges conduct
should always be beyond reproach. This Court has time and again emphasized that no
government position is more demanding of moral righteousness and uprightness than a seat in
the judiciary. Judges as models of law and justice are mandated to avoid not only impropriety, but
also the appearance of impropriety, because their conduct affects the peoples faith and
confidence in the entire judicial system.