ABUBAKAR Vs ABUBAKAR G.R. No. 134622. October 22, 1999

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SYNOPSIS

Petitioner and respondent were married in Jolo, Sulu, on 1 May 1978 in accordance with Islamic Law.
Sometime in February 1996, respondent filed before the 1st Shariah Circuit Court of Isabela, Basilan Province,
a complaint against petitioner for divorce with prayer for support and damages. At its pre-trial order, the circuit
court limited the issue to be resolved at the trial of a determination of the rights or the respective shares of the
parties with respect to their properties located at Tumaga Por Centro, Zamboanga City and Kasanyangan
Village, Jolo. Thereafter, the circuit court issued an order dissolving the marriage of petitioner and respondent,
distributing the properties equally between them as co-owners, and ordering petitioner to pay respondent the
amount of P10,000 as support during the three-month waiting period. Respondent filed a notice of appeal but
only as far as it involves the issue of partition of property. The 3rd Shariah Judicial District Court of Zamboanga
City, in its decision, affirmed the order of the circuit court with some modifications. In addition to the order of
the circuit court, the district court ordered petitioner to pay respondent moral damages, with legal interest, and
support in arrears from 14 February 1996 to 16 December 1997 also with legal interest from finality of the
judgment until the satisfaction thereof. The district court likewise ordered the partition of land in Alicia,
Zamboanga del Sur. Aggrieved by these changes, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. However, the
district court denied said motion. Hence, this petition.

In granting the instant petition, the Supreme Court held that the district court, acting as appellate court, was not
bound to go beyond what the appellant was asking for, as articulated in Rule 51, Section 8 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure. The basic procedural rule is that only errors claimed and assigned by a party will be considered
by the court except, errors affecting its jurisdiction over the subject matter. To this exception has now been
added errors affecting the validity of the judgment appealed from or the proceedings therein. From the inception
of the divorce proceedings, respondent lent the impression that she only wanted the court to determine how the
properties should be distributed between her and petitioner. When the district court decreed the equal division of
the lot of Alicia, Zamboanga del Sur, increased the decree of support and granted P50,000.00 in moral damages,
not only did it defeat the intent and content of the pre-trial order but it also went beyond the sphere of its
authority as delineated in the notice of appeal. These modifications certainly had no bearing on its jurisdiction;
neither did they constitute clerical errors. The Court, therefore, reversed and set aside the decision of the district
court and reinstated the order of the circuit court.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; PRE-TRIAL; PURPOSE. - That a pre-trial is indispensable in any civil or criminal
action in this jurisdiction is clearly laid out in Rules 18 and 118 of the Rules of Court. It is a procedural device meant to limit the
issues to be tackled and proved at the trial. A less cluttered case environment means that there will be fewer points of contention for
the trial court to resolve. This would be in keeping with the mandate of the Constitution according every person the right to a speedy
disposition of their cases. If the parties can agree on certain facts prior to trial - hence, the prefix pre - the court can later concentrate
on those which are seemingly irreconcilable. The purpose of pre-trials is the simplification, abbreviation and expedition of the trial, if
not indeed its dispensation. The stipulations are perpetuated in a pre-trial order which legally binds the parties to honor the same.

2. ID.; ID.; APPEAL; ONLY ERRORS ASSIGNED BY A PARTY WILL BE CONSIDERED BY THE APPELLATE COURT;
EXCEPTIONS. - The basic procedural rule is that only errors claimed and assigned by a party will be considered by the court, except
errors affecting its jurisdiction over the subject matter. To this exception has now been added errors affecting the validity of the
judgment appealed from or the proceedings therein. A case in point is Bella v. Court of Appeals, where the Court applied Rule 51 in
regarding a matter not questioned on appeal by the appellant to be final and beyond the appellate courts power of review. It was
concluded that the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in altering the trial courts award even when the appellant did not raise
that issue in his appeal. Thus: Since the size of the award is an issue which does not affect the courts jurisdiction over the subject
matter, nor a plain or clerical error, respondent appellate court did not have the power to resolve it.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; APPELLATE COURT ACTED BEYOND SPHERE OF ITS AUTHORITY IN CASE AT BAR. - From the
inception of the divorce proceedings, AURORA lent the impression that she only wanted the court to determine how the
PROPERTIES should be distributed between her and AMININ. When the DISTRICT COURT decreed the equal division of the lot at
Alicia, Zamboanga del Sur, increased the decree of support eleven-fold, and granted P50,000 in moral damages, not only did it defeat
the intent and content of the pre-trial order but it also went beyond the sphere of its authority as delineated in the notice of appeal.
These modifications certainly had no bearing on its jurisdiction; neither do they constitute clerical errors.

APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

Abdulmoin M. Pakam for petitioner.

Ahmad D. Sahak for private respondent.


FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 134622. October 22, 1999]

AMININ L. ABUBAKAR, petitioner vs. AURORA A. ABUBAKAR, respondent.

DECISION

DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:

Petitioner Aminin L. Abubakar (hereafter AMININ) and respondent Aurora A. Abubakar (hereafter AURORA)
were married in Jolo, Sulu, on 1 May 1978 in accordance with Islamic law.

Sometime in February 1996, AURORA filed before the 1st Shariah Circuit Court of Isabela, Basilan Province
(hereafter referred to as the CIRCUIT COURT), a complaint against AMININ for Divorce with Prayer for
Support and Damages. Docketed as Case No. 537, the complaint was mainly premised on the alleged failure of
AMININ to secure AURORAs consent before contracting a subsequent marriage, in violation of Articles 27 and
162 of Presidential Decree No. 1083, otherwise known as the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines.

In its pre-trial orderi[1] dated 21 March 1997, the CIRCUIT COURT limited the issue to be resolved at the trial
to a determination of the rights or the respective shares of the (parties) with respect to the property subject of
partition after divorce. Identified as the realty to be divided were: (a) a half unit of a duplex standing on a lot at
Tumaga Por Centro, Zamboanga Cityii[2] covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-86, 898. [The other half
is owned and occupied by a certain JACKARIA M. MOHAMMAD and his wife].2; (b) a 550-square meter lot
adjacent to the one previously mentionediii[3]; and (c) a house and lot at Block 2, (Lot 44), Kasanyangan
Village, Jolo, Sulu,iv[4] (hereafter collectively known as the PROPERTIES).

On 29 August 1997, Judge Kaudri L. Jainul issued an orderv[5] dissolving the marriage of AURORA and
AMININ, distributing the PROPERTIES equally between them as co-owners, and ordering AMININ to pay her
the amount of P10,000 as support during the three-month idda (waiting period).

AURORA duly filed a notice of appeal from this decision but only as far as it involves the issue of partition of
property, and not to the grant of divorce and damages it being in her favor.vi[6] Actually, both parties were
concerned only with the conclusion of the CIRCUIT COURT that the PROPERTIES were conjugal.

In his 20 May 1998 decision,vii[7] Judge Bensaudi I. Arabani, Sr., presiding over the 3rd Shariah Judicial
District Court of Zamboanga City (hereafter referred to as the DISTRICT COURT), affirmed the CIRCUIT
COURTs 29 August 1997 order with some modifications, thus:

WHEREFORE, appreciating the evidence submitted to the Court by both parties in their respective pleadings
and memoranda, and the pertinent laws applicable to the case, judgment is hereby rendered modifying the order
of the court of origin as follows:

(a) Affirming the grant of DIVORCE by faskh (decree of court) between the parties;

(b) Affirming the order of the trial Court, as follows:

The following properties is (sic) hereby awarded and distributed equally between herein plaintiff and defendant
being considered as co-owners and as such, they will have equal share in the partition of their properties, to wit:

1. House and lot situated at Tumaga Por Centro, Zamboanga City, consisting of a half duplex unit on
Lot No. 1845-B-2 under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-86, 898. (The other half duplex is owned
and occupied by JACKARIA M. MOHAMMAD and his wife);

2. A 550 square meters (sic) lot adjacent to the house and lot described under item No. 1, identified
as Lot No. 1845-B-3 under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 86, 899;

3. House and lot at Block 2, Lot 44, Kasanyangan Village, Jolo, Sulu under Transfer Certificate of
Title No. T-1820 containing an area of 240 square meters;
And, in addition, to be included as part of their common property and (to) be partitioned and divided equally:

1. The real estate at Alicia, Zamboanga del Sur.

(c) Ordering the defendant-appellee to pay the plaintiff-appellant the sum of one hundred ten thousand
(P110,000.00) pesos, Philippine Currency as support in arrears from . . . February 14, 1996, when plaintiff-
appellant demanded for it in her complaint, and up to the expiration of her idda (waiting period) on December
16, 1997, or (a) duration of twenty two (22) months, and in the amount of five (5) thousand (P5,000.00) pesos,
monthly, or a total amount of One Hundred Ten Thousand (P110,000.00) pesos, Philippine Currency, plus legal
interest thereon from the time this judgment becomes final and executory until the said amount is satisfied in
full;

(d) Ordering defendant-appellee to pay plaintiff-appellant the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) pesos,
Philippine Currency as moral damages, plus legal interest thereon from the time this judgment becomes final
and executory until the said amount is satisfied in full.

SO ORDERED. [Modifications in italics]

Aggrieved by these changes, AMININ filed a motion for reconsiderationviii[8] thereof on the following grounds:

1. THE HONORABLE COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN ORDERING THE AWARD OF MORAL


DAMAGES TO THE PLAINTIFF, THE GRANT TO HER OF SUPPORT IN ARREARS AND THE
PARTITION OF LAND IN ALICIA, ZAMBOANGA DEL SUR CONSIDERING THAT THESE ISSUES
WERE NEVER RAISED BY THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT IN HER APPEAL.

2. THE AWARD OF MORAL DAMAGES BY THE HONORABLE COURT IS NOT IN ACCORD WITH
LAW AND ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE.

3. THE HONORABLE COURT VIOLATED GENERALLY ACCEPTED PRINCIPLES OF ISLAMIC LAW


WHEN IT ORDERED THE GRANT OF SUPPORT IN ARREARS TO THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT.

On 15 July 1998, the DISTRICT COURT issued an order,ix[9] denying said motion for lack of merit.

AMININ is now before this Court, praying that the assailed 20 May 1998 decision be reversed and set aside
insofar as it pertains to the award of moral damages to the respondent, the grant to her of support in arrears, and
the partition of the agricultural lot situated in Alicia, Zamboanga del Sur.x[10]

We find merit in the instant petition.

At the heart of this action lies the time-tested policy of this Court regarding a litigants voluntary limitation of
issues vis--vis the courts exercise of its judicial prerogative. Specifically, the petition seeks confirmation
regarding the effects of a pre-trial order and the finality of matters not appealed by an appellant.

That a pre-trial is indispensable in any civil or criminal action in this jurisdiction is clearly laid out in Rules 18
and 118 of the Rules of Court. It is a procedural device meant to limit the issues to be tackled and proved at the
trial. A less cluttered case environment means that there will be fewer points of contention for the trial court to
resolve. This would be in keeping with the mandate of the Constitution according every person the right to a
speedy disposition of their cases.xi[11] If the parties can agree on certain facts prior to trial hence, the prefix pre
the court can later concentrate on those which are seemingly irreconcilable. The purpose of pre-trials is the
simplification, abbreviation and expedition of the trial, if not indeed its dispensation.xii[12] The stipulations are
perpetuated in a pre-trial order which legally binds the parties to honor the same.xiii[13]

In the case at bar, AMININ and AURORA agreed on the divorce, the idda, and the limitation of partition of
assets to the PROPERTIES. The pre-trial order of 21 March 1997 whose content and validity were never
questioned by either party stated the sole issue to be determined at the trial in this wise: What are the rights or
the respective shares of the herein plaintiff and defendant with respect to the property subject of partition after
divorce? This is precisely the question answered by the CIRCUIT COURT in its order of 29 August 1997. The
marriage was dissolved, the PROPERTIES awarded and evenly distributed to the parties as co-owners, and
support in the nominal amount of P10,000 during the three-month idda or waiting period was awarded to
AURORA. Such final order was, therefore, consistent with the pre-trial order.
Notwithstanding the absence of any irregularity or legal infirmity in the CIRCUIT COURTs order, AURORA
still questioned its wisdom insofar only as the issue of partition of their property was concerned; the grant of
divorce and damages being in her favor,xiv[14] she saw no need to pursue the same. Consequently, the
DISTRICT COURT, acting as an appellate court, was not bound to go beyond what the appellant was asking
for, as articulated in Rule 51, Section 8 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, viz.:

Sec. 8. Questions that may be decided. No error which does not affect the jurisdiction over the subject matter or
the validity of the judgment appealed from or the proceedings therein will be considered unless stated in the
assignment of errors, or closely related to or dependent on an assigned error and properly argued in the brief,
save as the court may pass upon plain errors and clerical errors. [Emphasis supplied]

The basic procedural rule is that only errors claimed and assigned by a party will be considered by the court,
except errors affecting its jurisdiction over the subject matter. To this exception has now been added errors
affecting the validity of the judgment appealed from or the proceedings therein.xv[15] A case in point is Bella v.
Court of Appeals,xvi[16] where the Court applied Rule 51 in regarding a matter not questioned on appeal by the
appellant to be final and beyond the appellate courts power of review. It was concluded that the Court of
Appeals committed reversible error in altering the trial courts award even when the appellant did not raise that
issue in his appeal. Thus:

Since the size of the award is an issue which does not affect the courts jurisdiction over the subject matter, nor a
plain or clerical error, respondent appellate court did not have the power to resolve it.xvii[17]

From the inception of the divorce proceedings, AURORA lent the impression that she only wanted the court to
determine how the PROPERTIES should be distributed between her and AMININ. When the DISTRICT
COURT decreed the equal division of the lot at Alicia, Zamboanga del Sur, increased the decree of support
eleven-fold, and granted P50,000 in moral damages, not only did it defeat the intent and content of the pre-trial
order but it also went beyond the sphere of its authority as delineated in the notice of appeal. These
modifications certainly had no bearing on its jurisdiction; neither do they constitute clerical errors.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED and the challenged decision of 20 May 1998 and order dated
15 July 1998 of the 3rd Shariah Judicial District Court of Zamboanga City in Appeal Case No. 01-97 are
REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. A new ruling is hereby entered REVERTING to the 29 August 1997 order of
the 1st Shariah Circuit Court of Isabela, Basilan Province, in Case No. 537.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, and Pardo, JJ., concur.

Kapunan, and Ynares_Santiago, JJ., on official leave.


i[1] Rollo, 55-56.

ii[2] Identified as Lot No. 1845-B-

iii[3] Identified as Lot No. 1845-B-3 covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 86, 899.

iv[4] The lot is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-1820 with an area of 240 square meters.

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