Case Digest on International Human Rights Law

Submitted by
Eduardo L. Reyes
 Piandiong vs. The Philippines

Facts:

Piandiong and Morallos were arrested on 27 February 1994, on suspicion of having

participated, on 21 February 1994, in the robbery of passengers of a jeepney in Caloocan
City, during which one of the passengers, a policeman, was killed. After arriving in the
police station, Piandiong and Morallos were hit in the stomach in order to make them
confess, but they refused. During a line up, the eyewitnesses failed to recognize them as
the robbers. The police then placed them in a room by themselves, and directed the
eyewitnesses to point them out. No counsel was present to assist the accused. During the
trial, Piandiong, Morallos and Bulan testified under oath, but the judge chose to disregard
their testimony, because of lack of independent corroboration.

Counsel further complains that the death sentence was wrongly imposed, because
the judge considered that an aggravating circumstance existed, as the crime was
committed by more than three armed persons. However, this was not proven beyond
reasonable doubt. Moreover, counsel states that the judge should have taken into
account the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, since they came with the
police without resisting. Counsel further states that the testimonies of the eyewitnesses
deserved no credence, because the eyewitnesses were close friends of the deceased and
their description of the perpetrators did not coincide with the way they actually looked.
Counsel also states that the judge erred when he did not give credence to the alibi
defence. Finally, counsel complains that the death penalty was unconstitutional and
should not have been imposed for anything but the most heinous crime.

On 7 November 1994, Piandiong, Morallos and Bulan were convicted of robbery

with homicide and sentenced to death by the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City. The
Supreme Court denied the appeal, and confirmed both conviction and sentence by
judgement of 19 February 1997. Further motions for reconsideration were denied on 3
March 1998. After the execution had been scheduled, the Office of the President granted
a three month reprieve of execution. No clemency was however granted and counsel
presented a communication to the Committee under the Optional Protocol. The
Committee transmitted the communication to the State party with a request to provide
information and observations in respect of both admissibility and merits of the claims.
The State party was also requested not to carry out the death sentence against Piandiong,
Morallos and Bulan, while their case was under consideration by the Committee. The
Committee was informed by counsel that a warrant for execution had been issued. After
having contacted the State partys representative to the United Nations Office at Geneva,
the Committee was informed that the executions would go ahead as scheduled, despite
the Committees request, since the State party was of the opinion that the Authors
received a fair trial. Counsel for the Authors filed a petition with the Supreme Court
seeking an injunction, which was refused by the Court. However, Messrs. Piandiong,
Morallos and Bulan were executed by lethal injection. Counsel argues that Authors
considered resort to the President as a domestic remedy necessary for them to exhaust
before presenting their communication to the Human Rights Committee. They argue
therefore that it was not improper for them to wait until it became clear that clemency
was not going to be granted. With respect to the State partys argument that clemency
could not be granted because the crime could not be considered as poverty driven,
counsel notes that Messrs. Piandiong, Morallos and Bulan disputed the very finding of
their supposed authorship of the crime.

With regard to the State partys argument that the Supreme Court has ruled the
death penalty and method of execution constitutional, counsel argues that the Supreme
Courts judgement deserves to be reconsidered.
Issue/s:

1. The Human Rights Committee must decide whether or not it is admissible under the
Optional Protocol to the Covenant.
2. Whether or not the accused were identified in Court by the eyewitnesses and that this
identification was sufficient.
3. Whether or not the courts of States parties, and not for the Committee, shall evaluate
facts and evidence in a particular case, and shall interpret the relevant domestic
legislation.
4. Whether or not the crime for which they were convicted was a most serious crime as
stipulated by article 6(2), and whether the re-introduction of the death penalty in the
Philippines is in compliance with the State partys obligations under article 6(1) (2) and
(6) of the Covenant.

Ruling:
1. The Committee notes that the State party has not raised any objections to the
admissibility of the communication. The Committee is not aware of any obstacles to the
admissibility of the communication and accordingly declares the communication
admissible and proceeds without delay with the consideration of the merits
2. Counsel has claimed that the identification of Messrs. Piandiong and Morallos by
eyewitnesses during the police line-up was irregular, since the first time around none of
the eyewitnesses recognized them, upon which they were put aside in a room and
policemen directed the eyewitnesses to point them out. The Court rejected their claim in
this respect, as it was uncorroborated by any disinterested and reliable witness.
3. The Committee reiterates that it is for the courts of States parties, and not for the
Committee, to evaluate facts and evidence in a particular case, and to interpret the
relevant domestic legislation. There is no information before the Committee to show that
the decisions by the courts were arbitrary or that they amounted to denial of justice. In
the circumstances, the Committee finds that the facts before it do not reveal a violation
of the Covenant in this respect.
4. The Committee is not in a position to address these issues, since neither counsel nor
the State party has made submissions in this respect.

The Human Rights Committee of the Optional Protocol to the International

Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, is of the view that it cannot make a finding of a
violation of any of the articles of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
The Committee reiterates its conclusion that the State committed a grave breach of its
obligations under the Protocol by putting the alleged victims to death before the
Committee had concluded its consideration of the communication.
 Baroy vs. The Philippines

Facts:
The author and an (adult) co-accused were thereafter charged with three counts
of rape. It is alleged that on the date of the offence, the author would have been 14 years,
1 month and 14 days old, by virtue of being born on 19 January 1984. At trial, the defense
introduced the issue of minority through the author, who claimed to have been born in
1982. The trial court instructed the appropriate government agencies to submit evidence
on his true age. Three documents were submitted. A Certificate of Live Birth listed the
date as 19 January 1984, while a Certificate of Late Registration of Birth showed the date
as 19 January 1981, and an Elementary School permanent record as 19 January 1980. The
trial court considered, in the light of the author's physical appearance, that the author's
true date of birth was 19 January 1980, thus making him over 18 years of age at the time
the offence was committed.

On 1999, the author and his (adult) co-accused were each convicted of three
counts of rape with a deadly weapon and sentenced to death by lethal injection. In
imposing the maximum penalty available, the Court considered that there were the
aggravating circumstances of night-time and confederation, and no mitigating
circumstances. On 2002, the Supreme Court, on automatic review, affirmed the
conviction but reduced the penalty from death to reclusion perpetua, on the basis that
no aggravating circumstances had been sufficiently alleged and proven to exist.

The author claims to have been a victim of a violation of article 6, paragraph 2,

both alone and in conjunction with paragraph 6. The author explains that following the
constitutional abolition of capital punishment in 1987, the Congress in 1994 reintroduced
the death penalty by electrocution through the Republic Act 7659. The author claims a
violation of article 10, paragraph 3, as after his conviction he was detained on death row
with other convicts sentenced to death, regardless of his age. The author further claims a
violation of article 14, in particular paragraph 4. He was not accorded a separate
procedure that would protect his rights considering his legal status as a minor. No
preliminary determination was made as to his minority, with the trial court simply placing
the burden of proof on the defense. The author finally claims a violation of article 26, in
that his age was arbitrarily determined to be 18, despite evidence of his birth being either
in 1981 or 1984. The trial court refused to treat him as a minor and singled him out with
the intention of arbitrarily determining the year of his birth, contrary to the evidence
presented.

Issues:

1. Whether or not there is a violation of article 10, paragraph 3, as after his conviction he
was detained on death row with other convicts sentenced to death, regardless of his age.
2. Whether or not there is a violation of article 14, in particular paragraph 4 when he was
not accorded a separate procedure that would protect his rights considering his legal
status as a minor.
3. Whether or not there is a violation of article 26, in that his age was arbitrarily
determined to be 18, despite evidence of his birth being either in 1981 or 1984.

Ruling:
In spite of this conclusion with respect to the claims under article 6, the Committee
observes that sentencing a person to death and placing him or her on death row in
circumstances where his or her minority has not been finally determined raises serious
issues under articles 10 and 14, as well as potentially under article 7, of the Covenant. The
Committee observes, however, with respect to the exhaustion of domestic remedies, that
the author has filed a "partial motion for reconsideration", currently pending before the
Supreme Court, requesting the Court to reconsider its treatment of his minority in its
judgment of 9 May 2002. The Committee recalls that its position in relation to issues of
exhaustion of domestic remedies is that, absent exceptional circumstances, this aspect of
a registered communication is to be assessed at the time of its consideration of the case.
In the present case, accordingly, the Committee considers that the questions of the
authors' age and the means by which it was determined by the courts are, by the author's
own action, currently before a judicial forum with authority to resolve definitively these
particular claims. It follows that issues arising under articles 10 and 14 and, potentially,
article 7 from the author's age and the manner in which the courts sought to determine
this question are inadmissible, for failure to exhaust domestic remedies.
 Pimentel vs. The Philippines

Facts:
Human rights victims (Pimentel) brought a class action suit against Philippine President
Ferdinand Marcos. Pimentel obtained a nearly $2 billion judgment and later tried to attach a
brokerage account at Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. (Merrill Lynch) (plaintiff), which
was owned by Arelma, S.A. (Arelma), a company incorporated by Marcos. The Republic of the
Philippines and the Philippine Presidential Commission on Good Governance (collectively, the
Republic) claimed the money in the brokerage account belonged to the Republic under Philippine
law and asked Merrill Lynch to transfer the money to the Philippine National Banc (PNB), pending
a decision by a Philippine court. Instead, Merrill Lynch filed an interpleader lawsuit in federal
court to settle all the claims in one case, naming the Republic, Arelma, PNB, Pimentel, and others
as defendants. The Republic claimed sovereign immunity and was dismissed from the lawsuit.
The Republic then moved to dismiss the interpleader action, arguing that the case could not
proceed without it because it was an indispensable party under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
(FRCP) 19. The district court denied the motion and continued to adjudicate the case. The
Republic appealed the denial, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
reversed and issued a stay, pending the outcome of the litigation in the Philippine court. The
district judge vacated the stay and awarded the money to Pimentel. The Republic asked the
Philippine court to declare the money forfeited, but that court has not yet ruled. The Republic,
Arelma, and PNB appealed, but the court of appeals affirmed this time, largely because the
Republic, despite being a required party under FRCP Rule 19(a), was unlikely to succeed on the
merits of its claim. The defendants petitioned the United States Supreme Court for certiorari,
which was granted.

Issue:
Whether or not there is a violation of the right to right to equality before the courts, the right to
speedy disposition of cases and the right to adequate legal remedy.

Ruling:
As to the length of the proceedings relating to the issue of the filing fee, the Committee
recalls that the right to equality before the courts, as guaranteed by article 14, paragraph 1,
entails a number of requirements, including the condition that the procedure before the national
tribunals must be conducted expeditiously enough so as not to compromise the principle of
fairness. (5) It notes that the Regional Trial Court and Supreme Court spent eight years and three
hearings considering this subsidiary issue and that the State party has provided no reasons to
explain why it took so long to consider a matter of minor complexity. For this reason, the
Committee considers that the length of time taken to resolve this issue was unreasonable,
resulting in a violation of the authors' rights under article 14, paragraph 1, read in conjunction
with article 2, paragraph 3, of the Covenant.

The Human Rights Committee, acting under article 5, paragraph 4, of the Optional
Protocol, is of the view that the facts before it discloses a violation of article 14, paragraph 1,
read in conjunction with article 2, paragraph 3, as it relates to the proceedings on the amount of
the filing fee.

The Committee is of the view that the authors are entitled, under article 2, paragraph
3(a), of the Covenant, to an effective remedy. The State party is under an obligation to ensure an
adequate remedy to the authors including, compensation and a prompt resolution of their case
on the enforcement of the US judgement in the State party. The State party is under an obligation
to ensure that similar violations do not occur in the future.
 Lumanog and Santos vs. The Philippines

Facts:
The authors of the communication are Mr. Lenido Lumanog and Mr. Augusto Santos,
Filipino nationals who, at the time of the submission of the communication, were on death row,
at New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa City, the Philippines. They claim to be victims of a violation by
the Philippines of articles 6, paragraph 1; 9, paragraph 1; 14, paragraphs 1, 3 (c) and 5; and 26 of
the Covenant. They are represented by counsels, Soliman Santos and Cecilia Jimenez.

The authors and three other individuals were sentenced to death for the murder of
former Colonel Rolando Abadilla, occurred on June 1996. They have been in detention since June
1996. After their motions for reconsideration and new trial were rejected by the RTC in January
2000, the case was transmitted to the Supreme Court in February 2000 for automatic review
(appeal) of the death penalty. All defence and prosecution appeals briefs for the purpose of the
Supreme Court review were filed by June 2004. Soon after the last appeal brief, on 6 July 2004,
the authors filed a Consolidated Motion for Early Decisions. On 10 December 2004, they filed
a Motion for Early Decision, which was responded to by Supreme Court is resolution of January
2005. In the latter resolution, the Supreme Court transferred the case to the Court of Appeals for
appropriate action and disposition, in conformity with its new jurisprudence pursuant to the
judgment in Mateo. As a result, the authors filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of
Transfer to the Court of Appeals on 24 February 2005, stressing that the jurisprudence in
Mateo should not be applied automatically to each death penalty case. Furthermore, it was
argued that the Supreme Court was in a position to proceed with the review of the case. The
Supreme Court rejected the Motion March 2005 for lack of merits. A new similar and more
substantiated request to reconsider the Supreme Courts decision was filed on June 2005, but by
Resolution of July 2005 the Supreme Court reiterated its decision to transfer the case to the Court
of Appeals, declaring that its decision was in conformity with the Mateo decision. The review
of the case has been pending before the Court of Appeals since January 2005. On January 2007,
due to internal organizational matters of the Court of Appeals, the criminal case concerning the
authors (Cesar Fortuna et Al.) was transferred to a newly appointed judge in the Court.

With respect to Mr. Lumanog only, it is submitted that he was denied interlocutory relief
while the case was pending before the Supreme Court. The Court denied his Motion for New
Trial and Related Relief. On November 2004, the Supreme Court denied another motion filed by
Mr. Lumanog, who had become a kidney transplant patient in 2003 and asked the Court to be
returned to the specialist kidney hospital where he was treated as a patient in 2002 instead of
being placed in the prisons general hospital. Mr. Lumanog went back to his cell, on his own
request, as he preferred the conditions there to those of the prisons hospital.
Issues:
1. Whether or not there are violations of the Covenant caused by the transfer of their case from
the Supreme Court to the Court of Appeals.
2. Whether or not the decision of the Supreme Court not to review their case and transfer it to
the Court of Appeals violates article 14, paragraph 5 of the Covenant insofar as it violates their
right to have their conviction and sentence reviewed by a higher tribunal.
3. Whether or not there is a violation of article 14, paragraph 3(c) of the Covenant, since their
case had been pending for five years before the Supreme Court and was ready for a decision
when it was transferred to the Court of Appeals, thereby unduly delaying the hearing.
4. Whether or not there is a violation of article 6, paragraph 1 and article 9, paragraph 1, since
the alleged violations of article 14 occurred in the context of a death penalty case with prolonged
detention which had very detrimental effect on the authors, and notably for Mr. Lumanog.

Ruling:
In relation to the authors claim under article 14, paragraph 3 (c), it may be noted that the
right of the accused to be tried without undue delay relates not only to the time between the
formal charging of the accused and the time by which a trial should commence, but also the time
until the final judgment on appeal3. All stages whether at first instance or on appeal, must be
completed without undue delay. Therefore, the Committee must not limit its consideration
exclusively to the part of the judicial proceedings subsequent to the transfer of the case from the
Supreme Court to the Court of Appeals, but rather take into account the totality of time. With
respect to the alleged violation of article 14, paragraph 5, of the Covenant, the Committee notes
that the authors appeal remains pending before the Court of Appeals, a higher tribunal within
the meaning of article 14, paragraph 5, which is seized of the case so as to enable it to review all
factual issues pertaining to the authors conviction. This part of the communication is therefore
inadmissible under article 2 of the Optional Protocol. The Committee therefore decides that the
communication is admissible only insofar as it raises issues under article 6, paragraph 1, and
article 14, paragraph 3(c), of the Covenant.

In accordance with article 2, paragraph 3 (a), of the Covenant, the State party is under an
obligation to provide the authors with an effective remedy, including the prompt review of their
appeal before the Court of Appeals and compensation for the undue delay. The State party is also
under an obligation to take measures to prevent similar violations in the future. By becoming a
party to the Protocol, the State party has recognized the competence of the Committee to
determine whether there has been a violation of the Covenant and, pursuant to article 2 of the
Covenant, the State party has undertaken to ensure all individuals within its territory or subject
to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the Covenant and to provide an effective and
enforceable remedy in case a violation has been established. In this respect, the Committee
wishes to receive from the State party, within 180 days, information about the measures taken
to give effect to the Committees Views. The State party is also requested to publish the
Committees Views.
 Marcellana and Gumanoy vs. The Philippines

Facts:
Marcellana was the former Secretary General of Karapatan-Southern Tagalog (a human
rights organisation) and Mr. Eddie Gumanoy was the former chairperson of Kasama Tk (an
organization of farmers). They were leading a fact finding mission in the province of Mindoro
Oriental, to enquire about the abduction of three individuals in Gloria town allegedly committed
by elements of the 204th infantry brigade and the killing and disappearance of civilians and
burning of properties by the military in the town of Pinamalayan. The victims were travelling on
the highway when their van was stopped by ten armed men. All the belongings of the members
of the fact-finding mission, including mobile phones, documents and photos of the mission, were
then seized. After the armed men tied them up, they were taken into a vehicle (jeepney). The
armed men were not all hooded and some of them could be identified as being former rebels
and currently associated with the military. The victims were later dropped along the roadside in
different parts of Bongagbong municipality. The dead bodies of Ms. Marcellana and Mr. Eddie
Gumanoy were found the following day. Forensic reports and the death certificates indicate that
their death was caused by gun-shot wounds.

The authors filed a complaint for kidnapping and murder before the Department of
Justice (DOJ) but dismissed the complaint on 2004 and the charges against one of the alleged
perpetrators on the ground of insufficient evidence. The authors filed a Petition for Review which
was 2006. The authors filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was dismissed on 2007. The
authors appealed the DOJs decisions before the Office of the President of the Republic. The
appeal requested that the DOJ decision be reversed and that charges be filed against Aniano
Silver Flores and Richard Waway Falla. That appeal is still pending.

A complaint was also filed with the Commission on Human Rights of the Philippines. This
complaint was later withdrawn, due to the authors assessment that they would not obtain
justice from this body. Complaints were also filed with the House of Representatives of the
Philippines, the Senate, and under the Comprehensive Agreement on respect for Human Rights
and International Humanitarian Law, but no action was taken. The authors add that, in spite of
widespread and public opposition, one of the principal suspected perpetrators, Col. Palparan,
was later promoted to Major General by the President.

Issues:
1. Whether or not the communication is inadmissible on the ground of failure to exhaust
domestic remedies.
2. Whether or not the State partys contention that the case is inadmissible because the subject
matter of the communication is being or was examined by the United Nations Special Rapporteur
on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions.
3. Whether or not the authors have abused their right of submission.

Ruling:
1. The authors have conceded non-exhaustion of domestic remedies but claim that remedies
have been ineffective and unreasonably prolonged. The Committee refers to its case law, to the
effect that, for the purposes of article 5, paragraph 2 (b), of the Optional Protocol, domestic
remedies must both be effective and available, and must not be unduly prolonged.
2. The Committee observes that fact-finding country visits by a Special Rapporteur do not
constitute a procedure of international investigation or settlement within the meaning of
article 5, paragraph 2(a), of the Optional Protocol. The Committee further recalls that the study
of human rights problems in a country by a Special Rapporteur, although it might refer to or draw
on information concerning individuals, could not be regarded as being the same matter as the
examination of individual cases within the meaning of article 5, paragraph 2 (a), of the Optional
Protocol. Accordingly, the Committee considers that the 2007 country visit by the UN Special
Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, does not render the
communication inadmissible under article 5, paragraph 2 (a), of the Optional Protocol.
3. The Committee rejects this view: On the contrary, it is clear that pursuant to article 1 of the
Optional Protocol [a] State party to the Covenant that becomes a party to the [] Protocol
recognizes the competence of the Committee to receive and consider communications from
individuals subject to its jurisdiction who claim to be victims of a violation by that State party.
In the absence of any valid reason offered as to why the present communication constitutes an
abuse of right of submission, the Committee is of the view that the case is not inadmissible on
this ground.

In the present case, though over five years have elapsed since the killings took place, the
State partys authorities have not indicted, prosecuted or brought to justice anyone in connection
with these events. The Committee notes that the State partys prosecutorial authorities have,
after a preliminary investigation, decided not to initiate criminal proceedings against one of the
suspects due to lack of sufficient evidence. The Committee has not been provided with any
information, other than about initiatives at the policy level, as to whether any investigations were
carried out to ascertain the responsibility of the other members of the armed group identified by
the witnesses. Absence of investigations to establish responsibility for the kidnapping and
murder of the victims amounted to a denial of justice. The State party must accordingly be held
to be in breach of its obligation, under article 6, in conjunction with article 2, paragraph 3,
properly to investigate the death of the victims and take appropriate action against those found
guilty.
 By becoming a party to the Optional Protocol, the State party has recognized the
competence of the Committee to determine whether there has been a violation of the Covenant
or not and that, pursuant to article 2 of the Covenant, the State party has undertaken to ensure
to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the
Covenant, and to provide an effective and enforceable remedy in case a violation has been
established.
 Larranaga vs. The Philippines

Facts:
On 1999, the author, along with six co-defendants, was found guilty of kidnapping and
serious illegal detention of Jacqueline Chiong by the Special Heinous Crimes Court in Cebu City
and was sentenced to reclusion perpetua. On 3 February 2004, the Supreme Court of the
Philippines found the author also guilty of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with homicide
and rape of Marijoy Chiong and sentenced him to death. He was also sentenced to reclusion
perpetua for the simple kidnapping and serious illegal detention of Jacqueline Chiong.

According to the author, he travelled from Cebu City to Quezon City on 8 June 1997 to
pursue a Diploma at the Centre for culinary arts in Quezon City. On 16 July 1997, he was taking
examinations during the entire day and then went to a restaurant in the evening. He stayed with
friends until the next morning. On 17 July 1997, he took another examination before taking a
plane back to Cebu City at 5pm.

The prosecution presented its first and main witness, the defendant Davidson Valiente
Rusia, who was promised immunity from prosecution if he told the truth. The author gave written
consent to the withdrawal of his counsel and requested three weeks to hire a new counsel.

The Special Heinous Crimes Court found the author guilty of the kidnapping and serious
illegal detention of Jacqueline Chiong and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua. It decided that
there was insufficient evidence to find him guilty of the kidnapping and serious illegal detention
with homicide and rape of Marijoy Chiong.

Isues:
1. Whether or not death penalty may be imposed upon Larranaga.
2. Whether or not the principle of presumption of innocence has been violated.
3. Whether or not there is a violation of article 14, paragraph 3 (b) and (d), of the Covenant.
4. Whether or not there is a violation of Article 14, paragraph 3(c). 5. Whether or not there is a
violation of Article 7.

Ruling:
The Committee notes from the judgments that the author was convicted of kidnapping
and serious illegal detention with homicide and rape under article 267 of the Revised Penal Code
which provides that "when the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is
raped ||, the maximum penalty shall be imposed". Thus, the death penalty was imposed
automatically by the operation of article 267 of the Revised Penal Code. The Committee recalls
its jurisprudence that the automatic and mandatory imposition of the death penalty constitutes
an arbitrary deprivation of life, in violation of article 6, paragraph 1, of the Covenant, in
circumstances where the death penalty is imposed without any possibility of taking into account
the defendant's personal circumstances or the circumstances of the particular offence. It follows
that his rights under article 6, paragraph 1, of the Covenant were violated. At the same time, the
Committee notes that the State party has adopted Republic Act No. 9346 prohibiting the
imposition of death penalty in the Philippines. The Committee has noted the arguments of the
author that the reintroduction of the death penalty for "heinous crimes", as set out in Republic
Act No. 7659, constitutes a violation of article 6 of the Covenant.

The Committee concludes that the author's trial did not respect the principle of
presumption of innocence, in violation of article 14, paragraph 2. The Committee is cognizant
that some States require that a defence of alibi must be raised by the defendant, and that a
certain standard of proof must be met before the defence is cognizable. In the present case, the
trial judge put a number of leading questions to the prosecution which tend to justify the
conclusion that the author was not presumed innocent until proven guilty. Moreover,
incriminating evidence against a person provided by an accomplice charged with the same crime
should, in the Committee's opinion, be treated cautiously, particularly where the accomplice was
found to lie about his previous criminal convictions, was granted immunity from prosecution, and
eventually admitted to raping one of the victims. In the present case, it considers that, despite
all the issues mentioned above having been raised by the author, neither the trial court nor the
Supreme Court addressed them appropriately.

The judge refused to grant the requests allegedly because the trial had to be terminated
within sixty days. The Committee considers that in a capital case, when counsel for the defendant
requests an adjournment because he was not given enough time to acquaint himself with the
case, the court must ensure that the defendant is given an opportunity to prepare his defence.
In the instant case, both the author's appointed and chosen counsel should have been granted
an adjournment. In the circumstances, the Committee finds a violation of article 14, paragraph 3
(b) and (d), of the Covenant.

The Committee has noted the State party's explanations concerning the delay in the trial
proceedings against the author. Nevertheless, it finds that the delay was caused by the
authorities and that no substantial delay can be attributable to the author. In any case, the fact
that the author appealed cannot be held against him. Article 14, paragraph 3(c), requires that all
accused shall be entitled to be tried without undue delay, and the requirement applies equally
to the right of review of conviction and sentence guaranteed by article 14, paragraph 5.

With regard to the alleged violation of article 7, the Committee considers that to impose
a death sentence on a person after an unfair trial is to subject that person wrongfully to the fear
that he will be executed. In circumstances where there is a real possibility that the sentence will
be enforced, that fear must give rise to considerable anguish. Such anguish cannot be dissociated
from the unfairness of the proceedings underlying the sentence. Indeed, as the Committee has
previously observed [FN58], the imposition of any death sentence that cannot be saved by article
6 would automatically entail a violation of article 7. The Committee therefore concludes that the
imposition of the death sentence on the author after the conclusion of proceedings which did
not meet the requirements of article 14 of the Covenant amounts to inhuman treatment, in
violation of article 7.

Bearing in mind that, by becoming a party to the Optional Protocol, the State party has
recognized the competence of the Committee to determine whether there has been a violation
of the Covenant or not and that, pursuant to article 2 of the Covenant, that State party has
undertaken to ensure all individuals within its territory or subject to its jurisdiction the rights
recognized in the Covenant and to provide an effective and enforceable remedy in case a
violation has been established.