BORLONGAN, JR VS PENA

GR NO. 143591

Facts:
Respondent Magdaleno Pea instituted a civil case for recovery of agents compensation and
expenses, damages, and attorneys fees, against Urban Bank and the petitioners, before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Negros Occidental, Bago City.- Respondent anchored his claim for
compensation on the contract of agency, allegedly entered into with the petitioners wherein
the former undertook to perform such acts necessary to prevent any intruder and squatter
from unlawfully occupying Urban Banks property located along Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City.-
Petitioners filed a MD arguing that they never appointed the respondent as agent or counsel.-
Attached to the MD were the following documents:
1. A letter dated December 19, 1994 signed by Herman Ponce and Julie Abad on behalf of
Isabela Sugar Company, Inc. (ISCI), the original owner of the subject property;
2. An unsigned letter dated December 7, 1994 addressed to Corazon Bejasa from MarilynG.
Ong;
3. A letter dated December 9, 1994 addressed to Teodoro Borlongan and signed byMarilyn G.
Ong; and
4. A Memorandum dated November 20, 1994 from Enrique Montilla III.
The above stated documents were presented in an attempt to show that the respondent was
appointed as agent by ISCI and not by Urban Bank or by the petitioners. Respondent Pea filed
his Complaint-Affidavit with the Office of the City Prosecutor, Bago City. He claimed that said
documents were falsified because the alleged signatories did not actually affix their signatures,
and the signatories were neither stockholders nor officers and employees of ISCI. Worse,
petitioners introduced said documents as evidence before the RTC knowing that they were
falsified. City Prosecutors Report (Sept 23, 1998) : In the report, the Prosecutor concluded that
the petitioners were probably guilty of four (4) counts of the crime of Introducing Falsified
Documents penalized by the second paragraph of Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
The City Prosecutor concluded that the documents were falsified because the alleged
signatories untruthfully stated that ISCI was the principal of the respondent; that petitioners
knew that the documents were falsified considering that the signatories were mere dummies;
and that the documents formed part of the record of Civil Case No. 754 where they were used
by petitioners as evidence in support of their motion to dismiss, adopted in their answer and
later, in their Pre- Trial Brief. Subsequently, the corresponding Information were filed with the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Bago City. The cases were docketed as Criminal Cases

1
Nos. 6683, 6684, 6685, and 6686. Thereafter, Judge Primitivo Blanca issued the warrants for the
arrest of the petitioners.
Petitioners (Oct `1, 1998) filed an Omnibus MQ: They insist that they were denied due process
because of the non-observance of a proper procedure on preliminary investigation prescribed
in the Rules of Court; since no such counter-affidavit and supporting documents were
submitted by the petitioners, the trial judge merely relied on the complaint-affidavit and
attachments of the respondent in issuing the warrants of arrest, also in contravention of the
Rules. Moreover they claim that the respondents affidavit was not based on the latters
personal knowledge and therefore should not have been used by the court in determining
probable cause.
On the same day that the Omnibus MQ was filed, the petitioners posted bail. Their bail bonds
expressly provided that they do not intend to waive their right to question the validity of their
arrest. On the date of arraignment, the petitioners refused to enter their plea, for the obvious
reason that the legality of their information and their arrest was yet to be settled by the court.
MTCCs answer (in response to Omnibus MQ filed by petitioners): They upheld the validity of
the warrant of arrest, saying that it was issued in accordance with the Rules. Besides, (according
to the MTCC) petitioners could no longer question the validity of the warrant since they already
posted bail.
Issues:
1) WON petitioners were deprived of their right to due process of law because of the denial of
their right to preliminary investigation and to submit their counter-affidavit;
2) WON the Information charging the petitioners were validly filed and the warrants for their
arrest were properly issued;
3) WON this Court can, itself, determine probable cause; and
4) WON the petitioners posting a bail constitutes a waiver of their right to question the validity
of their arrest.
Ruling:
Petition granted; MTCC is ordered to dismiss criminal cases against petitioners. For issues
numbered 1 and 3:-The following sections of Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure
are relevant to the aforesaid issues:
SECTION 1. Definition. Preliminary investigation is an inquiry or proceeding for the purpose
of determining whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a
crime cognizable by the Regional Trial Court has been committed and that the respondent is
probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial. SEC. 3. Procedure. Except as provided
for in Section 7 hereof, no complaint or information for an offense cognizable by the Regional
Trial Court shall be filed without a preliminary investigation having been first conducted in the
2
following manner:(a) The complaint shall state the known address of the respondent and be
accompanied by affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses as well as other supporting
documents, in such number of copies as there are respondents, plus two (2) copies of the
official file. The said affidavits shall be sworn to before any fiscal, state prosecutor or
government official authorized to administer oath, or, in their absence or unavailability, a
notary public, who must certify that he personally examined the affiants and that he is satisfied
that they voluntarily executed and understood their affidavits. SEC. 9. Cases not falling under
the original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts not covered by the Rule on Summary
Procedure. (a) Where filed with the fiscal. If the complaint is filed directly with the fiscal or
state prosecutor, the procedure outlined in Section 3 (a) of this Rule shall be observed. The
Fiscal shall take appropriate action based on the affidavits and other supporting documents
submitted by the complainant.
-Records show that the prosecutor relied merely on the affidavits submitted by the
complainant and did not require the petitioners to submit their answer. He should not be
faulted for doing such as this is sanctioned by the rules. Moreover, he is not mandated to
require the submission of counter-affidavits. Probable cause may then be determined on the
basis alone of the affidavits and supporting documents of the complainant, without infringing
on the constitutional rights of the petitioners.-Regarding the issuance of the warrant of arrest,
petitioners contend that the warrants were illegally issued as they were solely based on the
affidavits of the complainant. Section 2 of Article III of the Constitution underscores the
exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of
probable cause. But the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his
witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall (1) personally evaluate the
report and the supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor regarding the existence of
probable cause, and on the basis thereof, he may already make a personal determination of the
existence of probable cause; and (2) if he is not satisfied that probable cause exists, he may
disregard the prosecutors report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of
witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause. There is
no provision or procedural rule which makes the submission of counter-affidavits mandatory
before the judge could determine probable cause. For issue number 2:- For the issuance of a
warrant of arrest, probable cause has been defined as the existence of such facts and
circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe that an
offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested. It is one of the requisites for
a warrant of arrest to be valid.- On the basis of the above-stated documents (in the facts) and
on the strength of the affidavit executed by the respondent, the prosecutor concluded that
probable cause exists. These same affidavit and documents were used by the trial court in
issuing the warrant of arrest.-The SC finds the complaint-affidavit and attachments insufficient
to support the existence of probable cause. The respondents claims of the falsity of the
documents were mere assertions. - It must be emphasized that the affidavit of the
complainant, or any of his witnesses, shall allege facts within their (affiants) personal

3
knowledge. The allegation of the respondent that the signatures were falsified does not qualify
as personal knowledge. Nowhere in said affidavit did respondent state that he was present at
the time of the execution of the documents. Neither did he claim that he was familiar with the
signatures of the signatories. He simply made a bare assertion-A finding of probable cause need
not be based on clear and convincing evidence, or on evidence beyond reasonable doubt. It
does not require that the evidence would justify conviction. Nonetheless, although the
determination of probable cause requires less than evidence which would justify conviction, it
should at least be more than mere suspicion. While probable cause should be determined in a
summary manner, there is a need to examine the evidence with care to prevent material
damage to a potential accuseds constitutional right to liberty and the guarantees of freedom
and fair play, and to protect the State from the burden of unnecessary expenses in prosecuting
alleged offenses and holding trials arising from false, fraudulent or groundless charges.

JUDGE ABELITA III v. DORIA

GR.no. 170672
Facts: Judge Abelita III filed a complaint for Damages against P/Supt. Doria and SPO3
Ramirez. Petitioner alleged that while he and his family are on their way home, these
two officers requested them to proceed to the Provincial PNP Headquarters at Camp
Boni Serrano, Masbate, Masbate. He was forcibly taken and was searched without
warrant. A shotgun was found in his possession and he was arrested. Petitioner was
charged with illegal possession of firearms and frustrated murder. The trial court found
that petitioner was at the scene of the shooting incident in Barangay Nursery. The trial
court ruled that the police officers who conducted the search were of the belief, based
on reasonable grounds, that petitioner was involved in the incident and that the firearm
used in the commission of the offense was in his possession. The trial court ruled that
petitioners warrantless arrest and the warrantless seizure of the firearms were valid and
legal, thus, rejecting petitioners claim for frame up.
Issue: Whether the warrantless arrest and warrantless search and seizure were illegal
under Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure;
Ruling: No.
For the warrantless arrest under this Rule to be valid, two requisites must concur: (1)
the offender has just committed an offense; and (2) the arresting peace officer or private

4
person has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has
committed it.
Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure does not require the
arresting officers to personally witness the commission of the offense with their own
eyes. In this case, P/Supt. Doria received a report about the alleged shooting incident.
SPO3 Ramirez investigated the report and learned from witnesses that petitioner was
involved in the incident. They were able to track down petitioner, but when invited to the
police headquarters to shed light on the incident, petitioner initially agreed then sped up
his vehicle, prompting the police authorities to give chase. Petitioners act of trying to
get away, coupled with the incident report which they investigated, is enough to raise a
reasonable suspicion on the part of the police authorities as to the existence of probable
cause.
The seizure of the firearms was justified under the plain view doctrine. The plain view
doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (1) the law enforcement officer in
search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from
which he can view a particular area; (2) the discovery of the evidence in plain view is
inadvertent; and (3) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes
may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure.
The police authorities were in the area because that was where they caught up with petitioner
after the chase. They saw the firearms inside the vehicle when petitioner opened the door.
Since a shooting incident just took place and it was reported that petitioner was involved in the
incident, it was apparent to the police officers that the firearms may be evidence of a crime,
hence they were justified in seizing the firearms.

PEOPLE v. MOLINA
352 SCRA 174
Facts: SPO1 Marino Paguidopon, received an information regarding the presence of an
alleged marijuana pusher in Davao City. At around 9:30 in the morning of August 8,
1996, while the team were positioned in the house of SPO1 Paguidopon, a "trisikad"
carrying the accused-appellants passed by. At that instance, SPO1 Paguidopon pointed
to the accused-appellants as the pushers. Thereupon, the team boarded their, vehicle
and overtook the "trisikad."11 SPO1 Paguidopon was left in his house, thirty meters
from where the accused-appellants were accosted.12
The police officers then ordered the "trisikad" to stop. At that point, accused-appellant
Mula who was holding a black bag handed the same to accused-appellant Molina.
Subsequently, SPO1 Pamplona introduced himself as a police officer and asked
accused-appellant Molina to open the bag.13 Molina replied, "Boss, if possible we will
settle this."14 SPO1 Pamplona insisted on opening the bag, which revealed dried
marijuana leaves inside. Thereafter; accused-appellants Mula and Molina were
handcuffed by the police officers.15
On December 6, 1996, accused-appellants, through counsel, jointly filed a Demurrer to
Evidence, contending that the marijuana allegedly seized from them is inadmissible as
evidence for having been obtained in violation of their constitutional right against

5
unreasonable searches and seizures.16 The demurrer was denied by the trial court.17A
motion for reconsideration was filed by accused-appellants, but this was likewise denied
The Solicitor General filed a Manifestation and MO1ion (In Lieu of Brief), wherein he
prayed for the acquittal of both accused-appellants.
Issue: Whether or not the warrantless arrest, search and seizure in the present case fall
within the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement?
Ruling: No.
As applied to in flagrante delicto arrests, it is settled that "reliable information" alone,
absent any overt act indicative of a felonious enterprise in the presence and within the
view of the arresting officers, are not sufficient to constitute probable cause that would
justify an in flagrante delicto arrest. Thus, in People v. Aminnudin, it was held that "the
accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor was it
shown that he was about to do so or that he had just done so. What he was doing was
descending the gangplank of the MN Wilcon 9 and there was no outward indication that
called for his arrest. To all appearances, he was like any of the other passengers
innocently disembarking from the vessel. It was only when the informer pointed to him
as the carrier of the marijuana that he suddenly became suspect and so subject to
apprehension." Clearly, to constitute a valid in flagrante delicto arrest, two requisites
must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he
has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2)
such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.
In the case at bar, accused-appellants manifested no outward indication that would
justify their arrest. In holding a bag on board a trisikad, accused-appellants could not be
said to be committing, attempting to commit or have committed a crime.
Withal, the Court holds that the arrest of accused-appellants does not fall under the
exceptions allowed by the rules. Hence, the search conducted on their person was
likewise illegal. Consequently, the marijuana seized by the peace officers could not be
admitted as evidence against accused-appellants, and the Court is thus, left with no
choice but to find in favor of accused-appellants. They are acquitted.The law mandates
that searches be carried out with a search warrant upon the existence of probable
cause. Likewise, the law protects against unreasonable searches and seizures and
holds evidence taken from such incidents as inadmissible as evidence. There are
exceptions to this, the first being seizure conducted incidental to a lawful arrest For this,
there should be a lawful arrest first, before a search can be made.

6
VALEROSO vs PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES GR 164815 February 22, 2008

Petitioner: PSINSP JERRY C VALEROSO

Respondent: The People of the Philippines

FACTS:
On July 10, 1996, SPO2 Antonio Disuanco received a dispatch order which directed him and
three (3) other personnel to serve a warrant of arrest against petitioner in a case for kidnapping
with ransom. Then, the team proceeded to the Integrated National Police Central Station in
Culiat, Quezon City, where they saw petitioner as he was about to board a tricycle. SPO2
Disuanco and his team put the petitioner under arrest when they found tucked in his waist a
Charter Arms with five (5) live ammunition.

Petitioner was brought to the police station for questioning. A verification of the subject
firearm at the Firearms and Explosives Division at Camp Crame revealed that it was not issued
to the petitioner but to another person. Petitioner was then charged with illegal possession of
firearm and ammunition under PD No. 1866 as amended.

On May 6, 1998 trial court found petitioner guilty as charged. Petitioner moved to reconsider
but his motion was denied. He appealed to the CA. On May 4, 2004, the appellate court
affirmed the RTC disposition.

ISSUES:
I.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERRORS OF LAW IN AFFIRMING
THE CONVICTION OF PETITIONER DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT.
RULING:
In illegal possession of firearm and ammunition, the prosecution has the burden of proving the
twin elements of (1) the existence of the subject firearm and ammunition, and (2) the fact that

7
the accused who possessed or owned the same does not have the corresponding license for
it.[53]
The existence of the subject firearm and its ammunition was established through the testimony
of SPO2 Disuanco.[54] Defense witness Yuson also identified the firearm.[55] Its existence was
likewise admitted by the petitioner himself.[56]
The Court on several occasions ruled that either the testimony of a representative of, or a
certification from, the Philippine National Police (PNP) Firearms and Explosive Office attesting
that a person is not a licensee of any firearm would suffice to prove beyond reasonable doubt
the second element of possession of illegal firearms.[59] The prosecution more than complied
when it presented both.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 4, 2004 is AFFIRMED in full.

Esquillo vs People

Facts:

PO1 Cruzin, together with PO2 Angel Aguas (PO2 Aguas), proceeded at around 4:00
p.m. on December 10, 2002 to Bayanihan St., Malibay, Pasay City to conduct surveillance on the
activities of an alleged notorious snatcher operating in the area known only as Ryan.

8
 As PO1 Cruzin alighted from the private vehicle that brought him and PO2 Aguas to the
target area, he glanced in the direction of petitioner who was standing three meters away and
seen placing inside a yellow cigarette case what appeared to be a small heat-sealed transparent
plastic sachet containing white substance. While PO1 Cruz was not sure what the plastic sachet
contained, he became suspicious when petitioner started acting strangely as he began to approach
her. He then introduced himself as a police officer to petitioner and inquired about the plastic
sachet she was placing inside her cigarette case. Instead of replying, however, petitioner
attempted to flee to her house nearby but was timely restrained by PO1 Cruzin who then
requested her to take out the transparent plastic sachet from the cigarette case.

After apprising petitioner of her constitutional rights, PO1 Cruzin confiscated the plastic
[7]
sachet on which he marked her initials SRE. With the seized item, petitioner was brought for
investigation to a Pasay City Police Station where P/Insp. Aquilino E. Almanza, Chief of the
Drug Enforcement Unit, prepared a memorandum[8] dated December 10, 2002 addressed to the
Chief Forensic Chemist of the NBI in Manila requesting for: 1) a laboratory examination of the
substance contained in the plastic sachet to determine the presence of shabu, and 2) the conduct
of a drug test on the person of petitioner. PO1 Cruzin and PO2 Aguas soon executed a Joint
Affidavit of Apprehension[9]recounting the details of their intended surveillance and the
circumstances leading to petitioners arrest.

Repudiating the charges, petitioner[10] gave the following tale:

At around 1:00 to 2:00 p.m. of the date in question, while she was sick and resting at
home, several policemen in civilian garb with guns tucked in their waists barged in and asked her
whether she knew one named Ryan who they claimed was a notorious snatcher operating in the
area, to which she replied in the negative. The police officers then forced her to go with them to
the Pasay City Police Station-SOG office where she was detained.

While she was under detention, the police officers were toying with a wallet which they
claimed contained shabu and recovered from her. In fine, petitioner claimed that the evidence
against her was planted, stemming from an all too obvious attempt by the police officers to extort
money from her and her family.

Two other witnesses for the defense, petitioners daughter Josan Lee[11] and family friend
Ma. Stella Tolentino,[12] corroborated petitioners account. They went on to relate that the police
officers never informed them of the reason why they were taking custody of petitioner

Issue:

9
 Whether or not the warrantless arrest is valid.

Held:

By Decision[13] of July 28, 2003, the trial court found petitioner guilty of illegal
possession of Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride or shabu.

Before the Court of Appeals, appellant questioned as illegal her arrest without warrant to
thus render any evidence obtained on the occasion thereof inadmissible.

In its challenged Decision affirming petitioners conviction, the appellate court,

citing People v. Chua,[15] held that the police officers had probable cause to search petitioner
under the stop-and-frisk concept, a recognized exception to the general rule prohibiting
warrantless searches.[16]

Brushing aside petitioners defense of frame-up, the appellate court noted that petitioner
failed to adduce evidence that the arresting officers were impelled by any evil motive to falsely
charge her, and that she was even found positive for substance abuse.

In her present petition, petitioner assails the appellate courts application of the stop-and-
frisk principle in light of PO1 Cruzins failure to justify his suspicion that a crime was being
committed, he having merely noticed her placing something inside a cigarette case which could
hardly be deemed suspicious. To petitioner, such legal principle could only be invoked if there
were overt acts constituting unusual conduct that would arouse the suspicion.[17]

Petitioner did not question early on her warrantless arrest before her arraignment. Neither
did she take steps to quash the Information on such ground. Verily, she raised the issue of
warrantless arrest as well as the inadmissibility of evidence acquired on the occasion thereof for
the first time only on appeal before the appellate court.[18] By such omissions, she is deemed to
have waived any objections on the legality of her arrest.[19]

Be that as it may, the circumstances under which petitioner was arrested indeed engender
the belief that a search on her was warranted. Recall that the police officers were on a
surveillance operation as part of their law enforcement efforts. When PO1 Cruzin saw petitioner
placing a plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance into her cigarette case, it was in
his plain view. Given his training as a law enforcement officer, it was instinctive on his part to be
drawn to curiosity and to approach her. That petitioner reacted by attempting to flee after he
introduced himself as a police officer and inquired about the contents of the plastic sachet all the
more pricked his curiosity.

10
 That a search may be conducted by law enforcers only on the strength of a valid search
warrant is settled. The same, however, admits of exceptions, viz:

(1) consented searches; (2) as an incident to a lawful arrest; (3) searches of vessels
and aircraft for violation of immigration, customs, and drug laws; (4) searches of
moving vehicles; (5) searches of automobiles at borders or constructive borders;
(6) where the prohibited articles are in plain view; (7) searches of buildings and
premises to enforce fire, sanitary, and building regulations; and (8) stop and
frisk operations.[20] (emphasis underscoring supplied)

Elucidating on what includes stop-and-frisk operation and how it is to be carried out, the
Court in People v. Chua[22] held:

. . . the act of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate

him, and pat him for weapon(s) or contraband. The police officer should
properly introduce himself and make initial inquiries, approach and restrain
a person who manifests unusual and suspicious conduct, in order to check
the latters outer clothing for possibly concealed weapons. The apprehending
police officer must have a genuine reason, in accordance with the police
officers experience and the surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that
the person to be held has weapons (or contraband) concealed about him. It
should therefore be emphasized that a search and seizure should precede the arrest
for this principle to apply.

What is, therefore, essential is that a genuine reason must exist, in light of
the police officers experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief
that the person who manifests unusual suspicious conduct has weapons or
contraband concealed about him. Such a stop-and-frisk practice serves a dual
purpose: (1) the general interest of effective crime prevention and detection,
which underlies the recognition that a police officer may, under
appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach a
person for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even without
probable cause; and (2) the more pressing interest of safety and self-preservation
which permit the police
From these standards, the Court finds that the questioned act of the police officers
constituted a valid stop-and-frisk operation. The search/seizure of the suspected shabuinitially
noticed in petitioners possession later voluntarily exhibited[24] to the police operative was
undertaken after she was interrogated on what she placed inside a cigarette case, and after PO1
Cruzin introduced himself to petitioner as a police officer. And, at the time of her arrest,

11
petitioner was exhibiting suspicious behavior and in fact attempted to flee after the police officer
had identified himself.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED, with
the MODIFICATION that the penalty of imprisonment shall be twelve (12) years and one (1)
day, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, as maximum.

Kho vs Lanzanas

Facts:

Shun Yih Chemistry Factory (SYCF), a business existing and operating in

Taiwan and engaged in the manufacture and sale of Chin Chun Su Creams/Cosmetics,
appointed Young Factor Enterprises in the Philippines, owned and operated by Quintin
Cheng also known as Kho Seng Hiok, as its distributor of Chin Chun Su products in the
Philippines for a term of two years beginning 1978.1 Quintin Cheng registered with the

12
Bureau of Food and Drugs (BFAD) as distributor of Chin Chun Su products. Quintin
Cheng subsequently secured a supplemental registration for Chin Chun Su and
device.2 This supplemental registration was ordered cancelled by the Bureau of
Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer3 on the ground of failure of the registrant
to file the required affidavit of non-use as required by Section 12 of Republic Act No.
166, as amended.4

Notwithstanding this cancellation, Quintin Cheng executed on 30 January 1990

an Assignment of a Registered Trademark5 and a Supplementary Deed of
Assignment6 dated 25 November 1991 wherein he sold all his right, title, interest and
goodwill in the trademark Chin Chun Su and device to petitioner Elidad Kho.

In the meantime, animosity arose between SYCF and Quintin Cheng resulting in
the termination of their distributorship agreement on 30 October 1990.7

Consequently, on 30 November 1990, SYCF appointed respondent Summerville

General Merchandising, represented by Ang Tiam Chay and Victor Chua, as its
exclusive importer, re-packer and distributor of Chin Chun Su products in the
Philippines8 for a period of five years or until May 2005.

SYCF further executed a Special Power of Attorney dated 11 September 1991 in

favor of Summerville General Merchandising granting it the authority to file complaints
against usurpers of Chin Chun Su trademarks/tradename.9

On 20 December 1991, Elidad Kho/KEC Laboratory filed a Complaint for

Injunction and Damages against Ang Tiam Chay and Summerville General
Merchandising before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 90, docketed as Civil Case No.
Q-91-10926. Plaintiff therein Elidad Kho/KEC Laboratory sought to enjoin defendants
Ang Tiam Chay and Summerville General Merchandising from using the name Chin
Chun Su in their cream products. Accordingly, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. Declaring that plaintiff is not legally authorized to use the trademark "CHIN
CHUN SU" and upholding the right of defendant Summerville General
Merchandising & Co. to use said trademark as authorized by Shun Yih Chemistry
Factory of Taiwan;

2. Declaring plaintiff to have the right to use the copyright claim on "OVAL
FACIAL CREAM CONTAINER/CASE" by virtue of Certificate of Copyright
Registration No. 3687 issued by the National Library on May 23, 1991;

3. No award of damages;

4. Counsels for plaintiff and defendants are awarded P75,000.00 each as

attorneys fees; and

5. Both parties to pay proportionate fees.10

13
 Both parties appealed the RTC decision to the Court of Appeals. In a
decision11 dated 22 November 1999, the appellate court affirmed in toto the
decision of the trial court.

As correctly held by the Court of Appeals, petitioner Kho is not the author of the
trademark "Chin Chun Su" and his only claim to the use of the trademark is based on
the Deed of Agreement executed in his favor by Quintin Cheng. By virtue thereof, he
registered the trademark in his name. The registration was a patent nullity because
petitioner is not the creator of the trademark "Chin Chun Su" and, therefore, has no right
to register the same in his name. Furthermore, the authority of Quintin Cheng to be the
sole distributor of Chin Chun Su in the Philippines had already been terminated by Shun
Yih Chemistry of Taiwan. Withal, he had no right to assign or to transfer the same to
petitioner Kho.

Due to the proliferation of fake Chin Chun Su products, Summerville General

Merchandising filed a Complaint14 before the BFAD against KEC Cosmetic Laboratory
owned by Elidad Kho.

In a resolution of the BFAD dated 4 February 1992, it ruled that the brand name
clearance of CCS in favor of KEC is recalled and cosmetic registration number DR-
X6113-78 dtd 11/17/78 is TEMPORARILY CANCELLED until KEC applies to change or
amend the brand name CCS it is now using. For this purpose, KEC is hereby ordered to
retrieve all locally produced Chin Chun Su Pearl Cream for relabelling as soon as the
amendment of its brand name has been approved by this Bureau with the
corresponding amended Certificate of Registration.

A criminal case filed before the RTC of Manila, Branch 1, entitled, "People of the
Philippines v. Elidad and Violeta Kho and Roger Kho," pursuant to the DOJ Resolution
in I.S. No. 00A-02396 and I.S. No. 00B-10973, ordering the filing of a criminal complaint
against Elidad, Roger and Violeta Kho.16

Shortly before instituting Criminal Case No. 00-183261 against the Khos, or on 7
January 2000, Summerville General Merchandising applied for the issuance of a search
warrant against the Spouses Elidad and Violeta Kho and Roger Kho, since they
persisted in manufacturing and selling Chin Chun Su products despite the BFAD order
directing them to refrain from doing so. The application was docketed as Search
Warrant No. 99-1520 before the RTC of Manila, Branch 7, which was presided over by
respondent herein, Judge Enrico A. Lanzanas. A hearing on the application was held on
10 January 200029 and the search warrant was issued against Elidad, Violeta and
Roger Kho on the same day.30 Its enforcement led to the seizure of several Chin Chun
Su products.311

On 17 January 2000, Elidad, Violeta and Roger Kho filed before the RTC of
Manila, Branch 7, a motion to quash the search warrant and for the return of the items
unlawfully seized. The motion was opposed by Summerville General Merchandising.

14
 The RTC of Manila , denied Elidad and Violeta Khos motion to quash and to
return the seized articles for lack of merit.33 Elidad and Violeta Kho filed a motion for
reconsideration and motion to transfer the proceedings in RTC of Manila, Branch 7, to
RTC of Manila, Branch 1, citing Supreme Court Administrative Order 113-
9534 designating the RTC of Manila, Branch 1, as an Intellectual Property Court. The
RTC of Manila, Branch 7, denied these motions in an Order dated 5 June
2000,35 explaining that:

Anent the Motion to Compel this Branch to transfer the case to Branch 1 of this
Court, suffice it to say that the cases for violation of Arts. 188 and 189 of the Revised
Penal Code (now under the Intellectual Property Law) are those that are already filed in
court after the proper preliminary investigation and not cases for application for search
warrant involving probable violation of said law. WHEREFORE, for lack of merit,
respondents Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Transfer, are hereby DENIED

Elidad and Violeta Kho filed a Petition for Certiorari and Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction,37 docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 60084, before the Court of Appeals
questioning the aforementioned Orders of the RTC of Manila, Branch 7. A decision
dated 6 August 200138 was rendered by the Court of Appeals denying the petition. It
upheld Search Warrant No. 99-1520 as having been validly issued and properly
executed and, thus, there is no basis for the return of the goods seized. A motion for
reconsideration filed by the Khos was denied by the Court of Appeals in an Order dated
16 November 2001.39 Elidad and Violeta Kho filed the present petition praying that the
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 60084 dated 6 August 2001 be
reversed and set aside, and a new decision be issued granting the quashal of Search
Warrant No. 99-1520 and ordering the return of the items unlawfully seized.42

Issue:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the RTC in its findings of
probable cause to issue a search warrant.

Held:

The determination of probable cause does not call for the application of rules and
standards of proof that a judgment of conviction requires after trial on the merits. As
implied by the words themselves, "probable cause" is concerned with probability, not
absolute or even moral certainty. The prosecution need not present at this stage proof
beyond reasonable doubt. The standards of judgment are those of a reasonably prudent
man, not the exacting calibrations of a judge after a full-blown trial.

15
 No law or rule states that probable cause requires a specific kind of evidence. No
formula or fixed rule for its determination exists. Probable cause is determined in the
light of conditions obtaining in a given situation.

A perspicacious examination of the records reveal that the RTC of Manila,

Branch 7, followed the prescribed procedure for the issuance of Search Warrant No. 99-
1520, namely, (1) the examination under oath or affirmation of the Complainant and his
witnesses and, in this case, Judge Enrico A. Lanzanas personally examined
complainant-policewoman SPO4 Nedita Alvario Balagbis, and Mr. Victor Chua, the
representative/officer of Summerville General Merchandising, at the hearing on the
application for Search Warrant No. 99-1520 held on 10 January 2000; (2) an
examination personally conducted by then Presiding Judge Lanzanas, in the form of
searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath, of the complainant and
witnesses on facts personally known to them; and (3) the taking of sworn statements,
together with the affidavits submitted, which were duly attached to the records. 51

We cannot find any irregularity or abuse of discretion on the part of Judge

Lanzanas for issuing the assailed search warrant. On the contrary, we find that he had
complied with the procedural and substantive requirements for issuing a search warrant.
We are, therefore, bound to respect his finding of probable cause for issuing Search
Warrant. After declaring that Search Warrant was validly issued by the RTC of Manila,
Branch 7, then there is no reason for us to order the return of the articles seized by
virtue thereof.

avvphil

Kho vs Makalintal

Facts:

On May 15, 1990, NBI Agent Max B. Salvador applied for the issuance of search
warrants by the respondent Judge against Banjamin V. Kho, now petitioner, in his
residence at No. 45 Bb. Ramona Tirona St., BF Homes, Phase I, Paranaque. On the
same day, Eduardo T. Arugay, another NBI agent, applied with the same court for the
issuance of search warrants against the said petitioner in his house at No. 326 McDivitt

16
St., Bgy. Moonwalk, Paranaque. The search warrants were applied for after teams of
NBI agents had conducted a personal surveillance and investigation in the two houses
referred to on the basis of confidential information they received that the said places
were being used as storage centers for unlicensed firearms and chop-chop
vehicles. Respondent NBI sought for the issuance of search warrants in anticipation of
criminal cases to be instituted against petitioner Kho.

On the same day, the respondent Judge conducted the necessary examination
of the applicants and their witnesses, after which he issued Search Warrants.

On the following day, May 16, 1990, armed with Search Warrant Nos. 90-11 and
90-12, NBI agents searched subject premises at BF Homes, Paranaque, and they
recovered various high-powered firearms and hundreds of rounds of ammunition.

Another search was conducted at the house at No. 326 McDivitt St. Bgy.
Moonwalk, Paranaque, by another team of NBI agents using Search Warrant Nos. 90-
13, 90-14 and 90-15. The said second search yielded several high-powered firearms
with explosives and more than a thousand rounds of ammunition. The simultaneous
searches also resulted in the confiscation of various radio and telecommunication
equipment, two units of motor vehicles (Lite-Ace vans) and one motorcycle. Upon
verification with the Firearms and Explosives Unit in Camp Crame, the NBI agents
found out that no license has ever been issued to any person or entity for the
confiscated firearms in question. Likewise, the radio agents found out that no license
has ever been issued to any person or entity for the confiscated firearms in
question. Likewise, the radio tranceivers recovered and motor vehicles seized turned
out to be unlicensed and unregistered per records of the government agencies
concerned.

On May 22, 1990, the raiding teams submitted separate returns to the respondent
Judge requesting that the items seized be in the continued custody of the NBI

The petitioners presented a Motion to Quash the said Search Warrants, contending
that:
1. The subject search warrants were issued without probable cause;
2. The same search warrants are prohibited by the Constitution for being
general warrants;
3. The said search warrants were issued in violation of the procedural
requirements set forth by the Constitution;
4. The search warrants aforesaid were served in violation of the Revised Rules
of Court; and

17
 5. The objects seized were all legally possessed and issued.

Petitioners question the issuance of subject search warrants, theorizing upon the
absence of any probable cause therefore.

Issue: Whether or not there was a probable cause in the issuance of the search
warrant.

Held:

Petitioners contention is untenable. Records show that the NBI agents who
conducted the surveillance and investigation testified unequivocably that they saw guns
being carried to and unloaded at the two houses searched, and motor vehicles and
spare parts were stored therein. It is therefore decisively clear that the application for
the questioned search warrants was based on the personal knowledge of the applicants
and their witnesses. Nothing improper is perceived in the manner the respondent Judge
conducted the examination of subject applicants for search warrants and their
witnesses. He personally examined them under oath, and asked them searching
questions on the facts and circumstances personally known to them, in compliance with
prescribed procedure and legal requirements. It can be gleaned that the sworn
statements and affidavits submitted by the witnesses were duly attached to the pertinent
records of the proceedings. It was within the discretion of the examining Judge to
determine what questions to ask the witnesses so long as the questions asked are
germane to the pivot of inquiry - the existence or absence of a probable cause. The
Court believes, and so holds, that the said warrants comply with Constitutional and
statutory requirements. The law does not require that the things to be seized must be
described in precise and minute detail as to leave no room for doubt on the part of the
searching authorities. Otherwise, it would be virtually impossible for the applicants to
obtain a warrant as they would not know exactly what kind of things they are looking
for. Since the element of time is very crucial in criminal cases, the effort and time spent
in researching on the details to be embodied in the warrant would render the purpose of
the search nugatory.

Esquillo vs People

Facts:
On December 10, 2002, PO1 Cruzin, together with PO2 Angel Aguas conducted a
surveillance on the activities of a notorious snatcher operating in the area known as Ryan.

As PO1 Cruzin alighted from the private vehicle that brought him and PO2 Aguas to the
target area, he glanced in the direction of petitioner who was standing three meters away and
18
seen placing inside a yellow cigarette case what appeared to be a small heat-sealed transparent
plastic sachet containing white substance. While PO1 Cruz was not sure what the plastic sachet
contained, he became suspicious when petitioner started acting strangely as he began to approach
her. He then introduced himself as a police officer to petitioner and inquired about the plastic
sachet she was placing inside her cigarette case. Instead of replying, however, petitioner
attempted to flee to her house nearby but was timely restrained by PO1 Cruzin who then
requested her to take out the transparent plastic sachet from the cigarette case.

PO1 Cruzin confiscated the plastic sachet and with the seized item brought the petitioner
to the Pasay City Police Station. A laboratory examination on the substance contained in the
plastic sachet was done to determine the presence of shabu and the petitioner have undergone a
drug test.

Repudiating the charges, petitioner gave a different story. She said, she was sick and
resting at home, several policemen in civilian garb with guns tucked in their waists barged in and
asked her whether she knew one named Ryan who they claimed was a notorious snatcher
operating in the area, to which she replied in the negative. The police officers then forced her to
go with them to the Pasay City Police Station-SOG office where she was detained. While she
was under detention, the police officers were toying with a wallet which they claimed
contained shabu and recovered from her. In fine, petitioner claimed that the evidence against her
was planted, stemming from an all too obvious attempt by the police officers to extort money
from her and her family. Two other witnesses for the defense, the petitioners daughter and a
family friend corroborated petitioners account. They went on to relate that the police officers
never informed them of the reason why they were taking custody of petitioner

Issue:
Whether or not there is a valid warrantless arrest.

Held:
From these standards, the Court finds that the questioned act of the police officers
constituted a valid stop-and-frisk operation. In its challenged Decision affirming petitioners
conviction, the appellate court, citing People v. Chua,[15] held that the police officers had
probable cause to search petitioner under the stop-and-frisk concept, a recognized exception to
the general rule prohibiting warrantless searches.

Brushing aside petitioners defense of frame-up, the appellate court noted that petitioner
failed to adduce evidence that the arresting officers were impelled by any evil motive to falsely
charge her, and that she was even found positive for substance abuse. Petitioner did not question

19
early on her warrantless arrest before her arraignment. Neither did she take steps to quash the
Information on such ground. Verily, she raised the issue of warrantless arrest as well as the
inadmissibility of evidence acquired on the occasion thereof for the first time only on appeal
before the appellate court.[18] By such omissions, she is deemed to have waived any objections
on the legality of her arrest.[19]

Kho vs Lanzanas

Facts:

Shun Yih Chemistry Factory (SYCF), a business existing and operating in

Taiwan and engaged in the manufacture and sale of Chin Chun Su Creams/Cosmetics,
appointed Young Factor Enterprises in the Philippines, owned and operated by Quintin
Cheng also known as Kho Seng Hiok, as its distributor of Chin Chun Su products in the
Philippines for a term of two years beginning 1978.1 Quintin Cheng registered with the
Bureau of Food and Drugs (BFAD) as distributor of Chin Chun Su products. Quintin

20
Cheng subsequently secured a supplemental registration for Chin Chun Su and
device.2 This supplemental registration was ordered cancelled by the Bureau of
Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer3 on the ground of failure of the registrant
to file the required affidavit of non-use as required by Section 12 of Republic Act No.
166, as amended.4

Notwithstanding this cancellation, Quintin Cheng executed on 30 January 1990

an Assignment of a Registered Trademark5 and a Supplementary Deed of
Assignment6 dated 25 November 1991 wherein he sold all his right, title, interest and
goodwill in the trademark Chin Chun Su and device to petitioner Elidad Kho.

In the meantime, animosity arose between SYCF and Quintin Cheng resulting in
the termination of their distributorship agreement on 30 October 1990. 7

Consequently, on 30 November 1990, SYCF appointed respondent Summerville

General Merchandising, represented by Ang Tiam Chay and Victor Chua, as its
exclusive importer, re-packer and distributor of Chin Chun Su products in the
Philippines8 for a period of five years or until May 2005.

SYCF further executed a Special Power of Attorney dated 11 September 1991 in

favor of Summerville General Merchandising granting it the authority to file complaints
against usurpers of Chin Chun Su trademarks/tradename.9

On 20 December 1991, Elidad Kho/KEC Laboratory filed a Complaint for

Injunction and Damages against Ang Tiam Chay and Summerville General
Merchandising before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 90, docketed as Civil Case No.
Q-91-10926. Plaintiff therein Elidad Kho/KEC Laboratory sought to enjoin defendants
Ang Tiam Chay and Summerville General Merchandising from using the name Chin
Chun Su in their cream products. Accordingly, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. Declaring that plaintiff is not legally authorized to use the trademark "CHIN
CHUN SU" and upholding the right of defendant Summerville General
Merchandising & Co. to use said trademark as authorized by Shun Yih Chemistry
Factory of Taiwan;

2. Declaring plaintiff to have the right to use the copyright claim on "OVAL
FACIAL CREAM CONTAINER/CASE" by virtue of Certificate of Copyright
Registration No. 3687 issued by the National Library on May 23, 1991;

3. No award of damages;

4. Counsels for plaintiff and defendants are awarded P75,000.00 each as

attorneys fees; and

5. Both parties to pay proportionate fees.10

21
 Both parties appealed the RTC decision to the Court of Appeals. In a
decision11 dated 22 November 1999, the appellate court affirmed in toto the
decision of the trial court.

Due to the proliferation of fake Chin Chun Su products, Summerville General

Merchandising filed a Complaint14 before the BFAD against KEC Cosmetic Laboratory
owned by Elidad Kho.

A criminal case filed before the RTC of Manila, Branch 1, entitled, "People of the
Philippines v. Elidad and Violeta Kho and Roger Kho," pursuant to the DOJ Resolution
in I.S. No. 00A-02396 and I.S. No. 00B-10973, ordering the filing of a criminal complaint
against Elidad, Roger and Violeta Kho

Shortly before instituting Criminal Case No. 00-183261 against the Khos, or on 7
January 2000, Summerville General Merchandising applied for the issuance of a search
warrant against the Spouses Elidad and Violeta Kho and Roger Kho, since they
persisted in manufacturing and selling Chin Chun Su products despite the BFAD order
directing them to refrain from doing so. A hearing on the application of a search warrant
presided over by respondent herein, Judge Enrico A. Lanzanas was held on 10 January
200029 and the search warrant was issued against Elidad, Violeta and Roger Kho on the
same day.30 Its enforcement led to the seizure of several Chin Chun Su products.311

On 17 January 2000, Elidad, Violeta and Roger Kho filed before the RTC of
Manila, Branch 7, a motion to quash the search warrant and for the return of the items
unlawfully seized. The motion was opposed by Summerville General Merchandising.

Issue:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the RTC in its findings of
probable cause to issue a search warrant.

Held:

A perspicacious examination of the records reveal that the RTC of Manila,

Branch 7, followed the prescribed procedure for the issuance of Search Warrant. (1) the
examination under oath or affirmation of the Complainant and his witnesses and, in this
case, Judge Enrico A. Lanzanas personally examined complainant-policewoman SPO4
Nedita Alvario Balagbis, and Mr. Victor Chua, the representative/officer of Summerville
General Merchandising (2) an examination personally conducted by then Presiding
Judge Lanzanas, in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under
oath, of the complainant and witnesses on facts personally known to them; and (3) the

22
taking of sworn statements, together with the affidavits submitted, which were duly
attached to the records.

The determination of probable cause does not call for the application of rules and
standards of proof that a judgment of conviction requires after trial on the merits. As
implied by the words themselves, "probable cause" is concerned with probability, not
absolute or even moral certainty. The prosecution need not present at this stage proof
beyond reasonable doubt. The standards of judgment are those of a reasonably prudent
man, not the exacting calibrations of a judge after a full-blown trial.

No law or rule states that probable cause requires a specific kind of evidence. No
formula or fixed rule for its determination exists. Probable cause is determined in the
light of conditions obtaining in a given situation.

The Court did not find any irregularity or abuse of discretion on the part of Judge
Lanzanas for issuing the assailed search warrant. On the contrary, the court found that
he had complied with the procedural and substantive requirements for issuing a search
warrant.

Kho vs Makalintal

Facts:
On May 15, 1990, NBI Agent Max B. Salvador applied for the issuance of search
warrants by the respondent Judge against Banjamin V. Kho, now petitioner, in his
residence at No. 45 Bb. Ramona Tirona St., BF Homes, Phase I, Paranaque. On the

23
same day, Eduardo T. Arugay, another NBI agent, applied with the same court for the
issuance of search warrants against the said petitioner in his house at No. 326 McDivitt
St., Bgy. Moonwalk, Paranaque. The search warrants were applied for after teams of
NBI agents had conducted a personal surveillance and investigation in the two houses
referred to on the basis of confidential information they received that the said places
were being used as storage centers for unlicensed firearms and chop-chop
vehicles. Respondent NBI sought for the issuance of search warrants in anticipation of
criminal cases to be instituted against petitioner Kho.

On the same day, the respondent Judge conducted the necessary examination
of the applicants and their witnesses, after which he issued Search Warrants. On the
following day, May 16, 1990, armed with a Search Warrant, NBI agents searched
subject premises at BF Homes, Paranaque, and they recovered various high-powered
firearms and hundreds of rounds of ammunition.

Another search was conducted at the house at No. 326 McDivitt St. Bgy.
Moonwalk, Paranaque, by another team of NBI agents. The said second search yielded
several high-powered firearms with explosives and more than a thousand rounds of
ammunition. The simultaneous searches also resulted in the confiscation of various
radio and telecommunication equipment, two units of motor vehicles (Lite-Ace vans)
and one motorcycle. Upon verification with the Firearms and Explosives Unit in Camp
Crame, the NBI agents found out that no license has ever been issued to any person or
entity for the confiscated firearms in question. Likewise, the radio agents found out that
no license has ever been issued to any person or entity for the confiscated firearms in
question. Likewise, the radio tranceivers recovered and motor vehicles seized turned
out to be unlicensed and unregistered per records of the government agencies

The petitioners presented a Motion to Quash the said Search Warrants, contending
that:
1. The subject search warrants were issued without probable cause;
2. The same search warrants are prohibited by the Constitution for being
general warrants;
3. The said search warrants were issued in violation of the procedural
requirements set forth by the Constitution;
4. The search warrants aforesaid were served in violation of the Revised Rules
of Court; and
5. The objects seized were all legally possessed and issued.

Petitioners question the issuance of subject search warrants, theorizing upon the
absence of any probable cause therefore.

Issue:

24
 Whether or not there was a probable cause in the issuance of the search
warrant.

Held:

Petitioners contention is untenable. Records show that the NBI agents who
conducted the surveillance and investigation testified unequivocably that they saw guns
being carried to and unloaded at the two houses searched, and motor vehicles and
spare parts were stored therein. It is therefore decisively clear that the application for
the questioned search warrants was based on the personal knowledge of the applicants
and their witnesses. Nothing improper is perceived in the manner the respondent Judge
conducted the examination of subject applicants for search warrants and their
witnesses. He personally examined them under oath, and asked them searching
questions on the facts and circumstances personally known to them, in compliance with
prescribed procedure and legal requirements. It can be gleaned that the sworn
statements and affidavits submitted by the witnesses were duly attached to the pertinent
records of the proceedings. It was within the discretion of the examining Judge to
determine what questions to ask the witnesses so long as the questions asked are
germane to the pivot of inquiry - the existence or absence of a probable cause. The
Court believes, and so holds, that the said warrants comply with Constitutional and
statutory requirements. The law does not require that the things to be seized must be
described in precise and minute detail as to leave no room for doubt on the part of the
searching authorities. Otherwise, it would be virtually impossible for the applicants to
obtain a warrant as they would not know exactly what kind of things they are looking
for. Since the element of time is very crucial in criminal cases, the effort and time spent
in researching on the details to be embodied in the warrant would render the purpose of
the search nugatory.

Malacat vs. Court of Appeals

[GR 123595, 12 December 1997]

Facts:

On 27 August 1990, at about 6:30 p.m., allegedly in response to bomb threats reported seven
days earlier, Rodolfo Yu of the Western Police District, Metropolitan Police Force of the
Integrated National Police, Police Station No. 3, Quiapo, Manila, was on foot patrol with three
other police officers (all of them in uniform) along Quezon Boulevard, Quiapo, Manila, near the

25
Mercury Drug store at Plaza Miranda. They chanced upon two groups of Muslim-looking men,
with each group, comprised of three to four men, posted at opposite sides of the corner of
Quezon Boulevard near the Mercury Drug Store. These men were acting suspiciously with "their
eyes moving very fast." Yu and his companions positioned themselves at strategic points and
observed both groups for about 30 minutes. The police officers then approached one group of
men, who then fled in different directions. As the policemen gave chase, Yu caught up with and
apprehended Sammy Malacat y Mandar (who Yu recognized, inasmuch as allegedly the previous
Saturday, 25 August 1990, likewise at Plaza Miranda, Yu saw Malacat and 2 others attempt to
detonate a grenade). Upon searching Malacat, Yu found a fragmentation grenade tucked inside
the latter's "front waist line." Yu's companion, police officer Rogelio Malibiran, apprehended
Abdul Casan from whom a .38 caliber revolver was recovered. Malacat and Casan were then
brought to Police Station 3 where Yu placed an "X" mark at the bottom of the grenade and
thereafter gave it to his commander. Yu did not issue any receipt for the grenade he allegedly
recovered from Malacat. On 30 August 1990, Malacat was charged with violating Section 3 of
Presidential Decree 1866. At arraignment on 9 October 1990, petitioner, assisted by counsel de
officio, entered a plea of not guilty. Malacat denied the charges and explained that he only
recently arrived in Manila. However, several other police officers mauled him, hitting him with
benches and guns. Petitioner was once again searched, but nothing was found on him. He saw
the grenade only in court when it was presented. In its decision dated 10 February 1994 but
promulgated on 15 February 1994, the trial court ruled that the warrantless search and seizure
of Malacat was akin to a "stop and frisk," where a "warrant and seizure can be effected without
necessarily being preceded by an arrest" and "whose object is either to maintain the status quo
momentarily while the police officer seeks to obtain more information"; and that the seizure of
the grenade from Malacat was incidental to a lawful arrest. The trial court thus found Malacat
guilty of the crime of illegal possession of explosives under Section 3 of PD 1866, and sentenced
him to suffer the penalty of not less than 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of Reclusion Temporal, as
minimum, and not more than 30 years of Reclusion Perpetua, as maximum. On 18 February
1994, Malacat filed a notice of appeal indicating that he was appealing to the Supreme Court.
However, the record of the case was forwarded to the Court of Appeals (CA-GR CR 15988).

In its decision of 24 January 1996, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court. Hence, the
instant petition.

Issue:

Whether the search made on Malacat is valid, pursuant to the exception of stop and frisk.

Held:

No. The general rule as regards arrests, searches and seizures is that a warrant is needed in
order to validly effect the same. The Constitutional prohibition against unreasonable arrests,
searches and seizures refers to those effected without a validly issued warrant, subject to certain
exceptions. As regards valid warrantless arrests, these are found in Section 5, Rule 113 of the

26
Rules of Court. A warrantless arrest under the circumstances contemplated under Section 5(a)
has been denominated as one "in flagrante delicto," while that under Section 5(b) has been
described as a "hot pursuit" arrest.

Turning to valid warrantless searches, they are limited to the following: (1) customs searches; (2)
search of moving vehicles; (3) seizure of evidence in plain view; (4) consent searches; (5) a search
incidental to a lawful arrest; and (6) a "stop and frisk." The concepts of a "stop-and-frisk" and of a
search incidental to a lawful arrest must not be confused. These two types of warrantless
searches differ in terms of the requisite quantum of proof before they may be validly effected
and in their allowable scope. In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest
determines the validity of the incidental search. Here, there could have been no valid in flagrante
delicto or hot pursuit arrest preceding the search in light of the lack of personal knowledge on
the part of Yu, the arresting officer, or an overt physical act, on the part of Malacat, indicating
that a crime had just been committed, was being committed or was going to be committed.
Plainly, the search conducted on Malacat could not have been one incidental to a lawful arrest.
On the other hand, while probable cause is not required to conduct a "stop and frisk," it
nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a "stop and frisk." A genuine
reason must exist, in light of the police officer's experience and surrounding conditions, to
warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons concealed about him. Finally, a "stop-
and-frisk" serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general interest of effective crime prevention and
detection, which underlies the recognition that a police officer may, under appropriate
circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach a person for purposes of investigating
possible criminal behavior even without probable cause; and (2) the more pressing interest of
safety and self-preservation which permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself that
the person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and
fatally be used against the police officer. Here, there are at least three (3) reasons why the "stop-
and-frisk" was invalid:

First, there is grave doubts as to Yu's claim that Malacat was a member of the group which
attempted to bomb Plaza Miranda 2 days earlier. This claim is neither supported by any police
report or record nor corroborated by any other police officer who allegedly chased that group.

Second, there was nothing in Malacat's behavior or conduct which could have reasonably
elicited even mere suspicion other than that his eyes were "moving very fast" an observation
which leaves us incredulous since Yu and his teammates were nowhere near Malacat and it was
already 6:30 p.m., thus presumably dusk. Malacat and his companions were merely standing at
the corner and were not creating any commotion or trouble.

Third, there was at all no ground, probable or otherwise, to believe that Malacat was armed with
a deadly weapon. None was visible to Yu, for as he admitted, the alleged grenade was
"discovered" "inside the front waistline" of Malacat, and from all indications as to the distance
between Yu and Malacat, any telltale bulge, assuming that Malacat was indeed hiding a
grenade, could not have been visible to Yu. What is unequivocal then are blatant violations of
Malacat's rights solemnly guaranteed in Sections 2 and 12(1) of Article III of the Constitution.

27
 NOLASKO ET.AL V HON. ERNANI CRUZ PAO ET. AL

Facts:

Petitiones Aguilar-Roques was one of the accused in a rebellion case, she was then still at large.
On August 6, 1984, at 9am, Lt. Col. Virgilio G. Saldajeno of the CSG, applied for a Search Warrant
from respondent Hon. Ernani Cruz Pao, Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court in Quezon
City, to be served at the residence of AGUILAR-ROQUE, after almost a month of "round the clock
surveillance" of the premises as a "suspected underground house of the CPP/NPA." AGUILAR-
ROQUE has been long wanted by the military for being a high ranking officer of the Communist
Party of the Philippines, particularly connected with the MV Karagatan/Doa Andrea cases.

11:30 Am of the same dae, Aguilar-Roque and Nolasco were arrested by the Constabulary
Security Group (CSG).

A search was issued by the respondent Judge Pano. The disputed Search Warrant (No. 80-84)
describes the personalities to be seized as follows:

Documents, papers and other records of the Communist Party of the Phihppines/New Peoples
Army and/or the National Democratic Front, such as Minutes of the Party Meetings, Plans of
these groups, Programs, List of possible supporters, subversive books and instructions, manuals
not otherwise available to the public, and support money from foreign or local sources.

The searching party seized 428 documents and written materials, and additionally a portable
typewriter, and 2 wooden boxes, making 431 items in all.

On August 13, 1984 the CITY FISCAL filed an Information for Violation of Presidential Decree No.
33 (Illegal Possession of Subversive Documents) against petitioner.

Petitioner initially raised the inadmissibilty of the seized items, however, Judge Pano admitted
the the things seized and ruled that the seized documents "shall be subject to disposition of the
tribunal trying the case against respondent."

Petitioner filed a Motion to Suppress in the SUBVERSIVE DOCUMENTS CASE, praying that such of
the 431 items belonging to them be returned to them. Judge Santos denied the Motion.

Hence, this Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and mandamus to annul and set aside the (1)
Search Warrant issued by respondent RTC Judge Pao; (2) his Order admitting the Amended
Return and granting the Motion to Retain Seized Items; and (3) Order of respondent MTC Judge
Santos denying petitioners' Motion to Suppress.

28
Issue: Whether or not the Search Warrant No. 80-84 issued by Judge Pano is null and void.

Ruling. Yes.

The PETITIONERS principally assert that the Search Warrant is void because it is a general
warrant since it does not sufficiently describe with particularity the things subject of the search
and seizure, and that probable cause has not been properly established for lack of searching
questions propounded to the applicant's witness.

The Court finds merit on the petition.

he disputed Search Warrant (No. 80-84) describes the personalities to be seized as follows:

Documents, papers and other records of the Communist Party of the Phihppines/New Peoples
Army and/or the National Democratic Front, such as Minutes of the Party Meetings, Plans of
these groups, Programs, List of possible supporters, subversive books and instructions, manuals
not otherwise available to the public, and support money from foreign or local sources.

It is at once evident that the foregoing Search Warrant authorizes the seizure of personal
properties vaguely described and not particularized. It is an all- embracing description which
includes everything conceivable regarding the Communist Party of the Philippines and the
National Democratic Front. It does not specify what the subversive books and instructions are;
what the manuals not otherwise available to the public contain to make them subversive or to
enable them to be used for the crime of rebellion. There is absent a definite guideline to the
searching team as to what items might be lawfully seized thus giving the officers of the law
discretion regarding what articles they should seize as, in fact, taken also were a portable
typewriter and 2 wooden boxes. It is thus in the nature of a general warrant and infringes on the
constitutional mandate requiring particular description of the things to be seized. In the recent
rulings of this Court, search warrants of similar description were considered null and void for
being too general. The things to be search must be particularized.

Also, the questions propounded by respondent Executive Judge to the applicant's witness are
not sufficiently searching to establish probable cause. The "probable cause" required to justify
the issuance of a search warrant comprehends such facts and circumstances as will induce a
cautious man to rely upon them and act in pursuant thereof, said the Court. The Court went on
saying that the questions asked were leading questions and not searching questions. The
examination conducted was general in nature and merely repetitious of the deposition of said
witness. Mere generalization will not suffice and does not satisfy the requirements of probable
cause upon which a warrant may issue.

29
WHEREFORE, while Search Warrant No. 80-84 issued on August 6, 1984 by respondent Executive
Judge Ernani Cruz Pao is hereby annulled and set aside.

People v Chua

Facts.

Accused-appelant Chua was charged with violation of Section 16, Article III of R.A. 6425, as
amended by R.A. 7659, and for Illegal Possession of ammunitions in two separate Informations.

He pleaded not guilty.

The prosecution presented 3 witnesses. According to them:

They received a report from their informant that Chua wes about to deliver drugs that night at
the Thunder Hotel in Angeles City. The informer reported that Chua was distributing shabu to
different karaoke bars.

On the basis of the report, the policemen formed a team and position themselves across
McArthur Highway near Bali Hai Restaurant, fronting Thunder Inn Hotel.

The informer pointed to a car driven by Chua which just arrived and parked near the entrance of
the Hotel. Chua was seen to carrying a zest-o juice box, SPO2 Nulud and PO2 Nunag hurriedly
accosted him and introduced themselves as police officers. As accused-appellant pulled out his
wallet, a small transparent plastic bag with a shabu protruded from his right back pocket. The
police made ]a body search which yielded twenty (20) pieces of live .22 caliber firearm bullets
from his left back pocket. When the police peeked into the contents of the Zest-O box, he saw
that it contained a shabu SPO2 Nulud instantly confiscated the small transparent plastic bag, the
Zest-O juice box, the twenty (20) pieces of .22 caliber firearm bullets and the car used by
accused-appellant. Afterwards, SPO2 Nulud and the other police operatives who arrived at the
scene brought the confiscated items to the office of Col. Guttierez at the PNP Headquarters in
Camp Pepito, Angeles City.

Version of the accused.

30
Accused-appellant alleged that on the night in question, he was driving the car of his wife to
follow her and his son to Manila. He felt sleepy, so he decided to take the old route along
McArthur Highway. He stopped in front of a small store near Thunder Inn Hotel in Balibago,
Angeles City to buy cigarettes and candies. While at the store, he noticed a man approach and
examine the inside of his car. When he called the attention of the onlooker, the man
immediately pulled out a .45 caliber gun and made him face his car with raised hands. The man
later on identified himself as a policeman. During the course of the arrest, the policeman took
out his wallet and instructed him to open his car. He refused, so the policeman took his car keys
and proceeded to search his car. At this time, the police officers companions arrived at the scene
in two cars. PO2 Nulud, who just arrived at the scene, pulled him away from his car in a nearby
bank, while the others searched his car.

Thereafter, he was brought to the Salakot Police Station and was held inside a bathroom for
about fifteen minutes until Col. Guttierez arrived, who ordered his men to call the media. In the
presence of reporters, Col. Guttierez opened the box and accused-appellant was made to hold
the box while pictures were being taken.[6]

Wilfredo Lagman corroborated the story of the accused-appellant in its material points. He
testified that he witnessed the incident while he was conducting a routine security check around
the premises of the Guess Building, near Thunder Inn Hotel.

The trial court convicted him of the crime of Illegal Possession. Hence, Chua appealed, and raise
the validty of his arrest and subsequent searcgh.

Issue: Whether or not accused-appelant warrantless arrest and subsequent search is lawful.

Ruling. No.

Accused-appellant maintains that the warrantless arrest and search made by the police
operatives was unlawful; that in the light of the testimony of SPO2 Nulud that prior to his arrest
he has been under surveillance for two years, there was therefore no compelling reason for the
haste within which the arresting officers sought to arrest and search him without a warrant; that
the police officers had sufficient information about him and could have easily arrested him.
Accused-appellant further argues that since his arrest was null an void, the drugs that were
seized should likewise be inadmissible in evidence since they were obtained in violation of his
constitutional rights against unreasonable search and seizures and arrest.

The Court finds accused-appellant argument is impressed with merit.

31
In the case at bar, neither the in flagrante delicto nor the stop and frisk principles is applicable to
justify the warrantless arrest and consequent search and seizure made by the police operatives
on accused-appellant.

In in flagrante delicto arrests, the accused is apprehended at the very moment he is committing
or attempting to commit or has just committed an offense in the presence of the arresting
officer. Emphasis should be laid on the fact that the law requires that the search be incidental to
a lawful arrest. Therefore it is beyond cavil that a lawful arrest must precede the search of a
person and his belongings.Accordingly, for this exception to apply two elements must concur: (1)
the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the
presence or within the view of the arresting officer.

We find the two aforementioned elements lacking in the case at bar. The record reveals that
when accused-appellant arrived at the vicinity of Thunder Inn Hotel, he merely parked his car
along the McArthur Highway, alighted from it and casually proceeded towards the entrance of
the Hotel clutching a sealed Zest-O juice box. Accused-appellant did not act in a suspicious
manner. For all intents and purposes, there was no overt manifestation that accused-appellant
has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime.

However, notwithstanding the absence of any overt act strongly manifesting a violation of the
law, the group of SPO2 Nulud hurriedly accosted[19] accused-appellant and later on introduced
themselves as police officers.Accused-appellant was arrested before the alleged drop-off of
shabu was done. Probable cause in this case was more imagined than real. Thus, there could
have been no in flagrante delicto arrest preceding the search, in light of the lack of an overt
physical act on the part of accused-appellant that he had committed a crime, was committing a
crime or was going to commit a crime. As applied to in flagrante delicto arrests, it has been held
that reliable information alone, absent any overt act indicative of a felonious enterprise in the
presence and within the view of the arresting officers, is not sufficient to constitute probable
cause that would justify an in flagrante delicto arrest.

The Court added that, the police operatives cannot feign ignorance of the alleged illegal activities
of accused-appellant. Considering that the identity, address and activities of the suspected
culprit was already ascertained two years previous to the actual arrest, there was indeed no
reason why the police officers could not have obtained a judicial warrant before arresting
accused-appellant and searching his person. Whatever information their civilian asset relayed to
them hours before accused-appellants arrest was not a product of an on-the-spot tip which may
excuse them from obtaining a warrant of arrest. Accordingly, the arresting teams contention that
their arrest of accused-appellant was a product of an on-the-spot tip is untenable.

Finally, the Court empahsized, that the governments drive against illegal drugs needs the
support of every citizen. But it should not undermine the fundamental rights of every citizen as
enshrined in the Constitution. The constitutional guarantee against warrantless arrests and
unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be so carelessly disregarded as overzealous police

32
officers are sometimes wont to do. Fealty to the constitution and the rights it guarantees should
be paramount in their minds, otherwise their good intentions will remain as such simply because
they have blundered. The criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the law that sets him free.
Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws, or
worse, its disregard of the charter of its own existence.

Wherefore, the decision of the RTC is reversed, accused-appellant Chua is acquitted.

People vs Agojo
GR 181318
April 16, 2009

Facts:

A buy bust operation was conducted on August 27, 1999 with Rodolfo Alonzo, a civilian
informant, as poseur buyer.

Alonzo previously agreed with the accused German Agojo to meet at the Mercado Hospital on
above date. There, Agojo would sell him 200 grams of shabu worth Php 70,000. They agreed
on a 50% cash and 50% credit basis. Alonzo informed Police Chief Inspector Ablang who then
entrusted Alonzo with Php 71,000 marked JUA.

The buy bust team arrived at the hospital at about 11:00 pm. Alonzo waited for Agojo at an
eatery in front of the hospital and the rest of the team took strategic positions. Agojo arrived at
about 11:30 aboard his car. He approached Alonzo to ask if the latter had the money. Alonzo
handed over the marked money. Agojo then took a VHS box from his car and handed it over to
Alonzo. They then walked along the hospital gate near the emergency room. Agojo entered
the hospital.

Alonzo then examined the VHS box and signaled the buy bust team who immediately
proceeded to the scene. Alonzo handed the VHS box to Ablang. Inside were 4 plastic bags of
crystalline substance which the team suspected was shabu. Ablang instructed a team member,
Salazar, to inform Agojo that this car had been bumped to lure him into exiting the hospital.

Agojo exited from the hospital and was arrested despite his resistance. The team recovered
Php 10,000 marked money. A .45 caliber pistol containing 7 bullets was recovered from his car.

33
The laboratory examination the 4 plastic sachets revealed that it contained methamphetamine
hydrochloride with a total weight of 206.32 grams.

The RTS found Agojo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the charge against him for violation of
RA 6425 aka Dangerous Drugs Act. He was acquitted of the charge of violation of PD 1866 aka
Illegal Possession of Firearms for lack of sufficient evidence.

The case was brought on automatic review before the SC since he was sentenced to death by
the trial court. In his appeal, Agojo pointed that the arrest was not in flagrante delicto.

Issue: Was the arrest validly executed?

Held: Yes

Ratio: The fact that the arrest was not in flagrante delicto is of no consequence. The arrest was
validly executed pursuant to Sec. 5 par. B of Rule 113 of the ROC which states:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant when lawful:

xxx
b. When an offense has in fact been committed and he has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it;
xxx

In this case, both requirements are present. From the spot where the buy-bust team was, they
definitely witnessed the sale of shabu. There was a large measure of immediacy between the
time of commission of the offense and the time of the arrest. ***

*** Hot pursuit exception p. 242 Riano immediacy between the time of commission of the
crime & time of arrest

??? Was the search in the car valid?

34
People vs Gabo
GR 161083
August 3, 2010

Facts:

On May 14, 2001, around 12:15 am, a fire broke out inside the plant of Sanyoware Plastic
Products Manufacturing Corporation in Bulacan. The building that was razed by fire,
Warehouse 2, was shared with Unitedware Corp. The building was divided at the center by a
tall concrete firewall.

After the investigation conducted by the Criminal Investigation Detention Group (CIDG) and
Inter Agency Anti-Arson Task Force (IATF) of the DILG, 7 persons were accused of destructive
arson including Wilson Ting, plant manager, and Edward Yao (President of Unitedware).

35
In support of the accusation, the prosecution submitted sworn statements of Sanyoware staff
and the officers / firemen who examined the fire. Staff made the following allegations:

a. That a day before the fire, expensive finish products were loaded onto delivery trucks
and that saleable products were transferred from the burned warehouse;
b. That respondents Edward Yao and Wilson Ting threatened a staff to write a sworn
statement claiming that there were two separate sets of fire but occurred
simultaneously caused by defective wiring;
c. A week before the fire, unserviceable molds and unusable components were transferred
to the burned warehouse;
d. That Sanyoware had outstanding obligations to banks & corporations amounting to P95-
96 million, and to various individuals amounting to P180 million;
e. That Edward Yao went to Sanyoware 3 times a day before the fire, a Sunday, which he
normally did not do. Wilson Tingion also visited the plant that day;
f. That the witnesses statements were taken from the investigating firemen before the
investigation report could be prepared and that they were made to sign another report
by some officers;

The respondents refuted the allegations claiming that both companies were profitable and that
Sanyoware had a good record with the banks. They also alleged that the complainant did not
conduct any investigation except to get the sworn statements of the witnesses. It was the
elements of the Bocaue Fire Station and the Bulacan BFP that conducted a thorough
investigation. They took pictures and speciments which were submitted to the laboratory for
examination.

Information was filed against 6 of the original accused for the crime of arson.

Prior to arraignment and before the issuance of warrants of arrest, the respondents filed a
Motion to Conduct Hearing to Determine Probable Cause and to Hold in Abeyance the Issuance
of Warrant of Arrest.

The RTC dismissed the case. The CA affirmed the RTCs orders. Petitioners now appeal to the
SC.

Issue: Did the RTC Judge comply with Section 5, Rule 112 ROC in dismissing the case against
respondents?

Held: Yes

Ratio:

Sec. 5, Rule 112 provides that within 10 days from the filing of complaint or information, the
judge shall personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence.

36
He may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish
probable cause. In case of doubt on the existence of probable cause, the judge may order the
prosecutor to present additional evidence within 5 days from notice.

The first duty of a judge when the information is filed with the court is to determine probable
cause. It is the set of facts and circumstances as would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent
man to believe that the offense charged in the information has been committed by the person
sought to be arrested.

The Court finds that the RTC had complied with the requirement under the rules of personally
evaluating the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence. This court will defer to
the findings of fact of the RTC more so as they were affirmed by the CA.

The fire investigation report and certification made by the provincial fire marshall point to the
faulty wiring as the fires cause of origin. The reports ruled out the use of inflammable
substances. The findings were never debunked or repudiated. Physical evidence is evidence of
the highest order and it speaks more eloquently than a hundred witnesses.

37
 People vs Gerente
GR No. 95847-48 March 10, 1993

Facts: Accused-appellant Gabriel Gerente was charged with Murder and Violation of
Section 8, Art. II of R.A. 6425. As alleged in the information, the eye-witness Edna Edwina Reyes
overheard her neighbor, Gerente, and two others, Fredo Echigoren and Totoy Echigoren,
talking about their intention to kill Clarito Blace. The plan to kill the victim was carried out at
about 2:00 of the same day. Edna testified that she witnessed the killing; that Fredo Echigoran
hit him first, followed by Totoy Echigoran and then by Gerente, hitting him with a piece of wood
twice in the head and when he fell, Totoy dropped a hollow block on his head. At about
4:00pm, patrolman Urrutia received a report of a mauling incident and subsequently found out,
at the hospital, that the victim died on arrival. Urrutia, together with other patrolmen, went to
the scene of the crime and found the instruments of death. The witness pinpointed Gerente as
one of the persons who killed the victim. The policemen immediately went to Gerentes house
to arrest him. There, Urrutia frisked Gerente and found a coin purse in his pocket containing
dried marijuana leaves wrapped in cigarette foil.

Issue: Was the search and seizure in the course of a warrantless arrest valid?

Ruling: Yes, the search of the appellants person and the seizure of the marijuana leaves
in his possession were valid.

Sec. 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court speaks of search incidental to lawful arrest, which
provides that any person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything
which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant. In
relation to this, sec.5, Rule 113 provides that arrest without a warrant is lawful when an offense
has just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to
be arrested has committed it. In the case, the policemen arrested Gerente only some 3 hours
after he and his companions had killed Blace; and when they inspected the crime scene, they

38
found the instruments of death. The arrest was made after the eye-witness, Edna Edwina
Reyes, reported that she witnessed the killing and pinpointed Gerente as one of the killers. This
makes the arrest lawful even without a warrant.

Since the search was conducted incident to a lawful arrest, the search on the person and
the seizure of the marijuana found in his possession were likewise valid.

People vs Laguio, Jr
GR No. 128587 March 16, 2007

Facts: On May 16, 1996, police operatives arrested three persons for unlawful
possession of a drug popularly known as shabu. Upon investigation, the arrested persons
identified Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio as the source of the drug. An entrapment operation
was then set. During the operation, Teck and Junio were arrested and when they were
questioned, they did not disclose their source of shabu but admitted that they were working for
Lawrence Wang. The police decided to put Wang under surveillance and proceeded to Maria
Orosa Apartment where Teck and Junio said he would be. While Wang was walking towards his
BMW car, the policemen approached him and introduced themselves and, upon confirming
that he was indeed Lawrence Wang, immediately frisked him. When frisked, there was found
inside his front right pocket an unlicensed AMT Cal. 389 9mm automatic pistol with
ammunitions. He was asked to open the back compartment of the car and found inside it were
32 transparent plastic bags containing 29.29 kg of shabu, cash, electronic and mechanical
scales, and unlicensed Daewoo Pistol 9mm Pistol with magazine. Then and there, Wang resisted
the warrantless arrest and search. He was charged with RA 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act), PD
1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms) and RA 7166 (COMELEC Gun Ban). Subsequently, Wang
filed a Demurrer to Evidence, arguing that the search and arrest were unlawful. The trial court
granted the Demurer and acquitted him of the three charges filed. Hence, this petition for
review on certiorari.

Issue: Whether the warrantless arrest and search were lawful.

Ruling: The arrest and search were not lawful, as correctly held by the trial court.
39
 Arrest without warrant may be lawful when done in pursuance to Sec. 5, Rule 113 of the
Rules of Court. Such section provides three instances, two of which are (a) arrest in flagrante
delicto and (b) arrest based on personal knowledge when the crime has just been committed.
For in flagrante delicto arrest to be valid, there must be an (1) overt act indicating that the
person has just, is actually committing or about to commit a crime (2) in the presence or within
the view of the arresting officer. In the case, private respondent Wang did not manifest any
suspicious behavior that would invite the attention of the police. He was merely walking from
the apartment and was about to enter the parked BMW car when the police arrested him and
frisked and searched his person and the compartment of the car. Reliable information alone,
absent any overt act done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officers, is not
sufficient to constitute probable cause that would justify a warrantless arrest. He cannot
likewise be arrested without a warrant under arrest based on personal knowledge because he
was arrested merely on suspicion, having been named as the employer of Teck and Junio who
were previously arrested and charged for illegal transport of shabu.

Since the warrantless arrest was illegal, the warrantless search incidental to it is likewise
unlawful and invalid.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs TUAZON

FACTS:
Antipolo City Police Station received through telephone, confidential information that a
Gemini car bearing plate number PFC 411 would deliver an unspecified amount of shabu in
Marville Subdivision, Antipolo City. Acting on said trip, Antipolo City Chief of Police Major Rene
Quintana dispatched a team of policemen to the area to conduct surveillance. When the team
arrived in Marville Subdivision, they saw the said Gemini car and immediately flagged it down.
The driver of the car pulled to stop and opened a window of said vehicle giving the policemen
the opportunity to identify themselves as members of the Antipolo City Police Station. It was
then that PO1 M. Padlan saw a gun tucked on appellants waist. PO1 Padlan inquired about the
gun and appellant allegedly replied it did not belong to him nor could he produce any pertinent
document relating to said firearm. This prompted PO3 Bueno on the drivers seat, the contents
of which appellant allegedly admitted to be shabu. Appellant was thereafter immediately
brought to the police station. Expectedly, appellant presented a vastly different account of the
events that led to his indictment, however, the trial court found the evidence presented by the
prosecution sufficient to support a guilty verdict.

40
ISSUE:
Whether or not the warrantless search and seizure was valid.
HELD:
Yes. The Constitutional provisions against warrantless searches and seizures admit of
certain exceptions as follows: 1.) warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized
under sec. 12, Rule 126 of the Rules f Court and by prevailing jurisprudence; 2.) seizure of
evidence in plain view; 3.) search of a moving vehicle; 4.) consented warrantless search; 5.)
customs search; 6.) stop and frisk; and 7.) exigent and emergency circumstances. Nevertheless,
the exception from securing a search warrant when it comes to moving vehicles does not give
the police authorities unbridled discretion to conduct a warrantless search of an automobile. In
recognition of the possible abuse, jurisprudence dictates that at all times, it is required that
probable cause exists in order to justify the warrantless search of a vehicle. In this case, the
police had probable cause to effect the warrantless search of the Gemini car driven by the
appellant. A confidential informer tipped them off that said car was going to deliver shabu at
Marville Subdivision. Pursuing said lead, the Antipolo City Police sent a team to Marville
Subdivision to monitor said vehicle. The information provided by the informer turned out to be
correct as, indeed, the Gemini car was spotted in the place where it was said to be bringing
shabu. These circumstances, taken together, are sufficient to establish probable cause for the
warrantless search of the Gemini car and the eventual admission into evidence of the plastic
packets against appellant.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs TUAN

FACTS:
On January 2000, two informants namely Tudlong and Lading arrived at the office of
CIDG in Baguio City and reported to SPO2 Fernandez, Chief of the Station Drug Enforcement
Unit (SDEU), that a certain Estela Tuan had been selling Marijuana at Brgy. Gabriela Silang,
Baguio City. SPO2 Fernandez set out to verify the report of Tudlong and Lading. On the
afternoon of the same day, he gave Tudlong and Lading P 300. 00 to buy Marijuana and

41
accompanied the two informants to the accused Tuans house. Later, Tudlong and Lading came
out and showed SPO2 Fernandez the Marijuana they bought. Upon returning to the CIDG office,
SPO2 Fernandez requested a laboratory examination on the specimen and yielded positive
result of Marijuana. SPO2 Fernandez, together with the two informants filed the application for
a search warrant before Judge I. Cortes of MTCC, Baguio City on January 25, 2000. Two hours
later at around three o clock, Judge Cortes personally examined SPO2 Fernandez, Tudlong and
Lading, after which, she issued a search warrant, which stated Tuans residence as the house
of the accused Estela Tuan at Brgy. Gabriela Silang, Baguio City. The search was conducted
without Tuans presence but only accuseds father, Magno. During the search they found a
brick of Marijuana and a firearm. The RTC found the accused guilty as charged. On appeal, the
CA modified by acquitting Tuan of the charge for illegal possession of firearm but affirming her
conviction for illegal possession of Marijuana. Tuan raised the matter to the SC contending,
among others, that the warrant failed to particularly describe the place because the house was
a two storey building composed of several rooms.
ISSUES:
1.) Whether or not there was a probable cause for the judge to issue a search warrant;
and
2.) Whether or not the search warrant particularly described the place to be searched.
HELD:
1.) Yes. Before a search warrant can be issued, it must be shown by substantial evidence
that the items sought are in fact seizable by virtue of being connected with criminal activity,
and that the items will be proved in the place to be searched. In this case, such substantial basis
exists. Judge Cortes found probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant for Tuans
residence after said judges personal examination of SPO2 Fernandez, the applicant, and
Tudong and Lading, the informants. SPO2 Fernandez based his application for search warrant
not only on the information relayed to him by Lading and Tudlong. He also arranged a test buy
and conducted surveillance of Tuan. 2.) Yes. A description of the place to be searched is
sufficient if the officer serving the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify
the place intended and distinguish it from other places in the community. In the case at bar,
even if the location of the residence of Tuan was not specifically stated in the search warrant
(being a two-storey), the place stated therein is sufficient because SPO2 Fernandez can identify
and distinguish Tuans house from other places in the community.

42
 Quelnan vs People

GR No 166061 July 6, 2007

Facts:
Sometime in 1996, the Police Assistance and Reaction Against Crime (PARAC) was
tasked to implement a search warrant to a certain Bernard Lim for probably possessing
MA HCI (Shabu). The team was escorted to the unit by the security officer (Punsaran),
upon arrival at the place to be searched, a male person naked from the waist up opened
the door, which was later identified as Quelnan. The team presented the search warrant
and proceeded with the search. In the presence of Quelnan and Punsaran, they found
on top of a bedroom table 3 pieces of transparent plastic sachet containing white
crystalline substance which was later examined as Shabu. The next day, Quelnan was
arrested for violation of Sec. 16 Art. III of RA 6425.

Quelnan in his defense averred that he is not residing in the said unit, but he is the
registered owner of the said unit, which he leased to Sung Kok Lee beginning May
1996. That he was there during he search for he was collecting the rent. That he was

43
forced to sign some documents at gunpoint, handcuffed and brought to PARAC Office.
Two days later, he was brought to Makati Prosecutor's Office for inquest and a case
was filed against him.

Issue:
Whether or not the search warrant was properly enforced provided that he was not the
subject of the search warrant.

Whether or not Quelnan was validly arrested.

Ruling:
Yes, there is no provision of law that requires the search warrant must name the person
who occupies the described premises, that where the search warrant is issued for the
search of a specifically described premises only and not for the search of a person, and
failure to name to owner or occupant of such property in the affidavit and search warrant
does not invalidate the warrant.

Yes, Quelnan was arrested inflagrante delicto. In the prosecution of illegal possession
of shabu the following requisites must be present:
1. the accused is found in possession of a regulated drug;
2. the person is not authorized by law or by duly constituted authorities; and
3. the accused has knowledge that the said drug is a regulated drug.
That there must be intent to possess the drug, which includes actual possession or
constructive possession. Actual possession exist when the drug is immediate physical
possession or control of the accused, while constructive possession exist when he drug
is under the dominion and control of the accused or when he has the right to exercise
dominion over the place where it is found.

Quelnan was found and caught in flagrante when the shabu was found in his
constructive possession.

44
 Josefino S. Roan vs. Honorable Romulo T. Gonzales
GR No. 71410, November 25, 1986
Cruz, J.;
FACTS:
A search warrant was issued by respondent judge Romulo T. Gonzales on May
10, 1984. The application for the said search warrant was personally filed by PC Capt.
Mauro Quillosa. Together with Quillosa were two witnesses, Esmael Morada and Jesus
Tohilida, who presented to respondent judge their respective affidavits taken by police
investigator Pat. Josue V. Lining. The application was not yet subscribed and sworn to,
as such respondent Judge proceeded to examine Quillosa on the contents of the
application to ascertain if he knew and understood the same. Afterwards, Quillosa
subscribed and swore the said application before respondent judge.
Roans house was searched two days after the issuance of the search
warrant. The said search was conducted by military authorities. Despite none of the
articles listed in the warrant was discovered, the officers who performed the search
found one Colt Magnum revolver and 18 live bullets which they confiscated. The said
items served as bases for the charge of illegal possession of firearms against the
petitioner.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the search warrant be annulled on the ground that it violates the privacy
of one persons house

HELD:

YES. To be valid, a search warrant must be supported by probable cause to be

determined by the judge or some authorized officer after examining the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce. There must be a specific description of the place to be
searched and the things to be seized, to prevent arbitrary and indiscriminate use of the
warrant. Probable cause, as described by Judge Escolin in Burgos v. Chief of Staff,
refers to such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought
in connection with the offense arein the place sought to be searched. The probable
cause must refer to only one specific offense.
Capt. Quillosa was asking for the issuance of the search warrant on the basis of
mere hearsay and not of information personally known to him as required by settled

45
jurisprudence. It is axiomatic that the magistrate must be probing and exhaustive,
not merely routinary or pro-forma, if the claimed probable cause is to be
established. The examining magistrate must not simply rehash the contents of the
affidavit but must make his own inquiry on the intent and justification of the application.
Prohibited articles may be seized but only as long as the search is valid. In this
case, it was not because there was no valid search warrant and absent of such warrant,
the right thereto was not validly waived by the petitioner. In short, the military officers
who entered the petitioners premises had no right to be there and therefore had no
right to seize the pistol and bullets.

G.R. No. 165122, November 23, 2007

Rowland Kim Santos, petitioner,
vs PRYCE Gas Inc., respondents
Ponente: Tinga

Facts:
This is a petition for review on the decision of Court of Appeals to reversed the twin
orders of RTC Iloilo City quashing the warrant it issued and ordering the return of LPG
cylinders seized from petitioner.

Pryce is a domestic corporation engaged in manufacturing and distributing industrial

gases and LPG products. In 2002, Pryce noticed the decline of return of LPG cylinders
for refilling. Pryce employees suspected that LPG cylinders had been removed from
market circulation and refilled by their competitors, one of whoom is Sun Gas and
Santos as the manager.

Figueroa, Pryce's sales manger for Panay sought the assistance of CIDG to
recoverLPG cylinders allegedly in posession of Sun Gas. Criminal Investigation and
Detection Group (CIDG) conducted surveillance on the warehouse of Sun Gas then
later requested the Bureau of Fire Protection (BFP) to conduct a routine fire inspection

46
at Sun Gas. CIDG operatives entered the warehouse and were able to take
photographs of LPG cylinders (PO2 Demandara).

Demandara applied before RTC Iloilo for a warrant to search the premises with the
allegation that Pryce LPG cylinders were tampered and replaced with Sun Gas marking,
averred also that Sun Gas is distributing Pryce LPG products without the consent of
Pryce. RTC issued the search warrant with the authority to seize the following items: 1.
Assorted sizes of PRYCE LPG GAS TANKS CYLINDERS in different kilograms.
2. Suspected LPG gas tanks cylinders with printed/mark SUN GAS INC., trademark and
embossed Pryce Gas Trademark scrapped off.
3. Other materials used in tampering the PRYCE LPG GAS TANKS cylinders. The
authorities have seize a number of Pryce LPG tanks.

Santos then filed for motion to quash the search warrant on the grounds of lack of
probable cause as well as deception and fraud in obtaining evidence in support of the
application, violating article 3, section 2 of constitution and Rule 126 of rules of court.

On the same day, CIDG filed a criminal complaint before the office of City Prosecutor of
Iloilo against Santos, charging him with violation of RA No. 632.

After hearing, RTC granted the motion to quash , stating that the probable cause as
found by it at the time of the application for search warrant fell short of the requisite
probable cause necessary to sustain the validity of the search warrant.

Respondent filed a manifestation and motion to hold in abeyance the release of the
seized items. It also filed a motion for reconsideration of the 16 July 2002 Order but was
denied in an Order dated 9 August 2002.

Respondent elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals via a special civil action for
certiorari, arguing that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in quashing
the search warrant. The petition essentially questioned the quashal of the search
warrant despite a prior finding of probable cause and the failure of petitioner to prove
that he bought the seized items from respondent. It also challenged petitioners
personality to file the motion to quash.

On 16 January 2004, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision, which set
aside the two orders of the trial court. The appellate court also ordered the return of the
seized items to respondent. Petitioner sought reconsideration but was denied in an
order dated 16 July 2004.

Issues: (1) whether or not petitioner has authority to seek the quashal of the search
warrant; (2) who has proper custody of the seized items; and (3) whether or not
respondent correctly availed of the special civil action for certiorari to assail the quashal
of the search warrant.

Ruling:

47
1. The Court of Appeals ruled against petitioner and reversed the trial courts quashal of
the search warrant solely on the ground that petitioner, being a mere manager of Sun
Gas, Inc., failed to show his authority to act on behalf of the corporation and, therefore,
had no legal personality to question the validity of the search warrant. Thus, it
concluded that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in entertaining and
subsequently granting petitioners motion to quash.

Well-settled is the rule that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party
whose rights have been impaired thereby, and the objection to an unlawful search and
seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third parties.

2. In quashing the search warrant, it would appear that the trial court had raised the
standard of probable cause to whether there was sufficient cause to hold petitioner for
trial. In so doing, the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion.

Probable cause for a search warrant is defined as such facts and circumstances which
would lead a reasonably discrete and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place
sought to be searched. A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence
showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed and that it was
committed by the accused. Probable cause demands more than bare suspicion; it
requires less than evidence which would justify conviction.

3. The Court of Appeals, however, erred in ordering the return of the seized items to
respondent. Section 4, Rule 126 of the Revised Criminal Procedure expressly mandates
the delivery of the seized items to the judge who issued the search warrant to be kept in
custodia legis in anticipation of the criminal proceedings against petitioner. The delivery
of the items seized to the court which issued the warrant together with a true and
accurate inventory thereof, duly verified under oath, is mandatory in order to preclude
the substitution of said items by interested parties. The judge who issued the search
warrant is mandated to ensure compliance with the requirements for (1) the issuance of
a detailed receipt for the property received, (2) delivery of the seized property to the
court, together with (3) a verified true inventory of the items seized. Any violation of the
foregoing constitutes contempt of court.

The seized items should remain in the custody of the trial court which issued the search
warrant pending the institution of criminal action against petitioner.

Petition denied.

UNILAB, INC. vs. ERNESTO ISIP and/or SHALIMAR PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 163858
June 28, 2005

FACTS:

48
UNILAB hired a private investigator to investigate a place purported to be manufacturing
fake UNILAB products, especially Revicon multivitamins. The agent took some
photographs where the clandestine manufacturing operation was taking place. UNILAB
then sought the help of the NBI, which thereafter filed an application for the issuance of
search warrant in the RTC of Manila. After finding probable cause, the court issued a
search warrant directing the police to seize finished or unfinished products of UNILAB,
particularly REVICON multivitamins. No fake Revicon was however found; instead,
sealed boxes where seized, which, when opened contained 60 ml bottles of Disudrin
and 200mg tablets of Inoflox, both were brands used by UNILAB. NBI prayed that some
of the sized items be turned over to the custody of the Bureau of Food and Drugs
(BFAD) for examination. The court granted the motion. The respondents then filed a
motion to quash the search warrant or to suppress evidence, alleging that the seized
items are considered to be fruit of a poisonous tree, and therefore inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding, which the petitioners opposed alleging that the boxes of
Disudrin and Inoflox were seized under the plain view doctrine. The court, however,
granted the motion of the respondents.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the seizure of the sealed boxes which, when opened, contained Disudrin
syrup and Inoflox, were valid under the plain view doctrine.

HELD:
It is true that things not described in the warrant may be seized under the plain view
doctrine. However, seized things not described in the warrant cannot be presumed as
plain view. The State must adduce evidence to prove that the elements for the doctrine
to apply are present, namely: (a) the executing law enforcement officer has a prior
justification for an initial intrusion or otherwise properly in a position from which he can
view a particular order; (b) the officer must discover incriminating evidence
inadvertently; and (c) it must be immediately apparent to the police that the items they
observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure It was
thus incumbent on the NBI and the petitioner to prove that the items were seized on
plain view. It is not enough that the sealed boxes were in the plain view of the NBI
agents. However, the NBI failed to present any of officers who were present when the
warrant was enforced to prove that the the sealed boxes was discovered inadvertently,
and that such boxes and their contents were incriminating and immediately apparent. It
must be stressed that only the enforcing officers had personal knowledge whether the
sealed boxes and their contents thereof were incriminating and that they were
immediately apparent. There is even no showing that the NBI agents knew the contents
of the sealed boxes before they were opened. In sum then, the petitioner and the NBI
failed to prove that the plain view doctrine applies to the seized items.

49
 Rodolfo Abenes y Gacutan vs. Hon. Court of Appeals and People of the Republic of the
Philippines
G.R. No. 156320, February 14, 2007

FACTS: On May 8, 1998, the Philippine National Police (PNP) were directed to establish
and man a checkpoint in Brgy. Danlugan, Pagadian City, led by SPO3 Cipriano Q. Pascua, for
the purpose of enforcing the Gun Ban which was then implemented by the COMELEC. Vehicles
passing through were required to stop and occupants were requested to alight in order to allow
routine inspection and checking. Motorists who refused the request were not forced to do so.
50
 At about 10:30 in the morning of the same day, a red Tamaraw FX trying to pass
through the check point was stopped by the team and directed to park at the side of the road. As
the occupants of the vehicle could not be seen through its tinted windows, SPO1 Requejo,
member of the team, knocked the window and requested the occupants to step down for the
routine inspection. The eight occupants including the accused-appellant alighted from the
vehicle. At this juncture, SPO1 Requejo SPO3 Pascua noticed that a holstered firearm was
tucked at the right waist of Abenes. The firearm was readily visible to the policeman for it was
not even covered by the shirt worn by Abenes. Abenes was then asked by SPO3 Pascua whether
he has a license and authority to carry the firearm, and whether his possession is exempted from
the Gun Ban enforced by the COMELEC. The latter answered in affirmative. When he was
asked for the pertinent documents, he could not show any.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners constitutional right against unlawful search and
seizures was violated.

HELD: The checkpoint herein conducted was in pursuance of the gun ban enforced by the
COMELEC.

Section 261 of B.P. Blg. 881 (Omnibus Election Code), as originally worded, provides:

Sec. 261. Prohibited Acts. The following shall be guilty of an election offense:

(q) Carrying firearms outside residence or place of business. Any person who, although
possessing a permit to carry firearms, carries any firearms outside his residence or place of
business during the election period, unless authorized in writing by the Commission: Provided,
That a motor vehicle, water or air craft shall not be considered a residence or place of business
or extension hereof.

Section 32 of Republic Act No. 7166 (R.A. No. 7166), amending Section 261 of the Omnibus
Election Code, provides:

SEC. 32. Who May Bear Firearms. During the election period, no person shall bear, carry or
transport firearms or other deadly weapons in public places, including any building, street, park,
private vehicle or public conveyance, even if licensed to possess or carry the same, unless
authorized in writing by the Commission. The issuance of firearm licenses shall be suspended
during the election period.

The facts adduced do not constitute a ground for a violation of the constitutional
rights of the accused against illegal search and seizure. In the instant case, the firearm was seized
from the petitioner when in plain view, the policemen saw it tucked into his waist uncovered by
his shirt.

51
 Under the Plain view Doctrine, all elements are present in the instant case. The
law enforcement officers lawfully made an initial intrusion because of the enforcement of the
Gun Ban and were properly in a position from which they particularly viewed the area. In the
course of such lawful intrusion, the policemen came inadvertently across a piece of evidence
incriminating the petitioner where they saw the gun tucked into his waist. The gun was in plain
view and discovered inadvertently when the petitioner alighted from the vehicle.

Hence, the constitutional right of the accused against unlawful search and seizures
was not violated.

Universal Laboratories, Inc. vs. Ernesto Isip and/or Shalimar Philippines.

G.R. NO. 163858, June 28,2005.

FACTS: Rolando H. Besarra, NBI Investigator, filed an application in the Regional Trial
Court of Manila for the issuance of search warrant concerning the first and second floors of the
Shalimar Building, located at No. 1571, Aragon Street (formerly No. 1524, Lacson Avenue, Sta.
Cruz, Manila) occupied and/or used by Shalimar Philippines, owned/operated by Ernesto Isip,
and the seizures of the following:

1. Finished or unfinished products of UNITED LABORATORIES (UNILAB),

particularly REVICON multivitamins;

52
 2. Sundry items such as tags, labels, boxes, packages, wrappers, receptacles,
advertisements and other paraphernalia used in the offering for sale, sale and/or distribution of
counterfeit REVICON multivitamins;

3. Sales invoices, delivery receipts, official receipts, ledgers, journals, purchase

orders and all other books of accounts and documents used in recording the manufacture and/or
importation, distribution and/or sales of counterfeit REVICON multivitamins.

The search warrant was implemented at 4:30 p.m. on January 27, 2004 by NBI
agents Besarra and Divinagracia, in coordination with UNILAB employees. No fake Revicon
multivitamins were found; instead, there were sealed boxes at the first and second floors of the
Shalimar Building which, when opened by the NBI agents in the presence of respondent Isip,
contained the following:

QUANTITY/UNIT DESCRIPTION

-792 Bottles Disudrin 60 ml.

-30 Boxes (100 pieces each) Inoflox 200 mg.

In an open display, the Disudrin and Inoflox were seized.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Search and Seizure conducted were valid.

HELD: A search warrant, to be valid, must particularly describe the place to be searched
and the things to be seized. The officers of the law are to seize only those things particularly
described in the search warrant.

In this case, Disudrin and/or Inoflox were not listed in the search warrant issued
by the court a quo as among the properties to be seized by the NBI agents. The warrant
specifically authorized the officers only to seize counterfeit Revicon multivitamins, finished or
unfinished, and the documents used in recording, manufacture and/or importation, distribution
and/or sale, or the offering for sale, sale and/or distribution of the said vitamins. The
implementing officers failed to find any counterfeit Revicon multivitamins, and instead seized
sealed boxes which, when opened at the place where they were found, turned out to contain
Inoflox and Disudrin.

53
Valdez vs. People of the Philippines GR. No. 170180

Facts:

Petitioner Arsenio Valdez was found guilty by the lower courts for the violation of
Section 11 of RA 9165 (illegal possession of dangerous drugs) after dried marijuana
leaves were found in his possession by three barangay tanods who made a search on
him

Petitioner denied ownership and purported that he had just alighted from the bus when
one of the barangay tanods approached him and requested to see the contents of his
54
bags. The petitioner was then brought by the three tanods to the house of Brgy. Captain
Mercado, who again ordered to have the bag opened. During which, the dried
marijuana leaves were found.

Petitioner prays for his acquittal questioning, although for the first time on appeal, that
his warrantless arrest was effected unlawfully and the warrantless search that followed
was likewise contrary to law.

Issue:

WON the petitioner should be acquitted for the lack of a warrant supporting the arrest
and the search.

Held:

The Court ruled for the reversal of the decision by the lower courts. The accused was
acquitted by reasonable doubt.

Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedures provides for the only
occasions permitting a warrantless arrest: (a) When, in his presence, the person to
be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense; (b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to
believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be
arrested has committed it; and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who
has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred
from one confinement to another.

The Court held that none of the circumstances was attendant at the time of the arrest.

The Court also posed 2 exceptions to the said rule, to wit: (1) the person to be arrested
must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or
within the view of the arresting officer.

None of the petitioners actuations (i.e. his looking around and alleged fleeing upon
approach of the tanods) is adequate to incite suspicion of criminal activity to validate the
warrantless arrest.

However, the Courts decision was not only hinged on this premise but also on the fact
that the lower courts failed to establish the veracity of the seized items by virtue of the
chain of custody rule and in view of the contrasting testimonies by the prosecution
witnesses.

Failure of the lower courts to satisfy the test of moral certainty, the accused was thus
acquitted.

55
The Court added that the petitioners lack of objection to the search and seizure is not
tantamount to a waiver of his constitutional right or a voluntary submission to the
warrantless search and seizure.

People vs. Bohol Gr. No. 171729

Facts:

On August 2, 2002, at around 8:30 p.m., a confidential informant came to the police
station and tipped P/Sr. Insp. Jessie Nitullano that a certain Ricardo Bohol is engaged in
illegal drug trade in Isla Puting Bato, Tondo, Manila. P/Sr. Insp. Nitullano then formed a
team of six police operatives to verify the informants tip, and, if found positive, to launch
then and there a buy-bust entrapment of Bohol. PO2 Ferdinand Estrada was assigned
to act as poseur buyer, and he was provided with a marked P100-bill as buy-bust
money.

Between 9:30 p.m. to 10:00 p.m. of the same day, the team proceeded to the site of
their operation. Guided by the informant, PO2 Estrada proceeded to the house of Bohol,
whom they saw standing beside the stairs of his house. Following a short introduction,
PO2 Estrada and the informant told Bohol of their purpose. Bohol asked, How much?
To which PO2 Estrada replied, Piso lang (meaning P100 worth of shabu) and handed
to the former the marked P100-bill. In turn, Bohol gave PO2 Estrada a plastic sachet
containing white crystalline granules which the latter suspected to be shabu. The illicit
transaction having been consummated, PO2 Estrada gave to his companions their pre-
arranged signal. Emerging from their hiding places, PO2 Luisito Gutierrez and his
companions arrested Bohol. PO2 Gutierrez frisked Bohol and recovered from him the
buy-bust money and three plastic sachets containing similar white crystalline granules
suspected to be shabu.

ISSUE:
a.) WON Bohols arrest and the search on his person were illegal;
b.) WON the trial court erred in convicting Bohol despite the absence of proof
beyond reasonable doubt.

HELD:

56
For the first issue, the Court ruled that the arrest of Bohol is legal. The Constitution
proscribes unreasonable arrests and provides in the Bill of Rights that no arrest, search
and seizure can be made without a valid warrant issued by competent judicial authority.
However, it is a settled exception to the rule that an arrest made after an entrapment
operation does not require a warrant. Such warrantless arrest is considered reasonable
and valid under Rule 113, Section 5(a) of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.
In the present case, the arresting officers were justified in arresting Bohol as he had just
committed a crime when he sold the shabu to PO2 Estrada. A buy-bust operation is a
form of entrapment which has repeatedly been accepted to be a valid means of
arresting violators of the Dangerous Drugs Law.
Considering the legality of Bohols warrantless arrest, the subsequent warrantless
search that resulted in the seizure of the shabu found in his person is likewise valid.

As to the second issue, Bohol contends that the prosecution failed to establish his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. He laments the failure of the prosecution to present the
confidential informant as a witness during the trial, thereby preventing him from confronting
said witness directly.

The Court, however, found no improper motive on the part of the police officers that
would impel them to fabricate a story and falsely implicate Bohol in such a serious
offense. In the absence of any evidence of the policemens improper motive, their
testimony is worthy of full faith and credit. Also, courts generally give full faith and credit
to officers of the law, for they are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular
manner. Accordingly, in entrapment cases, credence is given to the narration of an
incident by prosecution witnesses who are officers of the law and presumed to have
performed their duties in a regular manner in the absence of clear and convincing
evidence to the contrary.

Lastly, as ruled by the appellate court, Bohol cannot insist on the presentation of the
informant. During trial, the informants presence is not a requisite in the prosecution of
drug cases. The appellate court held that police authorities rarely, if ever, remove the
cloak of confidentiality with which they surround their poseur-buyers and informers since
their usefulness will be over the moment they are presented in court. Further, what is
material to the prosecution for the illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the
transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of
the corpus delicti. Both requirements were sufficiently proven in this case. The police
officers were able to testify positively and categorically that the transaction or sale

57
actually took place. The subject shabu was likewise positively identified by the
prosecution when presented in court. Hence, Bohols guilt has been established by the
prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.

People vs. Nuevas GR. No. 170233

FACTS:

In the morning of September 27, 1997, PO3 Teofilo Fami and SPO3 Cesar Cabling
conducted a stationary surveillance and monitoring of illegal drug trafficking
along Perimeter Street, Barangay Pag-asa, Olongapo City. They had received
information that a certain male person, more or less 54 in height, 25 to 30 years old,
with a tattoo mark on the upper right hand, and usually wearing a sando and maong
pants, would make a delivery of marijuana dried leaves. While stationed thereat, they
saw a male person who fit the description, carrying a plastic bag, later identified as
Jesus Nuevas (Nuevas), alight from a motor vehicle. They accosted Nuevas and
informed him that they are police officers. Nuevas informed him that there were other
stuff in the possession of a certain Vangie, an associate, and two other male persons.
Later on, Nuevas voluntarily pointed to the police officers a plastic bag which, when
opened, contained marijuana dried leaves and bricks wrapped in a blue cloth. Shortly, in
his bid to escape charges, Nuevas disclosed where the two (2) other male persons
would make the delivery of marijuana weighing more or less five (5) kilos.
Fami and Cabling, together with Nuevas, then proceeded to Purok 12, Old
Cabalan, Olongapo City, which according to Nuevas was where his two (2)
companions, Din and Inocencio, could be located. From there, they saw and
approached two (2) persons along the National Highway, introducing themselves as
police officers. Din was carrying a light blue plastic bag. When asked, Din disclosed that
the bag belonged to Nuevas. Fami then took the bag and upon inspection found inside it
marijuana packed in newspaper and wrapped therein. After confiscating the items, Fami

58
and Cabling brought Nuevas, Din and Inocencio to the police office at Purok III for
proper documentation.

All three suspects were found guilty by the trial court for illegal possession of marijuana
and the judgment of conviction was elevated to the Court for automatic review.
However, Nuevas filed a manifestation and motion to withdraw appeal. The court
granted his withdrawal of appeal and considered the case closed and terminated as to
him.

ISSUE:

WON Din and Inocencios constitutional rights were violated regarding warrantless
search and seizures and arrest.

HELD: Yes.

Our Constitution states that a search and seizure must be carried through with a judicial
warrant; otherwise, such search and seizure becomes unreasonable and any evidence
obtained therefrom is inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. However,
exceptions to this rule would be warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest; search
of evidence in plain view; search of a moving vehicle; consented warrantless search;
customs search; stop and frisk; and exigent and emergency circumstances.

The Court ruled in the case of Din and Inocencio that a warrantless arrest must precede
the search; the process cannot be reversed as in this case where the search preceded
the arrest. Nevertheless, a search substantially contemporaneous with an arrest can
precede the arrest if the police have probable cause to make the arrest at the outset of
the search.

In this case, Nuevas, Din and Inocencio were not committing a crime in the presence of
the police officers. Moreover, police officers Fami and Cabling did not have personal
knowledge of the facts indicating that the persons to be arrested had committed an
offense. The searches conducted on the plastic bag then cannot be said to be merely
incidental to a lawful arrest. Reliable information alone is not sufficient to justify a

59
warrantless arrest under Section 5(a), Rule 113. The rule requires, in addition, that the
accused perform some overt act that would indicate that he has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.

Secondly, neither could the searches be justified under the plain view doctrine. Records
show that the dried marijuana leaves were inside the plastic bags that Nuevas and Din
were carrying and were not readily apparent or transparent to the police officers. In
Nuevass case, the dried marijuana leaves found inside the plastic bag were wrapped
inside a blue cloth. In Dins case, the marijuana found upon inspection of the plastic bag
was packed in newspaper and wrapped therein. It cannot be therefore said the items
were in plain view which could have justified mere seizure of the articles without further
search.

On the other hand, the Court finds that the search conducted in Nuevas case was
made with his consent. In Dins case, there was none. The prosecution failed to clearly
show that Din intentionally surrendered his right against unreasonable searches. There
was no mention of any permission made by the police officers to get or search the bag
or of any consent given by Din for the officers to search it. It is worthy to note that in
cases where the Court upheld the validity of consented search, the police authorities
expressly asked, in no uncertain terms, for the consent of the accused to be
searched. And the consent of the accused was established by clear and positive proof.

Furthermore, Inocencios supposed possession of the dried marijuana leaves was

sought to be shown through his act of looking into the plastic bag that Din was
carrying. Taking a look at an object, more so in this case peeping into a bag while held
by another, is not the same as taking possession thereof. To behold is not to hold.
Indeed, the act attributed to Inocencio is insufficient to establish illegal possession of the
drugs or even conspiracy to illegally possess the same. The prosecution failed to show
by convincing proof that Inocencio knew of the contents of the bag and that he

60
conspired with Din to possess the illegal items. Inocencio was firm and unshakeable in
his testimony that he had no part in any delivery of marijuana dried leaves.

Din and Inocencio were acquitted.

Yao vs People
GR 168306
June 19, 2007

Facts:

61
MASAGANA Gas Corporation is an entity engaged in the refilling, sale, and distribution of LPG
products. Petron and Shell are the largest bulk suppliers of LPG in the Philippines. Petron owns
the trademark GASUL and its cylinders. Shell owns the trademark SHELLANE and the device in
connection with its production, sale, and distribution. Both companies are solely authorized to
allow refillers and distributors to refill, use, sell, and distribute LPG cylinders using their
corresponding trademark.

On Feb 11, 2003, the NBI received a letter complaint from Atty. Bienvenido I. Somera Jr. on
behalf of Petron, Shell, and others requesting assistance in the investigation, apprehension, and
prosecution of certain persons and/or establishments suspected of violating the intellectual
property rights of Petron and Shell. Among the establishments identified to be allegedly
unlawfully refilling, selling, and distributing GASUL & SHELLANE LPG products is MASAGANA.

Under Sec. 155 of R.A. 8293 aka The Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines, mere
unauthorized use of a container bearing a registered trademark in connection with the sale,
distribution or advertising of goods or services which is likely to cause confusion, mistake or
deception among the buyers / consumers can be considered as trademark infringement.

NBI agent Ritche N. Oblanca filed to applications for search warrant with the RTC, Branch 17,
Cavite City against the petitioners, Yao, et. al., and other occupants of the MASAGANA
compound for alleged violation of RA 8293. The two applications alleged that per information,
belief, and personal verification of Oblanca, the petitioners are actually producing, selling,
offering for sale and/or distributing LPG products using steel cylinders owned by, and bearing
the tradenames, trademarks, and devices of Petron and Shell without authority and in violation
of the rights of said entities.

Among the allegations made by Oblanca in the affidavits are the following:

a. He confirmed that MASAGANA is not authorized to use Gasul and Shellane cylinders
and its trademarks and tradenames or to be refillers or distributors of Gasul and
Shellane LPGs
That he went to MASAGANAs refilling station located at Governors Drive, Barangay Lapidario,
Trece martires City, Cavite to investigate its activities.

b. He confirmed that Masagana is indeed engaged in the unauthorized refilling, sale and/or
distribution of Gasul and Shellane LPG cylinders
c. He twice conducted test-buys accompanied by Mr. Bernabe C. Alajar, a consultant hired
by Petron and Shell to carry out their Brand Protection Program. They entered the
Masagana compound or reflling plant to purchase Gasul and Shellane LPGs. They were
given order slips and that they were given cash invoices after payment. Thereafter, the
GASUL and Shellane cylinders were refilled in their presence. No valve seals were placed
on the cylinders.

62
After conducting the preliminary examination on Oblanca and Alajar, and upon reviewing their
sworn affidavits and other attached documents, Judge Melchor Sadang found probable cause
and correspondingly issued 2 search warrants one for Shell products and the other for Petron
products. It commanded any peace officer to make an immediate search of the MASAGANA
compound and to seize among others:

a. Empty/filled lpg cylinder tanks bearing the tradenames SHELLANE and GASUL
b. Machinery and equipment used or intended to be used for the purpose of illegally
refilling LPG cylinders belong to Shell and Petron
c. Documents pertaining to the production, sale, and/or distribution of the said goods &
products
d. Delivery trucks used for the purpose of selling and distributing above products

Oblanca and several NBI operatives proceeded to the Masagana compound and served the
search warrants on petitioners. They seized LPG cylinders, a motor compressor, and LPG
refilling machine.

The petitioners filed a Motion to Quash Search Warrants. The RTC denied the motion to quash
search warrants and CA affirmed the RTCs orders. They then filed a petition on the following
grounds:

a. The Judge had no sufficient basis in declaring the existence of probable cause
b. That NBI agent Oblanca did not have any authority to apply for a search warrant;
c. The place to be searched was not specified in the Search Warrants as the place to be
searched must be indicated with particularity;
d. The search warrant is characterized as a general warrant, i.e. ambiguous as to the items
to be seized
The motor compressor is owned by Masagana and must be returned pending any action for
infringement
Issue: Were the search warrants valid?

Held: Yes

Ratio:

Section 4 of Rule 126 of the ROC provides the requisites in issuing a search warrant:

a. It must be issued upon probable cause

b. Which must be determined by the judge himself
c. In the determination of probable cause, the judge must examine, under oath or
affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses he may produce; and
d. The warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and things to be
seized.

63
Probable Cause

Probable cause for a search warrant means such facts and circumstances which would lead a
reasonable discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that
the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place to be searched.

The facts and circumstances referred to above pertain to those personally known to the
applicant and witnesses. Personal knowledge is required. Reliable information is insufficient.
It can be gathered from the testimonial, documentary and object evidence that Oblanca and
Alajar have personal knowledge of the fact that petitioners, through Masagana, have been
using the LPG cylinders without permission from both Shell and Petron a probable cause for
trademark infringement.

Personal determination by judge

There is no hard-and-fast rule on how a judge must conduct his investigation. However, the
examination must be probing and exhaustive. It must not be routinary, general, and
perfunctory. The SC found the questions of Judge Sadang to be sufficiently probing after
perusing the transcript of stenographic notes of the preliminary examination. Among the many
inquiries, Judge Sadang required Oblanca to confirm the contents of his affidavit, the details of
the test-buys, verified Shell and Petrons trademarks, and asked for a sketch of the place.

Authority of the person applying for search warrant

There is nothing in the provisions on search warrant under Rule 126 ROC which requires that
the applicant law enforcer must be a member of a division that is assigned to the subject crime
/ offense before a search warrant application may be acted upon. It can be presumed that
Oblanca, as an NBI agent, is a public officer who had regularly performed his official duty.

Particularity of the place

The rule is that a description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the
warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended and distinguish it
from other places in the community. The executing officers prior knowledge as to the place
intended in the warrant is relevant.

The raiding team had ascertained and reached Masagana compound without difficulty. As well,
Oblanca, who was with the raiding team, was already familiar with the compound. Even if there
are several structures inside the Masagana compound, there was no need to particularize the
areas to be searched because the structures constitute the essential and necessary components
of the petitioners business and cannot be treated separately as they form part of the entire
compound.

Particularity of the items seized

64
A search warrant is said to particularly describe the things to be seized when the description is
as specific as the circumstances will allow. The law does not require that the things to be seized
be described in precise details as to leave no room for doubt. Substantial similarity of those
articles described as a class or specie would suffice.

Measured against above standard, the items to be seized under the search warrants in question
were sufficiently described with particularity. The items described in the warrant were clearly
limited to those which bore direct relation to the offense. The indication of the accurate sizes
of the LPG cylinders or tanks are unnecessary.

Ownership of property seized not required

The law does not require that the prop to be seized should be owned by the person against
whom the search warrant is directed. It is sufficient that the person against whom the warrant
is directed has control or possession of the property sought to be seized.

Thus, even if the properties seized belong to Masagana as a separate entity, their seizure
pursuant to the search warrants is valid.

Zalameda vs People
GR No. 183656 September 4, 2009

Facts: SP04 Orbeta, a desk officer of Precinct 1, Makati City received a phone call from a
concerned citizen regarding an ongoing pot session at a specified address. Acting on the tip,
he dispatched several policemen to verify the report. When they reached the specified address,
which they found to be a house, they saw Zalameda and Villaflor sniffing smoke. As they

65
rushed inside the house, Villaflor quickly threw away the tooter. They frisked them both and
recovered from Zalameda a rectangular plastic sachet containing a crystalline substance which
was later found to be shabu. They also found other items on top of the bed: aluminium foils, 3
plastic sachets of shabu, a pair of scissors, a disposable lighter, a bag with a zipper, and an
improvised tooter. Then and there, Zalameda and Villaflor were arrested and the confiscated
items were marked and turned over to the proper authority. The RTC found them guilty of
violating sec. 11 and sec.12 of RA 9165. On appeal, Zalameda alleges that the confiscated items
are inadmissible as evidence since the arrest, search and seizure were unlawful. The appellate
court ruled against, hence, this petition.

Issue: Were the arrest, search and seizure unlawful?

Ruling: No, the arrest, search and seizure were lawful and valid.

Pursuant to sec. 5, Rule 113, a peace officer may arrest a person without a warrant
when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense. This is commonly known as an in flagrante delicto arrest. For
a warrantless arrest to be valid under this, there must be (1) an overt act indicating that the
person has just committed, is committing, or about to commit a crime, and (2) such is done in
the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. Here, the police justifiably act on the tip
without securing a warrant, considering the urgency of the pot session. When they
responded, they in fact caught Zalameda and Villaflor on the act of using a prohibited drug and
with illegal drug paraphernalia in their possession. The two essential requisites of in flagrante
delicto arrest are satisfied. The warrantless arrest is therefore valid.

As regards the search and seizure, sec. 13 of Rule 126 provides that a person lawfully
arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or
constitute proof in the commission of an offense without search warrant. The warrantless
arrest, being lawful; it follows that the search was likewise lawful. The seizure of the drug
paraphernalia is also beyond question. Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the
plain view of an officer who has right to be in the position to have that view are subjected to
seizure and may be presented as evidence.

All the foregoing requirements for a lawful search and seizure are present in the case.
Hence, the arrest, search and seizure are all lawful.

People vs Nuez
GR No.177148 June 30, 2009

66
 Facts: Based on reports of drug possession, operatives conducted a search in the house
of appellant Raul Nuez. The operatives were assited by Brgy. Captain Mundin and Chief Tanod
Joaquin in serving the search warrant. At the appellants house, the warrant was showed to
Nuez. Thereafter, SP02 Ilagan and P02 Crisostomo surveyed Nuezs room in his presence.
Meanwhile, his family and other other officials and operatives remained in the living room.
During the search, SP02 Ilagan found 31 packets of shabu, lighters, improvised burners, tooters,
aluminium foil and a ladys wallet containing P4,610, which the group all confiscated. They also
seized a component, camera, electric planer, grinder, drill, jigsaw, electric tester and assorted
carpentry tools on suspicion that they were acquired in exchange of shabu. Following the
search, SP02 Ilagan issued a Receipt of Property Seized and a Certification of Orderly Search
which Nuez signed.

Issue: Whether there was irregularity in the search conducted.

Ruling: Yes, there was an irregularity in the search conducted.

Sec. 3, Rule 126 says that a search warrant may be issued for the search and seizure of
personal property: (a) subject of the offense; (b) stolen or embezzled and other proceeds of the
offense; and (c) used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense. In the
case at bar, only the shabu and drug paraphernalia may be seized. The other items such as the
ladys wallet, cash, grinder, camera, component, speaker, electric planer, drill, hammer, electric
tester and jigsaw are not encompassed by the word paraphernalia. They are not
paraphernalia and cannot be considered as belonging to the same class or kind. In seizing the
said items, the police officers committed an irregularity and exercised their own discretion
which they shouldnt have. A search warrant is not a sweeping authority empowering a raiding
party to confiscate any and all kinds of evidence or articles relating to a crime.

Since there was an irregularity in the seizure of some items, such must be restored to
Nuez. Nevertheless, Nuez is still found to be guilty of the crime charged.

67
68