de Joya vs. Jail Warden of Batangas City - Case Digest
de Joya vs. Jail Warden of Batangas City - Case Digest
de Joya vs. Jail Warden of Batangas City - Case Digest
Held: No. Section 4, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, as amended, provides that the writ of habeas corpus is not allowed if
the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge or by
virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record:
[Sec. 4. When writ not allowed or discharged authorized. If it appears that the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is
in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record,
and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment; or make the order, the writ shall not be
allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason of any
informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of
a person charged with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful
judgment.]
In this case, the petitioner was arrested and detained pursuant to the final judgment of the MTC of Batangas City, convicting
her of violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Irrefragably then, the petitioner is not entitled to a writ of habeas corpus.
Petitioners reliance of our ruling in Ordonez v. Vinarao that a convicted person is entitled to benefit from the reduction of
penalty introduced by the new law, citing People v. Simon, is misplaced. Thus, her plea that as provided for in Article 22 of
the Revised Penal Code, SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 as modified by SC Admin. Circular No. 13-2001 should benefit
her has no basis.
First. SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 is not a penal law; hence, Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code is not applicable.
The circular applies only to those cases pending as of the date of its effectivity and not to cases already terminated by final
judgment.
Second. As explained by the Court in SC Admin. Circular No. 13-2001, SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 merely lays down
a rule of preference in the application of the penalties for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. It does not amend B.P. Blg. 22, nor
defeat the legislative intent behind the law. SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 merely urges the courts to take into account
not only the purpose of the law but also the circumstances of the accused whether he acted in good faith or on a clear mistake
of fact without taint of negligence and such other circumstance which the trial court or the appellate court believes relevant
to the penalty to be imposed.
The clear tenor and intention of Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 is not to remove imprisonment as an alternative
penalty, but to lay down a rule of preference in the application of the penalties provided for in B.P. Blg. 22. The pursuit of
this purpose clearly does not foreclose the possibility of imprisonment for violators of B.P. Blg. 22. Neither does it defeat
the legislative intent behind the law. (De Joya vs. Jail Warden of Batangas City, G.R. Nos. 159418-19. December 10,
2003)