Maquiling v. COMELEC G.R. No.

195649 1 of 16

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 195649 April 16, 2013
CASAN MACODE MAQUILING, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ROMMEL ARNADO y CAGOCO, LINOG G. BALUA, Respondents.
DECISION
SERENO, CJ.:
THE CASE
This is a Petition for Certiorari ender Rule 64 in conjunction with Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to review the
Resolutions of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). The Resolution in SPA No. 10-1 09(DC) of the
COMELEC First Division dated 5 October 201 0 is being assailed for applying Section 44 of the Local
Government Code while the Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc dated 2 February 2011 is being questioned for
finding that respondent Rommel Arnado y Cagoco (respondent Arnado/Arnado) is solely a Filipino citizen
qualified to run for public office despite his continued use of a U.S. passport.
FACTS
Respondent Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen. However, as a consequence of his subsequent naturalization
as a citizen of the United States of America, he lost his Filipino citizenship. Arnado applied for repatriation under
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 before the Consulate General of the Philippines in San Franciso, USA and took the
Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on 10 July 2008. On the same day an Order of Approval of
his Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition was issued in his favor.
The aforementioned Oath of Allegiance states:
I, Rommel Cagoco Arnado, solemnly swear that I will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines
and I hereby declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the Philippines and will maintain true
faith and allegiance thereto; and that I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or
purpose of evasion.
On 3 April 2009 Arnado again took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic and executed an Affidavit of
Renunciation of his foreign citizenship, which states:
I, Rommel Cagoco Arnado, do solemnly swear that I absolutely and perpetually renounce all allegiance and fidelity
to the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA of which I am a citizen, and I divest myself of full employment of all civil
and political rights and privileges of the United States of America.
I solemnly swear that all the foregoing statement is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.
On 30 November 2009, Arnado filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte,
Maquiling v. COMELEC G.R. No. 195649 2 of 16

which contains, among others, the following statements:

I am a natural born Filipino citizen / naturalized Filipino citizen.
I am not a permanent resident of, or immigrant to, a foreign country.
I am eligible for the office I seek to be elected to.
I will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and
allegiance thereto. I will obey the laws, legal orders and decrees promulgated by the duly constituted authorities.
I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of evasion.
On 28 April 2010, respondent Linog C. Balua (Balua), another mayoralty candidate, filed a petition to disqualify
Arnado and/or to cancel his certificate of candidacy for municipal mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in
connection with the 10 May 2010 local and national elections.
Respondent Balua contended that Arnado is not a resident of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte and that he is a
foreigner, attaching thereto a certification issued by the Bureau of Immigration dated 23 April 2010 indicating the
nationality of Arnado as "USA-American." To further bolster his claim of Arnados US citizenship, Balua
presented in his Memorandum a computer-generated travel record dated 03 December 2009 indicating that Arnado
has been using his US Passport No. 057782700 in entering and departing the Philippines. The said record shows
that Arnado left the country on 14 April 2009 and returned on 25 June 2009, and again departed on 29 July 2009,
arriving back in the Philippines on 24 November 2009.
Balua likewise presented a certification from the Bureau of Immigration dated 23 April 2010, certifying that the
name "Arnado, Rommel Cagoco" appears in the available Computer Database/Passenger manifest/IBM listing on
file as of 21 April 2010, with the following pertinent travel records:
DATE OF Arrival : 01/12/2010
NATIONALITY : USA-AMERICAN
PASSPORT : 057782700
DATE OF Arrival : 03/23/2010
NATIONALITY : USA-AMERICAN
PASSPORT : 057782700
On 30 April 2010, the COMELEC (First Division) issued an Order requiring the respondent to personally file his
answer and memorandum within three (3) days from receipt thereof.
After Arnado failed to answer the petition, Balua moved to declare him in default and to present evidence ex-parte.
Neither motion was acted upon, having been overtaken by the 2010 elections where Arnado garnered the highest
number of votes and was subsequently proclaimed as the winning candidate for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del
Norte.
It was only after his proclamation that Arnado filed his verified answer, submitting the following documents as
evidence:
Maquiling v. COMELEC G.R. No. 195649 3 of 16

1. Affidavit of Renunciation and Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines dated 03 April 2009;
2. Joint-Affidavit dated 31 May 2010 of Engr. Virgil Seno, Virginia Branzuela, Leoncio Daligdig, and Jessy
Corpin, all neighbors of Arnado, attesting that Arnado is a long-time resident of Kauswagan and that he has
been conspicuously and continuously residing in his familys ancestral house in Kauswagan;
3. Certification from the Punong Barangay of Poblacion, Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte dated 03 June 2010
stating that Arnado is a bona fide resident of his barangay and that Arnado went to the United States in 1985
to work and returned to the Philippines in 2009;
4. Certification dated 31 May 2010 from the Municipal Local Government Operations Office of Kauswagan
stating that Dr. Maximo P. Arnado, Sr. served as Mayor of Kauswagan, from January 1964 to June 1974 and
from 15 February 1979 to 15 April 1986; and
5. Voter Certification issued by the Election Officer of Kauswagan certifying that Arnado has been a
registered voter of Kauswagan since 03 April 2009.
THE RULING OF THE COMELEC FIRST DIVISION
Instead of treating the Petition as an action for the cancellation of a certificate of candidacy based on
misrepresentation, the COMELEC First Division considered it as one for disqualification. Baluas contention that
Arnado is a resident of the United States was dismissed upon the finding that "Balua failed to present any evidence
to support his contention," whereas the First Division still could "not conclude that Arnado failed to meet the one-
year residency requirement under the Local Government Code."
In the matter of the issue of citizenship, however, the First Division disagreed with Arnados claim that he is a
Filipino citizen.
We find that although Arnado appears to have substantially complied with the requirements of R.A. No. 9225,
Arnados act of consistently using his US passport after renouncing his US citizenship on 03 April 2009 effectively
negated his Affidavit of Renunciation.
xxxx
Arnados continued use of his US passport is a strong indication that Arnado had no real intention to renounce his
US citizenship and that he only executed an Affidavit of Renunciation to enable him to run for office. We cannot
turn a blind eye to the glaring inconsistency between Arnados unexplained use of a US passport six times and his
claim that he re-acquired his Philippine citizenship and renounced his US citizenship. As noted by the Supreme
Court in the Yu case, "a passport is defined as an official document of identity and nationality issued to a person
intending to travel or sojourn in foreign countries." Surely, one who truly divested himself of US citizenship would
not continue to avail of privileges reserved solely for US nationals.
The dispositive portion of the Resolution rendered by the COMELEC
First Division reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for disqualification and/or to cancel the certificate of
candidacy of Rommel C. Arnado is hereby GRANTED. Rommel C. Arnados proclamation as the winning
candidate for Municipal Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Nore is hereby ANNULLED. Let the order of succession
under Section 44 of the Local Government Code of 1991 take effect.
Maquiling v. COMELEC G.R. No. 195649 4 of 16

The Motion for Reconsideration and

the Motion for Intervention
Arnado sought reconsideration of the resolution before the COMELEC En Banc on the ground that "the evidence is
insufficient to justify the Resolution and that the said Resolution is contrary to law." He raised the following
contentions:
1. The finding that he is not a Filipino citizen is not supported by the evidence consisting of his Oath of
Allegiance and the Affidavit of Renunciation, which show that he has substantially complied with the
requirements of R.A. No. 9225;
2. The use of his US passport subsequent to his renunciation of his American citizenship is not tantamount
to a repudiation of his Filipino citizenship, as he did not perform any act to swear allegiance to a country
other than the Philippines;
3. He used his US passport only because he was not informed of the issuance of his Philippine passport, and
that he used his Philippine passport after he obtained it;
4. Baluas petition to cancel the certificate of candidacy of Arnado was filed out of time, and the First
Divisions treatment of the petition as one for disqualification constitutes grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess of jurisdiction;
5. He is undoubtedly the peoples choice as indicated by his winning the elections;
6. His proclamation as the winning candidate ousted the COMELEC from jurisdiction over the case; and
7. The proper remedy to question his citizenship is through a petition for quo warranto, which should have
been filed within ten days from his proclamation.
Petitioner Casan Macode Maquiling (Maquiling), another candidate for mayor of Kauswagan, and who garnered
the second highest number of votes in the 2010 elections, intervened in the case and filed before the COMELEC
En Banc a Motion for Reconsideration together with an Opposition to Arnados Amended Motion for
Reconsideration. Maquiling argued that while the First Division correctly disqualified Arnado, the order of
succession under Section 44 of the Local Government Code is not applicable in this case. Consequently, he
claimed that the cancellation of Arnados candidacy and the nullification of his proclamation, Maquiling, as the
legitimate candidate who obtained the highest number of lawful votes, should be proclaimed as the winner.
Maquiling simultaneously filed his Memorandum with his Motion for Intervention and his Motion for
Reconsideration. Arnado opposed all motions filed by Maquiling, claiming that intervention is prohibited after a
decision has already been rendered, and that as a second-placer, Maquiling undoubtedly lost the elections and thus
does not stand to be prejudiced or benefitted by the final adjudication of the case.
RULING OF THE COMELEC EN BANC
In its Resolution of 02 February 2011, the COMELEC En Banc held that under Section 6 of Republic Act No.
6646, the Commission "shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest even after the
proclamation of the candidate whose qualifications for office is questioned."
As to Maquilings intervention, the COMELEC En Banc also cited Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 which allows
intervention in proceedings for disqualification even after elections if no final judgment has been rendered, but
Maquiling v. COMELEC G.R. No. 195649 5 of 16

went on further to say that Maquiling, as the second placer, would not be prejudiced by the outcome of the case as
it agrees with the dispositive portion of the Resolution of the First Division allowing the order of succession under
Section 44 of the Local Government Code to take effect.
The COMELEC En Banc agreed with the treatment by the First Division of the petition as one for disqualification,
and ruled that the petition was filed well within the period prescribed by law, having been filed on 28 April 2010,
which is not later than 11 May 2010, the date of proclamation.
However, the COMELEC En Banc reversed and set aside the ruling of the First Division and granted Arnados
Motion for Reconsideration, on the following premises:
First:
By renouncing his US citizenship as imposed by R.A. No. 9225, the respondent embraced his Philippine
citizenship as though he never became a citizen of another country. It was at that time, April 3, 2009, that the
respondent became a pure Philippine Citizen again.
xxxx
The use of a US passport does not operate to revert back his status as a dual citizen prior to his renunciation as
there is no law saying such. More succinctly, the use of a US passport does not operate to "un-renounce" what he
has earlier on renounced. The First Divisions reliance in the case of In Re: Petition for Habeas Corpus of Willy Yu
v. Defensor-Santiago, et al. is misplaced. The petitioner in the said case is a naturalized citizen who, after taking his
oath as a naturalized Filipino, applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport. Strict policy is maintained in the
conduct of citizens who are not natural born, who acquire their citizenship by choice, thus discarding their original
citizenship. The Philippine State expects strict conduct of allegiance to those who choose to be its citizens. In the
present case, respondent is not a naturalized citizen but a natural born citizen who chose greener pastures by
working abroad and then decided to repatriate to supposedly help in the progress of Kauswagan. He did not apply
for a US passport after his renunciation. Thus the mentioned case is not on all fours with the case at bar.
xxxx
The respondent presented a plausible explanation as to the use of his US passport. Although he applied for a
Philippine passport, the passport was only issued on June 18, 2009. However, he was not notified of the issuance of
his Philippine passport so that he was actually able to get it about three (3) months later. Yet as soon as he was in
possession of his Philippine passport, the respondent already used the same in his subsequent travels abroad. This
fact is proven by the respondents submission of a certified true copy of his passport showing that he used the same
for his travels on the following dates: January 31, 2010, April 16, 2010, May 20, 2010, January 12, 2010, March
31, 2010 and June 4, 2010. This then shows that the use of the US passport was because to his knowledge, his
Philippine passport was not yet issued to him for his use. As probably pressing needs might be undertaken, the
respondent used whatever is within his control during that time.
In his Separate Concurring Opinion, COMELEC Chairman Sixto Brillantes cited that the use of foreign passport is
not one of the grounds provided for under Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 63 through which Philippine
citizenship may be lost.
"The application of the more assimilative principle of continuity of citizenship is more appropriate in this case.
Under said principle, once a person becomes a citizen, either by birth or naturalization, it is assumed that he desires
Maquiling v. COMELEC G.R. No. 195649 6 of 16

to continue to be a citizen, and this assumption stands until he voluntarily denationalizes or expatriates himself.
Thus, in the instant case respondent after reacquiring his Philippine citizenship should be presumed to have
remained a Filipino despite his use of his American passport in the absence of clear, unequivocal and competent
proof of expatriation. Accordingly, all doubts should be resolved in favor of retention of citizenship."
On the other hand, Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento dissented, thus:
Respondent evidently failed to prove that he truly and wholeheartedly abandoned his allegiance to the United
States. The latters continued use of his US passport and enjoyment of all the privileges of a US citizen despite his
previous renunciation of the afore-mentioned citizenship runs contrary to his declaration that he chose to retain
only his Philippine citizenship. Respondents submission with the twin requirements was obviously only for the
purpose of complying with the requirements for running for the mayoralty post in connection with the May 10,
2010 Automated National and Local Elections.
Qualifications for elective office, such as citizenship, are continuing requirements; once any of them is lost during
his incumbency, title to the office itself is deemed forfeited. If a candidate is not a citizen at the time he ran for
office or if he lost his citizenship after his election to office, he is disqualified to serve as such. Neither does the
fact that respondent obtained the plurality of votes for the mayoralty post cure the latters failure to comply with
the qualification requirements regarding his citizenship.
Since a disqualified candidate is no candidate at all in the eyes of the law, his having received the highest number
of votes does not validate his election. It has been held that where a petition for disqualification was filed before
election against a candidate but was adversely resolved against him after election, his having obtained the highest
number of votes did not make his election valid. His ouster from office does not violate the principle of vox populi
suprema est lex because the application of the constitutional and statutory provisions on disqualification is not a
matter of popularity. To apply it is to breath[e] life to the sovereign will of the people who expressed it when they
ratified the Constitution and when they elected their representatives who enacted the law.
THE PETITION BEFORE THE COURT
Maquiling filed the instant petition questioning the propriety of declaring Arnado qualified to run for public office
despite his continued use of a US passport, and praying that Maquiling be proclaimed as the winner in the 2010
mayoralty race in Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.
Ascribing both grave abuse of discretion and reversible error on the part of the COMELEC En Banc for ruling that
Arnado is a Filipino citizen despite his continued use of a US passport, Maquiling now seeks to reverse the finding
of the COMELEC En Banc that Arnado is qualified to run for public office.
Corollary to his plea to reverse the ruling of the COMELEC En Banc or to affirm the First Divisions
disqualification of Arnado, Maquiling also seeks the review of the applicability of Section 44 of the Local
Government Code, claiming that the COMELEC committed reversible error in ruling that "the succession of the
vice mayor in case the respondent is disqualified is in order."
There are three questions posed by the parties before this Court which will be addressed seriatim as the subsequent
questions hinge on the result of the first.
The first question is whether or not intervention is allowed in a disqualification case.
The second question is whether or not the use of a foreign passport after renouncing foreign citizenship amounts to
Maquiling v. COMELEC G.R. No. 195649 7 of 16

undoing a renunciation earlier made.

A better framing of the question though should be whether or not the use of a foreign passport after renouncing
foreign citizenship affects ones qualifications to run for public office.
The third question is whether or not the rule on succession in the Local Government Code is applicable to this case.
OUR RULING
Intervention of a rival candidate in a
disqualification case is proper when
there has not yet been any
proclamation of the winner.
Petitioner Casan Macode Maquiling intervened at the stage when respondent Arnado filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the First Division Resolution before the COMELEC En Banc. As the candidate who garnered
the second highest number of votes, Maquiling contends that he has an interest in the disqualification case filed
against Arnado, considering that in the event the latter is disqualified, the votes cast for him should be considered
stray and the second-placer should be proclaimed as the winner in the elections.
It must be emphasized that while the original petition before the COMELEC is one for cancellation of the
certificate of candidacy and / or disqualification, the COMELEC First Division and the COMELEC En Banc
correctly treated the petition as one for disqualification.
The effect of a disqualification case is enunciated in Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646:
Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. - Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified
shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared
by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of
votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or
protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the
suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.
Mercado v. Manzano
clarified the right of intervention in a disqualification case. In that case, the Court said:
That petitioner had a right to intervene at that stage of the proceedings for the disqualification against private
respondent is clear from Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646, otherwise known as the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987,
which provides: Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for,
and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment
before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election,
the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon
motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the
proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of guilt is strong. Under this provision, intervention may be
allowed in proceedings for disqualification even after election if there has yet been no final judgment rendered.
Clearly then, Maquiling has the right to intervene in the case. The fact that the COMELEC En Banc has already
ruled that Maquiling has not shown that the requisites for the exemption to the second-placer rule set forth in
Maquiling v. COMELEC G.R. No. 195649 8 of 16

Sinsuat v. COMELEC are present and therefore would not be prejudiced by the outcome of the case, does not
deprive Maquiling of the right to elevate the matter before this Court.
Arnados claim that the main case has attained finality as the original petitioner and respondents therein have not
appealed the decision of the COMELEC En Banc, cannot be sustained. The elevation of the case by the intervenor
prevents it from attaining finality. It is only after this Court has ruled upon the issues raised in this instant petition
that the disqualification case originally filed by Balua against Arnado will attain finality.
The use of foreign passport after renouncing ones foreign citizenship is a positive and voluntary act of
representation as to ones nationality and citizenship; it does not divest Filipino citizenship regained by
repatriation but it recants the Oath of Renunciation required to qualify one to run for an elective position.
Section 5(2) of The Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003 provides:
Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be
subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following
conditions:
xxxx
(2)Those seeking elective public in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for holding such public office as
required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a
personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.
xxx
Rommel Arnado took all the necessary steps to qualify to run for a public office. He took the Oath of Allegiance
and renounced his foreign citizenship. There is no question that after performing these twin requirements required
under Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 or the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003, he became
eligible to run for public office.
Indeed, Arnado took the Oath of Allegiance not just only once but twice: first, on 10 July 2008 when he applied for
repatriation before the Consulate General of the Philippines in San Francisco, USA, and again on 03 April 2009
simultaneous with the execution of his Affidavit of Renunciation. By taking the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic,
Arnado re-acquired his Philippine citizenship. At the time, however, he likewise possessed American citizenship.
Arnado had therefore become a dual citizen.
After reacquiring his Philippine citizenship, Arnado renounced his American citizenship by executing an Affidavit
of Renunciation, thus completing the requirements for eligibility to run for public office.
By renouncing his foreign citizenship, he was deemed to be solely a Filipino citizen, regardless of the effect of
such renunciation under the laws of the foreign country.
However, this legal presumption does not operate permanently and is open to attack when, after renouncing the
foreign citizenship, the citizen performs positive acts showing his continued possession of a foreign citizenship.
Arnado himself subjected the issue of his citizenship to attack when, after renouncing his foreign citizenship, he
continued to use his US passport to travel in and out of the country before filing his certificate of candidacy on 30
November 2009. The pivotal question to determine is whether he was solely and exclusively a Filipino citizen at
the time he filed his certificate of candidacy, thereby rendering him eligible to run for public office.
Maquiling v. COMELEC G.R. No. 195649 9 of 16

Between 03 April 2009, the date he renounced his foreign citizenship, and 30 November 2009, the date he filed his
COC, he used his US passport four times, actions that run counter to the affidavit of renunciation he had earlier
executed. By using his foreign passport, Arnado positively and voluntarily represented himself as an American, in
effect declaring before immigration authorities of both countries that he is an American citizen, with all attendant
rights and privileges granted by the United States of America.
The renunciation of foreign citizenship is not a hollow oath that can simply be professed at any time, only to be
violated the next day. It requires an absolute and perpetual renunciation of the foreign citizenship and a full
divestment of all civil and political rights granted by the foreign country which granted the citizenship.
Mercado v. Manzano already hinted at this situation when the Court declared:
His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking made under oath. Should he betray
that trust, there are enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his Philippine citizenship through expatriation in
appropriate proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, we sustained the denial of entry into the country of petitioner
on the ground that, after taking his oath as a naturalized citizen, he applied for the renewal of his Portuguese
passport and declared in commercial documents executed abroad that he was a Portuguese national. A similar
sanction can be taken against anyone who, in electing Philippine citizenship, renounces his foreign nationality, but
subsequently does some act constituting renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.
While the act of using a foreign passport is not one of the acts enumerated in Commonwealth Act No. 63
constituting renunciation and loss of Philippine citizenship, it is nevertheless an act which repudiates the very oath
of renunciation required for a former Filipino citizen who is also a citizen of another country to be qualified to run
for a local elective position.
When Arnado used his US passport on 14 April 2009, or just eleven days after he renounced his American
citizenship, he recanted his Oath of Renunciation that he "absolutely and perpetually renounce(s) all allegiance and
fidelity to the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" and that he "divest(s) himself of full employment of all civil and
political rights and privileges of the United States of America."
We agree with the COMELEC En Banc that such act of using a foreign passport does not divest Arnado of his
Filipino citizenship, which he acquired by repatriation. However, by representing himself as an American citizen,
Arnado voluntarily and effectively reverted to his earlier status as a dual citizen. Such reversion was not
retroactive; it took place the instant Arnado represented himself as an American citizen by using his US passport.
This act of using a foreign passport after renouncing ones foreign citizenship is fatal to Arnados bid for public
office, as it effectively imposed on him a disqualification to run for an elective local position.
Arnados category of dual citizenship is that by which foreign citizenship is acquired through a positive act of
applying for naturalization. This is distinct from those considered dual citizens by virtue of birth, who are not
required by law to take the oath of renunciation as the mere filing of the certificate of candidacy already carries
with it an implied renunciation of foreign citizenship. Dual citizens by naturalization, on the other hand, are
required to take not only the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines but also to personally renounce
foreign citizenship in order to qualify as a candidate for public office.
By the time he filed his certificate of candidacy on 30 November 2009, Arnado was a dual citizen enjoying the
rights and privileges of Filipino and American citizenship. He was qualified to vote, but by the express
disqualification under Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code, he was not qualified to run for a local elective
Maquiling v. COMELEC G.R. No. 195649 10 of 16

position.
In effect, Arnado was solely and exclusively a Filipino citizen only for a period of eleven days, or from 3 April
2009 until 14 April 2009, on which date he first used his American passport after renouncing his American
citizenship.
This Court has previously ruled that:
Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the time of
appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officer's entire tenure. Once any of the required
qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged. x x x.
The citizenship requirement for elective public office is a continuing one. It must be possessed not just at the time
of the renunciation of the foreign citizenship but continuously. Any act which violates the oath of renunciation
opens the citizenship issue to attack.
We agree with the pronouncement of the COMELEC First Division that "Arnados act of consistently using his US
passport effectively negated his "Affidavit of Renunciation." This does not mean, that he failed to comply with the
twin requirements under R.A. No. 9225, for he in fact did.
It was after complying with the requirements that he performed positive acts which effectively disqualified him
from running for an elective public office pursuant to Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code of 1991.
The purpose of the Local Government Code in disqualifying dual citizens from running for any elective public
office would be thwarted if we were to allow a person who has earlier renounced his foreign citizenship, but who
subsequently represents himself as a foreign citizen, to hold any public office.
Arnado justifies the continued use of his US passport with the explanation that he was not notified of the issuance
of his Philippine passport on 18 June 2009, as a result of which he was only able to obtain his Philippine passport
three (3) months later.
The COMELEC En Banc differentiated Arnado from Willy Yu, the Portuguese national who sought naturalization
as a Filipino citizen and later applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport. That Arnado did not apply for a
US passport after his renunciation does not make his use of a US passport less of an act that violated the Oath of
Renunciation he took. It was still a positive act of representation as a US citizen before the immigration officials of
this country.
The COMELEC, in ruling favorably for Arnado, stated "Yet, as soon as he was in possession of his Philippine
passport, the respondent already used the same in his subsequent travels abroad." We cannot agree with the
COMELEC. Three months from June is September. If indeed, Arnado used his Philippine passport as soon as he
was in possession of it, he would not have used his US passport on 24 November 2009.
Besides, Arnados subsequent use of his Philippine passport does not correct the fact that after he renounced his
foreign citizenship and prior to filing his certificate of candidacy, he used his US passport. In the same way that the
use of his foreign passport does not undo his Oath of Renunciation, his subsequent use of his Philippine passport
does not undo his earlier use of his US passport.
Citizenship is not a matter of convenience. It is a badge of identity that comes with attendant civil and political
rights accorded by the state to its citizens. It likewise demands the concomitant duty to maintain allegiance to ones
Maquiling v. COMELEC G.R. No. 195649 11 of 16

flag and country. While those who acquire dual citizenship by choice are afforded the right of suffrage, those who
seek election or appointment to public office are required to renounce their foreign citizenship to be deserving of
the public trust. Holding public office demands full and undivided allegiance to the Republic and to no other.
We therefore hold that Arnado, by using his US passport after renouncing his American citizenship, has recanted
the same Oath of Renunciation he took. Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code applies to his situation. He is
disqualified not only from holding the public office but even from becoming a candidate in the May 2010 elections.
We now resolve the next issue.
Resolving the third issue necessitates revisiting Topacio v. Paredes which is the jurisprudential spring of the
principle that a second-placer cannot be proclaimed as the winner in an election contest. This doctrine must be re-
examined and its soundness once again put to the test to address the ever-recurring issue that a second-placer who
loses to an ineligible candidate cannot be proclaimed as the winner in the elections.
The Facts of the case are as follows:
On June 4, 1912, a general election was held in the town of Imus, Province of Cavite, to fill the office of municipal
president. The petitioner, Felipe Topacio, and the respondent, Maximo Abad, were opposing candidates for that
office. Topacio received 430 votes, and Abad 281. Abad contested the election upon the sole ground that Topacio
was ineligible in that he was reelected the second time to the office of the municipal president on June 4, 1912,
without the four years required by Act No. 2045 having intervened.
Abad thus questioned the eligibility of To p a c i o on the basis of a statutory prohibition for seeking a second re-
election absent the four year interruption.
The often-quoted phrase in Topacio v. Paredes is that "the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an
ineligible candidate to any other candidate when the sole question is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality
of the legally cast ballots."
This phrase is not even the ratio decidendi; it is a mere obiter dictum. The Court was comparing "the effect of a
decision that a candidate is not entitled to the office because of fraud or irregularities in the elections x x x with that
produced by declaring a person ineligible to hold such an office."
The complete sentence where the phrase is found is part of a comparison and contrast between the two situations,
thus:
Again, the effect of a decision that a candidate is not entitled to the office because of fraud or irregularities in the
elections is quite different from that produced by declaring a person ineligible to hold such an office. In the former
case the court, after an examination of the ballots may find that some other person than the candidate declared to
have received a plurality by the board of canvassers actually received the greater number of votes, in which case
the court issues its mandamus to the board of canvassers to correct the returns accordingly; or it may find that the
manner of holding the election and the returns are so tainted with fraud or illegality that it cannot be determined
who received a plurality of the legally cast ballots. In the latter case, no question as to the correctness of the returns
or the manner of casting and counting the ballots is before the deciding power, and generally the only result can be
that the election fails entirely. In the former, we have a contest in the strict sense of the word, because of the
opposing parties are striving for supremacy. If it be found that the successful candidate (according to the board of
canvassers) obtained a plurality in an illegal manner, and that another candidate was the real victor, the former
Maquiling v. COMELEC G.R. No. 195649 12 of 16

must retire in favor of the latter. In the other case, there is not, strictly speaking, a contest, as the wreath of victory
cannot be transferred from an ineligible candidate to any other candidate when the sole question is the eligibility of
the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast ballots. In the one case the question is as to who received a plurality
of the legally cast ballots; in the other, the question is confined to the personal character and circumstances of a
single individual. (Emphasis supplied)
Note that the sentence where the phrase is found starts with "In the other case, there is not, strictly speaking, a
contest" in contrast to the earlier statement, "In the former, we have a contest in the strict sense of the word,
because of the opposing parties are striving for supremacy."
The Court in Topacio v. Paredes cannot be said to have held that "the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from
an ineligible candidate to any other candidate when the sole question is the eligibility of the one receiving a
plurality of the legally cast ballots."
A proper reading of the case reveals that the ruling therein is that since the Court of First Instance is without
jurisdiction to try a disqualification case based on the eligibility of the person who obtained the highest number of
votes in the election, its jurisdiction being confined "to determine which of the contestants has been duly elected"
the judge exceeded his jurisdiction when he "declared that no one had been legally elected president of the
municipality of Imus at the general election held in that town on 4 June 1912" where "the only question raised was
whether or not Topacio was eligible to be elected and to hold the office of municipal president."
The Court did not rule that Topacio was disqualified and that Abad as the second placer cannot be proclaimed in
his stead. The Court therein ruled:
For the foregoing reasons, we are of the opinion and so hold that the respondent judge exceeded his jurisdiction in
declaring in those proceedings that no one was elected municipal president of the municipality of Imus at the last
general election; and that said order and all subsequent proceedings based thereon are null and void and of no
effect; and, although this decision is rendered on respondents' answer to the order to show cause, unless
respondents raised some new and additional issues, let judgment be entered accordingly in 5 days, without costs.
So ordered.
On closer scrutiny, the phrase relied upon by a host of decisions does not even have a legal basis to stand on. It was
a mere pronouncement of the Court comparing one process with another and explaining the effects thereof. As an
independent statement, it is even illogical.
Let us examine the statement:
"x x x the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an ineligible candidate to any other candidate when the sole
question is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast ballots."
What prevents the transfer of the wreath of victory from the ineligible candidate to another candidate?
When the issue being decided upon by the Court is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast
ballots and ineligibility is thereafter established, what stops the Court from adjudging another eligible candidate
who received the next highest number of votes as the winner and bestowing upon him that "wreath?"
An ineligible candidate who receives the highest number of votes is a wrongful winner. By express legal mandate,
he could not even have been a candidate in the first place, but by virtue of the lack of material time or any other
intervening circumstances, his ineligibility might not have been passed upon prior to election date. Consequently,
Maquiling v. COMELEC G.R. No. 195649 13 of 16

he may have had the opportunity to hold himself out to the electorate as a legitimate and duly qualified candidate.
However, notwithstanding the outcome of the elections, his ineligibility as a candidate remains unchanged.
Ineligibility does not only pertain to his qualifications as a candidate but necessarily affects his right to hold public
office. The number of ballots cast in his favor cannot cure the defect of failure to qualify with the substantive legal
requirements of eligibility to run for public office.
The popular vote does not cure the
ineligibility of a candidate.
The ballot cannot override the constitutional and statutory requirements for qualifications and disqualifications of
candidates. When the law requires certain qualifications to be possessed or that certain disqualifications be not
possessed by persons desiring to serve as elective public officials, those qualifications must be met before one even
becomes a candidate. When a person who is not qualified is voted for and eventually garners the highest number of
votes, even the will of the electorate expressed through the ballot cannot cure the defect in the qualifications of the
candidate. To rule otherwise is to trample upon and rent asunder the very law that sets forth the qualifications and
disqualifications of candidates. We might as well write off our election laws if the voice of the electorate is the sole
determinant of who should be proclaimed worthy to occupy elective positions in our republic.
This has been, in fact, already laid down by the Court in Frivaldo v. COMELEC when we pronounced:
x x x. The fact that he was elected by the people of Sorsogon does not excuse this patent violation of the salutary
rule limiting public office and employment only to the citizens of this country. The qualifications prescribed for
elective office cannot be erased by the electorate alone.
The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if they
mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the candidate was qualified. Obviously, this rule requires strict application
when the deficiency is lack of citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in the Republic of the Philippines, he must
owe his total loyalty to this country only, abjuring and renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any other state.
(Emphasis supplied)
This issue has also been jurisprudentially clarified in Velasco v. COMELEC where the Court ruled that the ruling in
Quizon and Saya-ang cannot be interpreted without qualifications lest "Election victory x x x becomes a magic
formula to bypass election eligibility requirements."
We have ruled in the past that a candidates victory in the election may be considered a sufficient basis to rule in
favor of the candidate sought to be disqualified if the main issue involves defects in the candidates certificate of
candidacy. We said that while provisions relating to certificates of candidacy are mandatory in terms, it is an
established rule of interpretation as regards election laws, that mandatory provisions requiring certain steps before
elections will be construed as directory after the elections, to give effect to the will of the people. We so ruled in
Quizon v. COMELEC and Saya-ang v. COMELEC:
The present case perhaps presents the proper time and opportunity to fine-tune our above ruling. We say this with
the realization that a blanket and unqualified reading and application of this ruling can be fraught with dangerous
significance for the rule of law and the integrity of our elections. For one, such blanket/unqualified reading may
provide a way around the law that effectively negates election requirements aimed at providing the electorate with
the basic information to make an informed choice about a candidates eligibility and fitness for office.
The first requirement that may fall when an unqualified reading is made is Section 39 of the LGC which specifies
Maquiling v. COMELEC G.R. No. 195649 14 of 16

the basic qualifications of local government officials. Equally susceptive of being rendered toothless is Section 74
of the OEC that sets out what should be stated in a COC. Section 78 may likewise be emasculated as mere delay in
the resolution of the petition to cancel or deny due course to a COC can render a Section 78 petition useless if a
candidate with false COC data wins. To state the obvious, candidates may risk falsifying their COC qualifications
if they know that an election victory will cure any defect that their COCs may have. Election victory then becomes
a magic formula to bypass election eligibility requirements. (Citations omitted)
What will stop an otherwise disqualified individual from filing a seemingly valid COC, concealing any
disqualification, and employing every strategy to delay any disqualification case filed against him so he can submit
himself to the electorate and win, if winning the election will guarantee a disregard of constitutional and statutory
provisions on qualifications and disqualifications of candidates?
It is imperative to safeguard the expression of the sovereign voice through the ballot by ensuring that its exercise
respects the rule of law. To allow the sovereign voice spoken through the ballot to trump constitutional and
statutory provisions on qualifications and disqualifications of candidates is not democracy or republicanism. It is
electoral anarchy. When set rules are disregarded and only the electorates voice spoken through the ballot is made
to matter in the end, it precisely serves as an open invitation for electoral anarchy to set in.
Maquiling is not a second-placer as
he obtained the highest number of
votes from among the qualified
candidates.
With Arnados disqualification, Maquiling then becomes the winner in the election as he obtained the highest
number of votes from among the qualified candidates.
We have ruled in the recent cases of Aratea v. COMELEC and Jalosjos v. COMELEC that a void COC cannot
produce any legal effect.
Thus, the votes cast in favor of the ineligible candidate are not considered at all in determining the winner of an
election.
Even when the votes for the ineligible candidate are disregarded, the will of the electorate is still respected, and
even more so. The votes cast in favor of an ineligible candidate do not constitute the sole and total expression of
the sovereign voice. The votes cast in favor of eligible and legitimate candidates form part of that voice and must
also be respected.
As in any contest, elections are governed by rules that determine the qualifications and disqualifications of those
who are allowed to participate as players. When there are participants who turn out to be ineligible, their victory is
voided and the laurel is awarded to the next in rank who does not possess any of the disqualifications nor lacks any
of the qualifications set in the rules to be eligible as candidates.
There is no need to apply the rule cited in Labo v. COMELEC that when the voters are well aware within the realm
of notoriety of a candidates disqualification and still cast their votes in favor said candidate, then the eligible
candidate obtaining the next higher number of votes may be deemed elected. That rule is also a mere obiter that
further complicated the rules affecting qualified candidates who placed second to ineligible ones.
The electorates awareness of the candidates disqualification is not a prerequisite for the disqualification to attach
Maquiling v. COMELEC G.R. No. 195649 15 of 16

to the candidate. The very existence of a disqualifying circumstance makes the candidate ineligible. Knowledge by
the electorate of a candidates disqualification is not necessary before a qualified candidate who placed second to a
disqualified one can be proclaimed as the winner. The second-placer in the vote count is actually the first-placer
among the qualified candidates.
That the disqualified candidate has already been proclaimed and has assumed office is of no moment. The
subsequent disqualification based on a substantive ground that existed prior to the filing of the certificate of
candidacy voids not only the COC but also the proclamation.
Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 provides:
Section 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. - Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be
disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is
not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning
number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action,
inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order
the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.
There was no chance for Arnados proclamation to be suspended under this rule because Arnado failed to file his
answer to the petition seeking his disqualification. Arnado only filed his Answer on 15 June 2010, long after the
elections and after he was already proclaimed as the winner.
The disqualifying circumstance surrounding Arnados candidacy involves his citizenship. It does not involve the
commission of election offenses as provided for in the first sentence of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code,
the effect of which is to disqualify the individual from continuing as a candidate, or if he has already been elected,
from holding the office.
The disqualifying circumstance affecting Arnado is his citizenship. As earlier discussed, Arnado was both a
Filipino and an American citizen when he filed his certificate of candidacy. He was a dual citizen disqualified to
run for public office based on Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code.
Section 40 starts with the statement "The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local
position." The prohibition serves as a bar against the individuals who fall under any of the enumeration from
participating as candidates in the election.
With Arnado being barred from even becoming a candidate, his certificate of candidacy is thus rendered void from
the beginning. It could not have produced any other legal effect except that Arnado rendered it impossible to effect
his disqualification prior to the elections because he filed his answer to the petition when the elections were
conducted already and he was already proclaimed the winner.
To hold that such proclamation is valid is to negate the prohibitory character of the disqualification which Arnado
possessed even prior to the filing of the certificate of candidacy. The affirmation of Arnado's disqualification,
although made long after the elections, reaches back to the filing of the certificate of candidacy. Arnado is declared
to be not a candidate at all in the May 201 0 elections.
Arnado being a non-candidate, the votes cast in his favor should not have been counted. This leaves Maquiling as
the qualified candidate who obtained the highest number of votes. Therefore, the rule on succession under the
Local Government Code will not apply.
Maquiling v. COMELEC G.R. No. 195649 16 of 16

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED. The Resolution of the COMELEC En Bane
dated 2 February 2011 is hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Respondent ROMMEL ARNADO y CAGOCO is
disqualified from running for any local elective position. CASAN MACODE MAQUILING is hereby
DECLARED the duly elected Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in the 10 May 2010 elections.
This Decision is immediately executory.
Let a copy of this Decision be served personally upon the parties and the Commission on Elections.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.