CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF BRITISH NAVAL LEADERSHIP

DURING WWI NEED FOR GREATER

STRATEGIC ORIENTATION

Captain Jawahar Bhagwat

By Maritime Strategy we mean the principles which govern a war in which the sea is a substantial factor.
Naval Strategy is but that part of it which determines the movement of the fleet when maritime strategy has
determined what part the fleet must play in relation to the action of the land forces; for it scarcely needs saying
that it is almost impossible that a war can be decided by naval actions alone. Unaided naval pressure can
only work by a process of exhaustion. Its effects must always be slow, and so galling both to our own
commercial community and to neutrals, that the tendency is always to accept terms of peace that are far from
conclusive.
- Julian Corbett1

One of the periods in history when possession of a world-wide chain of

Britannia could have been said to have strategic bases by the British and a
ruled the waves, then it was the sixty or strong Navy protecting an ever-
2
so years following the final defeat of growing global trade. John Bourne
Napoleon i.e. from 1815 to 1875. stated it unequivocally, Britain was
During this period British sea power one of the world's great industrial
exercised a wider influence than had powers. Seventy-five per cent of the
ever been seen in the history of world's shipping was British built and
maritime powers. So unchallenged, much of it British owned. London was
and so immense did this influence the world's greatest money and
appear that people spoke of a Pax commodities market. British access to
Britannica, the only equivalent in world supplies of food and credit and to
history to be the centuries long imperial resources of manpower made
domination of the world by imperial them a formidable enemy, despite the
Rome. The factors responsible for the 'contemptible little army' which was all
rise of Great Britain to this they could put into the field at the
3
unchallenged supremacy were the outbreak of war. Some British
Industrial Revolution, the weakening historians observed ruefully that
of the other European powers, the during the century long peace between

1
Julian Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, (Annapolis, Naval Institute Press, 1911), p 16.
2
Paul M. Kennedy, Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery, (London, Humanity Books, 1976), pp. 149-160.
3
John Bourne, Total War I The Great War in Charles Townsend (Editor), Oxford Illustrated History of WWI,
(Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1997), p 13.

153
 Critical Assessment of British Naval Leadership During WWI

the end of the Napoleonic Wars (1815) as the German fleet was young, alert
and World War I (WWI), the combat and ambitious.6
spirit of the Royal Navy officer corps
declined precipitously.
4
Fisher Revolution

The aim of the paper is to bring out the Admiral John Fisher took over the reins
necessity for strategic leadership in any of the RN as First Sea Lord on 21st
Navy. The paper hypothesises that the October 1904. To his credit were the
need for greater strategic orientation of introduction of a large number of
the leadership resulted in the Royal personnel reforms, change from coal to
Navy not being able to convert its oil fired ships, introduction of the
superiority into strategic successes for flotilla defence concept including
Britain during WWI. destroyers and submarines and the
launch of the Dreadnought in February
7
Beginning of the End of Pax 1906. At 21 knots, it was the fastest
Britannica (1897-1914) warship at the time. Perhaps the most
important strategic reform was the
Britains title of Mistress of the Seas redeployment of Britains nine fleets
was not challenged due to extended stationed in various locations around
peace for almost a century.5 The last the world. Fisher believed that Dover,
time the Royal Navy (RN) had fired a Gibraltar, Suez, the Cape of Good
shot in hostile intention after the Battle Hope and Singapore were the strategic
of Trafalgar was in 1855 off the keys locking up the seas of the world.
Crimean coast. The rise of potent The nine fleets were merged into five
American and Japanese fleets in the and based at each of the key points. The
last few years of the 19th Century and Home Fleet with eight battleships was
the first few years of the 20th Century made the most powerful. The essence
did not ruffle the British as they were of the re-organization was that 3/4th of
fleets of friendly powers. However, the Britains battleships would be readily
threat was clearly seen from Germany

4
David M. Keithly, Military Culture: Leadership and Introspection, (2001) available at URL:
http://www.defencejournal.com/2001/june/military-culture.htm (accessed on November 08, 2014).
5
Richard Humble (Editor), Naval Warfare An Illustrated History, (London, Time Warner Books, 2002), p 104.
6
Paul M. Kennedy, Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery, (London, Humanity Books, 1976), pp. 205-238.
7
Eric Grove, The RN since 1815 A New Short History, (London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), pp. 89-92.

154
 Captain Jawahar Bhagwat

available against Germany. Admiral force to help the French and on the
9
John Fisher was greatly influenced by periphery of the Central Powers.
Julian Corbett. However, in the eyes of
many British naval officers, whether Changes at the Admiralty
students in the War Course (generally
of the rank of Lieutenant Commanders This era was also marked with
to Captains) or senior Admirals except differences between the Army and the
for Admiral Fisher, Julian Corbett was Royal Navy over the acceptance of
an outsider. Eric Grove remarked in his each others viewpoint on the British
introduction to the classic work Some National military strategy. The
Principles of Maritime Strategy, Generals espoused the Continental
degrees of admiration and resentment plan whereas for the Admiralty the
were compounded by Corbetts ideas strategy centered on the Royal Navy.
being new and even shocking.
8 The recently formed Admiralty War
Staff was a cumbrous body with a
British strategy envisaged a Chief of Staff Vice Admiral Sir
predominantly naval war. A naval Doveton Sturdee, who insisted on
blockade would cause Germany to handling every important matter
decline economically. The German himself. To resolve the differences, the
Navy could choose not to break the British Prime Minister appointed
stranglehold, but then Germany would Winston Churchill, the outspoken head
lose the war. If it did choose to fight, it of the Home Office, as the First Lord of
would be overwhelmed. British the Admiralty. On 8th December 1912,
maritime superiority would be Prince Louis of Battenberg assumed
reinforced. Neutral opinion would be the post of First Sea Lord in succession
subdued. Fresh allies would be to Admiral Sir Francis Bridgeman post
encouraged into the war. The blockade the latters public controversy with
would be waged with ruthlessness. Churchill. Historian Arthur Marder
Military operations would be restricted said the whole politico storm did the
10
to the dispatch of an expeditionary Navy no good. Another historian

8
Eric Grove, Introduction to Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, (London, Brasseys, 1998), p. xxvi.
9
Charles Townsend (Editor), Oxford Illustrated History of WWI, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1997), p 23.
10
Arthur Marder, From Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1966), p. 259.

155
 Critical Assessment of British Naval Leadership During WWI

Hew Strachan contends that Overview of the Naval Campaign

Battenberg lacked Fisher's
dogmatism. Not the least of his At the outbreak of war, the Royal and
attractions to Churchill (the First Lord) German Navies were comparable with
11
was his malleability. Churchill the Royal Navy having greater number
introduced a number of social reforms of ships countered by German
in the lower deck but his propensity to technological superiority in armour
encourage juniors to comment and munitions. The Royal Navy had 31
unfavourably upon their seniors caused capital ships as compared to 13 for the
much offence with the Sea Lords and German fleet with both Navies having
they threatened resignation over one 12 more dreadnoughts and one battle
such incident in late 1913. Churchill cruiser under construction.
just about avoided another major
12 During the first few days of WWI,
crisis. The First Sea Lord, Prince
German merchant shipping was forced
Louis of Battenberg, was forced to
to move away from the sea or seek
resign on 28th October 1914 after a
shelter in neutral ports. The German
vicious press campaign objecting to his
High Seas Fleet was in Kiel, but some
German birth. Upon Churchills
German cruisers which were at sea in
insistence, Admiral Fisher again took
13 various parts of the world were hunted
over as the First Sea Lord. The
and destroyed. England declared
combination of frequent change and
blockade of the German coast. In
weak appointees (Wilson, Bridgeman
February 1915, the Germans declared a
and Battenberg) in the four years
similar blockade. The Grand Fleet
preceding the war ensured that the
twice encountered German ships in the
professional leadership of the Royal
North Sea at Heligoland (1914) and the
Navy lost its direction. Power now lay
Dogger Bank (1915) but none of the
with the service's civilian head ...
engagements were decisive. The
Winston Churchill.14 Dardanelles campaign saw differences

11
Hew Strachan, The First World War, Vol. I: To Arms, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 380.
12
Eric Grove, The RN since 1815 A New Short History, pp. 89-92.
13
Ibid, p. 111.
14
Hew Strachan, The First World War, Vol. I: To Arms, p. 380.

156
 Captain Jawahar Bhagwat

18
between Churchill and Fisher come to fleet would give Germany control of
the fore and finally Fisher resigned in the seas.19 This was accentuated by
May 1915. Subsequently, due to the poor communications between the RN
controversy and continued poor results 20
ships and delayed passage of
Churchill too was forced to go. 21
intelligence from the Admiralty to the
Churchill was replaced by the former Fleet.
22
Although the Germans
Prime Minister Arthur Balfour. Fisher destroyed greater number of ships, they
was replaced by Sir Henry Jackson. lost a greater percentage of their
smaller Navy. The German surface
The only major encounter between the
fleet never again tried to contest British
two navies was the Battle of Jutland
control of the North Sea.
that took place off the coast of
Denmark on 31st May and 1st June 1916. The narrow escape at Jutland
Admiral Sir John Jellicoe commanded convinced Scheer that Germany had
a British fleet of 150 warships and only one chance of victory i.e. to
opposing the RN was the German fleet commence unrestricted submarine
of 99 ships under the command of 23
warfare. The restricted success of the
Admiral Reinhard Scheer.15 In spite of U-boat counter offensive brought an
Britains superior strength, Jellicoe end to the Balfour-Jackson Board of
after initial tactical brilliance, acted 24
Admiralty. After Jutland, Admiral
16
cautiously with the advent of Jellicoe spent a year as First Sea Lord
darkness.17 He may have feared that he from 1916 to 1917, grappling the
could lose the entire war in a day U-boat menace. Submarine warfare
because the destruction of the British took place in the North Sea, the Black

15
Julian Corbett, Official History of the Great War, Naval Operations, Vol. 3, Spring 1915 to April 1916, (1921) available
at URL: http://www.naval-history.net/WW1Book-RN4.htm (accessed on November 01, 2014).
16
Winston Churchill, The World Crisis 1911-18, (New York, Simon & Schuster, 1931), p. 591.
17
Holloway H. Frost, The Battle of Jutland, (Annapolis, Naval Institute Press, 1964), p. 375.
18
Winston Churchill, The World Crisis 1911-18, p. 591.
19
Langhorne Gibson & J.E.T. Harper, The Riddle of Jutland An Authentic History, (London, Casell & Co., 1934), pp.
144-146.
20
Corelli Barnett, The Swordbearers, (New York, William Morrow & Co., 1964), p. 155.
21
Geoffrey Bennett, The Battle of Jutland, (London, B.T.Basford, 1964), p. 155.
22
John Irving, The Smoke Screen of Jutland, (New York, David McKay Co., 1967), p. 13.
23
Arthur Marder, From Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, pp. 205-207.
24
Eric Grove, The RN since 1815 A New Short History, (London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), p. 130.

157
 Critical Assessment of British Naval Leadership During WWI

Sea, the Atlantic, the Mediterranean, reinforced by the Americans from

25
and the Baltic. Germans resorted to April 1917, played a vital role in
unrestricted submarine warfare from German defeat. Ultimately, Britain
January 1917 and brought Britain to the needed US involvement to stem the
verge of ruin. Jellicoes obsession with tide and change the course of WWI.
the necessity to keep the Grand Fleet
strong led him to oppose the adoption Assessment of British Naval
of the convoy system until Americas Leadership
entry. After the Admiralty was
There were few Admirals in the RN at
compelled by the British cabinet to
the commencement of war who
return to the convoy system in 1917,
understood the nature of modern war.
losses to enemy submarines dropped
The British approach to World War I
dramatically.26 However, the British
veered to over confidence. David
Prime Ministers sinking confidence in
Divine in his book The Blunted
Jellicoe starting with his lack of
Sword concluded the Admiralty
enthusiasm for the convoy system and
discouraged, delayed, obstructed or
coupled with his differences with the
positively delayed significant
First Lord of the Admiralty Geddes
technological developments ever since
over the control of the air wing resulted
the first marine engine and that the
in his dismissal on Christmas eve of
inertia and stubborn resistance to
1917 and his deputy Rosslyn Wemyss
change resulted in stupendous waste,
taking over as the First Sea Lord in
inefficiency and consequential losses
January 1918. 27
including in WWI. Except for
German violation of international law Churchill, the politicians tended to
and sinking of American ships helped accede to the advice of the Generals
bring the United States into the war on and the Admirals on the premise they
the Allied side. The British naval were the experts and knew best, when,
blockade of Germany, massively in fact, as the war progressed the lack of

25
Henry Newbolt, Official History of the Great War, Naval Operations, Vol. 4, June 1916 to April 1917, (1928) available at
URL: http://www.naval-history.net/WW1Book-RN4.htm (accessed on November 01, 2014).
26
Paul Kennedy, Engineers of Victory, (New York, Random House, 2013), p. 30.
27
David Divine, The Blunted Sword, (London, Hutchinson, 1964), pp. 25-26.

158
 Captain Jawahar Bhagwat

strategic orientation would become the commencement of the War. In

apparent. However, Churchill was also military matters Prime Minister
guilty and did not keep himself abreast Herbert Asquith was unsuited to the
of operational infirmities which role of wartime leader. He ceded
resulted in the failed Dardanelles and control and decision-making to the two
Gallipoli campaigns. The failure of strong-willed men in his government:
these campaigns (at the Dardanelles Field Marshal Lord Kitchener, the
and at Gallipoli) resulted in substantial Secretary of State for War, and
casualties and was a serious setback to Churchill, the First Lord of the
the Allied war command, including Admiralty. At times, they did not
that of Churchill. He resigned his comprehend operational constraints.
position with the Admiralty after being
demoted, and headed to the Western The lack of joint planning between
Front to command a battalion. the naval and the military staff. Neither
armed force had given much thought
The ineffective political leadership was on how decisive fleet action would
a lesson Churchill would learn well and support the armies strategies on land.28
not to repeat during World War II.
Some of the reasons for the lack of Over reliance on the concentrated
strategic naval leadership were as fleet concept and the big battle, a
follows:- legacy of Mahan. This resulted in
battles of attrition and static warfare,
Lack of opportunistic training in the and the British fleet failed to deliver the
hard school of war and their seeming expected Nelsonic victory of total
continued association with the days of annihilation.29
sail.
The British Admiralty, therefore,
Changes at the Admiralty just before looked to comparative battleship

28
Lord Hankey, The Supreme Command, 1914-1918, Vol. Two, (London, George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1961), pp. 76-84
cited in Jan Breemer, Burden of Trafalgar Decisive Battle and Naval Strategic Expectations on the Eve of the First World
War, (1993), pp.33-34.
29
Herbert Summer, Broadsides of Ink - A Study about the Controversies of the Battle of Jutland, (1973) available at URL:
http://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc164081/m2/1/high_res_d/n_04743.pdf (accessed on November 08,
2014).

159
 Critical Assessment of British Naval Leadership During WWI

strength and losses as the primary The British Navy did not take
means of strategic advantage,30 and advantage of communications thirteen
this was their indication as to which years after the first wireless signal had
side had command of the seas. been transmitted across the Atlantic
and superior intelligence was not
The Admiralty war plans envisaged exploited sufficiently.
blockade of the enemy coast. However
the primary reason was to entice the Failed to perceive the impact of the
High Sea Fleet to come out and give submarine that had been proclaimed as
battle and not bringing economic an un-English weapon.
pressure to bear.31
The role of the airplane in a versatile
The Admiralty reiterated that the big use was neither envisaged nor
battle would protect ones shipping realised.33
ignoring the historical experience of
the aftermath of Trafalgar. Thus, the Poor operational execution of the
Admiralty made an ambiguous otherwise clear strategic plan of
connection between the tactical means Winston Churchill at Gallipoli due to
of battle and the strategic objective of lack of operational experience coupled
the safety of the Sea lanes of with lack of surprise, not factoring for
communication.32 mines, and also deficiency of shells.

In addition to the above, they were Less importance to professional

also influenced by Julians Corbett military education, a vital necessity to
derision of convoying resulting in developing a strategic orientation and
significant losses against unrestricted gain the intellectual credentials to
submarine warfare. interact at par with power structures

30
Jan Breemer, Burden of Trafalgar Decisive Battle and Naval Strategic Expectations on the Eve of the First World
War, (1993), p. 15, (Newport, Naval War College, Newport Paper #6 available at URL:
https://www.usnwc.edu/Publications/Naval-War-College-Press/Newport-Papers.aspx (accessed on November 08,
2014).
31
A.C. Bell, A History of the Blockade of Germany and of the Countries Associated with Her in the Great War, 1914-
1918, (London, Her Majestys Stationary Office (HMSO), 1961), pp. 23-32 cited in Jan Breemer, Burden of Trafalgar
Decisive Battle and Naval Strategic Expectations on the Eve of the First World War, (1993).
32
Jan Breemer, Burden of Trafalgar Decisive Battle and Naval Strategic Expectations on the Eve of the First World
War, (1993), pp. 34-35.
33
E.B. Potter (Ed), Sea Power, A Naval History, 2nd Edition (Annapolis, Naval Institute Press, 1981), pp. 194-197.

160
 Captain Jawahar Bhagwat

and civilian authorities in the national be creative himself; he should foster

34
and international arena. cooperative thinking to draw on
potential strength in the ideas of
Conclusion subordinates.36 Creativity is the ability
to perceive problems and issues. It
The paper has sought to establish that needs an awareness of geopolitics, geo-
the shortcomings of strategic economics and geo-technology.
leadership in the Royal Navy were one Leaders also need to be au fait with the
of the reasons responsible for lack of values and interests of other cultures.
decisive advantage over Germany In contemporary times, even the
during the War. According to Samuel quoted sentiments of Huntington
Huntington, The skill of the officer is cannot adequately describe the
neither a craft nor an art. It is instead intellectual demands of naval
an extraordinary complex intellectual leadership which will have to imbibe
skill requiring comprehensive study multifaceted disciplines of maintaining
and training. The intellectual content international peace, progressing
of the military officer requires him to Confidence Building Measures,
devote about one-third of his responding to crises and resolving
professional life to formal schooling, disputes. All these would need a
probably a higher ratio of educational multifaceted approach with a strategic
time to practice time than in any other orientation. As David Keithly
p ro f e s s i o n . 3 5 C r e a t i v i t y a n d succinctly commented: Those who
originality what General M. Galvin are unable to do so will find themselves
referred to as intellectual non- overwhelmed by international
conformity are crucial aspects of conflicts, unable to comprehend cause
leadership that must be promoted in and potential consequence.
37

todays services. A leader must not only

34
Vishnu Bhagwat, The Emergence of the Indian Scholar Warrior, (Mumbai, Times of India, May 1999).
35
Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State, (Cambridge, Belknap Press, 1957), p 292.
36
David M. Keithly, The Forgotten Element of Leadership, (USNIPS, Vol. 121, No. 12, December 1995).
37
Ibid.

161
 Critical Assessment of British Naval Leadership During WWI

About the Author

Jawahar Bhagwat is a sering member of the Indian Navy in the rank of Captain. He has
commanded the submarines INS Shishumar and INS Shalki. He was part of the
commissioning of crew of INS Chakra, a nuclear submarine. He is the recipient of CNS
Gold Medal for best paper of Naval Higher Command Course (NHCC-25) (2013), CNS
Gold Medal (1992) for standing first in the order of merit amongst midshipman of the 43rd
Integrated Course and FOCINC (West) Commendation (2002). The officer has also been
awarded M. Phil (Defence and Startegic Studies) from Mumbai University for his
dissertation - Indias Nuclear Doctrine - A Crtitical Reassessment. He is presently the
Officer-in-Charge, School of Advanced Under Sea Warfare located at Visakhapatnam.

162