De Jesus v. Aquino G.R. No.

164662 1 of 11

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 164662 February 18, 2013
MARIA LOURDES C. DE JESUS, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. RAUL T. AQUINO, PRESIDING COMMISSIONER, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION, SECOND DIVISION, QUEZON CITY, and SUPERSONIC SERVICES, INC.,
Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 165787
SUPERSONIC SERVICES, INC., Petitioner
vs.
MARIA LOURDES C. DE JESUS, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The dismissal of an employee for a just or authorized cause is valid despite the employer's non-observance of the
due process of law the Labor Code has guaranteed to the employee. The dismissal is effective against the employee
subject to the payment by the employer of an indemnity.
Under review on certiorariis the July 23, 2004 Decision promulgated in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 81798 entitled Maria
Lourdes C. De Jesus v. Hon. Raul T. Aquino, Presiding Commissioner, NLRC, Second Division, Quezon City, and
Supersonic Services, Inc.,whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the validity of the dismissal from her
employment of Maria Lourdes C. De Jesus(petitionerin G.R. No. 164622), but directedher employer, Supersonic
Services, Inc. (Supersonic), to pay her full backwages from the time her employment was terminated until the
finality of the decision because of the failure of Supersonic to comply with the two-written notice rule, citing the
rulinginSerrano v. National Labor Relations Commission.
Antecedents
The antecedent facts, as summarized by the CA, follow:
On February 20, 2002, petitioner Ma. Lourdes De Jesus (De Jesus for brevity) filed with the Labor
Arbiter a complaint for illegal dismissal against private respondents Supersonic Services Inc.,
(Supersonic for brevity), Pakistan Airlines, Gil Puyat, Jr. and Divina Abad Santos praying for the
payment of separation pay, full backwages, moral and exemplary damages, etc.
De Jesus alleged that: she was employed by Supersonic since February 1976 until her illegal dismissal
of March 15, 2001; from 1976 to 1992, she held the position of eservation staff, and from 1992 until
her illegal dismissal on March 15, 2001, she held the position of Sales Promotion Officer where she
De Jesus v. Aquino G.R. No. 164662 2 of 11

solicited clients for Supersonic and sold plane tickets to various travel agencies on credit; on March 12,
2001, she had an emergency hysterectomy operation preceded by continuous bleeding; she stayed at the
Makati Medical Center for three (3) days and applied for a sixty-(60) day leave in the meantime; on
June 1, 2001, she went to Supersonic and found the drawers of her desk opened and her personal
belongings packed, without her knowledge and consent; while there, Divina Abad Santos (Santos for
brevity), the companys general manager, asked her to sign a promissory note and directed her
secretary, Cora Malubay (Malubay for brevity) not to allow her to leave unless she execute a
promissory note; she was later forced to execute a promissory note which she merely copied from the
draft prepared by Santos and Malubay; she was also forced to indorse to Supersonic her SSS check in
the amount of P25,000.00 which represents her benefits from the hysterectomy operation; there was no
notice and hearing nor any opportunity given her to explain her side prior to the termination of her
employment; Supersonic even filed a case for Estafa against her for her alleged failure to remit
collections despite the fact that she had completely remitted all her collections; and the termination was
done in bad faith and in violation of due process.
Supersonic countered that: as Sales Promotion Officer, De Jesus was fully authorized to solicit clients
and receive payments for and in its behalf, and as such, she occupied a highly confidential and
financially sensitive position in the company; De Jesus was able to solicit several ticket purchases for
Pakistan International Airlines (PIA) routed from Manila to various destinations abroad and received
all payments for the PIA tickets in its behalf; for the period starting May 30, 2000 until September 28,
2000, De Jesus issued PIA tickets to Monaliza Placement Agency, a client under her special solicitation
and account, in the amount of U.S.$15,085.00; on January 24, 2001, the companys general manager
sent a memorandum to De Jesus informing her of the official endorsement of collectibles from clients
under her account; in March 2001, another memorandum was issued to De Jesus reminding her to
collect payments of accounts guaranteed by her and which had been past due since the year 2000;
based on the company records, an outstanding balance of U.S.$36,168.39 accumulated under the
account of De Jesus; after verifications with its clients, it discovered that the amount of U.S.$36,
168.39 were already paid to De Jesus but this was not turned over and duly accounted for by her;
hence, another memorandum was issued to De Jesus directing her to explain in writing why she should
not be dismissed for cause for failure to account for the total amount of U.S.$36, 168.39; De Jesus was
informed that her failure to explain in writing shall be construed that she misappropriated said amount
for her own use and benefit to the damage of the company; De Jesus was likewise verbally notified of
the companys intention to dismiss her for cause; after due investigation and confrontation, De Jesus
admitted that she received the U.S.$36,168.39 from their clients and even executed a promissory note
in her own handwriting acknowledging her obligation; she was fully aware of her dismissal and even
obligated herself to offset her obligation with any amount she would receive from her retirement; when
De Jesus failed to comply with her promise to settle her obligation, a demand letter was sent to her;
because of her persistent failure to settle the unremitted collections, it was constrained to suspend her
as a precautionary measure and to protect its interests; despite demands, De Jesus failed to fulfill her
promise, hence, a criminal case for estafa was filed against her; and in retaliation to the criminal case
filed against her, she filed this illegal dismissal case.
After due proceedings, on October 30, 2002, the Labor Arbiterruled against De Jesus, declaring her dismissal to be
for just cause and finding that she had been accorded due process of law.
De Jesus v. Aquino G.R. No. 164662 3 of 11

Aggrieved, De Jesusappealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), insisting that she had not been
afforded the opportunity to explain her side.
On July 31, 2003, however, the NLRC rendered its Resolution, affirming the Labor Arbiters Decision and
dismissing De Jesus appeal for its lack of merit, stating:
Records show that pursuant to a Memorandum dated May 12, 2001, complainant was required to
explain in writing why she should not be dismissed from employment for her failure to account for the
cash collections in her custody (Records, p. 37). In a letter dated June 1, 2001, complainant
acknowledged her failure to effect a turn-over of the amount of US$36,168.39 to the respondent
(Records, p. 40). More than this, she offered no explanation for her failure to immediately account for
her collections. Further, her allegation of duress may not be accorded credence, there being no evidence
as to the circumstances under which her consent was allegedly vitiated. Having been given the
opportunity to explain her side, complainant may not successfully claim that she was denied due
process. Further, her admission and other related evidence, particularly the finding of a prima facie case
for estafa against her, and corroborative statements from respondents client, sufficiently controvert
complainants assertion that no just cause existed for the dismissal.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision under review is AFFIRMED, and complainants
appeal, DISMISSED, for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
The NLRC denied the Motion for Reconsideration filed by De Jesus on October 30, 2003.
De Jesusbrought a petition for certiorari to the CA, charging the NLRC with committing grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in finding that she had not been denied due process; and in finding that
her dismissal had been for just cause.
On July 23, 2004, the CA promulgated its assailed decision, relevantly stating as follows:
The petition is partly meritorious.
In termination of employment based on just cause , it is not enough that the employee is guilty of
misfeasance towards his employer, or that his continuance in service is patently inimical to the
employers interest. The law requires the employer to furnish the employee concerned with two written
notices one, specifying the ground or grounds for termination and giving said employee reasonable
opportunity within which to explain his side, and another, indicating that upon due consideration of all
the circumstances, rounds have been established to justify his termination. In addition to this, a hearing
or conference is also required, whereby the employee may present evidence to rebut the accusations
against him.
There appears to be no dispute upon the fact that De Jesus failed to remit and account for some of her
collections. This she admitted and explained in her letters dated April 5, 2001 and May 15, 2001 to
Santos, the companys general manager. Without totally disregarding her allegations of duress in
executing the promissory note, the facts disclose therein also coincide with the fact that De Jesus was
somehow remiss in her duties. Considering that she occupied a confidential and sensitive position in
the company, the circumstances presented fairly justified her termination from employment based on
De Jesus v. Aquino G.R. No. 164662 4 of 11

just cause. De Jesus failure to fully account her collections is sufficient justification for the company to
lose its trust and confidence in her. Loss of trust and confidence as a ground for dismissing an
employee does not require proof beyond reasonable doubt. It is sufficient if there is "some basis" for
such loss of confidence, or if the employer has reasonable grounds to believe that the employee
concerned is responsible for the misconduct, as to be unworthy of the trust and confidence demanded
by his position.
Nonetheless, while this Court is inclined to rule that De Jesus dismissal was for just cause, the manner
by which the same was effected does not comply with the procedure outlined under the Labor Code
and as enunciated in the landmark case of Serrano vs. NLRC.
The evidence on record is bereft of any indicia that the two written notices were furnished to De Jesus
prior to her dismissal. The various memoranda given her were not the same notices required by law, as
they were mere internal correspondence intended to remind De Jesus of her outstanding
accountabilities to the company. Assuming for the sake of argument that the memoranda furnished to
De Jesus may have satisfied the minimum requirements of due process, still, the same did not satisfy
the notice requirement under the Labor Code because the intention to sever the employees services
must be made clear in the notice. Such was not apparent from the memoranda. As the Supreme Court
held in Serrano, the violation of the notice requirement is not strictly a denial of due process. This is
because such notice is precisely intended to enable the employee not only to prepare himself for the
legal battle to protect his tenure of employment, but also to find other means of employment and ease
the impact of the loss of his job and, necessarily, his income.
Conformably with the doctrine laid down in Serrano vs. NLRC, the dismissal of De Jesus should
therefore be struck as ineffectual.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Resolutions dated July 31, 2003 and October 30, 2003 of the
NLRC, Second Division in NLRC NCR 30-02-01058-02 (CA NO. 033714-02) are herebyMODIFIED,
in that while the dismissal is hereby held to be valid, the same must declaredineffectual. As a
consequence thereof, Supersonic is hereby required to pay petitioner Maria Lourdes De Jesus full
backwages from the time her employment was terminated up to the finality of this decision.
SO ORDERED.
De Jesusappealed by petition for review on certiorari to the Court (G.R. No. 164662), while Supersonic first
sought the reconsideration of the Decision in the CA.Upon the denial of its motion for reconsideration on October
21, 2004, Supersonic likewise appealed to the Court by petition for review on certiorari(G.R. No.
165787).Theappeals were consolidated on October 5, 2005.
In G.R. No. 164662, De Jesus avers that:
I. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in finding that respondent Supersonic is liable only on the
backwages and not for the damages prayed for.
II. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in finding that the dismissal was valid and at the same time,
declaring it ineffectual.
In G.R. No. 165787,Supersonic ascribes the following errors to the CA, to wit:
De Jesus v. Aquino G.R. No. 164662 5 of 11

I. Respondent Court of Appeals committed serious errors which are not in accordance with law and
applicable decisions of the Honorable Supreme Court when it concluded that the two-notice requirement
has not been complied with when respondent De Jesus was terminated from service.
II. Respondent Court of Appeals committed serious errors by concluding that the Serrano Doctrine applies
squarely to the facts and legal issues of the present case which are contrary to the law and jurisprudence.
III. Serrano Doctrine has already been abandoned in the case of Agabon v. NLRC, which is prevailing and
landmark doctrine applicable in the resolution of the present case.
IV. Respondent Court of Appeals committed serious errors by disregarding the law and jurisprudence when
it awarded damages to private respondent which is excessive and unduly penalized petitioner SSI.
Based on the foregoing, thedecisive issues to be passed upon are: (1) Whether or not Supersonic was justified in
terminating De Jesus employment; (2) Whether or not Supersonic complied with the two-written notice rule; and
(3) Whether or not De Jesus was entitled to full backwages and damages.
Ruling
We partially grant the petition for review of Supersonic in G.R. No. 165787.
Anent the first issue, Supersonic substantially proved that De Jesus had failed to remit and had misappropriated the
amounts she had collected in behalf of Supersonic. In that regard, the factual findings of the Labor Arbiter and
NLRC on the presence of the just cause for terminating her employment, being already affirmed by the CA, are
binding if not conclusive upon this Court. There being no cogent reason to disturb such findings, the dismissal of
De Jesus was valid.
Article 282 of the Labor Code enumerates the causes by which the employer may validly terminate the
employment of the employee, viz:
Article 282.Termination by employer. - An employer may terminate an employment for any of the following
causes:
(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or
representative in connection with his work;
(b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;
(c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly
authorized representative;
(d) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his employer or any immediate
member of his family or his duly authorized representatives; and
(e) Other causes analogous to the foregoing.
The CA observed that De Jesus had not disputed her failure to remit and account for some of her collections, for, in
fact, she herself had expressly admitted her failure to do so through her letters dated April 5, 2001 and May 15,
2001 sent to Supersonics general manager. Thereby, the CA concluded, she defrauded her employer or willfully
violated the trust reposed in her by Supersonic. In that regard, the CA rightly observed that proof beyond
reasonable doubt of her violation of the trust was not required, for it was sufficient that the employer had
De Jesus v. Aquino G.R. No. 164662 6 of 11

"reasonable grounds to believe that the employee concerned is responsible for the misconduct as to be unworthy of
the trust and confidence demanded by [her] position."
Concerning the second issue, the NLRC and the CA differed from each other, with the CA concluding, unlike the
NLRC, that Supersonic did not comply with the two-written notice rule. In the exercise of its equity jurisdiction,
then, this Court should now re-evaluate and re-examine the relevant findings.
A careful consideration of the records persuades us to affirm the decision of the CA holding that Supersonic had
not complied with the twowritten notice rule.
It ought to be without dispute that the betrayal of the trust the employer reposed in De Jesus was the essence of the
offense for which she was to be validly penalized with the supreme penalty of dismissal. Nevertheless, she was still
entitled to due processin order to effectivelysafeguard her security of tenure. The law affording to her due process
as an employee imposed on Supersonic as the employer the obligation to send to her two written notices before
finally dismissing her. This requirement of two written notices is enunciated in Article 277of the Labor Code, as
amended, which relevantly states:
Article 277.Miscellaneous provisions.xxx
xxxx
(b) Subject to the constitutional right of workers to security of tenure and their right to be protected against
dismissal except for a just and authorized cause and without prejudice to the requirement of notice under Article
283 of this Code, the employer shall furnish the worker whose employment is sought to be terminateda
written notice containing a statement of the causes for termination and shall afford the latter ample
opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with the assistance of his representative if he so desires in
accordance with company rules and regulations promulgated pursuant to guidelines set by the Department
of Labor and Employment. Any decision taken by the employer shall be without prejudice to the right of the
worker to contest the validity or legality of his dismissal by filing a complaint with the regional branch of the
National Labor Relations Commission. The burden of proving that the termination was for a valid or authorized
cause shall rest on the employer. The Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment may suspend the
effects of the termination pending resolution of the dispute in the event of a prima facie finding by the appropriate
official of the Department of Labor and Employment before whom such dispute is pending that the termination
may cause a serious labor dispute or is in implementation of a mass lay-off.
xxxx
and in Section 2 and Section7, Rule I, Book VI of the Implementing Rules of the Labor Code. The firstwritten
notice would inform her of the particular acts or omissions for which her dismissal was being sought. The second
written notice would notify her of the employers decision to dismiss her. But the second written notice must not be
made until after she was given a reasonable period after receiving the first written notice within which to answer
the charge, and after she was given the ample opportunity to be heard and to defend herself with the assistance of
her representative, if she so desired. The requirement was mandatory.
Did Supersonic observe due process before dismissing De Jesus?
Supersonic contends that it gave the two written notices to De Jesus in the form of the memoranda dated March 26,
2001 and May 12, 2001, to wit:
De Jesus v. Aquino G.R. No. 164662 7 of 11

Memorandum dated March 26, 2001

26 March 2001
MEMORANDUM
TO : MA LOURDES DE JESUS SALES PROMOTION OFFICER
FROM : DIVINA S. ABAD SANTOS
SUBJECT : PAST DUE ACCOUNTS
We have repeatedly reminded you to collect payment of accounts guaranteed by you and which have
been past due since last year. You have assured us that these will be settled by the end of February
2001.
Our books show, that as of today, March 26, 2001, the following accounts have outstanding balances:

Wafa $6,585

Monaliza/Ragab 4,326.39

Salah 1,950

Jerico 1,300

Rafat 4,730

Mahmood/Alhirsh 3,205

Amina 2,000

MMML 1,653

RDRI 361

HMD 2,100

Amru 1,388

Iyad Ali 97

Ali 740

Maher 675

Sharikat 350

Imad 905

Rubies 2,678
De Jesus v. Aquino G.R. No. 164662 8 of 11

Adel 1,125

$36,168.39

Please give us an updated report on your collection efforts and the status of each of the above accounts
to enable us to take necessary actions. This would be submitted on or before April 2, 2001
(SGD) DIVINA ABAD SANTOS
General Manager
Memorandum dated May 12, 2001
12 May 2001
MEMORANDUM
TO : MA. LOURDES DE JESUS SALES PROMOTION OFFICER
FROM : DIVINA S. ABAD SANTOS GENERAL MANAGER
SUBJECT : PAST DUE ACCOUNTS
You are asked to refer to my memorandum dated 26 March 2001. We were informed that the following
accounts have been paid to you but not accounted/turned over to the office:

NAME AMOUNTS

Wafa $6,585

Monaliza/Ragab 4,326.39

Salah 1,950

Jerico 1,300

Rafat 4,730

Mahmood/Alhirsh 3,205

Amina 2,000

MMML 1,653

RDRI 361

HMD 2,100

Amru 1,388

Iyad Ali 97
De Jesus v. Aquino G.R. No. 164662 9 of 11

Ali 740

Maher 675

Sharikat 350

Imad 905

Rubies 2,678

Adel 1,125

$36,168.39

You are hereby directed to explain in writing within 72 hours from receipt of this memorandum, why
you should not be dismissed for cause for failure to account for above amounts.
By your failure to explain in writing the above accountabilities, within the set deadline, we shall
assume that you have misappropriated the same for your own use and benefit to the damage of the
office.
(SGD.)DIVINA S. ABAD SANTOS
General Manager
Contrary to Supersonics contention, however, the aforequotedmemoranda did not satisfy the requirement for the
two written notices under the law. The March 26, 2001 memorandum did not specify the grounds for which her
dismissal would be sought, and for that reasonwas at best a mere reminder to De Jesus to submit her report on the
status of her accounts. The May 12, 2001 memorandumdid not provide the notice of dismissal under the law
because itonly directed her to explain why she should not be dismissed for cause. The latter memorandum was
apparently only the first written noticeunder the requirement.The insufficiency of the two memoranda as
compliance with the two-written notices requirement of due process was, indeed, indubitable enough to impelthe
CA to hold:
The evidence on record is bereft of any indicia that the two written notices were furnished to De Jesus prior to her
dismissal. The various memoranda given her were not the same notices required by law, as they were mere internal
correspondences intended to remind De Jesus of her outstanding accountabilities to the company. Assuming for the
sake of argument that the memoranda furnished to De Jesus may have satisfied the minimum requirements of due
process, still, the same did not satisfy the notice requirement under the Labor Code because the intention to sever
the employees services must be made clear in the notice. Such was not apparent from the memoranda. As the
Supreme Court held in Serrano, the violation of the notice requirement is not strictly a denial of due process. This
is because such notice is precisely intended to enable the employee not only to prepare himself for the legal battle
to protect his tenure of employment, but also to find other means of employment and ease the impact of the loss of
his job and, necessarily, his income.
Conformably with the doctrine laid down in Serrano vs. NLRC, the dismissal of De Jesus should therefore be
struck (down) as ineffectual.
On the third issue, Supersonicposits that the CA gravely erred in declaring the dismissal of De Jesus ineffectual
De Jesus v. Aquino G.R. No. 164662 10 of 11

pursuant to the ruling inSerrano v. National Labor Relations Commission;andinsiststhat the CA should have
instead applied the ruling in Agabonv. National Labor Relations Commission, which meanwhile abandoned
Serrano.
InSerrano, the Court pronounced as follows:
x xx, with respect to dismissals for cause under Art. 282, if it is shown that the employee was dismissed for any of
the just causes mentioned in said Art. 282, then, in accordance with that article, he should not be reinstated.
However, he must be paid backwages from the time his employment was terminated until it is determined that the
termination of employment is for a just cause because the failure to hear him before he is dismissed renders the
termination of his employment without legal effect.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission is
MODIFIED by ordering private respondent Isetann Department Store, Inc. to pay petitioner separation pay
equivalent to one (1) month pay for every year of service, his unpaid salary, and his proportionate 13th month pay
and, in addition, full backwages from the time his employment was terminated on October 11, 1991 up to the time
the decision herein becomes final. For this purpose, this case is REMANDED to the Labor Arbiter for computation
of the separation pay, backwages, and other monetary awards to petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
The CA did not err. Relying on Serrano, the CA precisely ruled that the violation by Supersonic of the two-written
notice requirement renderedineffectual the dismissal of De Jesus for just cause under Article 282 of the Labor
Code, and entitled her to be paid full backwages from the time of her dismissal until the finality of its decision.The
Court cannot ignore thatthe applicable case law when the CA promulgated its decision on July 23, 2004, and when
it denied Supersonics motion for reconsideration on October 21, 2004 was still Serrano. Considering that the
Court determines in this appeal by petition for review on certiorarionly whether or not the CA committed an error
of law in promulgating its assailed decision of July 23, 2004,the CA cannot be declared to have erred on the basis
of Serrano being meanwhile abandoned through Agabonif all thatthe CA did was to fully apply the law and
jurisprudence applicable at the time of its rendition of the judgment.As a rule, a judicial interpretation becomes a
part of the law as of the date that the law was originally passed, subject only to the qualification that when a
doctrine of the Court is overruled and the Court adoptsa different view, and more so when there is a reversal ofthe
doctrine, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively and should not apply to parties who relied on the old
doctrine and acted in good faith. To hold otherwise would be to deprive the law of its quality of fairness and
justice, for, then, there is no recognition of what had transpired prior to such adjudication.
Although Agabon,being promulgatedonly on November 17, 2004, ought to be prospective, not retroactive, in its
operation because its language did not expressly state that it would also operate retroactively, the Court has already
deemed it to be the wise judicial course to let its abandonment of Serranobe retroactive as its means of giving
effect to its recognition of the unfairness of declaring illegal or ineffectual dismissals for valid or authorized causes
but not complying with statutory due process. Under Agabon, the new doctrine is that the failure of the employer to
observe the requirements of due process in favor of the dismissed employee (that is, the two-written notices rule)
should not invalidate or render ineffectual the dismissal for just or authorized cause. The Agabon Court plainly saw
the likelihood of Serrano producing unfair butfar-reaching consequences, such as, but not limited to, encouraging
frivolous suits where even the most notorious violators of company policies would be rewarded by invoking due
process; to having the constitutional policy of providing protection to labor be used as a sword to oppress the
De Jesus v. Aquino G.R. No. 164662 11 of 11

employers; and to compelling the employers to continue employing persons who were admittedly guilty of
misfeasance or malfeasance and whose continued employment would be patently inimical to the interest of
employers.
Even so, the Agabon Court still deplored the employer's violation of the employee's right to statutory due process
by directing the payment of indemnity in the form of nominal damages, the amount of which would be addressed
to the sound discretion of the labor tribunal upon taking into account the relevant circumstances. Thus, the Agabon
Court designed such form of damages as a deterrent to employers from committing in the future violations of the
statutory due process rights of employees, and, at the same time, as at the very least a vindication or recognition of
the fundamental right granted to the employees under the Labor Code and its implementing rules. Accordingly,
consistent with precedent the amount of P50,000.00 as nominal damages is hereby fixed for the purpose of
indemnifying De Jesus for the violation of her right to due process.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari in G.R. No. 164662 entitled Maria
Lourdes C. De Jesus v. Han. Raul T Aquino, Presiding Commissioner, NLRC, Second Division, Quezon City, and
Supersonic Services, Inc.; PARTIALLY GRANTS the petition for review on certiorari in G.R. No. 165787
entitled Supersonic Services, Inc. v. Maria Lourdes C. De Jesus and, accordingly, DECLARES the dismissal of
Maria Lourdes C. De Jesus for just or authorized cause as valid and effectual; and ORDERS Supersonic Services,
Inc. to pay to Maria Lourdes C. De Jesus P50,000.00 as nominal damages to indemnify her for the violation of her
right to due process.
No pronouncements on costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C.J., Leonardo-De Castro, Villarama, Jr., and Reyes, JJ., concur.