SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 118328. October 8, 1998]

MARCIANA SERDONCILLO, petitioner, vs. SPOUSES FIDEL and
EVELYN BENOLIRAO, MELITON CARISIMA, and COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
DECISION
MARTINEZ, J.:
This petition for review assails the decision of the Court of Appeals dated
July 14, 1994 in CA G.R. CV No. 39251 which affirmed the decision of the
[1]

Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, (Branch 108) in Civil Case No. 7785, dated
June 30, 1992 directing herein petitioner to demolish and remove all illegal
structures which she constructed in front of the subject lots, to vacate the said
property and right of way, and return possession thereof to the respondents.
The antecedent facts:
The subject premises was formerly part of the estate of H. V. Ongsiako,
comprising of 1,806 square meters, more or less, located at the corner of Pilapil
and N. Domingo Streets, Pasay City. The legal heirs of H.V. Ongsiako organized
the United Complex Realty and Trading Corporation (UCRTC) which subdivided
the property into fourteen (14) lots, Lots 555-A to 666-N. The subdivided lots
were then offered for sale with first priority to each of the tenants, including the
private respondents and petitioner. Lot 666-H has an area of 248 square
[2]

meters, consisting of two (2) parts. One part is the residential portion with an
area of 112 square meters purchased by private respondents-spouses
Benolirao while the second part is the right of way for Lot 666-I and the
[3]

aforesaid residential portion. Private respondent Carisima purchased Lot 666-

[4]

I. Petitioner, who was occupying the western end and front portions of the
aforesaid lots declined the offer to purchase any of the lots offered for sale by
UCRTC. [5]

Petitioner continued paying rentals to H.V. Ongsiakos wife, Mrs. Rosario de

Jesus. Thereafter, the collection of rentals was stopped prompting petitioner to
file on June 30, 1987, Civil Case No. 5456 before the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Pasay City for consignation of rentals against UCRTC, Rosario de Jesus and the
spouses Carisima. The consignation was granted by the trial court and was
eventually affirmed on appeal by the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch
109 on October 25, 1989. [6]

On May 5, 1989, UCRTC executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of private

respondents-spouses Benolirao for Lot 666-H. This sale was annotated at the
[7]

back of UCRTCs title on Lot 666-H . [8]

On June 2, 1989, after unsuccessful oral and written demands were made
upon petitioner, UCRTC instituted an action against her for recovery of
possession of the subject premises before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City,
Branch 114 docketed as Civil Case No 6652. On July 15, 1990, the trial court
[9]

rendered its decision dismissing the complaint of UCRTC, stating in part, to wit:
It is clear, therefore, that plaintiff, not having been authorized in
writing for the purpose, may not validly bring an action to enforce
 a perceived easement of right of way pertaining to the owners of
Lots 666-H and 666-I or the Benolirao and Carisima
families. while Benjamin Ongsiako possessed the authority to
institute the case (Exhibit G), plaintiff is not the real party in
interest. Furthermore, the situation obtaining does not call for the
enforcement of an easement of right of way. Defendant
Serdoncillo is not the owner of and has never claimed ownership
over the portion of Lot 666-H on which her house is erected. A
servitude is an encumbrance imposed upon an immovable for
the benefit of another immovable belonging to a different owner
(Article 613, New Civil Code). In the present case, the ejectment
of defendant Serdoncillo from the portion of Lot 666-H occupied
by the house at the instance of the proper party (Renato
Bolinaraos family ) would remove the obstruction.
xxxxxxxxx
"WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, the
complaint against the defendant Marciana Serdoncillo, as well as
defendants counterclaim, is dismissed for lack of merit. Without
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED." [10]

UCRTC did not appeal the aforesaid decision of the Regional Trial Court,
hence, the same became final.
On November 20, 1989, Serdoncillo instituted Civil Case No. 7749 for the
Exercise of Preferential Rights of First Refusal against UCRTC and private
respondents-spouses Fidel and Evelyn Benolirao praying for the annulment of
sale of a portion of lot 666-H sold to the Benolirao spouses on the ground that
said transfer or conveyance is illegal. She claimed that she has the preferred
right to buy the said property and that the same was not offered to her under the
same terms and conditions, hence, it is null and void. UCRTC and private
respondents prevailed and this case was dismissed. On appeal to the Court of
Appeals, the same was dismissed on July 9, 1992. [11]

On November 20, 1990, private respondents made their final demand on

petitioner reiterating their previous demands to vacate the property. On [12]

December 13, 1990, private respondents filed their complaint for recovery of
possession of the subject premises against petitioner before the Regional Trial
Court of Pasay City, Branch 108, docketed as Civil Case No. 7785, which
complaint alleges these material facts:
5. That plaintiffs, being then registered owners of the properties
designated as lot 666-H and 666-I, are likewise the
owners/grantees of the right of way granted by United Complex
Realty and Trading Corporation which was correspondingly
annotated in its title (Annex B-3) under Entry No. 205154/T-
172291 of the Register of Deeds of Pasay City;
 6. That since 1982 the defendant has built and constructed a
residence and pig pen on the plaintiffs right of way as well as on
the front portions of the latters properties leaving them virtually
obstructed with no ingress or egress from the main road;
7. That verbal and written demands made upon the defendant
by the plaintiffs to remove and demolish her structures had been
ignored, the last of which was on November 20, 1990, xerox
copy of which is hereto attached as Annex C and taken as an
integral part hereof, but despite such demands, the defendant
failed and refusedand still fails and refuses to remove and
vacate her illegal structures on the portion of the properties as
well as on the right of way of plaintiffs;
8. That plaintiffs in compliance with the Katarungang
Pambarangay Law lodged a complaint before the Barangay
Captain, Barangay 84, Zone 10 of Pasay City, which certified
filing of the same in court, xerox copy of said certification is
hereto attached as Annex D and taken as integral part hereof;
9. That due to the unjustified refusal of the defendant, the
plaintiffs are suffering the unnecessary inconvenience of the
absence of decent and sufficient ingress and egress on their
properties, and will continue to suffer the same unless the illegal
structures are finally demolished and/or removed by the
defendants; [13]

Petitioner, in her Answer, put up the defense that she is the legitimate tenant
of said lots in question since 1956, pertinent portions of which are quoted
hereunder, thus:
13. That Lot 666-H and Lot 666-I mentioned in the complaint are
formerly portions of a big track(sic) of land consisting of 1,806
square meters then owned by H.V. Ongsiako;
14. That since 1956 and before the 1,806 square meters of lot
owned by H.V. Ongsiako was subdivided into fourteen (14) lots
in 1982, defendant is (sic) already a legitimate tenant and
occupant family of around 400 square meters of the 1,806
square meters of the said land then owned by H.V. Ongsiako by
erecting her residential house thereon at the agreed monthly
rental of P15.00 and increased to P100.00;
"15. That upon the death of H. V. Ongsiako his heirs continued
collecting the monthly rental of the premises from the
defendants;
"16. That the heirs of H. V. Ongsiako formed a corporation
known as UNITED COMPLEX REALTY AND TRADING
CORPORATION and the big parcel of land consisting of 1,806
 square meters was transferred to the said corporation and
subdivided in 1982 into fourteen (14) lots, two (2) of which lots
are the very same lots leased by the defendant from H.V.
Ongsiako and later from his heirs and then from United Complex
Realty and Trading Corporation as alleged in the preceding
pars. 13, 14, and 15; [14]

The issues having been joined, trial on the merits ensued. On June 30, 1992,
the trial court rendered its decision in favor of private respondents, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW of the foregoing, and finding
preponderance of evidence in plaintiffs favor, judgment is hereby
rendered as follows:
"1) Ordering the defendant to demolish and remove all
illegal structures she constructed on the front portions of
the subject lots and on the right of way of the plaintiffs;
"2) Ordering the defendant to vacate the property and
right of way and return possession thereof to the plaintiffs;
"3) Ordering the defendant to pay the cost of suit.
As to the damages (actual and moral) no award is given. In the
absence of proof of fraud and bad faith by defendants, the latter
are(sic) not liable for damages (Escritor Jr. vs. IAC, 155 SCRA
577).
"Actual and compensatory damages require substantial proof. In
the absence of malice and bad faith, moral damages cannot be
awarded (Capco vs. Macasaet, 189 SCRA 561).
"As to the attorneys fees, each party should shoulder his/her
expenses.
SO ORDERED." [15]

Aggrieved by the trial courts decision, petitioner appealed to the Court of

Appeals alleging that: 1) the lower court should have dismissed the complaint of
private respondents considering that based on the letter of demand dated
November 20, 1990, the action filed should have been unlawful detainer and not
an action for recovery of possession; 2) the action filed by private respondents is
barred by res judicata considering that the present action is identical with that of
Civil Case No. 6652; 3) the lower court erred in not dismissing the complaint for
lack of cause of action with respect to enforcement of right of way vis a
vis defendant; and 4) the lower court erred in ordering that defendants vacate the
properties in question since the lease of defendants thereon was still in existence
and had not yet been terminated. [16]

On July 14, 1994, the respondent Court of Appeals rendered its decision
sustaining the findings of the trial court and dismissed the appeal of petitioner,
stating in part as follows:
 The issue as to the proper action has been resolved by the
respondent court, to wit:
`The defense that what should have been filed is an
ejectment case and not recovery of possession, is not
also correct. The filing of this case for recovery of
possession, instead of an ejectment case, is not
altogether unjustified. The Benoliraos and Carisima
became the owners as early as May, 1989. Verbal and
written demands had been ignored. There is an
immediate need for plaintiffs to use the right of way, which
up to the present time is obstructed,. At most, what
surfaced is a technicality which should be abandoned.'
"A plain reading of the complaint shows that plaintiff-appellees
cause of action is for recovery of possession of their property
which was encroached upon by defendant-appellant. [17]

A motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid decision filed by petitioner on

August 8, 1994 was denied by the respondent on September 23, 1994.
[18] [19]

Hence, this petition.

Petitioner ascribes one single error committed by the respondent court, to
wit:
THE RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT AND THE
COURT OF APPEALS (Sp. Fifteenth Division) COMMITTED
GRAVE ABUSE OF JURISDICTION IN DECIDING AS AN
ACCION PUBLICIANA AN EJECTMENT OR UNLAWFUL
DETAINER CASE (THE JURISDICTION OF WHICH CLEARLY
PERTAINS TO THE INFERIOR COURT), A CASE BASICALLY
INVOLVING AN EASEMENT OF RIGHT OF WAY.
Petitioner asserts that the respondent court erred in sustaining the trial courts
finding that the complaint filed by private respondents for recovery of possession
of the subject premises is an accion publiciana notwithstanding the fact that the
action was filed within one (1) year from demand. Petitioner contends that private
respondents should have filed an action for unlawful detainer and not an action
for recovery of possession against petitioner. Consequently, the trial court is
without jurisdiction to hear and determine Civil Case No. 7785. In support of her
contention, petitioner cited the cases of Bernabe vs. Luna and Medina vs.
[20]

Court of Appeals, which she states is strikingly similar to the facts of this case.
[21]

Consequently, the rulings of this Court in these two cases are squarely applicable
and controlling in the case at bar.
Private respondents, however, aver that they were merely successors-in-
interest of UCRTC and therefore step into the shoes of the latter. They claim that
the demand to vacate required by law should at the very least be reckoned from
June 2, 1989, the date of the filing of the complaint in Civil Case No. 6652
considering that their demands are simply a reiteration of UCRTCs demands
against petitioner. Private respondents further contend that the allegations in the
complaint determine the jurisdiction of the court. Thus, the complaint in Civil
Case No. 7785 specifically alleged that private respondents are the owners of
lots 666-I and 666-H as evidenced by transfer certificates of title and prayed
forrecovery of possession of a portion thereof including its right of way illegally
and unlawfully possessed by petitioner.
Petitioners position is without merit.
It is an elementary rule of procedural law that jurisdiction of the court over the
subject matter is determined by the allegations of the complaint irrespective of
whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims
asserted therein. As a necessary consequence, the jurisdiction of the court
cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set up in the answer or upon the
motion to dismiss, for otherwise, the question of jurisdiction would almost entirely
depend upon the defendant. What determines the jurisdiction of the court is the
[22]

nature of the action pleaded as appearing from the allegations in the

complaint. The averments therein and the character of the relief sought are the
ones to be consulted. Accordingly, the issues in the instant case can only be
[23]

properly resolved by an examination and evaluation of the allegations in the

complaint in Civil Case No. 7785. [24]

In this regard, to give the court jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of an

occupant or deforciant on the land, it is necessary that the complaint must
sufficiently show such a statement of facts as to bring the party clearly within the
class of cases for which the statutes provide a remedy, without resort to parol
testimony, as these proceedings are summary in nature. In short, the [25]

jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the complaint. When the complaint
fails to aver facts constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as where it
does not state how entry was effected or how and when dispossession started,
the remedy should either be an accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria.
[26]

In the case of Javier vs. Veridiano II this Court held that the doctrine
[27]

in Emilia v. Bado, decided more than twenty-five years ago, is still good law. It
[28]

preserved the age-old remedies available under existing laws and jurisprudence
to recover possession of real property, namely: (1) accion interdictal, which is
the summary action for either forcible entry or detentacion, where the
defendants possession of the property is illegal ab initio; or for unlawful detainer
or desahucio, where the defendants possession was originally lawful but ceased
to be so by the expiration of his right to possess, both of which must be brought
within one year from the date of actual entry on the land, in case of forcible entry,
and from the date of last demand, in case of unlawful detainer, in the proper
municipal trial court or metropolitan court; (2) accion publiciana which is a
plenary action for recovery of the right to possess and which should be brought
in the proper regional trial court when the dispossession has lasted for more than
one year; and, (3) accion reivindicatoria or accion de reivindicacion which
seeks the recovery of ownership and includes the jus possidendi brought in the
proper regional trial court.
Accion reivindicatoria or accion de reivindicacion is thus an action
whereby plaintiff alleges ownership over a parcel of land and seeks recovery of
its full possession. It is different from accion interdictal or accion
publiciana where plaintiff merely alleges proof of a better right to possess
without claim of title. In Banayos vs. Susana Realty, Inc., this Court held that:
[29]

We have consistently held that a complaint for forcible entry, as

distinguished from that of unlawful detainer, in order to vest
jurisdiction upon the inferior court, must allege plaintiffs prior
physical possession of the property, as well as the fact that he
was deprived of such possession by any of the means provided
in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, namely: force,
intimidation, threats, strategy and stealth, for if the
dispossession did not take place by any of these means, the
courts of first instance, not the municipal courts, have
jurisdiction.
xxxxxxxxx
The aforesaid Rule 70 does not, however, cover all of the cases
of dispossession of lands. Thus, whenever the owner is
dispossessed by any other means than those mentioned he may
maintain his action in the Court of First Instance, and it is not
necessary for him to wait until the expiration of twelve months
before commencing an action to be repossessed or declared to
be owner of the land. Courts of First Instance have jurisdiction
over actions to recover possession of real property illegally
detained, together with rents due and damages, even though
one (1) year has not expired from the beginning of such illegal
detention, provided the question of ownership of such property
is also involved. In other words, if the party illegally
dispossessed desires to raise the question of illegal
dispossession as well as that of the ownership over the property,
he may commence such action in the Court of First Instance
immediately or at any time after such illegal dispossession. If he
decides to raise the question of illegal dispossession only, and
the action is filed more than one (1) year after such deprivation
or withholding of possession, then the Court of First Instance will
have original jurisdiction over the case. The former is an accion
de reivindicacion which seeks the recovery of ownership as well
as possession, while the latter refers to an accion publiciana,
which is the recovery of the right to possess and is a plenary
action in an ordinary proceeding in the Court of First Instance.
A reading of the averments of the complaint in Civil Case No. 7785
undisputably show that plaintiffs (private respondents herein) clearly set up title
to themselves as being the absolute owner of the disputed premises by virtue of
their transfer certificates of title and pray that petitioner Serdoncillo be ejected
therefrom. There is nothing in the complaint in Civil Case No. 7785 alleging any
of the means of dispossession that would constitute forcible entry under Section
(1) Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, nor is there any assertion of defendants
possession which was originally lawful but ceased to be so upon the expiration of
the right to possess. It does not characterize petitioners alleged entry into the
land, that is, whether the same was legal or illegal nor the manner in which
petitioner was able to construct the house and the pig pens thereon. The
complaint merely avers that a portion of the lot owned by private respondents
and its right of way have been occupied by petitioner and that she should
vacate. The action therefore is neither one of forcible entry nor of unlawful
detainer but essentially involves a dispute relative to the ownership of 4.1 square
meters of land allegedly encroached upon by petitioner and its adjoining right of
way. Indeed, the Ocular Inspection Report of the Branch Clerk of Court, states
that:
"xxx (T)he right of way hit directly the defendant Serdoncillos
property consisting of a two-storey residential house made of
wood and GI sheets and occupying the entire width of the rear
portion of the right of way. A coconut tree stands on the middle
of the road, at the back of which is a shanty made of rotten G.I.
sheets around it which is used as pigpens and place of washing
clothes extended from defendants house. To gain access to
plaintiffs property, the group turned right and passed between an
aratiris tree and cemented firewall owned by Mr. Belarmino
making only one person at a time to pass. This passageway has
only a width of 0.5 meter which is being used by the defendant
and her members of the family aside from the plaintiffs.
xxx Two (2) monuments of the lot boundary of the plaintiffs
property are existing, but the rest are nowhere to be
found. According to Mrs. Benolirao, they are located within the
premises of the defendants house. At the back of Benolirao is a
private property gutted by fire.
xxx Upon request, the group was granted permission by the
relatives of the defendant to inspect the place. The group further
noticed that defendants improvements were even encroaching
on the plaintiffs lot by approximately 4.1 meters, more or
less. The house of the defendant is facing the plaintiffs property;
there is a small chicken house and there is also a dog house
standing near it. [30]

It is noted that at the time of the filing of said complaint, Civil Case No. 7749,
an action for annulment of the sale between UCRTC and private respondents
Benolirao of Lot 666-H initiated by petitioner was likewise pending in another
court. This case puts in issue the validity of private respondents acquisition of the
subject lots and ultimately their ownership of Lot 666-H.
 Thus, what is noticeable in the complaint is that private respondents
definitely gave petitioner notice of their claim of exclusive and absolute
ownership, including their right to possess which is an elemental attribute of
ownership. It is immaterial whether or not private respondents instituted their
[31]

complaint one month from date of last demand or a year thereafter. What is of
paramount importance is that the allegations in the complaint are of the nature of
either an accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria.
Petitioners reliance on the Bernabe and Medina cases, which she claims to
be squarely applicable under the circumstances herein, is entirely
misplaced. While it is true that in these two cases the complaints were filed
before the one-year period had expired from date of last demand, the allegations
in the complaint failed to state material facts which are indicative of a case of
either an accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria. Thus, the Court
in Bernabe stated that:
"In their complaint, plaintiffs (petitioners herein) allege that they
are the owners of a parcel of land with an area of 199.4 square
meters more or less, located in Tondo, Manila, that defendant
(private respondent herein) constructed a house on said lot
without plaintiffs permission; that on November 14, 1980,
plaintiffs thru counsel made a written demand for the removal of
said house as well as for the recovery of damages for the
reasonable use and occupation thereof; and that defendant
refused and failed to comply despite repeated demands.
xxxxxxxxx
We have noted that while petitioners allege in their complaint
that they are the owners of the lot on which the house of the
private respondent is constructed, their attached TCT shows that
the lot is still in the name of Fejosera Investment
Incorporated. Private respondent and said company entered into
a contract of lease in l950 for the use and occupation of said
lot. Petitioners allegedly bought the lot in question in 1973, and
they must have been fully aware of the occupancy of the private
respondent of the premises in question. Yet, they did not take
any action to remove the house of the private respondent or to
inform the respondent that they had become the new owners of
the lot in question. It is clear therefore that the lease was
allowed to continue.
xxxxxxxxx
"Consequently, the possession of private respondent over the lot
in question became illegal only on November 14, 1980, when
the formal demand to pay and vacate the premises was sent to
him. [32]
 The allegations in the complaint clearly show that plaintiffs were already the
owners of the property when defendant constructed a house on the disputed lot
without their permission. That despite formal demand defendant failed to vacate
and surrender possession of the property to them. Indeed, the averments in
plaintiffs complaint present jurisdictional facts which do not illustrate plaintiffs
action as either an action publiciana or accion reivindicatoria but that of
forcible entry or unlawful detainer. Thus, the trial court correctly dismissed
plaintiffs complaint, pertinent portion of which is quoted hereunder:
It is clear on the face of the complaint that at the time of the filing
of this case on February 19, 1981, the defendant was in
possession, as tenant, of the premises. When plaintiffs counsel,
therefore sent a written notice on November 4, 1980 requiring
defendant to vacate the premises when this action was brought,
the one (1) year period after the unlawful deprivation or
withholding of possession has not yet set in. It is clear that this is
an ejectment case within the exclusive jurisdiction of the City
Court of Manila.
SO ORDERED. [33]

We likewise find the Medina case, relied upon by petitioner, to be

inappropriate. The facts distinctly show that the complaint filed by the owners of
the property before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch 47, was for
unlawful detainer. It was the action resorted to by the plaintiffs after advising the
defendant (the lessee of the premises in question) that a member of the family,
Dr. Igama, urgently needed the house and after repeated demands to vacate
made on the lessee proved to be unsuccessful. All these incidents, from
notification to the filing of the complaint dated May 16, 1985, transpired within a
period of six (6) months. Indeed, the factual background of this case is a classic
illustration of an action for unlawful detainer. Verily, the facts are therefore
diametrically opposite to the facts of the case at bar.
Petitioner has therefore no legal basis to insist that the present case is
similar to the Bernabe and Medina cases and from which this Court should base
its findings and conclusions. The doctrine laid down in Tenorio vs. Gomba is still
controlling. In that case the Court ruled that courts of first instance have
jurisdiction over all actions involving possession of land except forcible entry and
illegal detainer, and therefore the lower court has jurisdiction over the action
alleged in the appellants complaint because it is neither of illegal detainer nor of
forcible entry.
[34]

Petitioner maintains that her leasehold right as a tenant of the subject

premises had been settled in Civil Case No. 5456, an action for consignation,
which she won before the Metropolitan Trial Court and affirmed on appeal by the
Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 109. Said court ruled that the latter is
a tenant of the site or premises in question and that she cannot be ejected
therefrom, even on the assumption that her house and pig pen are allegedly
standing on a right of way. She claims that pursuant to Section 49 (b) (now
Section 47) Rule 39, Rules of Court, the issue of tenancy in said case is now
conclusive between her and private respondents with respect to the subject
premises in question.
Petitioners contention is devoid of merit.
Section 49 (now Section 47), provides that:
Section 49. Effects of Judgments.- the effect of a judgment or
final order rendered by a court or judge of the Philippines having
jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or order, may be as
follows:
(a) xxx xxx xxx
(b) In other cases the judgment or order is, with respect
to the matter directly adjudged or as to any other matter
that could have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive
between the parties and their successors-in-interest by
title subsequent to the commencement of the action or
special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and
under the same title and in the same capacity;
The fundamental principle upon which the doctrine of res judicata rests is
that parties ought not be permitted to litigate the same issue more than once, that
when the right or fact has been judicially determined, the judgment of the court,
so long as it remains unreversed, should be conclusive upon the parties and
those in privity with them in law or estate. [35]

Thus, for res judicata to bar the institution of a subsequent action the
following requisites must concur: (l) the former judgment must be final; (2) it must
have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the subject matter and the
parties; (3) it must be a judgment on the merits; and, (4) there must be between
the first and second actions; (a) identity of parties; (b) identity of subject matter;
and (c) identity of cause of action.
[36]

There is no dispute as to the presence of the first three (3) requirements and
the identity of the subject matter. The only issues remaining are whether as
between Civil Case No. 5456 and Civil Case No. 7785, there is identity of parties
and of causes of action in Civil Case No. 5456 to bar the institution of Civil Case
No. 7785.
There is identity of parties. The record shows that the parties in Civil Case
No. 5456 are petitioner as plaintiff while the defendants were UCRTC, the
spouses Meliton and Efremia Carisima and Rosario de Jesus. Private
respondents-spouses Fidel and Evelyn Benolirao acquired lot 666-H from
UCRTC and are therefore the successors-in-interest of UCRTC by title
subsequent to the commencement and termination of the first action. As such,
private respondents merely stepped into the shoes of UCRTC and acquired
whatever capacity and title the former had over the same property or subject
matter of the action. Indeed, there is actual, if not substantial, identity of parties
between the two actions. [37]

There is however, no identity of causes of action in both cases. In the case

of Garcia vs. Court of Appeals, this Court held that the test of identity of
[38]

causes of action lies not in the form of an action but on whether the same
evidence would support and establish the former and the present causes of
action. Petitioners complaint in Civil Case No. 5456 is an action for consignation
of rentals while Civil Case No. 7785 is an action for recovery of possession.
In other words, the issue in Civil Case No. 5456 is whether or not
consignation of rentals is proper under the circumstances obtaining in that
case. Private respondents action for recovery of possession requires them to
present evidence of their claim or title to the subject premises and their right to
possess the same from petitioner. Stated conversely, the evidence in Civil Case
No. 5456 is entirely different to that in Civil Case No. 7785. Thus, the decision in
Civil Case No. 5456 does not in any way affect nor bar Civil Case No. 7785.
Indeed, the Court noted that the parties had been at odds since 1987 when
petitioner initiated Civil Case No. 5456, and then Civil Case No. 7749. Private
respondents predecessor UCRTC likewise initiated Civil Case No. 6652 and the
present case under appeal, Civil Case No. 7785, all because of the use of a right
of way and an encroachment of only 4.1 meters of the subject premises. At some
point in time, all these squabbles must end. Thus, the respondent court stated
that:
It is true that it is the purpose and intention of the law that courts
should decide all questions submitted to them as truth and
justice require, and that it is greatly to be desired that all
judgments should be so decided; but controlling and irresistible
reasons of public policy and of sound practice in the courts
demand that at the risk of occasional errors, judgment of the
courts determining controversies submitted to them should
become final at some definite time fixed by law. [39]

In passing, We reiterate the time-honored doctrine that findings of facts of the

Court of Appeals are binding and conclusive upon the Supreme Court, and the
Court will not normally disturb such factual findings unless the findings of the
court are palpably unsupported by the evidence or unless the judgment itself is
based on misapprehension of facts. In this case, We find the said decision to be
[40]

totally supported by the evidence on record.

Based on the foregoing premises, it is unnecessary to pass upon the other
issues raised in the petition.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby DISMISSED and the
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV NO. 39251 is AFFIRMED. No
pronouncements as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, (Acting C. J.), Melo, Puno, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

[1]
Decided by the First Division, Court of Appeals composed of the Honorable Associate Justice
Justo P. Torres, Jr., Ponente and Chairman of the Division (now retired Justice of the Supreme
Court); Honorable Associate Justice Bernardo P. Pardo, Senior Member and Honorable Associate
Justice Corona Ibay-Somera, Junior Member.
[2]
Exhibit D, Civil Case No. 6652, Letter dated November 13, 1982.
 [3]
Deed of Absolute Sale, Annex A, pp. 1-2, Folder of Exhibits.
[4]
ENTRY NO. 205154/T-17291-RIGHT OF WAY-GRANTED: By the registered owner herein
covering a portion of the land herein as shown and marked in the subdivision Plan LRC Psd-
158391 from points 1 to 14, of lot 666-H with the width of 3.12 meters as an access road to and
from the existing road for the benefit and use of owners of Lot 666-I to 666-H of said Subdivision
Plan. Doc. No. 434, Page No. 88, Book No. 9352, Series of 1980, Julian Florentino. Date of
Instrument - December 11, 1980; Date of Inscription - December 12, 1980 at 10:25 a.m.
[5]
Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 114, Pasay City, pp. 13-18, ibid.
[6]
Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 109, Pasay City, pp. 25-28, Folder of Exhibits.
[7]
Deed of Absolute Sale, Annex A, pp. 1-2, ibid.
[8]
Entry No. 89-105751/T-17291 - PORTION SALE - in favor of SPS. FIDEL and EVELYN
BENOLIRAO, covering an area of ONE HUNDRED TWELVE (112) SQUARE METERS for the
sum of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (50,000.00), other conditions set forth in Doc. No. 08, Page
15, Block VI, Series of l989 of the Not. Register for Pasay City, Jeremias L. de Jesus, dated May
5, 1989. Date of Inscription, May 19, 1989 - 1:35 p.m..
[9]
Complaint, Civil Case No. 6652, Exhibit I, pp. 19-24, ibid.
[10]
Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 114, Pasay City, penned by the then Judge Fermin
A. Martin, Exhibit H, pp. 13-18, Folder of Exhibits.
[11]
par. 3, ibid.
[12]
Letter of Demand, page 11, Exhibit F, ibid.
[13]
Complaint, pages 5-9, Original Record.
[14]
Answer with Special Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaim,, pages 14-19, Ibid.
[15]
Decision of the Regional Trial Court, pp. 45-66, CA rollo.
[16]
Appellants Brief, pp. 15-42, CA Rollo. CA G.R. CV No. 39251.
[17]
Decision of the Court of Appeals, pp. 64-70 ibid.
[18]
Motion for Reconsideration, pp. 72-85, ibid.
[19]
Resolution of the Court of Appeals, page 87, ibid.
[20]
148 SCRA 113.
[21]
181 SCRA 837.
[22]
Caparros vs. Court of Appeals, 170 SCRA 758 (1989) ; Ganadin vs. Ramos, 99 SCRA 613, 621
(1973) ; Fuentes vs. Bautista , 53 SCRA 420 (1969) ; Simpao, Jr. vs. Lilles, 40 SCRA 180 (1971) ;
Vencilao vs. Camarenta, 29 SCRA 473 (1969).
[23]
Banayos vs. Susana Realty Inc., 71 SCRA 557 (1976).
[24]
Sarmiento vs. Court of Appeals, 250 SCRA 108 (1995)
[25]
36 A C.J.S. Forcible Entry and Detainer, Sec 39, p. 2002; Ind. - Boxley vs. Collins, 4 Blackf.
320; Me. - Treat vs.. Brent., 51 Me. 478.
[26]
Sarmiento vs. Court of Appeals, supra.; Accion reivindicatoria- An action for ejectment wherein
the plaintiff sets up title in himself and prays that he be declared the owner, and given possession
thereof. [Ledesma vs. Marcos, 9 Phil. 618 (1908)].
[27]
237 SCRA 565 (1994).
[28]
23 SCRA 183 (1968).
[29]
71 SCRA 557 (1976)
[30]
Ocular Inspection Report, September 10, 1991, pp. 45-48, Original Record.
[31]
Javier vs. Veridiano II, supra.
[32]
Bernabe vs. Luna, supra.
[33]
Ibid.
[34]
81 Phil. 54 (1948).
[35]
Sarabia vs. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, 2 SCRA 54 (1961).
[36]
Ipekdjian Mercjandising Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 9 SCRA 72 (1963); Mangoma vs. Court
of Appeals, et al., 241 SCRA 21(1995) ; Guevarra vs. Benito, 247 SCRA 570, 573(1995).
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/oct1998/118328.htm -
_ednref37 Mendiola vs. Court of Appeals, 258 SCRA 492 (1996); Comilang vs. Bautista, 21
[37]

SCRA 486, 491(1967); Penalosa vs. Tuason, 22 Phil. 303, 323 (1912).
[38]
14 SCRA 721 (1965); Guevarra vs. Benito, et al., ibid.
[39]
Decision of the Court of Appeals, supra.
[40]
Valenzuela vs. Court of Appeals, 253 SCRA 303; Mallari vs. Court of Appeals, 265 SCRA 456.