Epistemology and Tragedy: A Reading of Othello

Author(s): Stanley Cavell

Source: Daedalus, Vol. 108, No. 3, Hypocrisy, Illusion, and Evasion (Summer, 1979), pp. 27-43
Published by: MIT Press on behalf of American Academy of Arts & Sciences
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STANLEY CAVELL

Epistemology and Tragedy: A Reading of Othello

a cover letter)
(Together with

Dear Alceste,

They're thinking about you again, the good ones. Can you imagine why? I
will not disguise from you my conviction that your position is intellectually
indefensible. What more really can you say on your behalf but that human
society is filled with show, with artifice, with insincerity, with dissociations
between the public and the private, between the outer and the inner? And what
more to you than to concede this, and whatever
really need be said in reply
follows from it, as the nature of human society, as the very essence of the civ
ilized; and then simply request that you?what? Let us not say either love
civilization or leave it. The request is rather that you not be illogical: if you do
decide to jpin the human race; or let me say, to take your place in society; then
do not complain that you will not by that act have rejoined the world of nature.
It need not be denied that in this decision something is lost. But need you deny
that something is gained, something indeed human? To see these two sides is
just to grow up, something you are heartily advised to do.
Why is this not the end of the matter? The fact that it is not the end iswhat I
take the issue of hypocrisy to be about, what it is that keeps it an issue. The
issue is not so much why you are not convinced by the better arguments of the
others. That sort of impasse is hardly news in human affairs. The issue is rather
the others care that are not convinced. You are without What
why you power.
is your hold upon them? What do you represent to them?
to their and
Perhaps you imagine that you represent purity compromise
I think it would be closer to the truth to say that you represent
corruption.
or to their sense of their purity lost?not as if
purity to their purity, corrupted
exactly but as if misplaced, thus still present somehow. Purity and innocence
are no doubt
dangerous ingredients in society, rarely making a bad situation as
good as it can be, often making it as bad as it can be, unable to listen to reason.
But like
virginity itself, innocence ought to be put aside in its own good time;
which is to say, in a time and place of its own consent. In a happy world purity
willitself know its time and its place. But suppose it does not? Suppose that the
world is not happy. Purity can only know by its own heart and by the encour
agement of what draws it. So if I maintain the right of experience to its argu

27

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 28 STANLEY CAVELL

ments for consent, I equally maintain the right of innocence to to

give and
withhold its consent without argument, on the basis of its feeling, its sense of
itself. The world needs that sense, requires that you say, willingly, that the
world is good enough to want to live in. And I assume that in general you, in
to want the world; which is to say: you wish to be present
general youth, wish
ed with a world you can want, to which you give yourself. Why would you not?
Let us leave aside the possibility that you are neurotic, or tyrannical. Let us
assume that you may be that the world as it is, is not wantable, or not
right,
Let us also leave aside the that you are a victim of
acceptable. possibility politi
cal injustice, either privately or as the member of a victimized class or race. In
so much as
acknowledging that there may be room left, beyond private or public
injustice, for refusing the world, I am, you see, showing the side of me that
sides with you. (This implies that there is a part of me that parts with you. I'll
come to that.) Then what room is left? How could the world as a whole
present
itself, to one's feeling, as uninhabitable? What is the feeling?
it must be understood as a mode of
Evidently disgust, a repugnance at the
idea that your life should partake of the world's, that what it does, you do; or is
it at the idea that the world's life partakes of yours, that what you feel, it feels? I
am not to try now to define further or to assess such ideas. I am
going writing
to reaffirm that I believe in the potential epistemological
merely significance of
this mode of disgust (recognizing always, as one always has to add in our day,
that the significance may only be psychological, as if we knew what distinction
we had in mind). Like Hamlet before you (with his sensitivity to odor, to the

rotting), and like the romantics and the existentialists after you, you represent
the discovery of adolescence, of that moment at which the worth of adulthood
is?except, I suppose, to deep old age?most clearly exposed; at which adult
hood is the are asked to choose, to consent to. choice
thing you Naturally your
will be based on insufficient evidence. But woe to them that believe the choice is
easy, that in foregoing adolescence you forego little of significance. They have
as they have
merely forgotten what they have lost, forgotten the loss of child
hood, a matter of comparable significance. (Freud, to whom you should be
introduced, means like this, or to mean it, by speaking of
something ought
human sexual development as two the second of which, after a
having phases,
period of latency, recapitulates the first.)
The idea here, that when comes to rest upon con
the world's
legitimacy
sent?when the public world is something that each individual has at some
moment to agree to join?that then adolescence is invented as the time of pre
paring for that agreement, and is ended by it; this idea is confirmed in the
of a word which says something about a role but
thought hypocrisy, playing
which at the same time derives from a sense of measured from some
separation
a sense of dissociation. The hypocrite would dissociate himself or
thing, say
herself from a life of human vulnerabilities, call it human nature; the anti
would dissociate himself or herself from a world of invulnerable pre
hypocrite
tenses. If adolescence will level the most unforgiving at
charge of hypocrisy
those ahead of it, it will level against itself an equally unforgiving charge of
fraudulence?and the one because of the other. The world posed before it,
beckoning it, is a field of possibilities, toward which curiosity is bound to out

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 EPISTEMOLOGY AND TRAGEDY: A READING OF OTHELLO 29

reach commitment. It is inherently a time of theater, of self-consciousness pre

sented as embarrassment, of separation from the familiar, of separation from the
self, as if something were tearing; of a scrutiny that claims to know everything
itself upon feelings and actions that can claim to know nothing. It is a
directing
time containing the reversal of rites of passage: the tribe shifts the responsibility
for its pain from its back onto yours; and instead of opening secrets to you, it
informs you that it has none, that what you see is all there is to it. Hence to its
recruits it is now reduced merely to
saying "Grow up."
I have several reasons for wanting to be in touch with you now. First, my
old friend Judith Shklar is saying publicly that you finally lost the woman you
love. This implies at the least that C?lim?ne is right to refuse your offer of
marriage with its condition that she abandon the remainder of the world, that
she find the whole world in you. So I have to tell you that I agree with this
verdict and will say so publicly. I will, however, go on to claim that the more
significant fact, the mystery of your misanthropy, is that C?lim?ne loves you,
that they all love you, Arsino? as well as Philinte; that they do not
give you up
but end their play by going to seek you out. Quite as if they think you are right,
even if
placed in the wrong, and cannot want to live without the thing you mean
to them. And yet what? They find you too difficult or too hard. Is that your
or theirs?
problem
Second, the side of me that sides with you has in recent years repeatedly
found itself siding with those for whom the relation of innocence and experience
is their life, call it the relation between their past of possibilities and the present
of the world, or between their memories of and
actuality being disappointed
their fears of being disappointing. Thoreau is talking about this relation in this
passage from the chapter "Spring" inWaiden. "While such a sun holds out to
burn, the vilest sinner return. our own recovered innocence we
may Through
discern the innocence of our neighbors. You may have known your neighbor
yesterday for a thief, a drunkard, or a sensualist, and merely pitied or despised
him, and despaired of the world; but the sun shines bright and warm this first
the world. . . . There is not an
spring morning, re-creating only atmosphere
of good will about him, but even a savor of holiness groping for expression."
Emerson, I now believe to his credit, can barely let the issue alone, the issue of
consenting to the world. It is this fact of his perpetual youth, calling to the
in us, more than his incessant sagacity about it, that keeps
perpetual youth
Emerson so annoying to in the Swedenborg
good society. For example, chapter
of Representative Men: "The human mind stands ever in perplexity, demanding
intellect, demanding sanctity, impatient equally of each without the other. The
reconciler has not yet appeared." We may have imagined that it is hard to be
known for a sinner, and may have feared scandal from that quarter. It proves
harder to be known for a saint, hard to forgive the one who knows it of us. This,
I feel sure, is something Nietzsche loved Emerson for. Zarathustra says to the
young man from whom he has elicited the confession that he has been destroyed
by his envy of Zarathustra: "Yes, I know your peril. But, by my love and hope I
entreat you: do not reject your love and hope! You still feel yourself noble, and
the others, too, who dislike you and cast evil glances at you, still feel you are
noble. Learn that finds the noble man an obstruction. . . . Alas, I
everyone

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30 STANLEY CAVELL

have known noble men who lost their highest hope. And henceforth they slan
dered all high hopes. . . .But, love and hope I entreat you: do not reject
by my
the hero in your soul! Keep holy your highest hope."
One day soon I mean to write to you about Dusan Makavejev's last film,
which he calls Sweet Movie. It is, among other things, the most original explora
tion known to me of the endless relations between documentary and fictional
film, incorporating both; hence an of the endless relations
original exploration
between reality and fantasy. The conscience of the film ismost hideously cap
tured in the Nazi film footage of German troops exhuming bodies from mass
graves in the Katyn Forest. A lifelong participant in a society of socialist aspira
tions, Makavejev is Was my revolution even of this? Has it
asking: capable
cannibalized everything that has touched it? Is it true that the Red Army com
mitted a mass murder of the Polish officer corps in order to it with
replenish
more favorable a card which
personnel? The film shows contains Anthony
Eden's response: "Let us think of these things always. Let us speak of them
never." For Makavejev, that conspiracy of silence?call itmass hypocrisy?is a
prescription for self-administered poison. Mere film cannot alone prove who
caused and buried the corpses in the Katyn Forest, but this film can directly and

by itself break the conspiracy of silence about it. Sweet Movie is a work that
to extract from the fact that we are of
attempts hope very capable genuine dis
gust at the world; that this is to be understood as our revoltedness, as
disgust
our chance of revulsion, that the for freedom continues to
cleansing fight origi
nate in the demands of our instincts. It is a work powerful enough to encourage
us to think to require our
again that the tyrant's power continues complicitous
over to be
tyranny ourselves. I would expect you, dear Alceste, capable of tears
when, at the end of Makavejev's film, he allows a young boy who is fictionally
dead, in sheets and laid on a river bank, to resurrect and to
wrapped plastic
declare himself as the young actor playing this part, thus exhuming his younger
self, his innocent sincerity. He then directs this figure to look out from the
screen and hence to confront his older self, his artistry, his experience as a
filmmaker, a consenting adult in a world of horrors (thus, as Rousseau and
Thoreau a of that world, chained con
perceive, conspirator by partialities)
to to
fronting himself with the chance forgive himself, hence with the chance
start
again.
You see that Iwould try to tempt you back, to tell you that there are those in
the world who have not forgotten what you know, hence who feel the rebuke in
your taking offense. But it is up to you and to us in our separate ways; it is
to and this is not the time to harangue. The final reason I write
pointless beg,
now is to a cover for
provide showing you something I have been thinking about
Othello.1
a very long manuscript to do
My thoughts about it conclude having princi
with a close to your heart, namely whether, and on what basis, we
pally topic
must the existence of other human beings. These thoughts picture
acknowledge
Othello as, in various ways, a semblable of yours, one who demands being the
whole world to the woman he loves, as some sort of price for his joining her in
wedlock. My tale is cautionary. To you itwarns that a mind and a character as
pure and grand as Othello's may, in its isolation, fall to wallowing in littleness.
Of the world my tale asks watchfulness over itself, over its ability to encourage

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 EPISTEMOLOGY AND TRAGEDY: A READING OF OTHELLO 31

and to protect the innocent. Say Othello's ugliness was to have gone the limit in
murdering his love and his hope, the hero in his soul. But his beauty was to have
had such a love and such high hopes. Like Lear, he confuses the private and the
a
public, the erotic and the political, distorting both. But who finds himself in
to correct them? Who is to advise them to grow
position prepared up? Halting
the brawl on Cyprus, Othello asks how it happened, concluding: "What? In a
town of war / Yet wild, the
people's hearts brimful of fear, / To manage private
and domestic quarrel? / In night, and on the court and guard of safety? / 'Tis
monstrous. turn
lago, who began't?" (II, iii, 212-216) When these questions
upon him, he will turn upon himself.
to some passages from someone I
My thoughts also relate Othello Montaigne,
have several times wanted to bring you together with. Montaigne is appalled by
the human capacity for horror at the human. I think I know what he means and
I think you do too. But the world during my lifetime rather shows that it is yet
more horrible to lose this
capacity for horror. Judith Shklar's essay is guided
and colored by experiences of the world war of the forties and the local wars of
the sixties. How could it not be? But aren't Nazis those who have lost the
are our
capacity for being horrified by what they do? They special monsters for
that reason, monsters of adaptability. (Who knows whether what they did, apart
from scale, was really that different from what others have done? Who knows
whether the only real Nazis were created by a particular time and place and by a
particular set of leaders and led? Who does not know that Nazism cannot suc
ceed apart from the human capacity forgoing along? And what political thinker
does not recognize that most of us will mostly go along with the tide of events,
and even argue that we [mostly] ought to? But who does not see that there must
be some limit to this? I am saying that Nazism specifically turns this human
for into a of a of
capacity adapting mockery itself, mockery being human.) And
was the that the students
hypocrisy really charge brought against America the
other day? Their claim was to be in revolt because revolted, because horrified,
by what they were asked to consent to. I do not raise the question whether their
response was pure. My question here iswhether one is to credit revul
prepared
sion and horror as conceivably political responses, as perhaps the only epistemo
logical access to the state of the world; as possible forms of conscience. Or is
every attempt to deny the political, deny it supremacy, as it has become, in
human life, as it has become, to be dismissed as (anti-)
hypocritical?
If youth cannot over a period of time make itself clear to age, this is
tragic for
both. I once described this situation as one in which society cannot hear its own
screams. The nation was state of a
living then in the dissociated foreign "and
war and I was, at the time I if
incomprehensible speak of, trying, defiantly
to conclude a about another dissociated
unsuccessfully, private essay King Lear,
world. (This is a play in which each of two fathers produces the image of par
ents cannibalizing their children. Sweet Movie is gorged with images of this fate.)
I was as one did, subject to fits of
Evidently going around in those days, hearing
screams in my ears. Others sometimes may have me mad; I sometimes
thought
were me mad. I did not, I believe, think
thought they driving they were hypo
crites, though it is perfectly true that I was wrong with them
thought something
ones I even ones I had tremendous
(even loved, hopes for, like Lyndon
Johnson), and true that I did not want to hear their arguments again. What al

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 32 STANLEY CAVELL

lowed me to continue writing my essay was the idea of

including in it a love
letter to America, though its anguish at the tragedy of America might have
struck some to whom it was addressed as written out of hatred.

Montaigne seems, if I understand you both, to share your view of the exclu
siveness of friendship, hence to be another of the most private of men; and yet
somehow he puts this together with sociability. He invented, in inventing the
essay, an intimate discourse for addressing strangers. He calls those whom he
addresses his "relatives and friends," and so they are, after his discourse has
made them so (which it does in part by showing its strangeness to them, hence
their strangeness to him, so that
they may understand that there is something
for them to become familiar this a we
yet with). Isn't staggering thing when
remember our fathers? We may have known them not to have had the education
they provided for us, and sometimes felt their heartiness as well as their melan
to be to run over our subtleties. But I remember
choly bullying, roughshod
instances of my father in conversation with strangers?in a shop, a a
lobby,
train?animated, laughing, comparing notes, when the charge of insincerity fell
from my grasp and I would gaze at his behavior as at a mystery. How can he
care what the other thinks to be of his and yet
enough provident good feeling,
not care so as to become unable to
terribly provide it?What skill enables him to
be the one that puts the other at ease, and where did he acquire it?He knew no
more about the other than the other knew about him. He seemed merely able to
act on what nobody could fail to know, and to
provide what nobody could fail to
even if in a moment could not return it. Call it sociabili
appreciate, given they
ty. At such a time I felt itwould be happy to have my father as an acquaintance,
to be treated to a
by him serious regard, if somewhat external, for my comfort
and opinion; to count not as an intimate but as an equal. The very need of
formality, of ceremony, would all at once seem to me freeing, and for a while I
a a tenderness, in the idea of the sociable.
glimpsed splendor,
If you want further communication after the Othello material, it is not as
hard as some of my make out to find out where I am.2
acquaintances

* * *

Thelast part of the book3 of which my reading of Othello takes the last pages
is in effect a meditation on the relation between the title concepts of the two
concluding essays of my book Must We Mean What We Say??"Knowing and
Acknowledging" and "The Avoidance of Love: A Reading of King Lear"?that
is, a meditation on the between and avoidance,
reciprocity acknowledgment
hence between skepticism and tragedy. In particular, the reading of Othello is
the most detailed of several moments I choose in Shakespeare from which to

study the imagination of the body's fate in the progress of skepticism.

To orient ourselves, let us begin by considering briefly how it is that we are
to understand, at the as a
height of The Winter's Tale, Hermione's reappearance
statue. Specifically I ask how it is that we are to understand Leontes's accept
ance of the to flesh and blood, and hence to him. This
"magic" that returns her
is amost specific form of resurrection. Accepting itmeans accepting the idea that
she had been turned to stone; that that was the right means for her dis
appearance from life. So I am for the source of Leontes's conviction in
asking

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 EPISTEMOLOGY AND TRAGEDY: A READING OF OTHELLO 33

the Tightness of that fate. Giving the question that form, the form of my answer
is by now predictable: for her to return to him is for him to acknowledge her;
and for him to acknowledge her is for him to acknowledge his relation to her; in
to her, hence to him.
particular to acknowledge what his denial of her has done
So Leontes the fate of stone to be the consequence of his particular
recognizes
One can see this as the of his own sense of numbness, of
skepticism. projection
death. But then was this his fate? It is amost form of remorse
living why specific
or of (self-)
punishment.
Its environment is provided by a tale of harrowing by jealousy, and a con
sequent accusation of adultery?an accusation known by everyone else to be
insanely false. Hence Leontes is inevitably paired with Othello. I call attention
to two further ways in which The Winter's Tale is a commentary on Othello, and
therefore First, both plays involve a harrowing of the power of
contrariwise.
as what the knower knows
knowing the existence of another (as chaste, intact,
his other to be). Leontes refuses to believe a true oracle; Othello insists on be
a false one. Second, in both the consequence for the man's refusal
lieving plays
of knowledge of his other is an imagination of stone. It is not merely an appetite
for beauty that produces Othello's most famous image of his victim as a piece of
cold and carved marble (". . .whiter skin of hers than snow, / And smooth, as
monumental alabaster"). Where does his image come from?
Before I can give my answer I still need one further piece of orientation in
of as a kind of or as the outcome of
thinking tragedy epistemological problem,
the problem of knowledge?of the dominance of modern philosophical thought
by the problem of knowledge. Earlier, in meditating on the existence of other
minds, I was led to ask how we are to understand the other as having displaced
or absorbed the of God, the task of me that I am not alone in the
weight showing
universe. I was claiming there to be giving a certain derivation for the problem
of the other. But I was also echoing one formulation Descartes gives his motive
in wanting to find what is to know
beyond doubt, namely, beyond doubt that
he is not alone in the world (Third Meditation). Now I ask, in passing but
explicitly, why it is Descartes does not try to defeat that of isolation
possibility
in what would seem the directest and surest way, by the existence of
locating
one other finite
being.
He says simply that he can easily imagine that ideas "which represent men
similar to myself" could be "formed by the combination of my other ideas, of
myself, of corporeal objects, and of God, even outside of me there were
though
no other men in the world. ..." He a move
is, of course, setting up powerful
toward God. And we can that seems borne out in
gather from this?something
the sequel of this piece of writing?that the problem of others (other finite
beings) is not discovered, or derived,
by Descartes to be a
special problem of
knowledge; this is surely one reason it would not have been discovered to be
such in subsequent epistemology. However, the more one meditates on the unique
place Descartes makes for his relation to his own body, the less clear and dis
tinct it is that he has available to himself the formulation of the idea of another
body as having a unique relation to its mind, in that special quasi-substantial
way that he asserts is not like the way a ship is related to its pilot. But without
such an idea, what is the content of the idea of "men similar to I do not
myself"?

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34 STANLEY CAVELL

conceive of Descartes's appealing to the route of analogy here, since he must be

far surer that other human bodies go with minds than any sureness he can
extract by from another behavior alone. After all, the body has
inferring body's
to do with the soul! In the of
essentially nothing light this passing of the ques
tion of the other, a change is noticeable in the coda Descartes supplies his argu
ment at the end of this third meditation:

The whole force of the I have here used to the existence of God
argument prove
consists in the fact that I that it would not be possible for my nature to
recognize
be what it is, the idea of a God, unless God existed?the same
possessing really
God, I say, the idea of whom I possess, the God who possesses all these high
. . . [who] cannot be a deceiver . . .
perfections

The main point of summary is that I could not have produced the idea I have of
it can have come from new note
God, for nothing less than God himself. But a
of necessity is also struck, that without the presence of this idea in myself, and
(hence) the presence of the fact of which it is the own nature would
imprint, my
necessarily not be what it is. So not only the fact, as it were, of my existence,
but the integrity of it, depends on this idea. (And so these meditations are about
the finding of self-knowledge after all; of the knowledge of a human self by a
human self.)
That the integrity of my (human, finite) existence may depend on the fact
and on the idea of another being's existence, and on the possibility of proving
that existence?an existence conceived from my very dependence and in
hence conceived as and conceived as me "in
completeness, perfect, producing
some sense, in [its] own are that take me to a
study of
image"?these thoughts
Othello.
Briefly, to begin with, we have the logic, the emotion, and the scene of
skepticism epitomized. The logic: "My life upon her faith" (I, iii, 295) and "...
when I love thee not / Chaos is come again" (III, iii, 91-92) set up the stake
to best cases; the sense I
necessary expressed by the imaginary major premise,
"If I know anything, I know this." One standing issue about the rhythm of
Othello's plot is that the progress from the completeness of Othello's love to the
perfection of his doubt is too precipitous for the fictional time of the play. But
such precipitousness is just the rhythm of skepticism; all that is necessary is the
stake. The emotion: Here Imean not exactly Othello's emotion toward Desdemona,
call it jealousy; but rather the structure of his emotion as he is hauled back
and forth across the keel of his love. Othello's enactment, or sufferance, of
that torture is the most extraordinary known to me of the "aston
representation
ishment" in skeptical doubt. In the First Meditation we read: "I realize so
that there are no conclusive indications by which life can be
clearly waking
from that I am quite astonished, and my bewilderment is
distinguished sleep
such that it is almost able to convince me that I am sleeping." (It does not follow
that one is convinced that one is awake.) When Othello loses consciousness ("Is 't
?Confess? ?Handkerchief? ?Oh, devil!" [IV, i, 43-44]), it is not
possible?
from conviction in a piece of knowledge but in an effort to stave the knowledge
off. The scene: Here I have in mind the pervasive air of the language and the
action of this play as one inwhich Othello's mind continuously outstrips reality,
dissolves it in trance or dream or in the beauty or ugliness of his incantatory

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 EPISTEMOLOGY AND TRAGEDY: A READING OF OTHELLO 35

imagination; in which he visualizes possibilities that reason, unaided, cannot

rule out. Why is he beyond aid? Why are the ear and the eye in him disjoined?
We know that by the time he formulates his condition this way:

the world,
By
I think my wife be honest, and think she is not.
I think that art think thou art not.
thou just, and
I'll have some . . .
proof
(Ill, iii, 383-386)

he is lost. Two dozen lines earlier he had demanded of lago "the ocular proof," a
demand which was no purer a threat than it was a command, as if he does
indeed wish for this outcome, as if he has a use for Iago's suspicions, hence a use
for lago that reciprocates Iago's use of him. Nothing I claim about the play here
will depend on an understanding of the relation between lago and Othello, so I
will simply assert what is suggested by what I have just said, that such a ques
tion as "Why does Othello believe lago?" is badly formed. It is not conceivable
that Othello believes not Desdemona. we
lago and lago, might say, offers
Othello an opportunity to believe
something, something
to oppose to
something
else he knows. What does he know? Why does it require opposition? What do
we know?
We have known (say since G. Wilson Knight's "The Othello Music") that
Othello's language, call it his imagination, is at once his and the play's glory,
and his shame; the source of rtts power and of his impotence; or we should have
known (since Bradley's Shakespearean Tragedy) that Othello is the most romantic
of Shakespeare's heroes, which may be a way of the same facts.
summarizing
And we ought to attend to the perception that Othello is the most Christian of
the tragic heroes (expressed inNorman Rabkin's
Shakespeare and the Common Un
derstanding). Nor is there any longer any argument against our that
knowledge
Othello is black; and there can be no argument with the fact that he has just
nor with the
married, description, compared with the case of Shakespeare's
other that this one is not but domestic.
tragedies, political
We know more specifically, I take it, that Othello's blackness means some
thing. But what specifically does itmean? Mean, I mean, to him?for otherwise
it is not Othello's color that we are interested in but some generalized blackness,
or
meaning perhaps "sooty" "filthy," as elsewhere in the play. This difference
show in the one
may way takes Desdemona's early statement: "I saw Othello's
visage in his mind" (I, iii, 253). I think it is felt that she means she
commonly
overlooked his blackness in favor of his inner brilliance; and
perhaps further felt
that this is a piece of deception, at least of herself. But what the line more
naturally says is that she saw his visage as he sees it, that she understands his
blackness as he understands it, as the expression (or in his word, his manifesta
tion) of his mind?which is not overlooking it. Then how does he understand it?
As the color of a romantic hero. For he, as he was and is, manifested his
by
parts, his title, and his "perfect soul" (I, ii, 31), is the hero of the tales of ro
mance he tells, some ones of which he wooed and won Desdemona with, others
of which he will die upon. It is the color of one with enchanted
accordingly
powers and magical protection, but above all it is the color of one of purity, of a
perfect soul. Desdemona, in entering his life, hence in
entering his story of his

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36 STANLEY CAVELL

life, enters as a fit companion for such a hero; his perfection is now opened
toward hers. His absolute stake in his purity, and its confirmation in hers, is
shown in what he feels he has lost in losing Desdemona's confirmation:

. . . name, that was as fresh

My
As Dian's is now and black
visage, begrimed
As mine own face . . .

(Ill, iii, 386-388)

Diana's is a name for the visage Desdemona saw to be in Othello's mind. He

loses its application to his own name, his charmed self, when he no sees
longer
his visage in Desdemona's mind but in Iago's, say in the world's capacity for
rumor. To say he loses Desdemona's power to confirm his image of himself is to
say that he loses his old power of imagination. And this is to say that he loses his
grasp of his own nature; he no longer has the same voice in his history. So then
the question becomes: How has he come to displace Desdemona's imagination
with Iago's? However terrible the exchange, it must be less terrible than some
other. Then we need to ask not so much how lago gained his power as how
Desdemona lost hers.
We one the protection
know, gathers, that Desdemona has lost her virginity,
of Diana, by the time she appears to us. And surely Othello knows this! But this
a to hatch millennia of plots, is
change in her condition, while big enough fact
not what Othello accuses her of. (Though would that accusation have been
much more unfair than the unfaithfulness he does accuse her of?) I emphasize
that I am assuming that in Othello's mind the theme and condition of virginity
carry their full weight within a romantic universe. Here is Northrop Frye,
on the subject within the stock convention of virgin
writing recently: "Deep
baiting is a vision of human integrity imprisoned in a world it is in but not of,
often forced by weakness into all kinds of ruses and strategems, yet always
managing to avoid the one fate which really is worse than death, the annihila
tion of one's identity. .
. . What is symbolized as a virgin is actually a human
conviction, however that there is at the core of one's in
expressed, something
finitely fragile being which is not only immortal but has discovered the secret of
invulnerability that eludes the tragic hero" (The Secular Scripture, p. 86).
Now let us consolidate what we know in this sketch so far. We have to think
in this play not merely about marriage but about the marriage of a romantic
hero and of a Christian man, one whose to incorporate the idea
imagination has
of two becoming one in marriage and the idea that it is better to marry than to
burn. It is a play, though it is thought of as domestic, in which not a marriage
but an idea of marriage, or let us say an imagination of marriage, isworked out.
did I is the first question Othello asks himself, to express his first
"Why marry?"
raid of suspicion (III, iii, 242). The question has never been from his mind.
Iago's first question to him is "Are you fast married?" and Othello's first set
with less than an answer: "But that I love the
speech ends something gentle
Desdemona, / I would not my unhoused free condition / Put into circum
and confine / For the sea's worth." Love is at most a not a
scription necessary,
sufficient, condition for marrying. And for some minds, a certain idea of love
may compromise as much as validate the idea of marriage. Itmay be better, but
it is not to marry, as Saint Paul implies.
perfect

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 EPISTEMOLOGY AND TRAGEDY: A READING OF OTHELLO 37

We have, further, to think in this play not merely generally of marriage but
specifically of the wedding night. It iswith this that the play opens. The central
fact we know is that the whole beginning scene takes
place while Othello and
Desdemona are in their bridal bed. The simultaneity is marked: "Even now,
now, very now, an old black ram / Is tupping your white ewe ..." (I, i, 88).
And the scene is one of treachery, alarms, of shouts, of armed men running
a of the bridal chamber with a scene of
through sleeping city. The conjunction
emergency is insisted on Othello's reappearance from his bedroom to
again by
a brawl with his a the first
stop single presence; reappearance repeated night in
Cyprus. As an appearance from his of sex and dreams is what
though place
him the power to stop an armed with a word and a gesture. Or is this
gives fight
more than we know? the is to that their "hour of
Perhaps conjunction imply
love" (I, iii, 299-300), or their two hours, have each time been interrupted.
There is reason to believe that the marriage has not been consummated, anyway
reason to believe that Othello does not know whether it has. What is Iago's "Are
a
you fast married?" asking? Whether public, legal ceremony has taken place or
whether a or whether the public and the private have ratified one
private act;
another? Othello answers by
speaking of his nobility and his love. But apart
from else this seems to assume that was not
anything Iago's "you" singular,
plural. And what does Othello mean in Cyprus these
by apparently public
words:

. . . Come, dear
my love,
The made, the fruits are to ensue?
purchase
The to come 'tween me and
profit's yet you.
(II, iii, 8-10)

What is the purchase and what the fruits or profit? Othello has just had pro
claimed a general celebration at once of the of the Turkish fleet and of
perdition
his nuptials (II, ii). If the fruits and profit is the of
resumption their privacy, then
the purchase was the successful of his office and his
discharge public entry into
But this success was not his it was a Is the
Cyprus. doing; provided by tempest.
purchase their (public) marriage? Then the fruits and profit is their
conjugal
love. Then he is saying that this is yet to come. It seems to me
possible that the
or was her and the fruits or their
purchase, price, virginity, profit pleasure.
There could hardly be greater emphasis on their one shortened
having had just
night together, isolated from this second a tempest (always in these
night by
matters symbolic, perhaps here of a memory,
perhaps of an anticipation). Or is
it, quite simply, that this is something he wishes to say
publicly, whatever the
truth between them? (How we imagine Desdemona's reaction to this would
then become all important.)
I do not think that we must, or that we can, choose
among these possibilities
in Othello's mind. Rather, I think Othello cannot choose among them.
My
about the structure of the play is that the our
guiding hypothesis thing denied
sight throughout the opening scene?the thing, the scene, that lago takes Othello
back to again and again, it for Othello's enchafed imagination?is
retouching
what we are shown in the final scene, the scene of murder. This becomes our
ocular proof of Othello's of his two nights of married love. (It has
understanding
been felt from Thomas
Rymer to G. B. Shaw that the play obeys the rhythm of

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 38 STANLEY CAVELL

farce, not of tragedy. One might say that in beginning with a sexual scene
denied our sight, this play opens exactly as
a normal
comedy closes, as if it
turned comedy inside out.) I will follow out this hypothesis here only to the
extent of on that final scene.
commenting
However one seeks to the meaning
of the great entering speech of
interpret
the scene ("It is the cause, it is the . . .Put out thesoul.
cause, my light, and
then put out the light" [V, ii, 1, 7]), I cannot take its mysteries, its privacies, its
magniloquence, as separate from some massive denial to which these must be in
service. Othello must mean that he is acting impersonally, but the words are
those of a man in a trance, in a dream-state, fighting
not to awaken;
willing for
anything but light. By "denial" here I do not mean
initially something requiring
or other, I mean to ask that we not, con
psychoanalytical, any theory. merely

ventionally but insufferably, assume that we know this woman better than this
man knows Othello some kind of exotic, gorgeous, superstitious
her?making
lunkhead; which is about what lago thinks. However much Othello deserves
each of these titles, however far he believes Iago's tidings, he cannot just believe
them; somewhere he also knows them to be false. This is registered in the rapidi
ty with which he is brought to the truth, with no further real evidence, with
a counter-story (about the handkerchief) that bursts over him, or from him,
only
as the truth. Shall we say he the truth too late? The fact is, he
recognizes
it when he is as one alone can; in this case, when its burden
recognizes ready to,
is dead. I am not claiming that he is trying not to believe lago, or wants not to
believe what lago has told him. (This might describe someone who, say, had a
not someone whose life is staked upon hers.) I am
good opinion of Desdemona,
on the contrary, that we must understand Othello to be to
claiming, wanting
believe lago, to be trying, against his knowledge, to believe him. Othello's eager
insistence on Iago's honesty, his eager slaking of his thirst for knowledge with
that poison, is not a sign of his stupidity in the presence of poison but of his
need of it. I do not quite say that he could not have accepted slander
devouring
about Desdemona so quickly, to the quick, unless he already believed it; but
rather that it is a thing he would rather believe than something yet more terrible
to his mind; that the idea of Desdemona as an adulterous whore ismore conve
nient to him than the idea of her as chaste. But what could be more terrible than
Desdemona's faithlessness? Evidently her faithfulness. But how?
Note that in taking Othello's entering speech
as part of a ritual of denial, in
the context of taking the murder scene as a whole to be a dream-enactment of
the invisible opening of the play, we have an answer implied to our original
to stone.
question about this play, concerning Othello's turning of Desdemona
His image denies that he scarred her and shed her blood. It is denial at once
a
that he has taken her virginity and that she has died of him. The whole scene of
murder is built on the concept of sexual intercourse or orgasm as a dying. There
is a dangerously explicit quibble
to this effect in the
exchange,

Oth. Thou art on death bed.

thy
Des. but not yet to die.
Aye,
(V, ii, 51-52)

The possible quibble only heightens the already heartbreaking poignance of the
wish to die in her marriage bed after a long life.

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 EPISTEMOLOGY AND TRAGEDY: A READING OF OTHELLO 39

Though Desdemona no more understands Othello's accusation of her than,

in his darkness to himself, he does, she obediently shares his sense that this is
their final night and that it is to be some dreamlike recapitulation of their former
two
nights. This shows in her premonitions of death (theWillow Song, and the
request that one of the sheets be her shroud) and in her
wedding mysterious
. . on my bed my
request to Emilia, ". tonight / Lay wedding sheets" (IV, ii,
106-107), as if knowing, and faithful to, Othello's private dream of her, herself
the scene of her death as Othello,
preparing utilizing Iago's stage directions,
imagines it must happen ("Do it not with poison, strangle her in her bed, even
the bed she hath contaminated." "Good, good. The justice of it pleases. Very
good" [IV, i, 219-223]); as if knowing that only with these sheets on their bed
can his dream of her be contested. The dream is of contamination. The fact the
dream works upon is the act of deflowering. Othello is reasonably literal about
this, as reasonable as a man in a trance can be:

.
. . When I have the rose,
plucked
I cannot it vital
give growth again,
It must needs wither. I'll smell it on the tree.
Ah, breath, that dost almost
balmy persuade
Justice to break her sword! One more, one more.
Be thus when thou art dead, and I will kill thee,
And love thee after. . . .

(V, ii, 13-19)

(Necrophilia is an apt fate for a mind whose reason is in its sump

suffocating
tuous capacity for and which
figuration, takes the dying into love literally to
entail killing. "That death's unnatural that kills for or that
loving" [V, ii, 42];
turns its object to live stone. It is apt as well that Desdemona sense death, or the
figure of death, as the impending cause of death. And at the very end, facing
himself, he will not recover from this. "I kissed thee ere I killed thee." And after
too. And not just now when you died from me, but on our
previous nights as
well.)
The exhibition of wedding sheets in this romantic, conven
superstitious,
tional environment, can refer to the of
only practice proving purity by staining.
Imention in passing that this provides a
satisfactory weight for the importance
Othello attaches to his charmed (or farcical) handkerchief, the fact that it is
spotted, spotted with strawberries.
Well, were the sheets stained or not? Was she a virgin or not? The answers
seem as
ambiguous as to our earlier question whether they are fast married. Is
the final, fatal reenactment of their a clear denial of what
wedding night really
so that we can
happened, just read off, by negation, what really happened? Or
is it a straight reenactment, without and the flower was still on the
negation,
tree, as far as he knew? In that case, who was reluctant to see it plucked, he or
she? On such issues, farce and are
tragedy separated by the thickness of amem
brane.

We of course have no answer to such But what matters is that

questions.
Othello has no answer; or rather he can none, for any answer to the
give ques
tion, granted that I am right in taking the question to be his, is intolerable. The
torture of logic in his mind we
might represent as follows: Either I shed her

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 40 STANLEY CAVELL

blood and scarred her or I did not. If I did not then she was not a virgin and this
is a stain upon me. If I did then she is no longer a virgin and this is a stain upon
me. Either way I am contaminated. (I do not say that the sides of this dilemma
are of for Othello.)
equal significance
But this much logic anyone but a lunkhead might have mastered apart from
actually marrying. (He himself may say as much when he asks himself, too late,
why he married.) Then what quickens this logic for him? Call whatever it is
lago. What is lago?
He is everything, we know, Othello is not. Critical and witty, for example,
where Othello is commanding and eloquent; retentive where the other is lavish;
concealed where the other is open; cynical where the other is romantic; conven
tional where the other is original; imagines flesh where the other imagines spirit;
the imaginer and manager of the human guise; the bottom end of the world.
And so on. A Christian has to call him devil. The single fact between Othello
and lago I focus on here is that Othello fails twice at the end to kill lago, know
he cannot kill him. This all but all-powerful chieftain is stopped at this
ing
nobody. It is the point of his impotence, and the meaning of it. lago is every
thing Othello must deny, and which, denied, is not killed but works on, like
poison, like furies.
In speaking of the point and meaning of Othello's impotence, I do not think
of Othello as been in an sense with Desdemona. I
having everyday impotent
think of him, rather, as having been surprised by her, at what he has elicited
from her; at, so to speak, a success rather than a failure. It is the dimension of
her that shows itself in that difficult and dirty banter between her and lago as
on Rather than imagine himself to have elicited
they await Othello Cyprus.
or
that, solicited it, Othello would imagine it elicited by anyone and everyone
else. Surprised, let me say, to find that she is flesh and blood. It was the one
thing he could not imagine for himself. For if she is flesh and blood then, since
can com
they are one, so is he. But then although his potency of imagination
mand the imagination of this child who is everything he is not, so that she sees
his visage in his mind, she also sees that he is not identical with his mind, he is
more than his
imagination, black with desire, which she desires. lago knows it,
and Othello cannot bear what lago knows, so he cannot outface the way in
which he knows it, or knows anything. He cannot forgive her for existing, for
being separate from him, outside, beyond command, commanding, her cap
tain's
captain.
It is an unstable frame of mind which compounds figurative with literal
in love; and Othello unstably upon her, as he blames her:
dying projects

O woman! Thou dost stone heart,

perjured thy
And makest me call what I intend to do
A murder, which I a sacrifice.
thought
(V, ii, 63-65)

As he is the one who gives out lies about her, so he is the one who will give her a
stone heart for her stone body, as if in his words of stone which confound the
figurative and the literal there is the confounding of the incantations of poetry
and of magic. He makes of her the thing he feels (". . .my heart is turned to
stone" [IV, i, 193]), but covers the ugliness of his thought with the beauty of his

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 EPISTEMOLOGY AND TRAGEDY: A READING OF OTHELLO 41

imagery?a debasement of himself and of his art of words. But what produces
the idea of sacrifice? How did he manage the as a sacrifice?
thought of her death
To what was he to sacrifice her? To his of himself and of to
image her, keep his
intact, uncontaminated; as if this were his from slander's
image protection image
of him, say from a conventional view of his blackness. So he becomes conven
tional, sacrificing love to convention. But this was unstable; it could not be said.
Yet better thought than the truth, which was that the central sacrifice of ro
mance has
already been made by them: her virginity, her intactness, her per
fection, had been gladly foregone by her for him, for the sake of their union, for
the seaming of it. It is the sacrifice he could not accept, for then he was not
himself perfect. It must be displaced. The scar is the mark of finitude, of sepa
rateness; it must be borne whatever one's anatomical condition, or color. It is
the sin or the sign of refusing imperfection that or
produces, justifies, the visions
and torments of devils that inhabit the of this play.
region
If such aman as Othello is rendered impotent and murderous or
by aroused,
by having aroused, female or let us say: if this man is horrified by
sexuality;
human sexuality, in himself and in others; then no human
being is free of this
to
possibility. What I have wished bring out is the nature of this possibility, or
the possibility of this nature, the way human sexuality is the field in which the
fantasy of finitude, of its acceptance and its repetitious overcoming, is worked
out; the way human separateness is turned equally toward splendor and toward
horror, mixing beauty and ugliness; turned toward before and after; toward
flesh and blood. In and I take the skeptical wish as
"Knowing Acknowledging"
one of "a finitude as an intellectual lack." Is this a
interpreting metaphysical
denial of the human or an expression of it? For of course there are those for
whom the denial of the human is the human. Call this the Christian view. It
would be why Nietzsche undertook to the task of the hu
identify overcoming
man with the task of the denial of the human; which over
overcoming implies
coming the human not mortification but If the
through through joy, say ecstasy.
former can be thought of as the denial of the body then the latter may be
of as the affirmation of the Then those who are in at
thought body. pushed,
tempting to counter a dualistic view of mind and body, to assert the identity of
body and mind, are skipping or converting the problem. For suppose my identi
ty with my body is something that exists only in my affirmation of my body.
Then the question is:What would the
body become under affirmation? And what
would become of me?
I conclude with two
thoughts, or perspectives, from which to survey one's
space of conviction in the I have started of Othello, and from which
reading
perhaps to it further.
guide
First, what you might call the philosophy or the moral of the seems all
play
but contained in the essay entitles "On some verses of in
Montaigne Virgil,"
such a remark as: "What a monstrous animal to be a horror to himself, to be
burdened by his pleasures, to
regard himself as a misfortune!" The essay con
cerns the of sex with of sex with
compatibility marriage, age; it remarks upon,
and upon the relations among, doubts about
jealousy, chastity, imagination,
virginity; upon the strength of language and the honesty of language; and in
cludes mention of a Turk and of certain instances of
necrophilia. One just about
runs
through the topics of Othello if to this essay one adds the essay "Of the

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42 STANLEY CAVELL

power of imagination," which contains a Moor and speaks of a king of Egypt

who, finding himself impotent with his bride, threatened to kill her, thinking it
was some sort of sorcery. The moral would be what
might have been contained
in Othello's "... one that lov'd not but too well," that all these topics
wisely,
should be food for thought and moderation, not for torture and murder; as fit
for rue and laughter as for pity and terror; that they are not tragic unless one
makes them so, takes them so; that we are tragic in what we take to be tragic;
that one must take one's imperfections with a "gay and sociable wisdom" (as in
"Of experience") not with a somber and isolating eloquence. It is
Montaigne's
advice to one's and one can almost see as the slanderer of
accept humanity, lago
human nature
(this would be his diabolism) braced with Othello as the enacter
of the slander?the one to escape human nature from below, the other
thinking
from above. But to whom is the advice usable? And how do we understand
why it cannot be taken by those in directest need of it? The urging of moder
ation is valuable only to the extent that it results from a knowledge of the human
possibilities beyond its urging. IsMontaigne's attitude fully earned, itself with
out a tint of the wish for from the human? Or is Shakespeare's topic
exemption
of the sheets and the handkerchief understandable as a rebuke toMontaigne, for

refusing
a further nook of honesty? A bizarre question, I suppose; but meant
to one one test whether my emphasis
only indicate how might, and why should,
on the stain is necessary to sufficient to one's experience of the
give weight
horror and the darkness of these words and actions, or whether it is imposed.
My second concluding thought is more purely speculative, and arises in
response to my having spoken just now of "the refusal of as pro
imperfection"
"the visions and torments of devils that inhabit the region of this play." I
ducing
do not wish to dispute the evidence marshalled by Bernard Spivack in his Shake
speare and the Evil showing lago to be a descendent of the late morality
Allegory of
of the Vice. I mean rather to help explain further the appearance of that
figure
to suggest its humanizing, or human
figure in this particular play, and, I guess,
seems to deplore). It is
splitting off (the sort of interpretation Spivack's book
the tradition of the that I now go on to call attention?I
against morality play
cannot think I am the first to say it out loud?to the hell and the demon staring
out of the names of Othello and Desdemona. Imention this curiosity to prepare
meant as a others to it one way
something nearly pure conjecture, wishing prove
or another,
namely that underlying and shaping the events of this play are cer
tain events of witch trials. Phrases such as "the ocular and "... cords, or
proof"
knives / Poison, or fire, or suffocating streams . . ." (Ill, iii, 388-389) seem to me
to call for location in a setting of legal torture. And I confess to finding myself

thinking of Desdemona's haunting characterization of a certain conception of

her as "a moth of peace" when I read, from an 1834 study called Folk-lore of the
"
NE of Scotland, "In some parts of Scotland moths are called 'witches' (quoted in
Kittredge, Witchcraft in Old and New England). But what prompts my thought
primarily is the crazed logic Othello's rage for proof and for "satisfaction" seems
to require (like testing for a woman's witchcraft by seeing whether she will
drown, declaring that if she does she was innocent but if she does not she is to
be put to death for a witch): What happened on our night is that I
wedding
killed her; but she is not dead; therefore she is not human; therefore she must
die. ("Yet she must die, else she'll betray more men" [V, ii, 6].) Again he claims

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 EPISTEMOLOGY AND TRAGEDY: A READING OF OTHELLO 43

not to be
acting personally, but by authority; here he has delivered a sentence. I
recall that the biblical justification for the trial of witches was familiarly from
the punishments in Exodus: "Thou shalt not suffer a witch to live." Othello
seems to be
babbling the crazed logic as he falls into his explicit faint or trance:
"First to be hanged, and then to confess. I tremble at it" (IV, i, 38-39), not
or victim.
knowing whether he is torturer
I introduced the idea of the trial for witchcraft as a conjecture,
meaning
immediately that it is not meant as a I do not require it for any
hypothesis:
senses with the world of this
interpretative alignment of my play. It is enough,
without to have cribbed from literal subtexts of this
supposing Shakespeare
sort, that the play opens with a public accusation of witchcraft, and an abbrevi
ated trial, and is then succeeded with punctuating thoughts of hell and by fatal
scenes of and with death as the
psychological torture, concludes proof of mortal
ity, that is, of innocence (cf., "If that thou be'st a devil, I cannot kill thee" [V, ii,
I to stir the same a horror that
287]). Enough, mean, depths of superstition?of
proposes our lack of certain access to other minds?that under opportune insti
tutions caused trials of witchcraft. The play is at once, as we would expect of
what we call Shakespeare's humanity, an examination of the madness and be
witchment of inquisitors, as well as of the tortures of love; of those tortures of
which both victim and torturer are victims.
A statue, a stone, is something whose existence is fundamentally open to the
ocular proof. A human being is not. The two bodies lying together on their
bridal and death sheets form an emblem of this fact, the truth of skepticism.
What this man lacked was not certainty. He knew everything, but he could not
yield to what he knew, be commanded it. He found out too much for his
by
mind, not too little. Their differences from one another?the one the
everything
other is not?form an emblem of human which can be and
separation, accepted,
or not. Like the dissociation from God; everything we are not.
granted,

References
from Othello are taken from Complete Works ofWilliam
Quotations Shakespeare by G. B. Harrison
(Harcourt Brace, New York: 1952).
2I am grateful to and to Judith Shklar for comments that helped me to im
Stephen Graubard
prove the letter to Alceste.
3From The Claim of Reason: Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy, by Stanley Cavell.
? 1979 by Oxford University Press, Inc. Quoted of the publisher. An
Copyright by permission
abbreviated version of this material was presented at the annual of the Modern
meeting Language
Association in December 1978.

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