VDA. DE VILLANUEVA vs.

JUICO

4 SCRA 550

FACTS:

Don Nicolas Villaflor executed a will in Spanish in his own handwriting,

Petitioner filed an action against the administrator contending that upon the
widows death, she became vested with the ownership of the properties bequeathed
under clause 7 pursuant to its 8th clause of the will.

ISSUE:

WON the petitioner is entitled to the ownership of the properties upon the
death of Dona Faustina.

HELD:

The intention of the testator here was to merely give usufructuary right to his
wife Doa Fausta because in his will he provided that Doa Fausta shall forfeit the
properties if she fails to bear a child and because she died without having begotten
any children with the deceased then it means that Doa Fausta never acquired
ownership over the property. Upon her death, because she never acquired ownership
over the property, the said properties are not included in her estate. Those
properties actually belong to Villaflor. That was the intention of the
testator. Otherwise, if the testator wanted to give the properties to Doa
Fausta then he should have specifically stated in his will that ownership
should belong to Doa Fausta without mentioning any condition.
In re: Will and Testament of the deceased REVEREND SANCHO ABADIA.SEVERINA A. VDA. DE ENRIQUEZ,
ET AL. vs. MIGUEL ABADIA, ET AL.G.R. No. L-7188August 9, 1954

Facts: Andres Enriquez, as one of the legatees in a document purporting to be the last will and
testament of Father Sancho Abadia, which was executed on September 6, 1923, filed a petition for its
probate. Some cousins and nephews of the deceased, who would inherit his estate if he left no will, filed
opposition. The trial court ruled in favor of Enriquez, stating that even if the said document is a
holographic will, one which is not permitted by law at the time it was executed and at the time of the
testators death, such form of a will is already allowed at the time of the hearing of the case since the
new Civil Code is already enforced, and that to carry out the intention of the testator which according to
the trial court is the controlling factor and may override any defect in form. Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether the reckoning period in deciding the validity of the holographic will of Rev. Sanchio, the
time of the hearing of the case shall be considered and not the time of its execution

Held: No. The validity of a will is to be judged not by the law enforce at the time ofthe testator's death
or at the time the supposed will is presented in court for probate or when the petition is decided by the
court but at the time the instrument was execute, as supported by Art. 795 of the new Civil Code. One
reason in support of the rule is that although the will operates upon and after the death of the testator,
the wishes of the testator about the disposition of his estate among his heirs and among the legatees is
given solemn expression at the time the will is executed, and in reality, the legacy or bequest then
becomes a completed act. When one executes a will which is invalid for failure to observe and follow
the legal requirements at the time of its execution then upon his death he should be regarded and
declared as having died intestate, and his heirs will then inherit by intestate succession, and no
subsequent law with more liberal requirements or which dispenses with such requirements as to
execution should be allowed to validate a defective will and thereby divest the heirs of their vested
rights in the estate by intestate succession. The general rule is that the Legislature cannot validate void
wills. Hence, the trial courts decision was reversed.

IBARLE v. PO
GR No.L-5064, February 27, 1953
92 PHIL 721

FACTS: Leonardo Winstanley died leaving a parcel of land to his surviving spouse Catalina Navarro and
some minor children. Catalina sold the entire parcel of land to Maria Canoy who later sold the same land
to the plaintiff Bienvenido Ibarle. After some time, after her appointment as guardian of her minor
children, Catalina again sold 1/2 of the land in question, which portion now belonged to the children as
heirs, to herein defendant Esperanza Po.

ISSUE: Which sale was valid, and who has the rightful claim to the property?

HELD: The sale to defendant is valid. Article 657 of the old Civil Code provides: "The rights to the
succession of a person are transmitted from the moment of his death." in a slightly different language,
this article is incorporated in the new Civil Code as article 777.
The above provision and comment make it clear that when Catalina Navarro Vda. de Winstanley sold
the entire parcel to the Canoy spouses, one-half of it already belonged to the seller's children. No formal
or judicial declaration being needed to confirm the children's title, it follows that the first sale was null
and void in so far as it included the children's share.
On the other hand, the sale to the defendant having been made by authority of the competent court
was undeniably legal and effective. The fact that it has not been recorded is of no consequence. If
registration were necessary, still the non-registration would not avail the plaintiff because it was due to
no other cause than his own opposition.

QUIRICO L. SATURNINO v. FELIZA LUZ PAULINO

This is an appeal by certiorari from a decision of the Court of Appeals. The pertinent facts are:

Upon the death of Jaime Luz Paulino, on February 10, 1937, he was survived by his children Timoteo
Esteban, Macario and Feliza, all surnamed Luz Paulino- and a grandson-Quirico L. Saturnino, son of his
deceased daughter Antonia Luz Paulino. Among the properties left by Jaime Luz Paulino is a house and
lot, situated in Barrio No. 13, municipality of Laoag, province of Ilocos Norte, and more particularly
known as Lot No. 11366 of the Laoag Cadastre. On October 22, 1945, his daughter Feliza Luz Paulino
executed a deed of absolute sale of said property in favor of the spouses Maximo Daleja and Juana
Lucas and Nemesio Lucas and Donata Guillermo, for the aggregate sum of P1,200.00. In the language of
the decision of the Court of Appeals.

"As said sale was made without the knowledge or consent of Quirico L. Saturnino who, according to him,
learned of it in the early morning of October 23, 1945 (Exhs. B and I), and being desirous of exercising his
right of subrogation as co-heir of the vendor, on October 23, 1945, and again on the 29th of that month,
in the presence and with the assistance of his lawyer, offered verbally and in writing to the vendees to
return then and there to them, in actual cash, 4/5 of the purchase price of said property, together with
the expenses incurred by them in the preparation of the document, and tendered to them in their
respective houses in Laoag, Ilocos Norte, written copies of the offer and the money in actual cash,
Philippine currency, but defendants Juana Lucas and Donata Guillermo, for themselves and in
representation of their respective husbands who were absent, refused acceptance thereof. For this
reason on the following day, October 30, 1945, Quirico L. Saturnino instituted this action in the Court of
First Instance of Ilocos Norte against the defendants mentioned in the caption hereof, depositing with
the Clerk of said Court the sum of P960, Philippine currency, for delivery to the defendant vendees by
way of reimbursement, together with the amount of P50 Philippine currency, to cover the expenses
Incurred in the preparation of the deed of sale, and stating that he was ready and willing to deposit
other additional sums that the court may deem just and necessary. On these averments plaintiff prayed
in the complaint that judgment be rendered in his favor and against the defendants:

"a. Declaring the sale made by defendant Feliza Luz Paulino to her co-defendants illegal with respect to
one-fifth of the lot and to declare said one-fifth undivided share of the plaintiff;

"b. To order the defendants Maximo Daleja, Juana Lucas, Nemesio Lucas and Donato Guillermo to
accept and receive from the clerk of court the sum of P690 corresponding to the reimbursement of the
price paid by them for four-fifths (%) of the lot which their co-defendant Feliza Luz Paulino could legally
convey; and the additional sum of P50 to cover their expenses in the preparation of the deed of sale;

"c. Ordering the defendants Maximo Dalaja, Juana Lucas, Nemesio Lucas and Donata Guillermo to
execute a deed of reconveyance of what they could legally buy from their co-defendant Feliza Luz
Paulino of the lot in question, in favor of the herein plaintiff; and

"d. Ordering the aforesaid defendants to pay damages in the sum of P1,000 annually to plaintiff until the
reconveyance is effected, and an additional sum of P1,000 as damages to be paid by all of the
defendants for their malicious acts, and the costs of suit.

"For such other remedies and relief just and equitable in the premises.

"On November 14, 1945, defendants answered the complaint with counterclaim, which was amended
on December 12 of the same year, wherein it is alleged, among other things, that on April 25, 1937, at
the municipality of Laoag, province of Ilocos Norte, all their inheritance from the deceased Jaime Luz
Paulino had been divided in accordance with Section 596 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the last
verbal wish of the decedent before his death, giving the residential lot in question together with the
house of strong materials constructed thereon to Feliza Luz Paulino as her exclusive and only share, and
leaving her brothers, Timoteo, Esteban and Macario, and their nephew Quirico Saturnino to divide all
the agricultural lands among themselves, which division was duly effected. Defendants Maximo Daleja,
Juana Lucas, Nemesio Lucas and Donata Guillermo allege that they are engaged in business and
purposely bought said lot to erect thereon a 'camarin' for a rice mill and for use as a warehouse of rice,
'bagoong', coconuts and other articles of commerce and to deposit logs and lumber, and that because of
their inability to realize this plan due to the action of the plaintiff, they will suffer damages in the sum of
P3,000 yearly until this case is terminated. Wherefore all the defendants pray the court:

"1. To dismiss the complaint;

"2. To declare Feliza Luz Paulino as the exclusive owner of the whole lot in question;
"3. To declare the sale made by Feliza Luz Paulino of the whole lot in question to her co-defendants valid
and in full force and effect;

"4. To order the plaintiff to pay three thousand pesos (P3,000) annually until this case is terminated and
the further sum of one thousand pesos (P1,000) for the malicious acts of the plaintiff and the costs of
this suit; and

"5. Any other relief just and equitable." (Roll, pp. 17-20)

This case was docketed as Civil Case No. 23 of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte.

Meanwhile, or on November 19, 1945, Quirino L. Saturnino had filed, with said court, a petition, which
was docketed as Special Proceeding Case No. 37, for the probate of the will and testament of Jaime Luz
Paulino. Although, at first, all of the other heirs objected to said petition, on June 30, 1949, they
eventually withdrew their opposition thereto, and the probate of the will was allowed by an order dated
July 6, 1949. Said will provided that the property in dispute in Case No. 23, be distributed, share and
share alike among the heirs of the testator.

On or about March 10, 1950, the defendant in said Case No. 23 respondents herein filed a supplemental
answer alleging that plaintiff petitioner herein has no legal capacity to sue, because the property in
litigation -therein is part of the estate which is the subject matter of Case No. 37, in which an
administrator was appointed but no adjudication had, as yet, been made. In due course, a decision was
rendered in Case No. 23, on December 2, 1050, the dispositive part of which reads as follows:

"For all the foregoing considerations, the Court renders judgment declaring the sale made by the
defendant Feliza Luz Paulino to her co-defendants null and void with respect to one-fifth (1/5) of the lot
in question and the plaintiff is declared owner thereof aa his undivided share; that the defendants are
ordered to receive from the Clerk of Court the sum of P960 corresponding to the reimbursement of the
price paid by them for four-fifths (4/5) of the lot in question which their co-defendant Feliza Luz Paulino
could legally convey to them, and to execute a deed of reconveyance in favor of the plaintiff." (Roll, pp.
20-21).

On appeal from this decision, the defendants contended in the Court of Appeals, that the lower court
had erred:

"1. In not dismissing the complaint in so far as the recovery of one fifth undivided interest in the lot in
question is concerned;

"2. In not finding that there was an agreement between the defendant Feliza Luz Paulino on one hand
and Esteban, Timoteo and Macario Luz Paulino on the other by virtue of which the house and lot in
question were given and delivered to Feliza Luz Paulino;

"3. In not finding that the plaintiff-appellee fully confirmed the above mentioned agreement;
"4. In not upholding the validity of said agreement duly confirmed by the plaintiff-appellee and in not
giving its effects and efficacy; *

"5. In declaring the sale of the lot in question invalid with respect to one-fifth share of the appellee;

"6. In holding that there exists co-ownership in the lot between the appellee and appellants-purchasers;
and

"7. In ordering the appellants-purchasers to let redemption prayed for by the appellee." (Roll p. 21).

None of these questions was, however, decided by the Court of Appeals, which found it necessary to
pass instead, upon what it regarded a "prejudicial question." Said the Court of Appeals:

"Before delving into the merits of the appeal, we have first to pass upon a prejudicial question. There is
no dispute in this ease that the properties left by the late Jaime Luz Paulino are in custodia legis, for they
are subject to testate proceedings in said Civil Case No. 37 which is still pending in the Court of First
Instance of Ilocos Norte. Although the will of the testator has been allowed, no settlement of accounts
has been effected, no partition of the properties left by the decedent has been made, and the heirs have
not legally received or been adjudicated or assigned any particular piece of the mass of their
inheritance. This being the case, and pending such partition, adjudication or assignment to the heirs of
the residue of the estate of the testator Jaime Luz Paulino, none of his heirs can properly allege or cflaim
to have inherited any portion of said residue, if there be any, because his or her right of inheritance
remains to be in the nature of hope. Consequently, neither Feliza Luz Paulino, nor any of her coheirs}
can legally represent the estate of the decedent, or dispose as his or hers of the property involved in this
case, included as item No. 20 of the inventory (Exh. 4), or institute any case in court to demand any part
of such estate as his own, or claim any right of legal redemption as coheir in the sale of any piece of the
mass of the inheritance that may have been disposed of by any of the heirs. In the case at bar, even if it
were true that by agreement of the heirs the property involved herein had been assigned to Feliza Luz
Paulino as her share, that agreement and subsequent sale are of no legal effect without the sanction or
approval of the court before which Civil Case No. 37 is pending.

"The foregoing conclusion relieves Us from considering the other points raised in the present
controversy.

"Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and the complaint dismissed, without
pronouncement as to costs.

"It is so ordered." (Roll, pp. 21-23.)

The present petition for review by certiorari filed by Quirico L. Saturnino, is directed against this decision
of the Court of Appeals. It is clear, to our mind, that said petition must be granted. Pending "partition,
adjudication or assignment to the heirs" of a deceased estator, their "right of inheritance" is not merely"
in the nature of hope," for pursuant to Article 657 of the Civil Code of Spain, which was in force in the
Philippines at the time of the death of Jaime Luz Paulino "the rights to the succession of a person are
transmitted from the moment of his death" and the heirs pursuant to Article 661 of the same Code
"succeed to the deceased in all his rights and obligations by the mere fact of his death." In other words,
the person concerned is an heir and he may exercise his rights as such, from the very moment of the
death of the decedent. One of those rights is that of redemption under Article 1067 of the aforesaid
code (Article 1088 of the Civil Code of the Philippines). What is more, this right of redemption may be
exercised only before partition, for said provision declares explicitly:

"If either of the heirs should sell his hereditary rights- to a stranger before the partition, any or all of his
co-heirs may be subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him for the purchase price,
provided it be done within the period of one month, to be counted from the time they were informed
thereof." (Italics supplied.)

With reference to the adjudication, which the Court of Appeals seemingly considers essential to the
enjoyment of the right of redemption among co-heirs, it should be noted that a property may be
adjudicated either to one heir only or to several heirs pro-indiviso In the first case, the adjudication
partakes, at the same time, of the nature of a partition. Hence, if the property is sold by the heir to
whom it was adjudicated, the other heirs are not entitled to redeem the property, for, as regards, the
same, they are neither co-heirs nor co-owners. In the second case, the heirs to whom the property was
adjudicated pro-indiviso are, thereafter, no longer co-heirs, but merely co-owners. Consequently,
neither may assert the right of redemption conferred to co-heirsj although, in proper cases, they may
redeem as co-owners, under Article 1522 of the Civil Code of Spain (Article 1620, Civil Code of the
Philippines. Hence, commenting on said Article 1067, Manresa says:

"La venta del derecho hereditario ha de hacerse antes de que so practique la partition. Esto es evidente,
porque despues al derecho hereditario en abstracto sustituyen las cosas o derechos determinados
comprendidos en la respectiva adjudication, cesa la comunidad en la herencia, y podra proceder otro
retracto, mas no el retracto especial a que el art. 1067 se refiere." (7 Manresa [6th ed. Revised] p. 719.)

Again, the house and lot involved in the case at bar are not in custodia legis. Said property was sold by
Feliza Luz Paulino to Maximo Daleja, Juana Lucas, Nemesio Lucas and Donata Guillermo on October 22,
1945, or almost a month before Special Proceeding Case No. 37 was instituted (November 19, 1945). At
that time, the buyers of said property were in possession thereof. They still held it when the judicial
administrator was appointed in Case No. 37, and this must have taken place after the probate of the will
on July 6, 1949 (Rule 78, section 4, Rule 79, sections 4 and 6, and Rule 80, section 5, Rules of Court). Up
to the present, said buyers remain in possession of the property in litigation. Neither the court, taking
cognizance of Case No. 37, nor the judicial administrator therein appointed, has even tried to divest
them of said possession. In fact, if they were as they are unwilling to yield it and the administrator
wished to take the property under his custody, it would be necessary for him to institute a separate civil
action therefor.

In view of the foregoing1, and considering that the Court of Appeals has not passed upon the issues
raised therein by respondents herein and that the decision of said court does not state the facts
essential to the determination of those issues, said decision is hereby reversed, and let the records of
this case be remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings, 'not inconsistent with this
decision. Respondents, except the Court of Appeals, shall pay the costs of this instance. It is so ordered.

You are here: Home 2013 June Case Digest: Vitug v. CA (183 SCRA 755)

CASE DIGEST: VITUG V. CA (183 SCRA 755)

Published by paul on June 24, 2013 | Leave a response

Vitug v. CA
183 SCRA 755

FACTS:

Romarico Vitug and Nenita Alonte were co-administrators of Dolores Vitugs (deceased) estate.
Rowena Corona was the executrix. Romarico, the deceaseds husband, filed a motion with the probate
court asking for authority to sell certain shares of stock and real properties belonging to the estate to
cover alleged advancesto the estate, which he claimed as personal funds. The advances were used to
pay estate taxes.

Corona opposed the motion on ground that the advances came from a savings account which formed
part of the conjugal partnership properties and is part of the estate. Thus, there was no ground for
reimbursement. Romarico claims that the funds are his exclusive property, having been acquired
through a survivorship agreement executed with his late wife and the bank.

The agreement stated that after the death of either one of the spouses, the savings account
shall belong to and be the sole property of the survivor, and shall be payable to and collectible or
withdrawable by such survivor.

The lower court upheld the validity of the agreement and granted the motion to sell. CA reversed stating
that the survivorship agreement constitutes a conveyance mortis causa which did not comply with the
formalities of a valid will. Assuming that it was a donation inter vivos, it is a prohibited donation
(donation between spouses).

ISSUE:

W/N the survivorship agreement was valid.

HELD:

YES. The conveyance is not mortis causa, which should be embodied in a will. A will is a personal,
solemn, revocable and free act by which a capacitated person disposes of his property and rights and
declares or complies with duties to take effect after his death. The bequest or devise must pertain to the
testator.
In this case, the savings account involved was in the nature of conjugal funds. Since it was not shown
that the funds belonged exclusively to one party, it is presumed to be conjugal.

It is also not a donation inter vivos because it was to take effect after the death of one party. It is also
not a donation between spouses because it involved no conveyance of a spouses own properties to the
other.

It was an error to include the savings account in the inventory of the deceaseds assets because it is the
separate property of Romarico.

Thus, Romarico had the right to claim reimbursement.

A will is a personal, solemn, revocable and free act by which a capacitated person disposes of his his
property and rights and declares or complies with duties to take effect after his death.

Survivorship agreements are permitted by the NCC. However, its operation or effect must not be
violative of the law (i.e. used as a cloak to hide an inofficious donation or to transfer property in fraud of
creditors or to defeat the legitime of a forced heir).

Seangio v Reyes 508 SCRA 177 (2006)

G.R. Nos. 140371-72 November 27, 2006DY YIENG SEANGIO, BARBARA D. SEANGIO and VIRGINIA D.
SEANGIO, Petitioners,vs.

COMPLETE DIGEST

There was a petition for the probate of an alleged holographic will which was

denominated as Kasulatan sa pag

aalis ng mana. The private respondents moved

for the dismissal of the probate proceedings primarily on the ground that thedocument purporting to be
the holographic will of Segundo did not contain anydisposition of the estate of the deceased and thus
did not meet the definition of a willunder Article 783 of the Civil Code. According to private
respondents, the will onlyshowed an alleged act of disinheritance by the decedent of his eldest son,
Alfredo,and nothing else; that all other compulsory heirs were not named nor instituted asheir, devisee
or legatee, hence there was preterition which would result to intestacy.Private respondents maintained
that while procedurally the court is called upon torule only on the extrinsic validity of the will, it is not
barred from delving into theintrinsic validity of the same, and ordering the dismissal of the petition for
probatewhen on the face of the will it is clear that it contains no testamentary disposition ofthe
property of the decedent.

Petitioners filed their opposition to the motion to dismiss contending that: (1)generally, the authority of
the probate court is limited only to a determination of theextrinsic validity of the will; (2) private
respondents question the intrinsic and notthe extrinsic validity of the will; (3) disinheritance constitutes
a disposition of the

estate of a decedent; and (4) the rule on preterition did not apply because Segundos

will did not constitute a universal heir or heirs to the exclusion of one or morecompulsory heirs.

The RTC issued an order dismissing the petition for probate proceedings, hence, apetition for certiorari
was filed by petitioners.

Issue:

Whether the document executed by Segundo can be considered as a holographic will.

Held:

Petition granted. The questioned will is a holographic will. Testate proceedingsfor the settlement of the
estate of the decedent take precedence over intestateproceedings for the same purpose.

A holographic will, as provided under Article 810 of the Civil Code, must be entirelywritten, dated, and
signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to noother form, and may be made in or out of
the Philippines, and need not be witnessed.

The document, although it may initially come across as a mere disinheritanceinstrument, conforms to
the formalities of a holographic will prescribed by law. It iswritten, dated and signed by the hand of the
testator himself. An intent to dispose

mortis causa

(Article 783) can be clearly deduced from the terms of the instrument,

and while it does not make an affirmative disposition of the latters property, the

disinheritance of the son nonetheless, is an act of disposition in itself. In otherwords, the disinheritance
results in the disposition of the property of the testator infavor of those who would succeed in the
absence of the eldest son.
It is a fundamental principle that the intent or the will of the testator, expressed inthe form and within
the limits prescribed by law, must be recognized as the supremelaw in succession. All rules of
construction are designed to ascertain and give effectto that intention. It is only when the intention of
the testator is contrary to law,morals, or public policy that it cannot be given effect.

Holographic wills usually prepared by one who is not learned in the law should beconstrued more
liberally than the ones drawn by an expert, taking into account thecircumstances surrounding the
execution of the instrument and the intention of thetestator. In this regard, the document, even if
captioned as

Kasulatan ng Pag-alis ngMana

, was intended by the testator to be his last testamentary act and was executedby him in accordance
with law in the form of a holographic will. Unless the will isprobated, the disinheritance cannot be
given effect

Jimenez v. FernandezParas, J. (1990)PET: Sulpicia Jimenez et al.RESPs: Vicente Fernandez, Teodora

Facts:Land in question (2, 932 sqm) formerly belonged to Fermin Jimenez.Fermin Jimenez had 2
sons: Carlos and Fortunato. Fortunato predeceased Fermin leaving behind a daughter,
Sulpicia.After the death of Fermin Jimenez, the entire parcel of land was registered under Act 496 in
the name of Carlos Jimenez and Sulpicia Jimenez (uncle and niece) in equal shares pro-
indiviso.Carlos Jimenez died on July 9, 1936 and his illegitimate daughter, Melecia Cayabyab, also
known as Melecia Jimenez, took possession of the eastern portion of the property consisting of 436
square meters.Melecia Jimenez sold said 436 square meter-
portion of the property to EdilbertoCagampan and defendant Teodora Grado executed a contract
entitled "Exchange of Real Properties" whereby the former transferred said 436 square meter-portion
tothe latter, who has been in occupation since.August 1969 -- PET executed an affidavit
adjudicating unto herself the other half of the property appertaining to Carlos Jimenez, upon
manifestation that she isthe only heir of her deceased uncle. A TCT was then issued in petitioner's
namealone over the entire 2,932 square meter
property.PET, joined by her husband, instituted the present action for the recovery of the eastern
portion of the property consisting of 436 square meters occupied by defendant Teodora Grado and her
son.Lower court: Dismissed the complaint.CA: Affirmed lower court.

Issue:

1.WON Melecia Cayabyab had any right over the eastern part of the propertyshe took possession of and
later sold? No. (See Ratio 1 & 2)
2.WON Melecia Cayabyab had acquired any right over the said part of the property through
prescription? No. (Ratio 3)3.WON PET is barred from recovering the parcel of land through laches?
No.(Ratio 4)

Ratio:1.From the start the respondent court erred in not declaring that MeleciaJimenez Cayabyab also
known as Melecia Jimenez, is not the daughter of Carlos Jimenez and therefore, had no right over the
property in question. Respondents failed to present concrete evidence to prove that Melecia Cayabyab
was really the daughter of Carlos Jimenez.2.(RELEVANT) Assuming that Melecia Cayabyab was the
illegitimate daughterof Carlos Jimenez there can be no question that Melecia Cayabyab had no right
tosucceed to the estate of Carlos Jimenez and could not have validly acquired, nor legally transferred to
Edilberto Cagampan that portion of the property subjectof this petition.oArt. 777 of the CC: The
rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedentoArt. 2263 of
the CC: Rights to the inheritance of a person who died withor without a will, before the effectivity of
this Code, shall be governed by the Civil Code of 1889, by other previous laws, and by the Rules of
CourtoSince Carlos Jimenez, owner of one-half pro-indiviso portion of that parcel of died on July 9, 1936
way before the effectivity of the Civil Code of thePhilippines, the successional rights pertaining to his
estate must be determinedin accordance with the Civil Code of 1889.oTo be an heir under the
rules of Civil Code of 1889 (which was the law in force when Carlos Jimenez died and which should
be the governing law in so faras the right to inherit from his estate was concerned), a child must be
eithera child legitimate, legitimated, or adopted, or else an acknowledged natural chi