Cruz vs Secretary of DENR

Natural Resources and Environmental Law; Constitutional Law; IPRA; Regalian Doctrine

GR. No. 135385, Dec. 6, 2000

FACTS:
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa filed a suit for prohibition and mandamus as citizens and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of
certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371, otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA) and its implementing rules
and regulations (IRR). The petitioners assail certain provisions of the IPRA and its IRR on the ground that these amount to an unlawful deprivation
of the States ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian
doctrine embodied in section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.

ISSUE:
Do the provisions of IPRA contravene the Constitution?

HELD:
No, the provisions of IPRA do not contravene the Constitution. Examining the IPRA, there is nothing in the law that grants to the ICCs/IPs
ownership over the natural resources within their ancestral domain. Ownership over the natural resources in the ancestral domains remains
with the State and the rights granted by the IPRA to the ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in their ancestral domains merely gives them, as
owners and occupants of the land on which the resources are found, the right to the small scale utilization of these resources, and at the same
time, a priority in their large scale development and exploitation.

Additionally, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands of the public domain. They are private lands an d belong to the
ICCs/IPs by native title, which is a concept of private land title that existed irrespective of any royal grant from the State. However, the right of
ownership and possession by the ICCs/IPs of their ancestral domains is a limited form of ownership and does not include the r ight to alienate
the same.

The Supreme Court deliberated upon the matter. After deliberation they voted and reached a 7-7 vote. They deliberated again and the same
result transpired. Since there was no majority vote, Cruzs petition was dismissed and the constitutionality of the IPRA law was sustained. Hence,
ancestral domains may include public domain somehow against the regalian doctrine.

Chavez v. Pea and Amari

Fact:
In 1973, the Comissioner on Public Highways entered into a contract to reclaim areas of Manila Bay with the Construction and Development
Corportion of the Philippines (CDCP).

PEA (Public Estates Authority) was created by President Marcos under P.D. 1084, tasked with developing and leasing reclaimed lands. These
lands were transferred to the care of PEA under P.D. 1085 as part of the Manila Cavite Road and Reclamation Project (MCRRP). CDCP and PEA
entered into an agreement that all future projects under the MCRRP would be funded and owned by PEA.

By 1988, President Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517 transferring lands to PEA. It was followed by the transfer of three Titles (7309, 7311
and 7312) by the Register of Deeds of Paranaque to PEA covering the three reclaimed islands known as the FREEDOM ISLANDS.

Subsquently, PEA entered into a joint venture agreement (JVA) with AMARI, a Thai-Philippine corporation to develop the Freedom Islands. Along
with another 250 hectares, PEA and AMARI entered the JVA which would later transfer said lands to AMARI. This caused a stir especially when
Sen. Maceda assailed the agreement, claiming that such lands were part of public domain (famously known as the mother of all scams).

Peitioner Frank J. Chavez filed case as a taxpayer praying for mandamus, a writ of preliminary injunction and a TRO against the sale of reclaimed
lands by PEA to AMARI and from implementing the JVA. Following these events, under President Estradas admin, PEA and AMARI entered into
an Amended JVA and Mr. Chaves claim that the contract is null and void.

Issue:
w/n: the transfer to AMARI lands reclaimed or to be reclaimed as part of the stipulations in the (Amended) JVA between AMARI and PEA violate
Sec. 3 Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution
w/n: the court is the proper forum for raising the issue of whether the amended joint venture agreement is grossly disadvantageous to the
government.

Held:
On the issue of Amended JVA as violating the constitution:
1. The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable
lands of the public domain. PEA may lease these lands to private corporations but may not sell or transfer ownership of these lands to private
corporations. PEA may only sell these lands to Philippine citizens, subject to the ownership limitations in the 1987 Constitution and existing laws.

2. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural resources of the public domain until classified as alienable
or disposable lands open to disposition and declared no longer needed for public service. The government can make such classification and
declaration only after PEA has reclaimed these submerged areas. Only then can these lands qualify as agricultural lands of the public domain,
 which are the only natural resources the government can alienate. In their present state, the 592.15 hectares of submerged areas are inalienable
and outside the commerce of man.

3. Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private corporation, ownership of 77.34 hectares110 of the Freedom Islands, such
transfer is void for being contrary to Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind
of alienable land of the public domain.

4. Since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of 290.156 hectares111 of still submerged areas of Manila Bay, such
transfer is void for being contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the alienation of natural resources other than
agricultural lands of the public domain.

PEA may reclaim these submerged areas. Thereafter, the government can classify the reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable, and further
declare them no longer needed for public service. Still, the transfer of such reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain to AMARI will be void
in view of Section 3, Article XII of the 1987Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the
public domain.

Case Digest: Chavez v. National Housing Authority

FACTS:

On August 5, 2004, former Solicitor General Francisco Chavez, filed an instant petition raising constitutional issues on the JVA entered by National
Housing Authority and R-II Builders, Inc.

On March 1, 1988, then-President Cory Aquino issued Memorandum order No. (MO) 161 approving and directing implementation of the
Comprehensive and Integrated Metropolitan Manila Waste Management Plan. During this time, Smokey Mountain, a wasteland in Tondo,
Manila, are being made residence of many Filipinos living in a subhuman state.

As presented in MO 161, NHA prepared feasibility studies to turn the dumpsite into low-cost housing project, thus, Smokey Mountain
Development and Reclamation Project (SMDRP), came into place. RA 6957 (Build-Operate-Transfer Law) was passed on July 1990 declaring the
importance of private sectors as contractors in government projects. Thereafter, Aquino proclaimed MO 415 applying RA 6957 to SMDRP,
among others. The same MO also established EXECOM and TECHCOM in the execution and evaluation of the plan, respectively, to be assisted
by the Public Estates Authority (PEA).

Notices of public bidding to become NHAs venture partner for SMDRP were published in newspapers in 1992, from which R-II Builders, Inc. (RBI)
won the bidding process. Then-President Ramos authorized NHA to enter into a Joint Venture Agreement with RBI.

Under the JVA, the project involves the clearing of Smokey Mountain for eventual development into a low cost housing complex and
industrial/commercial site. RBI is expected to fully finance the development of Smokey Mountain and reclaim 40 hectares of the land at the
Manila Bay Area. The latter together with the commercial area to be built on Smokey Mountain will be owned by RBI as enabling components.
If the project is revoked or terminated by the Government through no fault of RBI or by mutual agreement, the Government shall compensate
RBI for its actual expenses incurred in the Project plus a reasonable rate of return not exceeding that stated in the feasibility study and in the
contract as of the date of such revocation, cancellation, or termination on a schedule to be agreed upon by both parties.

To summarize, the SMDRP shall consist of Phase I and Phase II. Phase I of the project involves clearing, levelling-off the dumpsite, and
construction of temporary housing units for the current residents on the cleared and levelled site. Phase II involves the construction of a fenced
incineration area for the on-site disposal of the garbage at the dumpsite.

Due to the recommendations done by the DENR after evaluations done, the JVA was amended and restated (now ARJVA) to accommoda te the
design changes and additional work to be done to successfully implement the project. The original 3,500 units of temporary h ousing were
decreased to 2,992. The reclaimed land as enabling component was increased from 40 hectares to 79 hectares, which was supported by the
issuance of Proclamation No. 465 by President Ramos. The revision also provided for the 119-hectare land as an enabling component for Phase
II of the project.

Subsequently, the Clean Air Act was passed by the legislature which made the establishment of an incinerator illegal, making the off-site
dumpsite at Smokey Mountain necessary. On August 1, 1998, the project was suspended, to be later reconstituted by President Estrada in MO
No. 33.

On August 27, 2003, the NHA and RBI executed a Memorandum of Agreement whereby both parties agreed to terminate the JVA and subsequent
agreements. During this time, NHA reported that 34 temporary housing structures and 21 permanent housing structures had been turned over
by RBI.

ISSUES:

1. Whether respondents NHA and RBI have been granted the power and authority to reclaim lands of the public domain as this power is vested
exclusively in PEA as claimed by petitioner
2. Whether respondents NHA and RBI were given the power and authority by DENR to reclaim foreshore and submerged lands
3. Whether respondent RBI can acquire reclaimed foreshore and submerged lands considered as alienable and outside the commerce of man
4. Whether respondent RBI can acquire reclaimed lands when there was no declaration that said lands are no longer needed for public use
5. Whether there is a law authorizing sale of reclaimed lands
6. Whether the transfer of reclaimed lands to RBI was done by public bidding
7. Whether RBI, being a private corporation, is barred by the Constitution to acquire lands of public domain
8. Whether respondents can be compelled to disclose all information related to the SMDRP
9. Whether the operative fact doctrine applies to the instant position
HELD:

1. Executive Order 525 reads that the PEA shall be primarily responsible for integrating, directing, and coordinating all reclamation projects
for and on behalf of the National Government. This does not mean that it shall be responsible for all. The requisites for a valid and legal
reclamation project are approval by the President (which were provided for by MOs), favourable recommendation of PEA (which were seen
as a part of its recommendations to the EXECOM), and undertaken either by PEA or entity under contract of PEA or by the National
Government Agency (NHA is a government agency whose authority to reclaim lands under consultation with PEA is derived under PD 727
and RA 7279).
2. Notwithstanding the need for DENR permission, the DENR is deemed to have granted the authority to reclaim in the Smokey Mountain
Project for the DENR is one of the members of the EXECOM which provides reviews for the project. ECCs and Special Patent Ord ers were
given by the DENR which are exercises of its power of supervision over the project. Furthermore, it was the President via the
abovementioned MOs that originally authorized the reclamation. It must be noted that the reclamation of lands of public domain is reposed
first in the Philippine President.
3. The reclaimed lands were classified alienable and disposable via MO 415 issued by President Aquino and Proclamation Nos. 39 and 465 by
President Ramos.
4. Despite not having an explicit declaration, the lands have been deemed to be no longer needed for public use as stated in Proclamation No.
39 that these are to be disposed to qualified beneficiaries. Furthermore, these lands have already been necessarily reclassified as
alienable and disposable lands under the BOT law.
5. Letter I of Sec. 6 of PD 757 clearly states that the NHA can acquire property rights and interests and encumber or otherwise dispose of them
as it may deem appropriate.
6. There is no doubt that respondent NHA conducted a public bidding of the right to become its joint venture partner in the Smokey Mountain
Project. It was noted that notices were published in national newspapers. The bidding proper was done by the Bids and Awards Committee
on May 18, 1992.
7. RA 6957 as amended by RA 7718 explicitly states that a contractor can be paid a portion as percentage of the reclaimed land subject to
the constitutional requirement that only Filipino citizens or corporation with at least 60% Filipino equity can acquire the same. In addition,
when the lands were transferred to the NHA, these were considered Patrimonial lands of the state, by which it has the power to sell the
same to any qualified person.
8. This relief must be granted. It is the right of the Filipino people to information on matters of public concerned as stated in Article II, Sec.
28, and Article III, Sec. 7 of the 1987 Constitution.
9. When the petitioner filed the case, the JVA had already been terminated by virtue of MOA between RBI and NHA. The properties and rights
in question after the passage of around 10 years from the start of the projects implementation cannot be disturbed or questioned. The
petitioner, being the Solicitor General at the time SMDRP was formulated, had ample opportunity to question the said project, but did not
do so. The moment to challenge has passed.

Republic vs Naguiat
Natural Resources and Environmental Laws

G.R. No. 134209; January 24, 2006

FACTS:
Celestina Naguiat filed an application for registration of title to four parcels of land located in Panan, Botolan, Zambales. The applicant alleges
that she is the owner of the said parcels of land having acquired them by purchase from its previous owners and their predecessors-in-interest
who have been in possession thereof for more than thirty (30) years; and that to the best of her knowledge, said lots suffer no mortgage or
encumbrance of whatever kind nor is there any person having any interest, legal or equitable, or in possession thereof.
Petitioner Republic opposed on the ground that neither the applicant nor her predecessors-in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation of the lands in question since 12 June 1945 or prior thereto, considering the fact that she has not
established that the lands in question have been declassified from forest or timber zone to alienable and disposable property.

ISSUE:
Did the areas in question cease to have the status of forest or other inalienable lands of the public domain?

HELD:
No, the said areas are still classified as forest land.The issue of whether or not respondent and her predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
exclusive and continuous possession of the parcels of land in question is of little moment. For, unclassified land cannot be acquired by adverse
occupation or possession; occupation thereof in the concept of owner, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership and be registered as
title.
A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification simply because loggers or settlers have stripped it
of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other
farmers. "Forest lands" do not have to be on mountains or in out of the way places. The classification is merely descriptive of its legal nature or
status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like.