Naser Noaman Mohamed Al Maotari, A077 251 699 (BIA June 2, 2017)

U.S.
Department of Justice
Executive Office for Immigration Review
Board ofImmigration Appeals

Office ofthe Clerk
5 /07 Leesburg Pike, Suite 2000

Falls Church, Virginia 22041
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Marks, Jay Schine OHS/ICE Office of Chief Counsel - WAS
Law Offices of Jay S. Marks, LLC. 1901 S. Bell Street, Suite 900
836 Bonifant Street Arlington, VA 22202
Silver Spring, MD 20910
Name: AL MAQTARI, NASER NOAMAN .. A 077-251-699
Date of this notice: 6/2/2017
Enclosed is a copy of the Board's decision and order in the above-referenced case.
Sincerely,
Cynthia L. Crosby
Acting Chief Clerk
Enclosure
Panel Members:
Guendelsberger, John
Liebowitz, Ellen C
Malphrus, Garry D.
Userteam: Docket
For more unpublished BIA decisions, visit

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Cite as: Naser Noaman Mohamed Al Maotari, A077 251 699 (BIA June 2, 2017)
U.S. Department of Justice Decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals
Executive Office for Immigration Review
Falls Church, Virginia 22041
File: A077 251 699 - Arlington; VA Date:

JUN - 2 2017
In re: NASER NOAMAN MOHAMED AL MAOTARI a.k.a. Naser Noaman Al-Maqtari

IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS
APPEAL
ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT: Jay S. Marks, Esquire
CHARGE:
Notice: Sec. 237(a)(l)(C)(i), l&N Act [8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(l)(C)(i)] -

Nonimmigrant - violated conditions of status
Sec. 237(a)(2)(A)(iii}, I&N Act [8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii)] -

Convicted of aggravated felony
Lodged: Sec. 237(a)(2)(A)(iii}, l&N Act [8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii)] -

Convicted of aggravated felony under section 101(a)(43)(M)
APPLICATION: Removability
This case was last before us on December 30, 2014, at which time we dismissed the
respondent's appeal from the Immigration Judge's September 11, 2012, decision finding him
removable as an alien convicted of an aggravated felony and therefore ineligible for asylum
under section 208(b)(2)(A)(ii}, (B)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C.
l158(b)(2)(A)(ii}, (B)(i).1 This case is now before us on remand pursuant to a June 11, 2015,
order from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. The Fourth Circuit granted
a remand request for us to reconsider our December 30, 2014, decision in light of Omargharib v.
Holder, 77 5 F.3d 192 (4th Cir. 2014), which interpreted Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct.
2276 (2013).
We review questions of law, discretion, and judgment arising in appeals from decisions of
Immigration Judges de novo, whereas we review findings of fact in such appeals under a "clearly
1 The Immigration Judge granted the respondent's applications for withholding of removal
under section 24l(b )(3) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 123l(b)(3), and for protection under the
Convention Against Torture (CAT). The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) did not
appeal those determinations. The full history of this case is set out in our December 30, 2014,
decision.
A07 7 251 699
erroneous" standard. See 8 C.F.R. 1003.l(d)(3)(i) , (ii) . The respondent's appeal will be
sustained, and the record will be remanded.
The respondent was charged with being removable under section 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) of the Act,
8 U. S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) , as an alien convicted of an aggravated felony under section
10 l(a)(43)(M)(i) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. l 10 l(a)(43)(M)(i) , i.e., an offense that involves fraud or

2
deceit in which the loss to the victim or victims exceeds $10,000.
The respondent was convicted in 2009 of violating 18 U.S.C. 641, which reads:
641. Public money, property or records

Whoever embezzles, steals, purloins, or knowingly converts to his use or the use of
another, or without authority, sells, conveys or disposes of any record, voucher, money,
or thing of value of the United States or of any department or agency thereof, or any
property made or being made under contract for the United States or any department or
agency thereof; or
Whoever receives, conceals, or retains the same with intent to convert it to his use or gain,
knowing it to have been embezzled, stolen, purloined or converted--
Shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both; but if the
value of such property in the aggregate, combining amounts from all the counts for which
the defendant is convicted in a single case, does not exceed the sum of $1,000, he shall be
fined under this title or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.
The word "value" means face, par, or market value, or cost price, either wholesale or
retail, whichever is greater.
To determine whether the respondent is removable as charged under section 10 l(a)(43)(M)(i)

of the Act as an alien convicted of an offense that involves fraud or deceit in which the loss to
the victim or victims exceeds $10,000, we employ the "categorical approach" and focus only on
the elements of the offense, and not on the facts surrounding the commission of the crime. See
Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2248 (2016) ; Descamps v. United States, supra, at
2281; Omargharib v. Holder, supra, at 196; Matter of Chairez, 26 l&N Dec. 819, 821 (BIA
2016) . If the statute is not a categorical match, we next must determine whether the statute is
divisible - i.e., it defines multiple crimes in the alternative, each of which requires a different set
of elements to be proven for conviction. If it is divisible, and if at least one, but not all, of the
offenses under the statute qualifies as an aggravated felony within the meaning of section
10 l(a)(43)(M)(i) of the Act, we must attempt to identify the respondent's actual crime of
conviction for the purpose of determining whether it falls within section 101(a)(43)(M)(i) . See
Mathis v. United States, supra, at 2249; Descamps v. United States, supra, at 2281; Omargharib
v. Holder, supra, at 197-98; Matter of Chairez, supra, at 821-22. To do so, we would employ
the "modified categorical approach" by looking to a limited class of documents in the record of
conviction, such as a charging document, jury instructions, a plea agreement, or a transcript of
the plea colloquy between the defendant and the judge. See Mathis v. United States, supra, at
2249; Descamps v. United States, supra, at 2283-86; Matter ofChairez, supra, at 822.
2
The lodged charge on the March 16, 2011, Form 1-261 refers generally to section
101(a)(43)(M) , but there is no dispute in this case that section 101(a)(43)(M)(ii) of the Act
(relating to tax evasion) is not at issue.
2
A077 251 699
We first consider whether 18 U.S.C. 641 categorically describes offenses involving fraud
or deceit. The Supreme Court has advised that "[t]he scope of [section l 0 l(a)(43)(M)(i) of the
Act] is not limited to offenses that include fraud or deceit as formal elements. Rather, [it] refers
more broadly to offenses that 'involv[er fraud or deceit - meaning offenses with elements that
necessarily entail fraudulent or deceitful conduct.'' Kawashima v. Holder, 565 U.S. 478, 483-84
(2012). The Court added that for purposes of section 101(a)(43)(M) of the Act, the term "deceif'

means "the act or process of deceiving (as by falsification, concealment, or cheating)." Id.
(citing Webster's Third New International Dictionary 584 (1993)).
Therefore, the proper inquiry is whether an offense under 18 U.S.C. 641 necessarily entails
fraudulent or deceitful conduct, not whether it did in this particular case. We conclude that it is
possible to commit this offense without fraud or deceit. The Supreme Court, in discussing
18 U.S.C. 641, which proscribes knowing conversions, has advised that knowing conversions
include "intentional and knowing abuses and unauthorized uses of government property.'' See
Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 272 (1952). Conversion "may reach use in an
unauthorized manner or to an unauthorized extent of property placed in one's custody for limited
use. Money rightfully taken into one's custody may be converted without any intent to keep or
embezzle it merely by commingling it with the custodian's own, if he was under a duty to keep it
separate and intact." Id. These forms of knowing conversion do not "necessarily entail
fraudulent or deceitful conduct." Kawashima v. Holder, supra, at 484. Because conversion
under 18 U.S.C. 641 does not necessarily entail fraudulent or deceitful conduct, a violation of
the statute is not categorically a fraud or deceit offense within the meaning of section
101(a)(43)(M)(i) of the Act.
The next step in the analysis is to determine whether the statute at issue is divisible - i.e., it
defines multiple crimes in the alternative, each of which requires a different set of elements to be
proven for conviction. However, in this case we can skip that step, for even if we assume the
statute to be divisible and therefore proceed to the modified categorical approach, we would
conclude that the record does not establish that the respondent is removable for a fraud or deceit
aggravated felony under current case law.
Applying the modified categorical approach to attempt to identify the respondent's actual
crime of conviction, see Mathis v. United States, supra, at 2249; Descamps v. United States,
supra, at 2284-85; Omargharib v. Holder, supra, at 197-98, we look first at the November 20,
2009, Judgment issued in connection with the respondent's conviction under 18 U.S.C. 641
(Exh. 2). The Judgment reflects that the respondent was adjudicated guilty of Count 1 of the
Indictment (Exh. 2), which alleged that the respondent "did unlawfully, knowingly, willfully,
embezzle, steal, and purloin money or things of value of the United States." The respondent was
not necessarily convicted of each of these offenses, for it is acceptable practice for a charging
document to state allegations in the conjunctive, although the statute lists multiple offenses in the
disjunctive, and a conviction may rest upon proof of any of the offenses alleged. See United
States v. Perry, 560 F.3d 246, 256 (4th Cir. 2009) (citing United States v. Champion, 387 F.2d
561, 563 n.6 (4th Cir. 1967)).
We look next at the respondent's August 27, 2009, Plea Agreement (Exh. 2) to see if it sheds
any light on the specific offense of which the respondent was convicted. The Plea Agreement
provides that the respondent agreed to plead guilty to "embezzling, stealing, purloining and
converting to his use, money and things of value." This language is broader even than that set
3
A077 251 699
forth in the Indictment, in that it includes conversion. However, under the Plea Agreement, the
3
respondent also admitted the facts set forth in the August 27, 2009, Statement of Facts (Exh. 2).
The Statement of Facts likewise states broadly that the respondent "embezzled, stole, purloined,
and knowingly converted" money or things of value. In addition, the Statement of Facts includes
a more specific admission by the respondent that he "misrepresented his income and
employment, resulting in the overpayment of government benefits from four federally-funded

programs." Although this factual admission may establish that the respondent actually
committed a fraud or deceit offense, these specific factual admissions are only "brute facts,"
which are "extraneous to the crime's legal requirements," see Mathis v. United States, supra, at
2248-49, since the statute does not refer to misrepresentation aimed at securing government
benefits. Thus we cannot rely on the Statement of Facts to conclude that the respondent
committed a fraud or deceit offense.
Turning back, then, to the most narrowly tailored language found in the conviction records -
the Indictment's language that the respondent did "embezzle, steal, and purloin money or things
of value of the United States," we must consider whether any of these offenses does not
necessarily entail fraudulent or deceitful conduct. "To steal means to take away from one in
lawful possession without right with the intention to keep wrongfully." Morissette v. United
States, supra, at 271. "Stealing, having no common law definition to restrict its meaning as an
offense, is commonly used to denote any dishonest transaction whereby one person obtains that
which rightfully belongs to another, and deprives the owner of the rights and benefits of
ownership, but may or may not involve the element of stealth usually attributed to the word
purloin." Id. at 266 n.28 (quoting Crabb v. Zerbst, 99 F.2d 562, 565 (5th Cir. 1938)). Such an
offense does not necessarily entail fraud or deceit.
We therefore conclude that the record does not establish by clear and convincing evidence, as
required by section 240(c)(3)(A) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1229a(c)(3)(A), that the respondent is
removable as charged under section 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) of the Act as an alien convicted of a fraud
4
or deceit aggravated felony, as defined at section 101(a)(43)(M)(i) of the Act.
Inasmuch as the record does not demonstrate that the respondent is removable as an
aggravated felon, we remand the record to allow the Immigration Court to consider the
respondent's eligibility for asylum under section 208 of the Act.
Accordingly, the following orders will be entered.
3
In Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 16 (2005), the Supreme Court advised that the
modified categorical approach may include examination of ''the statutory definition, charging
document, written plea agreement, transcript of plea colloquy, and any explicit factual finding by
the trial judge to which the defendant assentecf' (emphasis added). We therefore may consider
the Statement of Facts, which was incorporated into the Plea Agreement.
4 We need not reach the issue whether any such fraud or deceit resulted in a loss to the victim or
victims exceeding $10,000, as would be required to render the respondent removable under
section 101(a)(43)(M)(i) of the Act. See Nijhawan v. Holder, 551 U.S. 29 (2009).
4
A07 7 251 699
ORDER: The appeal is sustained with regard to the respondent's removability under section
237(a)(2)(A)(iii) of the Act, as an alien convicted of an aggravated felony under section
10 l(a)(43)(M)(i) of the Act.
FURTHER ORDER: The record is remanded to the Immigration Court for further
proceedings.
5

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U.S.

Executive Office for Immigration Review

Board ofImmigration Appeals

5 /07 Leesburg Pike, Suite 2000

Immigrant & Refugee Appellate Center, LLC | www.irac.net

Name: AL MAQTARI, NASER NOAMAN .. A 077-251-699

Date of this notice: 6/2/2017

For more unpublished BIA decisions, visit

Falls Church, Virginia 22041

File: A077 251 699 - Arlington; VA Date:

Immigrant & Refugee Appellate Center, LLC | www.irac.net

ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT: Jay S. Marks, Esquire

Notice: Sec. 237(a)(l)(C)(i), l&N Act [8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(l)(C)(i)] -

Sec. 237(a)(2)(A)(iii}, I&N Act [8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii)] -

Lodged: Sec. 237(a)(2)(A)(iii}, l&N Act [8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii)] -

Immigrant & Refugee Appellate Center, LLC | www.irac.net

641. Public money, property or records

To determine whether the respondent is removable as charged under section 10 l(a)(43)(M)(i)

Immigrant & Refugee Appellate Center, LLC | www.irac.net

561, 563 n.6 (4th Cir. 1967)).

Immigrant & Refugee Appellate Center, LLC | www.irac.net

Accordingly, the following orders will be entered.

Immigrant & Refugee Appellate Center, LLC | www.irac.net

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