0% found this document useful (0 votes)

233 views21 pages

Table of Contents - Printable

The document summarizes key doctrines related to criminal law, including: 1) Attempted and frustrated stages of a crime - Liability depends on whether the acts could have resulted in the crime without independent causes intervening. 2) Conspiracy - To be liable as a co-principal, one must perform overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy, though acts may be distinct from the actual crime. Conspiracy can be inferred from coordinated acts indicating a common purpose. 3) Justifying circumstances of self-defense - Unlawful aggression must be present for self-defense to apply. Retaliation after aggression ceases is not self-defense. Self-defense claims must be proven

Uploaded by

Vev'z Dangpason Balawan

We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.

Available Formats

Download as DOC, PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd

0% found this document useful (0 votes)

233 views21 pages

Table of Contents - Printable

Uploaded by

Vev'z Dangpason Balawan

We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.

Available Formats

Download as DOC, PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd

You are on page 1/ 21

1

Case San Beda College of Law

2005 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS
CRIMINAL LAW
SUMMARY OF DOCTRINES

Book One
STAGES OF COMMISSION
ATTEMPTED
When the wound inflicted could not have caused instantaneous death, the offender is liable for the
attempted stage of the crime. To be liable for the frustrated stage of a felony, the offender must
perform all the acts of execution which would produce the felony as a consequence but which,
nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator.
The testimonies of the medical experts show that the wound inflicted was not of the kind which
could have caused instantaneous death. (PEOPLE vs. PABLO DELA CRUZ, G.R. Nos. 154348-50.
June 8, 2004)

CONSPIRACY

To hold one as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, it must be shown that he performed an overt
act in pursuance of or furtherance of the conspiracy, although the acts performed might have been
distinct and separate. This overt act may consist of active participation in the actual commission of
the crime itself, or it may consist of moral assistance to his co-conspirators by being present at the
time of the commission of the crime, or by exerting a moral ascendance over the other co-
conspirators by moving them to execute or implement the criminal plan. (PEOPLE vs. NATIVIDAD,
G.R. No. 151072, September 23, 2003)

The prosecution was able to establish that appellants conspired in killing the victim through these
specific acts, which unmistakably indicate a common purpose and design. The Information charged
the appellants with conspiracy in killing the victim. Conspiracy must be proved as convincingly as
the criminal act itself. Like any element of the offense charged, conspiracy must be established by
proof beyond reasonable doubt. Conspiracy may be shown through circumstantial evidence;
deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated; or inferred from the
acts of the accused pointing to a joint purpose and design, a concerted action, and a community of
interest. (PEOPLE vs. GREGORIO, G.R. No. 153781. September 24, 2003)

In conspiracy, it is not necessary to show that all the conspirators actually hit and killed the victim.
What is important is that the participants performed specific acts with such closeness and
coordination as unmistakably to indicate a common purpose or design in bringing about the death
of the victim. That appellant conspired in the commission of the crime charged was sufficiently and
convincingly shown by his active participation in holding the victim to render him immobile, thus
enabling Quijada to consummate the killing. Regardless of the extent and character of his
participation then, conspiracy renders appellant liable as a co-principal because in contemplation
of law, the act of one conspirator is the act of all. Having joined in the criminal conspiracy,
appellant in effect adopted as his own the criminal design of his co-conspirators. Appellant is,
therefore, liable for the killing of the victim. (PEOPLE vs.FONCARDAS,G.R. No. 144598.
February 6, 2004)

Conspiracy must be proved with the same quantum of evidence as the crime itself, that is, by proof
beyond reasonable doubt. However, direct proof is not required as conspiracy may be proved by
circumstantial evidence. It is enough that at the time of the commission of a crime, all the
malefactors had the same purpose and was united in their execution. Once established, all the
conspirators are criminally liable as co-principals regardless of the degree of participation of each
of them for in contemplation of the law; the act of one is the act of all. (PEOPLE vs. AGUDEZ,
G.R. Nos. 138386-87. May 20, 2004)

CRIMINAL LAW COMMITTEE AND DIGEST POOL

CHAIRPERSON: Mark David Martinez EDP: Elaine Masukat ASSISTANTS: Catherine Danao, Albert Rodriguez, Reggie Sampaga, Gizelle Lou
Cabahug, Karen
Quizon,, Leo San Juan, Ma. Victoria Yambao, Ryan Lita, Bayani Brillante, Jr. DIGEST POOL: Sorhaya Dilabakun, Edizer Enriquez, Aira Ferrer, Eric
Sakkam, Vanessa
Raymundo, Ishmalyn Balbontin, Eunice Tan, Mitch Magdaong, Bheejay Sanchez, Froshell Saure, Salvador Escalante, RJ Balbuena, Ulysses Gonzales,
Donna Dumpit, Rowena Mutia, Irene Junio, Maritess Sy, Kristan Cristobal, Janice Didal, Christian Vargas, Uella Mancenido, Mae Belmes, Kristina De
Guzman, Mayette Mendoza, Michael Alinao, Apple de Lunas, Roviel Nepomuceno, Christopher Linag, Fe Taal, Kristine Ventura
2
San Beda College of Law Case
CRIMINAL LAW
2005 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS
Digest
There is conspiracy when two or more persons agree to commit a crime and decide to commit it. It
may be deduced from the acts of the malefactors before, during and after the commission of the
crime which are indicative of a joint purpose, concerted acts and concurrence of sentiments. Once
conspiracy is established, the act of one is deemed the act of all. In this case, the collective acts of
the appellants before, during and after the shooting, evince no other conclusion than that they
conspired to kill the victim. (PEOPLE vs. ALLAWAN, G.R. No. 149887, February 13, 2004)

Each conspirator is responsible for everything done by his confederates which follows incidentally in
the execution of a common design as one of its probable and natural consequences even though it
was not intended as part of the original design. Responsibility of a conspirator is not confined to
the accomplishment of a particular purpose of conspiracy but extends to collateral acts and
offenses incident to and growing out of the purpose intended. (PEOPLE vs. VASQUEZ, G.R. No.
123939, May 28, 2004)

In conspiracy, what is important is that all participants performed specific acts with such
cooperation and coordination bringing about the death of the victim. When conspiracy is present,
the act of one is the act of all. (PEOPLE vs. ELLORABA, G.R. No. 123917, December 10, 2003)

Conspiracy can be inferred from the acts of the accused which clearly manifest a concurrence of
wills, a common intent or design to commit a crime. In conspiracy, it is sufficient that at the time
of the aggression, all the accused manifested by their acts a common intent or desire to attack so
that the act of one accused becomes the act of all. (PEOPLE vs. MASAGNAY, G.R. No. 137364.
June 10, 2004)

As a rule, whenever homicide has been committed as a consequence of or on the occasion of the
robbery, all those who took part as principals in the robbery will also be held guilty as principals of
the special complex crime of robbery with homicide although they did not actually take part in the
homicide, unless it clearly appears that they endeavored to prevent the homicide. (PEOPLE vs.
ABES, G.R. No. 138937, January 20, 2004)

JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES
SELF-DEFENSE
Self-defense must be distinguished from retaliation; in that in retaliation, the inceptual unlawful
aggression had already ceased when the accused attacked him. In self-defense, the unlawful
aggression was still existing when the aggressor was injured or disabled by the person making the
defense. (PEOPLE vs. GALLEGO, G.R. No. 127489, July 11, 2003)

For the accused to be entitled to exoneration based on self-defense, complete or incomplete, it is

essential that there be unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, for if there is no unlawful
aggression, there would be nothing to prevent or repel. For unlawful aggression to be appreciated,
there must be an actual, sudden and unexpected attack or imminent danger thereof, not merely a
threatening or intimidating attitude. (PEOPLE vs. CAABAY, G.R. Nos. 129961-62. August 25,
2003)

In the case at bar, although the victim provoked the petitioner Alex, the victim however fled to
escape from the petitioners who pursued him. When they caught up with him at the CAP building,
petitioner hit the victim with a stick causing him to fall to the ground. While the victim was still
lying on the ground, the petitioner threw a stone at him. Clearly, by his own acts, Alex retaliated
against the victims provocation. (ASUNCION, et.al.., vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 140247.
October 23, 2003)

Like alibi, self-defense is inherently a weak defense which, can easily be fabricated. To merit
approbation, the accused is burdened to prove with clear and convincing evidence the essential
requisites for self-defense. (SANTOS vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 126624. November 11,
2003)

2005 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE AND

Where the accused interposes the justifying circumstance of self-defense, he is burdened to prove
with clear and convincing evidence the confluence of the following essential elements: (1) there
must be unlawful aggression by the victim; (2) that the means employed to prevent or repel such
aggression were reasonable; and (3) that there was lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the
person defending himself. (PEOPLE vs. DALA, G.R. No. 134563, October 28, 2003)

Accused likewise failed to prove the plea of self-defense. First, after stabbing the victim, the
appellant fled from the situs criminis. Flight is a veritable badge of guilt and negates the plea of
self-defense. Second, although the appellant surrendered to the police authorities early the next
day, he failed to inform them that he acted in self-defense when he stabbed the victim. Third, the
appellant stabbed the victim twice on the chest, and both wounds proved fatal. As correctly
contended by the prosecution, the nature and the number of the wounds of the victim negate the
appellant's claim that he acted in self-defense. There can be no complete or incomplete self-
defense unless the accused proves unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. (PEOPLE vs.
GUMAYAO, G.R. No. 138933. October 28, 2003)

The failure of the accused to account for the presentation of the bladed weapon allegedly used by
the victim is fatal to his plea of self-defense. In this case, the appellant failed to account for the
knife supposedly held by the victim and the bolo which the victim allegedly handed over to the
petitioner. He also failed to account for the knife he used in stabbing the victim and to surrender
himself and the said knife to the police authorities and to admit having stabbed the victim in self-
defense. Such failure rejects appellants claim of self-defense. (RUGAS vs. PEOPLE, G.R. No.
147789. January 14, 2004)

Finally there was lack of sufficient provocation on the part of petitioner. When the law speaks of
provocation either as a mitigating circumstance or as an essential element of self-defense, it
requires that the same be sufficient or proportionate to the act committed and that it be adequate
to arouse one to its commission. It is not enough that the provocative act be unreasonable or
annoying such as when the petitioner took the business permit from the booth of the victim without
the victims permission. (CANO vs. PEOPLE, G.R. No. 155258. October 7, 2003)

Unlawful aggression presupposes an actual, sudden and unexpected or imminent danger on the life
and limb of a person a mere threatening or intimidating attitude is not sufficient. There must be
actual physical force or a threat to inflict physical injury. In case of a threat, it must be offensive
and positively strong so as to display a real, not imagined, intent to cause injury. Aggression, if not
continuous, does not constitute aggression warranting self-defense. (GARCIA vs. PEOPLE, G.R. No.
144699. March 10, 2004)

A grudge and heated exchange of words are not sufficient reasons to justify a person to shoot
another. Those two do not constitute an unlawful aggression as to authorize one in killing another
under the precept of self-defense. (CATALINA SECURITY AGENCY vs. HON. ALICIA B. GONZALEZ-
DECANO, G.R. No. 149362. May 27, 2004)

The unlawful aggression, a constitutive element of self-defense, must be real or at least imminent
and not merely imaginary. A belief that a person is about to be attacked is not sufficient. Even an
intimidating or threatening attitude is by no means enough. Unlawful aggression presupposes an
actual or imminent danger on the life or limb of a person. Mere shouting, an intimidating or
threatening attitude of the victim does not constitute unlawful aggression. Self-defense does not
justify the unnecessary killing of an aggressor who is retreating from the fray. (PEOPLE vs.
CAJURAO G.R. No. 122767. January 20, 2004)

While the victim was inceptually the unlawful aggressor, the aggression ceased as soon as the
appellant had managed to wrest the knife from him and no longer committed any overt act
evidencing persistence to consummate the unlawful aggression. The appellant was not defending
himself; he stabbed the victim in retaliation for the latter's inceptual unlawful aggression. Indeed,
the appellant stabbed the victim, not only once, but thrice; once on a vital part of the body, the
CRIMINAL LAW COMMITTEE AND DIGEST POOL
CHAIRPERSON: Mark David Martinez EDP: Elaine Masukat ASSISTANTS: Catherine Danao, Albert Rodriguez, Reggie Sampaga, Gizelle Lou
Cabahug, Karen
Quizon,, Leo San Juan, Ma. Victoria Yambao, Ryan Lita, Bayani Brillante, Jr. DIGEST POOL: Sorhaya Dilabakun, Edizer Enriquez, Aira Ferrer, Eric
Sakkam, Vanessa
Raymundo, Ishmalyn Balbontin, Eunice Tan, Mitch Magdaong, Bheejay Sanchez, Froshell Saure, Salvador Escalante, RJ Balbuena, Ulysses Gonzales,
Donna Dumpit, Rowena Mutia, Irene Junio, Maritess Sy, Kristan Cristobal, Janice Didal, Christian Vargas, Uella Mancenido, Mae Belmes, Kristina De
Guzman, Mayette Mendoza, Michael Alinao, Apple de Lunas, Roviel Nepomuceno, Christopher Linag, Fe Taal, Kristine Ventura
4
San Beda College of Law Case
CRIMINAL LAW
2005 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS
Digest
chest. The nature and location of the stab wounds sustained by the victim belie the appellant's
affirmative defense. (PEOPLE vs. DE LOS REYES, G.R. No. 140680. May 28, 2004)

As to the third requisite that the provocation must be sufficient, it should be proportionate to the
aggression and adequate to stir the aggressor to its commission. To be entitled to self-defense,
however, the one defending himself must not have given cause for the aggression by his unjust
conduct or by inciting or provoking the aggressor. (RIMANO vs. PEOPLE, G.R. No. 156567.
November 27, 2003)

The numerous blows inflicted by appellant resulting to the eleven (11) wounds suffered by the
victim on vital areas of the body were clear manifestations of a deliberate, determined assault,
with intent to kill the victim, ruling out the claim of self-defense. (CASITAS vs. PEOPLE, G.R. No.
152358. February 5, 2004)

Even if it were true that the victim unsuccessfully tried to unsheathe his bolo immediately before
he was hacked, this did not qualify as unlawful aggression that would justify a finding of self-
defense. (PEOPLE vs. SE, G.R. No. 152966. March 17, 2004)
AVOIDANCE OF GREATER EVIL OR INJURY
The appellant in this case was the person who gave the provocation, the unlawful aggressor and the
author of a deliberate and malicious act of shooting the victim at close range on the forehead. It is
indispensable that the state of necessity must not be brought about by the intentional provocation
of the party invoking the same. (PEOPLE vs. RETUBADO, G.R. No. 124058. December 10, 2003)
FULFILLMENT OF DUTY
The requisites of the foregoing justifying circumstance are (1) that the accused acted in the
performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right; and (2) that the injury caused or the
offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due performance of duty or the lawful
exercise of such right or office. While the first requisite is present, the second is unavailing. The
petitioner was not acting in the fulfillment of his duty when he took the law into his own hands and
summarily demolished Mrs. Castillo's hut. It bears stressing that the said hut was constructed on the
property as early as April 1997. (VALEROSO vs. PEOPLE, G.R. No. 149718. September 29, 2003)

Article 11 of the RPC provides that a person who acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful
exercise of a right or office does not incur any criminal liability. Two requisites must concur before
this defense can prosper: 1) the accused must have acted in the performance of a duty or in the
lawful exercise of a right or office; and 2) the injury caused or the offense committed should have
been the necessary consequence of such lawful exercise. (PEOPLE vs. CATBAGAN, G.R. Nos.
149430-32. February 23, 2004)

EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES
INSANITY
Insanity under Art. 12, par. 1, of The Revised Penal Code exists when there is a complete
deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, i.e., appellant is deprived of reason; he acts
without the least discernment because of complete absence of the power to discern; or, there is a
total deprivation of freedom of the will. The fact that a person behaves crazily is not conclusive
that he is insane. (PEOPLE vs. FLORENDO, G.R. No. 136845. October 8, 2003)

It must be stressed that an inquiry into the mental state of an accused should relate to the period
immediately before or at the precise moment of the commission of the act which is the subject of
the inquiry. His mental condition after that crucial period or during the trial is inconsequential for
purposes of determining his criminal liability. (PEOPLE vs. OPURAN, G.R. Nos. 147674-75.
March 17, 2004)

2005 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE AND

MINORITY
The discernment that constitutes an exception to the exemption from criminal liability of a minor
under fifteen years of age but over nine, who commits an act prohibited by law, is his mental
capacity to understand the difference between right and wrong, and such capacity may be known
and should be determined by taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances afforded by
the records in each case, the very appearance, the very attitude, the very comportment and
behavior of said minor, not only before and during the commission of the act, but also after and
even during the trial. (PEOPLE vs. CORTEZANO, G.R. No. 123140. September 23, 2003)
ACCIDENT
Accident is an exempting circumstance under Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code. It must be
stressed that in raising this defense, appellant has the burden of the evidence and it was incumbent
upon him to establish that he was exempt from criminal liability. He must show with clear and
convincing proofs that: 1) he was performing a lawful act with due care, 2) the injury caused was
by a mere accident, and 3) he had no fault or intention of causing the injury. Considering
appellants evidence, it is clear that the requisites of accident as an exempting circumstance were
not proven. (PEOPLE vs. GENITA, G.R. No. 126171. March 11, 2004)

An accident is an occurrence that happens outside the sway of our will, and although it comes
about through some act of our will, lies beyond the bounds of humanly foreseeable consequences.
If the consequences are plainly foreseeable, it will be a case of negligence. (PEOPLE vs.
FALLORINA, G.R. No. 137347. March 4, 2004)

MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES
VOLUNTARY SURRENDER
The surrender must be spontaneous in such a manner that it shows the interest of the accused to
surrender unconditionally to the authorities, either because he acknowledged his guilt or because
he wishes to save them the trouble and expenses necessarily incurred in search and capture.
(PEOPLE vs. OCO, G.R. Nos. 137370-71. September 29, 2003)

The mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender cannot be considered against appellant since he
was actually arrested by the police and he merely submitted himself to their authority. (PEOPLE
vs. OSPIG, G.R. No. 141766. November 18, 2003)

Appellants surrendered to the authorities after more than one (1) year had lapsed since the
incident and in order to disclaim responsibility for the killing of the victim. This neither shows
repentance or acknowledgment of the crime nor intention to save the government the trouble and
expense necessarily incurred in his search and capture. Besides, at the time of his surrender, there
was a pending warrant of arrest against them. Voluntary surrender presupposes repentance. Going
to the police station to clear ones name does not show any intent to surrender unconditionally to
the authorities. (PEOPLE vs. ABOLIDOR, G.R. No. 147231. February 18, 2004)

The fact that appellant did not resist arrest or deny his criminal act did not constitute voluntary
surrender. A surrender, to be voluntary, must be spontaneous and must clearly indicate the intent
of the accused to submit himself unconditionally to the authorities. Here, the appellant,was
immediately arrested. There was, therefore no voluntary surrender to speak of because the
appellant was in fact arrested. (PEOPLE vs. BRECINIO, G.R. No. 138534. March 17, 2004)

AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES

CRIMINAL LAW COMMITTEE AND DIGEST POOL

CHAIRPERSON: Mark David Martinez EDP: Elaine Masukat ASSISTANTS: Catherine Danao, Albert Rodriguez, Reggie Sampaga, Gizelle Lou
Cabahug, Karen
Quizon,, Leo San Juan, Ma. Victoria Yambao, Ryan Lita, Bayani Brillante, Jr. DIGEST POOL: Sorhaya Dilabakun, Edizer Enriquez, Aira Ferrer, Eric
Sakkam, Vanessa
Raymundo, Ishmalyn Balbontin, Eunice Tan, Mitch Magdaong, Bheejay Sanchez, Froshell Saure, Salvador Escalante, RJ Balbuena, Ulysses Gonzales,
Donna Dumpit, Rowena Mutia, Irene Junio, Maritess Sy, Kristan Cristobal, Janice Didal, Christian Vargas, Uella Mancenido, Mae Belmes, Kristina De
Guzman, Mayette Mendoza, Michael Alinao, Apple de Lunas, Roviel Nepomuceno, Christopher Linag, Fe Taal, Kristine Ventura
6
San Beda College of Law Case
CRIMINAL LAW
2005 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS
Digest
DISREGARD OF RESPECT DUE BY REASON OF AGE
Anent the generic aggravating circumstance of disregard of the respect due the offended party on
account of age, it is considered present when the offended person, by reason of his age, is old
enough to be the father of the offender. (PEOPLE vs. BAJAR, G.R. No. 143817. October 27,
2003)
DWELLING
Dwelling is aggravating when the triggerman showed greater perversity when, although outside the
house, he attacked his victim inside the latter's own house when he could have very well
committed the crime without necessarily transgressing the sanctity of the victim's home. (PEOPLE
vs. BAGSIT, G.R. No. 148877. August 19, 2003)

Dwelling aggravates a felony where the crime was committed in the dwelling of the offended party,
who has not given any provocation. It is considered aggravating primarily because of the sanctity of
privacy the law accords to human abode. (PEOPLE vs. BAJAR, G.R. No. 143817. October 27,
2003)
NIGHTTIME
Nighttime cannot be appreciated because, by itself, it is not an aggravating circumstance. The fact
that the victim was killed at night will not suffice to sustain this aggravating circumstance, because
it must be shown that the darkness facilitated the commission of the crime and was purposely
sought by appellant. (PEOPLE vs. MATITO, G.R. No. 144405. February 24, 2004)

Nighttime cannot be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance because while the information

alleged that the killing was committed at past 11:00 p.m., there was no showing that nocturnity
was deliberately sought to facilitate the commission of the crime. It is settled that, by and of
itself, nighttime is not an aggravating circumstance. It becomes so only when it is specially sought
by the offender, or taken advantage of by him, to facilitate the commission of the crime or to
insure his immunity from capture. (PEOPLE vs. WERBA, G.R. No. 144599 June 9, 2004)
RECIDIVISM
Article 14(9) of the Revised Penal Code defines a recidivist as "one who, at the time of his trial for
one crime shall have been previously convicted by final judgment of another crime embraced in the
same title of this Code." To prove recidivism, it is necessary to allege the same in the Information
and to attach thereto certified copies of the sentences rendered against the accused. (PEOPLE vs.
RAPISORA, G.R. No. 147855. May 28, 2004)
EVIDENT PREMEDITATION
The prosecution failed to establish evident premeditation. There was no proof that the appellants
deliberately planned to liquidate the victim. On the contrary, the killing of the victim was the
immediate impulsive reaction of appellants to Tumayao's act of punching Ruben. Moreover, the
time that elapsed between the punching incident and the commission of the crime was not
sufficient for Ruben and the rest of the appellants to reflect upon the consequences of their
intended act. (PEOPLE vs. CAETE, G.R. No. 138366. September 11, 2003)

Evident premeditation is not present because no sufficient time elapsed for appellant to decide to
commit the crime and reflect on its consequences. Moreover, there was no showing that appellant
performed other overt acts to show that he was determined to commit murder. The essence of
evident premeditation is that the execution of the criminal act must be preceded by cool thought
and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent, during the space of time
sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment. (PEOPLE vs. GARCIA, G.R. No. 153591. February 23,
2004)

2005 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE AND

The circumstance of evident premeditation is not existent. The essence of evident premeditation
is that the execution of the criminal act was preceded by cool thought and reflection upon the
resolution to carry out the criminal intent during a space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm
judgment. It must be based on external acts which must be notorious, manifest and evident not
merely suspecting indicating deliberate planning. Evident premeditation, like other
circumstances that would qualify a killing as murder, must be established by clear and positive
evidence showing the planning and preparation stages prior to the killing. Without such evidence,
mere presumptions and inferences, no matter how logical and probable, will not suffice. (PEOPLE
vs. BORBON, G.R. No. 143085. March 10, 2004)

The circumstance of evident premeditation are not present in this case. Without any proof of any
circumstance that would qualify it, the killing could not amount to murder. The appellant should,
thus, be held liable only for homicide for the death of Anthony. Furthermore, nothing in the
records supports the trial court's conclusion that evident premeditation attended the commission of
the crime in this case. It was not shown by the prosecution that, in killing Anthony, the appellant
had definitely resolved to commit the offense and had reflected on the means to bring about the
execution following an appreciable length of time. In a case of fairly recent vintage, we ruled that
there is no evident premeditation when the fracas was the result, not of a deliberate plan but of
rising tempers, or when the attack was made in the heat of anger. (PEOPLE vs. TORPIO, G.R. No.
138984. June 4, 2004)
ABUSE OF SUPERIOR STRENGTH
In several other cases, it was held that an attack made by a man with a deadly weapon upon an
unarmed and defenseless woman constitutes the circumstance of abuse of that superiority which
his sex and the weapon used in the act afforded him, and from which the woman was unable to
defend herself. This is the exact scenario in this case. (PEOPLE vs. ROXAS, G.R. No. 140762.
September 10, 2003)

Abuse of superior strength is present whenever there is inequality of forces between the victim and
the aggressor, as when a situation of superiority of strength notoriously advantageous for the
aggressor and selected or taken advantage of by him in the commission of the crime. (PEOPLE vs.
PONCE, G.R. No. 141942. October 13, 2003)

To take advantage of superior strength is to purposely use excessive force, out of proportion to the
means of defense available to the person attacked. (PEOPLE vs. CARIO, G.R. No. 131117. June
15, 2004)

We hold that abuse of superior strength is considered when there is a showing that the accused
purposely employed superior strength to consummate the crime; that he used purposely excessive
force out of proportion to the means of defense available to the person attacked . (PEOPLE vs.
REFORMA, G.R. No. 133440. June 7, 2004)
TREACHERY
The fact that appellant had concealed the weapon he was clutching is evidence to show that he
consciously adopted his means of attacking Dorotheo to prevent the latter from protecting himself
from the attack. Hence, the elements of treachery are present in the killing of Dorotheo.
(PEOPLE vs. ALAJAY, G.R. Nos. 133796-97. August 12, 2003)

Even a frontal attack can be treacherous when it is unexpected and made on an unarmed victim
who would be in no position to repel the attack or avoid it. (PEOPLE vs. BALTAZAR, G.R. No.
143126. July 31, 2003)

CRIMINAL LAW COMMITTEE AND DIGEST POOL

Treachery cannot be appreciated if the assailant did not make any preparation to kill the victim in
such a manner as to insure the killing or to make it impossible or difficult for the victim to defend
himself. The prosecution must prove that the killing was premeditated or that the assailant chose a
method of attack directly and specially to facilitate and insure the killing without danger to
himself. (PEOPLE vs. GONZA, G.R. No. 138612. November 11, 2003)

The killing of minor children who, by reason of their tender years, could not be expected to put up
a defense is considered attended with treachery even if the manner of attack was not shown.
(PEOPLE vs. ALMOGUERRA, G.R. No. 121177. November 12, 2003)

As a rule, there can be no treachery when an altercation ensued between the appellant and the
victim. However, the evidence on record shows that after the altercation, Ildefonso left the scene
to go back home. He was unaware that the appellant had followed him and was armed with a
deadly weapon. That the victim was shot facing the appellant, as contended by the latter, does
not negate treachery. (PEOPLE vs. PEREZ, G.R. No. 134485. October 23, 2003)

There is no evidence that the appellant made some preparation to kill the victim in such a manner
as to insure the execution of the crime or to make it impossible or difficult for Donque to defend
himself or retaliate. Jurisprudence has it that a killing done at the spur of the moment is not
treacherous. (PEOPLE vs. BADAJOS [G.R. No. 139692. January 15, 2004)

Treachery may still be appreciated even when the victim was warned of danger to his person; what
is decisive is that the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim to defend himself or
to retaliate. There is no question that the elements of alevosia were proven by the prosecution.
For sure, the appellant deliberately sought the manner of attack. In sum, the assault was
indisputably sudden and the victim's premonition of peril did not negate the treacherous nature of
the attack. (PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. vs. NIO GARIN G.R. No. 139069 June 17, 2004)

The prosecution failed to prove that the appellant deliberately or consciously adopted a mode of
attack to ensure the killing. There is even no evidence of the particulars as to how the aggression
commenced or the events that led to the stabbing. The trial court erred in declaring that evident
premeditation was attendant to the crime. The prosecution failed to prove the following: (1) the
time when the accused decided to commit the crime; (2) an overt act showing that the accused
clung to their determination to commit the crime; and (3) the lapse of a sufficient period of time,
as to allow the accused to reflect upon the consequences of the act. The appellant may have
intended to kill the victim even before October 11, 1995. However, there is no evidence on record
that from that time on, until the victim was stabbed and killed, the appellant performed overt acts
indicating his determination to commit the crime. (PEOPLE vs. SANTIAGO, G.R. No. 147314.
February 6, 2004)

It behooves the prosecution to prove that the appellant deliberately and consciously adopted such
means, method or manner of attack as would deprive the victim of an opportunity for self-defense
or retaliation. Irrefragably, Isidro failed to see how the attack started. When he looked out
through the window, he saw Joel pulling out his knife from the chest of the victim. Isidro did not
see the initial stage of the stabbing and the particulars of the attack on the victim. Treachery
cannot thus be appreciated. (PEOPLE vs. SANTIAGO, G.R. No. 147314. February 6, 2004)

There can be no treachery when an altercation ensued between the appellant and the victim. The
appellant and the victim were engaged in a quarrel, a heated argument which culminated in the
appellants stabbing the victim in the heat of anger. (PEOPLE vs. AQUINO, G.R. No. 147220.
June 9, 2004)

2005 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE AND

The essence of treachery is that the attack is deliberate and without warning, done in swift and
unexpected manner of execution, affording the hapless and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist
or escape. (PEOPLE vs. DAGPIN, G.R. No. 149560. June 10, 2004)

There could thus be no treachery since, prior to the attack, the victim has been forewarned of the
danger to his life and has even attempted, albeit unsuccessfully, to escape. (PEOPLE vs.
BAUTISTA, G.R. No. 139530. February 27, 2004)

As a general rule, a sudden attack by the assailant, whether frontally or from behind, is treachery
if such mode of attack was deliberately adopted by him with the purpose of depriving the victim of
a chance to either fight or retreat. The rule does not apply if the attack was merely triggered by
the sudden infuriation on the part of the accused because of an act of the victim, or where the
meeting is purely accidental. (PEOPLE vs. DUMADAG, G.R. No. 147196. June 4, 2004)

There must be evidence showing that the mode of attack was consciously or deliberately adopted
by the culprit to make it impossible or difficult for the person attacked to defend himself or
retaliate. (PEOPLE vs. TORPIO, G.R. No. 138984. June 4, 2004)

ALTERNATIVE CIRCUMSTANCES
INTOXICATION
In the absence of clear and positive proof that Alejandro's intoxication was habitual or subsequent
to the plan to commit the crime, it is improper to consider the same as an aggravating
circumstance. Neither can intoxication be considered mitigating in the instant case, there being no
proof that the appellant was so drunk that his will-power was impaired or that he could not
comprehend the wrongfulness of his acts. (PEOPLE vs. BAJAR, G.R. No. 143817. October 27,
2003)

RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF PENAL LAW

For if the new law were to be applied retroactively as the trial court did, the same would aggravate
the criminal liability of the appellants and the imposable penalty for the crime charged. (PEOPLE
vs. AQUINDE, G.R. No. 133733. August 29, 2003)

PENALTIES
INDIVISIBLE PENALTIES
Since there was no aggravating or mitigating circumstance, the lesser of the two indivisible
penalties shall be imposed. (PEOPLE vs. ALVAREZ, G.R. No. 152221, August 25, 2003)

The presence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances must first be determined for the
imposition of the proper penalty. (PEOPLE vs. JUAN, G.R. No. 152289. January 14, 2004)

Since there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances that attended the commission of
the crime, the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed. (PEOPLE vs. CARPIO, G.R.
No. 150083. May 27, 2004)
IMPOSITION OF DEATH PENALTY
In modifying the penalty imposed, it opined that, even before the effectivity of Republic Act No.
7659, the penalty prescribed for the special complex crime of Rape with Homicide was already
death but death could not be imposed only because the Constitution had proscribed its imposition.
CRIMINAL LAW COMMITTEE AND DIGEST POOL
CHAIRPERSON: Mark David Martinez EDP: Elaine Masukat ASSISTANTS: Catherine Danao, Albert Rodriguez, Reggie Sampaga, Gizelle Lou
Cabahug, Karen
Quizon,, Leo San Juan, Ma. Victoria Yambao, Ryan Lita, Bayani Brillante, Jr. DIGEST POOL: Sorhaya Dilabakun, Edizer Enriquez, Aira Ferrer, Eric
Sakkam, Vanessa
Raymundo, Ishmalyn Balbontin, Eunice Tan, Mitch Magdaong, Bheejay Sanchez, Froshell Saure, Salvador Escalante, RJ Balbuena, Ulysses Gonzales,
Donna Dumpit, Rowena Mutia, Irene Junio, Maritess Sy, Kristan Cristobal, Janice Didal, Christian Vargas, Uella Mancenido, Mae Belmes, Kristina De
Guzman, Mayette Mendoza, Michael Alinao, Apple de Lunas, Roviel Nepomuceno, Christopher Linag, Fe Taal, Kristine Ventura
10
San Beda College of Law Case
CRIMINAL LAW
2005 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS
Digest
Therefore, the Court of Appeals did not consider the death penalty abolished but as, in a sense, in
a state of hibernation. Since the death penalty was not abolished, the Court of Appeals concluded
that in offenses where the death penalty is prescribed, it must still be reckoned with in
determining the imposable penalty. In the present case, since the penalty for Rape with Homicide
is death, the presence of the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority should reduce the
penalty by one degree lower from death. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals correctly increased
appellants penalty to reclusion perpetua. (PEOPLE vs.GULPE, G.R. No. 126280. March 30,
2004)
CONFISCATION AND FORFEITURE
Before a person can be deprived of his property, he should first be informed of the claim against
him and the reason upon which such claim is premised. There are no grounds, legal or logical, to
justify the decision of the respondent judge directing the confiscation of petitioners firearm after
the completion of appellants trial and his conviction. (CATALINA SECURITY AGENCY vs. HON.
ALICIA B. GONZALEZ-DECANO, [G.R. No. 149362. May 27, 2004)
CIVIL LIABILITY
The civil action instituted with the criminal action for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso
facto extinguished, upon the extinction of the criminal action due to the death of the accused.
(DE GUZMAN vs. PEOPLE, G.R. No. 154579. October 8, 2003)

2005 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE AND

BOOK TWO

CRIMES AGAINST THE FUNDAMENTAL LAWS OF THE STATE

ARBITRARY DETENTION
Arbitrary detention may still be committed even if the offended party was not kept within an
enclosure. In establishing the intent to deprive the victim of his liberty, it is not necessary that the
offended party be kept within an enclosure to restrict her freedom of locomotion. (ASTORGA vs.
PEOPLE, G.R. No. 154130, October 1, 2003)

CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC INTEREST

FALSIFICATION
As the Ombudsman correctly pointed out, Enemecio failed to point to any law imposing upon
Bernante the legal obligation to disclose where he was going to spend his leave of absence. Legal
obligation means that there is a law requiring the disclosure of the truth of the facts narrated.
Bernante may not be convicted of the crime of falsification of public document by making false
statements in a narration of facts absent any legal obligation to disclose where he would spend his
vacation leave and forced leave. (ENEMECIO vs. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, G.R. No. 146731.
January 13, 2004)

CRIMES COMMITTED BY PUBLIC OFFICERS

MALVERSATION
The fact that the obligation to deposit the collections of the City Treasurer's Office is not covered
by appellant's official job description is of no legal consequence in a prosecution for Malversation.
What is essential is that appellant had custody or control of public funds by reason of the duties of
his office. (PEOPLE vs. HIPOL, G.R. No. 140549. July 22, 2003)

CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS

MURDER
A sudden and unexpected attack under circumstances which render the victim unable to defend
himself by reason of the suddenness and severity of the attack constitutes alevosia. (PEOPLE vs.
SANTOS, G.R. No. 127492. January 16, 2004)

Dismemberment of a dead body is one manner of outraging or scoffing at the corpse of the victim.
(PEOPLE vs. ERIC GUILLERMO, G.R. No. 147786. January 20, 2004)

CRIMINAL LAW COMMITTEE AND DIGEST POOL

CHAIRPERSON: Mark David Martinez EDP: Elaine Masukat ASSISTANTS: Catherine Danao, Albert Rodriguez, Reggie Sampaga, Gizelle Lou
Cabahug, Karen
Quizon,, Leo San Juan, Ma. Victoria Yambao, Ryan Lita, Bayani Brillante, Jr. DIGEST POOL: Sorhaya Dilabakun, Edizer Enriquez, Aira Ferrer, Eric
Sakkam, Vanessa
Raymundo, Ishmalyn Balbontin, Eunice Tan, Mitch Magdaong, Bheejay Sanchez, Froshell Saure, Salvador Escalante, RJ Balbuena, Ulysses Gonzales,
Donna Dumpit, Rowena Mutia, Irene Junio, Maritess Sy, Kristan Cristobal, Janice Didal, Christian Vargas, Uella Mancenido, Mae Belmes, Kristina De
Guzman, Mayette Mendoza, Michael Alinao, Apple de Lunas, Roviel Nepomuceno, Christopher Linag, Fe Taal, Kristine Ventura
12
San Beda College of Law Case
CRIMINAL LAW
2005 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS
Digest
The barefaced fact that Daniel Sumaylo pleaded guilty to the felony of homicide is not a bar to the
appellant being found guilty of murder as a principal. It bears stressing that Sumaylo plea-
bargained on his re-arraignment. Even if the public prosecutor and the father of the victim agreed
to Sumaylo's plea, the State is not barred from prosecuting the appellant for murder on the basis of
its evidence, independently of Sumaylo's plea of guilt. (PEOPLE vs. MONTAEZ G.R. No. 148257.
March 17, 2004)
HOMICIDE
The qualifying circumstance of treachery was not sufficiently established by the prosecution. The
prosecution witness did not see the actual stabbing of the victim. Therefore, there is no way of
determining on how the attack was initiated. In the same way that no testimony would prove that
the appellant contemplated upon the mode to insure the killing. The crime committed by appellant
is homicide. (PEOPLE vs. DELA CRUZ, G.R. No. 152176, October 1, 2003)

No error was committed by the trial court in characterizing the felonious assault as frustrated
homicide and convicting appellant therefor. The appellant acted with intent to kill in firing the gun
at Miguel. Usually, the intent to kill is shown by the kind of weapon used by the offender and the
parts of the victims body at which the weapon was aimed, as shown by the wounds inflicted.
(GOROSPE vs. PEOPLE, G.R. No. 147974. January 29, 2004)

An accused may be convicted of slight, less serious or serious physical injuries in a prosecution for
homicide or murder, inasmuch as the infliction of physical injuries could lead to any of the latter
offenses when carried to its utmost degree despite the fact that an essential requisite of the crime
of homicide or murder - intent to kill - is not required in a prosecution for physical injuries.
(ARADILLOS vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 135619. January 15, 2004)
RAPE
In rape by sexual assault, the word "instrument or object" should be construed to include a human
finger. (PEOPLE vs.NEQUIA, G.R. No. 146569. October 6, 2003)

The definition of the crime of rape has been expanded with the enactment of Republic Act No.
8353, otherwise known as the Anti-Rape Law of 1997, to include not only "rape by sexual
intercourse" but now likewise "rape by sexual assault." An act of sexual assault under the second
paragraph of the article can be committed by any person who, under the circumstances mentioned
in the first paragraph of the law, inserts his penis into the mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument
or object into the genital or anal orifice, of another person. The law, unlike rape under the first
paragraph of Article 266-A of the Code, has not made any distinction on the sex of either the
offender or the victim. Neither must the courts make such distinction. (ORDINARIO vs. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 155415. May 20, 2004)

The fact that no laceration and no ruptured hymen were found in this case, does not necessarily
negate rape. The fact that the hymen was intact upon examination does not, likewise, belie rape,
for a broken hymen is not an essential element of rape, nor does the fact that the victim remained
a virgin exclude the crime. (PEOPLE vs. BALLENO G.R. No. 149075. August 7, 2003)

Even the slightest contact of the penis with the labia under the circumstances enumerated under
Art. 266-A of the Revised Penal Code constitutes rape. A flaccid penis can do as much damage as an
erect one at least insofar as the crime of rape is concerned. (PEOPLE vs. NAVARRO, G.R. No.
137597. October 24, 2003)

An unchaste woman who habitually goes out with different men may be a victim of rape. The
victims moral character is not among the elements of the crime of rape. It does not negate the
existence of rape. (PEOPLE vs. AGSAOAY, G.R. Nos. 132125-26. June 3, 2004)

Rape may be committed anywhere even in places where people congregate such as parks, along
the road side, within school premises, and inside a house where there are other occupants. The

2005 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE AND

The trial court has decreed the penalty of death on account of circumstance under Article 266-A,
i.e., that when "the offender knows that he is afflicted with Human Immuno-Deficiency Virus (HIV),
Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) or any other sexually transmissible disease and the
virus or disease is transmitted to the victim," the imposition of the extreme penalty of death would
be warranted. (PEOPLE vs. OLAYBAR G.R. Nos. 150630-31. October 1, 2003)

An accused may be considered a principal by direct participation, by inducement, or by

indispensable cooperation. This is true in a charge of rape against a woman, provided of course a
man is charged together with her. Thus, in two cases the Court convicted the woman as a principal
by direct participation since it was proven that she held down the complainant in order to help her
co-accused spouse consummate the offense. (PEOPLE vs. DE LA TORRE G.R. Nos. 121213 &
121216-23. January 13, 2004)

Absence of resistance does not mean consent. The complainant was only 14 years old when the
rape took place. At her age, it could easily be conceived that she feared the appellant and believed
his threats, that he would kill her and her family if she reported the incident to anyone. The test is
whether the threat or intimidation produces a reasonable fear in the mind of the victim that if she
resists or does not yield to the desires of the accused, the threat would be carried out. (PEOPLE
vs. ESPINOSA G.R. No. 138742 June 15, 2004)

The negative findings of spermatozoa on the medico-legal report does not prove that no rape was
committed. (PEOPLE vs. MALONES, G.R. Nos. 124388-90. March 11, 2004)

Where the girl is below 12 years old, the only subject of inquiry is whether carnal knowledge
took place. Proof of force, intimidation or consent is unnecessary since none of these is an element
of statutory rape. There is a conclusive presumption of absence of free consent of the rape victim
is below the age of 12. (PEOPLE vs. ROTE, G.R. No. 146188, December 11, 2003)

When the original and primordial intention of the appellant in keeping the victim in his apartment
was to rape her and not to deprive her of her liberty, the appellant is guilty only of rape under
Article 335, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, and not of the complex crime of serious illegal
detention with rape under Article 267, in relation to Articles 335 and 48 of the Code. (PEOPLE
vs.SABARDAN, G.R. No. 132135. May 21, 2004)

The mere assertion of a love relationship would not necessarily rule out the use of force to
consummate the crime. It must be stressed that in rape cases, the gravamen of the offense is
sexual intercourse with a woman against her will or without her consent. The victim, even if she
was indeed the appellants lover, cannot be forced to have sex against her will. (PEOPLE vs.
DAGAMI, G.R. No. 136397. November 11, 2003)

In construing the word force as an element of the crime of rape, the Court has held that it is
imperative for the prosecution to prove that force or intimidation was actually employed by the
accused-appellant upon his victim to achieve his end. Failure to do so is fatal to its cause.
(PEOPLE vs. BAARES, G.R. No. 127491. May 28, 2004)

Force or intimidation may be actual or constructive. In this case, the victim is a mental retardate.
The appellant took advantage of her condition and succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her.
Hence, he is guilty of forcible rape. (PEOPLE vs. BALATAZO, G.R. No. 118027. January 29,
2004)

Intimidation must be viewed in light of the victim's perception and judgment at the time of the
commission of the crime and not by any hard and fast rule. It suffices that the threat or
intimidation produces a reasonable fear in the mind of the victim that if she resists or does not

CRIMINAL LAW COMMITTEE AND DIGEST POOL

The requisites of the victims minority and her filiation with the offender must concur in order to
justify the imposition of the death penalty in qualified rape. In this case the relationship between
the appellant and the victim is not existent. The stepfather-stepdaughter relationship presupposes
a legitimate relationship a valid marriage between the accused and the mother of the private
complainant. (PEOPLE vs. SUMARAGO, G.R. Nos. 140873-77. February 6, 2004)

The qualifying circumstance of minority and relationship does not include god-father relationship
(PEOPLE vs. FUCIO, G.R. Nos. 151186-95. February 13, 2004)

To justify the imposition of the death penalty in cases of incestuous rape, the concurrence of the
minority of the victim and her relationship to the offender constitutes one special qualifying
circumstance which must be both alleged and proved with moral certainty.
(PEOPLE vs. ANCHETA, G.R. No. 142431. January 14, 2004)

In Qualified Rape, the term guardian refers to a legal guardian as in the case of parents or
guardian ad litem or judicial guardian appointed by the court, and not merely to an uncommitted
caretaker over a limited period of time. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MAURICIO WATIWA,
G.R. No. 139400, September 3, 2003)

The force or violence necessary in rape is a relative term that depends not only on the age, size,
and strength of the persons involved but also on their relationship to each other. In a rape
committed by a father against his own daughter, the former's parental authority and moral
ascendancy substitutes for violence or intimidation over the latter who, expectedly, would just
cower in fear and resign to the father's wicked deeds. (PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. vs. LAMBID G.R.
Nos. 133066-67, October 1, 2003)

The mere assertion of a love relationship does not necessarily rule out the use of force to
consummate the crime of rape. A sweetheart cannot be forced to have sex against her will.
Definitely a man can neither demand sexual gratification from a fiance nor employ violence upon
her, on the pretext of love. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ANTHONY SANDIG G.R. No.
143124. July 25, 2003)

A "sweetheart defense," to be credible, should be substantiated by some documentary or other

evidence of the relationship like mementos, love letters, notes, pictures and the like. Here, no
such evidence was ever presented by appellant. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILS. vs. JOEL AYUDA G.R.
No. 128882. October 2, 2003)

A defense based on sweetheart theory in rape cases is not a defense at all in rape where the
victim is a mental retardate. (PEOPLE vs. ACERO, G.R. Nos. 146690- 91. March 17, 2004)

Sweetheart theory prevails as a defense in rape when it casts reasonable doubt as to the guilt of
the accused. (PEOPLE vs. OGA, G.R. No. 152302. June 8, 2004)

CRIMES AGAINST PERSONAL LIBERTY AND SECURITY

KIDNAPPING
It is true that for kidnapping to take place, it is not necessary that the victim be placed in an
enclosure; neither is it necessary that the detention be prolonged. However, the essence of
kidnapping is the actual deprivation of the victim's liberty coupled with indubitable proof of the
intent of the accused to effect such deprivation. (PEOPLE vs. OBESO G.R. No. 152285. October
24, 2003)

Although the victim my have inceptually consented to go with the offender to a place but the
victim is thereafter prevented, with the use of force, from leaving the place where he was brought
2005 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE AND
SUBJECT CHAIRPERSONS
Maricel Abarentos (Over-all Chairperson), Ronald Jalmanzar (Over-all Vice Chair), Yolanda Tolentino (VC-Acads), Jennifer Ang (VC-
Secretariat), Joy Inductivo (VC-Finance), Elaine Masukat (VC-EDP), Anna Margarita Eres (VC-Logistics) Jonathan Mangundayao
(Political Law), Francis Benedict Reotutar (Labor Law),
Romuald Padilla (Civil Law), Charmaine Torres (Taxation Law), Mark David Martinez (Criminal Law), Garny Luisa Alegre (Commercial Law),
Jinky Ann Uy (Remedial Law), Jackie Lou Bautista (Legal Ethics)
15
Case San Beda College of Law
2005 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS
CRIMINAL LAW
to with his consent and is detained against his will, the offender is guilty of kidnapping and serious
illegal detention. (PEOPLE vs. PICKRELL, G.R No. 120409. October 23, 2003)

The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed for the purpose of
extorting ransom from the victim or any other person, even if none of the circumstances mentioned
in Article 267 were present in the commission of the offense. (PEOPLE vs. PUA, G.R. NO. 144050.
NOVEMBER 11, 2003)

CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY

ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE
For the appellant to be guilty of consummated robbery, there must be incontrovertible proof that
property was taken from the victim. The appellant is guilty of attempted robbery only when he
commences the commission of robbery directly by overt acts and does not perform all the acts of
execution which would produce robbery by reason of some causes or accident other than his own
spontaneous desistance. (PEOPLE vs. BOCALAN, G.R. No. 141527. September 4, 2003)

As correctly stressed by the Solicitor General, robbery with homicide is a special complex crime.
It is enough that in order to sustain a conviction for this crime, the killing, which is designated as
homicide, has a direct relation to the robbery, regardless of whether the latter takes place
before or after the killing. For as long as the killing occurs during or because of the heist, even if
the killing is merely accidental, robbery with homicide is committed. (PEOPLE vs. COMILING,
G.R. No. 140405. March 4, 2004)

Well entrenched in this jurisprudence is the doctrine that when homicide takes place as a
consequence or on occasion a robbery, all those who took part in the robbery are guilty as
principals in the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, even if they did not actually took
part in the homicide. The only exception is when it is clearly shown that the accused endeavored to
prevent the unlawful killing. (PEOPLE vs. BOLINGET, G.R. Nos. 137949-52. December 11, 2003)

There is no crime of Robbery with Multiple Homicide under the Revised Penal Code. The crime is
Robbery with Homicide notwithstanding the number of homicides committed on the occasion of the
robbery and even if murder, physical injuries and rape were also committed on the same occasion.
(PEOPLE vs. HIJADA, G.R. No. 123696. March 11, 2004)

The prosecution is not burdened to prove the actual value of the property stolen or amount stolen
from the victim. Whether the robber knew the actual amount in the possession of the victim is of
no moment because the motive for robbery can exist regardless of the exact amount or value
involved. (PEOPLE vs. DE JESUS G.R. No. 134815 May 27, 2004)

In robbery with homicide, the original criminal design of the malefactor is to commit robbery, with
homicide perpetrated on the occasion or by reason of the robbery. The intent to commit robbery
must precede the taking of human life. The homicide may take place before, during or after the
robbery. There is no such felony of robbery with homicide through reckless imprudence or simple
negligence. The constitutive elements of the crime, namely, robbery and homicide, must be
consummated. As long as there is a nexus between the robbery and the homicide, the latter crime
may be committed in a place other than the situs of the robbery. (PEOPLE vs. HERNANDEZ, G.R.
No. 139697 June 15, 2004)

When homicide takes place by reason or on the occasion of the robbery, all those who took part in
the robbery shall be guilty of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide whether or not
they actually participated in the killing, unless there is proof that they had endeavored to prevent
the perpetration of the crime. (PEOPLE vs. VALLEJO, G.R. No. 125784 November 19, 2003)

Under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of the special complex crime of robbery
with homicide are: (1) the taking of personal property with the use of violence or intimidation
CRIMINAL LAW COMMITTEE AND DIGEST POOL
CHAIRPERSON: Mark David Martinez EDP: Elaine Masukat ASSISTANTS: Catherine Danao, Albert Rodriguez, Reggie Sampaga, Gizelle Lou
Cabahug, Karen
Quizon,, Leo San Juan, Ma. Victoria Yambao, Ryan Lita, Bayani Brillante, Jr. DIGEST POOL: Sorhaya Dilabakun, Edizer Enriquez, Aira Ferrer, Eric
Sakkam, Vanessa
Raymundo, Ishmalyn Balbontin, Eunice Tan, Mitch Magdaong, Bheejay Sanchez, Froshell Saure, Salvador Escalante, RJ Balbuena, Ulysses Gonzales,
Donna Dumpit, Rowena Mutia, Irene Junio, Maritess Sy, Kristan Cristobal, Janice Didal, Christian Vargas, Uella Mancenido, Mae Belmes, Kristina De
Guzman, Mayette Mendoza, Michael Alinao, Apple de Lunas, Roviel Nepomuceno, Christopher Linag, Fe Taal, Kristine Ventura
16
San Beda College of Law Case
CRIMINAL LAW
2005 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS
Digest
against a person; (2) the property taken belongs to another; (3) the taking is characterized by
intent to gain or animus lucrandi; and (4) on occasion of or by reason of the robbery, the crime of
homicide, used in the generic sense, is committed. (PEOPLE vs. SUMALINOG, G.R. No. 128387.
February 5, 2004)

As long as the killing is perpetrated as a consequence or on the occasion of the robbery, the special
complex crime of robbery with homicide is committed. There is robbery with homicide when there
is a direct relation or an intimate connection between the robbery and the killing, whether the
killing takes place prior or subsequent to the robbery or whether both crimes are committed at the
same time. Whenever homicide is perpetrated with the sole purpose of removing opposition to the
robbery or suppressing evidence thereof, the crime committed is robbery with homicide. In the
case at bar, immediately after shooting the victims, the assailants loaded the sacks of palay onto
the trailer of the jeep. (PEOPLE vs. ANCHETA, G.R. No. 143935. June 4, 2004)
ESTAFA
A person who negotiated directly and personally the check drawn by another is guilty of estafa if he
had knowledge of insufficiency of funds. (GARCIA vs. PEOPLE, G.R. No. 144785. September 11,
2003)
By falsely leading a person to believe that he possessed the power and qualifications to provide him
with work abroad, when in fact he was not licensed or authorized to do so is estafa. (PEOPLE vs.
BILLABER, G.R. Nos. 114967-68. January 26, 2004)

The essence of estafa under Article 315 (1) (b) of the Revised Penal Code is the appropriation or
conversion of money or property received, to the prejudice of the owner thereof. It takes place
when a person actually appropriates the property of another for his own benefit, use and
enjoyment. The failure to account, upon demand, for funds or property held in trust is a mere
circumstantial evidence of misappropriation. (FILADAMS vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,
G.R. No. 132422. March 30, 2004)

Conspiracy to commit estafa need not be shown by direct evidence, but may take the form of
circumstances which, if taken together, would conclusively show that the accused came to an
agreement to commit a crime and decided to carry it out with their full cooperation and
participation. (SIM vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 159280. May 18, 2004)

Estafa under Article 315 was enacted to penalize unlawful acts accompanied by evil intent
denominated as crimes mala in se. The principal consideration is the existence of malicious intent.
There is a concurrence of freedom, intelligence and intent which together make up the "criminal
mind" behind the "criminal act." Thus, to constitute a crime, the act must, generally and in most
cases, be accompanied by a criminal intent. Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea. No crime is
committed if the mind of the person performing the act complained of is innocent. (PEOPLE
vs. OJEDA, G.R. Nos. 104238-58, June 3, 2004)

Fraud in its general sense is deemed to comprise anything calculated to deceive, including all acts,
omissions, and concealment involving a breach of legal or equitable duty, trust, or confidence
justly reposed, resulting in damage to another, or by which an undue and unconscientious
advantage is taken of another. It is a generic term embracing all multifarious means which human
ingenuity can device, and which are resorted to by one individual to secure an advantage over
another by false suggestions or by suppression of truth and includes all surprise, trick, cunning,
dissembling and any unfair way by which another is cheated. And deceit is the false representation
of a matter of fact whether by words or conduct, by false or misleading allegations, or by
concealment of that which should have been disclosed which deceives or is intended to deceive
another so that he shall act upon it to his legal injury. The false pretense or fraudulent act must be
committed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud. (ALCANTARA vs. HON.
COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 147259. November 24, 2003)
ARSON

2005 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE AND

SUBJECT CHAIRPERSONS
Maricel Abarentos (Over-all Chairperson), Ronald Jalmanzar (Over-all Vice Chair), Yolanda Tolentino (VC-Acads), Jennifer Ang (VC-
Secretariat), Joy Inductivo (VC-Finance), Elaine Masukat (VC-EDP), Anna Margarita Eres (VC-Logistics) Jonathan Mangundayao
(Political Law), Francis Benedict Reotutar (Labor Law),
Romuald Padilla (Civil Law), Charmaine Torres (Taxation Law), Mark David Martinez (Criminal Law), Garny Luisa Alegre (Commercial Law),
Jinky Ann Uy (Remedial Law), Jackie Lou Bautista (Legal Ethics)
17
Case San Beda College of Law
2005 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS
CRIMINAL LAW
Simple Arson contemplates crimes with less significant social, economic, political and national
security implications than Destructive Arson. Destructive arson under Article 320 of the RPC
contemplates the burning of buildings and edifices. (PEOPLE vs. SORIANO G.R. No. 142565. July
29, 2003)
MALICIOUS MISCHIEF
The elements of the crime of malicious mischief under Article 327 of the Revised Penal
Code are: (1) That the offender deliberately caused damage to the property of another; (2) That
such act does not constitute arson or other crimes involving destruction; (3) That the act of
damaging another's property be committed merely for the sake of damaging it. As to the third
element, petitioner was not justified in summarily and extrajudicially demolishing private
complainant's structure. As it is, the petitioner proceeded proceeded not so much to safeguard the
lot as it is the vent to his anger and disgust over the no tresspassing sign he placed thereon.
Indeed, his act of summarily demolishing the house smacks of his pleasure in causing damage to it.
(VALEROSO vs. PEOPLE G.R. No. 149718. September 29, 2003)

CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY

ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS
In the absence of convincing proof that the penis had slid into the female organ, rape was not
committed. Where the victim merely stated that she was carried around the sala with appellant's
penis "touching" her vagina, it would not be right to conclude that the act of the penis "touching"
the vagina was an entry or penetration, even slightly, of the labia majora or the labia minora of the
pudendum. The appellant is guilty of acts of lasciviousness and not rape. (PEOPLE vs. PALMA,
G.R. Nos. 148869-74. December 11, 2003)

The appellants act of directing Analyn to remove her lower apparel constitutes an act of
lasciviousness under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code, and not rape. (PEOPLE vs.
AQUINO G.R. No. 139181. October 27, 2003)
FORCIBLE ABDUCTION WITH RAPE
The complex crime of forcible abduction with Rape occurs when there is carnal knowledge of the
abducted woman under any of the circumstances mentioned earlier when force or intimidation is
used; when the woman is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious; and when the woman is
under twelve years of age or is demented. The employment of deception suffices to constitute
forcible abduction. This Court has previously ruled that if the victim's consent was obtained
through deceit and there was therefore no valid consent, the crime is forcible abduction, as the
deceit may be considered as constructive force. The second element, lewd design, was established
by the actual rapes. (PEOPLE vs. CARAANG, G.R. Nos. 148424-27. December 11, 2003)

CRIMES AGAINST CIVIL STATUS OF PERSONS

BIGAMY
a pardon by the offended party does not extinguish criminal action considering that a crime is
committed against the State and the crime of Bigamy is a public offense which can be denounced
not only by the person affected thereby but even by a civic-spirited citizen who may come to know
the same. (ABUNADO vs. PEOPLE, G.R. No. 159218. March 30, 2004)

CRIMES AGAINST HONOR

CRIMINAL LAW COMMITTEE AND DIGEST POOL

SPECIAL LAWS
R.A. NO. 6425 - DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 1972
It was not necessary for the prosecution to prove that appellant was in actual possession of all the
200.203 grams of shabu. In criminal law, possession necessary for conviction of the offense of
possession of dangerous drugs may be constructive as well as actual. It is only necessary that the
accused must have dominion and control over the contraband. In this case, appellant's dominion
and control over the drugs found on the second floor is established by the fact that he was the
person who was handling said items. (PEOPLE vs. ALMEIDA G.R. Nos. 146107-09. December 11,
2003)

The consummation of the crime charged herein may be sufficiently established even in the absence
of an exchange of money. The offer to sell and then the sale itself arose when the poseur-buyer
showed the money to appellant, which prompted the latter to show the contents of the carton, and
hand it over to the poseur-buyer. Mere showing of the said regulated drug does not negate the
existence of an offer to sell or an actual sale. The absence of actual or completed payment is
irrelevant, for the law itself penalizes the very act of delivery of a dangerous drug, regardless of
any consideration. Payment of consideration is likewise immaterial in the distribution of illicit
drugs. (PEOPLE vs. YANG, G.R. No. 148077. February 16, 2004)

What is material to the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the sale
actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti as evidence.
(PEOPLE vs. DOMINGCIL, G.R. No. 140679. January 14, 2004)

Appellant is guilty of the crime of attempted sale of shabu. As gleaned from the testimony of the
poseur-buyer, the appellant merely showed the bag containing the shabu and held on to it before it
was confiscated. There is no evidence that the poseur-buyer talked about and agreed with the
appellant on the purchase price of the shabu. There is no evidence that the appellant handed over
the shabu to the poseur buyer. (PEOPLE vs. ADAM. G.R. No. 143842. October 13, 2003)

In a prosecution for illegal possession of a dangerous drug, mere possession of a regulated drug
without legal authority is punishable under the Dangerous Drugs Act. Lack of criminal intent or
good faith does not exempt appellants from criminal liability. (PEOPLE vs. CHUA, G.R. No.
149878. July 1, 2003)
2005 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE AND
SUBJECT CHAIRPERSONS
Maricel Abarentos (Over-all Chairperson), Ronald Jalmanzar (Over-all Vice Chair), Yolanda Tolentino (VC-Acads), Jennifer Ang (VC-
Secretariat), Joy Inductivo (VC-Finance), Elaine Masukat (VC-EDP), Anna Margarita Eres (VC-Logistics) Jonathan Mangundayao
(Political Law), Francis Benedict Reotutar (Labor Law),
Romuald Padilla (Civil Law), Charmaine Torres (Taxation Law), Mark David Martinez (Criminal Law), Garny Luisa Alegre (Commercial Law),
Jinky Ann Uy (Remedial Law), Jackie Lou Bautista (Legal Ethics)
19
Case San Beda College of Law
2005 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS
CRIMINAL LAW

A prior surveillance is not a prerequisite for the validity of an entrapment or buy- bust operation,
the conduct of which has no rigid or textbook method. (PEOPLE vs. CADLEY G.R. No. 150735.
March 15, 2004)

In a case of illegal possession of dangerous drugs, knowledge of the existence and presence of the
drugS may be presumed from the fact that the dangerous drugS are in the house or place over
which the accused has control or dominion, or within such premises in the absence of any
satisfactory explanation. (PEOPLE vs. TIRA, G.R. No. 139615. May 28, 2004)

In a prosecution for illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the following facts must be proven with
moral certainty: (1) that the accused is in possession of the object identified as a prohibited or
regulated drug; (2) that such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) that the accused freely
and consciously possessed the said drug. In this case, proof of the accuseds ownership of the
house where the prohibited drugs were discovered is necessary. (PEOPLE vs. DEL NORTE, G.R. No.
149462, March 31, 2004)
B.P. BLG. 22 - BOUNCING CHECKS LAW
The barefaced fact that the signatory to the checks that were subsequently dishonored merely gave
rise to a prima facie presumption that he/ she knew of the insufficiency of funds; it did not render
him/ her automatically liable for violating B.P. Blg. 22. In order to create the prima facie
presumption that the issuer knew of the insufficiency of funds, it must be shown that he/ she
received a notice of dishonor and within 56 banking days thereafter, failed to satisfy the amount of
the check or shall arrange for its payment. (CABRERA vs. PEOPLE, G.R. No. 150618. July 24,
2003)

What the law punishes is the issuance of a bouncing check, not the purpose for which it was issued
nor the terms and conditions relating to its issuance. The mere act of issuing a worthless check is
malum prohibitum, provided the other elements of the offense are properly proved. The fact that
petitioner issued the subject checks knowing the inadequacy of his funds in the bank to cover said
checks makes him liable under B.P. 22. The Court has consistently declared that the cause or
reason for the issuance of the check is inconsequential in determining criminal culpability under BP
22. The gravemen of the offense under B.P. 22 is the act of making or issuing a worthless check or a
check that is dishonored upon presentment for payment. (ABARQUEZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
G.R. No. 148557, August 7, 2003)

SC Admin. Circular No. 13-2001, SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 merely lays down a rule of
preference in the application of the penalties for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. It does not amend B.P.
Blg. 22, nor defeat the legislative intent behind the law. The clear tenor and intention of
Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 is not to remove imprisonment as an alternative penalty, but to
lay down a rule of preference in the application of the penalties provided for in B.P. Blg. 22. (JOYA
vs. THE JAIL WARDEN OF BATANGAS CITY, G.R. Nos. 159418-19. December 10, 2003)
R.A. NO. 6539 - ANTI-CARNAPPING ACT
The absence of an explanation of how one has come into the possession of stolen effects belonging
to a person shot, wounded and treacherously killed, he must necessarily be considered the author
of the aggression, the death of the person, as well as the robbery committed. This presumption is
consonant with Rule 131 (3) (j) of the Rules of Court and validly applies to a case of carnapping for,
indeed, the concept of unlawful taking in theft, robbery and carnapping is the same and, had it not
been for the enactment of the Anti-Carnapping Act, the unlawful taking of the motor vehicle would
certainly fall within the purview of either theft or robbery. (PEOPLE vs. FERNANDEZ, G.R. No.
132788. October 23, 2003)
P.D. 1866 (as amended by R.A. 8294) ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARM
Appellant may not now be convicted of illegal possession of firearm in its aggravated form by
considering the commission of Murder or Homicide as an aggravating circumstance because, under
CRIMINAL LAW COMMITTEE AND DIGEST POOL
CHAIRPERSON: Mark David Martinez EDP: Elaine Masukat ASSISTANTS: Catherine Danao, Albert Rodriguez, Reggie Sampaga, Gizelle Lou
Cabahug, Karen
Quizon,, Leo San Juan, Ma. Victoria Yambao, Ryan Lita, Bayani Brillante, Jr. DIGEST POOL: Sorhaya Dilabakun, Edizer Enriquez, Aira Ferrer, Eric
Sakkam, Vanessa
Raymundo, Ishmalyn Balbontin, Eunice Tan, Mitch Magdaong, Bheejay Sanchez, Froshell Saure, Salvador Escalante, RJ Balbuena, Ulysses Gonzales,
Donna Dumpit, Rowena Mutia, Irene Junio, Maritess Sy, Kristan Cristobal, Janice Didal, Christian Vargas, Uella Mancenido, Mae Belmes, Kristina De
Guzman, Mayette Mendoza, Michael Alinao, Apple de Lunas, Roviel Nepomuceno, Christopher Linag, Fe Taal, Kristine Ventura
20
San Beda College of Law Case
CRIMINAL LAW
2005 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS
Digest
R.A. No. 8294, the use of an unlicensed firearm in a murder or homicide case is considered simply
as a special aggravating circumstance in the crime of homicide or murder and no longer treated as
a separate offense in its aggravated form. (PEOPLE vs. MALINAO, G.R. No. 128148. February 16,
2004)

Under Republic Act No. 8294 amending Presidential Decree No. 1866, the use of an unlicensed
firearm to commit homicide or murder is a special aggravating circumstance in the commission of
the crime. Unless it is alleged in the Information and proved by the prosecution, the use by the
appellant of an unlicensed firearm to commit murder is not aggravating. (PEOPLE vs. ALMAZAN,
G.R. No. 133442. March 23, 2004)

R.A. No. 8294 did not amend the definition of murder under Article 248, but merely made the use
of explosives an aggravating circumstance when resorted to in committing any of the crimes
defined in the Revised Penal Code. The legislative purpose is to do away with the use of explosives
as a separate crime and to make such use merely an aggravating circumstance in the commission of
any crime already defined in the Revised Penal Code. (PEOPLE vs. COMADRE, G.R. No. 153559,
June 8, 2004)
R.A. NO. 3019 ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES
The fact that the Commission suspended the proceedings due to the pendency of the civil case for
specific performance does not constitute an indictable offense under Section 3 [e] of R.A. No.
3019. The causing of undue injury or the giving of any unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence
constitutes the very act punished under the foregoing section. Jurisprudence has consistently
interpreted the term "undue injury" as synonymous to "actual damage." Undue has been defined as
more than necessary, not proper, or illegal; and injury as any wrong or damage done to another,
either in his person, rights, reputation or property; invasion of any legally protected interest of
another. Actual damage, in the context of these definitions, is akin to that in civil law. (GO vs.
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, G.R. No. 131399. October 17, 2003)

The value of the gift is not mentioned at all as an essential element of the offense charged under
Section 3 (c), and there appears no need to require the prosecution to specify such value in order
to comply with the requirements of showing a prima facie case. (MENDOZA-ONG vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN, G.R. Nos. 146368-69. October 23, 2003)
R.A. 8042 - ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT
Criminal prosecution for large scale illegal recruitment does not preclude prosecution for estafa.
(PEOPLE vs. DUJUA, G.R. Nos. 149014-16. February 5, 2004)
R.A. 9262 - BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME
In order to be classified as a battered woman, the accused and her spouse must go through the
battering cycle at least twice. Any woman may find herself in an abusive relationship with a man
once. If it occurs a second time, and she remains in the situation, she is defined as a battered
woman. (PEOPLE vs. GENOSA, G.R. No. 135981. January 15, 2004)
R.A. NO. 968 - PROBATION LAW
Appeal from civil aspect of criminal case does not bar application for probation. (SALVAN vs.
PEOPLE, G.R. No. 153845. September 11, 2003.)

Interposing an appeal relinquishes the alternative remedy of availing the probation law especially if
the appeal is based on protestations of guiltlessness. (LAGROSA vs. PEOPLE, G.R. No. 152044.
July 3, 2003)

2005 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE AND

SUBJECT CHAIRPERSONS
Maricel Abarentos (Over-all Chairperson), Ronald Jalmanzar (Over-all Vice Chair), Yolanda Tolentino (VC-Acads), Jennifer Ang (VC-
Secretariat), Joy Inductivo (VC-Finance), Elaine Masukat (VC-EDP), Anna Margarita Eres (VC-Logistics) Jonathan Mangundayao
(Political Law), Francis Benedict Reotutar (Labor Law),
Romuald Padilla (Civil Law), Charmaine Torres (Taxation Law), Mark David Martinez (Criminal Law), Garny Luisa Alegre (Commercial Law),
Jinky Ann Uy (Remedial Law), Jackie Lou Bautista (Legal Ethics)
21
Case San Beda College of Law
2005 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS
CRIMINAL LAW
R.A. 7610 - The Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse,
Exploitation and Discrimination Act
Sexual abuse includes 1) the employment, use, persuasion, enticement, or coercion of a child to
engage in, or assist another person to engage in sexual intercourse or lasciviousness conduct or 2)
the molestation, 3) prostitution, or 4) incest with children. For while it is not procedurally
incorrect to convict appellant of sexual abuse, a lesser offense necessarily included in rape which is
the crime charged, a perusal of the information shows that the victim's age was not duly alleged.
Appellant's acts cannot thus fall under the child abuse law without violating appellant's
constitutional right to due process and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him. (PEOPLE vs. PAYOPAY, G.R. No. 141140. December 10, 2003)

CRIMINAL LAW COMMITTEE AND DIGEST POOL

Inquest-Principles and Procedures
No ratings yet
Inquest-Principles and Procedures
28 pages
On The Use of Falsified Document
No ratings yet
On The Use of Falsified Document
16 pages
Cases On Relevance of Site Plan
0% (1)
Cases On Relevance of Site Plan
13 pages
Final - Financial Audit Manual
No ratings yet
Final - Financial Audit Manual
164 pages
Opening and Closing Prayer
100% (1)
Opening and Closing Prayer
1 page
BJMP Search and Seizure
100% (2)
BJMP Search and Seizure
26 pages
Consti Cases 2020
No ratings yet
Consti Cases 2020
168 pages
Comparison and Contrast: Educational System in Australia and in The Philippines
100% (1)
Comparison and Contrast: Educational System in Australia and in The Philippines
4 pages
Memorandum of Law Supporting Motion To Vacate
67% (3)
Memorandum of Law Supporting Motion To Vacate
175 pages
NGRI Manual
100% (1)
NGRI Manual
277 pages
Individual Action Plan 2015
100% (2)
Individual Action Plan 2015
6 pages
Sociology of Crime and Deviance
100% (1)
Sociology of Crime and Deviance
35 pages
Ipc Project
No ratings yet
Ipc Project
13 pages
Labor
No ratings yet
Labor
190 pages
Crim Rev
No ratings yet
Crim Rev
55 pages
Crim Rev
No ratings yet
Crim Rev
55 pages
Assignment 2 criminologyandSocialSciences
No ratings yet
Assignment 2 criminologyandSocialSciences
15 pages
Finalproof
No ratings yet
Finalproof
26 pages
PEOPLE v. REYNANTE MANZANERO, Et - Al.
100% (2)
PEOPLE v. REYNANTE MANZANERO, Et - Al.
2 pages
Concept of Liability in The Light of Jurisprudence An Overview
No ratings yet
Concept of Liability in The Light of Jurisprudence An Overview
23 pages
Smith Witness Statements (1993, Courtesy of Cryptome)
No ratings yet
Smith Witness Statements (1993, Courtesy of Cryptome)
376 pages
US V Flynn - Flynn Sentencing Memo
100% (2)
US V Flynn - Flynn Sentencing Memo
22 pages
React On The Use of Mother Tongue in Teaching Lessons For Grades 1 and 2
No ratings yet
React On The Use of Mother Tongue in Teaching Lessons For Grades 1 and 2
5 pages
Case Analysis K.M. Nanavati vs. State of Maharashtra by Surya Prakash 1
No ratings yet
Case Analysis K.M. Nanavati vs. State of Maharashtra by Surya Prakash 1
6 pages
National Symposium On Pretrial Justice: Summary Report of Proceedings
No ratings yet
National Symposium On Pretrial Justice: Summary Report of Proceedings
46 pages
Anti Wire-Tapping Law Notes
No ratings yet
Anti Wire-Tapping Law Notes
2 pages
OCA V Librado
No ratings yet
OCA V Librado
1 page
G.R. No. 157984 July 8, 2004 MOISES SIMANGAN, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent
No ratings yet
G.R. No. 157984 July 8, 2004 MOISES SIMANGAN, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent
23 pages
Evidence Cases 3
No ratings yet
Evidence Cases 3
23 pages
Rule 110 Sec 14
No ratings yet
Rule 110 Sec 14
4 pages
Final Crim Digests
No ratings yet
Final Crim Digests
53 pages
Non Commissioned Officers
No ratings yet
Non Commissioned Officers
7 pages
Letter of Commendation To Sheila Bayangan
No ratings yet
Letter of Commendation To Sheila Bayangan
1 page
Rodolfo Belbis Jr. and Alberto Brucales vs. People of The Philippines
No ratings yet
Rodolfo Belbis Jr. and Alberto Brucales vs. People of The Philippines
2 pages
Computer Scrapbook
No ratings yet
Computer Scrapbook
2 pages
CRiminal Case Doctrines
No ratings yet
CRiminal Case Doctrines
26 pages
Kalinga Colleges of Science and Technology
No ratings yet
Kalinga Colleges of Science and Technology
3 pages
Moot Memorials
No ratings yet
Moot Memorials
20 pages
2016 IPCRF and Annual: Accomplishme NT
No ratings yet
2016 IPCRF and Annual: Accomplishme NT
2 pages
Urbano vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
No ratings yet
Urbano vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
13 pages
G.R. No. 185390 March 16, 2011 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee
No ratings yet
G.R. No. 185390 March 16, 2011 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee
13 pages
The Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico V PDF
No ratings yet
The Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico V PDF
9 pages
CRiminal Case Doctrines
No ratings yet
CRiminal Case Doctrines
26 pages
Us VS Look Chaw (Digest)
100% (1)
Us VS Look Chaw (Digest)
1 page
Necessito v. Paras
No ratings yet
Necessito v. Paras
2 pages
Aggravating Circumstances Part 2
No ratings yet
Aggravating Circumstances Part 2
7 pages
SYLLABUS Syllabus in Criminal Law Review SY 2022 2023
No ratings yet
SYLLABUS Syllabus in Criminal Law Review SY 2022 2023
27 pages
FORMAT
No ratings yet
FORMAT
10 pages
Masso Hermanos Vs Director of Patents
No ratings yet
Masso Hermanos Vs Director of Patents
1 page
Ross Letham Documents
No ratings yet
Ross Letham Documents
2 pages
Ebooks File (Original PDF) Understanding Violence and Victimization 7th All Chapters
100% (1)
Ebooks File (Original PDF) Understanding Violence and Victimization 7th All Chapters
50 pages
89
No ratings yet
89
1 page
G.R. No. 214757 - People v. Sibbu
No ratings yet
G.R. No. 214757 - People v. Sibbu
12 pages
Digested Crim - CA
No ratings yet
Digested Crim - CA
10 pages
Leon County Sheriff'S Office Daily Booking Report 14-Oct-2021 Page 1 of 3
No ratings yet
Leon County Sheriff'S Office Daily Booking Report 14-Oct-2021 Page 1 of 3
3 pages
Crisostomo Vs Sandiganbayan
No ratings yet
Crisostomo Vs Sandiganbayan
2 pages
مدى فاعلية دور مسرح الجريمة في الكشف عن ملابسات حدوث الجريمة
No ratings yet
مدى فاعلية دور مسرح الجريمة في الكشف عن ملابسات حدوث الجريمة
28 pages
RPC Art 13 Digests
No ratings yet
RPC Art 13 Digests
45 pages
People v. Caabay, Et. Al. G.R. Nos. 129961-62
No ratings yet
People v. Caabay, Et. Al. G.R. Nos. 129961-62
19 pages
Against Persons - Homicide & Murder
No ratings yet
Against Persons - Homicide & Murder
6 pages
Criminal Procedure San Beda.
No ratings yet
Criminal Procedure San Beda.
2 pages
Types of Clouds
No ratings yet
Types of Clouds
1 page
Ayasin
No ratings yet
Ayasin
9 pages
People vs. Labagala (Full Text, Word Version)
100% (1)
People vs. Labagala (Full Text, Word Version)
10 pages
G.R. No. 17021 - U.S. v. Dominguez
No ratings yet
G.R. No. 17021 - U.S. v. Dominguez
5 pages
LEE V LEE
100% (1)
LEE V LEE
2 pages
US Vs Macasaet
100% (1)
US Vs Macasaet
3 pages
Case No
No ratings yet
Case No
14 pages
Diaz vs. Encanto GR No. 171303
No ratings yet
Diaz vs. Encanto GR No. 171303
15 pages
Complaint Sample (Assignment)
No ratings yet
Complaint Sample (Assignment)
8 pages
CRI 183 Reviewer 2
No ratings yet
CRI 183 Reviewer 2
4 pages
Crim Art4 Digest
No ratings yet
Crim Art4 Digest
8 pages
People V Tabaco, People V Valdez
No ratings yet
People V Tabaco, People V Valdez
10 pages
People of The Philippines V Mendoza
No ratings yet
People of The Philippines V Mendoza
14 pages
BP 22 Account Closed - 12g-06727, Ramos, Manahan
No ratings yet
BP 22 Account Closed - 12g-06727, Ramos, Manahan
1 page
111 Republic V Sandiganbayan
No ratings yet
111 Republic V Sandiganbayan
4 pages
Republic of The Philippines, Petitioner, vs. Sandiganbayan, Major General Josephus Q. Ramas and Elizabeth Dimaano, Respondents
No ratings yet
Republic of The Philippines, Petitioner, vs. Sandiganbayan, Major General Josephus Q. Ramas and Elizabeth Dimaano, Respondents
20 pages
Norma Del Socorro V
No ratings yet
Norma Del Socorro V
34 pages
Criminal Procedure: RULE 110 Prosecution of Offenses
No ratings yet
Criminal Procedure: RULE 110 Prosecution of Offenses
14 pages
Crimal Aggravating Suggests
No ratings yet
Crimal Aggravating Suggests
13 pages
2.a. Air France V Carrascoso
No ratings yet
2.a. Air France V Carrascoso
2 pages
Estafa Complaint
No ratings yet
Estafa Complaint
2 pages
People Vs Januario - 98552 - February 7, 1997 - J
No ratings yet
People Vs Januario - 98552 - February 7, 1997 - J
20 pages
Vette Industrial Sales Vs Sui Soan S Cheng
No ratings yet
Vette Industrial Sales Vs Sui Soan S Cheng
2 pages
NAACP v. Alabama Ex Rel. Flowers, 377 U.S. 288 (1964)
No ratings yet
NAACP v. Alabama Ex Rel. Flowers, 377 U.S. 288 (1964)
17 pages
People vs. Evangelio
No ratings yet
People vs. Evangelio
1 page
People v. Oanis 74 PHIL 257
No ratings yet
People v. Oanis 74 PHIL 257
20 pages
2 G.R. No. 140479 March 8, 2001 Rosencor Development Corporation Vs Inquing
No ratings yet
2 G.R. No. 140479 March 8, 2001 Rosencor Development Corporation Vs Inquing
8 pages
People V Sabalones Digest
No ratings yet
People V Sabalones Digest
1 page
Political Law 1 Digest
No ratings yet
Political Law 1 Digest
4 pages
Crim Case Digest
No ratings yet
Crim Case Digest
4 pages
People of The Philippines vs. Antonio Mendoza y Butones
No ratings yet
People of The Philippines vs. Antonio Mendoza y Butones
1 page
TORTS Cases Batch 2 Finals
No ratings yet
TORTS Cases Batch 2 Finals
9 pages
Chavez vs. Gonzales (GR No. 27454, 30 April 1970)
No ratings yet
Chavez vs. Gonzales (GR No. 27454, 30 April 1970)
2 pages
New Capitol Site, Tagbilaran City, Bohol
No ratings yet
New Capitol Site, Tagbilaran City, Bohol
12 pages
First Division (G.R. NO. 138033: January 30, 2007) Renato Baleros, JR., Petitioner, V. People of The PHILIPPINES, Respondent. Resolution Garcia, J.
No ratings yet
First Division (G.R. NO. 138033: January 30, 2007) Renato Baleros, JR., Petitioner, V. People of The PHILIPPINES, Respondent. Resolution Garcia, J.
5 pages
Dovetailing - People v. Alviar
No ratings yet
Dovetailing - People v. Alviar
31 pages
Case Digest On Criminal Law I
No ratings yet
Case Digest On Criminal Law I
4 pages
LE 13mercado Vs de Vera
No ratings yet
LE 13mercado Vs de Vera
1 page
People V Yanson Dumancas
No ratings yet
People V Yanson Dumancas
3 pages
People of The Philippines vs. Hermogenes Flora and Edwin Flora G.R. No. 125909, June 23, 2000
No ratings yet
People of The Philippines vs. Hermogenes Flora and Edwin Flora G.R. No. 125909, June 23, 2000
1 page
Case Brief: Estino V People
No ratings yet
Case Brief: Estino V People
5 pages
Oblicon Digest Cases
No ratings yet
Oblicon Digest Cases
5 pages
91 Recebido Vs
No ratings yet
91 Recebido Vs
1 page
Edmundo Escamilla Vs People of The Philippines: The Petition Is DENIED
No ratings yet
Edmundo Escamilla Vs People of The Philippines: The Petition Is DENIED
4 pages
GR No L39378 Ayson Simon Vs Adamos
No ratings yet
GR No L39378 Ayson Simon Vs Adamos
3 pages
BOYSAW vs. Interphil - Digest
No ratings yet
BOYSAW vs. Interphil - Digest
1 page
PP v. Talledo PDF
No ratings yet
PP v. Talledo PDF
4 pages
Severino Macavinta Jr. vs. People, L-36052
No ratings yet
Severino Macavinta Jr. vs. People, L-36052
1 page