ARTICLE VII – SECTIONS 7 TO 15

SECTION 7-12 PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION

CONDITION STIPULATION
PRESIDENT-ELECT FAILS TO QUALIFY OR TO BE VP-ELECT WILL BE ACTING PRESIDENT UNTIL
CHOSEN PRESIDENT IS CHOSEN
PRESIDENT-ELECT DIES OR IS PERMANENTLY VP BECOMES PRESIDENT.
DISABLED

PRESIDENT DIES/ PERMANENTLY VP BECOMES PRESIDENT FOR THE UNEXPIRED

DISABLED/IMPEACHED / RESIGNS TERM

VP DIES / PERMANENTLY DISABLED / 1. President will nominate new VP from House.

IMPEACHED / RESIGNS 2. Nominee must be confirmed by House
majority and Senate majority voting separately.
3. Nominee forfeits seat in Congress.

BEFORE TERM OF OFFICE SENATE PRESIDENT, IF DISABLED, HOUSE

BOTH PRESIDENT-ELECT AND VP-ELECT ARE SPEAKER BECOMES ACTING PRESIDENT UNTIL A
NOT CHOSEN, NOT QUALIFIED, DIE OR PRESIDENT OR VP ELECTED / CHOSEN AND
BECOME PERMANENTLY DISABLED QUALIFIED.

OR IF SENATE PRESIDENT / HOUSE SPEAKER ARE

DURING TERM OF OFFICE DISABLED, CONGRESS SHALL DETERMINE BY
BOTH PRESIDENT AND VP LAW, WHO WILL BE THE ACTING PRESIDENT
DIE / PERMANENTLY DISABLED /
IMPEACHED / RESIGN HOW:
1. Congress convenes 3 days after vacancy,
without need of call. The convening
Congress cannot be suspended.
2. Within 7 days after convening, Congress
shall enact law calling for special election
to elect President and VP. Special
election cannot be postponed.
3. Special election held 45-60 days from
enactment of law on special election.
4. 3 readings on special law can be held not
necessarily on separate days.
5. Law enacted upon approval on third
reading.

NO SPECIAL ELECTION IF VACANCY WITHIN 18

MONTHS BEFORE DATE OF THE NEXT
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION.
TEMPORARY DISABILITY of the President

The temporary inability of the President to discharge his duties may be raised in either of two ways:
a) By the President himself, when he sends a written declaration to the Senate President
and the Speaker of the House. In this case, the Vice-President will be Acting President
until the President transmits a written declaration to the contrary.

b) When a majority of the Cabinet members transmit to the Senate President and the
Speaker their written declaration.
i. The VP will immediately be Acting President.
ii. BUT: If the President transmits a written declaration that he is not disabled, he reassumes his
position
iii. If within 5 days after the President reassumes his position, the majority of the Cabinet
retransmits their written declaration, Congress shall decide the issue. In this event, Congress
shall reconvene within 48 hours if it is not in session, without need of a call.
iv. Within 10 days after Congress is required to assemble, or 12 days if Congress is not in session,
a 2/3 majority of both Houses, voting separately, is needed to find the President temporarily
disabled, in which case, the VP will be Acting President.

PRESIDENTIAL ILLNESS

a) If the President is seriously ill, the public must be informed thereof.

b) Even during such illness, the National Security Adviser, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and the Chief
of Staff of the AFP are entitled to access to the President

ESTRADA VS. DESIERTO

The case involves Estrada’s impeachment proceedings that began with the expose of Chavit Singson and
the subsequent resignations of his cabinet members. Estrada relinquished his position as president but
later contested that he did not resign. In this issue, the Court would use the totality test or the totality of
prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a material
relevance on the issue. Using this test, the Court rules that the petitioner had resigned. In the event of
this vacancy, the VP acted as president, until the time when the House and the Senate, voting separately,
chose Arroyo as President by their recognition of her as President.

ESTRADA VS. ARROYO

This is the case of Estrada challenging the office of Gloria Arroyo as President de jure. The court throws
out the case by saying that Estrada cannot be said to be unable to resign during investigation because
the law cannot be construed against the circumstances that led to his complete rejection. A sitting or
non-sitting President is not immune from suit for non-official acts or from wrongdoing. (Public office is a
public trust. The rule is that unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the State and the officer who
acts illegally is not acting as such but stands in the same footing as any other trespasser.)
SECTION 13. DISQUALIFICATIONS

POSITIONS PROHIBITIONS
PRESIDENT PROHIBITTED FROM:
VICE PRESIDENT 1. Holding office or employment during their
CABINET MEMBERS tenure unless otherwise provided in the
DEPUTIES / ASSISTANTS OF CABINET MEMBERS Constitution (e.g., VP can be appointed in
Cabinet, or Sec of Justice sits on JBC) or
the positions are ex-officio and they do not
receive salary or other emoluments (e.g.,
Sec of Finance is head of Monetary Board)
2. Practicing, directly or indirectly, any other
profession during their tenure;
3. Participating in any business;
4. Being financially interested in any contract
with, or in any franchise, or special
privilege granted by the government or
any subdivision, agency or instrumentality
thereof, including GOCCs or their
subsidiearies.
The rule on disqualifications for the President and his Cabinet are stricted than the normal rules
applicable to appointive and elective officers under Art IX-B, Sec. 7.

SPOUSES AND 4TH DEGREE RELATIVES OF THE CANNOT BE APPOINTED DURING PRESIDENT’S
PRESIDENT TENURE AS:
(CONSANGUINITY OR AFFINITY) 1.) Members of the Constitutions
Commissions;
2.) Office of the Ombudsman;
3.) Cabinet Secretaries;
4.) Department Undersecretaries
5.) Chairman or heads of bureaus or offices
including GOCCs and their subsidiaries
If the above relatives were already in any of the above offices at the time before President’s term of
office, relatives may continue in office. What is prohibitted is appointment and re-appointment, NOT
continuation in office.

SPOUSES can be appointed to the judiciary / ambassadors / consuls.

DOROMAL V. SANDIGANBAYAN

Quintin S. Doromal, a former Commissioner of the Presidential Commission on Good Government

(PCGG), for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019), Sec. 3(h), in connection
with his shareholdings and position as president and director of the Doromal International Trading
Corporation (DITC) which submitted bids to supply P61 million worth of electronic, electrical,
automotive, mechanical and airconditioning equipment to the Department of Education, Culture and
Sports (or DECS) and the National Manpower and Youth Council (or NMYC).
 The presence of a signed document bearing the signature of Doromal as part of the application to bid
shows that he can rightfully be charged with having participated in a business which act is absolutely
prohibited by Section 13 of Article VII of the Constitution" because "the DITC remained a family
corporation in which Doromal has at least an indirect interest."

CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

Petitioners: Ignacio P. Lacsina, Luis R. Mauricio, Antonio R. Quintos and Juan T. David for petitioners in
83896 and Juan T. David for petitioners in 83815. Both petitions were consolidated and are being
resolved jointly as both seek a declaration of the unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 284 issued by
President Corazon C. Aquino on July 25, 1987.

Executive Order No. 284, according to the petitioners allows members of the Cabinet, their
undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other than government offices or positions in addition
to their primary positions.

The Court ruled that EO 284 is unconstitutional.

BITONIO JR. V. COA

G. R. No. 147392
March 12, 2004

FACTS:

In 1994, petitioner Benedicto Ernesto R. Bitonio, Jr. was appointed Director IV of the Bureau of
Labor Relations in the Department of Labor and Employment. As representative of the Secretary of Labor
to the PEZA Board, he was receiving a per diem for every board meeting he attended during the years
1995 to 1997.

After a post audit of the PEZA’s disbursement transactions, the COA disallowed the payment of  per
diems to Mr. Bitonio pursuant to the Supreme Court ruling declaring unconstitutional the holding of other
offices by the cabinet members, their deputies and assistants in addition to their primary office and the
receipt of compensation therefore, and, to COA Memorandum No. 97-038 dated September 19, 1997,
implementing Senate Committee Reports No. 509.

In his motion for reconsideration to the COA, he contended that the Supreme Court modified its
earlier ruling in the Civil Liberties Union case which limits the prohibition to Cabinet Secretaries,
Undersecretaries and their Assistants. Officials given the rank equivalent to a Secretary, Undersecretary
or Assistant Secretary and other appointive officials below the rank of Assistant Secretary are not covered
by the prohibition.

He further stated that the PEZA Charter (RA 7916), enacted four years after the Civil Liberties Union
case became final, authorized the payment of per diems; in expressly authorizing per diems, Congress
should be conclusively presumed to have been aware of the parameters of the constitutional prohibition
as interpreted in the Civil Liberties Union case.

COA rendered the assailed decision denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE:

Whether COA correctly disallowed the per diems received by the petitioner for his attendance in the
PEZA Board of Directors’ meetings as representative of the Secretary of Labor.

RULING:

The assailed decision of the COA is affirmed.

The petitioner is, indeed, not entitled to receive per diem for his board meetings sitting as
representative of the Secretary of Labor in the Board of Directors of the PEZA.

The petitioner’s presence in the PEZA Board meetings is solely by virtue of his capacity
as representative of the Secretary of Labor. Since the Secretary of Labor is prohibited from receiving
compensation for his additional office or employment, such prohibition likewise applies to the petitioner
who sat in the Board only in behalf of the Secretary of Labor. The Supreme Court cannot allow the
petitioner who sat as representative of the Secretary of Labor in the PEZA Board to have a better right
than his principal.

Moreover, it is a basic tenet that any legislative enactment must not be repugnant to the
Constitution. No law can render it nugatory because the Constitution is more superior to a statute. The
framers of R.A. No. 7916 must have realized the flaw in the law which is the reason why the law was later
amended by R.A. No. 8748 to cure such defect. The option of designating representative to the Board by
the different Cabinet Secretaries was deleted. Likewise, the paragraph as to payment of per diems to the
members of the Board of Directors was also deleted, considering that such stipulation was clearly in
conflict with the proscription set by the Constitution.

PUBLIC INTEREST CENTER V. ELMA

Respondent Elma was appointed as Chairman of the Presidential Commission on Good Government
(PCGG) on 30 October 1998. Thereafter, during his tenure as PCGG Chairman, he was appointed as Chief
Presidential Legal Counsel (CPLC). He accepted the second appointment, but waived any renumeration
that he may receive as CPLC. Petitioners sought to have both appointments declared as unconstitutional
and, therefore, null and void.

In its Decision, the Court declared that the concurrent appointments of the respondent as PCGG
Chairman and CPLC were unconstitutional. It ruled that the concurrent appointment to these offices is in
violation of Section 7, par. 2, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, since these are incompatible offices.
The duties of the CPLC include giving independent and impartial legal advice on the actions of the heads
of various executive departments and agencies and reviewing investigations involving heads of
executive departments. Since the actions of the PCGG Chairman, a head of an executive agency, are
subject to the review of the CPLC, such appointments would be incompatible.
Section 14. Appointments extended by an Acting President shall remain effective, unless revoked by the
elected President, within ninety days from his assumption or reassumption of office.

Section 15. Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his
term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to
executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public
safety.

Principles:
Power to appoint is executive in nature. While Congress (and the Constitution in certain cases) may
prescribe the qualifications for particular offices, the determination of who among those who are quali

IN RE APPOINTEMENTS OF VALENZUELA AND VALLARTA

- Sec. 15 (President shall not make appointments within 2 months prior to the next Presidential
election) is applicable to the members of the Judiciary.
- This sort of appointment is made for partisan considerations.

Facts: Referred to the Court en banc are the appointments signed by the President dated March 30,
1998 of Hon. Mateo Valenzuela and Hon. Placido Vallarta as judges of the RTC of Bago City and
Cabanatuan City, respectively. These appointments appear prima facie, at least, to be expressly
prohibited by Sec. 15, Art. VII of the Constitution. The said constitutional provision prohibits the
President from making any appointments two months immediately before the next presidential
elections and up to the end of his term, except temporary appointments to executive positions when
continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.

Issue: Whether or not, during the period of the ban on appointments imposed by Sec. 15, Art. VII of the
Constitution, the President is nonetheless required to fill vacancies in the judiciary, in view of Secs. 4 (1)
and 9 of Art. VIII

Held: During the period stated in Sec. 15, Art. VII of the Constitution “two months immediately before
the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term” the President is neither required to make
appointments to the courts nor allowed to do so; and that Secs. 4(1) and 9 of Art. VIII simply mean that
the President is required to fill vacancies in the courts within the time frames provided therein unless
prohibited by Sec. 15 of Art. VII. This prohibition on appointments comes into effect once every 6 years.

The appointments of Valenzuela and Vallarta were unquestionably made during the period of the ban.
They come within the operation of the prohibition relating to appointments. While the filling of
vacancies in the judiciary is undoubtedly in the public interest, there is no showing in this case of any
compelling reason to justify the making of the appointments during the period of the ban.

DE RAMA V. COURT OF APPEALS

Upon his assumption to the position of Mayor of Pagbilao, Quezon, petitioner Conrado L. De Rama wrote
a letter dated July 13, 1995 to the Civil Service Commission (CSC), seeking the recall of the
appointments of fourteen (14) municipal employees.
De Rama justified his recall request on the allegation that the appointments of said employees were
“midnight appointments” of the former Mayor, Ma. Evelyn S. Abeja, done in violation of Article VII, Section
15 of the 1987 Constitution.

There is no law that prohibits local executive officials from making appointments during the last days of
their tenure. Petition for review is DENIED and CSC resolutions are AFFIRMED.

In the case at bar, petitioner justified his action of recalling the appointments of said fourteen employees
by saying that these were “midnight appointments”. In truth and in fact, there is no law that prohibits local
elective officials from making appointments during the last days of his or her tenure. The CSC correctly
ruled that the constitutional prohibition on so-called “midnight appointments”, specifically those made
within two (2) months immediately prior to the next presidential elections, applies only to the President or
Acting President.

TET GALLARDO