Conflict of Laws

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY
BAGUIO CITY
SCHOOL OF LAW
Compilation of cases in
Conflict of Laws
Bankey, Kathleen P.
Bolide, Rouelli Gift
Cabradilla, Kriztel- Ann J.
Campaano, Alfred H.
Dines, Victoria P.
Gironella, Jsa Noble D.
Lacasandile, Regine Anne B.
Paraan, Brian Jonathan T.
Quiben, Lovely Grazette D.
Reyes, Jareed C.
Reyes, Kathleen
Rivera, Richelle Joi F.
Rosario, Keouh P.
Tacio, Zafhrulah C.
Vehemente, Joseph Harvey
17 May 2016
Paris Convention
Emerald Garment vs. Court of Appeals, et al.

G.R. no. 100098 December 29, 1995.
Facts:
Private Respondent H.D. Lee Corporation, Inc. filed with the Bureau of
Patents a petition for cancellation of trademark for STYLISTICS MR. LEE used in
various clothing apparel by herein petitioner corporation. Respondent invoked Art.
VII of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property averred that the
trademark closely resembled its own causing confusion mistake and deception.
Issue:
Whether or not Petitioners trademark should be cancelled on the basis of
the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property
Ruling:
Following universal acquiescence and comity, our municipal law on
trademarks regarding the requirement of actual use in the Philippines must
subordinate an international agreement inasmuch as the apparent clash is being
decided by a municipal tribunal. Withal, the fact that international law has been
made part of the law of the land does not by any means imply the primacy of
international law over national law in the municipal sphere. Under the doctrine of
incorporation as applied in most countries, rules of international law are given a
standing equal, not superior, to national legislative enactments.
In other words, a foreign corporation may have the capacity to sue for
infringement irrespective of lack of business activity in the Philippines on account
of Section 21-A of the Trademark Law but the question of whether they have an
exclusive right over their symbol as to justify issuance of the controversial writ will
depend on actual use of their trademarks in the Philippines in line with Sections 2
and 2-A of the same law. It is thus incongruous for petitioners to claim that when a
foreign corporation not licensed to do business in the Philippines files a complaint
for infringement, the entity need not be actually using its trademark in commerce
in the Philippines. Such a foreign corporation may have the personality to file a suit
for infringement but it may not necessarily be entitled to protection due to absence
of actual use of the emblem in the local market.
In this case, respondent has not shown its prior use of the trademark in the
Philippines.
Law 323: CONFLICT OF LWS 1

Paris Convention
Pribhdas Mirpuri vs Court of Appeals, et al

G.R. no. 114508 November 19,1999
Facts:
The predecessor of herein petitioner filed for the registration of trademark
BARBIZON that she has been using in brassieres and ladies undergarments. This
was opposed by respondent corporation Barbizon Corporation, organized and doing
business under the laws of New York, USA. Respondent sought protection under the
Paris Convention of the Protection of Intellectual property of 1967.
Issue:
Whether or not Petitioners trademark should be cancelled on the basis of
the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property
Ruling:
The Convention of Paris for the Protection of Industrial Property, otherwise
known as the Paris Convention, is a multilateral treaty that seeks to protect
industrial property consisting of patents, utility models, industrial designs,
trademarks, service marks, trade names and indications of source or appellations of
origin, and at the same time aims to repress unfair competition. The Convention is
essentially a compact among various countries which, as members of the Union,
have pledged to accord to citizens of the other member countries trademark and
other rights comparable to those accorded their own citizens by their domestic laws
for an effective protection against unfair competition. In short, foreign nationals
are to be given the same treatment in each of the member countries as that country
makes available to its own citizens. Nationals of the various member nations are
thus assured of a certain minimum of international protection of their industrial
property.
Hence, respondents well known trademark must be protected as he has

proven prior usage.

Warsaw Convention
United Airlines v Uy
G.R.No. 127768, November 19,1999
Second Division, Bellosillo, J.
Facts
In October 1989, Willie J. Uy, a person of good station and a board of director
of several top 500 corporations boarded United Airlines Flight No.819 in San
Francisco bound for Manila. After checking in, one of his luggage was found to be
overweight. To his humiliation, an employee of the petitioner rebuked him in front
of the milling crowd telling that he should have known the maximum weight
allowance of 70 kgs. per bag. Uy acceded to the order of repacking his luggage but
his luggage was still overweight. He then offered to pay the overweight charges
through his airline pre-paid credit card but the airline refused to honor the same
leaving him with no choice but to pay using his American Express credit card.
Respondents troubles did not end there as he discovered upon arriving in Manila
that one of his bags had been slashed and its contents stolen, the amount of loss
estimated at US $5,310.00.
Uy sent a letter to the airline detailing his troubles and the airline offered to
pay him US $9.70 per pound. Thinking that the amount was grossly inadequate, Uy
sent two more letters in 1990 and 1991 to the petitioner asking for a P1,000,000.00
out-of-court settlement but the airline did not accede to his demands. Consequently
in 1992, Uy filed a complaint for damages against the petitioner: moral damages in
the amount of 1M, exemplary damages in the amount of P500,000.00 and attorneys
fees of P50,000.00.
United Airlines moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that Uys cause
of action had prescribed invoking Art. 29 of the Warsaw Convention which provides
that the right to damages shall be extinguished if an action is not brought within
two years reckoned from the date of arrival at the destination or from the date on
which the aircraft ought to have arrived, or from the date on which the
transportation stopped. The method of calculating the period of the limitation shall
be determined by the law of the court to which the case is submitted.
Respondent countered that the two-year period is interrupted by the

extrajudicial demands made. The lower court dismissed the complaint based on lack
of jurisdiction stating that the law clearly states that an action must have been
commenced within two years and does not contemplate the application of our
interruption rules. Fourteen days after the receipt of the decision, respondent
moved for the reconsideration of the decision which was denied. Respondent filed
his notice of appeal 2 days after receipt of the decision denying his motion for
reconsideration. Despite petitioners motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to
file notice of appeal within the reglementary period, the Court of appeals decided
to give due course to the appeal in the interest of justice and equity as well as

nature of the issue at bar. The Court of Appeals sustained the position of the
respondent that the extrajudicial demands made effectively suspended the two-
year period.
Issue
Has the cause of action of the respondent prescribed?
Ruling
Within our jurisdiction, the provisions of the Warsaw Convention may be
applied or ignored depending on the peculiar facts presented by each case. The
provisions of the Convention do not preclude the application of pertinent laws on
liability such as those arising from breach of contract.
Respondent sued under two causes of action: first, for the humiliation he
suffered in the airport and second, for loss of his things. As to his first cause of
action, since he grounded his claim using the provisions of the Convention
particularly the misconduct of the airline officers, it is clear that his action is already
barred for being filed beyond the two year period. This does not however preclude
the respondent from filing a case for breach of other provisions of the Civil Code
which prescribes within four years.
As to the respondents second cause of action, the travaux preparatories of

the Convention reveal that the delegates thereto intended the two year limitation
as an absolute bar to suit and not to be made subject to various tolling provisions of
the laws of the forum. Considering however the extrajudicial demands made by the
respondent and the delaying tactics employed by the airline, the Court is
constrained to allow the suit commenced by the respondent to continue.

Warsaw Convention
American Airline v CA
G.R.No. 116044-45, March 9, 2000
Third Division, Gonzaga-Reyes, J.
Facts
Private respondent, Democrito Mendoza, purchased from Singapore Airlines
in Manila conjunction tickets for Manila-Singapore-Athens-Lamaca-Rome-Turin-
Zurich-Geneva-Copenhagen-New York. The petitioner was not a participating airline
in any of the segments in the itinerary under said conjunction tickets. In Geneva,
Mendoza decided to forego his trip to Copenhagen and to go straight to New York.
Since there was no direct flight from Geneva to New York under his conjunction
tickets, he exchanged the unused portion of the unused conjunction tickets for a
one-way ticket from Geneva to New York from the petitioner airline. Petitioner then
issued its own ticket to Mendoza and claimed the value of the unused portion of the
conjunction ticket from the IATA clearing house in Geneva.
Mendoza filed an action for damages against petitioner for the alleged
embarrassment he suffered at the Geneva Airport when the petitioners security
officers prevented him from boarding the plane, detained him for an hour and
allowed him to board only after all the passengers have boarded. A motion to dismiss
based on lack of jurisdiction was filed by petitioner which was dismissed by the
lower court and affirmed by the appellate Court. Both the trial and appellate courts
ruled that the suit may be brought in the Philippines under the pool partnership
agreement among the IATA members which include Singapore and American Airlines
wherein the members act as agents of each other in the issuance of tickets.
Petitioner asserts that by issuing a new ticket, a new contract was entered
into by the parties distinct from that entered into by the respondent with Singapore
Airlines. Moreover, petitioner asserts that the second contract of carriage cannot
be considered as an extension of the first contract because it is not a participating
airline in the conjunction tickets.
Issue
May the Philippine Courts take cognizance of the case at bar?
Ruling
Yes. The Warsaw Convention applies to all international transportation of
persons, baggage or goods performed by an aircraft gratuitously or for hire. The
case at bar falls squarely within the ambit of the Convention including its rules on
jurisdiction. Art.28(1) states that an action for damages must be brought by the
plaintiff in the territory of the High Contracting Parties, either before the court of
the domicile of the carrier or of his principal place of business or where he has a
place of business through which the contract was made or before the court of the
place of destination. There is no dispute that the petitioner issued the ticket in
Geneva which was neither its place of domicile or principal place of business nor

the respondents place of destination. The question is whether the contract of
transportation between the parties would be considered as a single transaction.
The contract of carriage between the private respondent and Singapore

Airlines although performed by different carriers under a series of airline tickets
including that issued by the petitioner constitutes a single operation. Members of
the IATA are under a general pool of partnership agreement wherein they act as an
agent of each other in the issuance of tickets. A member airline which enters into a
contract of carriage consisting of a series of trips to be performed by different
carriers is authorized to receive the fare for the whole trip and through the required
process of interline settlement of accounts by way of the IATA clearing house an
airline is duly compensated for the segment of the trip serviced. By constituting
itself as an agent of the principal carrier, the petitioners undertaking should be
taken as a single operation under the contract of carriage executed by the private
respondent and Singapore Airlines in Manila. A contract of air transportation is taken
as a single operation whether it is founded on a single or series of contracts.
Petitioners acquiescence to take the place of the original designated carrier binds
it under the contract of carriage entered into by the private respondent and
Singapore Airlines in Manila.
The third option then of the respondent which is to sue in the place of
business of the carrier wherein the contract was made, is therefore, manila and the
Philippine Courts are clothed with jurisdiction over this case.

Conflict Rules
Korea Technologies Co., Ltd. Vs. Hon. Albert A. Lerma, et al. ,

G.R. No. 143581. January 7, 2008
Facts:
Petitioner KOGIES and respondent PGSMC executed a Contract whereby
KOGIES would set up an LPG Cylinder Manufacturing Plant for respondent.
Respondent unilaterally cancelled the contract on the ground that petitioner had
altered the quantity and lowered the quality of the machineries and equipment it
delivered. Petitioner opposed informing the latter that PGSMC could not unilaterally
rescind their contract nor dismantle and transfer the machineries and equipment on
mere imagined violations by petitioner.
Petitioner then filed a Complaint for Specific Performance against respondent

before the RTC. Respondent filed its Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim
asserting that it had the full right to dismantle and transfer the machineries and
equipment because it had paid for them in full as stipulated in the contract. KOGIES
filed a motion to dismiss respondents counterclaims arguing that when PGSMC filed
the counterclaims, it should have paid docket fees and filed a certificate of non-
forum shopping, and that its failure to do so was a fatal defect. The RTC dismissed
the petitioners motion to dismiss respondents counterclaims as these
counterclaims fell within the requisites of compulsory counterclaims.
Issue:
WON payment of docket fees and certificate of non-forum shopping were
required in the respondents Answer with counterclaim?
Ruling:
NO. The counterclaims of PGSMC were incorporated in its Answer with
Compulsory Counterclaim in accordance with Section 8 of Rule 11, 1997 Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure, the rule that was effective at the time the Answer with
Counterclaim was filed. Sec. 8 on existing counterclaim or cross-claim states, A
compulsory counterclaim or a cross-claim that a defending party has at the time he
files his answer shall be contained therein. As to the failure to submit a certificate
of forum shopping, PGSMCs Answer is not an initiatory pleading which requires a
certification against forum shopping under Sec. 524 of Rule 7, 1997 Revised Rules of
Civil Procedure. It is a responsive pleading, hence, the courts a quo did not commit
reversible error in denying KOGIES motion to dismiss PGSMCs compulsory
counterclaims. At the time PGSMC filed its Answer incorporating its counterclaims
against KOGIES, it was not liable to pay filing fees for said counterclaims being
compulsory in nature. We stress, however, that effective August 16, 2004 under Sec.
7, Rule 141, as amended by A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC, docket fees are now required to
be paid in compulsory counterclaim or cross-claims.

Private International Law
International School Alliance Of Educators vs. Quisumbing

G.R. No. 128845, June 1, 2000
Facts:
Private respondent International School, Inc. (School), pursuant to PD 732, is
a domestic educational institution established primarily for dependents of foreign
diplomatic personnel and other temporary residents. The decree authorizes the
School to employ its own teaching and management personnel selected by it either
locally or abroad, from Philippine or other nationalities, such personnel being
exempt from otherwise applicable laws and regulations attending their
employment, except laws that have been or will be enacted for the protection of
employees. School hires both foreign and local teachers as members of its faculty,
classifying the same into two: (1) foreign-hires and (2) local-hires.
The School grants foreign-hires certain benefits not accorded local-hires.

Foreign-hires are also paid a salary rate 25% more than local-hires.
When negotiations for a new CBA were held on June 1995, petitioner ISAE, a
legitimate labor union and the collective bargaining representative of all faculty
members of the School, contested the difference in salary rates between foreign
and local-hires. This issue, as well as the question of whether foreign-hires should
be included in the appropriate bargaining unit, eventually caused a deadlock
between the parties.
ISAE filed a notice of strike. Due to the failure to reach a compromise in the
NCMB, the matter reached the DOLE which favored the School. Hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether the foreign-hires should be included in bargaining unit of local-
hires.
Ruling:
NO. The Constitution, Article XIII, Section 3, specifically provides that labor
is entitled to humane conditions of work. These conditions are not restricted to
the physical workplace the factory, the office or the field but include as well the
manner by which employers treat their employees.
Discrimination, particularly in terms of wages, is frowned upon by the Labor

Code. Article 248 declares it an unfair labor practice for an employer to discriminate
in regard to wages in order to encourage or discourage membership in any labor
organization.
Constitution enjoins the State to protect the rights of workers and promote
their welfare, In Section 18, Article II of the constitution mandates to afford labor

full protection. The State has the right and duty to regulate the relations between
labor and capital. These relations are not merely contractual but are so impressed
with public interest that labor contracts, collective bargaining agreements included,
must yield to the common good.
However, foreign-hires do not belong to the same bargaining unit as the local-
hires.
A bargaining unit is a group of employees of a given employer, comprised of

all or less than all of the entire body of employees, consistent with equity to the
employer indicate to be the best suited to serve the reciprocal rights and duties of
the parties under the collective bargaining provisions of the law.
The factors in determining the appropriate collective bargaining unit are (1)
the will of the employees (Globe Doctrine); (2) affinity and unity of the employees
interest, such as substantial similarity of work and duties, or similarity of
compensation and working conditions (Substantial Mutual Interests Rule); (3) prior
collective bargaining history; and (4) similarity of employment status. The basic test
of an asserted bargaining units acceptability is whether or not it is fundamentally
the combination which will best assure to all employees the exercise of their
collective bargaining rights.
In the case at bar, it does not appear that foreign-hires have indicated their
intention to be grouped together with local-hires for purposes of collective
bargaining. The collective bargaining history in the School also shows that these
groups were always treated separately. Foreign-hires have limited tenure; local-
hires enjoy security of tenure. Although foreign-hires perform similar functions
under the same working conditions as the local-hires, foreign-hires are accorded
certain benefits not granted to local-hires such as housing, transportation, shipping
costs, taxes and home leave travel allowances. These benefits are reasonably
related to their status as foreign-hires, and justify the exclusion of the former from
the latter. To include foreign-hires in a bargaining unit with local-hires would not
assure either group the exercise of their respective collective bargaining rights.

Assumption of Jurisdiction
Asiavest Limited v. CA
296 SCRA 519
Facts:
The plaintiff Asiavest Limited filed a complaint against the defendant Antonio
Heras praying that said defendant be ordered to pay to the plaintiff the amounts
awarded by the Hong Kong Court Judgment. The action filed in Hong Kong against
Heras was in personam, since it was based on his personal guarantee of the
obligation of the principal debtor.
The trial court concluded that the Hong Kong court judgment should be
recognized and given effect in this jurisdiction for failure of HERAS to overcome the
legal presumption in favor of the foreign judgment.
Asiavest moved for the reconsideration of the decision. It sought an award of

judicial costs and an increase in attorney's fees with interest until full payment of
the said obligations. On the other hand, Heras no longer opposed the motion and
instead appealed the decision to CA. The Court of Appeals agreed with Heras that
notice sent outside the state to a non-resident is unavailing to give jurisdiction in
an action against him personally for money recovery. Summons should have been
personally served on Heras in Hong Kong.
Issue:
Whether or not the judgment of the Hong Kong Court has been repelled by
evidence of want of jurisdiction due to improper notice to the party
Ruling:
YES. Asiavest cannot now claim that Heras was a resident of Hong Kong at the
time since the stipulated fact that Heras "is a resident of New Manila, Quezon City,
Philippines" refers to his residence at the time jurisdiction over his person was being
sought by the Hong Kong court. Accordingly, since Heras was not a resident of Hong
Kong and the action against him was, ne in personam, summons should have been
personally served on him in Hong Kong. The extraterritorial service in the Philippines
was therefore invalid and did not confer on the Hong Kong court jurisdiction over
his person. It follows that the Hong Kong court judgment cannot be given force and
effect here in the Philippines for having been rendered without jurisdiction.
On the same note, Heras was also an absentee, hence, he should have been
served with summons in the same manner as a non-resident not found in Hong Kong.
The Rules of Court providing for extraterritorial service will not apply because the
suit against him was in personam. Neither can we apply Section 18, which allows
extraterritorial service on a resident defendant who is temporarily absent from the
country, because even if Heras be considered as a resident of Hong Kong, the
undisputed fact remains that he left Hong Kong not only temporarily but for good.

Forum Non Conveniens
Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corp. vs. Jack Robert Sherman

G.R. No. 72494 August 11, 1989
Facts:
Eastern Book & Supply Service, incorporated in Singapore, was granted by
HSBC Singapore an overdraft facility. Private respondents, directors of Eastern Book
executed a Joint and Several Guarantee in favor of HSBC which provided for that
the guarantee and all rights, obligations and liabilities arising thereat shall be
construed and determined under and may be enforced in accordance with the laws
of the Republic of Singaporeand that the Courts of Singapore shall have jurisdiction
over all disputes arising under such guarantee. Eastern Book defaulted. Hence, HSBC
filed a suit for collection against them before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City. Sherman filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the
complaint and persons of the defendants.
Issue:
Whether or not Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the suit.
Ruling:
Yes. A stipulation as to venue does not preclude the filing of suits in the
residence of plaintiff or defendant under Sec 2 (b), Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, in
the absence of qualifying or restrictive words in the agreement which indicate that
the place named is the only venue agreed upon by the parties. The parties did not
thereby stipulate that only the courts of Singapore, to the exclusion of all the rest,
have jurisdiction. Neither did the clause in question operate to divest Philippine
courts of jurisdiction.
In International Law, jurisdiction is often defined as the right of a state

to exercise authority over persons and things within its boundaries subject to certain
exceptions. This authority, which finds its source in the concept of sovereignty, is
exclusive within and throughout the domain of the state. A state is competent to
take hold of any judicial matter it sees fit by making its courts and agencies
assume jurisdiction over all kinds of cases brought before them.

Banco Do Brasil vs. CA

GR. Nos. 121576-78. June 16, 2000
Facts:
In 1989, Cesar Urbino, Sr. sued Poro Point Shipping Services for damages the
former incurred when one of the latters ship ran aground causing losses to Urbino.
Urbino impleaded Banco Do Brasil (BDB), a foreign corporation not engaged in
business in the Philippines nor does it have any office here or any agent. BDB was
impleaded simply because it has a claim over the sunken ship. BDB however failed
to appear multiple times. Eventually, a judgment was rendered and BDB was
adjudged to pay $300,000.00 in damages in favor of Urbino for BDB being a nuisance
defendant.
BDB assailed the said decision as it argued that there was no valid service of
summons because the summons was issued to the ambassador of Brazil. Further, the
other summons which were made through publication is not applicable to BDB as it
alleged that the action against them is in personam.
Issue:
Whether or not the court acquired jurisdiction over Banco Do Brasil.
Ruling:
No. Banco Do Brasil is correct. Although the suit is originally in rem as it was
BDBs claim on the sunken ship which was used as the basis for it being impleaded,
the action nevertheless became an in personam one when Urbino asked for damages
in the said amount. As such, only a personal service of summons would have vested
the court jurisdiction over BDB. Where the action is in personam, one brought
against a person on the basis of his personal liability, jurisdiction over the person of
the defendant is necessary for the court to validly try and decide the case. When
the defendant is a non-resident, personal service of summons within the state is
essential to the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person. This cannot be done,
however, if the defendant is not physically present in the country, and thus, the
court cannot acquire jurisdiction over his person and therefore cannot validly try
and decide the case against him.

Kazuhiro Hasegawa Vs. Minoru Kitamura

G.R. No. 149177. November 23, 2007
Facts:
Petitioner is a Japanese consultancy firm which entered into an Independent
Contractor Agreement with Kitamura, a Japanese national permanently residing in
the Philippines. Kitamura was to extend professional service for 1 year starting April
1999. On February 2000, Kitamura was informed that Nippon no longer intends to
automatically renew the agreement. The former then filed a case for specific
performance and damages.
Issue:
Whether or not Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the instant case.
Ruling:
Yes. In resolving the case, the SC elucidated that in the resolution of conflicts
problems, there are 3 phases:
1. Jurisdiction- where to litigate
2. Choice of law- which law to apply
3. Recognition and enforcement of decision- where the decision may be
enforced.
Athough petitioners claim that the court has no jurisdiction in view of the
principles of: (A) Lex Loci Celebrationis- law of the place where contract was
executed is applied; (B) Lex COntractus- law of the place where the contract is
performed is applied; (C) State of the most significant relationship- law of the state
which has the most substantial connection to the case and the parties is applied;
The SC pointed out that the invocation of the above rules is unsound as they
pertain not to the question of jurisdiction by to the 2 nd phase, the choice of law.
Jurisdiction, the question being raised, choice of law rules therefore are
inapplicable.
Choice of law is also prematurely raised in the case since before it is raised,
there should 1st exist a conflict of laws situation. In the instant case, such was not
met since the law of any foreign country was not pleaded and proved by the
petitioners.
Forum non conveniens is also not applicable since:

1. Such is not a ground for a motion to dismiss under the Rules of Court
2. Said doctrine depends on the facts of the case and on the sound discretion of
the court and in this case the RTC decided to assume jurisdiction
3. Such doctrine requires a factual determination, hence, such is a matter of
defense.

Question of Jurisdiction
Regner v. Logarta
G.R. No. 168747. October 19, 2007
Third Division, Chico-Nazario, J.
Facts
Luis Regner executed a Deed of Donation in favor of his two daughters with
his first wife, Cynthia and Teresa. The donation covered his share at Cebu Country
Club. Luis passed away on 11 February 1999.
Victoria Regner is the second wife of Luis. On June 15, 1999, she filed a
complaint for declaration of nullity of the Deed of Donation claiming fraud in the
execution of the document because Luis was very ill and no longer of sound and
disposing mind.
The sheriff served the summonses on Cynthia and Teresa at the Borja Family
Clinic in Tagbilaran City wherein Melinda (Teresa and Cynthias sister) worked as a
doctor, but Melinda refused to receive the summonses. Upon her arrival in the
Philippines, on 1 June 2000, Teresa was personally served the summons. Cynthia,
on the other hand, was not served summons. The RTC dismissed the complaint for
failure to serve summons on Cynthia, an indispensable party. The CA affirmed the
RTCs decision.
Issue
Whether or not the delay and failure to serve summons upon the respondents
warrants dismissal of the complant
Ruling
Yes. A Court must acquire jurisdiction over the persons of indispensable
parties before it can validly pronounce judgments personal to the parties. Courts
acquire jurisdiction over a party plaintiff upon the filing of the complaint. On the
other hand, jurisdiction over the person of a party defendant is assured upon the
service of summons in the manner required by law or otherwise by his voluntary
appearance.
Being an indispensable party, the trial court must also acquire jurisdiction
over Cynthias person through the proper service of summons.
Petitioner prayed for a declaration of nullity of the deed of donation, to

restrain Cebu Country Club, Inc. from transferring title and ownership of Proprietary
Ownership Certificate No. 0272 to Cynthia and Teresa, and for moral and exemplary
damages. Civil Case No. CEB 23927 is evidently an action against Cynthia and Teresa
on the basis of their personal liability for the alleged fraudulent transfer of the
subject Country Club membership from Luis to their name. Thus, the action
instituted by petitioner before the RTC is in personam.

Being an action in personam, the general rule requires the personal service
of summons on Cynthia within the Philippines, but this is not possible in the present
case because Cynthia is a non-resident and is not found within the Philippines.
As Cynthia is a nonresident who is not found in the Philippines, service of
summons on her must be in accordance with Section 15, Rule 14 of the Rules of
Court. Such service, to be effective outside the Philippines, must be made either
(1) by personal service; (2) by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in
such places and for such time as the court may order, in which case a copy of the
summons and order of the court should be sent by registered mail to the last known
address of the defendant; or (3) in any other manner which the court may deem
sufficient.
Since in the case at bar, the service of summons upon Cynthia was not done
by any of the authorized modes, the trial court was correct in dismissing petitioners
complaint.

Question of Jurisdiction
NM Rothschild and Sons Ltd. V. Lepanto Consolidated Mining Co.

G.R. No. 175799. November 28, 2011
First Division, Leonardo-De Castro
Facts
Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company filed with the RTC of Makati City a
Complaint against NM Rothschild & Sons (Australia) Limited praying for a judgment
declaring the loan and hedging contracts between the parties void for being contrary
to Article 2018 of the Civil Code of the Philippines and for damages. The trial court
authorized respondents counsel to personally bring the summons and Complaint to
the Philippine Consulate General in Sydney, Australia for the latter office to effect
service of summons on petitioner (defendant).
Petitioner filed a Special Appearance With Motion to Dismiss praying for the
dismissal of the Complaint on the ground, among others, that the court has not
acquired jurisdiction over the person of petitioner due to the defective and improper
service of summons.
The trial court denied the Motion to Dismiss holding that there was a proper
service of summons through the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA). Meanwhile,
the trial court issued an Order directing respondent to answer some of the questions
in petitioners Interrogatories to Plaintiff.
Issue
Whether or not the court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the
petitioner herein
Ruling
Yes.
The service of summons to petitioner through the DFA by the conveyance of
the summons to the Philippine Consulate General in Sydney, Australia was clearly
made pursuant to Section 15 of the Rule 14 of the Rules of Civil Procedure which
allows extraterritorial service of summons.
The court emphasized its ruling in another case that extraterritorial service
of summons applies only where the action is in rem or quasi in rem, but not if an
action is in personam.
The Complaint in the case at bar is an action to declare the loan and Hedging
Contracts between the parties void with a prayer for damages. It is a suit in which
the plaintiff seeks to be freed from its obligations to the defendant under a contract
and to hold said defendant pecuniarily liable to the plaintiff for entering into such
contract. It is therefore an action in personam, unless and until the plaintiff attaches

a property within the Philippines belonging to the defendant, in which case the
action will be converted to one quasi in rem.
Since the action involved in the case at bar is in personam and since the
defendant, petitioner Rothschild/Investec, does not reside and is not found in the
Philippines, the Philippine courts cannot try any case against it because of the
impossibility of acquiring jurisdiction over its person unless it voluntarily appears in
court.
So the next question is whether petitioner voluntarily appeared in court. The

court answered in the affirmative. The petitioner, while it filed a motion to question
the courts jurisdiction over its person, it also asked the court for affirmative reliefs
such as availing of modes of discovery against respondent.
In view of the above, the court ruled that petitioner, by seeking affirmative
reliefs from the trial court, is deemed to have voluntarily submitted to the
jurisdiction of said court. A party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure
affirmative relief against his opponent and after obtaining or failing to obtain such
relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction.

Refusal to Assume Jurisdiction
First Philippine International Bank v. CA

G.R. No. 115849. January 24, 1996
Third Division, Panganiban
Facts
Producers Bank (now called First Philippine International Bank), which has been
under conservatorship since 1984, is the owner of 6 parcels of land. The Bank had
an agreement with Demetrio Demetria and Jose Janolo for the two to purchase the
parcels of land for a purchase price of P5.5 million pesos. The said agreement was
made by Demetria and Janolo with the Banks manager, Mercurio Rivera. Later
however, the Bank, through its conservator, Leonida Encarnacion, sought the
repudiation of the agreement as it alleged that Rivera was not authorized to enter
into such an agreement, hence there was no valid contract of sale. Subsequently,
Demetria and Janolo sued Producers Bank. The regional trial court ruled in favor of
Demetria et al. The Bank filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals.
Meanwhile, Henry Co, who holds 80% shares of stocks with the said Bank, filed
a motion for intervention with the trial court. The trial court denied the motion
since the trial has been concluded already and the case is now pending appeal.
Subsequently, Co, assisted by ACCRA law office, filed a separate civil case against
Carlos Ejercito as successor-in-interest (assignee) of Demetria and Janolo seeking to
have the purported contract of sale be declared unenforceable against the Bank.
Ejercito et al argued that the second case constitutes forum shopping.
Issues
Was there forum-shopping on the part of petitioner Bank?
Ruling
Yes.
To begin with, forum-shopping originated as a concept in private international
law, where non-resident litigants are given the option to choose the forum or place
wherein to bring their suit for various reasons or excuses, including to secure
procedural advantages, to annoy and harass the defendant, to avoid overcrowded
dockets, or to select a more friendly venue. To combat these less than honorable
excuses, the principle of forum non conveniens was developed whereby a court, in
conflicts of law cases, may refuse impositions on its jurisdiction where it is not the
most convenient or available forum and the parties are not precluded from seeking
remedies elsewhere.
In the Philippines, forum-shopping has acquired a connotation encompassing not
only a choice of venues, as it was originally understood in conflicts of laws, but also

to a choice of remedies. In either of these situations (choice of venue or choice of
remedy), the litigant actually shops for a forum of his action. This was the original
concept of the term forum shopping.
Eventually, however, instead of actually making a choice of the forum of their
actions, litigants, through the encouragement of their lawyers, file their actions in
all available courts, or invoke all relevant remedies simultaneously. This practice
had not only resulted in conflicting adjudications among different courts and
consequent confusion inimical to an orderly administration of justice. It had created
extreme inconvenience to some of the parties to the action.
What therefore originally started both in conflicts of laws and in our domestic
law as a legitimate device for solving problems has been abused and misused to
assure scheming litigants of dubious reliefs.
There is forum-shopping whenever, as a result of an adverse opinion in one
forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion (other than by appeal or certiorari) in
another.
Applying the foregoing principles in the case before us and comparing it with
the Second Case, it is obvious that there exist identity of parties or interests
represented, identity of rights or causes and identity of reliefs sought.

Manila Hotel vs. NLRC, Arbiter Diosana, and Marcelo Santos

G.R. No. 120077
October 13, 2000
Facts:
Petitioners are the Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC), government-owned and
controlled corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines
when the case was filed in 1990, and the Manila Hotel International Company,
Limited (MHICL), a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of Hong
Kong. MHC is an "incorporator" of MHICL, owning 50% of its capital stock.
MHICL trained the personnel and staff of the Palace Hotel at Beijing, China by
virtue of a management agreement.
Marcelo Santos resigned as an overseas worker employed as a printer at the

Mazoon Printing Press, Sultanate of Oman because in June 1988, he was directly
hired by the Palace Hotel, Beijing, China. The employment contract of June 4, 1988
stated that his employment would commence September 1, 1988 for a period of two
years. It provided for a monthly salary of nine hundred dollars (US$900.00) net of
taxes, payable 14 times a year.
From June 8 to 29, 1989, respondent Santos was in the Philippines on vacation
leave. He returned to China and reassumed his post on July 17, 1989.
On July 22, 1989, Mr. Shmidt's (General Manager) Executive Secretary, Joanna
suggested in a handwritten note that respondent Santos be given 1 month notice of
his release from employment.
On August 10, 1989, the Palace Hotel informed respondent Santos by letter
signed by Mr. Shmidt that his employment at the Palace Hotel print shop would be
terminated due to business reverses brought about by the political upheaval in
China.
On September 5, 1989, the Palace Hotel terminated the employment of

respondent Santos and paid all benefits due him, including his plane fare back to
the Philippines. On October 24, 1989, respondent Santos, through his lawyer wrote
Mr. Shmidt, demanding full compensation pursuant to the employment agreement.
On February 20, 1990, respondent Santos filed a complaint for illegal dismissal
with the NLRC. The complaint named MHC, MHICL, the Palace Hotel and Mr. Shmidt
as respondents. The Palace Hotel and Mr. Shmidt were not served with summons
and neither participated in the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter.
The Labor Arbiter decided in favor of Santos. Petitioners appealed to the NLRC,
arguing that the POEA, not the NLRC had jurisdiction over the case to which the

NLRC agreed. However, in the motion for reconsideration, NLRC reversed such
decision on the ground that the case was not cognizable by the POEA as he was not
an "overseas contract worker.
Labor Arbiter de Vera found that respondent Santos was illegally dismissed from
employment and recommended that he be paid actual damages equivalent to his
salaries for the unexpired portion of his contract. NLRC ruled in favor of private
respondent.
Issue:
Whether or not the NLRC can assume jurisdiction in this case.
Held:
The NLRC was a seriously inconvenient forum.
The main aspects of the case transpired in two foreign jurisdictions and the
case involves purely foreign elements. The only link that the Philippines has
with the case is that respondent Santos is a Filipino citizen. The Palace Hotel
and MHICL are foreign corporations. Not all cases involving Filipino citizens
can be tried in the Philippines.
As to the employment contract, respondent Santos was hired directly by the
Palace Hotel, a foreign employer, through correspondence sent to the
Sultanate of Oman. He was hired without the intervention of the POEA or any
authorized recruitment agency of the government.
Under the rule of forum non conveniens, a Philippine court or agency may
assume jurisdiction over the case if it chooses to do so provided: (1) that the
Philippine court is one to which the parties may conveniently resort to; (2)
that the Philippine court is in a position to make an intelligent decision as to
the law and the facts; and (3) that the Philippine court has or is likely to have
power to enforce its decision. The conditions are unavailing in the case at
bar.
o Not Convenient. NLRC is not a convenient forum given that all the
incidents of the case. The inconvenience is compounded by the fact
that the proper defendants, the Palace Hotel and MHICL are not
nationals of the Philippines. Neither are they "doing business in the
Philippines." Likewise, the main witnesses, Mr. Shmidt and Mr. Henk
are non-residents of the Philippines.
o No power to determine applicable law. Neither can an intelligent
decision be made as to the law governing the employment contract as
such was perfected in foreign soil. This calls to fore the application of
the principle of lex loci contractus (the law of the place where the
contract was made). The employment contract was not perfected in
the Philippines. Respondent Santos signified his acceptance by writing
a letter while he was in the Republic of Oman. This letter was sent to
the Palace Hotel in the People's Republic of China.

o No power to determine the facts. This is because all acts complained
of took place in Beijing, China. The NLRC was not in a position to
determine whether the Tiannamen Square incident truly adversely
affected operations of the Palace Hotel as to justify respondent Santos'
retrenchment.
o Principle of effectiveness, no power to execute decision. Even
assuming that a proper decision could be reached by the NLRC, such
would not have any binding effect against the employer, the Palace
Hotel. The Palace Hotel is a corporation incorporated under the laws
of China and was not even served with summons. Jurisdiction over its
person was not acquired.
This is not to say that Philippine courts and agencies have no power to solve
controversies involving foreign employers. Neither are we saying that we do
not have power over an employment contract executed in a foreign country.
If Santos were an "overseas contract worker", a Philippine forum, specifically
the POEA, not the NLRC, would protect him. He is not an "overseas contract
worker" a fact which he admits with conviction.

Raytheon International vs. Stockton Rouzie, Jr.

G.R. No. 162894 February 26, 2008
Facts:
In 1990, Brand Marine Services, Inc. (BMSI), a corporation duly organized and
existing under the laws of the State of Connecticut, USA, and respondent Stockton
W. Rouzie, Jr., an American citizen, entered into a contract whereby BMSI hired
respondent as its representative to negotiate the sale of services in several
government projects in the Philippines for an agreed remuneration of 10% of the
gross receipts. On 11 March 1992, respondent secured a service contract with the
Republic of the Philippines on behalf of BMSI for the dredging of rivers affected by
the Mt. Pinatubo eruption and mudflows.
On 16 July 1994, respondent filed before the NLRC a suit against BMSI and Rust
International, Inc. (RUST), Rodney C. Gilbert and Walter G. Browning for alleged
nonpayment of commissions, illegal termination and breach of employment
contract. The case was ultimately dismissed for lack of jurisdiction which became
final & executory.
On 8 January 1999, respondent instituted an action for damages before the RTC.
The complaint essentially reiterated the allegations in the labor case that BMSI
verbally employed respondent to negotiate the sale of services in government
projects and that respondent was not paid the commissions due him from the
Pinatubo dredging project which he secured on behalf of BMSI. The complaint also
averred that BMSI and RUST as well as petitioner itself had combined and functioned
as one company.
On 18 May 1999, petitioner sought the dismissal of the complaint on grounds of

forum non conveniens and failure to state a cause of action in an omnibus motion.
RTC denied petitioners omnibus motion. The trial court held that the factual
allegations in the complaint, assuming the same to be admitted, were sufficient for
the trial court to render a valid judgment thereon. It also ruled that the principle
of forum non conveniens was inapplicable because the trial court could enforce
judgment on petitioner, it being a foreign corporation licensed to do business in the
Philippines.
CA denied the petition for certiorari for lack of merit and its motion for
reconsideration. It deferred to the discretion of the trial court when the latter
decided not to desist from assuming jurisdiction on the ground of the inapplicability
of the principle of forum non conveniens.
Petitioner mainly asserts that the written contract between respondent and BMSI
included a valid choice of law clause, that is, that the contract shall be governed by
the laws of the State of Connecticut. It also mentions the presence of foreign

elements in the dispute namely, the parties and witnesses involved are American
corporations and citizens and the evidence to be presented is located outside the
Philippines that renders our local courts inconvenient forums. Petitioner theorizes
that the foreign elements of the dispute necessitate the immediate application of
the doctrine of forum non conveniens.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC can assume jurisdiction in this case.
Ruling:
In Hasegawa v. Kitamura, the Court outlined three consecutive phases
involved in judicial resolution of conflicts-of-laws problems, namely: jurisdiction,
choice of law, and recognition and enforcement of judgments. Thus, in the instances
where the Court held that the local judicial machinery was adequate to resolve
controversies with a foreign element, the following requisites had to be proved: (1)
that the Philippine Court is one to which the parties may conveniently resort; (2)
that the Philippine Court is in a position to make an intelligent decision as to the
law and the facts; and (3) that the Philippine Court has or is likely to have the power
to enforce its decision.
On the matter of jurisdiction over a conflicts-of-laws problem where the case

is filed in a Philippine court and where the court has jurisdiction over the subject
matter, the parties and the res, it may or can proceed to try the case even if the
rules of conflict-of-laws or the convenience of the parties point to a foreign forum.
This is an exercise of sovereign prerogative of the country where the case is filed.
A. Jurisdiction
Jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter of an action is conferred by
the Constitution and the law and by the material allegations in the complaint,
irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover all or some of the
claims or reliefs sought therein. The nature of the action and the amount of damages
prayed are within the jurisdiction of the RTC for being an action for damages arising
from an alleged breach of contract.
As regards jurisdiction over the parties, the trial court acquired jurisdiction
over herein respondent (as party plaintiff) upon the filing of the complaint. On the
other hand, jurisdiction over the person of petitioner (as party defendant) was
acquired by its voluntary appearance in court.
B. Jurisdiction vs. Choice of Law

That the subject contract included a stipulation that the same shall be
governed by the laws of the State of Connecticut does not suggest that the Philippine
courts, or any other foreign tribunal for that matter, are precluded from hearing
the civil action. Jurisdiction and choice of law are two distinct concepts. Jurisdiction
considers whether it is fair to cause a defendant to travel to this state; choice of
law asks the further question whether the application of a substantive law which
will determine the merits of the case is fair to both parties. The choice of law

stipulation will become relevant only when the substantive issues of the instant case
develop, that is, after hearing on the merits proceeds before the trial court.
C. Doctrine of Forum non Conveniens

Under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, a court, in conflicts-of-laws
cases, may refuse impositions on its jurisdiction where it is not the most
"convenient" or available forum and the parties are not precluded from seeking
remedies elsewhere. Petitioners averments of the foreign elements in the instant
case are not sufficient to oust the trial court of its jurisdiction over action for
damages and the parties involved.
Moreover, the propriety of dismissing a case based on the principle of forum
non conveniens requires a factual determination; hence, it is more properly
considered as a matter of defense. While it is within the discretion of the trial court
to abstain from assuming jurisdiction on this ground, it should do so only after vital
facts are established, to determine whether special circumstances require the
courts desistance.

Philippine Aluminum Wheels vs. FASGI Enterprises

G.R. No. 137378 October 12, 2000
Facts:
FASGI Enterprises Incorporated (FASGI), a corporation organized and existing
under and by virtue of the laws of the State of California, USA, entered into a
distributorship arrangement with Philippine Aluminum Wheels, Incorporated (PAWI),
a Philippine corporation, and Fratelli Pedrini Sarezzo S.P.A. (FPS), an Italian
corporation. The agreement provided for the purchase, importation and
distributorship in the US of aluminum wheels manufactured by PAWI.
PAWI shipped to FASGI a total of 8,594 wheels. Thereafter, FASGI paid PAWI the
FOB value of the wheels. Unfortunately, FASGI later found the shipment to be
defective and in non-compliance with stated requirements.
Thereafter, FASGI instituted an action against PAWI and FPS for breach of
contract and recovery of damages before the US District Court for the Central
District of California. During the pendency of the case, the parties entered into a
settlement where it was stipulated that FPS and PAWI would accept the return of
not less than 8,100 wheels after restoring to FASGI the purchase price via 4
irrevocable letters of credit (LC).
PAWI informed FASGI that it was impossible to open a LC on or before April 1980
but assured that it would do its best to comply with the suggested schedule of
payments. FASGI insisted that PAWI should meet the terms of the proposed schedule
of payments, specifically its undertaking to open the first LC within April of 1980,
and that if the letter of credit is not opened by April 30, 1980, then it would
immediately take all necessary legal action to protect its position.
Despite its assurances, and FASGI's insistence, PAWI failed to open the first LC in
April 1980 allegedly due to Central Bank "inquiries and restrictions," prompting FASGI
to pursue its complaint for damages against PAWI before the California district
court. The parties, resolved to enter into another arrangement (Supplemental
Settlement Agreement). It provided that FASGI would deliver to PAWI a container of
wheels for every LC opened and paid by PAWI. The Supplemental Settlement
Agreement, as well as the motion for the entry of judgment, was executed by FASGI
president Elena Buholzer and PAWI counsel Mr. Thomas Ready.
PAWI, again, failed to comply with its obligation under the supplemental
settlement agreement. FASGI counsel Frank Ker and FASGI president Elena Buholzer
were more inclined to believe that PAWI's failure to pay was due not to any
restriction by the Central Bank or any other cause than its inability to pay.

Due to PAWI's persistent default, FASGI filed with the US District Court of the
Central District of California to enforce a stipulation in the Supplemental Settlement
Agreement against PAWI. A certificate of finality of judgment was issued by the US
District Judge of the District Court for the Central District of California.
Unable to obtain satisfaction of the final judgment within US, FASGI filed a
complaint for "enforcement of foreign judgment" before the RTC of Makati,
Philippines. The Makati court, however, in an order, dismissed the case, thereby
denying the enforcement of the foreign judgment within Philippine jurisdiction, on
the ground that the decree was tainted with collusion, fraud, and clear mistake of
law and fact arguing that, among others, the Supplemental Settlement Agreement
and the subsequent motion for entry of judgment upon which the California court
had based its judgment were a nullity for having been entered into by Mr. Thomas
Ready, counsel for PAWI, without the latter's authorization.
FASGI appealed the decision of the trial court to the CA. The appellate court
reversed the decision of the trial court and ordered the full enforcement of the
California judgment.
Issue:
Whether or not the foreign judgment obtained by FASGI can be enforced in
the Philippines through Philippine courts.
Ruling:
Generally, in the absence of a special compact, no sovereign is bound to give
effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country;
however, the rules of comity, utility and convenience of nations have established a
usage among civilized states by which final judgments of foreign courts of
competent jurisdiction are reciprocally respected and rendered efficacious under
certain conditions that may vary in different countries.
In this jurisdiction, a valid judgment rendered by a foreign tribunal may be
recognized insofar as the immediate parties and the underlying cause of action are
concerned so long as it is convincingly shown that:
There has been an opportunity for a full and fair hearing before a court of
competent jurisdiction;
That trial upon regular proceedings has been conducted, following due
citation or voluntary appearance of the defendant and under a system of
jurisprudence likely to secure an impartial administration of justice; and
That there is nothing to indicate either a prejudice in court and in the system
of laws under which it is sitting or fraud in procuring the judgment.
A foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in the country from
which it comes, until a contrary showing, on the basis of a presumption of regularity
of proceedings and the giving of due notice in the foreign forum. Rule 39, section
48 of the Rules of Court of the Philippines provide that the effect of a judgment or
final order of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to render the
judgment or final order, in case of a judgment or final order against a person, the

judgment or final order is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties
and their successors-in-interest by a subsequent title.
The judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence a want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or
fact.
In Soorajmull Nagarmull vs. Binalbagan-Isabela Sugar Co. Inc., the Court has
ruled that a judgment for a sum of money rendered in a foreign court is presumptive
evidence of a right between the parties and their successors-in-interest by
subsequent title, but when suit for its enforcement is brought in a Philippine court,
such judgment may be repelled by evidence of want of jurisdiction, want of notice
to the party, collusion, fraud or clear mistake of law or fact.
In Northwest Orient Airlines, Inc., vs. CA, the Court has said that a party
attacking a foreign judgment is tasked with the burden of overcoming its
presumptive validity.
PAWI claims that its counsel, Mr. Ready, has acted without its authority. In
this jurisdiction, it is clear that an attorney cannot, without a client's authorization,
settle the action or subject matter of the litigation even when he honestly believes
that such a settlement will best serve his client's interest. If Mr. Ready was indeed
not authorized by PAWI to enter into the supplemental settlement agreement, PAWI
could have forthwith signified to FASGI a disclaimer of the settlement. Instead, more
than a year after the execution of the supplemental settlement agreement, PAWI
President Romeo S. Rojas sent a communication to Elena Buholzer of FASGI that
failed to mention Mr. Ready's supposed lack of authority. On the contrary, the letter
confirmed the terms of the agreement when Mr. Rojas sought forbearance for the
impending delay in the opening of the first letter of credit under the schedule
stipulated in the agreement. It is an accepted rule that when a client, upon
becoming aware of the compromise and the judgment thereon, fails to promptly
repudiate the action of his attorney, he will not afterwards be heard to complain
about it.
PAWI denounced, likewise, Mr. Readys authority to enter into a stipulation

for judgment before the California court on the ground that it had by then already
terminated the former's services. Mr. Ready admitted that while he did receive a
request from Manuel Singson of PAWI to withdraw from the motion of judgment, the
request came too late. Mr. Ready told Mr. Singson that under American Judicial
Procedures when a motion for judgment had already been filed a counsel would not
be permitted to withdraw unilaterally without a court order. From the time the
stipulation for judgment was entered into until the certificate of finality of
judgment was issued by the California court, no notification was issued by PAWI to
FASGI regarding its termination of Mr. Ready's services. PAWI should have aptly
raised the issue before the forum which issued the judgment in line with the
principle of international comity that a court of another jurisdiction should refrain,
as a matter of propriety and fairness, from so assuming the power of passing
judgment on the correctness of the application of law and the evaluation of the
facts of the judgment issued by another tribunal.

Fraud, to hinder the enforcement within this jurisdiction of a foreign
judgment, must be extrinsic, i.e., fraud based on facts not controverted or resolved
in the case where judgment is rendered, or that which would go to the jurisdiction
of the court or would deprive the party against whom judgment is rendered a chance
to defend the action to which he has a meritorious case or defense. In fine, intrinsic
fraud, that is, fraud which goes to the very existence of the cause of action - such
as fraud in obtaining the consent to a contract - is deemed already adjudged, and
it, therefore, cannot militate against the recognition or enforcement of the foreign
judgment.
PAWI could not claim any prejudice by the settlement. PAWI was spared
from possibly paying FASGI substantial amounts of damages and incurring heavy
litigation expenses normally generated in a full-blown trial. PAWI, under the
agreement was afforded time to reimburse FASGI the price it had paid for the
defective wheels. PAWI, should not, after its opportunity to enjoy the benefits of
the agreement, be allowed to later disown the arrangement when the terms thereof
ultimately would prove to operate against its hopeful expectations.

Recognition of Foreign Judgment
Asiavest Merchant Bankers vs. CA

G.R. No. 110263. July 20, 2001
De Leon, Jr., J.
FACTS:
Petitioner Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad is a corporation organized
under the laws of Malaysia Private respondent Philippine National Construction
Corporation (PNCC) is a corporation duly incorporated and existing under Philippine
laws.
In 1983 petitioner initiated a suit for collection against private respondent
before the High Court of Malaya in Kuala Lumpur. Petitioner sought to recover the
indemnity of the performance bond it had put up in favor of private respondent to
guarantee the completion of the Felda Project and the non-payment of the loan it
extended to Asiavest-CDCP Sdn. Bhd. for the completion of Paloh Hanai and Kuantan
By-Pass Project
On September 13, 1985, the High Court of Malaya rendered judgment in favor
of the petitioner. Defendant should pay the Plaintiffs the sum of $5,108,290.23 with
12% interest per annum. Following unsuccessful attempts to secure payment from
private respondent under the judgment, petitioner initiated on September 5, 1988
the complaint before Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila, to enforce the
judgment of the High Court of Malaya.
Private respondent sought the dismissal of the case via a Motion to Dismiss
contending that the alleged judgment of the High Court of Malaya should be denied
recognition or enforcement since on its face, it is tainted with want of jurisdiction,
want of notice to private respondent, collusion and/or fraud, and there is a clear
mistake of law or fact. Dismissal was denied by the trial court considering that the
grounds relied upon are not the proper grounds in a motion to dismiss under Rule 16
of the Revised Rules of Court.
Trial court rendered its Decision dated October 14, 1991 dismissing
petitioner's complaint. Petitioner interposed an appeal with the Court of Appeals,
but the appellate court dismissed the same and affirmed the decision of the trial
court in a Decision dated May 19, 1993.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in denying recognition and enforcement of the
Malaysian Court judgment
RULING:
Yes. A foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in the country from
which it comes, until a contrary showing, on the basis of a presumption of regularity
of proceedings and the giving of due notice in the foreign forum. Under Section
50(b), Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court, which was the governing law at the

time the instant case was decided by the trial court and respondent appellate court,
a judgment, against a person, of a tribunal of a foreign country having jurisdiction
to pronounce the same is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties
and their successors in interest by a subsequent title. The judgment may, however,
be assailed by evidence of want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
In the instant case, petitioner sufficiently established the existence of the
money judgment of the High Court of Malaya by the evidence it offered. It was
sufficiently proven through other documents the existence and authenticity of the
foreign judgment, said foreign judgment enjoys presumptive validity and the burden
then fell upon the party who disputes its validity, herein private respondent, to
prove otherwise.
Private respondent failed to sufficiently discharge the burden that fell upon it
to prove by clear and convincing evidence the grounds which it relied upon to
prevent enforcement of the Malaysian High Court judgment. In this case, it is the
procedural law of Malaysia where the judgment was rendered that determines the
validity of the service of court process on private respondent as well as other
matters raised.

Priscilla C. Mijares vs. Hon. Santiago Javier Ranada
G.R. No. 139325. April 12, 2005
Tinga, J.
Facts:
Petitioners are prominent victims of human rights violations during the
Martial Law.
On 9 May 1991, a complaint was filed with the United States District Court
(US District Court), District of Hawaii, against the Estate of former Philippine
President Ferdinand E. Marcos (Marcos Estate). The action was brought forth by ten
Filipino citizens who each alleged having suffered human rights abuses such as
arbitrary detention, torture and rape in the hands of police or military forces during
the Marcos regime. Trial ensued, and subsequently a jury rendered a verdict and an
award of compensatory and exemplary damages in favor of the plaintiff class. Then,
on 3 February 1995, the US District Court, presided by Judge Manuel L. Real,
rendered a Final Judgment (Final Judgment)awarding the plaintiff class a total of
$1,964,005,859.90.
The Final Judgment was eventually affirmed by the US Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit, in a decision rendered on 17 December 1996.
On 20 May 1997, the present petitioners filed Complaint with the Makati RTC
for the enforcement of the Final Judgment. On 5 February 1998, the Marcos Estate
filed a motion to dismiss, raising, among others, the non-payment of the correct
filing fees. It alleged that petitioners had only paid P410.00 as docket and filing
fees, notwithstanding the fact that they sought to enforce a monetary amount of
damages in the amount of over US$2.25 Billion
On 9 September 1998, respondent Judge Santiago Javier Ranada of the Makati
RTC issued the subject Order dismissing the complaint without prejudice.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which Judge Ranada denied.
Petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 assailing the twin orders of
respondent judge.
Issue:
Whether or not the foreign judgment can be recognized and enforced in the
Philippines
Ruling:
Yes. The amount paid as docket fees by the petitioners on the premise that
it was an action incapable of pecuniary estimation corresponds to the same amount
required for other actions not involving property. The petitioners thus paid the
correct amount of filing fees, and it was a grave abuse of discretion for respondent
judge to have applied instead a clearly inapplicable rule and dismissed the
complaint.

Section 48, Rule 39 acknowledges that the Final Judgment is not conclusive yet,
but presumptive evidence of a right of the petitioners against the Marcos Estate.
Moreover, the Marcos Estate is not precluded to present evidence, if any, of want
of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law
or fact. This ruling, decisive as it is on the question of filing fees and no other, does
not render verdict on the enforceability of the Final Judgment before the courts
under the jurisdiction of the Philippines, or for that matter any other issue which
may legitimately be presented before the trial court. Such issues are to be litigated
before the trial court, but within the confines of the matters for proof as laid down
in Section 48, Rule 39. On the other hand, the speedy resolution of this claim by the
trial court is encouraged, and contumacious delay of the decision on the merits will
not be brooked by this Court.

Omanfil International Manpower Development Corp. vs. NLRC

G.R. No. 130339. December 22, 1998
Puno, J.
Facts:
Eduardo O. Felipe was married to the Lora Felipe (complainant) and the union
produced a child, Michelle F. Felipe. Eduardo O. Felipe was hired by Hyundai
Engineering and Construction Co., Ltd., through its local agent Omanfil International
Manpower Development Corporation, as Offshore Rigger sometime on February 7,
1993.
On or about June 7, 1993, the ferry boat where Eduardo Felipe was on board
met an accident, claiming the life of one worker but the body of Eduardo Felipe was
never found, despite diligent efforts to locate the same. Omanfil received from the
Melaka Labor Office a certification which provides that payment must be made in
accordance with the Labor law of Malaysia a computation was presented wherein
the RM 1,655 monthly income multiplied to 45 months is RM 74, 498 or RM 14, 400
whichever is less. The money shall be paid to PBN/PPB or to the next of kin of the
deceased. The Melaka Labor Office issued a receipt showing that Hyundai
Engineering deposited RM14,400.00 with the Melaka Labor Office. The issue raised
before the Labor Arbiter is the amount of death benefits due the complainant and
whether the deposit made by Hyundai with the Melaka Labor Office constitutes valid
payment. Complainant alleges that the amount should be US$27,902.02 and that the
deposit made by Hyundai Engineering to the Melaka Labor Office did not constitute
payment. Respondents contend that the complainant is only entitled to RM14,400.00
or US$5,393.29 and that their deposit of the said amount with the Melaka Labor
Office extinguished their obligation.
Labor Arbiter ordered petitioner to pay private respondent US$27,902.02 as

death benefit and 10% thereof as attorney's fees. NLRC affirmed the decision of the
Labor Arbiter.
ISSUE
Whether or not the complainant is entitled to RM 14, 000 or to $27, 902 (how
should the Certification and the Workmen's Compensation Act of Malaysia be
interpreted)
RULING:
Section 8 of the Workmen's Compensation Act of Malaysia provides that
'Where death has resulted from the injury, a lump sum equal to forty five months
earnings or fourteen thousand four hundred ringgit, whichever is the less. The Court
held that there is no ambiguity in the Computation/Certification from the Malacca
Labor Office. The computation is in complete accord with Section 8 of the

Workmen's Compensation Act of Malaysia. Clearly what is due to the private
respondent as death benefit is 14,400 Malaysian Ringgit since that amount is less
than US $27,902.02.
Section 10 of the Workmen's Compensation Law of Malaysia prescribes the mode

of payment of compensation of death benefits which provides that the payment of
compensation shall be made by depositing with the Commissioner and any such
payment made directly to any dependent of a deceased workman or to any woman
or minor shall be deemed not to be a payment of compensation for the purposes of
this Act. The receipt of the Commissioner shall be a sufficient discharge for any
compensation deposited with him."
Petitioner complied with this provision when Hyundai deposited the amount of
RM14,400 with the Office of the Director of Labour of Melaka. Private respondent
was thereafter duly informed of this deposit. Petitioner cannot now be faulted by
the public respondent for complying with the said law of Malaysia. Resultantly, we
hold that it has discharged its monetary obligation to the private respondent.

Wildvalley Shipping Co., Ltd. vs. CA

G.R. No. 119602 October 6, 2000
Facts:
The vessel Philippine Roxas, owned by respondent Philippine President Lines,
Inc. (PPLI), whose captain (master) was Captain Nicandro Colon ran aground the
Orinoco River while exiting the Puerto Ordaz in Valenzuela. When the vessel ran
aground the river, Captain Nicandro was with a Venezuelan Pilot Mr. Ezzar del Valle
Solarzano Vasquez. Due to the vessel running aground, the ingress and egress of
vessels in the river was obstructed, as a result the vessel Malandrinon owned by
petitioner Wildvalley shipping Co., Ltd. was unable to sail out of Puerto Ordaz which
caused the delay of the delivery of its cargo. Wildvalley then filed a suit against PPLI
and its insurer for damages and unearned profits due to the delay caused to their
vessel. Wildvalley avers that the applicable law should be that of Valenzuelan Laws
particularly The Reglamento General de la Ley de Pilotaje which provides that the
Captain and the owner of the vessel shall be liable for the same, as proof of the said
foreign law Wildvalley presented a photocopy of the Gaceta Oficial of the Republic
of Valenzuela where said law is published.
Issue:
Whether or not the foreign law should be given effect in the Philippine Courts
Ruling:
For a copy of a foreign public document to be admissible, the following
requisites are mandatory: (1) It must be attested by the officer having legal custody
of the records or by his deputy; and (2) It must be accompanied by a certificate by
a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consular or
consular agent or foreign service officer, and with the seal of his office. The latter
requirement is not a mere technicality but is intended to justify the giving of full
faith and credit to the genuineness of a document in a foreign country. Wildvalley
only presented a photocopy of the said foreign law and failed to accompany the
same with a certification of the person having legal custody of said law. Thus,
Philippine pilotage laws should govern the case which provides that the Pilot is a
superior of the Captain and shall be held liable for any damages or injuries caused
by the vessel during his pilotage of the same.

Menandro B. Laureano vs. CA

G.R. No. 114776 February 2, 2000
Facts:
Petitioner was employed as a Pilot by the defendant company originally
piloting a B-707 aircraft. Petitioner was then trained by the company to pilot A-300
aircrafts and was later promoted to pilot said aircraft. Following a recession, the
defendant company decided to terminate its excess personnel. Unfortunately,
petitioner was one of those terminated. Petitioner filed a case of illegal dismissal
before the Labor Arbiter upon his return to the Philippines. The defendant company
contends that the tribunal lacks jurisdiction and that since all the documents
pertaining to petitioners employment was executed in Singapore, Singaporean laws
should apply.
Issue:
Whether or not Singaporean Laws should govern the case
Ruling:
Defendant company has failed to provide proof of the existence of the
Singaporean law in which it invokes, it has failed comply with the following
requirements in order for a foreign law to be applied in the Philippines: (1) It must
be attested by the officer having legal custody of the records or by his deputy; and
(2) It must be accompanied by a certificate by a secretary of the embassy or
legation, consul general, consul, vice consular or consular agent or foreign service
officer, and with the seal of his office. Thus, Philippine Labor Laws shall govern the
case. Furthermore, respondent Court of Appeals acquired jurisdiction when
defendant filed its appeal before said court. On this matter, respondent court was
correct when it barred defendant-appellant below from raising further the issue of
jurisdiction.

EDI-Staffbuilders International, Inc. vs NLRC and Eleazar S. Gran

G.R. No. 145587 October 26, 2007
Facts:
Petitioner is a recruitment agency who recruited respondent Gran as an
Overseas Filipino Worker (OFW) to work for Omar Ahmed Ali Bin Bechr Est. (OAB) in
Saudi Arabia as a Computer Specialist for a period of two years. After only having
been working in OAB for five months, Gran was terminated by OAB based on the
ground of non-compliance with contract requirements and pre-qualification
requirements for the position and insubordination or disobedience to orders of top
management. Upon arrival at the Philippines, Gran filed a case of illegal dismissal
and underpayment against EDI and OAB with the Labor Arbiter. The labor arbiter
ruled in favour of Petitioner until the decision was reversed by the Court of Appeals
by stating that Gran was entitled to the benefits he would have received during the
two years he is supposed to be employed. Petitioner now contends that the contract
signed by Gran states that it is Saudi Law that should govern the terms of his
employment and therefore the same cannot be based on Philippine Labor laws.
Issue:
Will Saudi law govern the case?
Ruling:
No. Saudi law will not govern the case. For a foreign law to be recognized by
the Philippine Courts the following requisites must be complied with: (1) It must be
attested by the officer having legal custody of the records or by his deputy; and (2)
It must be accompanied by a certificate by a secretary of the embassy or legation,
consul general, consul, vice consular or consular agent or foreign service officer,
and with the seal of his office. Unfortunately for petitioner, it did not prove the
pertinent Saudi laws on the matter; thus, the International Law doctrine of
presumed-identity approach or processual presumption comes into play. Where a
foreign law is not pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not proved, the presumption is
that foreign law is the same as ours. Thus, we apply Philippine labor laws in
determining the case.

Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgment
Oil and Natural Gas Commission vs. Court of Appeals

GR 114323 July 23, 1998
Facts:
Petitioner is a foreign corporation owned and controlled by the Government
of India, while respondent Pacific Cement Company is organized under the laws of
the Philippines. There exists a contract between them whereby respondent is to
supply 4,300 metric tons of oil well cement, and petitioner is bound to pay
$477,300.00 by opening an irrevocable letter of credit in favor of the latter. The oil
well cement is loaded by MV Surutana Nava at Surigao City for deliver at India. But
due to a dispute between the shipowner and respondent, the cargo was held up in
Bangkok and did not reach its destination. Despite receipt of the payment and
several demands, respondent still failed to deliver the oil well cement. Negotiations
ensued and agreed that respondent will replace the oil well cement with Class G
cement cost free at the petitioners designated port. But upon inspection, the Class
G cement did not conform to the petitioners specifications.
Petitioner informed respondent that it was referring its claim to an arbitrator

pursuant to Clause 16 of their contract. The venue of the arbitration is in Dehra
Dun. The arbitrator resolved in favor of the petitioner. Respondent refused to pay
the amount adjudged by the foreign court. Petitioner then filed a complaint with
RTC Surigao for the enforcement of the judgment of the foreign court. The court
held that the dispute between the parties to the arbitrator under Clause 16 of their
contract is erroneous. Thus, the proceedings before the arbitrator were null and
void and the foreign court had adopted no legal award which could be the source of
an enforceable right. On appeal, CA affirmed the lower courts decision.
Issue:
Is the judgement of the foreign court enforceable in the Philippines?
Ruling:
Yes. As specified in the order of the foreign court, Award paper No. 3/B-1
shall be part of the decree. It contains an exhaustive discussion of the respective
claims and defences of the parties, and the arbitrators evaluation of the same. The
constitutional mandate that no decision shall be rendered by any court without
expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based
does not preclude the validity of memorandum decisions which adopt by reference
the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained in the decisions of the inferior
tribunal. In many cases, incorporation by reference is allowed if only to avoid the
cumbersome reproduction of the decision of the lower courts in the decision of the
higher court.

The recognition to be accorded a foreign judgment is not necessarily affected
by the fact that the procedure in the courts of the country in which such judgment
was rendered differed from that of the court in which the judgment is relied on.
Matters of remedy and procedure are governed by the lex fori or the internal
law of the forum. Thus if under the procedural rules of Civil Court of Dehra Dun,
India, a valid judgment may be rendered by adopting the arbitrators findings, then
the same must be respected.
The foreign judgment being valid, there is nothing left for the courts to do
but to enforce it.

Philsec Investment Corp vs. Court of Appeals

GR No. 103493 June 19, 1997
Facts:
Respondent Ducat obtained separate loans from petitioners Ayala and Philsec
in the sum of US$2.5 Million, secured by shares of stock owned by Ducat with a
market value of 14,088,995. In order to facilitate the payment of the loans,
respondent Daic assumed Ducats obligation under an Agreement whereby 1488 Inc.
executed a Warranty Deed with Vendors Lien by which it sold to petitioner Athona
Holdings a parcel of land in Texas, USA, while Philsec and Ayala extended a loan to
Athona as initial payment of the purchase price. The balance was to be paid by
means of a promissory note executed by Athona in favor of 1488 Inc. subsequently,
upon their receipt of the money, Philsec and Ayala released Ducat from his
indebtedness and delivered to 1488 Inc. all the shares of stock in their possession
belonging to Ducat.
As Athona failed to pay the interest on the balance, the entire amounts
covered by the note become due and demandable. Accordingly, 1488 Inc. sued
Philsec, Ayala and Athona in the US for the payment of the balance and for damages
for breach of contract and for fraud allegedly by petitioners in misrepresenting the
marketability of the shares of stock delivered to 1488 Inc. under the Agreement.
While the civil case in the US was pending, petitioners filed a complaint for
sum of money with damages against respondents in the RTC Makati. The complaint
reiterated their allegations in their civil action in the US Court that respondent
committed fraud in selling the property at a price 400% more than its value. The
trial court ruled that the evidentiary requirements of the controversy may be more
suitably tried before the forum of the litis pendentia in the US, under the principle
in private international law of forum non conveniens. The court granted Ducats
motion to dismiss. CA affirmed the dismissal of the case on the ground of litis
pendentia.
Issue:
Is the civil case in RTC Makati barred by the judgment of the US Court?
Ruling:
No. While the Court has given the effect of res judicata to foreign judgments
in several cases, it was only after the parties opposed to the judgment had been
given ample opportunity to repel them on grounds allowed under the la. This is
because in this jurisdiction, with respect to actions in personam, as distinguished
from actions in rem, a foreign judgment merely constitutes prima facie evidence of
the justness of the claim of a part and as such, is subject to proof to the contrary.

In the case at bar, it cannot be said that petitioners were given the
opportunity to challenge the judgment of the US Court as basis for declaring it res
judicata. The proceedings were summary. Neither the trial court nor the appellate
court was even furnished copies of the pleadings in the US Court or apprised of the
evidence thereat, to assure the proper determination of whether the issues then
being litigated in the US Court were exactly the issued raised in this case such that
judgment that might be rendered would constitute res judicata.

Bank of America NT & SA vs. American Realty Corp.

GR No. 133876 December 29, 1999
Facts:
Petitioner is an international banking and financial institution duly licensed
to do business in the Philippines, but organized under the laws of California.
Respondent is a domestic corporation. Petitioner granted 3 major multimillion US
dollar loans to (1) Liberian Transport Navigation, (2) El Challenger SA, and (3) Eshley
Compania Naviera SA. They are all existing under the law of Panama, and are foreign
affiliates of respondent.
Due to the default of payment of the loan, petitioner and the three borrowers
entered into a restructuring agreement. Respondent also executed two REM. The
borrowers defaulted in the payment of the restructured loans. Petitioner then filed
a civil action before the foreign courts (England and Hong Kong) for the collection
of the loan. Petitioner filed before the Office of the Provincial Sherriff of Bulacan,
an application for extrajudicial foreclosure of REM. The properties were sold in
auction.
Respondent filed before Pasig RTC an action for damages against petitioner.
The court rendered a decision on favor of respondent, declaring that the filing in
foreign courts by the defendant of collection suits operated as a waiver of security
of the mortgages. CA affirmed.
Issue:
Whether or not the English law will apply
Ruling:
No. The Philippine law will apply despite evidence presented by petitioner to
prove that the English law on the matter. It is a principle that in our jurisdiction,
there is no judicial notice of any foreign law; and even if it is properly pleaded or
proved, the Court ruled that it shall not find applicability. When the foreign law,
judgment or contract is contrary to a sound and established public policy of the
forum, the said foreign law, judgment or contract shall not apply.
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts, or property and those which
have for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be
rendered ineffective by the law or judgment promulgated or by determinations or
conventions agreed upon in a foreign country. The public policy sought to be
protected in the case is the principle imbedded in our jurisdiction proscribing the
splitting of a single cause of action. Foreign law should not be applied when its
application would work undeniable injustice to the citizens of the forum. To give
justice is the most important function of the law. A law or judgment or contract
that is obviously unjust negates the fundamental principles of Conflicts of Law.

Northwest Orient Airlines, Inc. vs. CA

G.R. No. 112573 February 9, 1995
First Division, Padilla, Jr., J.
Facts:
Petitioner Northwest Orient Airlines, Inc. (NORTHWEST), a corporation
organized under the laws of the State of Minnesota, U.S.A., sought to enforce in the
RTC- Manila, a judgment rendered in its favor by a Japanese court against private
respondent C.F. Sharp & Company, Inc., (SHARP), a corporation incorporated under
Philippine laws.
On May 9, 1974, Northwest Airlines and Sharp, through its Japan branch,
entered into an International Passenger Sales Agency Agreement, whereby the
former authorized the latter to sell its air transportation tickets. Unable to remit
the proceeds of the ticket sales made by defendant on behalf of the plaintiff under
the said agreement, plaintiff on March 25, 1980 sued defendant in Tokyo, Japan, for
collection of the unremitted proceeds of the ticket sales, with claim for damages.
On April 11, 1980, a writ of summons was issued by the 36th Civil Department,
Tokyo District Court of Japan against defendant at its office at the Taiheiyo Building,
3rd floor, 132, Yamashita-cho, Naka-ku, Yokohoma, Kanagawa Prefecture. The
attempt to serve the summons was unsuccessful because the bailiff was advised by
a person in the office that Mr. Dinozo, the person believed to be authorized to
receive court processes was in Manila and would be back on April 24, 1980.
On April 24, 1980, bailiff returned to the defendants office to serve the
summons. Mr. Dinozo refused to accept the same claiming that he was no longer an
employee of the defendant.
After the two attempts of service were unsuccessful, the judge of the Tokyo
District Court decided to have the complaint and the writs of summons served at
the head office of the defendant in Manila.
On July 11, 1980, the Director of the Tokyo District Court requested the
Supreme Court of Japan to serve the summons through diplomatic channels upon
the defendants head office in Manila. Two months later, defendant received from
Deputy Sheriff Rolando Balingit the writ of summons. Despite receipt of the same,
defendant failed to appear at the scheduled hearing.
The Tokyo Court proceeded to hear the plaintiffs complaint and rendered
judgment ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of 83,158,195 Yen and
damages for delay at the rate of 6% per annum from August 28, 1980 up to and until
payment is completed. On March 24, 1981, defendant received from Deputy Sheriff
Balingit copy of the judgment. Defendant not having appealed the judgment, the
same became final and executory.

Plaintiff was unable to execute the decision in Japan, hence, on May 20, 1983,
a suit for enforcement of the judgment was filed by plaintiff before the Regional
Trial Court of Manila Branch 54.
Defendant filed its answer averring that the judgment of the Japanese Court:
(1) the foreign judgment sought to be enforced is null and void for want of
jurisdiction and (2) the said judgment is contrary to Philippine law and public policy
and rendered without due process of law.
In its decision, the Court of Appeals sustained the trial court. It agreed with
the latter in its reliance upon Boudard vs. Tait wherein it was held that the process
of the court has no extraterritorial effect and no jurisdiction is acquired over the
person of the defendant by serving him beyond the boundaries of the state. To
support its position, the Court of Appeals further stated:
In an action strictly in personam, such as the instant case, personal service of
summons within the forum is required for the court to acquire jurisdiction over the
defendant. To confer jurisdiction on the court, personal or substituted service of
summons on the defendant not extraterritorial service is necessary.
Issue:
Whether a Japanese court can acquire jurisdiction over a Philippine
corporation doing business in Japan by serving summons through diplomatic channels
on the Philippine corporation at its principal office in Manila after prior attempts to
serve summons in Japan had failed
Ruling:
YES. A foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in the country
from which it comes, until the contrary is shown. It is also proper to presume the
regularity of the proceedings and the giving of due notice therein.
The judgment may, however, be assailed by evidence of want of jurisdiction, want
of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
It is settled that matters of remedy and procedure such as those relating to
the service of process upon a defendant are governed by the lex fori or the internal
law of the forum. In this case, it is the procedural law of Japan where the judgment
was rendered that determines the validity of the extraterritorial service of process
on SHARP. As to what this law is a question of fact, not of law.
It was then incumbent upon SHARP to present evidence as to what that Japanese
procedural law is and to show that under it, the assailed extraterritorial service is
invalid. It did not. Accordingly, the presumption of validity and regularity of the
service of summons and the decision thereafter rendered by the Japanese court
must stand. Alternatively in the light of the absence of proof regarding Japanese
law, the presumption of identity or similarity or the so-called processual
presumption may be invoked. Applying it, the Japanese law on the matter is
presumed to be similar with the Philippine law on service of summons on a private
foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines.

Section 14, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides that if the defendant is a
foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines, service may be made: (1) on
its resident agent designated in accordance with law for that purpose, or, (2) if
there is no such resident agent, on the government official designated by law to
that effect; or (3) on any of its officers or agents within the Philippines.
Where the corporation has no such agent, service shall be made on the
government official designated by law, to wit: (a) the Insurance Commissioner in
the case of a foreign insurance company; (b) the Superintendent of Banks, in the
case of a foreign banking corporation; and (c) the Securities and Exchange
Commission, in the case of other foreign corporations duly licensed to do business
in the Philippines.
Nowhere in its pleadings did SHARP profess to having had a resident agent
authorized to receive court processes in Japan.
While it may be true that service could have been made upon any of the
officers or agents of SHARP at its three other branches in Japan, the availability of
such a recourse would not preclude service upon the proper government official, as
stated above. As found by the respondent court, two attempts at service were made
at SHARPs Yokohama branch. Both were unsuccessful.
The Tokyo District Court requested the Supreme Court of Japan to cause the delivery
of the summons and other legal documents to the Philippines. Acting on that
request, the Supreme Court of Japan sent the summons together with the other
legal documents to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan which, in turn, forwarded
the same to the Japanese Embassy in Manila. Thereafter, the court processes were
delivered to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines, then to the Executive
Judge of the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Manila, who
forthwith ordered Deputy Sheriff Rolando Balingit to serve the same on SHARP at its
principal office in Manila. This service is equivalent to service on the proper
government official under Section 14, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, in relation to
Section 128 of the Corporation Code. Hence, SHARPs contention that such manner
of service is not valid under Philippine laws holds no water.

Characterization of Conflict Rules
Saudi Arabian Airlines v. CA

G.R. No. 122191, October 8, 1998
First Division Quisumbing, J.
Facts:
Saudia hired Milagros Morada as a flight Attendant for its airlines based in
Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. While on a lay-over in Jakarta, Morada went to a disco dance
with fellow crew members Thamer and Allah, both Saudi nationals. Because it was
almost morning when they returned to their hotels, they agreed to have breakfast
together at the room of Thamer. When they were in the room, Allah left, and thats
when Thamer attempted to rape Morada. Fortunately, a roomboy and several
security personnel heard her cries for help and rescued her. The Indonesian police
came and arrested Thamer and Allah.
Saudia officials interrogated Morada about the Jakarta incident. They tried
to pressure her in making a statement to drop the case against Thamerand Allah,
but Morada refused to cooperate. Indonesian authorities agreed to deport Thamer
and Allah after 2 weeks of detention, and they were again employed by Saudia.
1 years later, in Riyadh, a few minutes before the departure of her flight
to Manila, Morada was not allowed to board the plane but instead ordered to take a
later flight to Jeddah to see Mr. Miniewy, the Chief Legal Officer of Saudia. When
she did, she was brought to a Saudi court where she was asked to sign a document
written in Arabic. They told her this was necessary to close the case against Thamer
and Allah. As it turned out, Morada signed a notice to her to appear before the
court. Morada returned to Manila.
Later on, Morada was brought to the same Saudi court, and she was informed
that the investigation was merely routinary and posed no danger to her. A Saudi
judge interrogated her through an interpreter about the Jakarta incident. When her
plane was about to take off, a Saudia officer told her that the airline had forbid
den her to take flight. She was escorted to the same court where the judge
rendered a decision sentencing her to 5 months imprisonment and to 286 lashes. It
was then that she realized that the Saudi court tried her, together with Thamerand
Allah, for the Jakarta incident. The court found Morada guilty of adultery,going to
a disco, dancing & listening to the music in violation of Islamic laws, and socializing
with the male crew, in contravention of Islamic tradition
The Prince of Makkah dismissed the case against her and allowed her to leave
Saudi Arabia. She was terminated from the service by Saudia, without her being
informed of the cause. Morada filed a Complaint for Damages against Saudia.
Saudia contends that the trial court has no jurisdiction to try the case.
Moradas claim for alleged abuse of rights occurred in Saudi. The existence of a
foreign element qualifies the instant case for the application of the law of Saudi, by
virtue of the lex loci delicti commissi rule.

Morada contends that since her complaint is based on Arts. 19 and 21 of the
NCC, then the instant case is properly a matter of domestic law.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the instant case is a matter of domestic law.
2. Whether or not Philippine courts have jurisdiction to hear & try
the case.
3. Whether or not Philippine law should govern.
Ruling:
1. NO. A factual situation that cuts across territorial lines and is affected by
the diverse laws of 2 or more states is said to contain a foreign element. In the
instant case, the foreign element consisted in the fact that Morada is a resident
Philippine national, and that Saudia is a resident foreign corporation. Also, by virtue
of the employment of Morada with Saudia as a flight stewardess, events did transpire
during her many occasions of travel across national borders, particularly from Manila
to Jeddah and vice versa, that caused a conflicts situation to arise.
2. YES. The RTC of QC possesses jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
suit. Pragmatic considerations, including the convenience of the parties, also weigh
heavily in favor the RTC of QC assuming jurisdiction. Paramount is the private
interest of the litigant. Enforceability of a judgment if one is obtained is quite
obvious. Relative advantages and obstacles to a fair trial are equally important.
Saudia may not, by choice of an inconvenient form, vex, harass or oppress Morada,
i.e. inflicting upon her needless expense or disturbance. But unless the balance is
strongly in favor of the defendant, the plaintiffs choice of forum should rarely be
disturbed.
Weighing the relative claims of the parties, QC RTC found it best to hear the
case in the Philippines. Had it refused to take cognizance of the case, it would be
forcing Morada to seek remedial action elsewhere, i.e. in Saudi where she no longer
maintains substantial connections. That would have caused a fundamental
unfairness to her. Moreover, by hearing the case in the Philippines no unnecessary
difficulties and inconvenience have been shown by either of the parties. The choice
of forum of Morada should be upheld.
Similarly, the QC RTC also possesses jurisdiction over the persons of the
parties. By filing her Complaint with QC RTC, Morada has voluntary submitted
herself to the jurisdiction of the court. The records show that Saudia filed several
motions praying for the dismissal of Moradas Complaint. Saudia also filed an Answer
in Ex Abundante Cautelam. What is very patent and explicit from the motions filed,
is that Saudia prayed for other reliefs under the premises. Undeniably, Saudia has
effectively submitted to QC RTCs jurisdiction by praying for the dismissal of the
Complaint on grounds other than lack of jurisdiction.

3. YES. Considering that the complaint in the court a quo is one involving
torts, the connecting factor or point of contact could be the place where the
tortuous conduct or lex loci actus occurred. And applying the torts principle in a
conflicts case, the Court held that the Philippines could be said as situs of the tort
(the place where the alleged tortuous conduct took place). This is because it is in
the Philippines where Saudia allegedly deceived Morada, a Filipina residing and
working here. That certain acts or parts of the injury allegedly occurred in another
country is of no moment. What is important is the place where the overall harm or
the fatality of the alleged injury to the person, reputation, social standing and
human rights of complainant, had lodged, according to the Morada.
Also, this also an occasion to apply the State of the most significant
relationship rule, which should be appropriate to apply now, given the factual
context of this case. In applying said principle to determine the State which has the
most significant relationship, the following contacts are to be taken into account
and evaluated according to their relative importance with respect to the particular
issue: (a) the place where the injury occurred; (b) the place where the conduct
causing the injury occurred; (c) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of
incorporation and place of business of the parties, and (d) the place where the
relationship, if any, between the parties is centered.
There is basis for the claim that over-all injury occurred and lodged in the
Philippines. There is likewise no question that Morada is a resident Filipina national,
working with Saudia, a resident foreign corporation engaged here in the business of
international air carriage. Thus, the relationship between the parties was
centered here, although it should be stressed that this suit is not based on mere
labor law violations.

Characterization of Conflict Rules
Bienvenido M. Cadalin v. POEA

G.R. No. L-104776, December 5, 1994
First Division Quiason, J
Facts
This is a consolidation of 3 cases of special civil actions in the Supreme Court
for Certiorari.
On June 6, 1984, Cadalin, Amul and Evangelista, in their own behalf and on
behalf of 728 other OCWs instituted a class suit by filing an Amended Complaint
with the POEA for money claims arising from their recruitment by ASIA
INTERNATIONAL BUILDERS CORPORATION (AIBC) and employment by BROWN & ROOT
INTERNATIONAL, INC (BRII) which is a foreign corporation with headquarters in
Houston, Texas, and is engaged in construction; while AIBC is a domestic corporation
licensed as a service contractor to recruit, mobilize and deploy Filipino workers for
overseas employment on behalf of its foreign principals.
Cadalin et al. are overseas contract workers recruited by respondent-
appellant AIBC for its accredited foreign principal, Brown & Root, on various dates
from 1975 to 1983. As such, they were all deployed at various projects in several
countries in the Middle East as well as in Southeast Asia, in Indonesia and Malaysia.
The amended complaint sought the payment of the unexpired portion of the
employment contracts, which was terminated prematurely, and secondarily, the
payment of the interest of the earnings of the Travel and Reserved Fund; interest
on all the unpaid benefits; area wage and salary differential pay; fringe benefits;
reimbursement of SSS and premium not remitted to the SSS; refund of withholding
tax not remitted to the BIR; penalties for committing prohibited practices; as well
as the suspension of the license of AIBC and the accreditation of BRII.
The case rooted from the Labor Law enacted by Bahrain where most of the
complainants were deployed. His Majesty Ise Bin Selman Al Kaifa, Amir of Bahrain,
issued his Amiri Decree No. 23 on June 16, 1176, otherwise known re the Labour Law
for the Private Sector. Some of the provision of Amiri Decree No. 23 that are relevant
to the claims of the complainants-appellants are as follows:
Art. 107: A contract of employment made for a period of indefinite

duration may be terminated by either party thereto after giving the other
party prior notice before such termination, in writing, in respect of monthly
paid workers and fifteen days notice in respect of other workers. The party
terminating a contract without the required notice shall pay to the other
party compensation equivalent to the amount of wages payable to the worker
for the period of such notice or the unexpired portion thereof.
Art. Ill: x x x the employer concerned shall pay to such worker, upon
termination of employment, a leaving indemnity for the period of his

employment calculated on the basis of fifteen days wages for each year of
the first three years of service and of one months wages for each year of
service thereafter. Such worker shall be entitled to payment of leaving
indemnity upon a quantum meruit in proportion to the period of his service
completed within a year.
Issue:
Whether or not the Bahrain Law should apply in the case and assuming it is
applicable whether or not complainants claim for the benefits provided therein
have prescribed
Ruling:
NO. As a general rule, a foreign procedural law will not be applied in the
forum. Procedural matters, such as service of process, joinder of actions, period
and requisites for appeal, and so forth, are governed by the laws of the forum. This
is true even if the action is based upon a foreign substantive law.
A law on prescription of actions is sui generis in Conflict of Laws in the sense

that it may be viewed either as procedural or substantive, depending on the
characterization given such a law.
However, the characterization of a statute into a procedural or substantive

law becomes irrelevant when the country of the forum has a borrowing statute.
Said statute has the practical effect of treating the foreign statute of limitation as
one of substance. A borrowing statute directs the state of the forum to apply the
foreign statute of limitations to the pending claims based on a foreign law. While
there are several kinds of borrowing statutes, one form provides that an action
barred by the laws of the place where it accrued, will not be enforced in the forum
even though the local statute has not run against it. Section 48 of our Code of Civil
Procedure is of this kind. Said Section provides:
If by the laws of the state or country where the cause of action arose, the
action is barred, it is also barred in the Philippine Islands.
In the light of the 1987 Constitution, however, Section 48 cannot be s insofar
as it ordains the application in this jurisdiction of Section 156 of the Amiri Decree
No. 23 of 1976.
The courts of the forum will not enforce any foreign claims obnoxious to the
forums public policy. To enforce the one-year prescriptive period of the Amiri
Decree No. 23 of 1976 as regards the claims in question would contravene the public
policy on the protection to labor. Thus, the applicable law on prescription is the
Philippine law.

Nationality Theory
Petition For Leave To Resume Practice Of Law, Benjamin M. Dacanay

540 SCRA 424
Facts:
Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960.He practiced law
until he migrated to Canada in December 1998 to seek medical attention for his
ailments. He subsequently applied for Canadian citizenship to avail of Canada's free
medical aid program. He became a Canadian citizen in May 2004
On July 14, 2006, pursuant to RA 9225, petitioner reacquired his Philippine

citizenship. He took his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen before the Philippine
consulate general in Toronto, Canada. Thereafter, he returned to the Philippines
and now intends to resume his law practice
Issue:
Whether petitioner lost his membership in the Philippine bar when he gave
up his Philippine citizenship in May 2004
Ruling:
No. Practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. It is so delicately
affected with public interest that is both a power and duty of the state to control
and regulate it in order to protect and promote the public welfare.
Any breach by a lawyer of any of the conditions makes him unworthy of the
trust and confidence which the courts and client repose in him for the continued
exercise of his professional privilege.
Admission to the bar requires certain qualifications. The rules of court
mandates that an applicant for admission to the bar be a citizen of the Philippines,
at least twenty one years of age, of good moral Character and a resident of the
Philippines.
The constitution provides that the practice of all professions in the
Philippines shall be limited to Filipino citizens save in cases prescribed by law. Since
Filipino citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar, loss thereof terminates
membership in the Philippine bar and consequently the privilege to engage in the
practice of law. The practice of law is a privileged denied to foreigners.
The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of naturalization
as a citizen of another country but subsequently acquired pursuant to RA9225. This
is because all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be
deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship.
Therefore, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country is
deemed never to have lost his Philippine citizenship if he reacquires it in accordance
with RA 9225. Although he is also deemed never to have terminated his membership
in the Philippine bar, no automatic right to resume law practice accrues. He must
first secure from the court the authority to do so.

Nationality Theory
Mayor Jose Ugdoracion, Jr., vs. COMELEC

GR NO. 179851, APRIL 18, 2008
Facts:
Ugdoracion and Tungol were rival mayoralty candidates in the municipality of
Albuquerque province of Bohol. Tungol filed a petition to deny due course or cancel
the certificate of candidacy of Ugdoracion, contending that Ugdoracion's declaration
of eligibility for mayor constituted material misrepresentation because he is actually
a green card holder or a permanent resident of USA. He stated in his COC that he
resided in Albuquerque for forty one years before May 14, 2007 and he is not a
permanent resident or an immigrant to a foreign country. It appears that Ugdoracion
became a permanent resident in USA on September 26, 2001. Ugdoracion alleged
that he retained his domicile of origin notwithstanding his ostensible acquisition of
permanent residency in the USA. COMELEC cancelled Ugdoracion's COC - material
representation
Issues:
Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in cancelling
Ugdoracion's COC for material representation
Ruling:
No grave abuse of discretion.
Section 74, in relation to section 78 of the omnibus election code, requires
that the facts stated In the COC must be true, and any false representation therein
of a material fact shall be a ground for cancellation thereof. A material fact refers
to a candidate's qualification for elective office such as one's citizenship and
residence. It is the deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which
would otherwise render a candidate ineligible.
Caasi vs Court of Appeals - that a Filipino citizen's acquisition of a permanent
resident status abroad constitutes an abandonment of his domicile and residence in
the Philippines. A green card status in the USA is a renunciation of one's status as a
resident of the Philippines.
Residence, In contemplation of election laws, is synonymous to domicile.
Domicile is the place where one actually or constructively has his permanent home,
where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends
to return (animus revertendi ) and remain (animus manendi). It consists not only in
the intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place,
coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.
Domicile is classified into

1. Domicile of origin - acquired by every person at birth
2. Domicile of choice - acquired upon abandonment of the domicile of origin
3. Domicile by operation of law - which the law attributes to a person
independently of his residence or intention.

Three basic rules
1. A man must have a residence or domicile somewhere
2. Domicile, once established, remains until a new one is validly acquired
3. A man can have but one residence or domicile at any given time.
The general rule is that domicile of origin is not easily lost, it is only when there is
actual removal or change of domicile, Nona dude intention of abandoning the former
residence and establishing a new one, and acts which correspond with such purpose.
In the instant case however Ugdoracion's acquisition of lawful permanent resident
status in the USA amounted to an abandonment and renunciation of his status as a
resident of the Philippines.

Marriage as a Status
Philip Matthews Vs. Benjamin A. Taylor And Joselyn C. Taylor

G.R. No. 164584 June 22, 2009
Facts:
On June 30, 1988, respondent Benjamin, a British subject, married Joselyn, a
17-year old Filipina. On June 9, 1989, while their marriage was subsisting, Joselyn
bought from Diosa M. Martin a lot (Boracay property). The sale was allegedly
financed by Benjamin. Joselyn and Benjamin, also using the latters funds,
constructed improvements thereon and eventually converted the property to a
vacation and tourist resort known as the Admiral Ben Bow Inn. All required permits
and licenses for the operation of the resort were obtained in the name of Ginna
Celestino, Joselyns sister. However, Benjamin and Joselyn had a falling out, and
Joselyn ran away with Kim Philippsen. On June 8, 1992, Joselyn executed a SPA in
favor of Benjamin, authorizing the latter to maintain, sell, lease, and sub-lease and
otherwise enter into contract with third parties with respect to their Boracay
property. On July 20, 1992, Joselyn as lessor and petitioner Philip Matthews as
lessee, entered into an Agreement of Lease involving the Boracay property for a
period of 25 years, with an annual rental of P12,000.00. Petitioner thereafter took
possession of the property and renamed the resort as Music Garden Resort.
Claiming that the Agreement was null and void since it was entered into by
Joselyn without Benjamins consent, Benjamin instituted an action for Declaration
of Nullity of Agreement of Lease with Damages against Joselyn and the petitioner.
Benjamin claimed that his funds were used in the acquisition and improvement of
the Boracay property, and coupled with the fact that he was Joselyns husband, any
transaction involving said property required his consent.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the Agreement of Lease of a parcel of land entered into by a
Filipino wife without the consent of her British husband is valid
2. Whether or not Benjamin is the actual owner of the property since he
provided the funds used in purchasing the same
Ruling:
Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution states:

Section 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private
lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals,
corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the
public domain.
Aliens, whether individuals or corporations, have been disqualified from
acquiring lands of the public domain. Hence, by virtue of the aforecited
constitutional provision, they are also disqualified from acquiring private lands. The
primary purpose of this constitutional provision is the conservation of the national

patrimony. Our fundamental law cannot be any clearer. The right to acquire lands
of the public domain is reserved only to Filipino citizens or corporations at least
sixty percent of the capital of which is owned by Filipinos.
The rule is clear and inflexible: aliens are absolutely not allowed to acquire
public or private lands in the Philippines, save only in constitutionally recognized
exceptions. There is no rule more settled than this constitutional prohibition, as
more and more aliens attempt to circumvent the provision by trying to own lands
through another.
Benjamin has no right to nullify the Agreement of Lease between Joselyn and
petitioner. Benjamin, being an alien, is absolutely prohibited from acquiring private
and public lands in the Philippines. Considering that Joselyn appeared to be the
designated "vendee" in the Deed of Sale of said property, she acquired sole
ownership thereto. This is true even if we sustain Benjamins claim that he provided
the funds for such acquisition. By entering into such contract knowing that it was
illegal, no implied trust was created in his favor; no reimbursement for his expenses
can be allowed; and no declaration can be made that the subject property was part
of the conjugal/community property of the spouses. In any event, he had and has
no capacity or personality to question the subsequent lease of the Boracay property
by his wife on the theory that in so doing, he was merely exercising the prerogative
of a husband in respect of conjugal property. To sustain such a theory would
countenance indirect controversion of the constitutional prohibition. If the property
were to be declared conjugal, this would accord the alien husband a substantial
interest and right over the land, as he would then have a decisive vote as to its
transfer or disposition. This is a right that the Constitution does not permit him to
have.

Marriage as Status
Orions Savings Bank Vs Suzuki

G.R. No. 205487, November 12, 2014
Facts:
Suzuki a Japanese national bought a property (condominium unit and a
parking lot) from Mr. Kang, a Korean national through his agent Soneja. A deed of
absolute sale was executed, however even after several demands from Mr Suzuki to
have the titles of the properties delivered by Mr Kang, still he failed to deliver the
documents. Later he found out that Kang has already left Philippines, this prompted
Suzuki to verify the status of the property.
Suzuki learned the title to the Parking Slot No. 42 contained no annotations
although it remained under the name of Cityland Pioneer. This notwithstanding,
Cityland Pioneer, through Assistant Vice President Rosario D. Perez, certified that
Kang had fully paid the purchase price of Unit. No. 536 10 and Parking Slot No. 42.
The title to the condominium unit had no existing encumbrance, except for
annotation which provided that any conveyance or encumbrance of CCT No. 18186
shall be subject to approval by the Philippine Retirement Authority (PRA). Although
the title to the condominium contained an annotation representing a mortgage in
favor of Orion for a P1,000,000.00 loan, that annotation was subsequently cancelled
on June 16, 2000 by Entry No. 73232/T. No. 10186. Despite the cancellation of the
mortgage to Orion, the titles to the properties remained in possession of Perez.
To protect his interests, Suzuki then executed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim

with the Registry of Deeds of Mandaluyong City. Suzuki then demanded the delivery
of the titles.13 Orion, (through Perez), however, refused to surrender the titles.
Thereafter, Suzuki received a letter from Orions counsel dated stating that
Kang obtained another loan in the amount of P1,800,000.00. When Kang failed to
pay, he executed a Dacion en Pago dated February 2, 2003, in favorof Orion covering
Unit No. 536. Orion, however, did not register the Dacion en Pago, until October 15,
2003. The registration was made only after Suzukis demand for the delivery of the
titles to the properties.
Suzuki thus then executed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim over Parking Slot No.
42. Suzuki filed a complaint for specific performance and damages against Kang and
Orion. Both the RTC and the CA ruled in favor of Suzukis right over the properties
in litigation, contending that he was a buyer in good faith and the dacion was
belatedly registered, only two months after the sale has been executed. Orion
elevated the case to the Supreme Court contending that the deed of sale executed
was null and void for under the Korean law the sale of a conjugal properties should
be made with the consent of both spouses.
Issue:
What law shall govern in the case at bar?

Ruling:
Philippine Law governs the transfer of real property. Orion believes that the
CA erred in not ruling on the issue of spousal consent. We cannot uphold this
position, however, because the issue of spousal consent was only raised on appeal
to the CA. It is a well-settled principle that points of law, theories, issues, and
arguments not brought to the attention of the trial court cannot be raised for the
first time on appeal and considered by a reviewing court. To consider these belated
arguments would violate basic principles of fairplay, justice, and due process.
Having said these, we shall nonetheless discuss the issues Orion belatedly
raised, if only to put an end to lingering doubts on the correctness of the denial of
the present petition.
It is a universal principle that real or immovable property is exclusively

subject to the laws of the country or state where it is located. The reason is found
in the very nature of immovable property its immobility. Immovables are part of
the country and so closely connected to it that all rights over them have their natural
center of gravity there.
Thus, all matters concerning the titleand disposition ofreal property are
determined by what is known as the lex loci rei sitae, which can alone prescribe the
mode by which a title canpass from one person to another, or by which an interest
therein can be gained or lost. This general principle includes all rules governing the
descent, alienation and transfer of immovable property and the validity, effect and
construction of wills and other conveyances.
This principle even governs the capacity of the person making a deed relating
to immovable property, no matter what its nature may be. Thus, an instrument will
be ineffective to transfer title to land if the person making it is incapacitated by
the lex loci rei sitae, even though under the law of his domicile and by the law of
the place where the instrument is actually made, his capacity is undoubted.
On the other hand, property relations between spouses are governed

principally by the national law of the spouses. However, the party invoking the
application of a foreign law has the burden of proving the foreign law. The foreign
law is a question of fact to be properly pleaded and proved as the judge cannot take
judicial notice of a foreign law. He is presumed to know only domestic or the law of
the forum.
To prove a foreign law, the party invoking it must present a copy thereof and
comply with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court which
reads:
SEC. 24. Proof of official record. The record of public documents referred
to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be
evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer

having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the
record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the
custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the
certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general,
consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the
Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and
authenticated by the seal of his office. (Emphasis supplied)
SEC. 25. What attestation of copy must state. Whenever a copy of a
document or record is attested for the purpose of the evidence, the attestation
must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific
part thereof, as the case may be. The attestation must be under the official seal of
the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court having a seal,
under the seal of such court.
Accordingly, matters concerning the title and disposition of real property

shall be governed by Philippine law while issues pertaining to the conjugal natureof
the property shall be governed by South Korean law, provided it is proven as a fact.
In the present case, Orion, unfortunately failed to prove the South Korean
law on the conjugal ownership ofproperty. It merely attached a "Certification from
the Embassy of the Republic of Korea" to prove the existence of Korean Law. This
certification, does not qualify as sufficient proof of the conjugal nature of the
property for there is no showing that it was properly authenticated bythe seal of his
office, as required under Section 24 of Rule 132.
Accordingly, the International Law doctrine of presumed-identity approachor

processual presumption comes into play, i.e., where a foreign law is not pleaded or,
evenif pleaded, is not proven, the presumption is that foreign law is the same as
Philippine Law.
Under Philippine Law, the phrase "Yung Sam Kang married to' Hyun Sook
Jung" is merely descriptive of the civil status of Kang. In other words, the import
from the certificates of title is that Kang is the owner of the properties as they are
registered in his name alone, and that he is married to Hyun Sook Jung.
We are not unmindful that in numerous cases we have held that registration
of the property in the name of only one spouse does not negate the possibility of it
being conjugal or community property.33 In those cases, however, there was proof
that the properties, though registered in the name of only one spouse, were indeed
either conjugal or community properties.34 Accordingly, we see no reason to declare
as invalid Kangs conveyance in favor of Suzuki for the supposed lack of spousal
consent.

Actions Regarding Marriage
Grace Garcia vs. Rederick Recio

Gr No. 138322, Oct. 2, 2002
Facts:
Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian
Citizen, in Malabon, Rizal on March 1, 1987. They lived as husband and wife in
Australia. However, an Australian family court issued purportedly a decree of
divorce, dissolving the marriage of Rederick and Editha on May 18, 1989.
On January 12, 1994, Rederick married Grace J. Garcia where it was

solemnized at Our lady of Perpetual Help Church, Cabanatuan City. Since October
22, 1995, the couple lived separately without prior judicial dissolution of their
marriage. As a matter of fact, while they were still in Australia, their conjugal
assets were divided on May 16, 1996, in accordance with their Statutory Declarations
secured in Australia.
Grace filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground

of bigamy on March 3, 1998, claiming that she learned only in November 1997,
Redericks marriage with Editha Samson.
Issue:
Whether the decree of divorce submitted by Rederick Recio is admissible as
evidence to prove his legal capacity to marry petitioner and absolved him of bigamy.
Ruling:
The nullity of Redericks marriage with Editha as shown by the divorce decree
issued was valid and recognized in the Philippines since the respondent is a
naturalized Australian. However, there is absolutely no evidence that proves
respondents legal capacity to marry petitioner though the former presented a
divorce decree. The said decree, being a foreign document was inadmissible to
court as evidence primarily because it was not authenticated by the consul/ embassy
of the country where it will be used.
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven

as a public or official record of a foreign country by either: (1) an official publication
or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document.
If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be: (a) accompanied by
a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine
foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b)
authenticated by the seal of his office.
Thus, the Supreme Court remands the case to the Regional Trial Court of
Cabanatuan City to receive or trial evidence that will conclusively prove
respondents legal capacity to marry petitioner and thus free him on the ground of
bigamy.

Llorente vs Ca
G.R. No. 124371, November 23, 2000
Facts:
Lorenzo Llorente and petitioner Paula Llorente were married in 1937 in the
Philippines. Lorenzo was an enlisted serviceman of the US Navy. Soon after, he left
for the US where through naturalization, he became a US Citizen. Upon his visitation
of his wife, he discovered that she was living with his brother and a child was born.
The child was registered as legitimate but the name of the father was left blank.
Llorente filed a divorce in California, which later on became final. He married Alicia
and they lived together for 25 years bringing 3 children. He made his last will and
testament stating that all his properties will be given to his second marriage. He
filed a petition of probate that made or appointed Alicia his special administrator
of his estate. Before the proceeding could be terminated, Lorenzo died. Paula filed
a letter of administration over Llorentes estate. The trial granted the letter and
denied the motion for reconsideration. An appeal was made to the Court of Appeals,
which affirmed and modified the judgment of the Trial Court that she be declared
co-owner of whatever properties, she and the deceased, may have acquired during
their 25 years of cohabitation.
Issue:
Whether or not the national law will apply.
Ruling:
Lorenzo Llorente was already an American citizen when he divorced Paula.
Such was also the situation when he married Alicia and executed his will. As stated
in Article 15 of the civil code, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, provided that they
are validly required in their National Law. Thus the divorce obtained by Llorente is
valid because the law that governs him is not Philippine Law but his National Law
since the divorce was contracted after he became an American citizen.
Furthermore, his National Law allowed divorce.The case was remanded to the court
of origin for determination of the intrinsic validity of Lorenzo Llorentes will and
determination of the parties successional rights allowing proof of foreign law.

Alice Reyes Van Dorn Vs. Hon. Manuel V. Romillo, Jr.

G.R. No. L-68470 October 8, 1985
Melencio-Herrera, J.:
Facts:
Petitioner is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent is a citizen
of the United States; that they were married in Hongkong in 1972; that, after the
marriage, they established their residence in the Philippines; that they begot two
children born on April 4, 1973 and December 18, 1975, respectively; that the parties
were divorced in Nevada, United States, in 1982; and that petitioner has re-married
also in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn.
Private respondent filed suit against petitioner stating that petitioner's

business in Ermita, Manila, (the Galleon Shop, for short), is conjugal property of the
parties, and asking that petitioner be ordered to render an accounting of that
business, and that private respondent be declared with right to manage the conjugal
property.
Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action is
barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court
wherein respondent had acknowledged that he and petitioner had "no community
property" as of June 11, 1982.
The Court below denied the Motion to Dismiss in the mentioned case on the
ground that the property involved is located in the Philippines so that the Divorce
Decree has no bearing in the case. The denial is now the subject of this certiorari
proceeding.
Issue:
Whether the divorce obtained is valid in binding in our jurisdiction, the same
being contrary to local law and public policy.
Ruling:
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of
the States of the United States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an
American citizen. For instance, private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her
husband, in any State of the Union.
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the

Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute
divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public police and
morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in
the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case,
the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the
standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage.

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the
husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as
petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound
by the Decision of his own country's Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over
him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own
representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal
property. To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner
has to be considered still married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's
obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner
should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render
support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs
with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in
her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.

Gerbert R. Corpuz vs. Daisylyn Tirol Sto. Tomas

G.R. No. 186571 August 11, 2010
Brion, J.:
Facts:
Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired
Canadian citizenship through naturalization on November 29, 2000.
On January 18, 2005, Gerbert married respondent Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a

Filipina, in Pasig City. Due to work and other professional commitments, Gerbert
left for Canada soon after the wedding. He returned to the Philippines sometime in
April 2005 to surprise Daisylyn, but was shocked to discover that his wife was having
an affair with another man.
Gerbert then filed a petition for divorce on December 8, 2005 which was
granted. The divorce decree took effect a month later, on January 8, 2006.
Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has found another
Filipina to love. Desirous of marrying his new Filipina fiance in the Philippines,
Gerbert went to the Pasig City Civil Registry Office and registered the Canadian
divorce decree on his and Daisylyns marriage certificate.
Despite the registration of the divorce decree, an official of the National

Statistics Office (NSO) informed Gerbert that the marriage between him and
Daisylyn still subsists under Philippine law; to be enforceable, the foreign divorce
decree must first be judicially recognized by a competent Philippine court, pursuant
to NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982.
Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce

and/or declaration of marriage as dissolved (petition) with the RTC which was
denied. The RTC concluded that only the Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy,
under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, in order for Gerbert
to be able to remarry under Philippine law. From the RTCs ruling, Gerbert filed the
present petition.
Issue:
Whether the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code extends to
aliens the right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign
divorce decree.
Ruling:
The alien spouse can claim no right under the second paragraph of Article 26
of the Family Code as the substantive right it establishes is in favor of the Filipino
spouse. Through the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, EO 227

effectively incorporated into the law this Courts holding in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.
and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera. As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included
in the law "to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married
to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the
Filipino spouse." Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of Article 26
of the Family Code is not limited to the recognition of the foreign divorce decree.
If the court finds that the decree capacitated the alien spouse to remarry, the courts
can declare that the Filipino spouse is likewise capacitated to contract another
marriage. No court in this jurisdiction, however, can make a similar declaration for
the alien spouse (other than that already established by the decree), whose status
and legal capacity are generally governed by his national law.
Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and the purpose of the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the RTC was correct in limiting
the applicability of the provision for the benefit of the Filipino spouse. In other
words, only the Filipino spouse can invoke the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code; the alien spouse can claim no right under this provision.
The foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence of a right that clothes

the party with legal interest to petition for its recognition in this jurisdiction. In a
divorce situation, we have declared, no less, that the divorce obtained by an alien
abroad may be recognized in the Philippines, provided the divorce is valid according
to his or her national law.

Fe D. Quita vs. CA and Blandina Dandan

G.R. No. 124862 December 22, 1998
Bellosillo, J.:
Facts:
Fe Quita and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married in the Philippines
on 18 May 1941. They were not however blessed with children. Somewhere along
the way their relationship soured.
Eventually Fe sued Arturo for divorce in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. She
submitted in the divorce proceedings a private writing dated 19 July 1950 evidencing
their agreement to live separately from each other and a settlement of their
conjugal properties. On 23 July 1954 she obtained a final judgment of divorce.
Three (3) weeks thereafter she married a certain Felix Tupaz in the same
locality but their relationship also ended in a divorce. Still in the U.S.A., she married
for the third time, to a certain Wernimont.
On 16 April 1972 Arturo died. He left no will. On 31 August 1972 Lino Javier
Inciong filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for issuance of
letters of administration concerning the estate of Arturo in favor of the Philippine
Trust Company. Respondent Blandina Dandan (also referred to as Blandina Padlan),
claiming to be the surviving spouse of Arturo Padlan, and Claro, Alexis, Ricardo,
Emmanuel, Zenaida and Yolanda, all surnamed Padlan, named in the children of
Arturo Padlan opposed the petition and prayed for the appointment instead of Atty.
Leonardo Casaba, which was resolved in favor of the latter. Upon motion of the
oppositors themselves, Atty. Cabasal was later replaced by Higino Castillon. On 30
April 1973 the oppositors (Blandina and Padlan children) submitted certified
photocopies of the 19 July 1950 private writing and the final judgment of divorce
between petitioner and Arturo.
On 7 October 1987 petitioner moved for the immediate declaration of heirs of

the decedent and the distribution of his estate.
The trial court disregarded the divorce between petitioner and Arturo.
Consecuently, it expressed the view that their marriage subsisted until the death of
Arturo in 1972. Neither did it consider valid their extrajudicial settlement of
conjugal properties due to lack of judicial approval.
Issue:
Who are the proper heirs of the decedent?

Ruling:
We agree with petitioner that no dispute exists either as to the right of the
six (6) Padlan children to inherit from the decedent because there are proofs that
they have been duly acknowledged by him and petitioner herself even recognizes
them as heirs of Arturo Padlan; nor as to their respective hereditary shares.
But controversy remains as to who is the legitimate surviving spouse of Arturo.

The trial court did not grant private respondent's prayer for a hearing but proceeded
to resolve her motion with the finding that both petitioner and Arturo were "Filipino
citizens and were married in the Philippines." It maintained that their divorce
obtained in 1954 in San Francisco, California, U.S.A., was not valid in Philippine
jurisdiction. We deduce that the finding on their citizenship pertained solely to the
time of their marriage as the trial court was not supplied with a basis to determine
petitioner's citizenship at the time of their divorce. The doubt persisted as to
whether she was still a Filipino citizen when their divorce was decreed. The trial
court must have overlooked the materiality of this aspect. Once proved that she was
no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of their divorce, Van Dorn would become
applicable and petitioner could very well lose her right to inherit from Arturo.
We emphasize however that the question to be determined by the trial court

should be limited only to the right of petitioner to inherit from Arturo as his surviving
spouse.
Private respondent's claim to heirship was already resolved by the trial court.
She and Arturo were married on 22 April 1947 while the prior marriage of petitioner
and Arturo was subsisting thereby resulting in a bigamous marriage considered void
from the beginning under Arts. 80 and 83 of the Civil Code. Consequently, she is not
a surviving spouse that can inherit from him as this status presupposes a legitimate
relationship.

Juridical Persons
Communication Materials and Design, Inc. vs. CA

G.R. No. 102223 August 22, 1996
Torres, Jr., J.
Facts:
Petitioners Communication Materials And Design, Inc., (Cmdi) And Aspac
Multi-Trade Inc., (ASPAC) are both domestic corporations, while petitioner Francisco
S. Aguirre is their President and majority stockholder. Private Respondents ITEC,
INC. and/or ITEC, INTERNATIONAL, INC. (ITEC) are corporations duly organized and
existing under the laws of the State of Alabama, United States of America. There is
no dispute that ITEC is a foreign corporation not licensed to do business in the
Philippines. On August 14, 1987, ITEC entered into a contract with petitioner ASPAC
referred to as Representative Agreement. Pursuant to the contract, ITEC engaged
ASPAC as its exclusive representative in the Philippines for the sale of ITECs
products, in consideration of which, ASPAC was paid a stipulated commission. The
agreement was signed by G.A. Clark and Francisco S. Aguirre, presidents of ITEC and
ASPAC respectively, for and in behalf of their companies
Through a License Agreement entered into by the same parties on November

10, 1988, ASPAC was able to incorporate and use the name ITEC in its own name.
Thus, ASPAC Multi-Trade, Inc. became legally and publicly known as ASPAC-ITEC
(Philippines). By virtue of said contracts, ASPAC sold electronic products, exported
by ITEC, to their sole customer, the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company,
(PLDT). ASPAC, dealing under its new appellation, and PLDT executed a document
entitled PLDT-ASPAC/ITEC PROTOCOL which defined the project details for the
supply of ITECs Interface Equipment in connection with the Fifth Expansion Program
of PLDT.
One year into the second term of the parties Representative Agreement, ITEC
decided to terminate the same, because petitioner ASPAC allegedly violated its
contractual commitment as stipulated in their agreements. ITEC charges the
petitioners and another Philippine Corporation, DIGITAL BASE COMMUNICATIONS,
INC. (DIGITAL), the President of which is likewise petitioner Aguirre, of using
knowledge and information of ITECs products specifications to develop their own
line of equipment and product support, which are similar, if not identical to ITECs
own, and offering them to ITECs former customer.
Plaintiff sought to enjoin permanently; (1) defendants DIGITAL, CMDI, and Francisco
Aguirre and their agents and business associates, to cease and desist from selling or
attempting to sell to PLDT and to any other party, products which have been copied
or manufactured in like manner, similar or identical to the products, wares and
equipment of plaintiff, and (2) defendant ASPAC, to cease and desist from using in
its corporate name, letter heads, envelopes, sign boards and business dealings,
plaintiffs trademark, internationally known as ITEC; and the recovery from

defendants in solidum, damages of at least P500,000.00, attorneys fees and
litigation expenses.
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds:

(1) That plaintiff has no legal capacity to sue as it is a foreign corporation doing
business in the Philippines without the required BOI authority and SEC license, and
(2) that plaintiff is simply engaged in forum shopping which justifies the application
against it of the principle of forum non conveniens. The court a quo on February 22,
1991, issued its Order (1) denying the motion to dismiss for being devoid of legal
merit with a rejection of both grounds relied upon by the defendants in their motion
to dismiss, and (2) directing the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction on the
same day. etitioners elevated the case to the respondent Court of Appeals on a
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition which was later on dismissed.
Issues:
1. Whether or not private respondent ITEC is an unlicensed corporation doing
business in the Philippines.
2. If yes, whether or not this fact bars it from invoking the injunctive authority of
our courts.
Ruling:
1. Yes. Generally, a foreign corporation has no legal existence within the
state in which it is foreign. This proceeds from the principle that juridical existence
of a corporation is confined within the territory of the state under whose laws it was
incorporated and organized, and it has no legal status beyond such territory. Such
foreign corporation may be excluded by any other state from doing business within
its limits, or conditions may be imposed on the exercise of such privileges. Before a
foreign corporation can transact business in this country, it must first obtain a
license to transact business in the Philippines, and a certificate from the appropriate
government agency. If it transacts business in the Philippines without such a license,
it shall not be permitted to maintain or intervene in any action, suit, or proceeding
in any court or administrative agency of the Philippines, but it may be sued on any
valid cause of action recognized under Philippine laws.
Where a single act or transaction, however, is not merely incidental or casual

but indicates the foreign corporations intention to do other business in the
Philippines, said single act or transaction constitutes doing or engaging in or
transacting business in the Philippines.
Private respondent had been engaged in or doing business in the Philippines

for some time now. This is the inevitable result after a scrutiny of the different
contracts and agreements entered into by ITEC with its various business contacts in
the country, particularly ASPAC and Telephone Equipment Sales and Services, Inc.
(TESSI, for brevity). The latter is a local electronics firm engaged by ITEC to be its
local technical representative, and to create a service center for ITEC products sold
locally. Its arrangements, with these entities indicate convincingly ITECs purpose to

bring about the situation among its customers and the general public that they are
dealing directly with ITEC, and that ITEC is actively engaging in business in the
country.
2. Notwithstanding such finding that ITEC is doing business in the country,

petitioner is nonetheless estopped from raising this fact to bar ITEC from instituting
this injunction case against it.
A party is estopped to challenge the personality of a corporation after having

acknowledged the same by entering into a contract with it. And the doctrine of
estoppel to deny corporate existence applies to a foreign as well as to domestic
corporations. One who has dealt with a corporation of foreign origin as a corporate
entity is estopped to deny its corporate existence and capacity. The principle will
be applied to prevent a person contracting with a foreign corporation from later
taking advantage of its noncompliance with the statutes chiefly in cases where such
person has received the benefits of the contract.
The rule is deeply rooted in the time-honored axiom of Commodum ex injuria

sua non habere debet - no person ought to derive any advantage of his own wrong.
This is as it should be for as mandated by law, every person must in the exercise of
his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his
due, and observe honesty and good faith.
Petitioners insistence on the dismissal of this action due to the application,

or non-application, of the private international law rule of forum non conveniens
defies well-settled rules of fair play. This argument is misplaced because the court
has already acquired jurisdiction over the plaintiff in the suit, by virtue of his filing
the original complaint. And as we have already observed, petitioner are not at
liberty to question plaintiffs standing to sue, having already acceded to the same by
virtue of its entry into the Representative Agreement referred to earlier.
Thus, having acquired jurisdiction, it is now for the Philippine Court, based
on the facts of the case, whether to give due course to the suit or dismiss it, on the
principle of forum non conveniens. Hence, the Philippine Court may refuse to
assume jurisdiction in spite of its having acquired jurisdiction. Conversely, the court
may assume jurisdiction over the case if it chooses to do so; provided, that the
following requisites are met: 1) That the Philippine Court is one to which the parties
may conveniently resort to; 2) That the Philippine Court is in a position to make an
intelligent decision as to the law and the facts; and, 3) That the Philippine Court
has or is likely to have power to enforce its decision.
The aforesaid requirements having been met, and in view of the courts
disposition to give due course to the questioned action, the matter of the present
forum not being the most convenient as a ground for the suits dismissal, deserves
scant consideration.

Juridical Persons
Eriks Pte. Ltd. vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 118843 February 6, 1997
Panganiban, J.
Facts:
Petitioner Eriks Pte. Ltd. is a non-resident foreign corporation engaged in the
manufacture and sale of elements used in sealing pumps, valves and pipes for
industrial purposes, valves and control equipment used for industrial fluid control
and PVC pipes and fittings for industrial uses. Eriks alleged that it is a corporation
duly organized and existing under the laws of the Republic of Singapore. It is not
licensed to do business in the Philippines and is not so engaged and is suing on an
isolated transaction for which it has capacity to sue.
On various dates covering the period January 17 -- August 16, 1989, private
respondent Delfin Enriquez, Jr., doing business under the name and style of Delrene
EB Controls Center and/or EB Karmine Commercial, ordered and received from
petitioner various elements used in sealing pumps, valves, pipes and control
equipment, PVC pipes and fittings. The ordered materials were delivered via
airfreight.
The transfers of goods were perfected in Singapore, for private respondents

account, F.O.B. Singapore, with a 90-day credit term. Subsequently, demands were
made by petitioner upon private respondent to settle his account, but the latter
failed/refused to do so. Petitioner corporation filed with the Regional Trial Court a
case for recovery of sum of money plus interest thereon and damages.
Private respondent responded with a Motion to Dismiss contending that petitioner
corporation had no legal capacity to sue. The trial court dismissed the action on the
ground that petitioner is a foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines
without a license. On appeal, respondent Court likewise found petitioner to be
without legal capacity to sue.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner-corporation may maintain an action in Philippine
courts considering that it has no license to do business in the country.
Ruling:
No. The Corporation Code provides:
Sec. 133. Doing business without a license. - No foreign corporation
transacting business in the Philippines without a license, or its
successors or assigns, shall be permitted to maintain or intervene in
any action, suit or proceeding in any court or administrative agency of
the Philippines; but such corporation may be sued or proceeded
against before Philippine courts or administrative tribunals on any
valid cause of action recognized under Philippine laws.

The aforementioned provision prohibits, not merely absence of the
prescribed license, but it also bars a foreign corporation doing business in the
Philippines without such license access to our courts. A foreign corporation without
such license is not ipso facto incapacitated from bringing an action. A license is
necessary only if it is transacting or doing business in the country.
The accepted rule in jurisprudence is that each case must be judged in the
light of its own environmental circumstances. Considering the factual background
as laid out above, the transaction cannot be considered as an isolated one. Note
that there were 17 orders and deliveries (only sixteen per our count) over a four-
month period. The appellee (private respondent) made separate orders at various
dates. The transactions did not consist of separate deliveries for one single order.
In the case at bar, the transactions entered into by the appellant with the appellee
are a series of commercial dealings which would signify an intent on the part of the
appellant (petitioner) to do business in the Philippines and could not by any stretch
of the imagination be considered an isolated one, thus would fall under the category
of doing business.
Even if we were to view, as contended by the appellant, that the transactions
which occurred between January to August 1989, constitute a single act or isolated
business transaction, this being the ordinary business of appellant corporation, it
can be said to be illegally doing or transacting business without a license. Here it
can be clearly gleaned from the four-month period of transactions between
appellant and appellee that it was a continuing business relationship, which would,
without doubt, constitute doing business without a license. For all intents and
purposes, appellant corporation is doing or transacting business in the Philippines
without a license and that, therefore, in accordance with the specific mandate of
Section 144 of the Corporation Code, it has no capacity to sue.
Thus, we hold that the series of transactions in question could not have been
isolated or casual transactions. What is determinative of doing business is not really
the number or the quantity of the transactions, but more importantly, the intention
of an entity to continue the body of its business in the country. The number and
quantity are merely evidence of such intention. The phrase isolated transaction has
a definite and fixed meaning, i.e. a transaction or series of transactions set apart
from the common business of a foreign enterprise in the sense that there is no
intention to engage in a progressive pursuit of the purpose and object of the business
organization. Whether a foreign corporation is doing business does not necessarily
depend upon the frequency of its transactions, but more upon the nature and
character of the transactions.

Juridical Persons
Hutchison Ports Philippines Limited vs. Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority

G.R. No. 131367 August 31, 2000
Ynares-Santiago, J.
Facts:
In 1996, Hutchison Ports Philippines Limited (HPPL)won a public bidding made by
the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA). The project was to develop and
operate a modern marine container terminal within the Subic Bay Freeport Zone.
The SBMA Board of Directors already declared HPPL as the winner but later on, the
Office of the President reversed the decision of the Board and ordered a rebidding.
In the rebidding however, HPPL was no longer among the qualified bidders.
Eventually, HPPL filed a petition for injunction to enjoin SBMA from conducting the
rebidding.
Issue:
Whether or not Hutchison has the right to file an injunction case against SBMA.
Ruling:
No. The declaration made by the SBMA Board declaring HPPL as the winning
bidder was neither final nor unassailable. Under LOI No. 620, all projects undertaken
by the SBMA are subject to the approval of the Office of the President. Hence, the
Board of SBMA is under the control and supervision of the President of the
Philippines. Therefore, the declaration made by the Board did not vest any right in
favor of HPPL.
Further, HPPL cannot sue in the Philippines. It is a foreign corporation
registered under the laws of the British Virgin Islands. It did not register here in the
Philippines. HPPL cannot invoke that it was suing only on an isolated transaction.
The conduct of bidding is not an isolated transaction. It is doing business here in
the Philippines. The Supreme Court emphasized that as a general rule, doing or
engaging in or transacting business in the Philippines is a case to case basis. It
has often been held that a single act or transaction may be considered as doing
business when a corporation performs acts for which it was created or exercises
some of the functions for which it was organized. The amount or volume of the
business is of no moment, for even a singular act cannot be merely incidental or
casual if it indicates the foreign corporations intention to do business.
Participating in the bidding process constitutes doing business because it
shows the foreign corporations intention to engage in business here. The bidding
for the concession contract is but an exercise of the corporations reason for
creation or existence.
The primary purpose of the license requirement is to compel a foreign
corporation desiring to do business within the Philippines to submit itself to the
jurisdiction of the courts of the state and to enable the government to exercise
jurisdiction over them for the regulation of their activities in this country.

Juridical Persons
SBMA v. Universal International Group of Taiwan

340 SCRA 359
Facts:
UIG and SBMA entered into a Lease and Development Agreement (LDA)
wherein SBMA leased to UIG the Binictan Golf Course and appurenant facilities
thereto to be transforemed into a world-class 18-hole golf course/resort. The LDA
contained pre-termination clauses which authorizes SBMA, after due notice to UIG,
to terminate the lease and immediately take possession of the property if UIG
commits a material breach of any of the contracts conditions. SBMA wrote UIG,
calling its attention to its failure to deliver its various contactual obligations.UIG
imputed the delay to the default of its main contractor, FF Cruz, but committed
itself to comply with its undertakings.
The following month, SBMA declared UIG in default. Six months later, UIG
still failed to satisfy its obligations so SBMA served a letter of pre-termination to
UIG. Shortly thereafter, the golf course was formally closed and SBMA took
possession of the subject premises.
UIG filed a complaint against SBMA for Injuction and Damages with prayer for
TRO and preliminary injuction. TC granted UIGs prayer and ordered SBMA to restore
possession of the golf course to UIG. In a subsequent order, TC denied SBMAs motion
to dismiss. CA upheld UIGs capacity to sue, holding that SBMA is estopped from
questioning its standing. It also held that UIGDC and SBGCCI were real parties in
interest because they made substantial investments in the venture and had been in
possession in property when SBMA took over.
Issues:
1. WON UIG has capacity to sue.
2. WON UIGDC and SBGCCI are real parties in interest.
3. WON RTC has jurisdiction over the suit.
Ruling:
1. YES. As a general rule, unlicensed foreign non-resident corporations cannot
file suits in the Philippines. A corporation has legal status only within the
state or territory in which it was organized. For this reason, a corporation
organized in another country has no personality to file suits in the Philippines.
In order to subject a foreign corporation doing business in the country to the
jurisdiction of our courts, it must acquire a license from the SEC and appoint
an agent for service of process. Without such license, it cannot institute a
suit in the Philippines. However, after contracting with a foreign corporation,
a domestic firm is estopped from denying the formers capacity to sue.

2. YES. According to Sec. 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court defines a real party in
interest as the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment
of the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. In this case, the CA
made a factual finding that UIGDC and SBGCCI were in possession of the
property when SBMA took over. Moreover, it also found that they had already
made substantial investments in the project. The CA is correct in holding that
UIGDC and SBGCCI stand to be benefitted or injured by the present suit and
should be deemed real parties in interest.
3. YES. According to petitioners, the RTC has no jurisdiction over the case
because ejectment suits are cognizable by municipal courts. However, the
complaint reveals that it sought to enjoin petitioners from rescinding the
contract and taking over the property. While possession was a necessary
consequence of the suit, it was merely incidental. The main issue is not
ejectment, but whether SBMA could rescind the LDA. Because it was a dispute
that was incapable of pecuniary estimation, it was within the jurisdiction of
the RTC.

Juridical Persons
MR Holdings v. Bajar
260 SCRA 673
Facts:
Marcopper Mining Corporation was unable to pay its loans from the Asian
Development Bank (ADB). Later, ADB transferred all its rights to collect from
Marcopper to MR Holdings, Ltd. In order to pay MR Holdings, Marcopper assigned all
its assets to MR Holdings and executed therefor a Deed of Assignment in MR Holdings
favor. Meanwhile, another creditor of Marcopper, Solidbank Corporation, won a case
against Marcopper. The court then issued a writ of execution directing Sheriff Carlos
Bajar to levy Marcoppers assets. MR Holdings then filed an opposition asserting that
it is now the owner of Marcoppers assets hence, Bajar cannot levy them. The lower
court denied MR Holdings on the ground that the Deed of Assignment was made in
bad faith and that MR Holdings was a foreign corporation doing business without a
license in the Philippines (by virtue of the Deed of Assignment) and as such cannot
sue in the Philippines.
Issue:
Whether or not MR Holdings may sue on this particular transaction.
Ruling:
Yes. The Supreme Court emphasized the following rules when it comes to
foreign corporations doing business here in the Philippines:
if a foreign corporation does business in the Philippines without a license,
it cannot sue before the Philippine courts;
if a foreign corporation is not doing business in the Philippines, it needs no
license to sue before Philippine courts on an isolated transaction or on a cause
of action entirely independent of any business transaction;
if a foreign corporation does business in the Philippines with the required
license, it can sue before Philippine courts on any transaction.
Being a mere assignee does not constitute doing business in the Philippines.
MR Holdings, a foreign corporation, cannot be said to be doing business simply
because it became an assignee of Marcopper. MR Holdings was not doing anything
else other than being a mere assignee. The only time that MR Holdings is considered
to be doing business here is that if it continues the business of Marcopper which it
did not.
Therefore, since it is not doing business here, pursuant to the rules above, it can
sue without any license before Philippine courts on an isolated transaction or on a
cause of action entirely independent of any business transaction. Anent the issue of
bad faith, the same was not proven. It appears that the deed of assignment was an
earlier agreement incidental to the loan agreement between ADB and Marcopper
which precedes the action brought by Solidbank against Marcopper.

Juridical Persons
Communication Materials and Design Inc. v. CA

260 SCRA 673
Facts:
Petitioners Communication Materials And Design, Inc., (CMDI) and Aspac
Multi-Trade Inc., (ASPAC) are both domestic corporations.. Private Respondents
ITEC, INC. and/or ITEC, INTERNATIONAL, INC. (ITEC) are corporations duly organized
and existing under the laws of the State of Alabama, USA. There is no dispute that
ITEC is a foreign corporation not licensed to do business in the Philippines. ITEC
entered into a contract with ASPAC referred to as Representative Agreement.
Pursuant to the contract, ITEC engaged ASPAC as its exclusive representative in
the Philippines for the sale of ITECs products, in consideration of which, ASPAC was
paid a stipulated commission. Through a License Agreement entered into by the
same parties later on, ASPAC was able to incorporate and use the name ITEC in
its own name. Thus, ASPAC Multi-Trade, Inc. became legally and publicly known as
ASPAC-ITEC (Philippines).
One year into the second term of the parties Representative Agreement,
ITEC decided to terminate the same, because petitioner ASPAC allegedly violated
its contractual commitment as stipulated in their agreements. ITEC charges the
petitioners and another Philippine Corporation, DIGITAL BASE COMMUNICATIONS,
INC. The President of which is likewise petitioner Aguirre, of using knowledge and
information of ITECs products specifications to develop their own line of equipment
and product support, which are similar, if not identical to ITECs own, and offering
them to ITECs former customer.
The complaint was filed with the RTC-Makati by ITEC, INC. Defendants filed
a MTD the complaint on the following grounds: (1) That plaintiff has no legal
capacity to sue as it is a foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines without
the required BOI authority and SEC license, and (2) that plaintiff is simply engaged
in forum shopping which justifies the application against it of the principle of forum
non conveniens.
Petitioners elevated the case to the respondent CA on a Petition for Certiorari

and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Revised ROC. It was dismissed as well. MR
denied, hence this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45.
Issues:
1. Did the Philippine court acquire jurisdiction over the person of the
petitioner corp, despite allegations of lack of capacity to sue because of non-
registration?
2. Can the Philippine court give due course to the suit or dismiss it, on the
principle of forum non convenience?

Ruling:
1. YES; We are persuaded to conclude that ITEC had been engaged in or doing
business in the Philippines for some time now. This is the inevitable result
after a scrutiny of the different contracts and agreements entered into by
ITEC with its various business contacts in the country. Its arrangements, with
these entities indicate convincingly that ITEC is actively engaging in business
in the country.
A foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines may sue in Philippine

Courts although not authorized to do business here against a Philippine citizen or
entity who had contracted with and benefited by said corporation. To put it in
another way, a party is estopped to challenge the personality of a corporation after
having acknowledged the same by entering into a contract with it. And the doctrine
of estoppel to deny corporate existence applies to a foreign as well as to domestic
corporations. One who has dealt with a corporation of foreign origin as a corporate
entity is estopped to deny its corporate existence and capacity.
2. YES; Petitioners insistence on the dismissal of this action due to the

application, or non application, of the private international law rule of forum
non conveniens defies well-settled rules of fair play. According to petitioner,
the Philippine Court has no venue to apply its discretion whether to give
cognizance or not to the present action, because it has not acquired
jurisdiction over the person of the plaintiff in the case, the latter allegedly
having no personality to sue before Philippine Courts. This argument is
misplaced because the court has already acquired jurisdiction over the
plaintiff in the suit, by virtue of his filing the original complaint. And as we
have already observed, petitioner is not at liberty to question plaintiffs
standing to sue, having already acceded to the same by virtue of its entry
into the Representative Agreement referred to earlier.
Thus, having acquired jurisdiction, it is now for the Philippine Court, based on
the facts of the case, whether to give due course to the suit or dismiss it, on the
principle of forum non convenience. Hence, the Philippine Court may refuse to
assume jurisdiction in spite of its having acquired jurisdiction. Conversely, the court
may assume jurisdiction over the case if it chooses to do so; provided, that the
following requisites are met:
1) That the Philippine Court is one to which the parties may conveniently
resort to;
2) That the Philippine Court is in a position to make an intelligent decision as
to the law and the facts; and,
3) That the Philippine Court has or is likely to have power to enforce its
decision.
The aforesaid requirements having been met, and in view of the courts
disposition to give due course to the questioned action, the matter of the present
forum not being the most convenient as a ground for the suits dismissal, deserves
scant consideration.

Conflict of Laws

Uploaded by

Document Informationclick to expand document information

Copyright:

Available Formats

Conflict of Laws

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Conflict of Laws

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY

Emerald Garment vs. Court of Appeals, et al.

Law 323: CONFLICT OF LWS 1

Pribhdas Mirpuri vs Court of Appeals, et al

Hence, respondents well known trademark must be protected as he has

Law 323: CONFLICT OF LWS 2

Respondent countered that the two-year period is interrupted by the

Law 323: CONFLICT OF LWS 3

As to the respondents second cause of action, the travaux preparatories of

Law 323: CONFLICT OF LWS 4

Law 323: CONFLICT OF LWS 5

The contract of carriage between the private respondent and Singapore

Law 323: CONFLICT OF LWS 6

Korea Technologies Co., Ltd. Vs. Hon. Albert A. Lerma, et al. ,

Petitioner then filed a Complaint for Specific Performance against respondent

Law 323: CONFLICT OF LWS 7

International School Alliance Of Educators vs. Quisumbing

The School grants foreign-hires certain benefits not accorded local-hires.

Discrimination, particularly in terms of wages, is frowned upon by the Labor

Law 323: CONFLICT OF LWS 8

A bargaining unit is a group of employees of a given employer, comprised of

Law 323: CONFLICT OF LWS 9

Asiavest moved for the reconsideration of the decision. It sought an award of

Law 323: CONFLICT OF LWS 10

Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corp. vs. Jack Robert Sherman

In International Law, jurisdiction is often defined as the right of a state

Law 323: CONFLICT OF LWS 11

Banco Do Brasil vs. CA

Law 323: CONFLICT OF LWS 12

Kazuhiro Hasegawa Vs. Minoru Kitamura

Forum non conveniens is also not applicable since:

Law 323: CONFLICT OF LWS 13

Petitioner prayed for a declaration of nullity of the deed of donation, to

Law 323: CONFLICT OF LWS 14

Law 323: CONFLICT OF LWS 15

NM Rothschild and Sons Ltd. V. Lepanto Consolidated Mining Co.

Law 323: CONFLICT OF LWS 16

So the next question is whether petitioner voluntarily appeared in court. The

Law 323: CONFLICT OF LWS 17

First Philippine International Bank v. CA

Law 323: CONFLICT OF LWS 18

Law 323: CONFLICT OF LWS 19

Manila Hotel vs. NLRC, Arbiter Diosana, and Marcelo Santos

Marcelo Santos resigned as an overseas worker employed as a printer at the

On September 5, 1989, the Palace Hotel terminated the employment of

Law 323: CONFLICT OF LWS 20

Law 323: CONFLICT OF LWS 21

Law 323: CONFLICT OF LWS 22

Raytheon International vs. Stockton Rouzie, Jr.

On 18 May 1999, petitioner sought the dismissal of the complaint on grounds of

Law 323: CONFLICT OF LWS 23

On the matter of jurisdiction over a conflicts-of-laws problem where the case

B. Jurisdiction vs. Choice of Law

Law 323: CONFLICT OF LWS 24

C. Doctrine of Forum non Conveniens

Law 323: CONFLICT OF LWS 25

Philippine Aluminum Wheels vs. FASGI Enterprises

Law 323: CONFLICT OF LWS 26