G.R. No. 111107 January 10, 1997 motion to dismiss in an order dated December 28, 1989.

7
Their motion for reconsideration having been likewise
LOEONARDO A. PAAT, in his capacity as Officer-in-Charge denied, a petition for certiorari was filed by the petitioners
(OIC), Regional Executive Director (RED), Region 2 and with the respondent Court of Appeals which sustained the
JOVITO LAYUGAN, JR., in his capacity as Community trial court's order ruling that the question involved is purely
Environment and Natural Resources Officer (CENRO), both a legal question. 8 Hence, this present petition, 9 with prayer
of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources for temporary restraining order and/or preliminary
(DENR), petitioners, injunction, seeking to reverse the decision of the respondent
vs. Court of Appeals was filed by the petitioners on September
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. RICARDO A. BACULI in his 9, 1993. By virtue of the Resolution dated September 27,
capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 2, Regional Trial Court 1993, 10 the prayer for the issuance of temporary restraining
at Tuguegarao, Cagayan, and SPOUSES BIENVENIDO and order of petitioners was granted by this Court.
VICTORIA DE GUZMAN, respondents.
Invoking the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
Without violating the principle of exhaustion of remedies, petitioners aver that the trial court could not
administrative remedies, may an action for replevin prosper legally entertain the suit for replevin because the truck was
to recover a movable property which is the subject matter of under administrative seizure proceedings pursuant to
an administrative forfeiture proceeding in the Department Section 68-A of P.D. 705, as amended by E.O. 277. Private
of Environment and Natural Resources pursuant to Section respondents, on the other hand, would seek to avoid the
68-A of P.D. 705, as amended, entitled The Revised Forestry operation of this principle asserting that the instant case falls
Code of the Philippines? within the exception of the doctrine upon the justification
that (1) due process was violated because they were not
Are the Secretary of DENR and his representatives given the chance to be heard, and (2) the seizure and
empowered to confiscate and forfeit conveyances used in forfeiture was unlawful on the grounds: (a) that the
transporting illegal forest products in favor of the Secretary of DENR and his representatives have no authority
government? to confiscate and forfeit conveyances utilized in transporting
illegal forest products, and (b) that the truck as admitted by
petitioners was not used in the commission of the crime.
These are two fundamental questions presented before us
for our resolution.
Upon a thorough and delicate scrutiny of the records and
relevant jurisprudence on the matter, we are of the opinion
The controversy on hand had its incipiency on May 19, 1989
that the plea of petitioners for reversal is in order.
when the truck of private respondent Victoria de Guzman
while on its way to Bulacan from San Jose, Baggao, Cagayan,
was seized by the Department of Environment and Natural This Court in a long line of cases has consistently held that
Resources (DENR, for brevity) personnel in Aritao, Nueva before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the
Vizcaya because the driver could not produce the required court, it is a pre-condition that he should have availed of all
documents for the forest products found concealed in the the means of administrative processes afforded him. Hence,
truck. Petitioner Jovito Layugan, the Community if a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be
Environment and Natural Resources Officer (CENRO) in resorted to by giving the administrative officer concerned
Aritao, Cagayan, issued on May 23, 1989 an order of every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within
confiscation of the truck and gave the owner thereof fifteen his jurisdiction then such remedy should be exhausted first
(15) days within which to submit an explanation why the before court's judicial power can be sought, The premature
truck should not be forfeited. Private respondents, however, invocation of court's intervention is fatal to one's cause of
failed to submit the required explanation. On June 22, 1989, action. 11 Accordingly, absent any finding of waiver or
1
Regional Executive Director Rogelio Baggayan of DENR estoppel the case is susceptible of dismissal for lack of cause
sustained petitioner Layugan's action of confiscation and of
ordered the forfeiture of the truck invoking Section 68-A of action. 12 This doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
Presidential Decree No. 705 as amended by Executive Order remedies was not without its practical and legal reasons, for
No. 277. Private respondents filed a letter of reconsideration one thing, availment of administrative remedy entails lesser
dated June 28, 1989 of the June 22, 1989 order of Executive expenses and provides for a speedier disposition of
Director Baggayan, which was, however, denied in a controversies. It is no less true to state that the courts of
subsequent order of July 12, 1989. 2 Subsequently, the case justice for reasons of comity and convenience will shy away
was brought by the petitioners to the Secretary of DENR from a dispute until the system of administrative redress has
pursuant to private respondents' statement in their letter been completed and complied with so as to give the
dated June 28, 1989 that in case their letter for administrative agency concerned every opportunity to
reconsideration would be denied then "this letter should be correct its error and to dispose of the case. However, we are
considered as an appeal to the Secretary." 3 Pending not amiss to reiterate that the principle of exhaustion of
resolution however of the appeal, a suit for replevin, administrative remedies as tested by a battery of cases is not
docketed as Civil Case 4031, was filed by the private an ironclad rule. This doctrine is a relative one and its
respondents against petitioner Layugan and Executive flexibility is called upon by the peculiarity and uniqueness of
Director Baggayan 4 with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 2 the factual and circumstantial settings of a case. Hence, it is
of Cagayan, 5 which issued a writ ordering the return of the disregarded (1) when there is a violation of due process, 13
truck to private respondents. 6 Petitioner Layugan and (2) when the issue involved is purely a legal question, 14 (3)
Executive Director Baggayan filed a motion to dismiss with when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting
the trial court contending, inter alia, that private to lack or excess of jurisdiction, 15 (4) when there is estoppel
respondents had no cause of action for their failure to on the part of the administrative agency concerned, 16 (5)
exhaust administrative remedies. The trial court denied the when there is irreparable injury, 17 (6) when the respondent
is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the
Nikki T. Sia | StatCon Assignment 10082016 1
President bears the implied and assumed approval of the special technical knowledge and training
latter, 18 (7) when to require exhaustion of administrative of such agencies.
remedies would be unreasonable, 19 (8) when it would
amount to a nullification of a claim, 20 (9) when the subject To sustain the claim of private respondents would in effect
matter is a private land in land case proceedings, 21 (10) bring the instant controversy beyond the pale of the
when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies and fall
remedy, and (11) when there are circumstances indicating within the ambit of excepted cases heretofore stated.
the urgency of judicial intervention. 22 However, considering the circumstances prevailing in this
case, we can not but rule out these assertions of private
In the case at bar, there is no question that the controversy respondents to be without merit. First, they argued that
was pending before the Secretary of DENR when it was there was violation of due process because they did not
forwarded to him following the denial by the petitioners of receive the May 23, 1989 order of confiscation of petitioner
the motion for reconsideration of private respondents Layugan. This contention has no leg to stand on. Due process
through the order of July 12, 1989. In their letter of does not necessarily mean or require a hearing, but simply
reconsideration dated June 28, 1989, 23 private respondents an opportunity or right to be heard. 28 One may be heard, not
clearly recognize the presence of an administrative forum to solely by verbal presentation but also, and perhaps many
which they seek to avail, as they did avail, in the resolution times more creditably and practicable than oral argument,
of their case. The letter, reads, thus: through pleadings. 29 In administrative proceedings
moreover, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not
xxx xxx xxx strictly applied; administrative process cannot be fully
equated with due process in its strict judicial sense. 30
If this motion for reconsideration does not Indeed, deprivation of due process cannot be successfully
merit your favorable action, then this invoked where a party was given the chance to be heard on
letter should be considered as an appeal to his motion for reconsideration, 31 as in the instant case, when
the private respondents were undisputedly given the
Secretary. 24 opportunity to present their side when they filed a letter of
reconsideration dated June 28, 1989 which was, however,
denied in an order of July 12, 1989 of Executive Director
It was easy to perceive then that the private respondents
Baggayan, In Navarro III vs. Damasco, 32 we ruled that :
looked up to the Secretary for the review and disposition of
their case. By appealing to him, they acknowledged the
existence of an adequate and plain remedy still available and The essence of due process is simply an
open to them in the ordinary course of the law. Thus, they opportunity to be heard, or as applied to
cannot now, without violating the principle of exhaustion of administrative proceedings, an
administrative remedies, seek court's intervention by filing opportunity to explain one's side or an
an action for replevin for the grant of their relief during the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of
pendency of an administrative proceedings. the action or ruling complained of. A
formal or trial type hearing is not at all
times and in all instances essential. The
Moreover, it is important to point out that the enforcement
requirements are satisfied when the
of forestry laws, rules and regulations and the protection,
parties are afforded fair and reasonable
development and management of forest lands fall within the
opportunity to explain their side of the
primary and special responsibilities of the Department of
controversy at hand. What is frowned
Environment and Natural Resources. By the very nature of
upon is the absolute lack of notice or
its function, the DENR should be given a free hand
hearing.
unperturbed by judicial intrusion to determine a controversy
which is well within its jurisdiction. The assumption by the
trial court, therefore, of the replevin suit filed by private Second, private respondents imputed the patent illegality of
respondents constitutes an unjustified encroachment into seizure and forfeiture of the truck because the
the domain of the administrative agency's prerogative. The administrative officers of the DENR allegedly have no power
doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to to perform these acts under the law. They insisted that only
arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy the court is authorized to confiscate and forfeit conveyances
the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an used in transporting illegal forest products as can be gleaned
administrative body of special competence. 25 In Felipe from the second paragraph of Section 68 of P.D. 705, as
Ismael, Jr. and Co. vs. Deputy Executive Secretary, 26 which amended by E.O. 277. The pertinent provision reads as
was reiterated in the recent case of Concerned Officials of follows:
MWSS vs. Vasquez, 27 this Court held:
Sec. 68. . . .
Thus, while the administration grapples
with the complex and multifarious xxx xxx xxx
problems caused by unbriddled
exploitation of these resources, the The court shall further order the
judiciary will stand clear. A long line of confiscation in favor of the government of
cases establish the basic rule that the the timber or any forest products cut,
courts will not interfere in matters which gathered, collected, removed, or
are addressed to the sound discretion of possessed, as well as the machinery,
government agencies entrusted with the equipments, implements and tools illegaly
regulation of activities coming under the [sic] used in the area where the timber or
forest products are found. (Emphasis ours)

Nikki T. Sia | StatCon Assignment 10082016 2

A reading, however, of the law persuades us not to go along WHEREAS, our forest
with private respondents' thinking not only because the resources may be
aforequoted provision apparently does not mention nor effectively conserved
include "conveyances" that can be the subject of and protected through
confiscation by the courts, but to a large extent, due to the the vigilant enforcement
fact that private respondents' interpretation of the subject and implementation of
provision unduly restricts the clear intention of the law and our forestry laws, rules
inevitably reduces the other provision of Section 68-A, which and regulations;
is quoted herein below:
WHEREAS, the
Sec. 68-A. Administrative Authority of the implementation of our
Department or His Duly Authorized forestry laws suffers
Representative To Order Confiscation. In from technical
all cases of violation of this Code or other difficulties, due to
forest laws, rules and regulations, the certain inadequacies in
Department Head or his duly authorized the penal provisions of
representative, may order the confiscation the Revised Forestry
of any forest products illegally cut, Code of the Philippines;
gathered, removed, or possessed or and
abandoned, and all conveyances used
either by land, water or air in the WHEREAS, to overcome
commission of the offense and to dispose this difficulties, there is a
of the same in accordance with pertinent need to penalize certain
laws, regulations and policies on the acts more responsive to
matter. (Emphasis ours) present situations and
realities;"
It is, thus, clear from the foregoing provision that the
Secretary and his duly authorized representatives are given It is interesting to note that Section 68-A is
the authority to confiscate and forfeit any conveyances a new provision authorizing the DENR to
utilized in violating the Code or other forest laws, rules and confiscate, not only "conveyances," but
regulations. The phrase "to dispose of the same" is broad forest products as well. On the other hand,
enough to cover the act of forfeiting conveyances in favor of confiscation of forest products by the
the government. The only limitation is that it should be made "court" in a criminal action has long been
"in accordance with pertinent laws, regulations or policies provided for in Section 68. If as private
on the matter." In the construction of statutes, it must be respondents insist, the power on
read in such a way as to give effect to the purpose projected confiscation cannot be exercised except
in the statute. 33 Statutes should be construed in the light of only through the court under Section 68,
the object to be achieved and the evil or mischief to be then Section 68-A would have no Purpose
suppressed, and they should be given such construction as at all. Simply put, Section 68-A would not
will advance the object, suppress the mischief, and secure have provided any solution to the problem
the benefits intended. 34 In this wise, the observation of the perceived in EO 277, supra. 35
Solicitor General is significant, thus:
Private respondents, likewise, contend that the seizure was
But precisely because of the need to make illegal because the petitioners themselves admitted in the
forestry laws "more responsive to present Order dated July 12, 1989 of Executive Director Baggayan
situations and realities" and in view of the that the truck of private respondents was not used in the
"urgency to conserve the remaining commission of the crime. This order, a copy of which was
resources of the country," that the given to and received by the counsel of private respondents,
government opted to add Section 68-A. reads in part, viz.:
This amendatory provision is an
administrative remedy totally separate . . . while it is true that the truck of your
and distinct from criminal proceedings. client was not used by her in the
More than anything else, it is intended to commission of the crime, we uphold your
supplant the inadequacies that claim that the truck owner is not liable for
characterize enforcement of forestry laws the crime and in no case could a criminal
through criminal actions. The preamble of case be filed against her as provided under
EO 277-the law that added Section 68-A to Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal
PD 705-is most revealing: Code. . . 36

"WHEREAS, there is an We observed that private respondents misread the content

urgency to conserve the of the aforestated order and obviously misinterpreted the
remaining forest intention of petitioners. What is contemplated by the
resources of the country petitioners when they stated that the truck "was not used in
for the benefit and the commission of the crime" is that it was not used in the
welfare of the present commission of the crime of theft, hence, in no case can a
and future generations criminal action be filed against the owner thereof for
of Filipinos; violation of Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code.

Nikki T. Sia | StatCon Assignment 10082016 3

Petitioners did not eliminate the possibility that the truck forest laws and
was being used in the commission of another crime, that is, regulations, shall be
the breach of Section 68 of P.D. 705 as amended by E.O. 277. punished with the
In the same order of July 12, 1989, petitioners pointed out: penalties imposed under
Articles 309 and 310 of
. . . However, under Section 68 of P.D. 705 the Revised Penal Code .
as amended and further amended by . . (Emphasis ours;
Executive Order No. 277 specifically Section 1, E.O. No. 277
provides for the confiscation of the amending Section 68,
conveyance used in the transport of forest P.D. 705 as amended)
products not covered by the required legal
documents. She may not have been With the introduction of Executive Order No. 277 amending
involved in the cutting and gathering of Section 68 of P.D. 705, the act of cutting, gathering,
the product in question but the fact that collecting, removing, or possessing forest products without
she accepted the goods for a fee or fare authority constitutes a distinct offense independent now
the same is therefor liable. . . 37 from the crime of theft under Articles 309 and 310 of the
Revised Penal Code, but the penalty to be imposed is that
Private respondents, however, contended that there is no provided for under Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal
crime defined and punishable under Section 68 other than Code. This is clear from the language of Executive Order No.
qualified theft, so that, when petitioners admitted in the July 277 when it eliminated the phrase "shall be guilty of
12, 1989 order that private respondents could not be qualified theft as defined and punished under Articles 309
charged for theft as provided for under Articles 309 and 310 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code" and inserted the words
of the Revised Penal Code, then necessarily private "shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Article
respondents could not have committed an act constituting a 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code". When the statute
crime under Section 68. We disagree. For clarity, the is clear and explicit, there is hardly room for any extended
provision of Section 68 of P.D. 705 before its amendment by court ratiocination or rationalization of the law. 38
E.O. 277 and the provision of Section 1 of E.O. No. 277
amending the aforementioned Section 68 are reproduced From the foregoing disquisition, it is clear that a suit for
herein, thus: replevin can not be sustained against the petitioners for the
subject truck taken and retained by them for administrative
Sec. 68. Cutting, gathering and/or forfeiture proceedings in pursuant to Section 68-A of the
collecting timber or other products P.D. 705, as amended. Dismissal of the replevin suit for lack
without license. Any person who shall of cause of action in view of the private respondents' failure
cut, gather, collect, or remove timber or to exhaust administrative remedies should have been the
other forest products from any forest land, proper course of action by the lower court instead of
or timber from alienable and disposable assuming jurisdiction over the case and consequently issuing
public lands, or from private lands, the writ ordering the return of the truck. Exhaustion of the
without any authority under a license remedies in the administrative forum, being a condition
agreement, lease, license or permit, shall precedent prior to one's recourse to the courts and more
be guilty of qualified theft as defined and importantly, being an element of private respondents' right
punished under Articles 309 and 310 of the of action, is too significant to be waylaid by the lower court.
Revised Penal Code . . . (Emphasis ours;
Section 68, P.D. 705 before its amendment It is worth stressing at this point, that a suit for replevin is
by E.O. 277) founded solely on the claim that the defendant wrongfully
withholds the property sought to be recovered. It lies to
Sec. 1. Section 68 of Presidential Decree recover possession of personal chattels that are unlawfully
No. 705, as amended, is hereby amended detained. 39 "To detain" is defined as to mean "to hold or
to read as follows: keep in custody," 40 and it has been held that there is tortious
taking whenever there is an unlawful meddling with the
Sec. 68. Cutting, property, or an exercise or claim of dominion over it, without
gathering and/or any pretense of authority or right; this, without manual
collecting timber or seizing of the property is sufficient. 41 Under the Rules of
other forest products Court, it is indispensable in replevin proceeding that the
without license. Any plaintiff must show by his own affidavit that he is entitled to
person who shall cut, the possession of property, that the property is wrongfully
gather, collect, remove detained by the defendant, alleging the cause of detention,
timber or other forest that the same has not been taken for tax assessment, or
products from any forest seized under execution, or attachment, or if so seized, that
land, or timber from it is exempt from such seizure, and the actual value of the
alienable or disposable property. 42 Private respondents miserably failed to convince
public land, or from this Court that a wrongful detention of the subject truck
private land, without obtains in the instant case. It should be noted that the truck
any authority, or possess was seized by the petitioners because it was transporting
timber or other forest forest products without the required permit of the DENR in
products without the manifest contravention of Section 68 of P.D. 705 as amended
legal documents as by E.O 277. Section 68-A of P.D. 705, as amended,
required under existing unquestionably warrants the confiscation as well as the
disposition by the Secretary of DENR or his duly authorized
Nikki T. Sia | StatCon Assignment 10082016 4
representatives of the conveyances used in violating the Macarling and Rufino Garin, deceased, struck the latter on
provision of forestry laws. Evidently, the continued the head, knocked him down and held him on the ground
possession or detention of the truck by the petitioners for while Pedro Macarling stabbed him to death. There is and
administrative forfeiture proceeding is legally permissible, there can be no question as to his guilt of the crime of which
hence, no wrongful detention exists in the case at bar. he was convicted in the court below, the only question
raised on this appeal being his right to exemption from
Moreover, the suit for replevin is never intended as a prosecution for the crime thus committed, on the ground
procedural tool to question the orders of confiscation and that a former information, charging the same offense, had
forfeiture issued by the DENR in pursuance to the authority been dismissed as to him in order that he might testify as a
given under P.D. 705, as amended. Section 8 of the said law witness for the prosecution.
is explicit that actions taken by the Director of the Bureau of
Forest Development concerning the enforcement of the It appears that some time prior to the trial of the case at bar
provisions of the said law are subject to review by the an information was duly filed charging De Guzman, jointly
Secretary of DENR and that courts may not review the with the two Macarlings, with the murder of Guzman
decisions of the Secretary except through a special civil entered into an agreement with the fiscal under the terms
action for certiorari or prohibition. It reads: of which he promised to appear and testify as a witness for
the Government at the trial of his coaccused, and to tell the
Sec. 8. REVIEW All actions and decisions truth as to all that occurred, provided the information was
of the Director are subject to review, motu dismissed as to him and he himself was not brought to trial.
propio or upon appeal of any person With the consent of the court, and in pursuance of this
aggrieved thereby, by the Department agreement, he was not arraigned nor brought to trial, and
Head whose decision shall be final and the information was dismissed as to him. One of his
executory after the lapse of thirty (30) coaccused pleaded guilty and the other not guilty, and
days from the receipt of the aggrieved thereafter the case came on for trial. after several witnesses
party of said decision, unless appealed to had been called, De Guzman was placed on the witness
the President in accordance with Executive stand, and denied all knowledge of the murder. He denied
Order No. 19, Series of 1966. The Decision that he had ever said anything implicating his coaccused, and
of the Department Head may not be swore that a statement made by him before a justice of the
reviewed by the courts except through a peace was false, and that it had been made through fear of
special civil action for certiorari or certain police officer. Question by the court developed that
prohibition. he had made still another statement to one Natnat,
implication his coaccused, but he swore that statement had
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED; the Decision of the also been made through fear; and repudiating all former
respondent Court of Appeals dated October 16, 1991 and its statements made by him, he declared that they were false,
Resolution dated July 14, 1992 are hereby SET ASIDE AND and had been procured by the prosecuting officials of the
REVERSED; the Restraining Order promulgated on Government by the use of improper and illegal methods.
September 27, 1993 is hereby made permanent; and the
Secretary of DENR is directed to resolve the controversy with The Solicitor-General, relying on the provisions of sections
utmost dispatch. 34, 35 and 365 of General orders No. 58, recommends the
discharge of the appellant, and that he be set at liberty
SO ORDERED. forthwith, adding in the concluding paragraph of his brief
that, although such action would result "in a palpable
misdismissal and expressly bars a future prosecution" for the
crime charged in the information which was dismissed as to
him. We do not think so, and hold that, it conclusively
appearing that appellant failed to carry out his agreement
with the fiscal, and had knowingly and falsely testified at the
trial of his coaccused, and that he fraudulently secured the
dismissal of the former information, the state was wholly
within its rights in bringing him to trial, and convicting and
sentencing him for the crime with which he was charged in
the former information.

G.R. No. L-9144 March 27, 1915 Section 34, 35, and 36 of General orders No. 58, upon which
counsel for defense and the Solicitor-General rely, are as
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, follows:
vs.
VENANCIO DE GUZMAN (alias CACALASAN), defendant- SEC. 34. When two or more persons shall
appellant. be included in the same charge, the court,
at any time before the defendants have
Venancio de Guzman, the defendant and appellant in this entered upon their defense or upon the
case, was convicted in the court below of the crime of application of the counsel of the
asesinato (murder) and sentenced to life imprisonment. Government, may direct any defendant to
be discharged, that he may be a witness
The evidence of record leaves no room for doubt that, on the for the United States.
day and at place mentioned in the information, De Guzman,
who was walking through a field with Pedro and Serapio

Nikki T. Sia | StatCon Assignment 10082016 5

 SEC. 35. When tow or more persons shall sometimes assured of exemption from criminal prosecution
be included in the same charge, and the on condition that they testify against their coparticipants in
court shall be of opinion in respect to a the commission of a crime, would appear to have been
particular defendant that there is not authorized under the provisions of General Orders No. 58, as
sufficient evidence to put him on his a necessary incident to the supplanting of the old system of
defense, it must order him to be criminal procedure with a system borrowed, in large part,
discharged before the evidence is closed, from English and American precedents. This, doubtless, as a
that he may be a witness for his result of the emphasis placed by the new system on the
codefendant. presumption of innocence in favor of an accused persons, on
the requirement that the Government must establish its
SEC. 36. The order indicated in sections case beyond a reasonable doubt before the accused is called
thirty-four and thirty-five shall amount to upon to defend himself, on the prohibitions against
an acquittal of the defendant discharged, compelling an accused persons to be a witness against
and shall be a bar to future prosecution for himself, and against the drawing of inferences of guilt from
the same offense. the silence of the accused. Experience, under English and
American procedural methods, has shown that without the
These sections constitute a part of the notably short, aid of informers testifying against their coparticipants in
compact and concise military order issued April 23, 1900, crime, many guilty parties would escape, where the facts
which prescribed, in very summary terms, the procedure to which would sustain a conviction are known only to the
be followed in criminal cases in the various courts of the guilty persons themselves. Indeed, we do not doubt that the
Islands authorized to administer justice under American making of such agreements as the one under consideration
Sovereignty, and which continues in force, with a few would be held to have authorized under the new system of
amendments, to the present day. We have frequently held criminal procedure upon the authority of American and
that, for the proper construction and application of the English precedents, even had it not been expressly
terms and provisions of legislative enactment's which have recognized and provided for in General orders No. 58.
been borrowed from or of times essential to review the
legislative history of such enactments and to find an In the Whiskey Cases (9 Otto, 594; 25 L. ed., 399), we find an
authoritative guide for their interpretation and application interesting history of the original and growth of the practice
in the decision of American and English courts of last resort under consideration. It there appears that aciently, under
construing and applying similar legislation in those the common law of England, the criminal could not interpose
countries. (Kepner vs. U.S., 195 U.S., 100; 11 Phil. Rep., 669; such an agreement with the state as a plea in bar to the
Serra vs. Mortiga, 204 U.S., 470; 11 Phil. Rep., 762; Alzua vs. prosecution for the offense with which he was charged, but
Johnson, 21 Phil. Rep., 308.) Indeed it is a general rule of that the faithful performance of the agreement entitled him
statutory construction that courts may take judicial notice of to an equitable rights to a recommendation to executive
the original and history of the statutes which they are called clemency. In more recent times, however, the practice has
upon to construe and administer, and of the facts which been quite generally recognized by statutory enactment in
affect their derivation, validity and operation (2 Lewis many jurisdiction, and under the statutes the faithful
Sutherland on Statutory Construction, sec. 309). This author performance of the agreement is held to be a complete bar
in section 456, citing numerous cases in support of the to a subsequent prosecution of the criminal. A search of the
doctrine, says also that: year books shows but few cases in which a defendant, after
making an agreement with the prosecution to testify what
Where the meaning of a statute or any he knows about the commission of the crime, failed go
statutory provision is not plain, a court is comply with his promise. In the discussion of the general
warranted in availing itself of all legitimate subject, however, there is much dicta to the effect that the
aids to ascertain the true intention; and criminal must act in good faith and testify fully and fairly as
among them are some extraneous facts. to what he knows concerning the crime, in order to claim
The object sought to be accomplished immunity. (The Whiskey Cases, supra; Rex vs. Rudd, Crowp.,
exercises a potent influence in 331, as quoted in 41 N.J.L., 17; 4 Blackstone's Com., 330.)
determining the meaning of not only the
principal but also the minor provisions of a The question arose in Texas under a statute providing that:
statute. To ascertain it fully the court will "The attorney representing the State may at any time under
be greatly assisted by knowing, and it is the rules provided in article 37 dismiss a prosecution as to
permitted to consider, the mischief one or more defendants indicated with others, and the
intended to be removed or suppressed, or person so discharged may be introduced as a witness by
the necessity of any kind which induced either party." (Texas Code crim. Proc., art 709.)
the enactment. If the statute has been in
force for a long period it may be useful to Article 37 provides that when a district attorney desires to
know what was the contemporary dismiss a case he shall file a written statement, setting not
construction; its practical construction; occur without the permission of the presiding judge, who
the sense of the legal profession in regard shall be satisfied that the reasons so stated are good and
to it; the course and usages of business sufficient to allow such dismissal. These statutory provisions,
which it will affect. as will be seen, are not widely dissimilar from our own,
though we have no provision requiring a written statement
The dismissal of complaints or informations as to one of of the reasons for dismissal to accompany motions of this
several persons charged with the commission of an offense nature, a feature nevertheless which might well be adopted
in order that he may used as witness against his coaccused, by the trial courts without the necessity for statutory
and the making of agreements whereby quickly persons are enactment. In Ex parte Greenhaw (41 Tex. Crim. R., 278), the
court touched upon the question of the obligation of the
Nikki T. Sia | StatCon Assignment 10082016 6
accused to keep faith with the State under such an In discussing the effect of the failure of a defendant to keep
agreement and said: "I can find no case in which the question faith with the Government when called upon to testify
has been directly presented as to the terms of this character against his codefendants under this constitutional provision,
of contract; I think, however, it may be fairly deduced from the supreme court of that State recently said: "In this respect
the authorities that the state or Sovereign can contract with our immunity clause differs from the statute of Wisconsin,
the accomplice upon the following terms only: In which reserves the right of prosecution for perjury
consideration that he shall testify fully and fairly as to all he committed in the giving of such testimony. Touching this
knows in regard to the guilt of his associates in the particular reservation the supreme court of Wisconsin, in the case of
case in which the contract is made, that he will receive State vs. Murphy (128 Wis., 201), in discussing the question
immunity from punishment as to such case. . . . Again, it is as to whether or not under this statute a witness could only
agreed that there must be a compliance with the terms of secure immunity when he had testified to the truth, said:
the contract on the part of the accomplice before he can 'The statute itself, however, refutes any such meaning, for it
claim immunity. . . . so it follows, if the accomplice testifies expressly reserves the right to prosecute for perjury "in
corruptly or falsely he cannot claim immunity." giving such testimony."'

In the later case of Goodwin vs. State (158 S. W., 274), the The same reservation is contained in the
supreme court of Texas had the question of good faith on Acts of Congress granting immunity. See
the part of the informer directly presented to it. The United States Comp. St. 1901, p. 3173 (Act
defendant had been jointly indicted with one Butler for Feb. 11, 1893, c. 83 27 Stat., 443). If
adultery. She agreed with the prosecuting officer that if he Congress had thought that a person who
would dismiss the case against her she would testify fully on testified falsely in answer to question of an
the trial of her codefendant. The case was thereupon incriminating character would be subject
dismissed as to her, but when her codefendant was tried she to prosecution for perjury, why the
refused to testify against him fully. She contended that the necessity for this reservation? We have no
State was bound by its agreement, and that she could not such reservation in our constitutional
thereafter be prosecuted. The Supreme Court, in sustaining provision; and, as before said, if we should
the court's refusal to consider her discharge as a plea in follow the precedents, when the witness
abatement, said: "If she had carried out her agreement with does not speak the truth, the State would
the State and testified fully as she agreed on the trial of be left without redress, although the
Butler then the States would have been bound by said witness had violated the purpose and
agreement, and could not thereafter have prosecuted her. spirit of the constitution. We cannot
But certainly the State was not found by its agreement believe that it was the purpose of the
unless she carried out her agreement with it. As shown intelligent and just-loving of Oklahoma,
above she refused to do so." when they voted for the adoption of the
constitution, to grant immunity to any
The Texas statute is silent, as is our own, as to the man, based upon a lie, or, in other words,
consequence of bad faith on the part of the accused, and yet, that they intended that the commission of
as we have seen, the Texas court held that a discharge of this perjury should atone for an offense
kind, secured in bad faith, did not exempt the informer from already committed. It is a familiar rule of
prosecution unless he keeps faith with the Government. common law, common sense, and
common justice that a legal right cannot
The more common form of the statutory declaration of this be based upon fraud. We therefore hold
practice appears to be at permit any person accused of crime that the witness who claims immunity on
to testify concerning it at the request of the prosecuting account of self-incriminatory testimony
officer, with the understanding that when a person has so which he had been compelled to give must
testified he shall done in connection with such crime. This is act in good faith with the State, and must
the method adopted in various immunity clauses in Acts of make truthful replies to the question
Congress (see Act of Feb. 25, 1903, 32 Star., 854, 903, 904, c. which are propounded to him, and which
775), with a proviso that persons committing perjury, when he had been compelled to answer, and
so called upon to testify, may be punished therefor. (For a that any material concealment or
discussion of his history and an enumeration of these laws, suppression of the truth on his part will
see U.S. vs. Swift, 186 Fed., 1002.) deprive him of the immunity provided by
the constitution; and the witness must
testify to something which, if true, would
The constitution of Oklahoma, however, contains the
tend to criminate him. This immunity is
following provision which, like our own statute, has no
only granted to those who earn it by
proviso authorizing a prosecution: "Any person having
testifying in good faith. In our judgment
acknowledge or possession of facts that tend to establish the
any other construction would be an insult
guilt of any other person or corporation charged with an
to and a libel upon the intelligence of the
offense against the laws of the State shall not be excused
people of Oklahoma, an outrage on law,
from giving testimony or producing evidence, when legally
and a prostitution of justice. (Scribner vs.
called upon so to do, on the ground that it may tend to
State, 132 Pac., 933, 940.)
incriminate him under the laws of the State; but no person
shall be prosecuted or subjected to any penalty or forfeiture
for on account of any transaction, matter, or thing From a review of the history and development of the
concerning which he may so testify or produce evidence." practice under consideration, and reasoning along the line of
the above cited, we are all agreed that the failure of the
accused in the case at bar, faithfully and honestly to carry
out his undertaking to appear as a witness and to tell the
Nikki T. Sia | StatCon Assignment 10082016 7
truth at the trial of his coaccused, deprived him of the right organized for profit. Acting upon the recommendation of its
to plead his former dismissal as a bar to his prosecution in Legal Staff, the Social Security Commission in its Resolution
the case now before us. No. 572, series of 1958, denied the request. The Roman
Catholic Archbishop of Manila, reiterating its arguments and
We have found considerable difficulty however in coming to raising constitutional objections, requested for
an agreement as to the precise scope of the rule thus reconsideration of the resolution. The request, however,
adopted. All are agreed that in the absence of the above was denied by the Commission in its Resolution No. 767,
cited provisions of section 36 of General Orders No. 58, series of 1958; hence, this appeal taken in pursuance of
which provides that an order discharging one of two or more section 5(c) of Republic Act No. 1161, as amended.
accused persons that he may be a witness for the
prosecution "shall amount to an acquittal of the defendant Section 9 of the Social Security Law, as amended, provides
thus discharged and shall be a bar to further prosecution for that coverage "in the System shall be compulsory upon all
the same offense," a corrupt and fraudulent agreement, or members between the age of sixteen and sixty rears
an agreement not faithfully with by the accused would be no inclusive, if they have been for at least six months a the
bar to further prosecution. Some of the members of the service of an employer who is a member of the System,
court are of opinion that notwithstanding this provision, Provided, that the Commission may not compel any
such agreements are always vitiated by the failure of the employer to become member of the System unless he shall
accused to testify honestly and faithfully, it matters not have been in operation for at least two years and has at the
whether the accused is discharged at or before the trial, time of admission, if admitted for membership during the
other members of the court, of whom the writer of this first year of the System's operation at least fifty employees,
opinion is one, are inclined to believe that while the general and if admitted for membership the following year of
rule as held by the majority is applicable in all cases where operation and thereafter, at least six employees x x x." The
the agreement is made and the order of discharge is entered term employer" as used in the law is defined as any person,
before the trial actually begins, it is limited and restricted by natural or juridical, domestic or foreign, who carries in the
the provisions of section 36, and that in any case wherein an Philippines any trade, business, industry, undertaking, or
accused person is thus discharged after he has entered on activity of any kind and uses the services of another person
trial, the discharge amounts to an acquittal and bar a further who is under his orders as regards the employment, except
prosecution. This on the assumption (questioned by various the Government and any of its political subdivisions,
members of the court) that sections 34, 35 and 36 purport branches or instrumentalities, including corporations owned
only to deal with, and do in fact deal only with incidents of or controlled by the Government" (par. [c], see. 8), while an
"the trial," and declare merely what the procedure shall "employee" refers to "any person who performs services for
being cases of such discharges after the trial has begun. an 'employer' in which either or both mental and physical
efforts are used and who receives compensation for such
But however this may be, we are all agreed that in the case services" (par. [d], see. 8). "Employment", according to
at bar, in which the order discharging defendant was made paragraph [i] of said section 8, covers any service performed
before the trial began, appellant was not entitled to have the by an employer except those expressly enumerated
order of discharge held to amount to an acquittal or a bar to thereunder, like employment under the Government, or any
further prosecution. of its political subdivisions, branches or instrumentalities
including corporations owned and controlled by the
We find no errors in the proceedings prejudicial to the Government, domestic service in a private home,
substantial rights of the accused, and the judgment employment purely casual, etc.
convicting and sentencing him should therefore be affirmed,
with the costs of this instance against him. So ordered. From the above legal provisions, it is apparent that the
coverage of the Social Security Law is predicated on the
existence of an employer-employee relationship of more or
less permanent nature and extends to employment of all
kinds except those expressly excluded.

Appellant contends that the term "employer" as defined in

G.R. No. L-15045 January 20, 1961
the law should following the principle of ejusdem generis
be limited to those who carry on "undertakings or
IN RE: PETITION FOR EXEMPTION FROM COVERAGE BY THE
activities which have the element of profit or gain, or which
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM. ROMAN CATHOLIC
are pursued for profit or gain," because the phrase ,activity
ARCHBISHOP OF MANILA, petitioner-appellant,
of any kind" in the definition is preceded by the words "any
vs.
trade, business, industry, undertaking." The contention
SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION, respondent-appellee.
cannot be sustained. The rule ejusdem generis applies only
where there is uncertainty. It is not controlling where the
On September 1, 1958, the Roman Catholic Archbishop of plain purpose and intent of the Legislature would thereby be
Manila, thru counsel, filed with the Social Security hindered and defeated. (Grosjean vs. American Paints Works
Commission a request that "Catholic Charities, and all [La], 160 So. 449). In the case at bar, the definition of the
religious and charitable institutions and/or organizations, term "employer" is, we think, sufficiently comprehensive as
which are directly or indirectly, wholly or partially, operated to include religious and charitable institutions or entities not
by the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila," be exempted organized for profit, like herein appellant, within its
from compulsory coverage of Republic Act No. 1161, as meaning. This is made more evident by the fact that it
amended, otherwise known as the Social Security Law of contains an exception in which said institutions or entities
1954. The request was based on the claim that the said Act are not included. And, certainly, had the Legislature really
is a labor law and does not cover religious and charitable intended to limit the operation of the law to entities
institutions but is limited to businesses and activities organized for profit or gain, it would not have defined an
Nikki T. Sia | StatCon Assignment 10082016 8
"employer" in such a way as to include the Government and Constitution, since such payment shall be made to the priest
yet make an express exception of it. not because he is a priest but because he is an employee.

It is significant to note that when Republic Act No. 1161 was Neither may it be validly argued that the enforcement of the
enacted, services performed in the employ of institutions Social Security Law impairs appellant's right to disseminate
organized for religious or charitable purposes were by religious information. All that is required of appellant is to
express provisions of said Act excluded from coverage make monthly contributions to the System for covered
thereof (sec. 8, par. [j] subpars. 7 and 8). That portion of the employees in its employ. These contributions, contrary to
law, however, has been deleted by express provision of appellant's contention, are not in the nature of taxes on
Republic Act No. 1792, which took effect in 1957. This is clear employment." Together with the contributions imposed
indication that the Legislature intended to include charitable upon the employees and the Government, they are intended
and religious institutions within the scope of the law. for the protection of said employees against the hazards of
disability, sickness, old age and death in line with the
In support of its contention that the Social Security Law was constitutional mandate to promote social justice to insure
intended to cover only employment for profit or gain, the well-being and economic security of all the people.
appellant also cites the discussions of the Senate, portions of
which were quoted in its brief. There is, however, nothing IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, Resolutions Nos. 572 kind 767,
whatsoever in those discussions touching upon the question series of 1958, of the Social Security Commission are hereby
of whether the law should be limited to organizations for affirmed. So ordered with costs against appellant.
profit or gain. Of course, the said discussions dwelt at length
upon the need of a law to meet the problems of ______________________
industrializing society and upon the plight of an employer
who fails to make a profit. But this is readily explained by the
fact that the majority of those to be affected by the G.R. No. L-31711 September 30, 1971
operation of the law are corporations and industries which
are established primarily for profit or gain.
ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS as Mayor of the City of Manila and
MANUEL D. LAPID, petitioners-appellants,
Appellant further argues that the Social Security Law is a vs.
labor law and, consequently, following the rule laid down in ABELARDO SUBIDO as Civil Service Commissioner,
the case of Boy Scouts of the Philippines vs. Araos (G.R. No. EDUARDO Z. ROMUALDEZ as Secretary of Finance, JOSE R.
L-10091, January 29, 1958) and other cases1, applies only to GLORIA as Acting Asst. City Treasurer of Manila, and HON.
industry and occupation for purposes of profit and gain. The CONRADO M. VASQUEZ as Presiding Judge of Branch V,
cases cited, however, are not in point, for the reason that Court of First Instance of Manila, respondents-appellees.
the law therein involved expressly limits its application
either to commercial, industrial, or agricultural
Petitioner Antonio J. Villegas, in this appeal from a decision
establishments, or enterprises. .
of the lower court dismissing a special civil action for
prohibition, quo warranto and mandamus would lay claim as
Upon the other hand, the Social Security Law was enacted the Mayor of the City of Manila to the power of appointment
pursuant to the "policy of the Republic of the Philippines to of the Assistant City Treasurer to which office the other
develop, establish gradually and perfect a social security petitioner, Manuel D. Lapid, was by him named even if under
system which shall be suitable to the needs of the people its Charter 1 such a prerogative is expressly vested in the
throughout the Philippines and shall provide protection to President of the Philippines. 2 He would invoke a provision in
employees against the hazards of disability, sickness, old age the Decentralization Act to the effect that all "other
and death." (See. 2, Republic Act No. 1161, as amended.) employees, except teachers, paid out of provincial, city or
Such enactment is a legitimate exercise of the police power. municipal general funds, and other local funds shall, subject
It affords protection to labor, especially to working women to civil service law, rules and regulations, be appointed by
and minors, and is in full accord with the constitutional the provincial governor, city or municipal mayor upon
provisions on the "promotion of social justice to insure the recommendation of the office head concerned." 3 He is not
well-being and economic security of all the people." Being in deterred by the rather general and in explicit character of
fact a social legislation, compatible with the policy of the such statutory language as he contends for a construction
Church to ameliorate living conditions of the working class, rather generous, if not latitudinarian, in scope purportedly
appellant cannot arbitrarily delimit the extent of its in consonance with the avowed purpose of the Act of
provisions to relations between capital and labor in industry enlarging boundaries of local autonomy. Respondent
and agriculture. Abelardo Subido, who was proceeded against as
Commissioner of the Civil Service, 4 takes a stand
There is no merit in the claim that the inclusion of religious diametrically opposite not only because there is no legal
organizations under the coverage of the Social Security Law basis for such a claim in the light of what is expressly
violates the constitutional prohibition against the ordained in the City Charter but also because such an
application of public funds for the use, benefit or support of interpretation of the provision related upon would disregard
any priest who might be employed by appellant. The funds the well-settled doctrine that implied repeals are not
contributed to the System created by the law are not public favored. The lower court, in a well-written decision by the
funds, but funds belonging to the members which are merely Honorable Conrado M. Vasquez, accepted such a view. After
held in trust by the Government. At any rate, assuming that a careful study of the matter, we cannot discern any error.
said funds are impressed with the character of public funds, We affirm.
their payment as retirement death or disability benefits
would not constitute a violation of the cited provisions of the The facts as found by the lower court follows: "In a letter
dated June 3, 1968, respondent Eduardo Z. Romualdez,
Nikki T. Sia | StatCon Assignment 10082016 9
Secretary of Finance, authorized respondent Jose R. Gloria 1. The inherent weakness of the contention of petitioner
of the Office of the City Treasurer of Manila to assume the Mayor that would seize upon the vesting of the appointing
duties of Assistant City Treasurer effective June 1, 1968, vice power of all other "employees" except teachers paid out of
Felino Fineza who retired from the government service on local funds to justify his choice of petitioner Manuel D. Lapid
May 31, 1968. In administrative Order No. 40, series of 1968, as Assistant City Treasurer is readily disclosed. The Revised
dated June 17, 1968, petitioner Antonio J. Villegas, Mayor of Administrative Code distinguishes one in that category from
the City of Manila, directed respondent Gloria to desist and an "officer" to designate those "whose duties, not being of a
refrain from exercising the duties and functions of the clerical or manual nature, may be considered to involve the
Assistant City Treasurer,' on the ground that respondent exercise of discretion in the performance of the function of
Romualdez "is not empowered to make such designation." government, whether such duties are precisely defined by
On January 1, 1969, Mayor Villegas, appointed petitioner law or not." 9 Clearly, the Assistant and City Treasurer is an
Manuel D. Lapid, chief of the cash division of the Office of officer, not an employee. Then, too, Section 4 of the
the City Treasurer of Manila, as Assistant City Treasurer. In a Decentralization Act relied upon by petitioner City Mayor
1st endorsement dated February 14, 1969, respondent specifically enumerates, the officials and their assistants
Abelardo Subido, Commissioner of Civil Service disapproved whom he can appoint, specifically excluding therefrom city
the appointment of Lapid, basing his action, on an opinion of treasurers. 10 The expansive interpretation contended for is
the Secretary of Justice dated September 19, 1968 to the thus unwarranted.
effect that the appointment of Assistant Provincial
Treasurers is still governed by Section 2088 (A) of the Nor is the case strengthened for petitioner City Mayor by the
Revised Administrative Code, and not by Section 4 of the invocation of Pineda v. Claudio. 11 It is not to be denied that
Decentralization Law, Republic Act No. 5185." 5 in the opinion of the Court, penned by Justice Castro, undue
interference with the power and prerogatives of a local
Thereafter on February 25, 1969, to quote anew from the executive is sought to be avoided, considering his primary
appealed decision: "Mayor Villegas and Manuel D. Lapid filed responsibility for efficient governmental administration.
the instant petition for prohibition, quo warranto and What is not to be ignored though is that such a principle was
mandamus, with application for writ of preliminary announced in connection with the appointment of a
injunction, praying that judgment be rendered to declare department head, the chief of police, who necessarily must
illegal and void ab initio the authorization given by enjoy the fullest confidence of the local executive, one
respondent Romualdez to respondent Gloria to assume the moreover whose appointment is expressly vested in the city
duties of assistant city treasurer of Manila, and that a writ of mayor. The principle therein announced does not extend as
mandamus be issued to respondent Commissioner of Civil far as the choice of an assistant city treasurer whose
Service Subido commanding him to approve the functions do not require that much degree of confidence,
appointment of petitioner Lapid to the said office in not to mention the specific grant of such authority to the
accordance with the civil Service Rules." 6 It was not until the President. Equally unavailing then is Villegas v. Subido, 12
filing of the petition that respondent Jose R. Gloria was where this Court, through the then Justice Capistrano,
nominated by the President of the Philippines to the position recognized that the choice of who the city legal officer
of Assistant City treasurer of Manila and thereafter duly should be rests solely on the city mayor, such an office
confirmed. After the case was submitted for judgment on requiring as it does the highest degree of confidence. It bears
the pleadings and the documentary exhibits stipulated by repeating that the situation in the case before us is of a
the parties, the court rendered its decision on August 4, 1969 different category. The decision appealed from, then, is not
dismissing the petition. Hence this appeal by way of to be impugned as a failure to abide by controlling
certiorari. pronouncements of this Tribunal.

With this Tribunal, as with the court below, the decisive 2. Much less is reversal of the lower court decision justified
question is the applicable law. The Charter of the City of on the plea that the aforesaid provision in the
Manila, enacted in 1949, in express terms did confer on the Decentralization Act had the effect of repealing what is
President of the Philippines, with the consent of the specifically ordained in the city charter. It has been the
Commission on Appointments, the power to appoint the constant holding of this Court that repeals by duplication are
Assistant City Treasurer. 7 On the other hand, support for the not favored and will not be so declared unless it be manifest
petition is premised on the expansive interpretation that that the legislature so intended. Such a doctrine goes as far
would be accorded the general provisions found in the back as United States v. Reyes, a 1908 decision. 13 It is
Decentralization Act of 1967 to the effect that it is a city necessary then before such a repeal is deemed to exist that
mayor who has the power to appoint all other employees it be shown that the statutes or statutory provisions deal
paid out of city or local funds subject to civil service law, rules with the same subject matter and that the latter be
and regulations. 8 inconsistent with the former. 14 There must be a showing of
repugnancy clear and convincing in character. The language
It is understandable why the choice for the lower court was used in the latter statute must be such as to render it
not difficult to make. What has been so clearly ordained in irreconcilable with what had been formerly enacted. An
the Charter is controlling. It survives in the face of the inconsistency that falls short of that standard does not
assertion that the additional power granted local officials to suffice. What is needed is a manifest indication of the
appoint employees paid out of local funds would suffice to legislative purpose to repeal. 15
transfer such authority to petitioner Mayor. A perusal of the
words of the statute, even if far from searching would not More specifically, a subsequent statute, general in character
justify such an interpretation. This is all more evident, as to its terms and application, is not to be construed as
considering the fidelity manifested by this Court to the repealing a special or specific enactment, unless the
doctrine that looks with less than favor on implied appeals. legislative purpose to do so is manifest. This is so even if the
The decision now on appeal, to repeat, must be affirmed. provisions of the latter are sufficiently comprehensive to
include what was set forth in the special act. This principle
Nikki T. Sia | StatCon Assignment 10082016 10
has likewise been consistently applied in decisions of this P1,400.00. 6 Respondent Judge, however, issued an order
Court from Manila Railroad Co. v. Rafferty, 16 decided as far dated July 13, 1978 which, according to petitioner, is clearly
back as 1919. A citation from an opinion of Justice Tuason is contrary to the letter and spirit of the aforecited laws. 7
illuminating. Thus: "From another angle the presumption There was a Motion for Reconsideration dated July 21, 1978.
8
against repeal is stronger. A special law is not regarded as Its basis is the provision in Presidential Decree No. 1224:
having been amended or repealed by a general law unless "In the determination of just compensation for such private
the intent to repeal or alter is manifest. Generalia specialibus lands and improvement to be expropriated, the government
non derogant. And this is true although the terms of the shall choose between the value of the real property and
general act are broad enough to include the matter in the improvements thereon as declared by the owner or
special statute. ... At any rate, in the event harmony between administrator thereof or the market value determined by
provisions of this type in the same law or in two laws is the City or provincial assessor, whichever is lower, at the
impossible, the specific provision controls unless the statute, time of the filing of the expropriation complaint. " 9 It was
considered in its entirety, indicates a contrary intention then submitted that under the aforequoted statutory
upon the part of the legislature. ... A general law is one which provision, the owner's declared market value at P1,400.00
embraces a class of subjects or places and does not omit any which is lower than that fixed by the assessor is the just
subject or place naturally belonging to such class while a compensation of respondent Quirino Austria's property
special act is one which relates to particular persons or sought to be expropriated. The motion for reconsideration
things of a class. 17 was denied for lack of merit. Hence, this petition.

WHEREFORE, the lower court decision of August 4, 1969 is On January 4, 1979, the Court issued the following
affirmed. Without pronouncement as to costs. resolution: "Considering the allegations contained, the
issues raised and the arguments adduced in the petition for
G.R. No. L-49439 June 29, 1983 certiorari and mandamus with preliminary injunction with
prayer for a restraining order, the Court Resolved without
giving due course to the petition to require the respondents
NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, petitioner,
to comment, not to file a motion to dismiss, within ten (10)
vs.
days from notice. The Court further Resolved to issue a
HONORABLE PASTOR P. REYES, in his capacity as Presiding
temporary restraining order, effective as of this date and
Judge (on detail), Court of Agrarian Relations, Seventh
continuing until otherwise ordered by the Court." 10 The
Regional District, Branch II, Cavite City, QUIRINO AUSTRIA
comment was thereafter submitted by private respondents
and LUCIANO AUSTRIA, respondents.
Quirino Austria and Luciano Austria.

The undisputed fact that in this certiorari proceeding against

Private respondents stress that while there may be basis for
respondent Judge for failure to comply with the provision of
the allegation that respondent Judge did not follow
the Presidential Decrees as to the amount to be paid by
Presidential Decree No. 76 as amended by Presidential
petitioner to entitle it to a writ of possession in an
Decree No. 464, as further amended by Presidential Decree
expropriation proceeding, no question was raised as to their
Nos. 794, 1224 and 1259, the matter is still subject to his final
validity, calls for the grant of the remedy sought.
disposition, he having been vested with the original and
competent authority to exercise his judicial discretion in the
The controversy started with the filing of a complaint with light of the constitutional provisions. 11 There was a
the then Court of Agrarian Relations, Seventh Regional comment likewise submitted by counsel on behalf of
District, Branch II, Cavite City, against private respondents, respondent Judge but again, there was no question raised as
for the expropriation, pursuant to Presidential Decree No. to the validity of the aforementioned Decrees. Such
757, of a parcel of land, with an area of 25,000 square comments were considered as answers. The case was
meters, owned and registered in the name of respondent originally submitted to the Second Division, and in a
Quirino Austria, and needed for the expansion of the resolution of February 21, 1979, it referred this case to the
Dasmarias Resettlement Project. 1 Then came from Court en banc.
petitioner about a year later a motion for the issuance of a
writ of possession. 2 Petitioner was able to secure an order
Under the state of the pleadings as submitted to this Court,
placing it in possession. 3 Thereafter, private respondent
it is evident why, as noted at the outset, certiorari lies.
Quirino Austria filed a Motion to Withdraw Deposit in the
amount of P6,600.00, a sum which was equivalent to the
value of the property assessed for taxation purposes and 2. Nor is there any choice for petitioner National Housing
which was deposited by petitioner pursuant to Presidential Authority for precisely it was created for the laudable
Decree No. 42 . 4 There was an Opposition to the Motion to purpose of "urban land reform." 17 The first whereas clause
Withdraw Deposit by petitioner, citing Section 92 of speaks of the "magnitude of the housing problem of the
Presidential Decree No. 464 which states: "Basis for payment country" which "has grown into such proportions that only a
of just compensation in expropriation proceedings. In purposeful, determined, organized mass housing
determining such compensation when private property is development program can meet the needs of Filipino
acquired by the government for public use, the same shall families" for decent housing. 18 Moreover, the Presidential
not exceed the market value declared by the owner or Decree is mandated by the Constitution which requires the
administrator or anyone having legal interest in the State to "establish, maintain, and ensure adequate social
property, or such market value as determined by the services in the field of ... housing ..." as well as "to guarantee
assessor, whichever is lower." 5 Petitioner's submission is the enjoyment of the people of a decent standard of living."
19
that the owner's declaration at P1,400.00 which is lower The very first section of the Decree speaks of the following:
than the assessor's assessment, is the just compensation for "Pursuant to the mandate of the New Constitution, there
the respondents' property, respondents thus being shall be developed a comprehensive and integrated housing
precluded from withdrawing any amount more than program which shall embrace, among others, housing

Nikki T. Sia | StatCon Assignment 10082016 11

development and resettlement, sources and schemes of his wife, Luisa, managed the entire estate, including an
financing, and delineation of government and private sector agricultural land of approximately 89 hectares at San Isidro,
participation. The program shall specify the priorities and Misamis Occidental, until her death on April 18, 1971.
targets in accordance with the integrated national human
settlements plan prepared by the Human Settlements On September 28, 1971, intestate proceedings for the
Commission. " 20 In view of the urgency of the housing settlement of Luisa's estate were instituted by petitioner
problem the various decrees mentioned earlier were issued Diosdado Tac-an before the Court of First instance of
for the purpose of assuring that the government would be in Misamis Occidental, Branch III, docketed as Special
a financial position to cope with such basic human need Proceedings No. 615. ALFONSO opposed the petition
which in the Philippines, under the welfare state concept, contending that one-half of the new 6,159 coconut trees at
and according to the express language of the Constitution, is the San Isidro property belonged to him in accordance with
an obligation cast upon the State. The memorandum for his agreement with his late mother. Ultimately, on January
petitioner submitted by Government Corporate Counsel, 29, 1973, partition was ordered by the intestate Court
now likewise the Presidential Legal Assistant, Justice Manuel pursuant to a Compromise Agreement arrived at among the
M. Lazaro, pursues the matter further in prose impressed heirs. ALFONSO claimed, however, that the partition was
with force and clarity: "The issue in this petition for certiorari without prejudice to the prosecution of his claim in a
and mandamus involves the application of a rule introduced separate suit.
by P.D. No. 76 and reiterated in subsequent decrees that not
only promotes social justice but also ends the baneful and On January 31, 1975, ALFONSO filed a complaint for
one-sided practice abetted by the collusive acquiescence of Recovery of Ownership of Coconut Trees and Damages
government officials and employees, of under declaring against petitioners with the then Court of First Instance of
properties for the purpose of taxation but ballooning the Misamis Occidental, Branch III, Oroquieta City, docketed as
price thereof when the same properties are to be acquired Civil Case No. 3092, which he amended on April 3, 1975. He
by the government for public purposes. Put to the test, alleged that sometime in 1944, upon the request of his late
therefore, is the power of the government to introduce mother, and with the consent of petitioners, he planted
rationality in the laws and to discourage a deceitful practice coconut trees on an agricultural land of their late father at
that is not only ruinous to the government coffers but also San Isidro Seor Sinacaban, Misamis Occidental, with an
undermines its efforts at awakening a democratic area of 89.7033 hectares: that part of the land was planted
responsiveness of the citizenry toward good government with sugar cane which he gradually replaced with coconut
and its economic and social programs. The courts should trees, completing the work in 1957; that he and his mother,
recognize that the rule introduced by P.D. No. 76 and during her lifetime, agreed, without objection from
reiterated in subsequent decrees does not upset the petitioners, that the coconut trees including the fruits and
established concepts of justice or the constitutional produce thereof, would be equally divided between them;
provision on just compensation for, precisely, the owner is that their equal sharing continued for fifteen (15) years; that
allowed to make his own valuation of his property." 21 upon the death of their mother, petitioner Diosdado Tac-an
filed in September 1971, Special Proceeding No. 615 with the
WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is granted and the order Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental, Branch III, for
of respondent Judge of July 13, 1978 is hereby nullified and the partition of the real and personal properties left by their
set aside. The restraining order issued by this Court on parents, which he opposed.
January 4, 1979 is hereby made permanent. The case is
remanded to the lower court for further action conformably Petitioners, in their Answer, stated that ALFONSO's claim for
to law and to the above opinion. No costs. improvements is barred by prior judgment in Special
Proceedings No. 615 rendered by the intestate Court on the
basis of the amicable compromise agreement entered into
by the parties after concessions were given to respondent
G.R. No. L-62251 July 29, 1985 for the settlement of said claim; that by virtue of said
Decision, the land in San Isidro was subdivided and
IRENE TAC-AN-DANO, FELIPE G. TAC-AN, DIOSDADO G. adjudicated in equal shares among them; that the claim of
TAC-AN and SOCORRO TAC-AN GENOBATEN, petitioners, respondent for one-half () of the produce of the coconut
vs. trees was denied by the intestate Court in its Order of April
THE COURT OF APPEALS and ALFONSO G. TAC-AN, 18, 1972, which had already became final; that the
respondents. complaint states no cause of action; that the claim is
unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds, and is barred by
the Statute of Limitations and/or prescription.
Petitioners herein seek to reverse the Decision of the then
Court of Appeals 1 in CA-G.R. No. 63057-R, as well as its
Resolution which denied their Motion for Reconsideration, On September 12, 1977, the trial Court, through Judge
and to reinstate in toto the Decision of the then Court of First Mariano M. Florido, dismissed ALFONSO's Complaint and
Instance of Misamis Occidental, Branch III, Oroquieta City, in rendered judgment, thus:
Civil Case No. 3092, for Recovery of Ownership of Coconut
Trees and Damages filed by private respondent against ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby
them. rendered dismissing the plaintiff's
complaint for lack of merit; and ordering
Petitioners Irene Tac-an Dano, Felipe G. Tac-an, Diosdado G. the plaintiff, under the Counterclaim, to
Tac-an and Socorro Tac-an Genobaten, and private pay and deliver to the defendants:
respondent ALFONSO G. Tac-an, are brothers and sisters,
children of the deceased spouses Pio Tac-an and Luisa 1. The amount of P21,000.00, representing
Guzman. Upon the demise of Pio Tac-an on March 12, 1948, the share of the defendants which the

Nikki T. Sia | StatCon Assignment 10082016 12

 plaintiff failed to give and deliver to the The Court of Appeals committed serious
defendants from May, 1971 to September, error of law and grave abuse of discretion
1971, with interest thereon at six (6) per amounting to lack of jurisdiction in not
cent per annum from the filing of holding that the claim for improvements
defendants' Counterclaim on July 3, 1975, of Alfonso Tac-an is barred by a prior final
until the amount is fully paid; order in Special Proceeding No. 615 Res
Judicata.
2. The forty (40) heads of cows
representing the shares of the defendants II
in the amicable settlement dated January
29, 1973 in Special Proc. No. 615, and the The Court of Appeals committed serious
additional forty (40) heads of cows error of law and grave abuse of discretion
representing the offsprings, which the amounting to want of jurisdiction in not
cows of the defendants would ordinarily holding that the claim for improvements
have produced but which they failed to do of Alfonso Tac-an was likewise settled and
so, to the prejudice of the defendants, on adjudicated by the final decision
account of the default of the plaintiff, or embodying the amicable compromise
for a total of eighty (80) heads of cows; or agreement of the parties for the partition
in case of failure of plaintiff to deliver the of the estate in Special Proceeding No. 615
eighty (80) heads of cows to the Res Judicata.
defendants, to pay to the defendants the
amount of P80,000.00, representing the III
value of the eighty (80) heads of cows at
P1,000.00 per head. plus interest thereon
The Court of Appeals committed grave
at six (6%) per cent per annum from the
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
filing of defendants' counterclaim on July
jurisdiction when it sanctioned the filing of
3, 1975, until fully paid;
this present independent civil action
relying mainly on the clarificatory orders
3. The amount of P15,000.00 as moral (erroneously referred to by the Court of
damages; Appeals as "decision") of Judge Melecio
Genato which are contrary to the amicable
4. The amount of P20,000.00 as attorney's compromise agreement embodied and
fees; and in the further amount of approved in the decision of Judge Mariano
P5,000.00, as expenses of litigation; and Florido.

5. With costs against the plaintiff. IV

On appeal, the then Court of Appeals modified the judgment The Court of Appeals committed grave
of the trial Court by allowing ALFONSO to receive one-half of abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
the produce of the coconut trees, reducing the number of jurisdiction in modifying the lower court
cows, and eliminating the award of damages and attorney's decision by declaring that Alfonso Tac-an
fees, as follows: is entitled to receive one-half () of the
produce despite the fact that it
WHEREFORE, with the modifications that emphatically declared and held that no
the plaintiff is entitled to receive one-half agreement existed between plaintiff and
(1/2) of the produce of coconuts in the his mother.
land at San Isidro, Sinacaban, Misamis
Occidental to resume upon finality of this V
decision; that plaintiff should only return
to defendants 40 cows and if not possible Assuming arguendo that there was such
the equivalent in value at the rate of agreement the Court of Appeals gravely
P500.00 per head or a total of P20,000.00 erred in enforcing it against petitioners.
with legal rate of interest at 6% from the
filing of defendants' counterclaim on July
VI
3, 1975 until fully paid; the elimination of
moral damages, attorney's fees and
The Court of Appeals committed grave
expenses of litigation; the decision
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in all
jurisdiction in resolving the claim of
other respects, without pronouncement
Alfonso Tac-an by entitling him to one-half
as to costs in this instance.
() of the produce based on equity, justice
and human considerations instead of
Before us now, petitioners, as defendants below, impugn the
applying clear and specific provisions of
Decision of the Appellate Court assigning to it the following
law (positive laws).
errors:
VII
I

Nikki T. Sia | StatCon Assignment 10082016 13

 The Court of Appeals committed grave case is amended to be without prejudice
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of to whatever claim oppositor Alfonso Tac-
jurisdiction in applying laches and an has over the improvements he had
estoppel against defendants. personally introduced or caused to be
introduced into the estate situated at
VIII Seor Sinacaban, Misamis Occidental.

The Court of Appeals gravely erred in not In his Order, dated June 19, 1973, resolving petitioners'
resolving the issue that this action is Motion for Reconsideration, the same Judge held that there
barred by prescription relying on the illegal was "no amendment" to the Decision dated January 29,
clarificatory orders of Judge Melecio 1973. 2
Genato.
Those Orders were elevated on certiorari to this Court in G.R.
IX No. L-37298 entitled Irene Tac-an Dano, etc. vs. Hon.
Melecio Genato, et al., which petition this Court dismissed
The Court of Appeals likewise gravely for lack of merit on February 12, 1974. 3
erred in resolving the issue that this action
is barred by the Statute of Frauds also Premised on the foregoing, the defense of res judicata must
relying on the clarificatory orders of Judge fail and it has to be held that the right was reserved to
Genato. ALFONSO to pursue his claim for recovery of ownership of
coconut trees.
X
Prescription can neither be invoked as against ALFONSO by
The Court of Appeals gravely erred in reason of that reservation in his favor. He filed suit two years
modifying the decision of the lower Court after the Decision in the intestate proceedings had been
by ordering plaintiff to return to rendered. Under Article 1144 of the Civil Code, he had ten
defendants only 40 heads of cows or if not (10) years from the time the right of action accrued within
possible the equivalent in value at the rate which to file suit upon a judgment.
of P500.00 per head or a total sum of
P20,000.00 instead of the valuation of the On the Alleged Agreement
trial Court.
ALFONSO's complaint, filed in the trial Court, was completely
XI based on an alleged oral agreement between himself, as co-
owner, and his mother as another co-owner, whereby he
The Court of Appeals gravely erred in would be receiving benefits from the mentioned coconut
eliminating the award of P21,000.00 land more than he would be entitled to as co-owner. Both
representing the share of petitioners the trial Court and the Appellate Court made the factual
which plaintiff failed to give or deliver for finding that the arrangement if at all, could have referred
the period from May 1971 to September only to the produce, with the difference that the former
1971. Court held that its effectivity ceased after the mother's
death and could not bind the other heirs; whereas the latter
Court ruled that since petitioners acquiesced in the
XII
arrangement during their mother's lifetime, they are now
estopped from asserting the contrary.
The Court of Appeals gravely erred in
deleting the award of moral damages,
It is not disputed that the San Isidro property was the capital
attorney's fees and expenses of litigation.
property of the father of the opposing parties, and that
Luisa, their mother, was not authorized by petitioners upon
On July 27, 1983, we denied the petition for lack of merit,
the death of their father, to enter into contract with
and likewise denied on January 11, 1984, petitioners' Motion
ALFONSO concerning the produce of their respective shares
for Reconsideration of said Resolution. However, upon
of said property. It has been established, too, that the
petitioners' Second Motion for Reconsideration, we resolved
expenses incurred in planting coconut trees in said land
to reconsider our Resolutions of July 27, 1983 and January
came from the common fund 4 and that concessions were
11, 1984 and gave due course to the Petition.
given ALFONSO in the partition for his work in converting the
property into coconut land. So, whatever agreement the
On res judicata and prescription mother had with ALFONSO regarding the produce of the
coconut trees, could legally bind her share only, and chased
Petitioners contend that ALFONSO's suit for recovery of upon her death. Petitioners merely tolerated such sharing
ownership of coconut trees is barred by prior judgment in arrangement in deference to their mother's commitment.
Special Proceedings No. 615. While it may be that the said This is shown by the fact that five months after her death,
intestate proceedings did attain finality, it was subject to the petitioners instituted the proceedings for the partition of the
clarificatory Order, dated April 24, 1973, issued by Judge estate of their deceased parents including the San Isidro
Melecio Genato reading: property. Accordingly, the doctrine of laches and estoppel as
against petitioners cannot be successfully invoked. Absent
The decision dated January 29, 1973, was any element of turpitude or negligence connected with
rendered by this Court based on the the silence by which another is misled to his injury. 5
amicable settlement of the heirs in this
Nikki T. Sia | StatCon Assignment 10082016 14
Moreover, the agreement between mother and son must be The sharing in the Compromise Agreement submitted
deemed superseded, for, on September 29, 1953, even before the intestate Court with respect to the partition of
during the lifetime of the mother, Original Certificate of Title the cows should also be maintained. The Courts, as a rule
No. 28 (Lot No. 1) in the name of the deceased father, was may not impose upon the parties a judgment different from
cancelled and replaced by TCT No. RT-121 issued in the their Compromise Agreement. 7 The pertinent sharing
names of "Felipe Tac-An Irene Tac-an, Alfonso Tac-an, agreement reads:
Catalina Tac-an, Diosdado Tac-an, Socorro Tac-an and Luisa
Guzman, in pro indiviso share of one- seventh (1/7) each", 7. With respect to the number of cows, as
the last named being the surviving spouse (Exhibit "12"). It of today, there are seventy-one (71) heads
will be seen, therefore, that, after 1953, it was expressly of cows. It has been agreed by the parties
made of record that ALFONSO, his mother, and five (5) and their counsel that Alfonso Tac-an will
siblings (Catalina has since passed away) were co-owners in get 3/7 of this number or of whatever
equal shares. If, in fact, ALFONSO, had an agreement as to number of cows there are belonging to the
ownership of the trees and produce with his mother, that estate, and the remainder 4/7 of the cows
was the time for him to have insisted on a lien to be shall be divided equally by the four (4)
specifically included in the title. His mother, too, would have remaining heirs which would give them
been in a position to confirm or deny the existence of the the equivalent of 1/7 share of the said
agreement. cows. If actually the number of cows as
counted by the administrator is only 71, let
Additionally, as petitioners contend, to give ALFONSO the it be divided in accordance with the
right to receive one-half () of the produce of coconuts, as agreement of the parties and the
respondent Court did, would be to perpetuate a state of co- remaining one head of cow be turned over
ownership, contrary to Article 494 of the Civil Code, which to the administrator for evaluation and the
limits co-ownership to a period of ten (10) years or at most administrator may sell it and distribute the
twenty (20) years. actual proceeds among the heirs. ... 8

On the Partition Consonant, therefore, with our finding that ALFONSO is not
entitled to one-half () of the produce of the San Isidro
It follows that ALFONSO's claim for recovery of ownership of property, he should give to petitioners, as ruled by the trial
the coconut trees and of the produce thereof must fail. He court, their share which he failed to deliver from May 1971
should only be entitled to the share alloted to him in the to September 1971, or the amount of P21,000.00 plus
"share raffle" embodied in their compromise agreement and interest thereon at six (6) per cent per annum from the filing
approved by the Court in Special Proceeding No. 615, dated of petitioners' counterclaim on July 3, 1975, until the amount
January 29, 1973, as follows: is fully paid.

5. The share raffle was conducted with As to the award of damages, there being no evidence of
respect to the "Coconut Lands" mentioned fraud and bad faith committed by ALFONSO, the elimination
on page 3 of the said partition proposal by respondent Appellate Court of the award of moral
and the following result was registered: damages, attorney's fees and expenses of litigation to
petitioners should be affirmed.
1. Lot 1 was drawn in favor of Mrs. Socorro
Tac-an Genobatan; Lot 2 was drawn in WHEREFORE, modifying the judgment under review, this
favor of Mrs. Irene Tac-an Dano; Lot 3 was court RESOLVES:
drawn in favor of oppositor Alfonso Tac-
an; Lot 4 was drawn in favor of Atty. Felipe 1] The elimination of the award of moral damages,
Tac-an, and Lot 5 was drawn in favor of attorney's fees and expenses of litigation to petitioners is
Diosdado Tac-an. hereby AFFIRMED.

xxx xxx xxx 2] The award in favor of private respondent, Alfonso G. Tac-
an, of one-half of the produce of the coconut trees from the
7. ... The administrator of the estate is coconut lands situated at San Isidro Seor Sinacaban,
hereby ordered to make a tentative Misamis Occidental, is hereby SET ASIDE;
partition of the coconut land located at
Seor Sinacaban into five (5) shares based 3] Private respondent, Alfonso G. Tac-an, is hereby ordered
not only on the area, but also on the value to pay to petitioners the amount of P21,000.00 representing
of the improvements thereon within a the latter's share in the produce of the coconuts from May
period of ten (10) days from today, and 1971 to September 1971 with six (6) per cent interest
that the heirs hereby agree to draw thereon per annum from the filing of the counterclaim on
another raffle in order to determine the July 3, 1975 until the amount is fully paid; and
share that would correspond to them in
the drawing of lots, except the share of 4] The parties are enjoined to abide by the terms of their
Alfonso Tac-an, the oppositor, which is Compromise Agreement in the partition of the heads of
agreed by the heirs to be that area where cattle.
his house is standing and that the farm
house be adjudicated to him. 6 (Emphasis No costs.
ours)
SO ORDERED.
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Nikki T. Sia | StatCon Assignment 10082016 16