Theories of International Regimes - Stephan Haggard and Beth A. Simmons
Theories of International Regimes - Stephan Haggard and Beth A. Simmons
Theories of International Regimes - Stephan Haggard and Beth A. Simmons
1. Regimes: Definitions
Donald Puchala and Raymond Hopkins argue that a regime exists in every substantive issue-area
in international relations() wherever there is regularity in behavior, some kinds of principles
norms or rules must exist to account for it. Deducing regimes from patterned behavior makes it
difficult to decide how they mediate, constrain, or influence behavior.
The term regime is sometimes used in a purely descriptive way to group a range of state
behaviors in a particular issue-area, but since the potential for tautology is high, this approach has
largely been abandoned.
Stephen Krasner
Regime as implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around
which actorss expectations coverage in a given area of international relations. The complex
hierarchy of components is defined principles shade off into norms, standards of behavior defined
in terms of rights and obligations. Norms, in turn, are difficult to distinguish from rules, specific
prescriptions or proscriptions for actions.
Third definition
Treats regimes as multilateral agreements among states which aim to regulate national actions
within an issue-area. Regimes define the range of permissible state action by outlining explicit
injunctions. Regimes often contain rules which govern or specify their own transformation, but to
explain regime change per se is to explain why states would agree to modify the confided rights
and rules that regulate their behavior. This approach risks the charge of formalism a charge
which has plagued the study of international law. Focuses attention on the evolution of the texts
constituting international agreements, clearly separates normative consensus from the definition of
regimes, treating it rather as a causal or constitutive variable that may be useful in explaining
cooperation.
Regimes are examples of cooperative behavior and facilitate cooperation, but cooperation can take
place in the absence of established regimes. Regimes must also be distinguished from the broader
concept of institutions, the essential feature of which is the conjunction of convergent expectations
and patters of behavior or practice. They aid the institutionalization of portions of international life
by regularizing expectations, but some international institutions such as the balance of power are
not bound to explicit rights and rules convergent expectations may or may not be tied to explicit
argument, they might arise in a milieu characterized by substantial conflict.
Organizational form
- Some issues are conductive to decentralized regulation: regime injunctions may only seek help
on states to share information or to choose not to from certain actions (polluting, over-fishing)
- Fixed-exchange-rate regimes demand positive interventions by states, but remain largely
decentralized.
- Most regimes are likely to have at least some minimal administrative apparatus for the purpose
of dispute settlement, the collection and haring of information or surveillance.Complex
cooperative tasks require more elaborate and potentially autonomous, organizational structures.
If cooperation is already highly institutionalized theories resting on assumptions of anarchy are
highly misleading: black-boxing organizational structure and processes will lead to simplistic
predictions.
- The principles governing representation are another dimension of organizational variance.
Important distributional consequences since they affect international agendas and organizational
resource allocation.
- Most universalist regimes are structured either on the one nation, one vote principle
- Or on weighted voting (IMF,WB)
Based on discrimination:
- Along functional or sectoral lines (Tokyo Round codes).
Allocational mode
Regimes- different social mechanisms for resource allocation.
- Market-oriented regimes supports the private allocation of resources, discourages national
controls, guarantees property rights and facilitates private contracting.
- Authoritative allocation involves the direct control of resources by regime authorities and will
demand more extensive and potentially autonomous organizational structures. E.g.: IMFs role in
the balance-of-payments financing regime.
Nature of the issue-area and the extent of cooperation will partly determine the preference for
market-oriented versus authoritative modes of allocation. Many issue-areas could be organized
either way, however, will sharply different distributional consequences
e.g. Group oof 77s proposal for a New International Economic Order.
Functional theories
Assume rational actors, but introduce market imperfections, transactions and information costats
and uncertainty. Explains behaviors or institutions in terms of their effects.
If regimes serve to reduce information and transaction costs among their adherents, for example,
the rewards of compliance will reinforce the regime. Therefore, anticipated consequences explain
the persistence of the regime and compliance with its injunctions. The modification of regimes or
their weakening is likely to occur when they become dysfunctional. Functional theories explain
regime strength, particularly the puzzle of why compliance with regimes tends to persist even when
the structural conditions that initially gave rise to them changes.
Limitations:
- Not causal> better at specifying when regimes will be demanded rather than suggesting how
or when they will be supplied.
- Regimes and cooperation in one issue-area may arise as an unintended consequence of
cooperation in some other area. Collective action may not occur because of the free-rider
problem or if the need goes unperceived.
The regimes benefits are simply that it provides incentives to certain forms of cooperative action.
Regimes may be supplied when there is sufficient demand for the functions they perform, but the
market analogy has obvious limitations.
The specific functions that regimes perform naturally vary from issue-area to issue-area. > most
functionalist theorizing suggest that some generalized functions are under-provided, given
conditions of anarchy or market failure. Regime analysts working in this vein have drawn heavily
from the economic literature on transaction costs. > organizations or hierarchies evolve as
solutions to the opportunism, uncertainty, information costs, measurement problems and difficulties
of contract enforcement which plague arms-length market transactions. Drawing an analogy
between the market and the uncoordinated actions of states (Keohane, Oye, Aggarwal) have
shown that regimes reduce transactions costs and facilitate decentralized rule-making.
- Aggarwal: construction of a multilateral mechanism is organizationally less expensive than is the
development of many bilateral contracts.
- Keohane: marginal cost of dealing with an additional issue will be lower with a regime, an insight
that casts light on the important question of why regimes often expand in scope.
Once the functions are enumerated, the remaining positive research program which follows is
unclear. Crude functionalism has been criticized for simply noting that some behavior or institution
(this case, a regime) does perform an anticipated function. Even if we knew that every regime
performed some specified set of functions, this knowledge would not explain why regimes emerge
in some issue-areas and not in others. Nor would it explain why some regimes develop impressive
formal organizations while others do not.
In general, new functionalism does not distinguish clearly between institutions and organizations,
nor indicate the conditions that lead to the international development of the latter. The proper test
of a functional theory is the demonstration that actors behavior was motivated by benefits provided
uniquely, (at least more efficiently) through the regime or by reputational concerns connected to the
existence of rules.
- Keohane cooperation isnt a good, emphasizement of the functions which enhance the global
welfare or at least the collective welfare of the regimes adherents. The institutions that emerge
in world politics are certainly more likely to reflect the interests of the powerful than the interests
of the weal, a complaint repeatedly raised by commodity producers against the operation of the
GATT.
- Aggarwal: regimes control large states behavior toward the small by reducing the need to
exercise power directly. Regimes have occasionally kept domestic protectionist interests from
achieving their preferred solutions. Most of the functions which regimes perform can be used to
control states when the initial discrepancies of power are large and that stronger players
frequently ignore the restraints placed on them. The regime changed when it could not
adequately serve the interests of the developed country importers.
One cannot have the productivity of an industrial society with political anarchy. But while . . . a state
is a necessary condition for realizing the gains from trade, it obviously is not sufficient. A state
becomes the inevitable source of struggle to take control of it in the interests of one of the parties.
The state then becomes the vehicle by which the costs of transacting are raised to capture the
gains that will accrue to any interested party that can control the specification and enforcement of
property rights. Douglass North
Functional theories emphasize how the facilitating role of regimes helps them realize common
interests. But regimes are also areas for conflict and the exercise of power. Because functional
theories assume highly convergent interests and downplay divergent ones, they do not explore
how regimes may institutionalize inequalities.
Cognitive theories: Knowledge, ideology, and regimes
Focus on the intersubjective meaning structures that bind actors together, they necessarily see a
looser fit between structural constraints, interests and choices. See the regimes as conditioned by
ideology and consensual knowledge and evolving as actors learn. Theres no fixed national
interest, no optimal regime.
The core cognitive insight is that cooperation cannot be completely explained without reference to
ideology, the values of actors, the beliefs they hold about the interdependence of issues, an the
knowledge available to them about how they can realize specific goals. Cognitive approach are
particularly important in explaining the substantive content of regime rules and why they evolve. By
elevating the importance of actor learning, cognitive theories have a dynamic other theoretical
approaches lack. Ends, or purposes, of action are not self-evidently derivable from the scientific
understanding of relationships among variables. The generation of new knowledge just as easily
might render a game less cooperative by exposing new incentives to defect. Nor can cognitive
approaches argue that a particular regime is uniquely suited to realize some common values.
Ruggie, criticizing the hegemonic stability theory, argues that regimes reflect not only a
configuration of power, but also a configuration of dominant social purpose. Ruggies concept of
embedded liberalism tries to describe the common social purpose that arose after the Great
Depression across the advanced capitalist states the need to reconcile the advantages of
liberalism and the costs of an unfettered market system this purpose is elastic enough to
subsume a fairly wide range of norm-governed changesincluding the move from fixed to flexible
exchange rates and the rise of the new protectionism during the 1970s it cannot fully explain
these changes.
Learning and and ideology affect international rules and cooperation by showing the merit of
certain lines of action. Knowledge and ideology, including the knowledge provided by regimes, can
alter actor interests. Even this causal language knowledge affects interests is inappropriate
since the dichotomy between ideology and knowledge on the one hand, and interests on the other,
is wholly artificial and misleading. Interests only emerge within particular normative and argue that
the assumption of rational utility maximization, for example, is too spare to be of explanatory value
since it ignores the way that historically situated actors interpret their constraints. Nor is the
problem solved simply by showing that rationality is bounded in various ways.
The predictive value of cognitive theories is problematic, particularly when they emphasize the
importance of consensual knowledge. Since future knowledge is impossible to foresee, prediction
about the substantive content of cooperation is ruled out.
Methodological biases according Ernst Haas:
The type of systems theory I find useful features the inductive method in the construction of reality
and uses the perceptions and actions of concrete human beings in grappling with reality as its
main data. Such systems are assumed "open" in the sense that they do not tend, by definition,
toward a given state, such as equilibrium. They are "constructed" in the sense that the theorist
considers them as heuristic approximations rather than networks of determinative "laws"
constraining choice.
Can interests in an issue area be unambiguously deduced from power and situational constraints?
Without shifts in power position, interests change as a result of learning, persuasion, and divine
revelation. Knowledge and ideology may then become an important explanation of regime change,
but when posed in this fashion, the question is an empirical as much as a theoretical one.
- Domestic political process has been ignored from current theories of international regimes
because of the lure of parsimonious systemic theory.
- Issue of how regimes actually influence national policy choices ( related to issue of compliance
and regime strength).
- The neglect of the domestic political and economic realm has had deeper costs, including a
neglect of the substantive issues over which states are likely to seek cooperation and the basic
forces leading to regime change.
- Solution: suggestion of research program that views international cooperation as the outcome of
relations among states and the interaction between domestic and international games and
coalitions that span national boundaries.
Do regimes matter?
Regimes affect state behavior in two ways:
1) Regimes have altered the situation or setting in which states interact so that cooperation is
more likely. (functionalist, game-theoric approaches)
2) Regimes reduce the transactions costs associated with bilateral contracting (functionalist).
Regimes can alter actors interests or preferences, which are generally held constant in functional
and game-theoric formulations. Cognitivists claim that regimes may change basic definitions of
reality.
A fit between regime rules and national behavior may not occur for:
1) Norms characterizing the regime may not be formulated to be authoritatively binding. Some
regimes allow self-selected national exemptions or represent only broad collective aspirations;
they are, in effect born weak.
2) Opportunism for disjuncture between regime norms and stat behavior. States may negotiate
regimes with the intention of breaking them or knowingly exploit others compliance in order to
extract higher payoffs.
3) Involuntary defection (Robert Putnam) happens when a party reaching or supporting an
international agreement is unable to sustain commitments because of domestic political
constraints. Examples:
1) Rise of the new protectionism in the advanced industrial states > orderly marketing
agreements and voluntary report restraints, violate GATT norms, especially non-
discrimination norm.
2) Great Britains strong commitment to maintaining the gold standard during the 1920s
stimulated strong industrial opposition to the Bank of Englands policies, contributing to
the final decision to go off gold in 1931.
Defection as the outcome of domestic political conflicts which no single actor can control.