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NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

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SAUG
D JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS
F
OPERATIONS RESEARCH PAPER

GALLIPOLI REVISTED
An Operational Assessment of the 1915 Dardanelles Campaign

By
Captain Bill Piersig, USNR
Seminar 9
Thi docne*nt has been Qpp0ove4]y9
tc-r pile gee od sol.- 4 May 1994
di utiozn is vn11mfte

Faculty Research Advisor

Professor John Maurer
C-405, Ext. 2032

94-25955
948 16 132
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GALLIPOLI REVISITED -- AN OPERATIOFAL ASSESSMENT OF THE 1915 DARDANELLES
CAMPAIGN (V)
12. PERSONAL AUTHOR(S)
WILLIAM M. PIERSIG. CAPT. USNR
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17. COSATI CODES 1i. SUG)ECT TERMS (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)
FIELD GROUP SUB-GROUP WORLD WAR I FRENCH-BRITISH GALLIPCLI CAMPAIGN

DARDANELLEZIAMPHIBIOUS ',ARFARE
19. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse if necessary nd identify by block number)
IN 1915THE ALLIES CONDUCTED A SERIES OF OPERATIONS KNOWN AS THE GALLIPOLI
CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE TURKS IN AN ATTEMPT TO FORCE THE DARDANELLES STRAITS
AND THREATEN CONSTANTINOPLE. AT GALLIPOLI THE ALLIES CONDUCTED THE FIRST
MAJOR JOINT AND COMBINED AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS OF MODERN 'WARFARE. THESE
EFFORTS FAILED. THE CAMPAIGN IS A CLASSIC CASE STUDY STILL USED BY
STUDENTS OF AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE AND JOINT OPERATIONS. LESSONS LEAR.NE
k hOIl .111z r-On x.,.L 00
CL) AR6--ibURM '.Lih. .wit~i .YJn.
MUUft
Ub' TU)AYI U 0. NAVI ABD kMtHiBB uORPS DOUTRINE:. ThE FO(CUb U1I ThI6
VA-Z i(16 U 'N
ThE OP.RATIUNAL ASPEUTo Ux' ThE UAMPAIGN--THE LEADhER6HIP,
PLANNING, ANI) CUURI)hATION--ANU U.N WHAT MIUIT HAVE BEEN.

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All other editions are obsolete *.U.. AioFIe. A PI"itkvON ft ItS b4s

0102-LF-014-6602
is
* ,

ABSTRACT

In 1915, the Allies conducted a series of operations -- known as the

Gallipoli Campaign -- against the Turks in an attempt to force the

Dardanelles Straits and threaten Constantinople. The campaign began with

high hopes -- the potential rewards were inviting and the risks appeared

to be minimal. Turkey was the weakest member of the Central Powers.

Against her, the allies would direct an impressive array of naval and

amphibious power. First, overwhelming naval power alone was applied.

The Turks, however, were not overwhelmed. Then ground operations,

supported by the navy, were employed. At Gallipoli the allies conducted

the first major joint and combined amphibious operations of modem

warfare. These efforts also failed. Following the failure, a debate arose

regarding the campaign, which became one of the most studied military

operations in history. But Gallipoli provides much more than an historical

account of failure in battle. Gallipoli is a fascinating story of an attempt by

the world's premier naval power in 1915, Great Britain, to use that power

to influence world events. The campaign is a classic case study still used

by students of amphibious warfare and joint operations. Lessons learned

from the campaign -- distilled for nearly 80 years -- form the basis for

much of today's U.S. Navy and Marine Corps doctrine. The focus of this

paper is on the operational aspects of the campaign -- the leadership,

planning, and coordination -- and on what might have been.

Li
* .

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER PAGE

Abstract . .. ii

Maps iv

Chronology of Events .. v

I. Introduction . . . I
II. Origins of the Campaign . 6
II. The Naval Phase . 9

MI. Landings & Ground Offensives . 15

IV. The Evacuation .. . 23

V. Conclusions. . . . . 27

Bibliography . . .. 33

Acces~on For
NTIS CRAMI
DTIC TAB "
Unannoun~ced
Ju
tiic tin......... .... .............. ...
Justification

OistributionI
Availability Codes
SAvail and Ior
91st special

MA4
 MAPS

PAGE

The Turkish Theater, 1915 7

Dardanelles-Disposition of De Robeck's Fleet, 18 March 1915 10

Gallipoli Peninsula and Beaches 16

iv
 CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

Late SEP 1914 British turn back a Turkish torpedo boat attempting to
exit the Dardanelles. In response a German officer, on his
own authority, orders the straits closed and mined

03 NOV 1914 British Battle Cruiser Inflexible, shells the outer defenses

01 JAN 1915 Russia's request for a demonstration against the Turks is

received in London

05 JAN 1915 VADM Carden's response to Churchill's inquiry regarding

feasibility of Dardanelles ops received by the Admiralty

13 JAN 1915 War Council approves Gallipoli campaign

19 FEB 1915 VADM Carden's Battle Group bombards the outer forts;
minesweeping ops commence

08 MAR 1915 Turks lay new line of mines parallel to the straits(Linell)

12 MAR 1915 Kitchener announces plan to send a military force of

70,000 troops to Gallipoli
18 MAR 1915 VADM de Robeck commences new attack on the Straits;
3 Battleships sunk, 3 other ships damaged

20 MAR 1915 De Robeck telegraphs Admiralty with reattack plans

23 MAR 1915 After meeting with Hamilton, de Robeck agrees the army
should play the main role with Navy in support

25 APR 1915 Allied forces land at Cape Helles and Gaba Tepe/Anzac

06 AUG 1915 Amphibious landings made at Suvla bay

19 DEC 1915 Anzac and Suvla evacuated

8,9 JAN 1916 Helles beach forces evacuated

!=,i- -
 CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

It is an a#m among Iisarans thata boufzdege of Ais can smerv as a

guide tod present. W is not to say thiat die prsentougfutsimpA to imitate
td past forwevn ftumansituationis indeedunique, but radertiatindidua&s
andgrmps sou act to meet new situationspart(yj on tde basis ofpast e~7erience.
Amedforces ham a particuaiy bad reputationfor not taPng diis axim serioustj.1

The focus of this paper is on the operational level of warfare during

the British-French Gallipoli Campaign of 1915 and will examine the

leadership, planning, coordination and employment of forces by allied

commanders during the campaign. The campaign has been described as

both "the most brilliant and imaginative strategic conception of the war"

and as a reckless adventure doomed to fail from the beginning. 2 Since 1915

the debate amongst historians and strategists has continued regarding

Gallipoli. Did the mission fail because of flawed strategy or poor execution?

Was the campaign doomed to fail from the outset (as some have argued)

because of inadequate resources? If the operation had succeeded would it

have made a decisive contribution to the war?

My personal opinion is that Gallipoli could have been a tremendous

victory for the allies. Before reaching this conclusion I asked myself three

questions. First, were the strategic objectives worthy of the effort? Second,
were adequate resources available to accomplish the mission? And third,

1 ArucJ. Madaf, From to Dankna to Cman Sugsi of the BW NMa inWar a&W Pe
1940 g&.iondorc Oxford Untylni, 1974) p.33.
2 Benwdoft chnM and Harold VSduler, The Word In The Cruckl 1914-1919. (New Yoak
Harm mod Raw, 1964) p. 115.
S~1
did the concept of operations employed by the commanders afford them a

reasonable chance of success? The answer to all three questions was

emphatically "yes." The strategic rationale for the campaign provided

tremendous incentives for undertaking the operation. This is particularly

true in view of the alternatives being considered by Britain's War Council in

early 1915 (i.e. deploying more troops to the Western Front in France,

conducting amphibious operations in the North Sea/Baltic, and opening new

campaigns in the Balkans or the Middle East). Adequate means were

available to accomplish the mission. Further, although there are no "sure

bets" in war, the plans employed during campaign had a reasonable chance

of succeeding. (I will argue that there were at least four occasions when

success was within the grasp of the allies.) It also appears that the

campaign could have played a decisive role in bringing the war to an earlier

end, with fewer losses suffered by the combatants.

Many of the accounts of the Allied efforts at Gallipoli make for

interesting reading, but there are other worthwhile reasons for closely

examining the details bf the campaign.

The Gallipoli campaign is a classic case study for students of

amphibious warfare. During the campaign four distinct types of amphibious

operations were conducted -- demonstrations, raids, assaults and

withdrawalsO Many of the lessons learned at Gallipoli, both positive and

3 Cotez D.stephen, "Ga3 oI - What Went RigMt ?. arCm Octobe 1993,

pp. 73-77.
2
negative, remain valid. These lessons are particularly relevant to today's

Navy-Marine Corps team in light of the renewed emphasis on littoral

warfare -- for many of the challenges faced by the sailors and soldiers at

Gallipoli in 1915 still confront modern day warriors operating from the sea.

Gallipoli also provides an excellent case study for military

commanders, providing a contrast between some of the best and worst

applications of operational art. Gallipoli is replete with poignant examples

of why military planners and commanders should master the complexities

of operational art and joint warfare. The essence of the Navy's White Paper,

"...From the Sea," could have been written on the basis of the British

experiences and lessons learned at Gallipoli.

First the Royal Navy was tasked with forcing the straits with ships

alone. They nearly succeeded on two occasions. However, after suffering

the loss of four capital ships, the naval commander grew tentative. How, he

asked, could the navy be expected to "take Gallipoli with Constantinople as

its objective" 4 without the support of land forces? This was a reasonable

question, and one that should have been resolved before the operation

began. The navy, having decided that they could not succeed on their own,

turned to the army.

The army accepted the task of securing the Gallipoli peninsula, but

needed more time to prepare for the expedition. If the army had been

included in the initial planning or been able to react more quickly, they

4 Ulmi LMaicheK, no.Last in - VA r 01 Ginr 1874-1_=32 (New York Laurel, 1983), p.521
"3
would have faced a far weaker opposing force. The delay proved costly.

The element of surprise that the British hoped to achieve was lost before

the first troops went ashore. Though the Turks had been forewarned, the

landings, which involved nearly 70,000 troops, were fairly successful. Once

ashore, however, the operation "stalled." Rather than retreating in the face
of a modern, well-equipped force (as the British expected), the Turks dug in

and fought courageously. Intelligence at the tactical level was woefully

inadequate -- for example, accurate maps were not available. Inter- and

intra-service coordination was uneven -- army and navy commanders often

assumed certain tasks would be performed by others when, in fact, no one

had taken the required action. Basic logistics requirements -- like water --

became serious problems. Frustrated by the lack of progress,

reinforcements were called for. A second major amphibious landing was

made. The total number of troops committed to the campaign grew from

the original 70,000 to nearly 500,000 men. If courage or commitment were

the only critical elements needed, the operation would succeed. But, more

was required. Despite- the extraordinary efforts made by the sailors and

soldiers, the campaign lacked the essential ingredients for success.

Whatever initiative the Allies gained through their efforts seemed to

evaporate quickly. Victory, seemingly within their grasp several times,

eluded them. After eight months of failure and missed opportunities, the

question was no longer when they would succeed but how were they going

to extricate themselves from the stalemate. As casualties mounted (to

4
nearly a quarter million men) the decision was made to withdraw. Here, in

the last phase of a humbling and frustrating experience, the allies put

together a joint operation that was meticulouly planned, superbly

coordinated and brilliantly executed. Virtually all of the intangibles missing

earlier in the campaign -- including boldness, deception, coordination,

agility, synchronization, adaptability and luck -- were evident during the

evacuation. It seems ironic that many of the same people who had failed to

develop a cohesive plan for victory were so successful in "putting all the

pieces together" for the withdrawal.

In the end, the operation was a miserable failure. Few of the strategic

objectives of the campaign were achieved.5 Turkish pressure on the

Russians in the Caucasus was relieved, but most of the campaign's potential

rewards were not achieved. The costs of the campaign -- in terms of

resources committed, casualties, and individual careers ruined -- were

enormous. The long term implications of the failure were far reaching. The

proponents of the campaign, who had sought an alternative strategy for

fighting the war, were discredited. Those who had favored concentrating all

available resources in France felt some how vindicated, and refocused their

efforts for winning the war on the Western Front. "Even Churchill had now

learned his lesson. The war was no longer to be won by strategic ploys or

heroic adventures. Nothing would serve but skillfully applied attrition...."6

5 Schmkt and Vedeler, pp. 114-117

6 Robert Blake and W. Roger LouIs, ed., Q (New York W.W. Norton, 1993) p. 140.
5
 CHAPTER II

THE ORIGINS OF THE CAMPAIGN

In December 1914 -- after less than four months of fighting -- France

and England had suffered nearly a million casualties in the war against

Germany and the Central powers. Fighting on the Western Front had

"bogged down" into a war of attrition, with neither side able to gain a

decisive advantage over the other. In England, an editorial in The Times

called for a strategy with a "touch of imagination." 7 But where could the

allies attack decisively? There were two schools of thought among

members of Britain's War Council. The "Easterners" favored a traditional

maritime-peripheral strategy that relied primarily on Britain's naval

superiority. They proposed attacks on Borkum Island (off the German

coast), Salonika, Syria, and the Dardanelles. The "Westerners" favored a

continental strategy. Strongly supported by the army, they argued

vehemently against the diversion of resources away from the main theater

of war in France. The Westerners saw attrition as an inevitable aspect of

modern warfare and believed that the addition of just a few more divisions,

heavy guns, and trainloads of shells would lead to the long awaited

breakthrough on the Western Front. The strategic debate was settled (at

least temporarily) in early January 1915, when Grand Duke Nichola. of

Russia requested "a demonstration of some kind against Turks...either naval

"7Manchester, p. 511.
"6
or military," which was forwarded to London by Sir George Buchanan,

British Ambassador in Petrograd. 8 The Turks were pressing an attack

against the Russians in the Caucasus. France and Britain could not afford to
have Russia leave the war. Although poorly equipped and a poor match for
the Germans, Russian armies were tying down German troops that could
otherwise be fighting in France and Belgium. An attack against the

Dardanelles was agreed upon. The immediate objective of the campaign

was to demonstrate British and French commitment to the alliance.

*'.SERBIA SE.

salmn~

TheWDAELE
Tukih hete -19l5

anhesp.1.
T
M1915 7
 The other potential rewards of a successful operation were enormous.

Control of the straits would provide a link between Russia and her allies.

Russia could get needed war supplies while Britain and France would have

access to Russian wheat. Allied naval forces would pose a serious threat to

Constantinople, Turkey's capital and only major industrial center. The

threat to Constantinople might be enough to topple the badly divided

Turkish government and drive Turkey out of the war. A victory would

provide a tremendous boost to the sagging spirits of "the folks back home"

and the government of Prime Minister H.H. Asquith. There was a strong

possibility that the campaign might draw Greece, Bulgaria, Rumania and

Montenegro -- all who had their own reasons for fighting Turkey and

Austria-Hungary -- into the war on the side of the Entente. Access to the

Black Sea would provide the Allies potential avenues to attack Germany's

ally, Austria, via the Balkans. Most Importantly, opening a new front might

be the catalyst needed to break the stalemate on the Western Front.

Facing heavy pressure from the army, Lord Kitchener, the War

Minister, pressed the '-Admiralty to attempt the attack unsupported by

ground troops on Gallipoli.

8
 CHAPTER III

THE NAVAL PHASE

First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill, initially skeptical of

Kitchener's proposal, consulted his senior Admirals. They were pessimistic

about the prospects. Before turning Kitchener down, Churchill wired the

commander of the blockading squadron off Cape Helles, Vice Admiral

Sackville Carden, and asked for his opinion. Carden's response, received at

the Admiralty on 5 January, was "electrifying."' 0 Not only did Carden

indicate that the mission was feasible, he also forwarded his proposal on

how the mission could be accomplished. Churchill and First Sea Lord,

Admiral Sir John ("Jacky") Fisher, were now enthusastic about the mission.

The Navy would attempt to force the straits with ships alone.

Turkish defense of the straits 'consisted of four principle elements:

forts, the minefields (and minefield and mobile howitzer batteries),

torpedoes and floating mines."1 1 Individually, none of these appeared to

pose a significant chailenge. Turkish guns were old and considered

ineffective against moving targets. British minesweeping trawlers were

capable of sweeping both fixed and floating mines. The Turks only had

three fixed torpedo tubes at the Narrows that could be neutralized by

gunfire. Most importantly, the Turks were extremely low on munitions of

all types -- artillery shells, mines and torpedos. (This fact, thanks to good
10 MancheuWur P 519
1 MAdu', p. 2.
9
cryptographic work by British Intelligence, was known to the Naval

Commanders.) Once their limited supply of munitions was exhausted, the

Turks would be defenseless against the British fleet.

Carden's plan was to silence the forts and shore batteries with naval

gunfire, then sweep the mines. But the plan was flawed. Carden had
correctly assessed the threats posed by the Turks, but he had incorrectly

assessed his capabilities to cope with them.

10 26 02P

THE
DARDANELLE.S AS
'I. 18 Mbad. I915 Y'-- " S

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Dardanelles -- Disposition of De Robeck's Fleet, 18 March 1915

10
The initial bombardments on 25 February silenced the forts at the entrance

of the straits. As the ships entered the straits, however, they encountered

their first difficulties. The British Fleet, "which had concentrated before the

war on gunnery and torpedo practices for a fleet action ...had never

practiced firing at shore targets." 1 2 His ships were having a difficult

hitting their targets. Effective use of aerial spotting would have helped, but

Carden did not understand the capabilities of the squadron of seaplanes

available to him. As a result, the planes were frequedltly misemployed. 1 3

Another option was to move closer to the targets. Getting closer to the
batteries in the straits meant that the mines would have to be cleared first.

Carden's fleet of minesweeping trawlers, however, had several

limitations. They were extremely slow, crewed by civilian fishermen, and

carried a draught of 15-17 feet (placing them at risk in the minefields,

where the mines had been placed at a depth of about 12 feet.) With an

average speed of 5 knots and the current in the straits running between 2

to 4 knots, the trawlers resembled fixed targets when they sailed against

the current. Seven attempts to sweep were made. Each attempt turned

back. The first attempt, made in daylight, aborted shortly after it began

when the Turks opened fire. Carden opted for night operations, believing

that darkness would minimize the danger posed by the Turkish guns. Six

l2Mwrdsr. p.4.
13., pp. 5,11.

!11
attempts to sweep at night were made -- all were unsuccessful. The Turks

effectively employed searchlights to illuminate the trawlers for their shore

batteries. The trawler crews were terrified by the Turk's artillery. They

were willing to die if a mine exploded but were unnerved by the prospects

of sweeping under fire, even though Turkish gunners had demonstrateded

little capability for hitting them. There were other problems. Armor

plating -- added to protect the cabins - affected their compasses, making it

almost impossible for the trawlers to navigate in the dark. Also, the

accuracy of British gunners, which was a problem in daylight, was even less

effective at night. Carden realized that he needed to change his plan again

-- the next attempt would be in daylight.

Back in London, the War Council fretted over the lack of progress. On

12 March, Kitchener announced that he was sending 70,000 troops to

Gallipoli. Carden wired his new plan to the Admiralty on 15 March. His

warships would destroy the forts and dominate the shore batteries while

the mines were being swept. The following day, Carden succumbed to a bad

case of nerves and asked to be relieved. He was succeeded by his second in

command, the highly regarded Vice Admiral Sir John de Robeck.

On March 18, Admiral de Robeck's fleet entered the straits. Unknown

to him, the Turks had laid a new line of mines in an area that had been

previously swept by the trawlers. "Line 11" was unique in that it was the

only one aligned parallel to the straits, rather than perpendicular to it. The

attacking warships steamed past these mines. The forts were being

12
systematically demolished.. .and victory seemed imminent.

It was a day out of season: pleasant, warm, with bright

sunshine and a flawless overarching sky. De Robeck's attacking
fleet, the mightiest ever seen in the Mediterranean, was spearheaded
by four dreadnoughts, flanked by two battleships. A mile behind
them came the four French men-of-war, also flanked by British
battleships. Six more battleships, surrounded by destroyers and
trawlers were held in reserve; they were to clear away the last
obstacles, sail through the Narrows, and enter the Sea of Marmara
the following morning. Twelve hours later the Union Jack and the
French tricolor would fly over Constantinople.14

Disaster struck after the lead ships had completed their bombardment

and turned southward, presumedly into safe waters. First the French

battleship BAULU4 in a terrific explosion, sank in less than two minutes,

taking over 600 men with her. Shortly thereafter Inlexiblo. suffered an

explosion in the vicinity of where the Bouvet went down.' 5 Then the

battleship Izristibk was struck. De Robeck ordered a general withdrawal,

during which a fourth battleship, the Ocan. sank. Because de Robeck

believed that the area where the ships had gone down was clear of mines,

he was uncertain as to. the cause of the explosions. He suspected that the

Turks had released floating mines into the straits. If he or anyone on his

staff had plotted the positions where the ships were struck, they might

have realized that the sinkings were in an area out of the current and that

the positions fell in a straight line running from north to south. While his

Chief of Staff, Commodore Roger Keyes, remained behind to direct rescue

14 M
M'XJNW,p. an8.
1sdaU- aftugh bodly dwnamg, cd not snk. Thehpdd haveto bathesmeto

"13

II II I
 operations, de Robeck called a meeting of his commanders onboard the

Oueen Elizabeth' At the meeting, de Robeck -- depressed by the loss of

ships and certain that his career was finished -- seemed ready to abandon

the mission. Keyes argued for continuing. The admiral reluctantly agreed

and wired the Admiralty with his intentions. (In London, lost time, rather

than the loss of ships, caused the greatest concern. Most of de Robeck's
battleships were older ships destined to be scrapped, and were considered

expendable. Shipments of arms and munitions from Germany were enroute

to Turkey. The window of opportunity was closing.) The weather turned

bad, leading de Robeck to delay the reattack. On 23 March, General Sir Ian
Hamilton, commander of the newly formed Mediterranean Expeditionary
Force, met with de Robeck. At the meeting, the two men agreed that a joint

army-navy operation was more likely to succeed. De Robeck informed his

staff and subordinate commanders that they would delay further operations

until the army arrived. Land forces, supported by the Navy, would secure

the Gallipoli peninsula and neutralize the Turkish artillery. Then the straits

would be forced.

A silence now settled on the Gallipoli peninsula; no ship entered

the straits, no gun was fired. The fleet lay at anchor in the islands.
The first part of the great adventure was over.1 6

16Alan Moarhsw 2ft (New York Bdutko Bodok 1966) p.79.

14

Fi
 CHAPTER III

THE LANDINGS AND OPERATIONS ASHORE

While Churchill and Fisher fumed about the lack of aggressiveness by

the Mediterranean Fleet, the first elements of Hamilton's force -- comprised

of the 29th Infantry Division, two Australian-New Zealand (Anzac) divisions,

the Royal Navy Division, and a French colonial division -- began deploying.

At their head was Sir Ian Hamilton. Kitchener was confident that he had

picked the right man for the job.

A brilliant commander who was also a first rate trainer of

men and a good organizer, Hamilton seemed to combine all the
qualities necessary to make the expedition a success .... He had made
his reputation in the first Boer War (1880) and on the Northwest
Frontier of India and cemented it during the South African War
(1899-1902) .... During the years of peace that followed he revised
British infantry tactics, breaking up rigid lines of advance into
smaller flexible groupings; in his writings he stressed the overriding
importance of attacking the enemy. In short Hamilton must have
seemed like the ideal choice for the new venture.' 7

Hamilton's plan appeared to be very aggressive. The main body of his

forces would land at :'ive different beaches in the vicinity of Cape Helles (on

the southern tip of the peninsula) simultaneously. A supporting attack

would be made by the Anzacs in the vicinity of Gaba Tepe (In the following

days, this beach would become known as Anzac Beach.) To cover the

landings, Hamilton planned two amphibious demonstrations and an

amphibious raid. French forces would make diversionary attacks on the

17 Cohen idGooch, p. 138.

.. 15
Asian side of the straits (a demonstration in the vicinity of Besika and a raid

on the Turkish fort at Kum Kale). Meanwhile, the Royal Navy Division made
an amphibious demonstration in the vicinity of Bulair. The diversions and

initial stages of the landings by the main force were successful. Once
ashore, however, the allies found themselves in an inhospitable setting.

The attack was based on two assumptions, both of which

turned out to be unwise: that the only really difficult part of the
operation would be getting ashore, after which the Turks could
easily be pushed off the peninsula; and that the main obstacles to
a happy landing would be provided by the enemy."8

-- Gulf of S ros /1

Sod*D
Lob soi % "A
?pfWnasli I

*Arat Tow

A~Asiatic

The Gallipoli Peninsula and Beaches'1 9

18 CW=e and Gooch p. 137.

16
 The Turks had taken good advantage of the time since the initial

shelling of the outer forts in November to build up their forces defending

the straits. They also enjoyed fairly good intelligence on the British

intentions and had done a credible job, under the direction of German

General Liman von Sanders, in developing a defensive scheme to counter

the anticipated British actions. Von Sanders commanded a force of 60,000

troops, but they were spread from Bulair to Helles and were on both sides

of the straits. 2 0 Although outmanned in the vicinity of the landings, the

Turks held the high ground and pinned down allied forces.

The allies encountered other problems, though, that proved as

daunting as the Turkish defenses -- not the least of these was Gallipoli's

unexpectedly harsh terrain. An Australian war correspondent, C.E.W. Bean,

recorded his first impression of Gallipoli when he came ashore with the

Anzacs on 25 April:

The place is like a sand-pit on a huge scale -- raw sandslopes and

precipices alternating with steep slopes covered with low scrub --
the scrub where it exists is pretty dense.21

Hamilton's plan called for his forces to make coordinated attacks to

seize the high ground that dominated the peninsula; then to join up and

press northward to Bulair. While most of the groups encountered

moderate-to-heavy resistance (especially the Anzacs) at least one beach

offered an opportunity for a breakout. At "Y" beach, 2,000 troops landed

20 Cohen and Gooch p. 137.

21J , p. 152
17
unopposed and were in position to outflank a small Turkish force that had

another landing group pinned down. Inexplicably, the troops did not attack

or advance to the high ground. Instead, they held their position on the

beach for the next 24 hours. Turkish reinforcements eventually arrived

and drove this group back into the sea.

Hamilton's plan hinged on effective communication and coordination

between his forces ashore and the forces at sea. Poor communications --

some caused by equipment problems; some caused by doctrinal and

language difficulties -- and the lack of accurate maps hindered the

operation. The army's reliance on Naval gunfire support was acute.

Kitchener had witheld a large portion of the artillery requested by

Hamilton, assuming that the fleet's firepower would more than offset the

shortfall. Lacking reliable ship-to-shore communications and accurate

maps, the army was unable to utilize the the fleet's firepower effectively.

Also, as noted earlier, naval gunners were not very accurate initially. In

time, the allies worked out procedures for communicating with the ships,

accurate maps were Obtained, spotting planes were employed to direct fires,

and naval gunfire became increasingly accurate. Time, however, was not on

the allies side. The Turks also continued to improve their defenses and sent

additional forces to Gallipoli.

Another major problem was coordination between the ground forces

operating in five separate landing zones. Although the lack of reliable

comm gear and maps played a role, most coordination problems between

18
ground units appeared to be rooted in the personalities and military culture

of the British commanders. Senior officers were very rank conscious and

tradition bound. New ideas, adaptations of tactical plans and close

coordination with others were viewed as somehow unsound. This might not

have been critical to the operation's success if Hamilton had been given

"front line" officers capable of operating independently. But most of

Britain's "front line" officers were destined for France. Hamilton had been

given a "mixed bag" of officers, who had little in common except their lack

of combat experience. Several division and brigade commanders had been

recalled from retirement and were called "dugouts." 2 2 The "dugouts" -- well

past their prime -- were not up to the physical and mental challenges that

confronted them at Gallipoli. Hamilton was aware of the shortcomings of his

senior officers and recognized many of the problems as they developed, but

his concept of command made him reluctant to intervene.

"The view that the commander's role was to set the general
objectives and then leave his subordinates and their staffs to
work out the details was well established in the upper echelons
of the British aimy." 2 3

This was a sound and reasonable approach, so long as his subordinates were

capable. Unfortunately for Hamilton, they frequently were not.

The battle for Gallipoli began to resemble the Western Front -- trench

warfare and stalemate. The promise of a quick, easy victory was lost in the

22 Cohn and Gooch, p.141.

231., p. 157.
19

-I I I I |
scrub covered rocky outcrops of Gallipoli. "In the first month, Hamilton lost

forty-five thousand men .... It was over-the-top carnage, with no gains of

consequence."24 Hamilton's troops clung to three separate toeholds on the

peninsula. For three months the Turk's stymied, their efforts to breakout or

join up. To break the deadlock Hamilton planned for a new amphibious

landing at Suvla Bay. The landing would be commanded by Lieutenant

General Sir Frederick Stopford. Hamilton had sought a general with recent

combat experience to lead the operation. Kitchener balked and instead

offered Hamilton a choice between two "dugouts." The 'fate of the operation

rested on the shoulders of an officer described thusly:

He was deprecating, courteous, fatherly, anything except the

commander of Rn Army Corps which had been entrusted with
a major operation that might change the whole course of the
war in twenty four hours. 2 5

Before the landings, Stopford began conjuring up a host of reasons

why the operation would fail. He complained to Hamilton that he lacked

enough howitzers and argued that, without more guns, his troops could not

be expected to attack -a strongly entrenched foe. In fact, aerial photos

showed that the Turk's had few troops in the vicinity of Suvla. This

information, however, was unknown to Stopford.

Despite Stopford's pessimism, the landings began on the morning of 7

August on a good note. The Turks had been caught by surprise.

24 Manchester, p. 551.
25 Cohen and Gooch, p. 141.
20
 During the first day Stopford put 20,000 men ashore. His force
enjoyed a massive ten-to-one superiority, for it faced.. .no more
than 2,000 Turks...backed by 11 guns. 2 6

As his troops piled ashore, Stopford remained onboard the Lonouil with his

staff onboard another ship. Hamilton, meanwhile, was on the island of

Lemnos, about an hour away for most of the battle. Ashore, Stopford's

brigadiers began arguing about everything but how to exploit the

opportunity confronting them. For two days, faced with minimal opposition,

the troops did little more than set up camp on the beach. Hamilton,

disturbed by the lack of progress reports, sent a member of his staff,

Colonel Aspinall, to see what was going on. Aspinall's telegram confirmed

Hamilton's fears, "Feel confident that golden opportunities are being lost and

look upon the situation as serious." 2 7 Hamilton arrived at Suvla late on 8

August, and attempted to reinvigorate the offense. Not until the next day,

however, were Stopford's forces able to muster an advance toward the high

ground. The delay enabled Turkish troops, under the capable leadership of

Mustafa Kemal, to arrive and seize the high ground overlooking Suvla just

before Stopford's troops began their belated assault. The attack was driven

back. Another window of opportunity was missed, and once again the

British paid dearly for their lack of aggressiveness. Stopford, finally ready

to fight, hurled his troops in a succession of unsuccessful attacks against the

Turk's through the remainder of August, with little more than casualties to

2, Chn ad GOOCh pp. 143-144.

27M.. pp.144-145.
21
show for the effort.

In early September Hamilton requested 95,000 additional troops.

Kitchener denied the request. By October there was growing sentiment in

the British press and parliament for evacuating Gallipoli. (Churchill, the

strongest proponent of the campaign, had been pressured into resigning

from the Admiralty in May.) The Dardanelles Committee was convened to

determine why the campaign had faltered. The first recommendation made

by the committee was that Hamilton be relieved. On 15 October, General Sir

Charles Munro replaced Hamilton. Munro arrived in theater on 28 October.

After two days of meetings with his staff, he decided that it was indeed

time to begin planning an evacuation. At a meeting on 1 November, Munro

and de Robeck agreed to establish a joint army-navy committee to develop

an evacuation plan. 2 ' Munro predicted that the evacuation would be costly

-- estimating casulties of 40 percent (more than 40,000 men.) Kitchener,

unwilling to accept defeat or Munro's projected losses, personally visited

Gallipoli on 15 November. Only after he saw the situation firsthand and

conferred personally with Munro did Kitchener agree to an evacuation.

28 AM La e, MwrEvacuation Phase of the Gafl~t ol Cwqaign of 1915Fw

, U1 shed
Resewch Pape, U.S. AnyCommand and General Staff Colege, FT Leavenworth, KS: 1993
22
 CHAPTER IV

THE EVACUATION

In November de Robeck fell ill and was replaced by his nominal

superior, Admiral Sir Rosslyn Wester Wemyss. Wemyss, supported by the

Admiralty, opposed the evacuation and argued to. continue the operation.

In a concession to the Navy, Kitchener authorized an evacuation at Suvla

and Anzac, but ordered Munro to maintain the foothold at Helles.

In early December, over 130,000 allied troops occupied positions on

Gallipoli, along with 15,000 animals and 400 field guns, The evacuation

plan, discreetly begun in late October, had been meticulously developed by

the 3-man joint committee. One key to the plan's success was the ability of

the Allies to deceive the Turks. While maintaining the appearance of

business-as-usual during the day, the forces at Anzac and Suvla were to be

methodically reduced at night. Frontline troops, many in visual contact with

the Turks, were to be withdrawn last. The joint committee was remarkably

thorough -- logistics requirements, the impact of deteriorating weather,

potential threats posed -by the Turks, etc. had been evaluated. They had

developed innovative "work arounds" for a wide range of contingencies. As

an example, the Navy was short of vessels needed to meet the evacuation's

proposed timetable. To compensate for the shortage, the committee

proposed using a combination of motor lighters and pull boats for pierside

and beach embarkation of troops. The pull boats were connected to ships

29 Lawims, p. 22.
23
offshore by ropes, effecting a pulley system whereby the boats could be

loaded, then quickly pulled out to the awaiting vessel. To maintain

operational security a number of steps were taken. The islands of Lemnos

and Imbros, intermediate sites for offloading evacuees, were cordoned off

by the Navy. Fishermen and traders were restricted from the islands under

the pretense of a smallpox epidemic. Few officers or men knew about the

decision to evacuate until the plan was actually implemented. When the

evacuation began an elaborate deception plan was employed. At night,

thousands of cooking fires were kept burning, as had been done routinely

during the preceding months. Men scheduled for evacuation wrapped their

feet in burlap and blankets covered the piers to muffle the sounds of the

embarkation. During the day, allied vessels unloaded men and supplies,

adding to the illusion of a continued buildup on the peninsula. Turkish

defenders were unaware that the same men were cast in this role each

night and that the boxes and crates being unloaded were empty. 3 0

A serious security risk to the operation arose in England. Parliament

was openly debating the merits of a withdrawal and daily editorials on the

topic had shown up in British and French newspapers. Luckily for the

allies, the Turks discounted this dialogue as propaganda designed to mask

preparations for a new allied offensive at Gaulipoli. 3 1 Coordination between

the army and the navy, which had been outstanding during the planning

3 Mooresd, pp. 342-343

31an p.4341.
24
 phase, was even better during the evacuation. Between 13 and 20

December more than 83,000 troops were successfully withdrawn from

Suvla and Anzac without incident. On 20 December, among the last men to

leave Anzac cove were 200 veterans of the 25 April landing, who had
32
volunteered to stay until the very last.

Munro telegraphed Kitchener of the successful evacuation and

requested approval for immediate evacuation of Helles. Meanwhile, von

Sanders, who was not amused by the allies successful withdrawal, ordered

preparations for a massive attack on the remaining Allied foothold. The

40,000 Allied troops at Relies, under the command of Lieutenant General Sir

Francis Davies, faced a Turkish force of 120,000 men.

It was an impossible position for the British. They had four

divisions in Cape Helles. If they stayed they knew it could not
be for long before the Turks mounted a major attack...if they
attempted to go they were hardly likely to outwit the Turks a
second time.33

The plan for the Helles evacuation mirrored the one used at Anzac and

Suvla, with the last troops to be evacuated by 9 January. Though there

were serious challenges confronting Davies, the situation at Helles was

better in some respects than it had been at Suvla or Anzac. The beaches

were better protected from the elements and the trench system was more

developed. Engineers and navy crews supporting the evacuation had

developed a few new innovations. A network of jetties, floating bridges,

'IN p.41.
h3oorhgad, p. 325.
25

'- ,.
interconnected piers, and causeways had been prepared to enhance the

speed and security of the operation. The engineering efforts enabled de

Robeck (who had recovered from his illness and returned to replace

Wemyss) to implement a plan to use six destroyers as troop carriers, with

each ship accomodating a thousand men. The motor lighters carried a

maximum of 400 troops. Everything was proceeding smoothly until 7

January, when the Turks commenced 5 hours of heavy artillery

bombardments then launched an attack on the Allied positions. British

forces used a combination of withering enfillade fire and naval gunfire to

break the Turkish assault. The strong British response convinced von

Sanders that the withdrawal at Relles had not commenced, facilitating the

successful evacuation of the remaining 17,000 troops. The last allied troops

left Gallipoli in the early morning hours of 9 January.

26
 CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS

The Gallipoli campaign presented a series of opportunities to the Allies

that were missed or squandered. There were mistakes at every level --

strategic, operational and tactical -- that contributed to the failure. At the

strategic level, British leaders failed to articulate clearly what, and how

important, their strategic objectives were. The War Council and the senior

staffs in London were seeking a quick, "cheap" victory, expecting ambitious

gains with the minimal commitment of resources. In their haste, they

assumed away many of the risks inherent in the operation, and placed the

burden for planning the campaign on their operational commanders with

little or no strategic guidance. As a result, forces and supporting resources

were committed in piecemeal fashion throughout the campaign. At the

tactical level, Inexperience and lack of initiative often led the men who were

doing the fighting to stop when confronted by even relatively minor

problems. Many of these problems should have been anticipated and

resolved before the operations commenced.

But I began this paper stating that the focus would be on the

operational level of war. Why did three successive operational commanders

-- Carden, do Robeck and Hamilton -- fail? They were intelligent, dedicated

professional officers with distinguished military records. Yet somehow,

they were inadequate for the task. The issue centers on two concepts: the

ability of the commander to translate the strategic objectives into a concept

27
0

of operations to attain those objectives; and his ability to adapt the plan to

the dynamic environment that confronts him in battle. If his concept is

sound and updated to the "real world," he has a reasonable chance of

success. Implicit in this is that the commander believes that he has the

resources required to undertake the mission and that he effectively

employs those resources to attack the enemy's weaknesses.

Every commander...must produce a concept each time he receives a

mission... and every time his working concept is nullified by changing
circumstance .... This is a process we blithely label as "seizing the
initiative." He who has the initiative must surely have seized it via
the imposition of his own concept, and he who lokes the initiative
has seen his concept rendered useless by the actions of the opposing
commander .... Poor execution can render the most brilliant concept
null and void, but the most magnificent execution can rarely offset
the deadweight of a flawed concept? 4

The operational commander, more than anyone else, bears the

responsibility for both planning and execution. The Navy almost succeeded

in forcing the straits on two occasions. Admiral Carden's original plan was

flawed, but not fatally so. Pressured to commence the operations as soon as

possible, neither he nor his staff had worked through all the details for the

mission when they commenced the assault on 25 February. However, all

the tools were available. There were four adjustments that Cardin was in

the process of implementing that would have improved his chances for

success: more effective use of the seaplanes for spotting; crewing the

trawlers with naval personnel rather than civilians (Keyes began doing this

34 Wftn De~uy 'Conces of Operaion: the Newt of Command, the Tool of Doctrie,* AMn
Magmzhe AugM 1988 p. 26.
28
after the first two attempts failed); switching to daylight minesweeping (the

Turk's effective use of searchlights had negated any benefit of night ops);

and concentrating the fires against the minefield batteries rather than

attempting to neutralize all of the Turkish guns. The Turkish batteries, in

general, lacked the accuracy or the range to pose a threat to Carden's fleet.

Though annoying, the minefield batteries only posed a threat to the

trawlers when they were operating close to the shore. It was the

mineftelds, not the guns, that posed the only serious threat to Cardin's fleet

and prevented him from advancing to Constantinople. If he had

concentrated on defeating the mines, the Turks would have exhausted their

limited supply of shells in vain, and Carden may very well have succeeded.

Carden was an able strategist. His plan to rush the Dardanelles was
sound. But he was a worrier .... Carden's weakness was that, faced
with an operation requiring exceptional daring, he was unsure of
himself. It was a disease among military leaders in that war and it
was catching. Confronted by so many martial innovations, most
senior officers by 1915 had become excessively cautious and easily
discouraged. Bravery had nothing to do with it. Carden's second in
command, Vice Admiral John de Robeck, was brave in battle, but
faced with crucial decisions, he would prove to be of the same
stripe. 3

De Robeck "inherited" the mission on short notice when Carden

suffered his "breakdown" on 15 March, two days before the fleet was to

make its next attempt at forcing the straits. De Robeck came so close to

victory on 18 March that Churchill and Fisher could "taste it" in London. His

consternation about losing a third of his battleships was understandable.

35 Maisn' p.=,
29
His failure to analyze accurately the cause of the losses, his unwillingness to

accept additional losses, and his loss of confidence doomed the Navy's

efforts to force the straits by ships alone. No amount of encouragement by

Churchill or Fisher -- including the deployment of ships to replace those lost

on the 18th -- could convince de Robeck that he could succeed without the

support of the army. Ironically, both the Turks and the Germans believed

that de Robeck would renew the attack the next day, and that they were

defenseless to stop him. General von Sanders said afterward that if de

Robeck had attacked on March 19 he would have found Constantinople

undefended and that Turkey would have surrendered. This belief was

echoed by Turkey's wartime dictator, Enver Pasha. 3 6

Now it was Hamilton's "turn in the barrel." Of all the problems

confronting Hamilton, none was more daunting than the dilemma he faced

regarding leadership. He was a capable leader who believed strongly in

delegating authority to his subordinates. But, Hamilton had two glaring

weaknesses in his officer corps. Division and brigade level leadership was

at best mixed, with several critical positions held by "dugouts." He was also

extremely short of capable junior officers. His troops were willing to fight,

but inexperienced. They needed leaders capable of identifying what the

objectives were and driving towards them. A recurring problem that

Hamilton never solved was the inertia that seemed to set in every time his

troops were in position to commence offensive operations. This could only

36 Muctisets p.541.
30
have been overcome by bold, effective leadership. Hamilton needed to "lay

some heavy leadership on," or replace, his weaker generals. He was

unwilling or unable to do either. By failing to intervene, Hamilton allowed a

mixture of incompetence, arrogance, pessimism, and politicizing to persist at

the senior officer level throughout the campaign.

Another problem confronting Hamilton was the tactical employment

of his troops. Many officers of his day failed to grasp the significance of

experiences gained during the U.S. Civil War and the Russo-Japanese War 3 7

(i.e., the advantages afforded the defense as a result of modern weaponry,

including the machine gun, and the terrible implications of linear warfare

against entrenched forces). Uncomfortable or unfamiliar with the concept of

"maneuver warfare," most of his officers adopted the "over-the-top, eat-

steel" tactics so popular on the Western Front. But Hamilton had written

extensively on maneuver warfare, and had developed innovative tactics for

the infantry that emphasized "initiative," "surprise," "synchronization" and

"speed." Though he understood conceptually why these elements were

critical to the success of an operation, he failed to insist that they be

employed in this operation. Hamilton left the tactics and operational tempo

of the campaign to his subordinates. For eight months, his forces endured
hardships comparable to those on the Western Front. But the differences

between the two theaters were enormous. His forces were not fighting the

37 Hanmiton wbnesd the Russlapane War frsthand as a miuary observr inthe Far East, and
he mrote a majo study of the war.
31
Germans; nor were the boundaries of the battlefield as defined or

constraining; nor were the enemy's defenses nearly as developed as they

were on the Western Front. It is difficult to fathom how he reconciled the

persistent failures by some of his subordinates without intervening. During

the initial landings in April and again at Suvla Bay in August, Hamilton had

the initiative. He had found weaknesses in the Turkish defenses. Yet he

remained passive while the initiative passed to the Turks. He had ample

opportunities to shape, or reshape, the battle. Backed up by the Navy and

enjoying virtual control of the sea, he had the freedom to maneuver his

troops by sea -- when and where he wanted. He also had the ability to "see

and shoot" over the horizon (i.e., aerial recon/targeting and indirect fire)

thanks to the aircraft and the warships at his disposal. He never fully

exploited these advantages to attack the Turkish defenses in depth or to

disrupt their resupply.

The brilliant and (surprisingly) successful evacuations strongly

suggest that the allies possessed the requisite ingredients for success all

along, but failed to em-ploy them.

And so Gallipoli went into the history books as a "loss" for the allies.

The war would continue for another three, carnage-filled years. Would a

victory at Gallipoli have made a decisive difference? We will never know.

But the potential -- really awesome potential -- for an allied victory and a

radically different outcome for the war was there. If only....

32
4 b

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34