Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila
EN BANC

THE SECRETARY OF THE G.R. No. 167707

DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT
AND NATURAL RESOURCES, THE
REGIONAL EXECUTIVE Present:
DIRECTOR, DENR-REGION VI,
REGIONAL TECHNICAL PUNO, C.J.,
DIRECTOR FOR LANDS, QUISUMBING,
LANDS MANAGEMENT BUREAU, YNARES-SANTIAGO,
REGION VI PROVINCIAL CARPIO,
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
RESOURCES OFFICER OF KALIBO, CORONA,*
AKLAN, REGISTER OF DEEDS, CARPIO MORALES,
DIRECTOR OF LAND AZCUNA,
REGISTRATION AUTHORITY, TINGA,
DEPARTMENT OF TOURISM CHICO-NAZARIO,
SECRETARY, DIRECTOR OF VELASCO, JR.,
PHILIPPINE TOURISM NACHURA,**
AUTHORITY, REYES,
Petitioners, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and
BRION, JJ.
- versus -

MAYOR JOSE S. YAP, LIBERTAD

TALAPIAN, MILA Y. SUMNDAD, and
ANICETO YAP, in their behalf and Promulgated:
in behalf of all those similarly situated,
Respondents. October 8, 2008

x--------------------------------------------------x

DR. ORLANDO SACAY and G.R. No. 173775

WILFREDO GELITO, joined by
THE LANDOWNERS OF
BORACAY SIMILARLY
SITUATED NAMED IN A LIST,
ANNEX A OF THIS PETITION,
Petitioners,

- versus -

THE SECRETARY OF THE

DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT
AND NATURAL RESOURCES, THE
REGIONAL TECHNICAL
DIRECTOR FOR LANDS, LANDS
MANAGEMENT BUREAU,
REGION VI, PROVINCIAL
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL
RESOURCES OFFICER, KALIBO,
AKLAN,
Respondents.
x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION

REYES, R.T., J.:

AT stake in these consolidated cases is the right of the present occupants

of Boracay Island to secure titles over their occupied lands.

There are two consolidated petitions. The first is G.R. No. 167707, a petition
for review on certiorari of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) affirming
that[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Kalibo, Aklan, which granted the
petition for declaratory relief filed by respondents-claimants Mayor Jose Yap, et
al. and ordered the survey of Boracay for titling purposes. The second is G.R. No.
173775, a petition for prohibition, mandamus, and nullification of Proclamation
No. 1064[3] issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo classifying Boracay into
reserved forest and agricultural land.

The Antecedents

G.R. No. 167707

Boracay Island in the Municipality of Malay, Aklan, with its powdery white
sand beaches and warm crystalline waters, is reputedly a premier Philippine tourist
destination.The island is also home to 12,003 inhabitants [4] who live in the bone-
shaped islands three barangays.[5]

On April 14, 1976, the Department of Environment and Natural

Resources (DENR) approved the National Reservation Survey of Boracay
Island,[6] which identified several lots as being occupied or claimed by named
persons.[7]

On November 10, 1978, then President Ferdinand Marcos issued

Proclamation No. 1801[8] declaring Boracay Island, among other islands, caves and
peninsulas in the Philippines, as tourist zones and marine reserves under the
administration of the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA). President Marcos later
approved the issuance of PTA Circular 3-82[9] dated September 3, 1982, to
implement Proclamation No. 1801.

Claiming that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No 3-82 precluded
them from filing an application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title or
survey of land for titling purposes, respondents-claimants
Mayor Jose S. Yap, Jr., Libertad Talapian, Mila Y. Sumndad, and Aniceto Yap filed
a petition for declaratory relief with the RTC in Kalibo, Aklan.

In their petition, respondents-claimants alleged that Proclamation No. 1801

and PTA Circular No. 3-82 raised doubts on their right to secure titles over their
occupied lands. They declared that they themselves, or through their predecessors-
in-interest, had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation in Boracay since June 12, 1945, or earlier since time immemorial. They
declared their lands for tax purposes and paid realty taxes on them.[10]
 Respondents-claimants posited that Proclamation No. 1801 and its
implementing Circular did not place Boracay beyond the commerce of man. Since
the Island was classified as a tourist zone, it was susceptible of private
ownership. Under Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 141, otherwise
known as the Public Land Act, they had the right to have the lots registered in their
names through judicial confirmation of imperfect titles.

The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), opposed
the petition for declaratory relief. The OSG countered that Boracay Island was
an unclassified land of the public domain. It formed part of the mass of lands
classified as public forest, which was not available for disposition pursuant to
Section 3(a) of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 705 or the Revised Forestry Code,
[11]
as amended.

The OSG maintained that respondents-claimants reliance on PD No. 1801

and PTA Circular No. 3-82 was misplaced. Their right to judicial confirmation of
title was governed by CA No. 141 and PD No. 705. Since Boracay Island had not
been classified as alienable and disposable, whatever possession they had cannot
ripen into ownership.

During pre-trial, respondents-claimants and the OSG stipulated on the

following facts: (1) respondents-claimants were presently in possession of parcels
of land in Boracay Island; (2) these parcels of land were planted with coconut trees
and other natural growing trees; (3) the coconut trees had heights of more or less
twenty (20) meters and were planted more or less fifty (50) years ago; and (4)
respondents-claimants declared the land they were occupying for tax purposes.[12]

The parties also agreed that the principal issue for resolution was purely
legal: whether Proclamation No. 1801 posed any legal hindrance or impediment to
the titling of the lands in Boracay. They decided to forego with the trial and to
submit the case for resolution upon submission of their respective memoranda.[13]

The RTC took judicial notice[14] that certain parcels of land

in Boracay Island, more particularly Lots 1 and 30, Plan PSU-5344, were covered
by Original Certificate of Title No. 19502 (RO 2222) in the name of the Heirs of
Ciriaco S. Tirol. These lots were involved in Civil Case Nos. 5222 and 5262 filed
before the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan.[15]The titles were issued on
August 7, 1933.[16]

RTC and CA Dispositions

On July 14, 1999, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondents-

claimants, with a fallo reading:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court declares that

Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 pose no legal
obstacle to the petitioners and those similarly situated to acquire title to
their lands in Boracay, in accordance with the applicable laws and in the
manner prescribed therein; and to have their lands surveyed and
approved by respondent Regional Technical Director of Lands as the
approved survey does not in itself constitute a title to the land.

SO ORDERED.[17]

The RTC upheld respondents-claimants right to have their occupied lands

titled in their name. It ruled that neither Proclamation No. 1801 nor PTA Circular
No. 3-82 mentioned that lands in Boracay were inalienable or could not be the
subject of disposition.[18] The Circular itself recognized private ownership of lands.
[19]
The trial court cited Sections 87[20] and 53[21] of the Public Land Act as basis for
acknowledging private ownership of lands in Boracay and that only those forested
areas in public lands were declared as part of the forest reserve.[22]

The OSG moved for reconsideration but its motion was denied.[23] The
Republic then appealed to the CA.

On December 9, 2004, the appellate court affirmed in toto the RTC decision,
disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is

hereby rendered by us DENYING the appeal filed in this case and
AFFIRMING the decision of the lower court.[24]
 The CA held that respondents-claimants could not be prejudiced by a
declaration that the lands they occupied since time immemorial were part of a
forest reserve.

Again, the OSG sought reconsideration but it was similarly denied.

[25]
Hence, the present petition under Rule 45.

G.R. No. 173775

On May 22, 2006, during the pendency of G.R. No. 167707, President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 1064[26] classifying Boracay Island
into four hundred (400) hectares of reserved forest land (protection purposes) and
six hundred twenty-eight and 96/100 (628.96) hectares of agricultural land
(alienable and disposable). The Proclamation likewise provided for a fifteen-meter
buffer zone on each side of the centerline of roads and trails, reserved for right-of-
way and which shall form part of the area reserved for forest land protection
purposes.

On August 10, 2006, petitioners-claimants Dr. Orlando Sacay,[27] Wilfredo

Gelito,[28] and other landowners[29] in Boracay filed with this Court an original
petition for prohibition, mandamus, and nullification of Proclamation No. 1064.
[30]
They allege that the Proclamation infringed on their prior vested rights over
portions of Boracay. They have been in continued possession of their respective
lots in Boracay since time immemorial. They have also invested billions of pesos
in developing their lands and building internationally renowned first class resorts
on their lots.[31]

Petitioners-claimants contended that there is no need for a proclamation

reclassifying Boracay into agricultural land. Being classified as neither mineral nor
timber land, the island is deemed agricultural pursuant to the Philippine Bill of
1902 and Act No. 926, known as the first Public Land Act.[32] Thus, their
possession in the concept of owner for the required period entitled them to judicial
confirmation of imperfect title.
 Opposing the petition, the OSG argued that petitioners-claimants do not
have a vested right over their occupied portions in the island. Boracay is an
unclassified public forest land pursuant to Section 3(a) of PD No. 705. Being
public forest, the claimed portions of the island are inalienable and cannot be the
subject of judicial confirmation of imperfect title. It is only the executive
department, not the courts, which has authority to reclassify lands of the public
domain into alienable and disposable lands. There is a need for a positive
government act in order to release the lots for disposition.

On November 21, 2006, this Court ordered the consolidation of the two
petitions as they principally involve the same issues on the land classification
of Boracay Island.[33]

Issues

G.R. No. 167707

The OSG raises the lone issue of whether Proclamation No. 1801
and PTA Circular No. 3-82 pose any legal obstacle for respondents, and all those
similarly situated, to acquire title to their occupied lands in Boracay Island.[34]

G.R. No. 173775

Petitioners-claimants hoist five (5) issues, namely:

I.
AT THE TIME OF THE ESTABLISHED POSSESSION OF
PETITIONERS IN CONCEPT OF OWNER OVER THEIR
RESPECTIVE AREAS IN BORACAY, SINCE TIME IMMEMORIAL
OR AT THE LATEST SINCE 30 YRS. PRIOR TO THE FILING OF
THE PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF ON NOV. 19,
1997, WERE THE AREAS OCCUPIED BY THEM PUBLIC
AGRICULTURAL LANDS AS DEFINED BY LAWS THEN ON
JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT TITLES OR PUBLIC
FOREST AS DEFINED BY SEC. 3a, PD 705?
 II.
HAVE PETITIONERS OCCUPANTS ACQUIRED PRIOR VESTED
RIGHT OF PRIVATE OWNERSHIP OVER THEIR OCCUPIED
PORTIONS OF BORACAY LAND, DESPITE THE FACT THAT
THEY HAVE NOT APPLIED YET FOR JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION
OF IMPERFECT TITLE?

III.
IS THE EXECUTIVE DECLARATION OF THEIR AREAS AS
ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE UNDER SEC 6, CA 141 [AN]
INDISPENSABLE PRE-REQUISITE FOR PETITIONERS TO
OBTAIN TITLE UNDER THE TORRENS SYSTEM?

IV.
IS THE ISSUANCE OF PROCLAMATION 1064 ON MAY 22, 2006,
VIOLATIVE OF THE PRIOR VESTED RIGHTS TO PRIVATE
OWNERSHIP OF PETITIONERS OVER THEIR LANDS IN
BORACAY, PROTECTED BY THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF
THE CONSTITUTION OR IS PROCLAMATION 1064 CONTRARY
TO SEC. 8, CA 141, OR SEC. 4(a) OF RA 6657.

V.
CAN RESPONDENTS BE COMPELLED BY MANDAMUS TO
ALLOW THE SURVEY AND TO APPROVE THE SURVEY
PLANS FOR PURPOSES OF THE APPLICATION FOR TITLING OF
THE LANDS OF PETITIONERS IN BORACAY? [35] (Underscoring
supplied)

In capsule, the main issue is whether private claimants (respondents-

claimants in G.R. No. 167707 and petitioners-claimants in G.R. No. 173775) have
a right to secure titles over their occupied portions in Boracay. The twin petitions
pertain to their right, if any, to judicial confirmation of imperfect title under CA
No. 141, as amended. They do not involve their right to secure title under other
pertinent laws.

Our Ruling

Regalian Doctrine and power of the executive

to reclassify lands of the public domain
 Private claimants rely on three (3) laws and executive acts in their bid for
judicial confirmation of imperfect title, namely: (a) Philippine Bill of 1902 [36] in
relation to Act No. 926, later amended and/or superseded by Act No. 2874 and CA
No. 141;[37] (b) Proclamation No. 1801[38] issued by then President Marcos; and (c)
Proclamation No. 1064[39] issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. We shall
proceed to determine their rights to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect
title under these laws and executive acts.

But first, a peek at the Regalian principle and the power of the executive to
reclassify lands of the public domain.

The 1935 Constitution classified lands of the public domain into

agricultural, forest or timber.[40] Meanwhile, the 1973 Constitution provided the
following divisions: agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential,
resettlement, mineral, timber or forest and grazing lands, and such other classes as
may be provided by law,[41] giving the government great leeway for classification.
[42]
Then the 1987 Constitution reverted to the 1935 Constitution classification with
one addition: national parks.[43] Of these, onlyagricultural lands may be alienated.
[44]
Prior to Proclamation No. 1064 of May 22,
2006, Boracay Island had never been expressly and administratively classified
under any of these grand divisions. Boracay was an unclassified land of the public
domain.

The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to
the State, that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land and
charged with the conservation of such patrimony.[45] The doctrine has been
consistently adopted under the 1935, 1973, and 1987 Constitutions.[46]

All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are
presumed to belong to the State.[47] Thus, all lands that have not been acquired from
the government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the State as part of the
inalienable public domain.[48] Necessarily, it is up to the State to determine if lands
of the public domain will be disposed of for private ownership. The government, as
the agent of the state, is possessed of the plenary power as the persona in law to
determine who shall be the favored recipients of public lands, as well as under
what terms they may be granted such privilege, not excluding the placing of
obstacles in the way of their exercise of what otherwise would be ordinary acts of
ownership.[49]

Our present land law traces its roots to the Regalian Doctrine. Upon the
Spanish conquest of the Philippines, ownership of all lands, territories and
possessions in the Philippines passed to the Spanish Crown.[50] The Regalian
doctrine was first introduced in the Philippines through the Laws of the Indies and
the Royal Cedulas, which laid the foundation that all lands that were not acquired
from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain.
[51]

The Laws of the Indies was followed by the Ley Hipotecaria or

the Mortgage Law of 1893. The Spanish Mortgage Law provided for the
systematic registration of titles and deeds as well as possessory claims.[52]

The Royal Decree of 1894 or the Maura Law[53] partly amended the Spanish
Mortgage Law and the Laws of the Indies. It established possessory information as
the method of legalizing possession of vacant Crown land, under certain conditions
which were set forth in said decree. [54] Under Section 393 of the Maura Law,
an informacion posesoria or possessory information title,[55] when duly inscribed in
the Registry of Property, is converted into a title of ownership only after the lapse
of twenty (20) years of uninterrupted possession which must be actual, public, and
adverse,[56] from the date of its inscription.[57] However, possessory information title
had to be perfected one year after the promulgation of the Maura Law, or
until April 17, 1895. Otherwise, the lands would revert to the State.[58]

In sum, private ownership of land under the Spanish regime could only be
founded on royal concessions which took various forms, namely: (1) titulo real or
royal grant; (2) concesion especial or special grant; (3) composicion con el
estado or adjustment title; (4) titulo de compra or title by purchase; and
(5) informacion posesoria or possessory information title.[59]

The first law governing the disposition of public lands in

the Philippines under American rule was embodied in the Philippine Bill of 1902.
[60]
By this law, lands of the public domain in the Philippine Islands were classified
into three (3) grand divisions, to wit: agricultural, mineral, and timber or forest
lands.[61] The act provided for, among others, the disposal of mineral lands by
means of absolute grant (freehold system) and by lease (leasehold system). [62] It
also provided the definition by exclusion of agricultural public lands.
[63]
Interpreting the meaning of agricultural lands under the Philippine Bill of 1902,
the Court declared in Mapa v. Insular Government:[64]

x x x In other words, that the phrase agricultural land as used in

Act No. 926 means those public lands acquired from Spain which are
not timber or mineral lands. x x x[65](Emphasis Ours)

On February 1, 1903, the Philippine Legislature passed Act No. 496,

otherwise known as the Land Registration Act. The act established a system of
registration by which recorded title becomes absolute, indefeasible, and
imprescriptible. This is known as the Torrens system.[66]

Concurrently, on October 7, 1903, the Philippine Commission passed Act

No. 926, which was the first Public Land Act. The Act introduced the homestead
system and made provisions for judicial and administrative confirmation of
imperfect titles and for the sale or lease of public lands. It permitted corporations
regardless of the nationality of persons owning the controlling stock to lease or
purchase lands of the public domain.[67] Under the Act, open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands for the next ten (10)
years preceding July 26, 1904 was sufficient for judicial confirmation of imperfect
title.[68]

On November 29, 1919, Act No. 926 was superseded by Act No. 2874,
otherwise known as the second Public Land Act. This new, more comprehensive
law limited the exploitation of agricultural lands to Filipinos and Americans and
citizens of other countries which gave Filipinos the same privileges. For judicial
confirmation of title, possession and occupation en concepto dueo since time
immemorial, or since July 26, 1894, was required.[69]

After the passage of the 1935 Constitution, CA No. 141 amended Act No.
2874 on December 1, 1936. To this day, CA No. 141, as amended, remains as the
existing general law governing the classification and disposition of lands of the
public domain other than timber and mineral lands,[70] and privately owned lands
which reverted to the State.[71]

Section 48(b) of CA No. 141 retained the requirement under Act No. 2874 of
possession and occupation of lands of the public domain since time immemorial or
since July 26, 1894. However, this provision was superseded by Republic Act (RA)
No. 1942,[72] which provided for a simple thirty-year prescriptive period for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title. The provision was last amended by PD No. 1073,
[73]
which now provides for possession and occupation of the land applied
for since June 12, 1945, or earlier.[74]

The issuance of PD No. 892[75] on February 16, 1976 discontinued the use of
Spanish titles as evidence in land registration proceedings.[76] Under the decree, all
holders of Spanish titles or grants should apply for registration of their lands under
Act No. 496 within six (6) months from the effectivity of the decree on February
16, 1976. Thereafter, the recording of all unregistered lands[77] shall be governed
by Section 194 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 3344.

On June 11, 1978, Act No. 496 was amended and updated by PD No. 1529,
known as the Property Registration Decree. It was enacted to codify the various
laws relative to registration of property.[78] It governs registration of lands under
the Torrens system as well as unregistered lands, including chattel mortgages.[79]

A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In

keeping with the presumption of State ownership, the Court has time and again
emphasized that there must be a positive act of the government, such as an
official proclamation,[80] declassifying inalienable public land into disposable land
for agricultural or other purposes.[81] In fact, Section 8 of CA No. 141 limits
alienable or disposable lands only to those lands which have been officially
delimited and classified.[82]

The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of

the lands of the public domain is on the person applying for registration (or
claiming ownership), who must prove that the land subject of the application is
alienable or disposable.[83] To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible
evidence must be established that the land subject of the application (or claim) is
alienable or disposable.[84] There must still be a positive act declaring land of the
public domain as alienable and disposable. To prove that the land subject of an
application for registration is alienable, the applicant must establish the existence
of a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an
executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands
investigators; and a legislative act or a statute. [85] The applicant may also secure a
certification from the government that the land claimed to have been possessed for
the required number of years is alienable and disposable.[86]

In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative

action, report, statute, or certification was presented to the Court. The records are
bereft of evidence showing that, prior to 2006, the portions of Boracay occupied by
private claimants were subject of a government proclamation that the land is
alienable and disposable.Absent such well-nigh incontrovertible evidence, the
Court cannot accept the submission that lands occupied by private claimants were
already open to disposition before 2006. Matters of land classification or
reclassification cannot be assumed. They call for proof.[87]

Ankron and De Aldecoa did not make the whole of Boracay Island, or
portions of it, agricultural lands. Private claimants posit that Boracay was already
an agricultural land pursuant to the old cases Ankron v. Government of the
Philippine Islands (1919)[88] and De Aldecoa v. The Insular Government (1909).
[89]
These cases were decided under the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902
and Act No. 926. There is a statement in these old cases that in the absence of
evidence to the contrary, that in each case the lands are agricultural lands until the
contrary is shown.[90]

Private claimants reliance on Ankron and De Aldecoa is misplaced. These

cases did not have the effect of converting the whole of Boracay Island or portions
of it into agricultural lands. It should be stressed that the Philippine Bill of 1902
and Act No. 926 merely provided the manner through which land registration
courts would classify lands of the public domain. Whether the land would be
classified as timber, mineral, or agricultural depended on proof presented in each
case.
 Ankron and De Aldecoa were decided at a time when the President of the
Philippines had no power to classify lands of the public domain into mineral,
timber, and agricultural. At that time, the courts were free to make corresponding
classifications in justiciable cases, or were vested with implicit power to do so,
depending upon the preponderance of the evidence.[91] This was the Courts ruling
in Heirs of the Late Spouses Pedro S. Palanca and Soterranea Rafols Vda. De
Palanca v. Republic,[92] in which it stated, through Justice Adolfo Azcuna, viz.:

x x x Petitioners furthermore insist that a particular land need not

be formally released by an act of the Executive before it can be deemed
open to private ownership, citing the cases of Ramos v. Director of
Lands and Ankron v. Government of the Philippine Islands.

xxxx

Petitioners reliance upon Ramos v. Director of Lands and Ankron

v. Government is misplaced. These cases were decided under the
Philippine Bill of 1902 and the first Public Land Act No. 926 enacted by
the Philippine Commission on October 7, 1926, under which there was
no legal provision vesting in the Chief Executive or President of the
Philippines the power to classify lands of the public domain into mineral,
timber and agricultural so that the courts then were free to make
corresponding classifications in justiciable cases, or were vested with
implicit power to do so, depending upon the preponderance of the
evidence.[93]

To aid the courts in resolving land registration cases under Act No. 926, it
was then necessary to devise a presumption on land classification. Thus evolved
the dictum in Ankron that the courts have a right to presume, in the absence of
evidence to the contrary, that in each case the lands are agricultural lands until the
contrary is shown.[94]

But We cannot unduly expand the presumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa to

an argument that all lands of the public domain had been automatically reclassified
as disposable and alienable agricultural lands. By no stretch of imagination did the
presumption convert all lands of the public domain into agricultural lands.
 If We accept the position of private claimants, the Philippine Bill of 1902
and Act No. 926 would have automatically made all lands in the Philippines,
except those already classified as timber or mineral land, alienable and disposable
lands. That would take these lands out of State ownership and worse, would be
utterly inconsistent with and totally repugnant to the long-entrenched Regalian
doctrine.

The presumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa attaches only to land

registration cases brought under the provisions of Act No. 926, or more specifically
those cases dealing with judicial and administrative confirmation of imperfect
titles. The presumption applies to an applicant for judicial or administrative
conformation of imperfect title under Act No. 926. It certainly cannot apply to
landowners, such as private claimants or their predecessors-in-interest, who failed
to avail themselves of the benefits of Act No. 926. As to them, their land remained
unclassified and, by virtue of the Regalian doctrine, continued to be owned by the
State.

In any case, the assumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa was not

absolute. Land classification was, in the end, dependent on proof. If there was
proof that the land was better suited for non-agricultural uses, the courts
could adjudge it as a mineral or timber land despite the presumption. In Ankron,
this Court stated:

In the case of Jocson vs. Director of Forestry (supra), the

Attorney-General admitted in effect that whether the particular land in
question belongs to one class or another is a question of fact. The mere
fact that a tract of land has trees upon it or has mineral within it is not of
itself sufficient to declare that one is forestry land and the other, mineral
land. There must be some proof of the extent and present or future value
of the forestry and of the minerals. While, as we have just said, many
definitions have been given for agriculture, forestry, and mineral lands,
and that in each case it is a question of fact, we think it is safe to say that
in order to be forestry or mineral land the proof must show that it is more
valuable for the forestry or the mineral which it contains than it is for
agricultural purposes. (Sec. 7, Act No. 1148.) It is not sufficient to show
that there exists some trees upon the land or that it bears some mineral.
 Land may be classified as forestry or mineral today, and, by reason of
the exhaustion of the timber or mineral, be classified as agricultural land
tomorrow. And vice-versa, by reason of the rapid growth of timber or the
discovery of valuable minerals, lands classified as agricultural today may
be differently classified tomorrow. Each case must be decided upon
the proof in that particular case, having regard for its present or
future value for one or the other purposes. We believe, however,
considering the fact that it is a matter of public knowledge that a
majority of the lands in the Philippine Islands are agricultural lands that
the courts have a right to presume, in the absence of evidence to the
contrary, that in each case the lands are agricultural lands until the
contrary is shown. Whatever the land involved in a particular land
registration case is forestry or mineral land must, therefore, be a
matter of proof. Its superior value for one purpose or the other is a
question of fact to be settled by the proof in each particular case. The
fact that the land is a manglar [mangrove swamp] is not sufficient for the
courts to decide whether it is agricultural, forestry, or mineral land. It
may perchance belong to one or the other of said classes of land. The
Government, in the first instance, under the provisions of Act No. 1148,
may, by reservation, decide for itself what portions of public land shall
be considered forestry land, unless private interests have intervened
before such reservation is made. In the latter case, whether the land is
agricultural, forestry, or mineral, is a question of proof. Until private
interests have intervened, the Government, by virtue of the terms of said
Act (No. 1148), may decide for itself what portions of the public domain
shall be set aside and reserved as forestry or mineral land. (Ramos vs.
Director of Lands, 39 Phil. 175; Jocson vs. Director of Forestry, supra)
[95]
(Emphasis ours)

Since 1919, courts were no longer free to determine the classification of

lands from the facts of each case, except those that have already became private
lands.[96] Act No. 2874, promulgated in 1919 and reproduced in Section 6 of CA
No. 141, gave the Executive Department, through the President,
the exclusive prerogative to classify or reclassify public lands into alienable or
disposable, mineral or forest.96-a Since then, courts no longer had the authority,
whether express or implied, to determine the classification of lands of the public
domain.[97]

Here, private claimants, unlike the Heirs of Ciriaco Tirol who were issued
their title in 1933,[98] did not present a justiciable case for determination by the land
registration court of the propertys land classification. Simply put, there was no
opportunity for the courts then to resolve if the land the Boracay occupants are
now claiming were agricultural lands. When Act No. 926 was supplanted by Act
No. 2874 in 1919, without an application for judicial confirmation having been
filed by private claimants or their predecessors-in-interest, the courts were no
longer authorized to determine the propertys land classification. Hence, private
claimants cannot bank on Act No. 926.

We note that the RTC decision[99] in G.R. No. 167707 mentioned Krivenko v.
Register of Deeds of Manila,[100] which was decided in 1947 when CA No. 141,
vesting the Executive with the sole power to classify lands of the public domain
was already in effect. Krivenko cited the old cases Mapa v. Insular Government,
[101]
De Aldecoa v. The Insular Government,[102] and Ankron v. Government of the
Philippine Islands.[103]

Krivenko, however, is not controlling here because it involved a totally

different issue. The pertinent issue in Krivenko was whether residential lots were
included in the general classification of agricultural lands; and if so, whether an
alien could acquire a residential lot. This Court ruled that as an alien, Krivenko
was prohibited by the 1935 Constitution[104] from acquiring agricultural land, which
included residential lots. Here, the issue is whether unclassified lands of the public
domain are automatically deemed agricultural.

Notably, the definition of agricultural public lands mentioned

in Krivenko relied on the old cases decided prior to the enactment of Act No. 2874,
including Ankron and De Aldecoa.[105] As We have already stated, those cases
cannot apply here, since they were decided when the Executive did not have the
authority to classify lands as agricultural, timber, or mineral.

Private claimants continued possession under Act No. 926 does not create
a presumption that the land is alienable. Private claimants also contend that their
continued possession of portions of Boracay Island for the requisite period of ten
(10) years under Act No. 926[106] ipso facto converted the island into private
ownership. Hence, they may apply for a title in their name.
 A similar argument was squarely rejected by the Court in Collado v. Court
of Appeals.[107] Collado, citing the separate opinion of now Chief Justice Reynato
S. Puno in Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources,107-a ruled:

Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act, was passed in
pursuance of the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902.
The law governed the disposition of lands of the public
domain. It prescribed rules and regulations for the
homesteading, selling and leasing of portions of the public
domain of the Philippine Islands, and prescribed the terms
and conditions to enable persons to perfect their titles to
public lands in the Islands. It also provided for the issuance
of patents to certain native settlers upon public lands, for
the establishment of town sites and sale of lots therein, for
the completion of imperfect titles, and for the cancellation
or confirmation of Spanish concessions and grants in
the Islands. In short, the Public Land Act operated on the
assumption that title to public lands in the Philippine
Islands remained in the government; and that the
governments title to public land sprung from the Treaty of
Paris and other subsequent treaties between Spain and the
United States. The term public land referred to all lands of
the public domain whose title still remained in the
government and are thrown open to private appropriation
and settlement, and excluded the patrimonial property of
the government and the friar lands.

Thus, it is plain error for petitioners to argue that under the

Philippine Bill of 1902 and Public Land Act No. 926, mere
possession by private individuals of lands creates the legal
presumption that the lands are alienable and disposable.
[108]
(Emphasis Ours)

Except for lands already covered by existing titles, Boracay was an

unclassified land of the public domain prior to Proclamation No. 1064. Such
unclassified lands are considered public forest under PD No. 705. The
DENR[109] and the National Mapping and Resource Information
[110]
Authority certify that Boracay Island is an unclassified land of the public
domain.
 PD No. 705 issued by President Marcos categorized all unclassified lands
of the public domain as public forest. Section 3(a) of PD No. 705 defines a public
forest as a mass of lands of the public domain which has not been the subject of
the present system of classification for the determination of which lands are needed
for forest purpose and which are not. Applying PD No. 705, all unclassified lands,
including those in Boracay Island, are ipso facto considered public forests. PD No.
705, however, respects titles already existing prior to its effectivity.

The Court notes that the classification of Boracay as a forest land under PD
No. 705 may seem to be out of touch with the present realities in the
island. Boracay, no doubt, has been partly stripped of its forest cover to pave the
way for commercial developments. As a premier tourist destination for local and
foreign tourists, Boracay appears more of a commercial island resort, rather than a
forest land.

Nevertheless, that the occupants of Boracay have built multi-million peso

beach resorts on the island;[111] that the island has already been stripped of its forest
cover; or that the implementation of Proclamation No. 1064 will destroy the
islands tourism industry, do not negate its character as public forest.

Forests, in the context of both the Public Land Act and the
Constitution[112] classifying lands of the public domain into agricultural, forest or
timber, mineral lands, and national parks, do not necessarily refer to large tracts of
wooded land or expanses covered by dense growths of trees and underbrushes.
[113]
The discussion in Heirs of Amunategui v. Director of Forestry[114] is particularly
instructive:

A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does

not lose such classification simply because loggers or settlers may have
stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may
actually be covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators
or other farmers. Forest lands do not have to be on mountains or in out of
the way places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms,
and other trees growing in brackish or sea water may also be classified
as forest land. The classification is descriptive of its legal nature or
status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually
looks like. Unless and until the land classified as forest is released in an
 official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the
disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on
confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.[115] (Emphasis supplied)

There is a big difference between forest as defined in a dictionary and forest or

timber land as a classification of lands of the public domain as appearing in our
statutes. One is descriptive of what appears on the land while the other is a legal
status, a classification for legal purposes.[116] At any rate, the Court is tasked to
determine the legal status of Boracay Island, and not look into its physical
layout. Hence, even if its forest cover has been replaced by beach resorts,
restaurants and other commercial establishments, it has not been automatically
converted from public forest to alienable agricultural land.

Private claimants cannot rely on Proclamation No. 1801 as basis for

judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The proclamation did not convert
Boracay into an agricultural land. However, private claimants argue that
Proclamation No. 1801 issued by then President Marcos in 1978 entitles them to
judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The Proclamation classified Boracay,
among other islands, as a tourist zone. Private claimants assert that, as a tourist
spot, the island is susceptible of private ownership.

Proclamation No. 1801 or PTA Circular No. 3-82 did not convert the whole
of Boracay into an agricultural land. There is nothing in the law or the Circular
which made Boracay Island an agricultural land. The reference in Circular No. 3-
82 to private lands[117] and areas declared as alienable and disposable [118] does not
by itself classify the entire island as agricultural. Notably, Circular No. 3-82 makes
reference not only to private lands and areas but also to public forested lands. Rule
VIII, Section 3 provides:

No trees in forested private lands may be cut without prior

authority from the PTA. All forested areas in public lands are declared
forest reserves. (Emphasis supplied)

Clearly, the reference in the Circular to both private and public lands merely
recognizes that the island can be classified by the Executive department pursuant
to its powers under CA No. 141. In fact, Section 5 of the Circular recognizes the
then Bureau of Forest Developments authority to declare areas in the island as
alienable and disposable when it provides:

Subsistence farming, in areas declared as alienable and disposable

by the Bureau of Forest Development.

Therefore, Proclamation No. 1801 cannot be deemed the positive act needed
to classify Boracay Island as alienable and disposable land. If President Marcos
intended to classify the island as alienable and disposable or forest, or both, he
would have identified the specific limits of each, as President Arroyo did in
Proclamation No. 1064. This was not done in Proclamation No. 1801.

The Whereas clauses of Proclamation No. 1801 also explain the rationale
behind the declaration of Boracay Island, together with other islands, caves and
peninsulas in the Philippines, as a tourist zone and marine reserve to be
administered by the PTA to ensure the concentrated efforts of the public and
private sectors in the development of the areas tourism potential with due regard
for ecological balance in the marine environment. Simply put, the proclamation is
aimed at administering the islands for tourism and ecological purposes. It does
not address the areas alienability.[119]

More importantly, Proclamation No. 1801 covers not only Boracay Island,
but sixty-four (64) other islands, coves, and peninsulas in the Philippines, such as
Fortune and Verde Islands in Batangas, Port Galera in Oriental Mindoro, Panglao
and Balicasag Islands in Bohol, Coron Island, Puerto Princesa and surrounding
areas in Palawan, Camiguin Island in Cagayan de Oro, and Misamis Oriental, to
name a few. If the designation of Boracay Island as tourist zone makes it alienable
and disposable by virtue of Proclamation No. 1801, all the other areas mentioned
would likewise be declared wide open for private disposition. That could not have
been, and is clearly beyond, the intent of the proclamation.

It was Proclamation No. 1064 of 2006 which positively declared part of

Boracay as alienable and opened the same to private ownership. Sections 6 and 7
of CA No. 141[120] provide that it is only the President, upon the recommendation of
the proper department head, who has the authority to classify the lands of the
public domain into alienable or disposable, timber and mineral lands.[121]
 In issuing Proclamation No. 1064, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
merely exercised the authority granted to her to classify lands of the public
domain, presumably subject to existing vested rights. Classification of public lands
is the exclusive prerogative of the Executive Department, through the Office of the
President. Courts have no authority to do so. [122] Absent such classification, the
land remains unclassified until released and rendered open to disposition.[123]

Proclamation No. 1064 classifies Boracay into 400 hectares of reserved

forest land and 628.96 hectares of agricultural land. The Proclamation likewise
provides for a 15-meter buffer zone on each side of the center line of roads and
trails, which are reserved for right of way and which shall form part of the area
reserved for forest land protection purposes.
Contrary to private claimants argument, there was nothing invalid or
irregular, much less unconstitutional, about the classification
of Boracay Island made by the President through Proclamation No. 1064. It was
within her authority to make such classification, subject to existing vested rights.

Proclamation No. 1064 does not violate the Comprehensive Agrarian

Reform Law. Private claimants further assert that Proclamation No. 1064 violates
the provision of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) or RA No.
6657 barring conversion of public forests into agricultural lands. They claim that
since Boracay is a public forest under PD No. 705, President Arroyo can no longer
convert it into an agricultural land without running afoul of Section 4(a) of RA No.
6657, thus:

SEC. 4. Scope. The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of

1988 shall cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity
produced, all public and private agricultural lands as provided in
Proclamation No. 131 and Executive Order No. 229, including other
lands of the public domain suitable for agriculture.

More specifically, the following lands are covered by the

Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program:

(a) All alienable and disposable lands of the public domain

devoted to or suitable for
 agriculture. No reclassification of forest or mineral
lands to agricultural lands shall be undertaken after the
approval of this Act until Congress, taking into account
ecological, developmental and equity considerations,
shall have determined by law, the specific limits of the
public domain.

That Boracay Island was classified as a public forest under PD No. 705 did
not bar the Executive from later converting it into agricultural
land. Boracay Island still remained an unclassified land of the public domain
despite PD No. 705.

In Heirs of the Late Spouses Pedro S. Palanca and Soterranea Rafols v.

Republic,[124] the Court stated that unclassified lands are public forests.

While it is true that the land classification map does not

categorically state that the islands are public forests, the fact that
they were unclassified lands leads to the same result.In the absence of
the classification as mineral or timber land, the land remains unclassified
land until released and rendered open to disposition. [125] (Emphasis
supplied)

Moreover, the prohibition under the CARL applies only to a reclassification

of land. If the land had never been previously classified, as in the case of Boracay,
there can be no prohibited reclassification under the agrarian law. We agree with
the opinion of the Department of Justice[126] on this point:

Indeed, the key word to the correct application of the prohibition

in Section 4(a) is the word reclassification. Where there has been no
previous classification of public forest [referring, we repeat, to the mass
of the public domain which has not been the subject of the present
system of classification for purposes of determining which are needed
for forest purposes and which are not] into permanent forest or forest
reserves or some other forest uses under the Revised Forestry Code,
there can be no reclassification of forest lands to speak of within the
meaning of Section 4(a).
 Thus, obviously, the prohibition in Section 4(a) of the CARL
against the reclassification of forest lands to agricultural lands without a
prior law delimiting the limits of the public domain, does not, and
cannot, apply to those lands of the public domain, denominated as public
forest under the Revised Forestry Code, which have not been previously
determined, or classified, as needed for forest purposes in accordance
with the provisions of the Revised Forestry Code. [127]

Private claimants are not entitled to apply for judicial confirmation of

imperfect title under CA No. 141. Neither do they have vested rights over the
occupied lands under the said law. There are two requisites for judicial
confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title under CA No. 141, namely: (1) open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land
by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest under a bona fide claim of
ownership since time immemorial or from June 12, 1945; and (2) the classification
of the land as alienable and disposable land of the public domain.[128]

As discussed, the Philippine Bill of 1902, Act No. 926, and Proclamation
No. 1801 did not convert portions of Boracay Island into an agricultural land. The
island remained an unclassified land of the public domain and, applying the
Regalian doctrine, is considered State property.

Private claimants bid for judicial confirmation of imperfect title, relying on

the Philippine Bill of 1902, Act No. 926, and Proclamation No. 1801, must fail
because of the absence of the second element of alienable and disposable
land. Their entitlement to a government grant under our present Public Land Act
presupposes that the land possessed and applied for is already alienable and
disposable. This is clear from the wording of the law itself. [129] Where the land is
not alienable and disposable, possession of the land, no matter how long, cannot
confer ownership or possessory rights.[130]

Neither may private claimants apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect

title under Proclamation No. 1064, with respect to those lands which were
classified as agricultural lands. Private claimants failed to prove the first element of
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of their lands in Boracay
since June 12, 1945.
 We cannot sustain the CA and RTC conclusion in the petition for declaratory
relief that private claimants complied with the requisite period of possession.

The tax declarations in the name of private claimants are insufficient to

prove the first element of possession. We note that the earliest of the tax
declarations in the name of private claimants were issued in 1993. Being of recent
dates, the tax declarations are not sufficient to convince this Court that the period
of possession and occupation commenced on June 12, 1945.

Private claimants insist that they have a vested right in Boracay, having been
in possession of the island for a long time. They have invested millions of pesos in
developing the island into a tourist spot. They say their continued possession and
investments give them a vested right which cannot be unilaterally rescinded by
Proclamation No. 1064.

The continued possession and considerable investment of private claimants

do not automatically give them a vested right in Boracay. Nor do these give them a
right to apply for a title to the land they are presently occupying. This Court is
constitutionally bound to decide cases based on the evidence presented and the
laws applicable. As the law and jurisprudence stand, private claimants are
ineligible to apply for a judicial confirmation of title over their occupied portions
in Boracay even with their continued possession and considerable investment in
the island.

One Last Note

The Court is aware that millions of pesos have been invested for the
development of Boracay Island, making it a by-word in the local and international
tourism industry. The Court also notes that for a number of years, thousands of
people have called the island their home. While the Court commiserates with
private claimants plight, We are bound to apply the law strictly and
judiciously. This is the law and it should prevail. Ito ang batas at ito ang dapat
umiral.
 All is not lost, however, for private claimants. While they may not be
eligible to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under Section 48(b) of
CA No. 141, as amended, this does not denote their automatic ouster from the
residential, commercial, and other areas they possess now classified as
agricultural. Neither will this mean the loss of their substantial investments on their
occupied alienable lands. Lack of title does not necessarily mean lack of right to
possess.

For one thing, those with lawful possession may claim good faith as builders
of improvements. They can take steps to preserve or protect their possession. For
another, they may look into other modes of applying for original registration of
title, such as by homestead[131] or sales patent,[132] subject to the conditions imposed
by law.

More realistically, Congress may enact a law to entitle private claimants to

acquire title to their occupied lots or to exempt them from certain requirements
under the present land laws. There is one such bill[133] now pending in the House of
Representatives. Whether that bill or a similar bill will become a law is for
Congress to decide.

In issuing Proclamation No. 1064, the government has taken the step
necessary to open up the island to private ownership. This gesture may not be
sufficient to appease some sectors which view the classification of the island
partially into a forest reserve as absurd. That the island is no longer overrun by
trees, however, does not becloud the vision to protect its remaining forest cover
and to strike a healthy balance between progress and ecology. Ecological
conservation is as important as economic progress.

To be sure, forest lands are fundamental to our nations survival. Their

promotion and protection are not just fancy rhetoric for politicians and
activists. These are needs that become more urgent as destruction of our
environment gets prevalent and difficult to control. As aptly observed by Justice
Conrado Sanchez in 1968 in Director of Forestry v. Munoz:[134]

The view this Court takes of the cases at bar is but in adherence to
public policy that should be followed with respect to forest lands. Many
 have written much, and many more have spoken, and quite often, about
the pressing need for forest preservation, conservation, protection,
development and reforestation. Not without justification. For, forests
constitute a vital segment of any country's natural resources. It is of
common knowledge by now that absence of the necessary green cover
on our lands produces a number of adverse or ill effects of serious
proportions. Without the trees, watersheds dry up; rivers and lakes which
they supply are emptied of their contents. The fish disappear. Denuded
areas become dust bowls. As waterfalls cease to function, so will
hydroelectric plants. With the rains, the fertile topsoil is washed away;
geological erosion results. With erosion come the dreaded floods that
wreak havoc and destruction to property crops, livestock, houses, and
highways not to mention precious human lives. Indeed, the foregoing
observations should be written down in a lumbermans decalogue. [135]

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows:

1. The petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 167707 is GRANTED and the
Court of Appeals Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 71118 REVERSED AND SET
ASIDE.

2. The petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 173775 is DISMISSED for lack of
merit.

SO ORDERED.