Scribd Logo
Upload

Welcome to Scribd!

  • 212 views

    Explosion at The Conoco Humber Refinery - Lessons Learned PDF

    Uploaded by

    Muhammad Iqmal
    The document summarizes an explosion and fire that occurred at the Conoco Humber Refinery in April 2001. It describes how a catastrophic pipe failure led to a vapor cloud explosion and fire. The HSE investigation found that the refinery's pipe inspection system was insufficient and failed to identify corrosion on the pipe. It also found issues with management of change processes and corrosion management. Key lessons included the need for effective pipe inspection systems informed by condition data, proper management of changes, and communication of relevant inspection and corrosion information.

    Copyright:

    © All Rights Reserved
    Download as PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd

    Explosion at The Conoco Humber Refinery - Lessons Learned PDF

    Uploaded by

    Muhammad Iqmal
    212 views29 pages
    The document summarizes an explosion and fire that occurred at the Conoco Humber Refinery in April 2001. It describes how a catastrophic pipe failure led to a vapor cloud explosion and fire. The HSE investigation found that the refinery's pipe inspection system was insufficient and failed to identify corrosion on the pipe. It also found issues with management of change processes and corrosion management. Key lessons included the need for effective pipe inspection systems informed by condition data, proper management of changes, and communication of relevant inspection and corrosion information.

    Original Title

    Explosion at the Conoco Humber Refinery - Lessons Learned.pdf

    Copyright

    © © All Rights Reserved

    Available Formats

    PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd

    Did you find this document useful?

    Is this content inappropriate?

    The document summarizes an explosion and fire that occurred at the Conoco Humber Refinery in April 2001. It describes how a catastrophic pipe failure led to a vapor cloud explosion and fire. The HSE investigation found that the refinery's pipe inspection system was insufficient and failed to identify corrosion on the pipe. It also found issues with management of change processes and corrosion management. Key lessons included the need for effective pipe inspection systems informed by condition data, proper management of changes, and communication of relevant inspection and corrosion information.

    Copyright:

    © All Rights Reserved
    Download as PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
    Download as pdf or txt
    212 views29 pages

    Explosion at The Conoco Humber Refinery - Lessons Learned PDF

    Uploaded by

    Muhammad Iqmal
    The document summarizes an explosion and fire that occurred at the Conoco Humber Refinery in April 2001. It describes how a catastrophic pipe failure led to a vapor cloud explosion and fire. The HSE investigation found that the refinery's pipe inspection system was insufficient and failed to identify corrosion on the pipe. It also found issues with management of change processes and corrosion management. Key lessons included the need for effective pipe inspection systems informed by condition data, proper management of changes, and communication of relevant inspection and corrosion information.

    Copyright:

    © All Rights Reserved
    Download as PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
    Download as pdf or txt
    of 29

    Health and Safety

    Executive

    The Explosion and Fire at the Conoco


    Humber Refinery 16 th April 2001

    HSE Investigation and the Lessons Learned

    Jonathan Carter
    Principal Specialist Inspector
    HSE
    Hazardous Industries Directorate
    The Refinery

    Incident

    HSE Investigation

    Lessons to be Learned
    Conoco Humber Refinery, Immingham

    Designed & constructed mid 1960s


    Fully on line 1970
    Key product specialised coke for aluminium &
    steel production
    Various expansions to current 12 m tpa capacity
    Full range of integrated process units inc. FCCU,
    HFA, HDS etc.
    Total of 750 employed + up to 525 others
    Normal daytime on-site population 800
    Saturate Gas Plant (SGP)

    Commissioned 1981 to improve gas recovery


    In house process design
    Separates light liquids by fractionation into
    gasoline, butane, propane
    3 columns in series, with intermediate reflux
    drums
    W413 de-ethaniser, 28 barg
    W414 stabiliser, 10 barg
    W415 propane/butane splitter, 17 barg
    Throughput 12,000 bpsd
    Incident

    14.20 hrs Easter Monday 2001


    Plant running normally, no recent upsets
    Sudden release from de-ethaniser column
    overheads line (P4363)
    12m above ground, northern end of SGP
    0.7 m downstream of water injection point
    Upstream of X452 heat exchanger
    Dispersed into adjacent plant by 7.2 ms -1
    northerly wind
    SGP - Fire

    Explosion led to fire in SGP and surrounding


    areas
    Fire fuelled by other releases arising from blast
    damage
    Various fireball events due to hot failures of
    large diameter lines
    Fire continued for over 3 hours
    Manual isolation of all failed lines eventually
    eliminated fuel
    Total release 180 tonnes of gas/liquid
    Damage On Site

    SGP widespread major damage - write off


    Coker closed blow down system significant
    damage
    Minor damage to adjacent units
    Minor structural damage to many buildings
    including main admin. block, stores
    Site wide damage to glazing - canteens, offices
    Site wide damage to cladding, lagging - led to
    asbestos contamination
    Central control room blastproof - no damage
    Damage On Site
    Damage Off Site

    Property damage up to 1500m distance


    370 separate damage reports received
    from local businesses and homeowners
    Mainly glazing and minor structural
    effects
    Adjacent Lindsey Oil Refinery some
    building damage but none to plant
    Damaged reputation and trust
    Injuries

    1 3 day injury - employee in locker room cut by


    flying glass
    Various minor cuts & bruises
    No off significant off-site injuries
    Only 185 persons on site due to Bank Holiday
    Most operators indoors preparing for shift
    changeover
    Nearest occupied building 175m (150 -200mb
    OP), some structural damage but no collapse
    Optimum timing for injury limitation
    Source of Release

    Water

    P4363
    Injection
    Point

    RELEASE

    X452

    W413
    De-ethaniser
    X453
    Source of Release

    Release Point ----


    Source of Release
    HSE Investigation
    Vapour Cloud Explosion
    Modelling of release and dispersion
    Pipe failure equivalent to full bore release, 45
    downwards, release rate 133 kg/s, reducing to
    71 kg/s after 30s.
    Max. flammable cloud size (10k m3) after 15s,
    began contracting after 40s, max length 175m,
    max width 80m at 75m dist (CFD model).
    Congested volume ~5k m3, 500kg, max o/p
    0.5bar.
    Ignition 12-32s after release at fired furnace
    (65m)
    HSE Investigation
    Vapour Cloud Explosion
    Alternative wind speeds & directions modelled
    3 m/s (same direction) & 3/7 m/s at 90.
    In all cases max distance of flammable envelope
    reduced
    With 3 m/s crosswind max. volume increases to
    15k m3
    No other permanent ignition source within any
    alternative flammable gas cloud
    Concluded that outcome could not have been
    significantly worse no risk of significant impact
    on HF Akylation unit.
    HSE Investigation
    Cause of Release

    Catastrophic rupture of 6 diameter


    overhead pipe (P4363)
    Pipe failed at elbow 67cm downstream of
    water injection point
    Mild steel pipe, original thickness 7.1mm,
    reduced to min. 0.3mm, significant area
    <1mm.
    HSE Investigation
    Cause of Release

    Degradation due to corrosion-erosion


    Various potential corrosive agents
    present ammonia, chloride, hydrogen
    sulphide
    Injected water sweeping round pipe bend
    constantly removing passive film of
    corrosion products no dispersion
    device.
    HSE Investigation
    Cause of Release
    Conclusions and Key Lessons

    Management of pipe work inspection


    No effective system in place for SGP pipe work
    inspection
    Refinery inspection systems focused on
    equipment
    Pipe work systems not in line with
    industry good practice
    Knowledge and experience from other
    plants not applied
    Conclusions and Key Lessons

    Insufficient condition data obtained to


    verify integrity and inform future
    inspection
    Introduction of RBI requires comprehensive
    condition data, large backlog of data not entered
    into database
    Default RBI assessment would have led to P4363
    inspection but failure occurred first

    Key lesson; High hazard pipe work requires


    inspection to industry good practice
    standard informed by adequate condition
    data
    Conclusions and Key Lessons

    Management of change
    Installation of P4363 water injection not
    subject to MoC review

    Quick-fix solution to fouling problem

    No consideration of suitability of location, need for


    dispersion device or corrosion potential
    Conclusions and Key Lessons

    Use of injection point not monitored or


    controlled
    Changed between continuous and intermittent by
    operation staff
    Information on use not provided to other
    departments

    Key lesson: Effective MoC systems are


    needed for plant & process changes to
    prevent un-assessed quick-fix
    modifications.
    Conclusions and Key Lessons

    Management of corrosion
    Arrangements not sufficiently thorough or
    systematic
    Action on specific alert about injection
    point corrosion problems undermined by
    inadequate knowledge of status and
    mode of operation
    Conclusions and Key Lessons

    Resource provided for reviews and


    monitoring but not sustained
    Key lesson; Refinery corrosion
    management requires systems and
    resources to ensure that relevant
    information and knowledge is identified
    and acted on and that relevant processes
    are monitored and reviewed
    Conclusions and Key Lessons

    Communication
    Inadequate communication of the status
    and usage of P4363 water injection point,
    both within the operations department
    itself and also with other departments
    (notably inspection), resulted in its
    exclusion from subsequent assessment.
    Conclusions and Key Lessons

    Information from the limited inspections


    carried out on P4363 in 1994 was not
    adequately recorded or communicated,
    resulting in the recommended further
    inspections not being carried out.
    Key lesson; Accurate recording and
    effective sharing of information and data
    relevant to plant corrosion is essential for
    major accident prevention.
    Learning Points for HSE

    Focus on pipe work integrity


    Importance shown by this and other
    incident investigations
    HSE HID UK Refineries Pipework
    Integrity Project, 2002/03 findings
    detailed in SPC/Tech/Gen/33
    Project extended to to other major
    hazard chemical sites for 2005/06.
    HSE Actions

    Safety alert to industry via web site, once


    immediate cause confirmed, on need for
    effective pipe work inspection systems with
    particular reference to injection points
    Improvement Notice to implement adequate
    pipework inspection regime.
    Prosecution HSW S2 & 3 (COMAH Reg4 charge
    not pursued). Guilty pleas, fine 2 X 400k, with
    218k costs. June 2005.
    Publish incident report on web site late 2005.
    Any Questions?

    You might also like