What Is Geyi - V Mair
What Is Geyi - V Mair
What Is Geyi - V Mair
29
Victor H. Mair
University of Pennsylvania
The term geyi is often rendered as matching concepts and held to be a key means for the transmission
of Buddhism from India to China. It is said to be a translation technique whereby Buddhists borrowed
Taoist terms to express Indian ideas in Chinese. This study thoroughly debunks that notion, demonstrating
that geyi was actually a very short-lived attempt to deal with numbered lists that came to China from
So many people have helped me in so many ways during the prolonged course of the writing of this article
that I almost feel as though what started as a personal quest gradually became a collaborative enterprise.
Daniel Boucher, Josh Capitanio and Jidong Yang were responsible for the computer searches that provided
the hard data for my analysis. This trio also provided much other expert assistance and good advice. Denis
Mair photocopied important materials and mailed them to me when I was on leave in distant places, and
Jidong Chen went out of his way to track down an important article at a critical moment. Seishi Karashima
and the keenly interested members of his clubs in Tokyo participated in informed discussions on various
aspects of geyi, and lively audiences at Princeton University, UCLA, the Swedish Collegium for Advanced
Study in the Social Sciences, and a panel at the Fourth International Convention of Asia Scholars in
Shanghai organised by Alan K.L. Chan and Yuet-Keung Lo all offered valuable feedback. Several years ago,
Jan Nattier kindly sent me two of her unpublished papers on early Chinese Buddhist translation procedures
and later made many helpful suggestions for improvement of the final draft. Nathan Sivin and Paul Goldin
offered incisive philological comments on shishu. Takata Tokio and Kajiura Susumu made it possible for
me to use the splendid resources of the library of the Institute for Research in Humanities (Jinbun Kagaku
Kenkyujo) of Kyoto University, while Silvio Vita and Antonino Forte made available the holdings of the
Italian School for Oriental Studies in Kyoto, as did Franois Lachaud those of the French Institute for
Far Eastern Research, also in Kyoto. Among those who generously supplied scholarly references are Jens
Braarvig, John Kieschnick, James Benn, Funayama Toru, Stefano Zacchetti, Timothy Barrett, Antonello
Palumbo, Stephen Bokenkamp, Charles Muller, Jinhua Chen, Huaiyu Chen, Whalen Lai, Ronald Egan
and Alban Kojima. Finally, I am grateful to Li-ching Chang for serving as a sounding board during the
three decades of this articles gestation and always being ready to proffer sensible advice. Naturally, I alone
bear full responsibility for the views expressed herein.
Reprinted by permission from Philosophy and Religion in Early Medieval China edited by Alan K.L. Chan
and Yuet-Keung Lo, the State University of New York Press 2010, State University of New York. All
rights reserved.
India in great profusion during the early medieval period, and that the current misunderstanding of the
true nature of geyi is purely a matter of modern scholarship.
FUNDAMENTAL SEMANTICS
Starting from the second half of the twentieth century and still adhered to today, the
standard English translation of geyi is matching concepts or matching meanings.
This rendering conforms well with the scenario of geyi as an essential component of
the means whereby Indian Buddhist texts were translated into Chinese. Unfortunately,
matching meanings/concepts is an inaccurate rendition of geyi. There is no serious
problem with the second syllable (meanings or concepts), but rendering ge as match-
ing falls wide of the mark.
The fact that ge is written with a wood radical gives us a hint of its basic denotation,
viz., lattice, which signifies a structure of crossed wooden strips arranged to form a
pattern of rectangular, square or diagonal open spaces between the lines. From this is
derived the notion of gezi (square or checked), as in gezi zhi (the sort
of paper on which one writes hanzi [sinograms]). In linguistics, ge can refer to
grammatical case, and ge is also used in some advanced types of mathematical logic,
geometry, set theory, algebra and combinatorial mathematics, where it renders the
English term lattice. Another telling term formed with ge as a constituent morpheme
is gel . This is a technical term in traditional Chinese poetics that refers to such
aspects of verse as the number of syllables per line, antithesis, parallelism and rhyme.
These poetic features are governed by prosodic rules that can be thought of as deter-
mined by the gezi-like structure of Chinese regulated verse.
Perhaps the easiest way to think of how these fundamental facets of ge relate to the
problem of geyi is to visualise a set of pigeonholes and contemplate its function as a
device for the classification of discrete items. From classification, it is only a short step
to categorisation, which is precisely what the ge of geyi signifies. Axel Schuessler states
that the graph ge was used to write at least three different Sinitic etyma meaning
rack, tree branch and to come, go to (the latter originally written without the wood
radical).1 The first and second etyma evidently have to do with wood (as signified by
the radical), and the first provides the basis for the evolved meanings of lattice, etc.
In Hanyu da cidian (4.989b-991a), the graph has four different
Modern Standard Mandarin (MSM) pronunciations (g, lu, ge, h, plus an additional
two embedded pronunciations [l, h]) with a total of 42 (38 + 2 + 1 + 1) definitions.
Hanyu da zidian (2.1203b-1205a) gives the same four MSM pronuncia-
tions (plus the same two additional embedded pronunciations) for a total of 33 (29 +
2 + 1 + 1) definitions. Despite the plethora of definitions for this single graph, neither
of these authoritative works offers a justification for rendering it as matching (the
closest they come is to oppose [an enemy], but that is too remote to justify translating
geyi as matching meanings).
Most dictionaries of Modern Chinese (that is, MSM) give some or all of the fol-
lowing definitions for ge alone, and more or less in the order listed:2 square/compart-
ment/check/chequer (formed by crossed lines); lattice, grid; division; standard, pattern,
rule; character, manner, style; impede, obstruct, resist, bar (designated by some dic-
tionaries as a literary usage); hit, beat, fight; investigate, examine; case (grammatical).
1
Axel Schuessler, Etymological Dictionary of Old Chinese (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2006),
under g, g.
2
Among the dozens of dictionaries consulted are the following authoritative, standard sources: Xiandai
Hanyu cidian (Fifth ed.; to save space, I do not give complete publication data [place,
publisher, etc.] for well-known works); Xinhua zidian (10th ed.); New Age Chinese-English
Dictionary (Beijing: Commercial Press, 2000); ABC Chinese-English Comprehensive Dictionary (Honolulu:
University of Hawaii Press, 2003).
The majority of these meanings can be directly or indirectly derived from the basic
idea of a compartmentalised wooden framework in which sections are blocked off.
No dictionaries, whether of Literary or Modern Chinese, give matching or pairing as
a definition for ge. There is thus no lexicographical warrant for the currently ubiquitous
translation of geyi as matching meanings. We must conclude, therefore, that match-
ing is simply an ad hoc, unsubstantiated rendering of the graph devised by modern
scholars perplexed by its occurrence in the shadowy expression geyi.
The present investigation emphasises philology over philosophy, particularly
since many researchers leap into the geyi fray as though it were strictly a matter of
intellectual history and without taking into serious account the very difficult linguistic
problems surrounding this vexed term. Our inquiry needs to be solidly based on the
available evidence, so the first order of business is to take stock of all the relevant texts
in which the term geyi appears.
PRIMARY EVIDENCE
In actuality, it might be better to label this section Lack of Primary Evidence, because
there is not much. One would think that, for such an allegedly vital translation tech-
nique as geyi, which supposedly enabled Buddhism to gain a foothold in China during
the Eastern Han period and succeeding age, it would be unmistakably prominent in
texts from the second century and later. If that is what one assumes, one will be sadly
disappointed. In the whole of the Buddhist canon, the term geyi occurs fewer than two
dozen times, and many of these instances are repetitions of each other. Thus far, I have
not been able to find a single instance of geyi anywhere in the Daoist canon, including
compendia such as Wushang biyao (Essentials of unsurpassed arcana; around
580), Daojiao yishu (The pivotal meaning of Daoist doctrine; early eighth
century) and Yunji qiqian (Cloudy bookcase with seven labels; ca. 1028).
Nor is geyi to be found anywhere in the massive 25 official histories. Similarly, it is not
in Zizhi tongjian (Comprehensive mirror for aid in government; 1084) or Xu
Zizhi tongjian (Comprehensive mirror for aid in government, continued;
1801). There is not a single occurrence of geyi in the entirety of the massive Gujin
tushu jicheng (Assemblage of books and illustrations past and present;
1728). There are no independent instances of geyi in the enormous Siku quanshu
(Complete writings in the four repositories; 177181) or in the comprehensive
Chinese Ancient Texts (CHANT) database maintained by the Chinese University of
Hong Kong.3 It would appear that, after a few fleeting mentions during the Wei-Jin
3
In the whole of the enormous SQ, there are only seven occurrences of geyi, and not one of them
meaningfully enlarges our understanding of the development of Buddhism during the late Han, Wei-Jin
period, beyond what can be learned from the sources gathered in the Primary Evidence section of this
chapter. I have very carefully read all of the passages in SQ that contain ge and yi in immediate succession
and have determined that they are all false hits (in that they should be separated by a period or comma),
period (late third to fourth centuries), the term geyi was almost totally obliterated from
Chinese intellectual discourse and consciousness until the twentieth century.4
Significantly, geyi does not appear in Shishuo xinyu (A new account of
tales of the world; ca. 430) by the Liu-Song prince, Liu Yiqing (403444).
If geyi were a notable feature of Eastern Jin intellectual life, it would almost certainly
have been mentioned in Shishuo xinyu. Therefore, it is crucial to determine precisely
repetitions of one of the primary sources already discussed or irrelevant to the problem of Buddho-Daoist
interaction during the late Han, Wei-Jin period.
Vol. 851. Wang Guanguo (an author of the Zhao Song period [9601279]), Xuelin
(Grove of learning; a lexicographical, philological study), 5.18a (p. 125a): false hit.
Vol. 1021. Zhang Yushu (16421711) et al., (Yuding) Peiwen yunfu
([Imperially commissioned] treasury of rhymes [from the studio of ] esteem for literature; a huge
lexicon first published in 1711, with a supplement in 1720), 63/8.34a (p. 379b): a repetition of the
Fayuan zhulin passage to be discussed shortly.
Vol. 709. Wu Ruyu (fl. 1238), Zhun zhai zashuo (Miscellaneous discussions from
the Studio of Standards; a collection of essays on Neo-Confucian topics), A5b (p. 709a): the meaning
of ge (which is here defined as zheng [correct, upright]).
Vol. 1253. Cheng Minzheng (1445ca. 1499), Huangdun wenji (Collected
prose from the Bamboo Grove Mound; miscellaneous essays on topics of interest to literati), 53.4a
(p. 245b): the meaning of jiushe ge [a target used in drinking games that is divided into
nine compartments].
Vol. 1400. Mei Dingzuo (15491615), Shiwen ji (Records of Buddhist writings),
11.9b (p. 608b): copies Sengruis comments discussed below.
Vol. 1401. Ibid., 16.6b (p. 73a), copies Huiruis comments discussed below.
Vol. 1474. Hu Wenxue (f l. 1660), Yongshang qijiu shi (A collection of poems
from the elders of Ningbo), 29.2a (p. 562a): false hit.
Guoxue baodian has a total of nine occurrences of geyi, of which six may be traced back to
T. Of the remaining three, one is from Wang Qinruo et al., ed., Cefu yuangui (Outstanding
models from the storehouse of literature [1013]), j. 337 where the two graphs mean something entirely
different from the geyi of early Buddhism (repository of principles for the categories of commendation
[xunge yifu ]), another is from the Confucian scholar Chen Hus (161375) Yiguan wenda
(Questions and answers on the one thread that ties everything together), Part 1, where it occurs
with yet another meaning in the clause you ge jun xin zhi ge yi (has the meaning of ge in
the expression ge jun xin [examine the mind of the sovereign]). The third occurrence is from a reference
in a twentieth-century journal entitled Guoxue jin lun to Chen Yinkes article discussed in
the following pages. Similar observations may be made about the even fewer instances of geyi in the CHANT
database and in other major electronic resources consulted during the preparation of this article.
4
It is noteworthy that geyi is generally not mentioned in Buddhist dictionaries and encyclopaedias
compiled before around the 1960s of the twentieth century. For instance, it is not to be found in Ding Fubao
ed., Foxue da cidian (1925) or Soothill and Hodous (1937). In many cases, major non-
Buddhist reference works from the 1960s and later still do not mention geyi. It is missing from Morohashi
Tetsuji , ed., Dai Kan-Wa jiten (195560; rev. 196688; enlarged 198486) and
Luo Zhufeng , ed., Hanyu da cidian (198694). Other dictionaries from which geyi
is absent are the following: Bolshoi Kitaisko-Russkii Slovar, 4 Vols. (198384); Grand dictionnaire Ricci
de la langue chinoise, 7 Vols. (2001); Herbert Giles, A Chinese-English Dictionary (1892, 1912); Mathews
Chinese-English Dictionary (1931, 1975); Gwoyeu tsyrdean (1937 and later editions). Even the
what geyi did imply during the short span of time when it was current among a small
group of Buddhist teachers.
The primary and single most important document for the study of the history of
geyi is the biographical account of Zhu Faya (latter half of the third century
and the first half of the fourth century, that is, the Western Jin [265316] and the early
part of the Eastern Jin [317420]). Since, in the lengthy debates on the subject, it has
never been rendered in its entirety, it will be worth the effort to provide an integral
translation with extensive annotation.
largest available dictionaries for the study of Daoism do not have entries for geyi, for example, Daojiao da
cidian (1994) and Zhonghua daojiao da cidian (1995). All of this goes to
show that, properly speaking, geyi was not recognised as worthy of inclusion in general reference works
and, indeed, in specialised works for the study of Buddhism and Daoism. It was only from the 1970s
and later that geyi began to be common in reference works for the study of Buddhism and occasionally in
general reference works.
The otherwise usually reliable Foguang da cidian (1988), edited by Ciyi , has a fairly
lengthy entry on geyi (Vol. 5, p. 4143bc), the first part of which I shall translate here as typical of the sort
of thing that started to show up after the 1970s:
To explain Buddhist principles through Daoist or [other] non-Buddhist ideas. When Buddhism was first
transmitted to the east, intellectuals often were receptive to it because of its resemblance to Lao-Zhuang
thought. By Wei-Jin times Lao-Zhuang thought was even more often used to explain the principle of
emptiness in praja. The intellectual fashion of this transitional period was called geyi. Representative
figures of the times were the Seven Sages of the Bamboo Grove. Buddhism was thus influenced by the
fashion of the Pure Conversationalists [to talk about] the principle of emptiness in Lao-Zhuang. Without
exception, Buddhist lectures and commentaries on Buddhist texts all regularly cite terms from Lao,
Zhuang, and Yijing (The Book of Changes). In later times, aspects of the Buddhist dharma were also
forcefully compared to Confucian thought, and this too can be considered as a type of geyi.
Though the second long paragraph of the entry is more believable (inasmuch as it is devoted to citing
specific texts in which the term geyi actually occurs), most of what is said in the first paragraph (quoted here)
is pure fantasy. The dictionary declares that it has based its entry on Tang Yongtong, Wei-Jin Nanbeichao
Fojiao shi, ch. 9. Tangs interpretation of geyi will be discussed in the following pages. The entry on geyi in
the widely respected Bukkyogo daijiten (1975) edited by Nakamura Hajime (Vol.
1, 174d) says essentially the same thing as does the Foguang dictionary, but uses only two sentences and is
less elaborate in its presentation: Matching non-Buddhist religious concepts to Buddhist technical terms
in order to understand Buddhism. When Buddhism was first transmitted to China, it was the scholarly
fashion to explain the emptiness of praja by analogy to Lao-Zhuang thought. The general indebtedness
to Tang Yongtong is inescapable.
By the 1980s and 1990s, this type of misinformation about geyi had managed to seep into such reputable
reference tools as the last printed edition (1974, 1988: 6.778a) and the online version of the Encyclopaedia
Britannica and Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy (1998). Similarly, the 1999 edition of Cihai ,
Vol. 3, 3506b defines geyi thus:
A method for explaining Buddhist sutras during the Wei-Jin period. At that time, when Buddhist sutras
had only recently been transmitted to China, in order to make it easier to propagate them, some Buddhist
scholars invariably used indigenous concepts and vocabulary from Chinese philosophy (chiefly Lao-
Zhuang philosophy) to carry out strained comparisons and explanations. They believed that they could
thereby measure the texts of the sutras and clarify the principles in them, hence the name [geyi].
(Zhu)5 Faya6 was a man of Hejian.7 He was of a staid, tolerant disposition. As a youth,
he excelled at non-Buddhist8 studies, and when he grew up he became proficient in
Buddhist doctrine.9 The sons of gentry families all attached themselves to him and
requested that he teach them. At that time, the adherents who followed him were
uniformly well-versed in secular works, but did not yet excel in Buddhist principles.
Consequently, (Zhu Fa)ya, with Kang10 Falang and others, correlated the enumera-
tions of items (shishu ) in the sutras with non-Buddhist writings11 as instances of
12
lively explication; this was called categorizing concepts (geyi). Thereupon, Vibhu (?),
Tanxiang,13 and others also debated over the categorised concepts in order to instruct
their disciples. (Zhu Fa)yas manner was unrestrained and he excelled (in getting
at) the crux (of the matter). He alternately lectured on secular works and Buddhist
sutras. With Daoan and Fatai,14 he often explained the doubtful points they had
assembled, and together they exhausted the essentials of the sutras.
The signature of Tang Yongtong is also evident in this entry, particularly in the interpretation of ge
as measure (liangdu ). But the ultimate indebtedness to Chen Yinke is inescapable as well, especially
in the use of the expression strained comparisons (bifu).
A refreshing, recent counterexample to all of this attention paid to geyi is the Encyclopedia of Buddhism,
Robert E. Buswell Jr., editor in chief, 2 Vols. (Macmillan Reference USA. New York, Detroit: Thomson
Gale, 2004), which declines to award it an entry. However, in his article on China in this encyclopaedia
(143a), Mario Poceski states: A case in point is the putative method of matching the meaning (geyi), which
involved pairing key Buddhist terms with Chinese expressions primarily derived from Daoist sources.
5
Missing in some editions of the text, the surname Zhu is short for Tianzhu (a Sinitic
transcription of Sindhu). Zhu does not always indicate Indian ancestry, since (in the case of monks) it can
also serve as a lineage surname, that is, an indication of ethnikon borne by the monks master rather than
of his own ethnic heritage.
6
The name literally means Dharmic Elegance.
7
There is still a county of this name in central Hebei, approximately 150 km south of the centre of
Beijing.
8
Literally, external (wai ).
9
Literally, ideas, meanings or concepts (yi ).
10
The name signifies Sogdian parentage. He was from Zhongshan , a little over 100 km to the
west of Hejian.
11
By which Huijiao (497554; compiler of GZ, the text being quoted here) must mean with
(comparable enumeration of items) in non-Buddhist writings.
12
None of the scholars who have studied this passage have come up with a satisfactory interpretation
of the phrase sheng jie zhi li . A possible alternative to the novel attempt given in my translation
is examples for generating understanding.
13
The precise identification of these individuals is not known, but they were most likely followers of
Zhu Faya and Kang Falang.
14
Daoan is the famous fourth-century cleric about whom we will have much more to say in the following
pages; nothing more is known about Fatai.
16
When Yin Hao17 was dismissed and transferred to Dongyang,18 he read a large
number of Buddhist sutras, gaining a detailed understanding of them all. It was only
when he came to places where items were enumerated that he did not understand.
[Afterwards,] when he met a monk, he asked about [the items] he had noted down,
and then they were all resolved.
19
Liu Juns commentary on this passage gives a half-dozen specific examples of exactly
what shishu signified:
15
Apparently 130 km to the southwest of Zhongshan.
16
GZ 4, T.50 (2059) 347a1827. Subsequent citations from the Taisho will be given in the text.
17
Yin Hao (306356) is referred to in the text as zhongjun ([Generalissimo of the] Central
Army), a post he assumed in 350. For failure in a military campaign (352353) to recover the north, he
was dismissed and exiled to western Zhejiang, where he spent the last three years of his life immersed in
the study of Buddhist scriptures. See Mather (1976: 604) for a short biographical sketch.
18
The commandery in western Zhejiang to which Yin Hao was exiled.
19
Cf. Mather, Shih-shuo Hsin-y, 123; Chinese text in Zhang Yongyan , ed., Shishuo xinyu cidian
(Chengdu: Sichuan renmin, 1992), 643.
Aside from all of this invaluable testimony from Shishuo xinyu and its main com-
mentary, it is also pertinent to note that shishu may be equated with fashu (which
is linked to Sanskrit dharma-parya ya [formulaic terms of the dharma, usually translated
in Chinese as famen and generally signifying text/discourse on dharma] in the
Mahavyutpatti [see the following]) or mingshu (Buddhist terms that begin with
27
a number, that is, numerical groups of related items). These are numerical categories
of Buddhist doctrine such as the three realms, five skandhas, five regions, four dogmas,
six paths, twelve nidanas, etc. (Soothill and Hodous 1937: 270a). Equipping ourselves
with unequivocal information about shishu, we can feel a much greater degree of
confidence in our comprehension of geyi.
20
These are the five components that are said to constitute the pseudo-personality: (i) the physical
body; form or sensuous quality (rupa); (ii) sensation, reception, feeling (vedana); (iii) thought, perception;
conceptualisation (samja); (iv) action; mental acts (karma or sam.skara); (v) consciousness; cognition
(vijana).
21
The six sense-fields/organs (sadindriyani) and their corresponding objects of perception/cognition:
(i) the eyes (caksus) and (ii) visible sights (rupa), (iii) the ears (srota) and (iv) sounds (sabda), (v) the nose
(ghran.a) and (vi) smells (gandha), (vii) the tongue (jihva ) and (viii) taste (rasa), (ix) the tactile body (kaya)
and (x) tangible objects (spras.t.avya), (xi) the mind (manah) and (xii) mental data (dharma).
22
These are the Four Noble Truths that form the core of Buddhist religion: (i) life is flawed/unsatisfactory,
that is, suffering (duhkha); (ii) the arising (samudaya) of suffering is due to craving; (iii) there can be cessation
(nirodha) of suffering; (iv) there is a way (marga) (viz., the Eightfold Path) to the cessation of suffering.
23
These twelve nidanas (contributory causes/conditions) are: (i) spiritual ignorance (avidya), (ii) blind
volition (sam.skara), (iii) consciousness (vijana), (iv) mental functions and the formation of physical
elements (nama-rupa), (v) the six sense organs (s.ad. -ayatana), (vi) contact with external objects (sparsa), (vii)
sensations/perceptions (vedana), (viii) craving/desire for pleasure (tr..sn.a ), (ix) grasping what one craves/desires
(upadana), (x) the state of existing (bhava), (xi) birth (jati) and (xii) old age and death (jara-maran. a).
24
These are the same as the six sense organs (s. ad.-indriya) listed in note 21, minus the last, viz., mind
(manah).
25
These are the five positive powers, each of which overcomes its opposite negative tendency: (i)
faith (sraddha ) overcomes false beliefs, (ii) energy (v rya) overcomes slothfulness, (iii) mindfulness
(smr.ti) overcomes forgetfulness, (iv) concentration (samadhi) overcomes distractedness and (v) transcendental
insight (praja) overcomes ignorance.
26
They are: (i) mindfulness (smr.ti), (ii) investigation of the elements of empirical reality (dharma-
pravicaya), (iii) energetic exertion (v rya), (iv) rapture (prti), (v) lightness, that is, repose (prasabdhi),
(vi) concentration (sama dhi) and (vii) indifference (upeks.a).
27
Foguang da cidian (1988), 4.3421c-3422a.
It is obvious that shishu was a Buddhist technical term of the time and that people
were well aware of precisely what it signified when they employed it. Since shishu
unmistakably means the enumeration of items or matters pertaining to Buddhist doc-
trine, then we may conclude that geyi (which is equated with shishu in the biographical
sketch of Zhu Faya) was not a translation technique at all but an exegetical method,
and that it was by no means restricted exclusively to drawing upon Daoist texts for its
non-Buddhist (that is, non-Indian, non-Indic) comparanda. The raison dtre of geyi
was its dedication to the explication of the countless (!) lists of complicated technical
terms that are so characteristic of Indian philosophy, but which are so rare in traditional
(that is, pre-Buddhist) East Asian thought. In short, geyis fundamental purpose was
the correlation of lists of enumerated Buddhist concepts with presumably comparable
lists of notions extracted from non-Buddhist works. The inherent fallacy of such an
approach is manifest in the contradiction between the ubiquity of such lists (often
lengthy) in Buddhist texts and their rarity (usually very short) in non-Buddhist texts.
There clearly were not enough numbered lists in non-Buddhist texts to go around!
One can easily imagine why the shishu would have given Chinese Buddhists of the
late third and early fourth centuries so much trouble. Everywhere one turns, in Indian
philosophy and practice, and that includes Buddhist philosophy and practice, there are
long and short lists of technical terms to contend with. The individual terms by them-
selves are often difficult enough to comprehend. When they are bundled together in
groups, they become all the harder to grasp. For those like the early Chinese Buddhists
of the Jin period, whose native traditions of thought and praxis were unaccustomed to
drawing up such lists of complicated terminology, the experience of encountering the
shishu must have been mind-numbing. No wonder that even someone such as Yin Hao,
who dedicated the last years of his life to Buddhism, was stymied by the shishu.
In a word, geyi was no more or no less than an ephemeral, abortive attempt on
the part of Zhu Faya and a few of his close associates to ease the frustration their
students felt upon encountering the shishu. Geyi was a short-lived phenomenon, as
it was roundly repudiated by the very next generation of Chinese Buddhist teachers
under the leadership of Daoan (312385). Thus, geyi lasted for no more than
a generation and it was restricted to a very small group of persons who experimented
with it unsuccessfully for a limited, specific purpose: to lessen the burden of Chinese
Buddhists in dealing with numerical lists of concepts and terms.
For someone who is unfamiliar with the pervasive propensity for Indian (and
especially Buddhist) philosophers and religionists to resort to drawing up numbered
lists for purposes of analysis and teaching, a glance at the Mahavyutpatti, a Sanskrit
Tibetan lexicon of the early ninth century, should suffice to arrive at an appreciation
of this aspect of Indian and Buddhist thought. Mahavyutpatti contains 9,565 items
classified according to 277 different categories. There are, for example, 80 epithets of
the Buddha, 18 types of emptiness and 8 kinds of mundane dharmas. Some of the
categories have hundreds of entries.
28
Kasawara, Kenjiu, annot., F. Max Mller and H. Wenzel, ed. (n.d.: 66).
29
An Shigao was a Parthian who arrived in Luoyang in 148 CE. His surname is a truncated form of
the Chinese transcription of the dynastic name Arsacid. Tang Yung-Tung (Tang Yongtong ), On
Ko-Yi, the Earliest Method by which Indian Buddhism and Chinese Thought were Synthesized, translated
by M.C. Rogers, in Radhakrishnan: Comparative Studies in Philosophy Presented in Honour of His Sixtieth
Birthday (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1950), 28083 (full essay, 27686), provides an excellent
account of An Shigaos affinity for Abhidharma and the vital role of categories therein. Anyone who wishes
to have a deeper understanding of the significance of enumeration (shu) in early Chinese Buddhism leading
up to the time of Zhu Faya would profit from reading this account by Tang. See also Link (1958: 9, n. 4). In
short, Abhidharma was extraordinarily fond of enumerations and exposition by division and subdivision.
exposition by division and subdivision, we can see how pervasive this challenging aspect
of Buddhist doctrine was for the Chinese right from the very beginning.
In sum, the shu of shishu means (analytical) enumerative categories. Shishu,
then, indicates enumerative categories (or categorized enumeration) of things/items,
i.e., (technical) terms. Therefore, geyiwhich is explicitly defined by Huijiao
([497554] in the biography of Zhu Faya) as the correlation of shishu from Buddhist
scriptures with comparable material from non-Buddhist (not necessarily Daoist)
sourceshas to do with enumerated categories of technical matters. This is the most
authoritative explanation of geyi from the earliest source in which it was mentioned.
Since geyi was such a short-lived phenomenon (it was already rejected by Daoan by
the middle of the fourth century in his conversation with Sengxian [see the following]
and was only initiated earlier in the same century by Zhu Faya and his associates),30 it
did not have time to develop into something more elaborate or important, as is often
imagined by modern interpreters.
Much has been made of the fact that Huiyuan (334416), the important
precursor of the Pure Land schools of Buddhism and Daoans chief disciple, on one
occasion referred to the early Daoist thinker Zhuangzi:
When he was twenty-four [357 CE], Huiyuan began to lecture. Once there was a
guest who, listening to Huiyuans lecture, raised objections about the concept of
ultimate reality.31 The discussion went back and forth for quite some time, with the
guest becoming all the more confused. Thus, Huiyuan drew upon a concept from
Zhuangzi as an analogy. Thereupon, the deluded one came to understand. After
that, Daoan especially permitted Huiyuan not to abandon secular writings.
The rather awkward wording of the last part of the final sentence implies that it was
normal to abandon secular writings, while the first part indicates that Huiyuan was
given a special privilege in this regard, whereas other disciples were most likely encour-
aged to concentrate exclusively on Buddhist texts. Regardless of what one may think
of Huiyuans invocation of the Zhuangzi in this particular instance, it is irrelevant
to the question of geyi, whichas we have seen unmistakably earlieris a separate
matter. Furthermore, by the time of Huiyuans allusion to Zhuangzi (in the year 357),
30
There is no evidence that geyi existed or was practiced before the time of Zhu Faya.
31
Shixiang (dharmata, dharma-svabhava, naya, bhuta-naya, laks.an.ika, svabhava-laks.an.a). For
references, see Zhu Qingzhi and Mei Weiheng (Victor H. Mair), eds, Diyuan Yunlai [Ogiwara
Unrai] Hanyi duizhao Fan-He da cidian Hanyici suoyin
[Alphabetical index to the Chinese translations in the Sanskrit-Japanese Dictionary (with Parallel Chinese
Translations) of Ogiwara Unrai] (Chengdu: Ba-Shu, 2004), 255a; cf. Wogihara and Tsuji (1968).
Daoan had already repudiated geyi, as is evident in the following paragraph. Therefore,
the frequent citation of this passage from Huiyuans biography in support of the
allegation that geyi was a technique used by Buddhists for borrowing from Daoism is
completely fallacious.
When Daoan was living together with Sengxian (or Sengguang )32 on
33 34
Feilong Shan (Flying Dragon Mountain) around 349,
(Dao)an said, The old categorized concepts (geyi) of the past was often at
odds with Buddhist principles. We ought to analyze [the texts] carefreely,35 said
Sengxian. How are we permitted to dispute our predecessors? (Dao)an said, In
spreading and praising the [Buddhist] principles and doctrines, we should make
them fitting and proper. When dharma-drums36 compete to resound, what [does
it matter who comes] first [and who comes] later?
(GZ 5, T.50
[2059] 355a2528)
Judging from this brief and somewhat enigmatic exchange with Sengxian, Daoan was
opposed to geyi because it distorted Buddhist teachings. Furthermore, he did not stand
in awe of geyi simply because a few earlier teachers had employed it for a brief spell.
Another monk from Henan who criticised geyi was Sengrui (352436) in
his Pimoluojieti jing yishu xu (Preface to a commentary on
the Vimalakrti-sutra):
Since the Wind of Wisdom fanned eastward and the Word of the Dharma flowed
forth in song, although it may be said that there were places [set up] for lectur-
ing, the categorizing of concepts [employed in them] was pedantic and at odds
32
The complete biography (T.50 [2059] 355a.1829) of Sengxian is translated by Link (1958:
4244).
33
In Yongshi County, modern Hebei.
34
Tang, On Ko-Yi, p. 284, mistakenly writes 394. There is also an error in his footnote 2 on the same
page which states that the following passage is from Taisho, Vol. 50, p. 33 (instead of p. 355).
35
The expression xiaoyao here does not refer to the first chapter in Zhuangzi (Xiaoyao you [Carefree
wandering]), as some interpreters have assumed. Already by the Han, xiaoyao (in various sinographic forms)
was used to indicate an unrestrained, happy attitude. It is particularly interesting to note that it was sometimes
used to indicate a more relaxed approach to life in contrast to lectures and study as, for example, in Chi
she fu (Rhapsody on mounted archery) by the Han writer Ying Yang (d. 217): On a fine
day in sunny spring, in my spare time from lectures and study, I am carefree (xiaoyao) in the courtyard,
take pleasure in riding and archery (see HDC 11.366ab). Indeed, no less a giant of Buddhist translator
than Kumajva undertook some of his work in the Xiaoyao Yuan (Carefree Garden) of Changan
(see his biography in GZ14; T.55 [2145] 101b.16).
36
Sanskrit dharma-dundubhi or dharma-bheri, here signifying Buddhist monks in their capacity as
preachers of the Dharma.
with the original [sense of the Indian texts being discussed]; the Six Schools [of
Prajaparamita] were biased and did not touch [the truth]. As for the fundamental
doctrine of the emptiness of nature (prakanti-sunyata),37 examined from the vantage
of today, it comes closest to grasping the actuality [of Prajaparamita].
It is evident that, approximately a century after its rise and demise, the opposition to
geyi had been cemented among the most important Buddhist exponents of the age. By
the end of the fourth century and the beginning of the fifth century, geyi had already
long since ceased to exist as a functioning device, andeven in memoryit was
thought of with opprobrium. Certainly there were none at this time who advocated,
much less adopted, geyi.
A text that is often cited in discussions of geyi is the following passage from the
Yuyi lun (Treatise on the clarification of doubts) by Huirui , a disciple
of the renowned Kumarajva (344/350409/413; arrived in Changan in 401):
At the end of the Han and the beginning of the Wei [i.e., ca. 220 CE], the chancel-
lor of Guangling and the chancellor of Pengcheng joined the Order, and both were
able to maintain the great light [of the Doctrine].38 The worthies who sought the
essence [of Buddhist ideas] for the first time had fixed lecturing places. But they
puffed up [their lectures] with copious concepts and made them pedantic with
their paired explanations.
It is only the Ming edition of the text that has the variant geyi for yuyi (not to be
confused with the title of the treatise). The earlier, majority reading of yuyi, however,
fits better because it complements hui (extensive, vast, translated here as puffed
up). This reading also goes well with the following, parallel clause, which seems to
be criticising circuitous redundancy and repetition. Consequently, this passage most
likely has nothing to do with geyi. However, even if we adopt the late variant, this
passage would have to be said to display a decidedly negative attitude towards geyi.
37
Realised by Sengruis teacher, Daoan.
38
My translation of this sentence is indebted to Zrcher (1972: 328, n. 56). Zrcher points out that [t]he
chancellor of Guangling (in the vicinity of modern Jiangdu county northeast of Nanjing, between
Yangzhou and Taizhou in Jiangsu province) must refer to Zhai Rong , although, strictly speaking,
at that moment this post was occupied by another magistrate, viz., Zhao Yu . [T]he chancellor of
Pengcheng (the region north of the Huai River, in eastern Henan, southern Shandong and northern
Jiangsu) in 194 AD was Xue Li , who appears to have been associated with Zhai Rong, though nothing
is known about his alleged Buddhist sympathies.
Furthermore, we must note that it dates to roughly two centuries after the time that
it is commenting upon.39
From Sengyous (445518) biography of Kumarajva himself we have the
following telling and oft-repeated passage:
Since the Great Law covered the east, beginning in [the time] of Emperor Ming
[5875] of the [Later] Han and passing through the Wei [220265] and the Jin
[265420], the [translated] sutras (scriptures) and s astras (treatises) that were pro-
duced gradually became numerous. Yet the [translations] produced by Zhi (Qian)
and Zhu (Fahu)40 mostly [were plagued by] stagnant wording41 and categorized
concepts.
(CSJ
14, T.55 [2145] 101b1315; copied [with a couple of minor variants] in GZ 2,
T.50 [2059] 332a2728)
Judging from its parallelism with zhi, ge here was probably intended to mean obstruct,
block, confine, restrict and so forth. Yet, even in this case it may be said to function
as an extension of the basic meaning of compartment(alize).
39
If, as the totality of evidence would seem to indicate, Zhu Faya was the chief proponent and probable
initiator of geyi during the first half of the fourth century, then the ca. 220 date of the passage from the
Yuyi lun under discussion makes the late geyi variant all the more suspect.
40
The text says merely Zhi-Zhu , which is an abbreviated reference for Yuezhi (through a
process of historical description, this name often used to be rendered as Indo-Scythian, but the precise
ethnicity and linguistic affiliation of this important Central Asian group are still being debated; hence I shall
leave it untranslated) and Tianzhu (signifying Indian). The phrase is that of Sengzhao who, in his preface
to the Vimalakrti-sutra (T.55 [2145] 58b.910), originally used it to designate Zhi Qian (fl. 220252)
and Zhu Fahu (i.e., Dharmaraks.a, who is said in traditional biographies to have been a descendant of
the Yuezhi). See Shih (1968: 74, n. 56). For a detailed study of the translation techniques of this period,
see Boucher (1996). Boucher points out (p. 8) that it was particularly Zhi Qian and Dharmaraks.a who
preferred to translate proper names and technical terms rather than transcribe them, in contrast to the
style of Lokaks.ema (Zhiloujiachen , fl. 180189), who, however, was also a Yuezhi. The gist of
Sengzhaos critique of the style of Zhi Qian and Dharmaraks.a as zhiwen geyi, then, would seem to be that
they erred in overly Sinicising or Indigenising their translations, presumably at the expense of faithfulness
to the Indic originals. In any event, there can be no doubt that zhiwen geyi is a pejorative stigmatisation
of the translation style of Zhi Qian and Zhu Fahu.
41
For a note on the origin and significance of this expression, see Shih (1968: 74, n. 57), who points
out that it may ultimately derive from Daoans preface to the Moheboluoruoboluomi jing chao
(sic) (Extracts from the Mahaprajaparamita-sutra), in which Daoan states, Whenever I
come to a stagnant sentence (zhi ju ) or a passage where the beginning and the ending are obscured,
I set the scroll aside and think deeply, regretting that I never met such men as Dharmaraks. a and Moks.ala
(CSJ 8; T.55 [2145] 52b.1113). The text only says, Hu gong Chaluo , but most likely is an
abbreviated reference to the Gansu Yuezhi Zhu Fahu and the Khotanese Wuchaluo (var.
Wuluocha ), both of whom produced Prajaparamita translations in the latter part of the third
century (286 and 291, respectively).
Although Sengyou, the compiler of CSJ, uses geyi to chastise translators that he
clearly disapproves of, he seems to have only a vague understanding of the term,
since it originally was not a translation technique but a method of exegesis (one that
was, furthermore, restricted to the explication of numbered lists). As a matter of fact,
Sengyous complaint against Zhi Qian (fl. 220252) and Dharmaraks.a (Zhu Fahu
, ca. 233310) was almost certainly derived from Sengzhaos (374414)
Weimojie jing xu (Preface to the Vimalakrti-sutra), where the wording
is as follows: detested [translations] produced by Zhi and Zhu as causing principles
to stagnate in their texts ( ), and often feared that abstruse precepts [that is,
Buddhist doctrines] would founder at the hands of the translators, with no allusion
to geyi (CSJ 8, T.55 [2145] 58b910). The addition of geyi to zhiwen as another
supposed defect of the translations of Zhi Qian and Dharmaraks.a was thus due to
Sengyou, writing approximately a century after Sengzhao, and more than a century
and a half after the time of Zhu Faya, apparently the chief exponent of geyi.
Sengyous censure of the translations of Zhi Qian and Dharmaraks.a as being zhiwen
geyi is repeated verbatim by the following:
None of these authors add anything that would help us better comprehend the
nature or significance of geyi. The last-named author, a specialist in vinaya, elsewhere
uses the expression geyi for the literal signification of its two graphs and not in the
specialised technical sense that it had during the early Jin period (viz., explaining the
shishu [enumerations of items]): Was it only because he categorized the concepts of
the nine divisions that he was renowned? , referring to
an analytical approach is said to have been devised by Kumarajvas disciple Sengrui
, who consequently came to be known as the Nine Divisions Dharma Master
, although this method was actually created by an earlier Wei-Jin period
monk named Daorong and that it only came to be attributed to Sengrui through
confusion (T.55 [2157] 895c9).
The versatile and prolific monk Daoxuan (596667), compiler of Xu gaoseng
zhuan (Further biographies of eminent monks) and Guang hongming ji
(Expanded collection for the propagation of the light), twice mentions geyi
in the context of textual obfuscation (T.40 [1804] 97b10; T.45 [1895] 840a8). It
would appear that Daoxuan viewed geyi as a faulty type of explication, although he too
provided no details concerning the way it operated. Elsewhere, he states unmistakably
42
To save space, for texts that are not discussed in depth, I only give the Taisho reference, and not the
titles of the individual texts themselves.
that Daoan strove to extirpate the geyi of the past and to open up spiritual principles
(shenli ) for the future (T.50 [2060] 548b2).
The leader of the Three Treatises (Sanlun ) School, Jizang (born into
a family of Parthian origin, 549623), four times repeats the identical set of paired
clauses: Categorized concepts were pedantic and went against the fundament; the
Six [Praja] Schools were biased and off the mark ( )
(T.42 [1824] 4c11, 29a78; T.42 [1825] 174a1213, 183a2). Jizang twice prefaces
these remarks with reference to the flourishing of lecture sites for the propagation
of Buddhism and once mentions that all of this took place before the advent of
Kumarajva, who translated the three s astras that formed the basis for Jizangs brand
of Madhyamaka. While it is evident that Jizang was dissatisfied with geyi, as he was
with the Six Praja Schools of the Eastern Jin period, he does not provide any specific
information that would indicate how it functioned.
In his syncretic volume entitled Beishan lu (A record of North Mountain),
the late Tang monk, Shenqing (d. ca. 820), repeated from GZ 4 the account of
Zhu Faya resorting to geyi in his lectures (T.52 [2113] 595a79). Shenqing makes,
however, a couple of curiousand revealingmodifications. Where the original text
reads endeavored to correlate the enumerations of items (shishu) in the sutras with
non-Buddhist writings as instances of lively explication; this was called categorizing
concepts (geyi), Shenqing writes, endeavored to discuss Confucian writings (rushu
) with the classifications of concepts in the sutras as instances of lively explica-
tion; this was called geyi. Further, in the next sentence, Shenqing writes that this was
done to instruct their students (menxue ) instead of to instruct their disciples
(mentu ), and completely omits the clause about Vibhu (?), Tanxiang and the
others. The story about Zhu Faya must have seemed altogether strange and distant to
Shenqing and his eleventh-century commentator, Huibao , who made no attempt
to clarify this opaque passage.
A Buddhist lexicon from the first half of the eleventh century alludes to geyi in
such an oddly garbled fashion that the compiler, Daocheng (fl. 1019), seems to
have been confused about its true meaning. To show how badly rewritten this entry
of the lexicon is, it will be useful to cite the relevant portions of the original account
on which it was based:
(T.50 [2059] 347a1822; translated in
full above). In the eleventh-century lexicon, this admittedly somewhat difficult passage
is corrupted as follows:
(T.54 [2127] 294a1618). The compiler
manifestly was oblivious of the actual meaning of the reference to geyi in the passage
concerning Zhu Faya from the GZ, so it would be futile to make a serious translation
of his entry on nishu . Instead, I shall attempt to replicate its effect in English,
warts and all (and ignoring the gross mispunctuations of the T. editors):
Matched writings. The eminent monk Faya excelled at Buddhist and non-Buddhist
studies. Many lay scholars requested that he teach them. Given that the meanings
in the sutras were difficult to explain, Faya matched them with [those] in non-
Buddhist literature in order to provide instances of lively explications. This was
called striking concepts.
Even if we grant that in the lexicon is simply a typographical error for ,43
Daocheng has glossed over an essential component (shishu ) of the original. Perhaps
the best light we can put on this corrupted passage is that Daocheng was intention-
ally attempting to emend (and thus [in his mind] to improve) the original wording
of the latter phrase, which has indeed befuddled all scholars who have confronted it.
However, in substituting yi nan jie for shishu, Daocheng has eviscerated the
passage, leaving it limp and lifeless.
In a short essay on friendship, the Ming monk, Rujin (fl. 147089), quotes
the Sengxian passage from GZ 5 without elaboration and seemingly without a clear
understanding of the issues involved, no doubt because he was separated by so many
centuries from the time when Huijiao originally wrote it (ca. 530) (T.45 [2023]
1047a1).
The much vexed term geyi occurs a total of 23 times44 in the entire Buddhist canon.
All of the relevant occurrences in T. are cited and discussed in this article. There are
no other pertinent texts containing geyi outside of T. that are not simply copies of
passages in it.
It is clear from the evidence cited earlier that geyi was a method for coping with the
Indian proclivity for numerical lists of ideas and concepts. From its few occurrences
in the Buddhist canon, it is evident that geyi was an abortive exegetical method, not
a vital translation technique or essential philosophical principle. The main reason
we know about geyi at all is because the celebrated Eastern Jin monk Daoan, rightly
so, criticised it as ineffective. After the meagre series of texts cited earlier, there is
no significant mention of geyi until the twentieth century, when it is miraculously
revived by modern historians and made to play a key role in the early development
of Buddhism in China.
SECONDARY EVOLUTION
The overwhelming majority of the modern translations and interpretations of geyi are
partially or totally false. Only a few accurately relate even a portion of what geyi really
43
But we should not overlook the fact that and are interchangeable in one of the many senses of
the former, viz., to strike, hit (though, of course, not in all senses).
44
Or 25 if two questionable variants are included. In addition, ge and yi occur next to each other, but
not as a technical term related to the problem under discussion here, in T.38 (1779) 799c23 (by Zhiyuan
[9761022]) and T.40 (1805) 353b1315 (by Yuanzhao [1048 1116]).
was. Since the vast preponderance of these modern definitions, when measured against
the historical data, are self-evidently incorrect, it will not be necessary to comment on
them individually. Instead, I will merely cite a few of the more representative figures
who have been influential in making the obscure notion of geyi into the unjustifiably
key term in Buddhist studies that it has become.
So far as I have been able to determine, the first modern scholar to resurrect geyi
was the celebrated historian Chen Yinke. Not only was he the one to rescue geyi from
its richly deserved obscurity, it was he who established the basic nature of the discourse
that would be used to discuss it by nearly all scholars who followed in his wake. Chens
groundbreaking study of geyi was buried in his tour de force investigation of the
little-known figure, Zhi Mindu :
During the Jin era, the scholars who engaged in Pure Conversation (qingtan )
mostly favored strained comparisons (bifu ) between Buddhist texts and non-
Buddhist writings. What is more, among the monks there was a concrete method
called geyi. Although the term geyi is seldom seen in written records, it was prevalent
for a period, and its influence on contemporary thought was profound.45
One wonders, if geyi is seldom seen in written records, what evidence Chen can adduce
to buttress his bold assertion that it had a profound influence on contemporary thought.
A careful reading of his article on the subject reveals that there is precious little, and
that most of what he has to say about geyi is sheer speculation. Chens grasping at
straws in his allegations of the importance of geyi may be seen in a complex case that
he adduces near the end of one of his lectures on the subject (Chen 1987). He begins
with the Zhulin (Bamboo Grove) of India,46 to which he adds the mysterious
zuozhe qi ren (seven men who actedChen does not tell us who they are)
of the Analects (14.37). According to Chen, this yields the celebrated Zhulin Qi Xian
(Seven Sages of the Bamboo Grove), the lively group of third-century
bohemian, nonconformist intellectuals, poets, musicians and tipplers who gathered
in the environs of Luoyang. He then proceeds to note that the eclectic Jin poet and
45
Chen Yinke , Zhi Mindu xueshuo kao , in Guoli Zhongyang Yanjiuyuan Lishi
Yuyan Yanjiusuo jikan (Bulletin of the Institute of History and
Philology of Academia Sinica), Wai bian (Extra series), 1, Qingzhu Cai Yuanpei xiansheng liushiwu
sui lunwen ji (Beiping: Zhongyang Yanjiuyuan, 1933, 1935), 6.
Reprinted in Chen Yinke wenji , 2, Jinming guan conggao (Shanghai: Shanghai
guji, 1980), 14167.
46
In his identification of cultural parallels as constituting instances of geyi, Chen Yinke apparently does
not distinguish between alleged Buddhist borrowing of Daoist terms and Daoist borrowing of Buddhist
terms, for surely in this instance a supposedly Daoist group has been modelled on an Indian topos, inasmuch
as Zhulin is the Chinese translation of the celebrated Ven.uvana (Bamboo Grove) or Karan.d.a-
ven.uvana, a monastery park near the city of Rajagr.ha that was donated to Sakyamuni by King Bimbisara
(or, according to another account, by the elder Karanda).
47
Sun Chuo was fond of Confucianism, Daoism and Buddhism, as is evident in his Yu Dao lun
(A treatise on analogies of the Way), which is contained in Hongming ji , 3, in T.52 (2102)
16b717c25.
48
Chen Yinke, Zhi Mindu xueshuo kao, 10.
49
Tang, On Ko-Yi, pp. 27778 (see note 29).
50
Ibid., 276.
51
Tang Yongtong, Lun geyizui zao yi zhong ronghe Yindu Fojiao he Zhongguo sixiang de fangfa
, translated from English (Tang 1950) to
Chinese by Shi Jun , in Lixue, Foxue, Xuanxue (Beijing: Beijing daxue, 1991), 28294.
This has also been collected in Tang Yongtong quanji (The complete works of Tang Yongtong),
Vol. 5 (Shijiazhuang, Hebei: Hebei renmin, 2000), 23142. The original Chinese draft on which Rogers
based his English translation has not, to the best of my knowledge, been found.
52
See, for example, those mentioned in note 29.
53
Tang Yongtong, Han Wei Liang Jin Nanbeichao Fojiao shi (A History
of Buddhism during the Han, Wei, Two Jin, and Northern and Southern Dynasties), 2 Vols. (Beijing:
Zhonghua, 1983; originally published by Shangwu in 193638), 168 (171 in the 1936 edition). Or geliang
, as on p. 170 (173).
Among the many bizarre twists in the saga of geyi is the development of what
Japanese specialists refer to as kakugi Bukkyo (geyi Buddhism). Here we
have the reification of a hypothetical construct that never existed in historical reality,
but one thatonce borntakes on a life of its own and becomes a cornerstone in
studies of the history and thought of Chinese Buddhism, especially among Japanese
scholars, but also among Chinese and Western scholars who appear to have been
influenced by them,54 with countless disquisitions being written on the nature and
impact of what is essentially an imaginary phenomenon.
One of the first Japanese scholars to use the expression geyi Buddhism was
Tsukamoto Zenryu. Section 5 of Chapter 1 of his Shina Bukkyo shi kenkyu is entitled
Kakugi Bukkyo no To Shin seidan shakai e no tenkai
(The unfolding of geyi Buddhism towards a society of pure conversation
during the Eastern Jin) (Tsukamoto 1942: 2534). The previous section offers an
even more dubious proposition, that of Daoistic Buddhism (Dokyoteki Bukkyo
) (Tsukamoto 1942: 1825), since Daoist religion was hardly well enough
established before the Eastern Jin (the period to which Tsukamoto is here referring)
to have subsumed or significantly coloured Buddhism. Unfortunately, Tsukamotos
notion of Dokyoteki Bukkyo is adopted by later proponents of kakugi Bukkyo as a sta-
ple for Wei-Jin intellectuals and promoted as a parallel system that circulated among
the people.55
Tsukamoto and others advocate geyi as a vital factor in the early development of
Chinese Buddhism which connects the Dark/Abstruse/Mysterious/Metaphysical
Learning (xuanxue ) of the Wei-Jin period with praja studies, asserting that the
latter were carried out under the aegis of the former. Quite the contrary, it might much
more forcefully be argued (in terms of chronology and content) that it was Buddhism
(in particular praja and abhidharma studies) that provided the new leaven in the batter
of existing Chinese thought (chiefly Confucian and Daoist philosophy [not yet fully
elaborated religion]) that led to the ferment which resulted in xuanxue.
Americas major introduction to geyi is to be found in the enormously influential A
History of Chinese Philosophy by Fung Yu-lan: Such use of Taoist terminology to explain
Buddhist concepts was known at the time as ko yi or the method of analogy (lit.,
extending the idea) (Fung 1953: 241). Here we have two incompatible renderings of
geyi in the same sentence. On the next page, Fung expresses his indebtedness to Chen
Yinke (Fung 1953: 242, n. 1). Whether directly derived from Chen or not, neither of
Fungs definitions is satisfactory in terms of the available primary evidence.
Relying on Fung Yu-lan is another important Chinese scholar of the mid-
twentieth century, Kung-chuan Hsiao, who makes the following unverifiable claim
54
For example, Kobayashi Masayoshi (1997). Also see Hayashima Kyosho and
Takasaki Jikido, eds, Bukkyo-Indo shisq jiten (Tokyo: Shunjusha, 1987), 54b-55b
(Hirai Shunei ); and Whalen Lai (1979).
55
For example, Kameta Shigeo (1979 [1978]: 32).
about geyi: At the time there were many who discussed Buddhism in terms drawn
from the Chuang Tzu [Zhuangzi]; that process was called ko-yi [ , or matching
of terms] (Hsiao 1979: 657, n. 110). In the index-glossary, Hsiao gives a totally dif-
ferent and completely idiosyncratic, self-contradictory definition for geyi: invoking
the meaning, a method of matching terms used in translating Buddhist writings into
Chinese (Hsiao 1979: 741a).
Also influenced by Chen Yinke and Tang Yongtong was Arthur Link who, in 1957,
began a long series of articles in which he focused on issues that revolved around the
problem of geyi, which he initially defined as matching meanings, a method whereby
Chinese terms and concepts (chiefly Taoist) were paired with analogous Indian terms
and ideas (Link 1957: 4, n. 11; cf. Link 1958: 45).
The next American scholar to address the matter of geyi was Arthur Wright. In his
short, but widely read, volume on Buddhism in Chinese History, he rendered the term
as matching concepts and stated that [t]his device, which was prevalent in the second
and third centuries, was probably favored in the oral exposition of Buddhist teachings
(Wright 1959: 37). Aside from the fact that there is no indisputable evidence for geyi
until the fourth century, Wrights characterisation of this technique is so ambiguous
as to be of little value. He is to be credited, however, for recognising that numerical
groupings played a part in geyi.
In his Source Book, Wing-tsit Chan defines geyi as the practice of matching con-
cepts of Buddhism and Taoism, in which a Buddhist concept is matched with one in
Chinese thought. Thus tathata (thusness, ultimate reality) was translated by the Taoist
term original non-being (pen-wu [benwu], pure being) (Chan 1963: 336).56 For all
intents and purposes, this description of geyi is completely erroneous.
Kenneth Chens explanation, which is based heavily on the 1950 article of Tang
Yongtong, has been particularly damaging because his book has been, and still is, so
widely used in introductory courses concerning Chinese Buddhism. Chen describes
geyi as the method of matching the meaning. This method was used especially by the
translators of the Praja sutras for the purpose of making Buddhist thought more easily
understood by the Chinese (Chen 1964: 6869). Many other scholars followed Chen
in rendering geyi as matching the meaning.57 Lai spells out his definition more fully:
match Buddhist and Taoist concepts (Whalen Lai 1979: 238). Robert Shih gives two
idiosyncratic renderings of geyi in his French translation of GZ: rendait inexactement
[le sens] and interprtation par analogie (Shih 1968: 74 and n. 57).
A typical description of geyi during the 1970s is that given by Hurvitz and Link:
Prior to Tao-ans time it had been popular to explain Buddhist works by a method
of exegesis called ko yi , matching meanings. This meant that the Indian
terms and concepts in a systematic fashion were explained via Chinese terms and
56
For further discussion of benwu, see note 65.
57
For example, Ito (1996: 69).
concepts. In general, the texts used for this purpose were the Lao tzu , the Yi
ching , and the Chuang tzu . Though this was a definite step forward in
the earlier period, when it was devised as a technique of analysis and exegesis of the
foreign texts, it later became a crutch and a hindrance to a correct understanding of
the Buddhist concepts. Tao-an came to understand that this method of matching
meanings frequently did injustice to the Indian texts, and it is characteristic of his
great originality that, despite its traditional and almost universal acceptance by his
contemporaries, he nevertheless abandoned it. (Hurvitz and Link 1974: 406)
Very little, if any, of this elaborate scenario can be substantiated by the meagre textual
evidence concerning geyi that is available.
Closer to the truth of the matter is Zrcher, who states that geyi is elucidating
Buddhist terms, notably numerical categories (shu), with the help of notions extracted
from traditional Chinese philosophy (Zrcher 1972: 12). Elsewhere, however, he fol-
lows the crowd in translating geyi as matching the meanings (Zrcher 1972: 294).
Tsukamoto states that, when Buddhism was first introduced to China, it was received
as a sort of Taoistic religion, and then passed to the stage of geyi.58 His translator,
Hurvitz, leaves the term unrendered here, but Tsukamoto explains it as signifying the
interpretation of Buddhist doctrine by resort to the ideas of Lao-tzu and Chuang-tzu.
In discussing the account of Zhu Faya in Biographies of Eminent Monks, Tsukamoto
identifies geyi as an exegetical method, and here (Vol. 1, p. 294) Hurvitz offers the
unusual translation of investigating the Doctrine for this poorly understood term,
although he also renders it as matching the categories on the very same page. A few
pages later (Vol. 1, p. 297), Tsukamoto characterises geyi as a method of interpreting
the Buddhist scriptures through the mediation of classic Chinese ideas. He goes on
to cite Daoans preface to An Shigaos translation of Sam.gharaks.as Yogacarabhumi-
sutra (Xiuxing daodi jing ) and his subcommentary to Kang Senghuis
(fl. 247, d. 280 [var. 276]) commentary to An Shigaos translation of Anapana-
smr.ti-sutra (Anban shouyi jing) to show that, in the early stage of his career, Daoan
often utilised terms and ideas derived from the Laozi, Zhuangzi and Yijing, which
were fashionable in the xuanxue of the times (viz., the Wei and Western Jin periods).
Tsukamoto concludes (Vol. 1, p. 299) that the propagation of Buddhism in keeping
with dark learning is just another name for ko yi Buddhism , a gigantic leap of faith
that I am unable to follow. Yet another inexplicable rendering of geyi is given by Hurvitz
at p. 305: seeking the meaning. While Hurvitzs notes (Vol. 1, pp. 57779[n. i-al]),
drawing heavily on the scholarship of Arthur Link, ably and conclusively document
the Buddhist use of terminology from Laozi, Zhuangzi and the Yijing, the presumed
connection with geyi is not demonstrated. Tsukamoto proceeds to describe (Vol. 1,
p. 309, cf. 248) geyi as a movement whose aim was, through the intermediacy [sic] of
58
Tsukamoto (1985, Vol. 1: 248). Subsequent citations from this work will be given in the text.
the ideas of Lao-tzu, Chuang-tzu, and the Canon of Changes, to enable the Chinese
to understand the Indian Buddhist scriptures.
A curious facet of Tsukamotos treatment of geyi is embodied in the following pas-
sage (Vol. 1, p. 284, cf. 294 and 575, n. bw):
an appeal to the knowledge of traditional Chinese ideas, e.g., the equation of the
Five Precepts [wu jie , paca slani] with the Five Norms [wu chang ] for
the purpose of propagating the scriptures among Chinese intellectualsa style of
learning known in the history of Chinese Buddhism as ko yi.
While this seems entirely reasonable and in line with the close connection between
geyi and shishu analysed earlier, the alleged equation between wu jie (paca slani)
and wu chang is not attested among early texts referring to geyi.59 Even if it were so
attested, it would show how hopelessly facile and unilluminating the attempt to match
up one of the countless Indian lists of technical terms with one of the few Chinese
lists was (Table 1).
Table 1
The Five Precepts in Sanskrit and Chinese
paca s ilani wu chang
Abstinence (virati) from taking of animate life (pran.tipata) Humanity (ren )
Taking of anything not freely given by the possessor (anattadana) Justice (yi )
Violation of the code of sexual behaviour imposed by ones own society Propriety (li )
(kamamithyacara)
Lying (mr..savada) Wisdom (zhi )
Taking of alcoholic drink (maireya-madyapana-sura) Faith (xin )
59
So far as I am aware, this pairing off of the Buddhist wu jie with the non-Buddhist wu chang did not
occur until the Tiwei Boli jing (Sutra of Trapus.a and Bhallika), written by the Northern Wei
(386535) monk Tanjing sometime between 454 and 464. See Tang, On Ko-Yi, pp. 28586.
Furthermore, there is no indication that Tanjing, in comparing the Buddhist Five Precepts with the non-
Buddhist Five Norms, was conscious of engaging in geyi. Indeed, there is no reason why he should have
been aware of geyi because it had been defunct for more than a century, and it was of limited circulation
even during its supposed heyday (first half of the fourth century).
As for Daoan and others using the words of Lao-Zhuang and Dark Learning in
their prefaces for sutras and such compositions to explain Buddhist doctrines, this
is also geyi. If this foreign religion, Buddhism, wanted to sink its roots solidly in
China, it would have been difficult for Chinese to understand and accept it had
they not resorted to geyi. (Ren Jiyu, p. 201)
Such sweeping assertions are unsupported by the actual textual evidence for geyi. But
still more outlandish interpretations of geyi continue to abound, of which I shall men-
tion only Peng Ziqiangs Subjectively Retelling.60
In contrast, Robert Sharf is to be commended for his skeptical approach to geyi
as a significant phenomenon in Chinese Buddhist history. He realises that it isat
besta hermeneutic strategy, and evinces a critical attitude towards modern schol-
arly interpretations of this vastly overrated teaching technique (Sharf 2001: 5, 10,
11, 9799, 288 n. 12, 309 n. 56), even going so far as to refer to it as a red herring
(Sharf 2001: 97).
A soberer approach is reflected in the studies of early Buddhist translation pro-
cedures carried out by Jan Nattier. In them, we learn what actually transpired when
Sanskrit texts were converted into Chinese scriptures, instead of what some imaginary
geyi technique demanded. For instance, Nattier refers to what she calls Chinese cul-
tural calques. These are translations that make no attempt to reflect the etymology
of the Indian term, but instead employ what was viewed as a suitable counterpart in
Chinese.61 The examples she gives are telling:
60
From the English title of Peng Ziqiang , Cong geyi dao deyi: Fojiao Boruoxue yu Wei-Jin
Xuanxue jiaorong zhuxian : (From Ge-yi
[Subjectively Retelling] to De-yi [Objectively Understanding]: Interference between Prajaparamita Study
and Metaphisics [sic] in the Wei-jin [sic] Period), Foxue yanjiu 8 (1999): 9099.
61
Jan Nattier, Beyond Translation and Transliteration: A New Look at Chinese Buddhist Terms,
unpublished paper delivered at the annual meeting of the Western Branch of the American Oriental Society,
Portland (16 October 2004), 10.
By no means can all of these terms, even by the remotest stretch of the imagina-
tion, be characterised as Daoist. Indeed, if one were pressed to denominate their
intellectualreligious orientation, they may be classified as variously belonging to
Confucian, Daoist, popular and whimsical outlooks. Even wuwei, which geyi enthusiasts
constantly invoke as one of their favourite examples of an early Buddhist borrowing of
Daoist terminology, was certainly not restricted to Daoist texts, but was used more
broadly by Confucians and others as well.62 There is no question that nirvan.a/nibbana
was occasionally rendered as wuwei in early Buddhist translations,63 yet there is no
indication that this was part of a systematic, conscious policy to appropriate Daoist
terminology that was allegedly known as geyi. Furthermore, wuwei is used to render
more than a half-dozen different Sanskrit terms,64 and the negative wu is used at the
beginning of more than 2,000 words translated from Sanskrit (Zhu and Mei, Diyuan
Yunlai, 302a314c). It would be ludicrous to insist that any Buddhist text that uses
the terms wu or wuwei be branded as Daoistic simply because they also occur in
Daoist texts.
It is often alleged by geyi enthusiasts that, since early translators such as Lokaks.ema
( , fl. ca. 180189) and Zhi Qian (220252) (in their translations of
the As..tasahasrika-prajapuramita-sutra) used benwu (fundamental nothingness;
original nonbeing) to translate tathatha (thusness), they were emulating Laozi and
Zhuangzi. But Laozi never used the expression benwu, and it is quite a stretch to
claimas some dothat this is the sort of language Laozi might have used. In the
Zhuangzi, the graphs ben and wu occur in succession three times, never as a technical
62
For a note on the Confucian wuwei, as it occurs in Analects 15.5, see Brooks and Brooks (1998: 131).
To gain an appreciation of the broad usage of the term wuwei among various schools and in various texts (for
example, Laozi, Zhuangzi, Huainanzi , Li ji , Chunqiu fanlu ), see HDC 7.138ab.
63
See Zacchetti (2002: 87) for some precisely documented examples. In truth, however, wuwei eventually
came to be used as a translation for a number of other Sanskrit terms whose meanings it more nearly fits:
asam.skr.ta, akr.ta, anadhvan, anabhisam . ska ra, anabhisam. skr. tava, anutpa da, asam
. skara, asam
. skr. tatva,
.
asam. skr. ta-dharma, asam
. skr. ta-pada, asanga, nis. prapaca. See Hirakawa Akira (1997: 776ab).
64
Zhu Qingzhi and Mei Weiheng (Victor H. Mair), Diyuan Yunlai (see note 31), 310b. For notes on
the Daoist wuwei and its parallels in various Sanskrit concepts, see Mair (1990: 138, 142).
term, but only with the meaning there originally was no X.65 One might just as well
assert that using benwu for tathata was an innovative effort on the part of the early
translators (in particular, Lokaks.ema) to come up with a suitable functional equivalent
of tathata, especially when they were as yet unequipped to devise more philologi-
cally exact renderings. But even if we accept that benwu is a Daoist technical term (a
proposition of which I remain dubious, contra Chan [1963: 336] and countless others),
there is no justification for citing the rendering of tathata (thusness) by benwu as an
instance of geyi, since benwu is nowhere even remotely associated with geyi. Although
the use of benwu for tathata is a favourite example of supposed geyi translation, it is
entirely spurious, as is the very concept of geyi translation itself.
What this sample of Buddhist terminology shows unmistakably is that early transla-
tors of Indian texts into Chinese creatively used the entire inventory of Literary Sinitic
(LS), picking and choosing from what was available to convey as best they could the
ideas and images of this alien religion. There is no evidence whatsoever that indicates
that they favoured Daoist terminology over any other sector of the whole lexicon of
LS. In fact, some early translators, especially Lokaks.ema, Zhi Qian and Kang Senghui,
avoided indigenous terminology as much as possible, resorting to transcription instead.
This is in contrast to individuals (actually a team) such as An Xuan (fl. 181) and
Yan Fotiao (fl. 181188), who tended to translate names and terms rather than
transcribe them.66 Yet even the latter (those who preferred translation over transcrip-
tion) were not demonstrably partial to Daoist terminology.
CONCLUSION
65
In the hundreds of occurrences of ben wu that are to be found in texts dating from the pre-Qin period
to the Six Dynasties, it is only in Buddhist texts that it fuses as benwu to become a technical term meaning
fundamental nothingness or original nonbeing. There simply is no correlation between Daoist texts
and benwu as a technical term. Furthermore, its chief function during the Eastern Jin was as an effective
synonym for praja, but it also was used at various times to render the following Sanskrit terms: abhuta,
amula, apurva, tathata and sunya. Thus, far from being a Daoist technical term borrowed by Buddhism,
benwu was created by the Buddhists themselves.
66
Jan Nattier, How to Do Things with Translations: Methodological Reflections on Working with Early
Chinese Buddhist Texts, unpublished paper delivered at the annual meeting of the American Academy
of Religion, Toronto (25 November 2002); also personal communications, 13 December 2004 and 11
October 2007.
turned to Daoism for its technical terminology and other religious attributes, what
actually transpired is more nearly just the opposite.67 Namely, Buddhism came to
China as an already highly sophisticated religion with an extensive corpus of texts, an
elaborate system of thought, complex institutional structures and an advanced tradition
of artistic representation. Conversely, it was at this very same time (around the second
century CE) that Daoist religion began to take shape. Consequently, Daoism was in
no position to serve as a model for the development of Buddhism in China. In other
words, we may say that Daoism as a formal, organised religion with a body of texts,
monastic rules and institutions, nascent iconography and set of ritualised practice was
to a large extent a response to the advent of Buddhism. But that is a large and daunting
topic that I hope will someday merit an international conference or several panels of
its own. Surely, the whole issue of Buddho-Daoist interactions deserves to be worked
out in much more detail, specificity and accuracy than heretofore.
In the meantime, the erroneous understanding of geyi distorts both the history of
Buddhism and of Daoism individually, especially the former. It is enough that countless
innocent students are led astray by erroneous definitions and specious accounts of geyi
in otherwise generally reliable reference books, textbooks and monographs. Perhaps
worst of all, pseudo-geyi has spawned an entire industry of fake philosophising about
the intellectual history of China, particularly that of the period of the Northern and
Southern Dynasties (or Six Dynasties) that followed the Han. Geyi Fojiao or kakugi
Bukkyo (geyi Buddhism) is a purely modern notion, but it is projected back nearly
2,000 years, as though matching concepts were the defining characteristic of the first
stage of Buddhism in China. It would be easy to cite dozens of wildly imaginative
articles that make pseudo-geyi the linchpin of their recondite ruminations on xuanxue,
which is surely already a difficult enough subject of its own without having to get
mixed up with a chimera such as pseudo-geyi (for example, Zhou Daxing 2003).
Many of these studies frankly admit, moreover, that they are working with extended
(yinshen ) interpretations of geyi, and go so far as to declare that geyi was a method
of comparative philosophy operative throughout Chinese history after the advent of
Buddhism (Liu Lifu 2000). All of these overblown theses built upon pseudo-geyi and
its extended variations are empty and ahistorical.
67
In 1980, Erik Zrcher published an article entitled Buddhist Influence on Early Taoism, Toung Pao,
66.1-3: 84147. This is one of his most significant studies, but it is also perhaps the most overlooked. It is a
substantial and extremely well-documented piece of research. In this article, Zrcher demonstrates massive,
pervasive borrowing from Buddhism in the formation of religious Daoism. He notes, but does not similarly
document, that there must also have been some influence from Daoism upon early Buddhism, and that
the two religions undoubtedly developed together in a relationship of mutual exchange. In a companion
article, which Zrcher explicitly describes (p. 1) as an attempt to redress the balance, he shows that there
was indeed a Taoist counter-current. See his Prince Moonlight: Messianism and Eschatology in Early
Medieval Chinese Buddhism, Toung Pao, 68, No. 13 (1982): 175. Nonetheless, viewed strictly as a
process of historical interaction, it was Buddhisms advent in China that triggered the rise of Daoism as an
organised religion (or, more precisely, as a congeries of religious movements that gradually evolved into a
complex body of orthopraxis, monastic and lay institutions, rituals, texts, iconography and so forth).
Itos 1996 article is a handy survey of Chinese and Japanese scholarship on geyi.
The author declares:
For my own part, I basically wish to adopt the interpretation of geyi put forward
by Chen Yinke and other Chinese researchers. In addition to this, I characterize
the indigenous thought of China that played such a decisive role especially in geyi-
based Buddhism, namely, Lao-Zhuang thought, as the philosophy of dao-li, and
defining geyi as the comprehension and interpretation of Buddhism on the basis
of this philosophy of dao-li. I refer to all forms of Buddhism based on this geyi-
conditioned understanding as geyi-based Buddhism. (Ito 1996: 74)
This is a prime example of geyiism run amok. From a failed exegetical technique of little
consequence, geyi has mushroomed into a colossal, chimerical congeries of Daoistic
Buddhisms premised on a nebulous philosophy of dao-li . We must resist the
temptation to dehistoricise the limited textual record available to us and to stray so
far from the results of disciplined philological inquiry concerning it.
In sum, it is vital to recognise that the comparanda of geyi were not Buddhist and
Daoist terms for purposes of translation,68 but numerical lists of Buddhist and non-
Buddhist terms for purposes of explanation. Furthermore, geyi lasted for but a brief
moment in the history of Buddhism, and was almost totally unknown outside of the
handful of its practitioners. In a comprehensive, detailed history of the development
of early Chinese Buddhism, geyi deserves to be mentioned, but not as the centerpiece
that modern scholarship has made of it.
Abbreviations
CSJ Chu sanzang jiji (Collected notes on the production of the Tripit.aka)
GZ Gaoseng zhuan (Biographies of eminent monks)
HDC Hanyu da cidian (Unabridged dictionary of Sinitic)
j. juan (scroll, fascicle, chapter)
MSM Modern Standard Mandarin
n. note
SQ (Qinding) Siku quanshu (Imperially commissioned complete writings in
the four repositories), 1,500 volumes, Shanghai guji reprint (1987)
T Taisho shinshu daizokyo , 100 volumes. The standard modern edition of
the Chinese Buddhist canon, edited byTakakusu Junjiro and Watanabe
Kaigyoku . Tokyo: The Taisho Issaikyo Kankokai, 192234. The form of reference
for this work is T.50 (2059) 347a1827, where 50 is the volume number, 2059 is the text
number, 347 is the page number, a is the register, and 1827 are the lines quoted.
68
It is an article of faith among even otherwise respectable historians of Chinese Buddhism that geyi was
an essential translation technique. For example, see Chen (1964: 6869) and Orzech (1978: 17071).
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