Lacson-Magallanes Co., Inc. v. Paño
Lacson-Magallanes Co., Inc. v. Paño
Lacson-Magallanes Co., Inc. v. Paño
Pao
G.R. L-27881, November 17, 1967
Topic: Control and supervision over the executive branch of the government
Plaintiff-Appellant: LACSON-MAGALLANES CO., INC.
Defendants-Appellees: JOSE PAO, HON. JUAN PAJO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, HON. JUAN DE G.
RODRIGUEZ, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL RESOURCES,
Action and ponente: Sanchez
Facts
On January 9, 1953, Jose Magallanes ceded his rights and interests to a portion of a 1,103-hectare pastureland in
Bansalan, Davao, to the plaintiff corporation Lacson-Magallanes Co. That portion, 392. 76 hectares was released from
the forest zone in 1954 as pasture land and was declared an agricultural land. On January 26, 1955, Jose Pao and 19
other claimants applied for the purchase of 90 hectares of the released area. In March, they protested the plaintiffs
sales application for the entire released area. The Director of Lands, after an investigation, dismissed the claim of the
Jose Pao and the others, and denied their MR as well. The case was brought to the President.
On June 25, 1958, Executive Secretary Juan Pajo, "[b]y authority of the President," allowed that the land on which the
farmers have built improvements be allocated to them, and that the disputed land be subdivided into lots of
convenient sizes and allocated to the actual occupants without prejudice to the corporation's right to reimbursement
for the cost of surveying this portion.
The corporation filed a suit at the CFI, averring that CA 141 4 is controlling upon the courts and the president.
Issues
1. May the Executive Secretary, acting by authority of the President, reverse a decision of the Director of Lands
YES
- The Presidents duty to execute the law is of constitutional origin.[3] So, too, is his control of all executive
departments.[4] Thus it is, that department heads are men of his confidence. His is the power to appoint them; his,
too, is the privilege to dismiss them at pleasure. Naturally, he controls and directs their acts. Implicit then is his
authority to go over, confirm, modify or reverse the action taken by his department secretaries. In this context, it may
not be said that the President cannot rule on the correctness of a decision of a department secretary.
- with regard to decisions of the Director of Lands, as affirmed by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources,
the standard practice is to allow appeals from such decisions to the Office of the President.
- Parenthetically, it may be stated that the right to appeal to the President reposes upon the Presidents power of
control over the executive departments.[8] And control simply means "the power of an officer to alter or modify or
nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment
of the former for that of the latter." The president may undo an act of his department secretary.
2. The decision of the executive secretary was an undue delegation of power, and that there is no constitutional
provision allowing the presidential control to be delegated to the exec secretary. The president should personally act
upon the matter.
NO.
- There are constitutional powers that the president must exercise in person, but he may delegate to his executive
secretary the acts that the constitution does not command he perform in person.
- The President is not expected to perform in person all the multifarious executive and administrative functions. The
Office of the Executive Secretary is an auxiliary unit which assists the President. The Executive Secretary who acts for
and in behalf and by authority of the President has an undisputed jurisdiction to affirm, modify, or even reverse any
order" that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, including the Director of Lands, may issue.
3. The plaintiff argues that the ES is equal in rank to the other departments, and cannot intrude into the sphere of
another department secretary.
NO.
- the Executive Secretary acts "[b]y authority of the President", his decision is that of the President's. Such decision is
to be given full faith and credit by our courts. The assumed authority of the Executive Secretary is to be accepted.
For, only the President may rightfully say that the Executive Secretary is not authorized to do so. Therefore, unless the
action taken is "disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive", that remains the act of the Chief Executive, and
cannot be successfully assailed. No such disapproval or reprobation is even intimated in the record of this case.