I

Later on I asked M a r l o w why he wished to cultivate this chance acquaintance.

He confessed apologetically that it was the c o m m o n e s t curiosity. I flatter myself
that I understand all s o r t s of curiosity - curiosity about daily facts, daily things,
Introduction
about daily men. It is the m o s t respectable faculty of the human mind - in fact, I
cannot conceive the uses of an incurious mind. It would be like a chamber
perpetually locked up.
Joseph C o n r a d , Chance

In this chapter I provide a brief account of the territory covered in

metaethics, and of the main philosophical positions in metaethics to
be covered in detail in the course of the book.

I. I W h a t is Metaethics?

Suppose I am debating with a friend the question whether or not

we ought to give to famine relief, whether or not we are morally
obliged to give to famine relief. The sorts of questions philosophers
raise about this kind of debate fall roughly into two groups. First,
there are first order questions about which party in the debate, if
any, is right, and why. Then, there are second order questions about
what the parties in the debate are doing when they engage in it.
Roughly, the first order questions are the province of normative
ethics, and the second order questions are the province of metaethics.
As one recent writer puts it:

In metaethics, we are concerned not with questions which are the

province of normative ethics like 'Should I give to famine relief?' or
'Should I return the wallet I found in the street?' but with questions
about questions like these. (Smith 1994a: 2)

It is important to be clear that in normative ethics we do not just

look for an answer to the question 'Should we give to famine
relief?', we also look for some insight into why the right answer is
right. It is in their answers to this latter sort of 'why?' question that
the classic theories in normative ethics disagree. Examples of such
theories include: act-utilitarianism (one ought to give to famine relief
2 INTRODUCTION INTRODUCTION 3

because that particular action, of those possible, contributes most [Metaethics] is not about what people ought to do. It is about what they
to the greater happiness of the greatest number); rule-utilitarianism are doing when they talk about what they ought to do. (Hudson 1970:1)
(one ought to give to famine relief because giving to famine relief
is prescribed by a rule the general observance of which contributes The idea that metaethics is exclusively about language was no
most to the greater happiness of the greatest number); and doubt due to the more general idea that philosophy as a whole
Kantianism (one ought to give to famine relief because universal has no function other than the study of ordinary language and that
refusal to give to famine relief would generate some kind of 'philosophical problems' only arise from the application of words
inconsistency). Normative ethics thus seeks to discover the general out of the contexts in which they are ordinarily used. Fortunately,
principles underlying moral practice, and in this way potentially this 'ordinary language' conception of philosophy has long since
impacts upon practical moral problems: different general principles ceased to hold sway, and the list of metaethical concerns - in
may yield different verdicts in particular cases. In this book we metaphysics, epistemology, phenomenology and moral psych-
are not concerned with questions or theories in normative ology, as well as in semantics and the theory of meaning - bears
ethics. Rather, we are concerned with questions about the this out.
following: 1
Positions in metaethics can be defined in terms of the answers they
give to these sorts of question. Some examples of metaethical theories
(a) Meaning: what is the semantic function of moral discourse? Is the are moral realism, non-cognitivism, error-theory and moral anti-realism.
function of moral discourse to state facts, or does it have some The task of this book is to explain and evaluate these theories. In this
other non fact-stating role? chapter I give thumbnail sketches of the various theories and try to
(b) Metaphysics: do moral facts (or properties) exist? If so, what convey an idea of the sorts of questions they address. These prelim-
are they like? Are they identical or reducible to some inary sketches are then developed at more length in the remainder of
other type of fact (or property) or are they irreducible and sui the book.
generis?
(c) Epistemology and justification: is there such a thing as moral
knowledge? How can we know whether our moral judgements 1.2 Cognitivism and N o n - C o g n i t i v i s m
are true or false? How can we ever justify our claims to moral
knowledge?
(d) Phenomenology: how are moral qualities represented in the ex- Consider a particular moral judgement, such as the judgement that
perience of an agent making a moral judgement? Do they murder is wrong. What sort of psychological state does this ex-
appear to be 'out there' in the world? press? Some philosophers, called cognitivists, think that a moral
(e) Moral psychology: what can we say about the motivational state judgement such as this expresses a belief. Beliefs can be true or
of someone making a moral judgement? What sort of connec- false: they are truth-apt, or apt to be assessed in terms of truth and
tion is there between making a moral judgement and being falsity. So cognitivists think that moral judgements are capable of
motivated to act as that judgement prescribes? being true or false. On the other hand, non-cognitivists think that
(f) Objectivity: can moral judgements really be correct or incorrect? moral judgements express non-cognitive states such as emotions or
Can we work towards finding out the moral truth? desires. Desires and emotions are not truth-apt. So moral judge-
2

ments are not capable of being true or false. (Note that, although it
Obviously, this list is not intended to be exhaustive, and the may be true that I have a desire for a pint of beer and false that I have
various questions are not all independent (for example, a positive a desire to see England win the World Cup, this does not imply that
answer to (f) looks, on the face of it, to presuppose that the function desires themselves can be true or false.) In many ways, it is the battle
of moral discourse is to state facts). But it is worth noting that the between cognitivism and non-cognitivism that takes centre-stage in
list is much wider than many philosophers forty or fifty years this book: chapters 3 to 5 concern non-cognitivism and its prob-
ago would have thought. For example, one such philosopher lems, while cognitivism and its problems are the topic of chapter 2
writes: and chapters 6 to 10.
4 INTRODUCTION INTRODUCTION 5

We will look at two types of strong cognitivist non-naturalism:

1.3 S t r o n g Cognitivism : Naturalism Moore's ethical non-naturalism, as developed in his Principia Ethica
(first published in 1903), according to which the property of moral
goodness is non-natural, simple, and unanalysable; and the con-
A strong cognitivist theory is one which holds that moral judgements
temporary version of non-naturalism that has been developed by
(a) are apt for evaluation in terms of truth and falsity, and (b) canbe the
John McDowell and David Wiggins (roughly from the 1970s to the
upshot of cognitively accessing the facts which render them true.
present day; see McDowell 1998 and Wiggins 1987). Again, both
Strong cognitivist theories can be either naturalist or non-naturalist.
types of non-naturalist are moral realists: they think that there
According to a naturalist, a moral judgement is rendered true or false
really are moral facts and moral properties, and that the existence
by a natural state of affairs, and it is this natural state of affairs to which
of these moral facts and instantiation of these moral properties
a true moral judgement affords us access. But what is a natural state of
is constitutively independent of human opinion. Moore's non-
3

affairs? In this book I will follow G. E. Moore's characterization:

naturalism, and his attack on naturalism, are discussed in chapters
2 and 3; the non-naturalism of McDowell is discussed in chapter 10.
By 'nature', then, I do mean and have meant that which is the subject
matter of the natural sciences and also of psychology. (Moore [1903]
1993: 92)
1.5 S t r o n g Cognitivism without Moral Realism: Mackie's
A natural property is a property which figures in one of the natural 'Error-Theory'
sciences or in psychology: examples might include the property of
being conducive to the greatest happiness of the greatest number John Mackie has argued that although moral judgements are apt to
and the property of being conducive to the preservation of the be true or false, and that moral judgements, if true, would afford us
human species. A natural state of affairs is simply a state of affairs cognitive access to moral facts, moral judgements are in fact always
that consists in the instantiation of a natural property. false (Mackie 1977). This is because there simply are no moral facts
Naturalist cognitivists hold that moral properties are identical to or properties in the world of the sort required to render our moral
(or reducible to) natural properties. The Cornell realists (e.g. Nicholas judgements true: we have no plausible epistemological account of
Sturgeon, Richard Boyd, and David Brink; see Sturgeon 1988; Boyd how we could access such facts and properties, and, moreover,
1988; and Brink 1989) think that moral properties are irreducible nat- such properties and facts would be metaphysically queer, unlike
ural properties in their own right. Naturalist reductionists (e.g. Richard anything else in the universe as we know it. A moral property
Brandt and Peter Railton; see Brandt 1979 and Railton 1986a) think would have to be such that the mere apprehension of it by a
that moral properties are reducible to the other natural properties that moral agent would be sufficient to motivate that agent to act.
are the subject matter of the natural sciences and psychology. Both the Mackie finds this idea utterly problematic. He concludes that
Cornell realists and the naturalist reductionists are moral realists: they there are no moral properties or moral facts, so that (positive,
think that there really are moral facts and moral properties, and that atomic) moral judgements are uniformly false: our moral thinking
the existence of these moral facts and instantiation of these moral involves us in a radical error. Because Mackie denies that there are
properties is constitutively independent of human opinion. The non- moral facts or properties, he is not a moral realist, but a moral anti-
reductive naturalism of the Cornell realists is discussed in chapter 8 realist. Mackie's error-theory is the subject of chapter 6.
and naturalist reductionism is the subject of chapter 9.

1.6 W e a k Cognitivism about Moral s without Moral Realism:

1.4 Strong Cognitivism: N o n - N a t u r a l i s m ' B e s t O p i n i o n ' Theories

Non-naturalists think that moral properties are not identical to or A weak cognitivist theory is one which holds that moral judgements (a)
reducible to natural properties. They are irreducible and sui generis. are apt for evaluation in terms of truth and falsity, but (b) cannot be the
6 INTRODUCTION INTRODUCTION 7

upshot of cognitive access to moral properties and states of affairs. give different answers to this question: A. J.Ayer's emotivism (1936),
Weak cognitivism thus agrees with strong cognitivism on (a), but according to which moral judgements express emotions, or senti-
disagrees on (b). An example of a weak cognitivist theory would be ments of approval or disapproval; Simon Blackburn's quasi-realism
one which held that our best judgements about morals determine the (1984), according to which moral judgements express our dispos-
extensions of moral predicates, rather than being based upon some itions to form sentiments of approval or disapproval; and Allan
faculty which tracks, detects or cognitively accesses facts about the in- Gibbard's norm-expressivism (1990), according to which our moral
stantiation of moral properties. (The extension of a predicate is the judgements express our acceptance of norms.
class of things, events or objects to which that predicate may correctly Perhaps the main challenge to non-cognitivism is what is called the
be applied.) Moral judgements are thus capable of being true or false, Frege - Geach problem. According to emotivism, for example, judging
even though they are not based on a faculty with a tracking, accessing that murder is wrong is really just like shouting 'Boo for murder!'
or detecting role - in other words, even though true moral judgements (when I shout 'Boo!' I am evincing my disapproval; I am not at-
are not the upshot of cognitive access to moral states of affairs. This tempting to describe something). But what about 'If murder is
view thus rejects moral realism, not by denying the existence of moral wrong, then it is wrong to murder your mother-in-law'? This makes
facts (like the error-theory), but by denying that those facts are consti- sense. But on the emotivist interpretation it doesn't (what would it
tutively independent of human opinion. In chapter 7 I will discuss sound like on an emotivist interpretation?). We shall look at how
weak cognitivist theories of this type in the context of Crispin quasi-realism and norm-expressivism try to solve this problem for
Wright's work on anti-realism (e.g. Wright 1988a). non-cognitivism, as well as a range of other problems that threaten the
non-cognitivist. Non-cognitivism is the subject of chapters 3,4 and 5.

1.7 Non-Cognitivism

1.8 Internalism and Externalism, H u m e a n i s m and A n t i -

Non-cognitivists deny that moral judgements are even apt to be true
Humeanism
or false. Non-cognitivists thus disagree with both weak and strong
cognitivism. We shall look at a number of arguments which the
non-cognitivist uses against cognitivism. An example of such an One of the premises in the argument from moral psychology above is
argument is the argument from moral psychology. the claim that there is an internal and necessary connection between
Suppose that moral judgements can express beliefs, as the cogni- sincerely making a moral judgement and being motivated to act in
tivist claims. Being motivated to do something or to pursue a course of the manner prescribed by that judgement. This claim is known as
action is always a matter of having a belief and a desire. For example, I internalism, because it says that there is an internal or conceptual
am motivated to reach for the fridge because I believe that it contains connection between moral judgement and motivation. Some cogni-
beer and I have a desire for a beer. But it is an internal and necessary tivist philosophers (e.g. Railton, Brink) respond to the argument from
fact about an agent that, if she sincerely judges that X is good, she is moral psychology by denying internalism. They claim that the con-
motivated to pursue the course of action X. So if a moral judgement nection between judgement and motivation is only external and
expressed a belief, it would have to be a belief which sustained an contingent. Such philosophers are known as externalists. Other cog-
internal and necessary connection to a desire: it would have to be a nitivist philosophers (e.g. McDowell, Wiggins) respond to the argu-
necessary truth that an agent who possessed the belief would inter alia ment from moral psychology by denying another premise of
possess the desire. But no belief is necessarily connected to a desire the argument, the claim that motivation always involves the pre-
because, as Hume claimed, 'beliefs and desires are distinct existences', sence of both beliefs and desires (this premise is known as the Humean
and it is impossible to have a necessary connection between distinct theory of motivation, since it received a classic exposition by Hume).
existences (Hume [1739] 1968). So it cannot be the case that moral McDowell and Wiggins advance an anti-Humean theory of motivation,
judgements express beliefs. So moral judgements are not truth-apt. 4
according to which beliefs themselves can be intrinsically motivat-
If moral judgements cannot express beliefs, what do they ex- ing. The debates between internalism and externalism, and Humean-
press? We shall look at three versions of non-cognitivism which ism and Anti-Humeanism, are the subject of 9.9-9.10 and 10.4.
8 INTRODUCTION INTRODUCTION 9

1.10 Further Reading

1.9 Flowchart of Main Metaethical Theories

The following surveys of recent and contemporary metaethics may

be found useful: Sayre-McCord 1986; Darwall, Gibbard and Rail ton
1992; Little 1994a, 1994b; and Railton 1996a. For those entirely new
to philosophical ethics, Blackburn 2001 is an excellent and concise
introduction. Benn 1998 is also useful.