U.S.

Department of Justice

Executive Office for Immigration Review

Board ofImmigration Appeals

Office ofthe Clerk

5107 Leesburg Pike, Suzte 2000

Falls Church, Virginia 22041

Immigrant & Refugee Appellate Center, LLC | www.irac.net

Foden, Mary OHS/ICE Office of Chief Counsel - HAR
De Castro Foden, LLC P. 0. Box 230217
107 Oak Street Hartford, CT 06123-0217
Hartford, CT 06106

Name: NOLASCO-SANTIAGO, ADELA A 205-497-497

Date of this notice: 5/3/2017

Enclosed is a copy of the Board's decision and order in the above-referenced case.

Sincerely,

Cynthia L. Crosby
Acting Chief Clerk

Enclosure

Panel Members:
Kelly, Edward F.
Grant, Edward R.
Pauley, Roger

Userteam: Docket

For more unpublished BIA decisions, visit

www.irac.net/unpublished/index/

Cite as: Adela Nolasco Santiago, A205 497 497 (BIA May 3, 2017)
U.S. Department of Justice Decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals
Executive Office for Immigration Review

Falls Church, Virginia 22041

File: A205 497 497 - Hartford, CT Date: MAY - 3 2017

In re: ADELA NOLASCO SANTIAGO a.k.a. Adelina Nolasco a.k.a. Adela Nolasco

Immigrant & Refugee Appellate Center, LLC | www.irac.net

IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS

APPEAL

ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT: Mary D. Foden, Esquire

APPLICATION: Cancellation of removal under section 240A(b) of the Act

The respondent has appealed the Immigration Judge's June 11, 2015, decision that
pretermitted the respondent's application for cancellation of removal under section 240A(b) of
the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b). The record will be remanded.

We review Immigration Judges' findings of fact for clear error, but questions of law,
discretion, and judgment, and all other issues in appeals, de novo. 8 C.F.R. 1003.l(d)(J)(i),
(ii).

On January 10, 2013, the respondent was convicted of Fraud, and Misuse of Visas, Permits,
and other Documents in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1546(a). The Immigration Judge determined
that this offense constitutes a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT) under 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I)
of the Act, 8 U.S.C. l 182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), which renders the respondent statutorily ineligible for
cancellation of removal under section 240A(b)(l)(C) of the Act. The respondent challenges this
determination on appeal.

There is no dispute that the respondent was convicted under the first paragraph of 18 U.S,C.
1546(a), which "revolve[s] around a defendant's individual procurement, possession, or use of
various fraudulent immigration documents." See United States v. Principe, 203 F.3d 849,
852 (5th Cir. 2000). It provides in relevant part:

Whoever knowingly forges, counterfeits, alters, or falsely makes any immigrant

or nonimmigrant visa, permit, border crossing card, alien registration receipt card,
or other document prescribed by statute or regulation for entry into or as evidence
of authorized stay or employment in the United States, or utters, uses, attempts to
use, possesses, obtains, accepts, or receives any such visa, permit, border crossing
card, alien registration receipt card, or other document prescribed by statute or
regulation for entry into or as evidence of authorized stay or employment in the
United States, knowing it to be forged, counterfeited, altered, or falsely made, or
to have been procured by means of any false claim or statement, or to have been
otherwise procured by fraud or unlawfully obtained; or . . .

We conclude that the crime of immigration document fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C.

1546(a) is not categorically a CIMT because the statute does not necessarily reach only
Cite as: Adela Nolasco Santiago, A205 497 497 (BIA May 3, 2017)
A205 497 497

offenses involving moral turpitude. Indeed, in Matter of Serna, 20 l&N Dec. 579 (BIA 1992),
this Board held that a violation of 18 U.S.C. 1546(a) (1982) does not categorically constitute a
CIMT because the possession portion of the statute does not expressly include the element of
fraud. Put another way, "the crime of possession of an altered immigration document with the
knowledge that it was altered, but without its use or proof of any intent to use it unlawfully, is
not a crime involving moral turpitude." Id. at 586.

Immigrant & Refugee Appellate Center, LLC | www.irac.net

As such, we turn to whether the statute is divisible such that the modified categorical
approach may be applied. A criminal statute is divisible so as to warran t a modified categorical
inquiry only if ( 1) it lists multiple discrete offenses as enumerated alternatives or defines a single
offense by reference to disjunctive sets of "elements," more than one combination of which
could support a conviction and (2) at least one, but not all, of those listed offenses or
combinations of disjunctive elements is a categorical match to the relevant generic standard. See
Matter of Chairez, 26 l&N Dec. 819, 822 (citing Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276,
2281, 2283 (2013); see also Matter ofSilva-Trevino, 26 l&N Dec. 826, 833 (BIA 2016)). If the
statue is divisible, the record of conviction may be examined to identify the statutory provision
that the respondent was convicted of violating. See Descamps v. United States, supra, at 2281,
2283 (defining when a statute may be considered"divisible"); Matter of Chairez, supra, at 819-
20; Matter ofSilva-Trevino, supra, at 833.

We conclude that the clause of 18 U.S.C. 1546(a) at issue is not divisible because it does
not list multiple discrete offenses as enumerated alternatives or define a single offense by
reference to a disjunctive sent of"elements," more than one combination of which could support
a conviction. The first paragraph of 18 U.S.C. 1546(a) includes two clauses. The first clause
proscribes knowingly forging an immigration document, which is a CIMT under Matter of
Flores, 17 I&N Dec. 225, 226 (BIA 1980). See Omagah v. Ashcroft, 288 F.3d 254, 261 (5th Cir.
2002) (acknowledging that although the statute at issue in Matter of Flores, supra, the
predecessor to 18 U.S.C. 1546(a), "does not require a showing of intent to defraud, a
fraudulent intent inheres in the act of counterfeiting documents and violating the statute").
However, the second clause, under which it is apparent that the respondent was convicted,
prohibits both simple, knowing possession of illegal documents (not a CIMT), as well as
possession of illegal documents with an intent to use them (a CIMT). See Matter of Serna,
supra. We conclude that under the second clause of 18 U.S.C. 1546(a), whether the defendant
"used" or "possessed" the immigration document are merely different means by which the
statute may be violated, not elements of the offense. See United States v. Ryan-Webster,
353 F.3d 353, 360 n. 11 (4th Cir. 2003) (affirming a conviction under 18 U.S.C. 1546(a) where
the jury was instructed that the first element of the offense was that the defendant uttered, used,
or possessed a document); see also United States v. Meza-Perez, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67013,
at *5-6 (C.D. Ill. June 23, 2011). As such, we are unable to discern whether the respondent was
convicted of a CIMT and may not employ the modified categorical approach. 1

1 In the Second Circuit, an alien meets his or her burden of proof by showing an inconclusive
record of conviction. Martinez v. Mukasey, 551 F.3d 113 (2d Cir, 2008).

2
Cite as: Adela Nolasco Santiago, A205 497 497 (BIA May 3, 2017)
A205 497 497

The record will be remanded for further proceedings to determine whether the respondent is
otherwise eligible for cancellation of removal and whether she merits such relief in the exercise
of discretion.

Accordingly, the following order shall be entered:

Immigrant & Refugee Appellate Center, LLC | www.irac.net

ORDER: The record is remanded to the Immigration Court for further proceedings
consistent with the foregoing opinion and the entry of a new decision.

Cite as: Adela Nolasco Santiago, A205 497 497 (BIA May 3, 2017)
 ...

. EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW

UNITED STATES IMMIGRATION COURT
HARTFORD, CONNECTICUT

IN THE MATTER OF: )

)

Immigrant & Refugee Appellate Center, LLC | www.irac.net

NOLASCO SANTIAGO, Adela ) IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS
AKA NOLASCO, Adelina )
AlOS-497-497 )
)
_RE
S_P_O_N_D_E_NT
_ )
-

CHARGES: INA 212(a)(6)(A)(i), as amended: alien present in the United States

without being admitted or paroled, or who arrives in the United States
at any time or place other than as designated by the Attorney General.

INA 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I), as amended: alien not in possession of a

valid unexpired immigrant visa, reentry permit, border crossing
...
identification card, or other valid, required entry document, and a valid
unexpired passport, or other suitable travel document, or document of
identity and nationality if such document is required under the
regulations issues by the Attorney General under INA 21 l(a).

APPLICATIONS: Cancellation of Removal pursuant to INA 240A(b)(l)

Voluntary Departure
Torture Convention

ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT ON BEHALF OF DHS

Mary Foden Sarosh Wahla, Esq.
Law Office of Maria Luisa de Castro Foden, LLC Office of the Chief Counsel
107 Oak Street 450 Main Street, Room 483
Hartford, Connecticut 06106 Hartford, Connecticut 06103

DECISION AND ORDER OF THE IMMIGRATION JUDGE

I. PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL HISTORY

Adela Nolasco Santiago (Respondent) is a native and citizen of Mexico who entered the
United States without inspection at an unknown time and an unknown location. Respondent has
resided in the United States since her initial entry. She is mother to two United States citizen
children, born in 2002 and 2004, respectively.

Respondent has a number of criminal convictions. On March 20, 2007, Respondent pied
guilty to theft of plates, improper use of marker/license/registration, and operating a motor
vehicle without a license, in violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. 14-147a, 14-147(c), and 14-36(a)
respectively. On February 9, 2011, she pied guilty to second degree breach of peace in violation

1
of Conn. Gen. Stat. 53a-181. On January 10, 2013, she pled guilty to possession of a fraudulent
alien registration card in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1546(a). Finally, on February 22, 2013,
Respondent pled guilty to sixth degree larceny in violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. 53a-l25b.

On March 14, 2013, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) personally served
Respondent-with a Notice to Appear (NTA) identifying her as an arriving alien and charging her

Immigrant & Refugee Appellate Center, LLC | www.irac.net

as inadmissible pursuant to INA 212(a)(6)(A)(i) and 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I). In written pleadings
submitted by and through counsel on September 10, 2013, Respondent conceded proper service
of the NTA, admitted all factual allegations contained therein, conceded the charges of
inadmissibility, requested relief in the form of cancellation of removal for certain nonpermanent
residents, requested voluntary departure in the alternative, and designated Mexico as the country
to which her removal should be directed if so ordered. Respondent submitted and subsequently
withdrew an 1-589 application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the
United Nations Convention Against Torture.

II. TESTIMONIAL AND DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

Respondent testified in support of her application at a May 18, 2015 individual merits
hearing. She stated she was born in Oaxaca Mexico, came to the United States in 1997, and has
not since left the country. Respondent is the mother of two United States citizen children, Rafael
and Alexandra, aged 12 and 11, respectively, at the time of the hearing. She lives alone with her
children in a small apartment. Both of Respondent's children are insured through the State of
Connecticut. Respondent's son Rafael is medicated for learning and attention issues; he receives
individual attention in special education classes approximately five hours per week. Respondent
does not believe similar services are available in Mexico.

Respondent has been arrested at least five times in the United States. She stated that three
arrests related to shoplifting; one arrest stemmed from a fight between Respondent and her sister
in-law; and another arrest related to her use of fraudulent documents to obtain employment at
Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation. Respondent minimized her culpability: she cast blame for the
shoplifting arrests on various female friends; she identified her sister-in-law as the aggressor in
the fight that led to her arrest for breach of peace; and finally, she stated that although she
purchased an 1-551 and used it to secure employment, she knew nothing about the form other
than that it would help her obtain work.

Respondent and DHS submitted a number of documents in this matter including

Respondent's conviction records, a plea colloquy related to Respondent's federal conviction,
Respondent's tax returns, medical and school records related to Respondent's United States
citizen son, and various reports concerning country conditions in Mexico.

III. FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

A. Cancellation of Removal

1. Guiding Principles

2
 Section 240A(b) of the INA permits cancellation of removal for a non-permanent resident
alien, if the alien can establish she: (1) has been physically present in the United States for ten
years immediately preceding the date of the application for cancellation; (2) has been a person of
good moral character during that ten-year period; and (3) has not been convicted of an offense
that would render her inadmissible under INA 212(a)(2) or removable under 237(a)(2) or
(a)(3). See INA 240A(b)(l); see also Matter of Cisneros-Gonzalez, 23 I&N Dec. 668, 670

Immigrant & Refugee Appellate Center, LLC | www.irac.net

(BIA 2004).

Respondent is Statutorily Ineligible for Cancellation of Removal

The Court will pretermit Respondent's application for cancellation of removal.

Cancellation of removal is unavailable to aliens who, inter alia, have been convicted of crimes
involving moral turpitude within the meaning of INA 212(a)(2). INA 240A(b)(l)
Respondent's conviction for visa fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1546(a) is such a crime. Under
8 CFR 1240.2l(c)(l), the Court may deny the application regardless of the annual cap.

A crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT) is "inherently base, vile, or depraved, and
contrary to the accepted rules of morality and the duties owed between persons or to society in
general." Mendez v. Mukasey, 547 F.3d 345, 347 (2d Cir. 2008) ("Whether a crime is one
involving moral turpitude depends on the offender's evil intent or corruption of the mind.")
(citations omitted). Generally, "[c]rimes committed intentionally or knowingly have historically
been found to involve moral turpitude," In re Solon, 24 I. & N. Dec. 239, 240 (BIA 2007),
whereas other crimes, such as the "[v]iolation of statutes which merely license or regulate and
impose criminal liability without regard to evil intent[,] do not involve moral turpitude." Matter
of Serna, 20 l&N Dec. 579, 583 (BIA 1992) (quoting Matter of G-, 7 I&N Dec. 114, 118 (BIA
1956)). Accordingly, mere possession of an altered immigration document does not constitute a
crime involving moral turpitude because an alien "might not have had the intent to use the
altered immigration document in his possession unlawfully." Matter of Serna, 20 I&N Dec. 579,
586 (BIA 1992). Crimes involving intent to deceive or defraud, however, are unquestionably
morally turpitudinous. See Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 232 (1951) ("[T]he decided cases
make it plain that crimes in which fraud was an ingredient have always been regarded as
involving moral turpitude."); accord Matter of Flores, 17 I&N Dec. 225, 228 (BIA 1980).

The use of false immigration documents involves the kind of deceit or fraud that renders
a crime morally turpitudinous. See Matter of Flores, 17 I&N Dec. at 230 (determining that
notwithstanding lack of fraud as an element, crime of uttering or selling false or counterfeit paper
relating to alien registry, with knowledge of their counterfeit nature, inherently involves
deliberate deception and fraudulent conduct); see also Marin-Rodriguez v. Holder, 710 F.3d 734,
739 (7th Cir. 2013) (concluding BIA did not err in holding alien's "directly deceptive use of a
false Social Security card to obtain and maintain unauthorized employment" involved moral
turpitude); Lateeff Dep 't of Homeland Sec., 592 F.3d 926, 928, 931 (8th Cir. 2010) (concluding
alien's conviction for using "unlawfully obtained social security number" was morally
turpitudinous); Omagah v. Ashcroft, 288 F.3d 254, 261-62 (5th Cir. 2002) (affirming BIA ruling
that "conspiracy to possess [illegal immigration documents] with intent to use does rise to the
level of moral turpitude. .. . ").

3
 By knowingly presenting a fraudulent and falsely made alien registration card to an
employer, Respondent engaged in inherently deceptive and morally turpitudinous conduct. As
Respondent correctly asserts, the statute under which she was convicted, 18 U.S.C. 1546(a),
criminalizes mere possession, receipt, and acceptance of fraudulent documents, as well as the
utterance, use, or attempted use of such documents. 18 U.S.C. 1546(a). Accordingly, the statute
does not categorically proscribe morally turpitudinous conduct. See Serna, 20 I&N Dec. at 586.

Immigrant & Refugee Appellate Center, LLC | www.irac.net

The statue is, however, divisible, permitting modified categorical review of the record to
ascertain the specific elements underlying the conviction. Respondent's record of conviction
discloses she pled guilty to count one of an indictment that charged her with "fraud and misuse
of alien registration." A plea colloquy reveals that as part of her guilty plea, she admitted she
"knowingly possessed and used a fraudulent and falsely made alien registration receipt card, and
at the time [she] knew that the card was fraudulent and falsely made." See Exhibit 5, pages 9-22.
It is Respondent's burden to establish she is statutorily eligible for the relief she seeks. See INA
section 240(c)(4). She has failed to carry her burden. Because there is adequate proof in the
record that Respondent intended to use the fraudulent document at issue unlawfully, the Court
concludes her conviction under 18 U.S.C. 1546(a) involved moral turpitude. See Matter of
Serna, 20 I&N Dec. at 583 ("Were it the case that the conviction included the use of an altered
visa, we would agree that it was for a crime involving moral turpitude because of the strong
similarity of that offense to the crime discussed in Matter of Flores . . . . " Respondent is thus
statutorily ineligible for cancellation of removal.

B. Voluntary Departure

An individual may be permitted to voluntarily depart the United States if, at the
conclusion of proceedings, the Court is satisfied the individual established she: (1) has been
physically present in the United States for at least one year immediately preceding the service of
the NTA; (2) has been of good moral character, as defined by INA IOI(f)(l)-(8), during at least
five years immediately preceding the application for voluntary departure; (3) is not deportable as
an aggravated felon or a terrorist under INA 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) and/or INA 237(a)(4); and (4)
intends to depart the United States and has the means to so depart. INA 240B(b)(l)(A)-(D); 8
C.F.R. 1240.26(c)(l). The individual also must possess a valid travel document. 8 C.F.R.
1240.26(c)(2).

Voluntary departure is a discretionary benefit; a statutorily eligible applicant bears the

burden of establishing she merits relief. Matter of Seda, 17 I&N Dec. 550, 554 (BIA 1980),
overruled on other grounds by Matter of Ozkok, 19 I&N Dec. 546 (BIA 1988) (superseded in
part by statute INA 322(a)). To determine whether a favorable exercise of discretion is
warranted, the Court weighs all relevant adverse and positive factors, including the individual's
prior immigration history; criminal history, if any; length of residence in the United States; and
extent of his family, business, and societal ties to the United States. Matter of Thomas, 21 I&N
Dec. 20, 22 (BIA 1995). Discretion may be favorably exercised in the face of adverse factors
where there are countervailing equities such as long residence and/or close family ties in the
United States, or humanitarian needs. Id at 23.

Respondent is statutorily eligible for voluntary departure: she was physically present in
the United States for well over a year immediately preceding the service of the NTA, and she

4
neither been convicted of, nor admitted to having committed, an act described in INA
lOl(f)(l)-(8) immediately preceding her application for voluntary departure. Although she
admitted to having committed several crimes involving moral turpitude, those acts were
committed outside the relevant period. The Court considered Respondent's positive factors,
including her lengthy residence in the United States, her family ties (two United States citizen
children}, and her employment history. The Court finds, however, that these factors do not

Immigrant & Refugee Appellate Center, LLC | www.irac.net

outweigh Respondent's adverse factors, including her numerous arrests and convictions and her
professed lack of responsibility therefor.

IV. ORDERS

Based on the foregoing, the following orders are entered:

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Respondent's application for cancellation of removal is

PRETERMITTED and.her request for voluntary departure is DENIED;

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondent be removed to MEXICO.

:r;
Date
I I. '-\s-
,