Seminar Proceedings Series

No. 30

FINANCING DEVELOPMENT
IN ISLAM

ISLAMIC RESEARCH AND TRAINING INSTITUTE

ISLAMIC DEVELOPMENT BANK
JEDDAH, SAUDI ARABIA
 ISLAMIC RESEARCH AND TRAINING INSTITUTE (IRTI)
Establishment of IRTI

The Islamic Research and Training Institute was established by the Board of Executive Directors of
the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) in 1401H (1981). The Executive Directors thus implemented
Resolution NO.BG/14-99 which the Board of Governors of IDB adopted at its Third Annual Meeting held
on 10 Rabi Thani 1399H (14 March 1979). The Institute became operational in 1403H (1983).

Purpose

The purpose of the Institute is to undertake research for enabling the economic, financial and
banking activities in Muslim countries to conform to shari'ah, and to extend training facilities to
personnel engaged in economic development activities in the Bank's member countries.

Functions

The functions of the Institute are:

(A) To organize and coordinate basic and applied research with a view to developing models and
methods for the application of Shari'ah in the field of economics, finance and banking;
(B) To provide for the training and development of professional personnel in Islamic Economics to
meet the needs of research and shari'ah-observing agencies;
(C) To train personnel engaged in development activities in the Bank's member countries;
(D) To establish an information center to collect, systematize and disseminate information in fields
related to its activities; and
(E) To undertake any other activities which may advance its purpose.

Organization

The President of the IDB is also the President of the Institute. The IDB's Board of Executive
Directors acts as its supreme policy- making body.
The Institute is headed by a Director responsible for its overall management and is selected by the
IDB President in consultation with the Board of Executive Directors. The Institute consists of three
technical divisions (Research, Training, Information) and one division of Administrative and Financial
Services.

Location

The Institute is located in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.

Address

Telephone: 6361400
Fax: 6378927/6366871
Telex: 601407 - 601137
Cable: BANKISLAMI - JEDDAH
P.O. Box 9201
Jeddah 21413
Saudi Arabia
 ISLAMIC RESEARCH AND TRAINING INSTITUTE
ISLAMIC DEVELOPMENT BANK
JEDDAH, SAUDI ARABIA

FINANCING DEVELOPMENT
IN ISLAM

Papers presented at the Third International Conference on Islamic Economics

which was held in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, on 23-25 Rajab 1412H (January 28-30,
1992) under the joint sponsorship of the Islamic Research and Training Institute
(IRTI) of the Islamic Development Bank (IDB), Jeddah, International Islamic
University, Malaysia, and the International Association for Islamic Economists. The
Conference's theme was Financing Development in Islam.

Edited by

M. A. MANNAN

Seminar Proceedings Series No.30

Seminar Proceedings Series No.30

ISLAMIC RESEARCH AND TRAINING INSTITUTE

ISLAMIC DEVELOPMENT BANK

The views expressed in this book are not necessarily those of the Islamic
Research and Training Institute nor of the Islamic Development Bank.
References and citations are allowed but must be properly
acknowledged.

First Edition
1416H (19%)

Published by:

ISLAMIC RESEARCH AND TRAINING INSTITUTE

ISLAMIC DEVELOPMENT BANK
TEL: 6361400
FAX: 6378927/6366871
TELEX: 601407 - 601137 SIDB SJ
CABLE: BANKISLAMI JEDDAH
P.O. BOX 9201
JEDDAH 21413
SAUDI ARABIA
 CONTENTS
Page

Foreword 9

Introduction 11
M. A. Mannan

Section-I: Islamic Strategies for Financing Development 19

1. Shari'ah Compatible Shares:

A Suggested Formula and Rationale Muhammad Anas
Zarqa

2. Financing Economic Development from

Islamic Perspective
Hatem El-Karanshawy

3. Role of Equity Participation in Financing

Economic Development
Rodney Wilson

Section-II: Domestic Financing of Development 77

4. A Simple Model of Income Determination,

Growth and Economic Development on the
Perspective of An Interest-Free Economy
79
M. Fahim Khan

5. Causes of Fiscal Problems in Muslim

Countries and Some suggestions for Reform
Munawar Iqbal 109

5
 Page

6. Is Equity Financed Budget Deficit

Stable in An Interest-Free Economy
M. Aynul Hasan &
Ahmed Naeem Siddiqui 139

Section-HI: Financing Development in selected

Muslim Societies 161

7. The Basic Needs Fulfillment Guarantee in Islam

and A Measure of Its Financial Dimension in
Selected Muslim Countries
Zubair Hasan &
Muhammad Arif

8. Long Term Finance in Islamic Countries:

Case Study of Pakistan 163
Muhammad Akram Khan

9. Financing Economic Development in Islamic Economics:

Attitudes Towards Islamic Finance in Small 197
Manufacturing Business in Saudi Arabia
Bandar Al-Hajjar &
John Preslley
227
10. Some consideration on the Size of the
Public Sector in The Islamic Republic of Iran Iraj
Toutounchian
247
11. Efficiency of the Islamic Approach to External
Debt-Management in North Africa and Middle-East
I. O. Taiwo
285
12. The Survival and Development Strategies of the
Minority of Nairobian Muslims in Nairobi
Mohammed S. Mukras
307

6
 Page

Section-W: Financing Development in

Historical Perspectives 321

13. The Role of Finance in Development:

The Ottoman Experience
Ahmet Tabakoglu 323

14. Public Borrowing in Early Islamic History:

A Review of Some Records
M. Nejatullah Siddiqi 345

15. Provision of Public Goods: Role of

Voluntary Sector (Waqf) in Islamic History
Abdul Azim Islahi 367

16. The Relevance of the Ottoman Cash Waqfs

(Awqaf Al-Nuqud) for Modern Islamic Economics
Murat Cizakca 393

Appendixes 415

Inaugural Address by Y.B. Dato Seri Anwar Ibrahim 417

Welcome Address by Dr. Abdul Hameed Ahmad Abu Sulayman 419

Resolutions of the Conference 421

7
 FOREWORD

As the area of development financing constitutes a vital concern of

contemporary economic theory and policy in general and for development
planning in the developing countries in particular, it is only natural that it
gains much consideration from IRTI. This consideration has been
manifested in the keenness of IRTI to incorporate this subject in its in-
house research programs and organize seminars, workshops and
conferences on it so as to facilitate wide dissemination of knowledge and
exchange of views. IRTI's particular interest in this' field is-to investigate
the contours of development financing in Islamic framework, to highlight
issues and suggest alternatives to contemporary Muslim economies seeking
to apply Shari'ah in their economic and financial affairs.

The Third International Conference on Islamic Economics is one of

the activities sponsored by IRTI in cooperation with the International
Islamic University, Malaysia and the International Association for Islamic
Economics, UK in order to explore a multitude of ideas and deliberate on
several issues pertaining to the subject.

This volume is compilation of all the papers presented in this

conference. The topics and quality of the papers presented in the conference
included in this volume make it a valuable contribution to the existing
literature on Islamic economics. Islamic Research and Training Institute has
published the proceedings of earlier conferences and seminars which have
proved to be good reference and teaching material for researchers, teachers
and students of Islamic economics. It is hoped that this volume too will add
to the available teaching and research material in .this discipline. It is also
hoped that the discussion on various issues relating to .development
financing will induce further fruitful thinking on the subject and motivate
further research in this important area.

Dr. Mohammad Fahim Khan

 INTRODUCTION

M. A. MANNAN'

The Third International Conference on Islamic Economics was held

in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia on 23-25 Rajab 1412H (January 28-30
1992) under the joint sponsorship of the Islamic Research and Training
Institute (IRTI) of the Islamic Development Bank (IDB), Jeddah,
International Islamic University, Malaysia and the International
Association for Islamic Economists. The Conference's theme was
"Financing Development from an Islamic Perspective" . The main
objective of this Conference was to determine Islamic strategies for
financing development, and to find out the ways and means to float
Islamic instruments for effective mobilization of resources.

The papers presented at this Conference are grouped in four

sections : the first section deals with Islamic Strategies for Financing
Development consisting of three papers: a) Shari'ah Compatible
Shares: A Suggested Formula and Rationale, b) Financing Economic
Development From Islamic Perspective, c) Role of Equity Participation
in Financing Economic Development. The second section dealing with
Domestic Financing of Development also consists of three papers
namely, a) A Simple Model of Income Determination, Growth and
Economic Development on the Perspective of An Interest-Free
Economy, b) Causes of Fiscal Problems in Muslim Countries and Some
Suggestions for Reform and c) Is Equity Financed Budget Deficit
Stable In An Interest-Free Economy? The third section deals with
Financing Development in Selected Muslim societies. This section
includes the following six papers: a) The Basic Needs Fulfillment
Guarantee in Islam and A Measure of Its Financial Dimension in
Selected Muslim Countries, b) Long Term Finance in Islamic
Countries: A Case Study of Pakistan, c) Financing Economic
Development in Islamic Economics: Attitudes

* Senior Economist and former Head,. Special Assignment Unit of Islamic Research and
Training Institute (IRTI), Islamic Development Bank (IDB).

11
Towards Islamic Finance in Small Manufacturing Business in Saudi
Arabia, d) Some Considerations on the Size of the Public Sector in The
Islamic Republic of Iran, e) Efficiency of the Islamic Approach to
External Debt-Management in North Africa and Middle-East, 6) The
Survival and Development Strategies of the Minority of Nairobian
Muslims in Nairobi. The last section dealing with Financing
Development from Historical Perspectives consists of following four
papers : a) The Role of Finance in Development: The Ottoman
Experience, b) Public Borrowing in Early Islamic History: A Review of
the Records, c) Provision of Public Goods: Role of Voluntary Sector
(Waqf) in Islamic History and d) Relevance of the Ottoman Cash Waqfs
(Awqaf Al-Nuqud) For the Modern Islamic Economics.

These sixteen papers which are presented at the Conference both

individually, and collectively provide wide range of options for financing
development in an Islamic economy.

In his paper entitled, Shari'ah Compatible Preference Share: A

Suggested Formula and Rationale, Muhammad Zarqa made a case for a
modified form of Islamic preference share which can serve specific
economic functions in conformity with the Shari'ah. Recognizing that
preference share as found in the western secular market is contrary to
the principles of Shari'ah, he examined the Islamic loss sharing rule as
well as accumulative Islamic preference share scheme. He suggested that
in case of Islamic preference share, share holders can contract preference
share by offering more favorable profit sharing ratio. In case of losses, no
preferential treatment can, of course, be given. His proposal for
preference share scheme deserves a serious consideration. It introduces
an element of flexibility in raising capital of the company.

In his paper Financing Economic Development from Islamic

Perspective, Hatem El-Karanshawy tried to present a framework for
mechanism that may enable the mobilization of the surplus fund
available in some Islamic countries for the utilization of capital deficit
countries on the basis of Shari'ah based principles. While discussing this
framework, the paper attempted to determine the finance gap

12
between the surplus and deficit countries. In this context, the paper
discussed the role of the Islamic states and other relevant issues relating
to mobilization of domestic as well as external resources.

In his paper, Role of Equity Participation in Financing Economic

Development Rodney Wilson made a strong case for equity financing as a
source of long term investment. It is argued that such finance being
participatory in nature is also more equitable as risks are shared rather
than being the entire burden on the enterprises being financed. It is
however pointed out that main difficulty so far as most developing
countries are concerned is the under development of equity market.
When markets are limited and small, prices of the share tend to be
volatile. His paper clearly indicates need for developing the secondary
security market so that Islamic financial instrument can be floated.

Fahim Khan's paper entitled "A Simple Model of Income

Determination, Growth and Economic Development on the Perspective of
An Interest-Free Economy" tried to develop a macro-model to
demonstrate that Islamic financial system can generate a macro-
framework of an economy leading to full employment, growth and
development. Utilizing conventional framework the proposed model
highlighted the investment and demand function and tried to relate them
to the process of economic development in an Islamic economy. The
main conclusion of the paper is that Islamic economy can potentially
have a macro-model where growth and development variables can be
manipulated through supply side.

In his paper "Causes of Fiscal Problems in Muslim Countries and

Some Suggestions for Reform" Munawar Iqbal argued for a structural
change in both expenditure and revenue of the Government budget. It is
argued that given government expenditure approach then for mobilizing
the necessary fund is not the right one. The paper also advocated that
the clear distinction should be made between current expenditure and
development expenditure while mobilizing resources. The author argued
in favor of greater participation of private sector for meeting the
development expenditure. The paper stressed the

13
need for activating the rural Waqf and community services for financing
education, health etc.

In their paper," Is Equity Financed Budget Deficit Stable In An

Interest-Free Economy" Hasan and Siddiqi constructed a fixed price
closed economy macro-economy model with budget constraints in order
to investigate whether or not equity financed deficit is stable for an
Islamic economy ? Contrary to the popular views, the paper argued that
equity financed deficit is not necessarily instable and appropriate fiscal
policy measures are expected to have positive effect on the growth of the
economy.

In their paper, "The Basic Need Fulfillment Guarantee in Islam and A

Measure of its Financial Dimension in Selected Muslim Countries",
Hasan and Ariff tried to highlight the problems of adopting
internationally standardized basic need in the context of a poor Muslim
country. The authors argued that every country's poverty is to be
evaluated in its own context and the cure is to be prescribed within its
own resource capacity.

In his paper, "Long Term Finance in Islamic Countries: A Case Study

of Pakistan" Akram Khan tried to review the progress made by Pakistan
in Islamizing its financial system and tried to draw its lessons of
experience. It is argued that as long as avenue for interest bearing
investment is opened, the possibility of successful transition of Islamic
system of finance would be very difficult. While advocating for a
structural change in the financial system in Pakistan, the paper argued
that the Shari'ah principles of no-risk-no-return in all financial
transaction should be strongly enforced. While the importance of his
suggestion can hardly be over estimated the problem of transition can
not be ignored. Necessary institutional framework should, however, be
developed for eventual structural change from interest bearing system to
the pure Islamic financial system.

Bandar Al-Hajjar and John Presley in their paper "Financing

Economic Development in Islamic Economics: Attitudes Towards
Islamic Finance in Small Manufacturing Business in Saudi Arabia"

14
tried to explore the role of Musharaka (participatory) finance and
Mudaraba finance. They tried to demonstrate that these two modes of
finance may not be fully adequate to finance small manufacturing
business in Saudi Arabia. While advocating for exploring other modes
of finance it is argued that these two modes of Islamic financing can
make significant contribution to small business finance. There is a
need to create an awareness among the existing investment agencies.

Iraj Toutounchian's paper "Some Consideration on the Size of the

Public Sector in The Islamic Republic of Iran" tried to evaluate the
size of the public sector in Iran in the light of new constitutional'
obligations coupled with old assumed responsibilities. Having in mind
Islamic states assume greater responsibilities than a capitalistic state,
the paper tried to find a measure for optimal size of the government of
Islamic Republic of Iran although the conclusion appears to be
tentative.

In his paper entitled "Efficiency of the Islamic Approach to External

Debt-Management in North Africa and Middle-East " , I. 0 . Taiwo tried
to highlight the problem of debt crisis confronting North Africa and
Middle East. He stressed the need for a program for comprehensive
development based on indigenous technology and greater co-operation
among the Muslim countries and also tried to demonstrate how
Muslims minority in Nairobi, Kenya have resorted to informal finance
for income transfers from the deficit to the surplus households for
sustaining the economic well being of the community. In order to get a
clearer understanding of the determinants of transfers, a multifarious
regression model has been estimated from data collected from 267
households. The results shows that in order to strengthen the role of
transfers in the improvement of the economic well being of this
community, there is need to strengthen their commitment to the
religion of Islam, improve their education, and improve their access to
the formal labor and capital markets.

In his paper, "The Role of Finance in Development: The Ottoman

Experience " Ahmet Tabakoglu tried to outline 800 year experience of
Anatolian Muslim rule from 11th to 19th centuries in economic terms

15
and made an attempt to derive its contemporary implications for
financing development. It is argued that Ottoman economy
discouraged credit and encouraged participatory financing and
financing social security services through patronage of private
foundations. It is argued that Ottoman administration followed
essentially export oriented policy.

In his paper, "Public Borrowing in Early Islamic History: A Review

of the Records" N. Siddiqi. tried to report the cases of borrowing by
the ruler for public services covering the periods of the holy. Prophet
(Pbuh), four pious Caliphs, Ummayids and Abbasides during the 333H
(944 AD). The study demonstrated that borrowing was a legitimate
activity even from non-Muslims in case of a need. Fulfilling basic need
was one genuine reason justifying borrowing. No evidence was found
from the record of early history of borrowing for financing economic
development. The paper concluded that the social authority should
make public borrowing purpose specific and identify purposes most
likely to motivate the potential lenders for providing interest-free
participatory financing.

In his paper, "Provision of Public Goods: Role of Voluntary Sector

(Waqf) in Islamic History" Abdul Azim Islahi tried to state the nature
and extent of public goods provided by the voluntary institutions of
Waqf in Islamic history. The paper also established that voluntary
sector in general and Waqf in particular played a great role in
providing public goods to Muslim community. The paper stressed the
need for internationalizing the institution of Waqf by setting up a
World Muslim Foundation to combat illiteracy and diseases and
ignorance.

Murat Cizakca's paper on "Relevance of the Ottoman Cash Waqfs

(Awqaf Al-Nuqud) For the Modern Islamic Economics" argued that
cash waqf constituted a special category of Islamic endowment and
played a very significant role in the Ottoman economy and financial
history. It was pointed out that while the cash waqf constituted about
16% of the waqf establishments during the reign of Mohamet, the
conqueror in 1505, the ratio increase to 50% by 1560. It became the

16
dominant mode of endowment. The paper argued that cash waqf was
instrumental in transferring the savings of the well-to-do to those who
needed cash for financing various socio-economic activities. The author
argued that by combining the cash waqf with long term capital finance,
the problem of cash-waqf's perpetuity can be solved. It can also promote
participatory finance, free of interest.

These sixteen papers covered a wide range of topics dealing with

various Islamic strategies for financing development and mobilization of
resources both from home and abroad. While the emphasis was given for
mobilization of resources through Islamic profit-sharing and equity
finance, this does not however preclude the possibility of raising funds
through other Islamic modes of financing such as leasing, instalment
sale, hire-purchase, bay salam, etc. While efforts should be made to
introduce and float various Islamic financial instruments, it is
indispensable that attempt should be made to develop private sector and
secondary securities market where these instruments can be bought and
sold. In the absence of this secondary market, scope for raising funds
through Islamic financial instruments will remain limited. Various
models and options for financing development in selected Muslim
countries are discussed and have rightly emphasized the need for
curtailing the wasteful expenditure and altering priorities of allocation
of resources in favor of fulfilling the basic needs of the people and
supporting developmental activities which will ensure equitable
distribution of income among masses of the people. In this context, the
role of informal finance deserves serious consideration.

An analytical review of the records in early Islamic history as well as

Ottoman experience showed that this sector can play a powerful role in
mobilizing domestic resources for financing development of modern
Muslim societies. Besides waqf, there is an urgent need to activate other
voluntary sector institutions such as Hajj, zakah, sadaqah, Mosque, etc.

In conclusion, it can be said that while effort should be. made to

institutionalize Islamic socio-economic values, Governments of Muslim
states should encourage the development of private sector. It is also

17
imperative to meet the government deficit out of conventional tax and
non-tax revenues. In the process of creating secondary securities
markets for Islamic financial instruments, the central banks of the
Muslim countries can play a significant role. It is gratifying to note that
there is a growing recognition of Islamic modes of participatory
financing both in Muslim and Western countries. The historic decline of
rate of interest in almost all western countries such as USA, UK for
stimulating investment and growth (i.e., where bank interest rates, in
1993 is within the range of 3.5% to 4.5% in USA and UK, the lowest in
the last 20 years) provides further justifications for Islamic participatory
and custom-tailored financing program for alleviation of poverty in the
informal sector and economic progress in the Muslim countries. In this
context, the importance for reactivating the voluntary sector can hardly
be over-estimated.

18
 Section I

ISLAMIC STRATEGIES
FOR FINANCING DEVELOPMENT

1. Shari'ah Compatible Shares: A Suggested Formula and Rationale

Muhammad Anas Zarqa

2. Financing Economic Development from Islamic Perspective

Hatem El-Karanshawy

3. Role of Equity Participation in Financing Economic Development

Rodney Wilson
 1
SHARI'AH COMPATIBLE SHARES :
A SUGGESTED FORMULA AND RATIONALE

MOHAMMAD ANAS ZARQA*

1. CONVENTIONAL PREFERRED SHARES AND THEIR

FUNCTIONS

1.1 Preference Shares

Preference shares are best understood when compared to ordinary

shares which denote part-ownership of a company. The holders of
ordinary shares are residual claimants on the profits and assets of a
company. Ordinary shares normally carry voting power and generate
variable returns depending on the profits of the company while in
contrast, the main characteristics of preference shares are as follows:

a) Preference shares have a stated rate of dividend usually stipulated

as a percentage of par value. Thus, a $100 5 per cent preference
share can be expected to give $5 per annum. But unlike interest on
a bond, that 5 per cent promised dividend rate does not constitute a
fixed obligation on the issuing company. If the company makes no
profits, or sustains losses in a given year, preference shareholders
get nothing.

b) Preference shares are preferred over ordinary shares as to

dividends. All profits go first to preference shareholders until they
obtain their specified dividend rate. Remaining profits, if any, go to
ordinary shareholders only.'

c) Preference shares are also given priority over ordinary shares as to

claims on company assets on winding-up. Thus, in case of

* Professor, Center for Research in Islamic Economics, King Abdulaziz University, Jeddah,
Saudi Arabia.

21
 liquidation, debtors such as bondholders are paid first, followed by
preference shareholders who are paid the nominal value of their
shares. Ordinary shareholders receive what remains.

d) Cumulative Preference Shares

1. If dividends on cumulative preference shares are not earned in a

particular year, they are not lost but must be paid up in a later year
if earnings permit.

2. Non-cumulative preference shares are entitled to their stipulated

dividends which are completely lost to the preferred shareholders
for any particular year - Which year? - This is not clear.

e) Preference shareholders may or may not be given voting rights,

whereas ordinary shareholders are almost always given such rights.
This matter will not concern in this paper.

1.2 Economic Functions of Preferred Shares

"Preferred stock is a curious hybrid between debt and equity.

Although it is technically a form of equity investment, it has many of
the characteristics of debt ..."

"In terms of risk, the preferred stockholder is in a less risky position

than the common stockholder but in a more risky position than the
corporate bondholder. Preferred stockholders generally receive a greater
of return on their investment than bondholders in compensation for the
slightly greater risk they assume. However, they generally receive a
lesser rate of return than the common stockholder because they assume
less risk". (Francis, pp. 19, 22).

Preference shares thus appeal to investors who would like a risk-

return mix between that of a bond and an ordinary stock.

22
 From the issuing company's point of view the advantage of financing
itself by preference shares is that they are a hybrid between bonds and
ordinary stocks.

When compared to bonds, preference shares represent less of a

financial risk to a company. This is so because interest payments on
bonds are fixed financial obligations that must be met in good and bad
times. In contrast, stipulated dividends on preference shares, as we have
mentioned earlier, need not be paid unless the company makes profits.

"As compared to financing by issuing new ordinary shares,

conventional preference shares do not dilute2 ordinary shareholders
rights", (Coopers and Lybrand, p.47). This stands to reason, because
preference shares have a limited claim on company's earnings and have
often no voting rights.

2. WHY PREFERENCE SHARES ARE ISLAMICALLY

OBJECTIONABLE3

The main Islamic fiqh objection to preference shares are two:

Firstly, Muslim jurists are agreed that a partnership contract should

not contain provisions that may occasionally lead to the suspension of
profit-sharing among partners. It is clear from para 1.1(b) above that
preference shareholders may end up taking all the earnings of the
issuing company if such earnings do not exceed the stipulated dividends
on these shares.

Secondly, on liquidation of the company, preference shareholders

may receive the full par value of their shares, in precedence over
ordinary shareholders. Thus they virtually stand as lenders (who can
reclaim their principal) rather than as partners. From fiqh point of view,
if they are to be considered lenders they may not receive dividends in
the first place; they can only get back their principal. If they are
partners, they may not have preference over other partners, i.e. over
ordinary shareholders.

23
3. ISLAMIC PREFERENCE SHARES: A PROPOSED FORMULA

I would like to propose a modified form of preference shares which

would serve specific economic functions, while_ maintaining full
conformity with fiqh.

To meet the first fiqh objection, I propose that preferred

shareholders get a higher share of profits as long as their stipulated rate
of dividend has not been exceeded. By higher share, I mean a share
higher than the ordinary, i.e. higher than that corresponding to their
share in the company's total capital. For example, suppose a company
has the following capital structure:
Ordinary shares (units of $1 each) $ 500 (or 50 per cent)
6 per cent preference shares (units $ 500 (or 50 per cent)
of $1 each)
$ 1000

Under conventional preference shares rules, the first $30 (= 6 per

cent of $500) of earnings would go to preference shareholders only.
Earnings beyond $30, if any, would go to ordinary shareholders.

Under ordinary Islamic rules of partnership, any profits earned

would be simply divided (50/50) among the ordinary and the preferred
shareholders.

Under my proposed formula of Islamic preference shares, ordinary

shareholders would attract preference shareholders by offering them a
more favorable profit-sharing ratio as long as the 6 per cent stipulated
dividend is not exceeded. In our example, preference shareholders may
be offered, say, 80 per cent of any profits below the level that would
bring them their stipulated 6 percent dividend. This works out to be
$37.5 (=30/.8). Beyond $37.5 of profits, the profit-sharing ratio would
swing in favor of ordinary shareholders to, say, 70 per cent, with the
remaining 30 per cent going to preference shares.

24
 In case of losses, Muslim jurists are unanimous that they must be
shared "normally", i.e., in strict proportion to each partner's capital.
There can be no preferential treatment in this case.

4. FIQH BASES OF THE PROPOSED FORMULA

Several fiqh rulings are crucial to establish the shari'ah acceptability

of our proposed formula for Islamic preference shares.

The first is that it is permissible ('inan) partnership to agree on a

profit-sharing ratio which is different from the ratio of capital
participation of the partners. This rule, in strict interpretation, applies to
partnerships where each partner provides some capital and some labor.
For reasons to long to spell out here, I feel there is good justification
for extending the same principle to cover common stock companies.

The second ruling is the permissibility of making the profit-sharing

ratio in a partnership variable, depending on the level of realized
profits. That second ruling was approved by the shari'ah Board of
Faisal Islamic Bank of Sudan (see Appendix).

The shareholders, ordinary and preferred, are free to agree on any

variation in the profit-sharing ratios from their ordinary levels (i.e.
levels that correspond to the capital shares of ordinary vs. preferred
shareholders). The only limitation is that partnership in profits be truly
maintained among all groups of shareholders. In other words, what
must be avoided is a situation where almost all profits go to one group
of shareholders. As a rule of thumb, it should not be objectional for a
group of shareholders to give up to two-thirds, of their ordinary profit-
share to another preferred group. But to give up say 90 per cent of
their ordinary share is either it is or it is not unacceptable from a fiqh
point of view.

25
5. A NUMERICAL EXAMPLE

5.1 The Assumptions

Assume a company has the following capital structure:

Ordinary stock (units of $1.00 each) $ 50.00

7 per cent Islamic preference shares (units of $1.00 $ 50.00
each)
$ 100.00

The preference shareholders were offered 70 per cent of any profits

earned by the company as long as the return on their preference shares
does not exceed the stipulated 7 per cent. This, practically, means .that
when total profits are no more than $5.0, preferred shareholders get 70
per cent of the profits,' while ordinary shareholders get 30 per cent.
For profits above $5, preferred shareholders get only 30 per cent of
the extra profits and ordinary shareholders get 70 per cent.' Losses are
to be shared equally (see section 3 above).

To illustrate, if profits in a given year were only $3.0 i.e., less than
the critical $5.0; then:

Preferred shareholders would get 70 per cent or $2.1.

and ordinary shareholders would get 30 per cent or $0.9.

If profits had been say $20:

Preferred shareholders would have got $8.0 (= 3.5+4.5 = 70 per

cent of 5 + 30 per cent of the remaining 15).

26
 and ordinary shareholders would have got $12.0 (= 1.5+10.5 = 30
per cent of 5 + 70 per cent of 15).

The following table illustrates the implications of our assumed

example:

TABLE

TOTAL EARNINGS, PREFERRED AND ORDINARY DIVIDENDS

FOR AN ASSUMED COMPANY

YEAR Total DIVIDENDS TO

Company
Earnings ($) Islamic Ordinary
Preference Shares ($)
Shares ($)

1 17 7.1 9.9
2 8 5.9 2.1
3 (-5) (-2.5) (-2.5)
4 9 6.2 2.8
5 22 10.1 11.9
6 21 9.8 11.2
7 (-10) (-5) (-5)
8 (-2) (-1) (-1)
9 18 8.9 9.1
10 14 7.7 6.3
11 10 6.5 3.5
12 (-4) (-2) (-2)
Arithmetic Mean (m) 8.17 4.3 3.86
Standard Deviation (s) 10.5 5.13 5.55
Coefficient of 1.29 1.19 1.44
Variation (s/m)

27
 In the table, column (1) gives the earnings of the company for . a 12
year period. I assume that when earnings are positive, they are fully
distributed as dividends to all shareholders according to the ratios
mentioned earlier. Column (2) and (3) must add up to column (1)
(total profits), of course.

It is important to notice in column (2) and (3) that losses, in

conformity to fiqh, are shared strictly in proportion to the capital
contributed by each group. Thus, the losses sustained in years 3, 7
etc., have been assigned equally to ordinary and preferred
shareholders, as both groups contributed equally to capital.

5.2 Risk and Return in the Assumed Example

Let us compare the risk and return of total earnings for the full 12-
year period in column 1 of the table to the dividend streams of
preferred and ordinary shareholders in columns 2 and 3. Annual
earnings of the company averaged $8.17, out of which $4.3 or about
53 per cent were distributed as preferred dividends, and $3.86 or 47
per cent as ordinary dividends.

Relative risk 6 as measured by the coefficient of variation was 1.29

for annual company earnings. For preferred shareholders relative risk
decreased to 1.19 while for ordinary shareholders it increased to 1.44.

This numerical example demonstrates that our suggested formula

has the potential to achieve its desired objective of generating from
the same stream of earnings two sub-streams, one with lower risk and
the other with higher.

There is an apparent anomaly however: ordinary shareholders

received a lower return with a higher relative risk. Normally, they
would expect a higher return for their higher risk. Presumably our
scheme would lead to this outcome when the company ' s profits
became higher as higher profits improve the relative position of
ordinary shareholders.

28
 One cannot of course generalize from numerical examples.
Analytical treatment is needed to explore the general conditions under
which our suggested formula can achieve its objectives.

6. THE ECONOMIC FUNCTIONS OF ISLAMIC PREFERENCE

SHARES

By way of introduction, it may help us appreciate the potential role

of Islamic preference shares in an interest-free economy if we answer
first the following question:

Why are preference shares much less popular than stocks or bonds in
Western countries? This can be explained by one fundamental reason.
It is that preference shares are a mix (hybrid) between stocks and
bonds; hence their main characteristic can be matched by a suitable
portfolio containing both stocks and bonds. The existence of preference
shares probably owes more to institutional or tax system peculiarities
than to basic functions not achievable without preference shares. This
leads me to believe that preference shares can play a useful role in an
Islamic interest-free economy where interest bearing bonds are
prohibited. In such a setting, Islamic preference shares can provide, for
any particular company, a financial instrument which is less risky than
its ordinary shares. It may thus appeal to those investors who would
like to sacrifice some return to achieve lower risk.

6.1 Attracting Investors with Diverse Risk Preference

A particular company has an expected earnings stream with an

associated expected return and risk. The expectation may be based on
its past record, if it has one, or on those of similar companies within its
"risk class". One may appeal here to the capital asset pricing model or
some alternative theoretical structure to characterize the given
company's expected return and risk. Investors preferences as regards
risk and return may mean only a sub group among them would consider
that particular company as a suitable investment. Other potential
investors would shy away if they considered its risk/return combination
too high(or too low) for their particular needs.

29
 The proposed formula of Islamic preference shares would permit a
company to partially change its risk/return profile for a sub-group of
potential investors by offering them suitably designed Islamic
preference shares. It would add flexibility and desirable diversity to
other shari'ah approved modes of financing.

6.2 Conserving the Rights of Ordinary Shareholders

Imagine an on-going company that has only ordinary shareholders

but needs additional financing for some new very missing investment.
Issuing new ordinary shares would lead to dilution of profits for the
majority of existing shareholders. The proposed formula has the
potential of providing a partial solution by limiting the extent of
dilution. This is because preferred shareholders would get lower profit-
share when earnings (are very high) exceed a certain return.

Similarly, the assumed company may find Islamic preference shares

an attractive financing instrument if present earnings are meager but
are expected to increase significantly in the future.

6.3 Overcoming Information Asymmetry Among Investors

The two previous functions discussed in 6.1 and 6.2 are those usually
ascribed to conventional preference shares. Restating them is meant to
underscore the fact that proposed Islamic preference shares can
maintain these functions to a degree that is compatible with shari'ah.

The author has been unable to find any reference in relevant

literature to the function now described.

Assume two groups of investors B and C who have identical

risk/return preference maps (functions), but different assessment of the
risks and potential returns of a given venture. Group B may be a new
oil-exploration group, or a new innovative company, that has no track
record to convince group C of its high potential earnings. One way to
still attract investments from C is to offer them Islamic preference
shares on suitable terms.

30
7. CONTROLLING RISK IN. ISLAMIC PREFERENCE SHARES

7.1 Introduction

Company earnings fluctuate over the years. A given stream of such

earnings has a corresponding mean (m) and a measure of relative risk
devoted by its coefficient to a fixed share(p) of the earnings, the
group's sub-stream of dividends would have a mean equal to (pm) but
its relative risk would be identical to that of the original stream (=s/m).
Thus any fixed profit-share cannot generate a change in the risk
character of the resulting dividends stream.

This suggested formula for Islamic preference shares changes the risk
measure of preference shareholders because it involves a variable
profit-sharing ratio.

7.2 Implications of Islamic Loss-Sharing Rule

As mentioned earlier, Islamic fiqh require losses to be shared in strict

proportion to capital contributed. Thus, no preference rules can apply
in those years when earnings are negative. Rather, given fixed
proportions apply then, transmitting to preference shareholders' stream
the full consequence fluctuations in company earnings. The more years
with losses, land the larger those losses, the less effective would be
Islamic preference shares in insulating preference shareholders from
fluctuations in company earnings.

Thus, fluctuations in positive earnings may be controlled for

preference shares by changing the terms and proportions that apply to
preference shareholders. For fluctuations in negative earnings,
however, one must seek a different method of control.

7.3 Cumulative Islamic Preference Shares

In conventional "cumulative" preference shares, preferred dividends

that are "missed" in a given year are carried forward in arrears, to be
paid in later years. This is objectionable from Islamic fiqh point of

31
view, as it treats "missed" dividends much like a debt on ordinary
shareholders.

The advantage of cumulation, if it were permissible, is that it helps

reduce or sometimes (iron eliminate out) completely the losses that
we need to be controlled.

After some reflection, a simple accounting rule that is well

accepted in fiqh can be quite helpful here.

It requires setting the accounting period among partners to be

longer than a year. Suppose it is made three years. This means that all
earnings, whether positive or negative would be, cumulated and
assigned to a "profit stabilization fund". The same preference sharing
rules would apply to the balance in this fund every three years. This
would go a long way to achieving the goal of cumulation within the
fiqh guidelines.

If a three-year profit fund is applied to our earlier example,

the relative risk measure for preference dividends would be
further reduced significantly.

32
 Appendix

FATWA OF THE SHARI'AH SUPERVISORY BOARD OF

FAISAL ISLAMIC BANK, SUDAN

Answer to Question 11

It is essential for validity of a contract of partnership in profits that

the division of the profits takes place in such a way that each has a
given common share of them, e.g. 50 per cent each, if there are only two
partners. The partnership will be considered invalid if the share of either
party is determined as a given sum of money, e.g. LS.1000, or 10 per
cent of the share capital, since the profit realized may not exceed the
fixed share of profits, and so the party given such a share will retain all
the profits. The profits may well be less than the fixed rate of profits
and the fortunate party may take part of the share capital. A third
situation is where the profits may exceed the fixed rate and the partner
with the fixed rate will feel aggrieved. Ibn El Munthir said: "All the
learned men whom we know are in consensus in invalidating a
mudharabah contract if one of both parties have fixed a given sum of
money for their share in the profits."

This is the case where the term fixing a given sum of money is
expected to result in one of the parties being deprived of sharing the
profits; but if fixing the sum is not expected to result in such
deprivation, fixing the profits may be permissible. For example, if one
of the parties agrees to give the other LS.1000 over and above his share
in the profits, if the profits realized amount to LS.5,000, then the
remaining portion is to be divided equally between the two partners.
This is the rule as stated in the book called "El Bahr El Zakkar" as
follows: "If one of the parties asks for ten (pounds) if the profits exceed
that, then the stipulation is correct and binding and there is no reason to
consider it as voidable.."

Accordingly the agreement referred to in the question posed by the

bank is permissible, since the profit is shared in common between the
two parties; and the stipulation according to which a fixed sum of the

33
profits is to be given to the bank's partner if the profits exceed a given
sum will not result in negating the fact that both parties will have a
common share in the profits. This is so because the partner will not
deserve the fixed sum except after sharing fifty-fifty with the bank out
of the fixed profits agreed.

REFERENCES

- Christry, G. A. and Clendenin, J.C., Introduction to Investments,

N.Y. McGraw- Hill, 1982.

- Coopers and Lybrand: (U. K. Firm). A Guide to Financial

Instruments. London: Euromoney Publications, 1987.

- Faisal Islamic Bank of Sudan: Rules of the shari'ah Supervisory

Board (n.d.).

- Francis, J.C. Investments, Analysis and Management, 3rd ed. N. Y.

Mcgraw-Hill, 1980.

ENDNOTES

1. One variety of preference shares, called "participating preference

shares" get a share in these extra profits.

2. By dilution we mean the reduction in the actual or potential

earning per share caused by issuing more shares.

3. For more fiqh details see: Al-Khayyat, Vol. 2, pp. 222-24, and Al
Marzooqi, pp. 358-61.

4. To reach the stipulated 7 per cent of $50 preference shares, profits

assigned to preferred shareholders must reach $3.5. This amount is
70 per cent of $5.0 of total profits.

5. The profit-sharing ratios beyond $5 level of profits need not be

(from shari'ah point of view) the reverse of those below $5.0 m.

34
6. Risk is often measured by the standard deviation (s) of an income
stream, and as such would be in the same units as the stream.
Relative risk is often measured by the coefficient of variation (s/m)
or the Standard Deviation divided by the arithmetic mean (m).
This measure of relative risk is adopted here because it is a pure
number that is directly comparable for different streams regardless
of units or time span.

35
 2
FINANCING ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT FROM
AN ISLAMIC PERSPECTIVE
HATEM EL-KARANSHAWY*

1. INTRODUCTION

The question of development finance has occupied the minds of

economic thinkers, economic policy makers and executors for more
than half a century. As a result of a number of factors, probably the
most important of which is the adoption of imported development
models, underdeveloped countries have suffered what was known as a
resource or "finance gap " which was faced by external flows in its
various forms i.e. loans, grant and direct foreign investment. These
flows did not lead, as was expected, to the structural changes that were
required but rather in many cases lead to the deterioration of the
relative economic position of recipient countries. The capacity of
these countries to meet their debt service obligation has been reduced
gradually. Islamic countries in general, apart from those producing oil,
are among those indebted countries. The external debt ratio to gross
national income in some of them has reached 213 per cent as in case of
Mauritania. Debt service burdens have, in some cases, reached 69 per
cent of the total export of goods and services revenue as in Algeria
and about 33 per cent in Somalia, Niger, Indonesia, Morocco and
Turkey. Not only this, but several recent studies on grants, as well as
the so called "easy loans" which are tied most of the time has indicated
that the effective cost of each such loan may not be cheaper than the
commercial cost of borrowing and could even be note. What is more
important is the fact that Islamic countries have been trapped in the
prohibitive riba? dealings and once they are trapped in this vicious
circle escaping from it becomes extremely difficult even if those
countries want to do that.

* Professor of Economics and Finance, AI-Azhar University and American University in

Cairo, Egypt.

37
 In this working paper, we shall try to present a framework for a
mechanism that may enable the mobilization of the surplus available
in some Islamic countries which is currently utilized in international
capital markets in order to deal with some of the needs of deficit
countries on shari'ah based principles. Such a mechanism should
ensure the efficiency of utilization in these countries. Before going
into the basic principals of this mechanism, it is important, from our
view point to discuss three points which represent the framework
through which one can determine the finance gap and as such we can
work out ways and means to face how such a gap can be worked out.
The very concept of development itself represents the first point in
such a frame while the second point is the role of the state and its
responsibilities in Islamic jurisdiction. The third point discusses the
relation between the proper concepts and institutional framework in
Islam and the mobilization of domestic as well as external resources.

2. THE CONCEPT OF DEVELOPMENT

Needless to say, any attempt to review the literature on

development from an Islamic perspective goes beyond the scope of
this paper. However, it is important to choose one of the many
definitions given for development in these writings in order to reach a
criteria that will help in the measurement of the finance gap in deficit
countries. The development concept which will be adopted in this
paper starts from the fact that all resources in heaven and earth are
created with the objective to serve human beings. As such, humans are
committed in the light of this dedication of resources, to exert their
utmost effort in order to free the Islamic society as individuals and as
a society from the pressure of need and to ensure that the individual in
that society, irrespective of his beliefs or ideology, is guaranteed such
satisfaction through his work or through the institutions in the society
even if his output and income is not enough to satisfy his needs. The
concept of needs satisfaction in Islam goes well beyond the traditional
economic concept of basic needs. The quantity, type and level of
goods and services provided is based on sufficiency and continuously
moves with the general average standard of living in Islamic society.
This commitment extends to

38
ensuring the power of the state in providing domestic as well as
external security in a general way i.e. economically, politically,
militarily and socially. Development in this way has a dynamic content
which means that it has to continue all the way through so mankind will
achieve increasing degrees of control over available resources.
Rationalization of resources utilization, as well as the fair distribution
of output, are the other commitments necessary to achieve ever
increasing levels of income and economic possibilities which keep
Islamic society in its proper place domestically and internationally as a
model and leading society. Needless to say, the achievement of the
development of such frames will require a set of mechanisms and
methods, some of which are linked directly to the question of financing
development. Others deal with the issues of production and distribution.
With respect to the question of finance, we would like to point out the
following:

2.1 Consumption patterns and consumption behavior in an Islamic

society is directly controlled through a number of directives that have
an effect on the type, size, the growth rate and direction of such demand
in various stages in society's development. In this way, the volume of
needed resources and their allocation to produce a type of mix that
would satisfy the needs of the society within the frame of these
directives would also be affected. In other words, the predominance of
inappropriate imported consumption patterns in Islamic society will be
reversely correlated with the degree of commitment of that society to
Islamic values and directives.

2.2 The basic concept in the relation between man and the process of
full utilization of resources is the responsibility of both individual and
the state, whether these resources be capital, natural resource or even
the labor power of man himself as a factor of production. As a result of
this commitment, the gap between the available and utilized;the
attainable and actual, in all areas, including financial is substantially
reduced.

39
3. THE ROLE OF THE STATE AND ITS RESPONSIBILITIES IN
ISLAM

The government, in Islam, plays an essential role in economic life

represented basically in its commitment to ensure the minimum
standard of living for members of the society. Despite the general
consensus about this commitment, the question remains: Does this
commitment fall primarily on the state if the initial distribution of
income does not make such an objective possible. If we say that it is
primarily the responsibility of the government or state, this would
require a high level of intervention for the economic decision makers
in order to ensure the availability of resources to carry out policies.
But if we say that the role of the state starts from the point where the
efforts of the members of the society end, it means that the basic
burden in the area of satisfying the needs of members of the society
will fall upon the shoulders of the Islamic market mechanism at which
point the government steps if there is a departure from Islamic
limitations or standards or in extraordinary circumstances such as war or
natural disasters. This does not mean, in any way, that the government
in Islam should play the role of the guardian state in its role of
monitoring the application of Islamic guidelines to relations. Its
responsibility is in ensuring the necessary prerequisites exist for proper
economic activity and social life, either through giving enough
incentives for individuals to undertake development investments, or
through the allocation of public funds to carry out these activities.
Such a role excludes completely the concept of the guardian state and
replaces by the effective state and interventionist state when necessary.
In other words, it could be said that the responsibility of the state in
normal conditions is to prepare and ensure the productive and efficient
utilization of resources and to take the necessary steps for individuals
to undertake required infrastructure facilities or use public resources to
create such an infrastructure. These measures could extend to allow the
imposition of utilization fees from those who can pay for these
services given that the state is going to provide such services free of
charge for those who cannot afford the fee i.e. the legitimate need, not
the ability to pay, would be the basis for the decision.

40
 In the meantime, the government has to secure the proper
environment for the producer, investor and the consumer. Such an
environment would require prohibition of all types of illegitimate
activities, such as production of illegitimate goods and services,
prohibited monopolies, riba in all forms, quality control of all goods
and services, adherence to announced specifications. Pricing in such
cases might be needed and accepted by the jurists. This will also
extend to the commitment of the government to undertake direct
investment in areas where individuals is not able or willing to step in or
to run what is agreed upon to be part of the public domain. With these
concepts for the role of the state, the market plays an essential
function in the mobilization of resources, its allocation and distribution
of the production on the various factors of production according to
each factor and contribution in the production process. The word
market, in this case, covers factor markets, goods and services markets
as well as capital markets which are all controlled by the same
principals. The government, through its various organs, would accept
the responsibility of monitoring and control. Price and quality control
would be borne by Al Mohtasib; the monetary policy by the central
bank etc. These organs would step in when necessary to harmonize
action within these markets and between them.

One of the more important empirical results from the utilization of

Islamic financial instruments in the market would be the elimination
of one of the most severe problems in investment finance in
developing countries which is the malfinancing structures as a result
of high debt to equity ratios. In such a case, the relation between the
lender and borrower vanishes completely. The nature of all funds
going into the project will be unified. Financiers will make sure that
studies are precise, follow implementation and monitor the
management activities. They will provide bridging finance in cases of
temporary technical insolvency and in the same spirit and readiness
will be available to finance expansions or increases in production in
later more profitable stages. One of the basic requirements for the
success of the Islamic financial system, if it is partially implemented
together with the riba based interest system, is the necessity of
modifying taxation laws they are based on the luminance of interest

41
finance on all transactions. As such, it gives implicit agreement to
borrowing with interest, since interest payment is treated as a cost
element. As such the effective cost of borrowing is reduced with as a
result of tax relief while the. return on profit sharing or risk sharing is
treated as part of profit. As such, it is taxed which increases its
effective cost on the institution at the business level. At the same time
this reduces the return to the financier. Needless to say, it is the
principal of Islamic countries to encourage Islamic financial concepts
that result from Islamic financial formats. The zakat system represents
what might be called the perfect tie balance for the economic
transaction cycle in Islam, not only because of its redistribution effects,
but also because of the effect on the production process and its effect
on the increase of supply of capital and its effects on the cost of finance
used as a base in investment decision making. All this directly affects
both the availability of finance and type of investment.

4. ESTIMATION OF FINANCIAL GAP

The estimation of financial needs for development depends -

generally speaking on a number of factors:

Development objective and its time dimension

Development model adopted in the society
The stage of development of the society.

The distribution or "the mix" between internal and external sources

depends basically on the development model, the technological pattern to
be followed and the mobilization possibilities of local resources,
including capital resources. The development model adopted by most
Islamic countries actually emanates from the school of thinking that
puts capital in the top position in the development process. The two
sides of this school of capitalism, and what used to be known as
Socialism or Marxism, are similar in that respect. As a result of such
concepts, industrialization was linked to modern technology which is
capital intensive was considered a basic path to achieve development.
This was linked directly with a wasteful and repeated misuse of local
resources and an increasing gap between the so called developmental

42
imports and exports of these developing countries. In our view, the
adoption of Islamic development concepts, the utilization of Islamic
forms and tools and the adherence to Islamic Market principles are
going to lead not only to reduction of the absolute size of the finance
gap but also to the structural uprooting of the discrepancies between the
estimation of the absorptive capacity and the misuse of available
finance domestically and external finance. Funds are more often than
not allocated to projects that do not produce direct or indirect returns
sufficient to carry the burden or cost of that finance.

Technological choice, on the other hand, will be controlled by the

demand mix and by society's ability to absorb the new technology,
given that demand is subject to a lot of mechanisms and directives
including zakat which made demand for essential goods a basic
ingredient in total demand in the society. It follows that technological
choice will be biased to whatever area of production of these essential
goods is selected. The chances of a wider choice of production
techniques in this area substantial.

Commitment to Islamic principles in this area of society should

increase its local contribution to the process of technological
development in a way that leads to technological independence.
Imported technology is not a neutral factor or a catalyst in the
development process, rather it brings with it products, production
techniques, behavioral patterns and values of the originating society
which may or may not contradict with those prevailing in the importing
society. In terms of financial needs, inappropriate imported technology
certainly places demands on foreign exchange as well as on total funds
required for investment and operation.

In the field of finance technology, the utilization of Islamic based

tools and techniques instead of interest based techniques in undertaking
public utility projects, for example, would lead to the following direct
and indirect effects:

a) Rational use of available finance as it would be tied to certain

projects that would have clear costs and returns and an accounting

43
 system as to guarantee investors capital and returns in the project
itself rather than the government or the Central Bank commitment to
pay back the loan with' the due interest.

b) Implementation schedules are likely to be adhered to - thanks to the

follow up by investors - which is not the case particularly with the
so-called developmental easy soft loans where the long grace and
repayment periods leads to a sort of relaxation and lack of
seriousness.

c) Once the Islamic Financial System is used, repayment of capital as

well as returns profits would be made out of the actual revenue from
the project i.e. users fees and government allocated funds for
subsidized users - instead of payment of debt service out of the
general budget. This would mean the real burden borne by non-
direct beneficiaries of the projects would be eliminated. It would
also mean that the unfair allocation of debt service on future
generations who might not benefit directly or even indirectly from the
project would stop.

In short, it could be said that the size of the finance gap, ways to
face it deal with and the efficiency of utilization and the distribution of
the burden of such finance would differ substantially if Islamic
countries were to adopt development models and financing techniques
directly linked to proper Islamic concepts rather than the present
utilization of imported development models, methods and tools of
finance.

5. PROPOSED MECHANISM FOR THE MOBILIZATION OF

EXTERNAL FINANCE

The . success of any finance mechanism requires the availability of a

group of financial tools that are diversified and attractive. It also
requires handling and dealing institutions and a market where dealing
can be carried out as well as an increasing size or volume of
transactions that would ensure the self-sustained growth of the finance
system as a whole. As for the external finance for development and

44
activities, the condition of diversification and attractivity would be
satisfied if these tools carried the following characteristics:,

a) Full adherence to Islamic legitimacy away from anything that may

have an indication or attachment of illegitimate transaction or any
riba dealings.

b) It should vary in its nominal or face value and its maturity date as
such it would be capable of addressing various types of investors.

c) It should have sufficient insurance against non-commercial risks as

well as risks of inconvertibility to freely convertible currencies at
maturity date.

d) It should be easy to circulate.

1. The assurance of the seriousness and viability of the investments

to be financed.
2. To follow up the implementation and circulation.
3. Indicate the market value of various indirect tools.
4. Provide the necessary insurance on shari'ah accepted basis
against non-commercial risk and against the risk of losing all or
part of the principle.

As for the market, there is no choice in the absence of capital and

stock markets that follow or adhere to Islamic principles that such
markets have to be simulated through Islamic financial institutions
working at present and making full use of recent developments in
communications and circulation mechanisms. The following sections
will point out the possibilities of interaction between flows:

Direct foreign investment

Indirect foreign investment
Development grants.

45
5.1 Direct Foreign Investment

Direct foreign investment is the one type of international flow that

largely adheres to basic principles of economic transactions in Islam,
unless of course it is directed to prohibitive goods and services. As a
result of many factors which include limitations on repetition,
restrictions on the movement and transferability in the ousting
countries, lack of information about investment opportunities, a high
degree of non-financial risks in the host countries and insufficiency of
bilateral or international assurances or agreements that ensures against
such risks. The relative weight of this type of flow has deteriorated
sharply since the mid-70s leaving its place for commercial loans and
development grants or development finance. With the recent
international debt crises, writings and discussions have began again to
point out and emphasize the vital importance of linking finance to
specific projects and presenting various formats for debt/equity swaps.
Requests have been made for international banking systems to review
their financing strategies so as to reduce the risk of failure kin meeting
debt service. All of these would lead to the expectation of a higher
percentage for direct foreign investment in international flows
particularly with the signing of a growing number of agreements both
bilateral and multilateral for the protection of direct investment from
non-commercial risks. The introduction of new forms of direct foreign
investment that goes beyond the traditional form of owning physical
assets in foreign country to cover so many forms of agreements and
transactions which extend to financial leasing, licensing, marketing,
know-how, trade marks and so on would enhance such a trend. Islamic
countries with a financial surplus might be interested at the present
time, where the importance of diversification of foreign placements and
foreign utilization of its funds is mounting, to study the possibility of
transferring some of these placements. Needless to say, direct foreign
investments alone, even with the assumption of facilitating and
developing the necessary environment in both the recipient and
exporting countries, would not be sufficient. to cover the needs for the
host countries. Some of the activities would not by virtue of its nature
be suitable for direct foreign investment. In infrastructure activities for
example, it would not be feasible to

46
imagine that in short or medium run, the private foreign investor would
be permitted to offer it for sale or close it down if its return is not
coping with the opportunity cost of the investment and so on. Such
infrastructure projects as well as other activities are badly needed in the
host countries and as a matter of fact considered as a pre-condition for
enhancing investment opportunities to attract local as well as foreign
investment. On the other hand, there are a number of advanced and
developing countries which enforce some limits on direct foreign
investments and control ownership or property rights in some
activities. This is linked to economic or political calculations and
balances that are difficult to change. All of the above recommendations
indicate the need for other forms of external flows together with direct
foreign investment. The following are some recommendations that
would, in our view, facilitate the flow of direct foreign investment to
the host countries. These recommendations could be divided between
measures to be taken at the level of host countries and others to be
taken on the multilateral or international level.
5.1.1 Measures to be taken at Host Countries Level

a) Develop a clear precise investment environment which means

spelling out clearly where direct foreign investment could step in,
investment opportunities are enough information about various
activities and legal as well as procedure aspects.

b) Full respect for local as well as international agreements and the

announced readiness of the host country to protect the parties in
these agreements on an equal basis without discrimination for or
against the foreign party.

c) Providing assurance against non-commercial risks. The could be

arranged through host country participation in investment
guarantee agreements (either bilateral or multilateral) that provides
schemes against such risks.

47
d) Legal restructuring of present laws - if needed - so as to recognize
the various formats of contracts that is proposed according to
shari'ah and determination of the legal position for parties to these
contracts.
5.1.2 Measures to be taken on Multilateral Level

a) There is a need for either an independent body or a body attached

to an international Islamic organization such as the Islamic
Development Bank to carry the responsibility of the collection,
verification and analysis of information concerning investment
opportunities in Islamic countries, as well as legal and procedural
forms in these countries. This information would be available to
investors from member countries for a certain fee. It would
enhance the performance of this body or institution to have
sufficient financial resources to enable it to participate in the equity
of some of the projects that would analyze a limited basis and
circulate them at a later stage in the secondary market to act as a
promoter or catalyst for these projects. Some lessons could be
drawn here from the experience of other international finance
corporations. One major task for this institution would be to study
the legitimacy of various formats used in the direct foreign
investment and propose new formats that adhere to shari'ah
principles if needed.

b) The coverage of insurance companies that carry the non-

commercial risk insurance should be extended to cover all Islamic
countries. In addition there should be encouragement to make
bilateral agreements for investments protection between the surplus
and deficit countries.

c) The council for Islamic research or any other body should be

requested to study the legitimacy of the debt/equity swap from the
shari'ah point of view, particularly if negotiations with lenders
could lead to the reduction of the outstanding debt to its original or
principal value and foregoing accumulated interest. Or to

48
 examine its legitimacy even if it has some interest as a measure for
helping Moslems to avoid sinful dealing with interest.

5.2 Investment in Financial Asset

Types of financial assets that could be utilized as tools for external

funds mobilization includes - but is not limited to the following:

1. Property rights or common stock in existing companies: this would

include the purchase of common stock in one or more companies so
as to diversity risk.

2. Participation bonds with differing maturity dates: these are

investment bonds based on participation in the outcome of
operations or activities which can be used to finance certain
operations such as trading activities, or to finance investments in
fixed assets in on going projects. This can be further subdivided to:

2.1 Bonds convertible to stocks upon request of the holder in

accordance with certain terms and exchange ratios.
2.2 Bonds that have a fixed maturity price (The par value).
2.3 Bonds that have a maturity value that may go up or down with
the net worth of the company.
2.4 Bonds for finance of infrastructure activities: these bonds secure
a relatively stable return and can be used to finance public
utilities whose services can be sold - as electricity - with mark up
on cost.

3. Unit investment bond: this is a bond that represents an investment

in a number of projects or activities so as risk is diversified
including foreign exchange risk and a certain balance is achieved
between dividends or annual returns and the capital gains that may
materialize.

As for common stocks, the subject has been studied in the number
of papers and conferences and the general agreement is that dealing

49
in them is legitimate whether buying or selling at market value as long
as the project concerned is adhering to shari'ah rules. What is needed to
encourage people to deal with this the establishment the proper
institutions, a subject that will be considered shortly.

As for the participation bonds that have a set maturity date a few
points may be raised:

a) Duration of the bond: Such a duration may be limited by the

nature of the activity itself such as a trade transaction, a specific
deal or service or the finance of working capital to meet an
expected increase in demand. In this case, the result of operation
and calculation of repayment would not raise any serious problem
from either an accounting view point or from the shari'ah point of
view. However, for other activities such as industrial, agricultural
or even service investments which have long productive lives, the
determination of the participation period should take into
consideration: construction or gestation period, and the expected
time horizon for the project to reach full productivity as well as the
attractiveness of investment. Of course this would be reflected on
the basis upon which the return would be calculated, and the
possibility of calling the bond before its maturity date and the
expected value in case of sale before the maturity date assuming
certain demand and supply conditions exist which will reflect, to a
considerable extent, the quality and the rate of such return.

b) Basis of calculating the periodic return: The periodic return

would depend on the actual results of activity whether profit or loss.
The question which arises here is at which stage in profit
calculation should the share of these bonds be based. In our view,
this has to be linked with the expected value of the bond at
maturity. This means one of two things: First, the bond will be
redeemed at par value. In this case the share of the bond or profit
realized should be calculated on the basis of the operating profit
and before deduction of depreciation or any other reserves. All
these reserves will be deducted from the gross operating profit and
will increase the net worth of the firm but will not benefit the bond
holder in

50
 spite of the actual contribution made with his money in achieving
these results. One exception that can be made is the special
reserves which may be directed to the enforcement of low expected
profits during the period of the bond and in this case it is be the
right of the bond holder to get his share in the reserve at maturity
but not before that. Second, the bond will be redeemed at a certain
value based on net worth of the activity at time of maturity. In this
case, the basis for calculating the periodic return will be net profit
i.e. after deducting various reserves. Of course this has to be done
after adjusting taxation laws so as to allow the return on bond to be
treated as a cost of finance on the borrowing company. The bond
holder is going to get his share in the increase or decrease in the
value of the bond. As a capital gains (or losses) at maturity date.

c) The bond might be a convertible one which means that it can turn
into equity right in the firm. In this case, the value of the bond
could be linked to a certain number of stocks based on their par
value. Alternatively, numbers of shares that can be acquired by the
bond could be determined on basis of market value of bonds and
shares at the time of taking the decision of conversions.

As for public utility bonds, Jordan has an interesting experience

where a bond's par value is guaranteed by the government as a means to
encourage investors. It is more appropriate - from overview - to
replace such guarantees by government commitment to buy back the
bonds at market value. Alternatively bonds may be extended for
further periods at the holder's discretion. The government may give
certain incentives to local investors to buy there bonds - e.g., tax
incentives. Application of the above recommendations would induce
public officers in charge of infrastructure projects to improve the
performance of such projects in order to secure the continuous flow of
investment funds for expansion, replacements and improvements. This
flow can only be secured with good rates of return and/or expected
capital gains at maturity. On the other hand these recommendations
would automatically establish the right of bond holders representatives
(Auditors) in reviewing cost and revenue

51
accounts. Returns over and above the guaranteed par value in local
currency may not mean much for external inventors in the light of
prevailing inflation and instable exchange rate in many Islamic
countries.

Unit investment bonds could be the appropriate starting point for

the flotation of the proposed tools. It is recommended that the " Unit"
includes a diversified package of short term bonds, medium term
bonds and long term securities. The latter represents an element of
stability and the possibility to achieve capital gains. Foreign exchange
generating activities ought to be included in the package as form of
hedging against foreign exchange shortage as well as exchange rate
fluctuations.

The "Unit" value would be determined and announced periodically

by the issuing organization based on a weighted averaged of market
prices of the package's securities at time of valuation. Subject to
further detailed verification from the shari'ah point of view, it is
recommended that investment in these Units would be close ended and
the structure of the portfolio should be fixed during the term of the
Units. Before allowing an increase in investment funds, full valuation
- with liquidation option - should take place for existing units.

Needless to say that securities in the package should be free from

riba transactions and any other illegitimate products, services, dealings
or financing tools.

5.3 Development Grants

Published statistics indicate a continuous decrease in development

grants flow whether in absolute terms or as a percentage of donor
countries' national income. The share of developing countries in these
flows in likely to decrease as a result of redirecting a good deal of
these flows to help eastern Europe move towards a market economy.
As such it becomes extremely important to maximize the benefits from
available funds. This may require the "transfer " some of the

52
developmental projects - including public utilities - to income
generating activities where development bonds could be used to
generate at least part of the required finance.

On the other hand it is proposed that part - if not all - the surplus
that may be realized from the mutual insurance fund operations (to be
discussed shortly) should be channeled to the most needy Islamic
countries to finance development activities that will not generate
enough income to induce private inventors. The zakat fund, due on
investment profits in host countries, could also be directed for the
same proposed subject to the control of Islamic Organizations. zakat
funds however should be used to finance those projects and their
property right could be transferred to eligible poor and needy - in
accordance with what is agreed upon by shari'ah Jurists - These
include housing projects and small scale industries.

Generally speaking with the gradual success of Islamic based finance

for several activities - including infrastructure ones - the urgent need
for development grants will be reduced - zakat surpluses in some
Moslem countries could supplement these forms together with
benevolent loans.

5.4 Institutional Frame

As a pre-condition for the success of the proposed mechanism,

certain institutional arrangements have to be initiated. In the host
country (or issuing country) and on the multilateral level in Islamic
countries.

The first level would include Islamic banks, private investment

companies and public enterprises that adhere to Islamic transaction
concepts and guidelines. Those are going to study - or evaluate studies
prepared by others about investment opportunities, verify return
expectations, formulate financing plans, propose appropriate financial
tools and manage the portfolio on the domestic level in case of a
successful flotation.

53
 On the multilateral or international level specialized companies (S.C.)
preferably attached to the International Islamic Development Bank in
the beginning will undertake the marketing and promotional tasks for
various issues, check the studies and review the availability of domestic
finance if needed. These companies-will also undertake follow up,
auditing and ensure host countries and their companies adherence to
disclosure requirements. Such requirements should be designed in a
way that enable investors or their agents to carry out accurate, regular
economic valuations of the financed companies.

The S.C.'s can also play the role of the secondary markets until there
are sufficient and capable stock markets in Islamic countries. This role
will include the regular publication of information about prices,
dealings, supply and demand trends, etc. of listed securities.

These companies may perform some underwriting functions as a

necessary promotional initiative. They may issue their own "Unit"
investments that would include a package of diversified securities form
different countries and activities. These units may have a certain appeal
for the conservative or risk averse investors as such units present a
suitable tool for the investment of Islamic banks excess liquidity and
mutual insurance funds. Companies revenue from its operations - on the
domestic or international level - could be based on a certain percentage
of the value of the operation - flotation cost - or a margin of the
securities profits once realized.

In addition to the need for these S.C.'s it is necessary to establish

voluntarily based mutual insurance funds which insure investments
against non-commercial risks and foreign exchange risks. It may extend
its coverage to partial or full compensation in case of principal
investment loss within the shari'ah approved rules for mutual and
cooperative insurance. Funds accumulated would be invested in low
risk securities or assets. Profit generated - as proposed earlier - may be
directed to development aid for the least developed Islamic countries.

54
 Shari'ah control over the processes of issues, flotations, dealings, etc.
should be performed by an international independent authority with
appointed representatives in host countries. The authority would have
the right to review, examine and access to all documents deemed
necessary for performing its obligations. This body's expenses would
be financed from flotation or marketing commissions. As for the
collection of the zakat on investments and profits generated, it should
be collected either by independent Islamic organizations or Islamic
banks in the host countries previously mentioned.

6. MARKET REGULATIONS

Capital markets, like all other markets, are subject to the general
rules that characterize Islamic markets for goods, services or factors of
production. The application of these well known general rules in the
case of stock markets leads to a number of points that may be worth
emphasizing:

Stocks should not be sold for more that its par value before
invested money is transferred to productive assets.
Disclosure roles should secure enough flow of information to
establish the link between the financial asset value and real assets
productivity.
Margin trading should be prohibited.

Such guidelines together with the general rules regarding prohibition

of monopoly and speculative trading, would mean market stability and
help prevent the possibility of stock market collapses which are
becoming a feature of modern stock market operations.

One point that may require some further consideration relates to

whether stocks should be nominal or issued to the bearer. Nominal
shares restrict circulation and liquidibility. It may also hinder some
investors who may not prefer to reveal their identity or interests. On the
other hand nominal shares facilitate shari'ah control and limit
speculation opportunities. Dealers may be authorized within certain a
regulatory framework to carry out title transfers within certain dates

55
special ledgers might be kept for that purpose pending final transfer of
title in the issuing companies. Dealers could also be permitted to
manage private portfolios with no need to disclose owner
identification.

As for government's guarantees regarding the capital or return on

investment - it may be advocated - provides that tax payers do not
carry the burden for such guarantees. It is difficult to name the public
fund or resource for honoring such guarantees of which would not
represent a deduction from the citizens share.. Government funds are
not private property - they are owned by the general public. As an
alternative the government may guarantee the serious implementation
of projects, flexibility of transactions, fair taxation policies, and adjust
taxation systems to adhere to shari'ah principles as it was mentioned
earlier - all what may be classified under investment incentives.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Islamic Development Bank's Trade portfolio of Islamic Banks to

Finance Trade of OIC Member countries, Regulations.

2. Islamic Research and Training Institute, Islamic Development

Bank, Foreign Direct Investment, Overview And Implications for
OIC Member Countries (Background Paper No. 4 by Tariqullah
Khan), Jeddah, 1412H.

3. Atchison, M; De Mong R; Kling, J ; New Financial Instruments, A

Descriptive Guide, The Financial Investments, Proceedings of A
Seminar held in Kuala Lumpur - Malaysia, 19-26 Sha ' ban 1407H,
(Edited by M. Ariff and M. A. Mannan).

4. Park Y; Zwick J . , International Banking in Theory and Practice,

Addison-Weslley Publishing Company, Massachusetts, 1985.

5. Campbell, T . , Money and Capital Markets, Scott, Foresman And

Company, Illinois, 1988.

56
6. Eiteman, D. Stonehill, A, Multinational Business Finance, 3rd ed.,
Addision-Wesley Publishing Company, Massachusetts, 1985.
7. OECD, Financial Market Trends, Paris, May, 1990.

8. Millard, B. J., Stocks and Shares Simplified, 2nd ed. John Willey and
Sons Ltd. Chichester, 1987.

9. Al-Karanshawy, H., "Cost of Capital and Investment Decision in

Islamic Capital Markets", shari'ah Faculty Bulletin, Cairo, Al Azhar
University, 1987 (in Arabic). "Development and Finances", Faculty
of Commerce Bulletin, Banha University, Banha, 1986 (in Arabic).

10.Harvey, C., Analysis of Project Finance in Developing Countries,

Heinemann, London, 1983.

57
 3
THE ROLE OF EQUITY PARTICIPATION IN
FINANCING ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

RODNEY WILSON*
1. INTRODUCTION

In the literature on development finance, there is a growing interest in

the subject of equity participation as a means of promoting
development. The limitations of debt finance are increasingly evident at
both the micro and macro level, especially given the growth of bad debt
as far as business is concerned, and the problem of national
indebtedness involving many Third World countries. Borrowing has its
uses of course, but inevitably leads to problems if it is used as a means
of financing risky ventures or projects which are of a long term nature.
In contrast, equity finance means that it is the provider of capital who
takes on the risk. The fact that there is flexibility in the pay-off, which is
related to the project being backed, actually serves to reduce risk and
enhance the likelihood of successful outcomes.1

Equity finance raises a- number of moral and ethical issues, which are
usually neglected by western finance specialists. As with other branches
of economics, it can be instructive to take account of such issues, rather
than merely rely on a positive approach. Equity financing can be
conducted in a very moral manner, and the principles of risk sharing and
cooperation through participation is certainly preferable to the conflict
of interest which often exists between borrower and lender in a debt
financing situation. Unfortunately, however, there are also negative and
morally objectionable factors. Equity markets. are renowned for
speculation and other undesirable behavior, especially in the thin and
volatile markets which are often found in the Third World countries.
Whether equity markets function in a just or unjust manner will clearly
depend on the motives and

* Professor of Economics, Department of Economics, University of Durham, U.K.

59
behavior of the participants. It is to these behavioral issues that we must
now turn.

2. BEHAVIORAL ISSUES IN EQUITY INVESTMENT

Conventional neoclassical economic theory assumes that individuals

are maximizers of utility, with the objective function for equity
investors incorporating a trade-off between risk and return. Less risk is
preferred to more risk, and higher return to lower returns, but the
investor cannot maximize both.

Although individuals are assumed to be primarily motivated by the

maximization of their own utility, the latter may not only involve
personal material gain. The social value of investment may also be of
concern to equity investors, and the placement of funds in socially
worthwhile ventures may be preferred to those of less or even negative
social value: The satisfaction which the investor gets from participating
in a socially desirable project will itself represent utility, and may
compensate for lower material returns.2

Recognition of the social responsibilities of equity investors has both

positive and negative implications. On the positive side there is the
benefit of participation, cooperation and partnership which is
advantageous for all parties. The depth and closeness of the relationship
between the provider and user of funds is much greater than in the case
of debt finance, and the construction of such lasting relationships must
be considered highly desirable from the developmental point of view.3

On the negative side the investor must recognize that absolute

freedom to dispense with funds cannot be in the social interest or even in
the interests of the individual investor. Moral and ethical factors must
be brought into the reckoning. Speculation, for example, is in nobody's
interest, and neither are dishonest dealings. Not only must the
investment itself be undertaken in a morally acceptable manner, but the
purposes for which the funds are used should be socially and ethically
desirable. The former implies behavioral constraint, the latter

60
the question of responsibility over resources which are, most people
believe, ultimately provided on trust and not subject to absolute
individual ownership rights.4

Good information is essential if investors are to take the optimal

decisions, not only from the point of view of profitability, but also with
regard to social and moral responsibility. Full disclosure of company
dealings is essential for investors, and proper reporting of financial and
business activity. All parties must be well informed and briefed about
each others affairs. There can be no place for secretary between
business partners. Poor information cannot be an excuse for
unacceptable business and financial practice, but it can be a contributory
cause.

3. METHODS OF EQUITY FINANCING

Equity finance implies that investors take a direct stake in the

businesses they are backing. This gives investors a voice in how the
business backed is run, although day to day decision making, and even
long term business strategy is in the hands of the managers themselves.
The managers are however ultimately responsible for their actions to the
shareholders in the business who provide the funding. How this
responsibility is exercised will depend on the form of business
enterprise, whether a partnership, a private company or a publically
quoted joint stock concern.

Each of these forms of business organization has its merits, but the
most appropriate form will depend on the size and nature of the business
and the financial and economic environment in which it operates.
Partnerships are especially appropriate where businesses are small but
where is a need to bring in external risk capital. This may be due to the
limited resources of the concern itself, but where the owner wants to
avoid excessive reliance on debt finance. If a partnership is created then
trust will be needed on all sides. It usually involves a large commitment
for the participants, even for the so called "sleeping partners", whose
prime function is to provide finance rather than management.
Partnerships are difficult to terminate, and

61
there is limited flexibility in terms of bringing in new partners or
changing partners. Such developments involve the complete legal and
financial restructuring of the business.

The formation of a private company with several unequal

shareholders may be appropriate for medium sized businesses where
the management does not want to incur the expense of becoming a
publically quoted company. There is greater flexibility than with a
partnership, but with the shares not marketed, there is less danger of
losing control to unknown buyers. Such companies may be a useful
way of structuring family businesses where there is a case for
formalizing financial relationships. It may also be appropriate where
there are no developed stock markets and little advantage in going
public in terms of gaining access to additional financial resources.
This is the case in many developing countries, where even when stock
markets exist, they are thin and lack depth.'

Cooperative forms of business organization are also found in many

developing countries, and have often been actively encouraged by
socialist governments. These have become less fashionable in recent
years, but have their merits, especially in terms of widening business
participation and the cross fertilization of ideas in decision taking.
They can be vehicles for risk sharing and the spreading of
responsibility, and often work well in appropriate social settings. The
main weakness of cooperatives is in terms . of being useful in
harnessing savings or investment funds independently of government.
There are of course notable exceptions, but most have been unable to
attract large private capital backing largely because private investors
or substantial net worth usually want some control over how their
funds are deployed, and wish to maintain the option of disinvestment.

Ordinary share issues are of course in many respects the best way
of raising risk capital, and the preferred option for large businesses
which can afford the expenses associated with going to market. The
main attraction is being able to tap a large capital market and raise
funds on much more favorable terms than is possible with bank
borrowing or private placements. Investors are satisfied with

62
anticipated dividends well below market rates of interest on loanable
funds, as their concern is at least as much in possible capital gains as
with the income yield.

Businesses do not have to guarantee a return as they do in the case of

bank borrowing. The risk seeking investor knows the return is uncertain,
but provides funding in the expectation that his or her judgement will be
proved correct, and the risk taken will be rewarded. The hope is of
course that the return, including the capital gain, will be greater than the
interest on a bank deposit, but if this is not the case, then the investor
has to some extent his or her own judgement to blame.6

4. REQUIREMENTS WITH EQUITY FINANCING

Given the attractions of equity financing, what pre-requisites are

there to ensure that such facilities can be made available to as wide a
range of medium to large sized businesses as possible? Clearly one
important pre-condition is a developed stock market where shares can
be traded without impediment. This implies a sufficient number of
buyers and sellers in the market so that dealing can take place at all
times. A market will clearly fail if a seller. cannot find a buyer at any
price and vice versa.

The number of buyers and sellers is important, as in thin markets

with few traders, prices can be very volatile. A seller may have to lower
the price substantially in such a market in order to attract a purchaser. In
a developed market, with many competing purchasers, prices will be
much more stable. A flood of selling will of course lower share prices,
but not to the point where the market collapses. Unfortunately in thin
markets, the risk of collapse is very real, and this in itself deters entrants
to the market, and keeps it thin. It can be far from easy to break out of
such conditions into relative stability where company performance
determines share prices and not limitations of the market itself.

63
 Width and depth are therefore essential features for market maturity,
width referring to the range of companies quoted, and depth to the pool
of potential investors. In many developing countries banks and
investment companies are the main quoted shares on the stock
exchange, most industrial concerns either being within the state sector
or private family businesses. This limits the scope of the stock market,
and means that its use is very restricted as a vehicle for risk capital
financing.

In such markets the number of private investors will also be limited,

as most potential participants are not merely interested in banks and
investment companies. The market attracts the wrong type of investor,
only those interested in prices and share dealings, not those concerned
with the underlying companies whose shares are being traded. Hence
speculators tend to be over-represented in the market, and not those
who take a long term view of equity investment as a potentially
profitable hedge.

It is far from easy task to get ordinary members of the general public
interested in stock market transactions rather than merely a rich elite.
One way of attracting interest may be through a privatization program,
be selling off previously state owned industries. Such sell-offs have
become increasingly popular in recent years, both as a means of raising
government revenue and freeing industry from the constraints of state
control. Ideologically it has been a way of encouraging "popular
capitalism".

Another way forward is by encouraging the development of financial

products such as insurance, unit trusts and investment trusts. It is then
these institutional investors who participate in the equity market using
the funds they collect, not the general public. In many developed stock
markets it is the institutional dealers who dominate rather than small
private investors. Insurance companies were historically the main
source of funds, as they had a huge client base, and a need to protect
their assets on a long term basis, and hedge effectively against
inflation. Only a wide spread of equities could provide such

64
safeguards; fixed interest bank deposits cannot give adequate protection
in real terms in the long run.7

5. A ROLE FOR UNIT TRUSTS

In recent years unit trusts or mutual funds have enjoyed increasing

popularity with the general public as a relatively safe means of
participating in equity markets indirectly. The 1980s witnessed an
unprecedented growth of the unit trust industry worldwide, and although
there was some slowdown after the 1987 international stock market
crash, the 1990s are predicted to be a period of further rapid growth.

The post-1987 growth is partly due to tax changes, such as the

inclusion of unit trusts for eligibility in Personal Equity Plans in the
United Kingdom. This means no capital gains tax is payable up to a pre-
determined limit, and there is income tax exemption on the dividends
paid. The main attraction of unit trusts is as a hedge against inflation
however, as already indicated, a means of maintaining the real value of
assets. The value of the units being directly linked to the prices of the
underlying equities can fall as well as rise, but these swings are in the
nature of short term cycles. In the long term, the value of units
invariably rises, which means the selling price of the units is at least
maintained in terms of its purchasing power.

There are three distinct categories of unit trust, capital growth funds,
income funds and balanced funds. Capital growth funds, as their name
implies, are designed to maximize the appreciation of the unit holders'
capital value over time, but are not primarily concerned with the return
on capital. Recovery funds are one example of a capital growth oriented
trust. Unit holders' funds are put into companies that are experiencing
financial difficulties, but are believed to have good future prospects
once they are rescued. This is of course a high risk strategy, as many of
the companies will not survive even after the capital injection. Those
that do recover often perform extremely well however, which can mean
a rapid rise in the value of these assets. It is this that brings the growth
in the value of the units,

65
despite the losses. The ability of unit trusts to have a wide spread of
assets means that losses are not catastrophic. Some failures are
inevitable, but portfolio diversification ensures a favorable outcome
overall.8

At first sight income unit trusts are much less attractive than time or
savings deposits with banks or building societies as the returns are
significantly lower. Investors usually contrast the initial income on the
units with the interest on bank deposits, and it is rare for the former to
be more than fifty per cent of the latter. With unit trusts it is always
necessary to take a long term view. The return in the first year
underestimates the long term benefits, especially as even with income
unit trusts the initial return will seldom cover the difference between
the buying and selling price, which makes the. units unattractive as
short term investments.

In the longer term the value of income units appreciates, which

increases the flow of income as the stock of assets on which it is based
is worth more. The capital appreciation will of course be less than with
capital growth units, but it is greater than is the case with bank deposits,
which maintain constant money values, and hence are of declining real
value. The interest income from a bank deposit does not increase in the
long run, which means that after a five to seven year period the return
from an income unit trust is greater, and the investor also has the
advantage of seeing his capital appreciate. For those who want even
greater capital appreciation, but with a somewhat lower income, a
balanced unit trust may be the best fund to buy into. Such unit trusts are
particularly well suited for the first time investor, who seeks to avoid
excessive risk.

6. UNIT MANAGEMENT IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

The scope for unit trusts is of course much greater in the context of
the developed stock markets found in the world's major financial
centers. Unit managers have a huge variety of quoted stock to select
from when making their portfolio choices, and there are no worries
about the tractability of stock. Responsibility for a particular trust's

66
performance rests with the unit manager and he or she cannot blame
imperfections in the market. The financial pores compile league tables
of the best and worst performing unit trusts in each category, and
these are published and avoided read by the investing public when
making their choices. Hitherto many investors used stock brokers
even when buying and selling unit trusts, and relied heavily on the
advice of these specialists. Increasingly the investing public has
become better educated and informed, and make their own purchases
directly, often by clipping press advertisements. By purchasing direct
discounts of the purchase price can be obtained, and there is no need to
pay brokerage fees.

In developing countries the main problems in constructing unit trust

portfolios are the limited range of quoted stock, the tendency for the
whole market to be volatile at the same time, and the risk that the
market will be suspended in the event of a major crisis. These factors
make it more difficult for the unit manager to reduce risk on behalf of
investors in the trust, and make it virtually impossible to create
differentiated funds aiming at income or capital growth. Funds have
to be marketed as balanced, but their can be little real balance if the
main holdings are of bank stock or of shares in investment companies.
This makes the unit trust a virtual portfolios of financial portfolios, far
removed from the underlying investments.

Further problems arise where there are foreign exchange controls

which imply that unit holders investments must be confined to the
home market. In the European Community, the United States and
Japan there are no remaining controls of this type which means unit
trust portfolios can be constructed from quoted stock in markets
anywhere in the world. The constraint is the information available to,
and knowledge of the unit manager, but he or she can act without
regard to narrow national considerations. Specialist funds have been
established which specials in particular areas of the world. These are
marketed appropriately to investors who wish to have global exposure
as part of their portfolio diversification to minimize risk, but who want
to be involved in those countries and markets where prospects appear
especially promising. Hence in London most of the main unit trust

67
groups offer Far Eastern funds, North American funds and even units
geared to particular markets such as Hong Kong or Singapore. Such
choices cannot be offered where there are foreign exchange controls that
impede the free mobility of capital internationally.

One way of overcoming the shortage of investment opportunities as

far as quoted company stock is concerned in developing countries is to
widen the range of instruments in which unit trusts can invest. A number
of Western unit trusts specialize in "gilts" or government stock. The
participation of institutional investors in such issues in developing
countries would strengthen the market for government paper. However,
governments would have to recognize the need for supply restraint
otherwise there would be little incentive on the demand side for
institutional investors to enter such markets.

The unlisted securities market is another obvious direction for

unitized investment. Such markets are by nature risky, being based on
stock issued by smaller and less established companies. By acquiring a
spread of investments, unit managers can reduce risk, and introduce new
capital to the markets which would otherwise be unavailable. Unit trusts
can also participate in markets where there is only periodic or irregular
trading in securities, provided the degree of exposure is kept within pre-
determined limits, and unit holders are made fully aware of the risky
ventures for which their capital is being used. Regular financial
reporting is essential, as it is crucial that investors are fully informed
about how their funds are being used.

7. VENTURE CAPITAL AND DEVELOPMENT

The subjects of venture capital and equity investment are usually

treated quite distinctly, as the former concerns new or infant small
businesses, while the latter concerns large well established companies.
Equity investments are always risky, but for "blue chip" companies the
degree of risk is low, and if investment vehicles such as unit trusts are
used, the risk element is even further reduced. In contrast placing capital
with new or untested ventures is a high risk business, where the
probability of failure may exceed that of success, but where the

68
rewards can be considerable if a "winner" is backed. The risks are
almost like those in gambling, but the motivation is worthy, and it is not
merely unproductive wagering on the basis of chance.9

From the developmental point of view the distinction between venture

capital and equity investment is less clear cut, as stock markets in
developing countries are invariably more risky, and there are fewer
companies which can be identified as "blue chip" investments. Most
manufacturing concern still fall into the infant industry category, and
even the larger independence private sector companies are small by
western standards. Much or even most investment could be classified as
on a venture capital nature, as it is subject to a high degree of risk.

The paradox of course is that it is those of substantial means who are

best suited to participate in venture capital finance, as they can afford
the losses, but the numbers of such people in most developing countries
is extremely limited. This implies a restricted domestic supply of
venture capital, as most citizens are in low income categories. As a
consequence a strong case can be made for opening up such capital
markets for foreign participation, where that is not already the case.

One way forward is to encourage the formation of venture capital

financing companies, perhaps though tax concessions to investors, or
through direct government participation in such enterprises. State
subsidies are probably necessary if venture capital companies are to get
off the ground that can provide assistance on reasonable terms to new
businesses. Such subsidies can be justified in terms of an infant industry
support policy which aims to promote domestic economic
diversification. It may also be an optimal way of matching state
participation with private initiative in a joint context rather than the
government attempting to do everything on its own, with little public
support, as has so often been the case in many developing countries.

It requires some ingenuity to conceive of ways in which the private

investor of limited means might participate in venture capital financing.
One solution would be to form a unit trust specializing in the funding of
venture capital companies, with portfolio diversification

69
across a number of countries and sector to reduce risk. The trust would
hold a portion of its assets in liquid form both to provide security and
to ensure that funds were available to take advantage of favorable
opportunities as and when they arose. The liquid holdings would be
government securities rather than cash, so that returns could be earned
on all assets to increase the attractiveness of the trust to investors.

8. RISK REDUCTION WITH PREFERENCE SHARES

In recent years there has been much less interest in traditional

investment instruments such as preference shares, which many
regarded as having been superseded by the growing sophistication of
western financial markets. Investors themselves are more interested in
risk reduction by the purchase of unit trusts than by the acquisition of
preference shares, as each purchase ties them to a particular company.
Company managements are less concerned about the voting power of .
equity shareholders, given the large and diversified shareholder
interests in most major companies. The advantage of issuing non-
voting preference shares is not regarded as significant, and the
disadvantage in giving one group of shareholders a preferential stake is
seen as a much greater burden. Banks dislike competing preferential
claimants, and' other shareholders resent being only second claim. The
excessive issue of preference shares can result' in a loss of confidence
in a company.

In the case of developing countries a stronger case can be argued for

preferential shares as a means of raising financing as fewer alternative
routes are available. The small investor may like the idea of having a
prior claim on the assets of an established local company, and may be
less concerned with voting rights. Where no unit or investment trusts
exist in a local market, or where the choice is very restricted,
preference shares can present a welcome alternative as a means of risk
reduction. One issue that must be clarified from the outset however is
whether the preference is a prior claim to the assets in the event of
insolvency, or a prior claim to income in the event of no or only a small
dividend being declared. It is the latter which is of

70
most interest to potential investors, assuming the company is easonably
regarded.

Unlike preference shares rights issues remain popular in western

financial markets, partly because they involve lower financing costs
than new equity issues. The right to buy fresh stock at an advantageous
price is given to existing shareholders, a move which is usually well
received if a good case can be made for a further capital injection. From
the company's perspective the advantage is that the shareholding is not
diluted, and there is no need to incur expensive advertising costs or the
cost of issuing a new prospectus.

Given the company loyalty amongst shareholders in many

developing countries in spite of the volatility of market prices, a strong
case can be argued for rights issues as an appropriate means of raising
additional funding. The same can be argued for warrants, which are
attractive for those seeking extra risk, but perhaps wanting to avoid the
hazards of futures and options dealings. There are few stock markets in
the Third World where such dealings are undertaken in any case, and
even when they are, it is largely in markets dominated by speculators
and arbitragers. Warrants require less knowledge for sensible dealing,
and there is less risk of the uninitiated being duped.

9. WORRIES ABOUT EQUITY AND LOAN FINANCE

The main worry about equity finance for management is the fear of a
loss of business control. This could involve a take-over by a hostile
predator or a buy-out unfriendly interests that might ultimately plan to
install new management. The workforce might fear that their company
might be acquired by an asset stripper, interested only in the salable
value of the property and not the business itself. Such unwelcome
developments are a common occurrence in the stock markets of mature
industrial countries, indeed there are financiers who have made their
fortunes through such activity, to some extent at the expense of others.

71
 In developing countries the financial markets have not usually reached
the stage of maturity where such actions would bring rewards. Asset
strippers are more likely to find easy pickings in the property market,
where their activities can be less easily identified, than in the higher
profile financial markets. There are few with the resources to mount
hostile take-overs, and interventionist governments, conscious of their
political constituencies, are less likely to sanction such activity.
Industrialists and company workers are likely to be part of a strong
urban political lobby, which governments see it in their interests to
protect. De-regulation does not mean a completely hands-off approach.
For this reason companies have less to fear from equity market
developments.

Although there are genuine concerns about some of the ramifications

of equity financing, alternatives such as loan finance have even grater
drawbacks. Bank lending on an interest basis is invariably more
inflexible, and there is the constant worry over debt and fear of
insolvency. The burden of interest payments can often exceed the actual
repayments of the debt, and these charges are often variable, but
dependent on macro-economic circumstances and not on the financial
position of the business being funded. When inflation rises for example,
money interest rates also usually rise, and hence the costs of debt serving.
This can affect businesses adversely at a time when input costs are also
rising and result in bankruptcy in extreme cases.

With equity financing there is much grater flexibility, and less

likelihood of insolvency. If conditions get tough, then businesses can cut
the dividends paid to shareholders, or even pay no return. Shareholders
recognize that they may be expected to share in the bad times as well as
the' good. Of course with no dividend they may be tempted to sell their
shares. In such circumstances share prices will usually be depressed, but
shareholders have the option of cutting their losses if they wish, or if
personal circumstances dictate. If they hold on they may make capital
gains when conditions- improve. If they sell, then the buyers of the
shares will make the capital gains. In any case the system is self
equilibrating as long as the market continues to function.

72
 In practice business will always wish to strike a balance between
debt and equity financing, and this is where the concept of gearing is
important. Debt financing is appropriate for short term working capital
and trade finance. It oils the wheelless of any business undertaking.
For longer term finance of investment and capital expenditure, equity
financing is more appropriate. Such activity is sometimes financed by
taking short term loans and rolling them over so that they become
virtually indefinite lines of credit. Such an approach is not advisable, as
it is this that results in growing debt burdens. There may be times
when it is necessary to reschedule borrowing due to unforeseen
developments, but this should not be the intention at the outset when
the loan is contracted. Participatory finance, based on risk sharing, is
much more preferable for long term ventures, given the inevitable
uncertainties as the time period increases. Fixed commitments to loan
repayments on commercial terms over long periods are never
advisable, even at the international level, as the Third World debt
problems dramatically illustrated.10

10. CONCLUSIONS

There is a strong case for equity finance as s source for long term
investment funding on the practical level rather than reliance on bank
borrowing. Such finance, being participatory in nature, is also more
equitable, as risks are shared, rather than placing the entire burden on
the enterprise being financed.

The main difficulty as far as most developing countries are

concerned is the underdevelopment of equity markets. When markets
are thin and lack depth, prices tend to be volatile. This 'attracts the
wrong type of investor, those with speculative motives, rather than
long term suppliers of finance who regard equities as a potentially
profitable hedge. The saver of modest means has little choice of
investment instrument. Most merely hoard, or place funds in savings
and time deposits with banks. Unit trusts are one means of
encouraging such savers to diversify their asset holdings, and provide
capital that could make a contribution to the finance of long term
development. This could be a useful source of risk funding. Such

73
units could be based on quoted stock, or on more direct participation
which would not necessarily involve securitization.

There are many innovative options which it is worth exploring. It is

clear that traditional debt finance is not the best means of promoting
development, indeed it has been actually harmful in many instances.
Given these experiences it is certainly encouraging to see that
alternative approaches are now being actively pursued.

For Islamic countries such as Malaysia the increasing interest in

participatory finance is certainly welcome, not only on economic
grounds, but in terms of moral and religious values. In Islam profit and
risk sharing are essential concepts in the economic laws in the interests
of both social justice and sound management. Participatory finance
means that economic efficiency does not need to conflict with
equitable distribution as western neo-classical economics asserts.
Development can bring harmony, not conflict. Participatory finance is
not merely capitalism with a human face, but a means of promoting
growth that can be consistent with most value systems, including that
of the Islamic World. It is a way forward that includes the best feature
of the capitalist economic system, but which may ultimately replace it
in a more morally concerned world.

REFERENCES

1. Malcolm Gillis, Dwight Perkins, Michael Roemer and Donald

Snodgrass, Economic Development, W. W. Norton and Company,
New York, 1987 (Second Edition), pp.345-353.

2. Gilbert Beauge, Les Capitauxde l'Islam, Presses du CNRS, Paris,

1990, pp 25-28.

3. M. Umer Chapra, Towards a Just Monetary System, The Islamic.

Foundation, Leicester, 1985, p.68 if.

74
4. Munawar Iqbal, Distributive Justice and Need Fulfillment in an
Islamic Economy, The Islamic Foundation, Leicester, 1986, p.12 if.

5. Rodney Wilson, Banking and Finance in the Arab Middle East,

Macmillan, London, 1983, pp.99-109.

6. Edwin Mansfield, Managerial Economics: Theory, Applications and

Cases, W. W. Norton and Company, New York, 1990, pp.455-490.

7. Hamish McRae and Frances Cairncross, Capital City: London as a

Financial Center, Methuen, London, 1985, pp.129-157.

8. R. L. Carter, B. Chiplin and M. K. Lewis, Personal Financial

Markets, Philip Allen, Oxford, 1986, pp. 196-228.

9. Muhammad Nejatullah Siddiqi, Insurance in an Islamic Economy,

The Islamic Foundation, Leicester, 1985, pp. 27-46.

10. Rodney Wilson, "Third World Debt", in Adrian Darnell and Lynne
Evans, Contemporary Economics: A Teachers Update, Philip Allen,
Oxford, 1988, pp. 178-191.

75
 Section II

DOMESTIC FINANCING OF DEVELOPMENT

4. A simple Model of Income Determination, Growth and

Economic Development on the Perspective of An Interest-Free
Economy
M. Fahim Khan

5. Causes of Fiscal Problems in Muslim Countries and Some

suggestions for Reform
Munawar Iqbal

6. Is Equity Financed Budget Deficit Stable in An Interest-Free

Economy?
M. Aynul Hasan &
Ahmed Naeem Siddiqui
 4
A SIMPLE MODEL OF INCOME DETERMINATION
GROWTH AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN THE
PERSPECTIVE OF AN INTEREST-FREE ECONOMY

M. FAHIM KHAN*

1. INTRODUCTION

Several attempts have been made to develop macro economic

models for an Islamic economy. These models usually, being income
determination models, have been developed primarily to study the
stability aspect of an Islamic economy like any macro economic model
developed in the secular framework. No attempt has been made so far
to describe macro economic models developed in the secular
framework. No attempt has been made so far to describe the macro
economic framework of an Islamic economy in the context of growth
and development, though, in the secular framework, we do find related
macro models with growth through the concept of full employment
equilibrium suggesting that manipulation of aggregate demand may
improve fuller utilization of productive capacity and hence generate
growth in the economy. Also, Leif Johansen discussed the macro
economic framework in relation to growth in the economy by
explaining the price impact in the model and hence showing that
casual demand encourages growth by increasing the profitability
implicit in the rise in price level. Such an attempt in Islamic economy,
though very much needed, has not yet been made.

The secular attempts referred to above related macro economic

models to growth and development through manipulation of
aggregated demand. I feel that an Islamic economy will potentially

* Head, Research Division, Islamic Research and Training Institute (IRTI) of Islamic
Development Bank (IDB), Jeddah, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The views expressed are not
necessarily those of IRTI/IDB.

79
have a macro model where growth and development can be
manipulated through supply side.

In one of my earlier papers relating to Development Strategy in an

Islamic framework (7) it was emphasized that growth in Islamic
economy can be manipulated through supply side by mobilizing human
resources through the peculiar nature of Islamic financial system. No
formal macro model, however was presented in this respect. In the
present paper I want to develop a macro model to show that the Islamic
Financial System generates an implicit macro framework that leads the
economy to full employment and then continues it towards further
growth and development. The paper will utilize the conventional ISLM
Framework to link a simple income determination model to growth in
the economy. The ISLM Framework will be developed under the
assumptions of Islamic economy. The ISLM . framework will
particularly highlight the investment function in Islamic economy and
money demand functions and then will link this framework to the
process of economic development in the economy.

2. THE MODEL

We assume an economy with unemployed resources so that supply of

output is perfectly or almost perfectly elastic and all prices remain
constant. The aggregate supply curve for output is horizontal and so is
the labor supply curve (at least a very big chunk of the total labor
stock).

We assume an Arthur Lewis type economy.1There is surplus labor

available with an almost infinitely elastic supply at a constant wage, 2
say W.

An economically active population can be divided into two

categories, (a) those who work as what we may call entrepreneurs
(working for themselves to earn a profit and not earning a wage or
salary), and (b) those who work as what we call labor (working for
someone else). We thus write Human Resource equation as:

80
 H= E+L
Where H is stock of economically active human resources,
E is that part of human resource that is active as
entrepreneurs 3 , i.e. working for (uncertain) profits,
L includes all those who are either working for someone
else for wages in a modern sector or are disguised
unemployed in the subsistence sector.

L has two types of labor (a) those employed in the modern sector (call
this labor as L1 and (b) those employed in subsistence or traditional
sector (call this labor as L2 ). Bulk of L2 is disguised unemployed in
the sense that their removal form the traditional sector is possible
without affecting the output of the traditional sector.

The output that L2 shares in the traditional sector is sort of average

product in the sector. This average product determines a floor for the
minimum wage that L1 will demand in the modern sector.4 We may
call this W. which is assumed to remain constant as long as there is a
surplus stock of labor in the traditional sector.

The employment of labor in the modern sector (L 1 ) is generated by

the demand for labor from the entrepreneurs (E) which, in turn,
depends on the following:

i) Marginal productivity of labor

ii) Reservation wage W referred to above

The employment of human resources (H) into E depends on the

following:

a) Opportunities for the human resources to avail to work for

themselves;
b) Expected profits (P) from entrepreneurial activities;
c) Availability of the capital requirement for the activity;
d) Willingness and ability of human resources to avail of an
entrepreneurial opportunity yielding a certain expected return
(P) by beating certain risks.

81
 Since W is assured in the subsistence sector to all the population, the
human resources will take up entrepreneurial work only if it ensures a
certain minimum expected profit (P) for them. The reservation for
expected profits is a function of W.

P = F (W) (2)

Expected profits (P) from possible entrepreneurial opportunities

motivate resources to organize profitable enterprise. Such enterprises
once initiated may also generate demand for labor (L).

There may also be a minimum capital requirement to generate a

minimum reservation of expected P desired by the entrepreneurs.
However, the more capital is available to an entrepreneur, the more
profits (P) he expects to make.

A typical entrepreneur may perceive a potential entrepreneurial

activity as below:

R m = Minimum expected output that may motivate a typical human

resource to take up an entrepreneurial activity.

I m = Minimum level of investment required to generate R profit in

the activity.

82
 The curve implies diminishing marginal output on investments as
more and .more funds are used by the same entrepreneur.

We further assume the following:

a) Savers and entrepreneurs are different agents. Savers are owners

and suppliers of investible funds and entrepreneurs are users of
these funds.

b) There is no cost charged or profits made by institutions for

financial intermediation. (This is only for simplifying the analysis.
The assumption can be withdrawn without affecting conclusions).

c) There are no funds available on an interest-basis.

d) Owners of funds can supply funds to the entrepreneurial human

resources only on a profit/loss sharing basis. Under this
arrangement owners of funds agree to share the actual profits
according to a pre-agreed ratio and to share the losses (if any) in
the proportion of their funds in the total investment of the
enterprise. (If the entrepreneur has no investment of his own, all
losses will have to be borne by the supplier of the funds).

e) There is a tax (Z) on the ownership of money balances or all such

assets that are susceptible for investment or are susceptible to
growth or generating income. The tax is exempted in initial stages of
development if it is given as a loan to a potential or a low income
earning entrepreneur. (As an economy grows even the loans to
entrepreneurs may become taxable).

f) Growth in GNP comes by mobilizing human resources by motivating

them to take entrepreneurial activities when wage paid jobs are not
available. The supply of finance on a profit-loss sharing basis
provided the motivation and incentive to the human resources to
take up entrepreneurial activities.

83
 The entrepreneurial sector competes with the wage paid sector and
an equilibrium is simultaneously achieved in the wage paid labor
market and in the entrepreneurial labor market.
g
) Entrepreneurial sector serves a catalytic role. When it moves it
makes the other sector (the wage paid sector move) and hence the
entrepreneurial sector plays a catalytic role for growth in the
economy.

This model of growth in GNP has two basic elements:

There is no interest in the economy.

All finances/investments are available on profit-loss sharing
system.

What type of macro framework will result in the economy if the

above strategy is to be implemented and what implications will such a
framework have for growth to be discussed in the rest of the paper?

The above mentioned elements are primarily expected to affect

investment demand and money demand. The reformulation of macro
framework, therefore, concentrates on reformulation of these two
sectors only.

3: INVESTMENT DEMAND

Determination of Profit-Sharing Ratio and Demand for Funds at

Micro Level.

An entrepreneur, intending to avail himself of a particular

entrepreneurial opportunity, generates demand. for investible funds.
The effective demand of the entrepreneur for investment funds
depends on expected profits (P) that the entrepreneur can earn from the
potential entrepreneurial activity. This P, in turn, depends on:

Total profits (R) expected from the entrepreneurial activity.

Share in the profits claimed by the owner of funds.

84
 The profits that the supplier of funds will expect to receive on his
investment may increase at a constant rate implying a constant expected
rate of return on his funds or it may increase at an increasing rate
because the risk may increase for the supplier of funds as he supplies
more and more funds to the same entrepreneur. There may be a limit
beyond which the supplier of funds may not be willing to supply the
funds irrespective of the expected profits. This limit may depend on
various factors including the human capital of the entrepreneur seeking
the funds.'

On the other hand, an entrepreneur may expect certain profits from

his enterprise at different levels of investment as has already been
shown in Figure (1).

The expectations about the profits for the entrepreneur, as well as for
the supplier of funds from the investment in a potential enterprise, can
be shown together in the following diagram:

Ievel
Fig (2)

Curve A shows the total expected profits that the entrepreneur

expects to make from his enterprise with different levels of investment.

Curve B shows the expected profits that supplier of funds wants to

claim for his investment in the enterprise.

85
 The entrepreneur will effectively demand that amount of investment
funds which leaves him the maximum expected profit after paying the
share of the supplier of funds. In the above diagram the effective
demand would be Io . At this level of investment, the enterprise is
expected to make a total profit Po out of which supplier of funds
expects to claim Q.. The ratio of Qo to Ro at Io os a o . This is an
optimum point for both the parties and becomes a basis for entering
into a mutual contract. The contract between the parties will then be
made to include the following:

a) Supplier of funds will supply an amount of I o to the entrepreneur

to invest.

b) Supplier of funds shares in the actual profits. Share of the supplier

of funds in the actual profits of the enterprise will be determined
according to the pre-agreed ratio a o .

c) If entrepreneur has made no investment of his own, all losses will

be adjusted against the investment made by the supplier of funds.

4. INVESTMENT DEMAND FUNCTION AT MICRO LEVEL

The 'a' - value is agreed upon ex-ante and determines the planned
level of investment. The changes in `a' will affect the effective demand
of investment funds from the entrepreneur. The changes in `a' may
occur as a result of shifts in A or B or both.

Curve A may shift up or down depending on the shifts in the level of

human capital, technology available to human resources and various
environmental factors affecting the entrepreneurial productivity of
human resources.

The ratio of expected profits at each point of the curve B to the

expected profits at the corresponding points on curve A would be
referred to as profit-sharing ratio for the corresponding levels of
investment.

86
 Curve B may shift up and down depending on various factors such as
availability of more investible funds with the owners of funds,
improved credibility of the users of funds, reduced risks due to an
improved political and economic climate etc.

An upward shift in Curve A (other things remaining the same)

means reduction in `a' as the ratio to Q O/Ro goes down at all levels of
investment. This may lead to an increase in the entrepreneurs
effective demand for investment funds.

An upward shift in Curve B, on the other hand, means an increase in

`a' at all levels of investment and hence may lead the entrepreneur to
reduce its effective demand for investment. It should be noted that
Curve A and Curve B are determined independently of each other.

The equilibrium point for an entrepreneur to enter into a contract

with the owner of the funds will occur when the marginal productivity
of investment in the enterprise becomes equal to incremental increase
in the expected profits claimed by the owner of the funds. (For further
elaboration see Appendix).

We thus draw the conclusion that the entrepreneurial demand for

investible funds will be negatively related to the profit-sharing ratio `a ' .
This relationship, we may express as:

I=F(a) F a < 0 (3)

This will be referred to as investment demand function. `a' varies

between 0 and 1. It is possible for `a' to become zero.

When `a' = 0 implies that the owner of funds supplies his funds to
the entrepreneur with no share in profit. This also implies that he will
also not share or bear any losses and the entrepreneur is obliged to
return the full amount at sometime in future. The possibility that the
owner of funds may supply their funds at a = 0 may occur due to
several reasons:

87
a) Expected profits are too low and risk of loss is considered too high
to be compensated by the share in the expected profits.

b) The action of helping a poor entrepreneur and allowing him to keep

all the profits till his enterprise is developed to the extent that it can
afford paying a share in the profit.

c) Avoiding the penalty (Z) on money balances as already mentioned.

It is possible that there may be a lower limit on `a' which we may

refer to as `a' below which 'a m' may not decline except to become zero.
This will happen when optimum value of `a' happens to be the value
that generates such low expected return for the owner of funds which
they find not worth accepting because of the larger risks involved. In
such a situation, owners of funds rather prefer to advance their funds at
a =0 for reasons already explained.

It is not possible for `a' to become unity though it may approach to

unity. This is because a = 1 implies that owner of. funds will take all
the profits that the entrepreneur makes which will not be a rational
situation from the entrepreneur's point of view and hence he may cease
to effectively demand any amount of investible funds. `a' may be
approaching to unity if R is very large and/or supply of investible funds
is very scarce.

5. INVESTMENT FUNDS MARKET: MACRO PERSPECTIVE

At this state, it is important to recognize that the economy may have

projects of varying degrees of risk. On the other hand, economy may
also have fund owners with varying degrees of risk aversion. In other
words, there will be 'n' sets of projects having different levels of
riskiness a,, a2 .. .......... an. The demand for these sets of projects and
supply of funds available for each set of project determines respective
equilibrium level of 'a' for each set of project. In the economy thus,
there will be 'n' sets of `a'. To keep the analysis simple, we assume
homogeneity with respect to the riskiness and hence we get rid of the
third dimension to reflect al.

88
 We assume large number of entrepreneurs and large number of
suppliers of funds. An entrepreneur chooses a supplier whose return-
risk preferences (Curve B) enable him to agree upon an optimum value
of 'a' yielding him maximum expected profit (P).

In this process of search, it is possible to enter into a contract jointly

with more than one suppliers, in order to arrive at optimum investment-
profit-sharing-ratio package. We will, therefore, refer to the supply of
investible funds in terms of units of investment funds (rather than
owner of investment funds) available at different levels of 'a'. At macro
level, curve B thus is replaced by an upward supply curve as shown
below:

On the other hand, the available investment funds look for more
productive entrepreneurs so that they are able to claim more profit.
The most productive entrepreneur believed to be generating the highest
return (R) at all levels of investment would be chosen first. At this
stage, we may not distinguish between entrepreneur and enterprise. In
the presence of surplus stock of human resources, we assume that each
entrepreneur represents a single enterprise. Hence, we need not
distinguish between profitability of an enterprise and productivity of
an entrepreneur. Competitive conditions can be assumed to ensure that
profitability of enterprises is equalized over all

89
enterprises in the economy. The investment funds market, thus, will
determine three things:

i) Profitability of marginal enterprise in the economy (R);

ii) Investment level in the economy (I);
iii) Profit-sharing ratio (a) for the owner of the investment funds.

Because of the assumption of large numbers of enterprises/.

entrepreneurs in the economy, we can also assume that the profitability
(R) of the enterprises in the economy at the margin will not be affected
by the changes in the level of investment (I) and profit-sharing ratio
(a).

Hence at macro level, while the investment will continue to be

negatively related to the `a'-value, as shown in equation (3) the (total)
profits per enterprise (R) will remain fixed in the background in a
short run perspective.

5.1 Goods Market Equilibrium

Let us take the simplest model of goods market:

Y = C + I + G (4)
C = Private Consumption
I = Investment Demand
G = Government Expenditure
Y = Aggregate Demand (Equal to Aggregate Supply)
C = b o+ b ( 1 - t ) Y (5)
I i o - i a (6)
G = G (Exogenously given)
Y = Ao - A1a (7)

90
 Equation (7) shows a negative relationship between `a' and Y. This
is an IS curve in our framework with positive slope.

6. MONEY DEMAND

6.1 Money Demand Function

Demand for real money balances will depend on the level of real
income and the expected return on financial assets.

It depends on the level of real income because individuals hold

money to finance their expenditures which in turn depend on their
income.

L = bY (8A)

The demand for money depends also on the expected return on

financial assets. The higher the expected return on the financial assets
the less worthy it is to hold money.

This part of the demand for money may not be directed at

speculative demand for money. This part of demand for money, in an
Islamic environment has the following elements.

Besides the transaction demand for money, there is a demand for

meeting the short term borrowing needs of others. With the
importance attached to Qard-ul-Hasan and with the embarrassment
attached with not helping a brother in need, the Islamic environment
would require every one to keep some cash for meeting the short-term
borrowing needs of others. The money necessary for such situation,
however, will depend on cost of holding money which of course is the
expected rate of return on investment. The lower the rate of return the
higher the demand for this purpose. The demand for money

91
motivated by altruistic considerations in fact, will be a function of both
income (Y) and rate of return (0). While it will be positively related to
Y, it will be negatively related to Q. This part of the demand for
money for some cash for altruistic purposes can be written as:

A =a2Y-hQ (8B)

The equations (8A) and (8B) can be combined to write:

LA = kY - hQ (8)

As far as speculative demand for money is concerned, theoretically it

can exist on the same based economy. The expected rate of return will
be more volatile than the fixed interest rate and hence increase the
urge to speculate. Though speculation will always be on an expected
rate of return but it can always be translated into the profit-sharing
ratio prevailing in the market. Thus, the higher the profit-sharing ratio
the lower will be the speculative demand for money and vice versa.

There is generally an impression given by Islamic economists that

speculative demand for money cannot exist in an Islamic economy
because of the prohibition on gambling.

Since there will be a natural urge to hold money in periods of low

expected returns in order to be able to invest in periods of high
expected returns and since such an urge cannot be institutionally
controllable, some speculative demand for money is inevitable. It can,
however, be said that the speculative demand for money will be
shadowed by the altruistic demand for money. In periods of low
expected return on investment the urge to hold money for altruistic
purposes will be more than in periods of high expected return. There
is some institutional control on speculative demand for money in the
form of zakah. That will only reinforce the altruistic motive for
holding money. The speculative motive will, therefore, still keep the
form of demand function the same as shown in equation (8).

92
Hence, the demand for real money balances increases with the level of
real income and decreases with the expected rate of return on
financial assets. We can write demand for money function as:

LA = K Y - h Q , k > o ; h > o (8)

L = Demand for money
Q = Expected profits on financial assets for the owner of the
asset.
But we know that Q = aR.

Since R is exogenously given to money holders as far as money

demand is concerned, we can write equation (8) as:

LA = kY - haR
or LA =kY - h'a (9)
where h' = hR

6.2 Money Market Equilibrium

Assuming a fixed money supply (M) and a constant price level (P)
implying fixed real money balances F we write money market
equilibrium as:

This is the equation which will be referred to LAM curve in order to

distinguish it from the LM curve that represents interest-based
speculative demand for liquidity. LAM curve is based on the

93
demand for liquidity that is motivated by profit-cum-altruistic
considerations.

6.3 Income Determination - 'ISLAM' Framework

IS and LAM curves determine equilibrium level of income as usual

except that we have profit-sharing ratio (a) instead of interest as
shown below:

s 'there a vertical section in the LM curve ?

The answer depends on whether 'h' can be zero i.e. whether demand
for money can be insensitive to changes in 'a'. (Equation for money
demand being M = kY - h'a). 'a' may cease to have any effect on
demand for money when Q (the expected rate of return for the owners
of the financial assets) is very low. At very low Q, the owners of
financial assets may not prefer to invest at positive 'a' as a matter

94
of risk aversion. Positive `a' means also the responsibility to bear the
losses. The low Q may not tempt the financial assets owner to bear the
responsibility of loss implied in this Q. On the other hand there is a cost
in holding money. The holders pay 1 on the amount held. In such a
situation where holders of money do not like to invest on a profit/loss
sharing basis and also want to avoid the penalty Z, they may prefer to
lend the money to those who need it. Money lent, in our framework,
does not share any profit and is liable to be returned in full at some
future date. This may also be referred to as investment with a = 0 (i.e.
neither earning any profits nor bearing any losses).

The money demanded will remain insensitive to `a' until Q reaches a

cawtain level (Q) beyond which owners of financial assets become
responsive to changes in `a'. With R (expected total return on
investment) as given, this implies, that there is a corresponding `a' as
well below which h'a is zero. Hence it is possible to have a vertical
section below a certain a. There may not be any vertical section, if R is
not low.

Is there a horizontal section in LAM curve? The answer depends on

whether it is poss<xle for money demand and financial assets to be
perfect substitutes of each other. In terms of lower Q, we have already
discussed that it is not possible that any addition to money supply may
add to the money demand because of the existence of a cost (Z) of
holding money.

Thus, the LAM curve cannot be horizontal at lower values of Q. It

may be vertical up to a certain level of `a' and after that it will have a
positive slope. However, there is a limit to the value of `a' as it cannot
be equal to or greater that unity. If R is very high, there is scarcity of
capital and there is excess supply of human resources willing to take
entrepreneurial jobs, the `a' may rise to a very high level, still leaving
enough P (expected return for the entrepreneurs from the investment) to
induce him to remain in the entrepreneurial job. As `a' approaches to
unity, the LAM curve will become flatter and flatter. At higher levels of
`a' with R being very high, Q will also become very high which enables
the entrepreneur to demand more

95
money as they can afford to pay Z on their money balances out of the Q
earned on the finances already invested. Hence the bulk of any
addition to the money supply at this stage may simply add up to the
money demand. The horizontal section of LAM curve is possible at
very high (close to unity) level of `a' values. Such a horizontal section
may not occur at a very low level of R may mean P to be less than P m
( a thousand point of entrepreneurial human resources to remain in
entrepreneurial jobs).

Thus, we may observe two extreme positions as below:

1. When Q is very low due to lower values of R, LAM curve may be

vertical below a certain level of `a'..

2. When Q is high because of higher R, LAM curve will be

horizontal as `a' approaches to unity.

In between these two extreme situations, the slope of LAM curve

will depend on the slope of money functions which is an empirical
question.

In this framework, it is important to recognize that the slope of

LAM curve will be different at different stages of economic
development. Whereas the vertical LM curve will occur at initial
stages of .development, the horizontal section of the curve may occur
at advanced stages of economic development.

6.5 Slope of the IS Curve

Can the IS curve have any horizontal section?

To see this we reconsider the IS equation viz:

Y = Ao A1 a (12)
Or a = A A'Y (13)

96
 b = Marginal propensity to consume
t = Rate of income tax
i = Responsiveness of effective demand of investment funds to the
profit ratio

IS can be horizontal if A, is infinity or `a' is zero. This can be

possible either when i is infinity or when b(1-t) is equal to unity. For i
to be infinite, it implies that more and more investment funds can be
offered by the owner of funds without any change in `a' and the
entrepreneurial human resources are available to utilize the increased
supply of financial resources without a change in T.

. For b(1-t) to be equal to unity implies that there are no taxes on

income and the marginal propensity to consume is equal to unity. Let us
consider under what circumstances any of these two conditions may
hold good.

It may be convenient to start by considering investment demand as a

function of Q (the expected return on investment to be paid by the
entrepreneur to the owner of the funds). We ask the question: Is there
any level of Q at which investment may continue to be done without
decline in Q? In our framework this can occur as below:

i) For a given R on investment for an entrepreneur there will be a

level Q which leaves just that amount of P which is threshold point
for human resources to stay in an entrepreneurial job.

ii) There is surplus stock of human resources, which implies an

infinitely elastic supply curve of entrepreneurs at P m. This surplus
stock cannot compete to raise Q because that would mean a return
to them below P.

97
iii) Any additional supply of financial assets in this situation does not
have to offer a lower Q to get themselves deployed with an
entrepreneur.

iv) Hence investment can continue to take place at Q because of the

surplus supply of human resources. It is not necessary that new
entrepreneurs always have to come from the surplus stock in the
subsistence sector. Labor already employed in the modern sector can
take entrepreneurial jobs vacating wage-paid jobs in the modern
sector to be filled by the surplus labor in the subsistence sector. The
investment function, thus, may have a horizontal section.

Infinitely elastic portion in the investment curve may occur without

the presence of the surplus stock of labor. This may occur in a situation
where R and, P are such that they leave Q which is not acceptable to the
owner of funds. Accepting Q (expected return for owners) also means
responsibility of bearing the loss, if it should arise. The risks may be too
high to be compensated by Q. But owner of investible funds cannot
keep the funds idle in view of the existence of the tax Z. An easy
alternative to them would be to give their financial resources
temporarily to an entrepreneur with `a' = O which would mean neither
sharing the profit nor bearing the losses. Besides avoiding tax Z, the
various considerations may also complement the motivation of
advancing one's resources, on `a' = O when R, P and Q are too low.
These considerations have already been elaborated in section 3.2.

In this case a horizontal section in the investment curve will occur at

`a' = O as shown below:

98
 0
Fig. (5)

Now we come to consider the conditions when [1-b(1-t)] may

approach to zero and hence may cause IS curve to have a horizontal
section. The expression [1-b (1-t)] can approach to zero only if b
approaches to unity and t approaches to zero. This can occur, generally,
at very low levels of personal income. We can safely say that in the
initial stages of development when R is very low [1-b (1-t)] may
approach to zero. This is because when R is low, P and Q will also be
low and P will not be low if W is not low. Hence low P, Q and W
imply low personal incomes in the economy which in turn may make 1-
b (1-t) approaching to zero.

. The conclusion of all above is that slope of IS curve may be

horizontal at some low level of R if the economy is in the initial stages
of development.

Since R is given per entrepreneur, the investment function expressed

in (a, I) space will be as below:

99
 This is turn implies that there can be a horizontal section in the IS
curve in the initial stages of development when there is surplus stock
of human resources and return on investment in quite low.

At advanced stages of economic development when surplus labor has

been absorbed and R is not to low the IS curve will have a negative
slope as shown in the equation (13) where the magnitude of slope will
depend on the values of marginal propensity to save and the
responsiveness of investment to the values of 'a'.

Is there a vertical section in the IS curve?

We again revert to equation (13) viz.

7. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND THE MACRO

FRAMEWORK

7.1 Efficacy of Monetary Policy vis-a-vis Fiscal Policy

LAM has been shown to be vertical for having a steep slope when 'a'
is very low and rates of return (Q and P) are also lower. In such

100
cases, fiscal policy will be ineffective whereas monetary policy will have
full impact on GNP. When returns (Q and P) are higher and `a' is also
closer to unity, the LAM curve has been shown to be flatter. The
monetary policy, in this case, will cease to be very effective and
government spending (preferably to help improve the productivity of
human resources) will produce more effective results on growth and
employment.

It means that in our framework, the government will have to rely

more on monetary policy when the economy is in the initial stages of
development. But as the economy grows, government may use both
policies. Ultimately when the country has sufficiently developed,
government may have to rely only on fiscal policy.

This appeals to common sense. In the initial stages of development,

(meaning low incomes of capital, low income of labor and low income
for entrepreneurs), the lack of taxable capacity may substantially limit
government spending. Monetary policy may be a better alternative.
When a country has sufficiently developed, people own a lot of financial
assets and they are earning high rates of return on them, pumping more
money may not be as helpful to the economy as government spending
that may achieve certain social goals are well while expanding the GNP.

7.2 Process of Economic Development

We start with the following situation.. The economy is at a very low

stage of development. There is a stock of surplus labor. R is very low
and so is W, P and Q. This implies a horizontal IS curve.

Government has to rely on monetary policy. Hence, government

decides to increase the money supply. It instructs the monetary authority
to purchase government shares in private enterprises. The monetary
authority selects suitable enterprise and purchases the shares (a) from
the owners of the funds of these enterprises. This increases money
supply in the economy. Increased money supply looks for new
entrepreneurs. (No portion of it can be held because of the tax Z).

101
New entrepreneurs with new investment opportunities -are generated,
implying some absorption of the surplus labor from the subsistence
sector. The output and employment in the modern sector increases
without affecting the output of traditional sector because of the
presence of surplus labor.

The aggregate demand and hence output increases by the full effect
of the new investment. As more and more money is injected not does
only employment and output increase but the entrepreneurial
productivity improves through learning by doing and through the
competition that newly entered entrepreneurs pose to the existing
entrepreneurs. In the process R improves. This is in turn raises Q as
well as P. This means demand for money goes down. The IS curve
becomes horizontal at a higher level of `a'. The above process
continues with IS curve shifting in horizontal jumps till all surplus
labor is absorbed. Now R is at a higher level than that from we started
and there is no surplus so that `a' has to be reduced to attract human
resources to employ additional supply of investible resources. But
reduced `a' will also affect money demand. A choice has to be made
between monetary policy and fiscal policy depending on which of the
two will be more powerful given various parameters. R keeps on
improving till we reach a stage where IS curve becomes vertical.
Monetary policy loses its significance. Fiscal policy becomes
important. Now it is time for government to take up big development
projects of its own. This will further increase R forcing `a' to come
down and once again, we are on a downward sloping IS and an upward
sloping LAM. The process continues till a stage comes where the
government's role ends up in the economy and self sustaining growth
may take place.

7.3 Low Income Trap

In the horizontal section of the IS curve, it is possible that even the

money supply may not be effective if demand for investible funds from
the entrepreneurial human resources ceases to exist. This may happen
when the entrepreneurial liabilities of human resources are extremely

102
limited due to illiteracy or due to extremely bad infrastructure (absence
of roads etc) or extreme political instability etc.

In such a case, mere injection of money supply may not be enough. It

will have to be supplemented by measures conducive to generate
entrepreneurial demand for investible resources.

ENDNOTES

1. See Arthur Lewis [3]

2. This may be a subsistence wage as assumed Arthur Lewis or a

Market-cum-reservation wage of labor in a labor surplus economy
as in Khan's framework [1]

3. This includes self-employed.

4. For further elaboration of this hypothesis see Fahim Khan [1].

The theory basically is that of Arthur Lewis [3].

5. For more discussion, see Khan [2].

REFERENCES

1. M. Fahim Khan, "A Study into the Causes of Fluctuations in the

Real Wages in the Labor Surplus Economy of Pakistan", Ph. D.
Dissertation (unpublished), Boston University, 1978.

2. M. Fahim Khan, "Comparative Economics of Islamic Financing

Techniques", Mimeograph, Islamic Research and Training
Institute, Islamic Development Bank, Jeddah.

3. Arthur Lewis, "Economic Development with Unlimited Supply of

Labor",. Manchester School, Vol. 22, 1954.

103
4. Ausaf Ahmad, Income Determination in an Islamic Economy,
Scientific Publishing Center, King Abdulaziz University, Jeddah,
1987.

5. M. M. Metwally, "al Tawaz al-Aam al-Siyasat at-Iqtisadiyyah al-

Kulliyah fe Iqtessade Islamic" (General Equilibrium and
Macroeconomic Policies in an Islamic Economy), Journal for
Research in Islamic Economics, King Abdulaziz University, Jeddah,.
1981.

6. M. Fahim Khan, "Investment Demand Function in Islamic

Framework", paper presented in the Conference on Resource
Mobilization and Islamic Banking organized by International
Institute of Islamic Thought, Washington, 1990.

7. M. Fahim Khan, "Development Strategy for a Labor Abundant

Economy: An Islamic Perspective" - Paper presented in the Third
International Conference on Islamic Economics held in Islamabad
under the auspices of International Institute of Islamic Economics,
1986.

Appendix

DEMAND FOR PROFIT SHARING CAPITAL

Consider an entrepreneur demanding capital for an enterprise. With Y

as output/ income, K as capital and L as Labor, we write production
function as:

Y = F (K,L) (1)

Since labor and capital are sharing the income of the project and
hence do not impose fixed costs, this production function also
represents net income function for the project.

104
 Assuming that the entrepreneur is the only labor in the project and
hence the labor component is faked we can write the production
function as:

Y = F (K) (2)

As a typical production function we assume that this production

function has a declining marginal productivity of capital, i. e. F' (k) >
O, F" (k) < O.

The function, in other words, has the followin g form:

Y

Fig. (1)

. On the other hand the provider of capital expects to receive 'a certain
return on his capital. The expected return, of course, will be directly
related with the total amount he invests. In the very simplest form, this
relationship can be linear relationship of the type:

C = rK (3)

Where C is total return that the provider of capital expects to earn

on his capital K whereas Y is based on his own utility function.

In the interest-based framework, the provider of capital demands Y

from the user of his capital. In the Islamic framework, the provider

105
of capital cannot demand Y. It can only fix a share in the income or
profit of the project.

Let this share be called 'a'. Since income, i. e. 'y' is not fixed and
varies at different levels, of K, therefore, the profit-sharing ratio
becomes a function of the amount of capital.

Using equation (3) and (2) we can write:

This equation shows, that profit-sharing ratio will vary as more and
more capital is invested because C is increasing at a constant rate and
Y is increasing at a declining rate.

This fact can be more clearly seen in the following diagram:

Y,C

Fig. (2)

The curve A is the production function representing equation (2). The

line B shows the total return expected by the capital owner at different
amounts of capital to be provided by him. This is a straight line
representing equation (3).

106
 Two things are clear from Fig (2).

Firstly, the income sharing ratio (a) is different at different levels of

(K). The value of (a) can be observed at any level of K as a ratio of the
corresponding value at line B to the ratio of the corresponding value at
curve A.

It can be noted that beyond a certain level of K, the income sharing

ratio starts increasing until it reaches a level equal to ILO. This will
occur at KO.

Secondly, it will not be in the interest of the entrepreneur to

demand any amount of capital from the capital owner. A profit
maximizing entrepreneur will demand only that much capital from the
capital owner that will allow him to retain maximum profit. In terms
of Figure (2), he would demand that much amount of capital against
which the distance between curve A and line B is maximum. (The
distance between curve A and Line B measures the income to
entrepreneur after paying the share of capital owner from the income
of the enterprise.)

Hence, the assertion* September 11, 1931 that under the profit-
sharing system there will be infinite demand for capital is not valid per
se.

The argument can be taken a step further.

Under a profit-sharing arrangement, the supply schedule for capital

funds may not be a linear function as shown by equation (3). Since
capital owner bears all losses of an enterprise, a capital owner would
not like to give as much capital demanded by the entrepreneur at a
constant rate of return 'r'. Giving all his money to one entrepreneur
would mean putting all his eggs in one basket. He would like to

* Several scholars make the assertion that profit-sharing system would mean infinitely elastic
demand for investment.

107
spread his investment among different. enterprises unless an
entrepreneur is willing to offer a higher than 'r' return - higher enough
to compensate the risk of putting more capital in one enterprise.

Thus a higher supply of capital for the same entrepreneur would

mean a higher income-sharing ratio with the same entrepreneur. In
other words, we will have to rewrite equation (3) as:

C=g(K) (4)

with g' (K) > O

g"(K)>O

The profit maximizing entrepreneur then faces the following profit

function:

R=Y -C
R =F(K)-g(K)

Optimum demand for capital by entrepreneur will be for that level

of K where,

F'(K)=g'(K)

This can be shown in the following diagram as well:

Y,C

Ko
Fig. (3)

108
 5
CAUSES OF FISCAL PROBLEMS IN MUSLIM
COUNTRIES AND SOME SUGGESTIONS FOR REFORM
MUNAWAR IQBAL*

1. INTRODUCTION

A poor state of public finance is a feature common to most of the

Muslim countries. In many of these, the situation has reached alarming
proportions. They have been living beyond their means for too long.
Huge budget deficits have been left uncorrected for decades. Instead of
taking prudent decisions either to cut government expenditure or to
mobilize additional revenue, politically easy means of bridging the gap
by either printing more money or borrowing from domestic and
international markets were resorted to. The result has been an increase
in the rate of inflation on the one hand and a huge build-up of public
debt on the other. Both of these are repugnant to Islamic economic
principles. Inflation distorts allocation of resources and renders the
whole payment system inequitable. Public debt, obtained on interest is
even worse. It violates the clear and unequivocal prohibition of riba in
Islam. Even on purely economic grounds, deficit financing is a
dangerous policy except in a very limited way (to mobilize untapped
resources by increasing aggregate demand through government
expenditure). Similarly, public borrowing, even in a secular framework
would be prudent only if the expected rate of social return from the
project being financed through borrowing is higher than the cost of
obtaining the resource. However, this simple and rather obvious
principle is often ignored in practice. Islamic modes of financing
automatically guard against such economic imprudence but
unfortunately Islamic countries have made no attempt to mobilize
resources on the basis of Islamic techniques nor introduced any
discipline to their expenditures in line with Islamic principles. As

* Islamic Research and Training Institute (IRTI) of the Islamic Development Bank (IDB),
Jeddah, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

109
a result, many Muslim countries. are on the verge of bankruptcy and
are constrained to tow their "donors" line both in economic and
political policies.

What is even more disturbing is the fact that in spite of huge public
sector allocations financed through borrowing, most of these countries
have not been able to build viable physical and human infrastructures. It
is painful to note that a majority of the population in these countries is
living in slums or undeveloped rural areas without even. safe drinking
water, not to speak of electricity, sewerage or other civic facilities. The
rates of literacy are extremely low; health facilities are severely
deficient; housing problems are very serious and transport facilities are
extremely limited. Even after decades of high spending, most of these
countries have not been able to develop good railroad facilities, good
roads, good schools, adequate health care, sufficient energy for
industrial and domestic requirements, adequate irrigation facilities and
similar economic and social infrastructure. Where has all that money
gone? What went wrong? How serious is the problem? These are some
of the questions that will be addressed in this paper. In section two, we
present the long run trends on the state of public finance in Pakistan as
a case study. We have tried to highlight the aspects which may be
similar to those found in other Muslim countries. In section three an
attempt has been made to identify the reasons that have led to present
fiscal problems. In section four we present some reform proposals with
the hope that these will provide a basis for discussion and dialogue
which may lead to the formulation of some guidelines for a viable
strategy for fiscal reform in Muslim countries in the light of Islamic
teachings. Section five summarizes the main findings of the paper and
presents the main conclusions.

110
 TABLE 1

SUMMARY OF PUBLIC FINANCE IN PAKISTAN

111
2. ANALYSIS OF THE TRENDS OF PUBLIC FINANCE IN
PAKISTAN.

Pakistan has been facing serious budget problems throughout its

history. Table 1 gives the data on Pakistan's public finance for the
period 1971-72/1988-89. These figures present a summary picture of
the public finance situation in the country. Total government revenue
remained at a level of 15-17 per cent of GDP throughout the period. As
compared to this total expenditure has been in the range of 23-25
percent of GDP. This has produced a constant overall deficit to the
tune of 8 per cent of GDP on the average.

While the overall figures of expenditure have been in the range of

23-25 per cent of GDP, the composition of this expenditure has
changed. There has been an upward trend in current expenditure and a
corresponding downward trend in development expenditure. The ratio
of development expenditure to GDP has registered a secular decline. In
a mixed economy like Pakistan, the government performs a wide range
of economic functions. Provision of infrastructure is the most
important activity reserved for the public sector. The development
expenditure in the government budget basically caters for this role.
Therefore, the declining trend in development expenditure has serious
implications for the long run development potential of the country.

It may be noticed from Table 2 that the two largest items of

expenditure are defense and interest payments which, taken together,
account for almost half of total government expenditure. As compared
to this, the share of health and education is 1.0 and 2.6 per cent
respectively. The literacy rate is less than 30 per cent which is among
the lowest in the world. On the other hand, the infant mortality rate at
105 per thousand is among the highest in the world. Electricity is
available to only 35 per cent of population and only 23 per cent have
access to sewerage facilities. About 40 per cent of the population does
not even have access to clean drinking water. Housing conditions are
also very poor. According to the 1980 Housing Census, there were 3.5
persons per room.

112
 On the revenue side of the government budget, we notice that the
tax revenues have stagnated at around 13 per cent of GDP. Within the
total tax revenue, indirect taxes account for 87 per cent while the share
of direct taxes is only 13 per cent. Since, the incidence of indirect
taxes on the poor is relatively higher as compared to direct taxes, this
feature renders the tax structure inequitable. Moreover, both in direct
and indirect taxes, the base is very small and the tax rates are rather
high. For example, in a population of 113 million, the number of people
assessed for tax is only about 1.5 million and among them also the
upper 5 percent pay 96 percent of total income tax collected.
Similarly, in the case of customs duties, more than 50 percent of
imports are exempted while rest of imports are taxed at very high rates.
In case of excise duties, narrowness of the base is even

TABLE 2

STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE

(Rupees in Millions)
1979-80 1983-84 1984-85 1985-86 1986-87 1987-88 1988-89 1989-90
(P.A.) (R-E-)

Current Expenditure' 32,324 71,945 83,769 94,686 116,242 133,645 153,066 163,733
Defence 12,655 26,798 31,866 35,606 41,335 47,015 51,053 57,926
Interest 5,070 14,128 16,529 16,734 23,955 33,238 38,132 45,291
Current Subsidies 3,821 4,668 5,368 5,368 5,809 7,950 13,277 11,037
Gen. Administration 3,011 5,955 6,560 7,379 10,393 8,542 10,192 10,277
Social Services 3,979 9,815 10,485 12,375 15,452 17,325 19,304 19,657
All Others 4,288 10,581 12,969 13,886 19,298 19,575 21,108 19,545
Development Expenditure 21,805 28,057 33,050 39,777 36,160 46,728 48,110 55,000
Total Expenditure 54,629 100,002 116,819 134,463 152,402 180,373 201,176 218,733

As percent of Total
Expenditure

113
 1979-80 1983- 1984- 1985-86 1986- 1987-88 1988-89 1989-90
84 85 87 (P.A.) (R.E.)

Current Expenditure 60.1 72.0 71.7 70.1 76.4 74.1 76.1 74.9
Defence 23.2 26.3 27.3 26.5 27.1 26.1 25.4 26.5

Interest 9.3 14.1 14.1 14.7 15.7 18.4 18.9 20.7

Current Subsidies 7.0 4.7 4.6 4.2 3.3 4.4 6.6 5.1
Gen. Administration 5.5 6.0 5.6 5.5 6.8 4.7 5.1 4.7
Social Services 7.3 9.1 9.0 9.2 9.2 10.1, 9.6 9.0
Others 7.3 10.6 11.1 10.3 10.3 10.9 10.5 8.9
Development Expenditure 39.9 28.0 28.3 29.6 23.7 25.9 23.9 25.1
Total Expenditure 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

* Current Subsidies arc included in current Expenditure and

Source: Finance Division
Development Expenditure

P.A. Provisional Actuals

B.E. Budget Estimates

more pronounced. Only seven items contribute 87 percent of total

excise tax. In case of sales tax 80 percent of the proceeds come from
levies on imports, 10 percent from excisable products and only 10
percent from other items.

The National Taxation Reform Commission estimated that for the

year 1984-1985, income tax to the tune of Rs. 18,528 million was
evaded as against Rs. 7,000 million actually assessed. Even if we take a
more conservative estimate, it is safe to assume that only one third of
the tax actually due is collected.

Finally, coming to the analysis of the third area of public finance

activity i.e.. public debt, we notice a build-up of public debt. Relevant
data is given in Table 3. The overall size of public debt has increased at
quite high rates. From Rs.150 billion in 1980/81, the outstanding public
debt has risen to Rs.657 billion in 1988/89. This gives an annual growth
rate of 20 percent which far exceeds even the growth rate in the nominal
GDP. Consequently, the ratio of public debt to GNP has risen from 50
percent in 1980/81 to 82 percent in 1988/89. Within the

114
total public debt, the domestic debt has increased at a much faster rate
than foreign debt with the result that its share in total public debt has
increased from-42 percent in 1980/81 to 55 percent in 1988/89.

TABLE 3

SIZE AND COMPOSITION OF PUBLIC DEBT

Year Foreign Percent Domestic Percent Total Public Percent

debt Share Debt Share Debt of GNP
1980-81 87,650 58 62,483 42 150,133 50
1981-82 96,798 55 79,089 45 175,887 51
1982-83 . 118,262 54 101,727 46 219,989 55
1983-84 127,832 51 122,683 49 250,515 54
1984-85 147,926 50 149,916 50 . 297,842
57
1985-86 178,839 46 203,119 54 381,958 65
1986-87 206,796 45 248,477 55 455,273 71
1987-88 -247,034 44 290,146 56 577,180 72
1988-89 294,000 45 362,683 55 656,683 82

Source: Ministry of Finance, Pakistan

The domestic debt has increased at an annual average rate of about

25 percent.

Besides the high rate of growth, domestic borrowing has also become
increasingly costly. This has resulted in rising interest payments on
domestic debt. The government is offering increasingly higher rates to
attract domestic savings. It should also be pointed out here that the
higher rates of return on government schemes have not led to additional
resource mobilization. They have only displaced

115
private sector deposits. This can be easily verified by the ratio of
private savings to GNP which has not shown any upward trend. It has
hovered around an average of 10 percent.

External debt increased at an average annual rate of 16.4 percent

during 1980/81-1988/89. The cumulative debt now stands at U.S.$ 15
billion which is. about 37 percent of GNP. Debt service payments
consume 25-30 percent of export earnings of the country thereby
putting a large burden on country's balance of payments.

These trends in public debt have important implications for future

policy making in Pakistan and similar countries. In the aftermath of
recent developments in Europe, the Soviet Union and the Middle East,
it is expected that foreign loans to many Muslim countries will become
more and more difficult. Faced with a financial crunch, governments
are in general prone to seek out the politically easier "solutions". Since
raising taxes and prices of public utilities is politically unpopular and
cutting expenditures is difficult because of powerful pressure groups, it
is feared that the governments would tend to resort to more deficit
financing and domestic borrowing. These methods are politically
attractive but economically are extremely dangerous. Deficit financing
would, in general, lead to higher rates of inflation and domestic
borrowing would lead to higher rates of interest and lower private
investment.. These would adversely affect the future growth rates
which would in turn increase the overall deficit and the country would
go deeper and deeper into the red. In this background, it is extremely
important to have a hard look at the causes of fiscal problems and to
adopt bold reform measures.

3. CAUSES OF FISCAL PROBLEMS

The reasons that led many Muslim countries into serious fiscal
problems may vary from one country to another. However, there are
some factors which may be common to many countries. Identification
of the exact causes of the problems is essential before any reform is
contemplated. In this section we discuss some of the more common
reasons for fiscal deficits. Though we are guided by the experience of

116
Pakistan, many of these reasons may be present in other Muslim
countries as well.

3.1 Big Government Philosophy

The period starting from early 1940's and stretching well into 1970' s
was in general dominated by big government philosophy all over the
world. Previously the only rationale for the involvement of public
finance authorities in the production of goods and services had been the
provision of public goods such as defense, law and order, justice etc.
These goods and services have certain technical characteristics
(indivisibility, jointness of production etc.) which make their provision
by the private sector undesirable or unprofitable. Since the society
needs these goods, they had to be produced by the public sector. In late
1930's John Maynard Keynes popularized the idea that government
could play a more active role in stabilization and growth through
management of aggregate demand. Under the Keynesian influence these
two functions i.e. stabilization and growth also became necessary
components of public sector objectives. Around the same period,
governments started realizing that market forces left to themselves, may
not produce the distribution of income desired by the society. Partly due
to rising levels of unemployment and income inequalities and partly as a
reaction to communist philosophy, governments started taking upon
themselves the responsibility of supporting the unemployed, the
disabled, the old and the very young.

In the light of the prevailing philosophy, the developing countries

were advised to increase public investment and to take over many
economic activities, especially through the creation of public
enterprises, thus providing capital and managerial skills assumed to be
lacking in the private sector. Most underdeveloped countries, followed
this advice. For a large number of Muslim countries this period was
very crucial. They were becoming independent after long periods of
colonial rule and were in the initial stages of public policy formulation.
The dominant philosophy and the strong desire to develop as fast as
possible pushed them into the direction of having large public sectors.
They did not realize that the assumptions on which big government

117
theories were based did not prevail in their economies. (The recent
theoretical developments have shown that they do not prevail even in
the developed countries).

While these countries committed themselves to big government

expenditure, they were not able to mobilize sufficient resources
through taxation because: (i) The proportion 6f "cash economy" in
these countries was very small which made it difficult to collect taxes;
(ii) There were difficulties of defining and measuring the tax base and
of assessing and collecting taxes due to low level of literacy; (iii)
Administrative structures were not very well geared to fulfill these
functions; and because (iv) Taxation is politically unpopular and
governments, especially those which lack public support or stability
avoid this option.

The lack of tax revenue forced these governments to resort to

borrowing and deficit financing. These two in turn became the major
causes of fiscal crises in these countries.

3.2 Borrowing on Interest

In order to fill the gap between total government expenditure and

total government revenue, these countries borrowed heavily both
internally and externally. The result has been that public debt has
accumulated to alarming proportions. Table 4 gives data on external
debt in some Muslim countries. It may be noticed that in 11 out of the
20 countries the total external debt is more than half of the size of
their GNP. The debt servicing eats up around 30% of their exports of
goods and services on average. This, of course, is a very serious
situation. But this is not the end of their malaise. In addition to
external debt, they have hugged domestic debt as well. Since all of this
debt has been borrowed on the basis of interest, interest payments take
a huge chunk out of government expenditure and is the second largest
item of expenditure. In case of Pakistan, it eats up more than 25% of
total government expenditure and is the second largest item of
expenditure after defence.

118
 TABLE 4

LONG TERM DEBT AND DEBT SERVICING FOR

SELECTED MUSLIM COUNTRIES (1987)

DEBT OUTSTANDING DEBT OUTSTANDING

COUNTRY
Total Amount % of Total Amount % of Exports of
(Million US$) GNP (Million US$) Goods $ Services

Algeria 23025 37.2 6325 65.2

Bangladesh 8990 51.4 371 27.1
Burkina Faso 778 41.5 26 6.8
Cameroon 3775 31.0 637 30.1
Egypt 34828 105.3 2307 31.8
Indonesia 45066 69.3 6423 34.2
Iran 1396 1.4 953 5.7
Jordan 3969 72.0 611 26.8
Malaysia 21569 72.1 3957 18.7
Mali 1831 98.2 32 9.4
Morocco 17112 102.1 1370 32.7
Nigeria 23343 97.4 1219 15.6
Pakistan 14668 44.9 1341 26.8
Senegal 3251 74.8 294 32.3
Sudan 7711 95.3 132 28.8
Syria 3324 14.0 395 32.3
Tunisia 5801 74.1 968 28.8
Turkey 30763 46.6 4557 31.7
Uganda 1137 30.2 72 20.8
Yemen A.R. 2376 51.2 171 78.0

Source:. Handbook of International Trade and Development Statistics, UNCTAD,

1989.

119
 The reason that public debt has led to fiscal problems is that almost
all of this debt is on fixed interest basis. While borrowing this money,
there has been little consideration of the rates of return on these funds.
A general, obvious and simple rule which is easily forgotten is that no
public spending financed by borrowing should be carried out unless
the expected rate . of return on it at least equals, and is preferably
higher than, the cost of obtaining the resources. This is' one of the evils
of interest-based borrowing. The costs of servicing the borrowed
capital have been higher than the rate of return on investments carried
out with those funds. And even that is on the generous assumption that
these loans were used for investment. In fact, a good part of these
loans was used to finance extravagant government consumption. This
again is due to the fact that under interest based financing, the financier
has little interest in the way the funds are utilized as long as the
borrower does not default. These inherent problems of interest-based
borrowing are now widely recognized and a number of reform
proposals are being discussed.

3.3 Huge Defense Outlays

The third major reason for fiscal deficit in Muslim countries has
been huge expenditure on defense. In Pakistan, it is the largest item of
government expenditure and constitutes more than 30% of total
government expenditure. There are a number of other Muslim
countries where defense has taken 25% or more of total government
expenditure. Since defense expenditure does not lead to a
corresponding physical output, it creates a huge burden on government
exchequer. Because of its crucial importance, however, it cannot be
ignored by any government. Many countries find themselves in
extremely sensitive circumstances which call for sizable defense
outlays. Unfortunately, most governments have neither been able to
execute the defense policies efficiently which could have saved a

120
considerable amount of money, nor have been able to motivate their
populations to render necessary sacrifice that their situation demand.

If defense expenditure is met from the general budget as is being

done, then interest payments and defense taken together account for
about 40-50% of total government expenditure in many Muslim
countries, and in some cases even more. There is not much left to
fulfill other functions that governments have taken upon themselves.
Therefore, expenditure exceeds revenues and budget deficits persist.

3.4 Inelastic/Narrow Tax Structure

As mentioned before, the governments in many of these countries

took a very large portion of public expenditure as more or less given.
When it came to mobilizing revenue to finance that expenditure they
were unable to do that. Judging from the experience of Pakistan, the
reasons for low revenue have been: (a) low tax base; (b) high tax rates;
(c) widespread corruption; (d) tax evasion due to difficulties in
defining tax bases clearly; (e) subsidized provision of public services;
(f) complicated laws and procedures and (g) strong feeling of public
animosity towards the system. Many of these facts apply to other
Muslim countries to a large extent.

Table 5 presents time series data on total government expenditure

and total government revenue in selected Muslim countries. It can
easily be inferred from these figures that persistent deficit is not
anything special to the case of pakistan. Most of the Muslim countries
suffer from it. The reasons seem to be quite common as well. The
inelasticity of total revenue is quite evident from the figures in Table
5. When we look to the structure of tax revenue, we again find
significant similarities. The share of direct taxes in total revenue has, in
general, been smaller than the indirect taxes, in most cases by a

121
significant margin. (See Table 6). Inelasticity of tax revenue is a result of
narrow tax bases.

122
 TABLE 5

TOTAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE AND REVENUE

IN SELECTED MUSLIM COUNTRIES (% OF GDP)

Countries 1978 1979 1980 on 1982 on 1984 1989 1986 1987 on

Algeria NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 34.5 36.7 33.7 31.9
Rev NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 37.8 322 29.8 29.1

Bangladesh Fp 10.31 12.281 10.11 13.91 12.83 11.33 10.95 12.11 NA NA NA

Rev 11.2 0.8 11.4 11.8 12.1 11.1 9.3 95 &9 9.2 &7

Burkina Exp 13.8 15.99 1624 15.4 17.5 13.8 166 13.4 15.4 1.7 NA
Faso Rev 14.5 13.5 15.6 14.1 15.1 14.1 14.1 15.1 15.7 17.6 NA

cameroon Exp 17.4 16.5 15.7 20.7 20.5 20.9 N.A. NA NA NA NA

Rev 111.5 19.4 164 175 1&0 23.4 24.7 NA 222 16.6 NA

Egypt Exp 4242 443 NA 46.0 55.5 45.1 46.7 43.7 45.9 41.1 NA
Rev 3&4 37.0 NA 47.1 46.5 44.2 43.2 4&0 40.1 2&1 NA

Indonesia Exp 19.4 20.6 223 24.1 20.8 21.2 1&9 21.9 24.7 NA NA
Rev 17.5 19.9 21.4 23.2 19.6 20.1 20.0 21.4 20.2 NA NA

Iran Ep 41.4 33.2 342 33A 30.8 2&1 23.9 23.4 NA NA NA

Rev 31.4 2&1 20.6 23.1 25.1 21.8 19.9 19.4 N.A. NA NA

Jordan gap 4&8 59.8 49.6 469 47.8 46.1 40.5 44.1 421 468 NA
Rcv 23.6 23.4 21.8 25.1 261 265 262 25.7 2&7 27.4 NA

Malaysia Exp 25.2 222 28.5 3&4 361 31.1 27.6 NA 34.4 29.0 NA
Rev 23.2 225 264 27.5 266 26.6 25.8 269 27.7 227 23.8

Mali Exp 1&0 17.4 244 228 27.9 30.7 30.7 349 27.8 27.8 NA
Rev 15.2 126 125 11.5 128 12.9 14.1 16.8 15.7 15.7 NA

Morocco Exp 34.4 34.9 349 40.3 3&6 33.9 3.9 33.0 333 30.3 NA
Rev 242 255 24.9 266 27.1 25.9 25.5 25.3 24.5 25.4 NA

Nigeria Exp NA NA N.A. NA NA NA 14.5 129 18.2 23.6 N.A.

Rev NA NA NA NA NA NA 105 11.4 15.7 15.7 NA

Pakistan 17.5 1&6 17.5 19.2 17.2 19.4 19.6 19.4 21.9 21.0 20.7
Rev 14.3 15.1 163 164 15.7 15.9 169 15.8 16.4 16.3 17.1

Senegal Exp 19.8 20.2 244 265 30.5 2&3 349 NA NA NA NA

Rev 20.1 20.0 25.4 23.3 22.5 20.7 19.8 NA NA NA NA

Sudan Exp NA NA NA NA NA NA 23.7 21.6 21.4 24.8 223

Rev NA NA N.A. NA NA NA 9.3 9.2 9.6 10.4 8.6

Syria Exp 421 39.21 48.2 38.6 NA NA NA NA 369 28.1 NA

Rev 227 23.6 26.8 226 NA NA NA NA 24.1 224 NA

Tunisia Ep 34.0 33.8 31.8 32.5 37.8 39.0 39.1 32.0 38.8 35.2 NA
Rev 31.4 320 31.6 31.9 343 33.6 365 33.7 34.5 31.5 NA

Turkey Exp 23.1 24.1 23.9 226 NA 242 24.9 25.0 21.11 21.9 213
Rev 20.5 19.7 20.l 21.3 NA 20.0 14.9 17.6 1&0 17.9 17.5

Exp 93 61 5.5 9.1 13.9 140 17.8 17.4 15.0 NA NA

Rev 9.0 26 29 20 8.2 11.1 13.9 122 9.4 NA N.A.
Eganda 30.7
Exp 21.6 33.3 34.4 39.2 3&6 33.4 2&0 25.4 31.4
R- 19.4 1&3 21.0 20.9 18.5 20.0 186 17.2 1&7 . 17.5 221

Source: Government Finance Statistics yearbook 1985.

123
 TABLE 6

STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT REVENUE

IN SELECTED MUSLIM COUNTRIES (1988)
(% OF TOTAL REVENUE)

COUNTRY Direct Indirect Non-Tax Total Revenue

Taxes Taxes Revenue as % of GDP
Algeria 21.8 54.9 23.3. 30.0
Bangladesh 11.9 71.5 16.6 9.5
Burkina Faso 23.6 55.7 20.7 17.6
Cameroon 36.7 37.6 25.7 233.4
Egypt 29.1 32.6 38.3 38.1
Indonesia 55.9 33.1 11.0 N.A.
Iran 22.9 22.7 54.4 N.A.
Jordan 9.8 53.4 36.8 27.4
Malaysia 32.9 37.3 29.8 22.7
Mali 12.5 78.4 9.1 15.7
Morocco 24.0 65.8 10.2 25.4
Nigeria 39.9 12.0 48.1 15.7
Pakistan 11.9 64.3 23.8 16.4
Senegal 23.0 71.5 5.5 19.8
Sudan 14.0 63.6 22.4 9.5
Syria 32.3 35.0 32.7 22.4
Tunisia 22.1 52.5 25.4 31.5
Turkey 39.5 42.0 18.5 17.5
Uganda 6.0 94.0 0.0 9.4
Yemen A.R. 19.7 40.3 40.0 22.6

Source: Computed from data given in World Development Report 1990 and
Government Finance Yearbook 1989.

124
3.5 Tax Evasion

The problems of tax evasion are also common knowledge. These are
not easy to quantify, but their magnitude is generally believed to be
substantial. In the case of Pakistan, it was estimated that the tax evaded
was more than three times the amount of tax collected.* The major
reasons for tax evasion are multiplicity of exemptions on the one hand
and high tax rates on the other. Moreover, lack of clearly identifiable
and easily assessable tax bases has made tax evasion quite easy.

4. STRATEGY FOR FISCAL REFORMS

Through the analysis in previous sections we have tried to emphasize

the seriousness of fiscal problems in Muslim countries. We have also
tried to identify the major problems in the area of public finance. In this
section, we will make a few suggestions to tackle those problems. Before
doing that, however, we would like to caution that the problems are very
complex and long-standing. There are no easy solutions. Any reform
effort will need both political will as well as public support. People
have to be convinced of the need to make the sacrifices that they are
asked to make. There is an urgent need to overhaul tax systems and to
rationalize expenditure patterns. Fiscal reforms are being introduced all
over the world. While it would be useful to take notice of various
proposals for reform, it is high time that Muslim countries start to
formulate their policies in the light of Islamic teachings.

4.1 Defining the Proper Role of Public Sector

Any reform proposal must start with defining the proper role of
public sector. From a purely economic point of view, the experience of
three decades following World War II, which were characterized by

*Report of the National Taxation Reform Commission:

125
large public sector outlays, has shown that the big-government
philosophy has serious flaws. The growth of public spending was
justified on grounds that the government must promote economic
growth, sustain economic activity and bring about a better income
distribution. Yet the experience of many developed countries shows
that economies have not become more stable because of governmental
intervention; income distribution has not improved and the rate of
growth has not accelerated because of the larger government
involvement: Economic historians also state that the period between
1870 and 1913 was one of the most dynamic periods for the economies
of the modern world. The rate of growth was normally very high, and
must modern infrastructure such as railroads, roads and schools was
built. Yet the level of public spending was remarkably low. For
example, in France it was only about 10 percent of national income.
Similar percentages are found for the other countries (Tani, 1990).
These percentages raise doubts about the necessity for high levels of
public expenditure in promoting economic growth. In view of these
facts and the recent theoretical developments in the field of public
policy, more and more governments are now encouraging the private
sector, privatizing public enterprises and reducing regulations which
limit private sector activities.

Muslim countries must take note of these developments. In

addition, they must refer to Islamic principles in order to define a
proper role for the public sector. In the recent literature on Islamic
economics, there has been some discussion about the role of public
expenditure in an Islamic state and whether a modern government has
the right to impose additional taxes i.e. taxes other than the traditional
Islamic levies and if so under what conditions. (See for example:
Siddiqi, 1986 and Kahf, 1983). This literature is quite instructive.
While there is wide-spread support for the right of a Muslim
government to impose additional taxes, Islamic scholars are much
more strict with regard to seeking clear and proper justification for any
additional taxes and the utilization of public revenue.

126
4.2 Creating Earmarked Heads of Public Expenditure

A modern government has to perform a number of functions. In order

to perform these functions it needs to mobilize resources. The
predominant practice at present is that all government revenue is kept in
a general p o o l out of which expenditure to various heads is
apportioned. This practice has in general resulted in neglect of certain
functions which, from an Islamic point of view, should get top-most
priority. There are some other expenditures which are more or less
unavoidable. Defense and debt servicing are examples of such
expenditure. After meeting these expenditures from the general pool, a
sufficient amount is not left in the pool to perform other functions at the
desired level. It is due to this fact that in spite of heavy government
expenditures for decades, the general masses in a majority of Muslim
countries live in miserable social and economic conditions.

In view of these realities and keeping the Islamic priorities in view,

we suggest that a new scheme of apportionment of public expenditure
may be adopted. This scheme is based on the principle of earmarking.
Under this scheme, certain heads of expenditure should be established
for which separate resources should be mobilized. Under normal
circumstances, money mobilized for these heads should not be
transferred to other heads of expenditures. To start with, we suggest that
public expenditure may be classified under three heads, namely:

a) Poverty Elimination Programs (PEP)

b) Defense
c) General Expenditure

4.3 Resource Mobilization for Poverty Elimination Programs

This head of expenditure would be reserved for programs and

schemers the benefit of the poor only. These may include direct grants,
loans for self-employment schemes, scholarships for acquiring
education and skills, low-cost housing for the poor, food coupons etc.
Major source of funds for these schemes would be zakah. It should

127
be pointed out here that if applied properly, zakah should generate
between 2-3 percent of GNP [Zarqa, Anas, 1986].

If this amount is not enough, as would be the case in most of the

Muslim countries at present, additional taxes on the rich may be
imposed. These taxes should be such that their incidence falls on the
rich only. Income tax or wealth tax or net-worth tax are some
possibilities.' The existing taxes in these categories should be reserved
for PEP. As the level of poverty decreases, these taxes should also be
reduced. In the long run, zakah proceeds and other built-in distributive
schemes of an Islamic system are expected to be sufficient to fulfill the
needs of PEP. 2 Earmarking the proceeds of these taxes (or alternative
taxes specially designed for this purpose) will help to fulfill one of the
most important functions of an Islamic state i.e. guarantee of basic
needs. When people see these taxes being spent on the poor, the level
of tax evasion can also be expected to go down. This will be especially
so in the long term as the rates of these taxes decrease with decreasing
level of poverty.

We would also like to mention here that if zakah on government

property is calculated and at least part of this is transferred to this
head, the resources available for poverty elimination programs will
increase substantially. However, this needs some "ijtihad" on the part of
contemporary fuqaha. We feel that this is very much in order. The
circumstances under which earlier jurists exempted government
property from the levy of zakah have drastically changed. At their
times government property constituted a relatively small proportion of
national wealth. And since the general assumption was that
government spends money on serving public interest only, perhaps
they were justified in exempting government property from the
imposition of zakah. ' In the present day-world the circumstances are

1 We are not recommending imposition of all these taxes. These are some of the possibilities. Each of these taxes has its
merits and demerits. Detailed analysis of individual taxes is not possible in the paper.

2
See Zarqa (1986) for an excellent description of these schemes.

128
very different. Some of the changes which necessitate a fresh look on
the issue are the following:

a) In the present day world, government owns a much larger

proportion of national wealth. In some cases mineral wealth and
other natural resources constitute more than 80 percent of national
wealth.

b) Some categories of wealth which from an Islamic point of view are

"community property" i.e. water, fire (energy), natural vegetation
(forests) and salt (mines). Individuals should have free access to
these for meeting "personal" needs. However, such resources are
now under government control.

c) Governments have now taken up many new functions upon

themselves. In many cases the government is -engaged in
production activities.

d) Even if we assume that all government expenditure is for public

welfare (though we think this is very unrealistic assumption under
the present circumstances), still zakah is meant for specific
purposes and the right of the poor is unquestionably the top
priority for zakah disbursement. Exempting government property,
which is a very large proportion of national wealth and in some
cases of national product, from the payment of zakah deprives the
poor of a right bestowed upon them by Allah.

Therefore, we suggest that zakah should be assessed on government

property and the share of the poor and needy should be credited to the
head earmarked for Poverty Elimination Programs. .

4.4 Resource Mobilization for Defense

Defense is a responsibility that every government must accept.

There is hardly any doubt that from Islamic point of view, the
performance of this responsibility should occupy a very high priority
in the objective function of an Islamic state. However, it should be

129
pointed out here that while ensuring proper defense for the country, the
government should normally seek from the people whatever level of
sacrifice their defense requires.

In this regard every Muslim country should give very serious

consideration to a plan of compulsory military service. This will, on the
one hand, help in reducing the number of standing defense forces
required and hence reduce defense expenditure and, on the other hand,
help people in performing one of their religious duties. It is also
important to realize that many countries are not under imminent threat,
yet they have to be prepared for any emergency. A relatively small
standing army with a back-up of reasonably trained reserve force can
cope with the situation.

Another idea worth a serious consideration is the concept of

"productive forces". Whatever standing army a country decides to have
in the light of its circumstances, during peace time it can partly be used
for "productive" activities such as running military farms, factories and
other projects. This suggestion may invite objections on the ground that
this will compromise the " professional " status of the forces. If it
actually does, we would readily withdraw this suggestion. However, on
the face of it, it does not seem so unacceptable as long as the scheme is
implemented in a planned manner without overdoing it. A sizable
number of military personnel in the armed forces are in ancillary
services such as engineering, medicine, maintenance, driving, cooking
etc. If they take part in "productive" projects, preferably under military
management, their war-preparedness would not be affected.

After the proper size of standing and reserve forces has been worked
out and all possible measures to reduce expenditure without
compromise on having battle-ready forces have been taken, then
whatever expenditure seems necessary may be raised from the public
through taxation and voluntary contributions. It is against this
background that we are suggesting that a separate head of expenditure
for defense should be created. Under the joint pool system, while the
defense may get the necessary funds, other heads of expenditure

130
usually suffer. It is one at the cost of other. Ignoring other necessary
functions, especially the needs of the people, creates internal instability,
social tensions and public antipathy. In such circumstances, the very
objective of a defense build-up ensuring national and territorial
integrity, is jeopardized by "excessive" defense spending [Chapra, M.
U., 1988].

Having defense as a separate head of expenditure will make the

people realize that this is sort of an insurance premium that they are
paying for a specific service, i.e. security. The level premium that the
nation has to pay depends on the level of risk to which it is exposed. In
order to raise necessary funds under this head, we have the following
suggestions:

a) Since defense is a collective duty of all members of the community,

a defense tax with a very broad base may be imposed. We suggest
that a poll tax at moderate rates may be imposed. This is a direct tax
with a very broad base and beings easily recognizable there is very
little chance for tax evasion.

b) The purpose of building a strong defense is to protect the faith, life,

property and honor of the people against foreign aggression. One of
the calamities that may befall someone's life or property is war. Just
as people insure against other risks, they can insure against this
calamity by building a strong defense. Therefore, we suggest that a
small "defense premium" may be imposed on all property including
agricultural land, dwellings, factories, movable property etc. The
level of the defense premium will depend on the risk of war to
which a country is exposed. Therefore, the premium should be
adjusted according to that risk. Since the base is very wide, the rate
of the premium will be very low and will not be burdensome.

c) Voluntary contributions have always made a significant

contribution towards expenditure for defence in Islamic states. This
source should also be tapped.

131
d) The share of "in the path of Allah" in zakah collections can also
be spent under this head, whenever needed.

e) If the resources mobilized through the above measures are not

enough, then the proposed rates may be adjusted by introducing
moderate progression in the rates.

4.5 Resource Mobilization for the General Pool

Expenditure on all other government activities will be met out of

this pool. The amount of resources to be generated for this pool
depends on the number of activities that the government . has to
perform. It is important to realize that even though expenditure for
some inevitable activities of the Islamic state such as dawah, law and
order and general administration have to be met from this head, in
terms of the level of expenditure, other activities of the government
such as building of infrastructure . , education, health, energy etc. take a
much bigger chunk of government expenditure. Had the Muslim
governments been restricted to performing the only functions assigned
by shari'ah; the effort required for generation of resources for these
activities through taxation would have been much smaller. However
modern governments may have to provide a number of other public
benefits for the good of the society at large. The provision of these
public goods by the government is justified on the grounds of their
indivisibility and lumpiness. From an Islamic point of view, it has been
argued that maslahah and the fulfillment of fard kifayah provide
additional justifications for their provision by the government [Siddiqi,
1986].

While the provision of these goods by the government may be well

justified, their provision through budget deficits and corresponding
borrowing can hardly be justified. Huge public debt that has been built
in their name which itself goes against the long run public interest. It
is not even the case that these public goods could not be provided
through alternative arrangements. Many of them could. But the path of
borrowing and deficit financing was chosen because it was politically
easer. However, by doing so, the very justification for their

132
provision by the government, i.e., public interest, was sacrificed. A
radically different approach for a number of items of expenditure under
this head need to be adopted. Some suggestion in this regard are given
below:

a) First and foremost, the role of the private and voluntary sectors,
especially the latter, has to be strengthened. Awqaf have historically
played a very important role in the provision of public goods in
Islamic societies. This role has to be rejuvenated.

b) The "benefit principle" whereby the beneficiaries should bear the

cost is well established in Islamic jurisprudence. Therefore,
wherever possible, this principle should be applied. In the case of
most of the public utilities such as telephone, gas, electricity etc.,
this can easily be applied the private sector can also participate in
the provision of these goods on a commercial basis. Many
infrastructure projects, such as the building of airports, railroads
and highways can financed through user charges. As a general rule,
public utilities should be priced so as to cover their costs.

c) Using development charges to undertake development projects in

certain areas is also possible. Just as private companies develop
residential areas and sell off residential plots with development
charges, government or even private companies can develop
industrial areas, provide all necessary infrastructure and recover the
costs through selling industrial plots.

d) In some infrastructure projects, Islamic modes of financing can be

applied. All such opportunities should be used.

Even after using the above mentioned techniques some projects

which have substantial positive externalities and their "exclusion" are
not possible will remain. These have genuine claims over general pool
of tax revenue. However, the application of above mentioned principles
would reduce such claims by a very substantial amount. Resources for
these remaining claims may be generated through taxation.

133
4.5.1 Two "Unconventional" Sources for Financing" Public Goods

While we do not rule out any form of taxation that meets the
principles of justice, equity and ability to pay, we would like to draw
attention to two possible sources of financing for the provision of public
goods. Public goods we remember are goods and services from which
the community at large benefits. Interestingly, in a modern economy the
community as a whole also generates resources by using paper and
credit money as a medium of exchange. This is known as seigniorage.
This arises because of a joint-action by the community at large i.e.
accepting paper/credit money in settlement of mutual claims. Since the
community at large generates this, it seems most appropriate to use this
for the provision of goods and services for that community.

Secondly, it is not necessary that members of the community should

contribute only in cash for the provision of public goods. If we define
taxation broadly to mean the transfer of resources from the private
sector to the public sector, then one of the biggest potential sources for
taxation in most of the underdeveloped countries hitherto untapped is
labor. In other words, just as people are required to give money to the
government, they may be required to give man-hours to public
(community) projects. This would be one type of taxation in kind. We
feel there is huge potential for mobilizing this kind of "community
service" in Muslim countries and this can be a very good source for
"financing" community projects. For countries with large populations
and low incomes, this may be one of the largest sources for "taxation".
Therefore, it seems desirable that these countries should have a separate
ministry for community services to plan and execute community
projects preferably through a decentralized institutional set-up.

4.6 Limiting the Role of Public Borrowing

As mentioned before, most of the Muslim countries have relied

extensively on public borrowing to fill the budget deficit. The resulting
public debt has grown into a monster. Beside other problems, interest
payments are consuming a sizable part of the total government

134
expenditure. In Muslim countries, this is most unfortunate. In addition
to the economic problems that this public debt is creating for these
countries, they are in violation of Islamic shari'ah. As a matter of fact a
number of their economic problems are a result of ignoring the
unequivocal prohibition of borrowing when interest is charged.

As pointed out by Chapra [1988], the Islamic ban on interest-based

borrowing is in fact a blessing. It introduces a strict discipline into
public spending to ensure government lives within its means. The
constrains this imposes on government spending in the short-run is
more than offset by the much smaller debt-servicing burden in future.
This would ensure sustained and steadier economic growth supported
by real resources, freedom from external pressures and a dignified
position in the comity of nations that an Islamic state rightly deserves.

It is, therefore, suggested that all Muslim countries should impose a

constitutional -ban on future interest-based borrowing. Some people
may argue that in the early Islamic period, Prophet (SAW) himself
resorted to borrowing in order to meet national requirements. In this
regard, we must remember that such borrowing was on interest-free
basis and that too was done in o
extremely difficult circumstances. There are exceptions to every rule.
Therefore, while imposing constitutional ban on future interest-based
borrowing, such exceptions can be included in the law. However, these
should be clearly defined and restricted to very exceptional
circumstances.

The existing debt should be converted into interest-free loans or to

equity where possible. It may be pointed out here that debt=equity
swaps are being undertaken all over the world. It should also be noted
that citizens of Muslim countries have substantial amounts of capital
invested abroad. Stopping this capital flight and attracting the capital
invested abroad is perhaps the best bet for these countries. Therefore,
special policies should be designed for this purpose. The remaining
part of existing debt should be paid off on emergency basis to give new
policies a better start.

135
 We would like to re-emphasize that there are a number of ways for the
government to fulfil national requirements and that for genuine needs
government can levy additional taxes also. If the circumstances of a nation
require additional sacrifice, people should be convinced of that and then
made to offer that sacrifice. It must be remembered that borrowing does
not eliminate the need for sacrifice. It only postpones it and increases its
magnitude.

5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

It is an unfortunate fact that most of the Muslim countries are

suffering from budget deficits. The problems are both serious and
complex. Governments have been living beyond their means for too
long. Every Government needs resources for the fulfillment of its
genuine needs. As a matter of principle, all genuine expenditure of the
government must be met through taxes and non-tax revenue. Under
normal circumstances borrowing and deficit financing should not be
needed. Unfortunately, in most of the Muslim countries that is not the
case.

There is an urgent need for a radically different approach towards

public finance. We have to stop looking for easy solutions and ad-hoc
arrangements and face the problem squarely and boldly. There is need
for a structural change in both the expenditure and the revenue sides of
the government budget. The present approach of taking government
expenditure to be more or less exogenously given and then concentrating
all efforts to mobilize that amount is basically wrong. It is people , who
should decide what they need in terms of public services and how they
are going to provide for them. They must first be convinced about the
genuineness of all government expenditure. And once they are
convinced of that, they must pay all of it. The present practice of
meeting a very substantial portion of government expenditure through
borrowing must be discontinued.

The distinction between current expenditure and the development

expenditure should be kept in view while mobilizing resources. The
present practice of generating as many resources as possible from all

136
sources and then meeting current expenditure out of the available
resources and transferring the residual to the development budget is
not correct. In our view, the two kinds of expenditure need to be
mobilized through distinctly separate approaches. For determining the
development needs the possibilities of a more active participation by
the private sector should be considered. Many public projects can be
undertaken on the basis of islamic Financing Techniques.

Introduction of some ear-marked heads of expenditures will help to

ensure fulfillment of those functions without ignoring some other
important public needs. Defence and Poverty Elimination Programs are
appropriate candidates for such ear-marking.

Infrastructure for industrial development should be provided on the

basis of development charges. The government should develop
industrial estates in different parts of the country. Instead of tax
holidays which are not effective, the government should provide full
infrastructure and then charge the costs through the allotment of
industrial plots on the basis of actual costs. In areas where incentive
has to be provided for regional development, concessional price can be
charged.

In case of public utilities and attempt should be made first to ensure

efficient low cost production. Once that has been ensured the user
charges should be fixed so as to recover full costs.

The role of awqaf in the provision of public goods such as education

and health should be promoted. Voluntary contributions should also be
encouraged. Contributions in terms of community service have great
potential in Muslim countries. This should also be harnessed.

To conclude the paper we would like to re-emphasize that these

countries need a thorough overhaul of their revenue and expenditure
structures rather than ad-hoc fine tuning.

137
REFERENCES

Ahmad, Ziauddin; Munawar Iqbal, and M. Fahim Khan (eds.), Fiscal

Policy and Resource Allocation in Islam, Islamabad, IPS, 1983.

Chapra, M. U. "Towards an Equitable Fiscal Policy in Pakistan". Paper

presented at the second All Pakistan Chartered Accountants'
Conference, Karachi, November, 1988.

Kahf, Monzer, Taxation Policy in an Islamic Economy in Fiscal and

Resource Allocation in Islam, Edited by Ahmad, Ziauddin; Munawar
Iqbal, and M. Fahim Khan, Islamabad, IPS, 1983.

Musgrave, R. and P. Musgrave, Public Finance in Theory and Practice.

Siddiqi, Mohammad Nejatullah, "Public Expenditure in an Islamic

State". Paper presented in the international Seminar on Fiscal Policy
and Development Planning in an Islamic State, Islamabad, 1986.

Tanzi Vito, "Fiscal Policy for Growth and Stability in Developing

Countries: Selected Issues" in A Premchand (Ed), Government
Financial Management - Issues and Country Studies, IMF Washington,
D. C., 1990.

Zarqa, M. Anas, "Islamic Distributive-Schemes in Distributive Justice

and Need Fulfillment in Islam", Edited by Munawar Iqbal, Islamic
Foundation, Leicester, U.K., 1986.

70mn1 :a

138
 6
IS EQUITY FINANCED BUDGET DEFICIT STABLE IN
AN INTEREST FREE ECONOMY?

M. AYNUL HASAN*
AND
AHMAD NA'EEM SIDDIQUI*

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the stability of an equity

financed budget deficit in an interest free Islamic economy. To this effect a
small closed economy theoretical macroeconomic model broadly consistent
with the Islamic tenets is developed. This study found that under a strong
wealth effect an equity financed deficit is not necessarily unstable and that
government expenditure policies may contribute positively in terms of
enhancing the output of the economy.

1. INTRODUCTION

Over the past decade, there has been a growing literature on Islamic
economics involving theoretical macroeconomic models [e.g., Al-Jarhi
(1983), Haque and Mirakhor (1987), Kahf (1985), A. Khan (1982), M.
Khan (1986), M. Khan and Mirakhor (1989), Mirakhor and Zaidi (1988),
Naqvi (1982) and Zarqa (1983)]. Indeed, most of these studies have
provided a better conceptual and analytical understanding of how a
banking system may operate in an Islamic economy. For instance, the
study by M. Khan (1986) has shown that the Islamic Banking Model,
based on equity participation,' may be dynamically more stable than the
traditional banking model with fixed interest rates. In particular, M.
Khan (1986, p.19) noted that the Islamic Banking Model may be 'better
suited to adjusting to shocks that result

* Department of Economics, Acadia University, Wolfville, Nova Scotia, and Department of

Economics, The Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, respectively. The authors wish to
thank Carl Christ, Mohsin S. Khan and William Scarth for helpful discussion.

139
in banking crises' because in such a model the shocks are 'immediately
absorbed by changes in the values of shares (deposits) held by the public
in the bank'. In another paper, M. Khan and A. Mirakhor (1989)
developed an IS-LM model of closed Islamic economy wherein they
have shown that monetary policy, using Mudaraba financing, may have a
positive impact on the growth rate of output of the economy. Their
results were reinforced by A. Mirakhor and I. Zaidi (1988) in an open-
economy version of that model.

Although tremendous progress has been made in developing

theoretical macroeconomic models for an Islamic economy, most of
these models, nevertheless, examined issues pertaining to the Islamic
banking system or the efficacy of the monetary policy. The issues
related to fiscal policy, as an instrument to finance government deficit in
an Islamic economy have not been adequately addressed in the
literature.2 In this context S. Ahmed (1989, p.163) noted:

A notable omission [in the Islamic macroeconomic literature] is

how the government would finance its expenditure in an
economy with no fixed-interest debt.

On the same issue, Pryor (1985, p.205) wrote:

I have seen no thorough discussion of fiscal policy in the Islamic

economic system and of the degree to which the government
could engage in deficit spending.

The purpose of 'this paper is to present a simple theoretical macro

model of an Islam<x economy with explicit government budget
constraints. Though the model developed in this paper closely follows
Metzler (1951), Christ (1968, 1979), Scarth (1979) and Blanchard
(1981), it, nevertheless, differs from them in terms of integrating the
basic features of an Islamic Economy. For instance, our model has no
fixed interest bearing assets which makes it largely consistent with the
basic tenets of Islam.3 Moreover, the private agents in our model hold.
assets only in the form of profit and loss sharing (PLS) equities and

140
non-interest bearing money. Government, however, can finance its
deficit through money creation or equity finance.

It is well known in macroeconomic literature that a bond (fixed

interest bearing asset) financed government deficit leads to
macroeconomic instability [e.g., see Christ (1979) and Scarth (1979)].
Some economists have, therefore, questioned the worthiness of such
policies used by policy makers in Western economies to finance their
large deficits. With this objective in mind, we believe an important
contribution of this paper is to develop a macroeconomic model for an
Islamic Economy in order to analyze the stability implications of an
equity financed budget deficit. In fact, the conclusion that emerges from
our analysis is that under certain assumptions, namely, a strong wealth
effect, our model for the Islamic economy is stable.

The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the objective,

importance and implication of fiscal policy in an Islamic economy.
Section 3 sets up the macro model with explicit budget constraints for an
Islamic economy. The dynamic stability conditions of the model under
equity financing and money creation are examined in Section 3. Section 4
provides the steady state comparative static results of fiscal and
monetary policy under alternative budget financing. Finally, Section 5
summarizes. the conclusions.

2. OBJECTIVE AND THE ROLE OF FISCAL POLICY IN AN

ISLAMIC ECONOMY

In his comment on the role and function of the state, Ziauddin

Ahmad (1989: 5) writes:

The Qur'an and the sunnah provide basic guidance in

determining the role and function of the state. The following
functions can be derived directly from these two sources: (a)
defence of the territorial integrity of the state; (b) maintenance
of law and order; (c) dispensation of justice; (d) civil
administration; (e) propagation of good and suppression of'
evil; (f) assurance of at least a basic

141
 minimum standard of living for all citizens, and (g)
prevention of gross inequalities in income and wealth.

Thus, it appears that the state should play an important role in

providing and improving the welfare of its citizens. Furthermore, the
state should be actively involved in promoting and enhancing the
general economic conditions and proper utilization of the useful
resources of the society by creating necessary 'infrastructure and other
public goods' or through fiscal measures.

Having outlined the basic role of the state and the objectives of fiscal
policy in an Islamic society, the important question is how the state is
going to achieve these objectives. More specifically, how is the
government budget going to be financed or if the budget is not balanced,
then is deficit-financing permissible in an Islamic state? All these issues
will have important implications in constructing the government budget
constraint in the next section. Ziauddin Ahmad (1989: 15-16) has best
explained and clarified these questions. He writes:

The Islamic teachings allow a great deal of flexibility to the

government in shaping its budgetary policy. There is nothing
mansus (prescribed specifically by the Qur'an and Sunnah)
about the budget of a state being balanced or unbalanced or
the quantum of budgetary deficit". The only binding
constraint is that it cannot resort to borrowing on the basis of
interest to cover its budgetary deficit.

On the issue of government spending and deficit, S. Ahmed (1989,

p.163) writes:

Government spending that is permanent or recurring, such as

normal compensation of employees, would be financed by
taxation... Temporary spending for specific projects would be
financed by loans from the private sector on a profit- and
loss-sharing (PLS) basis. The central bank [on behalf of the
state] would be allowed to directly invest in the real sector

142
 on a PLS basis also and choose how much of the
government's equity to monetize through the usual kinds of
open market operations, with the only difference being the
nature of the securities being traded.

Because of the important place of zakah in the Islamic Financial

System, the government budget is divided into two broad categories,
namely, welfare budget and general budget.' Zakah receipts and voluntary
contributions are used to finance the expenditures of the welfare budget
which may include such items as cash grants to the poor and unemployed
and financing other social welfare programs (education and health care
for the poor). Financing of the general budget is, however, made by tax
revenues (direct or indirect), borrowing money from* the banks (money
financing) with no interest and trading government shares (equity
financing) on a PLS basis.

3. THE MODEL OF AN ISLAMIC ECONOMY

Consider a closed economy with a fixed price system implying a

horizontal supply curve. We assume that there is composite good and
two asset markets. The two assets are equity (which are titles to physical
capital) and outside money. Following M. Khan (1986), we also- assume
that savings and investment activities are performed through the banks
only and that these banks can be considered as firms engaged in
collecting funds which are then invested to make profits. Furthermore,
both the value of the investment deposits (shares) held by the private
agents and the corresponding yield on those shares are not fixed or
predetermined. In fact, these rates can take negative values as well.'
Moreover, at any given time, both private agents and government hold
these shares in a given proportion. Following Metzler (1951), we also
assume that the central bank, on behalf of the government, is authorized
to engage in buying and selling of these shares to finance government
deficit.

With these assumptions, we examine the following macro model

with explicit government budget constraints:

143
where the variables are defined as follows:

Y = aggregate national output;

Y
AD
= aggregate demand for national output;
Yd = disposable income;
C = private consumption;
I = private investment;
R = transfer payments from zakah fund;
Gg = government expenditure from general budget;
G = total government expenditure;
A = private wealth;
M = money balances;
M = absolute rate of change of real money balances;
S = market value of total shares held by private owners and
government;

a = proportion of income going to capital as profit;

z = Zakah rate..

We now explain the structure of the model.

144
 Equation (1) simply shows that the value of shares is equal to the
capitalized value of profits of the banks. As no capital gains and that
banks are not holding any reserves and additional net worth, equation
(1) can be thought of as bank's balance sheet with (aY/7r) as assets and
S as liabilities..

Equation (2) is used to determine the money market equilibrium.

This equation, basically determines the rate of return (n) such that the
desired proportions of money and shares held are equal to actual
proportions. By substituting S from equation (1) into (2), one can
obtain the following money market equilibrium condition wherein the
rate of return on shares is inversely related to the money demand.

Equation (3) represents the goods market equilibrium condition.

This equation can be viewed as the summary of the IS curve, wherein
the private demand depends positively on disposable income and
wealth and negatively on the rate of return. Because of fixed output
prices, the adjustment process in response to excess demand in the
goods market is assumed to be sluggish. Equations (4) and (5) define
private wealth and after-tax disposable income. Substituting equations
(1), (4), (5), (6) and (7) into (3) and assuming slow adjustment of the
goods market, we obtain the following dynamic equation for excess
demand for national output:

where a is the positive adjustment coefficient and Y is the absolute rate

of change of the national output.

145
 As mentioned earlier, the total government expenditure as
represented by equation (6) is divided into a welfare allocation and a
general allocation.6 Equation (7) shows the transfer payments or
welfare expenditures which are made from funds received through
zakah levy. It may, however, be noted that the welfare expenditure
[equation (7)] is exactly matched by the zakah collection. This is in
contrast with Ziauddin Ahmad's (1989) exposition of dual budget, who
has not ruled out the possibility of deficit in the welfare budget. The
allowance of financing such deficit from the general allocation may
diminish the important distinction between the welfare budget and the
general budget.' The term inside the bracket of-equation (7) represents
the total savings (the difference between disposable income and private
consumption). The total value of zakah fund is simply a fraction
(roughly 2.5%) of the total savings.8

Equation (8) is the basic government budget constraint identity.

The funds generated for this budget are entirely expended for the
purpose of general government expenditure as . discussed earlier.
These funds are, however, raised from three different possible sources,
namely, tax revenue (tY), money financing or outside money (M) and
selling of existing shares (XS) held by the government. 9 Since, at a
given point in time, it is unlikely that - the state will completely
replenish its entire asset holdings of the shares to finance the deficit,
the government will thus earn some revenue as dividends from its
stock holdings which is denoted by (1-r)aY in equation (8).

It is important to note that the inclusion of the budget constraint

now implies that both policy variables (M or X) simultaneously cannot
be set exogenously. In fact, Scarth (1988: 104) argued that . one of the
policy variables (M or X) 'must be determined residually by 'the setting
of the other policy instruments, the outcome of the economy, and the
need to satisfy the financing constraint'. Furthermore, the presence of
time rate of change in either proportion of shares (,.) or money (M)
makes the model necessarily dynamic. As such, we will have two
dynamic budget constraints, one in the case of equity (or share)
financing and the other for money financing. These two dynamic budget
constraints are, respectively, given below:

146
Equation (11a) is obtained by substituting S from equation (1) into (8)
and then setting M equal to zero. On the other hand, by setting 1l equal
to zero in equation (8), we obtain the second dynamic budget constraint
[equation (11b)]. Thus the compact dynamic system in the case of equity
financing consists of equations (9), (10) and (11a) while for money
financing the dynamic model includes equations (9), (10) and (11b).
Before a meaningful investigation of the stationary (or long run)
multipliers of the system can be done, it is necessary to analyze the
dynamic stability of the model.

4. DYNAMIC STABILITY ANALYSIS AND THE LONG RUN

MULTIPLIERS

The main focus of our analysis is to study the implications of equity

financed budget deficit on the stability of the system. However, a
comparison of these results with that of money financed budget would
enhance our understanding of the dynamic adjustment pattern of an
Islamic economy. In this section we analyze the stability conditions
under alternative modes of financing. We first discuss the case of equity
financing. In order to examine the effectiveness of fiscal policy under
equity financing, we also derive the income/expenditure multiplier.

Equity Financing: For equity financed deficit the dynamic model

consists of the following equations:

147
where

148
 This 3x3 system has three roots . Thus the
necessary and sufficient conditions for stability require that both the
determinant (n) and trace should be negative while the sum of the
principle minors be positive. However,if one of these conditions is
violated unambiguously then the system would be necessarily unstable.
Analyzing these stability conditions in the context of our model, we get

The above results clearly indicate that the dynamic system

considered is not categorically unstable because none of the stability
conditions are unambiguously violated. In fact, under certain suitable
conditions the system may converge to a stable time path. Analyzing
these conditions carefully one may observe that the influence of terms
A , and A Z are crucial for stability and in both these terms the wealth
effect on consumption ( C A > O ) is important. This leads us to make
the following proposition.

149
these conditions carefully one may observe that the influence of terms
A , and A2 are crucial for stability and in both these terms the wealth
effect on consumption (C A> 0) is important. This leads us to make the
following proposition.

Proposition 1: The dynamic macro model of an Islamic economy with

equity financed deficit may be stable if the wealth effect on private
consumption is sufficiently strong.

In order to analyze the dynamic adjustment pattern of our model,

we consider the phase diagram representation of equations (10) and
(11a). The slopes of y - 0 and Y - Q loci are given by:

Figure 1 describes the characteristics of the adjustment path

associated with an increase (decrease) in the proportion of total shares
held b . the private (government) sector. The locus, y - 0 and Y - 0
passes through point E which represents the new steady state. Notice
that the relative slopes of these loci reflect the assumed numerical
values of the parameters. The analysis of the steady state presented
above revealed that the dynamic system is not categorically unstable.
This result is again reinforced in figure 1 because at least some of the
arrows point towards the equilibrium point E. Thus, point E could be
considered as locally stable intertemporal equilibrium. A point such as
E1. in quadrant I can be considered as describing the initial steady,
state. Since below the Y - 0 locus, Y would increase and above X - 0
locus X decrease, the dynamic path terminates at E. At point E1.,
aggregate demand falls below natural level L 'output and climbs back
gradually to this level in response to the changes in relative share
holdings of the private sector (y). Such a pattern of dynamic
adjustment implies the significance of private sector's wealth in
determining the deviation of actual output from its natural level.

150
 Figure 1

REAL OUTPUT (Y) AND RELATIVE PRIVATE

SHARE HOLDINGS (y): AN ADJUSTMENT PATTERN
UNDER EQUITY FINANCED DEFICIT

Whether or not the wealth effect on consumption is sufficiently strong is

essentially a matter of empirical investigation which is beyond the scope
of this paper. We, however, can refer to the Qur'an and the writings of
Islamic scholars to seek information on the issues of spending and
acquiring wealth by private individuals in an Islamic society.
On the issue of acquiring wealth, the Qur'an says:

And when the prayer is ended, then disperse in the land and see
of Allah's bounty, and remember Allah much, that ye may be
successful. (62:10).

151
 And when the prayer is ended, then disperse in the land and
see of Allah's bounty, and remember Allah much, that ye may
be successful. (62:10).

And when it is said unto them: spend of that wherewith Allah

hath provided you, those who disbelieve say unto those who
believe: shall we feed those whom Allah, if He willed, would
feed? Ye are in naught else than error manifest. (36:47)

In the context of spending wealth, Ziauddin Ahmad (1989, p.7) writes:

The Qur'an proclaims that:

in no case will man attain piety unless he spends freely from

his wealth in the way of God for the needy and poor. (3:92)

Of course, Islam does not promote conspicuous consumption which,

in fact, is discouraged. What is, however, encouraged is not to hoard
wealth but share it with others.

Assuming that the model under equity financed deficit is stable, we

can then calculate the steady state long-run multipliers. We now set y and Y
equal to zero to define full-equilibrium in the above dynamic model
represented by equations (9), (10) and (11a). y is now interpreted as the
resulting proportion of equities or shares held by public that will
eliminate the budget deficit. Thus the three endogenous variables in
the model are now Y, y and . Taking a total differential of this and
writing it in matrix form we get:

152
where all variables and parameters are as defined earlier. Since our
interest in this paper is on the expenditure multipliers, we have ignored
the other exogenous terms in equation (13). The long-run expenditure
multiplier with respect to income M is given below:

Clearly, the sign of the expenditure multiplier is ambiguous.

However, if Proposition I is true, implying the presence of strong wealth
effect among the private individuals, this will then make both the
denominator (due to CA) and the numerator negative, giving a positive
expenditure multiplier in case of equity financing.

We now turn to the case of money financed deficit.

Money Financing: The Money Financing model consists of the

following dynamic equations:

153
 Given the parametric assumptions of the model, it is evident that
the dynamic system under money financing is necessarily stable. Our
results for an Islamic Economy, in this case, are consistent with the
traditional Keynesian type of macroeconomic model.

5. CONCLUSIONS

In this paper, we have constructed a fixed-price closed economy

macro model with explicit budget constraint in order to investigate

154
whether or not an equity (or shares) financed deficit is stable for an
Islamic economy. Most of the earlier studies based on fixed interest rate
system concluded that the bond financed budget deficit is necessarily
unstable. The implications of such a finding could be crucial, from the
policy point of view for the economies which use bond as an instrument
to finance the deficit. It has been argued that the policy makers in many
Western economies 'still hope that bond financed fiscal policy can be
used for growth and employment targets, with only transitory effects on
the national debt.' Scarth's (1979) research, however, found no strong
support for this hope.

Our study, based on a macro model broadly consistent with the tenets
of Islam, however, found that the equity financed deficit is not necessarily
unstable and fiscal policy measures may have positive effect on the
growth rate of the economy, provided there are strong wealth effects on
private consumption.

ENDNOTES

1. Here the principle of equity participation is defined as a system

where the deposits of the individuals are held on a profit and loss
sharing basis. In other words, as noted by Khan (1986), these
deposits held by the depositor should be treated as shares whose
nominal values (and hence rate of return) are not predetermined or
fixed by the banks.

2. One exception has been the study done by Ziauddin Ahmad

(1989) which did address the issue of fiscal policy, and public
finance and provided extremely useful information in this context.
His detailed study, however, is primarily descriptive and did not
develop any macro model to analyze the role of fiscal policy in
terms of an analytical mode.

3. For example, see M. Khan (1989, pp.39-40) for a detailed

discussion of this issue.

155
4. Zakah is a special tax on the individual ' s savings and wealth
which is then distributed to the poor citizens of the state. The
zakah rate varies between 2.5% and 20% depending upon the
type of assets held by the individual.

5. For example, see Khan (1986) for a discussion on this issue.

6. These two terms for government budget are borrowed from

Ziauddin Ahmad (1989).

7. It is worth pointing out that Ziauddin Ahmad (1989) has

emphasized the importance of such dual budget in an Islamic
framework.

8. It should be noted that zakah is levied not only on savings but

also on wealth such as gold, silver etc. In order to keep our
model simple we have limited our analysis of zakah as levy on
savings only. As a matter of fact, at the present time in Pakistan
the government levies a 2.5% zakah . only on the savings
account.

9. One can interpret the term (yS) as equity financing for the
following reason: y indicates the growth rate of the 93
proportion of shares held by the private individuals and when
this term is increased (because of legal authorization of the
central bank), it increases the share holdings of the private
individuals and reduces the share holdings of the government.
By virtue of this operation, the government is being able to
generate funds to finance its deficits. This operation can be
viewed as an open market operation in the traditional sense but
with one important difference being that unlike the bond, the
instrument- used in this operation does not have a fixed return.

156
REFERENCES

Ahmad, Ziauddin (1989): "Public Finance in Islam", IMF Working

Paper #/89/68.

Ahmed, Shaghil (1989): "Islamic Banking and Finance: A Review

Essay", Journal of Monetary Economics, Vo1.24, 157-67.

Al-Jarhi, Mabid Ali (1983): "A Monetary and Financial Structure for
an Interest-Free Economy", in Ziauddin Ahmad, Munawar Iqbal,
and M. Fahim Khan (ed.), Money and Banking in Islam, Islamabad:
Institute of Policy Studies, 69-87.'

Blanchard, Oliver (1981): "Output, the Stock Market, and Interest

Rates", American Economic Review, Vol.71, 132-43.

Christ, Carl (1968): "A Simple Macroeconomic Model with a

Government Budget Restraint", Journal of Political Economy, Vol.76,
53-67.

Christ, Carl (1979): "On Fiscal and Monetary Policies and the
Government Budget Restraint, American Economic Review, Vol.69,
526-38.

Haque, Nadeem U. and Abbas Mirakhor (1987): "Savings Behaviour

in an Economy without Fixed Interest", in Mohsin Khan and Abbas
Mirakhor (ed.) Theoretical Studies in Islamic Banking and Finance,
Houston: The Institute for Research and 'Islamic Studies.

Kahf, Monzer, (1978): Islamic Economy: An Analytical Study of the

Functioning of the Islamic Economic System, Plainfield, Indiana:
Muslim Students Association of the United States and Canada.

157
Khan, M. Akram (1982): "Inflation and the Islamic Economy: A
Closed Economy Model", in Muhammad Ariff (ed.), Monetary and
Fiscal Economics of Islam, Jeddah: International Center for Research
in Islamic Economics.

Khan, Mohsin (1986): "Islamic Interest-Free Banking: A Theoretical

Analysis", International Monetary Fund Staff Paper, Vo1.33, 1-27.

Khan, Mohsin and Abbas Mirakhor (1989):. "The Financial System

and Monetary Policy in an Islamic Economy", Journal of King
Abdulaziz University, Islamic Economics, Vol. 1, 39-57.

Metzler, Lloyd (1951): "Wealth, Savings, and the Rate of Interest":

Journal of Political Economy, Vol.59, 93-116.

Mirakhor, Abbas and Iqbal Zaidi (1988): "Stabilization and Growth in

an Open Islamic Economy", IMF Working Paper # 22.

Naqvi, Syed Nawab Haider (1982): On Replacing the, Institution of

Interest in a Dynamic Islamic Economy, Essays in Islamic Economic
Philosophy, 3, Islamabad: Pakistan Institute of Development
Economics.

Pryor, Frederic (1985): "The Islamic Economic System", Journal of

Comparative Economics, Vol.9, 197-223.

Scarth, William (1979): 'Bond Financed Fiscal Policy and the Problem
of Instrument Instability,: Journal of Macroeconomics, Vol.1, 107-17.

Scarth, William (1988): Macroeconomic: An Introduction to Advanced

Methods, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.

158
Zarqa, Mohammad Anas (1983): "Stability in an Interest-Free
Islamic Economy: A Note", Pakistan Journal of Applied Economics,
Vol. 2, 181-88.

70=144-:a.88

159
 Section III

FINANCING DEVELOPMENT IN SELECTED MUSLIM

SOCIETIES

7. The Basic Needs Fulfillment Guarantee in Islam and A

Measure of Its Financial Dimension in Selected Muslim
Countries
Zubair Hasan &
M. Arif

8. Long Term Finance in Islamic Countries: Case Study of Pakistan

Mohammad Akram Khan

9. Financing Economic Development in Islamic Economics:

Attitudes Towards Islamic Finance in Small Manufacturing
Business in Saudi Arabia
Bandar Al-Hajjar &
John Preslley

10. Some consideration on the Size of the Public Sector in The

Islamic Republic of Iran
Iraj Toutounchian

11. Efficiency of the Islamic Approach to External Debt-

Management in North Africa and Middle-East I.O.
Taiwo

12. The Survival and Development Strategies of the Minority of

Nairobian Muslims in Nairobi Mohammed S. Mukras

161
 7
THE BASIC NEEDS FULFILLMENT GUARANTEE IN
ISLAM AND A MEASURE OF ITS FINANCIAL
DIMENSION IN SELECTED MUSLIM COUNTRIES

ZUBAIR HASSAN*
AND
MOHAMMAD ARIF**

1. INTRODUCTION

Growth in the gross national product or GNP has of late been

replaced by the basic needs fulfillment (BNF) as a primary development
objective in many of the Third World countries.' This is a policy shift
with a real revolutionary potential. It has been hailed in the current
literature as a pragmatic response to the continually worsening income
disparities and ever spreading deprivation in these countries,. despite
their GNP having shown a more than satisfactory rate of growth over the
decades.2

However, one must realize that a BNF program is intrinsically fragile

and intricate, constrained as it is by a host of complex socio-political
considerations. It does not obviously intend to conflict with or detract
from the requirement of a GNP expansion. The BNF simply aims at
'minimizing poverty with growth'.3 But in doing so, it may often turn out
to be a program of wide ramifications. The BNF may require, for
example, a revision of development priorities, stinging redistributive
measures, shifts in the choice of technology, reallocation or relocation of
resources, and complex structural readjustments in the economy4. These
and the like are changes which are not only inter-

* Department of Economics, Faculty of Economics and Management, International

Islamic University, Malaysia.
** Deputy Dean (Students Affairs), Faculty of Economics and Management, International
Islamic University, Malaysia, respectively.

163
linked, but which may also not infrequently be concurrent. To integrate
them together in a unified development program may be difficult and
challenging. Their net result, or individual impact, may not always or
entirely be welcome to the entrenched status quo ante interests. As a
consequence, political expediency may often feel hesitant to implement
a BNF program despite an initial enthusiasm to implement such a
program.

The Islamic economists writing on the subject in recent years have,

however, remained undaunted, if not unaware, of the above mentioned
complexities or limitations in the way of putting a meaningful BNF
program into action. They have generally limited their discussions to
the judicial aspects of the issue with scant attention to its operational
side. One reason for this indifference may be the non-existence in the
modern world of an economy being run strictly according to the
shari'ah norms.

However, even in their theoretical constructs, the present day Islamic

economists have not been very clear about two things: (i) the content
and the size of a basic needs package, and (ii) the financial dimension
of a BNF program in the present day Muslim (if not Islamic) countries.
Both are intimately related aspects of a BNF based development strategy,
and the present paper seeks to analyze the issue from these two angles.

The scheme of this paper is as follows; section two deals with the
conceptual aspect of a BNF program from an Islamic viewpoint. Here we
shall give reasons for our reservations about an absolute concept
concerning basic needs5 , and shall argue that a relative measure is more
logical and helpful both for inter-temporal and inter-nation
comparisons. Such a measure is also more realistic and convenient for
analyzing the financial dimension of the program in various Muslim
countries.

Section three discusses this financial dimension in a rather restricted

form. 6 The exercise covers seven Muslim countries viz Bangladesh,
Egypt, Indonesia, Malaysia, Morocco, Pakistan and Turkey. The

164
selection is purposive and well spread across the globe. The countries
included have very diverse historical backgrounds, -natural resources,
population sizes and political systems, and are at' quite different
milestones on the road to economic development. Taken together, their
population is more than half a billion. This constitutes over 50% of all
Muslims in the world, and around 70% of those living in the Muslim
majority countries where, given the will, an Islamic version of a BNF
program can be put into operation.

It must be mentioned that both in the matter of sample selection and

the designing of the tools for analysis the nature and form of the
available data have played their role. Furthermore, the study is of a
static nature; it is related only to the year 1987. Essentially, it seeks to
sharpen concepts and develops a technique of analysis. Providing
concrete policy prescriptions is not its objective.

In section four, we present a summary of some important points of

the discussion and make a few concluding remarks.

2. BASIC NEEDS CONCEPT

The idea that the basic needs of all should be satisfied before the less
essential needs of a few are met has its origin in religious scriptures
including those of Islam.' The principle has won a very wide acceptance
(Streeten p. 8). However, the religious import of the idea which we shall
explain using the Islamic case as illustration, seems much different from
the restricted, somewhat technical, meaning it has assumed in the current
discussions on poverty, income distribution, and levels of living in the
area of development economics.8

From the viewpoint of Islam, and other religions too, the issue of the
spiritual poverty of the believers at present may not be less important
than the problem of the material deprivation which afflicts their vast
majority.9 Still, one can presumably separate the two for analytical
treatment with advantage, more so because the shari'ah sees an intimate
link between them. Promotion of the material well-being of the poor
through the BNF is expected to improve not only their

165
ethical performance but, depending on the content and range of the
program, of the rich as well.10

Islamic scholars seem to be almost unanimous on the point that the

fulfillment of basic needs and poverty reduction are the two prime goals
of the shari'ah's distribution scheme. The holy Qur'an reminds us time
and again that even though people may differ from one another in regard
to the quantum "of rizq sustenance granted to them, all creatures of the
Almighty have an equal right to a livelihood from His inexhaustible
treasures of the earth (and the heavens).11 Elaborating on the point,
Siddiqui holds that a guarantee for the fulfillment of the basic needs of
everyone is imperative to Islam. He quotes extensively from the text, the
Sunnah, Caliphal precedents, and the juridical writings in support of the
proposition. To him, the sanctity of this guarantee is such that he
recommends its inclusion in the constitution of an Islamic state so as to
grant the individuals a right to claim its fulfillment through the law
courts. 12 Siddiqui writes:

"This guarantee. applies to each and everyone irrespective of age, sex,

race, color, language, caste or creed. It applies to Muslims as well as to
non-Muslims. The only criterion for eligibility is need, without sufficient
means to fulfil it. Some members of the society are permanently placed
in this category because of some debility, e.g. the invalid, the blind and
the chronically ill, the very old and the very young etc. Some are
temporarily found in this condition such as the unemployed and those
with insufficient incomes. . These types of people are guaranteed
fulfillment of their basic needs through a number of direct and indirect
means." (page 252, emphasis ours).

Evidently, the need-income relationship in Siddiqui is equivocal and

imprecise. To him, the only qualification for the Islamic guarantee to
become operative is the existence of a need, non-violative of the shari'ah
norms one may add, and the insufficiency of income, irrespective of
reasons, to meet the same. There is an explicit delinking of the `basic'
from need, thus rendering the related income insufficiency a highly
indeterminate variable in the Islamic fulfillment scheme. Siddiqui
attempts to fortify his position by erecting a strong

166
shari'ah fence around his notion of needs which he then terms as `basic'
to everyone in the society. In that, he tends to break the link - so
common in the secular literature - between the `basic needs' and the
concept of `poverty' marked on an income scale. Naturally, Siddiqui's
list becomes too broad and its focus shifts from the 'basic needs' to
unquantifiable Islamic living in oblivion of resource availability at the
micro or macro level.

Ziauddin Ahmad adopts a similar approach in formulating his views

in 'Islam and Fulfillment of Basic Needs.13 Although he starts with a
narrow version of the basic needs - "adequate food, clothing and shelter
etc. for - living comfortably" (p.53) he lands himself in a state of
inconsistency when he adds: "Needs, however, include not only the
necessities for sustaining life but also comforts for making life more
pleasant and less difficult" (p.55). Things become more complicated
when he introduces another dimension: "The desired welfare in an
Islamic society can be achieved - also by the fulfillment of basic needs
that are necessary for the spiritual upliftment Islam stands for" (p.57).
The writer ultimately provides us with his final version of the basic
needs as including "food, clothing, shelter, and medical aid - domestic
services - education, marriage - employment opportunities and
transportation facilities" with some qualifications (p. 57).14

Even though both Siddiqui and Ahmad mention explicitly the stage
of economic development and income level as factors affecting the
Islamic need fulfillment guarantee, the overall argument - its content,
drift and thrust - tends to lessen the relevance of these constraints in
each case.

Fortunately, there is a succinct recognition in Islamic economic

literature that the concept of basic needs can have a narrower
connotation related to poverty expressed in terms of income level, as
opposed to the global view of the essential requirements for a decent
Islamic living as they are identified with in the Siddiqui - Ahmad
formulations. It is also generally held in the writings on the subject -
both secular and Islamic - that the concept of basic needs has to be a
flexible one. Their range and standard in a particular society would

167
have to be periodically spelled out in accordance with the level of
economic development reached (Hasan p. 40). This being so, one must
avoid the overdrawing of the `basic needs' list ignoring the operational
constraints, specially the financial ones, that delimit it.

Even as we detach the concept of `basic needs' from the stated

shari'ah requirements for a comfortable living and take a restricted view
of them so as to consider their non-fulfillment the result of the income
insufficiency of an appropriate category of the `poor'15, two types of
issues still remain unsettled. First, what are, or should be, the contents
of a `basic needs' basket and whether the concept of this basket would
be `absolute' or `relative'? Second, will the basket be made available to
the deprived by a scheme of income transfers, through a direct provision
of goods and services, or by raising their earning capacities, and what
agencies or institution would perform these functions?16

The. time and space. constraints do not permit here a detailed

discussion of all such questions. However, we shall take 'up the first of
these at some length,, and may touch. upon a few others in a cursory
way..

2.1 Absolute vs Relative Version

As alluded to earlier, the concept of a `basic needs' approach to

development emerged-as a consequence of the failure of the standard
growth approach to check the spread of poverty and. destitution in the
developing economies. Removal of poverty, through a reversal of
priorities, became an issue of serious concern in many countries for a
variety of reasons - social, economic, and political.18 To formulate
meaningful programs for the purpose `poverty' had to be defined in
precise terms, and the `poor' had to be identified accordingly. This was
attempted through specifying a basket of goods. and services which could
fulfil at the minimum the `basic needs' of food, clothing, shelter, medical
care, and education to grant the, recipients a living standard which
society could accept-as tolerable, if not decent.

168
 The contents of the basket varied according to the dictates of the
local requirements, but the `needs' it was meant to fulfil were virtually
the same in each case. A money equivalent of the basket was then
defined as the `poverty line' and those having incomes below this
minimal were identified as the `poor' . 19 Inflation being a perpetual
feature of all modern economies, the money value of the basket can be
raised periodically to obtain its current equivalent.

The idea of a physical basket of goods and services is considered to

be an absolute version of a `basic needs' concept. "Removing
malnutrition in children, eradicating disease, or educating girls are
concrete specific achievements that meet the basic human needs of the
deprived groups, whereas reducing inequality is abstract. There is, of
course, nothing wrong with an abstract moral objective, but if policies
are judged by evident reduction of suffering, meeting basic needs
scores better than reducing inequality.... "To consider basic needs is to
move from the abstract to the concrete, from the aggregate to the
specific". (Streeten, pp 17-18 and 21). ,

Another objection to a `relative' notion is that it defines poverty

only in such a way that it may never be reduced, despite any rise in the
absolute income levels, unless the measure of inequality is itself
changed.20 As an economy develops and the production of material
goods and services increases we must push up "the socially agreed
minimum" to ensure the presence of the poor in every society. Thus by
definition, a class of poor is created in all historical formations unless
we are in a regime of perfect equality (Naqvi, P.344). The absolute
version, on the other hand, envisages a list of items of consumption
regarded as an irreducible minimum, and material prosperity may then
lead to an elimination of the class of the needy and the poor. The
apprehension presumably is that while an absolute version of poverty
would allow us to get rid of the curse once and for all, the relative
notion would burden our conscience perpetually by maintaining
poverty as a socio-historical category.

Last but not the least, an interesting observation against the

"relative" poverty is that it is not considered justified in the shari'ah,

169
"as this type of subjective poverty may increase one's unhappiness and
greed with an associated urge for exploitation of the less fortunate
people." (Mannan, p.308).2'

In sum, a `relative' interpretation of basic needs expressed in terms of

money incomes is generally criticized on the grounds that (i) it is
abstract, (ii) it makes poverty eradication a perennial problem, and (iii)
it may tend to promote certain trends in social psychology unwelcome to
the shari'ah. We shall argue that these grounds are extremely shaky, if
not redundant, and will show that a `relative' concept of basic needs is
more purposive and operable compared to its `absolute' version.

First, it is not appropriate to conceive of `absolute' poverty as some

level of income not sufficient to meet the specified basic needs, and
consider only income inequalities beyond that as an issue concerning
`relative' poverty. The dichotomy is infirm. Moreover, it carries an air of
`relativity', with it. For, the contents and quality of a basic needs basket
cannot be determined in isolation of the per capita income of the
community. In the context of the present situation of most of the Muslim
states - especially those which for historical and other reasons are
overpopulated, like Bangladesh and Pakistan and where GNP per capita
is small - even if we distribute the available income evenly after
deducting the revenues needed for defence and civil administration, the
availability of goods and services would presumably be just or a little
more than sufficient to meet the minimum needs listed in the Siddiqui-
Ahmad formulations, Where will the resources come from for
developmental purposes? The line of. demarcation between the
`absolute' and `relative' components of poverty is related to and must
shift with time within and between nations according to the levels of
income reached and the state of its distribution.

Indeed we should consider the relativity issue, initially, in the context

of basic needs -not of incomes - if we wish to avoid the confusion the
discussion so often tends to run into. We believe that it is extremely
difficult, .,if not possible, to quantify basic needs in some `absolute'
sense without being arbitrary.

170
 To begin with, take the case of food requirements. Recent literature
on the subject is full of controversies as to what constitutes malnutrition
or more importantly how to ascertain the 'relative' degrees of under-
nourishment. The empirical research conducted by individuals,
institutions and international organizations on the issue poses
perplexing interpretive problems.22 For, "we do not know how many
calories are needed for people to live their daily lives". 23 It is also not
settled if protein deficiency is a distinct problem from inadequacy of
calories in a diet, or if the removal of the latter would mitigate the
former as well, except in some exceptional situations.24 Nor is one sure
if calories requirement in the diet would be the same for people engaged
in different kinds of activities requiring relatively more (or less)
energy.25 It is not only the difficulties of definition, the non-availability
of the relevant data complicates the problem further.

Despite these difficulties, one is able to make an estimate of at least a

minimum number of people suffering from malnutrition26 but the
phenomenon is not demonstrative of the food supply inadequacy at the
local or international levels. It only epitomizes the problem of highly
uneven distribution of the available supplies.27 The poor cannot afford
to buy (or produce) the needed food because of the purchasing power
insufficiency which is essentially expressive of `relative', not of some
arbitrary `absolute', poverty on ail income scale. In physical terms also,
an element of relativity is imparted by the mode of obtaining specified
amount of calories. The type of diet e.g. meat or cereals (and their
prices) would play an important role.

Since all stomachs are of almost the same size the difference in the
diet intakes of the rich and the poor is expected to be of a limited
nature,28 and one may probably stretch for an `absolute' view of the
requirement. But that cannot clearly be the case with the other basic
needs. For example, the size and quality of a shelter, and the range and
level of the accompanying services relating to water, electricity,
sewerage, transportation etc; can only be thought of meaningfully in
`relative' terms. Provision of education and medical services - their
quantum, type and standard - is all the more difficult to conceive of on an
absolute basis. In any case, when we aggregate all the basic needs,

171
as we must, using a money measure, we are but transported to the
realm of poverty indicated on an income scale. And poverty in this
sense cannot be divided, as argued, into `relative' and `absolute'
components.

Poverty is by its very nature a relative concept. 29 "Whatever doctors,

nutritionists, and other scientists may say about the objective
conditions of deprivation, how, the poor themselves perceive their
deprivation is also relevant. This perception is a function of the
reference group from which the poor take their standards of what
comprises the necessities for a decent minimum level of living"
(Streeten, P.19).

This brings us to our second point. The above mentioned perception

of relative poverty need not be expressive of the envy which Mannan
mentions as distasteful to the shari'ah if the living standards of the
reference group are improving, the desire of the poor as a group that
their lot should also show up a little, is almost a biological basic need
which can be devoid of grudge or envy.

Third and the last, the relative view, of course, defines poverty in
such a way that it can never be eliminated, however much the absolute
levels of income rise .30 But what is alarming about that? Which
society, and at what point in time has been, or presently is, without its
poor or free of a perception of poverty? Not even the most affluent
ones can claim to be entirely devoid of the malady. And why should
not an electric hare be used to spur on the greyhounds of public
concern if that would make them run on road to social welfare towards
an ever distancing destination? Islamic economics with a special focus
on distributive equity would presumably welcome such a built-in spur.
(Compare Streeten P.20).

3. FINANCIAL DIMENSION

The merit of the basic needs concept is that it takes us from the
general to the specific and focuses attention directly on the sore point of
destitution in society. But the decomposition of the underlying

172
poverty notion into the `absolute' and `relative' parts is entirely
capricious. There rarely is a way of defining the appropriate standards
of nutrition, shelter, clothing, health or education without a reference
base. Furthermore, this reference base cannot be the same in the
U.S.A. and Pakistan. Nor can it remain unchanged over time in either
country.

The time when the objective of BNF (absolute) will have been
attained and also the criteria to judge it, may both be fairly clear. But
that alone can hardly help. Required for policy formulation and result
appraisal is the firmness and clarity of relationships between the
needed inputs and the desired outputs. Unfortunately, there is no
production function which spells out these relationships. Precisely
what financial, fiscal or human resources would achieve the desired
results is rarely known. The situation in the developing countries is
characterized with a multiplicity of forces which interact in a complex
and intractable manner.

In contrast, the `relative' view of BNF is realistic and workable. It

does not seek to identify the biological and psychological components
of poverty. The concept may vary between climates, cultures and
locations. Yet comparisons over time and between nations can be
made. It also maintains the link with the issue of distributive justice
and keeps it perpetually in focus. 31 The essential requirement is to
specify the basic needs and express their fulfillment norm in money
terms so as to measure the magnitude of relative deprivation. For this
purpose we have taken the mean expenditure of each country covered
by the study on five basic needs - food, clothing, shelter, medical care
and education in the reference year 1987. Assuming that the bottom
40 percent on the income scale spend all their earnings on these
needs, their average expenditure is compared with the national norm
to illuminate the financial dimension of the problem.

Of course the average basic needs basket shall not be the same in
content and quality for all the seven countries under study. Still, it is
considered fairly realistic to assess the magnitude of deprivation in
each case by its own, and make comparisons on that basis. The

173
method avoids the difficulties of standardizing the basket as also the
problem of currency conversions to a common base.

Here the deprivation norm moves up with the national mean

expenditure on the basic needs. Notice that this norm is different from
that for relative poverty which rises with the mean national income. In
the latter case the focus on the basic needs may be blurred.32 Thus ours
is a 'roll up' approach to basic needs fulfillment as opposed to the
`once and for all' illusory solution provided by the 'absolute' poverty
removal approach.

To fix ideas, let us suppose that in a given country, for any period t,
Xyt is the mean national income, Xbt is the average expenditure on
specified basic needs, and on them Xbpt is the minimum desired
expenditure for the poor identified as those whose average income Xpt
is less than Xbpt.. Clearly, therefore:

Xpt < Xbpt < Xbt < Xyt

In the 'absolute' BNF approach Xbpt is defined as the poverty line,

and if after n years of effort the incomes (or their average?) of all
those below the line are raised above Xbpt level, poverty could claim
to have vanished once and for all, even if the gap between Xyt and
Xbpt or Xbpt and Xbt grows with the passage of time!

. In contrast, the 'relative' BNF approach, as conceived by us above,

would insist on measures to close the gap between Xpt and Xbt in the
first instance, and narrow it down between Xpt and in the long run in a
continual ' roll up' process with temporal growth in the GNP. 33

Secular economics has not so far given any serious consideration,

even in principle, to the desirability of a periodic review of basic needs
of the poor and their upward revision on a continuous basis, but the
Islamic norms of distributive justice would presumably prefer the
relative (roll up) approach to a static 'once and for all' secular view of
poverty removal.34

174
3.1 Measurement: Two Indices

To have an idea of the financial dimension of the BNF in the

selected seven Muslim countries we have attempted to construct two
main indices:

i) The Basic Needs Gap Index (BNGI); and

ii) The Budget Effort Index (BEI)

Conceptually, the BNGI is designed to measure the Basic Needs Gap

that exists between the consumption level (Xpt) of the target group
(i.e. bottom 40% of the population) and the national average
consumption level (Xbt). The BEI, on other hand, is designed to
measure the extent of financial resources required by the government
to meet the Basic needs Gap in 1987 given budget for that year.

In this study we measure these two indices for the selected seven
Muslim countries. We start with the percentage GNP share of the
target group in 1987. This share (col. 9, appendix I) is estimated as a
weighted average for the period 1975-2000, using the group's
population at the two time points as weights. 35

As mentioned earlier, here we assume that-the target group spends it

entire share of GNP (i.e. its entire income) on the basic needs. This
assumption is more than reinforced by an observation in Ahluwalia
and etal 1979 as quoted in Todaro (1985):

"...almost 40 percent of the population of the developing countries

live in absolute poverty defined in terms of income levels that are
insufficient to provide adequate nutrition..." 36

The BNGI rests on the extent of short fall in the target group's
income from the national average expenditure on the specified basic
needs. The gap is expressed as a ratio of the letter to obtain the
required index. Symbolically:

175
 BNGI [abY - PpY]abY (1)

where:

a : is the average propensity to consume in the economy C/Y

b : is the proportion of aggregate consumption expenditure on basic
needs (aY)
Pp : is the proportion of the average national income going to a given
ratio p (in our case 40%) of the bottom end population
Y : is the average (i.e. per capita) national income

Simplifying (1), we get:

BNGI = [1 - Pp/ab] (2)

If Pp tends to zero, the index tends to 1, showing a situation of

extreme destitution for the (Pp) proportion of the population. On the
other hand, if Pp approaches ab, the index would tend to zero,
indicating a continually easing situation for the same proportion of
population from the BNF viewpoint. It follows that the lower the
BNGI on a (0-1) scale, the better will be the BNF position of the
economy and vice versa. In a `roll up' approach to BNF, as envisaged in
the above discussion, the performance improvement indicated by the
progressive lowering of the BNGI will be indicative of improved
income distribution coupled with economic growth, if `p' is fairly large.
This is confirmed by a negative correlation (r = 0.63) in our case
between the BNGI and the per capita national income. The higher is
the income the lower is the BNGI in general. However, it is just about
0.39 showing that the rise in per capital income has a weak influence
in reducing income inequalities (compare with quotation in note 31).

Table 1 below shows our findings in terms of BNGI for the seven
selected Muslim countries for the year 1987. We have arrived at these
findings using the World Bank data for 1987 (World Development
Report, 1989).

176
 TABLE 1

BASIC NEEDS GAP INDEX (BNGI) : 1987

Country (a)=Aggregate (b) =Expenditure on BN* Pp BNG

Consumption Spending as a ratio of Aggregate I
(Priv+Gvt) as ratio of Consumption
GNP
1 2 3 4
Bangladesh 0.98 0.87 0.444 0.478
Egypt 0.91 0.70 0.338 0.469
Indonesia 0.71 0.74 0.324 0.381
Malaysia 0.63 0.57 0.328 0.086
Morocco 0.86 0.71 0.305 0.50
Pakistan 0.90 0.84 0.326 0.570
Turkey 0.76 0.73 0.239 0.886

The above table shows that there are significant income disparities
in the countries under study as indicated by the Pp which measures the
per head income of the poorest 40% (col. 11, appendix I) as a
proportion of the average GNP (col. 2, appendix I). In Turkey the
value of Pp is the lowest at (0.239). Consequently, the BNGI in that
country stands at (0.586) which is the highest in the group. With a per
capita income of U.S. $ 1210, Turkey ranks among the lower middle
income group countries but a highly skewed income distribution puts
her poorest 40% population much below the national average.
Although Bangladesh is the poorest country in the group, her BNGI
(0.478) is lower than Turkey's (0.586). This indicates relatively less
unequal income distribution in the former case. On the other hand,
Malaysia with a U.S. $ 1810 per capita income, is also a lower middle
income country like Turkey, but its track record in combating poverty is
the best in the entire group as indicated by its BNGI being the lowest
at (0.086). This performance of the Malaysian economy is neither
accidental nor is it the sole outcome of the trickled down

177
effects of growth. Rather, the Malaysian economy owes this better
distribution (and hence a lower BNGI) to the New Economic Policy
(NEP) which was introduced in the early 1970s with the specific goal of
improvement in income distribution.

.After having measured the BN gap, the next logical step is to

estimate the resource requirement to bridge the same. This is done
within the frame of the national budgets of these countries. Using the
World Bank figures which express the government budget of a country
as a percentage of its GNP, we attempt to measure the resource
requirements for each country in the group for 1987. We do this by
constructing a Budget Effort Index (BEI) for each country (col. 17,
appendix I). The BEI is measured as follows:

BEI - BNG as % of GNP Govt.

Budget as %' of GNP
Table 2 below gives the BEI estimates:

TABLE 2

BEI INDEX ESTIMATES : 1987

Country BNG as % of GNP Govt. Budget as % of GNP BEI

1.00 2.0 3=(1+2)
Bangladesh 16.25 12.2 1.33
Egypt 11.94 45.5 0.26
Indonesia 8.00 24.0 0.33
Malaysia 1.24 31.9 0.04
Morocco 12.20 35.0 0.35
Pakistan 17.26 21.4 0.81
Turkey 14.55 22.8 0.64

178
 The above estimates show that in order to bridge the 1987 BN gap, in
Bangladesh we need an increase of 133% in her budget for that year.
Pakistan ranks second in terms of additional budget requirement of 81%
while Turkey, needing a budgetary increase of 64%, ranks third in the
group. Malaysia, on the other hand, needs the least additional budget
(0.04%) to bridge the BN Gap. It is interesting to note that there is a
high positive correlation (r = + 0.8) between BNG expressed as a ratio
of GNP, and the BEI. This clearly shows that the higher the basic needs
gap relative to income, the greater will be the effort required to
mobilize resources for the improvement of the condition of the poor in
a `roll up' scheme.

4. CONCLUSION

In recent years the thinking on the poverty question in economics

has matured in so far as the focus has shifted from mere per capita
GNP growth to the fulfillment of the Basic Needs. This is a healthy
development indeed, but from the policy point of view economists still
remain undecided on the issue of absolute vs relative poverty.
Apparently the `absolute' version sounds very appealing, and that is
why most of the contemporary Islamic economists tend to take that
route, but such an approach raises some very serious conceptual and
operational issues as discussed in the present paper.

Furthermore, the approach raises serious problems in the case of

extremely poor countries like Bangladesh. Clearly, if we begin in such
cases by attempting to provide an internationally standardized basic
needs package, the cost will be so high (in terms of the resource
requirement) that it will become virtually impossible for that country
to make any meaningful dent on poverty without risking a political
upheaval. Even the international donor agencies would not be able to
make a serious commitment to the required extent. It is this inherent
difficulty of the lack of a realistic understanding of the problem which
has resulted in the failure to develop a suitable technique for
measuring resource requirement to solve it. The `roll-up' approach to
BNF as outlined in this study enables one to have a realistic frame of
analysis. For every country's poverty is evaluated in

179
its own context and the cure is prescribed within its own resource
capacity. The technique of estimation presented in this study is neither
claimed to be perfect nor final. Rather, it marks the beginning of a serious
discussion on the estimation of resource requirement and the relevant
strategies to reduce significantly the poverty in the Muslim world (or
elsewhere). Here the BEI estimates the resource requirement to bridge
the entire BN gap in just one year. Obviously, this gap cannot be bridged
in such a short period, and the resource requirement will have to be
estimated on an annual basis with reference to the desired time frame. At
the same time there will be need to discuss the strategies for resource
mobilization for the purpose. Hopefully, further research in the area will
explore relevant issues involved in the process.

180
 APPENDIX I

BASIC DATA AND DERIVATIONS : 1987

Source: World Development Report, 1989 (and appendices II $ III)

 Appendix II

STRUCTURE OF DEMAND : 1987

Distribution of GDP (%)
General Private Gross Gross Resource Balance
Country Government Consumption Domestic Domestic
Consumption Savings Investment 1987 1965

1 2 3 4 5=(3-4) 6
Bangladesh 8 90 2 11 -9 -4
Egypt 14 77 8 19 -11 -4
Indonesia 10 61 29 26 3 0
Malaysia 16 47 37 23 14 4
Morocco 18 68 14 19 -5 1
Pakistan 13 77 11 17 -6 -8
Turkey 12 67 23 26 -3 -1

Source: World Development Report, 1989, Table No. 9, Structure of Demand, pp.
180-81
Appendix III

EXPENDITURE ON FIVE BASIC NEEDS:

(Range of Years, 1980-85)
(As % Share of Total Household Consumption)
Country Food Clothing & Shelter, Medicare Education Total % on
Footwear Fuel & Basic Needs
Power
1 2 3 4 5 6=(1+2+3
+4+5)
Bangladesh 59 8 17 2 1 87
Egypt 36 4 5 14 11 70
Indonesia 48 7 13 2 4 74
Malaysia 30 5 9 5 8 57
Morocco 44 9 6 7 5 71
Pakistan 54 9 15 3 3 84
Turkey 40 15 13 4 1 73

Source: World Development Report, 1989. Table No. 10, pp. 182-83

182
ENDNOTES

1. The literature on basic needs is now vast and penetrating,

thoroughly covering the various issues in the area. Most notable is
Paul Streeten et al First Things First which contains an extensive
bibliography of just under one hundred entries up to 1980. No less
important is the contribution of A.K. Sen. Some selected
references are provided here mainly covering the. period since
1981. Some useful material has appeared periodically in the
World Development reports.

For a critical appraisal of the basic needs approach to

development, T.N. Srinivasan, and Sidney Dell are important.
Dell argues that there are difficulties of concept, measurement,
and interpretation in using 'basic needs' as an operational tool of
planning.

Discussion on various aspects of basic needs has so far been very

scanty in the nascent Islamic economics. Cursory references are
found in many writings, but a comprehensive discussion is taken up
only by Siddiqui and Ahmad more recently and that too primarily
at the juridical level.

2. The GNP per capital of the developing countries grew at an

average rate of 3.4% per annum during 1950-75 or 3.0% if China is
excluded. This was faster than either the developed or the
developing nations had grown in any comparable period prior to
1950, and exceeded both the official goals and private expectations
(Meier p. 45).

3. Basic Needs Approach (BNA) emphasizes "poverty minimizing

growth". Its strategy of direct attach on poverty has better
potential for LDCs' development and fulfillment of their
populations' basic needs than the trickle down mechanism of the
Growth Approach. (Farooq, Abs). Nevertheless, while the benefits
derived from the operation of BNF policies are not to be
discounted in the longer term the success of the approach may

183
 inevitably require an improvement in the rate of economic growth (Kumar,
Abs.).

4. For a detailed discussion of these requirements see Paul Streeten Ch. 2

and also pp. 110-112.

5. Srinivasan has emphasized that the same political and institutional

constraints that prevent the operation of the trickle down theory denying
the benefits of growth from reaching the poor in an effective measure also
apply to attempts to provide basic needs. He cites the Indian experience of
planning for 'minimum needs' to prove his point. (Streeten pp. 55-58).

6. Usually a basic needs approach to development is cast in a limited time

frame. Within a. short period say one generation, it seeks to put the basic
needs - food, clothing, shelter, medicare, and education - of a specified
amount and quality within the reach of targeted groups. We attempt in this
short paper to measure the financial dimension of the required program in
the selected economies from only this angle. We are, for example, not
concerned with the mobilization of resources or with their ways of
utilization.

7. Not only Islam but all other major religions of the world insist on the
fulfillment of basic human needs. An interesting elaboration available in
recent times is that of the Talmud, a codification of the Jewish religious law
spanning almost eight centuries. '"The Talmud attempted to raise the poor
to well-defined objective minimum living standards, while considering
individual subjective needs." For details see Shapiro pp. 54-59.

8. For this restricted view see Streeten pp. 109-110 and also H.W. Singer.

9. The issue of material and spiritual poverty as an integral part of overall

poverty is mentioned both by Mannan and Ahmad. While the former deals
only with material poverty, the latter also includes

184
 the spiritual poverty but fails to suggest its specific objective
dimensions or concrete policy measures to reduce it, save for a
vague, general remark.

10. A tradition says: "Sometimes poverty turns into disbelief' (al-

Sayuti, Jami al-Saghir). The Prophet (peace be upon him) is
reported to have sought God's protection from poverty (Abu
Daud). Again, an Islamically regulated economy must create the
environment where believers really heed to the Qur' anic advice:
"But seek with the wealth which God has bestowed on thee, the
home of the He and forget not thy portion of the present world"
(28:77). Thus Islam seeks to convert the material ambition of man
into the means for attaining spiritual heights i.e. his ultimate goal
(Hasan pp. 41).

11. See Hifz-ur-Rehman pp. 40-48 supported by the Holy Qur'an e.g.
15:20; 41:10.

12. Indeed, the point had been conceded both in Libya and Iran, for
example, much earlier than Siddiqui made it in 1983.

13. The paper gives the impression of a hurried effort. The argument is
at places repetitive and shifty and marked with digressions. The
verses quoted do not always bear out the points they are meant to
support.

14. This formulation can be defended as an ultimate goal of the

shari'ah in a 'pure' Islamic model. Indeed, such a broad eventual
range of basic needs is also visualized in secular writings though
for immediate purposes they stick to its narrower interpretation
(Streeten for example makes such a distinction pp. 109-110).

Furthermore, comfortable or decent living may be interpreted as

relative to the level of economic development the country has
reached. For example, the national average, which is used in this

185
 paper as the bench mark, may be regarded as decent for purposes of
measurement. We owe this suggestion to Mr. Zakariya Man,
presently Deputy Dean, Kulliyyah of Economics and Management,
International Islamic University, Malaysia.

15. One finds a comprehensive and modern categorization of the poor

in Erfan Shafey "To the traditional poor-the landless, the old aged,
sick, orphans, divorcees, widows, and migrants - one ought to
perhaps add contemporary types -victims of unemployment, run-
away inflation, relative geographical isolation, and of random
calamities such as fire, floods etc". (pp. 69).

An important addition to the list is made by Streeten " Indeed, the

very poor are not unemployed but work very hard and long hours
in unremunerative, unproductive forms of activity in the towns: the
street traders, garbage collectors, and casual workers, as well as
many in small production such as blacksmiths, carpenters, sandal
makers, builders and lamp makers. These people often work
extremely hard, are self-employed, or employed by their family and
are very poor. The "working poor" (pp. 13).

16. These institutions and agencies have been well-defined in Islamic

economics. Siddiqui, Manna, Ahmad, Rehman and Hasan all refer to
them and explain their respective roles. These are: the individual
himself, the relatives, the neighborhood, the community,
institutions, and the state in that order.

17. "The problem of development must be defined as a' selective

attach on the worst forms of poverty. Developmental goals must be
defined in terms of progressive reduction and eventual elimination
of malnutrition, disease, illiteracy, squalor, unemployment and
inequalities. We were taught to take care of our GNP because it
would take care of poverty. Let us reverse this, and take care of
poverty because it will take care of the GNP. In other words, let us
worry about the content of GNP even more than its rate of
increase". (Mehboobul Haque, pp. 6)

186
18. For a detailed discussion of these reasons see M.P. Todaro Ch. 1.
See also Srinivasan.

19. Such a concept was adopted in some Indian studies in the late
sixties. See, for example, Dandekar V.M. and Nilakantha Rath:
Poverty in India, New Delhi, Ford Foundation, 1970. For the basic
needs related concept of the absolute poverty line see Meier G.
(p.43) and for the standardization of the line to facilitate
international comparisons see Todaro, M.P. (pp.32).

20. For this (pp. 20) and other arguments against a 'relative' concept of
poverty see Streeten pp. 17-21.

21. Interestingly, Mannan not only believes that a perception of

relative poverty is unwelcome in the shari'ah, he also observes that
"the shari'ah demands that we must attack absolute poverty rather
than relative poverty as a matter of priority". (pp. 308). To this
Naqvi's rider is no less interesting. "Consistency demands that one
should deny any consideration to relative poverty, if it is not
justified. The language employed by the author gives the
impression that higher priority is to be given to the removal of
absolute poverty, and thus by implication relative poverty also
deserves attention, though entitled to a relatively lower priority".

The inconsistency in Mannan's argument is further highlighted

when he observes at a later stage that the "guarantee of a minimum
level of living is both conditional and relative at the same time". In
support of the relative nature of the guarantee he quotes two
traditions (from Bukhari) but fails to see that the reference base for
his 'relative' concept of the minimum living is not the same in both
cases; in the first tradition it is measured by the "prevalent custom",
in the second, by the consumption level of the employer.

Also, one may presumably ask: Why should a perception of

relative poverty only prompt the better off to exploit the "less
fortunate people"? Why may it not lead the latter to rise in revolt

187
 against the rich or compel the state to take corrective measures?
Will shari'ah bar this second course of action? The flow in Mannan
is obvious.

22. "It is not all certain just how many people in the world are
malnourished. In the late 1960s and early 1970s (for example) the
FAO estimated that approximately 1.5 billion people were
undernourished - but in 1974 the FAO estimated that around 1970
less than half a billion people were suffering from inadequate diets
... Unfortunately, the greatly reduced estimate of the number does
not reflect improved diets - merely changed definitions. In 1977,
the FAO once again estimated the number of undernourished in the
LDCs at * somewhere over 400. million people... The calculations
were based on a more conservative estimate of nutritional
requirements than in 1974 (Murdoch, pp. 95-96 see footnotes also
on p. 96).

23. U.S. National Academy of Sciences quoted in Murdoch, p. 97. Paul

Streeten observes: "...a nutritionally adequate diet is difficult to
define since caloric needs vary widely with climate, body weight,
activity, height, age and other factors, and even for the : same
conditions between persons and for the same person in the same
conditions from day to day" (p. 74).

24. In case of their earlier estimates of the malnourished the FAO

maintained that the protein deficiency was a distinct problem
affecting hundreds of millions who had sufficient calories. In 1974,
however, the FAO concluded that protein deficiency is not a
separate additional problem, except in regions where the main
staple is cassava or some starchy crop (Murdoch, p. 95).

25. The 1977 estimate of FAO quoted above in no. 22 is based on a

caloric requirement that takes no account of the energy needed for
activities such as farming, and Serimshaw and Young have the
evidence that even when allowance is made for such activities the
FAO requirements may still be understated. (Murdoch, p. 96-97).

188
26. Such an estimate can be made by examining medical surveys in
the developing countries. These surveys estimate directly the
number of people showing clinical symptoms of malnutrition. The
WHO has based some of its estimates on these surveys (Murdoch,
pp. 97-98).
27. See Streeten p. 125, also Murdoch pp. 98-99.

28. Still, in developed countries the average person consumes 50%

more calories and 70% more proteins than the average person in
poor countries, and directly and indirectly uses three times as
much grain. The extra food needed to provide adequate diets of the
malnourished of the world is equivalent to about 37 million tons of
grains. This was fifth of world grain production and is less than 10
per cent of the amount of grain fed to livestock in rich countries
(Murdoch p. 98).

29. "By necessities I understand not only the commodities which are
indispensably necessary for the support of life, but whatever the
custom of the country renders it indecent for creditable people,
even of the lowest order, to be without" (Adam Smith, The Wealth
of Nations bk. 5 ch. 2 p. 2, quoted in Streeten p. 19). .

30. It is not K.A: Naqvi alone who raised this objection, as quoted in
the text, to a relative concept of poverty, see also the discussion on
the point in Streeten pp. 18-21.

31. Maintaining this link is important because it is "an empirical fact

that only societies that have been successful in meeting the basic
needs are those that have also reduced inequalities". (Streeten, pp.
20-21).

32. In the case of a notion of relative poverty the reference base may
be a matter of one's predilections. It may be the mean national
income, the bottom of the top 80 percent of population on the
scale, the mean of the top 40 percent or any thing else for any
given percentage of people at the bottom.

189
33. Even in secular economics it is now well recognized that the BHN
(Basic Human Needs) strategy must be implemented in a flexible
way and must go beyond health, nutrition, education, sanitation,
water, and housing to include infrastructure and indigenous, small
enterprise products that will make it easier for domestic production
to meet basic human needs as and when the growing economy so
permits (For details see Curry).

34. The 'Roll Up' approach would insist that as Xbt expands with
growth in the GNP, the ratio of Xpt to Xbt is at least maintained at
the old level and the effort is made to raise it with the passage time.
This would require more pro-poor measures to raise their
productivity, disposable income and availability at reasonable
prices of goods and services included in the expanding basic needs
basket. The process should eventually tend to raise the ratio of Xpt
and Xyt making for a more equitable distribution of incomes (and
wealth) in accordance with the Islamic norms.

35. The calculations here are based on the data given in Todaro (pp.
152-53, 1985).

36. M.S. Ahluwalia, N. Carter and H. Chenery, "Growth and Poverty in

Developing Countries", Journal of Development Economics, 6
(1979), p. 306. And remember that nutrition is just one element of
the BN basket.

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 8
LONG TERM FINANCE IN ISLAMIC COUNTRIES :
CASE STUDY OF PAKISTAN

MOHAMMAD AKRAM KHAN*

INTRODUCTION

The main objective of this paper is to review the progress made by

Pakistan in Islamizing its financial system, more particularly in relation
to sources and application of long term finance. I have chosen
Pakistan for a detailed study because, of all the Muslim countries, it
has shown the greatest enthusiasm at the official level to eliminate
interest from the economy and this experience has attracted a lot of
attention from all quarters. Although the paper concentrates on
Pakistan, the lessons learnt from this experience and suggestions made
in this paper are of a fairly general nature. I hope the proposals
contained in this paper will be of interest to other countries as well if
they genuinely wish to eliminate interest from their economies.

The paper consists of five parts besides the Introduction. The first
part of the paper briefly surveys the existing financial instruments and
points out the extent to which these instruments adhere to the Islamic
framework. The second part suggests possible changes in these
practices to bring the financial instruments nearer to Islamic standards.
The third part proposes such institutional arrangements as would be
necessary to support the changes suggested in part two of the paper.
Although the main thrust of the paper is on long term finance, the
structural changes proposed in the paper will give rise to some related
questions about short term finance and overall economic management
of the economy. Therefore, part four discusses the related questions of
the proposals made in part two of the paper. The last part consists of
concluding remarks.

* Additional Auditor General, Lahore, Pakistan.

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 The main conclusions of the paper are as follows. First, the Islamization
of banking in Pakistan has not met with a success. Most of the finance is
being provided by the savers and the bankers on interest although different
terms are being used to camouflage this. Second, the early days of
Islamization in Pakistan did see some genuine but inadequate efforts to
eliminate interest from the economy but in a period of less than five years
most of these efforts have either been reversed or, at least, further progress
on them has been halted. Third, a genuine attempt to eliminate interest
from the economy would require the restriction of all opportunities for
interest-bearing finance. So long as avenues for interest-bearing
investment are open, the possibility of a successful transition to an Islamic
system of finance is well-nigh impossible. Four, a true Islamic system of
finance would require the savers desirous of earning a return on their
savings to assume risk as well. The shari'ah principle of no risk-no-return
would have to be strictly enforced. This would mean a structural change in
the role of financial institutions. Five, the macro-economic management of
the economy would also have to be in conformity with the Islamic
principles to make Islamic financing a successful experiment.

PART ONE : EXISTING PRACTICE OF LONG TERM FINANCE IN

PAKISTAN
Sources of Long Term Finance

The main sources of long term finance in Pakistan are as follows:

(1) Long term deposits with commercial banks and development finance
institutions (DFIs)
(2) Saving schemes of the government
(3) Long term bonds floated by the government or public enterprises (like
National Bonds, WAPDA bonds etc.)
(4) Foreign loans from such institutions as Asian Development Bank
(ADB), World Bank, IMF, and Islamic Development Bank, etc. (5)
National Investment (Unit) Trust (NIT)
(6) Mutual funds floated by the Investment Corporation of Pakistan (ICP)

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(7) Profit-Loss Sharing Investment scheme of ICP

The first sources are purely interest-bearing. Any proposal to reform

long term finance must suggest measures to transform these sources of
finance. The next one is to a large extent, interest-free because NIT
invests most of its funds on an equity basis. However, NIT also
channels part of its funds to interest-earning avenues. Therefore, some
reform is needed in this institution as well. It is only. the last two
schemes which are completely free of interest. The mutual funds are
invested in shares of joint stock companies. The profit-loss sharing
scheme provides for investment in equity of joint stock companies with
a maximum limit of Rs. 30000 for an individual' s funds with the
maximum of one self and one joint account of the individual. The ICP
provides counterpart funds to the extent of 150% of the saver ' s funds.
The profit is distributed in the proportion of 60:40 between the saver
and the ICP. However, loss is distributed in proportion to respective
capitals. But the ICP has closed the scheme for future domestic savers.
Only Pakistanis living abroad and willing to invest in foreign exchange
can avail of it now. It is pertinent to mention that part of ICP
operations are also based on interest. It invests its own funds on a
mark-up basis as well.

Application of Long Term Finance

The main applications of long term finance are as follows:

Equity investment in business, industry or agriculture

Participatory Term Certificates (PTCs) as Islamic substitute for
debentures
Term Finance Certificates (TFCs), a form of financing on mark-up
Leasing and Lease-purchase
Mudharabah Certificates (MCs)
Housing Finance

There are no two opinions about the legality of the equity

investment in the Islamic framework. Therefore, we shall not discuss it
any further.

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Participatory Term Certificates
The Participatory Term Certificates (PTCs) were designed to replace
interest-bearing redeemable finance. The PTCs were an innovation of
the Islamic finance movement. It introduced the concept of redeemable
long-term finance on the basis of profit-loss sharing. The concept
operated in the following manner. An enterprise which desired to get
long-term finance was required to float redeemable PTCs. The
financiers (mostly banks and DFIs) would accept the PTCs for the
finance provided by them. The enterprise would share profit or loss with
the PTCs-holders on the basis of a pre-determined rate. The profit of
loss was determined on a pro-rated basis for the equity capital and long-
term finance obtained through PTCs. The mechanism of obtaining
finance through PTCs has recently been discontinued as the financial
institutions have not found it profitable. Moreover, they involved some
risk for the financial institutions which the latter were unwilling to
assume.

The PTCs were an attempt towards interest-free finance, although a

number of their conditions were un-Islamic. For example, they provided
a fixed return of 12% during the gestation period of the enterprise
availing of the finance. Similarly, in case of loss they provided for
allotment of equity shares of the enterprise to the bank equal to the loss
instead of reducing the claim of the PTCs-holders. Another clause
provided that the bank would refund or forgo the profit" to the client if
it exceeded 17% of the principal sum, thus keeping the market rate of
interest as a point of reference. Instead of reforming the- instrument
on the Islamic pattern, the financial institutions have altogether
abandoned it. They have, as we shall show below, moved towards the
interest-bearing mode. of finance by adopting TFCs.

Term Finance Certificates (TFCs)

The TFCs are, financial instruments which have replaced the PTCs.
The" TFCs. are i s s u e d by the client enterprises to obtain. finance from
DFIs a n d banks on a mark up of 22% which is calculated by using the

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compound interest formula. However, the client gets a rebate of 6%-7%
if it pays back the principal sum with the mark-up on the due date.
Introduction of FCs in lieu of PTCs is a step in the reverse direction, so
far as Islamic financing is concerned. There is no difference between
this type of finance and debenture-finance on interest, except that it
does not involve compounding of interest beyond the due date. In that
sense, however, it is a less "efficient" mode of finance than debentures.

Leasing and Mudharabah

Leasing has recently become very popular in Pakistan. At the time of

writing this paper there are 22 mudharabah which are mainly engaged in
the leasing business. Similarly, some companies have been registered as
leasing companies. The leasing companies deal in providing finance
for, equipment, plant, building, land and transport. Most of the leases
are finance leases in which case the leasing companies provide finance
to the client and receive it back with a mark-up known as rental. The
asset in question remains the property of the lessor as a mortgage. The
lessee assumes all the risks and costs of depreciation, disaster,
obsolescence, idle capacity, decline in value, etc. When requesting for
finance the lessee enters into an agreement with the lessor to accept the
asset specified by the former.

The lessee does not have the option to refuse the article or to return
it before the lease term. In this way, the lessor does not assume the
"business risk" which a lessor of operating leases (such as houses etc)
would assume. The lessor in the case of finance-lease extends finance
for a specified period and takes it back with a pre-determined increment
without assuming business or trade risk. In brief, the finance-lease it
nothing but another form of financing on interest. However, some
companies are also in the operating-lease business. In this case the
lessor assumes all the risks which an owner of an asset has to bear in
the normal course of leasing business. This type of lease is not very
popular, however. Data are not available on the exact proportion of the
types of leasing business but interviews

201
with the executives of some of these companies revealed that they are
doing mostly finance-leasing.

Housing Finance

Housing finance in Pakistan. is mainly provided by the House

Building Finance Corporation (HBFC). The HBFC started providing
finance on rent-sharing basis from July 1979. HBFC shared the
notional rent of the house with the owner in proportion to its
investment in the total cost of the house. The rents are assessed every
three years in respect of all types of localities. Since more than 80% of
the users of the funds built houses in localities where rents were
comparatively low, the rent share of the HBFC has also been low. It
was assessed that in 1987 the average rate of return' of the HBFC. was
4.8% while there was an arrears of Rs 10 billions. The rate of recovery
was also very low. The HBFC got most of its funds from the
government through State Bank of Pakistan at a 9% rate of mark-up.
After studying the causes of the huge government deficits, foreign
lenders started pressing the government to raise the cost of housing
capital for the users so that the rate of return of the HBFC finance was
in conformity with the market rate of interest. Yielding to international
pressure the HBFC has, from 1988, revised its rent-sharing scheme,
which was nearer to the Islamic framework. The revised scheme has
divided the HBFC clients into four categories. Finance is now made
available on a predetermined rate of return which has been calculated
by taking into account the principal, the period, and expected inflation
during the net ten years. There does not now remain any difference
between interest-bearing finance and the present scheme of the HBFC.
Its previous scheme had some shortcomings from the Islamic point of
view. For example, the HBFC did not assume and responsibility if the
house met a natural disaster. Similarly, its system of fines and
penalties also needed some reform. Instead of reforming the scheme
towards an Islamic pattern, it has chosen to adopt a purely interest-
bearing system.

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Reasons for Going Back to Interest-Bearing System

The above discussion shows that the financial institutions in Pakistan

did make some moves towards Islamic finance during the first few
years. But in a short period of five years they have regressed to the old
practice of interest-bearing finance. What could be the reasons for it? I
interviewed about a dozen very senior bankers to explore the reasons
for this phenomenon. A summary of their replies is given below:

The bankers are extremely worried about the safety of the depositors
funds. They feel that at the prevailing standards of ethics and honesty,
it is highly risky to extend finance on profit-sharing basis. They are
afraid that their clients will depict losses or at least will suppress true
profits in their accounts and as bankers they will not be able to
effectively check this tendency. The confidence in the banks will
erode and the whole financial structure will collapse. Therefore, they
have adopted the safer course of providing finance on the basis of
mark-up which is a disguised form of interest.
The banks do not have any experience of operating in the public sector
which requires different types of skills. They do not want to risk the
depositors' funds by operating in a field they do not know. They are
conscious that they are in the position of financial intermediary and
they want to remain restricted to that without assuming additional
risk.
The cost of finance for the financial institutions is higher than the
return they can get from the investors or if they have to arrange
finance on interest they cannot give it on a profit-sharing basis. For
example, HBFC gets finance on a flat mark-up of 9% from the State
Bank of Pakistan. It could not afford to provide it to individuals on
rent-sharing bases, when the average rate of return was less than 5%.
Similarly, Pakistan Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation
(PICIC) obtained funds from ADB, IBRD etc. on fixed interest. It
could not risk its deployment on profit-sharing basis where the return
was uncertain.

203
 The above account of the reasons for a reversal towards interest-
bearing finance points toward the direction of the proposal we are
going to make in part two of the paper. In brief, there are two
compulsions: first, the banks are financial intermediaries. They cannot
get into real sector. This, by itself is not objectionable from the Islamic
point of view. The Islamic position is that, in this case, the banks
should also not expect a return of the finance provided by them. They
should remain restricted to getting a fee for being financial
intermediaries, which is a service. From the Islamic point of view, if
the banks want to earn a profit they should have to assume the business
risk, also. Since at that present moment of history they are unwilling to
assume the risk of loss, for whatever reason, they, should limit their role
to being agents of investors and savers for a fee or service charge and
quit the role of lenders on interest. In fact, this is going to be one of
our major proposals.

Second, the sources of finance carry a burden of interest which does

not allow the bankers to re-lend that finance on a profit-loss sharing
basis. It only suggests that all schemes of domestic investment which
collect household savings for a fixed return must also be discontinued.
This would require opening up alternate channels for household
savings. We shall take up this question below in part two of the paper.

So far as foreign finance is concerned, for the future the government

should accept funding on a profit-loss sharing basis only. This would
mean a lot of hardship in the beginning. But there is no alternative to
bold initiatives. Fortunately, the international financial climate is quite
favorable to risk capital at this point in history. The debt crisis of Latin
American countries has more than ever before, taught the international
creditors to look for such solutions for the heavily-indebted countries
that would reduce their debt servicing liabilities. The. move towards
debt-equity swaps is a clear indication of the fact that the world is
willing to consider non-interest-bearing alternatives for international
finance.

204
PART TWO : ISLAMIC INSTRUMENTS OF LONG TERM
FINANCE

In this section we shall present our main proposal to reform the

Islamic banking system in Pakistan. The section describes a set of new
instruments which would have to be introduced and promoted to move
further on the party of Islamization.

1. Common Stock (CS)

The common stock of joint stock companies is a perfectly Islamic

instrument of finance. It does not need any discussion. We have
mentioned it here to make the discussion comprehensive.

2. Participatory Term Certificates (PTCs)

The PTCs, a substitute for interest-bearing debentures were

introduced in Pakistan to attract redeemable long-term finance on a
profit-loss sharing basis. They have only recently been abandoned.
They need to be revived with following modifications:

There should not be any predetermined return on them during or after

the gestation period. In fact, profit of an investment accrues after
some period of time. Since the clients will not be paying any return
during the gestation period the profit expected from them after
commercial production starts will be higher because of the present
investment and therefore the financial institutions will also get a
higher return. In other words, the profit from the client, after the
production starts, will incorporate the effect of this investment.
The clients should not be allowed to redeem the PTCs before the due
date. This is necessary to forestall the tendency to have free finance
during the gestation period.
The financial institution should not be expected to forego or refund
any part of the profit which flows to it according to the terms of the
PTCs. This will have the effect of increasing the income of the
financial institutions. This proposal effectively discards the concept of
using interest as a point of reference for return on PTCs.

205
 The PTCs should be made tradeable on the stock exchange. The idea
is to develop a secondary market for these instruments. This will
obviate the need for discounting and re-discounting of the PTCs.

3. Mudharabah Certificates (MC)

They are already being issued by mudharabah companies. They

should continue in the following manner:

The mudharabah companies should not concentrate on leasing

business only. Instead, they should enter into all fields - trade,
industry and agriculture.
Those household savers and corporate entities, which have surplus
funds should invest in these certificates.
These certificates, as now, should be traded on the stock exchange.
The mudharabah certificates should provide a major channel to
attract household saving once the interest-bearing schemes are
banned altogether. These certificates will get a return based on the
actual business operations.

4. Leasing Certificates (LC)

This is a proposed instrument. It will have the following features:

These certificates will be issued by those companies which want to

acquire assets on lease. The banks or specialist financial institutions
will institute a Leasing Mutual Fund where savers, with the clear
understanding that their savings will be invested in leasing
operations, will place their funds.
These certificates will be traded on the stock exchange.
The banks or specialist financial institutions will act as agents of the
savers. As agents they will examine the potential ability of the
lessees to pay the rentals. They will also manage the leased assets
on behalf of the savers. When an asset is be returned by a lessee the
banks will make arrangements to lease it to another lessee.
Similarly, they will also arrange the purchase of leased assets for

206
 leasing to the first lessee if it is so required by him. The banks will
also arrange to dispose of the assets once they are returned by the
lessees after their natural life. In brief, the banks will act as agents of
the savers who will be the lessors.
As lessors, the leasing certificate holders will assume all the risks
which any lessor has to accept in this business.
Since the banks will not be assuming any risk they will also not be
entitled to any profit. All profit or loss will be passed on to the
leasing certificate holders after the banks have deducted their agency
commission. This commission will be a fixed sum to be paid once for
each service. However, to keep the interest of the banks it can be
stipulated that the banks will share in profit if it is over and above a
certain threshold.

5. Instalment Sales Certificates (ISC)

The consumers need credit to purchase durable goods like motor cars,
motor cycles, refrigerators, air-conditioners, and houses. Since the
consumer items do not generate any profit or loss their financing poses
a challenge. The following proposal is likely to present a solution to
this problem.*

The government should encourage investment of private capital in the

production of durable assets, like houses, motor-cars, motor-cycles,
refrigerators etc.
Manufactures of durable or builders of houses should offer to sell their
products on credit to consumers after satisfying themselves of the
credit-worthiness of the consumer and after obtaining a suitable
collateral. (To avoid a few people getting more than one facility on
credit, a national-wide credit-rationing system will have to be
instituted, more about which will be discussed in the next Part of the
paper.)

* For a short-comment on economic implication of this proposal, see part four of the paper
(below).

207
 These products will be offered for sale on instalment at the same
price as cash. This is essential to forestall the re-entry of interest in
the economic system in a disguised form. At present, the difference
in the cash price and the credit price of products sold on installments
is mainly due to the interest charges on the capital involved.
Most likely, it will have the effect of inducing everyone to try to
obtain the asset on credit, if possible.
The manufacturers will get a refinance facility from the central bank on
profit-loss sharing basis. The customers will repay their installments
to the sellers who will return the finance to the central bank along
with profit or loss. Since it may be possible that the central bank
cannot, possibly, deal directly with so many manufacturers, the
banks can act as agents of the manufacturers. They will charge their
agency commission for their services'.
Since the refinance will be available on a profit-less sharing basis, it
is possible that some saving societies(*) choose to provide finance to
the manufacturers or developers of the housing estates on a profit-
loss basis.
Gradually, the manufacturers and developers of houses can resort to
issuing of Instalment Sales Certificates which can be bought by the
consumers' saving societies or commercial banks, if they have funds,
or through a central bank.
These certificates will be traded on the stock exchange. In the
beginning, the central bank wall take the initiative to provide the re-
finance.
The Instalment Sales Certificates shall be redeemable by the
manufacturers and developers of the houses after a stated period.

6. Mutual Funds Certificates

At present the Investment Corporation of Pakistan (TCP) is the only

institution which issues mutual funds. There is a great need for
encouraging the establishment of such investment banks which accept

* Please see part three of the present paper (below).

208
deposits from the savers in the form of special or general purpose
mutual funds. These funds can be instituted to provide finance to
specialized sectors or for general purpose financing through PTCs,
MCs, LCs or ISCs. Since the former saving schemes, saving bank
accounts, fixed earning bonds and certificates will be banned, these
mutual funds will be a great attraction for the savers. The money
collected in these funds will be invested on the basis of equity or for
leasing or for mudharabah. The mutual fund certificates will be traded
on the stock exchange.

7. Investment Trusts

At present, the National Investment (Unit) Trust (NIT) is the only

institution which accepts small savers' deposits and invests them on
equity and interest-bearing business. The first proposal is that the
investment on interest-bearing business should be stopped. But the
other, and more important, proposal is that a large number of such
investment trusts be established which collect saving from different
sectors of society. At present the investment trusts may fix their selling
and re-purchase price in the light of the value of their assets instead of
leaving it to the stock exchange. We visualize that gradual
specialization will take place in the area. There will be unit trusts which
specialize in investment in certain specific sectors of the economy.

8. Profit-Loss Sharing Investment

Scheme Our proposal is as below:

The ICP scheme of profit-loss sharing, which has been discontinued

for domestic savers, should be revived. The scheme was discontinued
by the ICP as it did not have enough counterpart funds. But once
other saving schemes are banned, it is hoped that savers will have few
other avenues to divest their savings and the ICP is then likely to have
enough deposits to provide counterpart funds.

209
 The limit of Rs. 30,000 should be relaxed and people should be
allowed to make investment to any limit. However, the profit-loss
sharing can be made proportionate to respective capitals.
Similarly, the counterpart funds can be made available in equal
proportion.
There is no reason why the profit loss sharing investment scheme
funds should be restricted to the purchase of joint stock shares.
These funds should also be made available for investment through
other financial instruments.
The ICP also accepts funds for investment in equity stock without
providing counterpart funds. This arrangement can continue.

PART THREE : INSTITUTIONAL SUPPORT

The financial instruments proposed in part two of the paper cannot

become operational until strong institutional support is provided to
make them effective. Before we discuss the institutions, we should like
to mention three prerequisites for the proposals made above.

PREREQUISITES

1. Political Will: There should be a strong political will to eliminate

interest from the economy effectively. A lukewarm political attitude
can do more harm than good.

2. Legal framework: A suitable legal framework will have to be

devised to make various instruments operational. The legal framework
will specify rights and obligations of all parties and prescribe penalties
for violating the rules of the game. It will 'also provide for the setting
up of special courts to adjudicate cases of disputes and defaults.

3. The benefits of profit-loss sharing and equity-based investments

should be highlighted through the public media, educational
institutions and mass contact by leaders. An environment conducive to
a shift toward interest-free finance should be created to make the
changeover a success. Training and education of personnel to those

210
working in financial institutions in the concept and practice of Islamic
finance should be given a priority at the national level.

INSTITUTIONS

1. The Commercial Banks

The commercial banks will also have a changed role. They will
accept deposits on current account for safe custody only. They may be
allowed to charge a fee for providing this service. They will not accept
savings for investment and lending except in those cases where the
depositors agree to make them their agents or trustees for investing on
their behalf.

The commercial banks will provide short term loans to their

depositors on an interest-free basis. The limits of loans and the periods
of loans can be regulated on the basis of average balances held by
clients throughout the year. Moreover, the central bank can prescribe
that a certain percentage of the demand deposits held by the banks will
have to be set aside for giving loans on an interest-free short term basis.
The commercial banks shall be allowed to invest their surplus funds in
mutual funds, investment trust, mudharabah certificates, leasing
certificates, and installment sales certificates if they feel confident of
their liquidity. However, this activity of the commercial banks will be
closely monitored by the central bank to safeguard the interest of the
depositors. Since all this investment will be done by the banks of their
own risk only they will be entitled to the entire profit and would be
liable for the entire loss. In no case will the banks be allowed to invest
these deposits in risky investments beyond the limit of their own equity
capital.

The commercial banks will mainly provide agency services to various

types of savers who want to invest their funds in real sector. They will
supervise and monitor operations of various business on behalf of the
savers. Besides, they will continue carrying out a number of other
services in relation to remittance of funds, foreign exchange arbitrage,

211
brokerage, etc which they are doing at present and which do not involve
any interest related activities.

2. Investment Banks

The investment banks will replace the present day saving schemes,
saving bank accounts, postal saving accounts, fixed return certificates
and bonds issued by a large number of DFIs. The investment banks will
collect household and corporate savings and act as agents or trustees to
place those funds in the real sector. These banks, again, will be doing
this business on behalf of the savers and would receive agency charges
for various services they perform. At present the ICP and the NIT are
examples of investment banks. A large number of such banks will have
to be established in the public and private sector. Their number will
have to be large because they will be mainly responsible for attracting
household and corporate savings.

3. Mudharabah

The mudharabah law in Pakistan allows a company registered under

the Companies Act to float mudharabah which could be special purpose
as well as general purpose. Similarly, mudharabah can be terminal or
perpetual. At present, most of the mudharabah are in the leasing
business which is a very limited application of the concept of
mudharabah.

Since our proposal visualizes abolition of all such channels where

interest-bearing investment can be made, the demand for this type of
business organizations will increase dramatically. Mudharabah will have
to be encouraged in all sectors of the economy.

4. Stock Exchanges

Our proposal visualizes a number of new financial instruments which

can be traded on stock exchange. At present there are only two stock
exchanges in the country and the size of business is also very small. One
reason is that the size of financing on interest-bearing

212
basis is so overwhelmingly large and. the equity capital market is much
smaller. As a result, the activity and the stock exchanges is also very
limited. If necessary, more stock exchanges may have to be opened.

The regulation of stock exchanges and measures to forestall

speculation are also necessary. We have discussed elsewhere an Islamic
framework for the stock exchange 2.

5. Saving Societies

Another institution is the establishment of Saving Societies on a

cooperative basis. A suitable legal framework and institutional support
will be necessary from the government to encourage the organization of
household Saving Societies. These societies will collect savings from
individuals and small business firms and invest them in joint stock
company shares, unit trusts, instalment sales certificates, mudharabah
certificates and leasing certificates. These societies will not pay any
interest on deposits. They would distribute the, profit or loss on the
savings invested on behalf of the savers. Since the societies will be
supervised by democratically elected savers and professional managers,
their overheads will be lower. They will provide agency services on no-
profit-no-loss basis to their members.

6. Corporate Law Authority (CLA)

There exists a Corporate Law Authority in the country. But our

proposal visualizes the establishment and growth of the real sector
companies on a large scale. This authority will have to be expanded
with wider powers to inspect and order independent audits. The
confidence of the people have to be won before going in for such major
changes as visualized in this paper.

7. Islamic Audit Foundation (IAF)

Since the entire economy will now be governed on the general

principle of profit-loss sharing, the possibility of accounting frauds,
misrepresentations, non-disclosures etc. will also increase greatly.

213
There will be an urgent need to establish an independent Islamic Audit
Foundation (IAF) responsible for issuing accounting and auditing
standards which are in conformity with the Islamic law. The IAF should
also appoint auditors on behalf of the savers and investors to carry on
audits independently. The IAF will pay the audit fees for these audits
which it will recover from the companies registered with it. The
incentive for getting a registration of the IAF would be entitlement to
finance from various specified sources. We have discussed this question
in more detail elsewhere3.

8. Al-Hisbah

Perhaps the need to revive the institution of al-Hisbah will never be

greater than the time the present proposal is put into practice. The office
of the muhtasib will undertake his traditional functions of supervision of
markets, and forestalling of malpractices in various agencies suggested
in this paper. It will be a supreme regulatory body to ensure that interest
is effectively abolished from the economy and that it does not yet back
through some back door. It will also be the last appellate authority for
any malpractices carried out by an individual or an agency4.

9. Independent Credit Rating Agency (ICRA)

An Independent Credit Rating Agency (ICRA) will have to be

created to assess credit-worthiness of individuals, especially for
consumer durables. This is essential to reduce the political influence of
the financial sector. The ICRA would also issue credit ration cards for
specified finance such as housing or the purchase of motor vehicles so
that an individual does not avail of more than one facility within a
specified period of time.

PART FOUR : SOME RELATED ISSUES

In this part we shall discuss some broader issues which have a deep
impact on the success of the proposal made above.

214
1. Economic Implication of Consumer Durable Finance Proposal

At this stage, it seems pertinent to make a short comment on the

economic implications of this proposal, although it deserves a full-scale
analytical treatment, which is not within the scope of the present paper.

Once a durable assets market emerges which sells assets on

installments at the same price as cash, in all likelihood, the incentives
for buying in cash would decline considerably. Everyone would prefer to
buy these assets on installments. One immediate consequence would be
an abnormal increase in demand for these assets. This would open the
door to all sorts of pressures and political influence. How to regulate
this demand? In neoclassical theory, the rate of interest acts as a
regulating device. At market rate of interest, the supply of and demand
for loanable funds stabilizes. But in practice, this is hardly so. Firstly,
there is no one unique market rate of interest. Secondly, even at the rate
of interest on which banks lend money the demand for funds is always
higher than the supply of funds, which is evident from the going rate of
unemployment in the economy. At any rate of interest, there are always
resources (human and physical) available which can be made
productive but for the availability of funds. Therefore, the theoretical
postulate that interest rates regulate the supply of and demand for
loanable funds and creates economic equilibrium is not borne out by
facts. But the question remains, how to regulate the increased demand
for durable assets? The answer is that the State Bank of Pakistan can
regulate it by using any or all of the following devices:

Size of down payment.

Number of installments.
Frequency of installments.
Size of collateral.
Requirement for counter-part funds (esp. in case of houses)
Fixing personal quotas for each individual.

215
 It can be argued that the scheme can be misused. The answer is that
the legal framework, monitoring and auditing controls will have to be
strengthened to forestall its misuse. The possibility of misuse is not
specific to the proposal. It is general to all arrangements.

Another implication of the scheme is that in all probability even those

who have cash available for the purchase of assets would also be going
in for instalment purchases. The question is: what will they do with their
surplus cash? One possibility is that they would spend it on current
consumption, especially the small savers, who always have a pent up
demand for consumption to the extent that aggregate demand in the
economy shall be pushed up, giving an impetus to greater investment
and thus higher income levels. The other possibility is that these savers
will put this money into a Unit Trusts or Leasing Certificates, or
mudharabah Certificates etc. through Saving Societies or banks. To that
extent this will ease the supply of funds for re-finance to the
manufacturers of durables. What the actual pattern of behavior will be
depends on the performance of the economy as a whole. It is possible
that as things get settled down and the profitability to manufacturers of
consumer durables is established, the initial spurt of consumerism will
get channeled into various investment areas from where individual
savers will get a return on their savings.

Another question is: since the cash price and credit price will be the
same, it will stabilize at a level, where the manufacturers of consumer
durables are able to earn a profit and give a share of this profit to the
financial institutions providing finance. This level would, in all
probability be higher than the cash price level. As a result, there may be
a general price-hike in the economy. This fear is not realistic. The cash
price in a system where finance is available on interest. contains an
element of interest which bids up the sale price. In a situation, where the
price does not have an element of interest, the increase in price due to
the manufacturers' expectation for a higher profit would compensate for
the reduction in price due to absence of interest as an element of cost of
production. In practice, the price in the proposed arrangement could be
more or less than the effect of interest on price.

216
But then, we cannot make a firm comment at this stage of our
knowledge.

The proposal is likely to attract another criticism: it will lead to a

very high level of consumer indebtedness, which is not very desirable
from an Islamic point of view. The answer is that we will have to
educate people in Islamic consumer ethics to restrain this tendency. But
the overall benefits of the proposal will have salutary effect on
distribution of income. The consumer debt will be interest-free. It will
lead to a better standard of living without the burden of interest, which
channels wealth from the poor to the rich.
2. Public Debt

By end of 1989-90 Pakistan had accumulated a domestic debt of Rs.

328 billion and foreign debt of over $ 15 billion. The debt servicing
consisted of Rs 59.5 billion which was 26% of the export receipts
during 1988-89. It included about Rs. 40 billion as interest'.
Domestic Debt

We should like to make the following proposal. To effectively

abolish interest from the economy the government must revoke all
interest on domestic as well as foreign debt.* Such an action would be
in strict conformity with the injunctions of the Qur'an. It would also be
in line with the Sunnah of the Prophet (SAW) who abolished all
outstanding interest on the day of the Last Pilgrimage. For the domestic
debt taken by the government, it should own all principal sums and
announce their conversion to the already invested government equity in
public enterprises(6). For any left-over amounts the government should
issue any of the financial instruments suggested in part two of the paper
giving the' holders an entitlement to the profit-loss of various
government businesses in the real sector. These

* This is his personal opinion and does not necessarily reflect the views of IRTI/IDB.

217
instruments can be issued in installments according to the paying
capacity of the government.

A related question is the inflation that has eroded the value of the
money originally lent by a person to the government. It is highly
injudicious, it can be argued, to return the principal sum after so many
years. But this objection could have some validity if the loan had been an
interest-free loan. The lenders had been receiving interest on their loans
which, more or less, was equal or more than the inflation rate. In fact,
such lenders are not losing anything.

The domestic outstanding debt which has been taken by big

industrialists and politicians from nationalized banks be converted into
equity. Where possible, suitable legal enactment should be made giving
the debtor an option, either to return the debt in a lump sum or to issue
common stocks or PTCs in favor of the banks, giving the banks an
entitlement to share in profit or loss. In cases where the banks feel that
the conversion of debt into equity would be risky as the borrowers'
business may not have prospects of profit, the collateral with the bank
should be encashed. Anyway, a case-to-case assessment will have to made
for a suitable action. The objective should be to ensure that abolition of
interest does not become a windfall gain for the already wealthy sector.

Foreign Debt

For foreign debt, a dialogue will have to be established with foreign

lenders. The government should persuade the foreign lenders to convert
the interest-bearing loans into equity, in cases the loans were taken to
finance business or commercial ventures. However, the foreign loans
taken for defence purposes or for such public sector projects which do
not generate business profit will have to honored according to the
contracts.

The question of development without foreign finance will also have to

be raised. The subject requires a full scale treatment which this paper
cannot afford. Suffice to say at this time that so long the

218
domestic rate of savings is low, the need for foreign capital may remain.
Moreover, it may not be possible to change the course of the economy
in a sudden manner. Therefore the first effort should be to try to get
venture capital on a profit-loss sharing basis.

The question whether foreign funding will be available on a profit-

loss sharing basis in sufficient quantities to meet the demand for
sustained economic growth, needs to be considered in the wider macro-
economic perspective. The foreign capital will become available if the
financiers are reasonably sure of its safety, proper use and profitability.
This, in turn, depends on such exogenous factors as the "supply of
entrepreneurship", managerial ability, political will, national
commitment to growth, etc. Foreign capital on interest also does not
become available if the financiers are not sure of the above factors.
Therefore, if we want to attract foreign capital, major structural, cultural
and macroeconomic changes would be necessary. The terms of finance,
whether on an interest or a profit-sharing basis, would assume a
secondary position, in that event. It is pertinent to mention here that
once the government decides to contract future financing on a profit-
loss sharing basis, it will have to introduce a major change in its
economic management. For example, those public sector projects where
user charges can be levied (like roads, bridges, canals etc.), foreign
firms can be invited to participate on a build-own-operate-transfer
(BOOT) basis. (In fact, the Government of Pakistan has already started
inviting international firms to undertake projects on this basis). In case,
the social objectives are required a limited level of subsidies can be
introduced in user-charges. However, defence purchase, is perhaps, one
such area where finance cannot become available on a profit-loss
sharing basis. In this case, efforts will have to be made to avail of
finance from other Muslim countries in return for certain other services
that we may be able to offer such as training of their personnel in
defence, science, nuclear technology and medicine. All these areas need
to be explored further. This is not to argue that there are easy solutions
to these problems. Efforts would be necessary on a number of fronts:
economic political, diplomatic and social.

219
3. Public Financial Management

The public financial management in all developing countries

including Pakistan is highly inefficient, bureaucratic, wasteful and
ineffective. Corruption is rampant. Idle capacity and multiplication of
resources in the public sector, empire-building at the cost of tax payer
and unproductive conspicuous spending are the order of the day. All
these practices need overhauling in the light of the Islamic norm of
public spending. Some of the concrete suggestions are as below:

Deficit financing should be phased out, at whatever cost.

All public departments and agencies should frame their budgets which
specify physical targets.
All government departments should institute internal evaluation
programs.
The Auditor-General should be made responsible for reporting on the
performance of the executive departments. ..
Every department should publish an annual report specifying the
savings in wasteful expenses.
All domestic or foreign borrowing should be gradually stopped.

4. Macroeconomic Management

The macroeconomic management of the economy should focus on

the following areas:

All development plans should aim at developing the human beings of

the country. Expenditure on health and education should be
substantially increased.
The tax structure should promote trade and industry.
Monopolies should be controlled. An economic environment
conducive to healthy competition should be increased.
Development should take into account environmental and ecological
needs of the society.

220
5. Credit Rationing

To avoid favoritism in credit, especially in consumer durables, the

government should issue National credit cards to anyone who wants to
avail of this facility. It should have a personalized number.
Simultaneously, a computerized data base should be created which has an
on-line reference facility with all those agencies which deal in
consumers durable credit. At the time those who want to avail of such
credit, tax payment records should be consulted before an interest-free
loan is provided. The Independent Credit Rating Agency should be
consulted before allowing interest-free credit to any one.

6. Accountability Mechanism

An effective system of accountability of all public servants needs to be

instituted. A lot of lip service is being paid to this concept but hardly
anything has been done to strengthen it. Some of the suggestions are as
below:

The citizens should be granted the right to examine those papers on

which a certain decision affecting their entitlements has been made.
The citizens should be granted the right to receive information on any
changes in the laws, rules, and procedures. It should be the
responsibility of the executive departments and agencies to inform
their clients about the law.
The office of the muhtasib which exists at the federal level for redress
against administrative excesses should be opened at provincial as
well as local levels.
Public enquiries should be held against all those people who obviously
live beyond their means and all ill-gotten wealth should be confiscated
besides other penal measures.

There are some of the examples of the policies which will be

necessary to abolish interest from the economy. Mere passing of laws
will not help. Interest is an economic phenomenon and needs an
economic solution.

221
PART FIVE : CONCLUDING REMARKS

The paper has briefly discussed the existing pattern of long term
finance in Pakistan. It has been argued that by and large long term
finance is still being made available on an interest basis. Conceptually,
long term finance is one area where the concept of profit-loss sharing is
most suitably applicable. But this has not happened in Pakistan despite
all the lip service paid to Islamization. The reasons are, mainly, lack of
political will, existence of an interest-bearing economy which had the
effect of Gresham's law, nonavailability of interest-free finance from
other countries, internal resistance from the banking community which
is extremely skeptical of the whole concept of interest-free finance, and
inadequate legal support. The proposal made in this paper seeks to
establish the whole financial structure on a profit-loss sharing basis. It
visualizes a new role for banks and financial institutions. They should
restrict themselves to agency and other services for which they may get
a fixed fee. The savers in the economy, who like to earn a return on
their savings, should assume the risk as well. To facilitate this concept
a number of financial instruments have been proposed. At the same
time there is a need to establish such institutions which support the new
system. Not only this, a host of policy measures and structural changes
would be needed to effectively abolish interest within unIslamic
community.

This is from me and Allah knows the best

ENDNOTES

1 In fact, this is being done even now. The State Bank of Pakistan
provides re-finance @60% for Locally Manufactured Machinery credit.
Our proposal only transforms the fixed interest into profit-loss sharing.

2 American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences, Herndon, (5:1), 1988, pp.

91-114.

3 Journal of Research in Islamic Economics, Jeddah (3:1), 1985, pp. 31-

42.

222
4 For a detailed treatment, see the present writers' "al-Hisba and the
Islamic Economy" in Ibn Taimiya, Public Duties in Islam, Leicester: The
Islamic Foundation, 1982.

5 Annual Report of The State Bank of Pakistan, 1989-90, Karachi: SBP,

1990.

6 In fact, the ICP already has a State Enterprises Mutual Fund (SEMF).
This fund can be enlarged to include all government investments in state
enterprises. The holders of domestic debts may be issued SEMF
certificates, where profit and loss from all state enterprises will be
pooled. This will also allow a uniform rate of dividend to holders of
these certificates. The certificates can be made tradeable on the stock
exchange.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1 Ahmad, Khaleel B., "Lease Financing - Concept, Models and Operations

in Pakistan", in Lease Financing - Problems and Prospects, Karachi:
Institute of Bankers in Pakistan, 1990.

2 Congdon, T., The Debt Threat, Oxford: Basil Blackwall, 1988.

3 Ghifari, N.M. & M. Muzaffar Ijara and Its Modern Applications. Paper
presented in the Seminar on Islamic Financing Techniques, Islamabad,
December, 1984.

4 Hasanuzzaman, S.M., Bai' Salam: Principles and Practical Applications.

Paper presented in the Seminar on Islamic Financing Techniques,
Islamabad, December, 1984. ,

5 Irfani, A.M., Musharaka and Its Modern Applications. Paper presented to

the Seminar on Islamic Financing Techniques, Islamabad, December.

6 al-Jarhi, M.A., Mudaraba: Principles and Practical Applications. Paper

presented in the Seminar on Islamic Financing Techniques, Islamabad,
December.

223
7 al-Kaff, S.H.A.R., al-Murabaha in Theory and Practice, Karachi: Islamic
Research Academy.

8 Kakakhel, M.S.S., Bai Muajjal and Bai' Murabaha (U). Paper presented to
the Seminar on Islamic Financing Techniques, Islamabad, December.

9 Al-Kazaz, Aziz, The Islamization of Banking and Finance in Pakistan

and its Effect on Savings and Investment, Economics, Tubingen.

10 Khan, Amjad Aziz, "Lease Financing - Concept, Models and Operations

in Pakistan", in Lease Financing - Problems and Prospects, Karachi:
Institute of Bankers in Pakistan, 1990.

11 Khan Aftab A., The Role of Banks and Financial Intermediaries in The
Development of Capital Market IBP, Karachi, August 1990. -

12 Khan, A. Jabbar. Trade Related Modes of Financing Under Non-Interest

Based System of Techniques. Unpublished. Mimeo.

13 Khan M. Akram "Islamic Banking in Pakistan", International Journal of

Islamic and Arabic Studies, (2:2) 1985.

14' Khan M. Akram "A Survey of critical literatures on Interest-free

Banking", Journal of Islamic banking & Finances, (6:1), January 1989.

15 Khan, Mansoor A., Pakistan Banking Delegation Report Based on the

Discussions with Scholars and Institutions of Selected Countries in
Regard to corporate Structure and Islamic Modes of Financing,
Unpublished. Mimeo. 1988..

16 'Mudawi, al-Baqkir Y., "Islamic Medium, Term- and Long-Term

Finance", Arabia; London, Aug. 1986.

17 Muzaffar, M. Investment Type Modes of Financing under Non-Interest

Based System. of Banking Detailed Analysis. Unpublished. Mimeo.
u.n.d.

224
18 Qureshi, D.M., Mudaraba and its Modern Applications. Paper presented
to the Seminar on Islamic Financing Techniques, Islamabad,
December, 1984.

19 Qureshi, D.M. "Lease Financing Development in Pakistan in Lease

Financing Problems and Prospects", Karachi: Institute of Bankers in
Pakistan, 1990.

20 Qureshi, D.M. Investment Modes of Financing Under NIB - An

Evaluation or Their Application in NIB System, Problems
Encountered and Suggestions for Solutions. Unpublished. Mimeo.

21 Rehman, G., Bai' Muajjal and Bai' Murabaha (U). Paper presented in
The Seminar on Islamic Financing Techniques, Islamabad, (December
1984).

22 Saeed, K. Amjad Capital Market in Pakistan. Paper presented in a

course on Development of Capital Market in Pakistan. IBP Karachi,
(August 1990).

23 Sidat. M. Ebrahim "Lease Accounting: Principal Features" in Lease

Financing Problems and Prospects, Karachi: IBP, 1990.

24 Siddiaui. J., Role of Stock Exchanges in the development of Capital

Market in lease financing: Problem and prospects Pakistan, in IBP
Karachi. (August 1990).

25 Uzair, M. Modes of Financing Under Non-Interest Based System of

Banking. Unpublished. Mimeo. n.d.

26 Zaidi, N.A., Profit-Loss Sharing: An Islamic Experiment in Finance

and Banking. Karachi: Oxford University Press. 1987.

70=145-:a.88

225
 9
FINANCING ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN ISLAMIC
ECONOMICS: ATTITUDE TOWARDS ISLAMIC
FINANCE IN SMALL MANUFACTURING BUSINESSES
IN SAUDI ARABIA

BANDAR AL HAJJAR*
AND
JOHN PRESLEY**

INTRODUCTION

There is a growing volume of literature in Islamic economics which

argues that one of the major reasons for a failure to develop the
economic potential of small firms in Islamic developing economies is
the unwillingness to promote Islamic means of finance in the
establishment and expansion of small firms.' This paper is an attempt to
assess the attitude towards Islamic financial instruments in small
manufacturing businesses in Saudi Arabia and therefore to ascertain
whether their use would generate a greater demand for external funds
for small business development.

In this study, attitudes to two major forms of Islamic finance were

investigated - musharakah financing, or participation finance and
mudharabah finance.2 The former is a joint venture financial
arrangement between two parties where both parties participate in the
capital of the venture. Profits and losses from the venture are
distributed according to a previously agreed proportion. In contrast
Mudharabah finance is a contract between two parties where one party
provides the capital for a joint venture and the second party provides

* Department of Economics, King Abdulaziz University, Jeddah, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

** Economics Department, Loughborough University of Technology, Loughborough,

Leicestershire, U.K.

227
managerial and entrepreneurial skills. Again profits are shared according
to a proportion agreed in advance. Losses, if incurred, are the liability of
the provider of capital; the mudhareb (entrepreneur) merely loses his
expected share of profits and his efforts are foregone without
remuneration.

Essentially the perceived advantage of such forms of finance for small

businesses lies in the non-existence of high up-front borrowing costs
which are said to reflect capital market imperfections in developing
economies. High borrowing costs - in other words high interest charges
which anticipate higher risks are not a feature of Islamic financial
instruments; any return has to reflect the actual outcome of the projects
and cannot be a guaranteed return on the capital provided.

THE MANUFACTURING SECTOR IN SAUDI ARABIA -

THE BACKGROUND

The primary objective of industrial development in Saudi Arabia is to

liberate the economy from its overwhelming dependence on crude oil as
a main source of national income, in order for it to become a diversified
industrial economy. The industrial strategy has two directions: first, to
implement manufacturing projects in which the Kingdom has a
comparative advantage, second, to develop industries which offer import
substitution.

To achieve these objectives the Government has adopted two major

strategies: first, it has established, -in collaboration with foreign
companies, basic industries utilizing crude oil and natural gas and
secondly, it has encouraged the private sector, through a wide range of
incentives, to set up non-hydrocarbon related industries.

Accordingly, the structure of industry consists of oil-related industries

which are owned by the Government and foreign companies and non-oil
industries which comprise of factories regulated by the Ministry of
Industry & Electricity, (entitled to obtain interest-free loans from the
Saudi Industrial Development Fund (SIDF) in addition to

228
other non-financial incentives) and factories and workshops regulated
by the municipalities, having no access to financial and non-financial
incentives.

The oil related industries tend to be large scale industries in which

the Kingdom has comparative cost advantages resulting from reserves
of crude oil and natural gas. - There is very little small business activity
in this sector. In contrast most small manufacturing businesses are
concentrated in the non-oil related industries.

Several measures were adopted by the Government during the 1950's

and 1960's to encourage the domestic private sector and foreign investors
to set up non-oil industries. These measures included, in particular, the
issuing of the Regulation for the Protection and Encouragement of
National Industries, the issuing of the Foreign Capital Investment
Regulations in 1964, the issuing of Company Law in 1965 and the
establishment of the Industrial Studies and Development Center in
1967.

Despite these measures obstacles existed which prevented the

emergence of large scale non-oil industries until the mid-1970's. These
included the absence of financial facilities necessary for the
establishment of industrial projects, lack of raw materials, a skilled
labor force and the necessary physical infrastructure and the preference
of Saudi nationals to invest in property rather than in industrial projects;
in addition, the domestic market, with a small population and low
average income levels, worked against the expansion of non-oil
industries. However, this gave small factories and workshops on
opportunity to extend throughout the Kingdom, since their
establishment required neither large amounts of capital nor highly
skilled labor nor a large market place. Accordingly, businesses
employing less than 10 persons accounted for 96.5 per cent of the total
industrial concerns by 1971.3

The Government offered various financial and non-financial

incentives in the mid-1970's to encourage the private sector to set up
non-oil industrial projects producing import substitution goods directed

229
mainly at the domestic market. These included food, beverages, dairy,
chemical, metallic and non-metallic products. Government incentives
included the provision of medium and long-term interest free loans of up
to 50 per cent of the total cost of the project with a repayment holiday of
between one and two years, exemption from custom duties on raw
material and machinery used in production, preference of national
products on government contracts, distribution of land in various
industrial cities at nominal rent, subsidized prices for electricity and water
and the imposition of tariffs on similar foreign products: the latter was
possible given the ability of national factories to provide at least 70 per
cent of the market demand.'

However, these incentives were confined to factories whose invested

capital exceeded one million riyals and had an industrial license from the
MIE. This increased the profitability of these factories and hence the
contribution of internal funds as a source of finance.

The response of the private sector to these incentives is- shown in the
number of factories and the contribution of the manufacturing sector to
total GDP and to non-oil GDP. Table 1 indicates that the number of
factories operating -in the Kingdom up to 1987, reached 2,016, covering
all economic activities. Of these 31 per cent were small according to the
definition adopted in this study (employing between 10 and 30 persons
and their invested capital ranged between one and five million riyals).

Despite the industrial development which has taken place since the
mid-1970's, small factories and workshops continue to play a dominant role
in some industries. The census of private establishments conducted in
1976 and again in 1981 indicated that 92.8 per cent and 91.2 per cent
respectively of industrial concerns employed less than 10 people.

230
 TABLE 1

NUMBER OF FACTORIES BY ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES,

EMPLOYMENT AND CAPITAL SIZE'

Small Factories' Total Medium and' Total % of Small

Economic Activity Large Factories Factories
Saudi Joint' Factories in Total

Foodstuff Industry 88 11 99 280 397 26.0

Textiles and Ready 12 2 14 27 41 34.0

Made Garment Industry

Leather Products - - - 4 4
Industry

Wood Products Industry 15 5 20 46 66 30.3

Paper, Printing & 45 2 47 74 121 38.8

Publishing Industry

Chemical Industry 50 13 63 237 300 21.0

Pottery, Chinaware, 2 - 2 27 29 7.0

Glass & Ceramic

Building Materials 164 3 167 263 430 38.8

Industry

Metal Industry 109 32 141 271 412 34.0

Other Industries 48 21 69 165 234 228

533 89 622 1,394 2,016 30.9

Source: Ministry of Industry and Electricity, The List of National Factories Licensed Under the
Statute of Protection and Encouragement of National Industries and Foreign
Investment Code up to 1987.

1 . . These factories are licensed under the Statute of Protection and Encouragement of
National Industries and the Foreign Capital Investment Code.
2. Small factories are those whose invested capital ranges between one and five million riyal, and
employ between 10 and 30 persons.
3 Medium and large-scale factories are those whose invested capital is more than five million
and employ more than 30 persons.
4. With Saudi and foreign capital invested in company.

231
 TABLE 2

NUMBER OF ESTABLISHMENTS BY ECONOMIC ACTIVITY AND EMPLOYMENT SIZE 1976-1981

 Many factors support and facilitate the continued existence of small
factories and workshops. These include the market size, high
transportation costs and frequent changes in the nature of products. The
cost of transportation and the availability of raw materials throughout
the Kingdom have defined the market size for products like blocks,
bricks, tiles, marble and ready-mixed concrete. Table 2 .shows that 76
per cent of factories producing building materials are small (employing
less than 10 persons and their invested capital is less than one million
riyals).

The products of some industries are subject to frequent changes due to

the development in consumer tastes and preferences; small concerns are
often more flexible in adjusting to these changes. Industries which
exhibit this tendency are furniture, clothes and certain types of building
materials.

During 1973-80, Saudi society was more exposed to a Western way

of life especially with the inflow of expatriate labor. This, coupled with
high purchasing power, brought about rapid change in taste and fashion.
34 per cent respectively of small factories and 98.6 per cent of
workshops are engaged in manufacturing clothes, leather and textiles.

After 1982, the growth rate of the value added of the manufacturing
sector started to decline. Indeed, until recent years its growth rate has
been negative. This was due partly to the decline in government
spending, completion of most infrastructure projects and the departure
from Saudi Arabia of many foreigners, especially construction sector
workers.

METHODOLOGY

Unfortunately there is no universally accepted definition of what

constitutes a small business. The social and economic structure of each
country differs and accordingly the definition of a small business in
each country embraces different criteria, which best suit its structure.
The relevant statistical data is not necessarily available in all countries

233
and therefore definitions are often adopted within the constraints set by
data availability. (Burn & Dewhurst 1986; Neck & Nelson 1977).

Consequently two approaches can be adopted in defining small

businesses.' The first one stresses the distinctive differential features of
small and large businesses in terms of such factors as management,
ownership employment and market share. The second approach
emphasizes the role of statistical criteria in forming the definition, and
the range of each selected criteria determines the size of the business.
These criteria include such variables as the number of employees, the
annual turnover, profits, output and capital invested. Whether the
definition is on a qualitative or quantitative basis, it must be applicable,
unambiguous and appropriate for the purpose of any investigation.
(Davies & Kelly 1972).

.In the case of the manufacturing sector in Saudi Arabia identification

of small businesses by number of employees and level of invested capital
is possible via official data.' For the purpose of this study, therefore, a
small manufacturing business is defined as having less than. 30
employees and an invested capital of less than SR5M; this definition
embraces manufacturing firms which are registered with the
municipalities and with the Ministry of Industry & Electricity.

The investigation outlined in this paper was part of a much broader

investigation of most small businesses in Saudi Arabia and with a much
wider coverage of factors influencing small business development than
managerial inefficiency. The methodology adopted, having identified
small businesses in the manufacturing sector, was to produce an
unbiased sample of small businesses and to conduct a pilot study based
upon interviews; the results of these, in turn determined the nature of a
more comprehensive questionnaire and interview study.

The main objectives of the pilot study were to 'establish a better

understanding of the problems involved with small businesses in Saudi
Arabia and to identify new, relevant factors judged to have a great
bearing on small business development; to test the response of firms to
certain questions developed with considerations as to the best

234
approach to the conduct of interviews and also the most suitable ways
of distributing and collecting questionnaires. As far as the authors are
aware, this is the first survey undertaken of small businesses in Saudi
Arabia.

Four major conclusions emerged from the pilot study:

i) It was apparent that lack of finance was only one factor limiting
the development of small businesses.

ii) The lack of management sophistication appeared to limit not only

the ability firstly to approach sources of institutional finance and
secondly to secure that finance, but the general development of the
business. It therefore gained much more importance than was
originally intended in our broader study of small businesses in
Saudi Arabia.

iii) The pilot survey revealed that accounts were not readily available
in small businesses in Saudi Arabia. It was therefore impossible
to conduct the kind of case study approach adopted in other
developing countries, based upon accounting ratios. (Osaze 1981;
Ahmed 1987). A more general approach was adopted based upon
distributing a large number of questionnaires, accompanied by
follow-up interviews.

iv) The nature of interview techniques was also determined by the

pilot study. It was found that structured interviews were not
suitable for the case of small businesses in Saudi Arabia. This is
mainly due to the lack of, or limited, educational background of
the majority of small business managers. As a result, an
unstructured approach was used in interviewing managers which
allowed for more flexibility and as little use of accounting and
economic terminology as possible. Clearly the apparent ignorance
of entrepreneurs in small businesses limited the sophistication of
the questionnaire and interview approach in this study.

235
 The major investigation of the questionnaire which followed the pilot
study consisted of a questionnaire survey of 412 small firms within the
manufacturing sector: of these 222, or 53.9 per cent were completed,
collected and analyzed. The breakdown of these by product group is
contained in Table 3.

THE SURVEY RESULTS

The attitudes towards musharakah finance appear in Table 4. Of the

211 respondents, 176 (83.4 per cent) rejected the possibility of shared
ownership with the provider of finance, with only 35 (16.6 per cent)
prepared to do so. Of the six manufacturing sectors considered rejection
of musharakah never fell below 80 per cent in any sector, nor rose above
87.5 per cent so there was little sectoral variation in attitudes. Follow up
interviews were able to ascertain why respondents were both positive and
negative about musharakah financing. Those prepared to accept it did so
on the grounds that the financier may also be able to offer much needed
managerial or technical skills required in the business: others admitted to
being under such financial pressure that they were prepared to take
finance in whatever form it came whilst others saw musharakah finance
as a means of assisting product diversification.

236
 TABLE 3

THE MANUFACTURING SECTOR SAMPLE

Value No. of No. of % of % of

Questionnaires Questionnaires T/D* R/S**
Distributed Returned Sample
1 143 64 44.8 28.8
2 57 27 47.4 12.2
3 62 33 53.2 14.8
4 30 17 56.7 7.7

5 79 52 65.8 23.4
6 41 29 70.7 13.1
412 222 53.9 100.0

Where:

1 = Building materials 4 = Chemical products

2 = Aluminum products 5 = Iron products
3 = Wooden products 6 = Others

Total questionnaires returned from each industrial class

*R/D = ------------------------------------------------------------
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Total questionnaires distributed to each industrial class

Total questionnaires returned from each industrial class

**R/S = -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total questionnaires collected and analyzed for all industrial classes

Of those rejecting musharakah finance the overwhelming majority

(133 or 89 per cent) did so in order to remain sole owner(s) of the
business and to be in a position to hand over the business at a later date
to their heir(s). 10 per cent felt that new part owners would want too
much authority in the management of the business. A significant
number failed to provide a reason for rejection, but certainly one strong
notion in the context of Saudi Arabia, is the need for the true

237
owner of the business to remain anonymous. All businesses should
operate under Saudi ownership, but the questionnaire revealed that in
many cases must be collected a "kafil" arrangement exists where a Saudi
national has the appearance of being the owner in order to disguise the
true identity of the real owner who is non-Saudi. Any musharakah
arrangement would bring with it the fear of exposing the illegality of the
business. Interviews also revealed that were aware of the need to supply
financial and non-financial information in order to gain Islamic
financing. Most indicated that they were not in a position to be able to
do this.

A further aspect of Islamic finance tested was the attitude towards

different types of financiers.

TABLE 4.

CROSSTABULATION RESPONDENTS' OPINION ABOUT

MUSHARAKAH BY TYPE OF INDUSTRY

COUNT
ROW Building Aluminum Wooden Chemical Iron Others Row
PCT Materials Products Products Products Products Total
COL 1 2 3 4 5 6
PCT
TOT
PCT
Prepared to 9.0 5.0 4.0 20 10.0 5.0 35.0
accept 25.7 14.3 11.4 5.7 28.6 14.3 16.6
Musharakah 15.0 19.2 12.5 10.0 20.0 17.2
arrangement 4.3 24 1.9 0.9 4.7 24
Not 51.0 21.0 28.0 120 40.0 24.0 176.0
prepared to 29.0 11.9 15.9 6.8 227 13.6 83.4
accept 85.0 80.8 87.5 85.7 80.0 82.8
Musharakah 24.2 10.0 13.3 5.7 19.0 11.4
arrangement
Column 60.0 26.0 320 14.0 50.0 29.0 211.0
Total 28.4 123 15.3 6.6 23.7 13.7 100.0

Number of missing observations = 11

238
 TABLE 5

POTENTIAL INVESTORS PREFERRED BY THE RESPONDENTS

Type of Frequency Percent Valid Cum Percent

Respondent Percent
1 29 13.1 22.7 22.7

2 17 7-7 13.3 36.0

3 17 7.7 13-3 49.3

4 39 17.6 30-4 79.7

5 26 11-6 20-3 100.0

0 94 42-3 Missing
222 100-0 100.0

Where:

1. Friends 2. Relatives 3. Commercial banks 4. Islamic banks 5.

National company 0. No. Answer

TABLE 6

CROSSTABULATION RESPONDENTS' OPINION ABOUT

MUDHARABAH BY TYPE OF INDUSTRY

COUNT '
ROW PCT Building Aluminum Wooden Chemical Iron Others Row
COL PCT Materials Products Products Products Products Total
T0T PCT 1 2 3 4 5 6

Acceptance of 7.0 8.0 9.0 2.0 7.0 3.0 36.0

Mudharabah 19.4 222 25.0 5.6 19.4 8.3 22.1
15.2 24.2 45.0 15.4 20.6 17.6
4.3 4.9 5.5 1.2 4.3 1.8

Rejection of 39.0 25.0 11.0 11.0 27.0 14.0 127.0

Mudharabah 30.7 19.7 8.7 8.7 21.3 11.0 77.9
84.8 75.8 55.0 84.6 79.4 824
23.9 15.3 6.7 6.7 16.6 8.6

Column Total 46.0 33.0 20.0 13.0 34.0 17.0 163.0

28.2 20.2 123 8.0 20.9 10.4 100.00

Number of missing observations = 59

239
 Of the respondents (128), 36 per cent more preferred to share
business ownership with a friend or relative than with a financial
institution or national company. Interviews confirmed that this was due
to the simplicity and informality which might attach to such a financier
compared to the requirements, for example, of bank borrowing where
financial records and/or business plans might be required before share
capital is provided. In contrasts only 13 per cent would prefer to share
ownership with a commercial bank. Interviews concluded that this was
primarily because such banks were seen to be charging interest on
other accounts and therefore for religious reasons should be avoided.
Despite this response however it is noticeable that Islamic banks were
not overwhelmingly popular 'as financial sources, only 26 per cent
preferred than as first choice financiers.

The traditional formula for mudharabah lies in the willingness of one

party to provide capital whilst the other provides labor and experience.
Profits generated from the partnership are divided between these two
parties according to a predetermined percentage. If losses occur, the
provider of the capital alone incurs them, whilst the provider of labor
and experience loses his efforts only.

As Table 6 indicates, 78 per cent of respondents would not be

prepared to enter into a mudharabah financing arrangement. Of these
approximately two-thirds argued that their rejection stemmed from a
fear that the financier would eventually take over the business. The
partnership could be dissolved and the investor could replace the
"manager" under the mudharabah arrangement: as a consequence
musharakah was more popular than mudharabah financing. 30. per cent
of respondents also indicated that their reluctance to accept
mudharabah was due in large part to the possibility of management
interference that it might entail. Many examples of potential
interference were identified in interviews with owners objecting to
interference in the manner in which final products would be sold, in
how raw materials could be bought, where business could be located,
who could be employed and how products could be marketed.

240
CONCLUSION

In relation to the finance of small, manufacturing businesses in Saudi

Arabia, the evidence here indicates that the two Islamic financial
instruments tested here, musharakah and mudharabah, could not be
relied upon entirely to finance business development in its various
forms. They may, given current attitudes towards Islamic Finance in
Saudi Arabia, offer another source of funds alongside other financial
sources, and in this sense would complement the availability of finance
and speed small business development. If they are to make a more
significant contribution to small business finance there must be a major
educational process undertaken to generate a change in attitude towards
Islamic Finance of the type tested here; otherwise Islamic financiers
must seek out alternative financial instruments to more strongly
complement musharakah and mudharabah in Saudi Arabia.

Equally significant is the need for improving the provision of both

financial and non-financial information in small businesses through
education and training. This is essential both for the success, of small
businesses and Islamic financial institutions; without it the efficiency of
decision making is greatly undermined and unproductive investment
may well result.

FOOTNOTES

See, for example, J.R. Presley (e) Directory of Islamic Financial

Institutions, Croom Helm, 1988.

2. This is part of a much larger study of "Small Business Development

in Saudi Arabia".

3. Central Dept of Statistics, Statistical Year Book, 1390 A.H.

Ministry of Finance, Saudi Arabia.

4. Saudi Consultancy House, A Guide of Industrial Development, 7th

Ed., Riyadh.

241
5. For more details about the inconsistency in international statistics
about small firms, see Burns P & Dewhurst J. (eds.) Small Business in
Europe (1986). Macmillan Educational Ltd: Also see Enterprise
Development: Policies and Programs, International Labor
Organization (1977). For more details about the economic and
statistical definition of small businesses, also see Bolton Report:
Report of the Committee of Inquiry on Small Firms, Cmnd 4811,
London HMSO 1971. For more details about the statistical definition
of small businesses in some developing countries, see Stalev E &
Morse R. Moders Small Industry for Developing Countries, McGraw-
Hill, New York, 1965.

6. For a more detailed explanation of how random samples were

obtained, please contact either of the authors and also see Appendix
1.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bandar Al Hajjar is now Assistant Professor in the Department of

Economics, King Abdul Aziz University, Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. He
completed his doctorate at Loughborough University in 1989.

John Presley is Professor of Economics in the Department of Economics,

Loughborough University.

242
 Appendix I

SAMPLE METHOD: MANUFACTURING SECTOR

Having determined what constitute small businesses, the next step is

to identify the names and addresses of workshops and factories which
fall within our definition. In other words, to seek statistical data from
government departments which would classify the size of concerns
according to the measures mentioned in the previous section.

The Related Government Departments

1. The Ministry of Industry and Electricity issues a list of licensed

factories in production under the National Protection and
Encouragement Law and Foreign Capital Investment Law up to
1987.

The list contains the following information:

- Names and addresses of firms

- Type of manufactured products
-Annual production capacity
-Total invested capital
-Number of employees
-Date of license approval
- Foreign capital share and nationality

The information included in the list only partially serves the purpose
of this study since the list does not contain data on financial
measures such as annual turnover, sales and profits and, secondly, it
only covers those factories whose invested capital exceeded one
million Saudi riyal.

2. The Commercial Registration Department at the Ministry of

Commerce should keep a list of small factories and workshops
capitalised below one million riyals, since they are obliged to be
recorded under Commercial Registration Law. Unfortunately,

243
 despite their fully . computerized system, the Commercial
Registration Department have, to date, not produced such a list or
directory. The Department considers that the task of organizing and
classifying this information is the responsibility of the Ministry of
Industry and Local Municipalities since these concerns are involved
in industrial rather than commercial activities.

3. Local municipalities are the only official department responsible for

issuing licenses/permits for workshops, handicraft and small factories
which are not subject to the industrial license system. They record, in
the form of raw data, the name, address and type of manufacturing
activity of all concerns which have been granted a license.
However, the records are not yet organized in a manner which
would assist this study.

4. The Central Department of Statistics (CDS) has conducted four

surveys of private establishments operating in different economic
sectors. The first census was in 1967 and covered 25 cities; the
second and third censuses were in 1971 and 1976 and both covered
61 cities; the second and third census were in 1971 and 1976 and
both covered 61 cities. The fourth census, in 1981, was the most
comprehensive and covered 111 cities and towns.

The CDS published a summary of the results of the 1971, 1976 and
1981 censuses. However, information, including names and
addresses of concerns which participated in these surveys are
considered to be confidential by the CDS and are not available to
this study.

5. The Chambers of Commerce are well equipped with qualified staff

and technology. They produce a computerized list which contains
names and addresses of industrial establishments classified
according to the number of employees and the size of capital
invested. This list is useful, though it is confined to Chambers of
Commerce and Industry members.

244
6. The Domestic Economy Department at the Ministry of Finance and
National Economy has produced a very valuable list which is part of
a survey study of the national factories in production up to 1985. The
list contains the following information:

- Names, addresses and telephone number of industrial

establishments.
- Types of products produced by each factory.
- The year production commenced.
- License number and its source.
- Total capital invested and the share of the foreign partner. -
Number of employees and their nationalities.
- Value and classification of raw materials used in producing the
intermediate or final products.

The list covers 10 manufacturing sectors including chemicals,

engineering, iron and steel, building materials, wooden products, paper
textile, leather and other industries.

Moreover, the list contains 165 concerns capitalised below one

million riyals, 416 concerns with invested capital ranging between one
million and five million riyals, and 393 factories with invested capital of
more than five million riyal (see Table 7.8).

It is useful for the purpose of this investigation to consider two

samples. The first sample represents factories and workshops whose
total invested capital is less than one million riyals and employ less than
10 people; the second sample represents factories whose total invested
capital ranges between one and five million riyals, and employ between
10 and 30 employees.

The main reasons for adopting two samples is to stress the extent to
which the smaller concern has access to external sources of finance in
contrast to the slightly larger business. Members of the second sample
are entitled to obtain an industrial license from the Ministry of Industry
and Electricity, which enables them to obtain long and medium interest
free loans up to 50 per cent of the total cost of the

245
project from the Saudi Industrial Development Fund (SIDF). This, in
turn, paves the way for them to obtain financial facilities from
commercial banks and other external sources of finance. Members of
the first sample are not subject to industrial license regulations and this
deprives them of access to the financial facilities provided by SIDF.
Hence it is more difficult for them to secure loans or other financial
facilities from commercial banks.

The first sample was drawn from the lists prepared by the Ministry of
Finance and National Economy, and that. of the Chambers of
Commerce. The second sample was drawn mainly from the list of
licensed factories in production issued under the National Protection
and Encouragement Law and Foreign Capital Investment Law up to
1987 and the list prepared by the Ministry of Finance.

246
 10
SOME CONSIDERATION ON THE SIZE OF THE
PUBLIC SECTOR IN THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC
OF IRAN
IRAJ TOUTOUNCHIAN*

INTRODUCTION

It has always been instructive, on efficiency and equity grounds, to

ask about the size of the public sector. So much so when the growth in
size is unavoidable i.e. when a country goes through drastic changes
such as revolution and war. The new Iranian constitution, with regard to
the economic activities of government, has somehow, changed in
comparison with the old one. In the new constitution additional
responsibilities has been assumed for the government but none of the
previously assigned responsibilities have been eliminated.

The paper addresses itself to the above question and seeks answer to
see whether this past trend will persistently show up in the future or if
there are reasons to believe that past growth was temporary and
transitory?

Less than two years after the Islamic revolution in Iran, the country
engaged in an unwanted war with Iraq. Quite expectedly the government
in response to the expectation of the general public for protection
against resulting shortages and rising prices, intervened in some areas of
economic activity. This intervention went beyond the scope outlined in
the constitution.

On the basis of statistics provided in this paper, as the war continued,

the government increased its intervention in the economy. However,
after the end of the war, the government tried, in response

* Associate Professor of Economics, AI-Zahra University, Tehran, Iran.

247
to escalating economic problems such as unemployment and inflation to
limit its involvement in economic affairs.

This paper is composed of three parts and an introduction. In the

introduction, different measures, conventionally used to evaluate the
size of the public sector will be discussed. In the first part, the Iranian
government, by using different measures introduced in introduction, will
be measured. The period of analysis basically includes (six years after
the revolution) one year before the revolution and bearing in mind that
an Islamic state assumes greater social responsibilities than a
capitalistic state, the year before the war has been chosen as the base
year. In the second part, reasons for government interventions in an
environment distant from perfect competition will be analytically
discussed. Finally, in the last part of the paper, the Islamic duties of the
Iranian government will be viewed in the light of the new constitution, in
an effort to find a measure for the "optimum" size of the government.

SIZE OF GOVERNMENT

Although it is a common practice to measure the size of government

by the size of the public expenditure and taxation, what needs to be
answered is what set of transactions is to be considered as being that of
the public sector. Government might intervene and as a result limit the
activities of the private sector by providing goods and services directly
or by redistributing incomes. Both of these activities will be reflected in
the budget as increases in government expenditure,but each may have
different impacts on economic behavior.

. Public expenditure and taxation do not exhaust ways that

government intervenes in economic activities; private sector activities
can also be regulated with almost every law passed. In such cases, if
government expenditure is used as the measure of the size of the public
sector, the degree of government intervention would be underestimated
since regulatory activities do not drastically increase public expenditure
except for expenditure on bureaucratic activity. Hence, there exist the
difficulty of measuring government activity.

248
Economists, in general, have come to the conclusion that any measure
of the size of the government is arbitrary.

. Size of government, measured by the public expenditure, is not an

absolute concept but rather a relative concept. It has to be set
alongside the size of the whole economy. When population, total
output, personal incomes and prices increase so will, in response to the
increasing needs of the people, the public expenditure. The interest lies
in the relative rates of increase rather than their absolute increase.
Such relativity is usually measured by comparing public expenditure
with national aggregates.

There are a number of national aggregates that public expenditure

can be compared with. In Table 1 below you will find four such
measures:

TABLE 1

ALTERNATIVE MEASURES'

1. The ratio of public expenditure to GDP (at factor costs)

2. The ratio of public expenditure to GDP (at market prices)
3. The ratio of public expenditure to GNP (at factor costs)
4. The ratio of public expenditure to national income, i.e. net
national product (at factor costs)

Each one of the above-mentioned measures has its own merits and
demerits. Not all measures have the same sensitivity with regard to the
factor. chosen. For example, the errors in estimating capital
consumption, in using "national ' income" measures are . likely to be
greater than .the errors in -the measurement of " gross product' so that
variations in the ratio will be sensitive to the- precise method used to
calculate capital consumption. The same argument . applies to the
choice between market price and factor cost measures. Variations'in
the ratio will be sensitive to- variations in the mix of direct taxes,
indirect taxes and subsidies. This means that if ratio (2) is to be used

249
to show changes in the relative size of the public sector over time to
compare the sizes of the' public sectors in different countries, the
conclusions that can be drawn are clouded because the ratio will. not
only be an indicator of the relative size of the public sector, it will also
reflect. variations in the structure of public sector revenues. The
following example illustrates the point:

For example; Two countries A and B each spend 100 units on public
expenditure. Each of these two countries have gross domestic products,
measured at factor cost, equal to 200 units. Country A finances its
public expenditure from the following mix of taxes: 10 units from direct
taxes and 90 units from indirect taxes. Country B finances its public
expenditure from the following mix of taxes:, 90 units from direct taxes
and 10 units from indirect taxes. Subsides in country A=20 units and in
country 13=30 units.For country A, GDP (market price) = GDP (factor
cost) + indirect taxes - subsidies = 200+90 - 20 = 270, for country B;
GDP (market prices) = 200 + 10 - 30 = 180.

In Table 2 the alternative measures of the public sector in the two

countries are shown. While the absolute sizes of the public sector in
this example are identical, and while their relative sizes are identical
when using the factor cost measure of GDP, their relative sizes differ
when suing the market price measure. The difference lies, in the
instance, in variations in the tax structure and not because of variations
on the public expenditure side.

TABLE 2

ALTERNATIVE MEASURES OF THE PUBLIC EXPENDITURE

Ratio of Tax Revenues to Country A Country B

1. GDP (factor cost) 50 50
2. GDP (market prices) 37 56

250
 One should note that the conclusion derived from this example
depends on the degree of shifting the tax incidence. In other words, the
underlying assumption here is that both indirect taxes and subsidies will
be 100% shifted upward, which is of course a strong assumption.

It would seem that GDP measured at factor cost,however arbitrary,

is the most appropriate measure; Although the factor cost measures of
GDP will be biased and the measures of the relative size of the public
sector will be subjected to error. The lessons that should be drawn are
that the appropriate use of any measure requires an understanding of
the conceptual basis of the data as well as its sources and that there is
no such thing as a "true" measure of the size of government. One of
the reasons might be that the size of the public sector varies from one
country to another because some include , public corporations,
nationalized industries and other quasi-government organizations while
other countries do not. That is why some organizations such as OECD
use a standard set of national income definitions when making
international comparisons.

In a survey of a selection of OECD countries, taxes as a proportion

of GNP, of the years 1965-75, reveal useful facts.2 In 1975, the
percentage ranged from a high of 50 per cent in Sweden to a low of
20.4 per cent in Turkey, with the U.K., some where in the middle at
38..2 percent.3

Capitalism has a long and diversified history, therefore, having

properly defined and established one single measure, however arbitrary,
for one capitalistic state, it can be properly used for another capitalist
state.But in the case of an Islamic state the problem is that no such
measure has ever been introduced. This paper does not claim to have
established a unique measure (or measures) to be suitably used by all
Islamic states. It is the task of all Muslim economists on the basis of
the additional functions and responsibilities of an Islamic state in
comparison with a Capitalistic state, establish appropriate measure(s).

251
PART ONE : THE SIZE OF THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT
BEFORE AND AFTER REVOLUTION

In this section different measures as outlined above have been used to

measure the size of the Iranian government at two different time
periods, i.e. before and after the revolution; each of which resembling
its own ideology.

In Table 3 below, you will find alternative criterion used to measure

the size of the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran (for brevity,
hereafter, IRI will be sued wherever appropriate).

TABLE 3

ALTERNATIVE MEASURES OF THE SIZE OF THE

GOVERNMENT OF THE IRI

Year 1977 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986

Ratio of
Government
Expenditure to
1. GDP 26 32 29 26 23 21 20
(factor cost)
2. GDP 25 31 29 25 22 20 20
(market prices)
3. GNP 24 32 29 26 23 21 20
(factor cost)
4. NNP 28 34 31 29 25 22 22
(factor cost)

Source: Calculated ont he basis of the data provided by Department of National

Income Accounting; Central Bank of Iran and Ministry of Economic
Affairs and Finance-

With respect to the years selected and the time period chosen in this
paper some caveats are in order: 1) The year 1977 (corresponding to
1356 of the Iranian calendar) has been used as the base year with which
other ratios for the corresponding year can be compared. The

252
reason 1977 has been selected as the base year is that during that year
three major economic activities (namely, Agriculture Ministries and
Mines, and Services) had been operating at almost full capacity.4 2)
Although the revolution happened on 11th February 1979 the data for
the two preceding years have not been, due to the turbulent state of
affairs in the economy, reliable. 3) Unavailability of a uniform data to
make comparisons easy did not allow me to present them here.

The numbers in the table 3 reveal the following results:

(1) The range of numbers starts from 20 per cent and goes to the
highest value of 32 in all years covered, which is a mild increase in
the size of Government. However, the highest ratio was observed
in 1981 which not only does not keep its time trend in the
following years but also declines to its minimum value in the last
year of coverage, i.e. 1986.

(2) The maximum and the minimum values of all four ratios occur,
without exception, in 1981 and 1986, respectively. Emphatically,
all four ratios in 1986 are below the corresponding ratios in the
base year. Having accepted the four measures as being
appropriate and sound measures, this result might be used as an
evidence of a relative decline in the size of the government of the
IRI during the ten years under consideration.

Granted that government expenditures,by and large, increase the

welfare, of, the community, the decline in the ratios means
decline in welfare due to the war. Obviously, those who suffer the
most will be the low income receivers. The picture gets worse
especially when one notes that 35 million inhabitants in the IRI
increased to almost 50 (actually, 49.5) millions. In other words,
per capita government expenditures, at current prices,had, during
the said, period, drastically declined. The picture would look even
worse if per capita real expenditure is used as standard.

253
(3) Heavy dependency of the economy of the IRI on oil revenues
shows itself in 1983 and 1986. Full fluctuations in oil revenues
are reflected in the size of government expenditure in these tow
years. In 1983 the economy enjoyed the highest oil revenue ever
since the revolution. In that year, the first two values remain
constant, relative to those in the base year. But the last two
measures show slight increases in comparison with the
corresponding figures in 1977. In 1986, a sharp decline in oil
revenues, caused a corresponding decline in government
expenditure to such an extent that almost all figures reach their
minimum values in this year.

During 1980-85 inclusive, oil revenues account for over 50 per

cent of the total revenues (see Table 4). This fact has made the
country quite vulnerable and as the result severe action had to
be taken to reduce the degree of dependency. The degree of
dependency will increase if government should decide to devalue
the local currency. More will be said in this regard in the
following sections.

(4) None of the four measures show any significant difference in

one specific year. The range of values of the table for seven years
of coverage can be summarized, respectively, as follows: (24,
28); (31, 34); (29,31); (25,29); (22,25); (20,22); and (20,22).

The narrow range of these values show as if an organization had

been responsible to have close eye on these numbers not to
allow them to go beyond a narrow limit. Comparing the second
and the last ratios' in one specific year shows that the highest
increase took place in 1986, i.e. an increase of 10 per cent.6 The
corresponding values for a country like England in 1980, are, 50
and 62 per cent respectively, i.e. an increase of 25 per cent.
More will be said on this point when the procedure for
budgeting is briefly mentioned.

254
 TABLE 4

GOVERNMENT REVENUES
Unit: Billion Riyals

Year 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
Source of Revenue
1- Export of oil and gas 889 1056 1690 1779 1373 1189 417 766 668 763 1090
2. Other than oil and gas 543 868 1012 1217 1620 1780 1159 1748 1832 2619 3427

3- Taxes 340 554 614 797 899 1034 1025 1030 986 1031 1930

4- Non-taxes 202 314 398 420 721 846 575 718 846 1588 1797

Total 1431 1924 2701 2996 2993 2969 2016 2514 2500 3382 4517

* Figures are forecasts not actual-

Source: Calculated from the data provided by the Ministry of Economics Affairs and Finance; Deputy Ministries of Expenditure and Tax Revenue
COMPOSITION OF PUBLIC REVENUES AND EXPENDITURES

A) Public Revenues

. In this section four other tables have been provided. The first two
tables show the sources of government revenues and the remaining two
tables show the government expenditures. Table 4 shows four different
sources of revenues from 1980 to 1990. Although a mild decline in total
revenues was observed in 1984 and 1985 relative to those in the
preceding years, the decline in 1986 was quite sharp, i.e. over 30 per
cent.

Revenues from the export of oil and gas show a relatively small
decline in 1984 and 1985 compared to those in the preceding years.But a
drastic decline of 65 per cent occurred in 1986. As noted earlier, the
evidence of heavy dependency on one revenue source is shown in the
first six years where, oil and gas revenues accounted for 54 per cent of
the total revenues. It should be noted that the formal exchange rate is
$1=Riyals 70 i.e., all revenues earned from the export of oil and gas are
multiplied by 70. But inflation has ceased to allow the formal exchange
rate to play its role. If government should decide to devalue the local
currency, the degree of reliance on one revenue source will increase.
For example, in. 1987, oil and gas revenues amounted to over 10 billion
U.S. dollars. If effective exchange rate should be $ 1= Riyals 500 (in the
current year the black market rate has been over Riyals 1300) then,
ceteris paribus, total revenues would increase to 2719 billion riyals.
Consequently, the ratio-of oil and gas revenues calculated at the new
exchange rate (which would amount to 5471 Billion Riyals) to total
revenue of 7219 billion, Riyals -would go up to 75 per cent compared
to the actual r a t e o f 30 per cent.

Tax revenues exhibit an increase in all years covered except for two
years of 1986 and 1988. Tax collections has almost doubled in size
compared to 1981. There are. three reasons for such an increase. Firstly,
considerable ware expenditures forced the government to put strict
controls over the foreign exchange revenues and hence investment
expenditures declined drastically. Therefore, capital stocks

256
were allowed to depreciate to their minimum level. The book values of
the already existing stocks had been quite low, consequently
depreciation expenses were minimal. However, due to high inflation
rates, the replacement costs of capital stocks compared to their book
values was quite high. Secondly, inflation caused revenues to increase.
Granted that, during inflation, the rate of increase in other expenses
such as wages and salaries, customarily, lag behind the rate of inflation,
the two factors were partially responsible for the rise in profits and
hence an increase in tax revenues collected from corporate profits.
Thirdly, on equity grounds, government tried to collect more taxes from
occupational incomes on the belief that they had enjoyed windfall
profits during the inflationary period.

Table 4 shows that tax revenues did not exceed more than 50 per
cent of the government's revenues during the period of coverage. The
highest ratio occurred in 1986 which accounted for 50 per cent of total
revenue and the lowest ratio is identified in 1982. Although, since the
revolution, the greatest fall in oil and gas revenues bills in 1986, tax
revenues partially compensated the fall. Again, during the period under
consideration the IRI had the highest revenues, from the export of oil
and gas, in 1983. It reached the highest ratio of 59 per cent relative to
the total government revenues. But, in this year the ratio of income
taxes to total government revenues was the lowest at 27 per cent
relative to total revenues. Putting these facts together we can conclude
that tax revenues are the most reliable source of the revenue to the IRI.
Revenues received from the export of oil and gas are liable to external
shocks and drastic fluctuations in price and hence represent an
unreliable source of revenue.

257
 TABLE 5

DIRECT AND INDIRECT TAX REVENUES

Unit Billion Riyal

Year 1977 1988 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
Source and Ratio

Direct Taxes 231 270 229 129 327 296 331 405 528 579 612 646

Indirect Taxes* 213 197 140 211 227 318 464 503 505 446 418 340

Total Taxes 444 467 369 340 554 614 795 908 1033 1025 1030 989

Ratio of Direct to Total Taxes 52 58 62 58 58 48 42 45 51 56 59 65

Ratio of Indirect to Total Taxes 48 42 38 62 42 52 58 55 49 44 41 35

Source: High Council of Taxation; Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance (1989)

* Close to 100 per cent of indirect taxes is composed of import taxes- Other indirect taxes are negligible.
 To embark on the policy implication of the point made above, we
need further information. Table 5 is provided to furnish us with the
necessary information about direct and indirect taxes for the period
1977-88 inclusive. The growth of indirect taxes, quite expectedly,
parallels oil and gas revenues because of higher incentive led to
increased imports. As a result one can see the maximum value of oil and
gas revenues in 1983 (Table 4) which coincides with the highest ratio of
indirect taxes to total tax revenues of 58 per cent.

Speaking of reliable source of government income, after a peak in oil

and gas revenues in 1983, (see Table 5), the government of the IRI put
more emphasis on collecting (direct) taxes to finance development
expenditures. This amounts to saying that after 1983 the revenue from
oil and gas lost its importance. This tendency is still in full force. In
other words, the lesson from past experience, namely unpredictable oil
revenues, has changed the attitudes of government authorities towards
heavy reliance on this sole and, relatively important external source.
However, the. economy has been operating on the basis of natural
wealth, namely oil and gas, for quite a long time. naturally it takes time
to move the economy towards diversified external revenues.

B) GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES

The ratio of government expenditure to some national aggregate show

one thing but absolute levels of government expenditure show
something else. Table 6 shows the composition of government
expenditures for a period of 11 years. The four ratios measuring the size
of government, discussed earlier did not show any significant increase
in the size of the government of the IRI. However, using absolute
figures of total government expenditures is unrealistic but instructive as
represented in table 6 below. This shows the relatively important role
played by the government during the period of analysis. But the catch
lies in the population explosion during the war. The rising trend of
government expenditure is due to both-increasing war expenditures and
a steady rise in the population. A population growth rate of close to 4
per cent, forces the government to increase its expenditure on naturally
greater needs such as health, education and

259
if possible, welfare. As mentioned earlier the overall welfare of an
average Iranian- citizen has considerably declined.

Furthermore, the importance of public expenditures, relative to

current expenditures, has slightly increased during 1980-38 inclusive; .
but the trend completely changes until 1988. In 1988 the relative
importance of this item declines to its minimum of 17 per cent.

The real picture in table 6 has been clouded by using figures at

current prices.But if one chooses constant prices, the clouds would be
removed and the true picture show itself; i.e., all capital stocks had
been forced to depreciate. This was turn of only for the public sector
but also for the private sector as well. If we go little further into the
argument, the outcome becomes obvious. That is, allowing capital
stocks to depreciate, due to foreign exchange controls, would result in
negligible depreciation expenses which account for the high percentage
relative to total expenses. During inflationary periods, revenues will
increase and so will profits,. taxes and corporate profits. Having
purchased capital goods at a cheap rate before the revolution at
$1=Riyals 75, the profit rate (the ratio of total profits to the registered
capital) give unreal high rates. One solution to this problem is to allow:
(1) Replacement costs, instead of historical costs ax used by
corporations and a corresponding figure to be added to the registered
capital; and (2) Newly appreciated capital stocks to depreciate again,
despite the fact that their book values have declined close to zero. This
would make it attractive to offer the stocks of corporations on the stock
exchange market. Some steps are being taken in this regards.

To complete the picture, we need to briefly discuss negative income

taxes (subsidy) indirectly paid by government. In order to protect the
poor and the fixed income earners against shortages and inflation
during war period, the government of the IRI has paid the following
amounts:

260
 TABLE 6
COMPOSITION OF GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES
Unit: Billion Riyal
Year 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990*
Expenditures
Total Expenditures 2404 2861 3367 3895 3632 3616 3466 3983 4625 4528 1602
1. Current Expenditures 1730 2032 2253 2524 2476 2548 2410 2911 3394 3203 3965
2 Capital Expenditures 568 675 915 1149 878 765 746 729 816 900 1631
(24) (23) (27) (29) (24) (21) (21) (18) (17) (20) (26)

3. Other Expenditure 105 154 199 223 278 303 309 342 415 725 507

Sources: National Income Accounting Department: Central Bank of Iran - and Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance - various
publications-
* All figures are forecasts not actual.
Note: All figures are at current prices- Figures in parentheses are ratios of the respective figures to total- For further information: budget
deficits have traditionally been financed through borrowing from the Central Bank-

TABLE 7

AMOUNT OF SUBSIDIES
Unit Billion Riyals
1977 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988* 1989*
65.8 81.3 109.7 106-1 120-2 207.1 127-3 104-6 155-0 206.0

Source: The Organization for Protection of Consumer and Producers (various pamphlets)-
* Receipts not payments.
 Subsidies being mainly financed through overcharges o n imported
goods, it is seen from the table. that in 1 9 8 6 during which we experienced
the highest decline in oil and gas revenues, we witnessed a somewhat
corresponding decline of 60 per cent in subsidies. However, when the
country had the highest oil and gas revenues in 1 9 8 3 the amount of
subsides not only failed to rise but decreased slightly relative to 1982.

Q THE PROCESS OF BUDGETING

The economy is an organic phenomena whose affairs cannot be

stopped; therefore, decisions, either good or bad, have to be made. These
decisions are made by bureaucrats and politicians who may neither be
economists nor even know about economics. In fact, they do not need be
economists to make economic decisions. As long as they are properly
advised by experienced and professional economists one can be confident
that their decisions will increase the efficiency and equity of the economy.
However, not all decisions are necessarily based upon the principles of
economics. Hence, the question in this: in the context of budgeting, is
there an appropriate model to explain the, behavior of bureaucrats and
politicians?

A behavioral analysis of the process of budgeting has been advanced by

Aaron Wildavsky, a political scientist.* According to Wildavsky, the
largest determining factor of the. size and content of this year's budget is
last year's budget. (see his book written 1964; p. 13).

To be brief, the model of decision making that Wildavsky has in mind

is one made up of sequential or iterative procedures. The result of a
sequential decision-making model depends upon the order in which events
are decided upon. The outcome of earlier decisions may enter as binding
constraints on current decisions. Applying this model in the context of
budget decision making implies that a decision made about this year's
budget must take into account the decisions made

*Adopted from C.V. Brown and P.M. Jackson (1982), pp.157-160. 262

262
about last year's budget and the one the year before that and so on. A
decision to build a highway or a public health care centre is not a
commitment to allocate resources to these activities for the next year
only. Instead, these resources are committed until a decision is taken to
change the level of quality of service provision. thus, last year's budget
determines this year's budget because of the large commitment of
resources that is carried forward into the present from the past.

The second feature of Wildavsky's model of budget decision making is

that the amount of resources upon which current decisions are made is a
relatively small percentage of the total. The reason for this is that the
decision - maker does not start from a clear sheet but instead carries
forward a commitment of resources from previous decisions. Wildavsky
refers to this as "incrementalism", therefore, current decisions are
subjected to accepting previous decisions.

The third feature of Wildavsky's model is that incrementalism also

described the way in which decision-makers deal with the complexities
and the cost of decision-making in practice. Decision-makers have a
limited amount of time to prepare their budgets, although it is repeated
every year. To start each budget cycle and consider a balance of
resources between sub-programs and the interrelationships between
different parts of the implicit production function and study the spill-
over effects of each program would be an immense task requiring large
volume of computational resources. Not only would such practices
expensive but also decision makers have limited personal computational
facilities. According to Wildavsky, incrementalism is cheaper on
decision making resources. Moreover, if the demander of a new
program did not proceed via a piece meal incrementalist approach, there
is always a possibility that the program would run the risk of being
completely rejected.

The process of request and appropriation in the context of

incrementalism can be modelled by the following simple statistical
decision rules:

263
(1) Agency's . decision rule:
X it =bi Y it-1 +e it
where: X it = the requested budget by Agency i in period t.
Y i t 1 = The actual budget granted to agency i in the previous
_

year.
b i = a parameter> 1
eit= a randomly distributed variable with mean equal to zero.

An agency current year budget equals the previous year budget plus
certain mark-up. If, for example, b=i=1.12 then this year's budget is 12
per cent greater than the previous year.

(2) Committee's decision rule:

Yit= aiXit+Eit
where: a = a parameter <1
Eit= a randomly distributed variable with mean equal to zero.

This rule shows that the actual budget granted by the committee is
equal to some proportion (less than one) of the actual amount
requested. (The model needs some refinement. That is, after this
process has been continuously in use, then both the agency and the
committee know the rules of the game. Then each side can predict the
game that the other will play. Thus, the applying agency will always
overstate the amount requested with the belief that the committee will
try to reduce it. Consequently, as the committee has learned from past
experience that the agency often overestimates the needed budget . it
has the rationale to cut it. In other words, overstatement of , budgets
and. slashing them become an established rule. My experience as a
deputy minster, in the past, and as an adviser, at present, allows me to
claim that this has been the rule p racticed for long time in the IRI).

Substituting the Agency's decision rule into that of Committee's, we

.get the following simple rule:

Yit = aibiYit-1 +(E it +e it )

264
 It means that this year's budget is a function of last year's budget;
which is, the decision rule of incrementalism. The error terms in each
decision rule reminds us that these are statistical decision rules. In other
words, the actual outcome is dependent upon the actual amount granted
plus random events that occur during the year such as unforeseen
floods, earthquakes and other natural calamities.

The actual process of budgeting in the country is a proof that

incrementalism is a reasonable description of the decision-making
process. In other words, in the IRI, presumably like any other countries,
all three features of Wildavsky's model operate effectively. The narrow
range of the four ratios calculated to measure the size of the government
of the IRI, in Table 3, gives an overall average of 25.5 per cent. This
ratio shows that both the numerator of the measure (i.e. government
expenditures) and the denominator (i.e. GDP or GNP either at market
prices or factor costs) were controlled to change almost at the same
rate.

The Plan and Budget Organization is responsible for annual budget

making and planning the five-year economic development programs, it,
along with the legislative branch of government have performed their
tasks according to the prediction of the model developed by Wildavsky
as the controlling agents in the IRI. Furthermore, since the share of the
private sector accounts for almost three times as such that of the public
sector in GDP or GNP, it has also performed its own task in harmony
with the public sector. Hence, it can be concluded that the private sector
is a reliable one that the government of the IRI can depend upon.
However, it has to be under the direct control and supervision of
respective public agents.

PART TWO : REASONS FOR GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION

Real world markets are far away from being perfectly competitive.
There are some impediments that may prevent free markets from
generating allocative efficiency. Hence, government finds it to the
benefit of the pubic to intervene. The number of impediments to perfect
competition is practically infinite.Where possible, however,

265
these can be classified into three categories that include most of the cases
in the real world. They are namely: imperfect competition, externalities,
and public goods. In order to be able to carry forward the results of this
part of the paper to the next I will try to discuss each on of these
categories very briefly.

A) Imperfect Competition

Imperfect competition includes all those situation, in which economic

agents exert some market power in determining price. In such cases, a
profit-maximizing firm will not produce where price is equal to marginal
cost. As an example consider the following case. If good X is produced
in a monopoly market the profit-maximizing firm will choose that output
combination which the rate of product

transformation is equal to . This level of output corresponds

to point B where the rate of product transformation is less than

individuals' rate of substitution. This is obviously less than the rate of

these goods' market prices . Hence, too little X will be produced as a

result of monopolization of its market an optimal allocation of resources
cannot be achieved. This may give a reason for government to intervene
into the market and regulate the monopoly. However, the regulated
monopolist may be forced to produce where demand cuts average cost
curve. Average costs, in such cases, shall include some mark-up. In this
case, the price will be lower and output higher than that exhibited by
point B in the above figure.

266
B) Externality

A perfectly competitive model is a world of an absolute absence of

externalities. This market structure is a spaceless and timeless
economy; i.e., market distances shrink to zero and information is
costlessly obtained. Furthermore, individual utilities are independent of
each other. In brief, there are assumed to be neither positive nor
negative externalities. But realities are too complex to allow us to use
such a sample hypothesis, however useful a model in practice.
Societies, by and large, provide ample evidences on the presence of
externalities, both positive and negative via interactions among
individuals and firms.

Probably the best institutional expression used to show the reason

of externality is that of Professor G. Becker who says "externality
results from improper ownership of property". We need further
elaboration on this view point. Costs imposed by firms and utilities
derived from consumption are hardly internal; rather they go beyond
the original producer and the consumer (so much so with respect to
utility externalities in an Islamic economy). Therefore, there is always

267
divergence between-private and social cost (utility). In cases where
production of a commodity entails pollution the social rate of product
transformation will exceed the private rate of product transformation of the
same commodity with no pollution. Since the price system reflects only the
private costs therefore, the social and private rates of transformation differ.
The result would be that the private market will tend to produce too much
of the commodity when production entails pollution, relative to other
commodity.

In Islamic jurisprudence there is the principle of which allows an Islamic

government, to intervene in production and in consumption activities. To
make sure, when negative consumption externalities occur, individual
muslims are responsible as well.

In an Islamic economy, according to my views reflected in my book

entitled: Towards a Theory of Muslim Consumer Behavior (forthcoming),
due to the presence of positive utility externalities (via interdependent
utility functions) among Muslims the consumption bundle as well as the
pattern is somewhat different from that advocated by Western economists.
The price system, again because it reflects only private utilities will not
adequately register real behavior. Therefore, it is the responsibility of
Muslim economists to furnish the world with a new set of rules of Islamic
welfare economics.

C) Public Goods

A third possible failure of the market system to yield an optimal

allocation of resources stems from the existence of public goods for which
non-exclusion principle applies.This principle makes it possible for all
individuals to make use of the benefits derived from public goods. The
pervasive nature of this incentive will ensure that resources are under-
allocated for such goods. To avoid this under allocation, people may decide
to have the government produce non-exclusive goods.

I believe that the scope of public goods goes beyond the examples
conventionally given such as national defence, inoculations against

268
infectious diseases, criminal justice, pest control and the like. Another
important public good, whose importance cannot be exaggerated, is
"money" with all externalities attached to it. In my paper entitled:,
"Money in an Islamic Economy" I have prescribed that, due to the
peculiar characteristics of money such as not being allowed to hoard,
speculate or used on interest - based contracts, the government, not the
private sector, shall manage it.

An important caveat is in order at this point. Due to the mere existence

of externalities both in consumption and production, a freely operating
price system will be incapable of generating a true Pareto optimal
allocation. (According to Professor S.K. Nath: a Paretian optimum is not
necessarily superior to any non optimum.: See p.22 of his book).
Therefore, it is tempting treason that a competitive price system could
still be advocated for those sectors of the economy in which these
impediments are important: hence the Petro rules of efficiency would be
satisfied there. Unfortunately, this intuitive answer to the problem of
finding a 'second-best' solution is not correct. According to R.G.Lipsey
and K. Lancaster (See their paper pp. 11-32). It is not true that having more
(but not all) of the optimum conditions necessarily superior to having
fewer hold. As the result, one must analyze each individual situation
rather than attempt to draw such broad all-inclusive policy
recommendations. This, it seems to me, will allow the government to
exert more control and close supervision, if not absolute intervention, on
the activities of an Islamic economy.

PART THREE : THE GOVERNMENT OF THE IRI IN THE LIGHT

OF THE CONSTITUTION

A) Economic Duties of the Public Sector in the Constitution

The constitution, adopted by referendum on December 2-3, 1979,

contains twelve chapters with the general principles covered in Chapter 1.
Article 4 of this chapter declares that "all civil, penal, financial, economic,
administrative, cultural, military, political, and other laws and regulations
must be based on Islamic criteria, "As another general principle, Clause 1
of Article 3 of Chapter 1 state that "the planning of

269
a correct and just economic system in accordance with Islamic criteria is to
be one of the "goals" of the Government of the Islamic Republic".

Chapter IV of the Constitution deals exclusively with "Economy and

Financial Affairs". This chapter specifies the general form and objectives
of the economic system to be adopted by the Islamic Republic of Iran.
The economics system is to consist of the three sectors: public,
cooperative and private. The first sector " is to include all large scale and
major industries, foreign trade, major mineral resources, banking,
insurance, energy, dams and large scale irrigation networks, radio and
television, post, telegraphic and telephone services, aviation, shipping,
roads, railroads, and the like; all these will be publicly owned and
administered by the State." The second sector "is to include cooperative
companies and institutions concerned with production and distribution,
established in both cities and the countryside; in accordance with Islamic
criteria". The private sector is to consist of "those activities concerned
with agriculture, animal husbandry, industry, trade and services that
supplement the economic activities of the State and cooperative sectors."
The precise activities of each sector is to be specified by the Consultative
Assembly (the parliament).

At first glance, it seems that the private sector has been assigned a
residual and relatively minor role in the economy. However, the above
description of the cooperative sector does not assume, implicitly or
explicitly, that this sector is to be totally within the public sector domain.
Rather, the provision for the establishment of the cooperative sector
indicates an attempt to implement and foster the spirit of the principle of
cooperation in economic activities observed by the Qur'an and Sunnah.
This sector can be wholly within the private sector domain, that is, the
firms and units comprising this sector can be private, but "cooperatively",
owned just like a corporation whose shares are owned by a large number
of stockholders, as opposed to single proprietorships or (small)
partnerships. This idea is reinforced by Clause (b) of Article 43 which
designates cooperatives as means by which" conditions and possibilities of
employment" can be "assured for everyone, with a view towards attaining
full employment "by" placing

270
the means of production at the disposal of anyone who is able to work
but lacks the means. "The same clause specifies the granting of interest
free loans as a vehicle for securing the "means of production" for those
who are able to engage in productive activities but lack the financial
resources to do so. Clearly, the constitutional intent is to prevent
concentration of economic power in the hands of the few.

The remaining provisions of Article 43 endorse the right of everyone

to choose their own line of work, prohibit the formation of monopolies,
hoarding, usury, "extravagance and wastefulness in all matters related
to the economy, including consumption, investment, production,
distribution, and services, "and concentration of wealth; call for
planning of the national economy at each stage of its growth;" and most
important of all, require the "provision of basic necessities to all
citizens". Basic necessities are defined to include "accommodation,
food, clothing, health care, medicine, education, and the necessary
facilities for the establishment of a family.

Articles 22, 44, 46, and 47 of the Constitution affirm private

property rights by declaring that everyone "is the owner of the fruits of
his legitimate business and labor" (Article 46), and that private
property" legitimately obtained is to be respected "(Article 47), held
"protected by the laws of the Islamic Republic" (Article 44). The
private property that is to be "protected" must meet three conditions: (1)
the ownership of such property must "not go beyond the bounds of
Islamic law," (2) the property itself "contributes to the economic growth
and progress;" and (3) that the property "does not harm society" (Article
44).

Article 49 makes it a responsibility of the Government to "confiscate

all wealth resulting from usury, usurpation, bribery, embezzlement,
theft, gambling, misuse of endowments, misuse of government contracts
and transactions, the sale of uncultivated lands and other categories of
land inherently subject to public ownership, the operation of houses of
ill-repute, and other illicit sources". Before confiscation can take place,
however, the government is required to carry out" due investigation and
verification in accordance with the law of Islam". The confiscated

271
property is to "be restored to its legitimate owner, and if no such owner
can be identified, it must be placed in the public treasure". Economic
activities declared as illegitimate sources of property rights are precisely
those listed in traditional Islamic sources. However, Article 50 of the
Constitution expands the traditional list to include those economic
activities" that tend consistently to pollute the environment or inflict
irreparable damage on it".

The right to work is endorsed for everyone, and the Government has
been made responsible for providing "every citizen with the opportunity
to work," as well as with the duty of creating "equal conditions for
obtaining it" (Article 28). In carrying out these duties, however, the
Government itself must not become "a major or dominant employer"
(Article 43).

Regarding distributive justice, in addition to the provisions concerning

the basic necessities, the Constitution gives recognition to the right of
everyone "to benefit from social security with respect to retirement,
unemployment, old age, disability, and destitution benefits, as well as
benefits relating to emergencies, health services, medicine and medical
care, provided through insurance and other means. "These rights are to be
"
assured" by drawing down on the national income, in accordance with
the law, and income derived from the participation of the people"
(Article 29). Moreover, the Constitution declares that "owing a dwelling
commensurate with one's needs is the right of every individual and family
in Iran". The Government is asked "to pave the way for implementation
of this principe" (Article 31). The Government is further required to
"provide all citizens with free education to the end of the middle school,
and must expand higher education to the level required by the country for
self-sufficiency" (Article 30).

To provide financial resources for the Government, the Constitution

(article 45), places at the disposal of the Islamic Government all public
wealth and property, such as uncultivated or abandoned land, minerals,
seas,. lakes, rivers and other public bodies of water, mountains, valleys,
forests marshlands, natural forests, unenclosed pasture land, legacies
without heirs, property of undetermined ownership and public property

272
recovered from usurpers". Additionally, the National Consultative
Assembly (the parliament) is empowered to imposed taxes, "in
accordance with the law" (Article 51). The Government is to prepare
annual budges, "in a manner specified by law" and submit them "to the
national consultative assembly for discussion and approval" (Article 52).
Government revenues are to be placed" in accounts at the central
treasury, and all disbursements shall be within the allocations approved
in accordance with law" (Article 54). An auditing agency, under the
supervision of the parliament, is provided for in the Constitution as a
check on fiscal operations of the Government, its agencies, and its
contractors (Article 54 and 55).

To ensure that all laws passed by the parliament are compatible with
the shari'ah, the Constitution stipulates for a Council of Guardians
composed of twelve members-six Islamic scholars and "six jurists,
specializing in different areas of law". A majority vote of the Council
membership is required to declare legislation passed by the National
Consultative Assembly as compatible with the shari'ah, as well as the
Constitution.

B) Institutional Changes after the Revolution*

The fundamental changes that took place in the IRI after the
revolution led to the creation of many organizations and foundations.
The most important of these organizations are: (1) the Foundation for
the Oppressed; (2) the Reconstruction Crusade; (3) the Islamic
Revolution Housing Foundation; (4) the Foundation for the Affairs of
the Refugees of the Imposed War; (5) the Foundation for the Martyr of
the Islamic Revolution (the Martyr Foundation); and (6) National
Iranian Industrial Organization.

* Bank Markazi Jomhouri Islami Iran, Post-Revolution Economic changes, 1983/84, pp.
165-69, and 268-78.

273
1. The Foundation for the Oppressed

This foundation was created on March 5, 1979 in order to consolidate

and manage "the wealth of the Pahlavi family as well as the wealth of
those who through their connections to the Pahlavi family, have
obtained illegitimate wealth. "The foundation is also authorized -to
receive private contributions. The resources of the foundation are to be
used to improve "the living conditions, particularly the housing needs,
of the oppressed." The foundation is a non-profit organization whose
resources are chiefly revenues from its holdings and whose financial
operations are exempted from the laws and regulations of the General
Accounting law to which every public organization is subjected. The
holdings of the foundation by March 1982 included 786 parcels of land,
412 orchards, 238 trading firms, 146 industries, 101 buildings, and 64
mines.

2. The Reconstruction Crusade

This organization was founded on June 16, 1976 with the aim of
improving living conditions for the rural population residing in much
neglected 60,000 or more villages and tribal centers in the country. Its
responsibilities include: (a) activities related to improvement in
production of farming and animal husbandry, (b) construction and
maintenance of public buildings, serving villages and tribal centers; (c)
construction and maintenance of roads in rural and tribal areas; (d)
provision and maintenance of water resources in rural areas; (e) health
service assistance, and (f) provision of cultural services and activities in
ural areas. The Reconstruction Crusade has been very effective in
providing the above services to rural and tribal areas and was formally
brought into the governmental structure as a full-fledged ministry in
1986. Before that time its financial resources were supplied through: (a)
special line-item in the government budget; (b) surplus budgets of
provincial governments; (c) revenues from its own projects; and (d)
financial contributions from urban and rural areas.

274
3. The Housing Foundation

The Housing Foundation began its operations on June 26, 1979 as a

non-profit organization to assist in provision of housing for the poor,
especially in the rural areas. It is headquartered in Tehran and has more
than 200 branches in other provinces. Its duties include: (a) construction
and repair of low-income housing units; (b) provision of Qard ul-
Hasanah loans to the poor for the purpose of construction and repair of
housing units; (c) direct investment for the purpose of establishing
production units, specialized in producing raw materials for construction
of housing, particularly in the economically deprived and depressed
areas of the country; (d) help distribute construction materials provided
by government agencies as well as loans provided by the Housing Bank
for construction of low-income housing in rural and tribal areas; (e)
construction of government housing in rural areas; (f) planning and
implementation of projects aimed at improving the living environment
of the rural people; and (g) cooperation and coordination with the
Government and revolutionary and legal organizations in affairs relating
to planning, research, and studies in housing (particularly rural housing
), construction materials, and housing education. Financial resources
needed to carry out these functions are provided through: (a) a special
account set aside for this purpose called "the Imam's Account 100"
established in the Bank Melli which contains private contributions
designated for the Housing Foundation (b) cash and in - kind
contributions from the Foundation for the Oppressed; (c) cash and in-
kind contributions from the development budget set aside for "rural
housing"; (e) use of credit allocated by the banking system for housing;
and (f) income from production and distribution of construction
materials.

4. Foundation for the Affairs of the Refugees of the Imposed War

This organization was established by a special provision of an act of

the Majlis on June 4, 1981 as an agency of the Ministry of Interior in
order to: (a) centralize the affairs of war-damaged areas; (b) assist
refugees in problems related to resettlement; (c) deal with economic,
social, political, cultural and , health problems of the war-torn areas

275
and its people; and (d) help for reconstruction of the war-spoiled areas
after the war and the return of the refugees to their homes. Financial
resources for the foundation are provided by: (a) government budgets;
(b) gifts and other cash and in-kind contributions from the people as
well as agencies; and (c) income received from the foundation' s
investments in various projects.

5. The Martyr Foundation

The Martyr Foundation was organized on March 25, 1980 in order to

manage the affairs and provide for the needs of the family of the
martyrs as well as the disabled veterans. The financial. needs of this
foundation are provided through: (a) special allocation provided
through the budget of the executive branch; (b) private and public
contributions; and (c) sale and utilization of expropriated wealth
designated for the specific use of this foundation. The Martyr
Foundation has more than 180 offices in provinces throughout the
country managing a vast organization that deals with all aspects of the
lives of the families of the martyrs and disabled war veterans.

6. National Iranian Industrial Organization

This organization was established in July 1979 when the Provisional

Revolutionary Government announced a set of regulations called "The
Law for the Protection and Development of Iranian Industries." The aim
of this organization is to promote the industrial sector which was most
severely impacted at the time of the revolution due to many factors
including the flight of entrepreneurs and owners of many factories,
labor problems, uncertainties regarding ownership rights, and lack of
clear mandates on the rights and responsibilities of the private sector.
According to this law, the existing industries were divided into four
categories based on the conditions of ownership and financial status of
each:

(i) . In addition to oil, gas, railroads, utilities, and fisheries which had
already been nationalized, certain other industries such as
automobile manufacturing, metals, production, shipbuilding, and

276
 airplane industries were also declared nationalized. The private
shareholders and owners of these industries were compensated
the net worth of their shares.

(ii) Large industries and mines, the owners of which had accumulated
great fortunes via their illegal relationships with the previous
regime, and many of whom had already abandoned their shares,
came under the possession of the government. The claims of these
owners were to be settled through legal channels.

(iii). The government also took possession of industrial units for which
the liabilities to the Government and to the banking system
exceeded their assets.

(iv) All other industries which did not fall into categories (ii) and (iii)
remained in the private sector.

By the end of March 1983 some 580 industrial units were

nationalized in accordance with provisions of the above-mentioned law
of which about 130 were turned over to the three ministries namely:
Industry, Mines and Metals, and Heavy Industries. About 450 industrial
units employing more than 170,000 workers were placed under the
control of the newly organized "National Iranian Industrial
Organization". These units had total assets of Rls.774 billion and total
liabilities of Rls.890 billion of which Rls.404 billion (or 45 percent)
were owed to the banking system.

In order to evaluate the degree of burden on the Iranian annual

budget of the above mentioned Organization, attention has yet to be
drawn to some facts as follows:

The Foundation for the Oppressed has its own revenues and budgets
independent of the annual budget. The budget and the annual report is,
in fact, approved by the Muslim Leader. The Foundation's budget is not
only a burden to the Government budget but also due to its surplus
generating feature it does indirectly constitute to the well-being of some
economic classes of the country.

277
 The Reconstruction Crusade of the early years after the revolution
has been. transformed, as noted earlier, to a full-fledged ministry.
Therefore, its expenditures show up in the annual budget which due to
common low efficiency of the public sector is a great burden.
However, it has been quite successful in some aspects of its
responsibilities.

The Housing Foundation generally has deficits with regard to its

heavy duties in the depressed areas. The Foundation for the Affairs of
the Refugees of the Imposed War and also the Martyr Foundation have
become great burdens on the Annual budget, however useful and
necessary to the country.

The National Iranian Industrial Organization, was once said to

control on the basis of registered capital, almost 70 percent of the
country' s industrial units. In order to avoid any further unrest during
the war, the government appointed its own managers to these some
580 industrial units. From the one side, the managers were not
qualified and from the other side, the government, due to then existing
rules for governing the public sector, did not indirectly allow them to
manage the unit-in the same way a manager in the private sector would
have done. Furthermore, shortages of foreign exchange, due to severe
government controls forced them to operate the unit at some 50
percent of normal capacity. Putting all these factors together explains
the great losses in many units, a burden naturally passed to the budget.
The burden was even greater through the creation of three ministries
namely, Industry, Mines and Metals, and Heavy Industries. There
duties had previously been assumed by one ministry called "Industries
and Mines". On efficiency grounds, there was no legitimate reason for a
country whose highest earnings from non-oil and gas exports
amounted to less than one billion dollars to have three different
industries each of having its own budget and bureaucracy.

Last but not the least the factor contributing to the growth of the
size of the government, was that the Majlis decided, for several years,
to treat the foreign exchange budget, in the same way as the regular
(Rial) budget. In order to properly use the controlled foreign exchange

278
revenues, it was claimed that the benefit to the public could best be
served through the establishment of centers to supply and distribute
commodities. To this end 10 different large centers were created by the
Ministry of Commerce in order to import and distribute various types
of commodities. Not only did these centers control the importation of
many items but also other items intended for import to the country
required the appropriate center's approval. Obviously, each center has
its own personnel and budget included in the said ministry ' s budget.

C) Recent Developments and Outlook

In the last 12 years, the Iranian economy has experienced a

Revolution, leading to a protracted and costly war with Iraq, various
trade and financial sanctions, and the turbulence of the world of the
world oil market. These developments have brought profound
institutional and structural changes to the economy.

With the emigration of many owners of businesses and property as

well as skilled workers, combined with a decision to bring strategic
industries and activities under the State control, the government took
over the bulk of the countries manufacturing and service sectors. The
exigencies of war prompted the government to extend its regulation of
the economy into such areas as prices, distribution, and external trade.
As a result the scope and activities of the private sector were
circumscribed. The war also entailed the diversion of human and
material resources to military purposes as well as marked changes in
the composition of government expenditures in the composition and
direction of foreign trade.

The end of the war and the removal of the internal as well as
external pressures from the economy has given a chance to the
authorities to give some thought to the problems created during the
war period. In order to understand the current state of the economy,
studies have been undertaken in various areas, all of which are in the
process of compilation; therefore specific decisions have rarely been
announced. However, information released through newspapers and

279
magazines and also official interviews are evidences of some new
developments. The most important of them crudely put include the
following, irrespective of priorities:

(a) To bring about one single rate for foreign exchange in order to
eliminate a great many distortions in different markets. Presently,
there ' are four major rates for foreign exchange, namely: official,
preferential, competitive, and black market rate. To give an
indication of the scale of distortion introduced by having multiple
rate of exchange it should be mentioned that the black market rate
is over 20 times higher than the official rate.

(b) Deregulation of the private sector: There has been considerable

movement to make it easier for the private sector to perform its
duties especially with regard to paper work, import regulations,
foreign exchange demands and the like.

(c) Limiting the subsidy Bases: Some subsidies generated distortions

in different markets. Government has already decided to largely
eliminated the subsidy on some items like milk. Probably the
most important subsidy has been the under-valued foreign
currencies given to nationalized industries. Recent elimination of
such subsidies has already developed new problems. For
example, one of the locally built automobiles called "Paykan"
now costs more than 36 months of a recently-adjusted university
professor's monthly salary. More thought has to be given to such
problems.

Subsidy on bread is still in force. This subsidy has a two-fold

charter: one is about over-valued local currency, and the next is
on the supply of bread at a cost lower than that dictated by the
official exchange rate. These two factors combined together mean
that the purchasing power of an American dollar priced at a black
market rate is enough to buy over 100 loaves of bread. Bread,
being an Iranian staple food, can no longer be a substitute for
expensive rice, therefore it does not seem

280
 necessary to have this subsidy eliminated in a near future. Other
subsidies on necessities have also been kept in tact.

(d) Reappraisal of the Assets of Publicly Owned Corporations:

Government has come to the conclusion that it is no longer
necessary, on efficiency grounds, to keep ownership of these
industrial units any further. Many researchers have been
undertaken to study the financial state of such units which are
under the control of National Iranian Industrial Organization, as
discussed earlier. '

Evidence show that if assets of these industrial units are duly

reappraised, the current value of such assets makes it quite profitable
to have the share sold on the stock exchange market.

Before a conclusive results have been reached from these studies, it

is said that the government has already decided to turn over about one
third of the shares to the respective laborers and the rest to the general
public.

In summary, a lot has to be done by the government in order to be

able to disentangle itself from the economy from the situation that has
developed, intentionally or unintentionally, over the past 12 years. By
and large, the economic outlook seems rather clear, but years may have
pass to see how much the government has succeeded in performing in
accordance with the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

ENDNOTES

1. The table and the following example has been adopted form pp.
130-131 of C.V., Brown & P.M. Jackson (1982).

2. On the criteria of tax as a proportion of GNP the U.K. is not

therefore, a relatively heavily - taxed country.

3. Op.cit.pp.145-6.

281
4. Following dates might be of some assistance if there should arise
confusion: Revolution happened on 11th February 1979; War began
on 21st Sept. 1980; the Iranian fiscal year starts on March 21.

5. Fourth measure will be that chosen by those who wish to argue that
the public sector is too large.

6. See C.V. Brown and P.M. Jackson (1982), p. 130.

7. Bank Markazi Jomhouri Islami Iran, Post-Revolution Economic

Changes, 1983/84, pp.165-169, and pp 268-278.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Algar, H. (tr.) The Constitution of the Islamic republic of Iran; Mizan

Press, Berkley (1980)

Bank Markazi Jomhouri Islamic Iran, National Income Accounting

Department - various pamphlets.

Annual Report; various issues.

Post Revolutionary Changes in the Economy, 1983/84.

Brown, C. V. & Jackson, P.M.: Public Sector Economics; Martin

Robertson, Oxford, (1982).

Eckstein; O, Public Finance; Foundation of Modem Economic Series,

Prenticehall Inc. (1979).

Glahe, F. R. & Lee, D. R.: Macroeconomics (Theory and Applications);

Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Inc., N. Y. (1981).

Graaff, J. de V.: Theoretical Welfare Economics; Cambridge University

Press (1971).

282
Harcourt, G. C., "The Quantitative Effect of Basing Company Taxation
on Replacement Costs", The Social Science Imperialists (Selected
Essays); Routledge & Kegan Paul; London (1982).

Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance, Deputy Minister for tax

Revenues; various pamphlets (in Persian).

Deputy Minster for Expenditure; various pamphlets (in Persian).

High Council of Taxation, various pamphlets (in Persian).

Plan and Budget Organization: Forecasts of National Income and

Expenditure for 1988; (in Persian).

Annual Statistical Report: various pamphlets (in Persian).

Toutounchian, I.: "Money in an Islamic Economy" Journal of Economics

and Management, Azad Islamic University, No. 2, Summer 1989.

--------------------: Towards A Theory of Muslim Consumer Behavior

(forth-coming) Open Press, England.

Wildavsky, A., The Politics of Budgetary Process, Little, Brown: Foston

(1964).

70mn210-: a

283
 11
EFFICIENCY OF THE ISLAMIC APPROACH TO
EXTERNAL DEBT MANAGEMENT IN NORTH AFRICA
AND THE MIDDLE EAST

I. O. TAIWO*

INTRODUCTION

Most less developed countries (LDCs) have been battling with the
debt crisis which emerged in 1982 following an announcement by
Mexico, a major debtor country, that she would not be able to service
her external debts. This crisis cuts across ideological leanings, various
religions and geographic groups. Table 1 shows the magnitude of the
external debt problem facing LDCs in general and North Africa and the
Middle East in particular. As at 1982, when the debt crisis erupted, all
LDCs were indebted to the tune of about $752.00 billion; their debt-
export ratio was 160.3 per cent; and their debt service ratio was 15.4
per cent. As for North Africa and the Middle East, the external debt
stock was about $68.00 billion, while the debt-export ratio and the debt
service ratio were 140.6 per cent and 18.3 per cent respectively.

The debt crisis has become worse since 1982. As at 1988, the latest
year for which reliable information is available, LDC external debt
stock amounted to about $1,121.00 billion; and their debt-export ratio
and debt service ratio had risen to 201.2 per cent and 26.7 per cent
respectively. A similar fate befell North Africa and the Middle East, as
their external debt stock had increased to about $119.00 billion, and their
debt-export ratio and debt service ratio had risen to 296.0 per cent and
38.4 per cent respectively.

* Department of Economics, University of Ilorin, Nigeria.

285
 North Africa and the Middle East is not the most indebted
geographic group,' but from Table 1 it is clear that this group's debt-
export and debt service ratios are above average, implying that the debt
crisis faced by North Africa and the Middle East is sufficiently serious.
However, this is not a sufficient reason for focusing on this geographic
group. Our focus on the group is based mainly on the fact that this
paper is about an evaluation of the Islamic approach to the debt crisis;
and North Africa and the Middle East is comprised of a great number,
and in fact the largest concentration of Islamic countries, where policy
measures based on the Islamic doctrine can be more readily put into
practice.

The current approach to the debt problem is dominated by initiatives

from creditor countries. The measures that have been adopted or
proposed include debt rescheduling, debt forgiveness, debt swaps,
coupled with a program of structural adjustment. These measures have
been described as "a muddling through policy" 2 , i.e. short term
measures which would enable debtor countries themselves to work out
appropriate long term measures for combating the debt crisis facing
them Given this view, the Islamic approach has the potential of
contributing to the solution to the debt crisis, once it has been
established that it is a viable option.

The main purpose of this paper is to assess the role and viability of the
Islamic approach to the debt crisis. This is done by first tracing the
causes of the debt crisis, with the aid of an econometric model; and then
assessing the extent to which the Islamic approach, if adopted, can
influence the major causes of the debt crisis, for the better.

286
 TABLE 1

DEBT INDICATORS FOR ALL LDCS AND NORTH AFRICA

AND THE MIDDLE EAST, 1982-88

All LDCs North Africa and the Middle East

Year Debt Debt export Debt service Debt stock Debt Debt
Stock ratio (%) ratio (%) ($ billion) export service
($ billion) ratio (%) ratio (%)

1982 752 160.3 15.4 68 140.6 18.3

1983 816 176.2 15.6 71 145.4 18.7

1984 822 179.9 25.3 80 168.5 24.0

1985 915 204.0 28.9 92 195.2 24.5

1986 1,007 230.4 30.1 106 273.1 31.8

1987 1,137 229.8 27.1 120 285.2 29.5

.
1988 1,121 201.2 26.7 119 296.0 38.4

Average 197.4 24.2 214.9 26.5

Source: The World Bank, World Debt Tables, 1988-89 Edition, various volumes; and 1989-90 Edition, First Supplement.

There are ten countries in North Africa and the Middle East which are
listed by the World Bank as having a debt problem and which have
reported data on their debt situation. In this paper, we consider all of
these countries, except one, namely Lebanon. The reason for excluding
Lebanon is that not all the data needed for the estimation of our model
are available for this country. The remaining nine. countries that
constitute our sample are Algeria, Egypt, Jordan , Morocco, Oman,
Syria, Tunisia, Yemen Arab Republic, and Yemen Peoples Democratic
Republic.

With this background, the rest of this paper is organized as follows:

Section II specifies our estimating equation; Section III states the
methodology of the study, Section IV presents and analyses the
empirical results; Section V assesses the role which the Islamic
approach can play in the debt crisis; while the last section, Section VI,
draws the conclusions and makes appropriate recommendations.

287
2. THE MODEL

A) The Dependent Variable

Debt burden can be measured in various ways. The measures

include total outstanding debt, total debt service, the debt-export ratio,
and the debt-GNP ratio., Others are the debt service ratio, the ratio of
total debt service to the GNP the ratio of external reserves to total
debt, and the ratio of external reserves to imports. In this paper, we
shall adopt the debt-export ratio as our measure of debt burden. This is
because this ratio measures more accurately a - country's ability to
service her external debt.

B) The Explanatory Variables

(i) Level of Economic Development

Following Nau, Ekpo, and Ihonvbere, there is a structural dimension

to the debt crisis, so that we should expect the level of economic
development to account for a part of this crisis.' The argument has
been that the level of a country's development determines whether it is
at the center or periphery of the world economic system. At the
periphery, a dependency culture would likely prevail, 'leading to
reliance on imported consumer and capital goods, and technology.. On
the export side, a LDC is a small country, facing a somewhat perfectly
elastic supply, which indicates a low level of market power.

We adopt the relative concept of economic development, and

measure it using the ratio of the real income per capita of a LDC to the
average real income per capita of the industrial world.

The remaining issue to be settled is the expected direction of the

relationship between economic development and the debt crisis: should
it be positive or negative? The answer depends crucially on -the style of
development-. , There are at least three cases. The-first case is when
development proceeds through innovation and capital widening without
much reliance on foreign assistance. In this case, the LDC would

288
gradually proceed from the periphery to the center of the world
economic system, and the relationship between economic development
and debt crisis would be a negative one. Secondly, we have the case in
which development is financed by debt and the system is riddled with
leakages such that we end up with a positive association between debt
and development. Lastly, we have the case in which development is
intended to be financed by debt, but the receipts are diverted to non-
developmental issues. In this case, we end up with a negative
relationship between debt and development.

(ii) Terms of Trade

Some studies emphasize the role played by decline in primary

commodity prices in the debt crisis facing LDCs.4 Related to this are
studies which emphasize the role of oil price shocks on this crisis.' We
can capture the role played by these prices by a single. term, namely the
terms of trade, which is the ratio (in percentage) of the export price
index to the import price index. It is common knowledge that many
LDCs have witnessed a deterioration in their terms of trade, either
because of a decline in their export prices, or because of an increase in
their import prices, or both.

On the direction of the relationship between the terms of trade and

the debt burden, the expected initial impact of a deterioration in this
variable on debt burden is a negative one. However, we should expect a
secondary impact, because the demand and supply of exports and
imports are expected to be responsive to changes in import and export
prices. This secondary impact may reinforce the initial impact, or it may
offset it, partially or fully. Consequently, we should !not expect a
unique relationship between the terms of trade and. the debt burden.

(iii) Relative Price Level

The domestic price level plays at least two important roles. First, the
different between the domestic price level and export, prices serves as a
measure of export competitiveness which affects the supply of exports.6.
The, higher. this. differential the lower the supply of exports.

289
Secondly, the differential , between the domestic price level and the
foreign price level affects the demand for imports and exports. The
higher this differential the greater the demand for imports and the
lower the demand for exports. Because export prices are already
incorporated into the terms of trade dealt with in the preceding
subsection, the latter differential is emphasized here.

We use as our measure of this differential, the ratio of the domestic

price index suitably adjusted for the exchange rate, to the foreign price
index. There then exists a composite relationship between the debt
burden on the one hand, and the foreign price index, the domestic
price index, and the exchange rate, on the other. Overall, however, we
expect a positive relationship between the relative price, as defined
above, and the debt burden.

(iv) Other Explanatory Variables

Another reason that has been proffered for the debt crisis facing
LDCs is the increase in the cost of borrowing in the international debt
market.7 Up to the mid 1970s, most of these countries borrowed at
concessionary rates from official creditors, and interest rates were low.
Thereafter, most LDCs were compelled to borrow largely from private
creditors and at market rates. Consequently, the nominal interest rate
increased, especially up to 1981. Between 1970 and 1981, the ratio of
concessionary loans to total outstanding debt decreased from 55.8 per
cent to 26.3 per cent, and nominal interest rate increased from 5.3 per
cent to 11.1 per cent.8 However, other considerations influencing
market forces have tended to push down the nominal interest rate since
1981. In this paper, we shall focus on the real cost of borrowing which
is the nominal rate minus the rate of inflation. We expect that an
increase in interest rate will, ceteris paribus, reduce the demand for debt
but increase the difficulty with which contracted debt can be managed,
and vice versa. The overall effect can go either way.

There are also those who emphasize domestic policy lapses as a

major cause of the debt crisis." These lapses are of different forms,
including the level of corruption, defective project appraisal, grouping

290
of debt maturities, and defective investment incentives leading to an
industrial sector that is highly dependent on foreign inputs. Not all of
these lapses are measurable, and we do not have adequate time series
data for others. We then limit ourselves to two measures for which
reliable information is available, namely the average debt maturity and
the degree of openness of the economy, measured by the ratio of
imports of the GNP.

We expect a shortening of the debt maturity to worsen the debt

crisis. In the case of the degree of openness of the economy, a lot
depends on how the exposure is handled. For countries that emphasize
importation of capital goods and use them well, we expect exposure to,
ceteris paribus, ameliorate the crisis,10 while for those countries which
emphasize the importation of consumer goods or do not use imported
capital goods efficiently, we should expect exposure to worsen their
debt crisis.

From the foregoing, we have the following equation:

EDT
EGS = f(LED, TOT, PR, INT, MAT, DOP, u) (1)

Where; EDT = total outstanding external debt; XGS

= export of goods and services;

LED = Level of economic development, measured by the ratio of

the domestic real income per capita to the average real
income per capita of the industrial world;

TOT = terms of trade, i.e where Px is export price Pm index,

and P m is import price index;

291
 PR = Relative price level, measured by the ratio of the domestic price
index Pd, suitably adjusted to the exchange rate (e), to the
foreign price index (Pf);

INT = real cost of borrowing, which is the nominal cost of borrowing

minus the rate of inflation;

MAT = average debt maturity;

DOP = -degree ' of openness or exposure of the economy;

u = the error term.

One additional consideration is important to the construction of our

model. This arises because equation (1) is static. We cater for dynamic
adjustments by incorporating lags using the flexible autoregressive
distributed lag (ADL) approach." Only a one-period lag of some of the
variables, namely the terms of trade, the relative price level, and the real
interest rate performed well, severally and, in a few cases, jointly.

3. METHODOLOGY A)

Estimation Method

In deciding on the estimation method, one basic issue is whether

there are stochastic or endogenous regressors among the set of
explanatory variables. Following Wallis,12 a regressor is stochastic if it
can be influenced by the dependent variable. Turning to equation(1),
one can regard three of the explanatory variables, namely the level of
economic development, relative prices and the degree of openness of the
economy as stochastic or endogenous regressors. This is because the
heavier the debt burden,. the more difficult it is for a country to embark
upon growth-promoting policies; the more likely it is for domestic
inflation to be fuelled by factors such as currency devaluation

292
and low capacity utilization; and the more likely is import restriction.
The other variables are not so influenced.

In view of the above, we adopted the two stage least squares (2SLS)
method in preference to the ordinary least squares (OLS) method. In
the first stage, we regressed the stochastic regressors on their lagged
values as well as the exogenous variables of the model. The second
stage is comprised of a regression of the dependent variable in equation
(1) on the predicted values of the stochastic regressors as well as the
exogenous variables of the equation. We corrected for autocorrelation,
where present, using the Cochrane-Orcutt method.13

B) Evaluation Methods

Our estimated equations were tested for acceptability. We used four

statistical measures, namely R2 for goodness of fit, F for overall
significance of the model, t for significance of individual coefficients
and d for autocorrelation of the error term. The regressions were also
evaluated for economic meaningfulness, using the expected signs stated
in Section II.

C) The Data

We used time series data for the period 1970-87 to estimate the
regression equations. 1970 is the earliest year, while 1987 is the most
recent year, . for which a comprehensive debt and other data are
available. Our data were obtained from two principal sources, namely
(i) The World Bank; World Debt Tables, 1988-89 and 1989-90
Editions, various volumes; and (ii) IMF; International Financial
Statistics,, various issues.

On the units of measurement, we expressed the GNP (or the GDP),

exports, imports, debt, and debt service payments in million US dollars;
and all per capita incomes in US dollars. All ratios, except the one
measuring the level of economic development, were expressed in
percentages. That measuring the level of economic development was

293
expressed in decimals. All price indices have a base year of 1985 = 100,
and average debt maturity is in years.

4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS

Our empirical results are presented in Table 2, comprising equations

(2) - (10). Notice that our model has performed well, especially judging
by the various values of R2 , d and F. Secondly, none of the reported
regressions has a constant term. The equations are much better without
them; so we restricted the constant terms to assume a value of zero.

We shall discuss our results by taking the explanatory variables in

turn. The level of economic development has a positive impact on the
debt crisis in six of the countries sampled, and a negative impact in the
remaining three. However, only three of the positive impacts (those of
Algeria, Morocco and Syria) and one of the negative impact (that of
Oman) are significant. The overall impression given by the results is
that economic development has some impact on the debt crisis, but the
direction of the impact is not unique. Those countries that are
experiencing a negative impact are not unique. Those countries that are
experiencing a negative impact can have their debt burden reduced if
they develop, while those with a positive impact have some fault in their
style of development and should have their style changed.

The terms of trade also have a positive impact on the debt crisis in
six of the countries sampled, and a negative impact in the others. Two of
the positive impacts (those of Oman and Syria) and three of the
negative impacts (those of Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia) are
significant, so that the majority of the countries sampled are
significantly affected by their terms of trade. Like the case of the level of
economic development, however, the direction of the impact of the terms
of trade on debt burden is not unique.

Both the relative price level (i.e. the ratio of the domestic price level
vis-a-vis the foreign price . level) and cost of borrowing exert a positive
impact on the debt crisis, implying that both domestic inflation and

294
high interest rate are bad from the viewpoint of the debt crisis. The
relatives price level and the cost of borrowing have a significant impact
in eight (the exception being Yemen P.D.R) and five (the exceptions
being Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia and Yemen Arab Republic) of the
countries sampled, respectively.

The average debt maturity has a positive impact in only two of the
countries sampled. Consequently, for most of these countries, a longer
debt maturity eases the debt burden, which conforms to our a priori
expectation. However, only one of the positive impacts (that of Egypt)
and one of the negative impacts (that of Morocco) are significant,
implying that for most of the countries sampled, the maturity structure
of the debts is not a major factor in the debt crisis.

Lastly, the degree of openness of the economy, measured by the

import GNP ratio, has a positive impact in only four of the countries
sampled; and, by inference, negative impact in the remaining five. Two
of the positive impacts (those of Algeria and Tunisia) and three of the
negative impact (those of Jordan, Oman and Yemen Arab Republic)
are significant. One can then infer that the direction of the impact of
import compression on the debt crisis is not unique:

295
 TABLE 2

EMPIRICAL RESULTS

Explanatory variables
Country LED TOT PR INT MAT DOP R2 (in %)
d and F
Algeria 1176.57 -3.04 40.95* 9.77 -11.73 577.38 R'=95.0
(237) (-299) (230) (228) (-1.77) (3.25) d =214
F=34-8
Egypt -219228 0.39* 308.27 6.17 7.59 -121.39 R'=98.7
(-1.57) (0.62) (4.71) (222) (4-1) (-1.28) d =1.89
F =143-1
Jordan 660.51 0.48* 416.92* 223 0.65 -15224 R2=97.3
- (1.62) (1.16) (226) (0.94) (0.52), (-275) d =1.92
F =66.4
Morocco 5087.22 -0.71 25.57 1.27* -5.05 23-9 R'=98.5
(4.72) (-3.53) (5.2) (0.36) (-3-91) (0.13) d =202
F =216.2
Oman -11214 0.51* 228.85 247* -1.40 -50.48 R=98.5
(4.98) (3.79) (7.85) (5.24) (-207) (4.01) d =1.91.
F =348.9
Syria 54286 1.52* 5.91 5-52* -3.73 16231 R'=95.4
(236) (3.02) (277) (246) (-1.47) (-1.03) d =21
F =37.6
Tunisia 260.01 -1.76 _ 199.23* 1.42* -1.94 383.04. R=98.9
(0.36) (-261) (4.43) (0.68) (-1.88) (3.91) d =2.12
F =163.4
Yemen 584.26 0.43 21.36 1.20* -0.008 -148.5 R'=98.0
Arab (1.02) (0.63) (8.37) (0.31) (-0.007) (-224) d =2.07
Rep. F =65.7
Yemen -0334.81 0.81 580.16* 30.51* -1.91 915.84 R=81.9
P.D.R. (-1.06) (0.43) (1.26) (239) (-0.43) (1.79) d =2.12
F =8.3

Source: Author's computation.

Notes: 1. Because of data constraint and the use of lags, the data used for Oman and Yemen are for the period 1974-
87. For the other countries, we used the data for the period 1971-87. With six parameters, the degrees of
freedom for Oman and Yemen P.D.R is 8, while that for others is 11.
2 At - = 0.05, the critical values of t are 2 306 and 2.201 for 8 and 11 d.f respectively.
3. At - = 0.05, the critical values of F are 3-69 and 3.2 for 8 and 11 d.f respectively.
4. For d, - = 0.01 is preferred to - = 0.05, because the inconclusive region arising from the latter is too
wide. At - = 0.01, we do not have autoconelation problem. * denotes parameters for a one-year lag of
relevant variable.

import compression would worsen the debt crisis to a significant extent

in one-third of the countries sampled, and alleviate it significantly in
about 22.0 per cent of these countries.

296
 By and large in the majority of the countries sampled, domestic
inflation vis-a-vis inflation abroad, and the high cost of borrowing are
major causes of the debt crisis. In some, but not most, of these
countries, the debt crisis has been fuelled by the level and/or style of
economic development, a deterioration in the terms of trade, debt
maturity structure and import liberalization.

5. ISLAMIC ECONOMICS AND THE DEBT CRISIS

A) A Survey of Islamic Economics on Relevant Issues

We shall start with interest on loans (riba al Duyun) which is a type

of predetermined excess or surplus (riba).14 Islam abhors all riba, the
interest on loans included. In Islam, the legal rate of interest is zero,
so that any interest rate above zero, no matter how low it is, is usury.
Interest on loans is considered invalid for at least three reasons. First, it
does not involve a quid pro quo: the creditor receives an increment
without giving to the debtor an equivalent return, in which case, the
interest received by the creditor is considered to be an unearned
income. Secondly, the creditor and the debtor do not exchange on the
basis of equality, because one party, the creditor, receives profit with
certainty whereas there is no certainty of profit for the debtor. Last,
but no least, unlike in trade where a shareholder or vendor demands
profit from the purchaser only once, the interest on loans continues to
accrue as long as there is some principal outstanding.

Islamic economics preaches an alternative to interest charging,

namely partnership coupled with profit sharing. This arrangement
presupposes that capital, loan capital (aqridni) included, is an
instrument of enterprise so that it is needless to treat capital as a
separate factor of production. There are two main types of partnership,
namely al sharikah and al mudaraba. The former involves provision of
joint capital or labor and profit sharing according to an agreed ratio. In
joint partnership, losses are distributed in proportion to the shares of
the partners in the joint capital. There are several types of joint
partnership, but the one which is considered to be the best substitute for
interest charging is 'inan partnership. This is a form

297
of partnership in which the rights of the partners, are not necessarily
equal in terms of, e.g. share ownership and profit sharing. The
institution of involves the provision of capital by one or more partners,
and the work done by the other(s). Profit will be shared according to an
agreed ratio, but in the event of a loss, partners lose in proportion of
their capital share in the total investment. Islamic banking is then
modelled in a tripartite relationship consisting of two tiers. The first tier
involves depositors and the banks, while the second involves the bank
and investors.

It is now easier for us to state the Islamic attitude to borrowing, both

private and public.15 The overall spirit of Islam is to discourage deficit
financing and public borrowing; the partnership method of financing
being a preferred alternative; an alternative that can be coupled by aids
and other economic assistance from richer Muslim countries or even
individuals. Islam also preaches spiritual discipline in expenditure
policy so as to curb waste.

Islam treats economic development as an integral part of the overall

human development. 16 This concept of economic development derives
from certain philosophical ideals including tazkiyah (i.e. purification plus
growth). The outcome of tazkiyah is falah, i.e. prosperity both in this
world and the Hereafter. The Islamic approach to development preaches,
among other things, the common good (maslaha), expansion of useful
production, balanced development, equitable distribution of . wealth,
reduction of national dependency on non-Muslim world through, for
instance, evolution of indigenous technology; and the need for the
Muslim world to play a more positive role in reforming international
instabilities and exploitation. There is a general condemnation of both
the capitalist and the socialist modes of development.

There are several routes by which prices are managed in an Islamic

state. First, Islam abhors illegitimate excess on sales (riba al Buyu'), just
as it abhors interest charging (riba al Duyun). It is then needless to say,
trade practices such as hoarding, speculative deals and illegal
adjustments of weights and measures are condemned by Islam.

298
Secondly, we have the zakat and other taxes which act as in-built
mechanisms for redistributing income and wealth, and for controlling
spending. Last, but no least, we have those measures which are aimed at
combating cost-push inflation such as linking of wages with productivity,
subsidies on certain inputs and direct control method.

Finally, we have the Islamic attitude to trade." Islam is not against

trade. What Islam is against is trade which can lead to riba on sales. This
attitude applies to both domestic trade and international trade.
Consequently, Islam frowns at certain international trade practices such as
forward exchange rates, commodity pricing which is generally in favor
of the industrial countries of the world, and deceits relating to quality of
products.

B) Appraisal of the Islamic Approach to the Debt Crisis

In Section IV, we identified certain variables as accounting for the

debt crisis facing North Africa and the Middle East. The major ones are
the level of economic development vis-a-vis that of the industrial world,
the terms of trade, the domestic price level vis-a-vis the foreign price
level, interest rate and the degree of openness of the economy, measured
by the import-GNP ratio. Notice that these variables affect the various
countries differently.

Our discussion in Sub-Section V(i) shows that Islamic economics has

something to contribute to the debt crisis. Firstly, Islam tackles the debt
problem at the roots by discouraging public borrowing and deficit
financing; and favoring collaborative effort and the integration of loan
capital with enterprise. Where borrowing occurs at all, no interest is
charged. Turning to Table 2, we find that a reduction in interest rate, or
the abolition of interest charging would alleviate the debt burden of all
the countries sampled; and the relief is significant for Algeria, Egypt,
Oman, Syria and Yemen P.D.R. For instance, a one percentage point
reduction in interest rate would reduce Algeria's debt-export ratio by about
9.8 percentage point,, and that of Egypt by about 6.2 points.

299
 Secondly, Islam abhors all riba on sales, whether at the domestic or
international levels. This has a lot of implication on the relative price
level turning to Table 2, we find that a reduction in the. domestic price
level would alleviate the debt burden of all the countries sampled; and
the relief is significant for all of these countries except Yemen P.D.R.
For instance, a one percentage point reduction in the relative price
level would reduce Jordan's debt-export ratio by 4.2 percentage points,
and that of Oman by 2.3 points.

The abolition of riba on sales can also affect the terms of trade
depending on whether riba on imports departs from that on exports, or
not. If riba on imports exceeds riba on exports, and -all riba is
abolished, then the terms of trade would improve, which in turn affects
the debt burden. Table 2 shows that an improvement in the terms of
trade would significantly alleviate the debt burden of Algeria, Morocco
and Tunisia; and it would worsen it in the remaining countries, the
impact being significant in only Oman and Syria. For instance, a one
percentage point improvement in the terms of trade would reduce
Algeria's debt-export ratio by about 3.04 percentage points, and worsen
Oman's by about 0.51 points. It can therefore be concluded that there
are wide cross-country differences in the role which the Islamic
approach can play to alleviate the debt crisis through the terms of
trade.

On the degree of openness of the economy, Islam is, strictly

speaking, not against trade, but its concept of economic development
implies the need for self-sufficiency, which can be interpreted to mean
less dependence on imported goods and technology. Table: 2 shows
that import compression would significantly increase that of Jordan,
Oman and Yemen Arab Republic; and it would have no significant
impact on the debt burden of the remaining countries. For instance, a
one percentage point increase in imports vis-a-vis the GNP would
reduce Algeria's debt burden by about 5.8 percentage points, and
increase Jordan's by about 1.5 points.

By and large, the Islamic approach can be used to check the debt
crisis facing North Africa and the Middle East if the emphasis is on

300
price and interest rate reduction. But if the emphasis shifts to other
variables such as import control and the terms of trade, the evidence will
be divided; some countries would be worse off, while others may gain.
For example, import compression and an improvement in the terms of
trade would alleviate Algeria's debt burden, but worsen Oman's. Even in
countries where the Islamic approach is favorably disposed to work, we
should not expect smooth sailing and we now turn to the constraints.

C) Constraints Facing the Islamic Approach to the Debt Crisis

We shall limit ourselves to two problems which are likely to militate

against the efficacy of the Islamic approach to the debt crisis.

1. Economic dependence. Most countries are already heavily indebted to

the industrial countries of the world, and this is coupled with
dependence on foreign technology and capital. The question is: can
Islamic economics be ideally practiced without a minimum level of
economic in dependence?

2. The tendency towards a uniform international economic order. The

development of multilateral institutions and regional groupings seem
to be a pointer to a tendency towards a uniform international
economic order. Behind this tendency is some form of. competition
between alternative systems. The point then is that Islamic
economics must expand its area of influence, or be threatened by
other systems.

6. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The debt crisis confronting North Africa and the Middle East is part of
a global crisis faced by most LDCs. This crisis can be accounted for by
several factors, especially the level of economic development, the terms
of trade, the domestic price level vis-a-vis the foreign price level, cost of
borrowing, and domestic policy lapses measured, for instance, by the
average debt maturity and the degree of openness of the

301
economy. The Islamic approach to economic issues has -a lot to say
about each of these factors and can therefore be used to influence them
all. Islam abhors all illegitimate excesses, including interest charging
and extortionist trade policy; it also abhors wasteful spending; it
discourages deficit financing; and it has an integrated approach to
human development. It is then clear that the Islamic approach, if
adopted, can ameliorate the debt crisis facing North Africa and the
Middle East, and some other countries as well. However, there are
problems which can stymie a full scale adoption of this approach. They
include polarization within' the Muslim world, and economic
dependence on the developed West. We recommend that:

a. Muslim countries should embark vigorously on a program of

economic development. The policy measures should include
development of indigenous technology. With self-sufficiency, it
would be easier for Muslim countries to close their ranks; and with
greater unity, a more conducive environment would be created for
the practice of Islamic economics.

b. Muslim countries should cartelise, or strengthen existing ties, as

debtors, importers and exporters, not necessarily to repudiate their
debts, but to obtain more favorable terms on their trades and
borrowing. A collaborative effort with non-Muslim LDCs can also
be considered.

ENDNOTES AND SOURCES

1. See the World Bank; World Debt Tables, 1989/90 Edition, pp. 4-
17.

2. See Yima Sen (1989); "The Political Factor in the Third World
Debt Crisis", in Olusanyn, G.O. and Olukoshi, A.O. eds, The
African Debt Crisis, Nigerian Institute of International Affairs
Monograph Series,. No. 14, p. 105.

302
3. See Ekpo, A.H. (1989); "The Debt Crisis and Africa's Balance of
Payments Problems", in Olusanya and Olukoshi, op. cit, pp.. 30-
48; Ihonvbere, J.O. (1989); "The African Debt Crisis: Responses
and Options", in Olusanya and Olukoshi, op. cit, pp. 81-91; and
Nau, H.R. (1988); "The Debt Crisis: Putting Policy Before
Finance", Economic Impact, No. 65, pp. 45-48.

4. See, e.g. Oluskoshi, A.O. (1989); "Origins, Nature and

Dimensions of the African Debt Crisis", in Olusanya and
Olukoshi, op. cit, p. 11.

5. See, e.g. Mundell, R.A. (1989); "Perspectives on Debt

Adjustment", Economic Impact, No. 68, pp. 4-9.

6. See Paul, S. and Mote, V.L. (1970); "Competitiveness of

Exports: A Micro-Level Approach", Economic Journal, Vol. 80,
pp. 895-909.
7. See, e.g. Mundell, op. cit, p. 6.

8. See the World Bank; World Debt Tables, Vol. 1, p. 3 and Vol.
III, p. 3.

9. See Oyejide, T.A. (1985): "The Debt and Development

Dilemma ", an Inaugural Lecture delivered at the University of
Ibadan, 18 April, 1985.

10. See Viovadas, C. (1974); "Export, Foreign Capital Flow and

South Korean Growth", Economic Development and Cultural
Change, Vol. 22, No. 3, pp. 480-484.

11. For the treatment of the ADL approach see Hendry, D.F., Pagan,
A.R. and Sagan, J.D. (1984); "Dynamic Specification", in

303
 Griliches, Z. and Intrilligator, M. eds., Handbook of
Econometrics, Vol. 2, Amsterdam, North Holland.

12. See Wallis, K.F. (1972); Introductory Econometrics, Gray-Mills

Ltd., London, pp. 18-20.

13. See Koutosyiannis, A. (1977); Theory of Econometrics,

Macmillan, Second ed.,-222-223.

14. For a good treatment of riba see, e.g. Abdelmoneim Mahmoud El

Gousi (1982); riba Islamic Law and Interest, Ph.D thesis in
Islamic Economics, submitted to the Graduate Board of Temple
University, Chapters IV & V, pp. 121-247; and Muhammad
Uzair (1976); "Some Conceptual and Practical Aspects of
Interest-Free Banking", in Khurshid Ahmad, ed. Studies in
Islamic Economics, Chapter 3, pp.-37-58.

15. For a treatment of the Islamic attitude to deficit financing see;

e.g. El Gousi, op. cit, pp. 264-266.

16. The Islamic approach to economic development can be found in

Khurshid Ahmad (1976); "Economic Development in an Islamic
Framework in' Khurshid Ahmad, ed., op.cit, Chapter 9, pp. 171-
188; Balogun, I.A.B. (1988); "Some Aspects of Islamic
Economics", in Ibrahim Sulaiman and Siraj Abdulkarim, eds. On
the Political Future of Nigeria, pp. 48-55; and Sheikh A.
Abdullah (1988); "Moral Issues in Investment Islamic Viewpoint,
in Ibrahim Sulaiman and Siraj Abdulkari, eds., op.cit, pp. 56-60.
17. See El Gousi, op. cit, p. 150 and pp. 263-279.

18. See El Gousi, op.cit, pp. 41-47.

304
19. For some of these dissenting views see, e.g. El Gousi, op.cit, pp.
138 and 141.

305
 12
THE SURVIVAL AND DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES
OF THE MINORITY OF
NAIROBIAN MUSLIMS IN NAIROBI

MOHAMMED S. MUKRAS*

1. INTRODUCTION

Kenya, like other developing countries, is a predominantly

agricultural economy. About 80 per cent of its population still resides in
the rural agricultural sector, 30 per cent of its GDP is accounted for by
agricultural products, and about 60 per cent of its exports are
unprocessed foods and beverages.' Although the country has an abundant
supply of unskilled and semi-skilled labor, the production technology
employed in the industrial sector is excessively capital intensive.
Moreover, the available capital endowment is limited, as a result of
which productive, stable employment in the industrial sector is severely
curtailed. On the other hand, the agricultural sector has a promising
potential. However, the exploitation of the available potential will need
abundant resources and reorganization. In order for this sector to play its
strategic role in the transformation of the economy through the creation
of demand, generation of foreign exchange, and the production of raw
materials, food, and labor, the sector would need to overcome a number
of constraints it is currently facing. Some of these constraints include
insufficient marketing arrangements, low use of fertilizers, poor
infrastructure, appropriate technology, and inadequate finance and
delays in payments.

The economic scenario described above has serious welfare

implications for the majority of rural and urban residents. In the first
place, the majority of these people are mostly unskilled and have very
little or no education at all. This means that their eligibility for

* Economics Department, University of Nairobi, Nairobi, Kenya.

307
employment in the formal and informal sectors is very low, as a result
of which they are faced with low and uncertain incomes. This further
implies that their access to the formal labor and formal capital markets
as well as the formal social security system is seriously limited. The sum
total of all these factors is that the welfare situation of this sub-set of the
population is very precarious.

The Nubian Muslims in Nairobi, together with Nairobi urban

migrants fall within this category of urban residents. One major
difference between the two is that, whereas the Nubian Muslims are
"permanent urban" residents, the urban migrant has his home in the.
rural area and expects to return to the rural village to retire.2 This
expectation leads the urban migrant to maintain strong reciprocal ties
with the rural village community through the transfer of incomes which is
reciprocated mostly by the transfer of foodstuffs in the reverse
direction.3 In addition, the migrant undertakes several pertinent
investments intended to facilitate his easy re-entry into the rural village at
the time of retirement.' Through this system of reciprocation, these
urban migrants and their rural counterparts are able to ameliorate their
welfare status in times of economic hardships.

Although the survival and development strategy of. the Nubian

Muslim community is also based on income "transfers", the dynamics of
such transfers is different. Available empirical evidence suggests that this
community is relatively poorer, less educated, and ill represented in
formal wage employment than other communities in the country.5
However, through "Muslim Brotherhood Support Network", this
community has endeavored to sustain its economic well being through
interhousehold income transfers' which is the theme of this paper.

The first part of this paper is introductory. The second part provides
definitions, and thereafter, sections three and four present empirical
evidence of interhousehold transfers and theoretical foundations.
Section five discusses the econometric model which is used to generate
the results presented in section six. The emerging conclusions are
covered in section seven.

308
2. DEFINITIONS

Two important terms used in this study deserve to be defined:

"Muslim Brotherhood Survival Network" (survival network) and
"transfers". The term survival network refers to a system of relations
between a group of individuals or households through which one or
more units of transfer can flow. The phrase "Muslim Brotherhood" is
used to denote the fact that this system or relations is mainly based on
the bondage of Muslim Brotherhood existing among the participating
individuals or households. The system is also referred to as "survival
system" in so far as it plays, among other things, the role of transferring
resources for social maintenance and economic. survival 'and
development of its members. In other words, the survival system has
three main functions to play: that of economic survival, by guaranteeing
that all the participating members can secure income necessary for their
subsistences by influencing the flow of transfer between those who are
well off and the less fortunate ones; that of social maintenance, by
facilitating regular social interaction of members in the various
social/cultural activities in the community; and that of development
through the implementation of diverse infrastructural investments within
the community.

The survival network plays the important role of facilitating the flow
of transfers among individuals, household and community based
organizations. The term transfer is, in this context, used to refer to the
receipt or giving of one or more units of transfer by an individual, a
household, or a community organization. The units of transfer in
question can either be money, goods, or services, and when such
transfers flow among household or community organizations, they are
respectively referred to as inter-household and inter-community
transfers.

3. EVIDENCE OF INTERHOUSEHOLD TRANSFERS

Empirical evidence on Kenya, India and El-Salvador suggests a

considerable amount of income flow among individuals and households
through non-market mechanisms. Such evidence further suggests that

309
such income transfers constitute an important survival and development
strategy of poorer families.

Knowles and Anker7 found that income transfers in Kenya takes

place not only between urban and rural households, but also between
inter-rural and inter-urban households. They* further showed that
income transfers form a significant proportion of the gross income of
poorer families. Later works by Oucho and Mukras8 provided the
following conclusions: that the urban migrant remits an average of 27
per cent of his urban income earning to the rural area; that the rural
area is the net transfer recipient of urban-rural transfer flows; and that
transfers play the role of providing income for social maintenance,
subsistence, and development.

TABLE 3.1

PATTERNS OF TRANSFERS IN KENYA

Description of Flows Number of Per cent of Total

Transfers Amount
Transferred
Urban to Rural 431 50.4
Urban to Urban 119 15.0
Rural to Urban 76 6.3
Rural to Rural 540 28.3
TOTAL 1,166 100.0

Source: Knowles, J-C- and Anker R-, 1981, "An Analysis of Income Transfers in a Developing
Countries: The Case of Kenya", Journal of Development Economics, 8, p-210-

A survey conducted among the Nubian Muslims in Kibera in Nairobi

in 1988 and 1989 further corroborate some of these findings.9 Covering
a total of 267 households, the survey revealed that a total of Kshs.

310
525,000/= were remitted as transfers in the year 1988. Table 3.2 gives
the breakdown of these transfers into the three main functions: survival,
development and social maintenance.10

TABLE 3.2

MAGNITUDE OF TRANSFERS AMONG NUBIAN MUSLIMS IN

NAIROBI BY FUNCTIONS

Functions Transfers Ksh Per cent

Development 262,000 50
Survival 146,700 28
Survival Maintenance 115,300 22
Total 524,000 100

Allocations going into development included allocations for schools,

mosques, maddrass, health centre, purchase of land, and establishment of
small scale business enterprises. The social maintenance category
embraces such activities like funeral ceremonies, wedding ceremonies,
and other such social activities.

The same picture emerges from the works of Kaufman in El-

Salvador," and Oberai and Singh in India. 12

4. THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS

The Nubian Muslim Community in Kenya is a minority community

which is relatively poorer than the other 'communities in terms of
education and their economic welfare. Their limited access to the formal
capital and the formal labor markets gives the survival network existing
among members of this community an overriding importance as a
mechanism for their economics survival and social maintenance.

311
The survival network embraces' Muslim Brothers who are members of
the nucleus family, the extended family as well as neighbors and
friends. Common religion, spatial and social proximity, and a sufficient
degree of trust are important factors that create an enabling
environment necessary for reciprocal transactions within the survival
network.

From the point of view of the economist, this survival network can
be looked at as some form of an informal insurance institution catering
for. the economic welfare of member households. The close ties existing
among members, together with the degree of trust and the effective
access to information about the overall conduct of the members gives
this system of informal insurance a comparable advantage over a
formal insurance scheme. The main reasons for this relates to the usual
problems faced by the formal insurance schemes, such as moral
hazards, adverse selection, and deception which are -in this case taken
care of by the overall proximity of member households.

In order to explain the economic rationale for an average/typical

household to participate in this survival network, we shall denote its
income by Y. The household is assumed to allocate this income into
two consumption expenditures: expenditure for basic subsistence (C B ),
and expenditure for non-basic consumption (CNB ). These two
components of consumption expenditure correspond to YB and YNB ,
which are, respectively, the income levels required to cover basic and
non-basic consumption.

For the two components of income and consumption expenditure,

the following relationships hold:

Y = Y B + Y NB (4.1)
C = C B + C NB (4.2)

Three scenarios can be discerned in relation to the households basic-

consumption income. The household can either balance its subsistence
needs, experience an income surplus, or an income deficit in an

312
attempt to satisfy its basic consumption needs. These three scenarios are
given by (4.3), (4.4) and (4.5) respectively.

Y = YB (4.3)
Y > YB (4.4)
Y < YB (4.5)

Since the typical household faces uncertain employment and income,

income stream will be characterized with fluctuations particularly during
bad periods, when Y < YB and therefore is faced with a deficit in his
basic-consumption income, the household will need income transfer
from within the survival network in order to make up the deficit. On the
other hand, during the fortunate periods when Y > YB , the household
experiences a surplus and, through reciprocation, it will remit transfers
to the less fortunate members of the survival network.

It is therefore clear that through the mechanism of transfers, the

household is able to protect itself against undesirable income
fluctuations. The survival network therefore provides a form of informal
insurance coverage against such undesirable income fluctuations. This
informal insurance protection constitutes a very important economic
incentive for the household to become members of the network. The
transfer that it remits within the network can therefore be looked at as an
"insurance premium".

It should be noted that within the survival network, member

households will differ in their earning capacity. They will normally
differ in their expected earnings and the nature and degree of income
fluctuations they experience. However, irrespective of the economic
background of the member household, provided it does not often
experience disproportionately large deficits (shown in equation 4.6
below)

Y - YB > (4.6)

where = threshold income ''deficit against income deficits by

supplementing its income during bad periods.

313
 Such protection against the impacts of household income deficits is
made possible through the re-distributive role of the network. Sufficient
resources are extracted from the surplus household in order to meet the
deficits experienced by the deficit households.

5. THE ECONOMETRIC MODEL

5.1 Identification. of the Relevant Variables

Discussion's in the foregoing section suggest that there exists strong

linkage, or correlation between household income and inter-household
transfers whose behavior is the focus of this model. For this reason, it is
hypothesized that inter-household transfers depends on, among other
things, household income. Other explanatory variables are: age and
education of head of household; employment status; marital status;
number of children in household; ownership of property; and degree of
religiosity of head of household.

5.2 Functional Form of Model

It should be noted that although a number of scholars have modelled

inter-household income transfers in an attempt to explain its behavior,
no a priori theoretical model exists in this area. Notwithstanding this
shortcoming, we have decided to proceed in an exploratory manner -at
each step using statistical procedures to evaluate the performance of the
model we have specified.

We have postulated a multivariate stochastic model of the general form

given by (5.1).

TH = f(xi, E) - (5.1)

where: TH = Inter-household Transfer

xi = ith explanatory variable

i = 1, 2, ..., n

314
 E = stochastic term

Both the linear additive (5.2) and log-log (5.3) functional forms were
estimated.

Where: T'.= Inter-household Transfer of the ith household

A = constant term

xij= the Ph observation of the j'h explanatory variable

ai = coefficient of the jth explanatory variable

Ei = stochastic term

where: a1 = constant elasticities

X1 = explanatory variables

e = stochastic term

i = 1,2,...,n

Since the performance of the log-log form was found to be better, our
results here are based on this functional form. The performance of these
two functional forms were compared on the basis of two statistical
criteria: the statistical significance of individual parameter estimates;
and the goodness of fit of the model. Overall, the log-log form was
performed better.

315
5.3 A Priori Expectations

The a priori expected direction of the impact of explanatory

variables on transfers are summarized below:

(i) Household Income Y

Impact is expected to be positive. The explanation is that the higher

the household income, the greater the ability of such household to
remit higher transfers.

(ii) Education of Head of Household (ED)

Impact is expected to be positive. The rationale is that the higher

the educational status, the greater the access to labor market, capital
market, and the greater the potential earning capacity.

(iii) Employment Status (EM)

The employed are expected to have greater capacity to remit income

transfer than the unemployed.

(iv) Marital Status (M)

The married are expected to remit, on average, more than the

unmarried. The rationale is that, having a family to look after, they
have more to benefit transfer from reciprocation than the unmarried.

(v) Number of Children (CH)

The Number of children is expected to have an inverse relation with

income transfers. The rationale lies in the costs attributed to larger
families.

316
(vi) Ownership of Property (PR)

Impact is expected to be positive as this is an indicator of well being

and hence the ability to remit transfers.

(vii) Degree of Religiosity (R)

It is assumed that the more pious and generous a person is, the more
the person will feel obliged to remit transfers in an effort to
improve the well being of members of the network.

6. DATA

Date used in our regression were cross-sectional data collected from

among Nubian Muslims in Kibera in 1988/89. The sampling frame used
was constructed from the community Sports Clubs. Our sampling units
were the household, and, on the basis of the sampling frame, simple
random sampling was used to draw a random sample of 267
households from which the required data were collected.

7. RESULTS

Cross-sectional data collected from the survey described in the

foregoing section were used to estimate the multivariate regression
model described in Section 5. The OLS method was used for
estimation and the results obtained are presented on Table 6.1

317
 TABLE 6.1 REGRESSION RESULTS

Dependent Independent Coefficients

Variable Variables (t-statistics in brackets)
T Y +0.39
(3.03)
ED +0.42
(3.66)
AG +0.17
(4.88)
EM +0.27
(3.30)
M +0.33
(3.25)
CH +0.87
(2.77)
PR +2.79
(5.15)
R + 1.68
(3.95)

R2 = 0.48
n = 267 Households

Results on the table suggest that the regression model was able to
explain 48 per cent of the variations of the dependent variable. In
addition, apart from the coefficient of the explanatory variable
representing the "number. of children", the sign of all the other
coefficients are in conformity with a priori expectations. The coefficients
are all found to be statistically significant at a level of 5 per cent.

318
8. CONCLUSION

Our discussion in this paper suggest that, bonded together by muslim

brotherhood, and constrained by their limited access to the formal labor
market, the formal capital market, and the formal social security system,
the Nubian Muslims in Nairobi have resorted to an informal "survival
network" which can be loosely looked at as an informal insurance
institution through which income-transfers flow from the deficit to the
surplus household thereby sustaining the household's economic well
being in times of hardship.

In order to get a clearer understanding of the determinants of

transfers, a multivariate regression model has been estimated from data
collected from 267 households. Results from this exercise lead us to the
conclusion that, in order to strengthen the role of transfers in the
improvement of the economic well being of this community, we would
need to strengthen their commitment to the religion of Islam, improve
their education, and improve their access to the labor and capital
markets.

ENDNOTES

1. Republic of Kenya, Ministry of Planning and National

Development, 1989, Economic Survey.

2. Oucho, J.O. and Mukras, M.S. 1984, Migration, Transfers and

Rural Development: A Case Study of Kenya. A report based on
primary research conducted in Kenya between 1981 and 1984
(Nairobi, University of Nairobi, pp. 76.77.

3. See Mukras, M.S., Oucho, J.O. and Bamberger M., 1985,

"Resource Mobilization and the Household Economy in Kenya" in
Canadian Journal of African Studies, Vol. 19:2 (pp. 409-421).
Rampel, H and Lobdell, B.A., 1978, "The Role of Urban to Rural
Remittances in Rural Development", Journal of Development
Studies, Vol. 14:3 (pp. 324-341) and Weisner T.,

319
 1976, "The Structure of Sociability; Urban Migration and Urban
Ties in Kenya", Urban Anthropology 5 (pp. 199-223).

4. Mukras, M.S., 1983; Recent Findings on Determinants of Urban-

Rural' Income Transfers in Kenya, Tekuza Research Institute (TRI),
Research Paper Series No.2, (Nairobi), TRI), pp. 17-19.

5. Mukras, M.S., 1983, "The Nubian Muslim Community in Kenya:

An Economic Appraisal", Journal Institute of Muslim Minority
Affairs, Vol. 3:2 (pp. 206-221).
6. Ibid.

7. Knowles J. and Anker, R., 1981, "An Analysis of Income Transfers

in a Developing Country: The case of Kenya", Journal of
Development Economics 8 (pp. 205-226).
8. Oucho, J.O. and Mukras, ,M.S., 1984, op.cit.

9. This survey was conducted by the author and, due to budgetary

constraints, analysis has not been completed.

10. For detailed discussions on the functions of transfers see Mukras,

M.S., 1980, Income Transfers as a Survival Strategy of the Minority
Nubian Muslim Community in Kenya: An Econometric Model. Paper
presented at the World Assembly of Muslim Youth, in 1986 in
Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.

11. Kaufman, Dani, 1981, . "Household Income Formatting and

Expenditure Behavior: A Summary of Issues, Findings and Research
Prospects", Urban and Regional Division, World Bank.

12. Oberai, A.S. and Singh 'H.k.M., 1980, 'Migration,' Remittances and
Rural Development: Findings of A Case in the Indian Punjab"
International Labor Review, Vol. 9 N0.2.

320
 Section IV

FINANCING DEVELOPMENT IN HISTORICAL

PERSPECTIVES

13. The Role of Finance in Development : The Ottoman Experience

Ahmet Tabakoglu

14. Public Borrowing in Early Islamic History: A Review of the

Records M. Nejatullah Siddiqi

15. Provision of Public Goods: Role of the Voluntary Sector (Waqf)

in Islamic History Abdul Azim Islahi

16. Relevance of the Ottoman Cash Waqfs (Awqaf Al-Nuqud) for

the Modern Islamic Economics Murat Cizakca
 13
THE ROLE OF FINANCE IN DEVELOPMENT : THE
OTTOMAN EXPERIENCE
AHMET TBAKOGLU*

1. INTRODUCTION

"
Development" is an ideological concept contained in the capitalist
paradigm. Since capitalism has dominated the world economy since the
eighteenth century, (material) progress has been given top priority in all
spheres of life. Beginning from the late seventeenth century many
Ottoman and other Oriental observers began investigating the secret of
the material progress realized in the West. The term in vogue was
"civilization" during the nineteenth century; and it was, in a sense,
replaced by "development" in the twentieth. Europeanization,
Westernization, Modernization all are other appearances of the one and
same phenomenon: material development, based on a secularized
world-view. The more value-free term for this process may be
"industrialization". Here I am not in a position to discuss the
appropriateness of a term like "Islamic development". Rather, I shall try
to outline an 800 year experience of the Anatolian Muslim peoples from
the XI to XIX (H. VI to XIV) centuries, in economic terms, and make
an attempt to derive certain implications for current theoretical and
practical experience.

2. MAIN FEATURES OF THE OTTOMAN

ECONOMIC STRUCTURE

. The Ottoman State inherited the intellectual and institutional

legacies of the former Islamic states. Such economic institutions as
iqtatimar, futuwwa-uhuwwa, crafts guilds, muqataa, diwan etc. were
closely associated with the past Islamic experience. Besides, ancient
near

* Director, Economics Research Center for Middle-East and Islamic

Countries, Marmara University, Istanbul, Turkey.

323
Eastern (especially, Persian) and Byzantium influences can be observed in
certain aspects of the Ottoman institutions. Particularly in monetary and
fiscal systems, we can say that the Ottomans were as flexible as the early
Islamic societies faced with local traditions. In a sense, the Ottomans
were traditionalist, not `progressive-developmental'. Change was mostly
considered as a sign of decay, its remedy being a return to the Eternal
Law.

The financing of wars in a coinage economy requires the enhancement

of state revenues. An increase in production sometimes depends on this
condition. Revenue collecting is a function of just treatment of the
community. The state is financed through revenue (taxation), revenue is
collected through justice. Therefore, the foundation of the state (El-
Mulk) is justice. The principle of justice leads to the conception of
social `welfare'. The goal of the economy, as indicated in countless
documents, is social welfare. In other words, man is not for the economy,
it is the other way round.

The Ottoman system is not demand-oriented, it is supply-oriented.

Such is the case both from the individual and the social points of view.
Individuals are more `givers' then being merely "receivers". That is, they
are not utility or profit-maximizing egoists, but rather are devout
altruists. The essentials of this supply-oriented society and economy are
service and support (mainly for the poor `infaq'). Any modern treatment
of `Islamic economics' must emphasize these crucial points.

(In the Ottoman Archives, we have now more than 100 million
documents, illuminating many aspects of lengthy history politically,
socially as well as economically. My paper will be based on first-hand
research of relevant documents in these archives).

. A supply-oriented economy reveals that economy is subject to man

and his welfare. Another implication is the high production potential of
the Ottoman economy. Again for this reason, with the exception of
certain articles, imports were not prohibited. As to the exports, basic
food articles, industrial raw materials and armaments were not allowed
for export.1

324
 Until mid-eighteenth century the Ottoman economy was one with
high production and a favorable trade balance. 2 This high production
supported a flow of agricultural as well as industrial exports to
Europe.3 After the mid-eighteenth century, however, when serious
under-production began to emerge, Western capitalism established its
dominance over the Ottoman economic structure. The financial
structure of this system of high production and social welfare should
be studied first.

3. FINANCING OF PUBLIC PRODUCTION

Public production and the share of State out of this production may
be studied under three headings:

A. Central Finance (Treasury)

This is the section whose revenue and expenditure are reflected in

the central budget. Since the system was based on coinage, the
revenues were collected, and expenditures made, in cash money:
thus the existence of a powerful central treasury.

The treasury was of two kinds: Internal and external. The former
covered the sultans' private revenues and expenditures. But, it was also
a source of credit for the external treasury. This second one was the
responsibility of the Sadr-i azam (modern Prime Minister) and the
Defterdar (modern Minister of Finance); thus it was the State
Treasury. With the introduction of Reforms in the late eighteenth
century (called Nizam el Cedid), there had been a shift to a multi-
treasury system. But after Tanzimat, the one-treasury system was
resumed.

Budgets, which were certain accounting lists generally prepared in

year-ends, reflected the share of the central treasury in public
production. Moreover, there were budgets prepared at the beginning
of the year predicting the next period's revenue and expenditure. The
first Ottoman budget dates back to the year 930-1 H/1524-5 G. For
the period until Tanzimat (mid-nineteenth century) there were
around 30 states budgets.

325
 The main principle in Ottoman finance was to adjust expenditure
according to revenue. As a corollary to this principle, a logic, of
subtraction is observed in the Ottoman accounting (and budget)
registers. That is, if revenue has come to exceed expenditure, the
surplus is retained in the Treasury. In short, a surplus budget was the
target of the Ottoman financial mind.

The central budgets, which, generally reflected the cash in-and-

outflows, covered 51 per cent of all national revenue in the sixteenth
century.4 This share must have been risen through time, because the
economy was increasingly monetized afterwards.
1. Revenue Sources of The Budget

Major revenue sources in the budget are muqataa, jizyah and avariz
revenues. The muqataas, whose original forms were seen during the
Abbasid reign5 can loosely be defined as state enterprises run by the
private sector. They may assume monopolistic properties. Moreover,
the collection of a revenue share pertaining to the state can be
organized in muqataa form. Prominent examples are customs, mints,
mines and alum factories. The share of muqataa revenues in the
budgets oscillated between 24-40 per cent.

Muqataas were run by three main methods: iltizam, emanet and since
late seventeenth century, malikane. With the muqataa method, without
shouldering the burden of establishing a separate organization for tax
collecting, the state could determine these revenue sources and
transform them into muqataas, and then leave the task to private
enterprise. We see the muqataas in the official registers for
demography and taxation only in the cities. But, the lands belonging
directly to the Treasury were also run as muqataas. The agricultural,
commercial and industrial revenues consolidated under the title of
`muqataa revenues' in the Ottoman budgets and their respective rates
can be observed through the following table:

326
 Year Rates (%)
1103/1691-2 51.7
1110/1698-9 37.7
1113/1701-2 41.6
1114/1702-3 38.1
1122/1710-1 42
1147/1734-5 29.4
1159/1146-7 40.8
1161/1748 55.3

The variations in the muqataa revenues and in their respective shares

in total revenues had close connections with the political situation and
wars.

Iltizam (tax-farming) is the running of muqataas by the private sector

in return for a fixed price. The period is generally three years.
Allocation is made through auction. Sometimes an extraordinary rise
might be seen in the revenues of a certain muqataa, giving way to an
unexpected `profit'. In such cases, muqataas could be transferred to
someone offering a higher price, even before the time period expired. In
doing so, the state prevented the `unearned' accumulation of wealth in
private hands. On one hand, the iltizam owners (multezims) with their
advance as well as annual payments, contributed to the financing of
public expenditures; on the other, produced public goods. Thus, the state
was engaged 'in the control of the production, not in the production
itself. All the properties of the multezims was mortgaged to the treasury;
therefore, they could neither sell nor transfer their property to third
parties.6

As shall be explained later, the lands included in the timar system

were started to become muqataa from the sixteenth century onwards.
Since the old system was not suitable for the new war technology, plus
the increasing cash requirements due to the continued wars the new
trend was strengthened. Also, the trend to iltizam added much to the
private initiative and possession.

327
 Because of warring conditions, great difficulties were experienced in
the operation of the muqataas with iltizam method, leading to unstable
ups and downs in muqataa revenues. When peace was reached, new
measures were taken and revenues expanded.7

During unfavorable economic cycles, because of the possibility of

loss, the iltizam method became difficult and the state was compelled to
extend these revenue sources to certain powerful groups on the basis of
emanet (trust). In such cases, most often a mixed enterprise combining
government tasks with private enterprise was established. It would involve
a salaried official with the title of emin and a person responsible for the
profit and loss of the enterprise who undertook to pay the government a
pre-determined sum of money. This transitional regime was called
emanet ber vech-i iltizam (entrusted tax-farming).

Emanet is the running of muqataas by state officers called emin. The

muqataas which low-yield were unattractive to the multezim. Certain
crucial areas which could not be put outside state- operation (such as
state. land, mines, customs), were subject to the emanet method.

The emin (i.e. the entrusted government official) would not undertake
any responsibility concerning the amount of revenue and contested the
indemnity allocated to. him by the government. They were expected to
protect both the farmer and the land.8 The method of emanet was
preferred to iltizam in the-Ottoman fiscal tradition.

Malikane is the transformation of an iltizam into lifelong possession.

The. main reason behind this change. was the increasing cash
requirements of the, State since the late seventeenth century.

In the malikane system, revenue were sold to private persons on the

basis of part cash and. part annual installments.

The implementation was. first, started in the. agricultural sector which

was destroyed by this tax-farming method. The miltezim (tax-farmer)
instead of investing in the land and taking a long-run view, were
inclined to maximize profits in the very short-term. In addition; under

328
the pressure of financial crisis, the shortening of the iltizam periods
worsened the situation. The tax-farmer did not care to provide the
peasants with seed, draught-animal, and other `inputs' of agriculture.
With the malikane system, the social security element of the classical
timar system was to be re-substituted. In case of success, the reaya
(subjects) and the land would be protected. Agricultural productivity
would increase and thus an additional financial opportunity for
expenditures would be created. With this thinking, the new malikane
system was put into practice, first in the regions of Syria and Southern
Anatolia near to Egypt where life-long tax-farming had been a dominant
form for a ling time. The system was effective as one of the most
important financial and economic institutions of the Ottoman Empire
until the so-called Tanzimat period (1840's).

The revenues extracted in advance form the malikane system did not
reach a modest share of 3 per cent in the total budget revenues.
Moreover, the system was, not efficient in protecting the people working
in it.

The system had spread out to all the activities as well as the
provinces where the State had a tax base. However, it neither revived the
security provided by the timar system nor avoided the inconveniences
inherent in the iltizam. The chief reason for this failure was that the
malikane owners started to run their enterprises on the basis of tax-
farming, doubling the burden of the land and the working people.9

Jizyah is the capital tax the Islamic state imposes on its non-Muslim
subjects. It symbolizes the sovereignty of the Muslims, thus acquiring
the character of an `ideological' tax. It is the price paid by the non-
Muslim subjects for their security guaranteed by the Islamic state.10 The
exceptions to this capital tax are men of religion, children, those under
state service and the disabled. Those under the jizya obligation were
separated into three categories according to their wealth. The J i z y a h of
Egypt, Baghdad and Basra provinces were included in the revenue
surpluses (irsaliye) sent to the central government. Moreover, the lump-
sum jizyah of the provincial states of Eflak, Bogdan, Erdel, Dubrovnik

329
(today partly contained in the lands of Hungary, Romania and Yugoslavia)
were significant. The share of total jizyah in the budget revenues was
around 23-48 per cent and began to show increases after a reform in
1691.11

Avariz are extraordinary taxes, used primarily in the financing of the

wars, and transformed into normal taxes in late seventeenth century. Their
share in total was around 10-20 per cent. People serving military, religious
or financial institutions were exempt from avariz. 12

The avariz taxes, a part of which were collected in kind, considered the
tax-payers as a collectivity and made them responsible for a definite
amount, while muqataa, jizyah and other taxes were imposed upon
producers and single tax-payers. Avariz was imposed upon communities.
The unit was an avariz household. These `special' households consisted
mainly of three to five real households. For the tax-paying unit to pay the
tax, they had to be utilizing a certain dwelling (land) at the place of
taxation. Accordingly, those living in villages and those in the cities were
registered if they were actually in possession of land and a full-time trade,
respectively.13

Avariz taxes also included a list of those exempt who were either
individuals or collective groups. Those under military, religious or
financial services together with the disabled people, were exempted from
avariz taxes individually.14

Total or partial collective exemptions included the villages comprising

the so-called derbend organizations, which provided transport and trade
security throughout the Empire. Employees servicing, protecting and
repairing bridges and water canals as well as functionaries in the mines
and salterns, military couriers, the rice-growing farmers were also
exempted.15 Also, war destruction migration, epidemics, and similar events
were also considered as reasons for total exemption. 16

Major avariz taxes included avariz akcesi and payment for nuzul, sursat
and istira. The first is a fixed tax, the amount of which increased

330
parallel to the devaluation of money through time, collected on the basis
of avariz households (i.e. several real households).

Nuzul was the provision of various foodstuffs (flour, barley etc.) for
the Imperial army when it was on the way to a war. Sursat is an
obligation on the reaya (subjects) to provide for the military certain
foodstuffs and fuels at a price determined by the government. In istira,
we see the same obligation at market prices. All these were transformed
into cash obligation as time passed.

2. Budget Expenditures

The most important expenditure article in the budget was military

outlays, with an approximate share of 50 to 70 per cent of the total. Next
came various equipment costs of the army as well as the court, certain
bureaucratic expenditures, and finally current expenditures.

The Ottoman budget registers the monetary expenditures of the State.

Part of these are accounted without actual in-and-outflows to the
Treasury. The allocation principle, like that of expenditure, ranks among
the fundamentals of the general economic policy of the State. As an
essential aspect of a supply-oriented economy, the allocation policy
aimed at sustained production, realization of effective demand, and, as a
result, maintaining social welfare.

Expenditures of the Central Treasury had, like revenues, expanded.

However, when economic stagnation started in the second half of the
eighteenth century it affected the budgets as well. Especially during the
periods of defeats in wars, expenditure were fueled, whereas revenues,
despite new tax sources and tariff increases, stagnated, leading to crucial
budget deficits."

Public investment expenditures, which consist the major part of any

modern budget, are not contained in the Ottoman budgets. Because, such
investments, together with education, health, and other social service
expenditures were financed not through the Treasury, but

331
through private persons and especially foundations (waqfs) which were
mostly exempt from taxation and other financial responsibilities."

Infrastructural investments are among the tasks of the modern state.

The Ottoman was different. Infrastructure was left, through pious
foundations (awqaf) and tax exemptions, to private persons. Needless to
say, this private sector'.. had a different approach than its modern
counterparts. The functions which the State should perform sensitively
were the provision of justice and unity (`adalah and tawhid). Thus,
instead of being directly engaged in investment and production, the
State hoped to establish an efficient regulation and control mechanism.
In an effort to maintain the unity of the State, while the dominance of
tribal `feudalism' was gradually worn down, the ascendancy of a
possible landed aristocracy and a commercial/industrial bourgeoisie was
also precluded. The. control and supervision of production were carried
out with great care, so that, in addition to reaching the above targets,
individual efforts were channeled to the realization of justice and
welfare.

3. Domestic and Foreign Borrowing

Domestic borrowing was resorted to from the seventeenth century,

especially as a contribution to war financing. The first borrowing were
made into wealth tax (amounting to some 70 per cent of the period's
revenues) and all wealthy people were subject to additional taxation.
These taxes were transformed into regular ones during peacetime.19

During the second had of the eighteenth century (in 1775), with the
implementation of a bond-policy, large muqataa revenues were sold to
the public in an effort to generate fresh resources for the State. This
bond policy , (the esham system) is one of the original examples of
today's revenue partnerships (widely used in post-1980 Turkey). The
first paper money was introduced in 1839, thus the Ottoman economy
began formally to assume a capitalistic character. In this new era,
public expenditures were financed also through the non-Muslim Galata
bankers, the mushrooming moneylenders of Jewish and Greek origin.

332
 The first foreign borrowing was realized in 1854, during the Crimean
war with the Russians. The long resistance of the Ottoman State to
foreign borrowing is well known. They knew that an Islamic economy
was one based on self-financing. However such resistance was
undermined in an era of `Westernization' which had a totally different
concept of economy largely based on the utilization of credits. But, the
irrational use of the credits (mostly for wars or domestic consumption)
forced the Ottoman government into a state of bankruptcy in less than
25 years.20

B. The Timar System

This section is not included in the calculation of the central budgets.

The most crucial production activity was agriculture and the Ottomans
carried that task through the timar system. The essence of timar is the
allocation of the State's share of the agricultural revenue to specified
areas of expenditure, without the interference of the Treasury. These
revenues accrued from the utilization of the lands under state
ownership (rakabe) by farmers. These revenues are allocated to state
officers (sipahis) who are expected to perform certain military roles
during expeditions and national defence. Therefore, there are three
elements in the lands covered by the timar system. The first one is the
state, the possessor of the `abstract' property on land; the second
farmers; and third, the officials (generally the sipahis) who are allocated
the revenue (tax) of the land in return for military services. The State
thereby collects its tax revenue from the peasants or certain
functionaries. It is a flexible, three-element system. Since the state was
the legal possessor of the land, the sale, renting, donation, or
dedication (to a pious foundation, waqf), of the land by the peasant was
considered as illegal. The peasants, having the right to utilize the land,
was the sole possessors of its produce, provided that they paid the rent
(tax) to the officials (sipahis) nominated by the government. The
sipahi-peasant relations were organized by specific laws. They were
equal before the law. The functions of the sipahis were two fold:
militarily, they trained and fed a certain number of soldiers for the
Imperial army; economically, they supervised agricultural production
and helped the peasants with regard to the provision of certain `inputs'.

333
For example, they provided the farmers with seeds, agricultural animals
etc. 'in order to increase production. For all land to be cultivated, they
contributed financially to the farmers. This economic security and
solidarity was the main factor behind high agricultural produce.21

The system was so organized that the sipahis (or timar owners) were
not able to form a landed aristocracy. (This attitude was carried over to
prevent the formation of an industrial aristocracy as well). During the
sixteenth century, the share of timar in overall public finance was
around 35 per cent. However, with the monetarization of the economy
throughout the subsequent centuries, this share sharply declined.22

C. The Foundations (Awqaf )

The discouragement and prohibition of luxury and extravagance in

Islam has limited the prospects for disposable income, thereby directing
such extra income to the enhancement of the social welfare through
foundations. Besides, the revenues appropriated by the producers of the
capitalist system through price differentiation are directed (in the Islamic
system) towards furthering social welfare by way of foundations. Today
the `investments' which are contained in the central budget revenues,
such as religious affairs, education, health, social aid and civil
construction are financed generally by the foundations. Foundations are
of two kinds: tangible (in the form. of buildings or real estate) and
intangible. In both cases, the essential point is the foregoing of
individual property for the benefit of mankind. Thereafter, that property
belongs to Allah (s.w.t.). The main waqf (P. awqaf) is in the form of real
estate, primarily agricultural land and commercial buildings.

The share of waqf revenues in total public revenues was around 12

per cent in the sixteenth century. With the surge in private property, and
iltizams in the succeeding century, there was a considerable enlargement
in number of the foundations as well probably reaching some 25 per cent
in the eighteenth century.23

334
4. FINANCING OF PRIVATE PRODUCTION

There was no contemporary `public-private' sector distinction in the

Ottoman economy. In principle, production was carried by the `private
sector'; the public authority was the controlling agent. The distribution of
food products into specified regions as well as the allocation of raw
materials and semi-finished goods to specified producers were under the
control of the State.

Being an Islamic economy in nature, the Ottoman economy was a

self-financing, not a credit-based economy. The main principle was not
to resort to external financing, and encourage production with available
capital. The capital need is primarily met through partnership in the
enterprise. This point is so prominent that especially in the early
fourteenth century the term `partner' was used for 'merchant'. 24
Nevertheless, the increasing needs for further production necessitated
certain financing sources.

A. Sources of Credit

Since the Islamic Ottoman economy was not a credit-based economy,

it was also familiar with the concept of `saving'. The phenomenon of
credit is a relation of money demand and money supply. This leads to a
potential medium for interest (riba). Thus, the economic decision-
makers were, firstly, not willing to utilize money for purposes other than
being a medium of exchange. Secondly, whereas credit supply was
encouraged, credit demand was not. Moreover, foundations based on
cash money were generally discouraged. But in practice, the last one
was largely implemented.

Though not encouraged, savings were the main credit source. High
army officers (pashas), court officers, foundations and their security
vaults were utilizing the money they had in certain forms. The
merchants were collecting money capital through the mudharabah
system and returning a certain share to the owners of that capital.25

335
 There were persons and foundations who met the credit needs of
bid businesses and the craftsmen. There is detailed information on this
point in the Legal Registers. In this system, we see prominent
international traders as well as able bankers use third parties for
money payments and disbursements on their behalf.26

Credit phenomenon brings the interest phenomenon together. We

know also that money-foundations resort to disguised interest
transactions through hiyal shari'ah. The amounts accumulated through
money foundations (which were established under the authority of
Imam el-Zufer) were used for interest and the revenues were spent for
social purposes.27 Money foundations were so developed that they were
called foundation banks. 28 We also know that certain aid funds
organized for social security purposes were run this way. 29

Usury and unlawful interest rates were forbidden. The payments

made above the official rate were to be deducted from the original
total of the debt.30 Those who practiced usury were either punished
(directly and sometimes violently), or they were forced to provide
certain social services with their acquired wealth (The provision of the
meat requirements for Istanbul was among such services). Despite this,
they could not help avoiding bankruptcy in many cases. 31

Interest in the legal sense should be differentiated from economic

interest. Both in the fiqh and its application in the Ottoman experience,
we have certain cases which are not legally designated as riba, but are
economically so: bai al `inah, bai `al wafa, or bai al Istiglal ... The
Ottomans were always bound up with fatwa and continued the
applications which existed (and legitimated) the former ijtihad. The
common solution to riba was the so-called hiyal shari'ah (legal
avoidance). From the replies to the objections, it is understood that
such applications were mainly in the form of exchange transactions
rather than lending/borrowing relations. Whereas the second type was
forbidden, the first was considered as legitimate, although both
economically fall into the realm of .riba. Therefore, contemporary
Muslim economists must consider these legal and historical precedents.
A possible solution would consider our Islamic economy as one which

336
uses its own capital, rather than credit, as the base for profit-earning
activities.

B. Financing of Industry and Trade

One of the main reasons for maintaining a self-financing

manufacturing system was to prevent cheap pricing through deficient
quality. 32 The judges (qadis) were acting as notaries in commercial sales
with term payments (the so-called `cost-plus financing' in modern
times). The merchant who made the sale or provided financing normally
registered these transactions with the court and received document of
guarantee. For the sales on a credit basis, with different terms of
payment, the `borrower' acknowledged his debt and the related terms,
and. the `creditor' confirmed this. The names of the witnesses were also
included in this document (huccet).33

Since the lending contract that created an additional value is

considered as riba in Islam, the special circulating papers called `suftece'
led to a heated discussion. In Islamic jurisprudence, suftece is selling a
commodity or lending some amount of money to someone on the
condition that the payment will be -made to a third person, and taken
back in another city. This procedure eliminated the difficulties resulting
from money (gold and silver) transfers and provided a benefit for the
lender (or seller). The risk involved in the transfer was undertaken by
the borrower. However, if such a benefit had not been put as a condition
into the contract, the suftece was considered legitimate. This document
was being prepared by the judge (qadi).34 Suftece was also used in the
financial transactions of the State.35

C. Financing of Agriculture

In the classical Ottoman timar system, the small-scale agricultural

enterprise was made dominant; thus, a financing system meeting their
financial requirements was designed. Besides, an irrigation system was
developed in certain lands of the Ottoman State. The farmers who
provided irrigation through their own effort were to pay the main tax
(` ushr) in half, i.e., at 5 per cent. The method that existed in

337
agricultural activities concerning the shares of the labor (tenant) and the
proprietor was called muzaraah and based on the principle of the former
giving a portion of his produce to the latter. 36

The cultivation of certain `industrial' plants such as cotton, sesam,

hemp and hempseed were given high importance and encouraged
through certain tax incentives.37

Since the supply and demand elasticities of the agricultural produce

were quite low, the State prohibited the export of basic food items and
pursued warehousing policies.

The equilibrium provided by the timar system was shaken especially

during the second part of the eighteenth century. The small agricultural
producer was forced into borrowing (on interest) due to unfavorable
weather conditions, famines and animal destruction. In the absence of a
well running timar system, people had to resort to the private lending
market. The salam method, which consisted of selling the produce
before reaping, was utilized in an effort to provide the producer with his
cash requirement. However, whereas Islamically the factors of jahl and
gharar (unknownness and indeterminacy) were avoided, in practice the
buyer would not undertake the seasonal risks. Thus, in case of credit
non-performance, the lands were converted into large firms (chiftlik),
with the previous owners being reduced to the ranks of either landless
workers or share croppers.

As the system deteriorated under the influence of the Western

capitalism the financial needs of the small agricultural producers were
met through National Fund (Emniyet Sandigi) and the modern
Agricultural Bank (in late nineteenth century). Their success being
limited, the small producer became dependent on the
private/commercial credit market.38

D. Financing of Social Security,

In the Ottoman State, state officials as well as certain sections of the

general public formed specific funds to meet emergency needs during

338
old-age, sickness, or disabilities. There were certain state payments for
retirement or body injuries during official work. The professional army
members (Janissaries) had their own social security fund (orta sandigi)
which was operated as a credit mechanism, likewise, the guild members
had their own funds (esnaf sandigi), the urban and rural dwellers had
their avariz sandigi, all being operated on a credit basis. These latter had
the status of foundations (waqf). 39

In short, the social security funds organized under the patronage of

foundations formed a considerable part of the credit supply for the
economy.

CONCLUSION

To sum up, the Ottoman economy was fundamentally a self-financing

economy which discouraged credit demand. Instead, certain partnerships
provided a particular financing method. The credit supply was mainly
formed through foundations. A high credit supply with low demand
discouraged an interest-bound exchange medium. But, together with the
influence of the West and the ensuring Westernization drive, interest
rates began increasing. The Ottoman economy revealed that interest was
a function of credit supply and demand; thereby, the governments kept
the former high and the latter low to avoid an interest economy.

The fundamental characteristics of the classical Ottoman economy

were a high level of supply (production plus importation) and the just
distribution of this supply and the revenue created thereof. The aim was
social welfare. The high supply structure in the classical period (until the
latter part of the eighteenth century) permitted the restricted exports to
exceed imports as well.

This paper intends to understand this structure and attempts to explain

the way it was financed.

339
ENDNOTES
1. Muhimme, 3, pp. 6; 5, pp. 269; 6, pp. 27 and 613; 10,
pp.116; 12,12, pp.599; 73/1143 and 1294.

2. Genc, 1984, pp. 54-56.

3. Tabakoglu, 1986, pp.377-378.

4. Barkan, 1953, pp. 272A.

5. Inalcik, 1959.

6. Sahillioglu, 1963.

7. Rasid,. V, pp. 126-7.

8. Maliyeden Mudevver, 139; 23 11 1110/23 V 1699.

9. For further information see. Tabakoglu, 1985, pp. 120-135
and pp. 165-171.

10. Al-Qur'an, 9/29.

11. See Tabakoglu, 1985, pp. 136-152.

12. Tabakoglu, 1985, pp. 153-164.

13. Muhimme,. 96, s: 64: B 5 1089/VI 1678.

14. Barkan, 1943, pp. 21.

15. Gucer, 1964, -pp. 72-4.

16. Maliyeden Mudevver, 8468: 28 12 1133/20 X 1721.

17. Genc, 1984, pp. 55-6.

340
18. Tabakoglu, 1985, pp: 177-197.
19. Muhimme, 98, pp. 10/27; 119, pp.13; Kepeci, No.1678, 2000,
2015; Zubde, v. 110 a-b; Rasid, I, 496; Silandar, II, 263.

20. Sener, 1990, s. 194-195.

21. A. Vefik, H. 1329, pp. 247-248.

22. Barkan, 1974, pp. 286.

23. Yediyildiz, 1982.

24. Turan, 1980, pp. 372-383.

25. Inalcik, 1972, pp. 319.

26. Sahillioglu, 1975, pp. 137.

27. A. Refik, 1935, pp. 87.

28. Barkan-Ayverdi, 1970.

29. Muhimme, 96, pp.13; O. Nuri, H. 1338, pp. 704-705.

30. Muhimme, 12, pp. 595/1137.

31. Muhimme, 7, pp. 79/162, pp.82-172.

32. Muhimme, 6, pp. 728/1994.

33. Sahillioglu, 1975, pp. 106.

34. Sahillioglu, 1975, pp. 130-133.

35. Kepeci, No.2474, pp. 50.

341
37. Silahdar, Nusretname, pp. 240 a.

38. Guran, 1984.

39. Tabakoglu, 1990.

REFERENCES

I. Documents

A. Unpublished documents of Prime Ministry Archives in Istanbul

1. Classification of Cevdet, Belediye

2. Classification of. Kepeci
3. Classification of Maliyeden Mudevver
4. Classification of Muhimme
B. Unpublished documents of Ser'iyye Registers

C. Published documents

1. Ahmed Refik (1935) Onaltinci Asirda Istanbul Hayati (Life in

Istanbul in sixteenth century a.d.) (1553-1591), Istanbul.

2. Ahmed Refik (19310 Hicri onbirinci asirda Istanbul hayati

(Life in Istanbul in eleventh century h.) (1000-1100), Istanbul.

3. Ahmed Refik (1930) Hicri onikinci asirda Istanbul hayati (Life

in Istanbul in twelfth century h.) (1100-1200), Istanbul.

II. Books and Articles

A. Vefik (H. 1329), Tekalif kavaidi, Istanbul.

342
 Akdag Mustafa (1974) Turkiye'nin ictimai va iktisadi tarihi, 2 Vol.
Istanbul.

Arnakis G.G. "Futuwwa traditions in the Ottoman Empire" Journal of

Near Easter
Studies, XII, (Oct. 1953)

Barkan Omer L. (1953) "H. 933-934 (M. 1527-1528) mali yilina ait
butce ornegi" Iktisat Fakultesi Mecmuasi, Vol. 15, pp. 259-329.

- (1974) "Timar", Islam Ansiklopedisi, XII/I, Istanbul.

Barkan Omer L. Ayverdi E.H. (1970) Istanbul vakiflari tahrir defteri

(H. 953/M. 1546), Istanbul

Defterdar Mehmed Pasa, Zubde-i vekayiat, Suleymaniye Ktp., Es'ad

Kit. No.2382.

Ergin Osman Nuri (1338/1922) Mecelle-i Umur-i belediye, Istanbul.

Genc Mehmed (1984) "XVIII. yuzyilda Osmanli ekonomisi va savas"

Yapit, No.49, Ankara

Guran Tevfik (1984) ".Osmanli imparatorlugunda zirai kredi

politikasinin gelismesi, 1940-1910" Edirne.

Gucer Lutfi (1964) Osmanli Imparatorlugunda Hububat Meselesi,

Istanbul.

Inalcik Halil (1959) "Islam arazi va vergi sisteminin tesekkulu",

Islami Ilimler Enstitisu Dergisi, No. 1, Istanbul.

- (1970) "The Ottoman Economic Mind" in Cook, M.A. (ed.) Studies in

the Economic History of the Middle East, Oxford: University Press.

343
- (1978) The Ottoman Empire: The classical age 1300-1600, trans.
Norman-itzkowitz-Colin Imber, London.

- (1978) The Ottoman Empire: Conquest, organisation; and economy,

London, Variorum Reprints.
Rasid e Tarih, 5 Vol. Istanbul (1282/1865-6).

Sahillioglu Halil (1963) "Bir multezim zimem defterine gore Osmanli

darphane mukataalari", Istanbul Universitesi Iktisat Fakultesi
Mecmuasi, XXIII, Istanbul.

- (1975) "Burda kadi sicillerinde ic va dis odemeler araci olarak

`Kitabu'l-kadi' va `Suftece'ler", Turk Iktisat Tarihi Semineri Ankara.

Silahdar, Findikli Mehmed Aga, Nusretname, Beyazid Devlet Ktp.

Veliyyuddin Kit, No.2369.

- Tarih, 2. Vol. Istanbul, 1928..

Tabakoglu Ahmed (1985) Gerileme donemine girerken Osmanli maliyesi,

Istanbul.

- (1986) Turk Iktisat Tarihi, Istanbul.

- (1990) Turkiye'de sosyal guvenlik tarihine bir yaklasim denemesi,

Istanbul.

Turan Osman (1980) Selcuklular tarihi va Turk-Islam mederniyety

Istanbul.

Yediyildiz Beheading (1982) "Turk vakif kurucularinin sosyal

tabakalasmadi yeri 1700-1800" Osmanli Arastirmalari II, Istanbul.

344
 14
PUBLIC BORROWING IN EARLY ISLAMIC HISTORY:
A REVIEW OF SOME RECORDS

M. NEJATULLAH SIDDIQI*

INTRODUCTION

Public borrowing has assumed great importance in recent years as

indicated by the phenomenal rise in the volume of domestic as well as
external debt. This is especially true of the Muslim countries most of
which belong to the group of poor developing countries of the world.
There is a growing literature on the `solution' to the crisis supposedly
faced by the world financial system because of these debts, some of
which is now considered to be unrepayable. There have been attempts to
look at the causes of this phenomenon of permanent indebtedness of
nations. Islamic economists have also discussed the implications of
abolition of interest for public borrowing. They have tried to find
alternative ways of financing public needs hitherto financed by
borrowing.

It is in this context that scholars have felt the need to look back and
see what lessons can be learnt from the Islamic heritage. Did the Islamic
state in the. past borrow? If so, why and how i.e. on what terms? Were
there any alternatives to borrowing? With these and related questions
one can explore the historical records of the many governments,
spanning vast regions of the globe, over the long period of fourteen
hundred years. This is, however, a very ambitious project requiring
extended teamwork. Yet another problem with such study is the Islamic
authenticity of what the Muslim rulers have been doing all these
centuries in all these -regions. Authenticity naturally belongs to the
decisions and 'actions of the. Prophet. The consensus of the community
has extended -this authenticity to the period of the four pious Caliphs
also, i.e. to the policies of the Islamic state till the year

* Professor, Centre for Research in Islamic Economics, .King Abdulaziz University,

Jeddah, K.S.A.

345
40 after hijrah which can serves as examples of Islamic policy making
and, taking into consideration other relevant factors such as need, scope
and perceived function of borrowing etc., guide Islamic statecraft in the
modern period. As regards the other Muslims rulers, their decisions and
policies have to be judged on the criteria of Qur'an and Sunnah. In the
context of public borrowing, the most important criterion on which the
legitimacy of public borrowing by Muslim rulers has to be judged is
prohibition of interest. This means that if an incidence of borrowing on
the basis of interest by a Muslim ruler is reported it has to be regarded as
an aberration rather than a -precedent, generally speaking. This does not
mean, however, that recording and analyzing such cases is of no use to
Islamic economists. There is a possibility that such a course of action was
resorted to under `extreme necessity' (idtirar). In that case it becomes
possible to condone the action despite the fact that it can not be a
precedent for others, being a violation of shari'ah. While a judgement in
such cases may be beyond the scope of an Islamic economist's vocation, it
is his job to study these cases and analyze the causes and consequences as
befits an economic historian. In fact, such a study on his part not only
facilitates proper `judgement' on such matters, it is a necessary
precondition to it.

Another important dimension of the matter is the linkage of a

particular policy decision with the realization of the goals of shari'ah. Did
public borrowing serve a well recognized goal of shari'ah, is an obvious
criterion on which its propriety or otherwise should be judged?

This study covers only the periods of the Prophet, the four pious
Caliphs, the Umayyads and that of the Abbasids till the year 333
A.H./944 A.D. after which real power passed, in succession, to the
Buwaihids and the Seljuks, and this continued till the sack of Baghdad by
Holaku in 656/1258 which put and end to the Abbasid Caliphate at
Baghdad.

Our. primary task has been to record the reported cases . of borrowing
by the ruler for public purposes. Then we look into such details as the
need and circumstances which prompted borrowing, the

346
amount borrowed (in cash or kind) the identity of the lender and the
terms and conditions attached, if any. We also inquire whether the
lending was voluntary or the ruler had to coerce the lender. If available
we also look at the details of the repayment of the loan. Having noted
these features we try to analyze these cases in relation to their causes
and consequences. Finally we ponder over the lessons that can be drawn,
if any.

A serious handicap faced by the writer has been the absence of any
other study on the subject which could help in posing the questions or
looking for the answers. This should be regarded as one of the reasons,
should the discerning reader find the present study deficient in some
ways.

2. PUBLIC BORROWING BY THE PROPHET

The Prophet, peace be upon him, was known to be a frequent

borrower in his private capacity at least in the difficult early years in
Madinah, but reports relating to these borrowings do not concern us in
this study. We have noted only those cases where the Prophet borrowed
as the leader of all Muslims and the head of the state he established at
Madinah. It is not at all difficult to distinguish between the - Prophet's
personal borrowing and his borrowing for public purposes since the texts
themselves facilitate such a distinction.

Our search has so far lead us to six cases of public borrowing by the
Prophet which are reported below. A possible seventh case will also be
noted in the end.

1. We first present a report by a life-long companion of the Prophet

Bilal, who spent his time mostly near him from the early Meccan period
till the Prophet breathed his last in Madinah. This report tells us that the
Prophet used to borrow frequently in order to help needy Muslims
whenever the circumstances called for doing so. Though these borrowings
would be for comparatively small amounts, in cash or kind, the borrowing
was done even when no means of repayment were in sight.

347
 "
It is reported of Zaid that he heard Abu Salman saying that
Abdullah al Hawzani told him `I met Bilal, who used to give the call for
prayers for the Messenger of Allah, peace be unto him, at Halab. I
asked him to narrate about the expenditures of the Messenger of Allah,
peace be unto him. He said `He did not have any thing (to spend).1 I
used to look after it on his behalf ever since Allah called him to
prophethood till his death. It was his practice that when a man came to
him as a Muslim and he saw him in need of clothes he would order me
and I would go and borrow and buy a cloak for him, clothe him and
feed him. This continued till a person from amongst the polytheists
accosted me and said: `O Bilal, I have enough resources so you do not
borrow from any one other than me ' . I did accordingly. One day it so
happened that, as I made ablution and rose to give the call for prayer,
that polytheist came along accompanied by a group of traders. When
he saw me he called, O Abyssinian! I said, yes. He presented a grim
face to me and addressed me harshly, saying: `Do you know how many
days are left between you and the (end of the) month (when repayment
is due)?' Bilal says, `I told him it is near'. He said, `it is only four days
between you and it, after which I will capture you against what you
owe and return you to grazing sheep as you used to do before ' . I felt
what people feel (on hearing such a threat). When I had prayed the night
prayer (i.e. isha) and the Prophet, peace be unto him, retired to his
family, I sought permission to see him. He admitted me in. I said "O
Messenger of Allah, you are more dear to me than my father and
mother, the polytheist from whom I used to borrow has said this and
that and you do not have the means to repay him, nor do have I. He is
going to humiliate me. Please permit me to abscond to one of these
tribes (outside Medina) who have accepted Islam till such time as
Allah provides to His Messenger, from out of which provision he can
pay back the loan'. I came out (of the Prophet' s place) till I reached my
home and put in readiness my sword, socks, shoes and shield at the
head of my bed. When the first lights of dawn appeared on the horizon
I got ready to go. Suddenly I heard a man calling. O Bilal! you are to
report (immediately) to the Messenger of Allah, peace be unto him. I set
off till I came to him. What I saw there were four camels resting with
their loads. I sought permission to see (the Prophet). The Messenger of
Allah, peace be unto him, told me `cheer

348
up, Allah has sent what you can pay back your loan with! Then he
asked `Did you not notice the four camels in rest?' I said, `I did'. He
said, You have the camels as well as their loads. They are laden with
clothes and food which have been presented to me by the chieftain of
fidak. Take possession of them and pay off your debt'. "I did
accordingly .... "2

This incident must belong to the sixth year after the hijrah, or the
period after that, since Fidak was subdued during that period.

The one important point emerging from this report is the primacy
attached to need fulfillment. It was regarded by the Prophet to be a
purpose important enough to borrow even from non-Muslims and
without any definite means of repayment in sight.

2. The second report is not explicit as to the purpose of borrowing but

there are clear indications of the loan being repaid out of the public
treasury. This presumes borrowing for some public purpose. As the
details in the Arabic text reveal, the report reproduced below is part of
the story of a Jewish person in Medina embracing Islam. This person to
whom the Prophet owed (a quantity of dates, most probably) wanted to
test the Prophet for the quality of self control and forbearance. Hence
his peculiar behavior:

"...Zaid bin Si'na said: `When the due date of the loan was only two
or three days away the Prophet came to attend the funeral procession
of a man from the Ansar, accompanied by Abu Bakr, Umar, Usman
and some other Companions. When, after saying the funeral prayers,
he came near a wall to sit by it I came to him and gave him a very
hard look. I took hold of his shirt and the outer robe and said, "Pay up
to me, O Muhammad! By God what I know about default on part of
you children of Abd al Muttalib is based on my direct contacts with you
people!" Then I looked towards Umar whose eyes were moving in his
face like the rotation of the heavenly bodies. He looked towards me
and said, "O jew!, you do this to the Messenger of Allah? By him Who
sent him down with truth I would have struck your head with my sword
but for what I fear to miss'. (Zaid) said, `the Messenger of Allah, peace

349
be unto him, was calmly looking at Umar and smiling. Then he said,
`Myself and he are in need of something -else (from you), that you
advise me to pay back gracefully and advise him to ask for repayment
politely. O Umar go and pay back what is due to him and give additional
twenty sa' of dates against your threat to him'. Then (Zaid, son of Si'na)
narrated how he embraced Islam."3

3. We now report a case in which the borrowing by the Prophet may

have been for private purposes. However, there is some likelihood of the
debt having been incurred to meet some public need.

"Abu Said al Khudari reports that a bedouin came to the Prophet,

peace be unto him, asking for repayment of a debt owed by him. He
behaved rudely and said I will continue insisting till you pay up.
Thereupon the Companions scolded him and said "woe upon. you, do
you know whom you are addressing". He said, "I am only claiming my
rights." The Prophet said: "why did not you side with him who had the
rightful claim?" Then he sent a message to Khawla, daughter of Qais,
that if she had some dates she should lend it to him till his own dates
arrived out of which he could pay back to her. She responded by saying
`yes, you are dearer to me than my father, O Messenger of Allah!" (The
narrator says) so she lent to him and he paid up to the bedouin and
presented some food to him. Thereupon he said: `you have fulfilled your
obligation, may Allah repay you well.' The Prophet then said, `these are
the best of the people. A community in which the weak cannot get their
due right without trouble will not be regarded as pure. "4

The phrase `till our dates arrive' most probably refers to the annual
share from Khaibar out of which a fifth was earmarked for family of the
Prophet and rest for other beneficiaries. These shares would naturally be
channelled through the public treasury. That the dates lent by Khawla
were to be repaid out of the dates coming from Khaibar leaves both
possibilities open: It could be paid out of the fifth assigned to the
Prophet's family in which case the loan would have been a private loan.
Equally possible, it could have been paid out of the part earmarked for
other beneficiaries in which case the original debt must

350
have been incurred in order to meet the urgent needs of the same
beneficiaries.

A significant point to be noted in the above report is the practice of

obtaining a loan in order to pay back an earlier one.

As distinguished from the first two cases, in this case the lender
was a Muslim. The second lender whose lending made possible the
repayment to the first lender was also a Muslim.

4. The fourth case is a case of borrowing in kind, the object being a

camel of a particular age. Repayment was made of the camel
collected in zakat. This rules out the possibility of the loan being in
the Prophet's name since he was barred from zakat.

`Abu Rafi' reports that the Prophet, peace be unto him, borrowed
a small camel from a man. Then some camels from those collected as
zakat were given to him and he asked Abu Rafi' to pay back the man
the camel (owed to him). Abu Rafi' came back and said he could find
only better camels (older in age) who had their fourteenth grown. He
(the Prophet) said, `give it to him. The best among people are those
who are good at paying back."

As noted by Ibn-a-Hajar al Asqalani6 while commenting upon a

version of the same hadith in Bukhari's Sahih, this debt was most
probably incurred for helping somebody meet his basic needs.

The main point that emerges from this case is the propriety of'
borrowing for public purposes when there is a definite source of
revenue in sight. The Prophet borrowed for need fulfillment intending
to repay from zakat to be realized in the future.

5. In the fifth case to be reported, the purpose of borrowing is to

meet the requirements of jihad - war in the cause of Allah. This
occurred on the eve of the battle of Hunain in the eighth year after
hijrah.

351
 "When the Messenger of Allah, peace be unto him, decided to march
up on Hawazin to meet them (in battle) he was informed that Safwan
bin Ummayya had coats of arms and other weapons. He sent for him -
still a polytheist - and said to him, "O Abu Ummayya lend us your
weapons so that we can face our enemy tomorrow with their help."
Safwan asked, `O Muhammad do you want to confiscate them?" He
said, `No I want them temporarily with their return guaranteed till we
bring them to you.' He said, -there is no harm in (doing) this. So he
gave him one hundred coats of arms with the accompanying weapons.
They also claim that the Messenger of Allah requested him to transport
them too, which he did.'

6. The sixth case is that of borrowing a substantial sum of money from

a Muslim individual for financing a major battle.

"Ismail, son of Ibrahim', son of Abdullah, son of Abu Rabi'ah al

Makhzumi has-reported to us from his father who reported about his
grandfather that when the Prophet was to attach Hunayn he borrowed
thirty or forty thousand from him. He repaid it when he came back.
Then the Prophet, peace be unto him, told him: `May Allah bless you
with prosperity in your family and your property. The proper
recompense for lending is repayment and gratitude.8

In the version of this tradition recorded by Nasa'i 9 the amount of the

loan is' a definite forty thousand. The same is true of Ahmad bin
Hanbal in his Musnad. 10 As regards the source of payment both these
versions mention money that accrued to the Prophet subsequently,

The battle of Hunayn took place in the eighth year after "hijrah
immediately after the conquest of Mecca. These were comparatively
better days for state finances, The accrual of money referred to in the
tradition could have been from the spoils of war consequent to the
victory at Hunayn:

The above is a. clear case of borrowing for defense purposes. It is

also evident that the sum paid back equaled the sum borrowed and no
extra payments were involved.

352
7. The last case is that of Abbas, the Prophet's uncle, paying a year's
zakat in advance, along with that of the current year. Since this was
presumably done at the request of the Prophet," it has been construed as
a kind of borrowing. The Prophet significantly used the word aslafa for
the act, a word normally used for lending.

Ibn-e-Abbas is reported to have said that the Messenger of Allah,

peace be unto him, sent Umar as collector of zakat: He (Ibn-e-Abbas)
says, Abbas was rude to him so he came to the Prophet, peace be unto
him, and informed him. He (Ibn-e-Abbas) says, then the Messenger of
Allah, peace be unto him, told him `Abbas has advanced to us this year's
zakat of his wealth as well as that of the coming year. 12

The summary, the following can be noted.

The Prophet borrowed both in cash and kind, in small amounts as well
as large, from Muslims as well as non-Muslims, from men as well as
women. The purpose of borrowing was need fulfillment or defense/jihad.
But he also borrowed to pay off more urgent debts. No coercion was
involved in his borrowing. Nor did it stipulate repaying more than what
was received as a loan. He borrowed when he did not possess, in cash or
kind, what could meet the purpose in view. He borrowed in anticipation
of future income from. which repayment could be made, but he also
borrowed when no definite future income was in sight. He always repaid
the debts he incurred.

To put the above in proper perspective it should be noted that the

usual sources of revenue from meeting public expenditure during
Prophet's time were the following : . 11

a. Zakat (including ushr) which gradually grew in volume after the

second year after hijrah when it was introduced.

b. Fai, including the product share from Khaibar which was a steady
source of revenue.

c. Spoils of war out of which a share accrued to the public treasury.

353
 d.. Voluntary donations, often in response to appeal from the
Prophet.

The first three sources brought nothing during the first year of the
Prophet in Medina, hence exclusive reliance must have been placed on
the last. In the light of available reports, revenue from all these sources
was meager till year seven when Khaibar was subdued. Some cases of
small borrowing for need fulfillment seem to belong to this period. But,
as we have noted above, the two cases of big borrowing (case 5 and 6)
belong to the post-Khaibar period and relate to defense purposes.

. These records of the Prophet's borrowing for public purposes do not

mention any attempt by him to appeal for donations before resorting to
borrowing, though the absence of a report to this effect does not
eliminate the possibility.

3. PUBLIC BORROWING IN THE PERIOD AFTER PROPHET

We could not find a single instance of public borrowing during the

reign of the Rashidun Caliphs, i.e. years 11-40 A.H. This is not
surprising as revenues from zakat including ushr, fai including kharaj, as
well as spoils of war were steadily rising throughout this period. These
revenues would have been sufficient to meet all public expenditure
including need fulfillment and jihad/defense.

The same applies to the next hundred years of Umayyad rule (41-
132 A.H./661-749). We could not find any instance of state borrowing at
the level of the central administration. However, there is a report from
one of the provinces where an army commander borrows from traders
to buy provisions for a twelve thousand strong army. 13 He pays them
back after some weeks."

The incident belongs, probably, to the year 65 A.H./684 A.D. The

commander concerned is a tabi'i (i.e. one who has met a companion of
the Prophet, peace be unto him) Muhallab bin Abu Sufra, who died in
the year 83 A.H. He was asked by the governorate of Basra 15 to take

354
care of the Khariji rebellion which dominated Persia and threatened parts
of Iraq.

"They took stock of the public treasury and discovered that it had only
two hundred thousand dirhams. This was insufficient. Muhallab then sent
for the traders and told them: For a whole year your business is
depressed because the supplies from Ahwaz and Persia have been cut off
from you. Let us have some transactions. Then you come with me and I
will, God willing, fulfill all my obligations toward you. They sold to him
and he took whatever he needed to equip his army and to
provide for it ...."16

This is a case of purchase on credit on a very large scale. Even though

no extra returns are involved the traders have a big stake in the whole
thing as the success of Muhallab's mission would eventually restore their
supplies from Persia. It is not difficult to imagine that such `borrowing' or
purchase on credit would be repeated elsewhere too, though not
necessarily at the central government level. The report underlines an
important point not any less relevant of our age than it was in the seventh
century: Sometimes it is possible to meet a deficit by purchasing what
you need on credit.

The first century of Abbasid rule, from 1232 A.H. to 232 A.H. was
blessed by firm central administration and robust finances. Then started
the period of weak rulers, domination of Turkish army chiefs and gross
financial mismanagement. The Caliphs ruled only nominally as power
was, in fact, exercised by the army commanders while the finances were
managed by wazirs. The chief interest of the Caliph lay in the huge sums
of money flowing into his private treasury (Bait mal al Khass) thanks to
the appropriation of lands over the past and the customary gifts presented
to the Caliph, especially by the aspirants to public offices. It was not
unusual, in this period, for the public treasury to be empty while the
royalty rolled in money. The army did not get paid in time. Unusual
delays in the payment of salaries led the infantry to protests which
sometimes culminated in riots in the capital city, Baghdad.

355
 The first reports of public borrowing in our sources appear during
the reign of the eighteenth Abassid Caliph Muqtadir who ruled from
295 A.H. to 320 A.H (908 A.D. to 932 A.D.) Muqtadir ascended the
throne at the young age of thirteen. Real power was wielded by his
mother and the Wazirs who were changed very frequently. As we shall
see below the urgent need to pay the army while the state coffers were
empty was behind most of the public borrowing that occurred.

The nine reports relating to public borrowing given below all belong
to the period 300 A.H. to 333 A.H. This period was ruled by four
Abbasid Caliphs, Muqtadir (295-320 A.H.), Qahir (320-322 A.H.), Radi
(322-329 A.H.) and Muttaqi (322-333 A.H.). We could not cover the
later periods for many reasons, not the least important among them is
the fact that by then the world of Islam was divided into a dozen units
having separate rulers and independent finances. Any study covering
only the nominal Abbasid caliphate with its seat at Baghdad could no
longer be credible.

It also deserves mention that we have relied on sources almost

contemporary to the events being reported, e.g. Suli (d. 335 A.H.),.
Tanukhi (d. 384 A.H.), Miskwaih (d. 421 A.H.) and Sabi (d. 448 A.H.).
One of the greatest of the early historians of Islam, Tabari (d. 310 A.H.)
does not report any case of public borrowing. Later historians draw
upon these and other early sources.

4. PUBLIC BORROWING IN EARLY FOURTH CENTURY A.H.

1. "Ali bin `Isa 17 used to borrow from traders when some payments
came due and he had no other means to make it. He borrowed on the
basis of letters of credit (safatij) coming from the provinces but not yet
due for payment. (He borrowed) ten thousand dinars against payment
of -a profit of one and a half daniq 18 of silver for each dinar. Every
month he owed two thousand and five hundred dirhams as profit. 19
This practice continued with Yousuf bin Finhas and Harun bin Imran,
or their deputies, for sixteen years, and till after their death. They were
not turned away till their death. They had gained this position (of state
bankers) during the wazirate of Obaidullah bin Yahya bin Khaqan.20

356
 The ruler did not consider it wise to turn them away so that the
jahbazah retained its credibility among the traders and the traders
would lend the jahbadh in time of need. If the bankers were to be
turned away and others21 were given that position and the traders
refused to deal with these, the affairs of the Caliphs would collapse." 22

2. Tanukhis' above statement follows his narration of an incident

which culminates in the wazir, Ali bin `Isa making a special
arrangement with the two bankers named above'. He is reported to
have told them:

'Every lunar months I need a sum of money to be paid to the

infantry troops within the first six days of the month. This amounts to
thirty thousand dinars which sometimes is not available to me on the
first day of the month, even on the second. I want you two to lend me
one hundred and fifty thousand dirhams which you can recover within
the month out of the revenues from Ahwaz, 23 because the
administration of Ahwaz revenue is already in your charge ...... 24

Significantly, no `profits ' are promised in this case, nor is there any
mention of letters of credit. The author has quoted his source in giving
this report whereas the statement quoted earlier is given on his own
authority. It is also to be noted that the two bankers named above were
Jewish not Muslims. 25

3. The two Jewish bankers were given official positions by Muqtadir's

second wazir, Abul Hasan Ali bin Muhammad bin al Furat 26 whose first
round in this office lasted from 196 to 299 A.H. 27 Sabi reports one
Abdullah Muhammed bin Ismail al Anbari al Zanji telling him about
this wazir that:

"He called Yusuf bin Finhas the Jewish jahbadh, who was the
jahbadh of Ahwaz, and told him, `This situation has arisen and our
colleagues had not made the necessary preparations to deal with it. I
have assigned their emoluments to (the revenue from) Ahwaz. Now it is
very necessary that. you pay them in advance for two months. He
(Yusuf bin Finhas) mentioned the large sums already assigned for
advance payment on Ahwaz account and that it was not possible for

357
him to take on any more demands. He (the wazir) continued to argue
with him till he agreed to release one month's pay that very day .... "28

4. Another instance of interest bearing loan is cited by Miskwaih. It

relates to the wazir Kaluzani who held office briefly in the year 319
A.H.
"
Ibn Qarabah used to indicate to Muqtadir and Mifleh al Aswad that
it was he who helped the affairs of the wazirate being performed and
that no wazir could do without him. He used to make himself
continuously available at Kaluzani's place and to lend him, one behalf
of bani al Baridi and others, at the profit of one dirham per dinar. He
lent him two hundred thousand dinars which helped the management
of Kaluzani's affairs ....." 29

5. The same person, Ibn Qarabah, is reported to be lending to Husain

bin al Qasim, who succeeded Kaluzani as wazir in 319 A.H. `At the rate
of one dirham per dinar as was his practice. ' 31

6. Facing a very tight financial situation, Husain is also reported to

have sold some public property to raise five hundred thousand dinars
and to have realized in advance half the money due in the year 320
A.H., some months before the beginning of that year.31

7. After a couple of years, in 323 A.H. during the reign of Caliph

Radi, we find another wazir, Abu Ali bin Muqlah, `borrowing' from
traders who used to supply flour against what was due from Mosul. He
raised four hundred thousand dinars in this manner. 32 Significantly, no
`profit' is involved in this `borrowing ' . However, it becomes clear after
a few pages that the `borrowing' actually amounted to advance
payment for grains to be collected from the region as taxes and
delivered to traders.33

8. We have yet another report about the same year, 323 A.H. This
time the wazir tried to borrow from traders in order to pay the troops,
offering traders letters of credit (safatij), the traders disappeared and
the effort did not succeed.34

358
9. Another report by the same author, Suli, relates to the year 331 A.H.
The then Amir al-Umara, Nasir al Dawlah, upon learning that the money
changers were dealing in interest openly, warned them against doing so
and obtained their pledges to that effect. According to Suli, however,
this helped restrain- them only a little.35

This last one is not a report of public borrowing. We have noted it

only to underline the fact that despite the practice of interest-based
lending in the market, the authorities remain committed to its
elimination till the close of the period we have studied in this paper.

It is difficult to deny, however, that interest was involved in some

cases of public borrowing also. This reflects the gross mismanagement of
the financial affairs of an otherwise prosperous regime as well as the
compulsions of circumstances created by the maintenance of a large
force of mercenaries in the capital city of Baghdad. The most surprising
case of borrowing on interest relates to the wazir Ali bin `Isa `probably
the first to obtain a loan by paying interest.'36 Ali bin `Isa is reputed to
have been a pious Muslim, well versed in shari'ah sciences and
possessing extraordinary managerial skills.37 The only direct report of
this wazir borrowing from bankers is found in Tanukhi and that too does
not mention interest (case 2 above). But the same author reports Ali bin
`Isa borrowing regularly with interest on the basis of letters of credit,
without quoting any specific source. Even if we are to accept this
sweeping generalization, not corroborated by other historians, the
question remains: Did he, under compulsion of circumstances,
deliberately violate the prohibition of interest; or, did he look differently
at using letters of credit the way he did according to the second report
quoted above?

On the basis of the scanty material we could obtain, we can

distinguish between four types of public borrowing in early fourth
century after hijrah.

A. Advance payments realized in a salam type transaction, i.e. cash

obtained against food grains to be delivered in future (case 7).

359
B. Discounting letters of credit or bills of exchange, i.e. obtaining
cash by surrendering the right to receive a larger amount of cash
later. (Cases 1 and 8).

C. Cash obtained by promising to pay later with an addition of a

percentage on the sum borrowed (Cases 4 and 5).

D. Cash obtained by allowing the l e n d e r t o recover the sum

borrowed from revenue due in the near future (Cases 2 and 3).

As regards case 8 noted above, it is not clear from the report if it

belongs to category 2 or category 4.

In all the cases reported above it is not the Caliph who borrowed, but
the wazir, who actually ran the administration. Most of the borrowing is
done in cash to pay the army on time, but sometimes it is done to make
some other payments. Public borrowing in this period was largely in the
nature of bridge-financing, to be repaid from sure sources of revenue in
the near future. Loans are repaid out of the kharaj revenue (or land
taxes). The lenders are Jewish bankers as well as Muslim traders. The
amounts involved are large, but not out of proportion with the state
revenues in those times. .

One significant point to note is the absence of any reference to need

fulfillment as the purpose of public borrowing.

As regards the use of coercion in borrowing we have no. clear

evidence, even though the sources abound in reports of confiscation of
the properties of high officials once they fell from favor and of all sorts
of extortions from traders.

It is very difficult to opine whether there were any alternatives to

public borrowing in so far as it was resorted to. Apparently all other
means were exhausted before doing so. Ali bin `Isa especially reported to
have curtailed public expenditure to a very great extent, side by side with
abolishing many extra-shariah laxes.38

360
 What circumstances forced a pious man and efficient financial
manager, who curtailed public expenditure in an otherwise wasteful
affluent society, to borrow an interest, and how could he justify it to his
own conscience, remains an enigma - at least till further details are
available. This deviation from clearly defined shari'ah rules seems,
however, to be a culmination of many other deviations in the financial
management of the state, the details of which fill the pages of history
books.

5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The records of public borrowing examined in this brief study present

an interesting contrast. On the one hand we have the most responsible
of rulers borrowing for need fulfillment and jihad/defence even when
no future revenue was immediately in sight. On the other hand, we
have irresponsible regimes in an age of affluence forced to borrow for
bridging-finance, even if they had to violate the prohibition on interest.
The strongly worded indictment of public borrowing by jurists like
Imam al Haramain al Juwaini39 (419-478 A.H.) is largely in response to
the sorry state of affairs that the Abbasids had reached in the, fourth
century A.H. Given fiscal responsibility and adherence to the maqasid
al shari'ah a different view is more convincing. Much further research
is needed to trace the history of public borrowing in the thousand years
that separate us from. the period studied in this paper. Any guidelines
for contemporary policy making will be better drawn after such
research, even though the decisive factors should be the contemporary
situation and the example of the Prophet and his companions.

Meanwhile we can draw some lessons of contemporary relevance

from this study:

1. Borrowing, when there is a need, is a legitimate activity even if it

is from non-Muslims.

2. Fulfilling needs is one genuine reason justifying borrowing, while

jihad is another.

361
3. While early history does not present any record of borrowing for
financing economic development, it does provide an indirect
justification of the same in an age in which economic development
(especially of the third world countries) has become a sine qua non
for need fulfillment as well as for defence/jihad.

4. Since the lender receives no worldly return, public borrowing

presumes the lender being motivated by moral and religious
consideration. Projects directly related to jihad, those directed at
feeding, clothing and housing the poor and providing medical care to
those who can not buy the same, as well as educational and moral-
spiritual orientation programs, are most likely to motivate people to
give qard hasan. The social authority should, therefore, make public
borrowing purpose specific and select purposes most likely to
motivate lenders, in order to succeed in mobilizing interest free loans
to the government..

5. The state must repay what it borrows even if doing so. necessitates
further borrowing.
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7. al Bukhari, al Jami' al Sahih.

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9. al Duri, Abd al Aziz, Tarikh al Iraq al Iqtisadi fi'l Qarn al Rabi' al

Hijri, Beirut, Dar al Mashriq, 1974.

10. Fischel, Walter, J. Jews in the Economic and Political Life of

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JRAS, 1933, pp. 339-52.

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363
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Islamiyah, Beirut, Dar al Qalam, 1986.

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365
 15
PROVISION OF PUBLIC GOODS : ROLE
OF THE VOLUNTARY SECTOR (WAQF) IN
ISLAMIC HISTORY

ABDUL AZIM ISLAHI*

INTRODUCTION

The present paper aims to study the nature and extent of public goods
provided by the voluntary institution of waqf in Islamic history. It also
tries to present the voluntary sector in general and waqf in particular as
an alternative sector that has the potentiality to resolve, to a great extent
at least in an Islamic system, the issue of an efficient supply of public
services. Thus we propose to explore the possibility of utilizing this
institution in developmental activities with respect to pure public good
and mixed or quasi-public activities in contemporary Muslim economies.
To begin with we shall briefly point out the controversy associated with
the supply and allocation of public services. We shall also discuss the
nature of the voluntary sector and different constituents of this sector
especially the development, scope and dimensions of awqaf (plural of
waqf) as the important ingredient of the voluntary sector. After
discussing some evidence from Islamic history, the organization as well
as the composition of services provided by this institution will be
discussed. Making an analytical study of the whole we shall examine the
role of the state in the supervision and regulation of awqaf in Islamic
history and a desirable role for it in the present context. To conclude we
hope to establish, in the light of our discussion, some suggestions that a
modern state may adopt to make the best institution for the provision of
public welfare and to reactivate and revitalize this gradually diminishing
source of general good.

* Department of Economics, Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh, India

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PUBLIC GOODS AND THE QUESTION OF THEIR EFFICIENT
SUPPLY

Socially desirable goods that provide benefits which are not

marketable to individual purchasers are referred to as public goods.
Such goods must automatically be provided to more than one member of
the society simultaneously if it is to be offered to any one of them.
Private firms do not find it profitable to produce them due to their nature
of externality and non-rivalry. Thus public goods may be defined as ones
"that everybody can enjoy without diminishing the enjoyment of others,
and from which it is impossible to exclude people from participating".'
These are pure public goods. Defence, lighthouses, weather forecasting
and improvement of the quality of atmosphere are a few good examples
of "pure public good". Because of the impossibility of excluding anyone
from enjoying benefits once the good has been provided, this involves
the problem which is termed the "free rider effect." That is, every
individual being sure that the benefit of public goods has to cover him,
is not willing to contribute towards the cost of its supply.2 However,
there are some other benefits which fit the first half of the definition of
public good. That is, anyone can enjoy them without diminishing
anyone's else enjoyment but it is possible to exclude someone from
enjoying it. For example provision of health services, education, bridges
and roads, stage performance, etc. These benefits lie in the intermediate
range of a spectrum between wholly private and purely public. They
may be called quasi-public goods or mixed goods. In our discussion of
public goods we mean both pure public goods and non-pure public
goods yielding external benefits. Since public goods are used by all but
their enjoyment cannot be made subject to price payment, they cannot be
satisfied through the market mechanism. Therefore, their provision is
considered as the subject of public budget policy. The traditional stand
on public goods mentioned above is not a universally accepted view.
Ronald Coarse of the University of Virginia in one of his learned papers
"The Problem of Social Cost"3 argues that as a rule, no form of
government action is required to deal with externalities or public goods,
so long as property rights already exist. He showed that "though the
initial. allocation of property right affects the distribution of income, the
allocation makes

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no difference at all to the amount of resources directed to control an
externality. Economic forces ensure that the same effective allocation
will happen in all cases".4 This idea known as the Coarse Theorem, sets
out to demolish traditional thinking on public goods and externalities
and it has converted many more economists to the liberal, anti-
interventionist wing of their trade. But the issue remains as
controversial as when it first appeared. There is no direction available
to resolve this controversy.

Instead of the public sector or market, in early Islamic history, the

voluntary sector especially the waqf, was relied upon for the provision
of such goods. In fact, its role continued throughout Islamic history
along with the public sector.

VOLUNTARY SECTOR OF AN ISLAMIC ECONOMY

The voluntary sector, as distinguished from private and government

sectors, is a relatively new terminology. In an earlier theorization on the
three sectors in Islamic economy it has been stated that "an Islamic
economy will comprise of the private sector motivated by profit, the
private sector free of any profit motive (the voluntary sector) and the
public sector where profit motive is substituted by social welfare".5

At present, various works have appeared in the West that emphasize

the role of voluntary actions to achieve different social and economic
ends.6 Nevertheless, if we compare the voluntary institutions of the
West to those of their profit motivated private sector, the former will
appear to be very insignificant, while the comparative size and
importance of voluntary institutions in Islamic economy is very large.
Therefore, Islamic economy is apt to be called a three sector economy.

The following are the main components of the voluntary sector of an

Islamic economy:

a) Al Sadaqat al Nafilah (voluntary or recommended Charity). A

Muslim is always advised to spend his money for the help of
others. No minimum exemption limit, rate or time is prescribed

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 for it. al nafaqat al ghair al wajibah (non obligatory expenditures)
for which the state or its 'agencies cannot force someone to
contribute are examples of recommended charity.

b) Hibah, hadiyah or atryah (gift and grant). A gift or grant made for
some public purposes is also a voluntary action for helping others.
Alumra (life long hibah) and Al ruqba (hibah in waiting) are two
special types of provisions for gifts.'

c) Al Wasiyah (a will in the legacy). It is generally in favor of those

relatives who are not getting a share in the legacy or in favor of
some public purposes).

d) Al ariyah or al qard (lending). Al ariyah is to lend something to

someone for a certain period of time so that person may enjoy its
benefits. The Qur'an condemns those so called worshippers who
does not follow this prescription.

e) Al Nadhr (the vow or dedication). The vow or dedication, in order

to obtain a good fortune in a particular respect or to seek escape
from a difficulty in this way is called al nadhr (plural al nudhur).
The vow must be vowed of good deeds or spiritual services which
also includes humanity.

f) Alwaqf (endowment). It may be defined as taking the corpus of any

property from personal ownership, transferring it permanently to
the ownership of Allah and dedicating its usufruct to purposes
recognized by the shari'ah as pious or charitable. Permanence and
irrevocability are two essential characteristics of the waqf. The
income from a waqf property must be spent according to the terms
and conditions of the waqif (donor).

g) Cooperative Associations. Cooperation for the sake of securing

goodness is imperative in Islam.9 Any association or organization
for this purpose is harmonious to Islamic spirit.

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 Some pioneer writers on the voluntary sector in Islam have listed zakah
especially on invisible property (al amwal al batinah), sadaqat al fitr and
expenditure on relatives under voluntary institutions along with some other
forms of voluntarism.10 But Islamic history shows that they have been
compulsory payments. Even in the absence of official collections of zakah,
the standing divine enjoinder and its binding nature excludes it from the
category of voluntary actions. Similarly, al nafaqat al wajibah (the
obligatory expenditure on relatives and others) for which the government
or its agencies may compel a person may not be considered as voluntary
actions.

Apart from the above mentioned, different voluntary institutions that

involve material expenditure Islam has also encouraged its followers to
extend voluntarily physical services to individual and social welfare.
Dedication to teaching and preaching, voluntary participation in the
defence of the country, removal of hardship, planting trees etc. are a few
examples to mention here. However, we are concerned in this paper with
the institution of waqf and its role in Islamic history regarding the
provision of public goods.

THE INSTITUTION OF WAQF : ITS SCOPE AND DIMENSION

Pre-Islamic Arabia did not have a waqf system for the support of
general welfare. It was the Prophet (SAW) who initiated the institution of
waqf in the light of the Qur'anic teachings to spend and dedicate valuable
and lovable belongings in the way of achieving goodness and the pleasure
of Allah." There are two main categories of awqaf.

a) Waqf for the benefits of oneself and family called family waqf, and
b) Waqf for supporting the general good and welfare of the poor
called public waqf.

The voluntary sector is defined as `all individual and social activities

which are not by intent or design, undertaken to attain any economic or
material benefit for the doer or doers"12 excludes the former from

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our discussion. We mainly deal here with public awqaf that generates wide
ranging economic repercussions.

As compared to the other voluntary institutions enumerated above, the

waqf has been of enormous importance with respect to provision of public
goods. While voluntary charity is generally done for satisfaction of a
temporary need, waqf is made for the lasting object of public utilities.
Similarly, the concern in. the case of gifts or grants is love, affection and
recognition, while in the case of waqf the need of beneficiaries is more
important. As far al wasiyah is concerned, it may take a form of waqf also
but its scope is limited as it would be effective at the maximum of only
one third of the whole property. 13 Similar is the case of al nadhr. It is not
always related to avow or dedication of property. In many cases it is
related to performance of physical worship. Sometimes a waqf is created
to fulfill a nadhr. Thus it may be one of the ways of creating waqf Al ari
ah, in spite of being an act of voluntary help, cannot be compared with a
waqf which is an irrevocable permanent source of benefit. Cooperative
association, although an act of benefaction, is limited in scope to the
members association. Thus the scope, effect, magnitude and viability of
waqf is far greater than any other voluntary institution.

At present vast literature is available on the legal and religious aspects

of awqaf but similar attention has not been paid to exploring its role in
economic life of Muslims and its significance in the provision of public
goods. Historically it had played a very important role in this respect and
still has. potentialities to do so.

PRECEDENTS- FROM ISLAMIC HISTORY

Islamic history is full of vivid and rich evidences of awqaf in all its
ages and in every region. Their number and magnitude is so much that an
encyclopedia-like work would be required to prepare a directory of them
for every Muslim country. Here are a few precedents from countless
examples of awqaf in Islamic history starting from the Prophet's time up to
the present age.

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 It is reported by Anas (RA) that when the Prophet (SAW) came to
Madinah he ordered the construction of a mosque. He asked Banu
Najjar to sell him land. They said, "By Allah, we expect its reward from
Allah the Almighty" (And gave their land for the sake of Allah to
construct the mosque).14

Ibn Umar (RA) reports that Umar (RA received a land at Khaibar
and came to the Prophet (SAW) to consult him about it. He said, "O
messenger of Allah, I have received land at Khaibar, I have never got a
property more valuable than that. So what do you advise me regarding
it?" He replied, "If you wish, you can retain its corpus and give it away
in charity". At this Umar dedicated it providing that it should neither be
sold, nor gifted, nor bequeathed. He gave it away for the sake of poor,
the relatives, (freeing) slaves, in the way of Allah, for guests and for the
wayfarers. It would be permissible for its caretaker to eat from it
according to commonly accepted pattern and to feed a friend who does
not enrich himself from it. 15

Ahnaf (RA) reported that .... in the presence of Ali, Zubair, Talhah
and Sa'd, Uthman the third caliph said, "You do know that the Prophet
(SAW) said, whoever purchases the mirbad (land for keeping the
camels) of such and such person, Allah would forgive him, so I
purchased it and came to the Prophet (SAW) and told him that.I had
purchased that land, at which he said, "Dedicate it to our mosque and
you will be rewarded". They. confirmed, saying `Yes". Then Uthman
(RA) said to them, "You do know that the Prophet (SAW) said,
"Whoever purchases the well of Rumah, Allah will forgive him." Then I
came to the Prophet and told him that I had purchased the well of
Rumah. He said, "Dedicate it to Muslims and you will be rewarded".
They answered, "Yes". Then you do know that the Prophet (SAW) said,
"Whoever provides for the army of Misery, jaish al Usrah) Allah will
forgive him" . Whereupon he provided for them so much so that they
were not missing even a rope or a ring." They confirmed it saying "yes".
At this he said three times, "O Allah, be a witness.16

Ibn Abbas (RA) reported that the mother of Sa'ad,b. Ubadah died
when he was away from home. He told the Prophet (SAW) that in his

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absence his mother was dead; would it benefit her to give something in
charity on her behalf? The Prophet replied "Yes". He said, "I make you
witness that I give my garden al Mikhraf as charity on her behalf'.17

After the Prophet (SAW), the practice of endowment continued to.

expand throughout the Muslim world. Ibn Battutah (d. 1377) who visited
Damascus in the first quarter of 8th century hijrah describes that "awqafs
in Damascus are in such a large number that their kinds and purposes
cannot be counted. There are awqaf for those who are unable to perform
hajj; one who wants to perform hajj on behalf of someone is given full
expenses. There are some awqaf for supporting those-girls whose
guardians are not rich enough to help them financially to find husbands.
Some awqaf are for freeing captives and some others are for-wanderers-
they are provided with food, clothes, and expenses to return to their
countries. There are also some awqaf for the paving of roads and foot
paths, as streets in Damascus have platforms at their two sides on which
the pedestrians walk, while the riders pass in between them. And there-
are awqaf for some other welfare purposes

and good deeds. In later period, most of the Muslim rulers, along with their people,
created awqaf from their personal property or from the state treasury. Jalal
al Din Suyuti (d. 1505) in his book Husn al Muhadarah fi Ahwal Misr wa l
Qahirah gave detailed accounts of awqaf created by Ahmad b. Tulun (254-
370 A.H.), Fatimid Caliphs, Ayyubid Salatin, and Mamluk Salatin in
Egypt for mosques, schools, libraries, hospitals, khanqahs, etc. 19

The situation has been similar in India where most of the awqaf came
from kings of the past, and from scholars, saints and nobles. 20 One of the
earliest records is that created by Muhammad Chori (1175-1206 A.D.) who
made an endowment of two villages to meet the expenses of the grand
mosque of Multan and its related affairs. 21 Evidences relating to awqaf
during the Mughal period are too numerous to be noted here. Apart from
awqaf for objectives approved by shari'ah, there are a large number of
them for upkeep of tombs, khanqah zawiyah imambara, celebration of a
Shaikh' s birthday or

374
martyrdom, etc. One such waqf is that created for the tomb of Shaikh
Muinuddin Chishti of Ajmer, a spiritual saint of 7th century hijrah.
Since centuries it attracted awqaf from rulers as well as from common
devotees from all over the country. Due to its importance several acts
have been passed for its management. 22

In the recent past, awqaf for Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh,

Nadwatul Ulama of Lucknow, Darul Musannifin of Azamgard and
Hamdard University of New Delhi are a few examples that help
Islamic sciences and culture to survive and flourish in this part of the
subcontinent. At present there are more than one hundred thousand
public awqaf with an estimated annual income of Rupees 50 million.23

The situation of awqaf in Pakistan, Bangladesh and most of the far

eastern Muslim countries is not very different. In a limited research
paper it is not possible to go into detail.24 In the following pages, we
just selected different examples of awqaf from Islamic history of
various public works and welfare activities. They are as follows:

1. Places of worship.
2. Defence and fighting for the cause of Allah.
3. Help to the wayfarer and road services.
4. Food and lodging for the poor.
5. Water resources.
6. Education.
7. Preaching and call to the Religion.
8. Hospitals for the sick.
9. Celebration and adornment of tombs.
10. Marriage provisions for the poor.
11. Release of captives.
12. Support of handicapped.
13. Inner purification centers.
14. Research institutes, etc.

In the earliest history of Islam, when the departments were not fully
established, the institution of awqaf substituted for the state's role. On
different occasions, the Prophet (SAW) appealed to believers and drew ,

375
their attention to the need to the provision of certain public benefits and
his companions readily responded to his call and met the social need
voluntarily as it is clear from the instances of preparations for different
wars; help to As'hab al Suffah who needed state support as they were
engaged in learning; provision of drinking water, etc. The establishment
of a full state in Islam did not reduce the importance of this institution.
In fact it supplemented the state in fulfillment of its obligations towards
the provision of public the good. By, providing certain infrastructure
such as roads, means of irrigation, health care, better nutrition, and
research and educational institutions it also paved the way for the
growth of the economy. During foreign domination of Muslim
countries, awqaf helped Muslims to preserve their identity, culture and
system of education and it served as a source of strength for the
mujahidin.

ORGANIZATION AND COMPOSITION OF AWQAF

There are at least five aspects of awqaf through Islamic history

which deserve our attention. They are: motives for creating awqaf,
purposes, kinds of properties, management, and its supervision by state
agencies.

Motives: The driving force of dedication or waqf creation has been the
desire to win the pleasure of Allah. Verses of the Qur'an and hadith
provided a helping hand. This gave voluntary actions among Muslims
and edge over the secular thinking that limits them to altruism, man's
nature of interdependence, love, sense of social duty and urge for
recognition and approval. No doubt, all such factors motivate man to
voluntary actions, and a desire for the pleasure of Allah and hope of
unending reward in the Hereafter sharpens these factors except the last
one, i.e. an urge for recognition and approval which are negative factors
in the eyes of Islam as they are antagonistic to deeds for the sake of
Allah. Since waqf property cannot be inherited and ordinarily cannot be
sold, and generally is exempted from any tax, motives-for "creation of
waqf may be to deprive the legitimate heirs, or to deny-..the repayment of
loans, or to avoid taxes. Ibn Taimiyah noticed this- incident and
expressed his opinion that such a waqf would not be

376
allowed unless a preferable welfare consideration a l maslahah al
rajihah was expected therefrom as it was in the case of Umar's
precedent.25

Purposes: As far the purposes of awqaf are concerned, they have

been of diverse nature. In the above pages we have enumerated some of
them which involved the public good. Apart from that, awqaf were also
created for celebration of saints' (mashaikh's) birth anniversaries,
decoration and upkeep of tombs, imambara, khanqah, recitation of the
Quran at the graveyard, etc. Due to individual limitations and lack of
perception of the socially required goods, generally an unbalanced
selection of purposes took place. Due to the indifference of the state
and lack of guidance, deviation and failure of effective allocation of
resources prevailed in this sector. People followed their local customs,
traditions, and pseudo concepts of devotion and thawab. We do not find
awqaf for scientific researches, technical education, and general
economic welfare to the extent we find for worship places, traditional
madrasahs, tombs and monastery, etc. In the sub-continent; where
several hundred thousands public awqaf are found, the situation until
half a century ago was that there was only one waqf worth mentioning,
i.e. Dar al Musannifin which was created for religious and historical
researches, and not a single waqf was founded for social, economic or
scientific purposes.

Kind of waqf properties: The earliest examples of kinds of property

dedicated in Islamic history are those of mosques, fruit gardens, water
resources, agricultural land, schools, residential buildings, etc., and they
continued through the ages. In many cases, past salatin dedicated
villages was waqf for different purposes whose produce or tax revenue
was to be spent on those purposes. We do not have clear examples of
cash endowments. The reason may be that-many jurists did not
consider it proper as it lacked the character-of permanence.

Management: Management of this institution .was traditionally

entrusted to a mutawalli or caretaker who was appointed by the waqf
creator (waqif). Thereafter it became hereditary or the mutawalli ha d
the right to nominate after him. He enjoyed vast powers -and had

377
chances to misuse them. Mismanagement and misappropriation of waqf
properties had been a common complaint against mutawallis.26

Supervision and regulation: The institution of waqf started with a

separate identity between the private and government sectors. When
different Companions of the Prophet (SAW) voluntarily offered their
properties for public uses, he did not take them over in the name of Bait
al mal. This shows that he wanted an independent and voluntary sector to
develop among the Muslim Ummah. In its early history, the role of the
state was limited to solving disputes or appointing caretakers in case the
mutawalli's post fell vacant and his appointment according to waqf deed
was not possible. In some countries, it was required to get confirmation
from a new sultan at the succession of a (new) mutawalli.27

It was Umar b. Khattab, the second Caliph who first established a

department named diwan al nafaqat which also kept the account of
awqaf.28 With the increasing number of waqf properties and expansion of
this sector, a separate department named diwan al ahbas was established
in the 2nd century after hijrah under the supervision of a chief justice.
There is evidence of a very early central waqf administration under the
Umaiyads in Cordova. There was a treasury for the waqf-bait al mal in
contrast to the treasury - khazinat al mal.29

In the beginning, diwan al ahbas, was a section of the court. Later in -

the Fatimid and Mamluk a period it became one of the most important
government departments. 30 When Muhammad Ali (1805-1849) came to
power in Egypt he found the most of the agricultural land was dedicated
as a awqaf which were least efficiently used and caused a heavy burden
to the treasury. Thus he confiscated such lands and compensated the
beneficiaries. In Egypt in 1851 a central administration was created
which after various transformations was raised to a ministry in 1913 (1)
But Turkey was the pioneer in creating a ministry of awqaf as early as in
1840. 32

In India during the Mughal period, the supervision over awqaf was
entrusted to the qadi or sadr appointed by the king. 33 In the post of

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Mughal period, the British government, as against its French and
Italian counterparts in Tunis, Algeria and Tripoli, followed a-non-
interference policy regarding awqaf for many years and considered it
as the Muslims ' personal affair and so avoided any confrontation or
resentment from Muslims. It was Muslims themselves who made
several representations and demanded a government administration. In
1913, the government abandoned its policy of non-interference and in
subsequent years a number of waqf acts were passed. After
independence the government passed the Waqf Act of 1954, bringing a
uniform administrative establishment throughout the country. 34 At
present, a union waqf ministry and in some provinces state waqf
ministries exist.

THE VOLUNTARY SECTOR AND THE EFFICIENT SUPPLY OF

PUBLIC GOODS

The Coarse Theorem and its supporters tried to demolish the

presumption that externalities and public goods automatically call for
government intervention. they showed great economic insight in their
presentation. But the question remained unsettled as the advocates of
the private sector's efficiency in supplying of public goods ultimately
assign the government the role of allocating the property right that can
cope with the problem of externalities in public goods. Moreover, the
Coarse theorem admits the market failure in case where the transaction
costs are prohibitively high. Further, in spite of its rejection of the
standard example of lighthouses on historical and empirical grounds, in
many cases a satisfactory answer could not be obtained to deal with the
problem of free-riders. 35 There are sufficient reasons to presume the
voluntary sector in general and waqf in particular are alternative sectors
that have the potentiality to resolve the issue of the efficient supply of
public goods. We have seen that in Islamic history, the role of this
sector started rather earlier than that of state and much before the
evolution of the market. Public requirements at that time, such as
defence, worship places, traveling facilities, sources of water and clean
air, education and research, etc. were provided voluntarily, before the
establishment of the state. It was the proven efficiency of the voluntary
sector that many times in the past encouraged

379
government, instead of having such . public utilities in its own hands and
exercising control to give it to voluntary organizations.

It should be underlined that in case of waqf, the free rider is not a

problem. It is a desirable phenomenon because the more living souls
(such as the free riders) benefit from the dedicated public facility the
more will be fulfilled the objective of the dedicator in terms of thawab
and satisfaction in benefiting the greatest number. The Prophet (SAW)
said, "He who grows a crop or plants a plant from which a person or
beast or bird eats that will be accounted as an act of sadaqah by him (i.e.
he will be rewarded for it) 36 Thus the Islamic teachings of sadaqah
jarryah (a continuous source of rewarding), ihsan ila al khalq (benefit
the creatures of Allah) and shukr li Allah (thanks giving to Allah)
encourage the believers to provide externalities in terms of benefits; and
its teaching of la darar wa la dirar (no injury and no inflicting injury),
kaff al sharr waladha (stop harm and evil to others) and `iqab fi'l
akhirah (punishment in the Hereafter) will force him to control
externalities in terms of social costs.

PROBLEMS WITH AWQAF

In our brief study of awqaf in Islamic history we have seen that the
voluntary institution of, waqf had performed a very active role in
provision of public services. It also provided some infrastructure in the
past in the form of roads, canals, bridges, health services and
educational centers. But with the passage of time, in spite of increasing
the volume of awqaf, it did not perform the role for which it was meant
and decadence crept in as has been the case with many other Muslim
institutions. Beneficiaries of awqaf missed the spirit of the awqaf
creators and treated the waqf property as a source of easy and lethargic
living. It lessened the incentive to work. Thousands of lazy and idle
people sat around the awqaf on the tombs of saints (mashaikh) in the
subcontinent and in some other Muslim countries. This is also a
common phenomenon. Evils associated with public and common
ownership such as negligence, less efficient utilization of the property,
carelessness towards the maximization of its profits all crept

380
in the waqf property. Capital accumulation, the source of growth,
became negative.

There were many factors responsible for that. In the Prophet's days,
the. Companions used to consult him or he used to guide them
regarding the needs of the society. This close relationship between the
authority and waqf creators did not continue. Thus lack of state
guidance has been one of the important factors leading to an
unbalanced selection of public goals.

Another factor which harmed the waqf institution was the one man
basis of its organization. Hereditary and sometimes arbitrary
appointment or mutawalli for public waqf was liable- to mismanagement
and abuse of powers, the performance of waqf institutions would have
been far better, had the management been given to a committee or a
consultant body, with a mutawalli as its head.

Following the literal interpretation of the saying of some jurists that

the words of the donor are like a (divine) text (`ibartl al waqif ka'I nass),
the will of the waqf creator was held as supreme regarding purpose,
beneficiaries and management and was followed very rigidly and
strictly. Generally these words were defined very specifically and
narrowly when interpretation might not remain valid with the passage
of time. 37 Imam Ibn Taimiyah gave very good and wise interpretation
of that saying. According to him the sense of the saying of some jurists
that the conditions of the waqf creator are texts like the words of the
lawgiver (shurut al waqaf ka nass al Shari') is that they are like text to
denote the desired meaning. Their status is not to make the action
obligatory. The will of the donor is understood from his conditional
words as the lawgiver's intention is learnt from his words.38 He further
states, "To make the words of waqif or . any contracting person like the
text of the Lawgiver for obligatory action is a disbelief (kufr) by the
standards of all Muslims, as no one has the authority to be forever
correct in all his sayings except the Prophet (SAW). If the conditions
are in agreement with Book of Allah, they are right, and if opposed to
it, they are wrong." 39 Since the benefits and frequency of public services
provided by awqaf had temporal and spital limitations, the need for

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alteration in the object of waqf has been felt in all ages. Sometimes the
purposes of awqaf, with the passage of time, became redundant or non-
economical. But the belief in the sanctity of waqf property, the purpose
and the will of the donor, ordinarily did not allow modernization or
reorganization which caused decay and disorder of the waqf property.
Again it is worthwhile to quote Ibn Taimiyah who is against such
extreme views. He says, "A person's saying that transformation or
replacement (of waqf . property) is not permissible except when
utilization of the property is impossible, is not correct; they do not have
any shari'ah or legal evidence in support of their stand ................In this
context, Imam Ahmad's stand is more flexible who says that if a mosque
is congested, then there is no harm to shift it to a place more spacious.
It should be noted that congestion is not a loss of benefit. Actually
benefit is as usual; it is people whose number has increased."40

Waqf creation is, to a great extent, a function of taqwa (piety) and

thawab (reward in the Hereafter). The narrow and sometimes wrong
concept of taqwa and thawab caused by ignorance (jahalah), bad
innovations (bida'ah) and blind imitation (taqlid jamid) have much
affected the terms and conditions of awqaf and their purposes. It is this
reason that we see more awqaf for mosques, traditional madrasahs,
tombs and graveyards than modern colleges, universities, libraries,
hospitals, research institutes, etc.; and almost no waqf for such public
good as the protection of the environment, the supply of information
and social cohesion about which it might safely be said that only the
voluntary sector can prove to be more efficient and more beneficial.41

ROLE OF STATE IN REGULATING THE WAQF ORGANIZATIONS

We have seen in the preceding pages that from the earliest days of
Islam, the state supervised awqaf through the court or by establishing a
separate department. Many scholars have emphasized the government
role in this regard. Ibn Taimiyah says, "The ruler has the right to
exercise a general supervision and take action if something prohibited is
done. He should appoint some honest person if the caretaker is not
efficient or accused of misconduct. The purpose is to achieve the
desired objectives.42 On another occasion he said, "The

382
ruler should establish a department to check the accounts of waqf
property, according to needs and this may become obligatory if the
collection of fund and its disbursement is not carried out properly
without such a department because the principle is that provision of all
those means is obligatory on which fulfillment of any obligation
depends." 43

As we mentioned earlier, generally the role of the state was confined

to general supervision or solving disputes, removal of a mutawalli if
allegations against him proved to be correct, and appointment of
another in his place. The state did not pay attention to reorganization,
rationalization, modernization or development of awqaf. The result was
an increasing number of agricultural land and real estate as awqafs
without proper utilization. At the same time abuse and
misappropriation also increased' which led the state to confiscate,
abolish or strictly regulate the awqaf. This has negatively affected the
existing awqaf and discouraged the creation of new ones.

It should be noted that the creation of awqaf, though a voluntary

action, still involves opportunity cost. In view of the scarcity of
resources and the needs for the balanced growth of Muslim society, the
present situation of this institution seems to be far from satisfactory.
The Islamic principles of al masalih al mursalah (general welfare
consideration), al Istihsan (preference of the better) al istislah
(consideration of public interest), al hajr (interdiction), al dururah
(necessity), nahy an'l diya' wat israf (prohibition of wastage), istihbab al
kifayah (desirability of efficiency), and al walayat al ammah lit imam
(general guardianship of the state, all require that the state's role
should not be confined to resolving disputes over mutawallis,
controlling misappropriation and finally confiscation of waqf property
on different pretexts. Confiscation of property is not a solution. It will
discourage the creation of a new awqaf and put an end to this important
organ of the voluntary sector. There is need for the positive role of the
state in reorganization and activization of this institution so that it can
perform the same role in provision of the public good which it
performed during its early history.

383
 According to the modern analysis of demand and supply of the
public good, "benefits are available to all, so consumers will not reveal
their preference by bidding in the market but will act as free rider.
Hence a political process or voting system based on a given distribution
of money income, is needed to induce the revelation of preference. "44 In
the context of public god by the voluntary institution of awqaf, the
problem of free riders is not be a big concern. In fact, the very nature of
the voluntary institution of awqaf will eliminate "stealing free riders";
rather it will aim at providing everyone with "free rides" which will
generate a positive response from other members of the society. The
state's cooperation with such' volunteers for the better utilization of
waqf resources will relieve the former from a substantial burden
regarding the provision of public goods. In this connection the following
points may be emphasized:

1. The appointment of a consultative committee. To assist and guide

the mutawalli, the formation of a committee by the donor should be
made desirable during his life to accomplish the action according to the
ayah: wa amruhum shura bainahum (their matter is decided. by mutual
consultation), 45 and obligatory after his death, in the better interest al
istihsan of the waqf objectives. The mutawalli being the head of such a
committee, criteria relevant to the waqf property and purposes should
be predetermined.

2.- Removal of narrow and rigid conditions. To make the awqaf more
purposeful all such conditions which are not approved by the shari'ah
should be abolished because they create hurdles in the way of a better.
utilization of awqaf. This will be according to the Islamic teaching
which says: "Every condition not found in the book of Allah must be
rejected", and "the terms prescribed by Allah ate more apt to be
fulfilled". 46

3. The- rationalization of Awqaf Awqaf and offerings (nudhur) made for

a cemetery; tomb, 'monastery, etc.- should be rationalized by using their
revenues to spread the message of Islam, and to provide technical
education centers, training and research facilities,' preferably for those
who are attached to them and later extending to others. Thus removing

384
their unemployment open or in disguise. It is sad fact that in India
some Hindu temple trusts have established colleges research centers
and industrial estates which helped the growth of their trust revenue as
well as the intellectual and economic upliftment of their community.
We can hardly find such examples among the thousands of awqaf made
for tombs of mashaikh and awlia. Lamenting on this situation once, an
expert on Indian awqaf observed, "What Trupati temple has been able
to achieve in terms of its reorganization, raising an income of about
Rs.500,000 (Rupees five lakhs) in 1955 to about Rs. 80,000,000 (Rupees
eight crores) in 1975 benefitting every one concerned including the
counterparts of khadims is a great eye opener. By contrast the receipt to
the darqah (tomb of hadrat Muinuddin Chishti) administration in the
case of Ajmer set up is only about Rs. 200,000 (Rupees two lakhs) and
has not increased much!"47

4. The consolidation of scattered awqaf. The state should encourage

and facilitate consolidation of waqf properties scattered all over a
country. This will reduce the cost of administration and will contribute
towards the better utilization of the property. If replacement of the
waqf corpus can fulfil the objective of the waqf in better way, it is
permissible in the opinions of many jurists.48

5. Investment opportunity. To perform its function properly, and to

fulfil its objective permanently, investment opportunities and better
techniques should be provided by the state to the waqf management.
Thus, there should be full cooperation between the state and the public
waqf .49

6. Exemption from adverse rules and regulations. Since awqaf, by

supplying the public good shares in the responsibilities of the
government, they should be exempted from rules and regulations that
adversely affect the income and performance of this sector such as rent
control acts, etc: To tax public waqf means to tax the government itself.

7. Ambiguous awqaf. Awqaf whose donors are not known; nor their
terms and conditions; or the purpose for which they were created is no
longer needed may pass in to the hand of an Islamic state (ulil amr

385
minkum) treating them as heirless property and to be used for general
welfare purposes.

8. Educative efforts are required. The state should try to alter the pattern
of awqaf and their creation through its educative efforts. It should provide
necessary information abut public needs as the Prophet (SAW) used to
inform his Companions about the need for jihad, patrolling, water,
worship places, etc. In the modern context provision of the public good
such as remedial measures relating to pollution, scientific research,
weather forecasting, etc. should be emphasized.

9. Individuals may have insufficient information about the fund needed

for the provision of certain public ventures and their urgency for some
regions and undesirability for others. The state with its vast machinery
may provide better information in this respect. Getting such information,
individuals, it is hoped, will act accordingly and imbalances in kinds of
property, purposes, and regions may be avoided.

10. In spite of regional differences, there may also be a common purpose.

Thus the state may be given the right to transfer the resources from one
region of the state to another if income of the waqf in that region on that
particular purpose is surplus. We have support on this suggestion from an
outstanding thinker in Islam, Shaikh al Islam Ahmad Ibn Taimiyah, who
on an enquiry about the same issue, answered, "The surplus revenue
should be spent in that direction (jihah). For example, if the income of a
waqf on a mosque is more than its requirements, it should be spent on
other mosques, as the intention of the donor must be to spend on that kind
of good deed and the two are of the same kind (Jins)."50

In the end we feel that the time has come to internationalize the
voluntary institution of awqaf by setting up a non-government world
Muslim foundation which should provide public goods on a large scale and
in a much more significant fashion than has been the case up till now, to
combat illiteracy, sickness, lack of technical know-how etc. and to establish
world center for da'awah utilizing all modern and scientific methods for
propagation of the message of Islam. An Islamic news

386
agency, telecasting programs, rehabilitation of refugees, and supporting
the suppressed fighting for the religion, and securing dignity and human
rights may be some other functions of this foundation. Its benefits should
cover all Muslims living in different parts of the world and should work
for their intellectual, social and economic upliftment. Muslims being
similar to a single organic body, their backwardness in one country
means backwardness of the whole body.

There is also a need to issue an international journal specializing on

awqaf, research and application oriented, to publish the research
outcomes in this area, exchange views and provide information on new
avenues for investment of waqf funds and how to make the awqaf more
purposeful in meeting the public wants of the Muslim Ummah. Some
voluntary organization such as International Association for Islamic
Economics may volunteer for this task.

ENDNOTES AND REFERENCES

1. Weiss, Leonard W., Economics and Society, New York, Johan

Wiley and sons, 2nd ed. 1981, p.296.

2. Musgrave, R.A. and Musgrave P.B., Public Finance in Theory and

Practice, Tokyo, McGraw - Hill, 1980, pp.54 - 87.

3. Coarse, Ronald, "The Problem of Social Cost", in Journal of Law

and Economics, 2 Oct. 1960 with reference to The Economist,
London, Feb 23rd 1991, p. 76.

4. Schools Brief', The Economist, London, op. cit. pp. 76-77.

5. Faridi, F.R., `A Theory of Fiscal Policy in an Islamic State' in

Fiscal Policy and Resource Allocation in Islam edited by Ziauddin
Ahmed, Munawar Iqbal and Fahim Khan, Islamabad, Institute
of Policy Studies, 1983. p. 34.

6. Collard, David., Altruism and Economy, Oxford, Martin

Robertson, 1978. Elkan, Feter G., The New Model Economy,

387
 Pergamon Press, 1982, Lutz, Mark A. and Lenneth lux, The
Challenge of Ilumanistic Economics, California, Benjamina,1979,
Rushton, J.P. and Richard, M. 5. (editors), Altruism and Helping
Behavior, New Jersey, Lawrence Elbam Association 1981.

7. Cf. Al Bukhari, Abu Abdullah Muhammad b. Ismail, Sahih al

Bukhari, Beirut, Dar al Mar'ifah, n.d., vol.2, p.96.

8. Al Qur'an, 107:7.

9. Al Qur'an, 5:2

10. Siddiqi, M.N., "Role of the Voluntary Sector in Islam" Al Tawhid,

vol.5, no.2, 1408 A.H., pp. 131, 135, 140-44.

11. Dihlawi, Shah Wali Allah, Huijat Allah. al Balighah, Beirut, Dar al
Marifah, n.d., part 2, p.116.

12. Faridi, F.R., op. cit. p.35.,

13. Al Bukhari, op. cit., vol.2, p.125.

14. Ibid, vol.2, p.132.

15. Ibid.

16. Al Nasai, Sunan al Nasai, Jaisur, Zakaria Kutub Khana, n.d., part
2,,p.127.

17. Al Bukhari, op. cit., vol.2,- p.129.

18. Ibn Battutah, Tuhfat al Nuzzar, Cairo, Mutbaah Wadi al Nil, 1287
A.H., part 1, p-60.

19. Al Suyuti, Jalal al Din, Husn al Muhadarah fi Ahwal Misr wal

Qahirah, Egypt, Mutbah al Mawsuat, n.d., vol.2, pp.154-64.

388
20. Rashid, S. Khalid, Waqf Administration in India, New Delhi,
Vikas Publishing House, 1978, p.1.

21. Ibid., p.2.

22. Ibid., pp.11-13.

23. Qureshi, M.A., Waqfs in India, New Delhi, Gian Publishing
House, 1990, p.v,359.

24. Those interested may get some information from Management

and Development of Awqaf Properties, (Proceedings of the
seminar held on Aug. 04 - 16, 1984, Jeddah, IRTI, IDB.

25. Ibn Taimiyah, Maimu. Fatawa Shaikh al Islam Ahmad b.

Taimryah, Riyadh, 1398 A.H., vol.31, pp.35-45.

26. Rashid, S.K., op. cit., pp.151-53.

27. Chesney, R.D., "Waqf in Bulkh and Bukhara in the Second Half of
11th / 17th Century", Hamdard Islamicus, vol. 12 no.2, Summer
1989, p.41
28. Ibn Taimiyah, Majmu Fatawa Shaikh al Islam Ahmad b. Taimiyah,
Riyadh, 1398 A.H., vol. 31, p.86.

29. First Encyclopedia of Islam, Leiden, E.J. Brill, 1987, vol.8, p.1099.
30. al Qalqshandi, Abu al Abbas Ahmad, Subh al Asha, Cairo, al
Matbah al Amiriyah, 1914, p.494.

31. First Encyclopedia of Islam, op. cit., p.1102.

32. Ibid, p.1101.

33. Bilgrami, M. Rafat, Religious and Quasi-Religious Departments of
the Mughal Period Aligarh, AMU. 1984, pp. 1984.

389
34. Rashid, S.K., op. cit., pp.11-36; Qureshi, M.A., op. cit., p.352.

35. "Schools Brief', The Economist, London, op. cit.,,p.77.

36. al Qurashi, Yahya bin Adam, Kitab al Kharaj, Cairo, al Maktabah al
Salafiyah, 1347 H., p.82.

37. In 1891, a case was filed against a mutawalli who pronounced the
word amin in a loud tone, of Qureshi, M.A., op. cit., p.21.

38. Ibn Taimiyah, Majmu' Fatawa, op.cit., vol.31, p.47.

39. Ibid., p.48.

40. Ibn Taimiyah, Majmu Fatawa, op. cit., vol.31, p.220.

41. Siddiqi, M.N., op. cit., p.134, 137, 138.

42. Ibn Taimiyah, Al Ikhtryarat al Fiqhiyah, Beirut, Dar Al Arifah, -n.d.,
p.174.

43. Iban Taimiyah, Majmu Fatawa, op. cit., vol.31, pp.85-87.

44. Musgrave and Musgrave, op. cit., 41, 75.

45. al Qur'an, 42:38.

46. Ibn Taimiyah, Majmu Fatawa, vol.31, pp.13, 47, 48, 57-43.
47. Kkhusro, A.M., "Foreword". on Waqf Administration in India,
Rashid, S.K., op. cit., p.IX.

48. Ibn Taimiyah, Majmu Fatawa, op. cit., vol.31, pp.18, 208, 210, 213-
14, 252-53.

49. Zarqa, M.A., "Some Modern Means for the Financing and
Investment of Awqaf Projects" in Basar, Hasmet (editor,

390
 Management and Development of Awqaf Properties, op. cit.,
pp.38-48; 'Al Wasail al Hadithah li'l Tamwil wa'l Istithmar" in al
amin, Hasan Abdullah (editor), in Idarah wa 'l'athmir Mumtalakat
al a Waqf, op. cit., pp. 181-202.

50. Ibn Taimiyah, Majmu Fatawa, op. cit., vol.31, pp. 206-07.

391
 16
THE RELEVANCE OF THE OTTOMAN CASH WAQFS
(AWQAF AL NUQUD) FOR
MODERN ISLAMIC ECONOMICS

MURAT CIZAKCX*

INTRODUCTION

The cash waqf constituted a special category of Islamic endowments

and played a major role in Ottoman economic/financial history. As such
it can be considered as an important Islamic financial institution which
facilitated the flow of funds from those who were able to save to those
who needed capital, i.e., primarily the entrepreneurs, but also to the
members of the general public. This institution is also considered to be
one of the most significant Ottoman contributions to Islamic
civilization.'

The cash waqf was basically the establishment of a trust with money,
the return from which, would be utilized for serving mankind in the
name of God. These endowments were approved by the Ottoman courts
as early as the beginning of the 15th century and by the end of the 16th,
they had become extremely popular all over Anatolia and the European
provinces of the empire. Yet, they found little, if any, application the
Arab provinces. In a society where health, education and welfare were
entirely financed by gifts and endowments the cash waqfs carried
serious implications for the very survival of the Ottoman social
structure. Moreover, they were also instrumental in the emergence of a
legally sanctioned and well developed money market.

Looking at the relative importance of these institutions with respect to

the more traditional awqaf, i.e., the land waqfs, we note that while the
cash waqfs constituted about 16% of the awqaf established during

* Department of Economics, Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences,

Bogazici University, Bebek, Istanbul, Turkey.

393
the reign of Mehmed the conqueror, in the year 1505 the ratio increased
to 50% and by about 1560 they had become the dominant mode of
endowment. 2

2. LEGAL BACKGROUND

The legal issues pertaining to the legitimacy of the cash waqfs are
complex and have constituted the essence of a long lasting debate
among the jurists. The debate revolved mainly around three issues:
endowment of moveable assets the problem of perpetuity and the
potential danger of riba in transferring the endowment funds. The main
points of this centuries - long debate are summarized below, where due
to space restrictions only the Hanefi point of view, the most relevant
perspective for the Ottomans, will be emphasized.

2.1 Position of the Classical Islamic Jurists

Being devoted Hanefis, the Ottomans, naturally, conducted their

affairs within the general guidelines established by this school of
thought. It is, therefore, imperative that this analysis should start with a
summary of the classificial Hanefi position pertaining to the cash waqfs.

Let us first consider the endowment of the moveable assets; since the
perpetuity of the endowed asset is the essence of any waqf, in principle,
the endowment should consist of real estate. There are, however, three
recognized exceptions to this general principle among the Hanefi
scholars. First, the endowment of moveable assets belonging to an
endowed real estate, such as, oxen or sheep of a farm, is permitted.
Second, if there is a pertinent "Hadis", and third, if it is the custom
(ta'amul) in a particular region. Indeed, exercising "istihsan", Imam
Muhammed al-Shaybani has ruled that even in the absence of a
pertinent "Hadis", the endowment of a moveable asset is permissible if
doing so is customary in a particular location.2 Apparently, even custom
was not a required condition, for, according to Al-Sarahsi, Imam
Muhammed had in practice approved the endowment of movables even
in the absence of custom. 3 Furthermore, both Imam

394
Muhammed Al-Shaybani and Abu Yusuf had confirmed, absolutely, the
endowment of movables attached to a real estate. In view of this, it is
not surprising that we see, often, such combined cash/real estate waqfs in
the Ottoman records.

The next problem concerns the definition of a moveable asset. More

specifically, can money be considered as a moveable asset and
therefore be permitted as the basis for the establishment of a
foundation? It was Imam Zufer who answered this question
affirmatively and ruled that the endowment of cash was absolutely
permissible. Zufer went into details as to how such an endowment
could be organized: Accordingly, the endowed cash could be given as
the capital of a mudarabah partnership and the profit thus obtained
would be spent in accordance with the general purpose of the waqf as
stated in its charter. If the moveable assets endowed were not cash,
they could be sold in the market and the cash thus obtained could be
utilized as described above, i.e., as the capital of a mudarabah.

Thus, the approval of Imam Muhammed Al-Shaybani and Abu

Yusuf of movables as the basis of a waqf, in general, and the fact that
Imam Zufer considered cash as a moveable asset and approved the cash
endowment, constituted the foundation upon which the later Ottoman
jurists built the structure of the cash waqfs.

The establishment of cash waqfs by the Ottomans during the 15th

century appears to have taken place smoothly, without any legal
complications. But when during the next century, these waqfs became
very popular and began to dominate the awqaf system, the military
judge of Rumeli (the European provinces), Civizade, challenged the
situation. He was almost immediately answered by the S h a y " ul-Islam,
Ebussuud Efendi, and a fierce debate began. Since the details of this
debate have been already published,4 a summary of it will not be made
here. It should suffice here to say that the debate lasted for more than a
century, and that it was inconclusive. Supported by the state, the cash
waqfs continued to exist and flourish. The remainder of this article will
address itself on this paradigm of continuation and seek the answers to
the following questions:

395
1. Since, as mentioned above, one of the main points of the debate was
concerned. with the problem of perpetuity (proponents arguing that
these awqaf had as good a chance for survival as any other real estate,
and opponents believing that they would collapse within a relatively
short time), would it be possible now, during the last decade of the 20th
century, to look into this problem in retrospect and judge which side
was correct?

2. What exactly were the reasons for the outcome of the answer to the
first question? In other words, if these endowments, indeed, rapidly
disappeared, what were the reasons behind this failure, why were they so
badly managed? Where did they go wrong and what were their mistakes?
If, by contrast, 'they succeeded surviving for any length of time, then
what were the reasons for their relative success?

3. In what way did this institution contribute to the process of capital

accumulation? This question has to be tackled from both perspectives,
i.e., from the point of view of savers as well as the users of funds. More
specifically, did the savers pool their capital to form joint cash waqfs, or
add their capital to the already existing ones? Did the users of capital
have recourse to several cash waqfs so as to enlarge the available pool of
capital at their disposal?

4. In the process of transferring funds to the entrepreneurs or to the

public, to what extent, was the Islamic prohibition of riba observed? In
other words, to what extent were Barkan5 and Mandaville6, justified in
their accusations that cash waqfs violated Islamic law?

All of these questions pertain to an analysis of the cash waqfs in

retrospect. The following questions, by contrast, are about the future.
Namely;

5. To what extent can the cash waqfs can be considered as relevant to

modern Islamic economics? Assuming that it is possible to reform these
institutions, in what way can they contribute to the economy of
contemporary Islamic countries?

396
6. Any process of modernization must be based upon a thorough and
objective study of the past. Therefore, as an off-shoot of the second
question above, would it be possible to initiate a process of
modernization of this institution whereby the mistakes of the past can be
avoided and the virtues maintained? If yes, what characteristics should
be avoided and what others should be kept? Let us now try to answer
these questions in the order they were put.

3. CASH WAQFS IN HISTORICAL REALITY

3.1 The Problem of Perpetuity

Since perpetuity is considered to be the sine qua non of any waqfs, an

analysis of the survival rate of the cash waqfs assumes great importance.
Although the Turkish archives are extremely rich, some 400 million
documents are being preserved in the Istanbul Prime Ministry Archives
alone (!), unfortunately, only a small fraction of these sources have so far
been studied by the historians. In this context, the Barkan-Ayverdi study
is a great help.' According to this study, there were 1139 cash and
cash/rent waqfs in Istanbul during the period 927-953 (1520-1546). Out
of these only 324 survived to be included in the census of the next
period; 953-986 (1546-1578). But in this period 138 new such awqaf
were established, thus bringing the total number to 462. Most of these,
452 of them, survived into the next period; 986-1005 (1578-1596). In
this period 75 new such awqaf were founded, thus bringing the total
number up to 527. The Barkan-Ayverdi study ends here leaving us in
darkness about the fate of these 527 waqfs.

But even this incomplete data reveals some important insights. For
some obscure reason there appears to have been a massive decline in the
number of cash waqfs between the periods 927-953/1520-1546 and 953-
986/1546-1578. But then, the awqaf survived from the earlier periods
and the newly established ones during the period; 953-986/1546-1596,
survived more or less intact into the next period; 986-1005/1578-1596,
when the numbers of the newly established awqaf increased impressively
and we observe an upswing in the overall trend. Just what forces were
behind these fluctuations is difficult to ascertain.

397
But one thing is certain; the cash waqfs do not exhibit a downward linear
trend and disappear into oblivion at the end as suggested by Barkan and
Ayverdi8, instead we observe cyclical fluctuations. This is supported by
my own on-going research: I have found four waqf censuses belonging to
the city of Bursa covering the period; 1077/1666 to 1220/1805, the
registers; B 135/150, B 199/423, B 211/434, B 352/736, which indicate that
the cash waqfs at this late period were alive and well.

It is too early yet to attempt an answer to the first question above. To

do so, will demand that continuous series of awqaf censuses covering
several centuries be identified, and studied. Only then can we pretend to
judge which side of the perpetuity debate is actually correct. In short,
since such records exist we will be able to answer this question but not the
present time.

Concerning the second question, let us now go deeper into the

management issue. Obviously the most fundamental reason for the
collapse of a cash waqf was the mismanagement of its funds. Such
mismanagement could have occurred in a number of ways; the funds
could have been usurped by unscrupulous managers or entrepreneurs. Or,
even more likely, the returns achieved by these funds could simply be
less than the inflation rate leading to a slow exhaustion. Let us now
examine what kind of precautions that were taken to avoid these
problems.

First of all, there is no doubt whatsoever that a well developed system

of collaterals and sureties was applied. To give but one example; in the
year 1002/1593 the foundation for supporting the mosque of the.
Gurbetler village in the vicinity of Bursa was managed by a certain El-
Hac Mehmed. Mehmed transferred the funds of waqf to 11 different
individuals. Seven of these had to provide collateral and three had to bring
along other individuals who stood as sureties.9

The only person who did not have to provide a collateral or a surety
was certain Mehmed bin Abd-el-Rasul, who was in all probability well
known to and trusted by the waqf manager.

398
 Let us now look into the question of the rate of return. The waqf
census from the year 1181/1767 cataloged under the number; B 199
423 in the Bursa Ottoman Court Registers reveals important
information. All the awqaf were registered in this "defter" according to a
pattern: First comes the name of the waqf, which reveals briefly the
overall purpose of the foundation. Then the name of the trustee is
stated. The amount of the capital (asl-i-sene-i mal) is immediately
followed by the statements "murababah fi sene-i kamile", i.e., rate of
return in a full year. This is followed by the statement "minha
elmesarif'', i.e., the total expenditure of the foundation in that particular
year.

Just prior to the writing of this article, I was able to collect a sample
of 69 cases out of the above mentioned "defter" containing some 300
awqaf. The statistical details pertaining to this sample are as follows: In
most cases the annual rate of return was preserved for "Sadakah",
which was usually paid as salaries to the muezzin or Imam of the local
mosque and to those who would read a section of the Quran everyday.
22 of the awqaf enjoyed a rate of return greater than the expenses they
incurred. 14 of these had also made profits above the expenses in the
previous year and these profits were added to the capital. Thus, it is
reasonable to assume that in all the 22 cases the profits would be added
to the "asl-i mal", i.e., capital of the foundation in the following year. In
all cases, the rate of return was usually 10% to 12%. In eight of the
awqaf there was a merger with other foundations and the capital was
thus enlarged.

The vast majority of the cases studied were cash waqfs (61 in total)
versus only 8 combined . cash/real estate waqfs. Thus, it is clear that
despite the legal debate mentioned above the cash waqfs maintained
their popularity and continued to dominate the awqaf system as late as
the second half of the 18th century.

Most of the awqaf studied were fully utilizing their capital. That is to
say, they regularly transferred all of their funds to the entrepreneurs or
the members of the general public. Only four of them kept idle money
in their safes.

399
 Concerning the second question posed above, i.e., the management of
the awqaf, the following conclusions can be drawn: First of all, these
foundations were profitable. This is attested by the fact that whereas the
awqaf, in general, were generating a profit rate of 10-12 per cent per
annum, the rate of inflation was less than 5% throughout the 18th
century. 10 Thus, there is no doubt that these foundations were enjoying
substantial profits, at least, in the short run. The long term profitability,
on the other hand, is a different story altogether. Normally, the long
term profitability - could easily have been ensured by reinvesting the
above mentioned profits and adding them to the capital. This, however,
was not done. As we have seen above, the profits (murabahah fi sanai
kamile) were distributed as salaries to a number of individuals who were
performing certain religious, educational or health services. Although,
no doubt of great social importance, nevertheless, from the perspective of
the long term survival of the foundation, such expenditure was
unproductive. Consequently, the long term resilience of the waqf was
endangered.

On the positive side, these recipients of the waqf income had in

addition to the social services mentioned above, another very important
function. Since they were receiving regular salaries from the profits of the
waqf, they were the first ones to notice if there was any irregularity in the
waqf management. Indeed, there are many cases indicating that
whenever these individuals suspected the trustees of the waqf of
embezzlement they immediately notified the courts. In short, the
recipients not only fulfilled social services but also functioned as a
control mechanism.

At this point, one wonders, if there was any link between this problem
of long term profitability/survival and the rapid decline in the numbers of
cash waqfs observed by Barkan during the second half of the 16th
century. Although the unproductive investment of the awqaf profits
could explain a gradual decline and disappearance of the cash waqfs over
the long term, it cannot explain such a rapid disappearance as observed by
Barkan. In this context I would like to hypothesize that what Barkan
observed was not so much a disappearance of the cash waqfs but rather a
massive conversion of them into real estate waqfs

400
(istibdal). After all, the period in question was marked by one of the
most severe inflations in Ottoman history." Faced with an inflation of
such shocking proportions the trustees probably chose the most rational
avenue open to them; the conversion of the cash capital of the waqf
into real estate.

Testing this hypothesis requires a thorough investigation of the waqf

censuses during the inflationary second half of the 16th century. Since
the results of such a comprehensive and difficult research will probably
take years to see day-light, let us for the moment do the only thing we
can, i.e., look into the problem from the judicial perspective and
determine if conversion of the endowed assets was permitted by the
authorities.

The legal term istibdal simply means the conversion of the endowed
asset into another type of asset. As such, istibdal considered as one of
the ten conditions (shurut-u ashere),12 which the founder of the waqf
may dictate when he establishes the waqf. Since istibdal has important
implications for the perpetuity of the waqf (te'bid) and since it is open
to unscrupulous exploitation, it has been carefully scrutinized by the
jurists both before and during the Ottoman era.

According to the Hanefi jurists the istibdal procedure may be

resorted to under three conditions:

1. If the founder includes istibdal within the original charter of the

foundation and thus permits himself or the trustees in the future to.
resort to this procedure.

2. Istibdal would still be possible even in the absence of this condition

if the foundation has ceased to become profitable or begun to suffer
losses and thus endangering the perpetuity.

3. Even if there is no imminent threat to the perpetuity, istibdal may

still be permitted if there is a convincing argument that conversion
of the endowed asset would enhance the financial situation of the
foundation. It is well-known that Ebu Yusuf had confirmed this

401
procedure subject to the approval of the judge. This third condition,
however, was challenged later on by the Egyptian jurist Ibn-i Nuceym in
response to some misuse. Finally, the matter was settled once and for all
by the imam-i azam of the Ottomans; Ebussuud Efendi in the year
951/1544 who ruled that istibdal would be valid only if approved by
BOTH the Ottoman Sultan AND the local judge. 13 Thus, it can be
concluded that whereas istibdal could be resorted with relative case
before 951/1544, after this date it would be far more difficult to do so. In
this context it is revealing that the rapid decline, observed by Barkan, in
the number of cash waqfs took place during precisely this critical period;
1520-1546 and 1546-1578, thus giving use the impression that large
numbers of cash waqfs might, indeed, have been converted into real
estate before 1544 when it was relatively easy to do so. In the next
period, that is two years after Ebussuud's decision, the decline in the
number of cash waqfs suddenly halted, followed in the next period by a
recovery. 14

As for the third question pertaining to the process. of capital

accumulation, we can learn the following from the waqf census of 1767 in
the city of Bursa.15 First of all, as we have already noted above, out of
the 69 cases examined, 8 were mergers. That is to say, the assets of a
waqf were added to those of another. Thus, waqf mergers represented a
certain type of capital accumulation. In this way, obviously, not only the
assets of a declining waqf would be protected from an inevitable demise,
but also they would be utilized to enhance the financial power of another.

As far as the simple citizen is concerned, the cash waqfs provided as

substantial opportunity, perhaps the single most important one, in the
difficult process of capital accumulation. In a society where the deposit
banking system did not exist due to the prohibition of riba, cash waqfs
must have constituted, in all probability, the only source of capital for
ordinary folk. In reality, it seems they successfully performed the most
important function of banks, i.e., the diffusion of capital from those who
had been able to accumulate to those who had not been able to do so.
Among the cases examined a bewildering variety of borrowers have been
observed. Some waqfs lent to only one person, while others

402
diffused their capital to as many as 31 in a single year. Only 4 out of 69
kept their capital idle, while all the rest lent and thus diffused it.

The recipients of the waqf capital belonged to all the strata of the
Ottoman society, textile entrepreneurs, women, Christians, brick makers,
porters, fur makers, collectors of the jizyah tax, tailors etc. Practically
everybody who needed cash can be found on these registers. While a
detailed, computerized study of this enormously rich data will soon be
attempted by this author, even a quick look shows clearly that there was
capital accumulation at the individual level also. That is to say, an
entrepreneur could easily pool capital from two different awqaf. This was
certainly the case for a certain Christian tax farmer, Anderyas, who
obtained funds from two different awqaf in the district of Alaca Mescit.16

Let us now turn our attention to the thorny question of riba. As we

have seen above, both Barkan and Mandaville have dismissed the
provision of capital by the cash waqfs to the borrowers as riba. Were they
justified in their judgement or are we face to face with something more
complicated? First of all, it was mentioned above that the register referred
to the annual return with the term "murabahah" and although
"murabahah" is considered to be a synonym of riba in contemporary
Turkey, 17 it obviously carried a different meaning during the 16th
century. The term comes from the root riba which simply means profit. In
the foundation charters the formula used by the Ottoman jurists was the
following :

"... the above mentioned woman has decided to endow the said amount
which will be profitably invested through muamele-i shariye and
murabaha-i-mer'iyye at the rate of 1.25 dirhams for every 10 dirhams. The
trustees will see to it that their financial operations will be free of riba or
even a suspicion thereof'.18

Muamele-i shariye is a general term meaning a commercial operation in

conformity with the shari'ah, while murabaha-i mer'iyye means a rate of
return which should be observed in commercial operations. The
expression "at the rate of 1.25 dirhams for every 10 dirhams" refers to

403
the situation knows as "itzam-i rib", i.e., necessitating the profit. It
indicates whether the money advanced by the waqf is in the form of a
"Qard" or in the form of profit sharing. Therefore, the specific rates
given above, it has been argued, do not refer to riba but rather, state that
for every 10 dirhams earned by the borrower or entrepreneur 1.25
dirhams should be returned to the waqf 19

Another document supports the view that "murabahah" was used as a

general expression meaning profitability. Accordingly, a cash waqf was
founded with a capital of 5000 akces. The "murabaha" of the waqf was
stated as 2000 akces thus indicating a rate of return of 40%. Clearly,
such a high rate of return could only have been earned through profit
sharing. Here, therefore, we have another evidence that murabahah was
used as a general expression meaning profitability and could refer to
other financial instruments such as mudarabah or musharakah.20

In view of all this, dismissing the cash waqfs, as Barkan and

Mandaville have done, simply as riba institutions, is an unfair over
simplification. In any case, until we find many more cases of actual
transfer of funds by the cash waqfs we should avoid risky
generalizations. Furthermore, the bulk of the debate among the Ottoman
jurists on the issue of the cash waqfs pertained to the problem of
establishing waqf with moveable assets. This can be taken as an
indication that the contemporary jurists had no qualms about the way
these awqaf transferred their funds to the entrepreneurs. For, had there
been any suspicion in their minds about riba, they would certainly not
have- ignored this situation and dealt a devastating blow to these awqaf.

We can draw the following conclusions from this historical analysis:

First of all; concerning the problem of perpetuity (te'bid), the
conclusion, has to wait until a computerized analysis of many waqf
censuses covering several centuries is completed. For the moment, we
can only assert that the "disappearance" 'observed by Barkan may only
indicate to a massive istibdal in response to the economic conjuncture'

404
prevailing at that period. This argument is a mere hypothesis and needs
to be tested.

Second; if Barkan was right and the cash waqfs, indeed, tended to
vanish, a probable explanation can be found in the way the profits
generated by these awqaf were utilized. Only 32% of the cases
examined generated profits above costs, which were incurred entirely
for religious and educational purposes. The majority of the awqafs
studied allocated their entire profits to such expenditure. Consequently,
re-investment of the profits and enlargement of the original capital was
curiously lacking in most of the cash waqfs.

Third; notwithstanding the above mentioned problem, all the awqaf

studied generated real profits exceeding the prevailing rate of inflation.
Thus, it was the utilization of the profits and not the profitability itself
which was the real problem.

Fourth; the cash waqfs contributed to the process of capital

accumulation. They pooled capital through mergers among themselves
and among the entrepreneurs they financed by allowing them to obtain
capital from other cash waqfs.

Fifth; these awqaf, in transferring the funds to the entrepreneurs or

borrowers, in general, did not resort to riba. The earlier claims that they
did are due to misinterpretation of the complex legal terminology.

Having drawn these conclusions from the historical analysis above,

let us now turn our attention to the modern world.

4. CASH WAQFS AND THE MODERN WORLD

The basic function of the cash waqfs was to transfer the excess
savings of the well to do to those who needed capital. Moreover, this
institution performed this function within the framework of Islamic
financial principles. At the present time this function is performed by
modern Islamic banks. As such, cash waqfs should be considered as

405
complementary, not an alternative, to the Islamic banks already
successfully operating in most Islamic countries.

It has been explained elsewhere that while Islamic banks have proven
themselves, at least in case of Turkey, by generating profits well above
conventional riba interest-based banks, they are nevertheless subject to
criticism for resorting overwhelmingly to murabaha in transferring their
funds to the entrepreneurs. The murabahah, in modern context, however,
is considered to be dangerously close to riba. Consequently, Islamic
banks are face to face with a dilemma; while on the one hand they
generate handsome profits thanks to murabahah, on the other they are
criticized for achieving this profitability through this particular
instrument. In response to such criticism Islamic banks have made
earnest efforts to deadlock persists and murabahah dominates the
investment portfolio of these banks at the rate of 95%.21

In another paper, yet to be published, this author has suggested that

the inability of Islamic banks to transform their investment portfolio in
favor of mudarabah or musharakah partnerships was due to several
reasons.22 These were, first; those individuals who were given positions
of power in the Islamic banks, usually, had learned their trade in the
conventional banking system and therefore preferred those Islamic
instruments of finance closest to the methods utilized by conventional
banks. Since risk minimization is one of the best established principles
of conventional banks, more risky musharakah and, particularly,
mudarabah partnerships were naturally avoided. Second; Islamic banks
found themselves in fierce competition with the conventional banks and
felt obliged to pay their depositors a profit share commensurate with the
rate of interest paid by the latter. Particularly in Turkey, where the
current of interest paid to the depositors exceeds 50%, the surest way to
achieve such rates in the short term was considered to be the murabahah
and not musharakah or mudarabah. Third; in an economic situation
characterized by high rates of inflation and interest rates these managers
did not dare to venture into long term investments which mudarabah or
musharakah usually entail. Consequently, they were forced to design
their entire investment portfolio for the short and very short term.
Finally; mudarabah or musharakah partnerships involve

406
continuous and close contacts between the investor (rabb ul mal) and the
entrepreneurs financed, and a willingness to lend support to them
whenever they encounter problems. Islamic banks simply do not. have
the patience or resources for such a demanding activity.

In view of these problems it should not be surprising that the Islamic

banks failed to transform the structure of their investment portfolio. In
the same study, it was suggested that the Islamic banks should not be
expected to alter their portfolio but that if mudarabah and musharakah
partnerships were considered to be desirable instruments of finance
then they ought to be utilized by smaller and specialized Venture
Capital Companies (VCC's).23

There are remarkable similarities between the VCC's and

mudarabah/musharakah partnerships, so much so that Venture Capital
(VC) is considered to be, for all practical purposes, the same as these
classical Islamic partnerships. Although a detailed comparative
structural analysis cannot be attempted here due to the space
restrictions, it should suffice to say that VCC's have successfully
demonstrated in the United States, where they were born, that they
provide not only long term capital to entrepreneurs, but are also willing
to support them in case of difficulties.

Combining the experience of the Islamic banks with that of the

West, it was suggested that financial and managerial support to
entrepreneurs in the Islamic countries must be provided by small, yet
financially potent VCC's and these companies . must resort to only
mudarabah and musharakah or equity purchase when financing the
entrepreneurs.

The implicit problem in this suggestion is the source of finance for

the VCC's. Indeed, from where are they supposed to obtain the funds
which they will transfer to the entrepreneurs through mudarabah,
musharakah or equity purchase? One obvious source already suggested
was, again, the Islamic banks. It has been recommended that Islamic
banks be obligated by the governments to allocate 5% of their

407
investment portfolio per annum, cumulatively, to the purchase of VCC
equities.

5. CASH WAQFS AND VENTURE CAPITAL

The provision of finance to the venture capital companies can now be

linked to the main subject of this article. -What the VCC's will
ultimately need is long term capital. Equity purchase by Islamic banks
cannot by itself solve this problem, as these banks may unexpectedly
encounter liquidity shortages and be forced to sell the shares of the
VCC's on the stock exchange. In such a situation, they would also
inevitably deprive the VCC's of much needed capital.

It is at this point that the cash waqfs may enter the picture. For, after
all, by definition, waqf capital once endowed cannot be withdrawn by the
founder. Thus, cash waqfs could solve the most serious problem faced
by the VCC's, shortage of long term capital.

Let us now envisage how the cash waqfs can be combined with
venture capital. Assume that person A wishes to establish a cash waqf
with his savings. The purpose of this waqf would be to help finance
entrepreneurs who wish to establish their own businesses. The founder
of the waqf, A, approaches a VCC and informs them of his intention.
Then he deposits his savings with the VCC which constitutes the capital
of this cash waqf. The VCC would then sign a mudarabah contract with
the waqf, thus becoming in reality its mudarib. When it comes to the
transfer of waqf funds to the entrepreneurs, the VCC also agrees that the
capital' of the waqf would be invested solely in mudarabah/ musharakah
partnerships, thus eliminating all doubts about the legitimacy of this
investment from an Islamic point of view. Structurally speaking, this
would be a triple mudarabah with three parties involved; the waqf, the
VCC and the entrepreneur.

In order to minimize/diversify the risks, the VCC can and should

invest the waqf capital with several entrepreneurs. Once profits are
generated they can be distributed among the parties as follows: In a
normal mudaraba partnership the usual profit sharing ratio is 1/4th to

408
the mudarib (entrepreneur) and 3/4th to the rabb ul mal (VCC). So, the
VCC obtains 3/4th of the profit of the entrepreneur plus the original
capital whenever the project matures (no time constraint here).

Since the VCC has signed a mudarabah contract with the waqf, the
same ratios are observed while distributing the profits between the
VCC and the waqf. Thus, the waqf obtains the original capital 3/4th of
the profit earned by the VCC, the latter keeps 1/4th of it for venture
capital services rendered. Thus, in short, the waqf obtains 3/4th of the
3/4th, or 9/16th of the profit generated by the entrepreneur. Put
differently, if the entrepreneur earns a profit of 100 dollars, the waqf
gets 56.25 dollars as its share, plus, of course, the original , capital
invested by the waqf.

Since, what is involved here is essentially waqf capital, the issue of

perpetuity, hence the risks, assumes great importance. Risks and the
danger of loss can be minimized by forming two separate investment
portfolios: The first one by the founder A, who can divide his total
savings among a number of VCC' s, thus in effect establishing several
cash waqfs, and the second one by each of the VCC's which can invest
the waqf capital with several entrepreneurs.

While reducing the risks to a bare minimum by setting up two sets

of portfolio constitutes once aspect of ensuring the perpetuity (te'bid) of
the waqf, the other is the re-investment of the profits generated. As it
will be recalled, the greatest weakness of the Ottoman cash waqfs was
their inability to do so - that is instead of reinvesting the "murabahah
fi sanai kamile" by adding it to the waqf capital, most waqfs had spent it
for religious and social purposes. In view of this, it will be proposed
here that the modern cash waqfs add their profit share to the , original
capital of the waqf thus ensuring the perpetuity of endowment.

Actually, it is quite possible that not only the perpetuity will be

assured, but also, managed properly, the original endowment will grow
in real terms.

409
 Needless to say, the since qua non of success is proper management.
In this context it may be suggested that the involvement of a third party
in the affairs of the waqf may be desirable. The Ottomans, it will be
recalled, had successfully involved the recipients of the "murabahah" in
the management of the waqf. We have seen that whenever these
individuals suspected a mismanagement they immediately informed the
courts. By allocating, say . 1/10th, of the waqfs profit share to a neutral
third party, a body of "inspectors" can be recruited. Ideally, these
persons should be capable of analyzing the income and balance sheets of
the VCC. More pacifically, the business administration department of a
nearby university can be declared a recipient of this 1/10th and can be
given the authority to inspect the records of the VCC in the charter of
the waqf and in the original mudarabah contract signed between the
VCC and the latter.

6. CONCLUSION

Cash waqfs (awqaf al-nuqud) fulfilled a variety of tasks in the

Ottoman economy. While, on the one hand they were instrumental in
transferring the savings of the well to do to those who needed cash, i.e.,
the entrepreneurs or members of the general public, on the other, they
financed a myriad of religious, educational and social services.

While the state of our knowledge does not yet permit us to draw
conclusions pertaining to the important issue of perpetuity, we have,
nevertheless, been able to identify certain weaknesses that may have
jeopardized it.

This author believes that combining the cash waqfs with Venture
Capital sector, not only the problem of waqf capital's perpetuity but
also the problem of riba can be solved, while providing the much
needed long term capital to the Venture Capital Companies which are
essential in enhancing entrepreneurship in Islamic countries.

This author believes that combining the cash waqfs with the Venture
Capital sector, not only the problem of waqf capital's perpetuity but
also the thorny problem of riba can be solved, while providing the

410
much needed long term capital to the Venture. Capital which are essential
in enhancing entrepreneurship in Islamic countries.

ENDNOTES

1. Jon E. Mandaville, "Usurious Piety: The Cash Waqf Controversy

in the Ottoman Empire", International Journal of Middle Eastern
Studies, Vol.10, 1979, p.289.

2. Based upon Al-Sarahsi, AL-MEBSUT, Vol.V, 2083-2087; Hamid

Donduren, "Islam'da va Osmanli tatbikatinda Para Vakfi va
Finansman Olarak Kullanilma Yontemleri", Altinoluk, 1990,
August-November.

3. Hamdi Donduren, ibid.

4. Mandaville, op.cit., passim.

5. Omer L,. Barkan and Ekrem H. Ayverdi, Istanbul Vakiflari Tahirir

Defteri, (Istanbul: Istanbul Fetih Cemiyeti, Istanbul Enstitusu, 61,
Sayi, 1970), passim..

6. Mandaville, ibid.

7. Barkan-Ayverdi, op.cit., p.VIII.

8. Ibid., p.XXXI.

9. Bursa Ottoman Court Registers, A 151/183-41 b, 42 a.

10. I am grateful to Mehmed Genc for this unpublished information

about the 18th century inflation rate.

11. For the rate of inflation during the second half of the 16th century
see; Murat Cizakca, "Price History and the Bursa Silk

411
 Industry: A Study in Ottoman Industrial Decline, 1550-1650", The
Journal of Economic History, Vo.XL, September 1980, No.3.

12. These were; teksir-taklil (the power to increase or decrease the

allotment of a recipient), idhal-ihrac (the power to declare someone
who is not among the original recipients, a recipient, or to abolish a
person's previously given rights), i'ta-hirman (the power to continue
paying the allotments, or the power to stop paying the allotments on
a temporary basis),' tagyir-tebdil (the power of the original founder to
alter the conditions of the charter, or the 'power 'to alter the
conditions of perpetuation (intifa). This is tantamount to -altering the
original purpose of the waqf, iddal-istibdal (the power to sell an asset
belonging to the waqf, or the power to convert the original
endowment into another type of an asset.

13. Ahmet Akgunduz, Islam Hukukunda Va Osmanli Tatbikatinda Vakif

Muessesi, (Ankara: Turk Tarih Kurumu,, 1988), part IV, Chapter 2.

14. O.L. Barkan, EM. Ayverdi, op.cit.

15. Bursa Court Registers, B 199/423-1A.

16. Ibid.
17. It was through a series of imperial decrees dated 1852, 1864 and 1887
that the rate of interest was legalized in Turkey during the Ottoman
era. The most important one of these decrees, that of 1887 which
fixed .the legal rate. of interest at 9% is known as the "murabaha
decree".

18. Bursa Court Registers, A 21/27, 33A'

19. Hamdi Donduren, op.cit:

20. Bursa Court Registers, A 155/207-25A.

412
21. Murat Cizakca and Tansu Ciller, Turk Finans Kesiminde Sorunlar
Va Reform Onerileri, (Istanbul: Istanbul Sanayi Odasi, yayin
no.1989/7, 1989), passim.

22. Murat Cizakca, "Islamic Banks and Venture Capital: Origins,

Evolution and Reform Proposals", unpublished paper.

23. Ibid.

413
 APPENDIXES
Foreword by Hon. Dato Seri Anwar Ibrahim Foreword

by Dr. Abdul Hamid Ahmad Abu Suleyman

Resolutions of the Conference

415
 INAUGURAL ADDRESS
Y.B. DATO' SERI ANWAR IBRAHIM
Finance Minister of Malaysia
and President, International Islamic University Malaysia

I congratulate the International Islamic University for organizing the

Third International Conference on Islamic Economics in collaboration
with the Islamic Development Bank, and the International Association
for Islamic Economic. This joint effort between scholars and an
international organization promoting economic development in Muslim
countries is certainly an encouraging development. It will provide an
opportunity for greater interaction between scholars of Islamic
economics and policy makers.

Muslim countries are now in various stages of economic

development. Some have implemented economic policies with varying
degrees of success in improving the livelihood of their people and in
promoting growth, while some are still struggling to feed their
population and battling with natural disasters. Islamic economics has to
come to terms with these realities. The development of Islamic
economics has to be relevant to development issues in the Muslim
Ummah.

Neither can we be oblivious to the rapid changes in the global

scenario in the post-Cold War period which will have tremendous effects
not only on political, economic and international relations, but also on
the intellectual plane. Old concepts and categories which were
previously considered as intellectual imperatives in analyzing economy
and society need to be redefined. The monolithic and totalitarian
perspective of modernism is now giving way for pluralism.The role of
values in the study of human sciences is now increasingly being felt.

These developments pose tremendous challenge as well as provide

opportunities for practitioners of Islamic economics to enter into the
general discourse of the intellectual community. Muslim intellectuals

417
can no longer isolate themselves form the international intellectual
community. As communication technologies and travel facilities turn
the world into a global village and interactions between cultures
become a daily affair dialogue is inevitable.

I am confident this conference will be a useful platform for eminent

Muslim scholars to deliberate on intellectual as well as practical issues
relevant to the future of the Ummah. My best wishes for the success of
the conference. May Allah (SWT) guide us in our deliberations.

418
 WELCOME ADDRESS

Dr. ABDUL HAMEED AHMAD ABU SULAYMAN

Rector
International Islamic University Malaysia/
Vice-Chairman, Steering Committee
Third International Conference on Islamic Economics

The International Islamic University, Malaysia is privileged to host the

Third International Conference on Islamic Economics. In the emerging
scenario, Islamic economics has brought in its wake a complete socio-
economic system that prescribes value-based patterns of behavior for all
individuals. Indeed, the main objective of the system is to foster economic
development with social justice and to enhance and balance the role of
individuals and society. For Muslim countries, Islamic economics proposes a
balanced blueprint of guidelines for policy making. It symbolizes a
philosophy to improve welfare of the Ummah.

The nascent discipline of Islamic economics needs careful nurturing and

unfailing support of scholars, government administrators, public and private
sector managements, professionals, research institutions and all other
dedicated to the cause of promoting the above objectives of Islamic
economics in all walks of life.

With the collapse of the totalitarian approach and the persistent crisis
within the capitalistic approach, the balance provided by the Islamic
approach is greatly needed not only to help the Ummah but humanity as well.

Any effort in the direction of Islamization of Economics, combining

public welfare with efficiency and initiative and justice with growth is
commendable. Hence, I would like to express my gratitude to the Islamic
Development Bank, the International Association for Islamic Economics, and
all other institutions and individuals for supporting this Conference. I
welcome the participants in the Conference. I hope, their ijtihad will be
functional and fruitful. may Allah (SWT) guide us all to the straight path.

419
 RESOLUTIONS OF THE CONFERENCE
Thanks to Allah Almighty, the Third International Conference on
Islamic Economics was held at Kuala Lumpur on Rajab 23-25, 1 4 1 2 H
(January 28-30, 1992) under the joint sponsorship of the International
Islamic University, Malaysia, Islamic Development Bank, Jeddah and
the International Association for Islamic Economics. The Conference
theme was Financing Development from Islamic Perspective.

The Conference regards development to be high priority task for all

Muslim countries and communities. The Ummah of which these
countries and communities are parts is required by Allah to
communicate His message to humanity and demonstrate Islam by its
living example. This the Ummah cannot do unless it has the strength
and resilience which comes from development. At present a majority of
the over one billion Muslims are in a state of poverty, illiteracy and
suffering which is quite destructive of Islamic living and is sure to keep
the Muslim Ummah weak, dependent and ineffective. Yet, the Muslim
countries are, by the grace of Allah, also endowed with rich resources,
human and natural, which constitute the potential for the Ummah
effectively playing its God assigned role. Every Muslim individual,
group, community and country is therefore called upon to make all
possible efforts to achieve the aspirations and goals of development
based on freedom, stability and justice.

Means and policies necessary to develop to the level of material and

moral standards required in the light of the above must be explored by
Muslim economists, shari'ah scholars, and other professionals and
knowledgeable persons in each field of knowledge.

The Conference calls upon all concerned to contribute towards

creation of the proper environment for the flowering of development
efforts and required activities. The foremost characteristic of this
environment is shura with all the meaningful freedom it requires, e.g.
freedom of thought, expression and association, etc. Along with this
freedom is the need to institute mechanisms that will ensure
responsibility and accountability in decision making in the context of a

421
broad based participative system. Without these, pragmatic and prudent
policies for development cannot be expected when they are most needed
especially to overcome rampant inefficiencies and significant wastage of
public resources.

Financing development by interest bearing loans from abroad has

already led many countries into severe crises and it is high time Muslim
countries drastically reduce their reliance on this mode of finance. It
leads to conflict and ill-wills among nations, contributes to instability as
debt servicing is unrelated to the debtor country's ability to pay and,
also, reduces the efficiency of investment by affording opportunities for
financing non-productive and uneconomic projects, even corrupt
expenditures. The same applies to domestic borrowing with the
additional disadvantage that it increases the inequities and disparities in
the distribution of income and wealth. Debt financing of budget deficits
has been especially instrumental in creating imbalance, accelerating
inflation followed by its evil consequence.

The Conference calls upon Muslim countries increasingly to' sue -

Islamic modes of finance, rely on their own resources and those
generated by cooperation among Muslim countries. External resources,
whether private or official, should be welcome on a participation basis.
Simultaneously it urged Muslim countries to improve their investment
climate and provide adequate guarantees to investors so that increased
investment flows in while outflow of capital is checked.

The Conference considered the various Islamic modes of finance

being practiced by Islamic financial institutions e.g. murabaha,
mudarabah, musharakah, salam, istisna', leasing, etc. The Conference, in
endorsing these modes felt uncomfortable with the predominance of
murabaha and urged all concerned increasingly to adopt sharing-based
as well as other suitable alternative modes of finance wherever feasible.

It felt a strong need for developing suitable financial instruments on

the basis of these and other contracts which are free of interest and other
non-permissible features. It also urged the creation of a secondary
market for shari'ah-compatible financial instruments in order

422
to facilitate mobilization of resources for development. In this regard,
there is a special role to be played by the Central Banks of Muslim
countries by way of extending needed assistance to Islamic financial
institutions while guiding and supervising them without sacrificing
public interest. This Conference calls upon the Governors of the Central
Banks to play a positive and active role in the promotion and
strengthening of Islamic finance. Whereas in the past Islamic financial
institutions felt discriminated against, it is hoped they will receive
normal treatment in the future especially with respect to the Central
Banks' function as the lender of last resort.

The conference notes with satisfaction the valuable individual and

collective efforts being made in this regard, especially those by some
Muslim governments which are trying to get rid of interest and switch
over to Islamic finance. We are also hopeful about similar moves in other
Muslim countries and urge Muslim economists, shari'ah scholars, bankers
and experts in all relevant fields to fully cooperate with those practicing
Islamic finance.

There is great importance attached to the practice of Islamic finance in

Muslim countries as it is only after making significant progress in this
regard that we can hope the world at large to listen to us when we call
upon it to eschew interest and adopt the alternatives. It will also be in the
fitness of things for the international financial community in general and
the international financial institutions in particular to take favorable
notice of Islamic finance as it represents the aspirations of a sizeable
section of humanity. In fact, humanity will greatly benefit if interest
which is prohibited by the three major world religions and endorsed by
none, is abolished and replaced by alternatives that ensure fairness and
equity.

The Conference also feels that Zakah can play a significant role in the
realization of the social and economic goals of Islam and its
implementation should go hand in hand with other developmental efforts.

423
 This Conference assures all that in seeking to serve humanity in
general, it is not a matter of confrontation with anyone but a search for
peace in a harmonious and balanced vision for the economy of man
based on individual initiatives inspired by social goals and with the
aspiration to please Allah, the Lord of all mankind, the Creator, the
Sustainer.

The Conference also expressed its gratitude to the host institution,

the International Islamic University of Malaysia and the two other
sponsoring institutions, the Islamic Development Bank and the
International Association for Islamic Economics for their efforts in
making the Conference a success. It was especially thankful to the
people of Malaysia, Honorable Prime Minster, Dato' Seri Dr. Mahthir
Mohammad, the Finance Minister and President of IIU, Dato ' Seri
Anwar Ibrahim, the Education Minister, Datuk Amar Dr. Sulaiman Hj.
Daud and Tan Sri Dato' Jaffar Hussein, the Governor of the Central
Bank of Malaysia for their unqualified support and encouragement. The
overseas delegates to the Conference have a special word of thanks to
the Rector, IIU, Dr. AbdulHamid Ahmad Abu Sulayman, Dean,
Kulliyyah of Economics and Management,Dr. Syed Abdul Hamid Al
Juandi and the staff and students of IIU who worked hard to ensure the
delegates comforts.

424
Legal Deposit No. 1432/16
ISBN; 9960 - 627-61-6
 ISLAMIC DEVELOPMENT BANK (IDB)
Establishment of the Bank
The Islamic Development Bank is an international financial institution established in pursuance of the
Declaration of Intent by a Conference of Finance Ministers of Muslim countries held in Jeddah in Dhul Qa'da 1393H
(December 1973). The Inaugural Meeting of the Board of Governors took place in Rajab 1395H (July 1975) and
the Bank formally opened on 15 Shawwal 1395H (20 October 1975).

Purpose
The purpose of the Bank is to foster the economic development and social progress of member countries and
Muslim communities individually as well as jointly in accordance with the principles of Shari'ah.

Functions
The functions of the Bank are to participate in equity capital and grant loans for productive projects and
enterprises besides providing financial assistance to member countries in other forms of economic , and social
development. The Bank is also required to establish and operate special funds for specific purposes including a
fund for assistance to Muslim communities in non-member countries, in addition to setting up trust funds.
The Bank is authorized to accept deposits and to raise funds in any other manner. It is also charged with the
responsibility of assisting in the promotion of foreign trade, especially in capital goods among member countries,
providing technical assistance to member countries, extending training facilities for personnel engaged in
development activities and undertaking research for enabling the economic, financial and banking activities in
Muslim countries to conform to the Shari'ah.

Membership
The present membership of the Bank consists of 48 countries. The basic condition for membership is that the
prospective member country should be a member of the Organization of the Islamic Conference and be willing to
accept such terms and conditions as may be decided upon by the Board of Governors.

Capital
The authorized capital of the Bank is six billion Islamic Diners. The value of the Islamic Diner, which is a unit
of account in the Bank, is equivalent to one Special Drawing Right (SDR) of the International Monetary Fund. The
subscribed capital of the Bank is 3,654.78 million Islamic Dinars payable in freely convertible currency acceptable
to the Bank.

Head Office
The Bank's head office is located in Jeddah in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Bank is authorized to
establish agencies or branch offices elsewhere.

Financial Year

The Bank's financial year is the Lunar Hijra year.

Language
The official language of the Bank is Arabic, but English and French are additionally used as working
languages.
ISLAMIC RESEARCH AND TRAINING INSTITUTE ISLAMIC DEVELOPMENT BANK
TEL 6 3 6 1 4 0 0 FAX 6378927 / 6366871 TLX 601137/601945 CABLE: BANKISLAMI
P.O. BOX 9201 JEDDAH 21413