#93

Laput vs. Bernabe

G.R. No. L-34882 February 12, 1931
Facts:

This is a petition for a writ of mandamus to require the judge of the first branch of the
municipal court of the City of Manila to recognize the right of an accused person to avail
himself of the services of an agent of friend, not a licensed attorney-at-law, to aid him in
the litigation.
Laput is a law student and accordingly, not a recognized member of the Philippine Bar.
The written appointment of Laput was duly presented in court, but the respondent judge,
Bernabe, before whom the case was to be tried refused to allow Laput to act as the
counsel of Salas. Hence, this petition for a writ of mandamus.
The Judiciary Law, Act No. 136, enacted in 1901, in its section 69 provided: "The existing
courts of justices of the peace in the City of Manila shall be continued as now organized,
and with the same jurisdiction as is now by law conferred upon them, and shall so
continue until special provisions shall e made by law for the organization of inferior civil
and criminal tribunals for the City of Manila. " The Manila Charter, Act No. 183, approved
on the same year, created municipal courts with criminal jurisdiction and justice of the
peace courts with civil jurisdiction.
Section 44 of Charter, in its first sentence, further provided: "There shall be appointed by
the Civil Governor, by and with the consent of the Commission, two justices of the peace
and two auxiliary justices of the piece for the City of Manila, who shall be subject to
removal in the manner provided for their appointment, and who shall exercise within the
City of Manila the jurisdiction conferred upon justices of the peace in Act numbered One
hundred and thirty-six, providing for the organization of courts; but no justice of the
peace, or auxiliary justice of the peace, of the City of Manila, shall exercise any criminal
jurisdiction, such jurisdiction within the City of Manila being confined to courts of First
Instance and to the municipal courts herein provided.
This dual system of justice of te peace courts and municipal courts continued until Act
No. 3107 was enacted in 1923.
Issue:
WON the existing municipal court of the City of Manila maybe considered a court of a
justice of the peace within the meaning of section 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Held:
Yes. When the Code of Civil Procedure was placed on the statute books, there were in the
City of Manila justice of the peace courts to which section 34 naturally applied.
In these justice of the peace courts, there could have been no question that a party
could conduct his litigation which the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that
purpose. When the justice of peace courts were abolished, the law was made to provide
for municipal court which was to have the same jurisdiction on civil and criminal cases,
and same incidental powers "as are at present conferred by law upon municipal courts
and justice of the peace courts of the City of Manila."The intention here was, without
doubt, to transfer the justice of the peace courts as then existing to the municipal court
to make it a branch thereof.
The justice of the peace court of the City of Manila, like all other justice of the peace
courts, being included within the wording of section 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
and the powers of his court having been given to the municipal court, it follows as a
matter of course that, in so far as the civil jurisdiction of the municipal court was
concerned, it was the same as the former justice of the peace court of the City of Manila
and akin to that of justice of the peace courts in general.
#95
Paulino vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. L-46723, October 28, 1977
Facts:

The case originated from an action for ejectment filed by private respondents against
petitioners based on an alleged sale of petitioner's house in favor of respondents and
petitioner's alleged refusal to vacate the same. The Manila city court rendered
judgement for compensatory damages, exemplary damages, attorneys fees and
litigation expenses plus costs of suit.

On appeal, the Manila court of first instance modified the city court's judgement as
prayed for by respondents by ordering petitioners to vacate the house which petitioners
had constructed in another place nearby the original location in lieu of the compensatory
damage.
On the 29th day after receipt on May 26, 1977 of the court of first instance' decision,
petitioner's through their counsel, prepared on June 24, 1977 a motion for a 15-day
extension from June 25, 1977 within which to file a petition for review certiorari of said
decision, pursuant to the procedure provided by RA 6031. Counsels office messenger,
however, could not file the motion on said date since June 24, 1977 was declared a
special public holiday in Manila.

He was instructed to file it the next day, June 25, 1977, (Saturday) but he found no one
in the premises except a man clad only in an undershirt whom he assumed to be a
security guard, who informed that there was no one inside the building to receive the
motion and corresponding payment of the docket and other fees and could not tell him if
any court personnel would be reporting on that day since the previous day was declared
a special holiday in Manila.

On July 9, 1977, petitioners' counsel filed a motion for second extension for 10 days up to
July 20, 1977.
Respondent court however denied the motion for reconsideration and the petition for
review.

Issue:
WON the petition for review shall be dismissed due to its late filing

Held:
No.
Certainly, to dismiss the petition for review due to its late filing for a few hours or even a
day or two without regard to the circumstances for the delay in giving too much
importance to legal technicalities which may unfortunately amount to a denial of
substantial justice to petitioners. Normally, a petition for review of the decision of the
lower court could be thrown out for being filed out of time except when there is a special
circumstance that may warrant a liberal attitude of the Court.

In this case, the petition for review filed with respondent court has been submitted and
satisfied that the same raises substantial issues although the amounts involved may be
relatively small but certainly not for petition that deserve determination on the merits
and therefore direct that respondent court give due court thereto and resolve on the
merits.
#96

Cruz v. Mijares

G.R. No. 154464, Sept 11, 2008 |

FACTS:

Petitioner Cruz sought permission to enter his appearance for and on his behalf,
before the RTC in a civil case for Abatement of Nuisance. Petitioner, a fourth year law
student, anchors his claim on Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court that a non-
lawyer may appear before any court and conduct his litigation personally.

During the pre-trial, Judge Priscilla Mijares required the petitioner to secure a
written permission from the Court Administrator before he could be allowed to appear
as counsel for himself, a party-litigant. Atty. Stanley Cabrera, counsel for Benjamin
Mina, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss instead of a pre-trial brief to which petitioner Cruz
vehemently objected alleging that a Motion to Dismiss is not allowed after the Answer
had been filed. Judge Mijares then remarked, Hay naku, masama yung marunong pa
sa Huwes. Ok? and proceeded to hear the pending Motion to Dismiss and calendared
the next hearing.

Petitioner Cruz filed a Manifestation and Motion to Inhibit, praying for the voluntary
inhibition of Judge Mijares. The Motion alleged that expected partiality on the part of
the respondent judge in the conduct of the trial could be inferred from the
contumacious remarks of Judge Mijares during the pre-trial. It asserts that the judge, in
uttering an uncalled for remark, reflects a negative frame of mind, which engenders
the belief that justice will not be served.

In an Order, Judge Mijares denied the motion for inhibition stating that throwing
tenuous allegations of partiality based on the said remark is not enough to warrant her
voluntary inhibition, considering that it was said even prior to the start of pre-trial.
Petitioner filed a MR of the said order.

Judge Mijares denied the motion with finality. In the same Order, the trial court held
that for the failure of petitioner Cruz to submit the promised document and
jurisprudence, and for his failure to satisfy the requirements or conditions under Rule
138A of the Rules of Court, his appearance was denied.

In Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner reiterated that the basis of his appearance
was not Rule 138A, but Section 34 of Rule 138. He contended that the two Rules were
distinct and are applicable to different circumstances, but the respondent judge denied
the same, still invoking Rule 138A. Petitioner filed this case with Supreme Court (SC).

ISSUES
1) Whether or not the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus under
Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Court may issue.

2) Whether or not respondent court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction when it denied the appearance of the petitioner as party litigant
and when the judge refused to inhibit herself from trying the case.

HELD:

1) Yes. It should be filed with Court of Appeals (CA), but SC took cognizance because it
involves interpretation of procedural rules.

This Courts jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus

and injunction is not exclusive; it has concurrent jurisdiction with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) and the CA. This concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to
be taken as an absolute, unrestrained freedom to choose the court where the
application therefor will be directed. A becoming regard of the judicial hierarchy
most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs
against the RTCs should be filed with the Court of Appeals.

The hierarchy of courts is determinative of the appropriate forum for

petitions for the extraordinary writs; and only in exceptional cases and for
compelling reasons, or if warranted by the nature of the issues reviewed, may
this Court take cognizance of petitions filed directly before it. Considering,
however, that this case involves the interpretation of Section 34, Rule 138 and
Rule 138A of the Rules of Court, the Court takes cognizance of herein petition.

2) No. But it erred in denying petitioners appearance.

Sec. 34 or Rule 138 recognizes the right of an individual to represent him in

any case to which he is a party. The Rules state that a party may conduct his
litigation personally or with the aid of an attorney, and that his appearance
must either be personal or by a duly authorized member of the Bar. The
individual litigant may personally do everything in the course of proceedings
from commencement to the termination of the litigation. Considering that a
party personally conducting his litigation is restricted to the same rules of
evidence and procedure as those qualified to practice law, petitioner, not being
a lawyer himself, runs the risk of falling into the snares and hazards of his own
ignorance.

Therefore, Cruz as plaintiff, at his own instance, can personally conduct the
litigation. He would then be acting not as a counsel or lawyer, but as a party
exercising his right to represent himself. The trial court must have been misled
by the fact that the petitioner is a law student and must, therefore, be subject
to the conditions of the Law Student Practice Rule. It erred in applying Rule
138A, when the basis of the petitioners claim is Section 34 of Rule 138. The
former rule provides for conditions when a law student may appear in courts,
while the latter rule allows the appearance of a non-lawyer as a party
representing himself.