A decided case on failure to file SALN

By Toni Umali, Esq. - MAY 31, 201512037

IN our last article, we explained the laws and rules applicable to the administrative (and
criminal) offense of [f]ailure to file sworn Statements of Assets, Liabilities and Net worth
[SALN], and disclosure of business interest and financial connections including those of their
spouses and unmarried children under 18 years of age living in their households.

Lets discuss in more detail the relevant facts and legal principles of the case we mentioned in
our SALN article to further elaborate the importance of the law mandating the filing of SALN
by all public officials and employees. In the case of The Ombudsman, Fact-finding and
Intelligence Bureau, Office of the Ombudsman, and Preliminary Investigation and
Administrative Adjudication Bureau v. Nestor S. Valeroso, GR 167828, April 2, 2007, it was
alleged in a complaint among others that respondent, then occupying the position of director
II at the Bureau of Internal Revenue, failed to disclose his ownership of several properties, as
well as certain business interests of his wife, in his sworn SALN from 1995 to 2002, in violation
of Republic Act (RA) 6713, otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for
Public Officials and Employees.

Finding the existence of a strong indicia of guilt on the part (of Valeroso) for administrative
offense of dishonesty, and an unexplained increase in his net worth, the Ombudsman, in an
Order dated June 10, 2004, placed respondent under preventive suspension for a period of six
months without pay. On June 17, 2004, respondent Valeroso filed with the Court of Appeals
(CA) a petition for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining order, seeking to nullify the preventive suspension order against him.
The CA, finding that grave abuse of discretion tainted the issuance of the preventive
suspension order in question, granted respondents petition and accordingly annulled and set
aside the said order5 of preventive suspension. Petitioner then went to the Supreme Court
(SC) on the basic issue of whether the CA had erred in finding that grave abuse of discretion
attended the issuance of the subject preventive suspension order. The SC ruled for
petitioner Ombudsman. It ruled that: [c] learly, as the nondisclosure in his SALN of his assets
and business interest was understood by respondent himself, such non-disclosure essentially
embraced or comprehended concealment of unexplained wealth.

The SC then quoted the complementing provisions of Sections 7 and 8 of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019, as amended) which read: Section 7. Statement of Assets and
Liabilities. Every public officer, within 30 days after assuming office, and thereafter, on or
before the 15th day of April following the close of every calendar year, as well as upon the
expiration of his term of office, or upon his resignation or separation from office, shall prepare
and file with the office of corresponding department head, or in the case of a head
department or chief of an independent office, with the Office of the President, a true, detailed
and sworn statement of the amounts and sources of his income, the amounts of his personal
and family expenses and the amount of income taxes paid for the next preceding calendar
year: Provided, that public officers assuming office less than two months before the end of the
calendar year, may file their first statement on or before the 15th day of April following the
close of said calendar year.

Section 8. Prima Facie Evidence of and Dismissal Due to Unexplained Wealth. If in accordance
with the provisions of RA 1375, a public official has been found to have acquired during his
incumbency, whether in his name or in the name of other persons, an amount of property
and/or money manifestly out of proportion to his salary and to his other lawful income, that

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fact shall be ground for dismissal or removal. Properties in the name of the spouse and
dependents of such public official may be taken into consideration, when their acquisition
through legitimate means cannot be satisfactorily shown. Bank deposits in the name of or
manifestly excessive expenditures incurred by the public official, his spouse or any of their
dependents, including but not limited to activities in any club or association or any
ostentatious display of wealth, including frequent travel abroad of a nonofficial character by
any public official when such activities entail expenses evidently out of proportion to
legitimate income, shall, likewise, be taken into consideration in the enforcement of this
section, notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary. The circumstances hereinabove
mentioned shall constitute valid ground for the administrative suspension of the public official
concerned for an indefinite period until the investigation of the unexplained wealth is
completed.

The SC then emphasized the importance of these provisions: Section 8 above, speaks of
unlawful acquisition of wealth, the evil sought to be suppressed and avoided, and Section 7,
which mandates full disclosure of wealth in the SALN, is a means of preventing said evil and is
aimed particularly at curtailing and minimizing the opportunities for official corruption and
maintaining a standard of honesty in the public service. Unexplained matter normally results
from non-disclosure or concealment of vital facts. SALN, which all public officials and
employees are mandated to file, are the means to achieve the policy of accountability of all
public officers and employees in the government. By the SALN, the public are able to monitor
movement in the fortune of a public official; it is a valid check and balance mechanism to
verify undisclosed properties and wealth.

On the legality of the preventive suspension imposed by the Ombudsman, the SC explained:
Respondent cannot claim any right against, or damage or injury that he is bound to suffer
from, the issuance of the preventive suspension order in question, in the light of the
unbending rule that there is no such thing as a vested right or an estate in an office, or even
an absolute right to hold it.9 Public Office is not property but a public trust or agency. While
due process may be relied upon by public officials to protect their security of tenure which, in
a limited sense, is analogous to property, such fundamental right to security of tenure cannot
be invoked against a preventive suspension order which is a preventive measure, not imposed
as a penalty.

This column should not be taken as a legal advice applicable to any case, as each case is
unique and should be construed in light of the attending circumstances surrounding such
particular case.

SECOND DIVISION

FILOMENA L. VILLANUEVA,

Petitioner,

- versus -

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Respondent.

G.R. No. 188630

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Present:

CARPIO J., Chairperson,

NACHURA,

PERALTA,

ABAD, and

MENDOZA, JJ.

Promulgated:

February 23, 2011

x ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 filed by petitioner Filomena L.
Villanueva (petitioner) seeking to reverse and set aside the (1) November 13, 2008
Resolution[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) which dismissed her petition for review for lack of
jurisdiction; and (2) its June 25, 2009 Resolution[2] denying her motion for reconsideration.

The Facts:

Petitioner was the Assistant Regional Director of the Cooperative Development Authority
(CDA) of Region II, a position lower than Salary Grade 27.

Records show that on various dates in 1998, the petitioner and her husband Armando
Villanueva (Armando) obtained several loans from the Cagayan Agri-Based Multi-Purpose
Cooperative, Inc. (CABMPCI). Armando defaulted in the payment of his own loan. Because of
this, CABMPCI, represented by its General Manager, Petra Martinez (Martinez), filed a civil
case for collection of sum of money against Armando before the Regional Trial Court of
Sanchez Mira, Cagayan (RTC), docketed as Civil Case No. 2607-S. To support its claim,
CABMPCI presented a certification, received and signed by petitioner, attesting that she and
Armando promised to settle their obligation on or before February 28, 2001.[3]

During the pendency of the civil case before the RTC, Martinez filed an administrative
complaint for Willful Failure to Pay Just Debt against petitioner before the CDA. It was docketed
as CDA-Administrative Case No. 2002-002.[4]

On October 16, 2001, in Civil Case No. 2607-S, the trial court declared Armando in default
and rendered a decision ordering him to pay the total amount of P1,107,210.90, plus fine and
interest at the rate of 3% per month and the cost of collection. Armando filed a petition for
prohibition before the CA alleging that he should not be made to pay said loan as the same
had long been fully paid as shown by 1] Official Receipt No. 141084 in the name of petitioner
evidencing payment of the amount of P764,865.25, and 2] the Certification issued by
Martinez. When directed to file its comment, CABMPCI failed to comply. Its non-compliance
was deemed to have been a waiver to refute the claim of payment contained in the petition.
[5] Thus, on October 30, 2002, the CA promulgated a decision nullifying the RTC decision on
the ground that the obligation had already been settled.[6]

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On December 9, 2002, Martinez filed an administrative case with the Office of the
Ombudsman (Ombudsman) charging petitioner with Violation of Section 7(d) in relation to
Section 11 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713, otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees.[7]

In the end, the Ombudsman rendered a decision finding petitioner guilty of Grave Misconduct
and imposed the penalty of dismissal with forfeiture of benefits and disqualification for re-
employment in the government service.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the Ombudsman denied it.

Aggrieved, the petitioner filed a petition for review before the CA. The CA found merit in the
petition and reversed and set aside the assailed decision of the Ombudsman. The CA ruled
that the Ombudsman erred in applying R.A. No. 6713, without recognizing the fact of
membership and its privileges. It further stated that Martinez failed to prove that petitioner
had used undue influence in soliciting the loan. It noted that Martinez, in her capacity as the
general manager of CABMPCI, allowed the petitioner to obtain a loan, much less obtain a
passbook, although she was allegedly not qualified to become a member.[8]

Martinez filed a motion for reconsideration while the Ombudsman filed an Omnibus Motion to
Intervene and For Reconsideration. The CA denied both motions in its August 8, 2005
Resolution.[9]

Aside from those cases, a criminal case was also filed against the petitioner for violation of
Section 2(d) of R.A. No. 6713 before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Claveria, Cagayan
(MCTC), docketed as Criminal Case No. 3111-CL.

On March 24, 2006, the MCTC promulgated its decision in Criminal Case No. 3111-CL
convicting the petitioner and imposing the penalty of five (5) years of imprisonment and
disqualification to hold office (Section 11, R.A. No. 6713).

Petitioner appealed the MCTC Decision to the Regional Trial Court of Sanchez Mira, Cagayan
(RTC). The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 3082. On November 22, 2007, the RTC
affirmed the MCTC Decision.

Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for review before the CA.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) then filed a Manifestation and Motion contending
that the Sandiganbayan had exclusive appellate jurisdiction over the petition.

Petitioner, in her Comment, argued that the issue of jurisdiction could not be raised for the
first time before the CA in view of the failure of the Provincial Prosecutor to bring out the same
when she appealed the MCTC Decision to the RTC. She claimed to have availed of the remedy
provided under Rule 122 of the Rules of Court in good faith. Finally, she contended that the
essence of true justice would be served if the case would be decided on the merits.

The CA, however, agreed with the OSG. In its November 13, 2008 Resolution,[10] the CA
dismissed the petition. The CA made the following justification:

(1) At the time petitioner committed the crime charged, she was holding a position lower than
salary grade 27. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final
judgments, resolutions or orders of regional trial courts whether in the exercise of their own
original jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction. (CA cited Moll v. Buban, G.R. No. 136974,
August 27, 2002);
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(2) The OSG had timely raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction considering that the law does
not contemplate the remedy of appeal from the decision of the MTCC [sic] directly to the
Sandiganbayan; and

(3) Petitioners good faith and the merits of her case cannot in any way vest CA with
jurisdiction.

After the CA denied petitioners motion for reconsideration on June 25, 2009, she filed the
subject petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.

On October 14, 2009, the Court resolved to deny the petition[11]. Thus:

The Court resolves to NOTE petitioners Compliance and Explanation dated 22 September
2009 with Resolution dated 12 August 2009, apologizing to this Court for the clerical error on
the date mentioned in paragraph 2 of the affidavit of service of the motion for extension of
time to file petition for review on certiorari which was typed as 21 July 2009 instead of 23 July
2009, and submitting documents relative thereto.

Acting on the petition for review on certiorari assailing the Resolutions dated 13 November
2008 and 25 June 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 31240, the Court further
resolves to DENY the petition for failure to sufficiently show that the appellate court
committed any reversible error in the challenged resolutions as to warrant the exercise by this
Court of its discretionary appellate jurisdiction.

Moreover, pursuant to Rule 45 and other related provision of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court, only petitions
which comply strictly with the requirements specified therein shall be entertained. Herein
petitioner failed to state the material date of filing of the motion for reconsideration of the
assailed resolution in violation of Section 4[b] and 5, Rule 45 in relation to Section 5[d], Rule
56.

The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the Court on February 1,
2010.[12]

On March 29, 2010, petitioner filed her Motion for Leave and to Admit attached Second Motion
for Reconsideration.[13]

On April 28, 2010,[14] the Court granted said motion and further resolved to: (1) grant the
motion and set aside the Resolution dated October 14, 2009; and (2) reinstate the petition
and require the OSG to comment thereon within 10 days from notice.

The OSG then filed a Manifestation and Motion[15] stating, among others, that it is the
Sandiganbayan which has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over petitioners case, thus, it is the
Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) that has the duty and responsibility to represent the
People in cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and in all cases elevated from the
Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court. The OSG prayed that: (1) the Manifestation be noted;
(2) it be excused from further participating in this case; (3) petitioner be ordered to furnish the
OSP with a copy of the petition together with its annexes; and (4) the OSP be given a fresh
period within which to file its comment.

On August 25, 2010, the Court resolved to: (1) note the OSGs Manifestation and Motion and
grant its prayer to be excused from further participating in the present case; (2) direct the
Division Clerk of Court to furnish the OSP with a copy of the petition and its annexes; and (3)

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require the OSP to file a comment on the petition within ten (10) days from receipt of copy of
the petition and its annexes.[16]

Eventually, the OSP filed its Comment.[17] Primarily, it pointed out that the dismissal of
petitioners appeal by the CA was proper as it was indeed the Sandiganbayan which has
jurisdiction over the case; that the negligence of counsel binds the client; and that the right to
appeal is a mere statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner prescribed by
law. As the petitioner failed to perfect her appeal in accordance with law, the RTC resolution
affirming the MCTC Decision was rendered final and executory.

The Courts Ruling

There is no quibble that petitioner, through her former counsel, had taken a wrong procedure.
After the RTC rendered an adverse decision, she should have sought relief from the
Sandiganbayan in conformity with R.A. No. 8249.[18] Under R.A. No. 8249, the Sandiganbayan
shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions or orders of
regional trial courts whether in the exercise of their own original jurisdiction or of their
appellate jurisdiction as herein provided. Thus:

Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all
cases involving:

A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the
Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following
positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time
of the commission of the offense:

xxxxxxxxx

In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to Salary Grade
'27' or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military and PNP officer
mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional
trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, as
the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg.
129, as amended.

The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments,
resolutions or orders of regional trial courts whether in the exercise of their own original
jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction as herein provided. (Emphases supplied)[19]

Pursuant thereto, the Sandiganbayan promulgated its own internal rules. Section 2, Rule XI,
Part III of the Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan reads:

SEC. 2. Petition for Review. Appeal to the Sandiganbayan from a decision of the Regional Trial
Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction shall be by a Petition for Review under Rule
42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

This was strictly applied by the Court in the cases of Melencion v. Sandiganbayan[20] and
Estarija v. People,[21] where it ruled that the CA committed no grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing the petitions erroneously filed before it.

Thus, in this case, the CA was correct in dismissing the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Section
2 of Rule 50 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court provides, among others, that an appeal
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erroneously taken to the Court of Appeals shall not be transferred to the appropriate court but
shall be dismissed outright. This has been the consistent holding of the Court.

The peculiar circumstances of the case, however, constrain the Court to reconsider its position
and give the petitioner a chance to bring her case to the Sandiganbayan. The Court notes that
the CA eventually decided the administrative case filed against petitioner in her favor.[22]
This administrative case (where only substantial evidence is required) is so intertwined with
this criminal case (where evidence beyond reasonable doubt is required). The CA pointed out
that Martinez had issued an Official Receipt and Certification that petitioner had indeed paid
her loan. The said receipt was signed by Martinez herself as the General Manager of CABMPCI,
attesting to the payment of the loan.[23] The CA further ruled that Martinez failed to prove
that the petitioner exerted undue influence in obtaining the loans.

Records also bear out that the earlier civil case against Armando, the petitioners husband,
was also finally resolved in his favor since the obligation had already been settled.[24] This
civil case is also intertwined with the administrative and criminal cases filed against
petitioner.

Thus, it appears that the filing of the criminal case against petitioner was merely an
afterthought considering that the civil case against her husband and the administrative case
against her were resolved in the couples favor.

In light of what has been shown, the Court is inclined to suspend the rules to give the
petitioner a chance to seek relief from the Sandiganbayan. The Court likewise makes
exception to the general rule that the mistakes and negligence of counsel bind the client.
Doubtless, the filing of the appeal before the CA by the petitioners former counsel was not
simple negligence. It constituted gross negligence.

It bears stressing at this point, that the rule which states that the mistakes of counsel bind the
client may not be strictly followed where observance of it would result in outright deprivation
of the clients liberty or property, or where the interests of justice so require. In rendering
justice, procedural infirmities take a backseat against substantive rights of litigants.
Corollarily, if the strict application of the rules would tend to frustrate rather than promote
justice, this Court is not without power to exercise its judicial discretion in relaxing the rules of
procedure.[25] The Court takes note of settled jurisprudence which holds that:

The function of the rule that negligence or mistake of counsel in procedure is imputed to and
binding upon the client, as any other procedural rule, is to serve as an instrument to advance
the ends of justice. When in the circumstances of each case the rule desert[s] its proper office
as an aid to justice and becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy, its rigors must be
relaxed to admit exceptions thereto and to prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice.

xxxxxxxxx

The court has the power to except a particular case from the operation of the rule whenever
the purposes of justice require it.[26]

The Court also takes note that the petitioner has no participatory negligence. The resulting
dismissal by the CA was utterly attributable to the gross negligence of her counsel. For said
reason, the Court is not averse to suspending its own rules in the pursuit of justice. Where
reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process of law, or when its
application will result in outright deprivation of the clients liberty or property or where the

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interests of justice so require, relief is accorded to the client who suffered by reason of the
lawyers gross or palpable mistake or negligence.[27]

Aside from matters of life, liberty, honor or property which would warrant the suspension of
the rules of the most mandatory character and an examination and review by the appellate
court of the lower court's findings of fact, the other elements that are to be considered are the
following: (1) the existence of special or compelling circumstances, (2) the merits of the case,
(3) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the
suspension of the rules, (4) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous
and dilatory, (5) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby.[28] All these factors
are attendant in this case. In the case of Tiangco v. Land Bank of the Philippines,[29] it was
written:

Dismissal of appeals on purely technical grounds is not encouraged. The rules of procedure
ought not to be applied in a very rigid and technical sense, for they have been adopted to
help secure, not override, substantial justice. Judicial action must be guided by the principle
that a party-litigant should be given the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of his
complaint or defense rather than for him to lose life, liberty, honor or property on
technicalities. When a rigid application of the rules tends to frustrate rather than promote
substantial justice, this Court is empowered to suspend their operation.

Petitioners liberty here is at stake. The MCTC convicted her and imposed upon her the
penalty of five (5) years imprisonment and the disqualification to hold office. This MCTC
decision was affirmed by the RTC.[30] If she has to suffer in prison, her guilt must be
established beyond reasonable doubt, availing all the remedies provided for under the law to
protect her right. It is highly unjust for her to lose her liberty only because of the gross
negligence of her former counsel.

With the dismissal of the administrative case against the petitioner, it is in the interest of
substantial justice that the criminal case against her should be reviewed on the merits by the
proper tribunal following the appropriate procedures under the rules. Our legal culture
requires the presentation of proof beyond reasonable doubt before any person may be
convicted of any crime and deprived of his life, liberty or even property, not merely
substantial evidence. It is not enough that the evidence establishes a strong suspicion or a
probability of guilt. The primary consideration is whether the guilt of an accused has been
proven beyond reasonable doubt. It has been consistently held that:

In a criminal case, the accused is entitled to an acquittal, unless his guilt is shown beyond
doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of proof as, excluding
possibility of error, produces absolute certainty. Moral certainty only is required, or that
degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. On the whole, the meager
evidence for the prosecution casts serious doubts as to the guilt of accused. It does not pass
the test of moral certainty and is insufficient to rebut the constitutional presumption of
innocence.[31]

At this juncture, the Court takes opportunity to state that it is not countenancing the
inexcusable negligence committed by petitioners former counsel, Atty. Santos M. Baculi, in
handling petitioners case. He is, accordingly, warned to be more careful and meticulous in the
discharge of his duties to his clients.

It need not be overemphasized that the trust and confidence necessarily reposed by clients in
their counsel requires from the latter a high standard and appreciation of his duty to his
clients, his profession, the courts and the public. Every lawyer should, therefore, serve his
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client in a meticulous, careful and competent manner. He is bound to protect the clients
interests and to do all steps necessary therefor as his client reasonably expects him to
discharge his obligations diligently.[32]

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR
No. 31240 dated November 13, 2008 and June 25, 2009, are hereby SET ASIDE. In the interest
of justice, petitioner Filomena L. Villanueva is given the chance to file the necessary petition
for review before the Sandiganbayan, within ten (10) days from receipt hereof.

SO ORDERED.