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([1992V60] JULIANA P. YAP, petitioner, vs. MARTIN PARAS and ALFREDO D.

BARCELONA, SR., Judge of the 3rd MTC of Glan Malapatan, South Cotabato,
respondents., G.R. No. 101236, 1992 Jan 30, 1st Division)

DECISION

CRUZ, J.:

This is still another dispute between brother and sister over a piece of property they
inherited from their parents. The case is complicated by the circumstance that the
private respondent's counsel in this petition is the son of the judge, the other
respondent, whose action is being questioned.

Petitioner Juliana P. Yap was the sister of private respondent Martin Paras. *

On October 31, 1971, according to Yap, Paras sold to her his share in the intestate
estate of their parents for P300.00. The sale was evidenced by a private document.
Nineteen years later, on May 2, 1990, Paras sold the same property to Santiago
Saya-ang for P5,000.00. This was evidenced by a notarized Deed of Absolute Sale.

When Yap learned of the second sale, she filed a complaint for estafa against Paras
and Saya-ang with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of General Santos City. 1
On the same date, she filed a complaint for the nullification of the said sale with the
Regional Trial Court of General Santos City. 2

After investigation, the Provincial Prosecutor instituted a criminal complaint for

estafa against Paras with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Glan-Malapatan, South
Cotabato, presided by Judge Alfredo D. Barcelona, Sr.
On April 17, 1991, before arraignment of the accused, the trial judge motu proprio
issued an order dismissing the criminal case on the ground that:

. . . after a careful scrutiny of the statements of complainant, Juliana P. Yap and of

the respondent Martin Paras and his witnesses, the Court holds and maintained (sic)
that there is a prejudicial question to a civil action, which must be ventilated in the
proper civil court. In the case of Rasul vs. Rasul, 100 SCRA 125, the Supreme Court
had already made a pronouncement that "a criminal action for Estafa for alleged
double sale of property is a prejudicial question to a civil action for nullity of the
alleged Deed of Sale and defense of the alleged vendors of forgeries of their
signatures to the Deed." 3

The petitioner moved for reconsideration, which was denied on April 30, 1991. She
then came to this Court for relief in this special civil action for certiorari.

The Court could have referred this petition to the Court of Appeals, which has
concurrent jurisdiction under BP 129, but decided to resolve the case directly in
view of the peculiar circumstances involved.

The petitioner's contention is that where there is a prejudicial question in a civil

case, the criminal action may not be dismissed but only suspended. Moreover, this
suspension may not be done motu proprio by the judge trying the criminal case but
only upon petition of the defendant in accordance with the Rules of Court. It is also
stressed that a reversal of the order of dismissal would not bar the prosecution of
the accused under the double jeopardy rule because he has not yet been arraigned.

The Court notes that the counsel for private respondent Paras who filed the
comment in his behalf is the son and namesake of Judge Barcelona. Atty. Alfredo L.
Barcelona, Jr. is employed in the Public Attorney's Office. He has made it of record
that he was not the counsel of Paras at the time the questioned order of dismissal
was issued by his father. He thus impliedly rejects the charge of bias against his
father.
Perhaps out of filial loyalty, Atty. Barcelona suggests there may have been a basis
for the order in view of the alleged double sale of the property which was being
litigated in the regional trial court. He concedes, however, that the order may have
been premature and that it could not have been issued motu proprio. Agreeing that
double jeopardy would not attach because of the lack of arraignment, he asks that
his Comment be considered a motion for the suspension of the criminal action on
the ground of prejudicial question.

The Court has deliberated on the issues and finds that the respondent judge did
indeed commit grave abuse of discretion in motu proprio issuing the order of
dismissal.

Section 6, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended by this
Court on July 7, 1988, provides as follows:

Section 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question. A petition for

suspension of the criminal action based upon the pendency of a prejudicial question
in a civil action may be filed in the office of the fiscal or the court conducting the
preliminary investigation. When the criminal action has been filed in court for trial,
the petition to suspend shall be filed in the same criminal action at any time before
the prosecution rests.

Judge Barcelona's precipitate action is intriguing, to say the least, in light of the
clear provision of the above-quoted rule. The rule is not even new, being only a
rewording of the original provision in the Rules of Court before they were amended.
It plainly says that the suspension may be made only upon petition and not at the
instance of the judge alone, and it also says suspension, and not dismissal. One also
wonders if the person who notarized the disputed second sale, Notary Public
Alexander C. Barcelona, might be related to the respondent judge.

But more important than the preceding considerations is the trial judge's
misapprehension of the concept of a prejudicial question.

Section 5, Rule 111 of the 1980 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended provides:
Section 5. Elements of prejudicial question. The two (2) essential elements of a
prejudicial question are: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately
related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue
determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.

A prejudicial question is defined as that which arises in a case the resolution of

which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of
which pertains to another tribunal. The prejudicial question must be determinative
of the case before the court but the jurisdiction to try and resolve the question must
be lodged in another court or tribunal. 4 It is a question based on a fact distinct and
separate from the crime but so

intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the

accused. 5

We have held that "for a civil case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal action
as to cause the suspension of the criminal action pending the determination of the
civil action, it must appear not only that the civil case involves the same facts upon
which the criminal prosecution is based, but also that the resolution of the issues
raised in said civil action would be necessarily determinative of the guilt or
innocence of the accused." 6

It is the issue in the civil action that is prejudicial to the continuation of the criminal
action, not the criminal action that is prejudicial to the civil action.

The excerpt quoted by the respondent judge in his Order does not appear anywhere
in the decision of Ras v. Rasul. 7 Worse, he has not only misquoted the decision but
also wrongly applied it. The facts of that case are not analogous to those in the case
at bar.

In that case, Ras allegedly sold to Pichel a parcel of land which he later also sold to
Martin. Pichel brought a civil action for nullification of the second sale and asked
that the sale made by Ras in his favor be declared valid. Ras's defense was that he
never sold the property to Pichel and his purported signatures appearing in the first
deed of sale were forgeries. Later, an information for estafa was filed against Ras
based on the same double sale that was the subject of the civil action. Ras filed a
"Motion for Suspension of Action" (that is, the criminal case), claiming that the
resolution of the issues in the civil case would necessarily be determinative of his
guilt or innocence.
Through then Associate Justice Claudio Teehankee, this Court ruled that a
suspension of the criminal action was in order because:

On the basis of the issues raised in both the criminal and civil cases against
petitioner and in the light of the foregoing concepts of a prejudicial question, there
indeed appears to be a prejudicial question in the case at bar, considering that
petitioner Alejandro has' defense (as defendant) in Civil Case No. 73 of the nullity
and forgery of the alleged prior deed of sale in favor of Luis Pichel (plaintiff in the
civil case and complaining witnesses in the criminal case) is based on the very
same facts which would be necessarily determinative of petitioner Ras' guilt or
innocence as accused in the criminal case. If the first alleged sale in favor of Pichel
is void or fictitious, then there would be no double sale and petitioner would be
innocent of the offense charged. A conviction in the criminal case (if it were allowed
to proceed ahead) would be a gross injustice and would have to be set aside if it
were finally decided in the civil action that indeed the alleged prior deed of sale was
a forgery and spurious.

xxx xxx xxx

The petitioner Alejandro Ras claims in his answer to the complaint in civil Case No.
73 that he had never sold the property in litigation to the plaintiff (Luis Pichel) and
that his signatures in the alleged deed of sale and that of his wife were forged by
the plaintiff. It is, therefore, necessary that the truth or falsity of such claim be first
determined because if his claim is true, then he did not sell his property twice and
no estafa was committed. The question of nullity of the sale is distinct and separate
from the crime of estafa (alleged double sale) but so intimately connected with it
that it determines the guilt or innocence of herein petitioner in the criminal action.

In the Ras case, there was a motion to suspend the criminal action on the ground
that the defense in the civil case forgery of his signature in the first deed of sale
had to be threshed out first. Resolution of that question would necessarily resolve
the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case.

By contrast, there was no motion for suspension in the case at bar; and no less
importantly, the respondent judge had not been informed of the defense Paras was
raising in the civil action. Judge Barcelona could not have ascertained then if the
issue raised in the civil action would determine the guilt or innocence of the
accused in the criminal case.
It is worth remarking that not every defense raised in the civil action will raise a
prejudicial question to justify suspension of the criminal action. The defense must
involve an issue similar or intimately related to the same issue raised in the criminal
action and its resolution should determine whether or not the latter action may
proceed.

The order dismissing the criminal action without a motion for suspension in
accordance with Rule 111, Section 6, of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as
amended, and even without the accused indicating his defense in the civil case for
the annulment of the second sale, suggests not only ignorance of the law but also
bias on the part of the respondent judge.

Judge Alfredo D. Barcelona, Sr. is sternly reminded that under the Code of Judicial
Conduct, "a judge shall be faithful to the law and maintain professional
competence" and "should administer justice impartially." He is hereby reprimanded
for his questionable conduct in the case at bar, with the warning that commission of
similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Order issued by Judge Alfredo D.

Barcelona, Sr. dated April 17, 1991, dismissing Criminal Case No. 1902-G, and the
Order dated April 30, 1991, denying the motion for reconsideration, are REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. Criminal Case No. 1902-G is ordered REINSTATED for further
proceedings, but to be assigned to a different judge.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa (C.J.), Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

* "She died pendente lite on September 2, 1991, and was by resolution of the
Court dated January 13, 1991, substituted by her children, Ruperto, Rustico, Ignacio,
Rogelio, Arsenio, Jr., all surnamed Yap, Rainilda Yap Breta, and the children of the
deceased Teodora Yap Cuaycong.

1. Rollo, p. 8.

2. Ibid, p. 13.

3. Id., pp. 30-31.

4. People vs. Aragon, 94 Phil. 357; Merced vs. Diez, 109 Phil. 155; Zapanta vs.
Montesa, 114 Phil. 428; Fortich-Celdran vs. Celdran, 19 SCRA 502.

5. De Leon vs. Mabanag, 70 Phil. 202; Mendiola vs. Macadaeg, 1 SCRA 593.

6. Ras vs. Rasul, 100 SCRA 125; Mendiola vs. Macadaeg, supra.

7. Supra.

., G.R. No. L-31665, 1975 August 06, 1st Division)