NOT MEASUREMENT

SENSITIVE
MIL-HDBK-470A
4 AUGUST 1997
SUPERSEDING
MIL-HDBK-470
12 JUNE 1995
MIL-HDBK-471
12 JUNE 1995

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
HANDBOOK
DESIGNING AND DEVELOPING MAINTAINABLE
PRODUCTS AND SYSTEMS
VOLUME I

This handbook is for guidance only. Do not cite this document as a

requirement

AMSC N/A AREA MNTY

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A. Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

FOREWORD

1. This handbook is approved for use by all Departments and Agencies of the Department of
Defense (DoD). It was developed by the DoD with the assistance of the military departments,
federal agencies, and industry and replaces in their entirety Military Handbooks 470 and 471
(both formerly military standards). The handbook provides guidance to maintainability managers
and engineers in developing and implementing a sound maintainability program for all types of
products.

2. This handbook is for guidance only. This handbook cannot be cited as a requirement. If it is,
the contractor does not have to comply.

3. Maintainability is a discipline that has become more importance over the past 30 years as
military systems became more complex, support costs increased, and defense budgets decreased.
It is also important in the commercial sector, where high levels of maintainability are increasingly
becoming an important factor in gaining customer loyalty. In fact, American products that once
were shunned in favor of foreign alternatives recently have made or are making a comeback. This
shift in consumer preferences has been directly attributed to significant improvements in the
quality of the American products, a quality that includes good maintainability.

4. Despite the fact that maintainability has been a recognized discipline for much longer than 30
years, achieving the high levels of maintainability needed in military and complex industrial
systems is too often an elusive goal. System complexity, competing performance requirements,
the rush to incorporate promising but immature technologies, and the pressures of acquisition
budget and schedule contribute to this elusiveness.

5. Noting the significant improvement in the quality of commercial products and the rapidity
with which new technology is incorporated in commercial products, and facing a shrinking
defense budget, the Department of Defense changed its acquisition policies to foster the
evolution of a unified military and commercial industrial base. The objective is to capitalize on
the "best practices" that American business has developed or adopted, primarily in response to
foreign competitive pressures. When combined with the knowledge and expertise of military
contractors in building complex, effective military systems (soundly demonstrated during Desert
Storm), these commercial practices will help the Department of Defense to acquire world-class
systems on time and within budget.

6. The information in this handbook reflects both the move to incorporate commercial practices
and the lessons learned over many years of acquiring weapon systems "by the book." When
appropriate, commercial standards are cited herein for reference. Military standards and
specifications, which cannot be used as requirements in solicitations without obtaining a waiver,
are also cited for guidance. These documents are familiar to both military and commercial
companies, contain a wealth of valuable information, and often have no commercial counterpart.
Whereas many of these documents emphasize what to do and how to do it, this handbook, in the

ii
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

spirit of the new policies regarding acquisition, focuses on the objectives of a sound
maintainability program and the tools available to meet these objectives.

7. Beneficial comments (recommendations, additions, deletions) and any pertinent data which
may be useful in improving this document should be addressed to: Rome Laboratory/ERSR, 525
Brooks Road, Rome, NY 13441-4505. Comments should be submitted using the self-addressed
Standardization Document Improvement Proposal (DD Form 1426) appearing at the end of this
document or by letter.

iii
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

CONTENTS

PARAGRAPH
PAGE

FOREWORD....................................................................................................................... ii
1.0 SCOPE AND PURPOSE OF HANDBOOK............................................................. 1-1
1.1 Scope.................................................................................................................. 1-1
1.1.1 Purpose of the Handbook ...................................................................... 1-1
1.1.2 Using the Handbook............................................................................... 1-2
1.2 Applicable Documents....................................................................................... 1-2
1.3 Definitions, Acronyms and Abbreviations ........................................................ 1-8
2.0 THE CONCEPT OF MAINTAINABILITY .............................................................. 2-1
2.1 What is Maintainability?.................................................................................... 2-1
2.2 Effect of Maintainability on Operations and Cost ............................................ 2-2
2.2.1 Operations.............................................................................................. 2-2
2.2.1.1 Relationship of Reliability and Maintainability...................... 2-3
2.2.1.2 Availability and Operational Readiness.................................. 2-4
2.2.2 Life Cycle Costs..................................................................................... 2-5
2.2.2.1 Research and Development (R&D) Costs (DoD
Phases 0, I, and II)................................................................... 2-5
2.2.2.2 Production and Construction (P&C) Costs (Part of
DoD Phase III)........................................................................ 2-6
2.2.2.3 Operation and Maintenance (O&M) Costs (Part of
DoD Phase III)........................................................................ 2-6
2.2.2.4 Product Retirement and Phase-out (PR&P) Costs. ................ 2-7
2.2.2.5 Opportunity and Equivalent Costs......................................... 2-7
2.2.3 Affordability. ......................................................................................... 2-7
2.3 Other Relationships. .......................................................................................... 2-8
2.3.1 Manufacturing........................................................................................ 2-8
2.3.2 Human Engineering................................................................................. 2-9
2.3.3 Safety ..................................................................................................... 2-9
2.3.4 Diagnostics and Maintenance................................................................. 2-9
2.3.5 Logistics Support................................................................................... 2-10
2.4 Maintainability and the Acquisition Process..................................................... 2-10
3.0 OBJECTIVE OF A MAINTAINABILITY PROGRAM......................................... 3-1
3.1 Understand the Customer's Maintainability Needs........................................... 3-2
3.2 Integrate Maintainability with the Systems Engineering Process...................... 3-5
3.3 Thoroughly Understand the Design................................................................... 3-5
3.4 Design for Desired Level of Maintainability...................................................... 3-5
3.5 Validate the Maintainability Through Analysis and Development Test........... 3-6
3.6 Monitor and Analyze Operational Performance................................................ 3-6

iv
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

PARAGRAPH
PAGE

4.0 ELEMENTS OF A MAINTAINABILITY PROGRAM ........................................... 4-1

4.1 Overview.............................................................................................................. 4-1
4.2 Management Approach........................................................................................ 4-1
4.2.1 Clear Responsibility................................................................................. 4-2
4.2.2 Adequate Resources (Quantity and Quality)........................................... 4-2
4.2.3 Lines of Communication .......................................................................... 4-2
4.2.4 Integration with Related Functions.......................................................... 4-2
4.2.5 Subcontractor and Vendor Control........................................................... 4-2
4.2.6 Reviews.................................................................................................... 4-3
4.3 Design for Maintainability................................................................................... 4-3
4.3.1 Specific Considerations............................................................................ 4-3
4.3.1.1 Support Concept....................................................................... 4-4
4.3.1.2 Operational and Support Environment..................................... 4-6
4.3.1.3 Preventive Versus Corrective Maintenance Requirements ....... 4-6
4.3.1.4 Human Engineering (HE)........................................................... 4-9
4.3.1.4.1 Presentation of Information .................................... 4-10
4.3.1.4.2 Controls................................................................... 4-11
4.3.1.4.3 Anthropometrics..................................................... 4-11
4.3.1.5 Maintenance Tools and Support Equipment............................ 4-12
4.3.1.6 Maintenance Training................................................................ 4-12
4.3.1.7 Testability and Diagnostics....................................................... 4-12
4.3.1.7.1 Testability Design................................................... 4-13
4.3.1.7.2 Diagnostic Capability.............................................. 4-16
4.3.1.8 Interfaces and Connections ....................................................... 4-17
4.3.1.9 Safety and Induced Failures. ..................................................... 4-18
4.3.1.10 Standardization and Interchangeability ..................................... 4-18
4.3.1.10.1 Standardization Design Goals and Principles.......... 4-18
4.3.1.10.2 Interchangeability Design Goals and Principles...... 4-19
4.3.2 Design Tools. ........................................................................................... 4-21
4.3.2.1 Analytical.................................................................................. 4-21
4.3.2.2 Mockups................................................................................... 4-23
4.3.2.3 Simulation and Virtual Reality .................................................. 4-23
4.3.2.4 Handbooks and Other Reference Documents. .......................... 4-25
4.3.2.5 Artificial Intelligence. ................................................................ 4-25
4.3.2.5.1 Expert Systems ....................................................... 4-26
4.3.2.5.1.1 Rule-Based Expert Systems............... 4-26
4.3.2.5.1.2 Model-Based Expert Systems............ 4-28
4.3.2.5.2 Fuzzy Logic ............................................................ 4-28

v
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

PARAGRAPH
PAGE

4.3.2.5.3 Neural Networks..................................................... 4-29

4.4 Maintainability Analyses and Test...................................................................... 4-31
4.4.1 Analyses................................................................................................... 4-31
4.4.1.1 Objectives of Maintainability Analyses.. ................................. 4-31
4.4.1.2 Typical Products of Maintainability Analyses ........................ 4-32
4.4.1.3 Commonly Used Maintainability Analyses ............................. 4-32
4.4.1.3.1 Equipment Downtime Analysis.............................. 4-32
4.4.1.3.2 Maintainability Design Evaluation.......................... 4-33
4.4.1.3.3 Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA)........ 4-34
4.4.1.3.4 Testability Analysis................................................ 4-37
4.4.1.3.4.1 Dependency Analysis........................ 4-38
4.4.1.3.4.2 Dependency Analysis Tools.............. 4-40
4.4.1.3.4.3 Other Types of Testability
Analyses............................................. 4-40
4.4.1.3.5 Human Factors Analysis......................................... 4-40
4.4.1.4 Quantitative Measures of Maintainability................................ 4-42
4.4.1.4.1 Maintainability Models and Maintenance
Activities Block Diagrams....................................... 4-43
4.4.1.5 Qualitative Maintainability Factors.......................................... 4-44
4.4.1.6 Predictions, Allocations, and Assessments............................... 4-45
4.4.1.6.1 Maintainability Prediction ...................................... 4-45
4.4.1.6.1.1 Maintainability Prediction in
Accordance with MIL-HDBK-472.... 4-46
4.4.1.6.2 Maintainability Allocation...................................... 4-47
4.4.1.6.2.1 Failure Rate Complexity Method ...... 4-48
4.4.1.6.2.2 Variation of the Failure Rate
Complexity Method........................... 4-50
4.4.1.6.2.3 Statistically-Based Allocation
Method............................................... 4-50
4.4.1.6.2.4 Equal Distribution Method................ 4-51
4.4.1.6.3 Maintainability Assessment ................................... 4-51
4.4.2 Test .......................................................................................................... 4-51
4.4.2.1 Objectives.................................................................................. 4-52
4.4.2.2 Types of Testing....................................................................... 4-52
4.4.3 Statistical Distributions Used in Maintainability Models....................... 4-53
4.4.3.1 Lognormal Distribution............................................................. 4-54
4.4.3.2 Normal Distribution.................................................................. 4-55
4.4.3.3 Exponential Distribution........................................................... 4-56
4.5 Data Collection and Analysis............................................................................... 4-58
4.5.1 Types of Data.......................................................................................... 4-58

vi
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

PARAGRAPH PAGE

4.5.1.1 Development Data .................................................................... 4-58

4.5.1.2 Field Data.................................................................................. 4-60
4.5.2 Sources of Data ........................................................................................ 4-60
4.5.3 Data Analysis Techniques ....................................................................... 4-62
4.5.3.1 Data Used Explicitly for Compliance Verification.................... 4-63
4.5.4 Uses of Data............................................................................................. 4-64

APPENDIXES

Appendix A. Acquisition Guidance, Templates for Preparing Maintainability Section of

Solicitation, and Guidance for Selecting Sources............................................ A-1
Appendix B. Test and Demonstration Methods................................................................. B-1
Appendix C. Design Guidelines (Volume II of Handbook)................................................. C-1
Appendix D. Predictions...................................................................................................... D-1
Appendix E. Phasing of Maintainability Elements. ............................................................ E-1
Appendix F. Maintainability References. ........................................................................... F-1
Appendix G. Glossary......................................................................................................... G-1

FIGURES

Figure 1: Different Combinations of MTBF and MTTR Yield the Same

Inherent Availability ...................................................................................... 2-3
Figure 2: Some Key Disciplines to Which Maintainability is Related.......................... 2-8
Figure 3: QFD House of Quality .................................................................................. 3-3
Figure 4: Example Excerpt of House of Quality ........................................................... 3-4
Figure 5: Major Categories of Maintenance.................................................................. 4-7
Figure 6: The Steps in an RCM Approach to Identifying Preventive Maintenance .... 4-8
Figure 7: The Human Information Processing System.................................................. 4-10
Figure 8: Interactions Between Human and Product..................................................... 4-11
Figure 9: Steps in a General Approach for the Physical Development of a
Maintainability Expert System...................................................................... 4-28
Figure 10: Fuzzy Logic Set Membership........................................................................ 4-29
Figure 11: Typical Neural Network Configuration......................................................... 4-30
Figure 12: Steps in an FMEA ......................................................................................... 4-36
Figure 13: Typical FMEA Worksheet............................................................................ 4-36
Figure 14: Abbreviated Results from FMEA of a Solid Propellant Rocket Motor........ 4-37

vii
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

FIGURES (Continued)

Figure 15: Simple System Showing Test Dependencies ................................................. 4-38

Figure 16: Maintenance Activities Block Diagram.......................................................... 4-43
Figure 17: Example of Maintainability Allocation.......................................................... 4-50
Figure 18: Example FRACAS Form................................................................................ 4-59
Figure A-1: Sections of a Government Solicitation or Contract........................................ A-8
Figure A-2 Example Wording for a Statement of Objectives............................................ A-10
Figure A-3: Checklist for Evaluating Maintainability Portion of a Proposal.................... A-22
Figure B-1: Time Phasing of Maintainability Testing....................................................... B-2
Figure B-2: Procedure for Maintainability-Index Selection............................................... B-9
Figure B-3: OC Curve for Test A ..................................................................................... B-29
Figure B-4: OC Curve for Test B...................................................................................... B-30
Figure B-5: OC Curve for Test Method 2 ........................................................................ B-32
Figure B-6: OC Curve for Test Method 3 ........................................................................ B-36
Figure B-7: Distribution of Means.................................................................................... B-43
Figure B-8A: Acceptable Combinations of Dual Requirements .......................................... B-49
Figure B-8B: Values Acceptable to Dual Requirement of Maximum Values of
Two Percentiles.............................................................................................. B-49
Figure B-8C: Superimposition of Figure B-8A on B-8B..................................................... B-50
Figure B-8D: OC Curve for Test Method 8 ........................................................................ B-54
Figure B-8E: Probability of Passing Test A........................................................................ B-55
Figure B-8F: Probability of Passing Test B1 ....................................................................... B-56
Figure B-8G: Probability of Passing Test B2 ....................................................................... B-56
Figure B-9: OC Map Relative to a Given Dual Requirement ........................................... B-57
Figure B-10: Node Consisting of Fan-In Branches, a Fan-Out Origin, and Fan-
Out Branches.................................................................................................. B-79
Figure C-1: Redundancy BIT............................................................................................ C-5
Figure C-2: Wrap-Around BIT ......................................................................................... C-6
Figure D-1: RI Data Analysis Sheet - A............................................................................ D-12
Figure D-2: RI Data Analysis Sheet - B............................................................................ D-12
Figure D-3: MTTR Submodels ......................................................................................... D-14
Figure D-4: Definitions of MTTR Submodel Terms ........................................................ D-15
Figure D-5: Matrix For Correlating FD&I Features With RIs .......................................... D-23
Figure D-6: Fault Isolation Output and RI Correlation Tree ............................................ D-24
Figure D-7: Manual Fault Isolation Output And RI Correlation Tree (Partial)................ D-24
Figure D-8: Sample Maintenance Flow Diagram............................................................... D-26
Figure D-9: Example Time Synthesis Analysis................................................................. D-28
Figure D-10: Maintenance Correlation Matrix Format ....................................................... D-29
Figure D-11: Standard Screws ............................................................................................. D-32
Figure D-12: Hex or Allen Set Screws................................................................................. D-32
Figure D-13: Captive Screws............................................................................................... D-32

viii
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

FIGURES (Continued)

Figure D-14: Dzus Fasteners............................................................................................... D-33

Figure D-15: Tridair Fastener.............................................................................................. D-33
Figure D-16: Thumbscrews................................................................................................. D-33
Figure D-17: Machine Screws ............................................................................................. D-34
Figure D-18: Nuts or Bolts.................................................................................................. D-34
Figure D-19: Retaining Rings............................................................................................... D-35
Figure D-20: Drawhook Latch............................................................................................. D-35
Figure D-21: Spring Clip Latch-Catch................................................................................. D-35
Figure D-22: Butterfly Latch............................................................................................... D-36
Figure D-23: ATR Latch ..................................................................................................... D-36
Figure D-24: Lift and Turn Latch........................................................................................ D-36
Figure D-25: Slide Lock Latch............................................................................................. D-37
Figure D-26: Terminal Post Connections............................................................................ D-37
Figure D-27: Screw Terminal Connections.......................................................................... D-37
Figure D-28: Termipoint Connection.................................................................................. D-38
Figure D-29: Wirewrap Connection .................................................................................... D-38
Figure D-30: Taperpin Connection ..................................................................................... D-38
Figure D-31: PCB Connection............................................................................................. D-39
Figure D-32: BNC Connectors............................................................................................ D-39
Figure D-33: Quick Release Coax Connectors..................................................................... D-39
Figure D-34: Friction Locking Connector............................................................................ D-40
Figure D-35 Friction Locking Connector with Jackscrew.................................................. D-40
Figure D-36: Threadlocking Connector ............................................................................... D-40
Figure D-37: Slide Locking Connector................................................................................. D-41
Figure D-38: Dip ICs........................................................................................................... D-41
Figure D-39: Guided CCAs................................................................................................. D-41
Figure D-40: Guided CCAs with a Tool ............................................................................. D-42
Figure D-41: Non-guided CCAs.......................................................................................... D-42
Figure D-42: Modules ......................................................................................................... D-42
Figure D-43: Crimp Lugs..................................................................................................... D-43
Figure D-44: Form Leads..................................................................................................... D-43
Figure D-45: Soldering Terminal Posts................................................................................ D-43
Figure D-46: Soldering PCB Connections ........................................................................... D-43
Figure D-47: Desoldering with a Braided Wick................................................................... D-44
Figure D-48: Desoldering Using a Vacuum.......................................................................... D-44
Figure D-49: Form Flat Pack Leads..................................................................................... D-44
Figure D-50: Panels, Doors and Covers .............................................................................. D-45
Figure D-51: Drawers.......................................................................................................... D-45
Figure D-52: Display Lamps............................................................................................... D-45
Figure E-1: Life Cycle Phases of a Product ...................................................................... E-2
Figure E-2: Application of Activities by Phase................................................................ E-4

ix
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

TABLES

Table I: Scope of Key Topics.................................................................................... 1-1

Table II: Maintainability and Related Tasks............................................................... 1-3
Table III: Program Activity Characteristics and Guidelines for Supplier-Product
Classifications............................................................................................... 1-5
Table IV: Task Cross Reference: Old MIL-HDBK-470 to new MIL-HDBK-470A.. 1-8
Table V: Operational and Design Maintainability Contrasted.................................... 2-2
Table VI: Types and Purposes of Design Reviews...................................................... 4-3
Table VII: Risks and Consequences of Not Making BIT Part of Product Design ........ 4-17
Table VIII: Comparison of AI Techniques ..................................................................... 4-25
Table IX: First Order Dependency Model for Simple System .................................... 4-39
Table X: Typical Types of "In-Place" Repair and Maintenance................................ 4-48
Table XI: Allocation Using Failure Rate Complexity Method..................................... 4-49
Table XII: Example of Equal Distribution Method ....................................................... 4-51
Table XIII: Risks and Consequences of a Testing Approach That is Not Integrated..... 4-52
Table XIV: Values of z(t' 1- ) Most Commonly Used in Maintainability Analysis... 4-55
Table XV: Values of ke for Specified ...................................................................... 4-57
Table XVI: Example Data Fields From an Existing R&M Data Base............................... 4-61
Table B-I: Test Method Matrix..................................................................................... B-7
Table B-II: Factors Affecting the Suitability of a Specified Maintainability Index
for Maintainability Demonstration .............................................................. B-11
Table B-III: Causes of Discrepancies Between Test and Field Results........................... B-11
Table B-IV: Example of Step-by-Step Stratification........................................................ B-14
Table B-V: Calculations of Relative Frequency of Occurrence and Sample Size
for Example Radar Equipment...................................................................... B-15
Table B-VI: Stratification Procedure ................................................................................ B-17
Table B-VII: Failure Mode Selection................................................................................. B-19
Table B-VIII: Standardized Normal Deviates ..................................................................... B-25
Table B-IX: Sampling Plans for Specified p0, p1, , and When p0 is Small (e.g.,
p0<0.20)........................................................................................................ B-35
Table B-X: Plan A1. Observations Exceeding the Value of the Mean............................ B-51
Table B-XI: Plan B1. Observations Exceeding Mmax = 90 Percentile............................... B-52
Table B-XII: Plan B2. Observations Exceeding Mmax = 95 Percentile............................... B-53
Table B-XIII: vs. ................................................................................ B-59
~ ~
Table B-XIV: Acceptance Table for M ct or M pm ; Sample Size = 50 ................................ B-61
Table B-XV: Acceptance Table for Mmaxc or Mmaxpm; Sample Size = 50.......................... B-62
Table B-XVI: Penalty Values, P, for LFSR Signature Analyzers Implementing
Primitive Polynomial of Degree, k................................................................ B-80
Table B-XVII: Representative Faults for the Fault Equivalence Classes............................. B-82

x
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

TABLES (Continued)

Table B-XVIII: Sample Sizes Used to Obtain Lower Bound on Fault Coverage Using
Fault Simulation Procedure 2 ......................................................................... B-84
Table B-XIX: Sample Size Used to Accept/Reject Lower Bound on Fault Coverage
Using Simulation Procedure 3 ........................................................................ B-85
Table C-I: Categories of Product Subsystem, Equipment, and Component
Maintainability Guidelines............................................................................. C-1
Table C-II: Alpha Prefixes for Guidelines ........................................................................ C-3
Table C-III: Categories of Part Types and Technologies from RL-TR-92-12, Vol. I........ C-6
Table C-IV: Inherent Testability Checklist........................................................................ C-7
Table D-I: MTTR Elements............................................................................................ D-4
Table D-II: MTTR Elements for Prediction Procedure.................................................... D-4
Table D-III: Symbols Used in the MFD............................................................................ D-25
Table D-IV: Elemental Maintenance Actions..................................................................... D-30
Table D-V: Common Maintenance Tasks......................................................................... D-31

xi
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

This page has been left blank intentionally.

xii
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

SECTION ONE

1.0 SCOPE AND PURPOSE OF HANDBOOK.

1.1 Scope. Unlike previous handbooks which focused only on maintainability, this document
provides information to help the reader view maintainability in the context of an overall systems
engineering effort. The handbook defines maintainability, describes its relationship to other
disciplines, addresses the basic elements common to all sound maintainability programs,
describes the tasks and activities associated with those elements, and provides guidance in
selecting those tasks and activities. Due to the many aspects of maintainability and the large
number of related disciplines, the depth in which some topics are covered is necessarily limited.
Table I summarizes where the scope of the coverage of key topics is limited. Whenever possible,
references are given in the text to documents having more detailed information on a topic.

TABLE I. Scope of Key Topics.

Topic Scope Limited To
Availability and Readiness Basic concepts, effect of maintainability.
Life Cycle Costs Basic definitions, description of effect of maintainability on various cost
elements.
Manufacturing Description of impact of manufacturing on maintainability.
Human Engineering Description of human engineering discipline and relationship to
maintainability.
Safety Description of relationship to maintainability.
Testability Definition as subset of maintainability, description of concepts, general
information on key issues, design techniques and guidelines, definitions of
metrics, and demonstration testing (Appendix B). Testability is covered in
more detail in other handbooks and standards such as MIL-HDBK-2165.
Logistics Support General discussion with emphasis on how it is affected by maintainability.
Reliability-centered Maintenance Introduction with general procedure outlined.
Predictions Description of applications with the most used method from MIL-HDBK-
472 included in Appendix D.

This Appendix is for guidance only and cannot be cited as a requirement. If it is, the contractor
does not have to comply.

1.1.1 Purpose of the Handbook. This handbook has four purposes:

1. To provide insight into the reasons for specifying maintainability in a product1

development program and to describe the structural elements of a sound maintainability
program
2. To describe the design, test, and management tasks and activities that can be conducted
to meet the objective and achieve the required levels of maintainability and how to
incorporate these tasks in a tailored program

1
The general term "product" will be used to mean system, equipment, or item. It could be a vehicle, a
transmission, or an engine, whatever is being developed for the customer.

1-1
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

3. To provide guidance for structuring a Government solicitation to ensure that these tasks
and activities are addressed
4. To provide guidance for evaluating how well maintainability is addressed in proposals
submitted in response to a Government solicitation

1.1.2 Using the Handbook. Maintainability managers and engineers2 should use this document
when developing and implementing a sound maintainability program. It does not prescribe a set
of tasks that must be included for every product development effort but describes those
objectives common to all maintainability programs. It then provides guidance in selecting only
those tasks that best support the achievement of those objectives for the product development
effort in question. The handbook emphasizes and encourages the tailoring of each maintainability
program to account for schedule and budget constraints, technical risk, and customer needs and
requirements. Even though templates are provided to assist in developing the maintainability
portions of a statement of work and specification, they should not be used in "boilerplate"
fashion. To assist the reader in structuring an effective maintainability program, Tables II and III
are provided. Table II is an overview of maintainability tasks and activities and relates them to
the maintainability elements discussed in Section 4 of the handbook. Table III relates
maintainability activities to representative supplier/product classifications.

Although the principal maintainability tasks used in product development efforts are described in
this handbook, the reader is also referred to other documents for detailed "how to" procedures.
Detailed design guidelines, prediction methodology, acquisition guidance, and test methods and
plans are included as appendixes A through E. Appendix F lists all references and also includes a
listing of maintainability software tools.

As an aid to those readers familiar with the former MIL-STD-470B (reissued as MIL-HDBK-
470 in June 1995), task cross references are provided in Table IV.

1.2 Applicable Documents. See Appendix F.

(NOTE: Text continues with Section 1.5 following Tables II, III, and IV.)

2
Many companies may not use the job titles "maintainability engineer" or "maintainability manager." In many
cases, specialists in maintainability have been replaced by designers or other engineers who are assigned the
responsibility for maintainability. For convenience, "maintainability engineer" and "maintainability manager" are
used interchangeably in this handbook.

1-2
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

TABLE II. Maintainability and Related Tasks.

Relevant to Elements
Type
of
Activity Tasks and Description

Testability and Diagnostics. Designing and incorporating features for X

determining and isolating faults.
Design Reviews. Formal or informal independent evaluation and critique of X X X
a design to identify and correct hardware or software deficiencies.
D Environmental Characterization. Determination of the operational X X
E environment in which maintenance is expected to be performed.
S Supplier Control. Monitoring suppliers' activities to assure that purchased X X X
I hardware and software will have adequate maintainability.
G Standardization and Interchangeability. Designing for the use of and X
N incorporating common items. Designing so items can be exchanged
without alteration or change.
Human Engineering. Designing equipment so that they may be safely, X
easily, and efficiently used, operated, and maintained by the human
element of the system.
Testability. Systematically determining the coverage and adequacy of fault X X
detection and isolation capability. Includes dependency and fault
modeling.
Human Factors. Analyzing the design to ensure strength, access, visibility X X X
and other physical and psychological needs/limitations of users, operators,
and maintainers are adequately addressed.
Equipment Downtime Analysis. Determine and evaluate the expected X X
time that system will not be available due to maintenance or supply.
Failure Modes, Effects & Criticality Analysis (FMECA). Systematically X X X
A determining the effects of part or software failures on the product's ability
N to perform its function. This task includes FMEA.
A Failure Reporting Analysis & Corrective Action System (FRACAS). A X X X
L closed-loop system of data collection, analysis and dissemination to
Y identify and improve design and maintenance procedures.
S Life Cycle Planning. Determining maintainability and other requirements X X X X X
I by considering the impact over the expected useful life of the product.
S Modeling & Simulation. Creation of a representation, usually graphical or X X
mathematical, for the expected maintainability of a product, and validating
the selected model through simulation.
Parts Obsolescence. Analysis of the likelihood that changes in technology X X X
will make the use of a currently available part undesirable.
Predictions. Estimation of maintainability from available design, analysis X X X X
or test data, or data from similar products.
Repair Strategies. Determination of the most appropriate or cost effective X X
procedures for restoring operation after a product fails.
Quality Function Deployment. Determine product design goals (i.e., X X
product maintainability) from the user's operational requirements.
Allocations. Apportion system-level or product-level maintainability X X X X
requirements to lower levels of assembly.

1-3
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

TABLE II. Maintainability and Related Tasks. (continued)

Relevant to Elements
Type
of
Activity Tasks and Description

Functional Test. Verify product is behaving as intended. Of interest to X X

maintainability engineer are issues related to human factors.
Performance Test. Verifying that the product meets its performance X X X
requirements, including maintainability.
T Verification Test. Testing performed to determine the accuracy of and to X X X
E update the analytical data obtained from engineering analysis.
S Demonstration. Formal process conducted by product developer and end X
T customer to determine if specific maintainability requirements have been
achieved. Usually performed on production or pre-production items.
Evaluation. Process for determining the impact of operational and X X
maintenance and support environments on the maintainability performance of
the product.
Test Strategy and Integration. Determine most effective and economical X X X X
mix of tests for a product. Ensure integration of tests to minimize
duplication and maximize use of test data.
Benchmarking. Comparison of a supplier's performance attributes to its X X
competitors' and to the best performance achieved by any supplier in a
O comparable activity.
T Statistical Process Control (SPC). Comparing the variability in a product X
H against statistical expectations, to identify any need for adjustment of the
E production process.
R Market Survey. Determining the needs and wants of potential customers, X
their probable reaction to potential products, and their level of satisfaction
with existing products.
Inspection. Comparing a product to its specifications, as a quality check. X X

1-4
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

TABLE III. Program Activity Characteristics and Guidelines for Supplier-Product

Classifications.
Product Characteristics
* Product Tech- Unit Quan- Safety Program Program Activity Characteristics/Guidelines
Classification nology Cost tities Concerns Issue
Passive Items Low Low Large None Reqmts Customer doesn't specify requirements; suppliers
Dry goods to determine quality goals through QFD, surveys,
Books Low competitor benchmarking, warranty data, etc.
Handtools Design Maintainability may not be addressed as a separate
Furniture function but as part of product quality. Safety and
recycling are considerations.
Assess No separate maintainability analyses usually apply.
Warranty data and experience tracked.
Measure For products in which quality is driver, none. For
G others in which service life is a consideration,
E analysis, test, or both can be used.
N Ensure Market dictates length of service. Overdesign
E typical.
R Consumer Products Low Mod. Mod. Low Reqmts Supplier determines requirements based on customer
A Appliances to to to needs. Tailors to warranty requirements and
L Power tools Mod. Large Mod. competitive comparable products.
Cameras Design Limited maintainability practices used.
P Computers Assess Predictions and modeling possibly beneficial.
U Electronics Measure Some safety testing may be required by law. Some
B environmental testing may be appropriate. Formal
L maintainability testing not normally performed.
I Ensure Short term warranty may be appropriate.
C Consumer Durables Mod. Mod. Mod. Low Reqmts Maintainability program recommended with
Automobiles to to to allocated goals.
Boats High Large High Design Product quality and price prime drivers. Small
number of design teams with few members.
Testability and diagnostics of some importance.
Material selection and processes used are important.
Life considerations important.
Assess Predictions and modeling should be used. FMEAs
and testability analyses should be performed.
Significant testing used to assess progress.
Measure More extensive environmental and some
developmental testing usually appropriate.
Ensure Warranty and service contracts applicable.
Passive Items Low Low Large None Reqmts Customer doesn't specify requirements; suppliers
Dry goods to determine quality goals through QFD, surveys,
I Books Low competitor benchmarking, warranty data, etc.
N Handtools Design Maintainability may not be addressed as a separate
D Furniture function but as part of product quality. Safety and
U recycling are considerations.
S Assess No separate maintainability analyses usually apply.
T Warranty data and experience tracked.
R Measure For products in which quality is driver, none. For
I others in which service life is a consideration,
A analysis, test, or both can be used.
L Ensure Market dictates length of service. Overdesign
typical.
* Supplier Classification

Note: The activity characteristics and guidelines from one classification of product to the next within a given supplier classification are
additive. For example, the program activity characteristics and guidelines for Industrial Light Equipment include all those stated for Industrial
Passive Items.

1-5
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

TABLE III. Program Activity Characteristics and Guidelines for Supplier-Product

Classifications. (continued)
Product Characteristics
* Product Tech- Unit Quan- Safety Program Program Activity Characteristics/Guidelines
Classification nology Cost tities Concerns Issue
Light Equipment Low Mod. Large Mod. Reqmts Customer may specify requirements for unique needs.
Computers Most goals internally developed for market.
Printers Design Quality, service life, material selection, parts control
Engines and environment are typical concerns. Testability
Recorders and diagnostics of some importance.
Assess Modeling usually done to scope design and
understand interdependencies. Predictions possibly
needed. FMEA and testability analyses should be
considered.
Measure Development testing may be effective for high
quantities and severe operations.
Ensure Statistical process control important to control
variability.
Heavy Equipment Low Mod. Mod. Mod. Reqmts Translation of customer expressed needs to design
Elevators to to to specs needed. Surveys, QFD, & competitor
Escalators Mod. High High benchmarking often beneficial. Government safety
Boilers requirements common. Allocation of requirements
Transformers usually required. Comprehensive maintainability
program recommended.
I Design Although quality is important, service life is a
N driver. Few to many design teams with many
D members.
U Assess Modeling is important and FMEA used to
S understand maintenance and diagnostics needs.
T Safety, availability & operating costs very important.
R Customer may require specific analyses.
I Measure Safety testing common. Customers may require formal
A demonstrations. Some simulation may be
L appropriate.
Ensure Warranties apply; ability to repair is important;
maintenance reporting is strongly recommended.
Industrial Systems High High Small High Reqmts Risks need identification, trade analysis may be
Aircraft to to needed. Allocation of requirements may be needed.
Railroad engines Mod. Critical Design Safety, availability, operating costs and service life
Satellites are drivers. Few to many design teams with many
Medical equip. members. Built-in test of importance.
Assess Modeling, testability analysis, and FMEA are
essential to understand maintenance and diagnostics
needs. Customer may require specific analyses.
Measure Qualification test may be considered.
Ensure Obsolete parts and wearout are a concern. Audits
and inspections are useful.
Structures/Facilities Low High Small High Reqmts Extremely long service life requirements.
Bridges to Design Service life and safety essential. Maintainability is
Train tracks High important as it supports these requirements. Few to
Airport many design teams.
Building power Assess Materials selection critical.
plants Measure Extensive model testing & simulation usually
Chemical plants effective.
Ensure Periodic safety inspections or performance audits.
* Supplier Classification

Note: The activity characteristics and guidelines from one classification of product to the next within a given supplier classification are
additive. For example, the program activity characteristics and guidelines for Industrial Light Equipment include all those stated for Industrial
Passive Items.

1-6
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

TABLE III. Program Activity Characteristics and Guidelines for Supplier-Product

Classifications. (continued)
Product Characteristics
* Product Tech- Unit Quan- Safety Program Program Activity Characteristics/Guidelines
Classification nology Cost tities Concerns Issue
I Passive Items Low Low Large None Reqmts Customer doesn't specify requirements; suppliers
N Uniforms to determine quality goals through QFD, surveys,
D Food Low competitor benchmarking, warranty data, etc.
U Helmets Design Maintainability may not be addressed as a separate
S Desks function but as part of product quality. Safety and
T Dry goods recycling are considerations
R Assess No separate maintainability analyses usually apply.
I Warranty data and experience tracked.
A Measure For products in which quality is driver, none. For
L others in which service life is a consideration,
analysis, test, or both can be used.
Ensure Market dictates length of service. Overdesign typical.
Small Weapon Low Mod. Large Low Reqmts Customer usually specifies field maintainability re-
Systems to to quirements in his terms, translation to design speci-
Rifles High High fications needed. Allocation of requirements usually
Radios needed. Maintainability program recommended.
Munitions Design Parts and material selection important. Testability
and diagnostics are important. Many design teams
with many members. Conservative safety margins
used.
Assess Predictions usually performed, and sometimes
FMECAs and testability analyses.
Measure Government-mandated formal demonstrations
common. Sample testing may be effective in
production.
M Ensure Statistical process control valuable. FRACAS is a
I must.
L Critical Weapon High High Small High Reqmts Comprehensive program required. Customer specifica-
I Systems to to tions need to be translated and allocated. Require-
T Radars Mod. Critical ments need to be flowed-down to subcontractors.
A Tanks Design System must be modeled. Part and material
R Aircraft engines application critical to success. Integrated diagnostics
Y Smart munitions and BIT may be important.
Assess Predictions, testability analyses, and FMECAs
necessary. Environment assumptions must be valid.
Measure Developmental component, subsystem, and some
product-level testing should be required. Model
testing and simulation may be beneficial.
Ensure Warranties and part obsolescence should be
considered. Repair and service strategy important.
Strategic Weapon High High Small High Reqmts Extensive allocation of requirements to subsystems
Systems to and components required. Risks need identification.
Ships Critical Trade analysis should be performed. Comprehensive
Aircraft program required.
Satellites Design Safety and periods of failure-free operation are big
Submersibles drivers. Modeling and predictions are necessary.
Integrated diagnostics and BIT are essential.
Assess Predictions and FMEAs usually performed. Emphasis
on safety.
Measure Extensive and rigorous testing effective.
Ensure Periodic or continual audits and/or inspections may
be beneficial. Lifetime extension often required.
* Supplier Classification
Note: The activity characteristics and guidelines from one classification of product to the next within a given supplier classification are
additive. For example, the program activity characteristics and guidelines for Industrial Light Equipment include all those stated for Industrial
Passive Items.

1-7
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

TABLE IV. Task Cross Reference: Old MIL-HDBK-470 to New MIL-HDBK-470A.

Tasks from Old MIL-HDBK-470
MIL-HDBK-470A
101 102 103 104 201 202 203 204 205 206 207 301
Section
4.2 Management X X X
Approach
4.3 Design for M(t) X X X X X X X X
4.4.1 Analysis X X X X X X X
4.4.2 Test X X
4.5 Data Collection X X X X
and Analysis
Appendix B X
Appendix C X
Appendix D X X
Tasks: 101 - Program Plan 203 - Maintainability Predictions
102 - Monitor and Control Subcontractors 204 - Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
103 - Program Reviews 205 - Maintainability Analysis
104 - Data Collection, Analysis, & Corrective Action 206 - Maintainability Design Criteria
201 - Maintainability Modeling 207 - Maintenance Plan & LSA Inputs
202 - Maintainability Allocations 301 - Maintainability & Testability Demonstration

1.3 Definitions, Acronyms and Abbreviations. The following acronyms and abbreviations
are used within the main handbook. Definitions and additional maintainability and testability
related acronyms and abbreviations may be found in Appendix G: Glossary.

MCMT95 Maximum Corrective Maintenance Time at a 95% Confidence Level

AI Artificial Intelligence
Ai Inherent Availability
AIAG Automotive Industries Action Group
ANSI American National Standards Institute
Ao Operational Availability
ARINC Aeronautical Radio Incorporated
ASIC Application Specific Integrated Circuit
ATA Air Transportation Association
AWM Awaiting Maintenance (Time)
AWP Awaiting Parts (Time)

BIT Built-in-test
BITE Built-in-test Equipment

CAD Computer-aided-design
CAM Computer-aided-manufacturing
CID Commercial Item Description
CM Corrective Maintenance
CND Cannot Duplicate
COTS Commercial off-the-shelf
CRT Cathode Ray Tube

1-8
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

DAR Defense Acquisition Reform

DMH Direct Maintenance Hours
DMH/MA Direct Manhours per Maintenance Action
DoD Department of Defense
DoDISS Department of Defense Index of Specifications and Standards
DT Downtime
DT&E Development Test and Evaluation

EMD Engineering and Manufacturing Development

EMI Electromagnetic Interference
EMT Elapsed Maintenance Time
ETE External Test Equipment
ETI Elapsed Time Indicator

FAR False Alarm Rate

FD Fault Detection
FD&I Fault Detection and Isolation
FFD Fraction of Faults Detectable
FFI Fraction of Faults Isolatable
FI Fault Isolation
FMEA Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
FMECA Failure Modes, Effects and Criticality Analysis
FRACAS Failure Reporting, Analysis, and Corrective Action System
FSC Federal Stock Class
FTA Fault Tree Analysis

HE Human Engineering

IC Integrated Circuit
IEC International Electrotechnical Commission
IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
ILS Integrated Logistics Support
IOT&E Initial Operational Test and Evaluation
IPD Integrated Product Team

LRU Line Replaceable Unit

LSA Logistic Support Analysis

MA Maintenance Action
MACMT Mean Active Corrective Maintenance Time
MAISAP Major Automated Information System Acquisition Programs
MDAP Major Defense Acquisition Programs
MDS Mission/Design/Series

1-9
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

MDT Mean Downtime

MICAP Mission Capability
MLH Mean Maintenance Labor Hours
M Max Maximum Maintenance Time at a Specified Confidence Level
MMH/Repair Mean Manhours per Repair
MMH/FH Mean Manhours per Flying Hour
MMH/OH Mean Manhours per Operating Hour
MR Maintenance Rate
MTBF Mean Time Between Failures
MTBM Mean Time Between Maintenance
MTBPM Mean Time Between Preventive Maintenance
MTTR Mean Time To Repair
MTTRF Mission Time to Restore Functions
MTTRS Mean Time to Restore System
MTTS Mean Time To Service
MTUT Mean Equipment Corrective Maintenance Time To Support a Unit of
Operating Time

NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDI Non-developmental Item
NRTS Not Repairable This Station

O&M Operation and Maintenance

P&C Production and Construction

PAT Process Action Team
PCB Printed Circuit Board
PM Preventive Maintenance
PR&P Product Retirement and Phase-out

RAC Reliability Analysis Center

RAMS Reliability and Maintainability Symposium
R&D Research and Development
R&M Reliability and Maintainability
RCM Reliability-centered Maintenance
RFP Request for Proposal
RI Replaceable Item
R/R Remove and Replace
RTOK Retest OK
RU Replaceable Unit

SAE Society of Automotive Engineers

SMD Surface Mount Device

1-10
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

SOO Statement of Objective

SOW Statement of Work
SPS Standard Performance Specification
SRD Standard Reference Designator
STAMP System Testability and Maintenance Program
STAT System Testability Analysis Tool

TR Technical Report
TSMD Time Stress Measurement Device

VE Virtual Environment
VR Virtual Reality

WSTA Weapon System Testability Analyzer

WUC Work Unit Code

1-11
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

This page has been left blank intentionally.

1-12
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

SECTION TWO

2.0 THE CONCEPT OF MAINTAINABILITY.

What is maintainability and why is it important? Is maintainability related to reliability, weight,

safety, purchase price, ease of manufacture, finish, functional performance, and other
requirements? As explained in this introduction, if a product is to be maintainable, the concept of
maintainability, its relationship to other disciplines, and its contribution to product value must be
understood by the maintainability engineer and design team.

2.1 What is Maintainability? Different textbooks and other reference documents define
maintainability in slightly different ways. However, consolidating the ideas in these definitions
yields the following definition:

Maintainability. The relative ease and economy of time and resources with which an
item can be retained in, or restored to, a specified condition when maintenance is
performed by personnel having specified skill levels, using prescribed procedures and
resources, at each prescribed level of maintenance and repair. In this context, it is a
function of design.

In succeeding sections, this definition will be examined in more detail. For now, it is sufficient to
note that maintainability, a design characteristic, concerns the relative ease and cost of preventing
failures (retaining an item in a specified condition) or correcting failures (restoring an item to a
specified condition) through maintenance actions3.

Maintainability is a design parameter. Although other factors, such as highly trained people and
a responsive supply system, can help keep downtime to an absolute minimum, it is the inherent
maintainability that determines this minimum. Improving training or support cannot effectively
compensate for the effect on availability of a poorly designed (in terms of maintainability)
product. Minimizing the cost to support a product and maximizing the availability of that
product are best done by designing the product to be reliable and maintainable.

Testability, an important subset of maintainability, is a design characteristic that allows the

status (operable, inoperable or degraded) of an item to be determined, and faults within the item
to be isolated in a timely and efficient manner. The ability to detect and isolate faults within a
system, and to do so efficiently and cost effectively, is important not only in the field, but also
during manufacturing. All products must be tested and verified prior to release to the customer.
Paying attention to testability concerns up front will pay benefits during the testing phases of
manufacturing. Therefore, a great deal of attention must be paid to ensuring that all designs
incorporate features that allow testing to occur without a great deal of effort. Design guides and
analysis tools must be used rigorously to ensure a testable design. Not doing so leads to greater
costs in the development of manufacturing and field tests, as well as in the development of test

3
In designing for maintainability, we want to develop a product that is serviceable (easily repaired) and
supportable (can be cost-effectively kept in or restored to a usable condition).

2-1
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

equipment. Trade-offs must be made up front on the use of built-in-test (BIT) versus other
means of fault detection and isolation. Further, the expected percentage of faults that can be
detected and isolated to a specified or desired level of ambiguity must be determined as an
important input to the logistics analysis process. The consequences of poor testability are higher
manufacturing costs, higher support costs, and lower customer satisfaction.

No matter how they may define maintainability, commercial and military users measure the
performance of products in their own ways, to suit their own needs. A car owner may be most
concerned with low cost of operation and few visits to the repair shop. An airline may be most
concerned with staying on schedule. These measures may or may not include factors totally
determined by the design. So, the way in which a customer measures the maintainability of a
product in use may not be meaningful to a designer, and a translation from the user's measures to
measures more appropriate for design may be needed. Table V shows how operational (the
user's) maintainability and design maintainability differ. Also see Appendix A.

TABLE V. Operational and Design Maintainability Contrasted.

Design Maintainability Operational Maintainability
Used to define, measure and evaluate Used to describe performance when operated in planned
supplier's program environment
Derived from operational needs Not normally appropriate for contract requirements
Selected such that achieving them allows Used to describe needed level of maintainability performance
projected satisfaction of operational in actual use
maintainability
Expressed in design parameters Expressed in operational values
Includes only effects of design and Includes combined effects of item design, quality, installation
manufacturing environment, maintenance policy, repair, delays, etc.
Typical terms Typical terms
- MTTR (mean-time-to-repair) - MDT (mean-downtime)
- Ai (inherent availability) - Ao (operational availability)

2.2 Effect of Maintainability on Operations and Costs. Maintainability is a measure of a

product's performance that affects both mission accomplishment and operations and maintenance
costs. Too often we think of performance only in terms of speed, capacity, range, and other
"normal" measures. However, a product that requires an inordinate amount of time or other
resources to remain in an operable state or to be repaired (i.e., poor maintainability) will either be
unavailable when needed or unaffordable.

2.2.1 Operations. Maintainability is important to operations, or mission accomplishment,

because it directly affects product availability. Products that never fail would always be available
for use, but such products are rare. When a product fails, it must be restored to a functional
state as quickly as possible. Regardless of whether components of a product are repairable or
not (i.e., they may be throwaway items), it is important that failures can be economically
diagnosed and components quickly removed and replaced. Of course, an entire product may not
be designed to be repairable; economics may dictate total replacement. Even in these cases, the

2-2
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

product may require calibration or servicing of some type; so maintainability is still an important
consideration.

2.2.1.1 Relationship of Reliability and Maintainability. Reliability and maintainability

(R&M) are often considered to be complementary disciplines. To understand why, consider the
equation for inherent availability (equation 1). Inherent availability reflects the percent of time a
product would be available if no delays due to maintenance, supply, etc. (i.e., not design-related)
were encountered.

MTBF (Equation 1)
Ai = x 100%
MTBF + MTTR

where MTBF is the mean time between failure

and MTTR is the mean time to repair

If the product never failed, the MTBF would be infinite and Ai would be 100%. Or, if it took
no time at all to repair the product, MTTR would be zero and again the availability would be
100%. As shown in Figure 1, a given level of Ai (see the next section for a discussion of
availability) can be achieved with different values of R&M. As reliability decreases, better
maintainability is needed to achieve the same availability and vice versa.
(Increasing Reliability)
MTBF (in hours)

1/MTTR (in inverse of hours)

(Increasing Maintainability

FIGURE 1. Different Combinations of MTBF and MTTR Yield the Same Inherent
Availability.

2-3
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

This complementary relationship is important because it means that trades can be made between
the two requirements when the end objective is a given availability. For example, if achieving a
given level of reliability is too costly or technically difficult, it may be possible to achieve a given
availability by increasing the maintainability requirement, and vice versa. Also, some reliability
analyses, such as the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA), provide data needed by the
maintainability engineer. If for no other reason than these, the maintainability and reliability
engineers must work hand-in-hand to ensure that the product meets the R&M requirements.

2.2.1.2 Availability and Operational Readiness. Operational availability is similar to

inherent availability but includes the effects of maintenance delays and other non-design factors.
The equation for operational availability, or Ao , is:

MTBM (Equation 2)
Ao =
MTBM + MDT
where MTBM is the mean time between maintenance
and MDT is the mean downtime

(Note that MTBM addresses all maintenance, corrective and preventive, whereas MTBF only
accounts for failures. MDT includes MTTR and all other time involved with downtime, such as
delays. Thus, Ao reflects the totality of the inherent design of the product, the availability of
maintenance personnel and spares, maintenance policy and concepts, and other non-design
factors, whereas Ai reflects only the inherent design.)

Closely related to the concept of operational availability but broader in scope is operational
readiness. Operational readiness is defined as the ability of a military unit to respond to its
operational plans upon receipt of an operations order. It is, therefore, a function not only of the
product availability, but also of assigned numbers of operating and maintenance personnel, the
supply, the adequacy of training, and so forth.

Although operational readiness has traditionally been a military term, it is equally applicable in
the commercial world. For example, a manufacturer may have designed and is capable of making
very reliable, maintainable products. What if he has a poor distribution and transportation
system or does not provide the service or stock the parts needed by customers to effectively use
the product? Then, the readiness of this manufacturer to go to market with the product is low.

The concepts of availability and operational readiness are obviously related. Important to note,
however, is that while the inherent design characteristics of a product totally determine inherent
availability, other factors influence operational availability and operational readiness. The
maintainability engineer directly influences the design of the product. But, together with the
reliability engineer, the maintainability engineer also can affect other factors by providing logistics
planners with the information needed to identify required personnel, spares, and other resources.
This information includes the identification of maintenance tasks, repair procedures, and needed
support equipment.

2-4
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

2.2.2 Life Cycle Costs. In considering the effect of maintainability on costs, the costs
associated with the life cycle of a product, from cradle to grave (i.e., the costs to purchase,
operate and maintain the product over its planned service life, and then dispose of it), must be
addressed. These total costs are called life cycle costs. Each acquisition phase has costs
associated with it. Although the phases of acquisition can be defined differently by different
customers (or suppliers), life cycle costs are frequently broken out into four categories: research
and development, production and construction, operation and maintenance, and retirement and
phaseout.

As noted, the phases of acquisition have sets of associated costs (each set is a portion of the total
life cycle costs) and the phases can be defined in different ways. Within the Department of
Defense (DoD), the life cycle is divided into four phases, which do not necessarily occur in
strictly a serial manner but may overlap. The phases of acquisition as defined by Department of
Defense Regulation (DoD) 5000.2-R are:

Phase 0: Concept Exploration

Phase I: Program Definition and Risk Reduction
Phase II: Engineering and Manufacturing Development
Phase III: Production, Fielding/Deployment, and Operational Support

Although not referred to specifically as a phase, Demilitarization and Disposal is described by

DoD 5000.2-R as those activities conducted at the end of a system's useful life. See Appendix A
for a more detailed discussion of the acquisition phases as defined in DoD 5000.2-R and
Appendix E for a discussion of maintainability activities by phase.

In the commercial sector, the life cycle phases of a product are often defined as follows:

Customer need analysis

Design and development (includes DoD phases 0, I, and II)
Production and construction (includes production portion of DoD Phase III)
Operation and maintenance (includes operational support portion of DoD Phase III)
Retirement and phase-out (equivalent to Demilitarization and Disposal)

2.2.2.1 Research and Development (R&D) Costs (DoD Phases 0, I, and II). This category
includes the cost of feasibility (trade) studies; system analyses (support concept development);
detailed design and development (including software); fabrication, assembly, and test of
engineering models; initial system testing and evaluation; and associated documentation. The cost
attributable to maintainability at this stage is relatively high. Depending upon system
complexity, the maintainability engineer may need to implement design approaches that could
easily account for 10% of the development costs, especially if extensive BIT and diagnostics are

2-5
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

involved, to meet the maintainability requirements. Remember, however, that investments in

maintainability made early in a program can significantly reduce downstream operation and
maintenance costs. The goal during research and development should be to make investments
that will reduce the life cycle costs to the lowest possible value.

The design approaches recommended by the maintainability engineer must be based upon the
customer's requirements, the operational environment, experience, field surveys and interviews,
and trade studies.

2.2.2.2 Production and Construction (P&C) Costs (Part of DoD Phase III). This category
includes the costs of fabrication, assembly, and testing of production models; establishment of
the initial logistic support requirements; facility construction; production operations and quality
control; development of training courseware; and the integration of a software support plan.
Costs associated with maintainability in this phase are primarily driven by initial operational test
and evaluation, and demonstration testing. For the first time, the focus is on software and BIT,
and close surveillance is required to anticipate and correct problems. Costs incurred during R&D
and P&C should be viewed as an investment to ensure product availability and a low total cost of
ownership.

2.2.2.3 Operation and Maintenance (O&M) Costs (Part of DoD Phase III). This category
can be considered the costs of consumer or user ownership. Included are the costs of sustaining
operations, personnel and maintenance support, spares and repair parts, consumables,
warehousing, shipping, configuration management, modification requirements, technical data
changes, software maintenance and configuration control, and operating and maintenance
personnel training. During this phase, data collection and tracking, customer site visits, failure
analysis, and general integration issues constitute the majority of costs associated with
maintainability. The maintainability aspects of engineering changes that occur during this phase
must be evaluated.

Maintainability is important to O&M costs because it directly influences the ease and economy
with which required maintenance can be performed. Ease and economy translate to the number
and qualifications of people required to support a product, the number and types of support
equipment needed to perform maintenance, the time required to perform maintenance (cycle time
and touch labor time4), and the degree of safety (of both the product and the people) with which
maintenance can be performed. Although many other factors can affect the number of support
personnel and other elements of operating and support costs, the level of maintainability
designed into the product is an important driver of these costs. Indeed, if the maintainability
engineer has done a good job, the O&M phase of the product's life cycle should reflect the
benefits of a well balanced design: minimal downtime and low (affordable) ownership costs.

4
The time that a maintenance person is actually doing work on the product.

2-6
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

2.2.2.4 Product Retirement and Phase-out (PR&P) Costs. This category includes the costs
associated with reclamation and disposal of components and materials. In some companies, these
costs are the concern of the maintainability engineer. In such cases, even in the R&D phase, the
maintainability engineer can anticipate the PR&P phase by addressing in design
recommendations: material durability, environmental concerns, statutory regulations governing
material disposal, and the methods and locations where reclamation and disposal might be
performed. Special attention should be paid to the reclamation of precious metals and the
disposal of hazardous or radioactive materials. During PR&P, lessons learned files are updated,
and in-depth tear-down analyses of selected components are often conducted to update service
life data.

2.2.2.5 Opportunity and Equivalent Costs. Opportunity and equivalent costs are not a
separate category of life cycle costs. Instead, these costs can be associated with any category of
life cycle costs. An opportunity cost refers to a loss of revenue or the cost associated with a lost
opportunity to invest in a desired manner or to earn income. An equivalent cost is any cost not
readily measured in terms of dollars. Two examples follow.

One example of an opportunity cost would be the revenue "lost" by airline A when passengers
are re-booked on airline B, after airline A's aircraft was taken out of service because a failure could
not be fault isolated in time for the flight. Potential revenue is lost and cannot be recovered. This
lost revenue may not normally be recorded as a cost of operation but has the same effect on
profit as does any other cost. In this case, the opportunity cost would be an O&M cost.

The next example illustrates both an equivalent cost and an opportunity cost. A military service
needs and has sufficient funds to purchase, operate, and maintain 100 new cargo aircraft to meet a
mission need over the next 20 years. The quantity of 100 is based on the aircraft meeting certain
availability requirements. If an aircraft is bought but falls short of its availability requirements by
10% due to poor maintainability performance, the military customer has two alternatives5: meet
only 90% of mission requirements (equivalent to having purchased only 90 aircraft) or increase
availability. If the first alternative is selected, the equivalent cost would be the inability to
perform the mission. If the second alternative is selected (additional aircraft are purchased, an
improvement program is implemented, or additional spares and other logistics resources are
purchased), funds diverted from other purposes to increase availability would represent an
opportunity cost. In either case, the cost could be considered an O&M cost.

2.2.3 Affordability. Affordability means that the customer can afford the life cycle costs of a
product. Too often, "purchase price" becomes the sole focus of attention. Of course, purchase
price is an important factor to both seller and customer. Too high a purchase price means that
few, if any, products will be sold. However, a product that has a low purchase price but is
extremely expensive to own and operate is equally hard to sell. Customers also must be able to

5
Assume that the aircraft manufacturer cannot be made to improve the aircraft or provide additional aircraft at no cost
to the government. In view of actual historical cases, this assumption is not unreasonable.

2-7
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

afford to operate and maintain the product over its lifetime. Affordability is a function of
product value and product costs. Product value is a customer perception and is generally a
reflection of the degree to which the product meets all of the customers requirements, including
maintainability. Product costs, on the other hand, are a hard reality and may be considered a
limiting factor on affordability.

Maintainability affects affordability because it affects availability (value) and acquisition and
ownership costs. As noted earlier, up-front investments in maintainability increase acquisition
costs but will reduce downstream (O&M) costs. Balances, therefore, must be struck between
value and costs, and between acquisition costs and operation and maintenance costs.

2.3 Other Relationships. The relationships between maintainability and reliability and
between maintainability and life cycle costs have already been discussed. Maintainability is
related to many other design and support disciplines, either providing information to them or
receiving information from them. These relationships are influenced and supported by a multi-
disciplinary approach to developing and manufacturing a product. This approach is referred to
by titles such as systems engineering, concurrent engineering, or Integrated Product
Development. Maintainability engineers have the responsibility for developing and fostering
these relationships, and cannot fulfill their responsibilities unless they are a part of a team effort.
Figure 2 shows some of the key disciplines with which maintainability has a relationship. (Note
that design is not a related discipline because maintainability is a function of design.) Each of
these disciplines will be briefly discussed.

SAFETY

LOGISTICS MFG.
SUP P ORT
MAINTAINABILITY
(A Design Function)

DIAGNOSTICS & HUMAN

MAINTENANCE ENGINEERING

FIGURE 2. Some Key Disciplines to Which Maintainability is Related.

2.3.1 Manufacturing. The manufacturing processes used to transform the design to a tangible
product determine if the inherent design maintainability of the product is achieved. It is essential

2-8
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

that the designed maintainability not be compromised by manufacturing requirements, so

manufacturing engineers and planners must be involved in the design effort. Without their
involvement, maintainability design features or approaches may make the product difficult or too
expensive to manufacture. For example, access panels that were included to ensure
maintainability requirements are met might be placed in an area where the moldline of the product
has compound curves. Moving the panel to an area that is flat or has a simpler surface might still
allow good access and improve manufacturability.

2.3.2 Human Engineering. Human Engineering (HE) is the discipline that addresses the
safety, effectiveness, role, and integration of people in the operation, use, and maintenance of a
product. A part of the total system design process, HE examines how the design of the product
affects human welfare and how people interact with the product. These people include users,
operators, and maintainers of the product. The physical structure and mechanical operation of
the human body and functioning of human senses determine how people can interact with a
product. This interaction is usually referred to as the man-machine interface. In some textbooks,
maintainability is included as a subset of HE. The ease and economy with which maintenance
can be performed is partly a function of how well the designers have considered human
limitations and abilities in regard to strength, perception, reach, dexterity, and biology. Certainly,
the HE and maintainability engineers have related and often common goals. Close coordination
and communication between the two disciplines is, therefore, essential.

Maintainability is directly related to the anthropometric and psychological characteristics of the

human beings who will operate and maintain the product. The maintainability engineer must
collaborate with the human factors engineer, and consider human engineering factors during design
efforts, to ensure the required range of expected human maintainers can indeed accomplish the
tasks. Anthropometric characteristics determine how large access openings must be, the need for
stands, how far replaceable units may be placed inside a compartment and still be reachable, and
so forth. Psychological factors determine what types of warnings are most effective, which way
a calibration knob should turn, whether a continuously variable or detented knob should be used,
and so forth.

2.3.3 Safety. In designing for maintainability, the maintainability engineer must be constantly
aware of the relationship between maintainability and safety. Safety includes designing the
product and maintenance procedures to minimize the possibility of damage to the product during
servicing and maintenance, and to minimize the possibility of harm to maintenance and operating
personnel. From the safety discipline usually come warning labels, precautionary information for
maintenance and operating manuals, and the procedures for disposing of hazardous materials and
the product.

2.3.4 Diagnostics and Maintenance. Testability has been introduced as a subset of

maintainability. It was defined as a design characteristic that allows the status of an item to be
determined and faults to be detected and isolated efficiently (or at an "affordable" cost).
Diagnostics consists of the manual, automatic, and semi-automatic maintenance hardware,

2-9
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

software, and procedures used to determine status, detect faults, and isolate faults. The required
hardware, software, and procedures will depend in large measure on the maintainability of the
design (i.e., testability characteristics). Diagnostics are just one aspect of maintenance. All
maintenance procedures are determined in large measure by the design. A highly maintainable
design will require the least amount of support equipment and the fewest and the simplest
procedures.

2.3.5 Logistics Support. Logistics support requirements are greatly affected by

maintainability design decisions. The results of maintainability analyses are used by the logistics
managers in planning for the following five major categories of logistics support (Note: the
categories may be defined differently in other documents; however, the five listed here fairly
represent the major elements of logistics):

Manpower and personnel

Support and test equipment
Facilities requirements
Training development
Sparing
Technical manuals

Conversely, the logistics support provided for a product will affect the degree to which the
inherent maintainability of a product is realized in actual use. That is, even if the inherent
maintainability meets or exceeds the design requirement, the observed operational maintainability
will be as expected only if the required logistics support is available. Furthermore, the support
concept and any customer constraints or requirements regarding technical data, support
equipment, training, (initial, recurring, and due to personnel turnover), field engineering support,
spares procurement, contractor depot support, mobility, and support personnel must be
understood and considered during all design trade offs and analyses. An increasingly more critical
aspect of logistics is obsolescence of internal and piece parts. Sometimes these parts "vanish"
because the underlying manufacturing processes are eliminated for ecological or economic reasons.
Sometimes the parts themselves are displaced by ones that incorporate new technology but are
not identical in form, fit, and function. Whatever the reason, parts (and process) obsolescence is
an often overlooked and critical issue. Life buys are one way of coping with obsolescence.

2.4 Maintainability and the Acquisition Process. Maintainability is a customer

performance requirement. In the acquisition of a new product, the customer must either select an
"off-the shelf" product or must contract with a supplier to provide a product that meets all the
performance requirements. The former case typifies the commercial environment. A customer
shops around, for example, for an automobile that meets all of his or her performance
requirements (gas mileage, size, acceleration, etc.), satisfies the intangibles ("look and feel"), and
is affordable. Even customers who do not maintain their own automobiles want a car that is

2-10
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

inexpensive to have repaired (i.e., low O&M costs) and can be repaired quickly (high
availability). Competition not only gives the customer a wide range of choice, but it forces
manufacturers to design and build cars that are maintainable (and reliable, and comfortable, etc.).
Individual customers do not develop design requirements and specifications, contract for the
development of a new model, or otherwise directly participate in the development of
automobiles. Instead, the manufacturer must determine the requirements through customer
surveys, warranty information, and benchmarking of competitors' products.

Likewise, the military services, when purchasing commercial off-the-shelf (COTS)6 products do
not directly participate in the development of those products. For example, the military services
purchase personal computers (PCs) for office use from the same manufacturers as does the
general public. These PCs come off the same production lines used to manufacture PCs for the
commercial marketplace, have the same design, use the same parts, and often come with the same
warranty. So, for a COTS purchase, no design is involved and, hence, design maintainability is
not an issue7. The use of COTS items does, however, have implications for the support concept.
Since customers using COTS items are essentially purchasing on a form, fit, function, and
Interface ( F3 I or F-cubed I) basis, they will not have configuration control of or data describing
the internal design of a COTS item. Without configuration control or design data, the customer
will have no way to develop and maintain maintenance procedures for repairing the COTS item.
Consequently, the support concept will be one of removing and replacing the failed COTS item
and sending it back to the supplier for repair.

When the military needs a product not used in the commercial marketplace, or which is similar to
a commercial product but must meet much more severe requirements, a new military acquisition
program begins. The program may be to develop a completely new product or to modify an
existing one. In either case, the customer must explicitly identify to potential suppliers the
performance requirements for the product. When more than one supplier is capable of providing
the product, these requirements are included in a Request for Proposal (RFP) that is issued by
the military customer's procuring activity. Maintainability must be addressed in the RFP.

Appendix A describes the acquisition process, explains how the process is being affected by
Defense Acquisition Reform, and provides more detailed guidance on preparing an RFP and
evaluating proposals from a maintainability perspective.

6
Throughout this handbook, COTS is used to mean either Commercial Off-the-Shelf or Commercial Item.
7
Design of interfaces when the COTS is a component or subsystem of a larger product being developed for the
customer is, of course, another matter. For example, the ability to detect that the COTS item has failed, providing
access to remove and replace the item, identifying any tools or support equipment needed to calibrate the item, and
developing the procedures associated with these activities will be major maintainability concerns.

2-11
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

This page has been left blank intentionally.

2-12
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

SECTION THREE

3.0 OBJECTIVE OF A MAINTAINABILITY PROGRAM

The objective of a sound maintainability program is to design and manufacture a product that is
easily and economically retained in, or restored to, a specified condition when maintenance is
performed by personnel having specified skill levels, using prescribed procedures and resources,
at each prescribed level of maintenance and repair. Since maintainability is a true design
characteristic, attempts to improve the inherent maintainability of a product after the design is
"frozen" usually are expensive and inefficient. Nevertheless, as previously mentioned,
operational maintainability depends on other factors, most notable the support system, that can
negate the best efforts of the designer. For example, if an insufficient number of spare parts are
purchased, or it takes an inordinate amount of time to get those parts where and when they are
needed, then no level of maintainability will be adequate. Poorly trained maintenance personnel
will also cause maintainability to suffer. So although this handbook necessarily concentrates on
achieving maintainability through sound planning, engineering, design, test, and manufacturing,
remember that an adequate support system (spares, people, training, etc.) is essential to
capitalize on the inherent maintainability characteristics of the product. (Note: the "sum" of
design maintainability and the needed logistics support is sometimes referred to as
supportability.)

Six essential steps, or sub-objectives, are needed to meet the overall objective of a sound
maintainability program:

Understand the Customer's Maintainability Needs - determine the required level of

maintainability as will be measured by the user during actual use of the product
Integrate Maintainability with the Systems Engineering Process - make the
maintainability activities conducted during design and manufacturing an integral part of
the product and processes design effort
Thoroughly Understand the Design - understand the maintainability of the design and
the maintenance required for the product
Design for Desired Level of Maintainability - use proven design approaches to make
needed maintenance safe, economical, and easy to perform
Validate the Maintainability through Analysis and Development Test - conduct
analyses, simulation, and testing to uncover maintainability problems, revise the design,
and validate the effectiveness of the redesign
Monitor and Analyze Operational Performance - assess the operational maintainability
of the product in actual use to uncover problems, identify needed improvements, and
provide "lessons learned" for incorporation in handbooks and for refining modeling and
analysis methods

3-1
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

Each of these steps will be discussed in detail.

3.1 Understand the Customer's Maintainability Needs. Understanding the customer's

maintainability needs is the first and most obvious step in meeting the objective of a maintainable
product. It is important that the level of maintainability addressed here is that which is measured
by the user, the operational maintainability, not necessarily that measured during design and
development. Many factors can affect operational maintainability, not just the design
characteristics of the product or the manufacturing processes used to make the product. This
point will be addressed later in Section 3.6.

An important part of understanding customer needs is to collect and study lessons learned on
prior products, preferably products similar to the one being acquired. By learning which
problems have plagued products in the past, the maintainability engineer can adopt design
approaches that reduce if not eliminate the problem in the new product.

Quantitative maintainability requirements should be derived using the same process used to
derive other product design requirements. This process consists of performing a needs analysis
and through the use of tools such as Quality Function Deployment (QFD). QFD is a tool for
translating defined customer requirements into appropriate design requirements at each stage of
design and development. The method uses a matrix known as the House of Quality, as depicted
in Figure 3. Following are definitions of the terms used in the House of Quality.

Whats - The product characteristics, functions, or levels of performance

wanted by the customer. These are the customer needs or
requirements. The Whats are sometimes divided into Primary,
Secondary, and Tertiary requirements. Examples of each for a
fighter aircraft are, respectively, Operating Characteristics, Sorties,
and 4 Sorties per Day.
Hows - The ways in which the Whats can possibly be met. Also called
design requirements. A How for the fighter sortie requirement
might be a product availability of 0.92
Importance - The value or importance placed by the customer on each What.
Typically stated as Greatest, Average, or Least.
Hows to Whats - The relative strength of the relationship between a What (a
Relationships requirement) and a specific How. Typically stated as Very Strong,
Strong, or Weak or a corresponding numerical value.
Weighted - The importance of each How based on either its How to What
Importance relationship value and number of tertiary Whats (absolute
weighting) or the relationship value, risk, and number of tertiary
Whats (relative).

3-2
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

HOW
CORR ELATION

M
Desi gn Requirements f
H
O L C g
O o C
Customer Requirements W
S E s C P
t a
Descrip tion Imp ortan ce p

WHA TS
HOW TO WHAT
R ELATIONSHIP

Risk
L OE = level o f effor t WEIGHTED
Mfg. Cap. = Mfg. ca pability IMPORTAN CE
CP = Competitive po sition

FIGURE 3. Q FD House of Quality.

Weighted Importance is calculated as follows:

N
(
Relative weight = Relationship value x importance factor )i
i=1
Rank Ordered

N
(
Absolute weight = Relationship values )i
i=1
Rank Ordered

How Correlation - The strength of the technical interrelationships between the Hows. Typically
stated as Very Strong, Strong, or Weak.

Risk - The degree of technical and cost risk associated with each How. Typically
stated as Greatest Average, or Least.

N - The total number of requirements (Whats).

3-3
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

Briefly, the following steps are used in the QFD approach (see Figure 4).

1. Enter the Whats already determined. If necessary, further define the Whats as Primary,
Secondary, and Tertiary requirements.
2. Determine the Hows, the design requirements, based on technical experience and
knowledge.
3. Develop What-How relationships, assigning a numerical value to each (for example, a
Very Strong relationship might be assigned a 5, a Strong relationship a 3, and a Weak
relationship a 1). Determining relationships is based on experience and technical
knowledge. To provide an easily understood graphical display, symbols, as shown in
Figure 4, are used.
4. Define and assign customer importance factor for each of the lowest level (primary,
secondary, or tertiary) requirements and the degree of technical and cost risk associated
with each How. Assign numerical values to the factors and degrees of risk (e.g.,
Greatest = 5, Average =3, Least =1).

C ustom er Requirem ents D esig n R equirements

Prima ry Seco nda ry Tertia ry Importance DR1 DR2 DR3
A A -1
C A -2
h A -3
a
O r A -4
p a B B-1
e c
r B-2
t
a e B-3
t I C C-1
I s
n C-2
t
g I D D -1
c D -2
s
D -3
D -4
D -5
E E -1
E -2
Risk
Relativ e 3 1 2
Weights
Ab so lute 1 2 3

Sy mb o l Relatio nsh ip s Impo rtan ce/Risk

Very Strong = 5 Greatest = 5

Strong = 3 Average = 3

W eak = 1 Least = 1
None N/A

FIGURE 4. Example Excerpt of House of Quality.

3-4
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

5. Develop relationships among the Hows (not shown in Figure 4). Use the same
definitions for the strength of the relationship and the corresponding numerical value
that were used for the What-How relationships. Knowing the relationship among Hows
will be important during trades.
6. Calculate the relative and absolute weights for the Hows. For each How (DR1, DR2,
and DR3), sum the relationship values in that column. The results are 39, 35, and 32,
respectively. Ranked ordered, the Hows are given absolute weights of 1, 2, and 3. Now
multiply the relationship values in each column by the corresponding importance and
add the products yielding the following sums: 117, 67, and 100, respectively. Rank
ordered, the relative weights are 1, 3, and 2, respectively, for DR1, DR2, and DR3.
7. Multiply the relative weights by the Risk factors of the Hows. The products of this
multiplication indicate the attention merited by each How. DR2 rates the most
attention, DR3 the next most, and DR1 the least.

The right-hand side of the complete House of Quality (reference Figure 3) is used to project the
relative level of effort, cost, required manufacturing capability, and the supplier's competitive
position regarding each What. Projections are usually stated as Greatest, Average, and Least.

By using successive QFD "Houses of Quality", with the Hows from one used as the Whats of
the next, increasingly more detailed (lower level) requirements can be derived.

3.2 Integrate Maintainability with the Systems Engineering Process. Systems

engineering is a top down iterative process involving requirements definition, functional analysis
and allocation, synthesis and design, test and evaluation. By integrating the maintainability
activities into this process, maintainability requirements will be addressed concurrently with
other performance requirements. In this way, maintainability activities will be integrated with all
engineering and design activities, thereby avoiding duplicative effort and making the best use of
activity outputs. As is discussed in Appendix A, a maintainability program must address this
issue (i.e., how design, analysis, and other tasks will be integrated to minimize costs and
maximize the use of task products). An integrated, systems approach is essential because
maintainability is related to other product characteristics.

3.3 Thoroughly Understand the Design. Thoroughly understanding the design is essential to
making the final product maintainable. Accessibility, diagnostic capability, and repair times must
be known with as much certainty as time, budget, and technical knowledge allow. Understanding
the maintenance needed to support the product during use will help uncover shortcomings in
maintainability, as well as determine the level of support (e.g., number of spares) required.

3.4 Design for Desired Level of Maintainability. A maintainable product is the result of a
conscious and dedicated effort to incorporate design features that make preventive and corrective
maintenance easy, safe, and economical in terms of time and resources. Any product can be
maintained given enough time and money, but time and money are pervasive constraints. So it is
the responsibility of the design team to design the product so that it can be maintained within
these constraints.

3-5
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

An essential aspect of maintainability is determining when a product is malfunctioning and why.

The hardware, software, or other documented means used to determine that a malfunction has
occurred and to isolate the cause of the malfunction are collectively called diagnostics. As
products become more complex, diagnostics becomes an essential and critical part of design. For
such products, diagnostics is a driver of maintainability because identifying and isolating a
problem to its root cause often accounts for the majority of repair time. A diagnostic capability
encompasses more than built-in-test (BIT); it includes any automatic, semi-automatic, and
manual testing, maintenance aids, technical information manuals, and the effects of personnel and
training. So any action performed for the purpose of detecting and isolating malfunctions,
including any equipments, data or knowledge used in the performance of such actions can be
associated with a diagnostic capability.

Appendix C details many of the design guidelines proven to result in maintainable products.

3.5 Validate the Maintainability through Analysis and Development Test. Three
methods of verifying requirements are commonly used. They are inspection, analysis, and test.
Inspection is best suited to physical characteristics such as dimensions, weight, and finish.
Ideally, it is through analyses that we validate the functional characteristics of a design because
analyses are relatively inexpensive compared with testing. However, it is often only through
testing that the product's design, and the tools used to create that design, can be truly validated.
Testing uncovers unexpected problems or shortcomings. It helps us refine our analytical tools
with which we design the product. Testing is the essential development tool that provides the
feedback needed by engineers to refine their design and revise their analyses.

Maintainability and testability demonstration tests are conducted to show whether or not a
product possesses the requisite maintainability characteristics. The specific approach used for
demonstration testing ranges from limited testing done independently by the contractor to
extensive tests controlled by the customer. See Appendix B for specific test plans.

Recently, computer simulation in the form of virtual reality (see 4.3.2.3) has allowed some
maintainability characteristics of a design to be "evaluated" before any model or prototype is
even constructed. Although not a total substitute for testing, virtual reality simulation can reduce
the amount of time required by allowing some maintainability aspects of the design to be verified
without or with reduced maintainability demonstration and testing.

3.6 Monitor and Analyze Operational Performance. For many products, it is important
for the customer, the supplier, or both to monitor the performance of the product in actual use.
This monitoring may be done through tracking warranty data, collecting specialized information,
customer complaints, and surveys. Monitoring, and subsequent analysis of the data, is done for
three reasons:

Identify performance problems

Identify needed changes in policy, procedures, or design to resolve performance
problems
Identify and document lessons learned

3-6
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

The first two reasons are somewhat obvious. Despite our best efforts to design properly and to
validate the design through development testing, some problems may not evidence themselves
until the product has been fielded. It is then important to determine if the problems are serious
enough to require correction and, if so, the best means for doing so. If the product is warranted
and the problem is covered under that warranty, then the supplier must take the necessary
action. If the problem lies in the customer's maintenance policy and procedures, then changes to
those items need to be considered.

The third reason, to identify and document lessons learned, may not be as obvious. Lessons
learned are important because our design and manufacturing tools are imperfect and experience is
a valuable resource. As already stated, despite our best efforts to design properly and to validate
the design through development testing, products are seldom perfect. They are imperfect
because our knowledge and tools (models, analytical techniques, manufacturing processes) are
imperfect. Field performance can be monitored and the Lessons learned from that monitoring can
be used to refine our knowledge and tools. One way to capture the knowledge represented by
lessons learned is to capture them in design guidelines, such as those documented in Appendix C.

As noted in 2.2.2, demilitarization and disposal (or in commercial terms, retirement and
phaseout) of a product is a part of the life cycle. DoD does not define it as a separate phase, and
many companies and customers consider it as the last stage of the O&M phase. As some
products near the end of their useful life due to obsolescence or wear-out, the customer or
supplier may need to address several critical activities:

Recovery of precious metals or other valuable, recyclable materials

Salvage of equipment and components for use in other products
Safe disposal of hazardous materials
Logistics support of demilitarization and disposal (retirement and phaseout)

These activities can be made more efficient and economical if they are considered during the
design of the product. As noted in 2.2.2.4, the extent to which the maintainability engineer will
be involved with designing for demilitarization and disposal can vary from company to company.
In most cases, the maintainability engineer, safety engineer, and logistics managers play at least
some role in designing for demilitarization and disposal and in carrying out the associated
activities.

3-7
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

This page has been left blank intentionally.

3-8
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

SECTION FOUR

4.0 ELEMENTS OF A MAINTAINABILITY PROGRAM.

No single set of specific tasks and activities defines the "best" maintainability program. Specific
tasks and activities must be selected based on the type of product, the technology being used,
product development budget and schedule constraints, customer needs, and so forth. Certain
general elements, however, are necessary for a sound maintainability program and give direction
to the process of selecting specific tasks and activities. These elements are management, design,
analysis, test, and data.

A maintainability program may be described by a supplier in a maintainability plan. Such a plan

should address the management approach, required resources, interface with related disciplines,
the activities constituting the program and a schedule showing when activities must occur.
Within the Government, prior to Defense Acquisition Reform (DAR), it was customary to
require suppliers responding to a solicitation to include a maintainability program plan as part of
their proposals. Although not specifically addressed in DAR policy issued by DoD, some
procurement commands within the military services have now prohibited such a requirement. Of
course, suppliers are always free to include such a plan if they determine it to be the best way of
responding to the solicitation. Appendix A provides guidance in developing the maintainability
portion of solicitations and in evaluating responses. No single model or standard plan is cited in
this handbook because the plan should reflect the unique requirements of the acquisition program,
the technology being used in the product, the amount of new development versus commercial off-
the-shelf (COTS) or a non-developmental item (NDI), and many other factors. The elements
described in this section, however, should be addressed in any and all maintainability plans.

4.1 Overview. A sound maintainability program begins with good management. It is

management that assigns and allocates resources, directs and controls processes, and evaluates
progress. So a maintainable product begins with a deliberate decision by management to make the
product maintainable. Since maintainability is a true design characteristic, it must be a design
requirement leading to certain design approaches and features. To support designing for
maintainability, certain analyses must be conducted. Some of these analyses may be unique to
maintainability while others are also performed for other purposes. Design, especially for
products incorporating new technologies or having complex functions, must be supplemented by
effective development test. Finally, data are needed to support maintainability design and
analysis, and data from the maintainability effort are needed in other functional areas, especially
logistics planning.

4.2 Management Approach. Management has five basic responsibilities regarding a

maintainability program: assign responsibility for maintainability, provide adequate resources to
implement the maintainability program, establish and maintain good lines of communication
within the company and with the customer, integrate the maintainability program into the overall
product development effort, and establish controls for subcontractors and vendors.

4-1
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

Depending on the specific product development effort and on customer requirements, suppliers
may document how these responsibilities will be met in a maintainability plan. The plan may be
quite extensive and detailed or very simple and general, again depending on the product. It may
be a "stand-alone" plan or a part of other plans (a reliability and maintainability program plan, for
example).

4.2.1 Clear Responsibility. An individual must be given the formal responsibility for
implementing the maintainability program. As noted in 1.1, the title of this individual varies as
does his or her organizational assignment. Regardless of title or organizational placement, it is
essential that the individual have the appropriate knowledge and experience and be an integral
part of the design effort.

4.2.2 Adequate Resources (Quantity and Quality). Whoever is assigned the responsibility
for maintainability must also have the resources needed to do the job. These resources can
include analytical tools, test items and facilities, computers and software, labor hours, and
reference documents. The level of funding available for these resources should be appropriate for
the type of product, level of technical risk, and customer needs.

4.2.3 Lines of Communication. Accurate and timely communication is critical in today's

design and manufacturing environment. For products such as automobiles, aircraft, missiles, and
similarly complex items, many individuals and specialties are involved in the development effort.
Some may be geographically separated from others. Without good communications among these
people and with the customer, requirements can be overlooked. Communications are enhanced
through the use of computer-aided design and manufacturing (CAD/CAM) and the use of
common data bases.

4.2.4 Integration with Related Functions. As was discussed in 2.2 and 2.3, maintainability
is affected by many other related functions, such as manufacturing, human engineering, and so
forth. Maintainability, in turn, affects these and other functions. The interrelationships among
maintainability and other functions make it essential to develop a maintainability program that is
integrated with the overall product development program. The benefits of an integrated program
is the maximum use of data from each analysis and test, the elimination of duplicative efforts, and
a focus on overall product performance rather than on optimizing any one characteristic.

4.2.5 Subcontractor and Vendor Control. A strong maintainability program will reflect an
integrated team approach to the development of a product. Although the prime contractor has
the responsibility for the product's performance, each subcontractor and vendor is an important
member of the product development team. Accordingly, appropriate requirements and guidance
must be provided to all subcontractors and vendors. These requirements and guidance should, if
at all possible, be developed with the suppliers to encourage an exchange of ideas, foster a
thorough understanding of program objectives and the role of supplier in meeting those
objectives, and to promote the integrated team concept.

4-2
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

4.2.6 Reviews. A series of design reviews are necessary during a program to control risk,
ensure a balanced design is evolving, evaluate progress, and to anticipate and avoid problems.
These reviews vary in purpose and can vary in the manner in which they are conducted. Some
typical types of reviews are shown in Table VI. All of these reviews may not be necessary for
some products. Other products may require additional reviews. For some very complex
products, a review dedicated only to maintainability, or often to reliability and maintainability,
may be required. A key indicator of how well maintainability is being considered is whether it is
one of the requirements or characteristics included in all of these reviews. It should be clear that
maintainability is a "player" in tradeoffs and is being considered in the design. Clear signs that
maintainability is a dynamic element of the design are that the maintainability engineer or manager
has sign-off authority of design drawings and is required to participate in tradeoffs.

TABLE VI. Types and Purposes of Design Reviews

Review Title Purpose Key Maintainability Questions
Product Requirement Review the product requirements and Are performance-based
Review specifications to ensure they are clear, accurate, maintainability design requirements
verifiable, and reflect the operational needs of the included? Are they derived from
customer. A separate Software Specifications operational requirements?
Review may be conducted to concentrate only on
software requirements.
Product Design Review the high-level product design and Are maintainability requirements
Review architecture, partitioning, and requirements allocated? Are the allocated
allocations. requirements realistic?
Preliminary Design Review hardware and software designs for What trades have been made to
Review functional flow, requirements allocations, improve maintainability? Where are
thermal, power, packaging, reliability, the major maintainability problems?
maintainability, manufacturability, and other
performance characteristics. Identify potential
problems and develop solutions.
Critical Design Similar to Preliminary Design Review but the Are there outstanding maintainability
Review purpose in reviewing the designs is to evaluate problems? Do predictions indicate
their readiness for release to manufacturing. that the required product
maintainability will be achieved?
Production Readiness Review design of manufacturing processes, tools, Have any problems arisen in which
Review fixtures, and so forth to determine readiness of the manufacturing considerations affect
production facility to manufacture the product. maintainability?

4.3 Design for Maintainability. Design determines a product's inherent capabilities.

Whether it is the power handling capacity of a circuit, the frequency of a signal, or the minimum
time required to replace a part, a capability must be designed into a product.

4.3.1 Specific Considerations. Detailed and quantitative studies of maintainability were not
initiated until the early 1950's. Before 1950, maintainability was often viewed as a "common
sense" ingredient of design. However, other performance requirements and acquisition budget
concerns frequently overrode design decisions made to improve maintainability. Now, the
ownership costs and availability requirements of increasingly complex modern systems and
equipment demand that designing for maintainability be as important as designing for other
performance characteristics. The maintainability engineer must now ensure that considerations

4-3
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

for maintainable designs are an integral element of every design trade study or design change
activity.

The basic objectives of designing for maintainability are to meet the operational readiness
requirements for the product and to reduce support costs. A maintainability engineer committed
to these objectives will continually challenge the design to uncover weaknesses and potential
maintenance problems. The objective is to design in maintainability. If this objective is not met
and the production hardware fails to meet maintainability objectives, corrective design changes
will have to be made later in the equipment's life cycle at significant expense. The primary
emphasis of the maintainability program is to identify and correct maintainability problems early
in the design process when correction simply requires changing drawings.

4.3.1.1 Support Concept. Support concepts are the methods, including the maintenance
concept, by which the customer intends to maintain the product and can be as varied as the
design itself. Support concepts range from discard at failure to a complete overhaul at failure.
They may include periodic or scheduled maintenance or overhaul. They can include maintenance
performed by the customer, the supplier, a third party, or some combination of the three. Within
the military services, three levels of maintenance are normally defined: organizational (on-site),
intermediate (local shops), and depot (an overhaul facility). (No one definition of maintenance
levels could be found for all commercial industry. However, perhaps defined somewhat
differently or combined in some way, the following levels of maintenance are considered
representative of those used by commercial industry). Maintenance performed at these levels
keeps the product serviceable or restores it to an operational condition after a failure. A brief
description of each level of maintenance follows.

Organizational Level of Maintenance. Organizational maintenance is performed at the

operational or product site. Maintenance at this level normally is limited to periodic performance
checks, visual inspections, cleaning, limited servicing, adjustments, and removal and replacement
of some components (i.e., constituent module, part, item, etc. of the product). Repair of
removed components is normally not made at this level (but see 4.4.1.6.2). Instead, the failed
component is replaced with a spare. The removed component is then sent to the next level of
maintenance (usually intermediate) for repair. Diagnostics, accessibility and ease of removal and
replacement are very important at the organizational level and should be key design
considerations. This level of maintenance has the primary goals of keeping the product in a
serviceable condition and rapidly restoring the product to an operable condition after failure using
low to moderately skilled personnel.

Intermediate Level. Intermediate level maintenance is normally performed at a "shop

location" and may be performed on the product or a repairable component of the product. At
this level, products might be repaired by removal and replacement of parts or modules, or the
parts or modules of a product might be repaired. The skill level of personnel at this level is
usually higher than at the organizational level of maintenance. Intermediate level of repair

4-4
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

facilities may also be tasked with doing limited depot/overhaul level repairs. These type of
repairs are typically based upon technical knowledge, facilities and potential cost savings.

Depot Level. Depot is the highest level of maintenance. The depot is a specialized repair
facility that may very well be structured like an assembly line. It may be a customer-operated
repair facility or the original equipment manufacturer's plant. Maintenance includes rebuilding or
overhauling a product and may be performed on a specific lot of failed equipment that has been
screened for similarity in failure type. The most highly skilled and trained technical personnel are
assigned to depots. Test equipment is very complex, technical publications are more detailed,
and manufacturing source data are frequently available. One specific depot might be structured to
support all forms of communication radios or all types of pumps.

Maintenance can include two basic types of tasks. The first, called preventive maintenance
(PM), is usually performed at the organizational level. PM retains a product in serviceable
condition by inspections, servicing and other preventive measures performed on a calendar,
cyclical, or on-condition basis. The second is corrective maintenance (CM). CM is performed to
return a product to operation after a failure and may be accomplished at the operational,
intermediate, or depot level. The cost of maintenance, preventive or corrective, is directly
determined by the maintainability of the design.

A support concept is more than simply identifying whether PM and CM are required and
whether maintenance will be performed at one, two, or three levels of organization. It means
deciding on a run-to-failure or on-condition maintenance approach (see 4.3.1.3). It also addresses
whether support will be provided by the customer, by the product manufacturer, or by both.
Often, the military services elect to plan for contractor support at the intermediate and depot
levels until a product has been proven in actual use. Then responsibility for the maintenance
may be transitioned to the military service. Such a strategy is called interim contractor support.
Finally, a support concept can involve centralizing some organizational and intermediate level
maintenance at one or two sites.

The approach to handling ambiguity groups is also a part of the support concept. Sometimes,
factors make fault isolation to a single replaceable unit or item impossible to achieve. These
factors include the complexity that would be added by fault isolating to a single item, the total
cost associated with fault isolating to a single item compared with the cost associated with fault
isolating to two or more items, and the type of technology being used. Consequently, some
failures will be detected by the integrated diagnostics and isolated to two or more items. To
correct the failure, one of two basic approaches may be used. For relatively small ambiguity
groups, the entire group will be replaced. For larger groups, items in the group will be iteratively
replaced until the failure is corrected. The decision to use group or iterative replacement is
primarily based on economics and the effect on predicted total downtime.

The support concept should be tailored to the type of product in question. That is, the product
may be a new development, a non-developmental item, or a commercial off-the-shelf (COTS)

4-5
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

item. In the first case, planners have a good deal of latitude in selecting the concept, since the
designers can respond to the chosen concept as they design the product. For non-developmental
items, less latitude is available. Finally, for COTS, little flexibility in choosing a support concept
is left to the planners. It is unlikely that the engineering, design, and other detailed data needed to
develop an organic repair capability will be available. Also, configuration control below the
product level will most likely be maintained by the supplier, not the customer. So in many cases,
support for COTS will consist only of removal and replacement at the operational level with
depot and even intermediate maintenance performed by the depot.

For new development products, the support concept can and should greatly influence the design
for maintainability. For example, ease of disassembly is not a concern for non-repairable
products that are thrown away after failure. But if the product is a component or subsystem of a
larger product, accessibility to facilitate removal and replacement is important. Also, the design
approach for a product can be very different depending on whether the customer or the
contractor will be providing the support.

4.3.1.2 Operational and Support Environment. It is essential that the supplier understands
the environment in which the customer will operate and maintain the product. Environmental
factors, such as temperature and humidity, limit the way in which personnel can perform
required maintenance. For example, when products must be maintained in very cold climates or
under hazardous conditions (radioactive, biological or chemical environments), personnel will be
wearing heavy clothing and gloves. Such clothing restricts movement, requires more room for
access, and reduces dexterity. In addition, materials can shrink or expand making connection and
disconnection of mating parts difficult. In hot climates with high humidity, perspiration can
impair vision and affect a person's grip. If maintenance must be performed outside, the
maintainability engineer must try to design access panels so that rain cannot penetrate into the
interior of a product. For some products, it might be necessary to perform maintenance while the
product is operating. In such cases, the maintainability engineer's primary concern is to design
the product and procedures to minimize the hazards involved with maintenance.

In addition to analytical techniques, the maintainability engineer has two excellent methods of
characterizing the support environment. First, the customer's maintenance personnel can be
brought in to participate in the design process at the earliest phase of product development.
Second, maintainability and design engineers can visit the customer's operating sites to gain first-
hand knowledge of the operational and support environment. Every product needs to be
assessed for the environmental impact on maintainability.

4.3.1.3 Preventive Versus Corrective Maintenance Requirements. Preventive maintenance

(PM) is usually self imposed downtime (although it may be possible to perform some PM while
the product is operating). PM consists of actions intended to prolong the operational life of the
equipment and keep the product safe to operate. Ideally, a product will require no servicing or
other preventive maintenance and either the probability of failure is remote or redundancy makes
failure acceptable (however, one often-required PM task is to verify the operational status of

4-6
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

redundant components prior to a mission.). For such an ideal product, only corrective
maintenance, if any, would be required. Most often, however, failure is not a remote possibility.
Moreover, most products of any complexity require some servicing, even if that only consists of
cleaning. Sometimes failures can actually be prevented by preventive maintenance. The goal,
then, is to identify only that preventive maintenance that is absolutely necessary and cost-
effective. Figure 5 illustrates the two major categories of maintenance, PM and CM, and the
tasks associated with each.

Maintenance

CATEGORY

Preventive Maintenance Corrective Maintenance

(also called scheduled maintenance) (also called unscheduled maintenance)

TYPICAL
TASKS

Time Access AND Fault Isolation

Inspections
Replacement

Remove and
Calibration Repair OR
Cleaning Replace
and and
Adjustment Lubrication

Confirm Fault Close Up

AND
Corrected and Secure

REQUIRED REQUIRED
BY BY
Safety Failures
On-condition monitoring - confirmed
Servicing - unconfirmed*

*Result from false alarms in the built-in test, intermittent failures, or test equipment problems.
Unconfirmed failures will trigger some maintenance action, ranging from confirming no failure
exists (attributed to a false alarm or Cannot Duplicate) to removing and replacing a supposedly
bad item only to later find (at another level of maintenance) that the item is good (Retest OK).

FIGURE 5. Major Categories of Maintenance.

Reliability Centered Maintenance (RCM) is an analytical method used to identify essential and
cost effective preventive maintenance. Preventive maintenance for a product may be scheduled

4-7
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

based on condition, a number of events, rounds fired, cycles of operation, seasonal time period,
operational profile changes, and sometimes as the result of failures of other equipment. For
example, automobile manufacturers provide buyers with a range of recommended mileage-based
and time-based preventive maintenance. The initial overall maintenance program should reflect
the RCM-based schedule for preventive maintenance. Figure 6 summarizes the steps in an RCM
approach to identifying preventive maintenance.

INITIAL PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE SCHEDULE

(Update based on experience)

7. Analyze Results for Potential Corrective Action

all tasks and intervals based on economic cost/savings
redesign a consideration for items having failure modes that
cannot be reduced to an acceptable level with PM
redesign mandatory for failure modes that have safety
consequence and cannot be recued to an acceptable level with
PM or combination of tasks

6. Optimize Results with Data Collection Efforts

perform trend analysis to verify PM prevents degradation
use FRACAS information to analyze assumptions
adjust tasks and intervals based on data

5. Package All Tasks into Implementable Plan

group tasks with similar intervals
lengthen/shorten intervals of tasks designed to prevent less
serious failures to coincide with those of tasks designed to
prevent safety-related or serious failures

4. Determine Maintenance Tasks Intervals

maintenance task types (in order of preference): on-condition,
rebuild/rework, discard, inspect for undetected failure.
level of conservatism inversely related to availability of data
ensure tasks are applicable and effective

3. Categorize the Failure Distributions
ensure tasks are applicable and effective
perform Weibull analysis on population of parts
if applicable, determine when wearout begins
determine effectiveness of rework/rebuild actions

2. Perform Functional Failure Mode Analysis

FMEA
FTA
Consequences of failure

1. Design for Maintainability

facilitate required inspections with minimal tools
match component failure rates to PM schedule
provide indicators of failure
reduce risk of maintenance-induced failures

FIGURE 6. The Steps in an RCM Approach to Identifying Preventive Maintenance.

4-8
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

Reference has been made to "on-condition" and "based on condition" in determining the
frequency or need for PM. On-condition monitoring, also called predictive maintenance or
performance monitoring, is a process whereby one or more parameters are unobtrusively
monitored and trended over time. These parameters must have a direct relationship with the
"health" of the equipment being monitored. On the basis of some threshold value (determined
through analysis or experience) of a parameter or combination of parameters, the equipment will
be repaired or replaced prior to any actual failure. This approach to "scheduling" PM can
significantly reduce costs, prevent failures, and increase safety. The approach has long been used
to "detect" an impending problem in rotating machinery by monitoring vibration.

Improvements in sensors and recording devices and an understanding of which parameters truly
indicate health have increased the number of applications of condition monitoring. One device
developed under Air Force sponsorship, the Time Stress Measurement Device (TSMD), is one
example of a technological improvement related to on-condition monitoring. The TSMD collects,
records, and stores stress data for subsequent analysis. Although initially studied as a method of
dealing with false alarms (see 4.3.1.7), TSMDs can be used with appropriate sensors to record
health-related parameters. The recorded levels of the parameters can then be compared with pre-
established limits. When the limits have been exceeded or the data indicates that the limits will be
exceeded in the near future, an inspection would normally be performed to confirm that a failure
is imminent. If the inspection confirms the analysis, then appropriate maintenance can be
performed before an actual failure occurs. If the inspection shows that no problem exists, it may
be necessary to revise the pre-established limits.

Corrective maintenance includes those activities required to return failed equipment to acceptable
operational status. Corrective maintenance consists of recognizing that a failure has occurred
(fault detection - FD), determining what has failed (fault isolation - FI), accessing and replacing or
repairing the failed component, and confirming that the failure has been corrected. It is the
maintainability engineer's responsibility to strike the best balance between preventive and
corrective maintenance, keeping in mind such factors as safety, availability requirements, and the
customer's operating and support concepts.

4.3.1.4 Human Engineering (HE). During design, the HE engineer has two roles. In one role,
the HE engineer represents the potential user, operator, and maintainer and is concerned with
ease of operation, safety, comfort, work loads, and so forth. In the other role, the HE engineer
evaluates people as "components" and their contribution to product effectiveness. The HE
engineer is concerned with many design issues including:

Safety of operators and maintainers

Which functions to allocate to humans
How best to present information to the user, operator, or maintainer
Accessibility
The design of tools

4-9
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

The design of controls

Anthropometry
Required skill levels

Military standard 1472, MIL-HDBK-759, and MIL-HDBK-338 provide detailed information

and data on HE. In addition, Appendix C includes design guidance related to HE.

4.3.1.4.1 Presentation of Information. Although information is usually presented through

visual displays and through auditory signals, other methods include touch, smell, the sense of
balance (vestibular sense), or sensations of position and movement (kinesthesis). Each of these
methods has its own variables. Visual displays, for example, can be in color or black and white,
use symbols or text, use moving scales with fixed indicators or fixed scales with moving
indicators, and so forth. To select the best method requires an understanding of the way in which
humans process, interpret, and store information; the detection and differential sensitivity of the
human senses; and human psychology and physiology. Figure 7 illustrates some of the factors
involved in the human information processing system.

Storage Subsystem

Long-Term Short-Term
Memory Memory

Limbs Speech
Eyes Decision
Energies
Making &
in
Pattern Adaptive Motor
Ears Posture
Physical Recognition Processes
Response
Timing &
Environment
Other Time Sharing Outputs
Senses Speech

Sensing Information Processing Response

Subsystem Subsystem Subsystem

FIGURE 7. The Human Information Processing System.

The maintainability, HE, reliability, safety, and other design engineers must develop a product
design that contributes to proper operator responses by creating perceivable and interpretable
stimuli requiring reactions within the user's, operator's, or maintainer's capabilities. Feedback
ought to be incorporated into the design to verify that operator responses are correct. In other
words, product characteristics should serve as both input and feedback stimuli to the operator or
maintainer. These interactions between the human and the product are depicted in Figure 8.

4-10
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

INPUTS (Other Personnel)

INPUTS (Physical Environment)

INPUTS THE PRODUCT THE HUMAN

(Environmental)
Sensing Displays Sensing
INPUTS
(Other Equipment)
F F F
E E E
E E E
D D D
B B B
A Processing Processing A A
C C C
OUTPUTS K K K
(Other Equipment)

OUTPUTS
(Effect on Actuating Controls Actuating
Product )

Verbal and Other Responses

FEEDBACK

FIGURE 8. Interactions Between Human and Product.

4.3.1.4.2 Controls. Controls include the switches, knobs, levers, wheels, and other devices
with which a human controls the functions of a product. In selecting the proper control for a
specific function, the HE engineer must evaluate the function of the control, the requirements of
the control task, the informational needs of the human, the requirements imposed by the work
environment, and the consequences of inadvertent or accidental operation of the control.

4.3.1.4.3 Anthropometrics. Anthropometry is the science of measuring various human

physical characteristics, primarily size, mobility, and strength. Using such measurements in
designing a product, workplace, support equipment, and clothing, designers can enhance the
efficiency, safety, and comfort of users, operators, and maintainers.

People vary in size and strength within any group. This variance can be expressed statistically
by taking appropriate measurements of the population and calculating the mean and standard
deviation. Based on these statistics, percentiles can be calculated. For example, a 90th percentile
height for American men means that only 10% of the males in the United States are taller than
that height. Normally, the HE and maintainability engineer will design for people who are in the
95th or higher percentile for weight, stature, sitting height, and other anthropometric
measurements. Anthropometric tables and charts are available in HE handbooks and military
standards to help the engineer assess human physical interface factors. These tables and charts
include information on percentile measurements of physical size; allowances for clothing;
maximum strength (static forces and torque) of hands, fingers, and legs; and range of motion.

4-11
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

4.3.1.5 Maintenance Tools and Support Equipment. Few products can be maintained
without using some tools. Maintenance of many consumer products requires only common hand
tools, such as screwdrivers and pliers. Maintenance of other products can require test
equipment, servicing stands, protective clothing, specialized tools, and so forth. It is the
maintainability engineer's responsibility to identify the tools and equipment needed by
maintenance personnel to support the product. To keep costs down and reduce the amount of
specialized training required, the maintainability engineer will try to use tools and equipment
already in use for other products. For example, airlines have a large investment in hand tools,
support equipment, and other items with which aircraft are maintained. A commercial aircraft
manufacturer who ignores this "in-place" inventory and designs an aircraft requiring all new tools
and equipment, will find it difficult to market a new aircraft, no matter how advanced it may be.

4.3.1.6 Maintenance Training. Some training of those people who will be maintaining the
product is usually required. The amount of training and the extent to which this training is
unique to the product is a function of product complexity, whether the product is totally new or
is similar to a previous product, the technology used in the product, and the skill and education
levels of the maintenance personnel. As part of the maintainability effort, training requirements
for personnel at all levels of maintenance must be identified. Even when training requirements
and training development are the responsibility of training specialists, they will require inputs
from the maintainability engineer.

4.3.1.7 Testability and Diagnostics. An important component of maintainability is

testability, widely defined as a design characteristic that allows the status (operable, inoperable,
or degraded) of an item to be determined and the isolation of faults within the item to be
performed in a timely and efficient manner. As implied in this definition, it is not enough to
make a design "testable". The design must be such that testing is efficient in terms of detecting
and isolating only failed items, with no removal of good items. The removal of good items
continues to be a problem in many industries, with obvious impacts on troubleshooting times and
repair and logistics costs.

Whereas testability is related to the physical design characteristics of a product, diagnostics are
related to the means by which faults are detected and isolated. This includes the actual tests
themselves, as well as the means by which tests are performed. Achieving good diagnostics
involves determining the diagnostic capability required in a product. A diagnostic capability can
be defined as all capabilities associated with the detection, isolation, and reporting of faults,
including testing, technical information, personnel, and training. In comparing testability with
diagnostics, we see that testability is an inherent design characteristic, while diagnostics involves
factors other than those associated with the design itself. Attention paid to both in all design
phases will impact not only the cost of producing a product, but certainly the cost of maintaining
the product once it has been fielded.

Finally, planning for BIT at all levels within the system design is becoming more important for a
number of reasons. First, surface mount devices (SMDs) are increasingly being used in the design
of circuit cards. The use of SMDs, and devices with higher packaging density (including double-

4-12
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

sided boards), decreases the accessibility required for guided-probe testing, while increasing the
risks of such testing. Incorporating BIT in such designs therefore becomes critical to effective
diagnostics. Second, many component vendors of integrated circuits (ICs), such as Application
Specific ICs (ASICs) are incorporating some form of BIT into their designs. Higher-level designs
(i.e., board, module, etc.) that use such devices must take advantage of this fact by planning to
integrate lower-level BIT capabilities with higher-level BIT designs. Doing this will increase the
vertical testability of an entire system, wherein factory-level test programs can be used in field
operations as well as the factory. Further, tests performed using BIT at higher levels of support
(e.g., depot or intermediate) can also be used at lower levels (i.e., intermediate and organizational).
This characteristic of the diagnostic system will help to maintain consistency across maintenance
levels and may reduce the high incidences of Retests OK (RTOK) or Can Not Duplicates
(CNDs).

The most important factor in BIT design is early planning. Without planning for BIT early in the
life cycle, it will be harder to maximize any advantages offered by the use of BIT while
minimizing any negative impacts such as increased design cost, higher hardware overhead, and
increased failure rate. In "Chip-To-System Testability" (Interim Report submitted to Rome
Laboratory under Contract No. F30602-94-C0053, 1996, Research Triangle Institute and Self-
Test Services), five axioms are given that will allow designers to capitalize on the use of BIT.
These axioms are:

Plan for BIT starting at the earliest stage (e.g., proposal stage) of the program
Design BIT in conjunction with the functional design, not as an afterthought
Use the same high degree of engineering cleverness and rigor for BIT that is used for the
functional design
Take advantage of computer aided design (CAD) tools for the BIT design process
whenever possible
Incorporate the subject of BIT into peer, design and program reviews

4.3.1.7.1 Testability Design. Although a subset of maintainability, testability has become

recognized as a separate design discipline in its own right. Because of the impact on production
and maintenance costs of poor testability, it will continue to be treated as a distinct discipline, at
least in the foreseeable future. Therefore, it is important to develop a testability program plan as
an integral part of the systems engineering process, and to elevate testability to the same level of
importance accorded to other product assurance disciplines. Plans must be established that
define the need to analyze a design to assure it contains characteristics that allow efficient and
effective fault detection and isolation.

Ensuring that a product is testable requires adherence to some basic testability design principles.
A list of the most common testability design principles follows, along with a brief description of
each.

Physical and functional partitioning - The ease or difficulty of fault isolation depends to
a large extent upon the size and complexity of the units that are replaceable.

4-13
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

Partitioning the design such that components are grouped by function (i.e., each
function is implemented on a single replaceable unit), or by technology (e.g., analog,
digital) whenever possible will enhance the ability to isolate failures.
Electrical partitioning - Whenever possible, a block of circuitry being tested should be
isolated from circuitry not being tested via blocking gates, tristate devices, relays, etc.
Initialization - The design should allow an item to be initialized to a known state so it
will respond in a consistent manner for multiple testing of a given failure.
Controllability - The design should allow external control of internal component
operation for the purpose of fault detection and isolation. Special attention should be
given to independent control of clock signals, the ability to control and break up
feedback loops, and tri-stating components for isolation.
Observability - Sufficient access to test points, data paths and internal circuitry should
be provided to allow the test system (machine or human) to gather sufficient signature
data for fault detection and isolation.
Test System Compatibility - Each item to be tested should be designed to be electrically
and mechanically compatible with selected or available test equipment to eliminate or
reduce the need for a large number of interface device (ID) designs.

In addition to the preceding principles, checklists of testability design practices have been
developed that are specific to technologies, such as analog, digital, mechanical, and so forth. A
detailed checklist can be found in Appendix C.

Determining the amount of testability necessary in a design will be driven by the requirements for
fault detection and fault isolation. Fault detection requirements are typically stated as the
percentage of faults that can be detected, using defined means (BIT, semi-automatic/automatic
test, etc.), out of all possible faults. For instance, a system may have a requirement of 95% fault
detection, indicating that 95% of all possible failures are to be detectable by the diagnostic
capability of the system. Fault isolation requirements are typically stated as the percentage of
time fault isolation is possible to a specified number of components. As an example, a system
may have a requirement of 90% isolation to a single replaceable unit (RU), 95% isolation to an
ambiguity group of 2 or fewer RUs and 100% isolation to an ambiguity group of 3 or fewer RUs.

Mathematically, fault detection and isolation are defined in the following equations for the
fraction of faults detectable (FFD) and the fraction of faults isolatable (FFI).

FFD = FD/FA where FA = total number of actual faults occurring over timeand FD = no.
of actual failures correctly identified using defined means.

To calculate predicted fault resolution using equation 4, data are required that correlate each
detected failure with the signature, or "error syndrome", that each failure produces during testing.
The data are most conveniently ordered by signature and by failed module within each signature.
The signature, then, is the observed test response when a particular failure occurs. This
information typically is generated from an FMEA, or in the case of electronics design, especially

4-14
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

digital, from a fault simulation program. The collection of test responses, or failure signatures,
represents a fault dictionary. In many instances, several failures will produce the same observed
(usually at the system output(s)) signature, creating ambiguity. The fault resolution predicted by
equation 4 measures the amount of ambiguity that exists, for a given level of test capability. As
noted, for each signature, a list of suspect modules is created, providing the input data needed to
apply equation 4. Equation 4 includes a signature index, i, which is arbitrarily chosen (e.g., all
signatures can be numbered from 1 to n). The modules within a signature can also be numbered,
representing j in equation 4, or the module index within a signature.

100
i =1Xi j=1i ij
N M
FFIL = (Equation 4)
d
where:
Xi = 1 if M i L; 0 otherwise
N = number of unique test responses
L = number of modules isolated to (i.e., ambiguity group size)
i = signature index
Mi = number of modules listed in signature i
j = module index within signature
ij = failure rate for jth module for failures having signature i

i =1 j=1i ij
N M
d = overall failure rate of detected failures =

Additional quantitative measures of testability may include fault isolation time, which is derived
from the Mean Time To Repair (MTTR).

Mean Fault isolation time = Mean [repair time - (operation time + disassembly time +
interchange time + reassembly time + alignment time + verification time)]

Note that the first two measures are interrelated in that before you can isolate a fault, you must
first detect it. Therefore, a testability analysis program is designed to analyze the effectiveness
of the detection scheme, and then to analyze the effectiveness of the isolation scheme. For
complex designs, the analysis of testability often requires the use of testability design and
analysis tools that provide information on fault detection and isolation, for a given diagnostic
approach, or diagnostic capability.

False alarms (in which a failure is "detected" even though none occurred) is a problem related to
both testability and a system's diagnostic design. Manifesting themselves in varying degrees in
avionics and other types of equipment, false alarms are a drain on maintenance resources and
reduce a system's mission readiness. The two most commonly reported symptoms of false
alarms are CND and RTOK.

False alarms occur for many and varied reasons, including external environmental factors
(temperature, humidity, vibration, etc.), design of diagnostics, equipment degradation due to age,

4-15
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

design tolerance factors, maintenance induced factors (e.g., connectors, wire handling, etc.), or
combinations of these factors. External environmental factors may cause failure of avionics or
other equipment that do not occur under ambient conditions and are believed to be a leading cause
of false alarms. When the environmental condition are removed, the "failure" cannot be found.
One solution to the problem is to use a stress measurement device to record the environmental
stresses before, during, and after a system anomaly. Subsequent diagnosis can use this data to
determine what occurred and whether any action (maintenance, modifications, etc.) are needed.

As discussed in 4.3.1.3, a stress measurement device that has been studied over the past few
years by the Air Force is the TSMD. TSMDs focus on the measurement, collection, storage, and
subsequent failure correlation analysis of the recorded stress data. The TSMD records an image
of all of the environmental data prior to, during, and after a system anomaly. The recorded event,
called a fault signature, identifies any environmental stress-related conditions that may be causing
intermittent or hard failures. The TSMD data aids in reducing RTOK, and CND conditions by
correlating the event with the conditions that existed when the anomaly was detected.

Several different models of TSMDs have been developed by different manufacturers. They
feature both 8 bit8 and 32 bit9 internal microprocessors and RS-232 and RS-485 interfaces.
Typically they are powered by 5 volts DC drawn from the host system and dissipate 1 watt or
less. They also have the capability to accept power from an external battery for operation under
power-off conditions, e.g., shipping and/or storage.

Many commercial stress measurement devices are also in use or under study. A RAC
publication10 provides a compendium of currently available commercial stress measurement
devices, including their sensing and storing capabilities. This publication is part of an on-going
market survey aimed at identifying sources of stand-alone environmental stress data collection
systems.

4.3.1.7.2 Diagnostic Capability. Defining and developing a product's diagnostic capability

depends on a number of factors such as:

The product's performance and usage requirements

Maintenance support requirements (e.g., levels of maintenance)
Technology available to: improve diagnostics in terms of test effectiveness; reduce the
need for test equipment, test manuals, personnel, training, and skill levels; and reduce
cost
The amount of testability designed into the product
Previously known diagnostic problems on similar systems.
8
Skeberdis, P. W., White, E. G., Westinghouse Electronics Systems, Fault Logging Using a Micro Time Stress
Measurement Device, RL-TR-95-289, January 1996
9
Havey, G., Louis, S., Buska, S., Honeywell Inc., Micro-Time Stress Measurement Device Development, RL-TR-
94-196, November 1994
10
Environmental Characterization Device Sourcebook (ECDS), Reliability Analysis Center, P.O. Box 4700, Rome,
NY 13442-4700, 1 (800) 526-4802

4-16
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

Each of these factors will play a role in determining the approach to detecting and isolating faults.
A typical approach to diagnostics includes the use of BIT. BIT is a design response to the need
to reduce maintenance manpower and external test equipment. Other approaches may consider
the use of automatic or semi-automatic test equipment, manual testing using benchtop test
equipment, or visual inspection procedures. In all cases, tradeoffs are required among system
performance, cost, and test effectiveness.

It is important to remember that the effectiveness of the diagnostic capability, and the cost of
development, is greatly influenced by the amount of testability that has been designed into the
system. Should there be a lack of test points available to external test equipment, for example,
then the ability to isolate failures to smaller ambiguity group sizes may be adversely affected.
The result is higher costs to locate the failure to a single replaceable item. The cost of test
development may also increase. BIT design should be supported by the results of a failure
modes and effects analysis (FMEA). An FMEA (see 4.4.1.3.3) should be used to define those
failures that are critical to system performance, and to identify when the effects of a failure can
be detected using BIT. Without such information, BIT tests can be developed based only on the
test engineer's knowledge of how the system works, and not on whether a test needs to be
developed for a particular fault. Finally BIT must be a part of the product design or the risks and
consequences shown in Table VII can ensue. Further information on BIT design can be found in
Appendix C.

TABLE VII. Risks and Consequences of Not Making BIT Part of Product Design.
Risks Consequences
BIT is designed independently of the product BIT fails to support operational and maintenance needs
BIT is designed after the fact BIT's MTBF is less than that of the product
Production personnel are not consulted on BIT BIT is not effective in the factory

4.3.1.8 Interfaces and Connections. One area of design that poses problems for both the
reliability and maintainability engineer is that of interfaces and connections. Interfaces and
connections, of course, make it possible to remove or perform maintenance on individual items.
In disconnecting and reconnecting items, failures can be induced by mis-mating parts, cross
threading connectors, damaging interface devices, and so forth. Disconnecting and reconnecting
items accounts for much of the time needed to remove and replace items. In the case of high
voltage electrical or high-pressure hydraulic and pneumatic connections, injury can result if
proper precautions are not taken. The possibility of damage or injury, and the time associated
with connecting and disconnecting items can be minimized through proper design for
maintainability. Examples of such design are:

Items that can be connected and reconnected without special tools

Simple connections with few moving parts
Use of quick disconnects (self-sealing) in hydraulic/pneumatic systems
Adequate space allowed to make connections and disconnections
Items with safety interlocks

4-17
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

Appendix D illustrates many of the types of mechanical and electrical connections used in
modern products. Appendix C includes detailed design guidelines for product interfaces and
connections.

4.3.1.9 Safety and Induced Failures. As indicated in 4.3.1.8, connecting and disconnecting
items within a product can pose safety risks or result in induced failures. As implied by the
name, an induced failure is one caused by human error or misuse. Unsafe conditions also can
result from human error and misuse. Mislabeling or lack of labeling, poorly written instructions,
omission of warnings, inappropriate choices of displays and controls, and so forth can also lead
to damaged or failed equipment, and to injury or death of operators or maintainers.

Some of the reasons that induced failures or unsafe conditions occur are:

Operating or maintenance instructions or procedures are unclear or can be

misinterpreted
Warning labels are not properly placed or warnings in procedures not in correct
sequence
Items not functionally interchangeable are physically interchangeable
Blind matings do not have self-guiding features
High failure items require low-failure items to be removed to facilitate maintenance
(unnecessarily increasing the removal rate for the latter)
The operation of controls is contrary to intuition or common practice (i.e., a knob is
turned counter-clockwise to increase power)
Informational displays are difficult to read or interpret
Tasks are physically awkward to perform

Appendix C has many design guidelines intended to avoid unsafe situations and to reduce the
possibility of induced failures.

4.3.1.10 Standardization and Interchangeability. Standardization and interchangeability

are important, interrelated, maintainability design factors. Interchangeability is one of the
principal means by which standardization is achieved. Good examples of the close
standardization/interchangeability relationship are the standard size base for incandescent lamps
and the standard size male plug for electrical appliances.

This section stresses the economies of designing toward standardizing hardware and software
with that of existing customer products, or within the product under design.

4.3.1.10.1Standardization Design Goals and Principles. Standardization is a design feature

for restricting to a minimum the feasible variety of items which will meet the hardware
requirements. Standardization includes not only parts but also: engineering terms, principles,
practices, materials, processes, software, etc.

4-18
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

Standardization encourages the use of common items. It is important that maintainability

engineers strive for the design of assemblies and components that are physically and functionally
interchangeable with other like assemblies and components of the system. Standardization design
will reduce the need for expensive support facilities at all levels of maintenance.

Standardization, a major objective of maintainability, translates into achieving the following goals:

Minimizing both the acquisition and support costs of a system

Increasing the availability of mission-essential items
Reducing training requirements both in number of personnel and the level of skill
required
Reducing inventories of repair parts and their associated documentation.

To achieve standardization, the following design principles must be carefully considered:

Make maximum use of all common parts and assemblies

Reduce to a minimum the variety of assemblies and parts required, and, in doing so,
make certain that these basic types are: used consistently for each application and that
they are compatible with existing uses and practices
Reduce to a minimum, by careful study of the simplification thus attained, the problems
of supply, storage, and stocking
Simplify practices, by the same means, in the coding and numbering of parts
Make maximum use of "off-the-shelf" components, tools, software and test equipment

Despite the advantages offered by standardization, a system should not necessarily be built
around a standard item - particularly if the standard item does not meet the required performance,
has a record of poor reliability or costly maintenance; or the standard item may satisfy a safety
requirement in most environments but not in the unusual environment for which it is being
considered. Technological advances may also dictate the development of new material or provide
a superior product to replace an existing one.

4.3.1.10.2Interchangeability Design Goals and Principles. Interchangeability is the ability to

exchange parts or assemblies between like equipments, without having to alter or physically
change the item. This is an extremely important life-cycle cost design requirement.

Total interchangeability exists when two or more items are physically and functionally
interchangeable in all possible applications - i.e., when the items are capable of full, mutual
substitution in all directions. Functional interchangeability is attained when an item, regardless of
its physical specifications, can perform the specific functions of another item. Physical

4-19
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

interchangeability exists when two or more parts or units made to the same specification can be
mounted, connected and used effectively in the same position in an assembly or system.

The two broad classes of interchangeability are:

Universal interchangeable - Items that are required to be interchangeable in the field even
though manufactured by different facilities.
Local interchangeable - Items that are interchangeable with other components made by
the same facility but not necessarily interchangeable with those made by other facilities.
This may result from different sets of measurement units employed in their design and
manufacture.

To attain maximum interchangeability, the following design principles should be applied:

Functional interchangeability of parts and units should exist wherever physical

interchangeability exists - to avoid any potentially dangerous situation
Physical interchangeability should not exist whenever functional interchangeability is
not intended
Whenever total - functional and physical - interchangeability is impractical, the items
should be designed for functional interchangeability, and adapters should be provided to
make physical interchangeability possible
To remove latent doubt, sufficient information should be provided in documented
instructions and identification plates to enable the technician to decide positively
whether or not two similar items are actually interchangeable
Differences should be avoided, where possible, in the shape, size, mounting, and other
physical characteristics of functionally interchangeable items
Modification of parts and units should not change their manner of mounting,
connecting, and otherwise incorporating them into an assembly or system
Total interchangeability should be provided for all parts and units that:
- are intended to be identical,
- are identified as being identical,
- have the same manufacturer's part number or other identification, and
- have the same function in different applications (especially important for parts
and units that have a high failure rate)
Parts, fasteners and connectors, lines and cables, etc., should be standardized
throughout a system, particularly from unit to unit within a given system
Mounting holes and brackets should be made to accommodate parts and units made by
different facilities - i.e., make them universally interchangeable

4-20
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

4.3.2 Design Tools. To assist in the design of maintainable products, various types of design
tools have been developed. These tools can be categorized as analytical, mockups, simulation
and virtual reality, handbooks and other reference documents, and expert systems. These
categories are discussed in the following sections.

4.3.2.1 Analytical. The majority of analytical tools available today - to assist the designer in
designing a maintainable product - are related to modeling the human being. Since the late 1970's
more than 50 different human models have been developed. Electronic representations of human
forms are used in simulation of equipment assembly, operation, and maintenance during the
design process in order to "walk through" these activities in order to identify and resolve human
interface problems before hardware is built. Early human models used only hands or arms to
check clearances for tool manipulation. Today's models create whole-body representations using
a basic "link" system resembling a human skeleton to enable posturing of the model within the
work environment.

Although a large variety of human models have emerged to support the design effort, there is
little agreement about how the human form should be configured, what constitutes valid data,
what are acceptable levels of accuracy, and what software/communications standards should be
adopted. Earlier human models focused on the physical or ergonomic aspects of human/machine
interaction. The focus today is on integrating this information with visual and cognitive
information processing requirements and with human modeling simulation to create an integrated
modeling technology. This provides additional realism not only through accurate replication of
human anthropometry, biomechanics and movement, but also in simulating purposeful and logical
behaviors in response to external stimuli and workload.

The purpose of all of these models is to integrate human performance analysis with Computer-
Aided Design (CAD) to provide the design team with a high degree of visualization of human
performance capabilities and limitations with respect to the product design. Through integration
of graphic human models with CAD product models, "rapid prototyping" of human/product
simulations or their results can be passed back to equipment designers for resolution of identified
problems.

Designing equipment that is easy to operate, assemble, and maintain is often hindered by poor
communications between the design team and personnel familiar with the operation, assembly, or
maintenance of similar or existing equipment. Improved communication among integrated
product development (IPD) team members can be accomplished by simulating equipment
operation, assembly, and maintenance using human modeling technology. Human models
combine animated 3-D human mannequin geometry with equipment geometry in order to "walk
through" designs so that problems can be solved early in the design process. They help to ensure
that human-centered design information is readily and accurately documented and preserved to
aid in human resources and related logistics planning requirements for system support. The
models are used first to influence a product's design for supportability, and then to document the
product requirements for human and logistics resources. Another major objective is the

4-21
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

development and implementation of design evaluation technology for performance of "design

checking" and prescriptive human performance information for recommending corrective action to
equipment designers to conform to human performance requirements.

The term "human model" in this context refers to the 3-D, computer-graphic representation of a
human form for analysis purposes. It does not address human performance models that are
independent of the geometric aspects of the human body, e.g., human error models.

Human modeling systems can support both the design-requirements definition and design
evaluation when concepts are only represented in 3-D computerized form. The human design-
requirement definition can be accomplished using reach or vision envelops that describe the
minimum conditions a designer must satisfy for physical or visual access. Design evaluations, on
the other hand, usually focus on critical task segments in which the human/equipment interface is
tested for compliance with stated design requirements and freedom from "won't-fit" or "won't-
work" conditions.

Some of the important benefits of using human modeling in CAD are:

Elimination of most physical-development fixtures by performing evaluations

electronically
Reduction of design costs by enabling the IPD team to prototype more rapidly and test
a design among themselves
Avoidance of costly design fixes later in the program by considering human factors
requirements early in the design effort
Improvement of customer communications at every step of product development by
using compelling animated graphics to review and confirm equipment function.

Application of human modeling technology is likely to impact how engineers design, build, and
test products in the future. Those who are responsible for manufacturing planning, tool design,
or maintenance engineering will be able to communicate with structural and systems engineering
effectively to illustrate assembly or maintenance problems associated with new designs. It is
expected that human model applications will spread beyond what is traditionally called
engineering and be used by various IPD team members from factory-built units to product
support groups.

Human modeling software programs are available from a variety of suppliers. Unfortunately,
they have created models which are very different: both in functionality and in user interface, and
in the underlying data driving the mannequins. This diversity has created not only models that
look and behave differently, but also models that produce distressingly different results when
performing the same engineering analysis.

4-22
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

For these reasons, the Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) has formed an ad hoc committee
to formulate standards to promote the orderly growth of this technology. The SAE Human
Modeling Technology committee has established three major subcommittee activities: user
requirements, human model definition, and software standards. A fourth subcommittee activity
is being considered on the topic of human performance models that would address human error
prediction, human workload, and task time estimation.

4.3.2.2 Mockups. As products became more complex, conceptualizing shape and fit from a
two-dimensional drawing became increasingly difficult. As a pre-production version or
prototype of the product was constructed, the consequences of inaccurate conceptualization
evidenced itself in structural components that would not properly mate, hydraulic lines that did
not connect as planned, and so forth. To solve this dilemma, engineers began using mockups of
critical sections of the product, sometimes of the entire product. Constructed of inexpensive
materials, mockups are non-functioning, dimensionally accurate, and usually full-scale models of
the product. Mockups allow the fit and mating of components to be checked before constructing
any functional hardware. Although being supplanted by computer-aided design and virtual
reality, mockups are still useful tools due to their simplicity and relatively low cost11.

4.3.2.3 Simulation and Virtual Reality. Simulation, as used here, is a method for
representing or approximating an object, event, or environment. In this context, simulation can
include physical mockups, computer models, or mathematical models. Virtual reality, or VR, is a
new technology that has been defined as the total or near total immersion of an observer in a
three-dimensional, synthetic environment in which the observer interacts with the environment.

Simulation. Simulation is frequently used to evaluate the maintainability characteristics of

a design. Mockups can be built to represent a finished product so that access for performing
maintenance, for example, can be evaluated.

Virtual Reality. VR is a method of simulating an environment that:

is too dangerous for an observer

lacks elements, such as an aircraft or other item of study
does not exist
is not accessible

Three different types of VR have been developed. Although not all these types exactly fit the
definition of virtual reality, they do represent variations of the same basic technology.

11
Very sophisticated mockups have been constructed. For example, an expensive, full-scale, left half (bisected down
the longitudinal axis) of the B-1A bomber was built by Rockwell. The wing was sweepable. Normally, mockups
are relatively simple and inexpensive.

4-23
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

The three types of VR are:

Telepresence in which observers perceive and interact with a distant environment

Augmented reality, a combination of a real and synthetic environment, in which a real
environment is annotated or augmented with additional details or elements
Virtual reality in which a synthetic environment is created for the observer

Telepresence is used when the environment is dangerous or inaccessible. An example of the

former case is disarming a bomb, a hazardous task for a person, even if wearing a helmet, body
armor, and other safety devices. A robot equipped with telepresence can be operated by an
operator located a safe distance from the bomb with almost the same feeling of "being there" as if
he or she were actually at the site of the bomb. An example of the latter case is controlling robots
in earth orbit from a ground station on earth.

In augmented reality, information and details are "added" to the real world, providing guidance,
instructions, and so forth to help an observer's understanding or performance. Three examples
follow. First, in an augmented reality approach to video conferencing, a three-dimensional image
of a new product still in design could be generated from computer-aided design (CAD) files and
"placed" on the desk or table in front of each conferee. The nomenclature of parts could be
"superimposed" on them and would "follow" them no matter how they were moved within the
range of the video camera. Another example of the use of augmented reality is the superimposing
of the proper locations for drilling holes in an aircraft skin with other information, such as proper
hole size. Finally, surfaces or features of an item that are physically occluded can be displayed
as an overlay so that an observer can "see" them without disassembling the item.

In a total virtual reality environment, nothing (or very little) but the user is "real." Objects and
their physical characteristics, the physical environment, the time of day, and so forth are all
generated by a computer and displayed to the user, usually through goggles or a helmet. The user
"sees" and can interact with objects in the environment.

Applications for Maintainability. VR has definite applications for designing maintainable

equipment. For example, based on computer-aided design data files, a virtual copy of the
product can be "produced." The maintainability engineer can then enter a virtual environment
(VE) in which maintenance can be "performed" on the product. The accessibility of components,
whether an item fits in an allocated space, and the approximate time required to perform specific
maintenance actions all can be evaluated using VR. Virtual copies of support equipment, such as
dollies and lifting devices, can be evaluated by "performing" maintenance activities with them.
VR maintenance aids could allow technicians to view virtual information panels "superimposed"
(using augmented reality techniques) on the actual equipment. In general, virtual reality can be
used by the maintainability engineer to analyze:

reachability and access

field of view
posture

4-24
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

lifting guidelines
energy expenditure
activity timing

In addition to designing for maintainability, VR has many potential training applications.

Maintenance and manufacturing procedures, especially procedures that are seldom performed or
are difficult to teach using conventional approaches, can be taught using VR. VR could also be
used to train individuals in performing hazardous procedures, disposing of hazardous materials,
or performing life-threatening procedures. For example, surgeons can now "perform" operations
without actually using any physical tools or a live patient.

As has been the case with previous new technologies, the possible uses of VR cannot be fully
appreciated or anticipated. As VR matures, the applications related to design for maintainability
will certainly increase in number and in fidelity.

4.3.2.4 Handbooks and Other Reference Documents. Hard-copy handbooks and similar
reference documents are considered by some to be pass in today's world of computer-based
design and virtual reality. None-the-less, much of the knowledge gained over the years as well as
new information is documented in handbooks, manuals, data books, and so forth. Guidance,
rules-of-thumb, lessons-learned, and similar information, together with explanations make
handbooks and other reference documents important resources for the engineer. Some older
documents are being "digitized" for entry into computer data bases making it easier to search and
update the information. Nearly all new documents are created in digitized form.

4.3.2.5 Artificial Intelligence. Various forms of artificial intelligence (AI) are beginning to be
used in the field of maintainability, particularly in the design of diagnostic tools. Individual AI
techniques include: Expert Systems, Fuzzy Logic and Neural Networks. The structural basis and
respective advantages and disadvantages for each of these techniques is summarized in Table
VIII.

TABLE VIII. Comparison of AI Techniques.

Technique Basis Advantages Disadvantages Application to Maintainability
Rule-Based "IF...THEN" Audit trail possible Difficult to capture Expert systems for design and for
Expert System Logic "intuitional" rules fault diagnosis. Based on
knowledge of human "experts".
Model-Based Functional Specific models are Requires the development Expert systems for design and for
Expert System System Model available of a unique model for each fault diagnosis. Adds model of
problem problem to expert knowledge.
Fuzzy Logic Converts 1) Eliminates Each individual output Expert systems for design and for
discrete logic stepwise must be "defuzzified" fault diagnosis. Allows for non-
into approximations discrete inputs and outputs.
continuous 2) Easy to "Fine
values Tune"
Neural Numerous 1) Trained by 1) No theoretical Expert systems for design and for
Network interconnected example understanding fault diagnosis. Can be "trained" by
simple 2) Insensitive to 2) No practical guidelines non-experts. Can capture
processing "Noise" 3) No audit trail possible intuitional as well as procedural
modes 3) Able to capture rules.
"Intuitional"
rules

4-25
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

4.3.2.5.1 Expert Systems. "Expert systems" are becoming an important maintainability tool,
especially as industry downsizes with a concomitant loss of individual company "maintainability
experts." Expert systems are used to "capture" and codify the knowledge of one or more experts
in a given field or area of study and to make this knowledge available to non-experts.

For maintainability, a major use of expert systems is in diagnostic tools. The diagnostic
capability of expert systems has been successfully demonstrated in both the medical and
maintainability fields. Whether the problem is to identify a specific illness afflicting a patient or
to identify the cause of an observed system or equipment failure, expert systems have proved to
be efficient and effective.

Another potential use of expert systems in the field of maintainability comes as a result of
"downsizing" and the use of integrated product design teams (IPDTs). As companies have
downsized, the number of individuals employed as "maintainability engineers" has decreased.
Many years of corporate experience are being lost and the few remaining maintainability
engineers are spread thin. Where IPDTs are used, an engineer who may know very little about
maintainability, may very well be given the responsibility for that aspect of design. Expert
systems can help "replace" the maintainability engineer and assist those given the responsibility
for maintainability design. As part of a computer-aided design system, an expert system could
guide the designer in equipment placement, selection of fasteners, design of access panels and
hatches, and so forth.

Although no companies were found using expert systems as a maintainability design tool at the
time this handbook was published, many were developing knowledge bases. McDonnell
Douglas, for example, is consolidating thousands of design "rules" that have been developed over
the years for a variety of products, including fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters. Entered into a
data base, these design rules will be available to the engineers as part of the CAD system used by
McDonnell Douglas. Such a knowledge base, as will be discussed in 4.3.2.5.1.1, is an essential
part of a rule-based expert system.

Two distinct types of expert systems are used: rule-based and model-based.

4.3.2.5.1.1 Rule-Based Expert Systems. Rule-based expert systems operate through a set of
"IF....THEN" rules processed by an underlying "inference engine". A typical rule-based expert
system is composed of four major elements: the Inference Engine, a Knowledge Base, a User
Interface and an Explanation Facility.

The Inference Engine is that part of the expert system that performs the reasoning. It is
analogous to the raw intelligence of a human expert. Many different forms of inference engines
exist, but all are designed to perform the same task, i.e., to examine the current facts and use
available rules to generate new facts.

4-26
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

The Knowledge Base is where the information resides within the expert system. It consists of
two distinct parts: the rule base "IF <condition> THEN", and the fact base containing simple
statements about the condition of the world, as it is applicable to the problem under study.

The User Interface enables the expert system and the user to communicate. The exact form of
this interface depends on the intended audience for the expert system.

The Explanation Facility presents the user with the expert system's justification for its
conclusions, i.e., an audit trail, as necessary.

A typical expert system initially partitions the problem by applying a broad set of inference
rules to an initial set of data describing the problem or the symptoms. Each of these inference
rules will take the inference engine to a further data-acquisition stage (typically another, more
directed, questionnaire) or the establishment of a new fact. This process of a directed search with
additional data gathering continues until the expert system has reached a leaf node in the resulting
decision tree. Some inference engines may resolve an ambiguity, when several inference rules
evaluate as TRUE to a given data set, by selecting the one with the highest associated weighting
or confidence factor; others may use a different approach (e.g., fuzzy logic -- see 4.3.2.5.2).

The rules in the knowledge base, that portion which drives any expert system, are painstakingly
constructed by an expert systems specialist interrogating the knowledge expert and subsequently
codifying the often imprecise descriptions of their thinking processes into inference rules,
possibly with numerical limits. For example a rule for a medical diagnostic expert system may
state:

"IF heart rate > 100 beats per minute AND body temperature > 101F
THEN recommend that patient be placed in an ice bath".

The fact portion of the knowledge base would simply record the patient's heart rate and
temperature.

A general approach for the physical development of a maintainability expert system is shown in
Figure 9.

It may be difficult to capture all of an expert's knowledge in an expert system knowledge base
because the expertise is encoded as a causal relationship. "Rational" knowledge, where the
solution can be described analytically, is comparatively straightforward to codify into inference
rules. "Semi-rational" knowledge, where the expert can specify suitable ranges for conditions, but
cannot (easily) defend the choice of these ranges are more difficult. This process may take some
detective work by the expert system specialist. Unfortunately, however, much of what "makes
an expert" occurs at an intuitional or visceral level, where even the expert is unaware of the
underlying mechanism behind their decisions and may even be unable to quantify appropriate
ranges. This area presents the major challenge and limitation in the design of a rule-based expert
system. The following three sections will address some alternative solutions to this problem.

4-27
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

Design Expert System

Structure including User
Interface

Knowledge Acquisition

Rules Codification

System Validation

Growth or System
Enhancement

FIGURE 9. Steps in a General Approach for the Physical Development of a

Maintainability Expert System.

4.3.2.5.1.2 Model-Based Expert Systems. The second type of expert system - the model-
based system - uses a specific functional model to diagnose the observed symptoms and devise a
solution to the problem. The knowledge base is usually organized around a functional or
representative model of the system, but it is sometimes preferable to use an actual physical
model. This model now provides the procedure with a focus of attention directed toward
expected goals and guides the process in determining the effects of system/equipment failure
symptoms. In the area of testability a number of detail models have been developed. These
include models such as: WSTA, STAT and STAMP which are addressed in more detail in section
4.4.1.3.4.1 of this handbook.

4.3.2.5.2 Fuzzy Logic. Fuzzy logic is essentially an expert system structure tailored to deal
with continuous-valued inputs and outputs instead of discrete lexical elements. Thus, fuzzy logic
can potentially reduce the number of rules required in a system. This is achieved through clever
preprocessing of the inputs, where each continuous input value is "fuzzified" or converted from a
precise numeric value to a degree-of-membership in a "fuzzy set" as shown in Figure 10. Fuzzy
logic is attractive because it allows for conflicting "expert opinion," thereby allowing the use of
information normally excluded from scientific models. For design, fuzzy logic can be used to
define a range of feasible design parameters even when historical data are insufficient to use
tractional probability-based approaches.

When an input falls into a region where two or more fuzzy sets overlap, it simply produces a
degree-of-membership in each of the overlapping sets. An output term of a fuzzy logic system is
itself a fuzzy set, which must be "defuzzified" or converted back to a precise (i.e., "crisp")

4-28
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

numeric value. This is done by taking the centroid of the part of the output fuzzy set lying
below the degree-of-membership output value. This degree-of-membership can result from a
straight mapping of input fuzzy set to output fuzzy set, as shown by Rule 1 in Figure 10, or
from a logical combination of rules12 as used in an expert system (Rule 2 in Figure 10). When
two or more inference rules trigger on a given output, the "crisp" output is calculated as the
centroid of the areas of the contributing rules.

Rule 1: Rule 2:
IF pressure is high THEN IF temp is cold AND capacity is
valve position is medium full THEN valve position is wide

COLD MEDIUM WIDE

1 1
0.8
Degree
of
Membership

0 0 Valve
50 Temp.
FULL 0 42 64 90 Position
1
Degree
of 0.6
Membership Output from Output from
Rule 1 Rule 2
0 53
Capacity
60 gal Final output (centroid
HIGH of all applicable rules)
1
Degree
of
Membership 0.4

0
121 psi Pressure

FIGURE 10. Fuzzy Logic Set Membership.

By providing the means for an expert system structure to treat continuous inputs and outputs as
lexical elements, it eliminates the stepwise approximation a classical expert system would
normally be forced to use in such a situation. This significantly reduces the number of inference
rules required and makes the program structure more clear. Also, because the mapping between
inputs, outputs and lexical elements is done via simple curve functions, a fuzzy system is easier
to "fine tune". Thus a given fuzzy solution can be taken to other similar domains by rescaling or
reshaping the input and output curves while leaving the logical inferences unchanged.

4.3.2.5.3 Neural Networks. Artificial neural networks consist of a large number of densely-
interconnected simple processing nodes, each of which produces a non-linear result of a weighted

12
The AND operator selects the smallest degree-of-membership of its operands, while the OR operator selects the
largest degree-of-membership.

4-29
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

sum of its inputs (e.g., the output is a binary "1" if the sum exceeds a set threshold). The input
stimuli and/or the outputs of other neurons are typically as shown in Figure 11. While there are
numerous architectures of neural networks, they all work by partitioning the N-dimensional
stimulus space into a series of continuous regions and as such, serve as "feature detectors" where
the output (1,0) of an output-stage neuron represents the presence or absence of a desired
feature. This behavior is especially useful in pattern recognition.

Each connection is individually weighted

Input 1 Feature 1

Input 2 Feature 2

Input m Feature m
Input layer Hidden layer(s) Output layer

FIGURE 11. Typical Neural Network Configuration.

Neural networks, unlike expert systems or fuzzy logic, do not partition the stimulus space based
on explicit rules. Rather, they are "trained" with sets of example stimuli and desired outputs.
The training procedure gradually adjusts the weighting coefficients on each neuron's input until
the global error is minimized. Successive training sets for other stimulus-response sets alter the
coefficients, but a "memory" of previous training sets remains. Given a sufficient number of
training sets, the neural network gradually converges to a stable set.

Neural nets have four significant advantages over expert systems:

1) While they are slow to train, neural networks can be trained by someone who is not an
expert in the field (the training data sets, however, must be prepared by such an expert).
This can translate into considerable time and cost savings.
2) Because the network is trained by example, it can capture the intuitional expertise as
well as the procedural aspects.
3) The neural net automatically creates contiguous regions in the stimulus hypercube,
eliminating the: region gap, overlap, and understatement problems inherent in expert
systems.

4-30
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

4) Neural networks have been shown to be robust in the face of the noisy data found in
nature. They require little or no sensor calibration or special non-linear quantization
schemes.

Several factors, however, mitigate against the use of neural networks. These include:

Lack of a sound theoretical understanding of neural networks.

Absence of practical guidelines for selecting amongst the multitude of competing
architectures. Network architecture is often a matter of personal taste.
Lack of an established means for determining the correct number of neurons to use in a
given architecture for a given problem. Practitioners typically add neurons until they
achieve a desired level of network stability.
Neural networks are sensitive to the training data: With too little training neural nets
tend to misidentify stimuli (i.e., mispartition stimuli space). They can also exhibit
pattern sensitivity to some data sets. That is to say, the network will not converge to a
stable configuration, but oscillates between two or more metastable regions.
Attempts to deal with metastability and divergence often incur a rapid growth in the
number of neurons.
Neural networks are unable to provide an audit trail showing how or why an incorrect
decision was made. This makes them much harder to debug than expert systems, and
also poses some interesting liability issues.

In summary, neural networks provide several distinct advantages over classical expert systems,
most notably, a) training by example, b) robust pattern matching in the face of noisy or
incomplete data, and c) the ability to capture an expert's intuitive knowledge. However, they
operate "mysteriously", in a field with few landmarks. This makes neural network solutions
difficult to develop.

4.4 Maintainability Analyses and Test

4.4.1 Analyses. This section first discusses the objectives of maintainability analyses. Next,
the typical products or outputs of maintainability analysis will be outlined. Finally, brief
descriptions will be provided of the most common maintainability analyses.

4.4.1.1 Objectives of Maintainability Analyses. Maintainability analyses have five main

objectives.

To establish design criteria that will provide the necessary maintainability features
To support the evaluation of design alternatives and trade-off studies
To provide inputs to the process of identifying and quantifying support requirements
(spares, training, support equipment, etc.)

4-31
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

To evaluate the effectiveness of the support concept and maintenance policies and to
identify needed changes to the concept and policies
To verify that the design complies with the maintainability design requirements

4.4.1.2 Typical Products of Maintainability Analyses. The products of performing

maintainability analyses include but are not limited to:

Mean and maximum times to repair (at various levels of maintenance and at platform
and unit level)
Inputs to level of repair analysis
Maintenance time or labor hours per task or operating hour
Inputs to maintenance personnel requirements (e.g., number required, existing or special
skills, etc.)
Inputs to spares requirements
Support equipment requirements
False alarm rates, methods of fault detection, and effectiveness of BIT
Mean time between scheduled and preventive maintenance
Maintainability Models and Block Diagrams

4.4.1.3 Commonly Used Maintainability Analyses. The depth and scope of any analysis
will vary with the design detail available and the complexity of the equipment. Some analyses are
performed for other purposes. For example, an FMEA is usually performed as part of the
reliability effort to identify potential weaknesses in the design. In such cases, to avoid
duplicative effort, it must be decided who will be responsible for the analysis.

The various types of maintainability analyses include but are not limited to (a brief description of
each of these analyses follows):

Equipment Downtime Analysis

Maintainability Design Evaluation
FMEA
Testability Analysis
Human Factors Analysis

4.4.1.3.1 Equipment Downtime Analysis. Equipment downtime analysis is used to evaluate

the expected time that a piece of equipment is not available (i.e., it is down) due to maintenance
or a supply backlog. This value is the sum of elapsed maintenance time, awaiting parts time, and
awaiting maintenance time. It is a primary measure of merit that considers reliability,
maintainability, support system attributes, and operational environment. The results of this
analysis may be used to calculate other equipment measures of merit, such as mission capable

4-32
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

rate and equipment availability. The results of the analysis indicate those areas driving non-
availability of the equipment and are used to evaluate alternative design and support concepts
based on total system downtime.

Equipment downtime is derived by using the reliability and maintainability parameters and
support parameters. Downtime (DT) is the sum of elapsed maintenance time (EMT), awaiting
parts (AWP) time, and awaiting maintenance (AWM) time, and can be expressed as:

DT = EMT + AWP + AWM (Equation 5)

where: This parameter indicates repair time for corrective (unscheduled) maintenance.
EMT is a function of failure rate, maintenance action rate, maintenance action to
failure ratio, and mean time to repair. It can also include administrative and
logistics delay.

AWP time combines mean operating hours between demands, not repairable this
station (NRTS) rate, and expected available inventory to determine the expected
length of time a part is not available due to stockout conditions.

AWM time is the expected length of time the equipment cannot be worked on due
to any other considerations such as unavailable personnel, administrative delays,
logistics delays other than spare parts (e.g., support equipment), and weather
delay. This is usually derived from field data.

Equipment downtime analysis is typically performed at the total system level to provide the
operator with information that can be used for: (1) alternative design or support system concept
comparisons, (2) operations or mission planning, and (3) readiness capability assessment.
Individual subsystems and lower indenture equipment items can also be evaluated using this
analysis approach to identify the effects of individual equipment modifications or high-driver
contributors to overall system downtime.

Equipment downtime analysis may be used any time during the program or product life cycle.
The depth of this analysis increases as the system is more completely defined and parametrically
described in the later phases of a program. Early use of downtime analysis will provide criteria
to influence design for supportability, while later use will point out corrective actions that can be
taken through changes in the design or support system.

Equipment downtime analysis results in a figure of merit called "equipment downtime," measured
in hours, days or other time cycle appropriate for the equipment evaluated. It can be used to
identify areas driving system non-availability, to compare alternate design or support system
concepts, and as input to other equipment capability measures.

4.4.1.3.2 Maintainability Design Evaluation. Maintainability design evaluation is the

process of analyzing the maintenance implications of a proposed or evolving design and

4-33
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

providing feedback to the designer in a timely manner. A major goal of this evaluation is to
ensure that maintainability is designed into the product from the start.

The process starts with a set of standards available to the designer and maintainability engineer.
These standards normally consist of a preliminary "use study," maintenance concept, qualitative
and quantitative maintainability requirements, and lessons learned. The in-process evaluations
refine the maintenance concepts that will later form the basis for the maintenance elements of
logistics support analysis.

The depth of this analysis depends on the phase that the design program is in at the time and the
complexity of the equipment being designed. More complex equipment will need extensive
evaluation to ensure that all maintainability requirements are being met. The design criteria in
Appendix C provide a basis for evaluating a design for maintainability.

4.4.1.3.3 Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA). Traditionally, the FMEA (referred to
as a Failure Mode, Effects, and Criticality Analysis, or FMECA, when the criticality of failures
is also determined) has been used as a reliability analysis and design tool. However, the results of
an FMEA are also a key input to the design for maintainability. The FMEA helps establish the
necessary maintainability design characteristics based on potential failure modes and their effects
on subsystems, equipment, and product operation. The results of the FMEA are used to
determine placement and nature of test points, to develop troubleshooting schemes, to establish
design characteristics relative to the ease of maintenance, and to develop fault detection and
isolation strategies (the use of an FMEA as an input to testability analysis is discussed in
4.4.1.3.4).

Some of the prime outputs of an FMEA, from a maintainability viewpoint, include:

Identification of single point failures

Fail-safe design deficiencies
False alarm occurrences
Operator/maintenance person safety considerations
Potential failure detection methodology, including
- Protective and warning devices
- Failure over-ride features
- Built-in test (BIT) provisions

The FMEA should describe the means by which the occurrence of a specific functional failure
(failure mode) is detected and localized by the operator or maintenance person. FMEA outputs
are very important to the design of a system's diagnostic system, which may include BIT. By
identifying both local and next higher level effects of each potential system failure mode, methods
for identifying, annunciating, and isolating the failures modes that affect system operation can be
devised. Any applicable warning devices, BIT indications, or other indications which make
evident that an item has failed or malfunctioned should be clearly identified. If no such indication

4-34
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

exists, the situation should be flagged in the FMEA as a potential maintainability problem.
Proper recognition of an item failure or malfunction requires that normal, abnormal, and incorrect
indications be known. A normal indication is one that is obvious to an operator or maintenance
person when the item is operating normally. Abnormal and incorrect indications are those that
are evident when an item has malfunctioned or failed.

As indicated in the list of maintainability-related FMEA outputs, an FMEA can be used to

identify potential false alarms. False alarms often occur when the system's BIT detects and
annunciates a failure during operation that cannot be repeated or duplicated later at the initial
maintenance level. A false alarm can occur when the failure is an out-of-tolerance condition that
exceeds the preset BIT limits that define "good" indications of system operation. The FMEA
can be used to identify those failure modes that result in an out-of-tolerance condition rather than
in a hard failure. This knowledge can then be used to design the BIT so it recognizes such a
condition and only declares a failure if the condition persists over a specified period (time, cycles,
etc.) of operation. This is one example of how an FMEA can be used to avoid false alarms.
Another example is when the out-of-tolerance condition has no effect on system operation.
Without this knowledge, the BIT could be designed to declare a failure, resulting in an
unnecessary mission abort. With such knowledge, the BIT can be designed to ignore
(intentionally over-ride) this condition, allowing the mission to be completed.

Finally, the FMEA can be used to identify failures that are undetectable but have no effect on the
mission. In such cases, the consequences of a second failure can be analyzed. For those cases in
which the mission would be jeopardized by the second failure, the FMEA can be used to
determine whether or not a failure indication would now be evident to the operator, maintenance
person, or BIT.

Figure 12 illustrates the steps in an FMEA. As mentioned earlier, when the criticality of each
failure mode is also determined , the analysis is known as a FMECA. Figure 13 illustrates a
typical FMEA worksheet. References that describe a detailed methodology for performing an
FMEA are listed in Appendix F. Note that the text of the Society of Automotive Engineers
(SAE) document J-1739 is essentially identical to that of Automotive Industries Action group
(AIAG) document "Potential Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA). Both are listed in
Appendix F for the sake of completeness and to avoid the impression that one is preferred over
the other. Finally, Figure 14 shows an abbreviated results of an FMEA performed on a solid
rocket motor.

4-35
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

Functional Model Product and Process

and Description Specifications and
Drawings

Data from:
test field reports Subsystems
lessons learned Process Steps
similar products Design and Process
Changes

YES
Identify Potential Inputs to Other Tasks
Failure Modes Identify NO Safety Analysis
Compensating Corrective Action LSA
Provisions and Needed Quality Assurance
Identify Possible Procedures ? Testability
Failure Causes Identify Diagnostics Design
Detection
Methods
Determine Effects
Local Evaluate Criticality When this step is
Next Higher Severity included, the analysis is
End/User Probability called a FMECA

FIGURE 12. Steps in an FMEA.

FAILURE MODES AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS

Product: ______________________________________ Date: ______________________
Indenture Level: ________________________________ Sheet ______ of ______ Sheets
Reference Drawing: ______________________________ Completed by: _______________
Mission: _______________________________________ Approved by: ________________

ID Detection Compensating
Number Nomenclature Function Modes Causes Effects Method Provisions

FIGURE 13. Typical FMEA Worksheet.

4-36
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

FMEA
1. Subsystem: Rocket Motor 2. FMEA Prepared by: A. N. Engineer 3. Date: January 3, 1993

Component or Item Failure Mode Cause of Failure Effects

1. Motor case 1. Rupture 1. Poor workmanship Destruction of missile
2. Defective materials
3. Damage during shipping
4. Damage during handling
5. Damage during storage
6. Overpressurization

1. Cracking 1. Abnormal stresses from cure 1. Excessive burn rate

2. Propellant grain
2. Voids 2. Excessively low temperature 2. Overpressurization
3. Bond separation 3. Aging 3. Motor case rupture
during operation
3. Liner 1. Separation from case 1. Inadequate cleaning of case 1. Excessive burn rate
2. Separation from motor after fabrication 2. Overpressurization
grain or insulation 2. Unsuitable bonding material 3. Motor case rupture
3. Bonding process inadequate during operation
or not in control

FIGURE 14. Abbreviated Results from FMEA of a Solid Propellant Rocket Motor.

4.4.1.3.4 Testability Analysis. Testability analysis is important at all levels of design and can
be accomplished in a variety of ways. For instance, when designing complex integrated circuits
(ICs), such as Application Specific ICs, or ASICs, it is important to develop test vectors that
will detect a high percentage of 'stuck at' faults (i.e., signal stuck at logic '1' or '0'). This is almost
always determined via logic simulation wherein a model of the design is developed in an
appropriate fault simulation language. Once the model is compiled and ready to be simulated, a
set of test vectors are applied to the model. The fault simulation program then produces a list of
faults detected by the test vectors, as well as reporting the percentage (or fraction) of faults
detected. Many such programs also identify specific signals that were not detected such that
adjustments can be made either in the design or in the test vectors themselves in order to increase
fault detection percentage.

For non-digital electronics, fault detection efficiency is typically determined with the aid of an
FMEA. The FMEA will provide those faults that result in an observable failure, and can
therefore be detected. The test engineer then must develop a test that will verify operation and
detect any malfunctions as identified in the FMEA. Fault detection percentages are then
determined by summing the number of faults identified in the FMEA that are detected versus the
total number identified as being detectable. This process can occur at all levels of design. The
fault grading methods described in the first paragraph above are primarily applied at the IC and
printed circuit card levels.

In addition to determining fault detection percentage, a testability analysis should be performed

to determine the fault isolation effectiveness of designed tests. For digital electronics, many of
the tools used to grade test vectors also provide statistics on fault isolation percentages. This is

4-37
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

typically provided by creating a fault dictionary. During fault simulation, the response of the
circuit is determined in the presence of faults. These responses collectively form the fault
dictionary. Isolation is then performed by matching the actual response obtained from the circuit
or test item with one of the previously computed responses stored in the fault dictionary. Fault
simulation tools can determine from the fault dictionary the percentage of faults that are uniquely
isolatable to an ambiguity group of size n (n = 1, 2, 3, ...). These tools can be used to verify
fault isolation goals or requirements via analysis, prior to actual testing. For non-digital circuits,
hybrid circuits or even digital systems above the printed circuit card level, analysis of fault
isolation capability can be performed with the aid of a diagnostic model and a software tool that
analyzes that model. Examples are dependency modeling tools such as the Weapon System
Testability Analyzer (WSTA), System Testability Analysis Tool (STAT) or the System
Testability and Maintenance Program (STAMP)13. These tools, and others like them, can be
used to determine the fault isolation capability of a design based on the design topology, order of
test performance, and other factors such as device reliability. Statistics such as percentage of
faults isolatable to an ambiguity of group size n are provided, as is the identification of which
components or modules are in an ambiguity group for a given set of tests. Test effectiveness and
model accuracy are the responsibility of the test designer, however.

4.4.1.3.4.1 Dependency Analysis. Assessing testability via dependency analysis has gained in
popularity recently, and it is therefore prudent to provide some additional information on this
technique. Dependency analysis starts with the creation of a dependency model of the item to be
analyzed. The model is designed to capture the relationship between tests or test sites within a
system, and those components and failure modes of components that can affect the test. As an
example, consider the simple functional block diagram shown in Figure 15.

T1 T2 T3
C1 C2

T4
C3

FIGURE 15. Simple System Showing Test Dependencies.

The dependency model for the system, in the form of a tabular list of tests and their
dependencies is provided in Table IX.

13
STAT is a registered trademark of DETEX Systems, Inc. and STAMP is a registered trademark of the ARINC
Research Corporation. WSTA is a tool developed by the US Navy and available to most US Government
contractors and US Government employees.

4-38
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

TABLE IX. First Order Dependency Model for Simple System.

Test First-Order Dependencies
T1 None
T2 C1, T1
T3 C2, T2
T4 C3, T2

Figure 15 has been labeled to identify each potential test site within the system, where in this
example, exactly one test is being considered at each node. The dependency model shown in
Table IX is a list of "first-order dependencies" of each test. For example, the first order
dependency of test T3 is C2 and T2. This would indicate that T3 depends upon the health of
component C2 and any inputs to C2, which is T2 in this case. For this simple system, it is also
obvious that T3 will also depend on C1 and T1, but these are considered higher-order
dependencies. Each of the tools mentioned previously (i.e., STAT, STAMP and WSTA),
determine all higher order dependencies based on a first order dependency input model.

Dependency modeling is attractive due to its applicability to any kind or level of system. Note
in the example that neither the nature nor level of the system is required to process the model.
Consequently, this methodology is applicable to most any type of system technology and any
level (i.e., component to system).

Based on the input model, the analysis tools can determine the percentage of time isolation to an
ambiguity group of n or fewer components will occur. In addition, each of the tools discussed
will also identify which components or failures will be in the same ambiguity group with other
components or failures. Furthermore, any test feedback loops that exist, including those
components contained within the feedback loop, will also be identified. Note that the ambiguity
group sizes and statistics are based on a binary test outcome (i.e., test is either good or bad), and
in most cases the tools assume that the test is 100% effective. This means that if the model
indicates that a particular test depends on a specified set of components, the tools assume that
should the test pass, all components within the dependency set are good. Conversely, a failed
test makes all of the components within the dependency set suspect. Therefore, the accuracy of
the model, in terms of what components and component failure modes are actually covered by a
particular test are the responsibility of the model developer. The coverage is very much
dependent upon test design and knowledge of the system's functional behavior.

Even before intimate knowledge of what tests are to be performed is known, such as in the early
stages of system development, a model can be created that assumes a test at every node, for
instance. The system design can be evaluated as to where feedback loops reside, which
components are likely to be in ambiguity, and where more visibility, in terms of additional test
points, need to be added to improve the overall testability of the design. Once the design is more
developed, and knowledge of each test becomes available, the dependency model can then be
refined. Given that the analyst is satisfied with the model results, each of the tools discussed can
be used to develop optimal test strategies based on system topology and one or more weighting

4-39
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

factors such as test cost, test time, component failure rates, time to remove an enclosure to access
a test point, etc..

One of the drawbacks in the past to dependency modeling has been the time it takes to create a
model. However, translation tools exist and are continuously being developed that can translate a
design captured in a CAD format, such as the Electronic Data Interchange Format (EDIF), into a
dependency model compatible with the specific dependency analysis tool being used. The
analyst is still responsible for verifying the accuracy of the model, however, as in some cases, not
all dependencies will be 100% correctly translated. Despite this fact, the amount of time that can
be saved in translation out weighs any additional time it may take to verify the model.

4.4.1.3.4.2 Dependency Analysis Tools. The three tools mentioned, STAT, STAMP and
WSTA, provide the same basic kinds of outputs as just discussed. Each tool has other features
that may be attractive depending on the system being analyzed, CAD tools being used in the
design process, etc. Therefore, more information should be gathered on these and other similar
tools prior to making a final decision as to which one to acquire. Contact information for STAT,
STAMP, WSTA, and similar tools is provided in Appendix F.

The key points to remember about any of these tools is that model accuracy is most important.
Therefore, it is important to understand how the system behaves in the presence of a failure, and
which tests can be developed to detect such behavior. Thus, to gain the most benefit from the
model development process, experts in design and test should be involved. For additional
information on dependency analysis and dependency analysis tools and their applications, see
references listed in Appendix F.

4.4.1.3.4.3 Other Types of Testability Analyses. Other types of analyses that do not
require the use of a software tool are ad hoc procedures, such as reviewing a design against a
known set of testability design practices, such as the checklist found in Appendix C. Grumman,
and later Raytheon, developed such a procedure for the US Air Force Rome Laboratory that rates
a design based on the presence or absence of design features that increase or decrease ease of test.
The result is a score that is subjectively evaluated as indicating the design is anywhere between
untestable without redesign to very testable. Used in conjunction with a design guide, also
developed as part of the process by the mentioned companies, this method can be very effective
in making the test engineer's job easier and less costly. Some of the testability design guidelines
taken from the report referenced in the footnote14 are provided in Appendix C. Testability
analysis is a combination of applying any of the above mentioned techniques to a system design,
and should be tailored according to the design level and design technology.

4.4.1.3.5 Human Factors Analysis. One of the most basic maintainability requirements is
that the system be easy to maintain by human personnel. Maintainability analysis of a system

14
RL-TR-92-12, VOLUMES I & II - Testability Design Rating System: Testability Handbook (Volume I) &
Analytical Procedure (Volume II).

4-40
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

typically involves maintenance tasks that deal with the repair or removal and replacement of a
part or subassembly. Maintenance tasks usually involve the disassembly, which is needed to
access the target component, component repair or replacement and subsequent reassembly.

Thus, human factors analysis is performed to identify problems related to the interaction
between maintenance personnel and the design model in performing each maintenance task. This
analysis is used to verify that each required maintenance task, and its associated motions and
manipulations, can be performed by humans. It deals more with the qualitative requirements
than the quantitative requirements. Also, it is extremely important, that this analysis be done
while the product is still in the early design stages, i.e., before any "metal is bent."

Human factors problems may involve the limited strength of maintenance personnel, limited or
no work clearance required to carry out the task, i.e., accessibility problems and problems related
to visual requirements of the maintenance person performing the task. Thus, human factors
analysis involves three major considerations:

Strength analysis
Accessibility analysis
Visibility analysis

Strength analysis. This analysis is used to determine the feasibility of the disassembly and
assembly sequences. Determine whether or not the maintenance person is able to carry out a
maintenance activity that requires a certain level of human strength. That is, to evaluate the
ability of the maintenance person to carry, lift, hold, twist, push, and pull objects in a standard
body position (i.e., standing, bending, sitting, squatting, lying, etc.). Strength analysis can be one
of the most important criteria for the evaluation of a maintenance task.

Accessibility analysis. This analysis is performed to identify design problems related to the
inability of maintenance personnel to access the work area, i.e., to detect possible collisions
during the maintenance activity.

Visibility analysis. For some maintenance activities it is important (e.g. for safety considerations)
that the maintenance person be able to fully observe the work area.

In the past, human factors analyses were very time consuming. They required the construction
of expensive physical mock-ups to perform the analysis and also, unfortunately, the analysis
was not done until the final stages of design, when modifications were very costly. However,
there are a variety of modern, animated, computer-aided-design (CAD) tools and new virtual
reality techniques available to assist the maintainability engineer in effectively and efficiently
performing these analyses. Furthermore, when problems are discovered in the course of the
human factors analysis, the proposed design modifications can be quickly verified for their
effectiveness using these same tools and techniques.

4-41
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

4.4.1.4 Quantitative Measures of Maintainability. Quantitative maintainability

requirements are associated with those design characteristics controllable by the designer. They
are determined through an analysis of the customer needs and constraints as was discussed in 3.1,
"Understand the Customer's Maintainability Needs." Customer-imposed constraints include:

Expected operating time (or cycles) per unit of calendar time

Maximum downtime or maintenance time, or required availability
Operational environment and mission profile
Skill types and skill levels of maintenance personnel
Existing types of diagnostics and other maintenance support equipment available to
support the product and customer
Turnover rate of personnel

Quantitative maintainability requirements may be expressed using many different metrics and
may be established at any or all levels of maintenance. For example, they may be structured as
functions of time, labor hours, or in terms of fault detection and isolation. Examples of
quantitative maintainability requirements include:

Active maintenance in terms of corrective maintenance time in labor hours

Mean preventive maintenance time in labor hours
Mean active maintenance time in terms of mean labor hours per maintenance action
Unit removal and installation times
Inspection times
Turnaround time
Reconfiguration time
Mean Time to Repair (MTTR)
Mean Time to Restore System (MTTRS)
Maximum Time to Repair [at a specified confidence level, ] ( M Max ( ) )
Mean Manhours (MMH) per repair
Mean Manhours per Operating Hour (MMH/OH)
Mission Time to Restore Functions (MTTRF)
Direct Manhours per Maintenance Action (DMH/MA)
Mean Equipment Corrective Maintenance Time to Support a Unit Hour of Operating
Time (MTUT)
Maintenance Ratio (MR)
Mean Time to Service (MTTS)

4-42
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

Mean Time Between Preventive Maintenance (MTBPM)

Mean Manhours per Flying Hour (MMH/FH)
Probability of Fault Detection
Proportion of Faults Isolatable
Proportion of faults detected and percentage of time detected for failure modes to be
detected or isolated by automatic or built-in test equipment
Maximum false alarm rate for automatic or built-in test equipment

4.4.1.4.1 Maintainability Models and Maintenance Activities Block Diagrams.

Maintainability models and maintenance activities block diagrams are essential elements of
maintainability analysis. Models and diagrams are developed and used as the basis for the
allocation and prediction processes. Models also may be used as graphical representations of
maintenance tasks and may be used to assess compatibility with the maintenance human resource
requirements. Finally, models and diagrams are used to augment systems engineering tradeoff
studies.

Models and maintenance activities block diagrams may be based on system engineering models,
and are developed for alternative system concepts or configurations or for proposed design
changes. The models and maintenance activities block diagrams must be well documented and
used consistently throughout the design process. Figure 16 shows the maintenance activities
block diagram for the following example maintenance task.

Activity Activity
#1 #3

START Activity Activity Activity Activity

#5 #6 #7 #8
Activity Activity
#2 #4

Activity Activity
#12 #14
Activity Activity Activity FINISH
#9 #10 #11
Activity Activity
#13 #15

FIGURE 16. Maintenance Activities Block Diagram.

4-43
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

Example Maintenance Task (Reference Figure 4-12).

Task Description: Replace a receiver/transmitter (R/T) on an aircraft

Number of maintenance personnel: 2
Equipment/parts: Allen wrench, new R/T unit, maintenance stand, electrical power cart
Activities: 1. Get Allen wrench from tool box (or tool bin)
2. Get maintenance stand and position adjacent to R/T equipment bay
3. Move electrical power cart to aircraft and connect to aircraft power
connection
4. Open access panel Tridair fasteners using Allen wrench
5. Disconnect electrical cables with BNC connectors
6. Unscrew ATR latches securing unit to rack and remove R/T
7. Install new R/T and secure in position with ATR latches
8. Reconnect electrical cables with BNC connectors
9. Start power cart
10. Apply power to and run operational checks on R/T unit using established
procedures -- then turn power off
11. Turn off power cart
12. Close access panel; re-secure Tridair fasteners using Allen wrench
13. Disconnect power cart and move away from aircraft
14. Move maintenance stand away from aircraft & return to storage site
15. Return Allen wrench to tool box (or tool bin)

Note the activities that can be done simultaneously (in parallel). Although it might be possible
for one person to perform the task by doing each activity serially, two people make the job easier
and, during application of electrical power and operational checkout, safer. Also note that both
people are not needed during the entire maintenance action. The individual not performing
activities 5, 6, 7, and 8 can perform other work in the vicinity of the aircraft.

As a minimum, maintainability models should consider:

Operational maintenance concept

Safety considerations
Applicable levels of the system hierarchy
List of line replaceable units (LRUs)
Company policies

4.4.1.5 Qualitative Maintainability Factors. Any maintainability requirement that cannot

be categorized as a quantitative requirement is, by definition, a qualitative requirement.
Qualitative maintainability requirements encompass a wide variety of desired outcomes
considered to be essential in ensuring the product is maintainable. For example, customers

4-44
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

usually want to minimize the number of new skills, support equipment, and tools, the use of
safety wire, and the number and variety of fastener types. Such qualitative requirements are not
useful to the designer (i.e., when is the number of new skills minimized?). So some measurable
design rules must be established to ensure that the design reflects the qualitative requirements.
Using some of the examples of qualitative requirements already given, for instance, design rules
that are quantifiable might be:

No less than 80% of all maintenance actions will be performed using only those tools in
the customer's standard tool kit and no torque wrenches
No safety wire or lockwire shall be used
Existing skill levels must be used at all maintenance levels
No more than 15% of all access panels will be designed to require more than 4 fasteners
per side (or a total of 12 per perimeter)

4.4.1.6 Predictions, Allocations, and Assessments.

4.4.1.6.1 Maintainability Prediction. Maintainability predictions are estimates of design

performance from a maintainability perspective. They serve as a means for comparing design
options, assessing the feasibility of achieving maintainability requirements, and assessing
progress in achieving the maintainability requirements. However, predictions are imprecise, the
degree of imprecision being determined by the validity of assumptions, amount of available
performance data, applicability of the method, and so forth. Predictions should, therefore, never
be used as the sole basis for programmatic or engineering decisions.

The maintainability prediction is a useful tool for determining where to place the most emphasis
in designing for maintainability. Each subsystem, equipment, and component can be evaluated in
terms of failure rate, maintenance time required, and complex maintenance tasks. The designer is
thus provided with the necessary visibility into the attributes of subsystems, equipment, and
components to:

Identify design weaknesses, from a maintainability perspective

Support trade-off studies (e.g., relax maintainability requirement for a high reliability
component and still achieve the same availability)
Determine if the design is ready to proceed to next phase of development

The maintainability prediction is an iterative estimate of the future observed maintainability

characteristics of the product. Prior to starting the prediction process, all assumptions must be
specifically defined and evaluated as to their validity and applicability. Rationale must be
provided for all assumptions.

4-45
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

The predictions also are useful in logistical planning. Early estimates of maintenance time, labor
hours, and other maintainability metrics can be used in making preliminary assessments of the
support equipment, spare parts, personnel, training, and other logistics resources required to
maintain the system in operational use. As estimates are refined using test and demonstration
data, the estimates of logistics resources can be revised. Although other factors determine the
types and amounts of logistics resources to be acquired, maintainability predictions are important
for this purpose and, in the early stages of a program, may be the only basis on which to plan
logistics. By beginning the process of identifying logistics resources early in the program, a
"fully operational" status can be rapidly achieved after the fielding of a new system.

A variety of methods and metrics are used to predict maintainability. Each prediction method is
designed for a specific application. All depend on at least two basic input parameters. These
two common parameters are:

Failure rates of components at the specific level of assembly of interest

Repair times15 required at the maintenance level involved

Historically, the most commonly used methods for maintainability predictions are those found in
MIL-HDBK-472, "Maintainability Predictions."

4.4.1.6.1.1 Maintainability Prediction in Accordance with MIL-HDBK-472. Five different

maintainability methods are documented in MIL-HDBK-472. The different prediction methods
address different aspects of maintainability and each method predicts maintainability using
different metrics.

Procedure I - This procedure typically is intended to be used to predict flight-line maintenance

of airborne electronic and electromechanical systems involving modular replacement. It
uses a calculation procedure based on a list of elemental activities for which normalized
distributions and occurrence probability are given. The parameters used in this method are: the
distribution of downtimes for various elemental activities, maintenance categories, repair times,
and system down time.

Procedure II - This procedure typically is intended to be used to predict the maintainability of

shipboard and shore electronic equipment and systems. It could be used to predict the
maintainability of mechanical systems provided that task times and functional levels could be
established. Procedure II contains two different approaches, Part A and Part B.

Part A: The parameter used is corrective maintenance time expressed as an MTTR in hours.

15
Most maintainability experts agree that repair times exhibit the skewed characteristics of the log-normal
distribution. Thus, repair times are usually assumed to be log-normally distributed.

4-46
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

Part B: The parameters used are: active maintenance in terms of mean corrective maintenance
time in labor hours, mean preventive maintenance time in labor hours, and mean active
maintenance time in terms of mean manhours per maintenance action.

Procedure III - This procedure typically is intended to be used to predict the mean and the
maximum active corrective maintenance down time for Air Force ground electronic systems
and equipment. It also can be used to predict preventive maintenance down time. The
parameters used in this method are: mean and maximum active corrective down time (at the 95th
percentile), mean and maximum preventive downtime, and mean downtime.

Procedure IV - This procedure is intended to be used to predict the mean or total corrective and
preventive maintenance downtime of systems and equipment. The parameters used in this
method are: mean system maintenance downtime, mean corrective maintenance downtime per
operational period, total corrective maintenance per operational period, and total preventive
maintenance downtime per operational period.

Procedure V - This procedure was developed much later than the other four procedures and is
by far the most versatile. Typically it is used to predict the maintainability parameters of
avionics, ground and shipboard electronics at the organizational, intermediate and depot levels of
maintenance. It presents a tabulation of time standards in relation to illustrations of what each
time represents. The parameters used include: MTTR, M Max (), MMH/repair, MMH/OH
and MMH/FH

Significantly, all commercial computer software development to date has concentrated on

Procedure V, to the exclusion of the other four maintainability prediction procedures. Therefore,
only the procedure previously designated as "Procedure V" in MIL-HDBK-472 has been
included as Appendix D, "Maintainability Prediction" in this handbook.

4.4.1.6.2 Maintainability Allocation. Maintainability allocation is the process of

apportioning the system level maintainability requirements to lower levels of assembly. In other
words, the system requirements are apportioned to each subsystem; each subsystem's
requirements are apportioned to components and equipment within the subsystem; and, finally,
the component and equipment requirements may be apportioned to modules.

Maintainability allocation requires a detailed analysis of the system architecture and a knowledge
of the characteristics of various types of systems, subsystems, and so forth. Allocations are
made primarily for corrective maintenance requirements. Historically, system-level requirements
have been difficult to fully assess without a prototype or first-production version of the system.
So allocations have been used to assess the progress being made toward achieving the system
level maintainability requirement.

4-47
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

Maintainability allocations are a natural management tool. They are used by the customer, prime
contractor, and subcontractors and suppliers to:

Derive "not-to-exceed" maintainability values (i.e., maximum MTTR) for the system's
lower level indentures of assembly
Provide designers and maintainability engineers with a standard for monitoring and
assessing compliance with stated maintainability objectives
Identify areas needing additional emphasis (regarding maintainability) and areas where
improvements in maintainability will have the greatest effect on the system

Maintainability allocations provide a "budget" of maintainability values which, if met, will ensure
with a high degree of confidence that the system level requirements will be achieved. This budget
is the standard against which subsequent maintainability predictions and demonstrated (i.e.,
measured) values are compared. The allocation of maintainability requirements must be
completed and the results made available to the designers and any subcontractors early in the
program.

Allocation is an iterative process. The feasibility of achieving the initial set of allocated values
must be evaluated and, if the allocated values are not reasonable, the allocation must be revised.

One final note regarding allocations. As discussed thus far and will be shown in the specific
methods that follow, the maintainability values allocated to subsystems, components, etc. are
expressed in the same term as used for the product (MTTR, for example). However, an item
may simply be removed and replaced to repair the product (see 4.3.1.1). Repair of the item itself
would then be done off the product. For example, if an aircraft (the product) had an engine fail
internally, the engine would be removed and replaced. It then would be sent to the engine shop
or the engine manufacturer for repair. For complex products that are mobile (wheeled and tracked
vehicles, aircraft, railroad engines and cars, and, to a lesser extent, ships), many "repairs" consist
of removing and replacing the failed item or component. Table X shows the types of repairs and
maintenance that are made on the product (i.e., in-place).

TABLE X. Typical Types of "In-place" Repair and Maintenance.

Type of Maintenance Action Performed On
Repair Hydraulic, pneumatic, lubrication, and fuel lines
Electrical cables and wiring
Structural components
Control cables
Calibration & adjustments Subsystems, components, or items
Fueling and servicing Product, components, items
(Includes lubrication)

4.4.1.6.2.1 Failure Rate Complexity Method. In this method, the most stringent
maintainability requirements (that is, the lowest MTTR values) are allocated to the subsystems
and components having the lowest reliability; and conversely, the least stringent maintainability

4-48
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

requirements are allocated to the subsystems components having the highest reliability. The
assumption is that the most complex items will have the highest failure rates. For that reason,
the method is referred to as the Failure Rate Complexity Method (FRCM). The procedure for
the method is as follows:

Step 1. Determine Ni , the number of each item in the product for which the allocation is
being made.
Step 2. Identify i , the failure rate for each item (constant failure rate is assumed).
Step 3. Multiply i by Ni to find C fi , item is contribution to total failure rate.
Step 4. Express each item's MTTR, M i , as the product of ( H / i ) and MH , where H
is the item having the highest failure rate.
Step 5. Multiply each result from Step 4 by the corresponding i . The result is C Mi .
Step 6. Using equation 6, solve for the MTTR of the item having the highest failure rate.
CMi
MTTR Product = i (Equation 6)
Cfi
i
where C Mi = M i C fi
Step 7. Solve for the MTTR of the other items by multiplying the MTTR found in Step
6 by H / i .

Table XI illustrates an example of maintainability allocation using the FRCM, for the subsystems
shown in Figure 17. The same method was used to allocate the MTTRs found for subsystem B
to its components.

TABLE XI. Allocation Using Failure Rate ComplexityMethod.

Step 1. Step 2. Step 3. Step 4. Step 5.
Determine No. Identify Failure Calculate Contribution Express each MTTR Calculate
of Items per Rate i to Total Failure Rate ( M i ) as Contribution to
Product C fi = N i i System MTTR
Item ( Ni ) x 10-3 f/H ( H / i ) x MH C = M i C fi
-3 Mi
x 10 f/H
A 1 5 5 Ma 5 Ma
B 1 1.111 1.111 4.5 Ma 5 Ma
C 1 .833 .833 6 Ma 5 Ma
C fi = 6.944 C Mi = 15 Ma
Step 6. Solve for Ma
MTTR Product = C Mi / C fi 1.44 = 15 Ma / 6.944 Ma = .67 hours
Step 7. Solve for M b and M c
M b = 4.5 Ma = 3 hours ; M c = 6 Ma = 4 hours

4-49
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

SYSTEM
MTTR = 1.44 hours
= .0069 failures/hr

SUBSYSTEM SUBSYSTEM SUBSYSTEM

A B C
MTTR = .67 hours MTTR = 3.00 hours MTTR = 4.00 hours
= .005 failures/hr = .00111 failures/hr = .000833 failures/hr

COMPONENT COMPONENT
A B
MTTR = 1.99 hours MTTR = 6 hours
= .000833 failures/hr = .0002778 failurs/ hr
ASSUMPTIONS: 1. Constant failure rates
2. All subsystems and components in series (i.e., failure of any subsystem
results in system failure; failure of any component results in subsystem failure)

FIGURE 17. Example of Maintainability Allocation.

4.4.1.6.2.2 Variation of the Failure Rate Complexity Method. A method used by

Blanchard and Fabrycky in their text16 is a variation of the Failure Rate Complexity Model. In
this approach, an initial MTTR is assumed for each item and the product-level MTTR,
M Product , is calculated using equation 5. If the result is equal to or less than the required
M Product , the allocation is complete. If it is not, then new values of each item's MTTR are
selected and the process repeated until the calculated M Product is equal to or less than the
required M Product . The initial values for the items' MTTRs can be selected based on similar
items already in use or engineering estimates.

4.4.1.6.2.3 Statistically-Based Allocation Method. A well-documented, statistically-sound

methodology for performing a maintainability allocation may be found in IEC 706-6, "Guide on
Maintainability of Equipment - Part 6: Section 9: Statistical Methods in Maintainability
Evaluation," Annex A, "Maintainability Allocation." The key underlying assumption is that,
within a product, item maintainability is inversely proportional to item complexity.

This method is based upon the frequently used assumption that the maintenance times, and
especially the active corrective maintenance part of them, which is generally under the control of
the supplier, can be adequately described by a log-normal distribution with mean active corrective
maintenance time (MACMT) and 95th fractile maximum active corrective maintenance time
(ACMT95; also called M Max (95)). Active corrective maintenance times longer than ACMT 95

16
Blanchard, Benjamin S. and Wolter J. Fabrycky, "Systems Engineering and Analysis," Prentice-Hall,
Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1981.

4-50
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

are also determined so as to provide the complement to the accumulated mean active corrective
maintenance time specified for the item.

4.4.1.6.2.4 Equal Distribution Method. This method is applicable when the items have
equal, constant failure rates. The Equal Distribution method simply allocates the product-level
value of maintainability to each lower indenture item. As shown in Table XII for the product
depicted in Figure 17, using the product-level MTTR for each item does indeed result in an
allocation that supports the product-level requirement. The assumption underlying this method
is that repair times are unrelated to the failure rate (i.e., MTTR is not affected by complexity).
The method is identical in principle with the Equal Distribution method used for reliability
allocations.

TABLE XII. Example of Equal Distribution Method.

No. of Items per Item Failure Contribution to Total MTTR ( M i ) Contribution to
Product Rate i Failure Rate System MTTR
Item (each set equal to
( Ni ) C fi = N i i x 10-3 product-level M) C Mi = M C fi
x 10-3
A 1 5 5 1.44 7.2
B 1 1.11 1.11 1.44 1.6
C 1 .833 0.833 1.44 1.2
C fi = 6.943 C Mi = 10
CHECK
MTTR Product = C Mi / C fi = 10/6.943 = 1.44 hours

4.4.1.6.3 Maintainability Assessment. Periodically, assessments are made of the quantitative

and qualitative maintainability characteristics of the design. In making these assessments, terms
and parameters must be carefully defined.

Maintainability terms and parameters are many and varied, to the extent that maintainability
engineers sometimes use different terms for the same measure. Therefore, all parties involved in
the task must understand and track, for example, how the time intervals are measured and which
type of activities; preventive, corrective or both are included and which are excluded. If units or
categories get mixed, the results of the computations will be inconsistent and will have no
effective meaning or use. For further discussion of other data considerations see section 4.5,
"Data Collection and Analysis."

4.4.2 Test. In the development of any product, and prior to release to the customer, testing of
the product is conducted for several purposes. Tests are conducted to:

Verify that the hardware and software meet product performance specifications
Validate that the design is reliable and maintainable
Improve product quality by uncovering design and manufacturing process problems,
determining the root causes of problems, and subsequently introducing fixes

While we cannot develop a product without performing some kind of testing, it is often difficult
to determine how much testing should be done, given the constraints of limited test samples,

4-51
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

time, and budget. Given these factors, it becomes important to develop a well coordinated and
conceived product development and evaluation test plan. This plan should include input from all
disciplines, including maintainability. Without an integrated approach to testing, certain risks and
consequences can ensue, as shown in Table XIII.

TABLE XIII. Risks and Consequences of a Testing Approach That is Not Integrated.
Risks Consequences
Critical tests are omitted Design shortcomings may appear after the customer assumes
ownership of the product
Tests are duplicated Development costs increase and schedules are affected
Test resources are inadequate Tests are delayed, results are incomplete, results are inaccurate or
invalid, faults are missed, and product performance suffers
Test schedules are not coordinated Inadequate time for testing, tests occur in wrong sequence, tests
compete for critical test equipment, test requirements are not met, etc.
Schedules are milestone-oriented Test results seem to confirm progress but do not result in needed
product design improvements

Because testing budgets may be limited, it may be necessary to validate, refine and demonstrate a
product's maintainability, using the results of tests performed for other reasons. If this is to be
the case, the maintainability engineer must be involved in the test planning process, such that
provisions can be made to collect maintainability-related information that will assist in the
evaluation of the product maintainability design.

4.4.2.1 Objectives. There are two primary objectives for performing a test on a product:

(1) to validate and refine the design (and the design approaches and tools)
(2) to determine if a specification has been met.

In both cases, several tests may be required to meet these objectives. A maintainability test
objective may be to validate that a product's subassemblies can be removed and replaced by a
person using a defined set of tools. Another test may be performed to determine if the
specification for MTTR is being achieved. In either case, planning must be accomplished early in
development to determine if a formal maintainability test will be performed. If not, then a well
coordinated data collection program must be initiated that solicits information important to
maintainability. For example, if a reliability growth test is to be conducted, then data should be
collected on fault detection and isolation times and diagnostic efficiency when failures occur that
must be fixed. In addition, data should be collected on ease of maintenance during removal and
replacement of the failed items. Formal maintainability testing should be planned using
standardized methods such as those found in Appendix B, Test Methods. Appendix B was
based, in part, on MIL-STD-471A, Maintainability Verification, Demonstration, and Evaluation.

4.4.2.2 Types of Testing. In general, testing related to maintainability can be grouped into five
basic areas: functional, performance, verification, demonstration, and evaluation. Functional
testing is performed to verify that a product, or product function, is behaving as intended. Such
testing typically involves applying a known stimulus or set of stimulus to the test item and
comparing the item response to a known response or set of responses.

4-52
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

Performance testing goes beyond functional testing to verify that the level of performance of the
product functions meet the requirements. It is not sufficient, for example, to verify that for a
given input signal, the product provides the right kind of output signal; the characteristics of the
signal (amplitude, noise level, and so forth) and the reliability, maintainability, safety, and so
forth of the product must meet the requirements. Special types of performance testing are design
limit tests, life tests, software tests, electromagnetic interference (EMI) tests, and reliability
growth tests.

Functional testing and performance testing are performed throughout various phases of product
development and may include the use of models, simulations, testbeds, and prototypes or Full
Scale Development models of the product. While such testing is almost always performed as
part of the product design and development process, testing of the maintainability features of the
product design, such as diagnostics, must also be planned for in a similar fashion. Diagnostic and
other maintainability performance testing must be an integral part of all testing. This is
important to evaluate performance, uncover deficiencies and implement corrective action while
the product is still in development.

Verification testing is performed on a continuous basis throughout product development to

determine the accuracy of and update the analytical data obtained from engineering analysis.
Verification is typically performed prior to any planned demonstration or evaluation test to
provide assurances that the maintainability of the product can be achieved and demonstrated.
Note that all kinds of test data collected, such as from a functional test of the diagnostics, should
be used for verification of maintainability analyses and requirements.

Demonstration testing is usually a formal process conducted by the product developer and end
customer to determine whether specific maintainability requirements that have been specified
have been achieved. Such testing will involve development of a formal test plan, using defined
methods of analysis to determine compliance. Details of demonstration test plans and
procedures, as well as verification and evaluation test data can be found in Appendix B, Test
Methods.

Evaluation testing is the process to determine, at all levels of maintenance and product design, the
impact of the operational and maintenance and support environments on the maintainability
parameters of the product. Such testing should involve performance of defined maintenance
tasks in the product's actual use environments. Maintainability evaluation testing, as with other
forms of testing, should be integrated with testing designed to evaluate other product parameters.
Evaluation testing is one area that stands to benefit from virtual reality capabilities. Such
capabilities would allow the testing of some maintenance tasks (such as manual ones) in a
simulated usage environment, rather that the actual one. Some obvious cost savings are possible
with this approach.

4.4.3 Statistical Distributions Used in Maintainability Models. The distributions most

commonly used in maintainability analysis are the normal, lognormal, and exponential. Just as
the exponential distribution has been the one most widely used in reliability analysis of products,

4-53
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

the lognormal distribution is the one most commonly used in maintainability analysis of
products. However, use of other distributions such as the Weibull and gamma is also possible,
depending upon the analysis of the data and the use of "goodness of fit" tests.

4.4.3.1 Lognormal Distribution. The lognormal is the most commonly used distribution in
maintainability analysis because it is considered representative of the distribution of most repair
times. It applies to most maintenance tasks and repair actions comprised of several subsidiary
tasks of unequal frequency and time duration.

The probability density function is given by:

1 1 t - t
g(t = M ct ) = exp - 2
(Equation 7)
i t t 2 2 t

where:
t = M ct = repair time from each failure
i

t = standard deviation of repair times =

2 2

ln M ct - ln M ct /N
i
i
(Equation 8)
N1

t' = ln M ct = ln t
i

t i
t ' = ln M ct =
N
N = number of repair actions

The mean time to repair is given by:

MTTR = M ct = t = t g(t = M ct ) dt (Equation 9)
0 i

1
= exp t + ( t )2 (Equation 10)
2

The median time to repair is given by:

= exp ( t ')
M (Equation 11)
ct

4-54
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

The maximum time to repair is given by:

M Max = antiln t + z(t1- ) t (Equation 12)

ct

where z(t' 1- ) = the value from the normal distribution function corresponding to the
percentage point (1-) on the maintainability function for which M Max is defined. Most
ct
commonly used values of z(t' 1- ) are shown in Table XIV.

TABLE XIV: Values of z(t' 1- ) Most Commonly

Used in Maintainability Analysis.

(1-) z(t' 1- )
0.80 0.8416
0.85 1.036
0.90 1.282
0.95 1.645
0.99 2.326

4.4.3.2 Normal Distribution. In maintainability, the normal distribution applies to relatively

straightforward maintenance tasks and repair actions (e.g., simple removal and replacement tasks)
which consistently require a fixed amount of time to complete. Maintenance task times of this
nature are usually normally distributed, producing a probability density function given by:

(M M )2
1 ct i ct
g(t = M ct ) = exp (Equation 13)
SM 2 2(SM ) 2
ct ct

where:
M ct = repair time for an individual maintenance action
i

(M ct )
M ct = i = average repair time for N observations
N

2
(M ct - M ct )
= i = standard deviation of the distribution of
SM N -1
ct
repair times, based on N observations

N = number of observations

4-55
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

The mean time to repair ( M ct ) is given by:

M ct
M ct = i (Equation 14)
N

) is given by:
The median time to repair ( M ct

M ct
=
M i (Equation 15)
ct N

which is equal to the mean time to repair because of the symmetry of the normal distribution.

The maximum time to repair is given by:

M Max = M ct + z(t 1- ) SMct (Equation 16)

ct

where:

z(t 1- ) = value from normal distribution function corresponding to the percentage point
(1- ) on the maintainability function for which M Max is defined.
ct

Values of z(t 1- ) as a function of (1- ) are shown in Table XIV.

4.4.3.3 Exponential Distribution. In maintainability analysis, the exponential distribution

applies to maintenance tasks and maintenance actions for which completion times are
independent of previous maintenance experience (e.g., substitution methods of failure isolation in
which several equally likely alternatives are available and each alternative is exercised, one at a
time, until the one which caused the failure is isolated), producing a probability density function
given by:

1 M ct
(
g t = M ct = ) M ct
exp i
(Equation 17)
M ct

The method used in evaluating the maintainability parameters is similar to that used for analyzing
reliability with exponential times-to-failure. The fundamental maintainability parameter is the
repair rate, , which is constant for the exponential distribution. It is the reciprocal of M ct , the
mean-time-to-repair (MTTR). Thus, another expression for g(t) in terms of , the repair rate, is:

g(t) = e-t (Equation 18)

4-56
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

The maintainability function, M(t), is given by:

t t
M(t) = g(t) dt = e-t dt = 1 - e-t (Equation 19)
0 0

The MTTR is given by:

1 M ct
M ct = = i (Equation 20)
N

If the maintainability function, M(t), is known, the MTTR can also be obtained from:

t
MTTR = M ct = (Equation 21)
{ln[1 M (t )]}

is given by:
The median time to repair M ct

= 0.69 M ct
M (Equation 22)
ct

The maximum time to repair is given by:

M Max = k e M ct (Equation 23)

ct

where:
k e = value of M ct / M ct at the specified percentage point a on the exponential
i
function at which M Max is defined.
ct

Values of k e are shown in Table XV.

TABLE XV: Values of ke for Specified .

ke
95% 3.00
90% 2.31
85% 1.90
80% 1.61

4-57
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

4.5 Data Collection and Analysis. Valid data are important to every aspect of a
maintainability program. These data include data resulting from design analyses as well as data
generated from maintenance actions both during development and during a product's useful life
phase. For design, data are required for maintainability predictions, demonstration test
development, maintainability model verification (including diagnostics), and as input to
simulation models. Maintainability information collected from the field is important to determine
actual performance, capture lessons learned, and to identify where improvements are required for
product upgrades or new product development. Maintainability data analysis techniques are also
important to understand so that effective and efficient use of the information can be made.

Because of the importance of data to the success of product development, careful consideration
should be given to the kinds of data required, where to obtain the data, and how to analyze the
data in a way that is cost-effective.

4.5.1 Types of Data. The types of data to be collected can be broadly categorized as
development data and field data.

4.5.1.1 Development Data. Development data include built-in-test (BIT) effectiveness

information, such as fault detection and fault-isolation performance, and repair data. Whenever
failures occur during development or demonstration testing (such as a reliability demonstration
test), the results of fault isolation, such as time to isolate, ambiguity levels, and resources
expended should be recorded. Any problems noted during troubleshooting of failures should also
be recorded. Such information should be tied to the failure information, such as failure mode and
cause, so that the effectiveness of any diagnostic elements in correctly detecting and isolating the
fault can be determined. If the fault was a false alarm detected by system BIT, this fact should
also be recorded. If such a problem continues to exist, then an analysis will be required to
determine why the problem exists and how it can be fixed. In addition to diagnostic data, data on
repair actions should also be collected. Once again, information on repair times, resources and
any noted problems should be collected. All data should continuously be reviewed to determine
if corrective actions are necessary to improve maintainability. These reviews should be done in
conjunction with and as part of a failure reporting, analysis and corrective action system, or
FRACAS. Although most associated with reliability programs, FRACAS is a closed-loop data
reporting system for the purpose of systematically recording, analyzing, and resolving equipment
reliability AND maintainability problems and failures.

To benefit from a FRACAS, the maintainability manager must closely coordinate with the
reliability manager to ensure that maintainability data are incorporated into a FRACAS data
collection form. An example of a FRACAS form, showing blocks for maintainability data
(highlighted) is presented as Figure 18. In addition to collecting maintainability data resulting
from actual failure occurrences, information from maintainability simulations should also be
documented. This information would include BIT coverage values derived via fault simulations
and the results of simulating product repair procedures.

4-58
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

FRACAS FORM
1. Failure Report By: 2. Project RAM Manager 3. Initial Report Date:
4. Failure Analysis By: 5. Report No. 6. Final Report Date:
7. Incident Classification: Relevant Nonrelevant
(Check only one) ( ) Independent Failure ( ) Accident/Mishandling Failure
( ) No-Fault Verified ( ) Externally Applied Overstress
( ) Intermittent/Unverified ( ) Beyond Replacement Time
( ) Redundant System Failure ( ) Secondary Failure
( ) Inadvertent Operator Failure ( ) Test Initiation
8. Identify Unit and Test Run Number for This Event: ________________________________ Run No. __________________

( ) Unit XYZ ( ) Unit ABC ( ) Unit XXX ( ) Unit YYY

( ) Unit ZZZ ( ) Unit AAA ( ) Unit BBB
9. Describe Component Identification:

A. Next Higher Level System

Name _________________ WBS No. _____________ Serial No. _______________ Part/Dwg. No. _____________

B. Failed Level Component

Name _________________ WBS No. _____________ Serial No. _______________ Part/Dwg. No. _____________

10. Start Time for Component Operation 11. Stop Time for Component Operation

Yr Mo Day Hr Min Sec ETI CYC Yr Mo Day Hr Min Sec ETI CYC

12. Describe Symptoms and Method of Early Fault Detection and Isolation

13. Document Failure Detection/Isolation Effectiveness (e.g., actual fault correctly detected, fault isolation to ambiguity
group size of ________, etc.):

14. Document Fault Isolation Time:

15. Describe Failure Mode, Cause of Failure, Findings of Failure Analysis:

16. End Effect of the Failure: ( ) Module Catastrophic ( ) Module Derate ( ) Module Incipient
17. Describe Repair Action, Any Problems (e.g., Accessibility, Difficulties in Removal or Replacement), Parts Repaired,
Replaced, or Serviced

18. Corrective Action, Responsible Individual:

FIGURE 18. Example FRACAS Form.

4-59
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

4.5.1.2 Field Data. Field maintainability data include all operational information relevant to all
manual or automatic actions taken to retain an item in or restore it to an operable condition.
These data include repair time (including diagnostics), number and skill level of personnel
required, environmental conditions, and failure disposition (e.g., no fault found, relevant failure,
independent failure, etc.). The information should also be classified according to the maintenance
actions taken (i.e., preventive or corrective).

When designing a field data collection system, or when trying to improve upon an existing
system, it is important to minimize any bias that can be introduced by those personnel collecting
the data. Therefore, keep in mind that operations and maintenance personnel should be trained
on the data collection system, and its importance to tracking performance, identifying problems,
and improving the product and product support characteristics. As an example of the data fields
that exist in a current maintenance database, Table XVI shows the database structure from an Air
Force system developed for a specific product, in this example an electronic warfare system.

Other categories of data that would be beneficial to collect include information on the
maintenance support conditions. As noted previously, operational maintainability may not be
determined solely by inherent maintainability, but by logistical factors. Therefore, information to
be collected should include shortages in spares (due to inadequate initial provisioning, long
pipeline times, etc.), test resources, and human resources. Such data are important to determine
why a product's maintainability, as measured in the field, may not be meeting the values expected
based on design data. In addition to maintenance data collected as the result of performing a
maintenance action, other forms of data include customer satisfaction surveys. Such surveys
may include perception of product performance and dependability, service support performance,
agreements with advertised claims, maintainability performance, and maintenance and assistance
effectiveness. More detailed information on data collection systems and data requirements can be
found in IEC Standard 300-3-2: "Dependability Management - Part 3: Application Guide -
Section 2: Collection of Dependability Data from the Field," and in IEC Standard 706-3, "Guide
on Maintainability of Equipment - Part 3: Sections Six and Seven: Verification and Collection,
Analysis, and Presentation of Data."

4.5.2 Sources of Data. Maintainability-related data may be obtained from several different
types of sources. Some potential sources of maintainability data include:

Historical data from similar items

Item design and/or manufacturing data
Data recorded during item demonstration
Field use data

The data may be expressed in a variety of terms. These include observed values or modified
values (true, predicted, estimated, extrapolated, etc.) of the various maintainability measures.
Some precautions are therefore necessary regarding the understanding and use of such data.

4-60
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

TABLE XVI. Example Data Fields From an Existing R&M Data Base.
Field Name Description of Field
Job Control Number Documents year and day of action and assigns job control number
Work Center Primary Work Center
Serial Number Serial number of component maintenance is being reported against. Serial number must be
input if maintenance action involves serially controlled or time change item (i.e., If the item
being removed from an aircraft, the aircraft serial number is input into this field). Otherwise
may be blank.
MDS Mission/Design/Series data. If data pertains to all equipment of a particular
mission/design/series, the field is left blank.
SRD Standard Reference Designator. The code can be used to designate whether an item is
Mission Capability (MICAP) and/or MDS reportable. This field may be prefilled if
maintenance action is against a component which is not directly related to an ID numbered
piece of equipment and has an established event ID. Otherwise the SRD of equipment end
item the component is used on is entered. This field may be blank.
Sortie No. Sortie Number
FSC Federal Stock Class. The federal supply classification code of the item being modified or
removed
Part/Lot No. The part or lot number of the item being modified or removed
Operating Hours For items with an Elapsed Time Indicator (ETI), the number of hours indicated. Otherwise,
left blank.
Serial No. Serial number of the item removed.
Tag No. Tag Number that is prepared and attached to the removed item.
Discrepancy Free test narrative that describes the discrepancy that caused the reported maintenance event.
This field may be prefilled if the maintenance action is against a previously established event
ID.
Corrective Action Narrative that describes the detailed actions taken to correct the problem
Type Maint Type Maintenance Code. This field is a one character field used to identify the type of work
that was accomplished, such as scheduled or unscheduled maintenance. TMs can be found
in the WUC manual. (Y or S = transient aircraft)
Comp Pos Component Position. If installation involves the installation, removal, or maintenance of
installed engine on any component WUC item within systems 21-24 or 27, enter
component position. May be blank
WUC Work Unit Code. Five character field designed to provide a quick reference to identify
system, subsystem, and component relationships within end items.
Action Taken One character field used to identify the maintenance action that was taken such as the
removal or replacement of a component. Action taken codes are standard for all equipment
and are listed in the WUC manuals.
When Disc When discovered. One character field used to identify when a defect or maintenance
requirement was discovered. When discovered codes are listed in the WUC manuals.
How Mal How Malfunction Code. The How Mal code consists of three characters and is used to
identify the nature of the defect and not the cause of the discrepancy. May be blank.
Start Date/hour when a job is initiated.
Stop Stop day/stop hour. Job stop time. Typically only the number of hours taken to complete
a job is available. Hours are input in hours and tenths (i.e., XXX.X). Cannot be blank.
Crew Size Crew Size (0 to 9) can't be blank. Reflects the number of individuals or crew from the same
work center (same category of labor) that actually participated in the maintenance action
during the period of time documented identifying the action. When the crew size exceeds
nine an additional entry is made to reflect the additional number of technicians.
Cat Lab Category of Labor (1 to 6), can't be blank. Used to differentiate between the types of man-
hour expenditures. If all members of a maintenance crew are the same category of labor then
only one entry is required. If more than one category of labor (military and civilian) is
performing the same maintenance task, or if overtime hours are expended an entry is required
to reflect each category of labor.
Qty Quantity of items on a given line removed during the repair process.

4-61
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

Historical data - The origin of the historical data (e.g., field operation, repair shop and software
center) and the item on which such data are based should be described and the reasons why and
how they apply to the current item should be addressed. The methods used to collect the data,
together with the training and skill levels of maintenance personnel involved, should also be
clearly stated. Discrepancies which might affect the applicability of historical data to the item
under consideration should be specifically addressed.

Historical data is used primarily during the concept definition phase and for specification
requirement generation purposes. In the later phases of the item life cycle, historical data may be
considered in relation to actual data obtained for the current item. They can also serve as an
additional source of information for maintainability verification.

Item design/manufacturing data - When maintainability-related data are obtained through the use
of design analysis or prediction, or from data generated during the design phase or the
manufacturing phase (e.g., development tests, production or assembly operations), the
methodology used needs to be clearly identified. A discussion may also be needed to explain
how the specific method was selected and applied. Any possible resulting limitations in data
accuracy needs to be noted. Design/manufacturing data may be used as the basis for:

Item qualification and acceptance (with regard to maintainability requirements)

Review of the relevancy of historical data and the validity of previous maintainability
assessments

Item demonstration data and/or field data - Maintainability-related data may also be obtained
from formal or informal demonstration tests on mock-ups, prototypes or production equipment
in either a true or a simulated environment. Data may also be generated during actual item use
(e.g., support center, repair work shop, field operations, etc.). The methods for selecting specific
maintenance actions, data monitoring and recording techniques thus need to be described. The
skill level of maintenance personnel and the specific equipment training they have received should
be noted. The feedback of item demonstration data and field data is the primary means for
sustaining engineering activities during the in-service phase of the item life cycle.

4.5.3 Data Analysis Techniques. The precise form of statistical analysis of data is specific to
each use and can be a complex and time-consuming process. It should be carried out by an
experienced analyst who can properly assess the information required to be extracted from the
raw data.

Data (including maintenance data) are frequently analyzed to obtain statistical inferences
regarding a given population of data. Statistical inference, is the process of drawing conclusions
about an entire population of similar objects, events, or tasks, based upon a sample of a few.

4-62
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

Two basic approaches to statistical inference are mainly used17 (either or both approaches may
be used in the analysis of maintenance/maintainability data18):

Parametric - which is primarily concerned with inference about certain summary

measures of distributions (mean, variance, etc.). This approach is based on explicit
assumptions about the normality of population distributions and parameters.
Distribution - which is concerned with inference about an entire probability distribution,
free of the assumptions regarding the parameters of the population sampled.

Meaningful data handling and its subsequent evaluation also require some prior investigation of
the process generating the data. Different sets of data available on an item may be combined,
provided that the same selection criteria have been applied to each set. The choice of appropriate
methods of data evaluation may be influenced by such factors as possible time-dependency of
the process or more than one cause relating directly to the data.

Any peculiarities in the data collection scheme should be taken into account in developing the
data and in the analytical process. The analyst should identify any data falling outside a pre-set
range. Acceptance or rejection criteria should be explicitly validated.

Frequently one of a number of types of statistical distribution will underlie the collected data.
Three principal methods are available to identify a particular underlying distribution:

Engineering judgment, based upon an analysis of the physical process generating the
data
Graphical methods using special charts, leading to the construction of nomographs
Statistical tests, such as the Chi-square and goodness of fit, providing a measure of the
deviations between the sample and the assumed distributions

4.5.3.1 Data Used Explicitly for Compliance Verification. When maintainability-related

data is to be used for compliance testing and for determination testing, the analysis procedures
used need to be considered very carefully and discussed in detail in any subsequent test report.

Matters of importance include:

Data Editing/Data Transposition

Distribution Analysis

17
Hays, W. L. and Winkler, W. L. "Statistics-Probability, Inference and Decision", Holt, Reinhart and Winston,
New York, 1971
18
Knezevic, J. "Effective Analysis of Existing Maintainability Data", SAE Communications in RMS, Volume
2/Number 1, January 1995

4-63
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

Parameter Computation
Presentation of Results

a. Data Editing/Data Transposition - Actions taken to assure the accuracy, completeness

and validity of the data should be described. If any censoring is performed, the rules and reasons
for performing the censoring should be presented. If data are transposed from one form to
another (e.g., from a linear to a logarithmic scale), the reason and justification for such a
transposition should be clearly stated.

b. Statistical Distribution Analysis - If the data are to be analyzed statistically, it is usually

necessary to determine the underlying distribution. The most commonly used distribution
functions in maintainability are: the log-normal distribution and the multimodal distribution (in
special cases only). The method of testing the distribution assumption should be described, with
the reasons for that specific selection. Common methods used in maintainability analysis include
the 2 (chi-square), Kolmogorov-Smirnov and various graphical tests. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov
(also known as d-test) is the most frequently used method for distribution testing. Its usage,
relative to maintainability data, is described in detail in IEC 706-6, "Guide on Maintainability of
Equipment - Part 6: Section 9: Statistical Methods in Maintainability Evaluation," Annex C,
"Kolmogorov-Smirnov Distribution Testing." For other possible statistical analysis methods
pertinent statistical textbooks should be consulted.

c. Parameter Computation - The basis for computing all maintainability parameters to be

presented should be clearly stated. If selected parameters are to be computed on a cumulative or
interval basis, the method to be used should be detailed. If maintainability mathematical models
are to be used, they should be fully described.

d. Presentation of Results - When the results are to be presented, all conditions needed for
their understanding and use should be clearly stated. These conditions include the purpose of the
data collection scheme, especially with respect to type and variation of the data chosen.
Circumstantial information should also be provided, such as time (e.g., busy hours), locations
(e.g., geographic conditions) and the current duration of the data-collection scheme. Particular
situations which may limit the data application and use should be indicated (for example, any
difficulties encountered, assumptions, or incompleteness of data).

Consideration should also be given to the form of presentation. A condensed form (for example,
diagrams, histograms, graphical presentations) may be more appropriate than detailed numerical
listings.

4.5.4 Uses of Data

Data is always the key to the proverbial management sequel, namely - Where are we now? -
Where do we want to go? - How do we get there?

4-64
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

Maintainability data frequently answers the first question - Where are we now?

Subcontractors and suppliers frequently have little, if any, maintainability data. In fact, unless
they have previously had to deal specifically with maintainability requirements, they often have
no information about the maintainability of the items which they have delivered in the past.
Data collection is not a strong point in many industrial companies. Many are interested in
closing their contractual responsibilities at the end of the warranty period rather than motivated
for setting up an after-contractual data follow-up procedure with their customers. The practical
consequence of this philosophy is that collection of performance data on similar systems does
not become a priority task - until the early phases of a new program development.

Unless we know where we are - how can we know where we want to go?

Thus, subcontractors and suppliers often are reluctant to accept maintainability targets without
knowing the exact maintainability demonstration procedure.

Building of a corporate maintainability data base is the key, the starting point.

Such a data base (grounded upon actual product experience) is an important resource, a definite
corporate asset. It can prove to be extremely helpful for subsequent developments.

With modern spread sheet and data-base programs it is relatively easy to build such a data bank
based upon actual experience with a specific product. These data can then be used, for example,
to customize and enhance an existing automated prediction software program and thus provide a
more accurate maintainability prediction on a subsequent development item.

A closed-loop failure reporting system (FRACAS) addresses the third question - How do we get
there?

We get there - by first identifying, and then resolving, each problem one by one, as they are
discovered. Again, the data - which has been, or is being, collected - is the key.

Some of the specific benefits for such maintenance/maintainability data are:

Determine compliance with specified maintainability requirements

Provide logistics and support information
Assess adequacy of support resources
Determine personnel requirements
Determine deficiencies in maintainability and provide a basis for corrective action
Establish repair time histories and build a corporate maintainability data base
Detect excessive preventive maintenance

4-65
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

This page has been left blank intentionally.

4-66
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX A

ACQUISITION GUIDANCE, TEMPLATES FOR PREPARING MAINTAINABILITY

SECTION OF SOLICITATION, AND GUIDANCE FOR SELECTING SOURCES

SECTION A. ACQUISITION GUIDANCE

Scope. This Appendix is an essential part of MIL-HDBK-470A. The information contained

herein is intended for reference only. This Appendix is for guidance only and cannot be cited as a
requirement. If it is, the contractor does not have to comply.

Defense Acquisition Reform

Actions taken by the Secretary of Defense starting in 1994 significantly changed the way that the
Department of Defense (DoD) and military departments contract for products.

1. Background. On June 29, 1994, Secretary of Defense William Perry issued a five-page
memorandum, "Specifications & Standards - A New Way of Doing Business." The intent of the
memorandum can be summarized as three "overarching" objectives:

Establish a performance-oriented solicitation process

Implement a document improvement process
Create irreversible cultural change in the way DoD does business

The DoD is working to streamline the way in which procurement is managed and to adopt
commercial practices whenever possible. It is reassessing and trying to improve the way it does
business to decrease costs and increase customer satisfaction.

2. Specifications and Standards. Many months prior to the Perry memorandum of 29 June, a
Process Action Team (PAT), chartered by Colleen Preston, Deputy Under Secretary for
Acquisition Reform, and chaired by Darold Griffin, was tasked to review the system of military
standardization documents and develop recommendations to:

eliminate unnecessary and obsolete specifications and standards

use performance specifications and standards
use commercial standards and specifications to the greatest extent practicable
encourage industry to propose alternative solutions to military specifications and
standards
and reduce paperwork

A-1
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX A

The preparing activities of military standardization documents have reviewed and will continue
to review their documents and recommend disposition to the Secretary. The possible
recommendations for disposition of a military specification or standard are:

Retain as performance-based document (some revision may be necessary)

Retain as interface standard
Retain as test method standard
Convert to handbook
Inactivate for new design (reprocurement only)
Delete in favor of a commercial item description
Delete in favor of a non-government standard
Cancel

As is explained in sections 4a and 4b of this Appendix, military standards and specifications may
be cited for guidance in a Department of Defense solicitation but may not be cited as
requirements unless a waiver is granted. Commercial standards may be cited for guidance.
Although not specifically prohibited by policy at the time this handbook was written,
commercial standards should not be mandated as requirements. Given the spirit of the new
acquisition policy, mandating a commercial standard is no different than mandating a military
standard. In either case, the procuring agency would be telling the bidding contractors what to do
and how to do it, at least to the extent that the cited standard provides suggestions on the tasks
and activities needed for maintainability. The main objective of the new policy is to use
performance specifications. Only when performance specifications are inadequate for fully
describing what the Government wants should commercial specifications and standards be
considered. And only when commercial specifications and standards are inadequate should a
waiver (see Section 4 for an explanation of which military documents require a waiver) to use a
military specification or standard be considered.

3. Performance-based Specifications

a. A performance specification states requirements in terms of the required results and

provides criteria for verifying whether or not the requirements have been met. Performance
specifications do not state the methods for achieving the required results. They have the
following characteristics:

(1) Requirements should be stated quantitatively

(2) Requirements should be verifiable
(3) Interfaces should be stated in sufficient detail to allow interchangeability with parts of a
different design.
(4) Requirements should be material and process independent

A-2
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX A

b. There are four types of performance specifications: commercial item descriptions

(CIDs), guide specifications (GSs), standard performance specifications (SPSs), and program-
unique specifications.

(1) Commercial Item Descriptions. An indexed, simplified product description prepared

by the Government that describes, by performance characteristics, an available,
acceptable commercial product that will satisfy the Government's needs. Guidance for
CIDs is given in the General Services Administration Federal Standardization Manual
(Chapter 6), in the Defense Standardization Manual, DoD 4120.3-M, and in DoD
5000.37-H. By definition, CIDs are used only to describe requirements in terms of
function, performance, and essential form and fit requirements. CIDs are listed in the
DoD Index of Specifications and Standards (DoDISS).
(2) Guide Specifications. Guide specifications identify standard, recurring requirements
that are common for like systems, subsystems, equipments, and assemblies. The
format of a GS forces the user to tailor the document to the specific application.
Guidance for GSs is in DoD 4120.3-M. GSs are listed in the DoD Index of
Specifications and Standards (DoDISS).
(3) Standard Performance Specifications. A specification that establishes requirements for
military-unique items used in multiple programs or applications. MIL-STD-961
includes guidance on the format and content of SPSs.
(4) Program-Unique Specifications. This type of specification, also called a system
specification, establishes requirements for items used for a particular program or
weapon system. Little potential exists for using these specifications in other programs
or applications. They should be performance-based but may include a blend of
performance and detail design requirements. They are restricted to items for which the
preceding categories of performance specifications are not applicable.

c. Performance specifications are also categorized by the type of item being acquired.
Those used to acquire materials are called material specifications, to acquire components are
called component specifications, and to acquire systems are called system specifications. The
Department of Defense has issued a guide to performance specifications, SD-15. Issued under
the Defense Standardization Program, the guide covers the writing of performance requirements,
standard performance specifications, guide specifications, and program-unique specifications.
The preceding discussions under 3.a and 3.b are based on SD-15.

4. Other Standardization Documents.

a. Standards. There are four types of standards: interface, test method, manufacturing
process, and practices.

(1) Interface Standards. An interface standard is one that specifies the physical or
functional interface characteristics of systems, subsystems, equipments, assemblies,

A-3
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX A

components, items, or parts to permit interchangeability, compatibility, or

communications. Waivers are not required to use military interface standards as
requirements in Department of Defense solicitations.
(2) Test Method Standard. A test method standard is one that specifies procedures or
criteria for measuring, identifying, or evaluating qualities, characteristics, and
properties of a product or process. Military test method standards may not be cited
as requirements in a Department of Defense solicitation unless a waiver is granted.
(3) Manufacturing Process Standard. This type of standard states the desired outcome of
manufacturing processes or specifies procedures or criteria on how to perform
manufacturing processes. Military manufacturing process standards may not be cited
as requirements in a Department of Defense solicitation unless a waiver is granted.
(4) Standard Practice Standard. A standard practice standard is one that specifies
procedures on how to conduct certain functions or operations. These procedures are
not related to manufacturing processes. It has not yet been decided if standard practice
standards may be cited as requirements in a Department of Defense solicitation
without a waiver.

b. Handbooks. A handbook is a guidance document that provides engineering or technical

information, lessons learned, possible options to resolve technical issues, classification of similar
items, interpretive direction and techniques, and other types of guidance or information. The
purpose is to help the customer or the seller to design, construct, select, manage, support, or
operate systems, products, processes, or services. Military handbooks may not be cited as a
requirement in a Department of Defense solicitation, contract, specification, standard, drawing, or
any other document.

5. Overall Acquisition Policy and Procedures. The primary documents governing defense
acquisition are DoD Directive 5000.1 and DoD Regulation 5000.2-R. Both documents were
revised as a result of Defense Acquisition Reform. A third document, DoD 5000.2-M has been
canceled. The revisions to 5000.1 and 5000.2-R (previously a DoD Instruction) incorporate new
laws and policies, separate mandatory policies and procedures from discretionary practices, and
integrate acquisition policies and procedures for weapon systems and automated information
systems. In addition to the two documents, an Acquisition Deskbook is available to DoD
procuring activities. The Deskbook is an automated repository of information consisting of a
Desk Reference Set, a Tool Catalog, and a forum for information exchange. The Reference Set
consists of mandatory Guiding Principles, discretionary Institutionalized Knowledge, and Sage
Information (expert wisdom and lessons learned). Information about the Acquisition Deskbook
can be obtained using the Internet: <http://deskbook.osd.mil/deskbook.html>.

The major themes of the new acquisition documents are teamwork, tailoring, empowerment, cost,
commercial products, and best practices. In summary, (1) acquisition should be a team effort
among all concerned in the process, (2) the acquisition approach for a specific system should be

A-4
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX A

tailored based on risk and complexity, (3) acquisition will be conducted with a customer focus,
(4) cost will be an independent variable in programmatic decisions, (5) commercial products
should be used when practical, and (6) acquisition is now more closely modeled on best
commercial business practices.

The guiding principles of DoDD 5000.1 that are based on these themes are:

1. Translate Operational Needs into Stable, Affordable Programs

Program stability
Risk assessment and management
Total systems acquisition
Cost as an independent variable
Program objectives and thresholds
2. Acquire Quality Products
Event-oriented management
Hierarchy of material alternatives
Communication with users
Competition
Test and evaluation
Independent assessments
3. Organize for Efficiency and Effectiveness
Acquisition corps
Teamwork
Limited reporting requirements
Automated acquisition information

DoD 5000.2-R also redefines the life cycle phases of a product. These phases do not necessarily
occur in strictly a serial manner but may overlap. Preceding each phase is a decision milestone.
Decision milestones are points in time when a decision is made to either enter the next phase or
to stop the acquisition. These decisions are made on the basis of criteria defined in DoD 5000.2-
R. The criteria for leaving one phase and being considered for continuation into the next phase
are called exit criteria. An acquisition begins with the determination of a valid customer need.

A summary of the phases of acquisition as defined by DoD 5000.2-R are:

Phase 0: Concept Exploration - Conduct competitive, parallel short-term studies to

define and evaluate feasibility of alternative concepts and provide a basis for evaluating
the relative merits of these alternatives at the next decision milestone

A-5
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX A

Phase I: Program Definition and Risk Reduction - Define the program as one or more
concepts, and pursue design approaches and technologies as warranted. Perform risk
reduction activities including prototyping, demonstrations, and early operational
assessments as appropriate
Phase II: Engineering and Manufacturing Development - Translate the most promising
design approach into stable, producible, supportable, and cost effective design; establish
and validate a manufacturing capability; and demonstrate system capabilities through
testing.
Phase III: Production Fielding/Deployment and Operational Support - Produce
systems (except software-intensive systems having no hardware components or those
in ACAT 1A1), conduct operational test and demonstrations, provide operational
support, and incorporate modifications as needed

Although not referred to specifically as a phase, Demilitarization and Disposal is described by

DoD 5000.2-R as those activities conducted at the end of a system's useful life. See Appendix E
of MIL-HDBK-470A for a discussion of maintainability activities by phase.

6. Acquiring Maintainable Systems. Acquiring a maintainable product requires that certain key
issues be addressed and that a sound solicitation package be developed. As has been stated
previously, the solicitation must clearly define the maintainability requirements and provide
sufficient information that suppliers responding to the solicitation can develop cost-effective,
innovative approaches for meeting customer needs.

a. Key Issues. For any product, the key maintainability issues, from the customer's
perspective, are:

What measures of operational2 maintainability are important to me?

What realistic levels of operational maintainability are required?
Have the required levels of operational maintainability been achieved?

From the seller's perspective, the issues are:

How and when can the achievable levels of operational maintainability for a new
product under development for the customer be assessed for realism (neither too
optimistic nor too conservative given the nature of the development effort)?
How can the customer's operational maintainability requirements be "translated" into
design rules and requirements (i.e., design maintainability)?

1
Acquisition Category 1A , Major Automated Information System Acquisition Programs.
2
Section 2.1 of this handbook explains the differences between operational and design maintainability.

A-6
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX A

What design approaches and analysis tools will help achieve the levels of
maintainability required in the expected environment?
How can progress toward meeting the required levels of design maintainability be
measured?
How and when can the achieved levels of design maintainability be demonstrated or
determined?
How can the design maintainability be retained during manufacturing?

In a purely commercial world, particularly when the customer is the average consumer, the
customer is not usually concerned with the second set of issues - they are left to the seller to
confront. If the seller does a poor job, the customer will go elsewhere for the product. Thus,
competition in the marketplace provides a strong incentive to "do it right." In the defense world,
the level of competition is often much lower than in the commercial world. If dictated by the
nature of the product (e.g., used only by the military), the risks (e.g., very high with unproved
technologies being used), and the type of acquisition (e.g., totally new development), it will be
necessary for the Government customer to take more of an active role in addressing the second
set of issues. (Some industrial customers also may be involved with the second set of issues,
especially those dealing with measuring progress and determining the achieved level of design
maintainability.) The form that this role takes, however, has changed.

Previously, by imposing standards and specifications, the military customer could force
contractors to use certain analytical tools and methods, perform certain tests in a prescribed
manner, use parts from an approved list, and so forth. As has already been discussed, the
memorandum issued on 29 June 1994 by Secretary of Defense Perry primarily requires that
military agencies develop and use performance-based specifications in solicitations. It permits
the imposition of military standards and specifications as requirements only when performance
specifications are inadequate and no commercial specifications and standards are suitable. Even
then, military specifications and standards can be imposed only with a "blanket" waiver or the
approval of the acquisition authority.

In any case, the objective under Defense Acquisition Reform is not to tell contractors how best
to design and manufacture a product. The responsibility for making such decisions has shifted
from the Government to the contractor. None-the-less, military customers are still more likely to
be aware of the second set of issues than are commercial customers. Consequently,
specifications issued by the Government will probably continue to be more detailed than those
issued by commercial organizations. Of course, the procurement of commercial items or non-
developmental items (NDI)3 provides the best opportunity to adopt a commercial approach to
acquisition.

3
Publication SD-2, Buying NDI, issued in April 1996 by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Production and Logistics, defines commercial item and NDI.

A-7
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX A

b. The Solicitation. It is through the solicitation that a customer describes a needed

product and solicits bids from competing sources to develop the product. Typically, a
Government solicitation consists of the sections shown in Figure A-1.

PART I. THE SCHEDULE

A. Solicitation/Contract Form
B Supplies or Services and Prices/Costs
C. Description/Specification/Work Statement
D. Packaging and Marking
E. Inspection and Acceptance
F. Deliveries or Performance
G. Contract Administration Data
H. Special Contract Requirements

PART II. CONTRACT CLAUSES

I. Contract Clauses

PART III. LIST OF DOCUMENTS, EXHIBITS, AND OTHER ATTACHMENTS

J. List of Attachments

PART IV. REPRESENTATIONS AND INSTRUCTIONS

(Solicitations and RFPs only)

K. Representations, Certifications, and Other Statements of Offerors

L. Instructions, Conditions, and Notices to Offerors
M. Evaluation Factors for Award

CONTRACT ATTACHMENTS (e.g., SOW or SOO)

CONTRACT EXHIBITS (e.g., CDRL)

FIGURE A-1. Sections of a Government Solicitation or Contract.

Of most interest to the maintainability engineer are the specification, Section L, and the statement
of objectives (SOO) or statement of work (SOW). (Note: Military solicitations must be issued in
accordance with the Federal Acquisition Regulations.)

(1) Section L provides instructions to the offerors and can be used to explain the
information the offeror is expected to provide regarding how maintainability will be addressed in
the program, should a contract be offered.

(2) As already discussed, the specification should be a performance specification, one that
states requirements in terms of the required results with criteria for verifying compliance but does
not state the methods for achieving the required results.

A-8
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX A

Traditionally, a military or commercial acquisition has only one specification. Some

companies, however, have adopted a new approach to specifications. They issue an initial
specification and then work with each prospective bidder to develop a specification unique to
that bidder. In that way, multiple specifications are developed. The specifications reflect the
technical capability of each bidder, and one bidder's specification may be more demanding than
others, although all must meet the customer's needs. The bidder whose specification and price
represents a best-value is awarded the contract.

In some cases, the customer does not provide a specification. For example, the general
public does not provide automobile manufacturers with specifications for a vehicle. Instead, the
automobile manufacturers must develop their own specifications based on such considerations as:

federal, state, and other Government laws and regulations

benchmarking of competitors' products
market surveys and opinion polls

(3) The SOW normally includes constraints, assumptions, and other criteria that the
bidders must consider in developing and manufacturing the product. For example, the customer
should identify how the product will be used (operating concept) and supported (support
concept). In a military procurement, such information could be included in Sections L and M of
the solicitation. (See MIL-HDBK-245D for instructions on the preparation of a Statement of
Work.)

The SOW may also include specific activities or tasks required by the customer. In the
past, the SOW included with a military solicitation almost always identified specific tasks, such
as "perform a Failure Modes and Effects Analysis." As stated earlier, the approach under
Defense Acquisition Reform is to allow the bidders to identify planned activities and to explain
why, how, and when these activities will be performed. Commercial customers seldom specify
specific tasks but are, of course, free to do so.

Instead of the traditional SOW, some procuring agencies use a statement of objective
(SOO). Considered more in keeping with the spirit of acquisition reform, the SOO is concise
and written to allow the contractor as much flexibility as possible in responding to the
solicitation. A typical SOO has five sections: Objective of the Program (Solicitation), Objective
(Purpose) of the Contract, Scope of the Contract, Work to be Accomplished Under the Contract,
and Program Control. The SOO is included as an attachment to a Request for Proposal (RFP),
typically appended to Section L. Normally, the Government will ask offerors in response to the
SOO to prepare and provide a SOW in their proposals. Specific efforts defined in an offerors
SOW shall be traceable to the SOO. An example of how a SOO might be worded is shown in
Figure A-2. Note that the SOO may not discuss specific disciplines. So it is especially
incumbent upon the Government to ensure that maintainability is addressed in the specification.

A-9
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX A

In the section immediately following, guidance is given for preparing the maintainability
portion of a solicitation. This guidance is consistent with the policies established by the Perry
memorandum. In the final section of this appendix, guidance is provided for selecting a
contractor on the basis of the maintainability portion of submitted proposals.

Statement of Objectives
1.0 Program Objective

a. The program is: (here the customer defines the program as: (1) multi-phased, (2) single-
phase, or (c) one program with multiple contractors)

b. The objective of the program is to design, test, and manufacture [*] to satisfy the
performance requirements of the specification to meet a need date of [date].

2.0 Contract Objectives. The contractor shall meet the following objectives.

2.1 Design, Analysis, and Test.

Design the [*] to satisfy the user's performance requirements as defined in [cite applicable
section of RFP]. Perform such analysis and tests necessary to design the [*], to reduce risk, and
to verify that the product meets the user's performance requirements.

2.2 Configuration Management

Establish a product baseline to define the configuration of the [*] with a verified capability to
satisfy the user's performance requirements. Establish and maintain a management process to
thereafter control the product's configuration for the life of the contract. Document the design
of the product baseline through the use of engineering data.

2.3 Quality Control

Institute a quality program to ensure the [*] is produced in accordance with engineering data,
measuring and test equipment are properly maintained, and that appropriate actions are taken
for nonconforming materials.

2.4 Logistics

Develop and deliver all data necessary to support the [*] (including provisioning, installation,
and reprocurement data and operating and repair manuals) consistent with the maintenance
concept as stated in [cite applicable section of RFP]. All data shall be in a form and format
compatible with existing Government data systems.

*Name of the product

FIGURE A-2. Example wording for a Statement of Objectives.

A-10
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX A

SECTION B. TEMPLATE FOR PREPARING MAINTAINABILITY SECTION OF

SOLICITATION.

In developing the maintainability portion of a procurement package, two distinct areas must be
covered. These areas are:

performance-based requirements
programmatic and reporting requirements

In the case of performance-based requirements, customers must specify maintainability either in

terms they use to measure maintainability or in "translated" design terms. Commercial and
military customers measure the performance of products in their own ways, to suit their own
needs. A car owner may be most concerned with low cost of operation and quick and
inexpensive repair. An airline may be most concerned with staying on schedule. These measures
may or may not include factors within the control of the supplier. Furthermore, the way in
which a customer measures the maintainability of a product in use may not be meaningful to a
designer. If customer measures are placed in a specification, then the supplier must do the
translation from the user's measures to measures more appropriate to design.

A two-step conversion might be needed to translate an operational need to a design parameter.

Consider the following example in which we know what the operational availability4, defined by
equation A-1, and the mean time between maintenance (MTBM) must be, and we want to
specify both reliability and maintainability.

MTBM
Ao = (Equation A-1)
MTBM + MDT

Solve for mean downtime (MDT) which includes the actual repair time plus logistics delay time.
We've now "translated" Ao into MTBM and MDT. MTBM and MDT are operational
measures that take into account factors that may be beyond the control of suppliers. So MTBM
and MDT must now be translated into terms more suited to design (MTBF and MTTR, for
example).

One way of translating operational terms like MTBM and MDT into specifications such as
MTBF and MTTR can be done by examining the constituent elements of the operational terms.
For example, MTBM normally includes all maintenance events. Suppose, through evaluation of
field data or some other means, the number of maintenance events due to actual failures of fielded
products (similar to the one to be developed) can be determined. This number can be divided by
the total number of maintenance events giving a ratio we will call R. Then, a good estimate of
MTBM (inherent), a good estimate of the specification MTBF, can be found by dividing the

4
Operational availability, Ao, differs from inherent availability, Ai, because it accounts for all causes of maintenance
(not just failures) and for all downtime (not just the time to repair).

A-11
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX A

customer's MTBM requirement for the product by the ratio R. Likewise, the ratio of the total
mean downtime attributable to repair to total downtime, M, can be multiplied by the MDT to
derive a first estimate of MTTR.

The process cannot end with the translation to a contractual value. The translated requirements
must be evaluated for realism by the customer and by the supplier. The customer needs to check
for realism to make sure that the cost of the product will not be driven up by unnecessarily high
maintainability requirements. The supplier needs to check for realism to ensure that the product
can be developed with the requisite level of maintainability. Questions that have to be answered
are: are the requirements compatible with the available technology and do the requirements
unnecessarily drive the design (conflict with product constraints such as weight and power).
Answering these questions usually involves a review of previous studies and data for similar or
comparative products. The requirements may need to be adjusted to account for improvement of
technology, different operating environments, changes in force structure, different duty cycles,
and so forth.

Requirements for maintainability that may be placed in a specification include but are not limited
to:

- MTTR - MTBM
- MDT - Maintenance hours per operating hour
- Ambiguity group size - False alarm rate
- Specific design requirements (see Appendix C of MIL-HDBK-470A)

In the case of programmatic and reporting requirements, the customer:

may require the seller to prepare and submit reports describing the results of analyses,
tests, and other activities conducted by the contractor and described in the
maintainability program plan to design and manufacture a maintainable product
for NDI and COTS, may require the seller to furnish operational data and the results of
testing to substantiate maintainability claims
may suggest standards and specifications to be used as guidance
may require the seller to propose a method for verifying that maintainability
requirements have been met

It should be the seller's responsibility to select the tasks and other activities that will achieve
these objectives and to describe the tasks and activities in the maintainability program plan.
When the customer mandates specific tasks (and, even worse, how to do the tasks), the
contractor is, to some extent, relieved of the responsibility to ensure the tasks are value-added
and are preferable to other tasks.

A-12
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX A

The following Template provides an outline for developing the maintainability portion of a
procurement package. The following conventions are used.

Words within { } pertain only to new development efforts; words within [ ] pertain only to
procurement of NDI or COTS. Procurement packages for programs involving both
NDI/COTS and new development items should address each type of item separately but
require that the maintainability efforts be integrated.
Blanks __________ indicate where the user of the template must provide a value or other
information.
Italicized words are optional instructions that may or may not be used depending on the
desires of the user and needs of the procurement.
Notes to the reader are in parentheses with NOTE printed in all caps.

The reader is reminded that when purchasing NDI or COTS, the best course of action may be to
require only data that substantiates any claims for performance and to emphasize the role of
manufacturing processes (for NDI not yet in production) in determining the maintainability of
the product. In some cases, even that data may not be needed if either the customer has already
determined (through its own testing of samples, for example) that the product has the requisite
performance or if use or independent testing of the product in actual applications has shown the
product's performance to be satisfactory (for example, a personal computer in an office
environment).

In any case, imposing tasks on manufacturers of NDI, if they were willing to bid on such a
procurement, is counterproductive and expensive. The advantage of using NDI is that the
development is complete (with possibly slight exceptions); the contractor already has done (or
omitted) whatever might have been done to design a maintainable product. Again, what may be
needed are data to substantiate claims of performance and certain activities intended to ensure
that the integration of NDI into other products does not compromise the designed-in
maintainability characteristics.

As previously discussed, in lieu of issuing a SOW with a specification, many customers now
issue a SOO and require the offerors to include a SOW as part of their proposals. The best
manner to respond to the solicitation would be left entirely to the bidders (for example, whether
or not to have a maintainability plan). If the winning bidder did include such a plan in the
proposal, it would then become contractually binding. Some buying offices now prohibit the
solicitation from requiring the contractor to submit any plans.

A draft solicitation can be released by a customer for comment and suggestions for a statement of
work by potential bidders. Based on the comments and suggestions received, a "negotiated"
statement of work reflecting the bidders' best ideas on achieving the required level of
maintainability would be included in the formal solicitation (assuming a SOO is not being used
instead).

A-13
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX A

TEMPLATE FOR DEVELOPING MAINTAINABILITY PORTION

OF A PROCUREMENT PACKAGE

(NOTE: Not all possible requirements are listed, and not all listed requirements are
necessarily applicable to all procurements.)

SECTION L
1. The bidder shall describe how he will meet the maintainability requirements of the solicitation.
If a bidder elects to submit a maintainability program plan, the plan will become a part of the
contract upon contract award. In any event, the bidders' responses will be evaluated using the
following criteria.
1.1. The bidder shall describe all activities considered to {be necessary for ensuring the
development of a} [have contributed to designing and manufacturing a] maintainable
product. For each activity, the bidder shall describe the objective, rationale for selection,
method of implementation, methods of assessing results, and any associated
documentation.
1.2 The bidder shall explicitly address how the included activities {will be} [were]
integrated into the product and manufacturing design processes.
1.3 The bidder shall show how the results of the included activities {will be} [were] used
to support other activities, such as logistics planning, safety analyses, etc.
1.4 The bidder shall explicitly show a clear understanding of:
a. the importance of designing in maintainability and the relationship of
maintainability to other system performance characteristics.
b. maintainability design techniques, methodologies, and concepts.
c. the importance of integrating maintainability activities into the overall systems
engineering process.
d. the role of testability and diagnostics in maintainability and maintenance
e. integrated diagnostics design principles

1.6 The bidder shall show how the following objectives {will be} [were] met:
a. design for accessibility.
b. design for human factors.
c. minimize number of special tools (design so faults can be readily and confidently
detected and isolated).
d. design for testability.
e. design for ease of inspection and incorporate provisions for non-destructive
inspection.
f. verification of requirements.
g. evaluate the achieved maintainability.
{h. determine feasibility of achieving required maintainability.}

A-14
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX A

THE STATEMENT OF WORK

(NOTE: Regarding the next section, the reader is reminded that mandating tasks, even for
new development, is somewhat risky because it relieves the bidders of the responsibility
for selecting the best means to accomplish the desired ends [in this case, meet the
maintainability performance requirements]. Mandating tasks should be done on]y tier
careful consideration of the advantages and disadvantages of doing so. Even then,
bidders should not be told how to accomplish the required task.)

{1. 2% jbllbwizg activities wiI! be conducted by the bidder and rejkted in the
f~~fi~~~~~
(wpmch.

7:
-.4 &y~~OJp
. 4? rndwzi?mbwy mock! and make initial maintainability

.,Prdiaikm ushg that wmdel. AH predictions shall be ??w.& (a a stated

ifm?i Gf cm]M1w2.

L.,
77 Q:~&~: G .htqgmted Diagnostics Analysis to identifi the best mix IOj
aukvn~t!c, ~g~~.~~:~~~f~q built-in, and manual test capabilities; identify
expectei j%k akwfij cannot duplicate, and retest ~~ rates; and identi
levels G; idciim and mnbigui~.

7:
J..- Use cmn-zm!cr nzotieiing or other techniques go determine the
ccccsn%ili~ cf co.m-ponents JOT serviciwg and .maintern$vux.

:.4 ~~,.7h&~: ~:< .mz@Ms,

such as a ~auit Tree Analysis or lWIEA to 62ssist
...- +26
. L ..&- !#yc:g.q: dzsigm of BIT aid external test equipment and to assist in
:.G* :r- ~.-.nflf:qrqr
: $4e..LJJI,WA*CG.l, # ~~rrective maintenance require nwnts. Rationale for
szk:izg A ckw-z analysis technique will be givez.

;.: ~=c:/,
~-z:; &&.MQK FaCtWS azalyses to ensure tkt any human-machine
:.vL:g.7f~:: is ~c~e-p;~~~~.
.

;K
L. Cmfk: G nmintairuzbility demonstration. The contractor shall
ex-nkiz kw W demonstratiofi will be implemented and the underlying
Z!a?%kci ik!?iz Of the! Idemomuratifm

.75. ~cE&: ~ ~~fep ~~~ysi~ to identijj risks to support personnel.

1.6 Conduct a (NOTE: others as determined by buyer) 1

A-15
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX A

(NOTE: All reports, data requirements, and deliverable documents should be identified in the
Contract Deliverables Requirements List (CDRL). Data items can include FMEA results, results
of trade studies, BIT analyses results, and so forth. Data items should be selected based on the
nature of the development, the level of risk, intended use of the item [benefit], and cost. The
CDRL should provide data format and content preparation instructions and data delivery
requirements. Although the text of the SOW should not include these items, a data item
description number listed in the CDRL may be cross-referenced in the SOW. This cross
reference should usually be made in the paragraph describing the task that will lead to the
development of the data or document.)

A-16
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX A

THE SPECIFICATION

1. The following levels of maintainability are required. Note: All values are the minimum
acceptable values at a ____ confidence level, when appropriate.

(NOTE: Not all possible quantitative requirements are listed, and not all listed requirements
are necessarily applicable to all procurements.)

1.1 Platform-level (e.g., end product):

1.1.1 ______ mean time to repair

1.1.2 ______ maximum active corrective maintenance time at the _____ percentile on a
log-normal distribution

1.1.3 ______ mean corrective maintenance time

1.1.4 ______ mean preventive maintenance time

1.1.5 ______ mean time to fault isolate

1.1.6 ______% maximum False Alarm Rate for BIT

1.1.7 ______ % to ______ LRUs Fault Isolation Capability

1.1.8 100% fault detection through integrated diagnostics

1.1.9 ______ : average maintenance personnel skill level (customer-defined title or

designation)

1.2 Critical Systems (NOTE: User must define these)

1.2.1 ______ mean time to repair

1.2.2 ______ maximum active corrective maintenance time at the _____ percentile on a
log-normal distribution

1.2.3 ______ mean corrective maintenance time

1.2.4 ______ mean preventive maintenance time

1.2.5 ______ mean time to fault isolate

1.2.6 ______% maximum False Alarm Rate for BIT

1.2.7 ______ % to ______ components or modules within LRUs Fault Isolation

Capability

1.2.8 100% fault detection through integrated diagnostics

A-17
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX A

2. The design of the product and all components shall be such that:

functionally different items cannot be interchanged

a fastener cannot be installed where a longer fastener is required

equipment can be operated and maintained by personnel whose anthropometric

dimensions are within the ____ percentile values for ______________. (NOTE: user
must stipulate the percentile and whether it is for men, women, or both. Also, a
reference from a military or other Government or commercial standard giving the
anthropometric measurements should be cited.)

equipment can be operated and maintained by personnel wearing clothing appropriate

for the range of climatic conditions described in Section _______.

the probability of a catastrophic hazard to personnel during normal operation and

maintenance is essentially zero.

personnel do not have to lift or carry weights that exceed those prescribed for the ____
percentile ______________. (NOTE: user must stipulate the percentile and whether it
is for men, women, or both. Also, a reference from a military or other Government or
commercial standard giving the maximum prescribed weights should be cited.)

3. The product will be designed so that its maintainability will not be reduced due to the effects
of being shipped by land, sea, or air or by periods of storage up to ______ life units. (NOTE:
User must state the proper life units, either months or years.)

4. All maintainability requirements apply to the product as it will be used in the operating and
support environment defined in Section ___________ of the Specification and in accordance with
the operating and support concepts defined in Section __________ of the _______________.

A-18
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX A

SECTION C. GUIDANCE FOR SELECTING SOURCES

The maintainability portion of a bidder's proposal can be evaluated using the criteria in Figure A-
3. In addition to the criteria listed in the figure, the customer should encourage and look for
innovative approaches that achieve the maintainability performance requirements in the most
effective way. Also, the proposal should emphasize the following objectives:

Understand the Customer's Maintainability Needs - if the customer has not explicitly
done so, determine the required level of maintainability as measured by the user during
actual use of the product. No matter the source of the requirement, determine the
feasibility of achieving the required maintainability and track progress toward that
achievement.
Thoroughly Understand the Design - understand the maintainability of the design and
the maintenance required for the product.
Integrate Maintainability with the Systems Engineering Process - make the
maintainability activities conducted during design and manufacturing an integral part of
the product and processes design effort. Ensure all sources (i.e., suppliers, vendors,
etc.) of components, materials, etc. used in the product, design and manufacture those
components and materials in accordance with the maintainability requirements.
Design for Desired Level of Maintainability - use proven design approaches to make
needed maintenance safe, economical, and easy to perform.
Validate the Maintainability Through Analysis and Development Test - conduct
analyses, simulation, and testing to uncover maintainability problems, revise the design,
and validate the effectiveness of the redesign.
Monitor and Analyze Operational Performance - assess the operational maintainability
of the product in actual use to uncover problems, identify needed improvements, and
provide "Lessons Learned" for incorporation in handbooks and for refining modeling
and analysis methods.

NOTE: The following list is not all-inclusive and not all items necessarily apply to every
program

Understanding. Does the proposal show a clear understanding of:

the importance of designing in maintainability?

maintainability techniques, methodology, and concepts?
the role of testability and diagnostics in maintainability and maintenance?
integrated diagnostics design principles?
the importance of integrating maintainability activities into the overall systems engineering process?
FIGURE A-3. Checklist for Evaluating Maintainability Portion of a Proposal.

A-19
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX A

Approach
Management. Does the proposal identify:
- who is responsible for maintainability and his/her experience and qualifications?
- the number and experience of maintainability personnel assigned to the program and the level of effort
allocated to maintainability activities?
- how maintainability personnel fit in the program's organizational framework?
- an effective means of communication and sharing of information among maintainability engineers and
analysts, design engineers, manufacturing engineers, and higher management?
- how the testability and diagnostics functions are integrated into the maintainability function?
- the suppliers' system for controlling the maintainability of items from other suppliers & vendors?
- how the supplier implements concurrent engineering practices and integrates maintainability into the
overall engineering and manufacturing effort?
Design. Does the proposal explain:
- if and how design standards, guidelines, and criteria will be used?
- the approach to designing for testability and diagnostics?
- if and how tradeoff studies will be used for critical design areas?
- the time-phasing of maintainability activities in relation to key program milestones?
- any areas of maintainability risk?
- if and how software maintainability will be addressed?
Analysis/Test. Does the proposal identify and describe:
- methods of analysis and math models to be used?
- maintainability modeling, prediction, and allocation procedures?
- the time phasing of any proposed maintainability testing in relation to the overall program schedule?
- the time available for the test type required (such as maximum time for maintainability demonstration) and
how that time was determined?
- if and how the supplier will predict the maintainability (in whatever parameters are specified) prior to the
start of testing?
- the resources (test chambers, special equipment, etc.) needed to perform all required testing, how they were
determined, and their availability?
- how the results of all testing will be used to evaluate maintainability and identify maintainability
problems?
Compliance
Design. The proposal should include:
- evidence of compliance with military and commercial specifications and standards, when required, and
good engineering practices for maintainability.
- evidence that ease of maintenance and preventive maintenance requirements will be addressed.
- justification (models, preliminary estimates, data sources, etc.) to back up the claims of meeting
maintainability requirements.
Analysis/Test. The proposal should indicate:
- an explicit commitment to perform all maintainability analyses cited in the proposal or required by
contract.
- an explicit commitment to perform all maintainability testing cited in the proposal or required by contract.
- that the supplier complies with all product-level maintainability test requirements and that the contractor
will demonstrate the maintainability figures of merit by test using any specified accept/reject criteria or by
analysis.
- if and how the contractor will perform verification or demonstration testing, the type of testing planned, and
the specific purpose of the testing.
Data. The proposal should show an explicit commitment to deliver all required maintainability data items in
the format specified.

FIGURE A-3. Checklist for Evaluating Maintainability Portion of a Proposal.

(continued)

A-20
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX B

MAINTAINABILITY TEST AND DEMONSTRATION METHODS

B.1.0 Scope

This Appendix is an essential part of MIL-HDBK-470A. The information contained herein is

intended for reference only. Much of this appendix is based on the information that was
contained in MIL-HDBK-471 (formerly MIL-STD-471A), Maintainability Verification/
Demonstration/Evaluation. Although the referenced document covered verification,
demonstration and evaluation, the methods presented dealt primarily with maintainability
demonstration. Part of the reason is that separate tests designed and planned specifically to
verify or evaluate the maintainability characteristics of a design have not typically been part of a
system development program. In the case of reliability, testing such as reliability growth testing
is a separate process from reliability qualification testing or production reliability acceptance
testing. No such techniques, in the form of handbooks or standards have been developed for
similar (e.g., maintainability growth) testing associated with maintainability. Consequently, in
this Appendix, specific techniques for maintainability demonstration testing will be presented,
while other types of maintainability testing (i.e., verification and evaluation) will be addressed
from a more qualitative aspect.

This Appendix is for guidance only and cannot be cited as a requirement. If it is, the contractor
does not have to comply.

B.1.1 Purpose. The purpose of conducting maintainability tests is to verify, demonstrate and
evaluate both quantitative and qualitative maintainability characteristics of a design. Quantitative
parameters include metrics discussed elsewhere in this handbook, such as MTTR, M ct , or
M Max .
ct

B.1.2 Definitions. The following terms, used and discussed within this appendix are as defined
as follows:

B.1.2.1 Maintenance Task. The maintenance effort necessary for retaining an item in, changing
to, or restoring it to a specified condition.

B.1.2.2 Maintainability Model. A quantifiable representation of a test or process the purpose

of which is to analyze results to determine specific relationships of a set of quantifiable
maintainability parameters.

B.1.2.3 Verification. The effort performed from system concept through the hardware
development phase to: determine the accuracy of and update the analytical (predicted) data
obtained from the maintainability engineering analysis, identify maintainability design
deficiencies, and gain progressive assurance that the maintainability of the system or item can be
achieved and demonstrated in subsequent phases.

B-1
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX B

B.1.2.4 Demonstration. The effort (often performed jointly by the system developer and
system procuring activity) to determine whether specified maintainability requirements have
been achieved.

B.1.2.5 Evaluation. The procuring activity effort to determine, at all levels of maintenance, the
impact of the operational, maintenance and support environment on the maintainability
parameters of the system or item and to demonstrate depot level maintenance tasks.

B.1.2.6 Maintenance Concept. A description of the planned general scheme for maintenance
and support of an item in the operational environment.

B.1.2.7 Maintenance Environment. The climatic, geographical, physical and operational

conditions (e.g., combat, mobile, continental) under which an item will be maintained.

B.2.0 Verification Testing

Maintainability verification testing is conducted during Phase I of the overall system life cycle as
defined in Appendix E. Other maintainability testing (i.e., demonstration and evaluation) follow
verification testing during subsequent phases of the system life cycle. Figure B-1 provides a time
phased chart for the three kinds of maintainability testing discussed in this appendix. Each of the
life cycle phases shown in the figure are defined in detail in Appendix E, Phasing of
Maintainability Elements.

SYSTEM LIFE CYCLE P HASES

P HASE 0 P HASE I P HASE II P HASE III

CONCEP T P ROGRAM DEFINITION ENGINEERING AND P RODUCTION,
EXP LORATION AND RISK REDUCTION MANUFACTURING DEP LOYMENT AND
DEVELOP MENT OP ERATIONAL SUP P ORT

DEVELOP MENT TEST AND OP ERATIONAL TEST AND

EVALUATION EVALUATION

P ROTOTYP E FIRST UNIT

AVAILABLE DEP LOYED

VERIFICATION DEMONSTRATION EVALUATION

TESTING TESTING TESTING

FIGURE B-1. Time Phasing of Maintainability Testing.

B-2
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX B

The effort to verify maintainability parameters that are developed during Phase 0 (e.g., predicted
values of MTTR), is incremental in nature commencing with initial design and continuing through
hardware development from components to the configuration item. The basic objectives of
maintainability verification are:

To verify and update the contractor's maintainability model.

To ensure economical correction of design deficiencies and to provide assurance that
maintainability requirements will be achieved and demonstrated, if required, by
performing early in the design process, maintainability verifications such as limited low
confidence maintainability tests, time-motion measurements or such other tests as may
be proposed by the system developer.
To provide progressive assurance that the maintainability requirements can be achieved
and demonstrated and that elements of the integrated support plan directly related to
maintainability are valid.

Maximum use should be made of data resulting from maintenance performed in conjunction with
such tests as development, prototype, mock-up, qualification, and reliability tests. In this
respect, collection of maintenance task data must be planned for and coordinated with other
disciplines. (See Section 4.5 of this handbook for a discussion of maintainability data elements to
be collected as part of a Failure Reporting, Analysis and Corrective Action System [FRACAS]).
Further, specific maintenance tasks used in development of the maintainability model and
prediction must be clearly defined such that when failures occur during development testing that
result in a specific maintenance task, the maintenance time can be compared to that used in the
prediction model. This must be done for both preventive (as applicable) as well as corrective
maintenance tasking.

B.2.1 The Importance of Verification Testing. Development of a predicted value for

maintainability, whether it be a mean corrective maintenance time, mean downtime, or other
parameter, is based on time estimates of individual tasks associated with maintenance of a system
and its individual parts. The reliability data, such as failure frequency and failure mode and
effects, play a role in maintainability prediction as well, since it is the failure modes, their effects
and frequency of occurrence that ultimately define individual maintenance tasks to be performed.
In order to develop a maintainability prediction, the predictor must assume that a person with a
particular skill level will be assigned to maintain a particular subsystem within the system of
interest. Further, estimates of fault isolation time and fault detection capability must also be
developed based on the testability design and assumed effectiveness of any built-in-test (BIT)
features incorporated at various system levels. Often, time estimates derived in this manner are
based on experience and knowledge of the individual performing the estimate. Therefore, the
chances for bias in a prediction exist, especially if such factors as maintenance environment are
not well understood early in the design phase. It is important then to verify the maintenance task
database that is used to obtain the predicted values as a means of improving the maintainability

B-3
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX B

design aspects of the system, and to improve the chances of performing a meaningful and
successful maintainability demonstration.

In addition to the preceding discussion, testability aspects, such as BIT effectiveness, are not
easily verified in a formal demonstration test. This is due in part to the fact that such failure
mechanisms that cause transient or intermittent behavior are not easily simulated in a laboratory
environment (where many demonstrations take place). Further, the number of failures induced in
a demonstration represent such a small part of the overall number of failures that may occur
during fielded operation and are therefore too small to really demonstrate the diagnostic
capabilities of a system design. Because of this, a well planned verification program, that
optimizes naturally occurring failures during development and subsequent testing is needed to
assess the diagnostic characteristics of the design. In short, demonstration techniques and
methods that are documented in this appendix (and previously in MIL-HDBK-471A) are
inadequate for testability demonstration. Further discussion of testability verification is
provided in Section B.7 of this appendix.

B.2.2 Verification Techniques and Concepts. The means by which verification is

accomplished will depend on the maintainability characteristic or data element to be verified. For
qualitative elements, such as accessibility, clearances for use of tools, available work space, or
safety concerns, ease of maintenance studies can be planned and executed. This may include the
use of mock-ups, or in the future, the use of virtual mock-ups using virtual reality techniques as
discussed in Section 4 of this handbook. Other verification methods include design reviews, other
special studies (e.g., maintenance task analysis or simulation studies), or review of historical
information on like systems. The verification process should be continuous throughout the
system life cycle, and therefore data obtained from maintainability demonstration testing (see
Section 3 of this appendix) and operational test and evaluation should also be used to verify both
quantitative and qualitative features.

The process of executing a verification program should follow the general procedural elements
outlined below:

Identify possible data sources and develop data collection and analysis plan
Evaluate both qualitative and quantitative data
Compare results with requirements

Quantitative data analysis typically relates to collecting information on maintenance task times,
such as removal and replacement times, and developing an approach to statistically compare
actual data to predicted values.1

1
See Downs, W.R., "System Maintainability Verification - The Paired Time Comparison (PTC)
Method," Proceedings, 1979 Annual Reliability and Maintainability Symposium for an example of a
method used for verification.

B-4
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX B

B.3.0 Maintainability Demonstration

As discussed here, the purpose of conducting a maintainability demonstration is to provide

assurance that a specified maintainability index (i.e., M T TR, MDT, MMH/OH, etc.) will be
attained during fielded operation. This is done by scheduling and execution of a demonstration
test wherein maintenance tasks are performed at a specified level of maintenance (e.g.,
organizational, intermediate, depot) by personnel having the skill levels available or required in
the fielded maintenance environment. For each maintenance task performed, where a typical task
is to isolate and repair a failed unit, the time required to perform the maintenance task is recorded.
Depending on the maintainability index being demonstrated, and the test plan chosen, once a
statistically significant number of tasks are performed, the collected data are then used to
determine if the maintainability is acceptable or not. In addition to the quantitative data collected
during the demonstration test, qualitative information, such as the adequacy of test support
documentation or ease of maintenance (accessibility, safety, etc.) is also collected and reviewed.

B.3.1 Maintainability Demonstration Test Specification. As noted, the purpose of the

demonstration test is to provide assurance of the ability to meet a specified maintainability
requirement. The demonstration test is defined as a set of numerical requirements and associated
risk levels that will govern the design and decision criteria of the demonstration test. For the test
plans to be described, this specification involves decisions regarding the following:

Type of maintainability index to be specified

Acceptable and unacceptable values of the index
Associated risk levels

For example, the test specification might be as follows:

H0 : Mean corrective-maintenance time = 40 minutes

H1: Mean corrective-maintenance time = 80 minutes
= 0.20, = 0.10

H0 and H1 are the null and alternative hypothesis, respectively. and are the producer and
consumer risks, respectively. For the defined specifications above, the demonstration test must
be designed such that the probability of rejecting a system whose mean corrective maintenance
time is 40 minutes is 0.20, while the probability of accepting a system whose mean corrective
maintenance time is 80 minutes is 0.10. This is presented below in the form of probability
equations.

P (reject | M ct = 40 min.) = 0.20

P (accept | M ct = 80 min.) = 0.10

B-5
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX B

Typically the maintainability index is that specified in the procurement specification. The index
should represent a measure that is directly influenced by the equipment design so that the
producer can plan for high assurance of a pass decision, but bears the responsibility for a reject
decision. The index should also be appropriate for, and measurable in, the demonstration-test
environment. If a demonstration of the chosen maintainability index is to be required, then
adequate sampling and statistical-evaluation procedures, such as those described in this appendix,
should be available for demonstrating conformance to the requirement. Finally, the specified
index and risk values should not lead to sample sizes (i.e., the number of maintenance tasks
required to assess compliance) that would exceed available test resources.

B.3.2 Choosing a Demonstration Test Method. Table B-I provides a summary of the test
methods presented in this appendix. For each test method, the table also lists the maintainability
index for which the plan is designed to demonstrate, a summary of assumptions, the required
number of samples, the method by which samples are selected, and the demonstration
specification parameters. Definitions of individual terms found in the "Specification
Requirement" column of B-1 can be found in the subsection where the method is presented.

In reviewing Table B-I, it is evident that a number of factors influence the choice of a
maintainability demonstration test method. These include the index to be demonstrated, any
assumptions about the statistical nature of the index as related to the test method requirements,
the means by which sample maintenance tasks are selected, the number of maintenance tasks that
must be demonstrated to obtain a statistically significant number of data samples, and the
individual producer's and consumer's risk for some of the tests. Guidance and discussions of
some of these factors are provided in the sections that follow, to aid the user in making informed
decisions when specifying and executing a maintainability demonstration.

B.3.3 Choosing a Maintainability Index. As stated above, historically the specified

maintainability index is also the one that is demonstrated. However, it is important to provide
some guidance on choosing such an index, as this can affect which of the test methods, outlined in
Table B-I, is chosen for Maintainability Demonstration testing.

The principal criterion in selecting the index for a maintainability demonstration (and therefore
for a product specification) is consistency with the mission objectives and operational
constraints. This will generally mean that equipment downtime is the time measurement of the
index since operational effectiveness cannot be achieved unless downtime is controlled. If the
need for an equipment or system is not critical, and manpower control is important, a labor-hour
index may be most appropriate. Preventive-maintenance labor-hours per operating hour is
preferable to downtime due to preventive maintenance for equipments for which such required
maintenance can be scheduled without fear of operational demand during the maintenance action.

B-6
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX B

TABLE B-I. Test Method Matrix.

Test Sample Sample Specification
Plan Test Index Assumptions Size Selection Requirement
1-A Mean Log-normal dist. See test Natural occurring H 0 , H1 , ,
and prior knowledge method failures or
of variance stratification1
1-B Mean No dist. See test Natural occurring H 0 , H1 , ,
assumption, prior method failures or stratification
knowledge of
variance
2 Critical Percentile Lognormal dist., See test Natural occurring H 0 , H1 , ,
prior knowledge of method failures or stratification
variance
3 Critical Main. Time or None See test Natural occurring H 0 , H1 , ,
Manhours method failures or stratification
4 Median A Specific Variance 20 Natural occurring ERT
Log-normal failures or stratification
52 Chargeable maint. Downtime/ None See test Natural occurring ORR or A,
Flight method failures NCMDT/NOF
DDT/NOF, ,
63 Manhour Rate None See testNatural occurring Manhour Rate
method failures MR
74 Manhour Rate None See testNatural occurring R ,
method failures or stratification
8 Mean and Percentile Log-normal See testNatural occurring Mean, M Max
Dual Percentile None method failures or Simple
random sampling Dual Percentile
9 Mean (Corrective Task Time, None 30 Natural occurring
Prev. Maint. Time, Downtime) minimum failures or stratification , , ,
c pm p/c
M Max (90 or 95 percentile)
M Max
c
10 Median (Corrective task time, 50 Natural occurring ,M
M
None minimum failures or stratification ct pm
Prev. maint. time), M Max
ct M Max , M Max
(95 percentile), M Max (95 ct pm
pm
percentile)
11 Mean (preventive maint. task All All pm
time) None possible
M Max (preventive maint. task tasks M Max
pm
time at any percentile)
Notes for Table B-I: (1) See section 3.3 for stratification method for sample selection
(2) Test method 5 is an indirect method for demonstrating operational ready rate (ORR) or
Availability (A).
(3) Test method 6 is intended for use with aeronautical systems and subsystems.
(4) Test method 7 is intended for use with ground electronic systems where it may be necessary to
simulate faults.

By the same reasoning, corrective maintenance is more crucial than preventive maintenance,
especially if the latter can be scheduled to take place during known periods of non-use. For
equipment operated or needed continuously, such as an alert radar, total maintenance time is of

B-7
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX B

prime importance. For equipment demanded at random times, such as a missile-defense system,
the approach might be to use separate controls for corrective maintenance and preventive
maintenance. The choice of the statistical measure to be used often depends on the mission
objective. If there is an operational availability requirement for the system, then the equation for
Ao , reprinted below from Section 2.2.1.2 of the handbook, is used to determine maintainability
requirements.

MTBM
Operational Availability = (Equation B-1)
MTBM + MDT

Inherent availability may also be a requirement, in which case MTBF and MTTR are substituted
for MTBM and MDT, respectively, in the above equation. When either availability expression
is appropriate, then a mean value becomes the maintainability index to be demonstrated. There
may be, however, an availability requirement where a maximum downtime or mean time to repair
is required or more appropriate. Such a requirement would apply to critical equipment aboard an
aircraft, for example, where the aircraft may have to be available for a new mission within two
hours after completing a mission. In this case, a requirement of 0.95 probability, for instance, of
completing the necessary maintenance within 100 minutes would be more consistent with the
operational objective than a mean-value index. Of course, the maintenance level for which the
requirement is developed also plays a role. For instance, a maximum time to repair may not be
appropriate or needed at the intermediate or depot-level of maintenance assuming that an
adequate amount of spares are available at the next lower level of maintenance (i.e., organizational
or intermediate, respectively).

To provide further guidance in choosing an appropriate index for demonstration, a guidance

matrix is provided in here in Figure B-2.2 To use the matrix, each of the conditions listed at the
top of the exhibit that apply to the equipment of interest should be checked. The appropriate
index is then found from the matrix by locating the column that contains an x for each condition
checked above. For example, if steady-state availability is a critical parameter (Condition 1) and
maintenance time is limited by environmental or operational circumstances (Condition 5), the
recommended index provides a control on both the mean and maximum maintenance time, and
there is an option for including preventive-maintenance time depending on equipment use or
scheduling and criticality. The set of conditions listed is not exhaustive, but it is believed to
include the most important ones.

2
Taken from RADC-TR-69-356, "Maintainability Prediction and Demonstration Techniques, Volume II
-Maintainability Demonstration," Technical Report, ARINC Research Corporation, January 1970.

B-8
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX B

Condition Identification
(Place an x in appropriate boxes)

Condition
1 Steady-state availability is a critical parameter.
2 Steady-state availability is not a critical parameter.
3 Maintenance-time distribution is unknown.
4 Maintenance-time distribution is expected to be lognormal.
5 Environmental or operational circumstances limit maintenance time.
6 Manpower allocation or cost is an important factor.

Selection Matrix 1

Index ~
~ M ct and M maxct2 M ct and M maxct
M ct and M pt 2 M ct M max MMH ~
M pt and M maxpt M pt and M ma pt
Condition
1 x x x x x x x x

2 x x x x x x x x x x x

3 x x x x x x

4 x x x x x x x

5 x x x x x x x x

6 x x x x x x
~
Notation M = mean, M = median, M max = maximummaintenance time, MMH = maintenance man-hours
ct = corrective maintenance, pt = preventive maintenance

Notes 1 The inclusion of preventive-maintenance indices is optional depending on scheduling and

criticality.
2 A combined total-maintenance-time index can be used instead of separate indices for
corrective and preventive maintenance.

FIGURE B-2. Procedure For Maintainability-Index Selection.

Several of the major considerations that led to the development of the matrix are as follows:

The mean is directly related to steady-state availability and is therefore the index of
choice when this operational requirement exists.
If the distribution of maintenance times is unknown, the median is preferred since it
permits distribution-free tests. If availability is critical, however, use of the central-
limit theorem permits a mean test, provided the sample size is large.

B-9
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX B

For the lognormal distribution, the median is preferred to the mean (assuming that
Condition 2 applies and that 5 and 6 do not) since it is based on only one parameter,
which makes statistical analysis exact.
When maintenance time is limited (Condition 5), the M Max index is preferred.
The mean is preferred over the median if manpower control is also required because the
mean is more directly related to manhours. However, if the distribution is unknown,
the median may be used as long as availability is not critical.

Note that complete dependence on this procedure is to be avoided. Because of the wide variety
of equipments, mission objectives, and environmental and operational circumstances, the
selection matrix should be considered a guide only. Ultimately, the best measure is determined
by individual system circumstances and good judgment.

Finally, no matter what indices are specified in the requirements or as the index to be
demonstrated, the values for those indices must be realistic, based on current knowledge of the
state-of-the-art, past history of like systems, and engineering judgment. Whether historical data
or prediction, or both, is used for assessing realism, careful judgment is required. If an allocation
leads to an M ct value of 20 minutes, but a 30 minute value was observed for the most similar
existing item, can it be concluded that 20 minutes is achievable? In all such cases, the following
questions should be considered:

- How similar are the items?

- How similar will the maintenance environment be?
- Since the observed 30-minute value is necessarily based on a sample, what is the lower
confidence limit associated with such a mean-value estimate?
- How much maintainability improvement can reasonably be expected?
- Is there any margin for increasing the 20-minute specified value?

B.3.4 Demonstration Environment Versus Requirements. Past history has shown that
demonstrated and predicted values of both reliability and maintainability often do not correlate
well with actual field experience. In the case of demonstrated maintainability values, this most
likely stems from the fact that the demonstration environment is often not the fielded
environment. Studies have shown that the closer the demonstration test environment is to the
expected field environment, the more meaningful the demonstration test, and therefore every
effort should be made to achieve such similarity.

In most cases, it is likely that demonstration environments will continue to differ from the field
environment. Because of this, when maintainability demonstration environments are based on
operational requirements, the applicability of that requirement to the demonstration environment
needs to be considered. As a general principle, the specified value based on operational goals and
conditions must be suitably adjusted to reflect the maintenance environment governing

B-10
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX B

demonstration. Often, it is a difficult to adhere to this principle. With an avionics system, for
example, a certain amount of time will be spent in the field to access the equipment in the aircraft,
and the time to locate the malfunction and complete repairs and checkout is a function of this
accessibility. If the demonstration test is not to take place in the aircraft (and this is often the
case) there is the question of whether the specified value should be adjusted and by how much.

It might be possible to construct a mockup to simulate the actual condition, thus eliminating the
need for adjustment. However, this type of simulation is often expensive and therefore not
practicable. Tables B-II and B-III list various factors to be considered in evaluating the
applicability of a specified maintainability index.

TABLE B-II. Factors Affecting the Suitability of a Specified Maintainability Index for
Maintainability Demonstration.
Physical Equipment Support Items
Stage of completion Tools
Similarity to production items General and special test equipment
Physical location Spares availability
Interfacing equipment Technical manuals

Test Location and Facility Operational Factors

Lighting factors Mode of equipment operation
Weather factors Procedures for instituting maintenance
Space factors

Test Team
Organization
Training and experience
Indoctrination

TABLE B-III. Causes of Discrepancies Between Test and Field Results.

Causes of Optimistic Test Results

1.
The demonstration maintenance technicians are not representative of typical field maintenance personnel
because they have more education and training or greater knowledge of the equipment's design.
2. The monitoring situation imparts to the technician an urgency not normally encountered in the field.
3. Known probable tasks are rehearsed beforehand.
4. Necessary support equipment is readily available.
5. Observed times are not contaminated with such factors as administrative or logistic delay, as field results
sometimes are.
6. Difficult to isolate faults such as intermittents and degradation failures are not simulated during
demonstration.
Causes of Pessimistic Test Results

1. The technicians are not familiar with the equipment and have not acquired the necessary experience for rapid
fault isolation.
2. Field and procedural modifications to reduce maintenance time have not yet been made.
3. Initial manuals may be incomplete or require revision.
4. The monitoring situation can adversely affect the technician's performance.

B-11
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX B

B.3.5 Maintenance Task Sampling. It is necessary to choose a specified number of

maintenance tasks for the demonstration test. In general, there are two basic approaches for
sample selection:

1. Observe maintenance tasks as they occur naturally in an operational or simulated

operational situation.
2. Induce faults in the system and observe the maintenance actions to correct these faults.

For the fault-inducement approach, a decision must be made on the type of sampling procedure
to be used. This is generally between stratified sampling and simple random sampling.
Guidelines are presented here for evaluation of the applicability of the two basic approaches,
obtaining maintenance-task samples, and choosing the appropriate sampling design and
procedure.

B.3.5.1 Natural Versus Induced Failures. It is important that the choice of sample selection
be made early in the development program, especially if the choice is naturally occurring failures
or a combination of the two. The natural-failure approach is dependent on whether the program
schedule allows enough time to obtain the required number of maintenance tasks, where the
allowable time is related to reliability. Given the MTBF, or , of a system, the average number
of operating hours needed to yield n failure occurrences is n. Therefore, for items with large
MTBFs (i.e., hundreds of hours), and a required sample size of say 30 to 50 tasks, the number of
required equipment operating hours can easily exceed 10,000 (e.g., 50 samples from an item with
an MTBF of 200 hours). Because of the time requirements of this magnitude, most
maintainability demonstrations are based on the fault-inducement approach, allowing
demonstration to be completed in a few days.

While the reality of cost and schedules dictate the use of induced failures for maintainability
demonstration, the natural failure approach is the preferred one. A disadvantage that has always
existed with inducing failures is that there is no guarantee that such faults are representative of
those which will be seen in operation. This disadvantage is amplified when considering
demonstration of diagnostic features of a design. Because of these problems, the following
general recommendations are made concerning sample selection:

If the schedule allows for natural failures, then this type of sampling is preferred.
If the complete demonstration cannot be completed with only naturally occurring
failures, a combination of the two approaches should be used. One possibility is to
take advantage of other development tests, such as the reliability demonstration test and
correct faults that occurred in these tests. Close coordination between the
maintainability demonstration test and any other test will be required.
If natural failure testing cannot be conducted, any natural failures that do occur during
the induced failure test should be included in the sample.

B-12
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX B

B.3.5.2 Failure Inducement Approach. An initial step in developing a sample set of tasks for
demonstration is to develop a hypothetical maintenance task population. The two basic
approaches to identifying the maintenance task groups are simple random sampling and
stratification. For discussion purposes, comments will be restricted to stratification, as they will
also generally apply to simple random sampling when task selection by failure inducement is
being considered.

The first task in stratification is choosing criteria by which to stratify. This involves the
characteristic by which to stratify, the number of strata, and the boundaries defining the
individual strata. The major objective here is to divide the equipment for which maintainability is
to be demonstrated into a subset of homogeneous groups. To accomplish this, the maintenance
tasks within each group, or stratum, should require approximately the same amount of
maintenance time or the same number of manhours, whichever is most appropriate. Blind
application of this requirement, however, is not recommended. Repairing an electronic assembly
within a system may take approximately the same amount of time as repairing a motor within the
same system; however the differences between the two types of maintenance actions would
make it unnatural to place them in the same stratum. Therefore, it is reasonable to make sure that
there are similarities among the tasks assigned to a stratum. As is evident, engineering judgment
must always play a role when grouping elements of this nature. The following approach is
presented as additional guidance to stratum development.

First divide the equipment or item by physical entities, such as equipments within a
system or units within an equipment. These first level breakdowns will be called
blocks.
For each block, subdivide to the highest system level at which maintenance will be
performed. If the block is the highest level, no further subdivision is necessary. If an
equipment is under test and the organizational maintenance philosophy is unit
replacement, subdivide to the units. These elements of the subdivision will be called
sub-blocks.
For each sub-block, list the associated maintenance tasks and estimated maintenance
task times or manhours. For a sub-block that is a Line Replaceable Unit (LRU), or
equivalent, removal or replacement may be the only task listed. However, if LRU
adjustment or some further tasks such as crystal replacement are possible, they would
also be listed as sub-block tasks.
Group together those tasks in each sub-block which require essentially similar actions
and will be expected to have similar maintenance times or manhours, whichever index
applies. The use of historical and predicted data, and previous development tests
should be used as inputs for the time estimates. These groups will then form part of
the initial set of strata.

The initial set of strata may have to be revised when the actual tasks to be induced and sample-
size requirements are considered. An example of the preceding four-step process is provided

B-13
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX B

here. The example will be concerned with a maintainability demonstration test of an airborne
Doppler radar consisting of the following units:

Antenna (AS)
Receiver/Transmitter (R/T)
Frequency Tracker (FT)
Radar Set Control (C)
Drift Angle Indicator (ID)

Assume that the demonstration is for the organizational maintenance level and that the procedure
for this equipment is to replace all units except the receiver/transmitter, for which modularized
assemblies are removed and replaced. The assemblies of the R/T are:

I.F. - A Modulator (Mod)

I.F. - B Transmitter (TX)
Audio Amplifier (Amp) Power Supply (PS)

Assume further that crystal replacement in the frequency tracker is also performed as part of
equipment maintenance. The stratification process described is documented in Table B-IV.

TABLE B-IV. Example of Step-by-Step Stratification.

Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4
Blocks Sub-Blocks Sub-Block Tasks* and Task Times Block Strata
Antenna Antenna R/R - 10 A - R/R
Receiver/Transmitter IF - A
IF - B
R/R - .03
R/R - .03 IF - R/R
Amplifier R/R - .04
Modulator
Power Supply
R/R - .04
R/R - .04
} Amp, Mod
PS - R/R
Transmitter R/R - .05 TX - R/R
Frequency Tracker Frequency Tracker R/R - 0.6 FT - R/R
Replace Crystals - 0.5 FT - Replace Crystals
Radar Set Control Radar Set Control R/R - 0.5 C - R/R
Drift Angle Indicator Drift Angle Indicator R/R - 0.5 ID - R/R
*R/R - Remove and Replace

Once the initial set of strata has been established, it is necessary to estimate the frequency of
occurrence of tasks in each stratum. For tasks that result from part failure, the use of part failure
rates such as those obtained from applying MIL-HDBK-217 could be used. These failure rates,
however, primarily reflect catastrophic piece-part failures and usually do not include such failure
modes as degradation, part interactions, and intermittencies. Such failures may be considered as
part of performing a failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA).

Once the failure-rate predictions are available, the relative frequency of task occurrence is
calculated by dividing the individual failure rates of equipment blocks found in column 2 of Table
B-V, by the total failure rate of all equipment blocks. Table B-V shows the computations for the
example radar equipment.

B-14
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX B

TABLE B-V. Calculations of Relative Frequency of Occurrence and Sample Size For
Example Radar Equipment.
Failure Relative
Maintenance Rate () Quantity Duty Tot Freq of Cum.
Task Strata x 10-6 of Items Cycle Occurrence Range Sample Size*
Antenna R/R 105 1 1.0 105 0.175 0 - .1749 9
IF -R/R 25 2 1.0 50 0.083 .1750 - .2579 4
Amp - R/R 21 1 1.0 62 0.104 .2580 - .3619 5
Mod - R/R 18 1
PS - R/R 23 1
Tx - R/R 10 1 1.0 10 0.017 .3620 - .3789 1
FT 400 1 0.7 280 0.467 .3790 - .8459 23
FT - Replace 20 4 0.7 56 0.093 .8460 - .9389 5
Crystal
C - R/R 35 1 0.8 28 0.047 .9390 - .9859 2
ID R/R 10 1 0.8 8 0.013 .9860 - 1.000 1
Totals N/A N/A N/A 599 1.000 50 50
* - The sample size shown applies only to stratified sampling. For simple random sampling, the relative
frequencies of occurrence are used.

The failure rates provided in Table B-V are based on predicted values. Dividing the total failure
rate of 599 into the individual maintenance task strata rates yields the relative frequencies of
occurrence shown in the table. The number of sample tasks to be demonstrated for each strata
are determined by multiplying the required sample size, as determined from the chosen
demonstration test plan, by the relative frequencies shown in Table B-V. An alternative means
of determining sample size would be by random sampling. For this example, where the required
sample size is 50, 50 numbers would be drawn from a random-number table, where the numbers
are between 0 and 1. If a random number is between 0 and 0.1749, a maintenance task involving
the antenna is to be simulated. If the random number is between 0.175 and 0.2579, a fault
resulting in the removal and replacement of the I/F module is induced, etc.

As implied, the last column of Table B-V is the number of samples chosen using the stratified
approach, exclusively. Within this approach, when a task group consists of more than one
module or assembly, etc., as is the case for the amplifier, modulator and power supply group in
the R/T, the total number of maintenance tasks assigned to the group (5 in this example) should
be allocated to the modules, assemblies, etc., within the group in accordance with the relative
frequency of occurrence of maintenance for each module, etc., within the group. The selection
process for this group is illustrated as follows:

Total Rel. Freq. Demonstration Sample

Group sub-blocks F.R. of Occur. Size

Amplifier 21 0.339 1.7 ~ 2 (.339 x 5 = 1.7)

Modulator 18 0.290 1.4 ~ 1
Power Supply 23 0.371 1.9 ~ 2
62 1.000 5

B-15
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX B

At this point, only the maintenance task sample size by strata have been discussed. To be
complete, the demonstration population of maintenance tasks from which to choose the samples
must also be determined, as well as the specific maintenance tasks to be sampled from within that
population. To minimize any biasing problems due to task rehearsals and the problem of not
being able to physically induce a selected fault, it is necessary to select a much larger number of
possible tasks than required by the demonstration method. Previous standards (i.e., MIL-STD-
471A) have required a number equal to four (4) times the specified sample size, or as specified
by the procuring authority. Most of the methods presented in Section 4.0 are based on having a
demonstration population of 4 times the specified sample size. For the example Radar system
then, 200 sample tasks, or 4 x 50, should be available. This number should then be allocated to
the individual groups using the relative frequency of occurrence method just presented. Further
allocation within modules of a group is also necessary again, using the relative frequency of
occurrence method as illustrated. An entire table for this example, documenting the process of
sample task allocation is presented in Table B-VI. This table is summarized in the following 12
step approach, using the R/T as stratified in Table B-V.

Step 1. Column 1 - Identify the major units which comprise the equipment

Step 2. Column 2 - Subdivide each unit to the functional level at which maintenance for the
demonstration is to be performed in accordance with the approved maintenance plan. This level
may be an assembly, module, printed circuit card or piece part.

Step 3. Columns 3 & 4 - For each functional level of maintenance identified in Column 2, identify
in Column 3 the type of maintenance task or tasks to be performed and in Column 4 the
estimated mean maintenance time for the task. The maintenance tasks and estimated maintenance
time would be derived from a maintenance engineering analysis, a maintainability prediction
effort, or from historical data. The same maintenance task, such as "remove and replace" of a
module may result from different faults within the module. Column 3 would identify the
maintenance task and not the fault or failure which results in the occurrence of the task.

Step 4. Column 5 - Determine the failure rate (F/ 106 hours) for each module, printed circuit card,
etc., for which the maintenance task was identified in Column 3. The failure rates used should be
the latest available from an associated reliability program.

Step 5. Column 6 - Determine the quantity of items in each major unit associated with each task
in Column 3.

Step 6. Column 7 - Determine the duty cycle for each item associated with each task in Column 3
(e.g., operating time of a receiver to the operating time of the radar; engine operating hours to
aircraft flight hours).

B-16
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX B

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

TABLE B-VI. Stratification Procedure.

Variable
Nomenclature - Radar XYZ Fixed Sample Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
Major Functional Maint. Est. Mean Failure Quan. of Duty Task Total Rel. Freq. of Dem. Demon. Cum. Range
Units level of Task Maint Rate F/106 items Cyc. Groups Failure Occurrence Pop. Sample
Maint. Time (hrs.) hrs. Rate Alloc. Size
Antenna Antenna R/R (A) 1.0 105 1 1.0 Grp. 1 - 105 0.175 35 9 0 - .1749
Task A
Receiver/ IF -A R/R (A) 0.3 25 1 1.0 Grp. 2 - 50 0.083 17 4 .1750 - .2579
Transmitter I/F -B R/R (B) 0.3 25 1 1.0 Task A, B

Amplifier R/R (C) 0.4 21 1 1.0 Grp. 3 - 62 0.104 C -7 C-2 .2580 - .3619
Modulator R/R (D) 0.4 18 1 1.0 Task C-E D-6 21 D-1 5
Pwr. Supply R/R (E) 0.4 23 1 1.0 E-8 E-2

Transmitter R/R (F) 0.5 10 1 1.0 Grp. 4 - 10 0.017 3 1 .3620 - .3789

Task F
Freq. Freq. Tracker R/R (A) 0.6 400 1 0.7 Grp. 5 - 280 0.467 93 23 .3790 - .8459
Tracker Replace Task A
Crystal 0.5 20 4 0.7 Grp. 6 - 56 0.093 19 5 .8460 - .9389
(B) Task B
Radar Set Radar Set R/R (A) 0.5 35 1 0.8 Grp. 7 - 28 0.047 9 2 .9390 - .9859
Control Control Task A
Drift Angle Drift Angle R/R (A) 0.5 10 1 0.8 Grp. 8 - 8 0.013 3 1 .9860 -1.0000
Indicator Indicator Task A

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

599 1.000 200 50

Note 1: R/R = remove/replace (includes time to perform each element of maintenance time).

Note 2: This table is for illustration only. It is not intended to represent a complete radar nor should the entries be considered as real data.

Note 3: Delete column 11 and column 12 for sequential test methods.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
B-17
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX B

Step 7. Column 8 - Group together the maintenance tasks identified in Column 3 which have
both:

a. Similar maintenance actions. NOTE: A maintenance action is an element of a

maintenance task. Although the estimated maintenance time for different maintenance tasks may
be similar, the actions may be different, that is, one task may involve significant diagnostics and
another involve minimum diagnostics but significant access time.

b. Similar estimated maintenance times. The maintenance times in each group should be
within a range that shall not exceed the smallest value in the group by more than 50 percent.

Task grouping should be limited to within major units identified in Column 1.

Step 8. Column 9 - Determine the total failure rate for each task grouping identified in Column 8.
The total failure rate is equal to the sum of the products of Columns 5, 6 and 7 for all tasks
within the group.

Step 9. Column 10 - Determine the relative frequency of occurrence for each task grouping by
dividing the sum of the total failure rate (sum of Column 9) into the individual total failure rate
for each group.

Step 10. Column 11 - Fixed Sample - A sample of maintenance tasks equal to four times the
sample size specified for the selected test method (see Section B.4.0 of this appendix) or as
specified or agreed upon with the procuring activity should be allocated among the task groups in
accordance with the relative frequency of occurrence of the task group. (For Table B-VI, required
sample size = 50, population sample size = 4x50=200).

Step 11. Column 12 - The maintenance tasks to be demonstrated (50 tasks for this example) are
allocated among the task groups in accordance with the relative frequency of occurrence of
maintenance for the group. The maintenance task to be demonstrated is then randomly selected
from the maintenance tasks allocated to the group or modules, assemblies, etc., within the group
(Column 11). The maintenance task to be demonstrated is not returned to the sample pool and is
therefore demonstrated only once.

Step 12. Column 13 - Variable Sample/Sequential Test - When variable sample size, sequential
test methods are employed, a simple random sampling of the total population of maintenance
tasks using a random number table based on a uniform distribution from 0 to 1 is used. Using
Table B-V, columns 1 through 10, determine from the relative frequency of occurrence (column
10), the cumulative range of frequency of occurrence for each task group. A maintenance task is
selected from that group whose cumulative range of frequency of occurrence includes the number
selected from the random number table. The number selected from the random number table is
then "returned" to the table before selecting a second number. The "specimen" task demonstrated
is also returned to the sample pool.

B-18
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX B

B.3.5.2.1 Maintenance Task Selection. The stratification procedure discussed so far only
provides a technique for grouping the maintenance tasks by functional blocks or sub-blocks, and
determining the population and demonstration sample sizes. However, how to choose samples
from the population has yet to be addressed. Table B-VI presents the method whereby the
number of maintenance tasks to be simulated is allocated to each group based on the relative
frequency of occurrence expected for that group. Within these tasks, there will also be a choice
of faults to be simulated. This may involve, for example, the selection of an assembly or part and
its mode of failure. As an example, consider the task of choosing which failures to be simulated
that will result in a maintenance task for the frequency tracker (FT) block of the Radar system
example. The number of failure modes to be considered for the FT should equal at least 93 (see
column 11 of Table B-VI) from which 23 failures are to be selected for simulation (see column
12).

As was done to determine the number of tasks to be sampled for Group 3 of Table B-VI, the
failure modes for the FT block and their relative frequency of occurrence must be determined
such that a random sampling procedure can be applied to select the maintenance tasks to be
sampled. This implies that an FMEA for the system be conducted at the level of maintenance to
be demonstrated. If these data are not available, an alternate means of choosing samples must be
developed.3 As an example, suppose an FMEA of the FT indicates that there are five major
failure modes that require a remove and replace action and that are detectable at the unit level.
These modes, their effects, and relative frequencies of occurrence are shown in Table B-VII.

TABLE B-VII. Failure Mode Selection.

1 2 3 4 5
Maintenance Task Failure Effect Relative Frequency of Cumulative Range
Mode Occurrence (%)
Frequency Tracker 1 Inoperative 30 0 - .2999
Remove/ Replace 2 Will not lock on 20 .3000 - .4999
3 Breaks lock 20 .5000 - .6999
4 Drifts 15 .7000 - .8499
5 Erratic 15 .8500 - 1.0000

To determine which faults to induce for simulating the 23 tasks, 23 four digit numbers, between 0
and 1, are selected from a random number table. If the number is between 0 and .2999, then a
fault or malfunction that makes the FT inoperative must be induced. A random number between
.3000 and .4999 would indicate that a fault resulting in inability to lock-on effect is to be
simulated, etc.

Within any failure mode, a choice would then have to be made concerning the specific means of
fault inducement (e.g., which lead to disconnect or which part to replace with a known faulty
part). If, with respect to the maintenance action, there is no discernible difference, the simplest
means can be used. If, however, the fault selection can affect maintenance time (e.g.,

3
See the symptom-matrix approach in RADC-TR-69-356.

B-19
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX B

disconnecting one lead may cause secondary symptoms, while disconnecting another will not),
then, again, a random-selection criterion could be used, if desired.

The preceding process adds to the previous 12 step process for development of a stratification
table. Continuing with step 13, the following steps are added to the entire process of
maintenance task selection (refer to Table B-VII.)

Step 13. Column 1 - Identify the maintenance task of interest.

Step 14. Column 2 - Determine the failure modes which will result in the maintenance task of
interest.

Step 15. Column 3 - Determine the effect of each failure mode identified in column 2.

Step 16. Column 4 - Determine the relative frequency of occurrence of each failure mode.

Step 17. Column 5 - Simple Random Sampling - Determine the cumulative range of frequency of
occurrence for each failure mode. Using a random number table a number is selected and the
failure mode to be induced is that whose cumulative range of frequency of occurrence includes the
number selected. The number selected from the random number is "returned" to the table before
selecting a second number. The specimen demonstrated is also returned to the sample pool.

There are alternative approaches documented for choosing the maintenance tasks to be
demonstrated, such as the symptom-matrix approach referenced earlier. However, this approach
requires a much more detailed analysis of the system design. Interested readers are encouraged to
review the report referenced in the footnotes for more information.

B.3.6 Statistical Maintainability Demonstration Plans. The following subsections contain

test methods and criteria for demonstrating the achievement of specified quantitative
maintainability requirements. The matrix presented previously in Table B-I is repeated as a
summarization of the major characteristics of each test method as well as the quantitative
requirements which must be specified for each. The data analysis method included with each test
method provides the decision criteria for acceptance or rejection of the item being demonstrated.

Each of the test plans contained in this section includes an equation or other directions for
determining a minimum sample size of maintenance tasks. Any departure from the minimum
sample size requirements can affect the statistical validity of the test procedures. Some of the
test plans require a prior estimate of the variance of the distribution of interest for the calculation
of sample size. Such prior estimates are typically obtained from data on similar systems
provided similarities in maintainability design, skill levels of maintenance personnel, test
equipment, manuals and the maintenance environment are considered in the estimation process.
Equations for predicting the variance when prior estimates are not available are presented in
RADC-TR-69-356 (see footnotes), which can be used, provided the information needed for the
prediction is available. To preserve the desired risk values in those cases where the variance is

B-20
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX B

predicted, the 85th - 95th upper confidence bound on the predicted or estimated variance should
be used. Average values of the variance have ranged from 0.5 to 1.3.

Test Method Matrix

Test Sample Sample Specification
Plan Test Index Assumptions Size Selection Requirement
1-A Mean Log-normal dist. See test Natural occurring H 0 , H1 , ,
and prior knowledge method failures or
of variance stratification1
1-B Mean No dist. See test Natural occurring H 0 , H1 , ,
assumption, prior method failures or stratification
knowledge of
variance
2 Critical Percentile Lognormal dist., See test Natural occurring H 0 , H1 , ,
prior knowledge of method failures or stratification
variance
3 Critical Main. Time or None See test Natural occurring H 0 , H1 , ,
Manhours method failures or stratification
4 Median A Specific Variance 20 Natural occurring ERT
Log-normal failures or stratification
52 Chargeable maint. Downtime/ None See test Natural occurring ORR or A,
Flight method failures NCMDT/NOF
DDT/NOF, ,
63 Manhour Rate None See testNatural occurring Manhour Rate
method failures MR
74 Manhour Rate None See testNatural occurring R ,
method failures or stratification
8 Mean and Percentile Log-normal See testNatural occurring Mean, M Max
Dual Percentile None method failures or Simple
random sampling Dual Percentile
9 Mean (Corrective Task Time, None 30 Natural occurring
Prev. Maint. Time, Downtime) minimum failures or stratification , , ,
c pm p/c
M Max (90 or 95 percentile)
M Max
c
10 Median (Corrective task time, 50 Natural occurring ,M
M
None minimum failures or stratification ct pm
Prev. maint. time), M Max
ct M Max , M Max
(95 percentile), M Max (95 ct pm
pm
percentile)
11 Mean (preventive maint. task All All pm
time) None possible
M Max (preventive maint. task tasks M Max
pm
time at any percentile)
Notes for Table B-1: (1) See section 3.3 for stratification method for sample selection
(2) Test method 5 is an indirect method for demonstrating operational ready rate (ORR) or
Availability (A).
(3) Test method 6 is intended for use with aeronautical systems and subsystems.
(4) Test method 7 is intended for use with ground electronic systems where it may be necessary to
simulate faults.

B-21
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX B

Because of the difficulty in obtaining prior information and estimates of variance, and due to the
fact that the mean corrective maintenance time ( M ct ) and maximum corrective maintenance time
( M Max ) have historically been the maintainability requirement most often cited in a
ct
procurement specification, test method 9 has been the most chosen method for maintainability
demonstration. Note that this method does not rely on any assumptions regarding the
distribution of maintenance times. Despite this fact, there are examples when one or more of the
other test methods have been employed, and therefore all methods will be given equal
consideration in this handbook.

B.3.6.1 Task Selection. Section 3.5.2 presented methods of determining which tasks to be
sampled under the fault inducement approach, which are applicable to each of the test methods
presented herein. When the demonstration is a requirement of the development program, the
procuring activity historically has had the option of surveillance over and/or participation in the
random selection of tasks comprising the demonstration population (see Column 11 of Table B-
V) down to and including the specific faults to be simulated or induced. It is recommended that
this practice continue. Further details on this and other management aspects of maintainability
demonstration are contained in Section B.6.0 of this appendix. In all cases, whenever a chosen
task can result in events detrimental to safety of personnel or property, appropriate redesign
action must take place. In the event that secondary failures result from an induced fault, they
should be documented and their impact on item maintainability assessed. A report of such
findings is typically made to the procuring activity or demonstration authority.

Two basic types of tests may be used for statistical maintainability demonstration: sequential
and non-sequential. In sequential testing, testing continues until a decision to accept or reject the
hypothesis under consideration (see Section B.3.1 of this Appendix for discussion of hypothesis
testing) can be made. One drawback of sequential testing is that the length of the test cannot be
determined in advance. However, sequential testing will accept very low MTTRs or reject very
high MTTRs very quickly. A non-sequential, or fixed sample size is best when the
maintainability must be demonstrated with a given confidence level.

Whenever sequential test plans are employed (see Test Method 1, for example), care must be
exercised in selecting and sampling tasks to insure that a true simple random sample is obtained.
Departures from simple random sampling, such as proportionate stratified sampling, can affect
the validity of the test procedures presented herein. However, this effect is considered minimal
for the sample sizes required by the test procedures that are not sequential tests. In short,
simple random sampling must be used for sequential test methods.

B.4.0 Test Methods

In general, the maintainability index to be demonstrated is the primary consideration in selecting a

maintainability demonstration test method. Considerable savings in sample size can be obtained

B-22
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX B

by use of sequential test procedures in preference to fixed sample sized tests. As a general rule,
however, the sequential test should be used only when prior knowledge (e.g., from the
prediction) indicates that the equipment may be much better (or worse) than the specified value.

The justification for use of the log-normal assumption for corrective maintenance time is based on
extensive analysis of field data which have shown that the log-normal distribution provides a
good fit to the data. However, in some cases it might be suspected that the log-normal
assumption does not hold (e.g., equipment with a high degree of built-in diagnostics). When this
occurs the log-normal assumption should be tested through the use of goodness of fit tests such
as the Chi-square or Kolomogorov-Smirnov. If other distributions also do not fit the data, then a
distribution-free method should be employed to ensure preservation of specified risks.

B.4.1 List of Symbols. The following symbols and notations are common to test methods 1 - 3
contained in this appendix:

X = the random variable which denotes the maintenance characteristics of interest (e.g., X
can denote corrective maintenance time, preventive maintenance time, fault location time,
manhours per maintenance task, etc.).

Xi = the i th observation or value of the random variable X.

n = the sample size.

n
1
X = the sample mean (i.e. , X = (X ) )
n i =1 i

E(random variable) = the expected value of the variable

2 = E[ (lnX - )2 ] = the true variance of lnX.

= E(X) = the true mean of X.

d 2 = Var (X) = E[( X - )2 ] = the true variance of X.

d 2 = the sample variance of X (i.e. , d 2 =

n n
1 2
(X i X) =
1 X i nX
2 2
n 1 i =1
n 1 i =1

d 2 = the prior estimate of the variance of the maintenance time.

B-23
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX B

Xp = the (1-p)th percentile of X (i.e. , X.05 = the 95th percentile of X).

M = X.50 = the median of X.

Y = lnX = the natural logarithm of X.

Y = the sample mean of Y

= E(lnX) = the true mean of lnX

2 = the prior estimate of the variance of the logarithm of maintenance times.

s2 = the sample variance of lnX.

Z p = the standardized normal deviate exceeded with probability p (i.e.,

Z2

2
e
1
dz = p )
Zp 2

Z = Z (1- ) = standardized normal deviate exceeded with probabilities and (1- )

respectively.

= the producer's risk; the probability that the equipment will be rejected when it has
a true value equal to the desired value ( H0 ).

= the consumer's risk; the probability that the equipment will be accepted when it
has a true value equal to the maximum tolerable value ( H1).

H0 = the desired value specified in the contract or specification and is expressed as a

mean, critical percentile, or critical maintenance time.

H1 = the maximum tolerable value. Note: H0 < H1.

When X is a log-normally distributed random variable:

1 2
f(x) = e1 2 (lnx )2, 0<x<
x 2

If Y = lnX, the probability density of Y is normal with mean and 2 variance

Y~ N( , 2 )

B-24
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX B

Properties of the log-normal distribution:

2
+
2

mean = = e

2+ 2 2

variance = d = e
2
e 1

= e
median = M
2
mode = M = e

+ Z
(1-p)th percentile = Xp = e
p

TABLE B-VIII. Standardized Normal Deviates.

P Zp

0.01 2.33
0.05 1.65
0.10 1.28
0.15 1.04
0.20 0.84
0.30 0.52

The following symbols are common to test methods 4, 8 - 11 contained in this appendix.

Xci = Maintenance downtime per corrective maintenance task (of the i th task).

Xpm = Maintenance downtime per preventive maintenance task (of the i th task).
i

nc = Number of corrective maintenance tasks sampled.

n pm = Number of preventive maintenance tasks sampled.

= Consumer's risk

= That value, corresponding to risk, which is obtained from a table of normal

distribution for a one-tail test.
fc = Number of expected corrective maintenance tasks occurring during a
representative operating time (T).

B-25
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX B

f pm = Number of expected preventive maintenance tasks occurring during a

representative operating time (T).
T = Item representative operating time period.
Dt = Total maintenance downtime in the representative operating time (T).

Xc , X pm , X p/c= Mean downtimes of sample. (Corrective, Preventive, and combined

Corrective/Preventive Maintenance Times.)
M Max = Sample calculated maximum corrective maintenance downtime.
c
c = Specified mean corrective maintenance time.

pm = Specified mean preventive maintenance time.

p/c = Specified mean maintenance time. (Taking both corrective and preventive
maintenance time into account.)
M Max = A requirement levied in terms of a maximum value of a percentile of task time
(i.e., 95% of all corrective task times must be less than 60 minutes) usually
taken as the 90th or 95th percentile.
M Max = Specified M Max of corrective maintenance downtimes.
c
M Max = Specified M Max of preventive maintenance downtimes.
pm

c = E(ln Xc) = Expected value of the logarithm of corrective maintenance tasks.

Log Xc , Log Xc = Log to the base 10 of Xc , Xc.

i i
ln Xc , ln Xc = Natural logs of Xc , Xc.
i i

M = Median value of corrective maintenance tasks.
ct

M pm = Median value of preventive maintenance tasks.

B.4.2 TEST METHOD 1: Test On The Mean. This test provides for the demonstration of
maintainability when the requirement is stated in terms of both a required mean value ( 1) and a
design goal value ( 0 ) (or when the requirement is stated in terms of a required mean value ( 1)
and a design goal value ( 0 ) is chosen by the contractor). The test plan is subdivided into two
basic procedures, identified herein as Test Plan A and Test Plan B. Test A makes use of the
lognormal assumption for determining the sample size, whereas Test B does not. Both tests are
fixed sample tests, (minimum sample size of 30), which employ the Central Limit Theorem and
the asymptotic normality of the sample mean for their development.

B-26
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX B

ASSUMPTIONS

Test A - Maintenance times can be adequately described by a lognormal distribution. The

variance, 2 , of the logarithms of the maintenance times is known from prior information or
reasonably precise estimates can be obtained.

Test B - No specific assumption concerning the distribution of maintenance times are

necessary. The variance d 2 of the maintenance times is known from prior information or
reasonably precise estimates can be obtained.

Hypotheses

H0 : Mean = 0 (Equation B-2)

H1: Mean = 1, ( 1> 0 ) (Equation B-3)

Illustration: H0 : 0 = 30 minutes
H1: 1 = 45 minutes

Note that 0 is normally the specified maintainability index value, and that 1 is typically
the maximum acceptable value of the specified index.

SAMPLE SIZE - For a test with producer's risk and consumer's risk , the sample size
for Test A is given by:

(Z 0 + Z1 )2 2
n= (e 1) (Equation B-4)
(1 0 )2
where 2 is a prior estimate of the variance of the maintenance times and Z and Z are
standardized normal deviates. The sample size for Test B is given by:

2
Z + Z

1 0
n= (Equation B-5)
d

where d 2 is a prior estimate of the variance of the maintenance times. Z and Z are
standardized normal deviates.

B-27
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX B

Decision Procedure - Obtain a random sample of n maintenance times, X1, X2 , . . . , Xn ,

and compute the sample mean,
n
1
X= X (Equation B-6)
n i =1 i

and the sample variance

n
1 2
X nX 2
d 2 = (Equation B-7)
n 1 i =1 i

d
Test A: Accept if X 0 + Z (Equation B-8)
n
d
Test B: Accept if X 0 + Z (Equation B-9)
n

Reject otherwise

Discussion - By the central limit theorem, the sample mean X is approximately normal for
large n with mean E(X) and variance Var ( X). In Test A, under the log-normal assumption Var
2 2 2
X = d 2 where d 2 = e( 2 + )(e -1) = 2 (e -1). Thus the sample size, n, can be
computed using a prior estimate of 2 . In Test B, a prior estimate of d 2 is assumed to be
available to calculate the sample size. A critical value C is chosen such that 0 +
Z VarX = C = 1 Z VarX . If = 0 , then P( X > C ) = and if = 1, then
P( X C ) = .

Example - It is desired to test the hypothesis that the mean corrective maintenance time is
equal to 30 minutes against the alternate hypothesis that the mean is 45 minutes with
= =0.05.

Then H0 : 0 = 30 minutes.
H1: 1 = 45 minutes.

Test A: Under the log-normal assumption with prior estimate of 2 = 0.6, the sample size using
[1.65(30) + 1.65(45)]2
equation B-4 is: n c = (e 0.6 1) = 56.
(45 30) 2

B-28
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX B

2
Test B: Under the distribution-free case with a prior estimate of d = 900, (or d = 30), the
sample size using equation B-5 is:

2


3.29
nc = = 43
45 30

30

Operating Characteristic (OC) Curve - The OC curve for Test B for this example is given in
Figure B-4. It gives the probability of acceptance for values of the mean maintenance time from
20 to 60 minutes. The OC curve for Test A for this example is given in Figure B-3. It gives the
probability of acceptance for various values of the mean maintenance time. Thus, if the true
value of is 40 minutes, then the probability that a demonstration will end in acceptance is 0.21
as seen from Figure B-3.

Mean Maintenance Time (Minutes)

FIGURE B-3. OC Curve for Test A.

B-29
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX B

Mean Maintenance Time (Minutes)

FIGURE B-4. OC Curve for Test B.

B.4.3 TEST METHOD 2: Test On Critical Percentile. This test provides for the
demonstration of maintainability when the requirement is stated in terms of both a required
critical percentile value ( T1) and a design goal value ( T0 ) [or when the requirement is stated in
terms of a required percentile value ( T1) and a design goal value ( T0 ) is chosen by the system
developer]. If the critical percentile is set at 50 percent, then this test method is a test of the
median. The test is a fixed sample size test. The decision criterion is based upon the asymptotic
normality of the maximum likelihood estimate of the percentile value.

ASSUMPTIONS - Maintenance times can be adequately described by a log-normal

distribution. The variance, 2 , of the logarithms of the maintenance times is known from prior
information or reasonably precise estimates can be obtained.

HYPOTHESES

H0 : (1-p)th percentile, XP = T0 (Equation B-10)

or P[X > T0 ] = p

H1: (1-p)th percentile, XP = T1 (Equation B-11)

or P[X > T1] = p, ( T1 > T0 )

B-30
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX B

Illustration: H0 : 95th percentile = XP = X.05 = T0 = 1.5 hours

ln T0 = 0.4055
H1: 95th percentile = XP = X.05 = T1 = 2 hours
ln T1 = 0.6932

SAMPLE SIZE - To meet specified and risks, the sample size to be used is given by
the formula
2 2
2 + Zp Z + Z
n= 2 (Round up to next integer) (Equation B-12)
2 lnT1 lnT0

where:
2 is a prior estimate of 2 , the true variance of the logarithms of the maintenance times.
Z p is the standardized normal deviate corresponding to the (1-p)th percentile.

DECISION PROCEDURE - Compute:

n
1
Y = lnXi (Equation B-13)
n i =1
n
1
s2 = (lnXi )2 nY 2 (Equation B-14)
n 1 i =1


1
2 2
1 Zp
X* = ln T0 + Z s + (Equation B-15)
n 2(n 1)

Accept if Y + Z s X * (Equation B-16)

p
Reject otherwise.

DISCUSSION - This test is based upon the fact that under the log-normal assumption, the
( + Z p)
(1-p)th percentile value is given by XP = e . Taking logarithms gives ln XP = +
Z p , and using maximum likelihood estimates for the normal parameters and , the (1-p)th

percentile maximum likelihood estimate is ln X = Y + Z n 1 . ln X is approximately

p p n P
normal. To meet the producer's risk requirements, a critical value X* is chosen for the sample
estimate of the (1-p)th percentile XP . Note Y = is an estimate for .

B-31
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX B

Example - The following hypotheses are to be tested at = = .10.

H0 : 95th percentile = X.05 = 1.5 hours = T0 ; ln T0 = .4055

H1: 95th percentile = X.05 = 2.0 hours = T1; ln T1 = .6932
2
A prior estimate of is equal to 1.0. Using equation B-12,
2 + (1.65)2 (2.65)2
nc = 1.0
2 (ln2.0 ln1.5)2
= 187

The critical value X* is given by equation B-15,

1
2 2
1 Zp p
X* = ln T0 + Z s +
n 2(n 1)

1
1 (1.65) 2 2
= ln 1.5 + 1.28s +
187 372
= .4055 + .1437s
OC Curve - The OC curve for Test Method 2 for this example is given in Figure B-5. It
gives the probability of acceptance for various values of the 95th percentile of the maintenance
time distribution. If the true value of X0.05 is 1.7 hours, then the probability that a
demonstration will end in acceptance is 0.57 as seen from Figure B-5.

95th Percentile Maintenance Time (Minutes)

FIGURE B-5. OC Curve for Test Method 2.

B-32
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX B

B.4.4 TEST METHOD 3: Test On Critical Maintenance Time Or Manhours. This test
provides for the demonstration of maintainability when the requirement is specified in terms of
both a required critical maintenance time (or critical manhours) ( XP1 ) and a design goal value
( XP0 ) (or when the requirement is stated in terms of a required critical maintenance time ( XP1 )
and a design goal value ( XP0 ) is chosen by the system developer). The test is distribution-free
and is applicable when it is desired to establish controls on a critical upper value on the time or
manhours to perform specific maintenance tasks. In this test both the null and alternate
hypothesis refer to a fixed time and the percentile varies. It is different from Test Method 2
where the percentile value remains fixed and the time varies.

ASSUMPTIONS - No specific assumption is necessary concerning the distribution of

maintenance time or manhours.

HYPOTHESES

H0 : T = XP0 (Equation B-17)

( p1 > p 0 )
H1: T = XP1 (Equation B-18)

For a specified and .

Illustration

H0 : 30 minutes = X0.50 = 50th percentile (median)

H1: 30 minutes = X0.75 = 25th percentile

SAMPLE SIZE, n, AND ACCEPTANCE NUMBER, c - The normal approximation to the

binomial distribution is employed to find n and c when p 0 is not a small value. Otherwise, the
Poisson approximation is employed. The equations for n and c are as follows:

For 0.20< p 0 < 0.80 ( p i = 1- Qi ),

2
Z p Q + Z p Q
1 1 0 0
n= (Use next higher integer value.) (Equation B-19)
p1 p 0

Z p p Q + Z p p Q
0 1 1 1 0 0
c = n (Use next lower integer value.) (Equation B-20)
Z p Q +Z p Q
0 0 1 1

B-33
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX B

For p 0 < 0.20, n and c can be found from the following two equations:

c np 0
e (np 0 )r
1 (Equation B-21)
r =0 r!

c np1
e (np1 )r
(Equation B-22)
r =0 r!

Table B-IX provides sampling plans for various and risks and ratios p1/ p 0 when p 0
< 0.20.

Decision Procedure - Random samples of maintenance times are taken, yielding n

observations X1, X2 , . . . , Xn . The number of such observations exceeding the specified time T
is counted. This number is called r.

Accept H0 if r < c. (Equation B-23)

Reject H0 if r > c. (Equation B-24)

Example - A median value of 30 minutes is considered acceptable whereas if 30 minutes is

the 25th percentile then this is considered unacceptable. The following hypotheses result:

H0 : 30 minutes = X0.50 = 50th percentile (median)

H1: 30 minutes = X0.75 = 25th percentile

= = .10

Then, Z = Z = 1.28, p 0 = 0.50, p1 = 0.75. Using equations B-19 and B-20:

2
2
(.75)(.25) + (.50)(.50)
n = (1.28) 23
(.25)

and,

1.28(0.5) (.75)(.25) + 1.28(.75) (.50)(.50)

c = 23 14
1.28 (.50)(.50) + 1.28 (.75)(.25)

B-34
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX B

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

TABLE B-IX. Sampling Plans for Specified p0, p1, , and When p0 is Small (e.g., p0<0.20).
= 0.05 = 0.10 = 0.20

p1 = 0.05 = 0.10 = 0.20 = 0.05 = 0.10 = 0.20 = 0.05 = 0.10 = 0.20

k =
p0

c D c D c D c D c D c D c D c D c D

1.5 66 54.1 54 43.4 39 30.2 51 43.0 40 33.0 29 23.2 36 31.8 27 23.5 17 14.4

2 22 15.7 18 12.4 14 9.25 17 12.8 14 10.3 10 7.02 12 9.91 9 7.29 6 4.73

2.5 13 8.46 10 6.17 8 4.70 10 7.02 8 5.43 6 3.90 7 5.58 5 3.84 3 2.30

3 9 5.43 7 3.98 6 3.29 7 4.66 5 3.15 4 2.43 4 3.09 3 2.30 2 1.54

4 6 3.29 5 2.61 4 1.97 4 2.43 3 1.75 2 1.10 3 2.30 2 1.54 1 0.824

5 4 1.97 3 1.37 3 1.37 3 1.75 2 1.10 2 1.10 2 1.54 1 0.824 1 0.824

10 2 0.818 2 0.818 1 0.353 1 0.532 1 0.532 1 0.532 1 0.824 1 0.824 0 0.227

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

To find the sample size n, for given p0, p1, , and , divide the appropriate D value by p0 and use the greatest integer less than the quotient. Example: p0
0.20 D 2.43
= 0.05, P1=0.20, =0.10, =0.05. Then k = = 4 and n = = = 48 . The acceptance number is c = 4.
0.05 0.05 005

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
B-35
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX B

OC Curve - The OC curve for Test Method 3 for this example is given in Figure B-6. It
gives the probability of acceptance for values of probability p, varying from 0.3 to 1.0. Here Xp
is the (1-p)th percentile. Thus, if the true value of the given critical maintenance time is the 40th
percentile, i.e., if the value of p is 0.6, then the probability that a demonstration will end in
acceptance is 0.61 as seen from Figure B-6.

Critical Maintenance Time Percentile

FIGURE B-6: OC Curve for Test Method 3.

B.4.5 TEST METHOD 4: Test On The Median (ERT). This method provides for
demonstration of maintainability when the requirement is stated in terms of an Equipment Repair
Time (ERT) median, which will be specified in the detailed equipment specification.

ASSUMPTION - This method assumes the underlying distribution of corrective

maintenance task times is lognormal.

SAMPLE SIZE - The sample size required is 20. This sample size must be used to employ
the equation described in this test method.

B-36
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX B

TASK SELECTION AND PERFORMANCE - Sample tasks are selected in accordance

with the stratification procedure outlined in Section 3.5.2. The duration of each task is recorded
and used to compute the following statistics:

n
c
(LogXc )
Log MTTR G = i =1
i
(Equation B-25)
nc
n
c
2
(log Xc )
i =1 (log MTTR G )2
i
S= (Equation B-26)
nc

(Note: All logarithms in equations B-25 and B-26 are to be taken to the base 10.)

Where: MTTR G is the measured geometric mean time to repair. It is the equivalent to the M ct
used in other plans included in this document.

DECISION PROCEDURE - The equipment under test will be considered to have met the
maintainability requirement (ERT) when the measured geometric mean-time-to-repair ( MTTR G )
and standard deviation (S) as determined in equation B-26 above satisfies the following
expression:

Accept if log MTTR G < log ERT + 0.397(S) (Equation B-27)

where:
log ERT = logarithm of the equipment repair time
log MTTR G = the value determined in accordance with equation B-25
S = the value determined in accordance with equation B-26

DISCUSSION - The value of equipment repair time (ERT) to be specified in the detailed
equipment specification should be determined using the following expression:

ERT (specified) = 0.37 ERTmax (Equation B-28)

ERTmax = the maximum value of ERT that should be accepted no more than 10 percent of
the time.

0.37 = value resulting from application of "student's t" operating characteristic that
assures a 95 percent probability that an equipment having an acceptable ERT will not be
rejected as a result of the maintainability test when the sample size is 20, and assuming a
population standard deviation ( ) of 0.55.

B-37
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX B

DERIVATION OF CRITERIA - The following are brief explanations of the derivations of

various criteria specified herein, and are intended for information purposes only. The acceptance
criterion, log MTTR G < log ERT + 0.397(S), assures a probability of 0.95 of accepting an
equipment or system as a result of one test when the true geometric mean-time-to-repair is equal
to the specified equipment repair time (that is, a probability of 0.05 of rejecting an equipment or
system having a true MTTR G equal to the specified ERT). This was derived by using
conventional methods for establishing acceptance criteria. The conventional methods for
determining acceptance based on the measured mean of a small sample (that is, sample size less
than 30), and when the true standard deviation ( ) of the population can only be estimated, is to
compare the measured mean with the desired mean using the expression:
( x x0 )
t= nc 1 (Equation B-29)
S
where:

i (xi x )2
S = or the standard deviation of the sample
nc
x = the sample or measured mean
x0 = the specified or desired mean
nc = the sample size
xi = the value of one measurement of the sample

The decision to accept the product will be made when the test results give a value of t, as
calculated for the above expression, numerically less than or equal to a value of t obtained from
"student's t" distribution tables at the established level (that is, 0.99, 0.95, 0.90, etc.) of
acceptance and the appropriate sample size. The "student's t" distribution tables (for a single
tailed area) give a value to t=1.729 at the 0.95 acceptance level when the sample size is 20 (that
is, 19 degrees of freedom). The table for single tailed area is used since only values of MTTR G
greater than the specified ERT are critical. An equipment with any value of MTTR G lower than
the specified ERT is acceptable. To apply the expression for "t" to the maintainability test, let
x0 = log ERT (specified), x= log MTTR G (measured), S = the measured standard deviation of
the logarithms of the sample of measured repair time, and n c = the sample size of 20. The
measured MTTR G is then compared to the desired ERT by calculating the value of t using the
expression below:

(log MTTR G log ERT )

t= 19
S

The equipment under test can be acceptable if the value of t calculated from the expression above
is equal to or less than +1.729 (the value of t from the "Student's t" distribution tables at an

B-38
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX B

acceptable level of 0.95 when the sample size is 20). Therefore, the equipment should be
accepted when:

(log MTTR G log ERT )

19 +1.729.
S

Upon rearranging and simplifying the above expression, the acceptance criterion is obtained as
shown below:

1.729(S)
log MTTR G log ERT
19

log MTTR G log ERT + 0.397(S) 4

B.4.6 TEST METHOD 5: Test on Chargeable Maintenance Downtime per Flight.

Because of the relatively small size of the demonstration fleet of aircraft and administrative and
operational differences between it and fully operational units, operational ready rate or
availability cannot be demonstrated directly. However, a contractual requirement for chargeable
downtime per flight can be derived analytically from an operational requirement of operational
ready rate (ORR) or availability. This chargeable downtime per flight can be thought of as the
allowable time (hours) for performing maintenance given that the aircraft has levied on it a certain
availability or operational ready requirement. The requirement for chargeable downtime per flight
will be established using the procedure presented within this section.

DEFINITIONS - The following definitions apply to this test method:

A = Availability - A measure of the degree (expressed as a probability) to which an aircraft

is in the operable and committable state at the start of the mission, when the mission is called for
at an unknown (random) point in time. For this test method, availability is considered
synonymous with operational readiness. The aircraft is not considered to be in an operable and
committable state when it is being serviced and is undergoing maintenance.

TOT = Total Active Time in Hours.

Active Time = That time during which an aircraft is assigned to an organization for the
purpose of performing the organizational mission. It is time during which:

1. The aircraft is flying or ready to fly.

2. Maintenance is being performed.
3. Maintenance is delayed for supply or administrative reasons.

4
Reference - "Introduction to Mathematical Statistics," P. Hoel, J. Wiley and Sons, Inc., 2nd Edition, 1954, pp.
222-229)

B-39
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX B

DUR = Daily Utilization Rate - The number of flying hours per day.

AFL = Average Flight Length - Flying hours per flight.

NOF = Number of Flights per day.

DT = Downtime - Time (in hours) during which the aircraft is not ready to commence an
assigned mission (i.e. , have the flight crew aboard the aircraft).

CMDT = Chargeable Maintenance Downtime - Time (in hours) during which maintenance
personnel are working on the aircraft, except when the only work being done would fall under the
nonchargeable maintenance downtime (NCMDT) category.

NCMDT = Nonchargeable Maintenance Downtime - Time (in hours) during which the
aircraft is not available for immediate flight but the only maintenance being performed is not
chargeable. It would include the following:

1. To correct maintenance or operational errors not attributable to technical orders,

contractor furnished training or faulty design.

2. Miscellaneous tasks such as keeping of records or taxiing or towing the aircraft to or

from other than the work center area.

3. Repair of accident or battle damage.

4. Modification tasks.

5. Maintenance caused by test instrumentation.

DDT = Delay Downtime - Downtime (in hours) during which maintenance is required but
no maintenance is being performed on the aircraft for supply or administrative reasons. It would
include the following:

1. Supply Delay Downtime.

a. Not Operationally Ready Supply (NORS) time.
b. Item obtainment time from other than the work center area.

2. Administrative Delay Downtime.

a. Personal breaks such as coffee or lunch.
b. No maintenance people available for administrative reasons.

B-40
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX B

= the producer's risk: The risk that the producer (or supplier) must take that the
hypothesis that a true mean = M 0 will be rejected even though it is true. The desirable value of
must be determined by judgment and agreed upon by the procuring activity and the systems
developer. All other things being equal, a smaller value of will require a larger sample size.

M = The maximum mean chargeable maintenance downtime per flight.

M 0 = The required mean CMDT per flight.

M - M 0 = The difference between the maximum mean (M) of the parameter being tested and
the specified mean ( M 0 ). This value must be determined in conjunction with a value for , the
consumer's risk. M is a value, greater (or worse) than the specified mean, which the consumer is
willing to accept, but only with a small risk or probability (). If the true mean is in fact equal to
the value of M selected, the hypothesis the true mean = M 0 will be accepted, although
erroneously, 100 percent of the time.

= The consumer's risk. The risk, which the consumer is willing to take, of accepting the
hypothesis that the true mean = M 0 when in fact the true mean = M. All other things being
equal, a smaller value of will require a larger sample size.

= The true standard deviation of the parameter (CMDT per flight) being tested. This
value, unless it is a specification requirement, will not be known, but an estimate must be made.
(It is assumed that both M and M 0 will have the same value of .) The developer's
maintainability math model, previous models, or previous data may be used. All other things
being equal, a larger value of will require a larger sample size.

ASSUMPTIONS - This method requires no assumption as to the probability distribution

of chargeable downtime per flight. The method is valid only if the Central Limit Theorem
applies, which means that the sample size (number of flights) must be large enough for this
theorem to apply. The sample size must be at least 50, but the actual size is to be determined in
accordance with equation B-39.

DERIVATION OF CMDT PER FLIGHT FROM AVAILABILITY - The requirement for

CMDT per flight which will be demonstrated will be determined using the following
mathematical derivation.

CMDT + NCMDT + DDT

A = 1- (Equation B-30)
TOT

A(TOT) = TOT - CMDT - NCMDT - DDT (Equation B-31)

CMDT = TOT - A(TOT) - NCMDT - DDT (Equation B-32)

B-41
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX B

CMDT TOT A(TOT ) NCMDT DDT

= (Equation B-33)
NOF NOF
but,

TOT (DUR )
NOF = (Equation B-34)
24 (AFL )

therefore,

CMDT 24 (AFL ) A(24 )(AFL ) NCMDT DDT

= (Equation B-35)
NOF DUR DUR NOF NOF
CMDT
= CMDT per flight, which will be demonstrated.
NOF
Values for DUR and AFL should be those planned for the aircraft during operational use. Values
NCMDT DDT
for and are a function of the operational environment. They should be
NOF NOF
provided to the system developer in the RFP or, if not, must be provided by the developer in his
proposal. The value for availability or operational ready rate should be provided in the RFP.

CMDT
Example - Following is an example of how a requirement for CMDT per flight
NOF
will be derived:

Required A = 0.75
DUR = 2 hours per day
AFL = 4 hours per flight
NCMDT
= 0.2 hours per flight
NOF
DDT
= 1.0 hours per flight
NOF
Then,

CMDT 24 (4 ) (0.75)(24 )(4 )

= 0.2 1.0
NOF 2 2
CMDT
= 48 36 0.2 1.0
NOF
CMDT
= 10.8 hours per flight
NOF

B-42
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX B

SAMPLE SIZE - Since the Central Limit Theorem is applied, the expected distribution of
the means will take on a normal distribution as in Figure B-7. If the true mean is equal to M 0
and a particular is desired, the upper distribution (the mean of the distribution will equal M 0 )
will apply. It is on this basis that an acceptance rule is generated to the effect that if X is found
Z
to be equal to or less than the value M 0 + the item is to be accepted.
n

FIGURE B-7. Distribution of Means.

B-43
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX B

If the true mean is equal to M (which is greater than M 0 ) the distribution of means will take on a
normal distribution with a mean of M as shown in the lower distribution. The value to be used
Z
as an acceptance criterion, M 0 + , corresponds and is equal to a value:
n
Z
M + ; where is a new confidence level
n

Z Z
M0 = =M + ; (Equation B-36)
n n
where M= M 0 + (M- M 0 ) (Equation B-37)

Z Z
M0 + = M 0 + M- M 0 + (Equation B-38)
n n
or simplifying, the sample size (n) requirement is:

(Z Z )2 (Z Z (1 ) )2
n= = (Equation B-39)
2 2
M M0 M M0

If this expression should result in n less than 50, then a sample of 50 must be used.

= Probability of rejection if true mean equals M.

1- = = Probability of acceptance if true mean equals M.

Z , Z (1- ) = standardized normal deviate as defined.

See table below for relationships between Z w and and , where w= or 1- .

Z w .01 .05 .1 .15 .2 .3 .7 .8 .85 .9 .95 .99

2.33 1.65 1.28 1.04 .84 .52 -.52 -.84 -1.04 -1.28 -1.65 -2.33

Z w = Z or Z (1- )

Example - Suppose for a requirement of M 0 = 2.0, the following statistical test parameters
were agreed to by the procuring activity and the system developer:
M M0
= 0.10; Z = 1.28; = 0.10; Z1- = -1.28; M- M 0 = 0.30; = 1.0; = 0.3

B-44
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX B

(1.28 + 1.28)2 (2.56)2 6.57

Using equation B-39: n = = = = 73
(0.3)2 (0.3)2 0.09

Decision Procedure - The chargeable maintenance downtime ( Xi ) after each flight will be
measured and , at the end of the test, the total chargeable downtime will be divided by the total
number of flights to obtain ( X) the sample mean CMDT and the sample standard deviation (s)
of CMDT.
NOF
Xi
X = i =1 (Equation B-40)
NOF

NOF NOF
(Xi X )2 1 2
s= = Xi (NOF)X 2 (Equation B-41)
i =1 NOF 1 (NOF 1) i =1

Z S
Accept if: X M 0 + (Equation B-42)
NOF

Z S
Reject if: X > M 0 + (Equation B-43)
NOF

B.4.7 TEST METHOD 6: Test on Manhour Rate.5 This test for demonstrating manhour rate
(manhours per flight hour) is based on a determination during Phase II (See Appendix E) test
operation of the total accumulative chargeable maintenance manhours and the total accumulative
demonstration flight hours. The demonstrated manhour rate is calculated as:

Total Chargeable Maintenance Manhours

Manhour Rate = (Equation B-44)
Total Demonstration Flight Hours

If the demonstrated manhour rate is less than or equal to the manhour rate requirement plus a
maximum value ( MR), by which the demonstrated manhour rate will be permitted to differ
from the required manhour rate, then the requirement has been met. MR will be provided, by
the procuring activity, as a percentage of the system manhour rate requirement and will be
determined based upon such considerations as the expected Phase II duration, and prior
experience with similar systems. It is recognized that this demonstration method is non-
statistical in nature and does not allow the determination of quantitative producer's and

5
Test Method 6 is intended for use with aeronautical systems and subsystems.

B-45
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX B

consumer's risk levels. It is for this reason that the MR is provided (in a subjective manner) to
minimize the producer's risk.

Normally, all maintenance performed by approved test maintenance personnel during Phase II
and documented in appropriate maintenance reports will be the source of data for identifying
chargeable maintenance manhours. The procuring activity may elect to terminate the
demonstration prior to Phase II completion if sufficient data are collected to project that the
requirement will be met.

The manhour rate requirement must pertain to the aircraft configuration provided for in the
contract. For Phase II flights conducted with a configuration other than this, an appropriate
amount of chargeable manhours will be included in calculating the total chargeable manhours.
This amount will be based upon the predicted manhour rate associated with the equipment not
installed.

Care must be exercised in assuring that the predicted manhour rate pertains to flight time and not
equipment operating time. Appropriate ratios of equipment operating time to flight time must
therefore be developed.

B.4.8 TEST METHOD 7: Test on Manhour Rate - (Using Simulated Faults).6 This test
for demonstrating manhour rate (manhours per operating hour) is based on (a) the predicted total
failure rate of the equipment used in the formulation of Table B-V (see section 3.5.2 of this
appendix), and (b) the total accumulative chargeable maintenance manhours and the total
accumulative simulated demonstration operating hours. The demonstrated manhour rate is
calculated as:
n
X + (PS)
Total Chargeable Maintenance Hours i =1 c i
Manhour Rate = = (Equation B-45)
Total Operating Time T

where:
Xc = Manhours for corrective maintenance task i
i
n = Number of corrective maintenance tasks sampled; n must not be less than 30
MTBF = MTBF of the unit (value used in development of Table B-V)
(PS) = Estimated average total manhours which would be required for preventive
maintenance during a period of operating time equal to n.(MTBF) hours

6
Test Method 7 is intended for use with ground electronic systems where it may be necessary to
simulate faults.

B-46
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX B

n
Xc
i =1 i
= Xc = Average number of corrective maintenance manhours per corrective
n
maintenance task

T = Operating time

Discussion - When maintenance tasks are simulated as in Table B-V, T = n(MTBF),

where 1/MTBF = , the total failure rate of the equipment in question.
T
n n
Xc + (PS) Xc + (PS)
i =1 i i 1 (PS)
= i =1 = [ Xc + ] (Equation B-46)
T n (MTBF) MTBF n

All components of (B-46) with the exception of Xc can be considered constants. Xc can be
considered a normally distributed variable when n is large (due to the Central Limit Theorem)
d2
with Variance = .
n
1 PS
If Xc is normally distributed it can be shown that the function: [ Xc + ] is also
MTBF n
1 d
normally distributed around the mean of the manpower rate with Variance = ( )( )2 ;
n MTBF

assuming d = d.

Decision Procedure - Therefore, if the manhour rate requirement = R :

Accept if:

PS d
Xc R (MTBF) ( ) + Z (Equation B-47)
n n

Where denotes producer's risk.

B.4.9 TEST METHOD 8: Test on a Combined Mean/Percentile Requirement. This test

provides for the demonstration of maintainability when the specification is couched in terms of a
dual requirement for the mean and either the 90th or 95th percentile of maintenance times when
the distribution of maintenance time is lognormal.

ASSUMPTIONS - For use as a dual mean and 90th or 95th percentile requirement, the
mean must be greater than 10 and less than 100 units of time; the ratio of the 90th percentile

B-47
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX B

maximum value to the value of the mean must be less than two (2); the ratio of the 95th
percentile maximum value to the value of the mean must be less than three.

Maximum Ratio of Percentile to Mean

90th Percentile Value 2
95th Percentile Value 3
Distribution assumptions are as defined above.

DISCUSSION - The test method actually demonstrates the 61st percentile value of
maintenance time in combination with either the 90th or 95th percentile values of maintenance
time rather than the mean value of maintenance time in combination with either the 90th or 95th
percentile values of maintenance time. However, because of the particular characteristic of the
lognormal distribution once a 61st percentile value of maintenance time less than X1 and a 90th
or 95th percentile value less than X2 has been demonstrated, for all practical purposes, a mean
value of less than approximately X1 and a 90th or 95th percentile value less than X2 have
likewise been demonstrated.

A dual requirement on maintainability, assuming a lognormal distribution of repair times, of a

maximum value of the Mean in conjunction with either the maximum value of the 90th or 95th
percentile of repair time (to be referred to as M Max ) results in the definition of various
combinations of s and s which are acceptable to the dual requirement. (A complete technical
description of a lognormal distribution is provided by knowledge of and , hence all possible
lognormal distributions acceptable to the requirements are defined through definition of all
possible acceptable values of and .) See Figure B-8A which defines the acceptable
combinations of and for a Mean of 30 minutes and a 95th percentile ( M Max ) of 60 minutes.

For the lognormal distribution, it is also possible to structure a dual requirement made up of the
maximum values of two percentiles (for example, the 61st percentile of repair time shall be a
maximum of 30 minutes and the 95th percentile of repair time shall be a maximum of 60 minutes).
This dual requirement also results in the definition of various combinations of acceptable values
of and . See Figure B-8B. If a dual percentile requirement could be structured such that the
set of acceptable values of and defined were almost identical to the set of values of and
defined for a given dual Mean and percentile requirement then a demonstration of that dual
percentile requirement would in reality also demonstrate the attainment of the dual Mean and
M Max requirement. For this particular instance it has been found that under the assumption
listed above, almost identical acceptable values of and are provided for a combined Mean
and M Max requirement and a combined 61st percentile (where the value of the 61st percentile is
taken equal to the specified value of the Mean) and M Max requirement. See Figure B-8B which
defines the values of and acceptable to a dual 61st percentile (where the value of the 61st
percentile is taken equal to a specified mean of 30 minutes) and 95th percentile (where the

B-48
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX B

maximum value of the 95th percentile, M Max , is given as 60 minutes) and Figure B-8C, which is
the superimposition of Figure B-8A on Figure B-8B.

FIGURE B-8A. Acceptable Combinations of Dual Requirements.

FIGURE B-8B. Values Acceptable to Dual Requirements of Maximum Values of Two

Percentiles.

B-49
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX B

FIGURE B-8C. Superimposition of Figure B-8A and B-8B.

Therefore, tests performed to demonstrate the attainment of both the percentiles in question
actually demonstrates the attainment of values of and which are almost identically
acceptable to a dual requirement of the Mean and M Max . It follows then that an accept decision
relative to both percentiles would also approximately signify an accept decision for a dual Mean
and M Max requirement.

Since both percentiles can be considered independent for practical purposes, the same samples
can be used for demonstration of both percentiles, therefore, if desired, the tests may be run
simultaneously.

PROCEDURE - Sample tasks are to be selected with respect to the procedure defined for
variable sample/sequential tests. The same sample tasks may be used simultaneously in the
demonstration of both the Mean and M Max requirements. Table B-X*, Table B-XI*, and Table
B-XII* (which are based upon the sequential probability ratio test of proportion) define the
accept/reject criteria for the values of the required mean, M Max (when defined as the maximum
90th percentile value), M Max (when defined as the maximum 95th percentile value),
respectively. The number of observations greater than and less than the required values of the
Mean and M Max must be cumulated separately and compared to the decision values shown in
the tables applicable to the two requirements. When one plan provides an accept decision,
attention to that plan is discontinued. The second plan continues until a decision is reached. The

*
Tables B-X, B-XI, and B-XII are appropriate to Test Plans A1, B1 and B2, respectively.

B-50
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX B

TABLE B-X. PLAN A1: OBSERVATIONS EXCEEDING THE VALUE OF THE MEAN
(OR 61ST PERCENTILE VALUE).
# of Tasks # of Tasks
Observed (N) Accept Reject Observed (N) Accept Reject
5 5 55 12 20
6 6 56 13
7 57 21
8 58
9 7 59 14
10 60 22
11 61
12 0 62
13 8 63 15 23
14 64
15 1 65
16 9 66 16
17 67 24
18 68
19 2 69 17
20 10 70 25
21 71
22 3 72
23 11 73 18
24 74 26
25 4 75
26 12 76 19
27 77 27
28 78
29 5 79 20
30 13 80 28
31 81
32 6 82
33 14 83 21
34 84 29
35 7 85
36 15 86 22
37 87 30
38 88
39 8 89
40 16 90 23 31
41 91
42 9 92
43 17 93 24
44 94 32
45 95
46 10 96 25
47 18 97 33
48 98
49 11 99
50 19 100 26
51
52 12
53 20
54

B-51
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX B

TABLE B-XI. PLAN (B1): OBSERVATIONS EXCEEDING Mmax - 90 Percentile

# of Tasks # of Tasks
Observed (N) Accept Reject Observed (N) Accept Reject
2 2 52 1 4
3 53 5
4 54
5 55
6 56
7 57
8 58
9 59
10 60
11 61
12 62
13 63
14 3 64
15 65 2
16 66
17 67
18 68
19 69
20 70
21 71
22 72
23 73 6
24 74
25 75
26 0 76
27 77
28 78
29 79
30 80
31 81
32 82
33 83
34 4 84
35 85 3
36 86
37 87
38 88
39 89
40 90
41 91
42 92
43 93 7
44 94
45 95
46 1 96
47 97
48 98
49 99
50 100
51

B-52
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX B

TABLE B-XII. PLAN (B2): OBSERVATIONS EXCEEDING Mmax - 95 Percentile

# of Tasks # of Tasks
Observed (N) Accept Reject Observed (N) Accept Reject
2 2 52 3
3 53
4 54
5 55
6 56
7 57 0
8 58
9 59
10 60
11 61
12 62
13 63
14 64
15 65
16 66
17 67
18 68
19 69 3
20 70 4
21 71
22 72
23 73
24 74
25 75
26 76
27 2 77
28 3 78
29 79
30 80
31 81
32 82
33 83
34 84
35 85
36 86
37 87
38 88
39 89
40 90
41 91
42 92
43 93
44 94
45 95
46 96
47 97
48 98 0
49 99 1
50 100 1 4
51

B-53
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX B

equipment is rejected when a decision to reject on either plan has occurred regardless of the status
of the other plan. The equipment is accepted only when an accept decision has been reached on
both plans. If no accept or reject decision has been made after 100 observations, the following
rule applies:

Plan A1 - Accept only if 29 or less observations are more than the value of the required
Mean.
Plan B1 - Accept only if 5 or less observations are more than M Max .
c
Plan B2 - Accept only if 2 or less observations are more than M Max .
c

It is recognized and accepted that truncation will somewhat modify probability of acceptance
characteristics as described in the following subsection.

The OC Curve - The operating characteristic curve for the test procedure may be
determined by mapping the probability of acceptance for various selected points on a diagram of
the acceptable and unacceptable regions such as Figure B-8D. (Note that any point can be
identified uniquely by the coefficient of Q, where Q = ln (required Mean), on the ordinate and the
coefficient of Q on the abscissa - let the coefficient of Q be denoted as (C) and the coefficient
of Q be denoted as (K) - for example, point B on Figure B-8D can be uniquely located at
C=3/4, K=.4). Each point is also representative of a particular lognormal distribution possessing
unique percentiles for the values given for 1 (required maximum value for Mean ) and M Max ,
respectively.

FIGURE B-8D. OC Curve for Test Method 8.

B-54
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX B

The probability of acceptance relative to any point is equal to the compound probability of
passing the percentile test relative to 1 (Test A1) and passing the percentile test relative to
M Max (Test B1 or B2 ).

Let PA1, PB1, and PB2 be the probability of passing test A1, B1 and B2 , respectively for any
given unique combination of and (a particular point). PA1, PB1, and PB2 may be determined
by calculating YA1, YB1, and YB2 from the following equations:

Q (1 C)
YA1= (Equation B-48)
K
ln M max CQ
YB1 = YB2 = (Equation B-49)
K Q

and entering Figure B-8E (for Test A1) with the calculated value of YA1 and Figure B-8F (for
Test B1) or Figure B-8G (for Test B2 ) with the calculated value of YB1 or YB2 . The
corresponding value of probability of acceptance, PA1, and PB1 or PB2 (whichever of the B tests
are appropriate) is read from each figure and PA1 and the appropriate PB1, or PB2 value are
multiplied. The result of this multiplication is the probability of acceptance of a unit having a
particular and characteristic defined by (C) and (K).
Probability

FIGURE B-8E. Probability of Passing Test A.

B-55
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX B
1

.9

.8

.7

.6
Probability

.5

.4

.3

.2

.1

1 YB1 2 3

FIGURE B-8F. Probability of Passing Test B1.

.9

.8

.7

.6
Probability

.5

.4

.3

.2

.1

1 2 3
YB2

FIGURE B-8G. Probability of Passing Test B2 .

B-56
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX B

Repeating the above for a number of points, as in Figure B-9, defines an operating characteristic
map relative to a given dual requirement. Note that probabilities of acceptance always decrease
as the point is located upward or to the right and always increase as the point in consideration is
located downward or to the left on the figure. Hence, sufficient knowledge of test characteristics
can be generated by evaluating relatively few points.

Sigma ( )
FIGURE B-9. OC Map Relative to a Given Dual Requirement.

B.4.10 TEST METHOD 9: Test for Mean Maintenance Time (Corrective, Preventive,
Combination of Corrective and Preventive) and M Max . This method is applicable to
demonstration of the following indices of maintainability: Mean Corrective Maintenance Time
( c ), Mean Preventive Maintenance Time ( pm ), Mean Maintenance Time (includes preventive
and corrective maintenance actions) ( p/c), and M Max (percentile of repair time).

CONDITIONS OF USE - The procedures of this method for demonstration of c , are

based on the Central Limit Theorem. No information relative to the variance ( d 2 ) of maintenance
times is required. It may therefore be applied whatever the form of the underlying distribution,
provided the sample size is adequate. The minimum sample size is set at 30. The actual sample
size (if greater than 30 are required) must be determined for each equipment to be demonstrated,
and is usually approved by the procuring activity.

Note: The procedure of this method for demonstrating M Max is valid for those cases
c
where the underlying distribution of corrective maintenance task times is lognormal.

B-57
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX B

QUANTITATIVE REQUIREMENTS - Application of this plan requires identification of

the index or indices of interest and specification of quantitative requirements for each. When
demonstration involves c or pm , or a combination of both, consumer's risks need to be
specified. When demonstration involves M Max , the percentile point which defines the
c
specified value of M Max is specified. A minimum sample size of 30 corrective maintenance
c
tasks is required for demonstration of corrective maintenance indices. A minimum sample of 30
preventive maintenance tasks is required where demonstration of preventive maintenance indices
by sampling is permitted and is to be accomplished by this method.

TASK SELECTION AND PERFORMANCE - Sample tasks are selected in accordance

with the stratification procedures outlined in Section 3.5.2. The duration of each is recorded and
used to compute the following statistics:

nc
Xc
i
Xc = i =1
n c
n pm
Xpm
i
Xpm = i =1
n pm

Dt = f c Xc + f pm Xpm

f cXc + f pm Xpm
Xp / c =
f c + f pm

2
nc
ln X
n nc ci
c i =1
2
ln Xc (ln Xc )
i =1 i i =1 i nc
M max = Anti log +
c nc nc 1

B-58
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX B

where the Antilog is taken to the Base e and where is the value of the independent
variable lognormal function which corresponds to the percentile point at which M Max has been
c
established. For the two most common percentile points, 90% and 95%, is 1.282 and 1.645
respectively.

ACCEPT/REJECT CRITERIA - A table of the normal distribution function is consulted

for values of (for a one-tailed test) which corresponds to the specified level of consumer risk
. Table XIII provides values of which correspond to the most commonly used values of .

TABLE B-XIII. vs. .

0.84 20%
1.04 15%
1.28 10%
1.65 5%

Accept/reject criteria is computed for each specified index in accordance with the following:

Test for Mean Corrective Maintenance Time ( c ) - The accept/reject value for c is:

d c
Xc + d c= standard deviation of sample of corrective maintenance tasks.
nc

d c
Accept if c (specified) Xc +
nc

d c
Reject if (specified) < X +
c c nc

Test for Mean Preventive Maintenance Time ( ) - The accept/reject value for pm is:
pm

d
pm
Xpm + d pm = standard deviation of sample of preventive maintenance tasks.
n pm

d
pm
Accept if pm (specified) > X +
pm n pm

B-59
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX B

d
pm
Reject if (specified) < Xpm +
pm n pm

Test for the Mean of all Maintenance Actions ( ) - The accept/reject value of p/c is:
p/c

n (f d )2 + n (f d )2
pm c c c pm pm
Xp / c +
n n (f + f )2
c pm c pm

2 2
n (f d ) + n (f d )
pm c c c pm pm
If p/c (specified) > Xp / c + , Accept
n n (f + f )2
c pm c pm

n (f d )2 + n (f d )2
pm c c c pm pm
If p/c (specified) < Xp / c + , Reject
n n (f + f )2
c pm c pm

Test for M Max - The accept/reject value for M Max is:

c c

n
c
n 2
nc c ( ln Xc )
2
(ln Xc ) i =1
i
(ln X )
ci i =1 i nc
M Max = Antilog i =1 + , where Antilog is to the
c nc nc 1





Base e.

Accept if M Max (specified) > M Max

c c

Reject if M Max (specified) < M Max

c c

B.4.11 TEST METHOD 10: Tests for Percentiles and Maintenance Time (Corrective
Preventive Maintenance). This method employs a test of proportion to demonstrate

B-60
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX B

achievement of M , M , M Max and M Max when the distribution of corrective and

ct pm c pm
preventive maintenance repair times is unknown.

CONDITIONS OF USE - This method is intended for use in cases where no information is
available on the underlying distribution of maintenance task times. The plan holds the confidence
level at 75% or 90% as may be desired and requires a minimum sample size (N) of 50 tasks.

QUANTITATIVE REQUIREMENTS - Application of this method requires specification

of M ct , M , M Max (95th percentile) or M Max (95th percentile) and selection of 75% or
pm ct pt
90% confidence level.

TASK SELECTION AND PERFORMANCE - Sample tasks are selected in accordance

with the stratification procedures outlined in section 3.5.2. The duration of each task will be
, M
compared to the required value(s) of the specified index or indices ( M , M Max and
ct pm ct
M Max ) and recorded as greater than or less than each index.
pm

ACCEPT/REJECT CRITERIA - The item under test shall be accepted when the number of
observed task times which exceed the required value of each specified index is less than or equal
to that shown in the Table (B-XIV or B-XV) corresponding to each index for the specified
confidence level.

Test for the Median - Table B-XIV is a test of the median for corrective and preventive
maintenance tasks. The acceptance level is shown for two confidence levels and a sample size
(N) of 50 tasks.

, or M
TABLE B-XIV7. Acceptance Table for M ; Sample Size = 50.
ct pm

Confidence Level
75% 90%
Acceptance Level
22 20

Test for M Max and M Max - Table B-XV is a test for M Max and M Max at the
c pm c pm
95th percentile. The acceptance level is shown for two confidence levels and a sample size (N)
of 50 tasks.

7
NOTE: Reference for Tables B-XIV and B-XV - "Introduction to Statistical Analysis" by Dixon & Massey, Page
230, McGraw-Hill Company, 2nd Edition, 1957.

B-61
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX B

TABLE B-XV. Acceptance Table for M Max or M Max ; Sample Size = 50.
c pm
Confidence Level
75% 90%
Acceptance Level
1 0

B.4.12 TEST METHOD 11: Test For Preventive Maintenance Times. This method
provides for maintainability demonstration when the specified index involves pm and/or
M Max and when all possible preventive maintenance tasks are to be performed.
pm

CONDITIONS OF USE - All possible tasks are to be performed and no allowance need be
made for underlying distribution.

QUANTITATIVE REQUIREMENTS - Application of this plan requires quantitative

specification of the index or indices of interest. In addition, the percentile point defining
M Max must be stipulated when M Max is of interest.
pm pm

TASK SELECTION AND PERFORMANCE - All preventive maintenance tasks will be

performed. The total population of PM tasks will be defined by properly weighing each task in
accordance with relative frequency of occurrence as follows: Select the particular task for which
the equipment operating time to task performance is greatest and establish that time as the
reference period. Determine the frequency of occurrence ( f pm ) of all other tasks during the
reference period, where the frequency of occurrence of a given task is a fractional number, the
frequency shall be set at the nearest integer. The total population of tasks consists of all tasks
with each repeated in accordance with its frequency of occurrence during the reference period.

ACCEPT/REJECT CRITERIA

Test for pm - the mean is computed as follows:

k
f pm (Xpm )
(Actual) = i =1
i i
pm
k
f pm
i =1 i

Where: f pm is the frequency of occurrence of the i th task in the reference period,

i

k is the number of different PM tasks.

B-62
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX B

f pm is the total number of PM tasks in the population.

i

Accept if: (required) > pm (actual)

pm

Reject if: pm (required) < pm (actual)

Test for M Max - The PM tasks shall be ranked by magnitude (lowest to highest value).
pm
The equipment shall be accepted if the magnitude of the task time at the percentile of interest is
equal to or less than the required value of M Max .
pm

B.5.0 Maintainability Evaluation

The objective of maintainability evaluation is to evaluate the impact of the actual operational,
maintenance, and support environment on the maintainability parameters of the system, to
evaluate the correction of any deficiencies exhibited during maintainability demonstration, and to
demonstrate depot level maintenance tasks when applicable. A maintainability evaluation is
managed and conducted by the procuring activity during Operational Test and Evaluation as part
of the total system evaluation (see Figure B-1). Many of the requirements for demonstration
testing apply for evaluation testing except for the following:

All evaluation items are production or production equivalent models

The evaluation is conducted in the actual operational and maintenance environment
unless otherwise specified by the procuring activity
All maintenance tasks are performed by those personnel (either procuring agency (e.g.,
government or civil service) or contractor who would normally perform maintenance on
the system in the fielded environment at the specified maintenance level.
Maintenance tasks to be evaluated are those resulting directly from and incidental to
actual operation and maintenance. These tasks should be supplemented by fault
simulation only to evaluate specific tasks or special tasks that do not occur by chance
during the evaluation phase.

B.6.0 Maintainability Verification/Demonstration/Evaluation Planning and Management

Management of maintainability verification/demonstration/evaluation should include the

development of a maintainability test program plan8. The plan is prepared by the system
developer and should typically include the following sections, tailored according to the specific

8
This plan should be an integral part of the overall test plan for the development program.

B-63
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX B

requirements of a program. Each of the sections should be in some way identified as being
applicable to verification, demonstration or evaluation phases of the program.

Background Information - Includes a description of the quantitative and qualitative

maintainability requirements; the maintenance concept; maintenance environment; applicable
levels of maintenance; where testing is to be conducted; test facilities requirements; participating
agencies; mode (s) of operation of the items of interest, including configuration and mission
requirements; the specific items that are subject to verification, demonstration, and evaluation;
and data required for completion of the verification/demonstration/evaluation.

Item Interface - A description of the adequacy or inadequacy of the item support elements
and an estimate of their effect on the item maintainability. These elements would include the
following: Maintenance planning; support and test equipment; supply support; transportation,
handling and storage; technical data; facilities; and personnel and training.

Test Team - A test team should be assembled and described in the plan. The description
should include: Organization, degree of participation of procuring activity personnel and system
developer personnel, including managerial, technical, maintenance, and operation personnel. The
plan should also include test team member qualifications, quantity, sources, training
requirements, and indoctrination requirements.

Support Material - This section should cover support equipment, tools and test equipment,
technical manuals to be used (or required), spares and consumables requirements/needs, safety
equipment needs, and calibration equipment requirements.

Preparation Plan - Include a description of and schedule for the organization and assembly
of the test team, training of personnel, preparation of facilities, and availability, assembly,
checkout, and preliminary validation of support material.

Implementation - Provide a description of: the test objectives of each test phase (i.e.,
verification, demonstration, evaluation), schedule of tests (as coordinated with other disciplines);
procedures for selection of maintenance tasks when faults are to be simulated; any special
maintenance tasks, such as those requiring unique skills, equipment, test methods, etc., to be
performed, including method of demonstration; test method (see Section 3.6), including
accept/reject decision criteria, risks, etc.; data acquisition methods; data analysis methods and
procedures; specific data elements; type and schedule of reports to be generated, if any; and the
maintenance tasks to be verified, demonstrated, and evaluated.

Retesting Requirements - Provide a provisional schedule for special or repeat testing

required to investigate any deficiencies or trouble areas. Deficiencies should be corrected in any
item which has failed to meet the acceptance criteria. The corrected portions of the item and any

B-64
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX B

other portions of the item affected by the correction should be retested during retest. The
maintenance tasks to be demonstrated should be as designated by the procuring activity.

B.6.1 Test Procedures. In designing the maintainability test procedures, both qualitative and
quantitative requirements should be verified, demonstrated and evaluated. Typically, qualitative
maintainability requirements to be verified, demonstrated and evaluated are described via a
checklist prepared by the system developer and coordinated with the procuring activity, when
applicable. These checklists permit observation, analysis, and identification of maintainability
characteristics incorporated or omitted. Quantitative requirements are verified, demonstrated,
and evaluated by actual demonstration of maintenance tasks.

B.6.1.1 Maintenance Task Generation. As implied, verification, demonstration and

evaluation is accomplished by performance of maintenance tasks at a specified maintenance level.
Generation of the specific maintenance tasks during each maintainability test phase can take
several forms as indicated below. The means by which the tasks are generated should be
considered, planned for and documented in the maintainability test plan.

Actual operation of the item in the specified test, operational and maintenance environment is
always the preferred method of maintenance tasks generation (i.e., maintenance is performed as a
result of naturally occurring failures). This can only be done, however, provided that assurances
can be given that a sufficient number of failures or maintenance tasks will occur during the test
period to satisfy any minimum sample requirements for the test method employed. This method
of maintenance task generation must therefore be considered early in the development stages to
make sure that a sufficient number of test or operational hours are planned, both through tests
dedicated for maintainability and other forms of testing, to make this approach feasible. Close
coordination with the entire development team is required for this approach to maximize all test
time planned.

In lieu of the naturally occurring failure approach to maintenance task generation is the fault or
failure simulation approach. This approach is to introduce failures by way of faulty parts,
deliberate misalignment, open leads, shorted parts, etc. As part of this approach, a maintenance
task sampling plan, as described in Section 3.5.2, must be prepared. When this is done as part of
demonstration testing, the actual task selection should not be made by the test team until
immediately prior to the demonstration.

B.6.2 Administration. As mentioned in the description of the maintainability test plan, a test
team consisting of members of both the procuring activity, if any, and the system developer
should be formed to manage the test program. The team members should be empowered to make
decisions for their respective organizations. Each member of the team may have advisors from
their organizations who are knowledgeable in the various aspects of the demonstration and the
requirements of the verification/demonstration/evaluation plan. The responsibilities of the team

B-65
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX B

will be in accordance with what is described in the maintainability test plan, and should typically
include the following:

Maintain surveillance over maintenance and inspection operations. Any apparent

discrepancies in maintenance task accomplishment and documentation observed by any
member of the team should be brought to the attention of the remaining test team
members within one working day of the occurrence for appropriate action.
Evaluate and validate maintenance and operational data to determine applicable labor
hours, flying hours, operating time, maintenance time, downtime, item status, etc.
Assure that the demonstration item selected has been adequately prepared in accordance
with applicable technical manuals and that no maintenance has been deferred that will
compromise the successful completion of the next scheduled operation or mission prior
to being placed in an operational ready status.
Decide if resulting failures, maintenance time, elapsed downtime, maintenance labor
hours, etc., should be chargeable in cases where operator or maintenance crew errors
have been committed.
Rule on questions of whether or not the verification, demonstration, and evaluation plan
has been adhered to.
Rule on controversial points which may arise that are not specifically covered by
applicable specifications or other pertinent documentation. Further, determine those
matters which require contractual interpretation or resolution by the appropriate
procuring authority and system developer organizations. For these matters, the test
team majority and minority statements should be submitted to the procuring activity, or
other applicable authorities' contracting officer for resolution.
Prepare and submit demonstration status reports to the procuring activity and system
developer.
Analyze data and determine the extent of achievement of specified maintainability
requirements.
Prepare and submit final results of each of the maintainability test phases to the
procuring activity and the system developer within the time period indicated in the test
plan.
Assure that the following conditions have been fulfilled prior to the start of the
demonstration and evaluation test phase:
- each test item complies with the established configuration or that all deviations
reported have been accepted by the procuring activity
- all required technical manuals have been updated as necessary.
- all support resources are available in the type and quantity specified in the
verification, demonstration and evaluation test plan.
- all operator or maintenance crew personnel are properly trained and meet
established skill level requirements.

B-66
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX B

- all records of approved changes in personnel requirements, operating and

maintenance manuals, data handling procedures and analysis techniques have been
incorporated in the final revision of the verification, demonstration, and evaluation
test plan.

B.6.2.1 Other Administrative Requirements. In addition to those duties just listed for the
test team, there are other administrative duties that usually accompany the implementation of a
maintainability test plan. For instance, the designated test team should have a test director who
has the authority to decide in all cases of deadlock between the members of the team. This
person is usually designated by the procuring activity. Other such requirements or "rules of
conduct" are provided below.

Instrumentation Failures: Any failures of test instrumentation used to instrument the

demonstration item for test purposes or failures induced by such test instrumentation installation
or operation, and all associated maintenance are not chargeable maintenance tasks.

Maintenance Due To Secondary Failures: If any secondary failures result from a

chargeable primary failure, the total resultant maintenance time to restore the items are chargeable
as a single maintenance task, except when the secondary failure results from the method used to
simulate a fault rather than from the fault itself. If the reason for the secondary failure is removed
(corrected), the time charged for the secondary failure can be deleted.

Inadequate Technical Manuals Or Support Equipment: If, in the accomplishment of a

maintenance task, a technician finds the applicable technical manuals or support equipment to be
inadequate, these instances should be brought to the attention of the test team and, if the
inadequacy is verified, this portion of the demonstration can be terminated. In these instances,
times measured are not chargeable. Action then must be taken to correct the inadequacies of the
technical manuals or support equipment, after which the same maintenance task is repeated.

Cautions: If an item is damaged or maintenance errors induced by item design complexity,

by poor design practice, or by following improper procedures that allow improper maintenance
(e.g., interchangeability of connectors) without proper caution in the technical manuals, the
failure and resultant maintenance times are chargeable. In these cases, action is then taken to
correct the improper procedures or deficiencies and the corrective action verified. When this
action is completed, the maintenance time saved can then be deleted.

Personnel Number and Skill: Each task should be performed by the prescribed number of
personnel with the prescribed skills. If personnel are required on an intermittent or sequenced
basis, the labor hours assessed against the maintenance task will include the required standby
time only if the standby time is of a type or duration which prevents standby personnel from
performing other productive tasks.

B-67
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX B

Cannibalization: The maintenance associated with the removal or reinstallation of the item
or support equipment assemblies and/or components for cannibalization purposes are not
chargeable unless the deficiency can be directly related to lack of recommendations for proper
level of support spares or expendables. If the system developer takes action to correct the
deficiency, the time charged can be deleted.

B.6.3 Data Collection. As mentioned in other parts of this handbook, data collection is
important to the ability to identify weaknesses in the maintainability design of a system and
subsequent correction of those weaknesses. For the purposes of verification, demonstration and
evaluation, a sound data collection system must exist and be coordinated with other disciplines
and tests. The data system should be accessible by all members of the test team, including the
procuring activity, and should include information on all mission debriefings, failures and
maintenance data. The descriptions of all maintenance tasks must be adequate to enable
determination of which maintenance task was performed. It is important to include in the
maintainability database or maintenance related data records, all direct maintenance downtime or
labor hours which are not specifically determined to be nonchargeable. This information will then
feed into the quantitative calculations of all applicable maintainability metrics. Maintenance
times that may not be chargeable could result from such causes as:

- Maintenance and operational errors not chargeable to technical manuals, system

developer furnished training or faulty design
- Miscellaneous tasks such as keeping of records, taxiing and towing of aircraft to or from
an area other than the assigned work center area
- Repair of accident damage
- Documented delay downtime (supply or administrative) which is clearly outside the
responsibility of the system developer
- Modification tasks
- Maintenance of test instrumentation exclusive of normal configuration
- Maintenance time accountable to test instrumentation installation (other than normal
configuration) accrued during maintenance task performance

In any case, it is extremely important to establish up front in the program which maintenance
tasks will be chargeable, and which ones that will not. This will avoid confusion and arguments
later on between test team members.

B.6.3.1 Maintainability Parameter Calculations. All data acceptable to the test team during
each applicable test phase (i.e., verification, demonstration, etc.) is used in calculating the
maintainability parameters of interest. Section B.4.0 of this appendix provides methods of
calculating several such parameters and for determining, statistically, whether the system meets
the requirements.

B-68
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX B

B.6.4 Documentation. After each phase of maintainability testing, a final report should be
developed that documents, as a minimum, the following information:

- Summary of data collected and location of data files

- Factors that influence the data
- Analysis of the data
- Results of the phase and certification that the specified objectives and requirements
have or have not been met
- Assessment of the integrated logistic support factors, such as technical manuals,
personnel, tools and test equipments, support equipment, maintenance concept and
provisioning for their effect on quantitative and qualitative demonstrated maintainability
parameters
- All noted deficiencies
- All recommendations to correct deficiencies and to make improvements

B.7.0 Testability Demonstration

A review made of a sample of past maintainability demonstrations showed a 100% success rate
for both large and small systems at primarily the organizational and intermediate maintenance
level. Only a small percentage of the systems reviewed, however, specifically addressed
testability. Those that did also had a 100% demonstration success rate, determined by
specifically calculating the percentage of faults detected and isolated. Despite the fact that
maintainability demonstrations are quite successful, testability related problems, especially those
associated with Built-In-Test (BIT), have continued to plague the maintainability performance of
many complex systems. Metrics such as cannot duplicate (CND) rate, retest OK (RTOK), and
false alarm rate have continued at unacceptable values in actual operations resulting in too many
resources being spent on maintenance of systems and equipments.

There are several reasons why maintainability demonstrations are usually successful, but
testability performance in the field continues to fall short of both expectations and demonstrated
values. Specifically, current demonstration techniques are inadequate to demonstrate testability
metrics such as fraction of faults detected and fault isolation resolution. Most maintainability
demonstrations are performed in laboratory environments using the fault insertion methods
previously described. Furthermore, the faults selected for insertion represent a small percentage
of those likely to occur during fielded operation. The reasons for limiting the number of faults
inserted include the fact that faults that will result in equipment damage or cannot be easily
inserted are not selected for demonstration. Only hard faults, such as open leads or shorted
components, that are relatively easy to detect, isolate and repair are selected. Also, many of the
faults that result in CNDs or RTOKs, are not easily simulated in a demonstration test. Finally, it
is not possible to simulate failures or intermittent conditions that can be considered false alarms,
thus eliminating the ability to demonstrate any specified false alarm rate for BIT.

B-69
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX B

Given the preceding facts, effective demonstration of testability is probably not possible in the
near future. It should be considered as part of future development programs only if significant
progress is made in developing methods that can demonstrate meaningful testability metrics.
This does not mean that maintainability demonstration, as described in this appendix, is not
useful. The need to demonstrate ease of maintenance and the adequacy of logistical support
services such as technical manuals, support equipment, sparing levels and training is still
extremely important to maintainability. Furthermore, if the diagnostic system designed into a
system cannot detect and isolate even those hard failures induced as part of a maintainability
demonstration, then this is an indication that a redesign is warranted.

If it is not possible to adequately demonstrate testability characteristics of the design in terms of

the aforementioned metrics, the question still remains then as to how the customer can be given
some assurance that the diagnostic system will allow the system to meet its overall system
performance requirements. The key is to do a better job early on in development of determining
exactly what the system diagnostic needs are, and then to develop a process by which higher
level requirements are allocated properly to subsystems. Further, as part of the systems
engineering approach to design, wherein an integrated product development (IPD) team is
assembled to manage the program and make decisions regarding requirements, allocations, etc., a
single individual must be given overall authority for testability. Furthermore, this person must be
given equal status in the decision making process, such that testability needs and requirements do
not take a back seat to other performance needs. In this manner, any design decisions must
consider the impact on testability prior to finalizing any approaches.

B.7.1 Defining Needs. In addition to making sure that testability receives equal consideration,
the IPD team needs to determine several items that will contribute to an effective testability
design. For instance, the need exists to define what constitutes a failure. In particular, failures
that can affect BIT performance, such as drift, must be clearly defined. This has been a problem
that has plagued BIT performance in the field. BIT algorithms that are too sensitive may detect
and report failures that only occur intermittently due to environmental or other factors, but it
may not be possible to duplicate in the maintenance environment the conditions that caused the
failure. A formal process must also be in place to ensure that test verticality is maintained from
one maintenance level to the next.

Another area that needs clear definition is in which failures need to be reported by BIT. Should
all BIT failures be reported, or only those that degrade safety or mission capability? For
example, should a failure be reported in a connector if it occurs intermittently (e.g., an average of
once every three flights) or only if the connector has failed three times in five consecutive test
attempts? All reportable BIT indications should be carefully reviewed to define the failure state
and the appropriate action.

Testability needs also should be determined from field and manufacturing data on like systems.
This is a problem, however, as many data collection systems do not adequately report testability

B-70
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX B

problems. Therefore, the data collection system must be devised to collect data such as CNDs.
These data must then be analyzed to determine the root causes of such behavior such that
corrective actions can be implemented in next generation designs.

B.7.2 Using Test Programs to Verify Testability Design Attributes. Although a formal test
program to demonstrate testability features is not practical, full use must be made of all forms of
other testing, including reliability demonstration tests and other development tests, to improve
the testability design of the system. This requires, however, that the diagnostic system, such as
BIT, be available prior to the testing taking place. Once again, close coordination between the
individual(s) responsible for the diagnostic design and other disciplines within the IPD team is
absolutely essential.

During all testing that includes diagnostics, all failures and the diagnostic system response to
those failures, as well as the ability to detect and isolate faults using test support equipment,
must be recorded and analyzed accordingly to identify problems and to develop corrective
actions. This process includes collecting diagnostic performance data on both hardware and
software faults. A training program should be instituted that disseminates to all individuals
responsible for data collection the importance of testability information, and how to properly
record such data. This form of verification and evaluation (i.e., using laboratory tests,
development tests, etc.), as opposed to dedicated demonstration testing, is much more effective
for testability features, as such testing provides a means for testing diagnostics for long periods
of time without the need for unique diagnostic tests and extra assets.

Other methods regarding testability design and testability improvement can be found in
Appendix C, Design Guidelines.

B.7.2.1 Evaluation Methods for Digital Technology. Despite the noted lack of adequate
formal methods for testability demonstration, analytical techniques are available for specific
technologies at specific levels of design. In particular, fault simulation tools have been used for
several years in the assessment of digital designs. They are used at the IC level for manufacturing
level test, and at the circuit card level and above for both manufacturing level test and diagnosis
for repair.

In general, simulation, as described here, is the process of modeling the behavior of an object. The
purpose of using simulation is to save costs by verifying the designs and their specifications in a
software environment, prior to committing the design to hardware. Fault simulation of a digital
network is the modeling of the network's behavior in the presence of faults, where such faults can
be caused by physical defects or environmental influences.

As a means of testability verification, fault simulation is used for measuring or grading the
adequacy of a set of test patterns for detecting single "stuck-at" faults. In this way, the
percentage of failures that are detectable in the circuit, given a specific test pattern, is reported by
a particular fault simulation package. In essence, this is a measure of the fault coverage capability

B-71
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX B

of the test pattern. Fault coverage is measured as the ratio of the number of faults detected by
the test pattern to the total number of simulated faults. Note that this number is not always
determined the same way in all fault simulators9. For instance, some fault simulators determine
the number of "fault classes" detected by the test pattern and divide this by the total number of
fault classes simulated to get fault coverage. A fault class is one or more faults in a circuit that
cause the same fault signature at a primary output of the circuit. Note also that most fault
simulators simulate "Stuck at" faults on the inputs and outputs of the devices in the model. This
is the most popular fault model, and will represent a majority of the faulty behaviors of digital
circuits. However, this technique does not cover all possible faults, and therefore some faults can
still occur that are undetectable, even if the fault simulation results in 100% fault coverage. The
standard procedure for fault coverage measurement, procedure 5012 of MIL-STD-883, outlines a
method for obtaining consistent results from any commercially available fault simulator. This
procedure is provided in Section 8.0 of this appendix.

Note that the achievable level of fault coverage is determined by the design of the circuitry, and
not just the test patterns. Many commercial packages that provide fault simulation capabilities
also report design characteristics that contribute to poor fault coverage values, thus allowing the
design engineer to make changes necessary to improve the testability of the circuit.

In addition to identifying design characteristics that inhibit fault coverage potential, many fault
simulators are used to build fault dictionaries for the purpose of fault isolation. Fault dictionaries
are created by applying tests to the design and then recording the errors in the form of a fault
signature. When an actual test is applied using ATE, for example, the errors that result are
recorded, and the fault dictionary is then searched in order to find the fault signature that matches
the observed fault signature. The corresponding list of candidate faults represents the ambiguity
groups that may contain the fault. Note that creation of such fault dictionaries, especially for
highly complex designs, can be expensive. Because of this, fault simulation is used more to
evaluate the fault detection characteristics of the design, rather than to build fault dictionaries.

Fault simulation is an essential part of evaluating the testability of digital designs, and of
developing test programs needed to support such designs. Often, fault simulation is not
performed during the development of digital circuits, even when good circuit simulation is.
Trying to develop high quality diagnostic tests without fault simulation is extremely difficult and
can lead to test strategies inadequate to detect and isolate faults in complex digital designs.
Therefore, investment in a commercial fault simulator and integration of fault simulation into the
digital design process should be a high priority for the IPD team.10

9
See RADC-TR-89-230, "Fault Simulator Evaluation," Final Technical Report, November 1989,
University of South Florida
10
For further information on fault simulation see: RL-TR-91-6, "Digital Logic Testing and Testability,
In-House Report," February 1991, Dr. Warren H. Debany, Jr., and "Digital Systems Testing and
Testable Design, Revised Edition," by Abramovici, Breuer and Friedman, IEEE Press, 1990.

B-72
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX B

B.8.0 Fault Coverage Measurement For Digital Microcircuits, Method 5012.1

Excerpted from MIL-STD-883D, 27 July 1990

B.8.1 Purpose. This test method specifies the procedures by which fault coverage is reported
for a test program applied to a microcircuit herein referred to as the device under test (DUT).
This method describes requirements governing the development of the logic model of the DUT,
the assumed fault model and fault universe, fault classing, fault simulation, and fault coverage
reporting. This method provides a consistent means of reporting fault coverage regardless of the
specific logic and fault simulator used. Three procedures for fault simulation are described in this
method: full fault simulation and two fault sampling procedures. The applicable acquisition
document shall specify a minimum required level of fault coverage and, optionally, specify the
procedure to be used to determine the fault coverage. A fault simulation report shall be provided
that states the fault coverage obtained, as well as documenting assumptions, approximations, and
procedures used. When any technique detailed in this method is inapplicable to some aspect of
the logic model, or inconsistent with the functionality of the available fault simulator and
simulation postprocessing tools, it is sufficient that the user employ an equivalent or comparable
technique and note the discrepancy in the fault simulation report. Microcircuits may be tested
by nontraditional methods of control or observation, such as power supply current monitoring or
the addition of test points that are available by means of special test modes. Fault coverage
based on such techniques shall be considered valid if substantiating analysis or references are
provided in the fault simulation report.

B.8.1.1 Terms. Terms and abbreviation not defined elsewhere in the text of this test procedure
are defined in this section.

a. Automatic Test Equipment (ATE). The apparatus with which the actual DUT will be
tested. ATE includes the ability to apply a test vector sequence (see 8.1.1L).
b. Broadside application. A method of applying a test vector sequence where input
stimuli change only at the beginning of a simulation cycle or ATE cycle and all changes
on primary inputs of the DUT are assumed to be simultaneous. Nonbroadside
application occurs when test vectors are conditioned by additional timing information
such as delay (with respect to other primary inputs), return-to-zero, return-to-one, and
surround-by-complement.
c. Detection. An error at an observable primary output of a logic model caused by the
existence of a logic fault. A hard detection is where an observable output value in the
fault-free logic model is distinctly different from the corresponding output value in the
faulty logic model. An example of a hard detection is where the fault-free logic model's
output value is 0 and the faulty logic model's output value is 1, or where the fault-free
logic model's output value is 1 and the faulty logic model's output value is 0. If the
high-impedance state (Z) can be sensed by the ATE, then a hard detection can involve
the Z state as well. A potential detection is an error where the fault-free output is 0 or
1 and the faulty output value is unknown (X), or Z if Z cannot be sensed by the ATE.

B-73
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX B

d. Established test algorithm. An algorithm, procedure, or test vector sequence, that when
applied to a logic component or logic partition has a known fault coverage or test
effectiveness. This fault coverage or test effectiveness is denoted herein as the
established fault coverage or established test effectiveness for the established test
algorithm. For example, an established test algorithm for a RAM may be a published
memory test algorithm, such as GALPAT, that has been shown by experience to detect
essentially all RAM failures and therefore is assessed an established test effectiveness
of 100 percent. An Arithmetic Logic Unit (ALU) may be tested by means of a
precomputed test vector sequence for which fault coverage has been previously
determined. More than one established test algorithm may exist for a logic component
or logic partition, each with a different established fault coverage or test effectiveness.
e. Failure hierarchy: Failure mechanism, physical failure, logical fault, error. The failure
hierarchy relates physical defects and their causes to fault simulators and observable
effects. A failure mechanism is the actual cause of physical failure; an example is
electromigration of aluminum in a microcircuit. A physical failure (or simply failure) is
the actual physical defect caused by a failure mechanism; an example is an open metal
line. A logical fault (or simply fault) is a logical abstraction of the immediate effect of a
failure; an example is "stuck-at-one" behavior of a logic gate input in the presence of an
open metal line. An error is a difference between the behavior of a fault-free and faulty
DUT at one or more observable primary outputs of the DUT.
f. Fault coverage. For a logic model of a DUT, a fault universe for the logic model of the
DUT, and a given test vector sequence, fault coverage is the fraction obtained by
dividing the number of faults contained in the fault universe that are detected by the test
vector sequence as a percentage. In this test procedure, fault coverage is understood to
be based on the detectable fault equivalence classes (see B.8.3.3.2). Rounding of fault
coverage fractions or percentages shall be "toward zero," not "to nearest." For example,
if 9,499 faults are detected out of 10,000 faults simulated, the fault coverage is 94.99
percent; if this value is to be rounded to two significant digits, the result shall be
reported as 94 percent, not 95 percent.
g. Logic line, node. Logic lines are the connections between components in a logic model,
through which logic signals flow. Logic lines are the idealized "wires" in a logic model.
A set of connected logic lines is a node.
h. Logic: Combinational and sequential. Combinational digital logic contains only
components that do not possess memory, and in which there are no feedback paths.
Sequential digital logic contains at least one component that contains memory, or at
least one feedback path, or both. For example, a flip-flop is a component that contains
memory, and cross-coupled logic gates introduce feedback paths.
i. Macro. A logic modeling convention representing a model contained within another
model. A macro boundary does not necessarily imply the existence of a physical
boundary in the logic model. A main model is a logic model that is not contained within
a larger model. Macros may be nested (that is, a macro may contain submacros).

B-74
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX B

j. Primary inputs, primary outputs. Primary inputs to a logic model represent the logic
lines of a DUT that are driven by the ATE's drivers and thus are directly controllable
test points. The inputs to the "main model" of the logic model of the DUT are the
primary inputs, and the outputs from the main model are the primary outputs. Internal
nodes that can be driven or sensed by means of special test nodes shall be considered to
be control or observation test points.
k. Test effectiveness. A measure similar to fault coverage, but used in lieu of fault
coverage in cases where physical failures cannot be modeled accurately as logical faults.
For example, many RAM and Programmable Logic Array (PLA) failures cannot be
idealized conveniently in the same way as gate-level failures. However, established test
algorithms may be used to detect essentially all likely physical failures in such
structures.
l. Test vector sequence. The (ordered) sequence of stimuli (applied to a logic model of a
DUT) or stimulus/response values (applied to, and compared for, the actual DUT by
the ATE).
m. Undetectable and detectable faults. An undetectable fault is defined herein as a logical
fault for which no test vector sequence exists that can cause at least one hard detection
or potential detection (see B.8.1.1c). Otherwise (that is, some test vector sequence
exists that causes at least one hard detection, or potential detection, or both), the fault is
defined herein to be a detectable fault (see B.8.3.3.3).

B.8.2 Apparatus

B.8.2.1 Logic Simulator. Implementation of this test procedure requires the use of a facility
capable of simulating the behavior of fault-free digital logic in response to a test vector sequence;
this capability is herein referred to as logic simulation.

In order to simulate sequential digital logic, the simulator must support simulation of a minimum
of four logic states: zero (0), one (1), high-impedance (Z), and unknown (X). In order to simulate
combinational digital logic only, the simulator must support simulation of a minimum of two
logic states: 0 and 1.

At the start of logic simulation of a logic model of a DUT containing sequential logic, the state of
every logic line and component containing memory shall be X; any other initial condition,
including explicit initialization of any line or memory element to a 0 or 1, shall be documented
and justified in the fault simulation report.

In order to simulate wired connections or bus structures, the simulator must be capable of
resolving signal conflicts introduced by such structures. Otherwise, modeling workarounds shall
be permitted to eliminate such structures from the logic model (see B.8.3.1.2).

In order to simulate sequential digital logic, the simulator must support event-directed simulation.
As a minimum, unit-delay logic components must be supported.

B-75
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX B

Simulation of combinational-only logic, or simulation of sequential logic in special cases (such as

combinational logic extracted from a scannable sequential logic model) can be based on nonevent-
directed simulation, such as levelized, zero-delay, or compiled-code methods. The fault
simulation report shall describe why the selected method is equivalent to the more general event-
directed method.

B.8.2.2 Fault Simulator. In addition to the capability to simulate the fault-free digital logic, the
capability is also required to simulate the effect of single, permanent, stuck-at-zero and stuck-at
one faults on the behavior of the logic; this capability is herein referred to as fault simulation.
Fault simulation shall reflect the limitations of the target ATE. It is not necessary that the fault
simulator directly support the requirements of this test procedure in the areas of hard versus
potential detections, fault universe selection, and fault classing. However, the capability must
exist, at least indirectly, to report fault coverage in accordance with this procedure. Where
approximations arise (for example, where fault classing compensates for a different method of
fault universe selection) such differences shall be documented in the fault simulation report, and it
shall be shown that the approximations do not increase the fault coverage obtained.

B.8.3 Procedure

B.8.3.1 Logic Model.

B.8.3.1.1 Level of Modeling. The DUT shall be described in terms of a logic model composed
of components and connections between components. Primary inputs to the logic model are
assumed to be outputs of an imaginary component (representing the ATE's drivers), and primary
outputs of the logic model are assumed to be inputs to an imaginary component (representing
the ATE's comparators). Some logic simulators require that the ATE drivers and comparators be
modeled explicitly; however, these components shall not be considered to be part of the logic
model of the DUT.

B.8.3.1.2 Logic Lines and Nodes (see B.8.1.1g). All fan-out from a node in a logic model is
ideal, that is, fan-out branches associated with a node emanate from a single point driven by a
fan-out origin. All fan-in to a node in a logic model is ideal; that is, multiple fan-in branches in a
node drive a single line. Figure B-10 shows a node that includes fan-in branches, a fan-out origin,
and fan-out branches. Because fan-in and fan-out generally are not ideal in actual circuit layout,
the actual topology of the circuit should be modeled, if it is known, by appropriately adding
single-input noninverting buffers to the logic model.

B.8.3.1.3 G-logic and B-logic Partitions. Simple components of the logic model (logic
primitives such as AND, OR, NAND, NOR, XOR, buffers, or flip-flops; generally the
indivisible primitives understood by a simulator) are herein referred to as gate logic (G-logic).
Complex components of the logic model (such as RAM, ROM, or PLA primitive components,
and behavioral models - relatively complex functions that are treated as "black boxes" for the
purpose of fault simulation) are referred to herein as block logic (B-logic).

B-76
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX B

Fan-in branches Fan-out branches

Fan-out origin Direction of signal

FIGURE B-10. Node Consisting of Fan-in Branches, a Fan-out Origin,
and Fan-out Branches.

For the purpose of fault simulation, the logic model shall be divided into nonoverlapping logic
partitions; however, the entire logic model may consist of a single logic partition. The logic
partitions contain components and their associated limits; although lines may span partitions, no
component is contained in more than one partition. A G-logic partition contains only G-logic;
any other logic is a B-logic partition.

A logic partition consisting of G-logic, or B-logic, or G-logic and B-logic that, as a unit, is testable
using an established testing algorithm, with known fault coverage or test effectiveness, may be
treated as a single B-logic partition.

B.8.3.1.4 Model Hierarchy. The logic model may be hierarchical (that is, consisting of macro
building blocks), or flat (that is, a single level of hierarchy with no macro building blocks).
Hierarchy does not impose structures on lines; for example, there is no implied fan-out origin at a
macro input or output. Macros that correspond to physical partitions in a model shall use
additional buffers (or an equivalent method) to enforce adherence to the actual DUT's fan-out.

B.8.3.1.5 Fractions of Transistors. The fraction of transistors comprising each G-logic and B-
logic partition, with respect to the total count of transistors in the DUT, shall be determined or
closely estimated; the total sum of the transistor fractions shall equal 1. Where the actual
transistor counts are not available, estimates may be made on the basis of gate counts or
microcircuit area; the assumptions and calculations supporting such estimates shall be
documented in the fault simulation report. The transistor fractions shall be used in order to
weight the fault coverage measured for each individual logic partition (see B.8.3.5).

B.8.3.2 Fault Model.

B.8.3.2.1 G-logic. The fault model for G-logic shall be permanent stuck-at-zero and stuck-at-
one faults on logic lines. Only single stuck-at faults are considered in calculating fault coverage.

B-77
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX B

B.8.3.2.2 B-logic. No explicit fault model is assumed for B-logic components. However, an
established test algorithm shall be applied to each B-logic component or logic partition. If a B-
logic partition contains logic lines or G-logic components, or both, justification shall be provided
in the fault simulation report as to how the established test algorithm that is applied to the B-
logic partition detects faults associated with the logic lines and G-logic components.

B.8.3.2.2.1 Built-in Self-test. A special case of B-logic is a partition that includes a linear-
feedback shift register (LFSR) that performs signature analysis for compression of output error
data. Table B-XVI lists penalty values for different LFSR degrees. If the LFSR implements a
primitive GF(2) polynomial of degree "k", where there is at least one flip-flop stage between
inputs to a multiple-input LFSR, then the following procedure shall be used in order to determine
a lower bound on the established fault coverage of the logic partition:

Step 1: Excluding the LFSR, but including any stimulus generation logic considered to be
part of the logic partition, determine the fault coverage of the logic partition by fault
simulation without signature analysis; denote this fault coverage by C.
Step 2: Reference Table B-XVI. For a given degree "k" obtain the penalty value "p". The
established fault coverage of the logic partition using a LFSR of degree "k" shall be
reported as (1-p)C. That is, a penalty of (100p) percent is incurred in assessing the
effectiveness of signature analysis if the actual effectiveness is not determined.

TABLE B-XVI. Penalty Values, P, for LFSR Signature Analyzers

Implementing Primitive Polynomial of Degree k.
k p
k<8 1.0
k = (8 . . . 15) 0.05
k = (16 . . . 23) 0.01
k > 23 0.0

B.8.3.3 Fault Universe Selection and Fault Equivalence Classing. Fault coverage shall be
reported in terms of equivalence classes of the detectable faults. This section describes the
selection of the initial fault universe, the partitioning or collapsing of the initial fault universe into
fault equivalence classes, and the removal of undetectable faults in order to form the detectable
fault universe. These three stages constitute the fault simulation reporting requirements;
however, it is generally more efficient to obtain the set of faults that represent the fault
equivalence classes directly without explicitly generating the initial fault universe.

B.8.3.3.1 Initial Fault Universe. The initial fault universe shall consist of single, permanent,
stuck-at-zero and stuck-at-one faults on every logic line (not simply on every logic node) in the
G-logic partitions of the logic model. A bus, which is a node with multiple driving lines, shall be
considered, for the purpose of fault universe generation, to be a multiple-input, single-output
logic gate. The initial fault universe shall include stuck-at-zero and stuck-at-one faults on each
fan-in and fan-out branch and the fan-out origin of the bus (see Figure B-10).

B-78
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX B

The fault universe does not explicitly contain any faults within B-logic partitions. However, all
faults associated with inputs and outputs of B-logic components either are contained in a G-logic
partition or shall be shown to be considered by established test algorithms that are applied to the
B-logic partitions.

No faults shall be added or removed by considering or not considering logic model hierarchy. No
extra faults shall be associated with any primary input or output line, macro input or output line,
or logic line that spans logic partitions where the logic partitions do not correspond to a physical
boundary. No more than one stuck-at-zero and one stuck-at-one fault per logic line shall be
contained in the initial fault universe.

B.8.3.3.2 Fault Equivalence Classes. The initial fault universe shall be partitioned or
collapsed into fault equivalence classes for reporting purposes. The fault equivalence classes
shall be chosen such that all faults in a fault equivalence class cause apparently identical
erroneous behavior with respect to the observable outputs of the logic model. One fault from
each fault equivalence class shall be selected to represent the fault class for reporting purposes;
these faults shall be called the representative faults.

For the purpose of implementing this test procedure it is sufficient to apply simple rules to
identify structurally-dependent equivalence classes. An acceptable method for selecting the
representative faults for the initial fault universe consists of listing all single, permanent, stuck-at
faults as specified in Table B-XVII. Any other fault equivalencing procedure used shall be
documented in the fault simulation report. If a bus node exhibits wired-AND or wired-OR
behavior in the applicable circuit technology, then faults associated with that bus shall be
collapsed in accordance with the AND or OR fault equivalencing rules, respectively. Otherwise,
no collapsing of faults associated with a bus shall be performed.

TABLE B-XVII. Representative Faults for the Fault Equivalence Classes.

Stuck-at faults Type of logic line in logic model
s-a-1 Every input of multiple-input AND or NAND gates
s-a-0 Every input of multiple-input OR or NOR gates
s-a-0, s-a-1 Every input of multiple-input components that are not AND, OR, NAND, or NOR gates
s-a-0, s-a-1 Every logic line that is a fan-out origin
s-a-0, s-a-1 Every logic line that is a primary output
Note: "s-a-0" is stuck-at-zero and "s-a-1" is stuck-at-one.

B.8.3.3.3 Detectable Fault Universe. Fault coverage shall be based on the detectable fault
universe. Undetectable faults shall be permitted to be dropped from the set of representative
faults; the remaining set of representative faults comprises the detectable fault universe. In order
for a fault to be declared as undetectable, documentation shall be provided in the fault simulation
report as to why there does not exist any test vector sequence capable of guaranteeing that the
fault will cause an error at an observable primary output (see B.8.1.1m). Any fault not
documented in the fault simulation report as being undetectable shall be considered detectable for
the purpose of calculating fault coverage.

B-79
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX B

B.8.3.4 Fault Simulation.

B.8.3.4.1 Automatic Test Equipment Limitations. Fault coverage reported for the logic model
of a DUT shall reflect the limitations of the target ATE. Two common cases are:

a. Fault detection during fault simulation shall occur only at times where the ATE will be
capable of sensing the primary outputs of the DUT; there must be a one-to-one
correspondence between simulator compares and ATE compares. For example, if fault
coverage for a test vector sequence is obtained using broadside fault simulation (where
fault detection occurs after every change of input stimuli, including clock signals), then
it is not correct to claim the same fault coverage on the ATE if the test vectors are
reformatted into cycles where a clock signal is pulsed during each cycle and compares
occur only at the end of each cycle.
b. If the ATE cannot sense the Z output state (either directly or by multiple passes), then
the reported fault coverage shall not include detections involving the Z state. That is, an
output value of Z shall be considered to be equivalent to an output value of X.
Any differences in format or timing of the test vector sequence, between that used by
the fault simulator and that applied by the ATE, shall be documented in the fault
simulation report and it shall be shown that fault coverage achieved on the ATE is not
lower than the reported fault coverage.

B.8.4.2 G-Logic.

B.8.4.2.1 Hard Detection and Potential Detections. Fault coverage for G-logic shall include
only faults detected by hard detections. Potential detections shall not be considered directly in
calculating the fault coverage. No number of potential detections of a fault shall imply that the
fault would be detected.

Some potential detections can be converted into hard detections for the purpose of calculating
fault coverage. If it can be shown that a fault is only potentially detected by fault simulation but
is in fact detectable by the ATE by a difference not involving an X value, then upon documenting
those conditions in the fault simulation report that fault shall be considered to be detected as a
hard detection and the fault coverage shall be adjusted accordingly.

Faults associated with three-state buffer enable signal lines can cause X states to occur on nodes
with fan-in branches, or erroneous Z states to occur on three-state primary outputs that may be
untestable on some ATE. These faults may then be detectable only as potential detections, but
may be unconvertible into hard detections. In such cases, it is permissible for the fault simulation
report to state separately the fraction of the undetected faults that are due to such faults.

B.8.4.2.2 Fault Simulation Procedures. The preferred method of fault simulation for G-logic
is to simulate the effect of each representative fault in the G-logic. However, this may not be
practical in some cases due to the large number of representative faults, or because of limitations

B-80
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX B

of the logic models or simulation tools. In such cases fault sampling procedures may be used.
When fault sampling is used, either the acquisition document shall specify the method of
obtaining a random sample of faults or the fault simulation report shall describe the method used.
In either case, the complete random sample of faults shall be obtained before beginning the fault
simulation procedure involving a random sample of faults.

Use of any fault simulation procedure other than fault simulation procedure 1 (see B.8.4.2.2.1)
shall be documented and justified in the fault simulation report.

In this section, it is assumed that the representative faults declared to be undetectable have been
removed from the set of faults to be simulated.

B.8.4.2.2.1 Fault Simulation Procedure 1. Simulate each representative fault in a G-logic

partition. The procedure used shall be equivalent to the following:

Step 1: Denote by "n" the total number of representative faults in the G-logic partition.
Step 2: Fault simulate each representative fault. Denote by "d" the number of hard
detections.
Step 3: Fault coverage for the G-logic partition is given by d/n.

B.8.4.2.2.2 Fault Simulation Procedure 2. Obtain lower bound on actual fault coverage in a
G-logic partition using fixed sample size (see Table B-XVIII). The procedure used shall be
equivalent to the following:

Step 1: Select a value for the penalty parameter "r" (r = 0.01 to 0.05). The
corresponding value of "n" in Table B-XVII is the size of the random sample of
representative faults.
Step 2: Fault simulation each of the "n" representative faults. Denote by "d" the number
of hard detections.
Step 3: The lower bound on the fault coverage is given by "d/n-r".

TABLE B-XVIII. Sample Sizes Used to Obtain Lower Bound

on Fault Coverage Using Fault Simulation Procedure 2.
r n
0.01 6860
0.015 3070
0.02 1740
0.03 790
0.04 450
0.05 290
Note: "n" is the minimum sample size required for a chosen
penalty "r".

B-81
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX B

B.8.4.2.2.3 Fault Simulation Procedure 3. Accept/reject lower bound on fault coverage in a

G-logic partition using fixed sample size (see Table B-XIX). The procedure used shall be
equivalent to the following:

Step 1: Denote by "F" the minimum required value for fault coverage. From Table B-
XIX obtain the minimum required sample size, denoted by "n".
Step 2: Fault-simulate each of the "n" representative faults, and denote by "d" the
number of hard detections.
Step 3: If "d" is less than "n" (that is, any faults are undetected), then conclude that the
faults coverage is less than "F". Otherwise (that is, all sampled faults are detected),
conclude that the fault coverage is greater than or equal to "F".

TABLE B-XIX. Sample Size Used to Accept/Reject Lower Bound

on Fault Coverage Using Fault Simulation Procedure 3.
F n F
50.0% 5 87.1%
55.0% 6 89.1%
60.0% 6 89.1%
65.0% 7 90.6%
70.0% 9 92.6%
75.0% 11 93.9%
76.0% 11 93.9%
77.0% 12 94.4%
78.0% 13 94.8%
79.0% 13 94.8%
80.0% 14 95.2%
81.0% 15 95.5%
82.0% 16 95.8%
83.0% 17 96.0%
84.0% 18 96.2%
85.0% 19 96.4%
86.0% 20 96.6%
87.0% 22 96.9%
88.0% 24 97.2%
89.0% 26 97.4%
90.0% 29 97.6%
91.0% 32 97.9%
92.0% 36 98.1%
93.0% 42 98.4%
94.0% 49 98.6%
95.0% 59 98.8%
96.0% 74 99.1%
97.0% 99 99.3%
98.0% 149 99.5%
99.0% 299 99.8%
NOTE: For a given minimum required fault coverage "F" simulate "n" faults. If all faults
are detected, then conclude that the actual fault coverage is greater than or equal to "F".
Otherwise, conclude that the actual fault coverage is less than "F". The column labeled "F"
shows that actual fault coverage that has a 50 percent probability of acceptance.

B-82
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX B

B.8.4.3 B-logic. Fault coverage shall be measured indirectly for each B-logic partition. For a
given B-logic partition, the established fault coverage or test effectiveness shall be reported for
that B-logic partition only if it is shown that: (a) the test vector sequence applied to the DUT
applies the established test algorithm to the B-logic partition, and (b) the resulting critical output
values from the B-logic partition are made observable at the primary outputs. Otherwise, the
fault coverage for that B-logic partition shall be reported as 0 percent. For each B-logic partition
tested in this way, the established test algorithm, proof of its successful application, and the
established fault coverage or test effectiveness shall be documented in the fault simulation report.

B.8.5 Fault Coverage Calculation. Let "m" denote the number of logic partitions in the logic
model for the DUT. For the i th logic partition, let "Fi" denote its fault coverage (measured in
accordance with 8.3.4), and let " Ti " denote its transistor fraction. The fault coverage "F" for the
logic model for the DUT shall be calculated as:

F = F1T1 F2 T2 ... Fm Tm

If fault simulation procedure 1 is performed for each G-logic partition in the logic model of a
DUT, then the fault coverage for the logic model of a DUT shall be reported as:

F of all detectable equivalence classes of single, permanent, stuck-at-zero and stuck-at-one

faults on the logic lines of the logic model as measured by MIL-STD-883, test method
5012."

If fault simulation procedure 2 or 3 is performed for any G-logic partition, then the fault coverage
for the logic model of a DUT shall by reported as:

"No less than F of all detectable equivalence classes of single, permanent, stuck-at-zero
and stuck-at-one faults on the logic lines of the logic model, with 95 percent confidence,
as measured by MIL-STD-883, test method 5012".

The confidence level of 95 percent shall be identified if any fault simulation procedure other than
procedure 1 was performed for any G-logic partition.

B.8.6 Summary. The following details shall be specified in the applicable acquisition
document:

a. Minimum required level of fault coverage and method of obtaining fault coverage.
b. If a fault sampling method is permitted, guidance on selection of the random sample of
faults.
c. Guidelines, restrictions, or requirements for test algorithms for B-logic types.

B-83
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX D

MAINTAINABILITY PREDICTIONS

FOREWORD

This Appendix is an essential part of MIL-HDBK-470A. The information contained herein is

intended for reference only. The maintainability prediction procedure incorporated here was
previously identified as Procedure V in MIL-HDBK-472. The procedure has been retyped and
reformatted and the paragraph numbering was changed to reflect a stand-alone document.
Otherwise it has been incorporated without change.

Maintainability Prediction Procedure V was initially incorporated into MIL-HDBK-472

"Maintainability Prediction" with Notice 1 to that handbook dated 12 January 1984. This
incidentally was the only change made to that handbook since it was originally issued on 24 May
1966.

MIL-HDBK-472 Procedure V was developed under the joint sponsorship of Rome Laboratory,
formerly Rome Air Development Center (RADC) and the Naval Electronics System Command
by Hughes Aircraft. It was specifically developed to overcome deficiencies identified in
Procedures I and IV (See RADC-TR-78-169). After Procedure V was incorporated into the
handbook, it became the overwhelming procedure of choice for performing maintainability
predictions. It is the only prediction procedure addressed by modern automated maintainability
analysis tools.

Thus, only Maintainability Prediction Procedure V from MIL-HDBK-472 has been included in
this appendix.

D-1
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX D

D.1.0 GENERAL

Scope. This procedure is primarily used to predict maintainability parameters of avionics and
ground and shipboard electronics at the organizational, intermediate and depot levels of
maintenance. It can also be applied to any application environment and type of equipment
including mechanical equipment. This Appendix is for guidance only and cannot be cited as a
requirement. If it is, the contractor does not have to comply.

D.1.1 Philosophy and assumptions. The maintainability prediction procedures presented herein
permit the maintainability of electronic equipment/systems to be analyzed, including direct
accountability of diagnostics, isolation, and test capabilities; replaceable item (RI)1 construction;
packaging; and component failure rates. In addition, the following assumptions and stipulations
apply to any predictions made using the procedures:

a. Failure rates experienced are all in the same proportion to those predicted
b. Only one failure at a time is considered
c. Maintenance is performed in accordance with established maintenance procedures
d. Maintenance is performed by maintainers possessing the appropriate skills and training
e. Only active maintenance time is addressed; administrative and logistic delays, and clean-
up are excluded

Two separate methods are presented. Method A is a prediction method for use in the early
stages of the development of an equipment or system. Method B is a detailed prediction method
that uses actual detailed design data to predict maintainability parameters.

The application of the procedures presented here permits the user to monitor the overall system
maintainability throughout the design and development of that system. The user can identify
whether or not the specified maintainability design requirements will be met before the system is
complete. Thus, if it appears the maintainability requirements will not be met, the designers can
be informed and the necessary changes can be made before they become prohibitively expensive.

D.1.2 Point of application. Both prediction methods (Method A is the early prediction and
Method B is the detailed prediction) of this procedure can be applied to any equipment or
system level, at any level of maintenance, and for any maintenance concept pertinent to avionics,
ground electronics, and shipboard electronics. (While the prediction methods were developed
specifically for electronic equipments and systems, there is nothing inherent in the methods that
should prevent them from being applicable to electro-mechanical or mechanical equipments or
systems).

1
A replaceable item (RI) is any of those physical entities normally removed and replaced to effect repair at the
maintenance level for which the prediction is being made.

D-2
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX D

D.1.3 Basic parameters of measure. Mean time to repair (MTTR) is the primary maintainability
parameter that can be predicted using this procedure. The other maintainability parameters that
can be predicted using this procedure are: maximum corrective maintenance time at the
percentile ( M Max ( )), percent of faults isolatable to a single replaceable item ( I1); percent of
faults isolatable to <N replaceable items ( IN), mean maintenance labor hours per repair
(MLH/repair), mean maintenance labor hours per operating hour (MLH/OH), mean maintenance
labor hours per flight hour (MLH/FH). (For details see paragraph 2.2).

D.1.4 Information required. These data items must be provided as part of the maintainability
prediction.

D.1.4.1 Method A. To use Method A the following data are necessary:

a. The number and contents of (either actual or estimated) the primary RIs
b. The failure rates, either predicted or estimated, associated with each RI
c. The basic fault isolation test strategy of each RI
d. The replacement concept, if fault isolation is to a group of RIs
e. The packaging philosophy
f. The fault isolation resolution, either estimated or required (i.e., % of faults isolated to
one repairable item or the average RI group size)

D.1.4.2 Method B. The data necessary to implement Method B are:

a. The replacement concept of each RI or group of RIs

b. The fault detection and isolation outputs associated with each RI
c. The failure rate of each RI
d. The maintenance procedure that is followed to remove and replace each RI

D.2.0 BASIC DEFINITIONS AND MODELS

D.2.1 MTTR elements. Corrective maintenance (CM) actions consist of the following tasks:
Preparation, Fault Isolation, and Fault Correction (further broken down into Disassembly,
Interchange, Reassembly, Alignment, and Checkout). The time to perform each of these tasks is
an element of MTTR, so the task times are called MTTR elements.

The definitions and abbreviations for the MTTR elements used in the prediction models are
shown in Table D-I.

D-3
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX D

TABLE D-I. MTTR Elements.

MTTR Element (Abbreviation) Definition
Preparation ( TP ) Time associated with those tasks required to be performed before fault
nj isolation can be executed.

Fault Isolation ( TFI ) Time associated with those tasks required to isolate the fault to the
nj level at which fault correction begins.

Disassembly ( TD ) Time associated with gaining access to the replaceable item or items
nj identified during the fault isolation process.

Interchange ( TI ) Time associated with the removal and replacement of a faulty

nj replaceable item or suspected faulty item.

Reassembly ( TR ) Time associated with closing up the equipment after interchange is

nj performed.

Alignment ( TA ) Time associated with aligning the system or replaceable item after a
nj fault has been corrected.

Checkout ( TC ) Time associated with the verification that a fault has been corrected
nj and the system is operational.

Start-Up ( TST ) Time associated with bringing a system up to the operational state it
nj was in prior to failure, once a fault has been corrected and the
operational status of the system verified.

The nj subscript indicates that the nth RI is the object of the maintenance action brought about by
the jth fault detection and isolation (FD&I) indication or symptom. The term FD&I is defined as
those indications, symptoms, printouts, readouts, or the results of manual procedures which
separately, or in combination, indicate a fault or failure has occurred and identifies to the
maintainer the procedures to follow in performing maintenance.

Table D-II indicates the MTTR elements that must be predicted for each of the different fault
isolation cases listed at the top of the table.

TABLE D-II. MTTR Elements for Prediction Procedure.

Isolation to Isolation to Group
Single RI with Group Isolation to Group with Isolation with Ambiguity (Requires
Replacement Iterative Replacement Further Isolation)
Preparation Preparation Preparation Preparation Secondary
Preparation
Isolation Isolation Isolation Isolation Secondary Isolation
Disassembly Disassembly Disassembly Disassembly
Interchange Interchange Interchange Interchange Secondary Fault
Reassembly Reassembly Reassembly Reassembly Correction
Alignment Alignment Alignment Alignment
Checkout Checkout Checkout Checkout
Start Up Start Up Start Up Continue Start Up

D-4
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX D

D.2.2 Basic models. The maintainability prediction contains two separate procedures: (1)
Method A is an early procedure for implementation when preliminary design data are available.
(2) Method B is a detailed procedure for implementation when detailed design and support data
are available. Both of these procedures are time synthesis model techniques and employ the
same general MTTR prediction model.

D.2.2.1 Mean time to repair (MTTR).

N
n Rn
MTTR = n =1 (Equation D-1)
N
n
n =1

where:
N = number of replaceable items (RI)
n = failure rate of the nth RI
R n = mean repair time of the nth RI as computed in 2.2.1.1

th
D.2.2.1.1 Meanrepairtimeforthen RI.

J
njR nj
j=1
Rn = (Equation D-2)
J
nj
j=1
where:
J = number of unique FD&I outputs (see 3.2.3)
nj = failure rate of those nth RI parts which would cause the nth RI to be called out in
the jth FD&I output.
R nj = average repair time of the nth RI when called out in the jth FD&I output as
computed in 2.2.1.2

D-5
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX D

D.2.2.1.2 AveragerepairtimeforthenthRI.

M nj
R nj = Tm (Equation D-3)
m =1 nj

where:
M nj = # of steps to perform CM when a failure occurs in the nth RI and results in
the jth FD&I outputs. Includes all CM tasks, including operations on
other RIs called out in the jth fault isolation result.
Tm = Average time to perform the mth CM step for the nth RI given the jth
nj
FD&I output.

D.2.2.2 Percent isolation to a single RI.

K
k
I1 = k =1 x 100 (Equation D-4)
N J
nj
n =1 j=1
where:
nj = failure rate of those nth RI parts which would cause the nth RI to be called out
in the jth FD&I output.
k = failure rate associated with the kth FD&I output which results in isolation to one
RI.
K = number of FD&I outputs which result in isolation to a single RI.
J = number of unique FD&I outputs (see 3.2.3)

D.2.2.3 Percent isolation to a group of RIs.

P
p
p =1
IN = x 100 x 100 (Equation D-5)
N J
nj
n =1 j=1

D-6
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX D

where:
p = failure rate associated with the p th FD&I output which results in isolation to N
or less RIs.
nj = same as for I1
P = number of FD&I outputs which result in isolation to N or less RIs.

Other maintenance parameters that can be predicted using these procedures follow.

D.2.3 Mean maintenance labor hours per repair (MLH/repair).

N
n MLHn
MLH/Repair = n =1 (Equation D-6)
N
n
n =1
where:
N = quantity of RI's
n = failure rate of nth RI
MLHn = mean maintenance labor hours required to repair the nth RI

D.2.3.1 Mean ma int enance labor hours required to repair the n th RI.

J
nj MLHnj
j=1
MLHn = (Equation D-7)
J
nj
j=1
where:
J = quantity of FD&I results
nj = failure rate associated with the jth result for the nth RI
MLHnj = maintenance labor hours required to repair the nth RI given the jth FD&I
result

(Method A and Method B procedures can be used by replacing repair times in the appropriate
method with the maintenance labor hours required for each repair action.)

D-7
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX D

D.2.4 Mean maintenance labor hours per maintenance action (MLH/MA).

This calculation is the same as for MLH per repair except that time spent as a result of system
failure false alarms must also be included in the maintenance labor hours.

Two types of false alarms are considered:

1) Type 1 false alarm is detected during normal operations but cannot be repeated during
the fault isolation process.
2) Type 2 false alarm is detected and isolated to an RI when the RI does not have an
actual fault.

N N
( )
1 + F2n n MLHn + F1n n MLHD
MLH/MA = n =1 n =1 (Equation D-8)
N N
( )
1 + F2n n + F1n n
n =1 n =1
where:
F1n = frequency of occurrence of type 1 false alarms 1/
F2n = frequency of occurrence of type 2 false alarms 1/
1/ is expressed as a fraction of the nth RI failure rate
MLHD = mean maintenance labor hours associated with Type 1 false alarms.
MLHn = mean maintenance labor hours required to repair the nth RI
n = failure rate associated with the jth result for the nth RI

D.2.5 False alarm rates. False alarms are dependent on the system type, operating environment,
maintenance environment, system design and fault detection and isolation implementation.
Therefore, a standard set of false alarm values would be impossible to derive.

D.2.6 Mean maintenance labor hours per operating hour ( MLH/OH). MLH/OH includes the
entire labor power that is required to maintain a system; corrective maintenance, preventive
maintenance, and maintenance caused by false alarms.

N N PM
MLH/OH = (1 + F2n) n' MLHn + F1n' MLHD + Fr MLHr (Equation D-9)
n =1 n =1 r =1

D-8
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX D

where:

n = n expressed in failures per operating hour

Fr = frequency of rth preventive maintenance
MLNr = mean maintenance labor hours to perform rth preventive maintenance type
PM = quantity of unique preventive maintenance types
N = quantity of RI's
F1n = frequency occurrence of type 1 false alarms 1/
F2n = frequency of occurrence of type 2 false alarms 1/
MLHD = mean maintenance labor hours associated with type 1 false alarms
MLHn = mean maintenance labor hours required to repair the nth RI

1/ expressed as a fraction of the nth RI failure rate.

D.2.7 Mean maintenance labor hours per flight hour (MLH/FH). MLH/FH is the same as
MLH/OH where n = n is expressed in failures per flight hour.

D.2.8 Maximum corrective maintenance time for the percentile ( M Max ( )). Two M Max ( )
models are provided. The first yields an approximate value and requires that system repair times
be lognormally distributed. The second gives a more accurate value.

D.2.8.1 Approximate M Max ( ). Appendix B of MIL-HDBK-472 contains tables of M Max

( ) values for selected values of system , system MTTR (MEAN), and standard deviation of
system repair times (SIGMA). MTTR may be predicted using Method A, and the MTTR
models in paragraph 2.2.1. SIGMA is usually determined from data on similar equipments.
Approximate M Max ( ) values for values of , MEAN, and SIGMA not covered in the
Appendix B of MIL-HDBK-472 may be calculated by using the following equation.

[
M Max () = exp logMTTR + SIGMA ]
where:
N N
(log R ni )2 [( log R ni )2 / N]
SIGMA = i =1 i =1 (Equation D-10)
N 1

D.2.8.2 Accurate M Max ( ). A computerized and a manual means of predicting an accurate

M Max ( ) are provided in Appendixes C and D, respectively, of MIL-HDBK-472.

D-9
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX D

D.3.0 APPLICATION. The application of the early and detailed maintainability prediction
techniques is described in 3.1 and 3.2 respectively.

D.3.1 Method A - early prediction procedure. This section provides a step-by-step procedure
for performing an early prediction of mean time to repair. The tasks involved in performing the
early prediction are:

a. Define the prediction requirements

b. Define the replacement concept
c. Determine the prediction parameters
d. Select the appropriate models
e. Compute the MTTR (or other parameters)

Descriptions of each of these tasks are provided in the following subsections.

D.3.1.1 Prediction requirement definition. This step of the prediction is in some respects the
most important aspect since it establishes a common baseline of understanding the prediction
purpose, approach and scope. During this step, the maintainability parameter(s) to be evaluated
is defined, the prediction ground rules are established, and the maintenance level for which the
prediction is being made is defined.

Parameter definition includes the selection (if required) of the parameter(s) to be evaluated and
the establishment of a qualitative and quantitative definition of each parameter. If the prediction
is being performed in compliance with a customer statement of work defining the parameter to be
analyzed, it must be determined if the stated parameter is consistent with an equivalent
parameter contained in this methodology. If not, the prediction models must be changed
accordingly. As part of the parameter evaluation, it must be determined which elemental
maintenance tasks (e.g., preparation, isolation, etc.) are to be included in the analysis and which
are to be excluded.

The latest aspect of this step is to explicitly define the maintenance level for which the prediction
is being made. If the level is defined in terms of a specific maintenance organization (e.g., direct
support unit, depot, etc.), then the tasks to be performed are readily defined by the maintenance
concept as described in the following section. If the level is defined by operating level or location
(e.g., on-site, flight-line, etc.), then this level must be redefined in terms of the maintenance
organization(s) performing maintenance at the level/location.

D.3.1.2 Replacement concept definition. The maintenance concept must be established, so that
in conjunction with a definition of the prediction requirements (paragraph D.3.1.1), a baseline is
established which defines the prediction to be performed. With respect to the maintainability

D-10
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX D

prediction, the primary output of the maintenance concept is the definition of how a repair is
effected and what the replaceable items are.
As part of this process, a complete set of replaceable items is identified. If the maintenance
concept allows for fault isolation to a group of RIs and repair by group replacement, then the RI
groups can be reclassified as RIs if each of the groups is independent of other groups.

D.3.1.3 Determination of the prediction parameters. This step involves:

a. Defining the RIs

b. Determining the predicted or estimated failure rate associated with each RI
c. Defining fault isolation test methodology for each RI
d. Defining the replacement concept
e. Defining the packaging philosophy
f. Determining the estimated or required fault isolation resolution (i.e., X% to 1 RI or
average RI group size).

Forms similar to those in Figures D-1 and D-2 should be used for the data collection process.
Data are collected on these forms at the level for which predictions are performed. For example,
if a repair time is to be computed for every equipment within a system, then a separate data
collection form should be used for each equipment. Data should be tabulated in the following
manner.

a. First tabulate all the primary RIs and their associated failure rates in the respective
columns of Figure D-1 (V refers to the method).
b. Next describe all methods (V) for performing each elemental activity (m) in Figure D-2.
(Note: some maintenance actions do not include all maintenance elements).
c. Next enter the appropriate number of headings ( Vm ) for each elemental activity along
the top of Figure D-1.
d. For each elemental activity (m, v) synthesize times ( Tmv ) using times, selected in
accordance with paragraph 3.2.6, noting them in the respective column of Figure D-2.
e. Next enter the associated failure rate of each RI for the elemental activity that it pertains
to in Figure D-1.

D-11
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX D

Item Nomenclature Preparation Fault Isolation Disassembly

RI Description Qty x Qty P1n P2n ...
VPpn FI1n FI2n ...
VFIpn D1n D2n

RI1

RI2

RI3

RI4

.
.
.
RIn
Total

FIGURE D-1: RI Data Analysis Sheet - A.

MTTR Element (m) v Description of the vth Method Tm m

v v

(For additional data, see #12 of

bibliography)

FIGURE D-2: RI Data Analysis Sheet - B.

These completed data sheets provide the basis for the early prediction technique. Once they are
complete, the submodels can be applied.

D.3.1.4 General prediction model and submodel selection. The general form of the prediction
model is:

M
MTTR = T p + TFI + TFC + TA + Tco + TST = Tm (Equation D-11)
m =1

D-12
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX D

where:
Tp = Average Preparation Time
T FI = Average Fault Isolation Time
TD = Average Disassembly Time
TI = Average Interchange Time
TR = Average Reassembly Time
TA = Average Alignment Time
T CO = Average Checkout Time
TS T = Average Startup Time
T FC = TD + TI + TR
Tm = Average time of the mth element of MTTR

Variations of the model are limited to deleting the time elements for elemental activity terms that
are not necessary to complete certain maintenance actions.

The selection of submodels is dependent on the replacement policy imposed. The appropriate
submodels for computing the average time for the elemental activities and the MTTR submodel
term definitions are given in Figures D-3 and D-4, respectively.

The submodels presented are of a general form and can generally be applied to any equipment
level (i.e., system, subsystem, equipment, etc.). The only limitation being that if the fault
isolation result ( SG) or the average number of iterations required to correct a fault ( SI) are
computed, the prediction level must be consistent with the RI grouping rules presented in
paragraph 3.1.5.1. Otherwise, the elemental activity submodels are applied at the lowest level
for which an MTTR prediction is desired.

D.3.1.5 MTTR computation. The MTTR is computed at the level at which SG or SI is

established. For example, if SGor SI can be estimated for each equipment within a system, then
the lowest level that the MTTR can be predicted is the equipment level. Higher level predictions
of MTTR, such as system level MTTR, can be computed by taking a failure rate weighted
average of the equipment MTTRs within the system.

D-13
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 FIGURE D-3. MTTR Submodels.
MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX D

D-14
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX D

TP time required to prepare a system for fault isolation using the vth method
v
T FI time required to isolate a fault using the vth method
v
TD time required to perform disassembly using the vth method
v
TR time required to perform reassembly using the vth method
v
TI time required to interchange an RI using the vth method
v
TA time required to align or calibrate an RI using the vth method
v
TC time required to check a repair using the vth method
v
T ST time required to start up a system using the vth method
v
P failure rate of RIs associated with the vth method of performing preparation
v
FI failure rate of RIs associated with the vth method of performing fault isolation
v
D failure rate of RIs associated with the vth method of performing disassembly
v
R failure rate of RIs associated with the vth method of performing reassembly
v
I failure rate of RIs associated with the vth method of performing interchange
v
A failure rate of RIs associated with the vth method of performing alignment
v
C failure rate of RIs associated with the vth method of performing checkout
v
ST failure rate of RIs associated with the vth method of performing set-up
v
VP the number of unique ways to perform preparation
VFI the number of unique ways to perform fault isolation
VD the number of unique ways to perform disassembly
VR the number of unique ways to perform reassembly
VI the number of unique ways to perform interchange
VA the number of unique ways to perform alignment
VC the number of unique ways to perform check-out
V ST the number of unique ways to perform start-up
SG the average number of RIs contained in a fault isolation result
SI the average number of interchanges required to correct a fault
A the number of unique accesses (A < VD or VR)
A the average number of unique accesses required per fault isolation result
a the failure rate of the RIs that require the ath type of access
T the total system failure rate
TD the time required to disassemble the ath access
a
TR the time required to reassemble the ath access
a

FIGURE D-4. Definitions of MTTR Submodel Terms.

D-15
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX D

Computing repair times below the level at which S(I or G) is established may give an inaccurate
account of repair times. The only exception is when fault isolation is down to a single RI ( SG =
1) for the entire system, equipment . . .), then the MTTR may be computed at any level since
ambiguities between RIs do not exist. Otherwise, the following criteria must be followed:

In order to compute a repair time at a given level, a value for S (I or G) must be established at
that level. After the level at which the repair times will be computed has been selected, the
appropriate models are selected to compute time for each elemental activity at that level with
higher level repair time being computed using a failure rate weighted average.

Values for SG, SI, A, TD or TR , where required, should be computed as detailed in the
following subsections.

D.3.1.5.1 Method of computing SG and SI . Two methods are used for computing the
average number of RIs in a fault isolation result ( SG) and the average number of iterations
required to correct a fault ( SI). Compute SI or G using the specified or design requirements, or
compute SI or G by assessing the approximate fault isolation capabilities of the system.

D.3.1.5.1.1 Method 1. The first method of computing SI or SG depends upon how the
fault isolation requirements are specified. In the fault isolation resolution is specified as follows:

X1 % to N1 RIs

N1 RIs < X2 % to N2 RIs

N2 RIs X3 % to N3 RIs

and X1 + X2 + X3 = 100

then,

N + 1 N + N2 + 1 N2 + N3 + 1
X1 1 + X2 1 + X 3
2 2 2
SI or G =
100

D-16
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX D

If the fault isolation requirements are specified as follows:

X1 % to N1 RIs

X2 % to N2 RIs

100% to N3 RIs
where:
X1 % < X2 % < 100%

then,

N + 1 N + N2 + 1 N2 + N3 + 1
X1 1 + (X2 X1 ) 1 + (100 X )
2
2 2 2
SI or G =
100

The predicted MTTR using this method of computing S is based on the assumption that the
specified fault isolation requirements have been (or will be) met. The resulting prediction is the
inherent MTTR that will be realized by achieving the specified requirements. This approach is
valuable during the early stages of equipment development for purposes of allocation and
assessment of the requirements facility. This approach should not be used when data are
available on the actual fault isolation characteristics.

D.3.1.5.1.2 The second method of computing SI or SG involves an

Method 2.
analysis of the fault isolation characteristics of the subject equipment/system as follows:

a. Prepare a simple block diagram depicting the system and how each major function is
related (i.e., show functional interfaces).
b. Group the functions (RIs) into "G" RI sets such that:
an estimate of the fault isolation (number of RIs) can be determined for each RI set
each RI set is independent of any other RI set
each RI set established is the smallest set that can be established
c. For each RI set (g) estimate the average fault isolation resolution or the average number of
RIs per fault isolation result depending on the replacement philosophy in question ( S(I)g
if iterative replacement, S(G)g if group replacement).

D-17
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX D

d. Compute the average SI, or SG for the system or equipment using a failure rate weighted
model.
G
g Sg
g =1
SI or SG = (Equation D-12)
G
g
g =1

For repair times computed at lower levels, the overall S does not have to be computed.

Computation of A, TD and TR .
D.3.1.5.2 The average number of accesses
(disassemblies and reassemblies) required per fault isolation result ( A) can be computed as
follows.
G
g Ag
g =1
A= (Equation D-13)
G
g
g =1

and,

( )
Ag AgS
g ga g
Ag = Pga = 1
a =1 a =1 g

where:
Ag = average number of accesses required per fault isolation result in gth RI set, ("G"
RI sets established the same way as was done for S)
Pga = the probability that the ath access will be required for any random fault isolation
result
Ag = the number of unique accesses in the gth RI set
g = the failure rate of the RIs located in the gth RI set
ga = failure rate of the RIs located in ath access location of gth RI set
Sg = average number of RIs per fault isolation result for the gth RI set
G = total number of RI sets

D-18
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX D

The computation of TD and TR is exactly like the method used for A with one modification.
Each probability is multiplied by its appropriate disassembly or reassembly time. The equation
for TD or TR is:

G
g TDg
g =1
TD = (Equation D-14)
G
g
g =1

and,

G
g TR g
g=1
TR =
G
g
g=1

where:

( )
Ag S
g ga g
TD = 1 TD (Equation D-15)
g a =1 g ga

The same equation also holds true for reassembly, ( TR )

g

where:

TD = the disassembly time for the ath access of the gth RI set.
ga
TR = the reassembly time for the ath access of the gth RI set.
ga

Note here also that if the RIs are grouped into just one set instead of G sets, then all the
subscripts "g" will fall-out and the failure rate weighting of the gth RI sets is not necessary.

D-19
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX D

D.3.1.5.3 Determination of MTTR. The MTTR can now be computed by summing up

the average times computed from each submodel. Thus, the MTTR is expressed as

M
MTTR = Tm (Equation D-16)
m =1

If the repair time computed is for a lower level, then the higher level repair times are computed as
follows:

B
bMTTR b
MTTR = b=1
B
b
b=1
where:
MTTR b = mean repair time of the bth lower level
b = failure rate of the bth lower level
B = quantity of lower level breakdowns.

D.3.2 Method B - Detailed prediction procedure. This section provides a step by step
procedure for performing a detailed prediction of mean time to repair (MTTR). The tasks
involved in performing the prediction are:

a. Define the prediction requirements

b. Define the replacement concept
c. Identify the fault detection and isolation outputs (FD&I outputs)
d. Correlate the FD&I outputs and hardware features
e. Correlate replaceable items and fault detection and isolation outputs
f. Prepare a maintenance flow diagram
g. Prepare time line analyses
h. Compute the maintainability parameters

Descriptions of each of the tasks are provided in the following subsections.

D.3.2.1 Prediction requirements definition. This step is similar to that required for an early
prediction; refer to paragraph 3.1.1.

D-20
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX D

D.3.2.2 Replacement concept definition. This step is similar to that required for an early
prediction; refer to paragraph 3.1.2.

D.3.2.3 Fault detection and isolation output identification. This step involves the identification
of all the "outputs" which are used in the fault detection and isolation process. Normally, the
fault detection and isolation processes are segregated. However, for purposes of maintainability
prediction, the fault detection methodology is considered as the first step of fault isolation and is
properly included as part of the isolation capability. Any time associated with fault detection
(e.g., mean fault detection time) is normally excluded from the prediction model, but can be
included if desired.

The term fault detection and isolation outputs is defined as those indications, symptoms,
printouts, readouts, or the results of manual procedures which separately or in combination,
identify to the maintenance technician the procedure to be followed.

FD&I outputs will vary in form, format, complexity and data content from system to system
and some will be more obvious than others. The maintenance actions taken in response to these
outputs may depend upon the system maintenance environment and the system operating
criticality. It is important, therefore, not only to identify the FD&I outputs but also to ensure
that the FD&I outputs identified are the ones that will be used in the intended maintenance
environment.

Some of the more common generic FD&I outputs are:

a. Indicator or annunciator
b. Diagnostic or BIT output
c. Meter readings
d. Circuit breaker and fuse indicators
e. Display presentation
f. Alarms
g. Improper system operation
h. Improper system response
i. System operating alerts

To apply the prediction methodology presented herein, the predictor should first identify all
primary unique outputs upon which the maintenance technician relies to make decisions on the
repair methodology (e.g., perform adjustment, replace RI, proceed to a different method of fault
isolation, etc.). Secondary outputs should then be identified for those cases where the primary
output yielded a result which did not correct the problem and further isolation is required.

D-21
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX D

D.3.2.4 FD&I outputs and hardware correlation. The key to this prediction procedure, and by
far the most demanding of the prediction tasks, is the establishment of a correlation between the
FD&I outputs (See paragraph 3.2.7) and the hardware for which the prediction is being made.
This step demands a thorough understanding of the system hardware, software, monitoring and
diagnostic capabilities, and of the FD&I features inherent to the system. FD&I features are those
hardware and software elements, or combinations thereof, which generate or cause to be generated
each FD&I output.

This task can be accomplished either from the top down or bottom up. The top down approach
involves a fault tree technique where the top of the tree is each unique FD&I output; the next tier
identifies the FD&I feature(s) which can yield the subject output; and, the bottom tier identifies
the RIs or partial RIs which upon failure would be detected or isolated by the subject FD&I
feature. The bottom up approach involves identification of all the circuitry in terms of RIs
associated with each FD&I feature, and the analysis of how a failure of each RI presents itself in
terms of an FD&I output.

Either approach requires the same five steps to be performed:

a. Identify all FD&I features

b. Identify the circuitry associated with each feature
c. Identify the FD&I sequencing
d. Establish the RI failure rate associated with each FD&I feature
e. Correlate the FD&I features with the FD&I outputs

FD&I features are those hardware and software elements, or combinations thereof, which
generate or cause to be generated each FD&I output. Typical features include diagnostic program
routines, BIT routines, BITE, performance monitoring programs, status monitors, and test
points.

After the FD&I features are identified, the circuit schematics are analyzed to identify the
components tested or verified by each feature. The outputs of this analysis are then translated
into a matrix as shown in Figure D-5. The matrix identifies, for each FD&I feature, the RIs and
components which are tested by that feature. Also included in the matrix is an identifier which
defines the order in which the FD&I features are utilized during the isolation process.

D-22
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX D

FIGURE D-5. Matrix for Correlating FD&I Features with RIs.

The matrix is used to identify the failure rate of each RI associated with each FD&I feature. The
first FD&I feature is examined and the failure rate of each component associated with that feature
is entered in the matrix under that feature. The second feature is then examined, etc. If a
component is tested by more than one feature, the failure rate is assigned to the first feature
which would result in a positive failure indication. If different tests of the same component
check different failure modes, then the failure rate is apportioned to each feature based on the
relative occurrence of each failure mode. The failure rates for the components under each RI in
each FD&I feature column are summed and entered as the failure rate for the RI checked by that
particular feature. This assumes the feature either checks a single RI or can check multiple RIs
by some sequencing scheme. Components not included under any FD&I features represent
failures not isolated with the FD&I features. The failure rates of the failures not isolated by the
FD&I features are noted in the manual isolation failure rate column of the matrix to complete the
accounting of the total equipment failure rate. All manual isolation cases must be accounted for.

In those cases where the nth failure rate is known to result in several FD&I outputs, but the
allocated failure rates are not known, the rationale for the assumed allocation of the failure rates
shall be stated.

The next step in the correlation process is to associate the FD&I features with the FD&I
outputs. This is accomplished using a fault tree type diagram such as the sample shown in
Figures D-6 & D-7. The top of the tree consists of all FD&I outputs; the second tier contains
the FD&I features which separately or jointly result in the given FD&I output; and, the bottom
tier presents the RIs associated with each FD&I feature and the failure rate associated with that
feature. The circles are used to assign numbers to all unique FD&I outputs. The triangles

D-23
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX D

identify the order in which RIs are replaced when the replacement concept calls for iterative
replacement.

FIGURE D-6. Fault Isolation Output and RI Correlation Tree.

FIGURE D-7. Manual Fault Isolation Output and RI Correlation Tree (Partial).

D-24
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX D

D.3.2.5 Prepare maintenance flow diagrams. Next a maintenance flow diagram (MFD) is
prepared to establish the R nj values for insertion in the Maintenance Correlation Matrix (Figure
D-10). The MFD is prepared to illustrate the sequence of maintenance required. The symbols
used in the MFD are shown in Table D-III.

TABLE D-III. Symbols Used in the MFD.

Starting Point. (i.e., Failure Occurs and is Detected) or Ending

Point

Activity Block. The top of the block indicates a specific

maintenance activity and the bottom indicates the time
associated with that activity. This is the only symbol that
denotes time.

FD&I Outputs. Designates the primary or secondary unique

FD&I output which defines the subsequent maintenance
activity to be performed. The "j" associated with the output
is entered in the circle.

Decision Point. Defines a point in the maintenance flow at

which time the maintenance technician must make a decision
on which subsequent path to take.

Path Identifier. Uniquely identifies each path by unique RI(n)

n,j and FD&I output (j).

Continuation. Designates continuation from or to another

place in the maintenance flow diagram.

The MFD (as illustrated in Figure D-8) starts on the left side of the figures as a "Failure Occurs
and is Detected" event. If isolation is inherent in fault detection, the next item shown in the
MFD is the unique FD&I outputs. If isolation is not inherent in detection, the next item in the
MFD is the fault detection output. This would be followed by activity blocks which define the
procedure followed to achieve fault isolation. The activity block(s) is followed by the unique
primary FD&I outputs associated with the maintenance actions that have been executed.

Following the FD&I output symbols are shown the activities required for fault correction and
repair verification.

D-25
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX D
1
Apply Power, Start System Start System Shut Down
001 BIT R/R 001 System Yes End
Cooling, Hyd Warm Up Warm Up Clean Up 1,1 1,11
IND SET OK? 9.2 min
4.2 minutes N/A 3.0 minutes 3.0 minutes N/A

No A To Sheet 4
2
Apply Power, Start System Run BIT Yes Shut Down
011 BIT R/R 011 System End
Cooling, Hyd Warm Up Verify Repair Clean Up 2,2 2,12
IND SET OK? 40.4 min
35.4 minutes N/A 3.0 minutes 2.0 minutes N/A

No B To Sheet 4
3
Apply Power, Start System Start System Shut Down
022 BIT R/R 022 Yes End
Cooling, Hyd Warm Up Warm Up System
Clean Up 8.6 min 3,3 3,13 3,14
IND SET 3.6 minutes OK?
N/A 3.0 minutes 2.0 minutes N/A

No
C To Sheet 4
4
Apply Power, Start System Start System Shut Down
031 BIT R/R 031 End
Cooling, Hyd Warm Up Warm Up Clean Up 4,4
IND SET 40.4 min
35.4 minutes N/A 3.0 minutes 2.0 minutes N/A

Failure 5
Occurs Apply Power, Start System Start System Shut Down
and is 039 BIT R/R 039 End
Cooling, Hyd Warm Up Warm Up Clean Up 5,5
Detected IND SET 9.2 min
4.2 minutes N/A 3.0 minutes 2.0 minutes N/A
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

START
6
Apply Power, Start System Start System Shut Down
041 BIT R/R 041 System Yes End
Cooling, Hyd Warm Up Warm Up Clean Up 6,6 6,15
IND SET OK? 9.2 min
6.0 minutes N/A 3.0 minutes 3.0 minutes N/A

No
D To Sheet 4
7
Apply Power, Start System Start System Shut Down
081 BIT R/R 081 End
Cooling, Hyd Warm Up Warm Up Clean Up
IND SET 11.0 min 7,7
6.0 minutes N/A 3.0 minutes 2.0 minutes N/A

8
Apply Power, Start System Start System Yes Shut Down
541 BIT R/R 541 System End
Cooling, Hyd Warm Up Warm Up Clean Up 8,8
IND SET OK? 9.2 min
4.2 minutes N/A 3.0 minutes 2.0 minutes N/A

No E To Sheet 4
9
Apply Power, Start System Start System Shut Down
610 BIT R/R 610 End
Cooling, Hyd Warm Up Warm Up Clean Up 9,9
IND SET 9.2 min
4.2 minutes N/A 3.0 minutes 2.0 minutes N/A

FIGURE D-8. Sample Maintenance Flow Diagram.

D-26
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX D

If an FD&I output results in non-ambiguous maintenance (i.e., primary isolation to a single RI, or
group RI replacement), then an "End" symbol will directly follow the fault correction and
verification activities. If an FD&I output results in an ambiguous result, a verification decision
block is shown after each verification activity (except the last). Any activity (e.g., clean-up)
performed after a positive verification decision is shown in an activity block(s) between the
decision block and the End symbol. Associated with each End symbol is a path identifier which
uniquely identifies each path by RI and FD&I output. For example, the path associated with the
second RI and FD&I Output #12 would be designated as 2, 12.

Care must be exercised to ensure that all possible maintenance actions that could be followed as a
result of an FD&I output observation have been accounted for, especially those that result in
Manual Fault Isolation.

The R nj values are computed by adding the times associated with each activity block from the
"Failure Occurs and is Detected" event to the "end" event for the subject (n, j) pair. Note that
only the activity blocks have time associated with them. The time entered in the individual
activity blocks is computed from a time line analysis prepared in accordance with paragraph
3.2.6. Elemental times entered in the time line analysis are extracted from the following sources
in the order given:

a. Actual times experienced on the subject equipment

b. Standard times from Tables D-IV and D-V (see Section 4)
c. Actual times experienced on similar equipment
d. Other recognized time sources
e. Engineering judgment

In the establishment of the time line analysis, the number of maintainers must be considered. For
example, if a given equipment has two technicians performing maintenance, one technician may
perform disassembly to achieve access to the faulty RI while the second technician
simultaneously performs other work. In the maintenance flow diagram, this would show as a
single maintenance activity with the associated time being the elapsed clock time. If the
parameter of interest was MLH/OH, instead of MTTR, then the time entered in the activity
block would be the combined MLH in lieu of the elapsed time.

D.3.2.6 Time line analysis. The estimated times used in the two prediction methodologies are
synthesized using a time line analysis method. A time line analysis consists of computing the
total elapsed time of a maintenance action by accounting for the time required to perform each
step. The procedure for performing a time line analysis is as follows:

a. Identify each task that comprises the maintenance action

b. Determine the time required to perform each task by either actual times, maintenance
time standards, time studies, or engineering judgment

D-27
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX D

c. Determine which actions can be done simultaneously if more than one maintainer is
available
d. Determine the overall time to perform the maintenance action by summing up the times
to perform each action

Figure D-9 is an example of how to synthesize time for a simple physical task. The time
associated with each task is extracted from column 3, 4, or 5 of Table D-IV.

RI Name: Module T/R Element Maintenance Action: Interchange

Description of the Elemental Tasks Time/Action Qty Total Time
Remove Quick Release Coax 0.04 4 0.16
Remove Slide Lock Connector 0.09 1 0.09
Remove Module 0.09 1 0.09
Replace Module 0.11 1 0.11
Replace Slide Lock Connector 0.12 1 0.12
Replace Quick Release Coax 0.04 4 0.16
Total Time 0.73
FIGURE D-9. Example Time Synthesis Analysis.

D.3.2.7 RI and FD&I output correlation. The results of the preceding section are summarized in
a matrix which shows the relationship among the RIs for which the prediction is being performed
and the total set of FD&I outputs. The matrix (Figure D-10) identifies the RIs across the top
and the unique FD&I Outputs down the left column. In reference to the math models (refer to
paragraph 2.2) the RIs are the "n" parameters and the FD&I outputs are the "j" parameters. Each
RI column is further divided into three columns: Qnj , nj, and R nj

Under each RI column, enter the failure rate ( nj) of the RI (obtained from the FD&I correlation
tree) (See Figure D-6) that is associated with each FD&I output. For each unique output which
has only one RI associated with it, enter a 1 in the Qnj column for that combination. For those
outputs which are associated with 2 or more RIs, the Qnj value is determined by the replacement
concept. If the replacement concept is group RI replacement, enter under Qnj the number of RIs
associated with each output. For example, if three RIs could contribute to the same FD&I
output, then a 3 is entered in the Qnj for each of those RIs. If the replacement concept is
iterative replacement, then Qnj is assigned based on the order of replacement. That is, the first
RI to be replaced upon recognition of the subject FD&I output is designated Qnj = 1, the second
Qnj = 2 and so forth. In cases of iterative replacement, the values for each Qnj is based on the
relative failure rates of the RIs, with the highest failure rate RI assigned as the first replacement
item.

D-28
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX D

1j 1j 1j 2j 2j 2j 3j 3j 3j 4j 4j 4j 5j 5j 5j

FIGURE D-10. Maintenance Correlation Matrix Format.

D.3.2.8 Compute maintainability parameters. Once the MFD and Maintenance Correlation
Matrix have been completed, compute the maintainability parameter(s) using the equations in
Section 2 of this appendix.

D.4.0 TIME STANDARDS

The time standards are tabulated in Table D-IV. The times tabulated in Table D-IV have
corresponding figures referenced which illustrate what each time represents. Table D-V contains
composite times of common maintenance actions that may occur. Columns two and four of
Table D-V denote which times of Table D-IV were used to synthesize each activity (letters
denote removal (A) and replaceable (B) times).

It should be noted that the standard times given are ideals. In actual practice, the task times will
probably be longer due to environmental conditions, the need for gloves or other protective
clothing that may interfere with performing certain tasks, and less than ideal access. For this
reason, as stated in D.3.2.5, elemental times should be extracted from the following sources in the
order given:

a. Actual times experienced on the subject equipment

b. Standard times from Tables D-IV and D-V
c. Actual times experienced on similar equipment
d. Other recognized time sources
e. Engineering judgment

D.4.1 Maintenance task synthesis. Other maintenance tasks can easily be synthesized by the
following method (for an example, see Figure D-9, in paragraph D.3.2.6).

a. List the actions involved for the maintenance task.

b. Obtain the times for each action by using Table D-IV (times that are not listed should
be established either by actual data, time studies, or engineering judgment).
c. Compute the time by summing up each individual time.

D-29
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX D

TABLE D-IV. Elemental Maintenance Actions.

Time Standard Times
Standard Description Remove Replace Interchange Reference
Number (min.) (min.) (min.) Figure
FASTENERS
1 Standard Screws 0.16 0.26 0.42 D-11
2 Hex or Allen Type Screws 0.17 0.43 0.60 D-12
3 Captive Screws 0.15 0.20 0.35 D-13
4 DZUS (1/4 Turnlock) 0.08 0.05 0.13 D-14
5 Tridair Fasteners 0.06 0.06 0.12 D-15
6 Thumbscrews 0.06 0.08 0.14 D-16
7 Machine Screws 0.21 0.46 0.67 D-17
8 Nuts or Bolts 0.34 0.44 0.78 D-18
9 Retaining Rings NA 0.27 NA D-19
LATCHES
10 Drawhook 0.03 0.03 0.06 D-20
11 Spring Clip 0.04 0.03 0.07 D-21
12 Butterfly 0.05 0.05 0.10 D-22
13 ATR (spring loaded, pair) 0.45 0.69 1.14 D-23
14 Lift & Turn 0.03 0.04 0.07 D-24
15 Slide Lock NA NA NA D-25
TERMINAL CONNECTIONS
16 Terminal Posts (per lead) 0.22 0.64 D-26
17 Screw Terminals 0.23 0.45 0.68 D-27
18 Termipoint 0.22 0.30 D-28
19 Wirewrap 0.09 0.24 D-29
20 Taperpin 0.07 0.07 0.14 D-30
21 PCB (a) Discretes 0.14 0.17 D-31
22 (b) Flatpacks 0.14 per 0.13 per D-31
lead flatpack
(c) DIP ICs
23 8 pin 0.46 0.52 D-31
24 14 & 16 pin 0.90 0.86 D-31
CONNECTORS
25 BNC (single pin) 0.07 0.10 10. 17 D-32
26 BNC (multipin) 0.07 0.12 0.19 D-32
27 Quick Release Coax 0.04 0. 04 0.08 D-33
28 Friction Locking NA NA NA D-34
29 Friction Locking with one Jack 0.18 0.20 0.38 D-35
Screw
30 Thread Locking 0.09 0.17 0.26 D-36
31 Slide Locking 0.09 0.12 0.21 D-37
PLUG IN MODULES
32 DIP ICs (into DIP sockets) 0.07 0.14 0.21 D-38
CCAs (without tool) (guided)
40 pin NA NA NA D-39
33 80 pin 0.04 0.07 0. 11 D-39
C CA s (with tool) (guided)
34 40 pin 0.06 0.07 0.13 D-40
35 80 pin 0.09 0.08 0. 17 D-40
CCAs (without tool) (not guided)
40 pin NA NA NA D-41
36 80 pin 0.04 0.16 0.20 D-41
37 Modules 0.09 0.11 0.20 D-42

D-30
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX D

TABLE D-IV. Elemental Maintenance Actions (continued).

Time Standard Times
Standard Description Remove Replace Interchange Reference
Number (min.) (min.) (min.) Figure
MISCELLANEOUS
38 Strip Wire - - 0.10 -
39 Cut Wire of Sleeving - - 0.04 -
40 Dress Wire with Sleeving - - 0.21 -
41 Crimp Lugs - - 0.27 D-43
42 Form Leads (per lead) - - 0.03 D-44
43 Trim Leads (per lead) - - 0.03 -
44 Adhesives 0.55 0.13 0.68 -
45 Conformal Coating 2.20 0.23 2.43 -
46 Soldering (a) Terminal Post - - 0.22 D-45
47 (b) PCB - - 0.06 D-46
48 Reflow Soldering - - 0.25 -
49 Tinning Flatpacks (dipping) - - 0.30 -
50 Desoldering (a) Braided Wick - - 0.16 D-47
51 (b) Solder Sucker - - 0.09 D-48
52 Form Flatpack Leads - - 0.11 D-49
(Mechanically)
53 Clean Surface - - 0.29 -
54 Panels, Doors & Covers 0.04 0.03 0.07 D-50
55 Drawers (Large) 0.09 0.10 0.19 D-51
56 Display Lamps 0.10 0.11 0.21 D-52
57 Threaded Connector Covers 0.11 0.14 0.25 -
NOTE: Data obtained from RADC-TR-70-89, Maintainability Prediction and Demonstration Techniques

TABLE D-V. Common Maintenance Tasks.

Elements of Remove Elements of Replace Interchange
Description Removal* (min.) Replacement* (min.) (min.)
1. R/R of transistor from a 50(3), 21A(3), 53 1.19 42(3), 21B(3), 47(3), 1.16 2.35
PCB 43(3), 53
2. R/R of a transistor from 50(3), 16A(3), 53 1.43 42(3), 16B(3), 43(3), 3.05 4.48
terminal posts 46(3), 53
3. R/R of an axial component 50(2), 21A(2), 53 0.89 42(2), 21B(2), 47(2), 0.87 1.76
from a PCB 43(2), 53
4. R/R of an axial component 50(2), 16A(2), 53 1.05 42(2), 16B(2), 43(2), 1.69 2.74
from terminal posts 46(2), 53
5. R/R of a radial component 50(2), 21A(2), 53 0.89 21B(2), 43(2), 47(2), 53 0.81 1.70
from a PCB
6. R/R of a radial component 50(2), 16A(2), 53 1.05 42(2), 16B(2), 43(2), 1.69 2.74
from terminal posts 46(2), 53
7. R/R of a terminal point 18A 0.22 39, 20B 0.34 0.56
connection
8. R/R of a wirewrap 19A 0.09 39, 38, 19B 0.38 0.47
connection
9. R/R of a 16 pin IC from a 50(16), 24A, 53 3.75 24B, 47(16), 43(16), 53 2.59 6.34
PCB
10. R/R of a 16 pin flatpack 50(16), 22A(16), 53 5.09 49, 52, 22B, 48, 53 1.08 6.17
11. R/R an 8 pin IC from a PCB 50(8), 23A, 53 2.03 23B, 47(8), 43(8), 53 1.53 3.56
* Numbers in these columns pertain to the time standard numbers in Table D-IV. A and B refer to removal and replacement
times respectively. The number in parentheses refers to the quantity of each action. R/R = removal and replacement.

D-31
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX D

Standard Screws
This time is for all standard threaded fasteners such as; slotted head, Phillips head, and
fillister head
The time given is the time required to remove/replace the fastener from the hole and
disengage/or engage it by several twisting motions of the hand (approximately 8 twists)
Tool required is standard screwdriver (flat head, Phillips, or hex)

FIGURE D-11. Standard Screws.

Hex or Allen Set Screws

This time is for hex or Allen type set screws
The time given is for the time to tighten/or loosen a hexagonal type
set screw using an Allen type wrench
Tools required are hex wrenches or Allen type wrenches

FIGURE D-12. Hex or Allen Set Screws.

Captive Screws
This time is for standard fasteners that are captive to the
panel/bracket they secure
The time given for this action includes the time to engage/or
disengage the fastener by a series of twisting motions with the hand
The tool required is a standard screwdriver (flathead, Phillips or
hex)

FIGURE D-13. Captive Screws.

D-32
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX D

DZUS Fastener
This time is for fasteners that require only a 1/4 turn to
engage or disengage (fastener is captive)
The time given is the time required to engage or disengage
the fastener by a 1/4 twist motion of the hand
The tool required is a standard screwdriver (flathead,
Phillips or hex)

FIGURE D-14. DZUS Fasteners.

Tridair Fastener
This fastener is a quick engaging fastener that requires
less than one turn
This time includes the time necessary to engage/or
disengage the fastener using a turn of the hand
The tool required is an Allen wrench

FIGURE D-15. Tridair Fastener.

Thumbscrews
This fastener is a threaded screw with a head that can be
grasped easily by the hand
This time includes the time necessary to disengage/or
engage the fastener by turning it with the hand
No tools required

FIGURE D-16. Thumbscrews.

D-33
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX D

Machine Screws (with nut)

This fastener is any threaded fastener that does not tap into the structure; instead it
engages into a loose nut
This time includes the time to remove/or position the fastener and nut and the time
required to tighten the fastener
Tools required are a screwdriver and a wrench

FIGURE D-17. Machine Screws.

Nuts or Bolts
Any fastener that requires a wrench to tighten it down
This time includes the time necessary to position the wrench and engage/or disengage the
fastener

FIGURE D-18. Nuts or Bolts.

D-34
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX D

Retaining Rings
This device is a "U" shaped piece of metal that retains a
unit/component in position
The time given includes the time necessary to engage/or
disengage this fastener
Special pliers are required to remove/replace this fastener

FIGURE D-19. Retaining Rings.

Drawhook Latch
Any latch that is similar to the one shown here
The time includes the time to engage/disengage the latch
completely
No tools required

FIGURE D-20. Drawhook Latch.

Spring Clip Catch

Any latch similar to the one shown here
Time includes the time necessary to engage/or disengage
the latch completely
No tools required

FIGURE D-21. Spring Clip Catch.

D-35
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX D

Butterfly Latch
Any latch similar to the one shown here
Time includes the time necessary to engage/or disengage
the latch completely. Normally consists of the time to
lift the tab and turn it 90
No tools required

FIGURE D-22. Butterfly Latch.

ATR Latch
Any latch similar to the one shown here
Time includes the time necessary to unscrew/or screw
the cap over the nib to engage/or disengage the secured
unit. The time given is for a pair of ATR latches.
No tools required

FIGURE D-23. ATR Latch.

Lift and Turn Latch

Any latch similar to the one shown here
Time includes the time necessary to lift the handle and
turn it to unsecure or secure a door or panel
No tools required

FIGURE D-24. Lift and Turn Latch.

D-36
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX D

Slide Lock Latch

Any latch similar to the one shown here
The time given is the time necessary to slide the locking
device to engage/or disengage the panel
No tools required

FIGURE D-25. Slide Lock Latch.

Terminal Posts
Any terminal connection similar to the ones shown here
This time is the time required to remove or replace a lead
from a terminal (does not include soldering or
desoldering)
Needle nose pliers are required for this task

FIGURE D-26. Terminal Post Connections.

Screw Terminals
Any terminal connection similar to the one shown here
This time is the time required to remove/or position the
terminal lug and loosen/or tighten the screw
A screwdriver is required

FIGURE D-27. Screw Terminal Connections.

D-37
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX D

Termipoint Connections
Any terminal connection similar to the one shown here
This time is the time required to remove the clip with a
pick or tweezers and the time to replace the clip with a
termipoint gun
Tools required are tweezers, or a pick, and a termipoint
gun

FIGURE D-28. Termipoint Connection.

Wirewrap
Any terminal connection similar to the one shown here
The time given are to replace the wirewrap with a
wirewrap gun and to remove the connection with an
unwrapping tool
Tools required are a wirewrap gun and an unwrapping
tool

FIGURE D-29. Wirewrap Connection.

Taperpin
Any terminal connection similar to the one shown
here
The time given is the time required to unplug mate or
demate the connector
No tool required

FIGURE D-30. Taperpin Connection.

D-38
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX D

PCB
Any terminal connected directly to the printed circuitry of a circuit card
The time given is the time required to remove or replace a lead from the PCB (no soldering
or desoldering time included)
The tools required are a pick or needlenose pliers

FIGURE D-31. PCB Connections.

BNC Connectors
Any connector that has a bayonet-locking device
Times given are for mating/demating the connectors by a
twisting motion
No tool required

FIGURE D-32. BNC Connectors.

Quick Release Coax Connectors

Any coax connector that engages or disengages by a push
or pull motion
Times given are for demating/mating the connectors by a
pulling or pushing motion
No tool required

FIGURE D-33. Quick Release Coax Connectors.

D-39
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX D

Friction Locking Connectors

Any connector that is mated and secured by the friction
of the pins and/or connector case
The time given is the time necessary to mate or demate
these connector types
No tool required

FIGURE D-34. Friction Locking Connector.

Friction Locking Connector with Jackscrew

Any friction locking connector that is secured by a
jackscrew
The time given is the time necessary to demate/mate the
connector by disengaging/engaging the jackscrew
No tool required

FIGURE D-35. Friction Locking Connector with Jackscrew.

Thread Locking Connector

Any connector that is secured by a threaded connector
shell
The time given is for the demating/mating of the
connector and the securing/unsecuring of it by a turning
motion
No tools required

FIGURE D-36. Threadlocking Connector.

D-40
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX D

Slide Locking Connector

Any connector that is secured by a slide lock
The time given is the time required to mate/demate the
connector and engage/disengage the slide lock
No tools required

FIGURE D-37. Slide Locking Connector.

DIP ICs
This includes any dip IC that is secured in a dip socket
The time given is the time required to unplug or plug in
the dip IC
No tools required

FIGURE D-38. Dip ICs.

Guided CCAs
Any guided CCA that is inserted/removed by hand
The time given is the time to pull out or push in the
CCA
No tools required

FIGURE D-39. Guided CCAs.

D-41
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX D

Guided CCAs with a Tool

This time is associated with any CCA that is
inserted/removed with a card extracting tool
The time includes the time required to position the tool
and remove/replace the CCA
A card extracting tool is required

FIGURE D-40. Guided CCAs with a Tool.

Non-guided CCAs
This time is associated with plug-in cards that are not
guided
The time includes the time required to remove/replace the
CCA from the edge connector (does not include time for
fasteners)
No tools required

FIGURE D-41. Non-guided CCAs.

Modules
This is the time associated with removing or positioning
a modular assembly
The time is the time necessary to remove the module or
position it in place
No tools required

FIGURE D-42. Modules.

D-42
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX D

Crimp Lugs
This is the time associated with securing a terminal lug to
a wire
The time given includes the time to position the wire in
the lug and crimp it
A crimping tool is required

FIGURE D-43. Crimp Lugs.

Form Leads
This is the time associated with forming a lead on a
component prior to connecting it to a terminal
The time given is the time necessary to grasp the lead
with the pliers and form it
Needle nose pliers are required

FIGURE D-44. Form Leads.

Soldering Terminal Posts

The time associated with soldering a lead to a terminal
post
The time given is the time to heat the terminal post and
apply the solder
A soldering iron is required

FIGURE D-45. Soldering Terminal Posts.

Soldering PCB Connections

The time associated with soldering a lead to a PCB
etching
The time given is the time to heat the etching pad and
apply the solder
A soldering iron is required

FIGURE D-46. Soldering PCB Connections.

D-43
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX D

Desoldering using a Braided Wick

The time associated with desoldering a connection using
a braided copper wick
The time given is the time to reheat the solder and extract
it from the PCB or terminal using a braided copper wick
A soldering iron and braided copper wick are required

FIGURE D-47. Desoldering with a Braided Wick.

Desoldering using a Vacuum

The time associated with desoldering a connection using
a vacuum assisted desoldering iron
The time given is the time required to reheat and "suck-
up" the solder
A desoldering iron is required

FIGURE D-48. Desoldering Using a Vacuum.

Form Flat Pack Leads

The time associated with forming flatpack leads using a
mechanically operated die
The time given is the time required to position the
flatpack and actuate the mechanism
A mechanically operated device is used to do this

FIGURE D-49. Form Flat Pack Leads.

D-44
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX D

Panels, Doors, and Covers

The time associated with open/closing panels, doors and covers
No tools required

FIGURE D-50. Panels, Doors and Covers.

Drawers
The time associated with opening/closing of drawers that
are on a track
No tools required

FIGURE D-51. Drawers.

Display Lamps
The time required to remove/replace panel indicators that
pop in and out
No tools required

FIGURE D-52. Display Lamps.

D-45
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX D

This page has been left blank intentionally.

D-46
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX E

PHASING OF MAINTAINABILITY ELEMENTS

Scope. This Appendix is an essential part of MIL-HDBK-470A. The information contained

herein is intended for reference only. This Appendix is for guidance only and cannot be cited as a
requirement. If it is, the contractor does not have to comply.

E.1.0 Product Life Cycle

A product goes through several phases during its life cycle. The number, title, and definitions of
the phases vary slightly between the military and commercial communities, and even among
commercial companies, but are similar. The life cycle acquisition phases defined by DoD
Regulation 5000.2-R are:

Phase 0 - Concept Exploration

Phase I - Program Definition and Risk Reduction
Phase II - Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD)
Phase III - Production, Fielding/Deployment, and Operational Support

DoD 5000.2-R does recognize that it is necessary to demilitarize and dispose of a product1 at the
end of its useful life. Although not designated as an acquisition phase, the period of time over
which demilitarization and disposal occurs could be considered the Phase-out and Retirement
phase of a product's life cycle.

Each phase has specific objectives and the activities conducted during the phase must support
these objectives. Milestone decision points mark the beginning and end of the acquisition
phases. The milestone decision points are:

Milestone 0 - Approval to Conduct Concept Studies (beginning of phase 0)

Milestone I - Approval to Begin a New Acquisition Program (end of Phase 0,
beginning of Phase I)
Milestone II - Approval to Enter EMD (end of Phase I, beginning of Phase II)
Milestone III - Production or Deployment Approval (end of Phase II, beginning
of Phase III)

For some products, a phase may be "abbreviated" or even "skipped." For example, the R&D
phase for a new product that is simply an updated or moderately improved version of an older,
mature product will likely be very short, concentrating only on the differences between the two.

1
DoD Directive 5000.1 and DoD Regulation 5000.2-R use the term "system", not product. Recall, however, that
within this handbook, the general term "product" will be used to mean system, equipment, or item. It could be a
vehicle, a transmission, or an engine, whatever is being developed under the acquisition program.

E-1
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX E

Figure E-1 shows the life cycle phases, milestone decision points, the objectives of each phase,
and a summary of the activities associated with each phase.

ACQUISITION PHASES
0 I II III
Concept Program Definition Engineering and Production,
Exploration and Risk Reduction Manufacturing Fielding/Deployment,
Development and Operational
Support
1. Define and 1. Define program as 1. Translate most 1. Produce and
O evaluate the one or more concepts promising design manufacture the
b feasibility of approach into stable, product
j alternative concepts 2. Pursue design producible, supportable,
e to meet deficiencies approaches and and cost effective design 2. Deploy the
c parallel technologies product
t 2. Provide the basis 2. Validate
i for assessing manufacturing and 3. Operate and
v relative merits of production processes maintain the
e alternative concepts product
s at next decision 3. Demonstrate product
milestone capabilities through
testing

1. Validate 1. Conduct 1. Achieve design Manufacturing

A assessment of need prototyping, stability Use of the product
c demonstrations, and in the intended
t 2. Conduct concept early operational 2. Verify adequate environment,
K i studies assessments to reduce resources have been scheduled and
e v risk programmed for unscheduled
y i 3. Develop product production, maintenance,
t requirements in 2. Update product deployment, and improvements
i terms of requirements support through updates
e effectiveness and and modifications,
s performance 3. Identify 3. Conduct IOT&E performance
measures accomplishments to be tracking
completed in Phase 2

Milestone 0 Milestone I Milestone II Milestone III

Decision Point Decision Point Decision Point Decision Point
MILESTONE DECISION POINTS
FIGURE E-1. Life Cycle Phases of a Product.

The product will be kept in service, sometimes beyond the original intended service life through
life extension efforts. Eventually, it will be necessary to retire and dispose of the product.
Removal of a product from service can entail the disposal of toxic materials, recovery of precious
metals, and recycling.

E-2
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX E

E.2.0 Maintainability Activities by Life Cycle Phase.

The maintainability activities conducted during each of the life cycle phases of a product must be
consistent with and support the overall objectives for the phases. In the following discussion,
maintainability activities will be discussed in the context of the phase(s) in which they are most
applicable. It is not practical to try and address all possible types of products, so the discussion
assumes that a major product, such as an aircraft, tank, turbine engine, or similar item, is being
developed. It should be obvious that the level of effort and types and scope of activities that
would be necessary for a portable, man-carried receiver/transmitter will not be the same as for a
new tactical fighter or main battle tank. Figure E-2 summarizes the discussion.

E.2.1 Phase 0 - Concept Exploration. During the concept exploration phase, the
maintainability activities are necessarily intended to prepare for Phase I. The maintainability
program plan may be started in which the goals and objectives for the new product are broadly
stated. Some analysis may be made of prior similar products to help establish ranges of realistic
maintainability goals. Very general modeling may be used to complement the analysis in deriving
ranges of maintainability goals. Also, new approaches and technologies related to maintainability
design, analysis, and validation can be identified during this phase.

E.2.2 Phase I - Program Definition and Risk Reduction. For the alternative concepts that
are carried into this phase, the maintainability effort becomes more intense and focused.
Additional detail is added to the maintainability program plan. Additional analysis is required to
begin developing better defined maintainability requirements for the next phase of acquisition.
Maintainability engineers should be participating in and supporting trade studies in which the
various alternatives are compared, different design approaches are evaluated, and overall system
requirements are harmonized2. Some program and design reviews are usually held during this
phase, and the issue of maintainability must be considered during these reviews. The emphasis
during these early reviews will be to choose among the alternative concepts. An understanding of
the strengths and weaknesses of the alternatives, from a maintainability perspective, must be one
result of these reviews. Preliminary modeling, high-level maintainability block diagrams of the
various maintenance concepts for each design concept may be needed. In addition, the
maintainability concept must be evaluated to ensure that the necessary and proper general design
attributes are assigned to each product element. Data from whatever prototyping, proof-of-
concept demonstrations, and similar "testing" is conducted should be analyzed in evaluating the
relative maintainability of each concept and in determining realistic maintainability characteristics
for the product.

2
As used here, harmonization refers to developing a set of consistent, non-conflicting requirements for the product.
Compromises and trade-offs are made to ensure that the overall performance (including maintainability) of the
product is optimized, rather than any single requirement. Of course, the various requirements may be prioritized and
the resulting harmonized set of requirements must reflect this prioritization. Finally, the goal of a totally
harmonized set of requirements is elusive and the effort continues during Phase 3 as unexpected problems are
revealed, especially during test.

E-3
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX E
ACQUISITION PHASES
Key 0 I II III
Maintainability Concept Program Definition Engineering and Manufacturing Production, Fielding/

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

Activities Exploration and Risk Reduction Development Deployment, and Operational
Support
Program Plan S G (2) G G (2) (1)

Supplier Control S G G (Prod), S (Opnl)

Program & Design

Reviews S G (2) G G (Prod), S (Opnl)

Design S (2) G C (Prod), S (Opnl)

Analysis
S (2) G (2) G (1) C (1) (Prod), S (Opnl)

Modeling
S S (3) G C (Prod), S (3)
Test & Demo

S G C (Prod), S (Opnl)
Data Collection,
Analysis &
Corrective Action S G G (Prod), S (Opnl)

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

Milestone 0 Milestone I Milestone II Milestone III
MILESTONES
Definition of Codes:
S - Selectively applicable Opnl - Operational Support
G - Generally applicable (1) - Requires considerable interpretation of intent to be cost effective

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
C - Generally applicable to design changes only (2) - Appropriate for those task elements suitable to defining during this phase
Prod - Production (3) - Depends on physical complexity of the product, its packaging, and overall
maintenance concept.

FIGURE E-2. Application of Activities by Phase.

E-4
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX E

E.2.3 Phase II - Engineering and Manufacturing Development. Usually only one concept is
carried into Phase II. As indicated in Figure E-1, the objectives of this phase are to:

translate the most promising design approach into a stable, producible, supportable, and
cost effective design
validate the manufacturing and production processes to be implemented in Phase III
demonstrate product capabilities through testing

During this phase, the design of the product is matured. The processes that will be used to
manufacture and produce the product are developed. Development test and evaluation (DT&E)
and some initial operational test and evaluation (IOT&E) is conducted to verify the design and
demonstrate the product's performance. Consequently, it is during this phase that the
maintainability effort is most intense. The maintainability program plan must clearly define:

the activities (tasks) to be conducted during this phase

the purpose and expected result of each activity
who will perform each activity
when each activity must be performed
the resources required for the activities

General and specific design criteria, standards, and policies for maintainability are defined and
implemented. Requirements for suppliers are developed based on allocations of product-level
maintainability requirements. Maintainability analyses are conducted to evaluate the evolving
design, identify problems, and develop solutions to those problems. Modeling and simulation are
used as part of the evaluation effort. Predictions and estimates of maintainability are made, first
using only analytical inputs. As testing and demonstrations occur, data from these events are
collected and analyzed to refine the estimates of the design maintainability. Based on the design
maintainability and the results of any IOT&E, assessments can be made of the operational
maintainability of the product. The effectiveness of diagnostics, especially built-in test,
accessibility for maintenance, the adequacy of the man-machine interface, and other issues are
addressed. Support and training equipment requirements, and maintenance training requirements
must be identified as well as support facilities. Maintainability engineers are concerned with the
development of maintenance procedures, determining sparing requirements, and in developing the
needed inputs to the detailed maintenance plan and logistics support analysis. Data collection,
analysis, and corrective action is an essential activity during this phase because it supports the
analysis, design, and evaluation efforts.

E.2.4 Phase III - Production, Fielding/Deployment, and Operational Support. During

production, the focus of the maintainability effort will be to ensure that the designed level of

E-5
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX E

maintainability is not compromised by any proposed engineering changes. Additional

operational testing and demonstration will occur during production and deployment, and the
maintainability engineer must be involved with these efforts to refine and update the assessment
of the product's operational maintainability. The maintainability program plan may be updated
to better define the activities to be conducted during production, deployment, and operational
support. Supplier control will continue during production and may continue into the operational
support phase. During the operational support portion of this phase, efforts must continue to
track and evaluate proposed design changes (due to modifications and upgrades), track and
evaluate the operational maintainability of the product, identify problems (ideally before they
occur), and develop solutions for these problems. Maintainability design, analysis, and test will
be required to support modifications, whether those modifications are made to address
maintainability or for any other reason (e.g., safety, upgrade functional performance, extend life,
etc.).

E.2.5 Demilitarization and Disposal. When some military products reach the end of their
useful life, they may need to be demilitarized prior to disposal. It will be necessary to dispose of
all "discarded" product. Disposal may involve component and material reclamation and
disposal. To some extent, the maintainability engineer can address disposal and reclamation by
considering material durability, environmental concerns, statutory regulations governing material
disposal, and the methods and locations where reclamation and disposal might be performed
during design. Special attention should be paid to the reclamation of precious metals and the
disposal of hazardous or radioactive materials. During disposal, Lessons Learned files are
updated, and in-depth tear-down analyses are often conducted of selected components to update
service life data.

E-6
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX F

MAINTAINABILITY REFERENCES

F.1.0 Scope. This Appendix is an essential part of MIL-HDBK-470A. The information

contained herein is intended for reference only. This appendix identifies both the Government
and non-government documents from which material and ideas, dealing specifically with
maintainability, were considered for incorporation in this handbook update. Applicable
document sources include: DoD: directives, standards, handbooks, guide documents and
laboratory reports; ANSI and member professional societies including the SAE and IEEE; IEC;
NATO; and other published literature.

Those documents marked with an asterisk (*) are being or have been canceled by the government
when this handbook was published. However, since many companies may have copies and may
wish to use them as references, they are listed here. Those marked with a double asterisk (**) are
being converted or have been converted to military handbooks, data specs, design criteria
standards, or standard practices.

This Appendix is for guidance only and cannot be cited as a requirement. If it is, the contractor
does not have to comply.

F.2.0 US Government documents. Copies of current US Government documents are available

from: Standardization Document Order Desk, 700 Robbins Avenue, Building 4D, Philadelphia,
PA 19111-5094.

2.1 Department Of Defense Directives and Instructions

DOD 4120.3 Defense Standardization Program Policies and Procedures

DOD 5000.1 Defense Acquisition
DOD 5000.2-R Mandatory Procedures for Major Defense Acquisition Programs
(MDAPs) and Major Automated Information System Acquisition
Programs (MAISAPs)
*DOD 5000.39 Acquisition and Management of ILS for Systems and Equipment
*DOD 5000.40 Reliability and Maintainability

F.2.2 Department Of Defense Standards

MIL-STD-280 Definitions of Item Levels, Item Exchangeability, Models and Related

Terms
*MIL-STD-721 Definition of Terms for Reliability and Maintainability

F-1
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX F

DOD-STD-863 Military Standard Wiring Data and Schematic Diagrams, Preparation of

MIL-STD-962 Defense Standards and Handbooks
MIL-STD-1309 Definition of Terms for Testing, Measurement, and Diagnostics
*MIL-STD-1369 Integrated Logistic Support Program Requirements
**MIL-STD-1388-1 Logistics Support Analysis
**MIL-STD-1388-2 DOD Requirements for a Logistics Support Analysis Record
**MIL-STD-1472 Human Engineering Design Criteria for Military Systems, Equipment and
Facilities
*MIL-STD-1568 Materials and Processes for Corrosion Prevention and Control in
Aerospace Weapons Systems
*MIL-STD-1629 Procedures for Performing an FMECA
MIL-STD-1686 Electrostatic Discharge Control Program for Protection of Electronic Parts,
Assemblies and Equipment
DOD-STD-1701 Hardware Diagnostic Test System Requirements
MIL-STD-1761 Fastener Recess Test, Method for Damage Tolerance Evaluation
MIL-STD-1814 Integrated Diagnostics
MIL-STD-2067 Aircrew Automated Escape Systems R&M Program, Requirements for
MIL-STD-2073-1 DOD Standard Practice for Military Packaging
*DOD-STD-2107 Product Assurance Program Requirements for Contractors
MIL-STD-2155 Failure Reporting, Analysis and Corrective Action System
MIL-STD-2173 Reliability-Centered Maintenance Requirements for Naval Aircraft,
Weapons Systems and Support Equipment

F.2.3 Department Of Defense Handbooks

MIL-HDBK-217 Reliability Prediction of Electronic Equipment

MIL-HDBK-263 Electrostatic Discharge Control Handbook for Protection of Electrical and
Electronic Parts, Assemblies and Equipment
MIL-HDBK-338 Electronic Reliability Design Handbook
MIL-HDBK-454 Standard General Guidelines for Electronic Equipment
MIL-HDBK-470 Maintainability Program for Systems and Equipment
*MIL-HDBK-471 Maintainability Verification / Demonstration/ Evaluation
MIL-HDBK-472 Maintainability Prediction
MIL-HDBK-759 Human Engineering Design for Military Materiel

F-2
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX F

DOD-HDBK-791 Maintainability Design Techniques

MIL-HDBK-792 Prove Out of Production Facilities
MIL-HDBK-798 System Engineer's Design for Discard Handbook
MIL-HDBK-1472 Human Engineering Design Criteria for Military Systems, Equipment and
Facilities
MIL-HDBK-2084 General Guidelines for Maintainability of Avionics and Electronic System
and Equipment
MIL-HDBK-2165 Testability Program for Systems and Equipment
*MIL-HDBK-46855 Human Engineering Guidelines for Military Systems, Equipment, and
Facilities

F.2.4 Department Of Defense Guide Documents

AF GUIDE SPEC. 87256 Integrated Diagnostics

F.2.5 Rome Laboratory Reports. Copies of the following Rome Laboratory documents are
available from: the Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC-FDAC), Cameron Station,
Building 5, Alexandria, VA 22304-6145, Tel (703) 274-7633 or from the National Technical
Information Service (NTIS), Department of Commerce, 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, VA
22161-2171, Tel (703) 487-4650.

RL-TR-95-289 Fault Logging Using a Micro Time Stress Device

RL-TR-94-196 Micro-Time Stress Measurement Device Development
RL-TR-94-232 Reliability And Maintainability Design Expert System
RL-TR-93-209 A Quality Process Approach to Electronic Systems Reliability: (Two
volumes)Handbook Procedure
RL-TR-92-12 Testability Design Rating System: Testability Handbook (Vol I) 2 Vols
and Analytical Procedure (Vol II)
RL-TR-91-6 Digital Logic Testing and Testability, In-House Report
RADC-TR-90-31 A Contractors Program Manager's Testability / Diagnostics Guide
RADC-TR-89-209 Computer-Aided Design for Built-In Test
RADC-TR-89-230 Fault Simulation Evaluation
RADC-TR-78-169 Maintainability Prediction and Analysis Study
RADC-TR-70-89 Maintainability Prediction and Demonstration Techniques (Final Report)
RADC-TR-69-356 Maintainability Prediction and Demonstration Techniques (2 Volumes)

F-3
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX F

F.2.6 Air Force Documents. Copies of the following document are no longer available.

*DH 1-9 AFSC Design Handbook, Series 1-0 General - Maintainability

F.2.7 US Army Documents. Copies of the following documents are no longer available.

QR-870-J Maintainability Program for Systems and Equipment Development

AMCP 706-133 Engineering Design Handbook: Maintainability engineering Theory and
Practice

F.2.8 US Navy Documents. Copies of the following documents are no longer available.

*NAVAIR 01-1A-31 Reliability and Maintainability Management Handbook

*NAVAIR 01-1A-33 Maintainability Engineering Handbook

F.2.9 National Aeronautical And Space Administration (NASA) Documents. Copies of

current NASA documents are available from: NASA Center for Aerospace Information, 800
Elkridge Landing Rd., Linthicum Heights, MD 21090-2934, Tel, (301) 621-0134, Fax, (301) 621-
0100.

NASA NHB 5300.4 (1G) Reliability, Maintainability, and Quality Assurance Publication,
NASA Assurance Terms and Definitions
NASA NHB 5300.4 (1E) Reliability, Maintainability, and Quality Assurance Publication,
Maintainability Program Requirements for Space System

F.3.0 Non-Government Publications.

F.3.1 International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) Documents. Copies of IEC

documents are available from: American National Standards Institute, 1430 Broadway, New
York, NY 10018, Telephone, (212) 642-4900, FAX, (212) 302-1286.

IEC 50 Chap 191 International Electrotechnical Vocabulary Chapter 191: Dependability and
Quality of Service
IEC 300 - 3-2 Dependability Management - Part 3: Application Guide - Section 2:
Collection of Dependability Data from the Field
IEC 362 Guide for the Collection of Reliability, Availability, and Maintainability
Data from Field Performance of Electronic Items
IEC 706 - 1 Guide on Maintainability of Equipment - Part 1: Sections One, Two and
Three: Introduction, Requirements and Maintainability Programme

F-4
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX F

IEC 706 - 2 Guide on Maintainability of Equipment - Part 2: Section Five:

Maintainability Studies During the Design Phase
IEC 706 - 3 Guide on Maintainability of Equipment - Part 3: Sections Six and Seven:
Verification and Collection, Analysis and Presentation of Data
IEC 706 - 4 Guide on Maintainability of Equipment - Part 4: Section 8: Maintenance
and Maintenance Support Planning
IEC 706 - 5 Guide on Maintainability of Equipment - Part 5: Section 4: Diagnostic
Testing
IEC-812 Analysis Techniques for System Reliability - Procedure for Failure Mode
and Effects Analysis (FMEA)
IEC 706 - 6 Guide on Maintainability of Equipment - Part 6: Section 9: Statistical
Methods in Maintainability Evaluation
IEC 812 Analysis Techniques for System Reliability - Procedure for Failure Mode
and Effects Analysis
IEC 863 Presentation Of Reliability, Maintainability and Availability Predictions

F.3.2 American National Standards Institute (ANSI) Documents. Copies of ANSI

documents are available from: American National Standards Institute, 1430 Broadway, New
York, NY 10018, Telephone, (212) 642-4900, FAX, (212) 302-1286.

ANSI/IEEE 762 Standard Definitions for Use in Reporting Electric Generating Unit
Reliability, Availability, and Productivity
ANSI/SAE AIR 4276 Survey Results: Computerization of Reliability, Maintainability and
Supportability (RM&S) in Design

F.3.3 Society Of Automotive Engineers (SAE) Documents. Copies of SAE documents are
available from: SAE International, Publications Sales, 400 Commonwealth Drive, Warrendale, PA
15096-0001, Telephone, (412) 776-4970, FAX, (412) 776-5760.

SAE ARD 50010 Recommended RMS Terms And Parameters

SAE ARD 50046 RMS Information Sourcebook
SAE M-102 Reliability, Maintainability, and Supportability Guidebook
SAE J 1739 Potential Failure Mode And Effects Analysis in Design (Design FMEA)
and Failure Mode And Effects Analysis in Manufacturing and Assembly
Processes (Process FMEA) Reference Manual, Recommended Practice
SAE HS-2600 SAE Maintainability, Repairability, and Serviceability Standards Manual

F-5
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX F

F.3.4 Automotive Industries Action Group (AIAG) Documents. Copies of the following
AIAG document are available from: Automotive Industry Action Group, 26200 Lahser Road,
Suite 200, Southfield, MI 48034, Telephone (313) 358-3003.

(No number) Potential Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA).

F.3.5 Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) Documents. Copies of IEEE
document are available from: IEEE, 445 Hoes Lane, P.O. Box 1331, Piscataway, NJ 08855-1331,
Telephone, (800) 678-IEEE, FAX, (908) 981-9667.

IEEE-STD-1149.1 Standard Test Access Port and Boundary-Scan Architecture

F.3.6 Air Transport Association Documents. Copies of ATA document are available from:
Air Transport Association of America, P.O. Box 511, Annapolis Junction, MD 20701,
Telephone, (202) 626-4000.

ATA-Spec. 2100 Digital Data Standards for Aircraft Support

F.3.7 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Documents. Copies of NATO

documents are available from: Global Engineering, 15 Inverness Way East, Englewood CO 80112-
5704, Telephone, (800) 854-7179, FAX, (303) 792-2192.

NATO ARMP-1 Ed 2 NATO Requirements for Reliability and Maintainability

NATO ARMP-2 Ed 2 General Application Guide on the Use of ARMP-1
NATO ARMP-3 Application of National Reliability And Maintainability Documents
NATO ARMP-5 Guidance on Reliability and Maintainability Training
NATO ARMP-6 In-Service Reliability and Maintainability
NATO ARMP-8 Ed 1 Reliability And Maintainability in the Procurement of Off-the-Shelf
Equipment

F.4.0 Published Literature.

F.4.1 Reliability And Maintainability Symposium Proceedings (RAMS)

Bakken, D., and J. M. Banghart, "More Accurate Maintainability Predictions," 1985 RMS Page
44

Downs, W. R., "Maintainability Analysis versus Maintenance Analysis - Interfaces and

Discrimination," 1976 RMS Page 476

F-6
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX F

Locks, M. O., "Maintainability and Life-Cycle Costing," 1978 RMS Page 251

Rawicz, A. H. and D. R. Girling, "Neural-Network Enhancement for a Reliability Expert-

System", 1994 RMS.

Vannatter, R. L., "New Maintainability Prediction Technique," 1985 RMS Page 39

F.4.2 AUTOTESTCON Proceedings

Debany, W.H., D.E. Daskiewich and C.R. Unkle, "Integrating Logic Simulation And Dependency
Modeling," AUTOTESTCON, 1993.

DeMare, G. and G. Giordano, "Intelligent Maintenance Aid "Software," AUTOTESTCON, 1994.

Franco, J.R., "Experiences Gained Using the Navy's IDSS Weapon System Testability
Analyzer," AUTOTESTCON, 1988.

Su, L.P. Dr., G. de Mare, and M. Nolan, "DARTS: An Enabling Technology for Concurrent
Engineering," AUTOTESTCON, 1993

F.4.3 Other Symposia

Johnson, F. and R. Unkle, "The System Testability and Maintenance Program (STAMP), A
Testability Assessment Tool For Aerospace Systems," AIAA/NASA Symposium on
Maintainability of Aerospace Systems, 1989.

Saporito, J. and C.R. Unkle, "An Approach to Bed-Of-Nails Testing Using Dependency
Modeling Techniques," Proceedings, Symposium On the Role of Reliability, Availability, and
Maintainability in Providing Quality Army Equipment, June 1992.

F.4.4 Journals

SAE Communications in RMS, Knezevic, J., "Maintainability Prediction at the Design Level,"
Vol. 1, No. 1, Winter 1994.

F.4.5 Corporate Documents

"Maintainability Handbook: A Guide for Maintainability Engineers," McDonnell Douglas Corp.

B1399, 27 February 1989.

F-7
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX F

F.4.6 Published Textbooks and Dictionaries

"Bodyspace: Anthropometry, Ergonomics, and Design," S. Pheasant, Taylor and Francis, Inc.,
Philadelphia, PA, 1986.

"Human Engineering Guide to Equipment Design," H. P. Van Cott and R. C. Kinkade, Revised
Edition of 1963 Text Published by the U.S. Government Printing Office, Tams Books, Inc., Los
Angeles, CA, 1972.

"Human Factors Design Guide," W. E. Woodson, McGraw-Hill, New York, NY 1981.

"The Human Factor in Engineering," J.H. Burgess, Petrocelli Books, Princeton, NJ, 1986.

"Human Factors in Engineering and Design," E. J. McCormick, McGraw-Hill, Inc., New York,
NY, 1976.

"Product Assurance Dictionary," Dr. R. R. Landers, Marlton Publishers, Marlton, NJ, 1996.

"Reliability Centered Maintenance," A. M. Smith, McGraw-Hill, Inc., New York, NY, 1993.

"Systems Engineering and Analysis," B. S. Blanchard and W. J. Fabrycky, Prentice-Hall, Inc.,

Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1981.

F.4.7 Maintainability Software Tools. Many maintainability software tools are available
from government, industry and academia. Table F-I is a list of software tool types with
associated supplier reference numbers. Table F-II is the list of the suppliers associated with the
reference numbers. While the list of suppliers may not be complete, it includes addresses and
telephone numbers confirmed to be accurate as of March 1995. The inclusion of a supplier does
not in any way constitute Government endorsement nor does the omission of a supplier
constitute Government disapproval. Potential software tool users should thoroughly research
any claims made by software suppliers and carefully study their own needs before obtaining any
software. Further information on maintainability software tools can be obtained in the following
reports (the reports contain data relative to software tool hardware requirements, claimed
capabilities, interface capabilities, demonstration package availability and price):

RL-TR-91-87 "A Survey of Reliability, Maintainability, Supportability and Testability

Software Tools"

RMST 93 "R&M Software Tools," Reliability Analysis Center

Also see "http://rome.iitri.com/RAC/TECHNICAL/RMST", the RAC R&M Software Tools

Listing on the Internet World Wide Web.

F-8
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX F

TABLE F-I: Software Tool Type/Supplier Reference Number Listing.

Software Tool Type Supplier Reference Numbers
FMECA/FMEA 2,6,8,9,10,12,13,14,15,18,19,20,21,24,25
Maintainability Prediction & Analysis 2,3,4,7,9,13,14,15,17,20,21,22,23,24
Testability 26,27,28,29
Reliability Centered Maintenance 14
Repair Level Analysis 1
Logistics 2,14,15,22
Availability 4,5,11,14,15,16,22

TABLE F-II: R&M Software Tool Supplier Listing.

1. Air Force Materiel Command 9. Innovative Software Designs, Inc.
Logistics Model Development Branch One Country Drive
ASC/ALTD Greensburg, PA 15601
Wright-Patterson AFB, OH 45433 (412)836-8800
(513) 255-2122 FAX: (412) 836-8844
2. Advanced Logistics Developments (IQRC) 10. Innovative Timely Solutions
P. O. Box 232 7413 Six Forks Road, Suite 113
College Point, NY 11356 Raleigh, NC 27615
(212) 594-6600 (919) 846-7705
FAX: (919) 676-1282
E-mail: [email protected]
3. BQR Reliability Engineering Ltd. 11. Isograph Ltd.
P.O. Box 208 Rishon-LeZion 75101 Television House
Israel 10 Mount St.
972-3 966-3569 Manchester M25WT
FAX: 972-3 969-8459 United Kingdom
+44 (0) 161-835-2902
4. COSMIC, University of Georgia 12. JBF Associates
382 East Broad St. 1000 Technology Park Center
Athens, GA 30602 Knoxville, TN 37932-3353
(404) 542-3265 (615) 966-5232
FAX: (615) 966-5287
5. Decision Systems Associates 13. JORI Corp.
746 Crompton Rd. Attn: John House
Redwood, CA 94061 4619 Fontana St.
(415) 369-0501 Orlando, FL 32807
(407) 658-8337
6. Engineered Work Systems, Inc. 14. Management Sciences, Inc.
145 S. Livernois, Suite 112 6022 Constitution Ave. NE
Rochester, MI 48307 Albuquerque, NM 87110
(313) 651-4211 (505) 255-8611
FAX: (505) 268-6696
E-mail: [email protected]
7. Evaluation Software 15. Mitchell & Gothier
2310 Claassen Ranch Lane 200 Baker Ave.
Paso Robles, CA 93446 Concord, MA 01742
(805) 239-4516 (508) 369-5115
FAX: (805) 239-9046
8. Ford Motor Company 16. National Energy Software Center
FMEA Program Headquarters 9700 S. Cass Ave.
101 Union Street Argon, IL 60439
Plymouth, MI 48170 (708) 972-7250
(313) 455-0055
FAX: (313) 459-6861
E-mail: [email protected]

F-9
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX F

TABLE F-II: R&M Software Tool Supplier Listing (continued).

17. National Technical Information Service 24. Tecnasa Electronica Professional S.A.
5258 Port Royal Rd. Av. Brig. Faria Lima 811, Cx Postal 201
Springfield, VA 22161 Sao Jose dos Campos SP CEP12.225
(703) 487-4763 Brazil
55-123-41-3344
18. OMEGA Logistics 25. Turing Institute Ltd.
2700 Navajo Road, Suite A, North American Office
El Cajon, CA 92020 68 Smith St.
(619) 697-1238 Chelmsford, MA 01824-1711
(508) 256-9593
19. OMNEX Engineering and Management 26. DETEX Systems, Inc.
777 E. Eisenhower Parkway, Suite 315 Attn: Craig De Paul (for STAT)
Ann Arbor, MI 48108 1574 N. Batavia
(313)761-4940 Suite 4
FAX: (313) 761-4966 Orange, CA 92667
(714) 637-9325
FAX: (714) 998-4875
20. Powertronic Systems, Inc. 27. ARINC
13700 Chef Menteur Hwy. Attn: John Sheppard (for STAMP)
New Orleans, LA 70129 2551 Riva Road
(504)254-0383 Annapolis, MD 21401
FAX: (504) 254-0393 (410) 266-4000
21. Probabilistic Software, Inc. 28. Naval Undersea Warfare Center
PSI Building, Suite 101 Attn: Tim Bearse (for WSTA)
4536 Indianola, P.O. Box 714 Newport Division
La Canada, CA 91011 1176 Howell Street
(818) 790-9743 Newport, RI 02841-1708
22. Rex Thompson & Partners, Ltd. 29. Giordana Automation Corporation
Newnhams, West St. Attn: Gerard Giordana (for Diagnostician)
Farnham, Surrey GU9 7EQ England Sparta, NJ 07871
0252-711414
23. SEA (Systems Effectiveness Associates, Inc.
20 Vernon St.
Norwood, MA 02062
(617) 762-9252

F-10
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX G

MAINTAINABILITY GLOSSARY OF TERMS, DEFINITIONS, ACRONYMS AND

ABBREVIATIONS

SCOPE

This Appendix is an essential part of MIL-HDBK-470A. The information contained herein is

intended for reference only. Many definitions, acronyms, and abbreviations are used in the field
of maintainability, and no attempt has been made to list them all here. Instead, a compilation of
terms from three historical documents (MIL-STD-721, MIL-HDBK-470, and MIL-HDBK-471)
and from MIL-HDBK-472, and key terms from this handbook is provided.

This Appendix is for guidance only and cannot be cited as a requirement. If it is, the contractor
does not have to comply.

-A-

ACCESSIBILITY: A measure of the relative ease of admission to the various areas of an item for
the purpose of operation or maintenance.

ACTIVE CORRECTIVE MAINTENANCE TIME: That part of active maintenance time during
which actions of corrective maintenance are performed on an item. Excluded are logistics and
administrative delays (e.g., awaiting parts, shift change, etc.).

ACTIVE TIME: That time during which an item is in an operational inventory.

ADMINISTRATIVE TIME: That element of delay time, not included in the supply delay time.

AFFORDABILITY: Affordability is a measure of how well customers can afford to purchase,

operate, and maintain a product over its planned service life. Affordability is a function of
product value and product costs. It is the result of a balanced design in which long-term support
costs are considered equally with near-term development and manufacturing costs.

ALIGNMENT: Performing the adjustments that are necessary to return an item to specified
operation.

AMBIGUITY: The inability to distinguish which of two or more subunits of a product or item
has failed.

AMBIGUITY GROUP: The number of possible subunits of a product or item identified by

BIT, ETE, or manual test procedures, which might contain the failed hardware or software
component.

G-1
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX G

ANTHROPOMETRICS: Quantitative descriptions and measurements of the physical body

variations in people. These are useful in human factors design.

AUTOMATIC TEST EQUIPMENT (ATE): Equipment that is designed to automatically

conduct analysis of functional or static parameters and to evaluate the degree of UUT (Unit
Under Test) performance degradation; and may be used to perform fault isolation of UUT
malfunctions. The decision making, control, or evaluative functions are conducted with minimum
reliance on human intervention and usually done under computer control.

AVAILABILITY: A measure of the degree to which an item is in an operable and committable

state at the start of a mission when the mission is called for at an unknown (random) time. (Item
state at start of a mission includes the combined effects of the readiness-related system R & M
parameters, but excludes mission time.)

-B-

BUILT-IN-TEST (BIT): An integral capability of the mission equipment which provides an on-
board, automated test capability, consisting of software or hardware (or both) components, to
detect, diagnose, or isolate product (system) failures. The fault detection and, possibly, isolation
capability is used for periodic or continuous monitoring of a system's operational health, and for
observation and, possibly, diagnosis as a prelude to maintenance action.

BUILT-IN TEST EQUIPMENT (BITE): Any device permanently mounted in the prime
product or item and used for the express purpose of testing the product or item, either
independently or in association with external test equipment.

-C-

CALIBRATION: A comparison of a measuring device with a known standard and a subsequent

adjustment to eliminate any differences. Not to be confused with alignment.

CHECKOUT: Tests or observations of an item to determine its condition or status.

CHECKOUT TIME: That element of maintenance time during which performance of an item is
verified to be a specified condition.

COMMERCIAL ITEM: Any item, other than real property, that is of a type customarily used
for nongovernmental purposes and that has been sold, leased, or licensed to the general public, or
has been offered for sale, lease, or license to the general public; items evolved from these items
that are not yet available in the commercial market but will be in time to meet the delivery
requirements of a solicitation. (See SD-2 or the Federal Acquisition Regulation, Parts 6, 10, 11,
12 and 14, for a complete definition and criteria.)

G-2
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX G

COMMERCIAL-OFF-THE-SHELF (COTS): Items available in a domestic or foreign

commercial marketplace and usually ordered by part number.

COMPONENT: Within a product, system, subsystem, or equipment, a component is a

constituent module, part, or item.

COMPUTER-AIDED DESIGN (CAD): A process which uses a computer system to assist in

the creation, modification, verification, and display of a design.

CONFIGURATION ITEM (CI): A collection of hardware and software which satisfies a defined
end-use function. The CI is designated for separate as-designed, as-built and as-shipped content
makeup management control.

CONTRACT DELIVERABLES REQUIREMENTS LIST (CDRL): A listing of all technical

data and information which the contractor must deliver to the Government.

CORRECTIVE ACTION: A documented design, process, procedure, or materials change

implemented and validated to correct the cause of failure or design deficiency.

CORRECTIVE MAINTENANCE (CM): All actions performed as a result of failure, to restore

an item to a specified condition. Corrective maintenance can include any or all of the following
steps: Localization, Isolation, Disassembly, Interchange, Reassembly, Alignment and Checkout.

CRITICAL DESIGN REVIEW (CDR): The comparative evaluation of an item and program
parameters. It is usually held just prior to production release after the item has reached a degree
of completion permitting a comprehensive examination and analysis.

-D-

DATA ITEM DESCRIPTION (DID): A Government form used to define and describe the
written outputs required from a contractor.

DELAY TIME: That element of downtime during which no maintenance is being accomplished
on the item because of either supply or administrative delay.

DEMONSTRATION TEST: A test conducted under specified conditions, by, or on behalf of

the customer, using items representative of the production configuration, in order to determine
compliance with item design requirements as a basis for production approval. (also known as a
"Qualification")

DEPENDABILITY: A measure of the degree to which an item is operable and capable of

performing its required function at any (random) time during a specified mission profile, given
item availability at the start of the mission. (Item state during a mission includes the combined

G-3
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX G

effects of the mission-related system R & M parameters but excludes non-mission time; see
availability.)

DESIGN MAINTAINABILITY: A measure of inherent maintainability that includes only the

effects of an item design and its application, but which is derived from the level of maintainability
required in a specific operational and support environment.

DETECTABLE FAILURE: Failures at the component, equipment, subsystem, or system

(product) level that can lie identified through periodic testing or revealed by an alarm or an
indication of an anomaly.

DEVELOPMENT TEST: Testing performed during development and integration to ensure

critical design parameters are met, verify the performance of an item's design, and produce data
supporting design improvements. Development test, sometimes called engineering test, also
discloses deficiencies and verifies that corrective action effectively prevents recurrence of these
deficiencies. Properly done, development test reduces the risk of redesign being necessary
following demonstration testing or delivery to the customer.

DEVELOPMENT TEST AND EVALUATION (DT&E): Test and evaluation focused on the
technological and engineering aspects of the product (system, subsystem, or equipment).

DIAGNOSTICS: The hardware, software, or other documented means used to determine that a
malfunction has occurred and to isolate the cause of the malfunction. Also refers to "the action of
detecting and isolating failures or faults."

DIRECT MAINTENANCE MANHOURS PER MAINTENANCE ACTION (DMMH/MA):

A measure of the maintainability parameter related to item demand for maintenance labor. The
sum of direct maintenance labor hours divided by the total number of preventive and corrective
maintenance actions during a stated period of time.

DIRECT MAINTENANCE MANHOURS PER MAINTENANCE EVENT (DMMH/ME): A

measure of the maintainability parameter related to item demand for maintenance labor. The sum
of direct maintenance labor hours, divided by the total number of preventive and corrective
maintenance events during a stated period of time.

DISASSEMBLE: Opening an item and removing a number of parts or subassemblies to make the
item that is to be replaced accessible for removal. This does not include the actual removal of the
item to be replaced.

DOWNTIME: That element of time during which an item is in an operational inventory but is
not in condition to perform its required function.

G-4
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX G

-E-

ELEMENT MAINTENANCE ACTION: A unit of work into which a maintenance activity

may be broken down at a given indenture level.

EQUIPMENT: A general term designating an item or group of items capable of performing a

complete function.

-F-

FAILURE ANALYSIS: Subsequent to a failure, the logical systematic examination of an item, its
construction, application, and documentation to identify the failure mode and determine the
failure mechanism and its basic course.

FAILURE EFFECT: The consequence(s) a failure mode has on the operation, function, or status
of an item. Failure effects are typically classified as local, next higher level, and end.

FAILURE MECHANISM: The physical, chemical, electrical, thermal or other process which
results in failure.

FAILURE: The event, or inoperable state, in which any item or part of an item does not, or
would not, perform as previously specified.

FAILURE, INTERMITTENT: Failure for a limited period of time, followed by the item's
recovery of its ability to perform within specified limits without any remedial action.

FAILURE MODE: The consequence of the mechanism through which the failure occurs, i.e.,
short, open, fracture, excessive wear.

FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS (FMEA): A procedure by which each potential
failure mode in a product (system) is analyzed to determine the results or effects thereof on the
product and to classify each potential failure mode according to its severity or risk probability
number.

FALSE ALARM: A fault indicated by BIT or other monitoring circuitry where no fault can be
found or confirmed.

FALSE ALARM RATE (FAR): The frequency of occurrence of false alarms over a defined
period of measure (e.g., time, cycles, etc.).

FAULT: Immediate cause of failure (e.g., maladjustment, misalignment, defect, etc.).

FAULT DETECTION (FD): A process which discovers the existence of faults.

G-5
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX G

FAULT ISOLATION (FI): The process of determining the location of a fault to the extent
necessary to effect repair.

FAULT ISOLATION TIME: The time spent arriving at a decision as to which items caused the
system to malfunction. This includes time spent working on (replacing, attempting to repair, and
adjusting) portions of the system shown by subsequent interim tests not to have been the cause
of the malfunction.

FRACTION OF FAULTS DETECTABLE (FFD): That fraction of all failures that occur over
operating time, t, that can be correctly identified through direct observation or other specified
means by an operator or by maintenance personnel under stated conditions.

FRACTION OF FAULTS ISOLATABLE (FFI): That fraction of all failures that occur over
operating time, t, that can be correctly isolated to n or fewer units at a given maintenance level
through the use of specified means by maintenance personnel under stated conditions.

FUNCTIONAL TEST: An evaluation of a product or item while it is being operated and

checked under limited conditions without the aid of its associated equipment in order to
determine its fitness for use.

-G-

GOVERNMENT-FURNISHED EQUIPMENT (GFE): An item provided for inclusion in or use

with a producer service being procured by the Government.

GUIDE SPECIFICATION: This is a type of performance specification prepared by the

Government. It identifies standard, recurring requirements that must be addressed when
developing new systems, subsystems, equipments, and assemblies. Its structure forces
appropriate tailoring to meet user needs.

-H-

HUMAN ENGINEERING (HE): The application of scientific knowledge to the design of items
to achieve effective user-system integration (man-machine interface).

HUMAN FACTORS: A body of scientific facts about human characteristics. The term covers
all biomedical and psychosocial considerations; it includes, but is not limited to, principles and
applications in the areas of human engineering, personnel selection, training, life support, job
performance aids, work loads, and human performance evaluation.

-I-

INACTIVE TIME: That time during which an item is in reserve. (In an inactive inventory).

G-6
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX G

INHERENT AVAILABILITY(Ai): A measure of availability that includes only the effects of an

item design and its application, and does not account for effects of the operational and support
environment.

INITIAL DELAY TIME: The time between the moment the product becomes available for
maintenance and the moment work is commenced.

INITIAL ISOLATION: Isolation to the product subunit which must be replaced on line to
return the product to operation. A subunit can be a modular assembly, or a component such as a
crystal or antenna subsection. In the event that the maintenance concept requires a subunit to be
removed, repaired and then replaced in the product, initial isolation includes both isolation to the
failed subunit and isolation to the failed and removable portion of the subunit.

INITIAL ISOLATION LEVEL OF AMBIGUITY: The initial number of possible product

subunits, identified by the built-in-test, built-in-test equipment, external test equipment, or
manual test procedure, which might contain the failed component.

INTEGRATED DIAGNOSTICS: A structured process which maximizes the effectiveness of

diagnostics by integrating pertinent elements, such as testability, automatic and manual testing,
training, maintenance aiding, and technical information as a means for providing a cost effective
capability to unambiguously detect and isolate all faults known or expected in items and to
satisfy system mission requirements. Products of this process are hardware, software,
documentation, and trained personnel.

INTEGRATED PRODUCT TEAM: A concurrent engineering team made up of individuals

representing all relevant disciplines associated with a product's design, manufacturing, and
marketing. All members work together using shared knowledge and capabilities to develop and
manufacture a product in which requirements are balanced. The individuals must be committed
to a common purpose, work to a unified set of requirements, and hold themselves accountable for
decisions made and actions taken.

INTERCHANGE: Removing the item that is to be replaced, and installing the replacement item.

INTERCHANGEABILITY: The ability to interchange, without restriction, like equipments or

portions thereof in manufacture, maintenance, or operation. Like products are two or more items
that possess such functional and physical characteristics as to be equivalent in performance and
durability, and are capable of being exchanged one for the other without alteration of the items
themselves or of adjoining items, except for adjustment, and without selection for fit and
performance.

INTERFACE DEVICE: An item which provides mechanical and electrical connections and any
signal conditioning required between the automatic test equipment (ATE) and the unit under test
(UUT); also known as an interface test adapter or interface adapter unit.

G-7
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX G

ISOLATION: Determining the location of a failure to the extent possible, by the use of
accessory equipment.

-L-

LEVELS OF MAINTENANCE: The division of maintenance, based on different and requisite

technical skill, which jobs are allocated to organizations in accordance with the availability of
personnel, tools, supplies, and the time within the organization. Within the DoD, typical
maintenance levels are organizational, intermediate and depot.

LIFE CYCLE COST (LCC): The sum of acquisition, logistics support, operating, and retirement
and phase-out expenses.

LIFE CYCLE PHASES: Identifiable stages in the life of a product from the development of the
first concept to removing the product from service and disposing of it. Within the Department of
Defense, four phases are formally defined: Concept Exploration; Program Definition and Risk
Reduction; Engineering and Manufacturing Development; and Production, Deployment, and
Operational Support. Although not defined as a phase, demilitarization and disposal is defined
as those activities conducted at the end of a product's useful life. Within the commercial sector,
various ways of dividing the life cycle into phases are used. One way is: Customer Need
Analysis, Design and Development, Production and Construction, Operation and Maintenance,
and Retirement and Phase-out.

LINE REPLACEABLE UNIT (LRU): A unit designed to be removed upon failure from a larger
entity (product or item) in the operational environment, normally at the organizational level.

LOCALIZATION: Determining the location of a failure to the extent possible, without using
accessory test equipment.

LOGISTIC TIME: That portion of downtime during which repair is delayed solely to waiting
for a replacement part or other subdivision of the system.

LOGISTICS SUPPORT: The materials and services required to enable the operating forces to
operate, maintain, and repair the end item within the maintenance concept defined for that end
item.

-M-

MAINTAINABILITY: The relative ease and economy of time and resources with which an item
can be retained in, or restored to, a specified condition when maintenance is performed by
personnel having specified skill levels, using prescribed procedures and resources, at each
prescribed level of maintenance and repair. Also, the probability that an item can be retained in,
or restored to, a specified condition when maintenance is performed by personnel having

G-8
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX G

specified skill levels, using prescribed procedures and resources, at each prescribed level of
maintenance and repair.

MAINTAINABILITY ACTIVITIES BLOCK DIAGRAM: A diagrammatic representation of

the necessary order of the various maintenance activities involved with a maintenance task for an
item. Three possible orders exist: simultaneous, sequential, and a combination of simultaneous
and sequential.

MAINTAINABILITY ALLOCATION: The apportionment of numerical requirements to all

levels within a product which will result in meeting the overall maintainability requirement or
goal.

MAINTAINABILITY DEMONSTRATION: A formal test specifically designed to measure

maintainability by the use of objective evidence gathered under specified conditions.

MAINTAINABILITY MODEL: A quantifiable representation of a test or process the purpose

of which is to analyze results to determine specific relationships of a set of quantifiable
maintainability parameters.

MAINTAINABILITY PREDICTION: That maintainability performance which is expected at

some future time, postulated on analysis of models, test, and past experience.

MAINTENANCE: All actions necessary for retaining an item in or restoring it to a specified

condition.

MAINTENANCE ACTION: An element of a maintenance event. One or more tasks (i.e., fault
localization, fault isolation, servicing and inspection) necessary to retain an item in or restore it to
a specified condition.

MAINTENANCE CONCEPT: A description of the planned general scheme for maintenance

and support of an item in the operational environment. It provides a practical basis for design,
layout, and packaging of the system and its test equipment. It establishes the scope of
maintenance responsibility for each level of maintenance and the personnel resources required to
maintain the system.

MAINTENANCE ENVIRONMENT: The climatic, geographical, physical and operational

conditions (e.g., combat, mobile, continental) under which an item will be maintained.

MAINTENANCE EVENT: One or more maintenance actions required to effect corrective and
preventive maintenance due to any type of failure or malfunction, false alarm or scheduled
maintenance plan.

MAINTENANCE RATIO: A measure of the total maintenance manpower burden required to

maintain an item. It is expressed as the cumulative number of labor hours of maintenance

G-9
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX G

expended in direct labor during a given period of the life units divided by the cumulative number
of end item life units during the same period.

MAINTENANCE TASK: The maintenance effort necessary for retaining an item in, or
changing/restoring it to a specified condition.

MAINTENANCE TIME: An element of downtime which excludes modification and delay time.

MAXIMUM CORRECTIVE MAINTENANCE TIME FOR THE PERCENTILE

( M Max( ) ): The maximum repair time associated with some percentage of all possible system
corrective repair actions. (For example, 95% of all corrective repair actions must be
accomplished in less than one hour.)

MEAN ACTIVE CORRECTIVE MAINTENANCE TIME (MACMT): The average time

associated with active corrective maintenance actions. Time includes only actual repair time
associated with a repair person performing corrective maintenance steps (i.e., Localization,
Isolation, Disassembly, Interchange, Reassembly, Alignment, and Checkout).

MEAN DOWNTIME (MDT): The average time a system is unavailable for use due to a failure.
Time includes the actual repair time plus all delay time associated with a repair person arriving
with the appropriate replacement parts.

MEAN MAINTENANCE MANHOURS PER MAINTENANCE ACTION (MMH/MA):

This term is defined in the same way as MMH/Repair except that time spent as a result of
system failure false alarms must also be included in the maintenance labor hours.

MEAN MAINTENANCE MANHOURS PER REPAIR (MMH/REPAIR): The summation of

the products of the mean maintenance labor hours expended to repair each given repairable item
multiplied by the failure rate for the item, divided by the summation of the failure rates for all
repairable items. The equation is given in MIL-HDBK-472, page V-7, as follows:
N
n MMHn
MMH/Repair = n =1
N
n
n =1

Also, the total maintenance labor hours required to perform all repairs at any specific level of
maintenance, divided by the number of repairs.

MEAN MAINTENANCE TIME: The measure of maintainability taking into account

maintenance policy. The sum of preventive and corrective maintenance times, divided by the
sum of scheduled and unscheduled maintenance events, during a stated period of time.

G-10
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX G

MEAN MANHOURS PER FLYING HOUR (MMH/FH): A maintainability performance

figure calculated by dividing the labor hours expended to maintain a particular aircraft fleet during
a given period, by the flying hours during that period.

MEAN MANHOURS PER OPERATING HOUR (MMH/OH): The total labor hours required
to maintain a system divided by the number of operating hours. This includes labor hours
associated with: corrective maintenance, preventive maintenance, and maintenance caused by
false alarms.

MEAN TIME BETWEEN FAILURE (MTBF): A basic measure of reliability for repairable
items. The mean number of life units during which all parts of the item perform within their
specified limits, during a particular measurement interval under stated conditions.

MEAN TIME BETWEEN CRITICAL FAILURE (MTBCF): A measure of mission or

functional reliability. The mean number of life units during which the item performs its mission
or function within specified limits, during a particular measurement interval under stated
conditions.

MEAN TIME BETWEEN MAINTENANCE (MTBM): A measure of the reliability taking

into account maintenance policy. The total number of life units expended by a given time,
divided by the total number of maintenance events (scheduled and unscheduled) due to that item.

MEAN TIME BETWEEN MAINTENANCE ACTIONS (MTBMA): A measure of the

product reliability parameter related to demand for maintenance labor. The total number of
product life units, divided by the total number of maintenance actions (preventive and corrective)
during a stated period of time.

MEAN TIME BETWEEN REMOVALS (MTBR): A measure of the product reliability

parameter related to demand for logistic support: The total number of system life units divided
by the total number of items removed from that product during a stated period of time. This
term is defined to exclude removals performed to facilitate other maintenance and removals for
product improvement.

MEAN TIME TO REPAIR (MTTR): A basic measure of maintainability. The sum of

corrective maintenance times at any specific level of repair, divided by the total number of
failures within an item repaired at that level, during a particular interval under stated conditions.

MEAN TIME TO RESTORE SYSTEM (MTTRS): A measure of the product maintainability

parameter, related to availability and readiness: The total corrective maintenance time, associated
with downing events, divided by the total number of downing events, during a stated period of
time. (Excludes time for off-product maintenance and repair of detached components.)

G-11
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX G

MEAN TIME TO SERVICE (MTTS): A measure of an on-product maintainability

characteristic related to servicing that is calculated by dividing the total scheduled
crew/operator/driver servicing time by the number of times the item was serviced.

MISSION MAINTAINABILITY: The measure of the ability of an item to be retained in or

restored to specified condition when maintenance is performed during the course of a specified
mission profile. (The mission-related system maintainability parameter.)

MISSION TIME: That element of up time required to perform a stated mission profile.

MISSION-TIME-TO-RESTORE-FUNCTIONS (MTTRF): A measure of mission

maintainability: The total corrective critical failure maintenance time, divided by the total number
of critical failures, during the course of a specified mission profile.

MODIFICATION: Major engineering changes to an existing product or item to effect

improvements in design capabilities or characteristics.

MTTR ELEMENTS: Corrective maintenance actions consisting of the following tasks:

Preparation: Time associated with those tasks, including localization, required to be

performed before fault isolation can be executed.

Fault Isolation: Time associated with those tasks required to isolate the fault to the level
at which fault correction begins.
Disassembly: Time associated with gaining access to the replaceable item or items
identified during the fault isolation process.

Interchange: Time associated with the removal and replacement item or suspected faulty
item.
Reassembly: Time associated with closing up the equipment after interchange is
performed.

Alignment: Time associated with aligning the system or replaceable item after a fault has
been corrected.

Checkout: Time associated with the verification that a fault has been corrected and the
product is operational.

Start-Up: Time associated with bringing a product up to the operational state it was in
prior to failure, once a fault has been corrected and the operational status of the product
verified.

G-12
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX G

-N-

NON-DEVELOPMENTAL ITEM (NDI): Any previously developed item used exclusively for
governmental purposes by a Federal agency, a State or local government, or a foreign government
with which the U.S. has a mutual defense cooperation agreement; any such item with minor
modifications; and any item fully developed and in production but not yet in use. (See SD-2 or
the Federal Acquisition Regulation Parts 6, 10, 11, 12 and 14, for a complete definition and
criteria.)

NON-DESTRUCTIVE INSPECTION (NDI): Any method used for inspecting an item

without physically, chemically, or otherwise destroying or changing the design characteristics of
the item. However, it may be necessary to remove paint or other external coatings to use the
NDI method. A wide range of technology is usually described as nondestructive inspection,
evaluation, or testing (collectively referred to as non-destructive evaluation or NDE). The core of
NDE is commonly thought to contain ultrasonic, visual, radiographic, eddy current, liquid
penetrant, and magnetic particle inspection methods. Other methodologies, include acoustic
emission, use of laser interference, microwaves, NMR and MRI, thermal imaging, and so forth.

NON-DETECTABLE FAILURE: Failures at the component, equipment, subsystem, or system

(product) level that are identifiable by analysis but cannot be identified through periodic testing
or revealed by an alarm or an indication of an anomaly.

-O-

OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT: The aggregate of all external and internal conditions (such
as temperature, humidity, radiation, magnetic and electric fields, shock vibration, etc.) either
natural or man made, or self-induced, that influences the form, operational performance,
reliability or survival of an item.

OPERATIONAL MAINTAINABILITY: The assessed maintainability of an item based on field

data.

OPERATIONAL READINESS: The ability of a military unit to respond to its operation

plan(s) upon receipt of an operations order. (A function of assigned strength, item availability,
status, or supply, training, etc.).

OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION (OT&E): Test and evaluation which focuses on
the development of optimum tactics, techniques, procedures, and concepts for products and
items, evaluation of reliability, maintainability and operational effectiveness, and suitability of
products and items under realistic operational conditions.

G-13
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX G

-P-

PERCENT ISOLATION TO A GROUP OF RIs: The percent of time that detected failures can
be fault isolated to a specified ambiguity group of size n or less, where n is the number of
replaceable items (RIs).

PERCENT ISOLATION TO A SINGLE RI: The percent of time that detected failures can be
fault isolated to exactly one replaceable item (RI).

PERFORMANCE SPECIFICATION (PS): A design document stating the functional

requirements for an item.

PERFORMANCE-BASED REQUIREMENTS (SPECIFICATION): Requirements that

describe what the product should do, how it should perform, the environment in which it should
operate, and interface and interchangeability characteristics. They should not specify how the
product should be designed or manufactured.

PREPARATION TIME: The time spent obtaining, setting up, and calibrating maintenance aids;
warming up equipment; etc.

PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE (PM): All actions performed in an attempt to retain an item

in specified condition by providing systematic inspection, detection, and prevention of incipient
failures.

PROCESS ACTION TEAM (PAT): A group of individuals with complementary skills,

committed to a common purpose, set of performance goals, and approach for which they hold
themselves accountable, who work together using shared knowledge and capabilities to improve
business processes.

PROGRAM-UNIQUE SPECIFICATION. This type of Government specification, also called a

system specification, establishes requirements for items used for a particular weapon system or
program. Little potential exists for the use of the document in other programs or applications. It
is written as a performance specification, but it may include a blend of performance and detail
design type requirements.

-R-

REASSEMBLY: Assembling the items that were removed during disassembly and closing the
reassembled items.

REDUNDANCY: The existence of more than one means for accomplishing a given function.
Each means of accomplishing the function need not necessarily be identical.

G-14
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX G

RELIABILITY: (1) The duration or probability of failure-free performance under stated

conditions. (2) The probability that an item can perform its intended function for a specified
interval under stated conditions. (For non-redundant items this is equivalent to definition (1).
For redundant items this is equivalent to definition of mission reliability.)

RELIABILITY-CENTERED MAINTENANCE (RCM): A disciplined logic or methodology

used to identify preventive and corrective maintenance tasks to realize the inherent reliability of
equipment at a minimum expenditure of resources.

REPAIR TIME: The time spent replacing, repairing, or adjusting all items suspected to have
been the cause of the malfunction, except those subsequently shown by interim test of the
system not to have been the cause.

REPLACEABLE ITEM (RI) or REPLACEABLE UNIT (RU): An item, unit, subassembly, or

part which is normally intended to be replaced during corrective maintenance upon failure of the
item.

REQUEST FOR PROPOSAL (RFP): A letter or document sent to suppliers asking to show
how a problem or situation can be addressed. Normally the supplier's response proposes a
solution and quotes a price. Similar to a Request for Quote (RFQ), although the RFQ is usually
used for products already developed.

-S-

SCHEDULED MAINTENANCE: Periodic prescribed inspection and/or servicing of products

or items accomplished on a calendar, mileage or hours of operation basis. Included in Preventive
Maintenance.

SERVICING: The performance of any act needed to keep an item in operating condition, (i.e.
lubricating, fueling, oiling, cleaning, etc.), but not including preventive maintenance of parts or
corrective maintenance tasks.

STANDARD PERFORMANCE SPECIFICATION (SPS): A type of specification that

establishes requirements for military-unique items used in multiple programs or applications.

STORAGE LIFE: The length of time an item can be stored under specified conditions and still
meet specified operating requirements.

SUBSYSTEM: A combination of sets, groups, etc. which performs an operational function

within a product (system) and is a major subdivision of the product. (Example: Data processing
subsystem, guidance subsystem).

SUPPLY DELAY TIME: That element of delay time during which a needed replacement item is
being obtained.

G-15
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX G

SUPPORT CONCEPT: A product-level description of maintenance needs consistent with an

item's design and operational requirements.

SUPPORT ENVIRONMENT: The mobile, fixed and computer resources necessary for the
operation and maintenance of a product under various environments but which are not physically
part of the product. These resources are the people and the equipment required to make an item,
product or facility operational as intended.

SYSTEM: General - A composite of equipment and skills, and techniques capable of performing
or supporting an operational role, or both. A complete system includes all equipment, related
facilities, material, software, services, and personnel required for its operation and support to the
degree that it can be considered self-sufficient in its intended operational environment.

SYSTEM ADMINISTRATIVE TIME: System (product) downtime other than active

maintenance time and logistic time.

SYSTEM DOWNTIME: The time interval between the commencement of work on a system
(product) malfunction and the time when the system has been repaired and/or checked by the
maintenance person, and no further maintenance activity is executed.

SYSTEM FINAL TEST TIME: The time spent confirming that a system (product) is in
satisfactory operating condition (as determined by the maintenance person) following
maintenance. It is possible for a system final test to be performed after each correction of a
malfunction.

-T-

TESTABILITY: A design characteristic which allows status (operable, inoperable, or degraded)

of an item to be determined and the isolation of faults within the item to be performed in a timely
manner.

TEST MEASUREMENT AND DIAGNOSTIC EQUIPMENT (TMDE): Any product or item

used to evaluate the condition of another product or item to identify or isolate any actual or
potential failures.

TEST POINT: A jack or similar fitting to which a test probe is attached for measuring a circuit
parameter or waveform.

TIME, TURN AROUND: That element of maintenance time needed to replenish consumables
and check out an item for recommitment.

TOTAL SYSTEM DOWNTIME: The time interval between the reporting of a system
(product) malfunction and the time when the system has been repaired and/or checked by the
maintenance person, and no further maintenance activity is executed.

G-16
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX G

-U-

UNIT UNDER TEST (UUT): A UUT is any product or item (system, set, subsystem,
assembly or subassembly, etc.) undergoing testing or otherwise being evaluated by technical
means.

UNSCHEDULED MAINTENANCE: Corrective maintenance performed in response to a

suspected failure.

UPTIME RATIO: A composite measure of operational availability and dependability that

includes the combined effects of item design, installation, quality, environment, operation,
maintenance, repair and logistic support: The quotient of uptime divided by the sum of uptime
and downtime.)

UPTIME: That element of ACTIVE TIME during which an item is in condition to perform its
required functions. (Increases availability and dependability).

USEFUL LIFE: The number of life units from manufacture to when the item has an unrepairable
failure or unacceptable failure rate. Also, the period of time before the failure rate increases due
to wearout.

UTILIZATION RATE: The planned or actual number of life units expended, or missions
attempted during a stated interval of calendar time.

-V-

VERIFICATION: The contractor effort to: (1) determine the accuracy of and update the
analytical (predicted) data obtained from the maintainability engineering analysis; (2) identify
maintainability design deficiencies; and (3) gain progressive assurance that the maintainability of
the item can be achieved and be demonstrated in subsequent phases. This effort is monitored by
the procuring activity from date of award of the contract, through hardware development from
components to the configuration item (CI).

VIRTUAL REALITY: A combination of various interface technologies that enables a user to

intuitively interact with an immersive and dynamic computer-generated environment.

G-17
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX G

This page has been left blank intentionally.

G-18
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

INDEX

Acronym Defined on Page Acronym Defined on Page Acronym Defined on Page

Ai 1-8 FA 4-14 MLH/OH D-8

ACAT A-6 FAR 1- 9 MMH 1-10
ACMT95 1-8 FD 1-9 MMH/FH 1-10
AFL B-40 FD&I 1-9, D-4 MMH/OH 1-10
AI 1-8 FFD 1-9 MR 1-10
AIAG 1-8 FFI 1-9 MTBF 1-10
ALU B-76 FH D-9 MTBM 1-10, A-11
ANSI 1-8 FI 1-9 MTBPM 1-10
3
Ao 1-8, A-11, B-9 FI 2-11 MTTR 1-10, D-3
ARINC 1-8, B-9 FMEA 1-9, B-14 MTTR G B-37
ASIC 4-13 FMECA 1-9 MTTRF 1-10
ATA 1-8 FOD C-11 MTTRS 1-10
ATE B-75 FRACAS 1-9 MTTS 1-10
AWM 1-8 FRCM 4-49 MTUT 1-10
AWP 1-8 FSC 1-9
FTA 1-9 NASA 1-10
BIT 1-8, B-71, C-5 NATO 1-10
BITE 1-8 GS A-3 NCMDT B-40
NDI 1-10, A-8
CAD 1-8 HE 1-9 NOF B-40
CAM 1-8 NORS B-40
CDRL A-18 IC 1-9 NRTS 1-10
CID 1-8, A-3 ID 4-14
CM 1-8, D-4 IEC 1-9 O&M 1-10
CMDT B-40 IEEE 1-9 OC B-29
CND 1-8, B-71 ILS 1-9 OH D-3
COTS 1-8 IOT&E 1-9, E-5 OT&E G-13
CRT 1-8 IPD 1-9, B-72
CUT C-5 IPDT 4-26 P&C 1-10
PAT 1-10, A-1
DAR 1-9 LFSR B-80 PCB 1-10
DDT B-40 LRU 1-9, B-13, PLA B-77
DMH 1-9 C-4 PM 1-10
DMH/MA 1-9 LSA 1-9 PR&P 1-10
DoD 1-9, A-1
DoDISS A-3 MCT B-21 QFD 3-2
DT 1-9 M MAX 1-10
DT&E 1-9, E-5 MA 1-9 R&D 1-10
DUR B-40 MACMT 1-9 R&M 1-10
DUT B-75 MAISAP 1-9 R/R 1-10
MDAP 1-9 RAC 1-10
EDIF 4-40 MDS 1-9 RADC D-1
EMD 1-9, E-1 MDT 1-10, A-11 RCM 1-10
EMI 1-9 MFD D-25 RFP 1-10, A-9
EMT 1-9 MICAP 1-10 RI 1-10, D-2
ERT B-37 MLH 1-10, D-3 ROM C-5
ETE 1-9 MLH/FH D-3 RTOK 1-10, B-71
ETI 1-9 MLH/MA D-7 R/T 4-44

Index-1

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

INDEX
Acronym Defined on Page

RU 1-10

SAE 1-10
SMD 1-10
SOO 1-11, A-8
SOW 1-11, A-8
SPS 1-11, A-3
SRA C-4
SRD 1-11
SRU C-3
STAMP 1-11
STAT 1-11

TR 1-11
TSMD 1-11

UUT G-17

VE 1-11
VLSI C-6
VR 1-11

WRA C-4
WSTA 1- 11
WUC 1- 11

Index-2

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

INDEX
Index Term Page Number Index Term Page Number

(A) Automatic Test Equipment B-75, B-82

Availability
Acceptance equation 2-3
criteria B-20, B-38, B-49, B-59, B-61, B- inherent 2-3
65 operational 2-4, A-11
level B-38, B-39, B-61 requirements 4-3
testing B-1 Awaiting maintenance 4-32
Accessibility 3-5, 4-4, 4-6, 4-9, 4-13, 4-24, 4- Awaiting parts 4-32
41, A-15, B-4, B-5, B-11, E-6
Accident B-40, B-69 (B)
Acquisition
category A-6 Baseline D-10
Costs See Costs Battle damage B-40, C-10
definition phase 4-62 Behavioral models B-78
Deskbook A-4 Benchmarking 1-4, 2-11
document(s) A-4 Built-in
DoD Phases 2-5, Appendix E diagnostics B-23
guidance Appendix A self-test B-80
in-service phase 4-62 Built-in test (BIT) 2-6, 3-6, 4-12, 4-14, 4-17, 4-32,
manufacturing phase 4-62 4-34, 4-43, 4-58, B-4, B-71
O&M phase 2-6, 3-7 analyses results A-18
phase(s) E-1 effectiveness 4-32, B-4
policy(ies) A-2, A-4 failures B-72
reform 2-11, 4-1, A-1, A-4, A-7 - A-9 performance B-72
regulations A-4
retirement phase 2-5, 2-7, 3-7 (C)
Active CAD See Computer-aided design
corrective maintenance A-19 Cannot duplicate (CND) 4-13, 4-15, B-69
maintenance 4-42, D-2 Central Limit Theorem B-28, B-41, B-43, B-47, B-57
Administrative B-12, B-38, B-66, D-2 Chargeable
delay downtime B-39 downtime B-39, B-40, B-45
requirements B-66 maintenance B-39, B-45, B-67
delays 4-33 maintenance downtime B-39, B-45
Affordability 2-7 Checkout B-11, B-63, D-4, D-14
Alarm rate(s) 4-43, A-12, A-19, B-71, D-8 Commercial
Alarm(s) 4-58, A-12, A-19, D-21, D-7 acquisition A-8
Algorithm(s) B-72, B-76, B-79, B-84 customers A-7
Alignment D-4 fault simulation B-83
Allocation 4-47 product(s) 2-11
Equal Distribution Method 4-51 specifications A-1, A-7, A-23
FR Complexity method 4-48, 4-50 standard(s) A-1, A-2
of requirements 4-3 Compliance testing 4-63
Statistically-Based Method 4-50 Computer-aided-design (CAD) 4-2, 4-21, 4-22, 4-24, 4-26, 4-40
Allocation(s) A-22, B-71, E-5 Concept
Alternate definition D-10, D-21
concepts A-5, E-3 exploration 2-5, A-5, E-1
hypothesis B-28, B-32 studies E-1
Ambiguity(ies) 2-2, 4-5, 4-14, 4-15, 4-17, 4-27, Concurrent engineering 2-8, A-22
4-38, 4-58 Condition monitoring 4-9
A-12, B-74 Confidence level(s) A-19, B-20, B-22, B-44, B-61,
group(s) A-12, B-72 B-85
Analysis(es) (Analytical) Configuration control 2-6, 2-11, 4-6
accessibility 4-41 Configuration management 2-6, A-10
criticality 4-34 Consumer risk(s) B-5, B-41
dependency 4-38 Corrective Action 4-22, 4-33, 4-53, 4-58, 4-65
downtime 4-32
FMEA 2-4, 4-17, 4-34 Correlation Matrix D-23, D-29
human factors 4-32, 4-40 Costs
testability 4-15, 4-32, 4-37 acquisition 2-5, 2-8
tool(s) 4-2, 4-21, 4-39, A-7 design 4-22
Anthropometric(s) 4-11, 4-21, A-20 life cycle 1-2, 2-5
characteristics 2-9 maintenance 2-6, 4-13
measurements 4-11 O&M 2-6, 2-11
Artificial Intelligence 4-25 opportunity & equivalent 2-7
Assessment(s) 4-33, A-5, B-70, B-73, E-2, E-6 ownership 2-8, 4-3
Audit trail 4-25, 4-27, 4-31 production & construction 2-6
Augmented reality 4-24 R&D 2-5
Automated maint. analysis D-1 retirement & phaseout 2-7

Index-3

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

INDEX
Index Term Page Number Index Term Page Number

(D) Diagnostic(s)
capabilities 3-6, 4-12, 4-15, 4-26, B-3
Data design principles 4-13
accuracy 4-62 tests B-73, B-74
acquisition methods B-20, B-23, B-65, B-76 tools 4-25
analysis method(s) 4-62 Disposal 2-5, 2-7, 3-7, A-6, E-1, E-6
collection 2-6, 4-8, 4-9, 4-58, B-4, E-6 Distribution(s) (statistical) 4-46, 4-50, 4-53 to 4-58, 4-63, 4-
element(s) B-4 64
items A-18, A-23, D-3 Duty cycle(s) B-16
sources 4-60, A-23, B-4
system(s) 4-16, 4-58, 4-60 (E)
Decision
criteria B-5, B-20, B-31 Elapsed Maintenance 4-32
milestone A-5, E-2 Elemental
procedure B-28, B-31, B-34, B-37, B-45, B- maintenance actions D-30, D-31
47 activity/tasks D-11, D-13, D-16
Defense Acquisition Reform 4-1, A-1, A-4, A-7 times D-27, D-29
Deficiencies B-2, B-3, B-64, B-68, B-70, D-1, Environment(al) 2-6, 2-10, 4-2, 4-6, 4-11, 4-16,
E-2 4-19, 4-21, 4-23, 4-32, 4-42, 4-
Degradation 4-8, 4-15 53, 4-62, A-7, A-12, B-8, B-10,
Demilitarization 2-5, 3-7, A-6, E-1, E-6 B-72
Demonstration/verification B-2, B-5 conditions 4-16, 4-60, D-30
Data 4-46, 4-62 factors 4-6, 4-15
environment B-10 stress(es) 4-16
evaluation B-1, B-62, B-71 Evaluation(s) 2-5, 4-22, 4-31, 4-41, 4-48, 4-63,
method(s) B-6, B-16, B-22, B-36, B-65, B- B-1, B-4, B-12, B-64, B-73, E-5
71 Expert system 4-21, 4-25
plans B-20 Exploration phase 2-5, E-1, E-3
population B-16, B-22
techniques B-4, B-71, D-31 (F)
test (ing) 1-2, 2-6, 3-5, 4-52, 4-58, A-22,
B-2, B-6, B-7, B-73 Facility (ies) 2-6, 2-10, 4-2, 4-19, B-11, B-65,
test(s) B-6, B-11, B-23 B-77
Dependability 4-60 Failure(s)
Dependency analysis 4-38 analysis 2-6
Deployment 2-5, A-6, E-1, E-6 induced 4-18, B-4, B-12, B-13, B-68, B-
Depot 2-10, 4-4, 4-13, 4-47, B-2, B-5, 71
B-8, B-64, D-2, D-10 intermittent 4-16
Design mechanism(s) B-4, B-76
attributes B-72, E-3 rate weighted(ing) D-14, D-16, D-18
changes 4-4, 4-43, E-5 rate(s) 4-13, 4-20, 4-33, 4-40, 4-45, B-
characteristics 2-4, 3-2, 4-12, 4-34, 4-42, B-74 14, B-46, D-3
costs See Costs reporting 4-58, 4-65, B-3
criteria 4-31, 4-34 simulation B-19, B-64, B-66, B-74, B-76, B-
data 2-11, 4-24, 4-60 78, B-80, B-82, B-86
deficiencies B-1, B-3 symptoms 4-28
evaluation 4-22, 4-32 False alarm(s) 4-9, 4-15, 4-34, 4-58, D-7
expert system 4-26 rate(s) 4-32, 4-43, A-12, A-17, A-19,
goal(s) 4-18 B-71, D-8
guidelines 1-2, 3-6, 3-7, 4-18, 4-40, Fault coverage B-73, B-75, B-73, B-80, B-86
Appendix C Fault detection 2-2, 4-9, 4-13, 4-32, 4-37, 4-42,
principles 4-13, 4-19, 4-20 4-52, 4-58, B-3, B-74, B-82, D-
process(es) 2-9, 4-4, 4-6, 4-13, 4-21, 4-40, 4, D-21, D-25
4-43, B-3, B-74 Fault(s)
requirements 2-11, 3-2, 4-22, 4-32, A-3, A-12 correction D-4, D-25
D-2, D-16 dictionaries 4-15, 4-38, B-74
reviews 4-3, B-5, E-3 equivalence(ing) B-76, B-80, B-86
team 2-1, 3-5, 4-21, 4-26 inducement B-13, B-19
Detect(ion) insertion methods B-71
capability B-3 isolatable 4-14, 4-38, 4-43
efficiency 4-37 model B-73, B-80
of faults/failures 2-2, 4-9, 4-12, 4-34, 4-37, 4-42 sampling B-75, B-83, B-86
Detection (continued) selection B-19
percentage(s) 4-37 signature 4-14, B-73
requirements 4-14 simulation(s) 4-15, 4-20, 4-21, 4-23, 4-37, 4-
Development 53, B-74, B-80, B-81, B-82
costs 2-5 simulator(s) B-73, B-74, B-77, B-82, B-86
phase 2-5, B-2, E-1 Faulty logic model B-75
test(s) and testing 3-6, 4-1, 4-52, A-22
Index-4

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

INDEX
Index Term Page Number Index Term Page Number

Feasibility 2-5, 4-41, 4-45, 4-48, A-5, A-16, Lessons learned 2-7, 3-1, 3-6, 4-25, 4-34, 4-58,
A-21, E-2 A-4, A-21, E-6
Flight-line maintenance 4-46 Liability issues 4-31
Form, Fit, Function, & Interface 2-11 Life cycle costs (LCC) See Costs
Formal demonstration test B-4, B-5 Life cycle phases 2-5, A-5, B-2, E-1
FRACAS 4-58, 4-65 Likelihood estimate(s) B-31
Functional Logic partition(s) B-76, B-79, B-84
characteristics 3-6 Logic(al) fault B-76
interchangeability 4-19 Logistic(s) 2-4, A-15
levels 4-46 analysis process 2-2
model 4-28, 4-25 costs 4-12
Fuzzy Logic 4-28, 4-29, 4-30 delay 4-33, A-11, D-2
managers 2-10, 3-7
(G) resources 2-7, 4-21, 4-46
support 2-6, 2-10, 3-1, 3-7, 4-34, B-71,
Geometric mean-time-to-repair B-37 E-6
Group replacement D-11, D-17 Lognormal distribution 4-53, 4-54, B-10, B-28, B-48
Guide specification(s) (GS) A-3
Guidelines 1-2, 3-7, 4-18, 4-25, 4-31, 4-40, (M)
A-22, B-86
Maintainability
(H) allocation 4-47 to 4-51
analysis(es) 2-10, 4-31, 4-40, 4-53, 4-58, D-
Hazardous materials 2-7, 2-9, 3-7, 4-25 1, E-5
House of Quality 3-2 assessment 4-51
Human concept 2-1
engineering 1-2, 2-9, 4-2, 4-9, data 4-58, 4-60, B-3
error 4-18, 4-22 defined 2-1
factors 2-9, 4-22, 4-32, 4-41, A-16 A-17 demonstration(s) 3-6, 4-53, B-5, B-14, B-71
factors analysis 4-32, 4-41 demonstration Plans B-20
machine interface 2-9, A-17 demonstration test(ing) B-5, B-7, B-14, B-23
models 4-21 design 2-5, 2-8, 4-3, 4-18, 4-26, 4-33,
resources 4-21, 4-60 A-15, E-6
senses 2-9, 4-10 elements 4-1, Appendix E
engineering analysis B-1
(I) evaluation 4-32, 4-53, B-65
expert system 4-21, 4-25
Inference engine 4-26 index B-5, B-9, B-11, B-21, B-27
Information processing 4-10, 4-21 inherent 2-1, 2-8, 2-10, 3-1, 4-60
Inherent measures 2-2, 4-42
availability 2-2, 2-3, B-8 models 4-32, 4-43, 4-53, 4-58
design characteristics 2-4, 2-5, 4-12 needs 3-1
Integrated diagnostics 4-5, A-15, A-17, A-19, A-22 objectives 1-1, 4-4, 4-48
Integrated product development 2-8, 4-21, B-72 operational 2-2, 2-10, 4-60
Interchangeability 4-18, 4-20, A-2, B-68 parameters 4-33, 4-47, 4-51, 4-53, 4-56, 4-
Interface(s) 2-9, 2-11, 4-1, 4-11, 4-14, 4-16, 64, B-1, B-64, B-69, D-3, D-20,
4-17, 4-18, 4-21, 4-22, 4-26 D-29
characteristics A-3 Maintenance
standard(s) A-2, A-3 aids 3-6 4-24
Isolation categories 4-7, 4-46
capability 4-38 concept(s) 4-4, 4-34, 4-44, A-22, B-2, B-65,
effectiveness 4-37 B-70, D-3, D-10, E-3, E-5
FFI 4-14 costs See Costs
of failures/faults 2-1, 2-9, 4-5, 4-13, 4-38, 4-58 data 4-60, 4-62
of malfunctions 3-6 depot level 4-5, 4-47
requirements 4-14 downtime 4-47, B-25, B-39, B-45, B-67
strategies 4-34 elements D-11
times 4-15, 4-52 environment B-2, B-3, B-5, B-10, B-20, B-64,
Iterative replacement 4-5, D-4, D-17, D-28 B-72, D-8, D-21
flow diagram D-20, D-25, D-27
(K) intermediate level 4-4, 4-6, 4-13, 4-47
level(s) 2-1, 3-1, 4-4, 4-12, 4-16, 4-19,
Knowledge base 4-26 4-32, 4-35, 4-42, 4-45, 4-47, 4-
Kolmogorov-Smirnov 4-64 53, B-2, B-5, B-8, B-14, B-64, B-
71, D-2, D10
(L) policy 2-4, 3-7
preventive 2-4, 3-5, 4-5, 4-47, 4-51, 4-60,
Laboratory environment(s) B-4, B-71 4-65

Index-5

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

INDEX
Index Term Page Number Index Term Page Number

Maintenance (continued) (O)

requirements 2-6, 4-6, 4-47, A-6, A-12, A-15,
A-17, A-20 O&M Costs See Costs
source data 4-5 Obsolescence 2-10, 3-7
task 2-4, 4-7, 4-41, 4-43, 4-53 OC curve B-29, B-30, B-32, B-36, B-54
task sample(s) B-12, B-18 Off-the-shelf 2-11, 4-1, 4-5, 4-19
task selection B-18, B-19, B-22 On-condition 4-5, 4-9
task times B-4, B-14, B-36, B-57, B-61 Operating
Malfunction(s) 3-6, 4-34, B-11, B-19 concept 4-9, A-9, A-20
Man-machine interface 2-9, E-6 environment(s) A-12, A-20, D-8
Management 1-1, 4-1, A-5, A-22, B-22, B-65 Operational
Manual fault isolation D-24, D-27 assessments A-6, E-6
Manufacturability 2-9, 4-3 availability 2-2, 2-3, 2-4, B-8
Manufacturing 2-8, 3-1 checks 4-44
capability 3-5, A-6 constraints B-6
data 4-5, 4-62, B-72 data A-12, B-67
development 2-5, A-6, E-1, E-5 effectiveness B-7
process standards A-4 environment 2-6, 4-6, 4-32, 4-42, 4-53, B-
processes 2-10, 3-7, A-4 A-13 42, B-64
Material disposal 2-9, E-6 life 4-6
Materials 4-6, 4-18, 4-23, 4-25, A-2, A-9, maintainability 2-2, 2-10, 3-1, 3-2, 4-60, A-6,
A-21, E-2, E-6 A-21, E-5
Maximum likelihood estimate B-31 maintenance concept 4-44
Mean corrective maintenance 4-47, B-5, B-21, B-26, B-28, B- needs 4-3
57 performance 3-6, A-21
Mean downtime(s) 2-4, 4-47, A-11, B-3, B-25 readiness 2-4, 4-4, B-39
Mean preventive maintenance 4-42, 4-47, A-19, B-26, B-57 ready rate B-39
Mean repair time D-5, D-20 requirement(s) 4-3, B-10, B-39
Mean-time-to-repair (MTTR) 2-3, 4-15, 4-42, 4-47, 4-50, B-1, status 4-6, 4-9
B-3, B-5, B-37 support 2-5, A-6, E-1, E-6
Measures 2-2, 4-15, 4-32, 4-42, 4-60 test(ing) 2-6, A-6, B-4, B-64, E-5
Milestone(s) A-5, A-22, E-1, E-2 Organizational maintenance level 4-4, B-5, B-8, B-13, B-71
Military Ownership costs See Costs
-unique items A-3 Partitioning 4-13, 4-30, B-80
customers 2-7, 2-11, A-7, A-11 Performance
procurement A-8 capabilities 4-21
products E-6 characteristics 4-4, A-2, A-15
solicitation A-8 checks 4-4
specification(s) A-1, A-7 data 4-45, 4-58, 4-65, B-72
standardization documents A-1 models 4-22
Mission monitoring 4-9, D-22
capable rate 4-32 requirements 2-10, 3-5, 4-3, 4-22, A-17
essential items 4-19 specification(s) 4-51, A-1
objective(s) B-7, B-10 Performance-based
readiness 4-15 document A-2
requirement(s) 2-7, B-65 requirements A-11
Mobility 2-10, 4-11 specifications A-2, A-7
Mock-up(s) 4-21, 4-23, 4-41, 4-62, B-3, B-11 Personnel requirements 4-32, 4-65
Model-Based Expert System 4-28 Personnel training 2-6
Modeling 3-1, 4-21, 4-38 Prediction(s) 4-45, A-17, E-5
Modifications 4-16, 4-33, 4-41, A-6, B-11, E-6 ground rules D-11
Modular replacement 4-46 methods(ologies) 1-2, 4-46, Appendix D
Modules 4-4, 4-15, 4-38, 4-47 model(s) B-3, Appendix D
Monitoring 3-6, 4-9, 4-48, 4-62, B-11 B-75, parameters D-11
D-22 procedures 4-46, A-22, Appendix D
process(es) 4-43, 4-45
(N) purpose D-2
requirements D-10, D-20
Natural failures B-12 software program 4-65
Neural Networks 4-25, 4-29 Preliminary
Non-destructive inspection A-16 design data D-5
Non-developmental items 4-1, 4-5, A-7 Design Review 4-3
Normal estimates A-23
approximation B-33 modeling E-3
deviate(s) B-24, B-27, B-31, B-44 validation B-65
distribution 4-53, 4-55, B-25, B-43
lognormal 4-46

Index-6

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

INDEX
Index Term Page Number Index Term Page Number

Preventive Replaceable unit(s) 2-9, 4-5, 4-14, 4-44, B-13

maintenance tasks B-25, B-58 Replacement concept D-3, D-10, D-21, D-28
measures 4-5 Resolution (FI) B-71, D-3, D-11, D-16
versus corrective 4-5, 4-6 Retest OK 4-13, 4-15, B-71
Probability 4-6, 4-28, 4-43, 4-46, 4-54 Retirement phase 2-5, E-1
Process Action Team A-1 Reviews, Types and Purpose 4-3
Process standards A-4 Risk(s)
Procurement package A-11, A-15 assessment A-5
Procurement specification B-6, B-21 levels A-18, B-5, B-45
Product reduction 2-5, A-6, E-1
defined 1-1 Root causes 4-51, B-72
design 3-2, 4-10, 4-17, 4-53 Rule-based expert system 4-26
design teams 4-26 Run-to-failure 4-5
development 1-1, 2-8, 4-1, 4-6, 4-21, 4-52,
4-58 (S)
life cycle E-1
Production Safety 2-1, 2-6, 2-9, 3-7, 4-9, 4-17, 4-
equipment 4-62 24, 4-53
facility 4-3 analyses A-17
Readiness Review 4-3 concerns B-4
reliability B-1 considerations 4-34, 4-41, 4-44
Program Sampling
definition 2-5, A-6, E-1 method B-86
development 4-65 plans B-34
objectives 3-1, 4-2, A-5 procedure(s) B-12, B-19, B-75, B-83
schedule B-12 tasks B-22
stability A-5 Scheduled maintenance 4-4, 4-7, 4-32, 4-61
Proof-of-concept demonstrations E-3 Secondary failure(s) 4-35, B-22, B-68
Proposal(s) 1-1, 2-11, 4-1, A-9, A-14, A- Sequential
21, B-42 logic model B-78
Prototype/Prototyping 3-6, 4-21, 4-47, 4-53, 4-62, A- probability ratio B-50
6, B-3, E-3 test methods B-18, B-22
Provisioning 4-60, B-70 tests B-22, B-50
Service life 2-5, 2-7, E-2, E-6
(Q) Simulation 3-1, 3-6, 4-15, 4-21, 4-23, 4-37,
4-53, 4-58
Qualitative Simulator(s) B-73, B-82, B-86
characteristics 4-51, B-1 Skill levels 2-1, 3-1, 4-10, 4-16, 4-42, 4-45,
elements B-4 4-62
requirement(s) 4-34, 4-41, 4-44, B-65 Software
Quality 2-2, 2-6, 4-2, 4-51, A-5 designs 4-3
Quality Function Deployment 3-2 development 4-47
Quantitative 4-3, B-1 faults B-72
data B-4 maintainability A-22
measures 4-14 maintenance 2-6
parameters B-1 requirements 4-3
requirements 3-2, 4-34, 4-41, 4-42, A-19, B- Specifications Review 4-3
20, B-58 standards 4-21, 4-23
Solicitation package A-6
(R) Spare(s) 2-4, 2-6, 3-5, B-8, B-65, B-69
Random sampling B-12, B-15, B-18 parts 3-1, 4-33, 4-46
RCM 4-7 procurement 2-10
Redundant(cy) 4-6 requirements 4-32
Reject criteria A-23, B-20, B-59, B-61, B-62 Sparing 2-10, B-71, E-6
Reliability Standardization 4-18
analyses 2-4, 4-34, 4-53 Statistics/Statistical
Centered Maintenance See RCM analysis methods 4-62, 4-64
growth test(ing) 4-52 distribution 4-53 to 4-58, 4-63
Repair inference 4-62
actions 4-54, 4-58 methods and tests 4-50, 4-63
analysis 4-32 Steady-state availability B-9
capability 4-6 Stratification B-13, B-19
data 4-58 Stress Measurement Device 4-9, 4-16
facility(ies) 4-5 Supplier(s) 2-5, 2-10, 3-6, 4-1, 4-4, 4-6, 4-
parts 2-6, 4-19 22, 4-48, 4-50, 4-65
shop 2-2, 4-62 Supply 2-1, 2-3, 4-19, 4-32, B-39, B-65,
times 3-6, 4-33, 4-46, 4-54, 4-58 B-69

Index-7

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

INDEX
Index Term Page Number Index Term Page Number

Support (V)
analysis 4-34, E-6
concept(s) 2-10, 4-4, 4-9, 4-32, A-9, A-20 Virtual mock-ups B-4
costs See Costs Virtual Reality
disciplines 2-8 application of 4-24
elements B-65 environment 4-24
environment 4-6, 4-53, A-20, B-2, B-64 mockups 4-23, B-5
equipment 2-4, 2-6, 2-10, 4-12, B-65, B-68, simulation 3-6, 4-23
B-70 types 4-24
facilities 4-19, E-6
personnel 2-6, 2-10 (W)
phase 2-5, E-6
requirements 2-10, 4-16, 4-31 Warranty
Supportability 3-1, 4-21, 4-33 Data 3-6
System(s) Information 2-11
design 2-9, 4-39 Period 4-65
diagnostics 4-15, B-71
downtime 4-33
engineering 1-1, 3-1, 3-5, 4-13, 4-22, 4-43
life cycle B-2
specifications A-1, A-3
testing 2-5

(T)

Task
analysis B-4
group(s) B-13, B-15, B-18
sampling B-12, B-22, B-66
selection B-19, B-22, B-37, B-58, B-61,
B-66
times B-4, B-13, B-57, B-61, D-3, D-
28
Teams (IPDTs) 4-26
Tear-down analyses 2-7, E-6
Technical manuals 2-10, B-65, B-68
Telepresence 4-24
Test(ing)
effectiveness 4-16, 4-17
formal maintainability 4-52
objectives 4-52, B-64
plans 3-6, Appendix B
types 4-52
Testability
analysis 4-15, 4-32, 4-34, 4-37 to 4-41
analyzer 4-38
defined 2-1, 2-9, 4-12
demonstration Appendix B
design 4-13, 4-40, Appendix C
handbook 4-40
metrics B-71
verification Appendix B
Trade-offs 2-2, 2-4, 2-10, 4-17, 4-43
Trade/Tradeoff studies 2-5, 4-4, 4-31, 4-45, A-18, A-22,
E-3
Training 2-1, 2-4, 2-6, 2-10, 3-1, 3-6, 4-
12, 4-16, 4-19, 4-25, 4-30, 4-46,
4-62, B-40, B-65, B-68, B-71, D-
2, E-6
Troubleshooting 4-12, 4-34, 4-58

(U)

Undetectable fault(s) B-77, B-81, B-86

Uniform distribution B-18
Unit replacement B-13
Useful life 2-5, 3-7, 4-58, A-6, E-1, E-6

Index-8

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MI L-H DBK-470A

,.

CONCLUDING MATERIAL

CUSTODIANS: PREPARING ACTIW:

ARMY - SY AF-17
NAVY - AS (PROJECT MNTY-0016)
AIR FORCE -17
DLA - DH

REVIEW ACTIVIES:
ARMY - IE, Ml, PT, TM2
NAVY - AS, CG, EC, MC, NP, SA, TD
AIR FORCE -08,10,13,19,21,33
DLA - DH
DIA - DI
NSA - NS
NORAD -US
OSD - HS, MA

(. .

-.
... ,,,

[
. .

,:.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 STANDARDIZATION DOCUMENT IMPROVEMENT PROPOSAL
INSTRUCTIONS
1. The preparing activity must complete blocks 1, 2, 3, and 8. In block 1, both the document number and revision letter should be
given.

2. The submitter of this form must complete blocks 4, 5, 6, and 7.

3. The preparing activity must provide a reply within 30 days from receipt of the form.

NOTE: This form may not be used to request copies of documents, nor to request waivers, or clarification of requirements on current
contracts. Comments submitted on this form do not constitute or imply authorization to waive any portion of the referenced
document(s) or to amend contractual requirements.
1. DOCUMENT NUMBER 2. DOCUMENTDATE (YYMMDD)
I RECOMMEND A CHANGE:
MIL-HDBK-407A 97/08/04
3. DOCUMENT TITLE DESIGNING AND DEVELOPING MAINTAINABLE PRODUCTS AND SYSTEMS
4. NATURE OF CHANGE
(Identify paragraph number and include proposed rewrite, if possible. Attach extra sheets as needed.)

5. REASON FOR RECOMMENDATION

6. SUBMITTER
a. NAME (Last, First, Middle Initial) b. ORGANIZATION

c. ADDRESS (Include Zip Code) d. TELEPHONE (Include Area Code) 7.DATE SUBMITTED
(1) Commercial (YYMMDD)
(2) AUTOVON
(if applicable)
8. PREPARING ACTIVITY
a. NAME b. TELEPHONE Include Area Code)
ROME LABORATORY/ERSR (1) Commercial (2) AUTOVON
(315) 330-4205 587-4205

c. ADDRESS (Include Zip Code) IF YOU DO NOT RECEIVE A REPLY WITHIN 45 DAYS, CONTACT:
525 BROOKS RD. DEFENSE QUALITY AND STANDARDIZATION OFFICE
ROME, NY 13441-4505 5203 Leesburg Pike, Suite 1403, Falls Church, VA 22401-3466
Telephone (703) 756-2340 AUTOVON 289-2340

DD Form 1426, OCT 89

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:
Previous editionsDocument
are obsolete.
provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
198/290
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 NOT MEASUREMENT
SENSITIVE
MIL-HDBK-470A
4 AUGUST 1997
SUPERSEDING
MIL-HDBK-470
12 JUNE 1995
MIL-HDBK-471
12 JUNE 1995

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
HANDBOOK
DESIGNING AND DEVELOPING MAINTAINABLE
PRODUCTS AND SYSTEMS
VOLUME II
APPENDIX C: DESIGN GUIDELINES

This handbook is for guidance only. Do not cite this document as a

requirement

AMSC N/A AREA MNTY

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A. Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX C

This page has been left blank intentionally.

C-ii

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX C

TABLE OF CONTENTS

C.1 Scope............................................................................................................................. C-1

C.2 Introduction................................................................................................................... C-1
C.2.1 Use of the Guidelines........................................................................................ C-3
C.2.2 Special Guidance. .............................................................................................. C-4
C.2.2.1 Testability.......................................................................................... C-4
C.2.2.2 Safing and Arming .............................................................................. C-11
C.3 List of Guidelines.......................................................................................................... C-13
C.4 Guidelines by Category................................................................................................. C-47

FIGURES

Figure C-1: Redundancy BIT............................................................................................ C-5

Figure C-2: Wrap-Around BIT ......................................................................................... C-6

TABLES

Table C-I: Categories of Product Subsystem, Equipment, and Component

Maintainability Guidelines................................................................................ C-1
Table C-II: Alpha Prefixes for Guidelines ........................................................................... C-3
Table CIII: Categories of Part Types and Technologies from RL-TR-92-12, Vol. I........... C-6
Table C-IV: Inherent Testability Checklist........................................................................... C-7

C-iii

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX C

This page has been left blank intentionally.

C-iv

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX C

DESIGN GUIDELINES

C.1 Scope

This Appendix is an essential part of MIL-HDBK-470A. The information contained herein is

intended for guidance only. This Appendix is for guidance only and cannot be cited as a
requirement. If it is, the contractor does not have to comply.

C.2 Introduction

Although quantitative measures are used extensively to evaluate the maintainability of a design as
it evolves, much of the "art" of designing for maintainability involves the application of tried and
true design criteria or guidelines. This appendix includes several hundred such guidelines; some
are generic and applicable to all types of products, while others are applicable to specific types
of products. Guidelines are provided for the categories of product characteristics, subsystems,
equipment, and components shown in Table C-I.

TABLE C-I. Categories of Product Characteristics Subsystem, Equipment,

and Components.
2.01 Accessibility 3.03 Structure
2.02 Fasteners 3.03.01 Radomes
2.03 Human Factors 3.03.02 Drains & Vents
2.04 Mating and Connections 3.06 Avionics & Electronics
2.05 Standardization and Interchangeability 3.06.01 Antennas, Apertures, & Sensors
2.06 Simplification 3.06.02 Communications, Command & Control
2.07 Modularization 3.06.03 Computers
2.08 Testability and Diagnostics Technique 3.06.04 Power Supply
2.08.01 System Testability Design 3.06.05 Information Systems
2.08.02 System/Subsystem BIT/BITE 3.07 Environmental Control, Air Conditioning, and
2.08.03 Module Level Testability Guidelines Pressurization
2.09 Module BIT/BITE 3.07.01 Oxygen Systems
3.08 Armament & Explosives
2.09.01 General BIT 3.08.01 Armor
2.09.02 General BIT Techniques 3.08.02 Weapons, Guns, Flares, Chaff, & Cannon
2.10 Inherent Testability Design Checklist 3.08.03 Cartridge Actuated Devices, Shaped Charges,
2.11 Preventive Maintenance Detonating Cord, & Pyrotechnic Devices
2.11.01 Environmental Factors 3.09 Fluid Systems
3.01 Connections 3.09.01 Fuel Systems, Tanks, Containers, Pumps, Trucks,
3.01.01 Plumbing, Hoses, Fittings, & Quick & Bladders
Disconnects 3.09.02 Pneumatic Systems & Pumps
3.01.02 Wiring, Connectors, & Fiber Optics 3.09.03 Hydraulic Systems, Tanks, Pumps, Accumulators,
3.01.03 Coaxial Connectors & Wave Guides & Reservoirs
3.01.04 Control Rods, Cables, & Controlex Concept 3.10 Wheels & Related
3.02 Power 3.10.01 Tracks
3.02.01 Engines (Gasoline & Diesel) 3.10.02 Wheels, Tires, & Brakes
3.02.02 Engines (Turbine-driven) 3.10.03 Landing Gear & Alighting Gear
3.02.03 Transmissions, Clutches, & Rotors 3.10.04 Skids & Floats
3.02.04 Auxiliary, Secondary, & Emergency Power 3.10.05 Hooks & Catapults
3.02.05 Gear Boxes & Drives 3.11 Personnel Equipment
3.02.06 Exhaust Exits, Nozzles, & Outlets 3.11.01 Oxygen Systems, Masks, Controls, & Containers
3.02.07 Inlets & Inlet Ducts 3.11.02 Personnel Protective Garments & Equip
3.02.08 Electrical 3.11.03 Flotation Equipment
3.11.04 Parachutes

C-1

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX C

TABLE C-I. Categories of Product Characteristics Subsystem, Equipment,

and Components. (continued)
3.12 Low Observable Technologies 3.14 Test & Diagnostics
3.13 System Support 3.14.01 Non-destructive Test & Inspection
3.13.01 Support & Ground Handling Equipment 3.14.02 Built-in Test & Built-in Test Equipment
3.13.02 Cleaning & Decontamination 3.14.03 External Test Equipment
3.03.03 Crew Stations, Crew Cabs, Cockpits, & 3.15 Man-Machine Interfaces
Personnel Enclosures 3.15.01 Displays & Instrumentation
3.03.04 Access Doors, Panels, & Openings 3.15.02 Service, Caution, Warning, & Advisory Lights &
3.03.05 Windshields, Windows, Canopies, & Optics Indicators
3.03.06 Structures, Airframes, Bodies, Chassis, & Hulls 3.15.03 Data Entry
3.03.07 Cargo Holds, Storage Bays, & Storage 3.15.04 Controls
Compartments 3.15.05 Access
3.03.08 Weapon Bays, Racks, Compartments, Pylons, 3.16 Equipment Decontamination
Housings & Turrets 3.17 Survival Equipment
3.03.09 External & Parasitic Tanks Pods, Containers, 3.17.01 Survival Packs
& Devices 3.17.02 Dinghies, Boats
3.03.10 Personnel Seats (Crew & Passenger), Ejection 3.17.03 Pods & Capsules
Seats, Benches, & Chairs 3.17.04 Backpacks
3.03.11 Materials, Treatments, Coatings, & Finishes 3.18 Tools
3.04 Control 3.18.01 Standard and Special
3.04.01 Steering & Directional Control 3.19 Miscellaneous
3.04.02 Flight Control Systems & Air Cushion 3.19.01 Extinguishing Agents, Containers, Controls, &
Systems Devices
3.04.03 Thrusters 3.19.02 Safe/Arm Devices
3.05 Mechanisms 3.19.03 Anti-ice, De-fog, De-ice, &, Windshield Cleaning
3.05.01 Bellcranks, Pivots, Mechanical Advantage Systems
Devices, Shift Devices, Ratio Changers, 3.19.04 Chemical, Biological, & Nuclear Environments &
Bulkhead/Firewall Penetrators, etc. Protection

Most of the design guidelines presented in this appendix were developed over many years
experience gained by McDonnell Douglas in designing aircraft, helicopters, and vehicles, and the
various subsystems and components used in these products. Some guidelines were recommended
by design and maintainability engineers from various companies and professional societies and
associations who reviewed the early drafts of the appendix. Few, if any, of the guidelines are
absolutes that must or can be followed in every case. Other requirements, as discussed in MIL-
HDBK-470A, such as manufacturing considerations, may make it impractical to incorporate
certain guidelines even when they may be desirable from a maintainability perspective.

Each guideline is presented with a brief explanation of its purpose. For example, consider
guideline Number C-1:

Avoid swivel type connectors and fittings for air, fuel, and hydraulic line interfaces
due to their history of low reliability.

This guideline does not prohibit the use of swivel type connectors and fittings. However, if
used, some action must be taken to avoid the problem of low reliability encountered in the past.
Also, if a trade is to be made, whatever advantages might be obtained through the use of swivel
connectors would have to be weighed against its historically low reliability (and the
correspondingly high maintenance rate). Indeed, design guidelines allow realistic trade-offs to be
made among the various design considerations (i.e., maintainability, other performance,
requirements, manufacturability, safety, etc.).

C-2

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX C

C.2.1 Use of the Guidelines.

Each guideline is assigned an alphanumeric "number"; the alpha prefix denotes the type of
equipment, subsystem, or area to which the guideline primarily applies. See Table C-II for an
explanation of these alpha prefixes1. The numeric suffix is simply a randomly assigned sequential
number. The guidelines are first listed by their alphanumeric number in ascending order. Then,
each category from Table C-I is listed and all guidelines that apply to that category are listed.
The exception are the general human factors guidelines which, since they apply to nearly all
categories, are listed only under 2.03 Human Factors.

TABLE C-II. Alpha Prefixes for Guidelines.

Abbrev. Meaning Abbrev. Meaning
AA&S Antennas, Apertures, and Sensors HOOK Hooks, and Catapults
ACS Air Cushion Systems HYD Hydraulic Systems, Tanks, Pumps,
ARM Armor Accumulators, and Reservoirs
BIT Built-in-Test IN Inlets and Inlet Ducts
BIT-M Module BIT IN(V) VTOL Top Mounted
BIT/BITE
Built-in Test and Built-in Test Equipment LG Landing Gear and Alighting Gear
C Plumbing, Hoses, Fittings, and Quick LO Low Observable Technologies
Disconnects MATL Materials, Treatments, Coatings, and Finishes
CARGO Cargo Holds, Storage Bays, and Storage MC Mating and Connections
Compartments MG Mechanical Guidelines
CBR Chemical, Biological, & Nuclear MP Mechanical and Physical Guidelines
Environments & Protection NDI Non-destructive Test and Inspection
CC Cabling and Connections OXY Oxygen Systems
CO Computers P Access Doors, Panels, and Openings
CONT Control Rods, Cables, and Controlex Concept PERS Personnel Equipment
CREW Crew Stations, Crew Cabs, Cockpits, and PYRO Cartridge Actuated Devices, Shaped Charges,
Personnel Enclosures Detonating Cord, and Pyrotechnic Devices
D&V Drains and Vents R Radomes
EC Electrical Connectors SABCH Structures, Airframes, Bodies, Chassis, and
ECS Environmental Control, Air Conditioning, Hulls
and Pressurization SAFE Safe/Arm Devices
EDECOM Equipment Decontamination SE Support and Ground Handling Equipment
EG Electrical Guidelines SEAT Personnel Seats (Crew and Passenger),
ENG Engines (Turbine-driven) Ejection Seats, Benches, and Chairs
ENG(G) Engines (Gasoline and Diesel) SI Simplification
ENV Environmental Factors SKID Skids and Floats
EXH Exhaust Exists, Nozzles, and Outlets SURV Survival Equipment
EXT External and Parasitic Tanks, Pods, T Thrusters
Containers, and Devices TCR Transmissions, Clutches, and Rotors
EXTING Extinguishing Agents, Containers, Controls, TOOLS Tools
and Devices TP System Test Points
F Fasteners W Wiring, Connectors, and Fiber Optics
FI Fault Isolation WBAY Weapon Bays, Racks, Compartments,
FUEL Fuel Systems, Tanks, Containers, Pumps, Pylons, Housings, and Turrets
Trucks, and Bladders WIND Windshields, Windows, Canopies, and
GBD Gear Boxes and Drives Optics
HF Human Factors WT&B Wheels, Tires, and Brakes

1
Note thay there is not a one-to-one correlation between the prefixes and the categories shown in Table C-I.
Initially, as the guidelines were developed, it was thought that each category would have unique guidelines. This
did not turn out to be the case and many guidelines apply to more than one category. Dropping the prefix and just
numbering the guidelines was considered but it was felt that having some categorization of guidelines would make
the addition of new ones easier, so the prefix was retained.
C-3

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX C

The guidelines are most helpful if the following steps are followed.

Screen guidelines for applicability prior to initiating conceptual layouts to assure the
maximum degree of proactivity.
Screen guidelines on an iterative basis as the level of design detail increases.
Make those guidelines applicable to a specific type of product, wherein ignorance of the
guideline might result in vehicle accident/loss, personnel death or injury, collateral
damage, or seriously detract from performing the function or mission, the subject of
special project awareness prior to exiting the conceptual design phase.

Once the type of product is established, and the appropriate guidelines are identified, efforts
should be directed to translating each guideline into specific quantitative and qualitative "design
to" criteria. As technology changes, the maintainability guidelines must be revised, expanded, and
otherwise kept current. Users of this appendix are encouraged to keep their own tailored list of
design for maintainability guidelines.

Many of the guidelines refer to line-replaceable units (LRUs), shop-replaceable units (SRUs),
weapon-replaceable assemblies (WRAs), and shop-replaceable assemblies (SRAs). The former
are terms used within the US Air Force, and the latter used within the US Navy. LRU and WRA
refer to items that are repaired in place or replaced on the end product (e.g., the aircraft, tank,
truck, etc.). SRU and SRA refer to items that must be repaired off of the end product, usually at
some level of maintenance called intermediate, shop, or depot.

Two terms used in the guidelines may not be familiar. These terms and their definitions are:

Parasitic - Parasitic is a term used in connection with structure, armor, patches and repairs,
and tanks. Parasitic structure or armor is structure or armor that is bolted or
scabbed in place. A parasitic patch or repair is one that is scabbed in place and
is not flush with the surrounding surface. A parasitic tank is a conformal or
pallet tank.

Hard point - Structural attachment and load bearing area. Used to mount equipment or
external stores or weapons, or for jacking or supporting a structure.

C.2.2 Special Guidance.

C.2.2.1 Testability.

Many of the testability and diagnostics guidelines in Sections C-3 and C-4 have been excerpted
from RL-TR-92-12, TESTABILITY DESIGN GUIDE RATING SYSTEM: Testability Handbook,
dated February 1992. In addition, that document provides the following general guidance
regarding testability and diagnostics.

C-4

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX C

Redundancy - Built-in-Test (BIT) can be implemented by repeating the functional circuitry (the
redundancy) to be tested by BIT. The same functional signal(s) is input into the redundant
element and Circuit Under Test (CUT). Therefore, the circuitry of the CUT exists twice in the
design and the outputs can be compared. If the output values are different and their difference
exceeds a limit (analog circuits), then a fault exists. Due to the expense of this technique,
redundant BIT design is usually implemented only in critical functions

An example of a BIT design using redundancy is shown in Figure C-1. In this example, an analog
circuit is repeated and the difference between the output levels is compared. If the difference
exceeds a predefined threshold, then a fault signal is generated and latched.

CUT

Differential Window Fault

Amplifier Comparator Latch
Redundancy

reset

FIGURE C-1. Redundancy BIT (source: RADC-TR-89-209, Vol. II).

Wrap-around BIT - Wrap-around BIT requires and tests microprocessors and their input and
output devices. During test, data leaving output devices is routed to input devices of the module.
The BIT routine is stored in on-board read-only memory (ROM). Wrap-around can be done by
directing output signals from the processor back to the input signals and verifying the input
signal values. Wrap-around BIT can be applied to both digital and analog signals concurrently.
An example of wrap-around BIT testing both analog and digital devices is shown in Figure C-2.
In this example, during normal operation processor outputs are converted from digital to analog
outputs and analog inputs are converted to digital input signals. When the BIT is initiated, the
analog outputs are connected to the analog inputs and the signals are verified by the processor.

The remainder of RL-TR-92-12, Volume I, provides detailed guidance on testability design

techniques and structured test techniques for the categories of part types and technologies shown
in Table C-III on the following page.

In addition to the practical design guide information found in RL-TR-92-12, Volume I, Appendix
B of MIL-HDBK-2165, Testability Program For Systems And Equipments, provides an Inherent
testability checklist. It is reprinted here, in a slightly different format, as Table C-IV. Refer to
MIL-HDBK-2165 for further guidance on testability program planning.

C-5

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX C

Memory

Microprocessor D/A

Analog
ROM Switch
BIT
Routines
A/D

FIGURE C-2. Wrap-around BIT (source: RADC-TR-89-209, Volume II).

TABLE C-III. Categories of Part Types and Technologies from RL-TR-92-12, Volume I.
Digital Guidelines Very Large Scale Integration (VLSI) High Power Guidelines
Initialization LSI Based CCAs Regulated Power Supplies
Visibility Visibility Corona and Electric Arcing
Controllability Controllability High Voltage/High Current
Functional Elements Synchronization Circuits
Microprocessors and Support Chips Initialization High Power
Microprocessor/Microcontrollers Partitioning General High Power Module
Complex Instruction Set Self-tests Techniques
Computer (CISC) Device Standardization Electro-Optic Guidelines
Microprocessors Standard LSI/VLSI Guidelines Human/Hardware Interaction
Reduced Instruction Set Structured LSI/VLSI Guidelines Hydraulic UUTs
Computer (RISC) Pneumatic UUTs
Microprocessors Electric Drive UUTs
General Mechanical Components
Transputers (INMOS CORP) Memory and Programmable Incircuit Test and Testability
Bit Slice Microprocessor General Memory Guidelines Philosophy
Single Chip/Embedded Memory and PLD Techniques Advantages and Limitations
Microcontrollers and Guidelines ICT Program Generation
Digital Signal Processors (DSP) Generic Memory Techniques Testability Problems
and Others and Guidelines Incircuit Testability Rules
Future Processors (General) Software Techniques Used for BIT/BITE
Microprocessor Support Chip Memory Testability Impulsive UUTs
Testability Analog Testability Guidelines Software Testability Guidelines
Structured Design-For-Test General Guidelines General "Other" Guidelines
Techniques Specific Guidelines High Frequency Guidelines
Structured LSI/VLSI Low Frequency Linear and Linear and Pulse Circuits
Level Sensitive Scan Pulse Circuits Microwave Guidelines
Design Data Conversion Circuits MMIC Guidelines
Scan Path Monitoring and Control
Scan/Set Logic Circuit
Random Access Scan
Built-in Logic Block
Observation (BILBO)
Boundary Scan
Scan/Boundary Scan Testability
Guidelines

C-6

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX C

TABLE C-IV. Inherent Testability Checklist.

Mechanical Design Checklist (for electronic designs)
Is a standard grid layout used on boards to facilitate Is defeatable keying used on each board so as to reduce
identification of components? the number of unique interface adapters required?
Are the number of I/O pins in an edge connector or Is each hardware component clearly labeled?
cable connector compatible with the I/O capabilities of Are all components oriented in the same direction (pin
the selected test equipment? 1 always in same position)?
Are connector pins arranged such that the shorting of Does the board layout support guided-probe testing
physically adjacent pins will cause minimum damage? techniques?
Is the design free of special set-up requirements When possible, are power and ground included in the
(special cooling) which would slow testing? I/O connector or test connector?
Does the item warm up in a reasonable amount of Have test and repair requirements impacted decisions
time? on conformal coating?
Has provision been made to incorporate a test-header Is enough spacing provided between components to
connector into the design to enhance ATE testing of allow for clips and test probes?
surface-mounted devices?
Partitioning Checklist (for electronic functions)
Is each function to be tested placed wholly upon one If required, are pull up resistors located on same board
board? as the driving component?
Within a function, is the size of each block of circuitry Is the number and type of stimuli required compatible
to be tested small enough for economical fault with the test equipment?
detection and isolation? Within a function, can complex digital and analog
Is the number of power supplies required compatible circuitry be tested independently?
with the test equipment? Are analog circuits partitioned by frequency to ease
If more than one function is place on a board, can each tester compatibility?
be tested independently? Are elements which are included in an ambiguity
group placed in the same package?
Test Control Checklist
Are connector pins not needed for operation used to Can long counter chains be broken into smaller
provide test stimulus and control from the tester to segments in test mode with each segment under tester
internal nodes? control?
Is it possible to disable on-board oscillators and drive Can feedback loops be broken under control of the
all logic using a tester clock? tester?
Is circuitry provided to by-pass any (unavoidable) one- Are test control points included at those nodes which
shot circuitry? have high fan-in (test bottlenecks)?
In microprocessor-based systems, does the tester have Are redundant elements in design capable of being
access to the data bus, address bus and important independently tested?
control lines? Can the tester electrically partition the item into
Are active components, such as demultiplexers and smaller independent, easy-to-test segments? (placing
shift registers, used to allow the tester to control tri-state element in a high impedance state).
necessary internal nodes using available input pins? Have provisions been made to test the system bus as a
Can circuitry be quickly and easily driven to a known stand-alone entity?
initial state? (master clear, less than N clocks for Are input buffers provided for those control point
initialization sequence)? signals with high drive capability requirements?
Parts Selection Checklist
Is the number of different part types the minimum Have parts been selected which are well characterized
possible? in terms of failure modes?
Is a single logic family being used? If not, is a Are the parts independent of refresh requirements? If
common signal level used for interconnections? not, are dynamic devices supported by sufficient
clocking during testing?

C-7

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX C

TABLE C-IV. Inherent Testability Checklist. (continued)

Test Access
Are unused connector pins used to provide additional Are all high voltages scaled down within the item
internal node data to the tester? prior to providing test point access so as to be
Are test access points placed at those nodes which consistent with tester capabilities?
have high fan-out? Are test points provided such that the tester can
Are active components, such as multiplexers and shift monitor and synchronize to onboard clock circuits?
registers, used to make necessary internal node test Are buffers or divider circuits employed to protect
data available to the tester over available output pins? those test points which may be damaged by an
Are signal lines and test points designed to drive the inadvertent short circuit?
capacitive loading represented by the test equipment? Is the measurement accuracy of the test equipment
Are buffers employed when the test point is a latch and adequate compared to the tolerance requirement of the
susceptible to reflections? item being tested?
Analog Design Checklist
Is one test point per discrete active stage brought out Are stimulus frequencies compatible with tester
to the connector? capabilities?
Are circuits functionally complete without bias Are stimulus amplitude requirements within the
networks or loads on some other UUT? capability of the test equipment?
Is a minimum number of complex modulation or Does the design allow testing without heat sinks?
unique timing patterns required? Are multiple, interactive adjustments prohibited for
Are response rise time or pulse width measurements production items?
compatible with test capabilities? Is a minimum number of phase or timing
Does the design avoid or compensate for temperature measurements required?
sensitive components? Do response measurements involve frequencies
Is each test point adequately buffered or isolated from compatible with tester capabilities?
the main signal path? Does the design avoid external feedback loops?
Is a minimum number of multiple phase-related or Are standard types of connectors used?
timing-related stimuli required?
RF Design Checklist
Do transmitter outputs have directional couplers or Have RF compensation procedures and data bases been
similar signal sensing/attenuation techniques established to provide calibration of all stimulus
employed for BIT or off-line test monitoring purposes, signals to be applied and all response signals to be
or both? measured by BIT or off-line ATE to the RF UUT
Has provision been made in the off-line ATE to interface?
provide switching of all RF stimulus and response Have suitable termination devices been employed in
signals required to test the subject RF UUT? the off-line ATE or BIT circuitry to accurately emulate
Are the RF test input/output access ports of the UUT the loading requirements for all RF signals to be
mechanically compatible with the off-line ATE I/O tested?
ports? Does the RF UUT employ signal frequencies or power
Have adequate testability (controllability/ levels in excess of the core ATE stimulus/
observability) provisions for calibrating the UUT been measurement capability? If so, are signal converters
provided? employed within the ATE to render the ATE/UUT
If an RF transmitter is to be tested utilizing off-line compatible?
ATE, has suitable test fixturing (anechoic chamber) Has the RF UUT been designed so that repair or
been designed to safely test the subject item over its replacement of any assembly or subassembly can be
specified performance range of frequency and power? accomplished without major disassembly of the unit?
Have all RF testing parameters and quantitative Does the off-line ATE or BIT diagnostic software
requirements for these parameters been explicitly stated provide for compensation of UUT output power and
at the RF UUT interface for each RF stimulus/ adjustment of input power, so that RF switching and
response signal to be tested? cable errors are compensated for in the measurement
Has the UUT/ATE RF interface been designed so that data?
the system operator can quickly and easily connect and
disconnect the UUT without special tooling?

C-8

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX C

TABLE C-IV. Inherent Testability Checklist. (continued)

Electro-optical (EO) Design Checklist
Have optical splitters/couplers been incorporated to Do monitors possess sufficient sensitivity to
provide signal accessibility without major accommodate a wide range of intensities?
disassembly? Can optical elements be accessed without major
Has temperature stability been incorporated into disassembly or realignment?
fixture/UUT design to assure consistent performance Do they possess sufficient range of motion to meet a
over a normal range of operating environments? variety of test applications?
Have optical systems been functionally allocated so Has adequate filtering been incorporated to provide
that they and associated drive electronics can be required light attenuation?
independently tested? Can all modulation models be simulated, stimulated,
Are the ATE system, light sources, and monitoring and monitored?
systems of sufficient wave-length to allow operation Can targets be automatically controlled for focus and
over a wide range of UUTs? aperture presentation?
Does the test fixturing intended for the off-line test Do light sources provide enough dynamics over the
present the required mechanical stability? operating range?
Is there sufficient mechanical stability and Do test routines and internal memories test pixels for
controllability to obtain accurate optical registration? shades of gray?
Can requirements for boresighting be automated or Are optical collimators adjustable over their range of
eliminated? motion via automation?
Digital Design Checklist
Does the design contain only synchronous logic? If the design incorporates a structured testability design
Does the design avoid resistance capacitance one-shots technique (scan path, signature analysis), are all the
and dependence upon logic delays to generate timing design rules satisfied?
pulses? Is the number of fan-outs for each internal circuit
Is the design free of WIRED-ORs? limited to a predetermined value?
Will the selection of an unused address result in a well Are all memory elements clocked by a derivative of the
defined error state? master clock? (Avoid elements clocked by data from
Are all clocks of differing phases and frequencies other elements.)
derived from a single master clock? Does the design include data wrap-around circuitry at
Is the number of fan-outs for each board output limited major interfaces?
to a predetermined value? Are latches provided at the Is a known output defined for every word in a read only
inputs to a board in those cases where tester input memory?
skew could be a problem? Are sockets provided for microprocessors and other
For multilayer boards, is the layout of each major bus complex components?
such that current probes or other techniques may be Does the design support testing of "bit slices"?
used for fault isolation beyond the node? Do all buses have a default value when unselected?

C-9

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX C

TABLE C-IV. Inherent Testability Checklist. (continued)

Built-in-Test (BIT) Checklist
Can BIT in each item be exercised under control of Is the failure latency associated with a particular
the test equipment? implementation of BIT consistent with the criticality
Does the BIT use a building-block approach (all of the function being monitored?
inputs to a function are verified before that function is Is the test program set designed to take advantage of
tested)? BIT capabilities?
Does on-board ROM contain self-test routines? Does building-block BIT make maximum use of
Does BIT include a method of saving on-line test data mission circuitry?
for the analysis of intermittent failures and operational Is the self-test circuitry designed to be testable?
failures which are non-repeatable in the maintenance Is the predicted failure rate contribution of the BIT
environment? circuitry within stated constraints?
Is the additional volume due to BIT within stated Is the additional power consumption due to BIT
constraints? within stated constraints?
Does the allocation of BIT capability to each item Are BIT threshold values, which may require
reflect the relative failure rate of the items and the changing as a result of operational experience,
criticality of the items' functions? incorporated in software or easily-modified firmware?
Are the data provided by BIT tailored to the differing Are on-board BIT indicators used for important
needs of the system operator and the system functions? Are BIT indicators designed such that a
maintainer? BIT failure will give a "fail" indication?
Built-in-Test (BIT) Checklist (continued)
Is sufficient memory allocated for confidence tests and Is the additional weight due to BIT within stated
diagnostic software? constraints?
Are BIT threshold limits for each parameter Is the additional part count due to BIT within stated
determined as a result of considering each parameter's constraints?
distribution statistics, the BIT measurement error and Is processing or filtering of BIT sensor data performed
the optimum fault detection/false alarm characteristics? to minimize BIT false alarms?
Is BIT optimally allocated in hardware, software, and Does mission software include sufficient hardware error
firmware? detection capability?
Have means been established to identify whether
hardware or software has caused a failure indication?
Performance monitoring Checklist
Have critical functions been identified (by FMECA) Has the displayed output of the monitoring system
which require monitoring for the system operation and received a human engineering analysis to ensure that
users? the user is supplied with the required information in
Have interface standards been established that ensure the best useable form?
the electronic transmission of data from monitored
systems is compatible with centralized monitors?
Diagnostic Capability Integration
Have vertical testability concepts been established, Has a means been established to ensure compatibility
employed, and documented? of testing resources with other diagnostic resources at
Has the diagnostic strategy (dependency charts, logic each level of maintenance (technical information,
diagrams) been documented? personnel, and training)?
Mechanical Systems Condition Monitoring (MSCM) Checklist
Have MSCM and battle damage monitoring functions Are preventive maintenance monitoring functions (oil
been integrated with other performance monitoring analysis, gear box cracks) in place?
functions? Have scheduled maintenance procedures been
established?

C-10

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX C

TABLE C-IV. Inherent Testability Checklist. (continued)

Sensors Checklist
Are pressure sensors placed very close to pressure Have procedures for calibration of sensing devices been
sensing points to obtain wideband dynamic data? established?
Has the selection of sensors taken into account the Has the thermal lag between the test media and
environmental conditions under which they will sensing elements been considered?
operate?
Test Requirements Checklist
Has a "level of repair analysis" been accomplished? For each item, does the planned degree of testability
For each maintenance level, has a decision been made design support the level of repair, test mix, and degree
for each item on how BIT, ATE, and General Purpose of automation decisions?
Electronic Test Equipment (GPETE), will support Is the planned degree of test automation consistent
fault detection and isolation? with the capabilities of the maintenance technician?
Test Data Checklist
Do state diagrams for sequential circuits identify Are testability features included by the system
invalid sequences and indeterminate outputs? designer documented in the Test Requirement
For computer-assisted test generation, is the available Document (TRD) in terms of purpose and rationale for
software sufficient in terms of program capacity, fault the benefit of the test designer?
modeling, component libraries, and post-processing of For large scale ICs used in the design, are data
test response data? available to accurately model the circuits and generate
If a computer-aided design system is used for design, high-confidence tests?
does the CAD data base effectively support the test Are test diagrams included for each major test? Is the
generation process and test evaluation process? diagram limited to a small number of sheets? Are
Is the tolerance band known for each signal on the inter-sheet connections clearly marked?
item?

C.2.2.2 Safing and Arming

Failure to properly "safe" or "arm" any of the numerous devices containing safe/arm provisions
has resulted in loss of life, loss of the vehicle, wide-ranging personnel injury, wide-ranging
vehicle/ground equipment damage, non-military liability damage, damage to facilities, ground
aborts, air aborts, and a host of equipment/personnel incidents. The following exemplifies some
of the major cases:

Failure to "Safe":

Canopy Ground Jettison Seat Ground Ejection

Ground Release/Jettison of Collapse/Retraction of Nose or Main
Weapons/Stores Landing Gear
Gun/Missile Firing on Ground Uncommanded Opening/Closing of
Uncommanded Extension/Retraction of Tail Weapon Bay Doors During Ground
Hook maintenance/Handling
Flight Control Surface/Ground Equipment Flight Control Surface/Access Door
Contact Damage Contact Damage
Folding Wing Contact Damage with Flight Control Damage due to Absence of
Ground Equipment, other Aircraft, or Gust/Control Locks
Facility Structure
C-11

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX C

Failure to "Arm":

Inability to Jettison Canopy Inability to Eject

Inability to Fire/Drop/Launch Weapons Inability to Jettison External Store/Pylon
(Air/Mission Abort)
Failure to Retract Landing Gear (Air Abort) Inability to Retract Speed Brake (Ground
Abort)
Inability to Extend Tail Hook Inability to Extend Wings

Improper Handling/Stowage of Safe/Arm Devices:

Engine Foreign Object Damage (FOD) Flight Control FOD

FOD in Gun System, Throttle Controls, Damage/FOD in Bay Containing Pin
Escape System Linkage Stowage Provisions
FOD/Damage from Pins/Covers in Aft Aircraft Loss Due to Control Locks
Cockpit when Flying Solo

C-12

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of: Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX C

List of Guidelines
Guideline Numbers Guideline

A-01 Seal equipment bays and compartments against the environmental elements including all types of servicing fluids used for the vehicle, all
types of anti-ice and de-ice fluids, and all types of fluids used for chemical, biological, or nuclear decontamination
A-02 Equipment bay and compartment structure should be bonded, co-cured, welded, machined, or combinations thereof to eliminate or
minimize the use of mechanical fasteners.
A-03 All equipment bay and compartment structural flanges and stiffeners should be external to the compartment to maximize the volume
available for equipment installation and arrangement.
A-04 Use stiffening beads in lieu of flanges to the maximum extent to enhance compartment volume and simplify repairs. Stiffening beads
should have the convex surface toward the compartment to eliminate fluid traps.
A-05 Keep all machined compartment frames, webs, and closure panels to a constant thickness (e.g., not stepped or tapered) to ease simplicity
of fluid or electrical penetrations and ease and simplicity of structural repair.
A-06 Hardpoints (structural attachment and load bearing areas) within a compartment to assist in equipment mounting or support should not
be integral with the machined part. Hardpoints should be parasitic to enable quick repair in case of wear or damage in lieu of precise
ream/bush repair typical of machined hardpoints.
A-07 Paint equipment bay and compartment interiors a high gloss white to maximize lighting reflectivity, visibility, and rapid leak detection
Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

capability.
A-08 Plumbing penetrations into a compartment should not be on a vertical axis due to difficulty in making or breaking vertically-oriented
connections. When compartment access is from the bottom, vertically-oriented connections can allow fluid to leak onto the maintainer.
When access is from the top, such connections can allow foreign matter to enter the line. Use horizontal penetrations whenever possible.
A-09 Any heat or temperature sensitive structure within a compartment should contain heat-sensitive tape or appropriate heat sensor for easy
indication of over-temperature excursions.
A-10 Provide a sufficient number of compartment fluid drains to ensure fluid drainage for varying aircraft static attitudes and varying terrain
slopes for ground vehicles.
A-11 Locate compartment electrical penetrations close to the access opening for ease of sight, probing, repair, and to eliminate fluid soaking,
wicking, or contamination.
A-12 Locate compartment electrical penetrations far enough from the access opening to prevent damage resulting from improper (over-length)
panel fasteners.
A-13 Two-sided or two-surfaced access should not be required for access to equipment interfaces and hardpoints. The term two-sided infers
top/bottom, left/right, front/back, or combinations thereof.
A-14 Do not locate nutplates or gang channels in inaccessible areas that would require extensive disassembly or equipment removal to gain
access.
A-15 Locate tie-down attachment points such that tie-down chains, straps, or cables do not prevent or restrict normal servicing, weapon
loading, or safe/arm functions.
A-16 Structural design should provide good access to corrosion-prone areas for inspection and treatment.

C-13
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX C

List of Guidelines (Cont'd)

Guideline Numbers Guideline

A-17 All structural fasteners in an access door or panel should be of identical grip and diameter. In rare cases where this is not possible,
fasteners of different grip must have different diameters to prevent a shorter fastener being substituted for the correct, longer fastener.
A-18 Use transparent windows, quick-opening covers, or openings without any cover to permit quick visual inspections where needed.
AA&S-01 Flush mounted antennas, sensors, and air data devices should have a good color contrast to surrounding structure when located in
walkway areas.
AA&S-02 Closure and sealing of cavities, compartments, and wells for retractable antennas should be mechanized to function as part of the extend
and retract cycle.
AA&S-03 Closure and sealing of cavities, compartments, and wells for retractable antennas should be maintained when antennas are not installed
without need for ancillary measures or equipment.
AA&S-04 LO antennas should be designed to be tolerant of accumulations of grime or dirt without degrading performance or biasing the BIT/fault
isolate performance.
AA&S-05 Multi-function antennas, arrays, and sensors located in leading edges should be modularized to reduce vehicle downtime through
simplified replacement of a faulty module.
AA&S-06 Moveable flaps or slats containing integral antennas, arrays, or sensors should be interchangeable to provide the option for on-vehicle or
Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

off-vehicle repair.
ACS-01 Design air cushion skirt surfaces to be highly resistant to high velocity blowing sand and stones.
ACS-02 Design skirt surfaces to the same operational and environmental criteria as that identified for low observable surfaces.
ACS-03 Select materials for the skirt surface so that bonded repairs can be used for punctures and tears across a wide temperature
spectrum/humidity index without relying on special facilities or equipment.
ACS-04 Incorporate rip-stop methodology in skirt construction to limit tears and rips and to prevent tear propagation.
ACS-05 Incorporate a color-coded interply in skirts to readily identify the maximum abrasion limit.
ACS-06 Do not try to achieve high reliability by requiring frequent visual inspections or scheduled replacement at predetermined calendar or
operating hour intervals.
ACS-07 Design skirt repair kits and select materials for the kits so they are not subject to a predetermined shelf-life or special storage
requirements.
ACS-08 Design all elements making up the air cushion control system so they are capable of sustained operations in salt air/water environments.
ACS-09 Employ control by wire or control by light technology to eliminate complex control mechanisms and associated maintenance and
support.
ACS-10 Ensure all diagnostic and prognostic logic, intelligence, and status type informational data are storable and viewable within the crew
station.
ACS-11 Provide crew station personnel with the capability to manually initiate selective BIT and interrogate the prognostics system without
interrupting the full-time or periodic BIT routines.

C-14
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX C

List of Guidelines (Cont'd)

Guideline Numbers Guideline

ARM-01 For an aircraft, the fuselage lower shear moldline should be no less than 38" above the ground when external weapons only will be carried
on the fuselage.
ARM-02 For an aircraft, the fuselage lower shear moldline should be no less than 50" above the ground when internal weapons will be carried in
the fuselage and weapon bay door widths exceed 22".
ARM-03 Locate fuselage weapon bays a minimum of 18" from the nose landing gear and main landing gear of an aircraft.
ARM-04 No single weapon/store mounted on a transporter should intrude into the service/turnaround envelope of another station.
ARM-05 All servicing and turnaround functions (including movement envelopes) should be outside the gun firing envelope.
ARM-06 The relationship of the nose landing gear to the main landing gear should not restrict the positioning of weapon transporters under the
fuselage of an aircraft.
ARM-07 The design of weapon and store ejectors and launchers should not require scheduled servicing, maintenance, or inspection requirements
prior to upload of the weapon or store.
ARM-08 Weapon and store ejectors containing arming solenoids should ensure the solenoids can be rapidly replaced while installed.
ARM-09 Weapon and store ejectors containing adjustable pitch control devices should ensure devices are easily accessible and adjustments are
Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

Murphy-free.
ARM-10 Weapon and store stations should be located to ensure vehicle ballasting will not be required under any combination of weapon/store
configurations.
ARM-12 Missile and weapon cooling provisions should have the capability to be serviced in-situ or rapidly replaced as a pre-charged assembly.
ARM-13 Do not locate magnesium fittings or structure in the motor plume of rail-launched missiles.
BIT-01 During design of the BIT, use worst-case stress analysis to ensure that any circuit failures induced by temperature extremes, tolerance
build-up, power supply variations, and combinations thereof are identified.
BIT-02 Ensure that BIT system thresholds are consistent with those across the system, subsystem, item, module, and piece-part levels to
prevent excessive numbers of Cannot Duplicate (CND) and Retest OK (RTOK) events from occurring.
BIT-03 The degree of BIT required or proposed should be based on the respective failure rates and the appropriate FMECA at all equipment
indenture levels.
BIT-04 Limit the amount of data that is recorded to a manageable size by:
- Limiting the number of signals that are monitored
- Limiting the maximum sampling rate
- Reducing the time span over which data is accumulated
- Restricting the type of data accumulated
BIT-05 Incorporate testability design features as an integral part of equipment preliminary design process.
BIT-06 Mission critical functions should be monitored by BIT.
BIT-07 Set BIT tolerances to maximize fault detection and minimize false alarm rate in the expected operating environment.

C-15
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX C

List of Guidelines (Cont'd)

Guideline Numbers Guideline

BIT-08 Design BIT fault detectors to accommodate the needs of operator maintenance personnel.
BIT-09 Use concurrent BIT to monitor system critical functions.
BIT-10 Design the BIT and BITE so that no fault or failure within the BIT or BITE will degrade, disrupt, or fail the system bein g monitored.
BIT-11 In the area of software design and test responsibility, the responsibility for the design and development of verification testing of an end
item (e.g., digital filter) should reside with the same engineer(s).
BIT-12 Define stimuli and response data for each diagnostic test at the system/subsystem level. The same data should be planned for use both in
factory testing as well as in field maintenance of the equipment. These data minimize the amount of unique software to be written.
BIT-13 Provide for manual control to test sequences, so that the test can be selected individually, and appropriate test combinations can be
executed at the operator's discretion.
BIT-14 Provide access to all BIT control and status signals at module connector pins. This will enable ATE to directly connect to BIT
circuitry.
BIT-15 Incorporate complete BIT functions and BITE on module. If only a portion of the BIT routine or BITE circuitry exists on the module,
then ATE cannot utilize the BIT routine without providing the missing BIT functions.
Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

BIT-16 Critical voltages should be visually monitored by sending the voltage signals to visible LEDs.
BIT-17 BIT failures should be latched on the module. This makes it easier for the system or ATE to poll the error bit at any time.
BIT-18 If many BIT routines exist on a module, then ATE should have access and the ability to control each routine individually.
BIT-19 Design BIT to have a very low false alarm rate; otherwise BIT will not be an effective maintenance tool. As a goal, the false alarm rate
should be 1% or less.
BIT-20 The BIT should be mechanized so that when a piece of equipment is not installed in a subsystem or the product, a failure will not be
indicated.
BIT-21 The failure detection function should provide the equipment operator with a go/no-go indication of equipment readiness.
BIT-22 The BIT should be designed so that auxiliary test devices or external equipment are not needed for daily and other regular checks.
BIT-23 Design BIT so it is initiated automatically upon equipment power-up.
BIT-24 Test points should be functionally grouped together and clearly labeled for convenience and ease of maintenance.
BIT-25 Equipment should not require manual probing to fault isolate.
BIT-26 Locate routinely used test points so they are accessible without removing or disassembling other equipment
BIT-27 Periodic and initiated BIT should detect at least 98% of all failures and isolate a minimum 99% of those failures detected to a single
LRU or WRA.
BIT-28 Design BIT to have the same level of EMI protection as the system or equipment being monitored.
BIT/BITE-01 Design to keep false alarm rates below 1%. Higher false alarm rates can limit the effectiveness of BIT as a maintenance tool.
BIT/BITE-02 Design EMI protection to eliminate finger type EMI contact devices.
C-01 Avoid swivel type connectors and fittings for air, fuel, or hydraulic line interfaces due to their history of low reliability.

C-16
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX C

List of Guidelines (Cont'd)

Guideline Numbers Guideline

C-02 Provide spacing between parallel plumbing runs so that in-line couplings can be replaced without removing lines or disconnecting any
line support devices.
CARGO-01 Ground vehicles with storage bays or compartments accessible from outside the vehicle should:
- Have the door sill located no lower than knee height to accommodate a wide range of percentiles while standing.
- Ensure door handles are flush with outer surface to protect personnel.
- Contain goose neck hinges to protect the hinge from the elements.
- Contain peripheral door seals that will protect against blowing sand entry at 50 mph.
- Ensure door can be opened with transport tie downs installed.
- Ensure door opening envelope does not intrude into the opening envelope of an adjacent door.
- Contain simple sheet metal hold-open spring or mechanism.
- Ensure floor of bay or compartment is flush with sill to simplify cleanout and drainage.
- Ensure door unlocking and opening mechanism can be actuated by a 95 percentile male hand while wearing arctic gloves.
- Contain 15 percent added volume for density growth.
CARGO-02 Ground vehicles with small exterior storage bays or compartments containing emergency equipment or supplies should:
- Be located at chest height of the 50 percentile male.
Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

- Contain unlatching mechanisms activated by pushing inward on the door.

- Meet all other generic bay and compartment requirements.
CBR-01 Orient all vehicle liquid servicing fittings to ensure fluids will not come in contact with protective garb during connect/disconnect
activities.
CBR-02 Ensure vehicle overboard passive liquid drains are clearly marked or visible to enable personnel to remain clear of area.
CBR-03 Design fuel cell drains so they can not be activated in a manner that would allow fuel to come in contact with a protected hand.
CBR-04 Design emergency ingress provisions so they can be activated by a 95 percentile male wearing full protective chemical or biological
protection gear.
CBR-05 Size rescue doors, panels, and "cut here" areas to accommodate the 95 percentile shoulder width wearing full protective chemical or
biological protection gear.
CBR-06 Consider the reduction in peripheral vision resulting from wearing chemical or biological protection gear when designing intended fire
paths and crash rescue paths into a vehicle.
CC-01 Use fiber-optic technologies in preference to conventional interconnect concepts to reduce the number of interconnects/interfaces, reduce
manufacturing and ownership costs, and significantly improve R&M.
CC-02 Standardize connector and wire types to improve testability and logistic support. Keep the number of "different" standard connectors to a
minimum. Use the same connector type keyed differently where possible.
CC-03 Provide clearance around connectors for engagement/disengagement of cables and proper connector orientation under anticipated
environmental conditions (e.g., bare hand of 50 percentile male in an enclosed or protected environment and a gloved hand of a 50
percentile male in an open or unprotected environment).

C-17
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX C

List of Guidelines (Cont'd)

Guideline Numbers Guideline

CC-04 Use quick release cables and locate cables to make removal and replacement easy and to avoid having to remove one cable to gain access
to another. Provide adequate space for cables, including sleeving and tie-downs, and adequate service loops for ease of
assembly/disassembly
CC-05 Orient and space connectors to allow a sufficient grip on the connector for cable or wire extraction without fear of using the wiring or cable
for additional leverage.
CC-06 Label, and where possible color code, each wire in a harness or cable to facilitate tracking from origin to termination. Each wire, cable,
and coax-to-connector interface should be provided with a source of identification to aiding trouble shooting, repair, or modification.
Marking the cable designator on the cable along with bar codes is also recommended.
CC-07 Do not manufacture or dress connectors containing more than 25 wires or cables as a single integrated harness. Group the wires or cables
into runs of no more than 25 wires or cables each. In addition to making trouble shooting and repair easier, this approach help avoid
large bend radii, thereby simplifying routing, packaging, and stowage.
CC-08 Standardize connector pin assignments for power, ground, and other frequently used signals.
CC-09 Locate LRU/subsystem critical nodes (and or test points) so they are accessible from a connector to prevent the need for internal LRU
probing or access.
Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

CC-10 Avoid hidden cables. Visually inspecting and tracing all assembly cables rather than having hidden cables (such as behind other cables
or even LRUs) allows for a quick system and cable integrity check which aids in overall system integrity and debug. This also implies
quick access for manipulative actions.
CC-11 Orient spare wires and cable pigtails along the outer diameter or periphery of connectors to make access easier.
CC-12 Build up and assemble straight and angle connector shells or back shells in a manner that ensures that wire or cable strain or wear is not
possible.
CO-01 Design automated systems and programs with provisions to enable "stop test" and "resume" without the need to cycle back or repeat the
entire test.
CO-02 In the event of program loss or hang-up, automated systems and programs should have provisions for reverting to manual test and
operation.
CO-03 Use a test connector to provide test and maintenance bus access to all system and subsystem faults.
CO-04 Design systems and subsystems so that ATE can be used to access, read, and control internal components in concert with the test or
checkout program.
CO-05 Avoid the need for costly adapters for signal communications between system, subsystems, line replaceable units (LRUs) or Weapon
Replaceable Assemblies (WRAs), and ATE.
CONT-01 Control rods should use Boyd or impedance type bolts (or equivalent) to eliminate the need for cotter pins or safety wire.
CONT-02 Do not use metal control cables for vehicles that will operate in salt water or salt air environments.
CONT-03 Use control rods rather than control cables for non-complex applications and non-complex routing within the vehicle.
CONT-04 Use control cables rather than control rods for most complex applications.

C-18
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX C

List of Guidelines (Cont'd)

Guideline Numbers Guideline

CONT-05 Route cables so that 100 percent of a cable will be viewable for inspection.
CONT-06 Design all pulleys and brackets associated with cable installations so they are accessible by a 75 percentile male hand.
CREW-01 Canopy attachment/hinge hardpoints should be located on the same structural subassembly as the canopy locking hardpoints.
CREW-02 Armor protection integrated with the vehicle structure should be given preference over parasitic armor.
CREW-03 In rare cases where armor is parasitic, armor should be interchangeable and easily installed.
CREW-04 Avoid wiring, coax, and plumbing penetrations through the floor of crew cabs, operators' compartments, crew stations, cockpits, and
passenger compartments.
CREW-05 Structural instrument panels, dashboards, and control panels should be modularized for easy and adequate access to all interfaces, to
simplify manufacturing, and to reduce maintenance-induced problems.
CREW-06 Film magazines, tapes, and removable modules should permit considerable handling without reliance on special support equipment
protection.
CREW-07 Electronic and photosensitive storage media should withstand the adverse environment created by ground, flightline, or shipboard
electromagnetic fields and light sources.
CREW-08 Data storage media containers and modules should be capable of chemical and biological decontamination processes.
Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

CREW-09 Crew and operator station cassettes or magazines should be capable of being removed and installed with one hand while the operator or
air crew is seated and strapped in.
CREW-10 Design cameras, recorders, and sensors to be fully interchangeable and quickly replaceable.
CREW-11 Design cameras, lenses, reconnaissance pods, aiming devices, and related equipment so they can be reconfigured by one individual.
CREW-12 Requirements for boresighting should not be part of the design or integration.
CREW-13 Provide storage provisions in each vehicle type (ground and airborne) to store extra tapes, modules, canisters, cassettes, as appropriate to
the intended vehicle use/mission.
D&V-01 The geometric aspects of structural design and interfaces should not result in any natural bathtubs.
D&V-02 Closed structural sections subject to condensation or fluid migration should contain drainage provisions.
D&V-03 Crew cabs, operators' compartments, crew stations, cockpits, and passenger compartments should be subject to the same corrosion
prevention measures as the exteriors of the vehicles. Low points, pockets, and related fluid collection points within should be provided
with low point drains.
EC-01 A threaded electrical connector should contain integral locking mechanisms and visual indications that the connector is properly seated
and locked.
EC-02 An electrical connector requiring less than one full turn to connect or disconnect should contain integral locking mechanisms and visual
indications that the connector is properly seated and locked.
EC-03 A push-pull electrical connector (excluding rack-and-panel type) should contain integral locking features and visual indication that the
connector is properly seated and locked.

C-19
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX C

List of Guidelines (Cont'd)

Guideline Numbers Guideline

EC-04 All electrical connectors should be keyed or asymmetrically shaped to ensure proper alignment.
EC-05 All electrical connectors should contain scoop-proof shells to ensure pin damage will not occur prior to engaging key way.
EC-06 All electrical connectors should be corrosion resistant to reduce or eliminate the need for scheduled inspections or corrosion prevention
measures.
EC-07 Avoid using electrical connectors requiring any type or form of soldering.
EC-08 Locate and position electrical connectors such that all pin identification for either half can be easily seen.
EC-09 Electrical connectors selected for critical applications on ground vehicles should be both accessible and capable of being connected
disconnected by a fifty percentile gloved male hand.
EC-10 Separation between grouped electrical connectors should be sufficient to ensure make or break of any connector by a fifty percentile gloved
male hand. Where this is not possible, an alternate method should be used such as the use of stand-offs, long-shelled connectors
alternated with standard connectors, 180-degree connectors alternated with 90-degree connectors, or innovative equivalents.
EC-11 Avoid connectors requiring potting as a method for environmental protection due to lengthy repair time and tendency for potting
compound reversion.
Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

EC-12 Electrical penetrations into a compartment should not be on a vertical axis to ensure foreign matter does not enter connector.
EC-13 Electrical, electronic, and coaxial interfaces between fixed and moveable surfaces should contain quick disconnects to simplify replacement
of the moveable surface or the electronic module.
EC-14 Scoop proof connectors should be used throughout unless their use would require an increase in the volume of the aircraft, in which case
deviations will be considered on an individual basis.
EC-15 The removal or replacement of electronic equipment should not require the removal of any other piece of equipment or armament.
EC-16 Select connectors so that contacts on the "live" or "hot" side of the connection are socket type rather than pin type to minimize personnel
hazard and to prevent accidental shorting of live circuits.
EC-17 Whenever possible, use self-locking connector plugs of a type not requiring safety wire.
EC-18 All electric connectors should be environment resistant.
EC-19 Connectors containing fiber optic contacts should, whenever possible, be mounted on a vertical surface to prevent particle and fluid
contamination.
EC-20 Use quick disconnect connectors where allowed and identify all pins on each connector.
EC-21 Locate connectors far enough apart so that they meet specified requirements.
EC-22 All connectors should be keyed differently with aligning pins that extend beyond the electrical pins. Connector pins and sockets should
engage after key position is entered.
EC-23 Design connectors so that plugs are cold and receptacles are hot.
EC-24 Use electrical connectors that incorporate alignment key-ways to reduce incidents of damage due to improper engagement.

C-20
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX C

List of Guidelines (Cont'd)

Guideline Numbers Guideline

EC-25 Use positive locking, quick disconnect electrical connectors to save man-hours, prevent foreign object damage (FOD) and decrease the
chance of personal injury.
EC-26 Avoid using identical electrical connectors in adjacent areas.
ECS-01 Design so that equipment servicing status are accessible and readable from the ground level for air vehicles and from the operator's
position for ground and water vehicles.
ECS-02 Do not locate equipment servicing points in crew, passenger, or operator areas.
ECS-03 Heat exchangers using hot liquids as the heat source should not be located inside the compartments used for operator, crew, or
passengers.
ECS-04 Plumbing, lines, or hoses containing hot liquids, toxic gases or liquids should be external to operator, crew, or passenger stations.
ECS-05 Access, removal, and installation of all type filter elements should be possible without removing the assembly or disconnecting any filter
package interfaces.
ECS-06 All electrical control, sensing, sensor, warning, caution, or signal interface and wiring should be fully BIT compatible.
ECS-07 Liquid type refrigeration compressors/packages should contain highly reliable quick disconnects to negate servicing or bleeding
Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

subsequent to replacement.
ECS-08 All liquid type refrigeration compressors and packages stocked as spares should be pre-serviced wherein the servicing is compatible with
the shelf life of the unit.
ECS-09 Design control valves, both manual and powered, with a visual pointer that clearly indicates the position of the valve.
ECS-10 The power actuation source used for valves that direct or control air, gas, or liquid flow should be parasitic to the valve body to enable
replacement without disturbing the integrity of the lines, ducts, or plenums.
ECS-11 Design air inlets, outlets, and exhausts to be accessible without reliance on ladders or work stands for ease of installing protective plugs
or covers.
ECS-12 Design air inlets, outlets, and exhausts with screens to prevent bird or rodent entry.
ECS-13 Design air inlets, outlets, and exhausts to be meniscus-free to prevent a bathtub effect. In remote instances where this is not possible,
passive drains should be provided at all low points to prevent liquid accumulation with the vehicle in its normal static attitude.
ECS-14 Instances where air inlets, outlets, and exhausts are subject to water entry, passive drains should be employed capable of handling 4" of
rain per hour.
ECS-15 Locate and orient air inlets, outlets, and exhausts in a manner that prevents their use as footholds during maintenance.
ECS-16 All components contained in the systems, including all attaching brackets and supports, should use hex-head self-locking bolts for ease
and simplicity of installation.
ECS-17 Do not use air ejectors due to their low reliability and susceptibility to clogging.
ECS-18 Avoid the use of insulation blankets containing polyvinyl for any application due to the dense smoke and toxic fumes if burned or
subjected to high temperature bleed air leakage.

C-21
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX C

List of Guidelines (Cont'd)

Guideline Numbers Guideline

ECS-19 Thermal blankets and covers used in ground vehicles should be replaceable.
ECS-20 Minor rips, tears, and punctures in ground vehicle thermal blankets and covers should be capable of being repaired in place.
ECS-21 Do not locate ground cooling or circulation fans that operate at high noise levels in operator, crew, or passenger compartments.
ECS-22 There should be no requirements for scheduled servicing or lubrication.
ECS-23 Intentionally left blank.
ECS-24 System design and integration and technology application should be such that requirements for torque is not required.
ECS-25 Technology, material selection, and treatments should combine to provide a corrosion-resistant system.
ECS-26 Design and integrate components whose proper operation depends on the direction of flow such that they cannot be incorrectly installed.
ECS-27 Use temperature-limiting devices with high temperature air systems to ensure no single or combination of surface wind, cross wind,
ground operation or flight operation will damage windshields, canopies, windows or optics.
ECS-28 Install and orient air supply and distribution ducts so they clear all access openings and equipment removal envelopes.
EDECOM-01 Provide surface sensors on equipment located in compartments containing louvers, screens, flush inlets, or similar openings to the
environment to indicate the presence of chem/bio contaminants.
Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

EDECOM-02 Provide integral sensors (viewable from the exterior) for equipment subject to internal forced-air cooling from outside or external air to
indicate the presence of contaminants.
EDECOM-03 Design equipment surfaces and structure to be compatible with all decontamination agents and methods.
EDECOM-04 Provide passive overboard drains in compartments subject to decontamination processes to void the area of contaminants.
EDECOM-05 Provide hoist, lift or transport handles for equipment requiring removal from the host vehicle for decontamination. In instances where
this may not be practical, design the equipment with hardpoints for attaching parasitic carrying provisions
EG-01 Design feedback loops so that the loop can be broken during test to ensure that faults do not propagate to the point where they cannot be
isolated.
EG-02 Avoid using external feedback loops requiring complex circuitry to simulate feedback I/Os.
EG-03 In rare instances when complex external feedback loops cannot be avoided, incorporate simple interruptible control points.
EG-04 Avoid long sequences of vectors to initialize or alter device outputs to minimize potential testability problems.
EG-05 Avoid the need to have test equipment generate complex, phased or time related signals.
EG-06 Test points should be located on all circuit nodes that are useful in determining the module's health.
EG-07 Test points should be designed so that functional circuitry cannot be damaged or degraded due to the routing or accidental shorting of a
signal at a test point. Some type of test point isolation technique should be used (buffers, isolator, etc.).
EG-08 Test points should be easily accessed and clearly marked.
EG-09 Intentionally left blank.
EG-10 Design redundant circuits to be independently testable to ensure errors are not masked.
EG-11 To improve the probability of fault detection, avoid shorting signals together to achieve a specific test function or condition.

C-22
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX C

List of Guidelines (Cont'd)

Guideline Numbers Guideline

EG-12 Incorporate concept for partitioning module functions to simplify test equipment or eliminate the need for ancillary test equipment..
EG-13 Design oscillators or clocks that are resident on the module to be replaceable by a signal from a connector to avoid the need to
synchronize ATE to on-board signals.
ENG(G)-01 Provide access to all engine mounts for ground vehicles so that hoisting or crawling under the vehicle is not required.
ENG(G)-02 Use torque-limiting bolts or torque washers as engine mount attaching hardware to eliminate the need for torque wrenches.
ENG(G)-03 Design hard points for hoisting or positioning the engine during installation and removal to be integral to the engine and capable of
hoisting and supporting a fully-built-up engine package.
ENG(G)-04 Do not use downward engine removal concepts that require jacking or hoisting of the ground vehicle.
ENG(G)-05 Use concepts for removing ground vehicle engines from the front, rear, or side rather than from overhead (using hoisting).
ENG(G)-06 The distance between the engine and firewall should ensure the access envelopes to lines, fittings, wiring, and adjustments will
accommodate the 75 percentile male hand.
ENG(G)-07 The distance between the cooling fan and radiator core should ensure that access envelopes will not require removal of the core.
ENG(G)-08 The interface of the engine assembly to the engine compartment and structure should be designed to ensure all spark plugs, glo-plugs,
and igniters can be replaced within 30 minutes elapsed time.
Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

ENG(G)-09 Design all interfaces between the engine assembly and the host vehicle to be in full view of the maintainers and so that crawling under the
vehicle is not required.
ENG(G)-10 Design attaching hardware for all mechanical engine-to-vehicle interfaces to be captive and with integral safeties.
ENG(G)-11 Use "torq-set" type clamps or equivalent in all cooling system hose interfaces to eliminate torque wrenches and the potential for error.
ENG(G)-12 Provide a clear and viewable access envelope to fuel and oil filters.
ENG(G)-13 Locate fuel filters to ensure no safety hazard will exist due to residual fuel during filter change.
ENG(G)-14 Access envelopes to fuel and oil filters should not be in close proximity to exhaust manifolds or cooling system return lines.
ENG(G)-15 Any single drive belt (excluding timing belts) should be capable of replacement within 30 minutes elapsed time
ENG(G)-16 Do not locate batteries in the engine compartment. In those instances where this is not possible:
- The battery support structure should be of a material that is impervious to acid leakage or boil-over.
- The battery support structure should serve as a scupper to collect and direct the acid out of the engine compartment.
ENG(G)-17 Install simple, lightweight shields over cooling system return lines to protect personnel from hose or line blowout during maintenance.
ENG(G)-18 Incorporate appropriate sensors to enhance the diagnostic and prognostic capabilities for the following:
- Oil temperature - Fuel filter bypass
- Oil pressure - Coolant pressure
- Oil filter bypass - Coolant level
- Oil cooler bypass valve position - Coolant temperature
- Oil level - Vibration pickups
- Oil return line particle count - Chip detector

C-23
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX C

List of Guidelines (Cont'd)

Guideline Numbers Guideline

ENG(G)-19 Paint engine compartments gloss white to enhance light reflectivity and enhance fluid leak detection.
ENG(G)-20 Design all firewall fittings, connectors, and penetrations to be fully viewable and directly accessible to the maintainers.
ENG-01 All facets of engine design should take advantage of Electrostatic Engine Monitoring Systems (EEMS) and Inductive Debris Monitoring
(IDM) toward achievement of on-condition maintenance and engine health monitoring.
ENG-02 Each different component of rotating machinery should contain different tracer elements to enhance EEMS and IDM isolation and tracking
of wear.
ENG-03 Digital electronic controls, fully automatic digital electronic controls, and similar concepts should contain the highest degree of BIT and
diagnostics commensurate with affordability, operation and maintenance, and life cycle costs as appropriate.
ENG-04 The engine and engine-mounted gear box should have individual oil supplies to ensure wear or failures in one will not contaminate or
fail the other.
ENG-05 All engine-mounted air and fluid lines should be located next to the fan case, engine case, or full-length fan duct to ensure quick and
simple replacement of accessories and components.
ENG-06 All other engine surfaces and engine-mounted accessory surfaces should be free of pockets, channels, and bathtubs that could trap and
retain fluids.
Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

ENG-07 Plumbing and wiring spanning two or more engine modules should contain in-line disconnects to enhance and simplify engine
modularization.
ENG-08 Use V-band clamps to mount accessories to engine-mounted gear boxes.
ENG-09 On multi-engine air vehicles, the engines should be capable of being installed in any engine cavity without need for reconfiguration.
ENG-10 On multi-engine air vehicles, the airframe-to-engine interfaces should be in identical positions or orientations for each engine cavity.
ENG-11 Control-by-wire or control-by-light throttling concepts should take precedence over mechanical controls.
ENG-12 All engine-mounted accessories must be capable of being removed and installed through the available airframe access openings.
ENG-13 Engine oil systems should contain on-board spectrometric oil analysis devices located on the engine.
ENG-14 Coring of engine gear box cases and housings to provide for fuel heat sink routing should take precedence over dedicated fuel or oil heat
exchangers.
ENG-15 Engine removal for aircraft intended to be operated off carriers should be accomplished within the shadow of the aircraft.
ENG-16 Aircraft jacking should not be required for engine removal.
ENG-17 Aft engine removal should be an acceptable alternative for USAF aircraft.
ENG-18 For either downward or aft engine removal, it should be possible to maintain control of the engine on all axis during the entire removal
and installation process.
ENG-19 The minimum clearance between engine and airframe should be 1 inch, including removal and installation.
ENG-20 Do not locate equipment or components in the engine cavity except for those components associated with the engine or engine
installation.

C-24
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX C

List of Guidelines (Cont'd)

Guideline Numbers Guideline

ENG-21 Do not locate equipment or components in the engine bay cavity in a manner that would require removal or repositioning for engine
removal.
ENG-22 The engine cavity structure should be capable of withstanding a 2000-degree Fahrenheit fire for 10 minutes without jeopardizing loss of
the vehicle.
ENG-23 All engine borescope provisions should be accessible with the engine installed and hooked up.
ENG-24 Replacement of all ignitors should be possible with the engine installed.
ENG-25 All engine-to-airframe plumbing, wiring, and duct interfaces should be capable of being connected or disconnected by hand, should
contain integral safety provisions, and should not require torquing.
ENG-26 Locate and position engine overheat and fire warning sensors so that damage cannot occur during engine maintenance or replacement.
ENG-27 No rigging or calibration should be required following engine replacement.
ENG-28 No engine operational start and checkout should be required following engine replacement.
ENG-29 No functional check flight should be required following engine change. On twin engine aircraft where both engines were changed
simultaneously, a functional test flight is permissible.
Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

ENG-30 It should not be necessary to close or reinstall engine access doors for engine ground operation up to and including military power.
ENG-31 No rigging or calibration should be required subsequent to replacement of any engine-mounted component.
ENG-32 Design the engine fuel controls and electronic controllers so that no manual fuel grade adjustments are required.
ENG-33 Engine access doors and panels and their integral support struts should be capable of withstanding 60 MPH winds in the opened
position.
ENG-34 Identification plates on the engine and all engine-mounted components should be viewable with the engine installed and engine access
doors opened.
ENG-35 No time-change components or scheduled actions should be planned solely to protect component integrity or reliability.
ENG-36 All borescope mechanisms should have positive integral locking features.
ENG-37 Gravity type servicing fittings, covers, and caps should have integral locking features, openable by hand, and contain a cable or chain to
prevent loss or dropping.
ENG-38 The characteristics of engine-to-vehicle interfaces coupled with the capabilities of electronic engine controls, should negate the necessity
for making any type of engine rigging including maximum power, idle, and idle cut-off.
ENG-39 Engine-to-vehicle plumbing quick disconnects should contain positive visual indication that the interface is fully seated and locked.
ENG-40 Design of electronic engine controls should be such that no single failure of a sub-component within can result in over speed, over
temperature, stagnation, or shut-down.
ENG-41 Use captive fasteners containing self-locking features to attach the nose dome to the engine face. The fasteners should be fully viewable
during engine face FOD inspections.

C-25
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX C

List of Guidelines (Cont'd)

Guideline Numbers Guideline

ENG-42 Attach engine-to-inlet duct interface seals to the vehicle so they can be left in place during engine removal.
ENG-43 Design engine-to-inlet duct seal so the interface is automatic during engine installation without needing any form of alignment,
adjustment, or mechanical attachment interface.
ENG-44 Select engine-to-inlet duct seal material to ensure seal life is sufficient for the life of the vehicle.
ENG-45 Provide remote servicing points accessible from the ground to service engine accessories mounted on top of the engine (e.g., oil tanks,
gear boxes, generators, etc.) to eliminate climbing upon or atop the host vehicle.
ENG-46 Design the basic engine and engine-mounted accessory interface so that no fluid traps or bathtubs exist regardless of engine-mounted
accessory location.
ENG-47 Design the engine, including all accessories, plumbing, wiring, ducts, and mechanisms, to meet the same environmental protection and
compatibility requirements as the host vehicle.
ENG-48 Do not drain or dump residual fuel in the engine fuel control/manifold overboard. When it is not possible to follow this guideline, route
the fuel to an engine-mounted collector tank capable of retaining fuel from two shutdowns.
ENG-49 Design engine fuel and oil filters with integral locking features so they can be installed and removed by hand, and require no torquing.
ENG-50 Design engine fuel and oil filter delta pressure indicators so they can be reset only from within the filter housing.
Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

ENG-51 Provide engine fuel and oil filters with anti-surge protection to ensure false delta pressure indications do not occur.
ENG-52 Incorporate provisions to enable very slow rotation of the fan, compressor, and turbine during borescope inspections.
ENG-53 Design magnetic chip detectors to ensure that oil shut-off will occur as the detector is being removed for visual inspection.
ENG-54 Incorporate provisions for fuzz burn-off. in magnetic chip detectors.
ENV-01 Materials, treatments, coatings, finishes should be compatible with all anti-ice and de-ice fluids, chemical and biological decontamination
fluids, washing and cleaning fluids, and all vehicle subsystem fluids.
ENV-02 There should be no top coat or treatment deterioration throughout the standard temperature and humidity spectrum.
ENV-03 For airborne vehicles, the finishes should be durable against rain, hail, and dynamic erosion throughout the flight envelope.
ENV-04 For airborne and ground vehicles, the finishes should be durable against sand erosion throughout all surface wind speeds experienced in
arid or desert geographical locations.
ENV-05 For airborne vehicles, materials and all finishes with the engine inlet should be durable against hammer shock and compressor stalls.
ENV-06 For ground vehicles, the finishes should be compatible with and durable against all rain, hail, sleet, snow, and ice conditions experienced
in all intended operational environments.
ENV-07 The finishes and surfaces should be capable of low velocity impact (LVI) of 10 foot-pounds with no visual or detectable damage with a
design goal of 30 foot-pounds.
EXH-01 Treatments required for engine hot sections and exhaust areas should not require scheduled removals for the purposes of recoating.
EXH-02 High temperature exhaust patterns should flow away from or be directed away from treated surrounding structure, coatings, or finishes.
EXT-01 Locate Tanks, Pods, Containers, and Devices (TPCD's) so they do not block or restrict access to existing vehicle access areas or access
approach envelopes.

C-26
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX C

List of Guidelines (Cont'd)

Guideline Numbers Guideline

EXT-02 Design TPCD's for fuel containment to automatically interface to the host vehicle during installation or removal.
EXT-03 Design TPCD's to be fully compatible with the existing vehicle built-in hoisting provisions and locking devices.
EXT-04 Design TPCD's used for fuel containment so that post-installation operational tests or checks are not required.
EXT-05 Design access doors for cargo type TPCD's to be non-load carrying and with simple latches for all doors and panels.
EXT-06 Design cargo TPCD's to ensure all cargo and equipment can be downloaded and uploaded with the TPCD installed on the host vehicle.
EXTING-01 Use extinguishing concepts dedicated to each individual fire zone in preference to manifold systems operating from a central source.
EXTING-02 Design sealed extinguishing agent containers with an integral pressure/volume gage and a pressure-sensing transmitter for remote read-
out.
EXTING-03 Keep each individual fire zone over-temperature/fire warning system separate from those in other fire zones.
EXTING-04 Design individual fire zone over-temperature/fire warning system to be fully BIT capable (the BIT concept should permit both initiated
and periodic BIT).
EXTING-05 Route and locate all tube, wire, and plumbing interfaces in a manner that prevents induced damage during maintenance.
EXTING-06 Provide an alternate capability to activate the system remotely from the cockpit/crew station, or operator's position to satisfy emergency
situations during vehicle maintenance.
Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

EXTING-07 Analyze the vehicle operational environment and type of fire zones to determine if remote stop/shut-off of equipment is warranted.
EXTING-08 Analyze the vehicle operational environment and type of fire zones to determine if remote alarm and/or visual indication of a fire is
warranted.
EXTING-09 Do not locate provisions for overboard venting or dumping of extinguishing agents in areas that could create hazards for personnel.
F-01 Use blind fasteners only where absolutely necessary or where considerable cost can be saved.
F-02 Minimize access fasteners while making them quick release, easily removed and replaced, and captive.
F-03 Choose fasteners based on the requirement top operate by hand or with common hand tools rather than special tools.
F-04 Whenever possible, incorporate barrel type fasteners as opposed to hi-torque fasteners. Failure of Hi-torque fasteners due to stripping are
common and a source of potential foreign object damage (FOD).
FI-01 Design each FI test to be independent of all other tests.
FI-02 Design FI initiation to be subordinate to the higher priority predecessor tests.
FI-03 Design each test so that it can be terminated prior to completion and then re-initiated at its start point.
FI-04 Design the unit tests so that they can accommodate the following subsystem response modes:
- Incorrect response
- No response
- Inconsistent response
- Unexpected condition
FI-05 Design all software so that it is structured by test priority. The test software should take advantage of both subroutine constructs for all
message outputs and of failure dictionaries which identify the location of the most likely failed replaceable unit.

C-27
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX C

List of Guidelines (Cont'd)

Guideline Numbers Guideline

FI-06 In an airborne avionics system, consider indicating mission critical faults on a pilots "head-up" display accompanied with an audible
alarm, so that the pilot can easily check for critical system or mission threatening problems.
FI-07 Ensure that system user manuals include instructions for faults not covered by BIT such as, system will not power up or system is being
used in an incorrect environment such as, at the wrong altitude, etc.
FI-08 Interlock the high power sections of systems and subsystems with visual/audible BIT to ensure safe system activation.
FI-09 Design BIT to first conduct self-test for circuitry integrity before conducting system test.
FI-10 Use clear text to report failures rather than alpha-numeric codes, lights, indicators, etc.
FI-11 Locate BIT circuitry on the same level of the subsystem under test to simplify test and repair when it is removed from the main system.
FUEL-01 Locate fuel vent and dump masts to ensure exiting fuel will be clear of servicing, loading, arming and safing areas for all types of ground
and airborne vehicles.
FUEL-02 Manufacturing splices for major sub-assemblies should not intrude into or through integral fuel cells or tanks.
FUEL-03 Structural bolts, screws, and fasteners should not penetrate into integral fuel cells or tanks other than those used for access door
attachment.
FUEL-04 Where the fuel wetted area inside a fuel cell or tank is void of blade, knife, and hat stiffeners for use as hardpoint attachment, standoffs
Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

bonded to the cell surface should be used as attachments for clamps, and brackets to eliminate fastener penetration of the fuel cavity.
FUEL-05 Intersecting of two or more surfaces in a fuel wetted area of less than 90 degrees should be avoided to simplify manufacture and repair.
FUEL-06 Where maintaining a minimum angle of 90 degrees is not possible, sufficient depth, width, and height should be maintained to provide
tool clearances for all tools used in the manufacturing processes and in the operational field repair environment.
FUEL-07 When feed tanks are designed such that the lower portion of the tank serves as a surge chamber, the top closure deck of the surge chamber
should provide the strength to support the weight of a 95 percentile male.
FUEL-08 The size and number of fuel cell and tank access doors should be sufficient to ensure no wetted area of the cell or tank is beyond a
maximum 18" distance from the edge of the access opening. This guideline applies to only non-man rated cells.
FUEL-09 All fuel cell or tank access doors not mounted on the exterior surface should contain sealing provisions other than the channel type.
FUEL-10 Provide access from the wing closure ribs in lieu of the moldline when access is required in close proximity to the wing fold area.
FUEL-11 Through-the-tank fasteners should not be used for fuel cells or tanks in areas where a leak path could be established into an inaccessible
portion of the vehicle.
GBD-01 Guidelines for transmissions, clutches, and rotors apply.
GBD-02 Use the host gear box lubricating system to provide lubrication of the drive shaft spline.
GBD-03 Design drive shafts using the "blind spline" concept to ensure correct mating of the shaft to the gear box.
GBD-04 Design drive shafts with a simple, light-weight cover to protect personnel.
GBD-05 Design drive shaft covers with a hole or slot type opening to prevent the masking of leakage or damage.
HF-01 Steps and handholds for all ground vehicles should be parasitic to the surface and capable of safely supporting a 95 percentile male
wearing arctic boots.

C-28
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX C

List of Guidelines (Cont'd)

Guideline Numbers Guideline

HF-02 Locate identification and modification plates for all major structural assemblies and subassemblies so as to be fully visible and legible
when viewed through normal access provisions. Avoid the need to remove equipment or components to view the plates.
HF-03 Provide hoist fittings or hardpoints for hoist fitting attachments that are readily accessible.
HF-04 Size structural openings into man-rated fuel cells to enable entry by a 75 percentile male.
HF-05 In designing the vehicle, system, subsystem, and equipment, attempt to satisfy the personnel spectrum from the 5th percentile female to
the 95th percentile male.
HF-06 Recognize that design ingenuity cannot overcome the fact that certain tasks may be outside of the capabilities of females in the lower
percentile ranges. Many of these tasks may also be outside the capability of a large portion of the male lower percentile ranges. In
designing, proactively recognize these inabilities so the necessary scope and depth of good design tradeoffs can be identified or expanded.
The tasks include:
- Manually loading many types of weapons.
- Pushing an engine/transport trailer combination.
- Handling various large actuators, motors, or generators.
- Removing, installing, and handling many built-up wheel and tire assemblies.
- Lifting a large percentage of avionics.
Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

- Reaching all areas of windshield/canopy surfaces for cleaning.

- Moving major support equipment.
- Handling tie-down chains.
- Pulling or removing pinched chocks.
- Lifting tool boxes.
- Aiding in pilot rescue.
- Safely moving about in high over-the-deck or ground surface winds.
- Riding brakes or taxiing aircraft.
- Lifting and connecting refueling hoses.
- Changing or repairing tank treads.
- Handling small ammunition containers.
- Achieving high torque values.
HF-07 Recognize that design ingenuity cannot overcome certain tasks that are not within the capability of the 95 percentile male. In designing,
proactively recognize these inabilities so the necessary scope and depth of good design tradeoffs can be identified or expanded. The tasks
include:
- Pulling circuit breakers with a gloved hand.
- Achieving good working access inside of many equipment bays and compartments.
- Working under air vehicles with lower shears less than 32 inches above the static ground line.
- Connecting and disconnecting electrical connectors that are generally considered to be sufficiently spaced.
- Recovering a dropped tool from many different bays and compartments.
- Preparing many different types of vehicles for operation while wearing arctic clothing or chemical/biological protective gear.

C-29
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX C

List of Guidelines (Cont'd)

Guideline Numbers Guideline

HF-08 Avoid solely relying on decals, placards, or instruction media to simplify or negate redesign. In rare instances such use of decals, etc.
may lead to significant payoffs, the decision should be supported by complete analysis and supporting rationale.
HF-09 Develop decals, placards and instruction media around an 8th grade reading level and a 10th grade level of comprehension.
HOOK-01 Locate, orient, and mechanize Nose Gear Tow/Nose Gear Holdback (NGT/NGH) mechanisms so they do not interfere with the hookup
and attachment of standard towbars.
HOOK-02 Design NGT/NGH mechanisms with integral provisions to visually indicate correct hookup/attachment. The indication must be visible
during all day and night carrier operations.
HOOK-03 NGT/NGH mechanisms should not require scheduled visual or NDI type inspections.
HOOK-04 Design tail hook points to be interchangeable and easily replaceable.
HOOK-05 Design tail hook points so they can not be incorrectly installed.
HOOK-06 Avoid the need to remove the tail hook to facilitate engine access or removal.
HOOK-07 Incorporate remote means to read the tail hook dampener pressure charge to enhance carrier suitability.
HYD-01 For military combat vehicles having two or more hydraulic power systems, provide a minimum 30-inch spacing between ground power
Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

and servicing interfaces to ensure:

- Design flexibility in locating and arranging equipment in high-density vehicles such as fighters and helicopters,
- Work area separation to enable concurrent service/maintenance on systems,
- Systems vulnerability enhancement,
- Reduction in turn-around elapsed time due to concurrent servicing capability.
HYD-02 Use identical components, such as pumps, reservoirs, and accumulators, in each individual power subsystem. In instances where this is
not fully possible, perform and document trade studies or appropriate analysis to provide justification and supporting rationale.
HYD-03 Use identical types of fluid in all hydraulic subsystems. Brakes may be the exception only if the system is totally separated from the
independent of other hydraulic systems.
HYD-04 For vehicles containing two or more systems with different fluids, use different service fittings and different ground power interfaces for
each fluid type.
HYD-05 Design protective caps or covers over service fittings with steel cable lanyards to prevent loss and migration in the vehicle.
HYD-06 Mount hydraulic pumps to the gear box flange with v-band clamps containing a torq-set or equivalent fastener.
HYD-07 Modularize electric-driven hydraulic pumps to enable replacement of the drive motor without interruption of the fluid lines.
HYD-08 Design hydraulic pumps and motors with tracer elements to detect wear through on-board spectrometric oil analysis devices.
HYD-09 Provide hydraulic devices used in critical applications with integral 5 micron filtering.
HYD-10 Design the fluid storage system so it can be serviced in one-quart increments to eliminate the effects of handling and storing partially-
filled cans.
HYD-11 Design flexible hose with molded-in color bands to clearly indicate when the maximum wear/abrasion has been reached.

C-30
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX C

List of Guidelines (Cont'd)

Guideline Numbers Guideline

IN(V)-01 Design inlet door actuators and door actuation mechanisms so they not protrude into the air inlet flow field to eliminate FOD potential.
IN(V)-02 Do not use loose structural fasteners in the access area to inlet door actuators and mechanisms. Where this guideline cannot be followed,
design the actuator door to be accessible only when the inlet doors are fully closed.
IN(V)-03 For engine inlet bellmouth fairings, use methods of retention other than fasteners. Latches may be considered as an acceptable alternative
only if latch-to-panel retention is from the inner mold line.
IN(V)-04 Design inlet doors and inlet bellmouth fairings to be fully interchangeable to eliminate the need to cut, file, or trim at the engine face.
IN(V)-05 Locate the inlet duct edge a minimum of 60 inches from the cockpit or crew station to eliminate restricting engine operation to canopy-
closed conditions.
IN(V)-06 Use captive fasteners on all access doors forward of the inlet to significantly reduce engine FOD potential.
IN(V)-07 Ensure that no ground safety pins or streamers are used forward of the inlet or within a 3-foot radius aft of the inlet.
IN(V)-08 Incorporate an inlet closure door sealing concept that prevents entry of fluid, dust, or sand across the entire airborne and ground
environment spectrum.
IN-01 Low Observable (LO) engine face frames should be within 10 inches of the first stage fan or compressor blades.
Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

IN-02 Openings throughout the engine face frame should be sufficient to perform a 100% FOD inspection of the engine face.
IN-03 Openings throughout the engine face frame should be sufficient to permit minor blending or repair of FOD without removing the engine.
IN-04 For frames not integral with the engine, frame removal should be achievable from the engine cavity.
IN-05 Both integral and remote engine front frames should be interchangeable.
IN-06 Front frame anti-ice and de-ice provisions should give preference to engine hot bleed air.
LG-01 Bearings, excluding wheel bearings, should not require lubrication during the expected life of the air vehicle airframe.
LG-02 Hardpoints for attachment of landing gear trunnions should be capable of carrying all induced gear loads for the life of the airframe.
LG-03 Hardpoints for attachment for landing gear trunnions should not be machined as an integral part of the airframe structure when normal
design sink rates over 25 feet per second are required.
LG-04 Do not use Beryllium and Beryllium base alloys in any location subject to wear or corrosive atmospheres or in installations where
machining may be required.
LG-05 All bolts or similar threaded means used as adjustable stops should be positively retained in the adjusted reference without reliance on
jam nuts, cotter pins, or safety wire.
LG-06 Design struts, attachments, and interfaces so they do not depend on scheduled visual inspections, non-destructive inspection (NDI), or
non-destructive test (NDT) to ensure the reliability or integrity of the system in the operational environment.
LG-07 No portion of the landing gear struts, drag braces, or interfaces should contain pockets or bathtubs that can trap or hold moisture. In rare
instances where this is not possible, holes should be drilled as appropriate to prevent moisture/liquid accumulation.

C-31
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX C

List of Guidelines (Cont'd)

Guideline Numbers Guideline

LG-08 Brackets, levers, links, rods, et al mounted on the struts should either be symmetrical to tolerate reverse installation or should be
impossible to reverse.
LG-09 Use coiled tubing in lieu of flex lines or hoses for hydraulic line routing from the airframe to the strut.
LG-10 All wiring or coax mounted to a strut should have appropriate interface connectors to simplify strut removal and installation.
LG-11 All microswitches, proximity switches, lights, sensors, etc. mounted to a strut should have individual interface connectors. Wiring
pigtails requiring in-line splices should be avoided.
LG-12 All struts should contain a spare strut lower seal stowed in the strut collar to avoid removing the lower strut for leak repair.
LG-13 No special tools or equipment should be required to maintain/service struts in normal day-to-day operational environments.
LG-14 All interfaces from the airframe to the struts should be visible and accessible, and not require removal of airframe structure for access.
LG-15 No portion of the landing gear closure door(s) should be attached to the strut. In rare instances where this may not be possible, that
attached portion should not require alignment or rigging.
LG-16 No portion of the landing gear rigging process should require support equipment type templates, gauges, or tools. Indexes, reference
points, etc., should be an integral part of the landing gear/airframe design.
Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

LG-17 Hydraulic, pneumatic, or electrical actuators associated with landing gear systems should not require adjustment or rigging once installed
in the air vehicle. Spare units should be rigged at the time of manufacture or overhaul.
LG-18 Landing gear ground safety down locks should be an integral part of the overall design. Use or reliance on loose pins (support equipment)
should be avoided.
LG-19 When deemed necessary for the respective design, pilots, flight crews, or operators should have an indication of the downlock status in
the cockpit or crew station to avoid the necessity of a flight abort.
LG-20 Special locks and pins used solely for landing gear ground maintenance safety should be used only in those cases substantiated by cost
effectiveness analysis.
LG-21 Proximity type switches used in landing gear design should meet a minimum of 200 volt-amperes to eliminate Electromagnetic
Interference (EMI) or Radiation Hazard (RADHAD) problems. Wiring associated with the landing gear design should meet the same
requirements.
LG-23 Design strut fittings for servicing nitrogen or hydraulic fluid to be easily accessible and adjacent to the appropriate strut pressure gage.
LG-24 Design struts so they can be serviced with clean, dry air in lieu of nitrogen during deployments without affecting the overall reliability.
LG-25 Mechanical shrink struts, when used, should not permit gear to jam in wheel well if failure of shrink mechanism occurs.
LG-26 Gravitational emergency extension of landing gear should be given preference over all other concepts.
LG-27 Downlocks should be over-center mechanical type and should not depend on hydraulic pressure to maintain the lock.
LG-28 Landing gear control handle should have only "up" or "down" detents with no neutral or intermediate positions.
LG-29 Basic gear design combined with manufacturing tolerances should ensure that no uplock or downlock rigging is required.

C-32
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX C

List of Guidelines (Cont'd)

Guideline Numbers Guideline

LG-30 Do not use landing gear wells to locate any type of auxiliary air inlet.
LG-31 Landing gear doors designed to close after gear is extended should be capable of being manually opened on the ground without reliance
on electrical or hydraulic power.
LG-32 Design of landing gear doors normally closed after gear extension should ensure failure modes will not enable uncommanded opening on
the ground.
LG-33 Design of landing gear doors normally left open after gear extension should ensure no failure mode will enable closing on the ground.
LG-34 Avoid sharp edges and corners on landing gear doors or fairings.
LG-35 Avoid the use of landing gear doors to mount or house antennas, arrays, or air data sensors.
LG-36 Location of integral wheel jack points on a strut should provide a minimum 6-1/2 inch clearance for positioning the jack with tire
ruptured and wheel ground 2 inches off ground.
LG-37 Integral hardpoints to jack the entire vehicle should ensure that identical jacks can be used at all jack points.
LG-38 All landing gear doors should be interchangeable.
LG-39 Gear-mounted tie-down or chain-down fittings should be interchangeable and easily replaceable.
Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

LG-40 Nose gear design and selection of nose gear seals should ensure strut will gradually compress while aircraft is being fueled. Sticking
struts followed by sudden compressing is highly hazardous to personnel and equipment.
LG-41 No more than 1 jack should be required to change any singular wheel/tire assembly.
LG-42 Landing gear struts should contain built-in, dial type pressure gages.
LG-43 Incorporate low pressure warning sensors in nose landing gear whenever under-servicing of the gear could result in failure to rotate aircraft
during takeoff. This feature will eliminate many aborted take-offs, many of which result in blown tires or aircraft leaving the runway.
LG-44 Landing gear door mechanisms and interfaces should ensure that multiple cycles or occasional exceedence of maximum gear-down speed
do not result in loss of doors
LO-01 Use LO compatible gap fillers for manufactured gaps in lieu of tape and butter (surface coating compound).
LO-02 Avoid scheduled forced inspections or replacement of materials, coatings, or finishes solely to protect either the reliability or the
signature.
LO-03 Equipment and support structure requiring shrouds to reduce radar returns should not cause increases in equipment service/repair time.
LO-04 Infrequently-accessed structural doors and panels incorporating special coatings or conductive paints should contain provisions for prying
the door or panel clear of moldline with standard screwdriver without damage.
LO-05 Do not locate flush mounted LO screens for auxiliary air inlets and exits in walkway areas unless durability has been proven.
LO-06 Size flush mounted LO screens for auxiliary air inlets and exits to ensure functionality with up to 25 percent of the openings plugged.
LO-07 Flush and non-flush LO screens should be interchangeable.
MATL-01 A high degree of durability should be maintained for a minimum distance of 36 inches forward of the inflight refueling receptacle.

C-33
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX C

List of Guidelines (Cont'd)

Guideline Numbers Guideline

MATL-02 Cosmetic type repairs should not exceed 1 hours including cure or drying times.
MATL-03 Cosmetic and vehicle repair material shelf life should not be less than 24 months.
MATL-04 Cosmetic and vehicle repair materials should be non-proprietary and non-single source.
MATL-05 Cosmetic and vehicle repair materials should not require refrigeration or special facilities or atmospheres for storage.
MATL-06 Repair criteria, repairs, and instructions should not be classified.
MATL-07 All cosmetic touch-up and repair materials should be environmentally safe.
MATL-08 Repairs (other than major depot repair) should not require autoclave type facilities.
MATL-09 A high degree of durability should be achieved across all walkway areas on the top surfaces of all vehicles up to and including 95
percentile personnel.
MATL-10 Coatings and finishes should be durable against the effects of missile gases, velocities, and particles emanating from the missile motor.
MATL-11 Coatings and finishes should be durable against the effects of gun gases, projectile shock waves, and brass particles emanating from the
projectile seal rings.
MATL-12 Leading edge materials and coatings should be durable against fragments from frangible gun port plugs.
Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

MATL-13 Special handling or shipping requirements of repair materials should be avoided.

MATL-14 Leading edges, including chines, containing or constructed of radar absorbing materials, should be interchangeable to reduce vehicle
downtime and simplify repairs.
MATL-15 Doors and panels containing blade seals used for signature reduction should be interchangeable or contain interchangeable blade seals.
Deviation is acceptable where repairs can be accomplished on the vehicle in a time equal to or less than door or seal remove and replace
time.
MC-01 All clamps should contain torque-set or torque-limiting connections to prevent clamp or component failure due to over-torque. Clamp
installation call outs should not depend on special tools to establish the required torque values.
MC-02 Avoid the use of cotter pins, safety wire, safety clips, and similar devices to prevent maintenance-induced events leading to ground
vehicle accidents or loss of air vehicles.
MC-03 All tubing connections and interfaces should use rosan/dynatube (or equivalent) to (1) enable connect or disconnect with one hand, one
tool, (2) eliminate the need to safety the connection, (3) provide a superior seal, and (4) negate need to reposition line(s) during
component replacement.
MC-04 No trombone type, flared tube type, or piloted line type interfaces should be used to avoid the need for removal or repositioning during
equipment removal.
MC-05 Avoid potential foreign object traps during manufacturing or operational maintenance by eliminating vertical penetrations of
plumbing/fittings into tanks, compartments, or cells
MC-06 Locate, position, orient all plumbing and duct electrical connectors to prevent the need for sequential installation or removal.

C-34
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX C

List of Guidelines (Cont'd)

Guideline Numbers Guideline

MC-07 Maximize areas of constant web thickness in firewalls, carry-through bulkheads, major frames, structural ribs, spars, webs, keels, and
close-outs to provide flexibility in locating penetration fittings. Stepped chem milling, stepped machining, stepped composite layup
concepts all tend to result in minimal available surface area for penetrations.
MC-08 All in-line plumbing connections within a fuel tank or cell should be capable of making/breaking the interface by hand, require no torque,
contain integral safety locking mechanisms, and should be void of any requirement for safety wire.
MC-09 All plumbing connections and fittings used for fuel systems should contain integral bonding features to eliminate the need for bonding
clamps or jumper cables.
MC-10 In rare instances where a plumbing run contains complex form or geometry that would require removal of other plumbing or equipment
for access, in-line connectors should be incorporated to maintain the integrity of other plumbing or equipment.
MC-11 No subsystem plumbing, equipment, or wiring should use a tank, cell, or compartment containing liquids as a means for routing or
penetration simplicity during manufacture.
MC-12 All plumbing and connectors containing liquids should be meniscus-free.
MC-13 In instances where plumbing or connector interfaces cannot or are not keyed for a specific orientation, all identification, markings,
cautions, and directions should be placed 360 degrees around the tube or duct.
Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

MC-14 Where multiple connectors are located in close proximity, ensure (1) a minimum hand tool arc of 120 degrees can be maintained, and (2)
stagger fittings to ensure firm coupling interface/hand tool interface can be accomplished without inducing damage to adjacent lines.
MC-15 Route, orient, and position plumbing, wiring, ducts, and connectors sufficiently away from the outer surface of the vehicle to preclude
induced damage due to minor dents, drill bits during repair, etc. Minimum rule of thumb is 1" away from the inner surface and 1" below
a plate nut channel.
MG-01 Mount LRUs/sub-systems on drawer slides or extender racks to provide easier accessibility during integration, testing, debug, and repair
of Units Under Test (UUTs).
MG-02 Use a modular system design so that each subassembly is designed as a functionally complete entity. Then when a subassembly was
removed for testing, ATE will not need custom circuitry to simulate missing functions.
MG-03 Clearly mark all subsystems/LRUs to make system integration, test, debug, and repair easier.
MP-01 Avoid the use epoxies to mount parts on repairable modules because they make repair extremely difficult.
MP-02 Use a unique identification (ID) resistor incorporated in each system module to verify that the proper module is mounted on ATE.
MP-03 Design modules so that lengthy warm-up times, special coding and air purity levels, and similar constraints are not necessary.
NDI-01 Avoid reliance of extensive interpretation by NDI equipment operators to detect structural flaws.
NDI-02 Do not use non-destructive inspection technologies to maintain or protect the reliability of an item.
NDI-03 Derive NDI/NDT requirements from the Failure Mode Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) and the associated Reliability Centered
Maintenance (RCM) analysis and documentation.

C-35
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX C

List of Guidelines (Cont'd)

Guideline Numbers Guideline

NDI-04 Evaluate selective application of appropriate NDI/NDT technologies against high-time units, items, and vehicles with the intent of:
- Finding the optimum time intervals,
- Preventing the across-the-board application of NDI/NDT,
- Increasing the time intervals between inspections, and
- Eliminating the requirement.
NDI-05 Include the effect and impact of NDI/NDT applications as a major element in developing operations and support cost (O&S) analysis to
include:
- Cost of Equipment
- Cost of Facilities
- Cost of PMEL
- Cost of training/retraining
- Cost of personnel
- Impact on deployment
- Impact on sea/air/land lift
OXY-01 System should contain automatic BIT for warning indicators to eliminate dedicated test switches and/or test requirements.
Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

OXY-02 Provide sensors to denote occurrence of On-Board Oxygen Generating Systems (OBOGS) bleed air over temperature.
OXY-03 Provide condition sensors for oxygen concentrators to eliminate periodic and/or forced replacement.
OXY-04 OBOGS should be given preference over liquid oxygen systems.
OXY-05 Locate liquid oxygen (LOX) containers in a sealed, dedicated compartment to eliminate need for frequent visual inspections.
OXY-06 Liquid oxygen container design and integration should contain appropriate sensors to detect and monitor air filter brazement.
OXY-07 Locate liquid oxygen containers to ensure simultaneous replacement with other turnaround activities.
OXY-08 LOX containers should contain rear mounted, automatic interfaces.
OXY-09 Special or common hand tools should not be required to remove or replace LOX containers.
OXY-10 Effective leak detection sensors should be integral to the system.
OXY-11 System operational and service condition status should be capable of being downlinked to centralized maintenance facilities.
OXY-12 LOX compartments should be sealed from adjacent compartments and should contain dedicated overboard drains.
P-01 Access door and panel fastener types for airborne vehicles should meet the following criteria:
- use latches for a frequency of access of 0 to 40 flight hours
- use High Strength Quick Release fasteners for a frequency of access of 40-400 flight hours
- use structural screws for a frequency of access of 400 flight hours or more

C-36
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX C

List of Guidelines (Cont'd)

Guideline Numbers Guideline

P-02 Access door and panel fastener types for surface vehicles should meet the following criteria:
- use a spring loaded or latch fastener for an opening frequency of daily
- use a one quarter turn fastener (or equivalent) for a opening frequency of weekly
- use screws or bolts for all other cases
P-03 All doors and panels subject to environmental elements should contain form-in-place seals (or equivalent) attached to the door structure,
not substructure, to prevent damage during maintenance.
P-04 Door and panel seals should be compatible with all types of on-board servicing fluids, de-ice and anti-ice fluids, and all fluids used for
chemical, biological, and nuclear decontamination.
P-05 Piano type hinges should not be used on doors or panels because they are subject to wear, corrosion, and sand and fluid entry.
P-06 Access door and panel devices used to support door in opened position should meet the following criteria:
- for airborne vehicles, design for 60 knot gust loads (or equivalent jet blast loads)
- for ground vehicles, design for 50 mph gust loads
P-07 Hinged access doors and panels capable of remaining in the opened position should not have sharp edges or corners.
Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

P-08 Removable access door and panel fasteners should be of identical grip length and diameter.
P-09 Acceptable door and panel hold-open devices include over-center sheet metal spring, over-center spring link, spring cartridge, support
strut, and pinned goose neck hinge.
P-10 Access doors and panels requiring non-captive fasteners should not be located forward of air inlet ducts or high-energy rotating
components (e.g., prop fans, engine cooling fans, etc.).
P-11 Access doors and panels should be interchangeable as justified by operation and support costs or life cycle costs.
PERS-01 Group man-machine interfaces manifold-style to enable connect/disconnect in a single action.
PERS-02 Include an integral, highly visible indicator in a man-machine interface connector to denote connector is seated and locked.
PERS-03 Design interface connectors so that a distinct action is required by an individual to effect a disconnect. (Excludes airframe-to-ejection seat
personnel interfaces.)
PERS-04 Interfaces should contain an emergency release mechanism that can be activated by rescue personnel with a 95 percentile gloved hand.
PERS-05 Design emergency interface release mechanisms to be clearly visible under all types of lighting situations.
PERS-06 Storage bins, compartments, sacks, or bags should be available within the vehicle to store/protect all personal equipment required to
conduct operations.
PERS-07 All flight and ground vehicles should contain one cubic foot minimum storage compartment(s) for various loose and sundry personal
items (for each individual).
PERS-08 Design stowage and mounting provisions for portable air or oxygen containers to withstand 40G crash or impact loads.
PERS-09 Design portable emergency locator beacons, radio receiver/transmitters, global positioning systems, and similar battery operated devices
with integral provisions for determining battery health or status and remaining battery life.

C-37
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX C

List of Guidelines (Cont'd)

Guideline Numbers Guideline

PRYO-03 Provide the pilot or the weapon officer, crew, or gunner with the capability to electrically arm/safe each respective weapon from the
cockpit, crew station, or operator station as appropriate.
PYRO-01 Provide the "safe/arm" status to the pilot, crew, or gunner in the cockpit, crew station, or operator station as appropriate.
PYRO-02 Provide the "safe/arm" status as an external cue discernible from a distance of 10-20 feet.
PYRO-06 "Safe/arm" mechanism design should be free from FOD potential.
PYRO-07 Manual "safe/arm" mechanisms should be well-clear of inlet ducts, propellers, rotors, and similar rotating components.
PYRO-08 Manual "safe/arm" mechanisms should be well-clear of engine exhausts, fuel/toxic vents, fluid drains, control surface deflection envelopes,
and rescue path envelopes.
PYRO-09 Provide positive, Murphy-proof locking detents for both the "safe" and "arm" positions of mechanical mechanisms.
PYRO-10 Provide a numerical maintenance code on maintenance panels or maintenance recorder/memory systems to denote the "safe/arm" status for
each weapon or store.
PYRO-11 Design electrical/electronic "safe/arm" systems to eliminate the need for mechanical type system interrupt devices.
PYRO-12 Design of weapons, flare/chaff packages, and airborne pyrotechnic containers should follow the "wooden round" design concept to
Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

eliminate scheduled tests, checks, and inspections throughout its intended life cycle.
PYRO-13 Container design for shipping, handling, and storing weapons, flares, chaff, and similar devices should not require special atmospheres.
PYRO-14 Design weapon drop and fire/release circuits with frequency-coded firing systems or similar concepts to ensure stray energy tests and
checks will not be required and that stray energy will not impose a safety hazard or problem.
PYRO-15 Pylon-to-weapon and pylon-to-air vehicle electrical interfaces should contain built-in test/fault location capabilities.
PYRO-16 Do not use cartridge actuated devices (CADs) for store or weapon ejection or for pylon jettison due to inherent ground safety hazards,
stray energy hazards, and scheduled cleaning requirements.
PYRO-17 In rare instances where use of CADs may be required, a positive indication to denote "cartridge installed" should be provided.
PYRO-18 Mechanical "safe/arm" mechanism design should enable activation by a 95 percentile male wearing arctic mittens.
PYRO-19 Locate built-in grounding receptacles clear of weapon approach and loading envelopes.
PYRO-20 Weapon bay doors, when opened, should not block or restrict access to other servicing points.
PYRO-21 Weapon bays should contain internal lighting controlled by a separate switch that is only functional when doors are open
PYRO-22 A "rounds remaining" status should be available at the gun loading interface, maintenance panel, or cockpit/crew station/operator station.
PYRO-23 Crew size for full ammo load should not exceed two persons.
PYRO-24 Ammo loader interface should not be less than 30" nor more than 50" above the ground to ensure loading can be accomplished by a wide
range of percentiles wearing chemical or biological protective gear.
PYRO-25 Gun loading and servicing should be possible concurrently with all other weapon loading and servicing activities to minimize the
elapsed downtime.

C-38
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX C

List of Guidelines (Cont'd)

Guideline Numbers Guideline

PYRO-26 Do not locate ammunition loader interfaces close to inlets, exhausts, fuel dumps and drains, antennas, sensors, lights, or hazardous
protrusions.
PYRO-27 Incorporate integral hoisting provisions at each weapon/store station to enable direct lift from the container or carrier to the attachment
hardpoints.
PYRO-28 Automatic locking of the retention hooks should be accomplished for each respective weapon and store.
PYRO-29 Provide quick mechanical over-travel (no power) for weapon bay doors to maximize the weapon/store loading envelope.
PYRO-30 Ensure weapon bay door arc (both normal and over-travel) does not block or intrude into adjacent service points or envelopes.
PYRO-31 Ensure weapon bay door open positions do not intrude into any other door opening envelope.
PYRO-32 Provide sufficient longitudinal clearance between weapon bays to enable simultaneous loading of two bays.
PYRO-33 Provide sufficient lateral clearance between weapon bays to enable simultaneous loading of two bays.
PYRO-34 Weapon bay door seals should be bonded or attached to door structure to minimize induced seal damage during weapon or store loading.
PYRO-35 Suspension system should permit any single weapon or store to be loaded by a two man crew.
PYRO-36 Suspension system design and spacing should enable any combination of eight weapons to be loaded by two two-man crews within the
Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

refueling time of the vehicle (excludes nuclear weapons).

PYRO-37 Internal weapon suspension arrangements should preclude sequential weapon loading.
PYRO-38 Any single pylon or built-up pylon/weapon package should have the capability for rapid reconfiguration.
PYRO-39 Weapon bay ejectors and launchers should have the capability for total interchangeability and reconfigurability.
PYRO-40 All weapon and store loading functions should be within the percentile range of 5% female to 95% male standing at ground level.
PYRO-41 Weapon or store handling and transportation equipment should be compatible with rough terrain and capable of 25 mph towing speeds
minimum.
PYRO-42 In weapons carriage design and integration, avoid dependence of on-board high pressure nitrogen.
PYRO-43 Launcher or ejector design/interface should not require a dual function of carrying airframe structural loads.
PYRO-44 Launcher and ejector design should incorporate automatic sway bracing.
PYRO-45 Missile ejectors should be provided with repeatable missile motor fire wires to simplify loading and reduce elapsed time.
PYRO-46 Design pylons, launchers, and ejector racks so that weapon loading, servicing, and reconfigurations can be accomplished using standard
hand tools.
PYRO-47 Installation design of ejectors, launchers, racks, and associated hardware interfaces should avoid reliance on torque wrenches.
R-01 Large radomes wherein the combination of the diameter and length exceeds 60" should be top-hinged. Hinge should be load-carrying to
reduce radome retention fastener count.
R-02 Radome and radar array support structure design and material selection should eliminate the need for LO type fillers or shrouds.

C-39
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX C

List of Guidelines (Cont'd)

Guideline Numbers Guideline

SABCH-01 Do not locate auxiliary air inlets, sensors, access doors, or drains in boundary bleed areas.
SABCH-02 All flush type structural screws should have identical head drives for the entire vehicle.
SABCH-03 All non-flush type structural screws should have identical head drive recesses for the entire vehicle.
SABCH-04 Special high strength bolts, such as twelve-point heads, should be fully justified from standpoint of the cost of ownership and
effectiveness.
SABCH-05 Structural design should avoid the reliance on blind fasteners unless fully supported by cost, weight, schedule, and effectiveness analysis.
SABCH-06 Structural design should avoid the potential of dissimilar material or fastener corrosion.
SABCH-07 No structural fasteners should be used that require special tools for installation.
SABCH-08 Taper pins should be threaded and retained with self-locking hardware.
SABCH-09 Pins and collars (lockbolts) should only be used in applications which do not normally require removal.
SABCH-10 Do not use lockbolts in composites.
SABCH-11 In rare instances where the use of dissimilar material in immediate contact cannot be avoided, they should be sufficiently insulated to
endure for the life of the vehicle.
Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

SABCH-12 Avoid tapping threads into structural members. Use of heli-coil type or similar insert concepts is permissible.
SABCH-13 No structural design concept should rely on frequent scheduled inspections to monitor or otherwise ensure structural integrity.
SABCH-14 No structural fastener intended to carry shear or tension loads should be smaller than 1/4" diameter (.25").
SABCH-15 Give preference to butt type splices over lap type splices in the design of manufacturing splices.
SABCH-16 Wing-to-fuselage attachment should give preference to tension ties over shear ties to improve overall volumetric efficiency.
SABCH-17 Hardpoints for securing tie down chains, cables, and devices during transport should not require reaching under or crawling under the
vehicle.
SABCH-18 Rings, posts, and clevis devices used for attaching tie downs should not require opening of doors or panels for access.
SABCH-19 Avoid tie down concepts requiring attaching hardpoints as a prerequisite.
SABCH-20 Location of hardpoints used for tie down attachment should:
- Remain outside of door and panel opening envelopes.
- Be clear of exhaust pipes, ducts, manifolds, and mufflers.
- Be clear of overboard fluid drains and vents.
SABCH-21 Tire pressure reduction should not be required prior to tie down solely to increase the tire footprint
SAFE-01 Drag chute installation designs not containing electrical safing should contain remote safe/arm provisions reachable from ground level by
5 percentile females. Remove location should be clear of engine exhaust areas and flight control deflection envelopes.
SAFE-02 Emergency ingress actuation provisions into cockpits, crew stations, passenger compartments, and operator stations should be accessible
from the ground by 5 percentile females.

C-40
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX C

List of Guidelines (Cont'd)

Guideline Numbers Guideline

SAFE-03 Stored energy devices (e.g., accumulators, nitrogen bottles, gas generators, etc.), that could cause injury, harm, or damage if
inadvertently actuated, should contain integral safing provisions.
SAFE-04 Electrical and optical safe/arm system design should eliminate the need for mechanical type system interrupt devices.
SAFE-05 Crash locator beacon door opening/ejection mechanisms should contain integral electrical safe/arm features.
SAFE-06 Wing fold locking mechanisms should provide a moldline indication that locks are in place. Loose or separate safety devices that must
be installed manually should be avoided.
SAFE-07 Landing and alighting gear design should ensure downlocks are integral to the mechanisms and provide a clear indication of position
status. This guideline also applies to tail hooks.
SAFE-08 A single lever safety should, when positioned, safe the entire escape/ejection system. Use of the single lever to "arm" should require two
hands.
SAFE-09 Safing the canopy jettison system should be accomplished through the same lever device used to safe the ejection seat.
SAFE-10 The single lever safing concept should apply to day-to-day flight operations. Individual or multiple safety pins for pyrotechnic devices
should only be required during escape system maintenance.
Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

SAFE-11 All individual safety pins used for ground maintenance should be clearly visible and coupled together to ensure no single pin will be
overlooked during arming.
SAFE-12 Internal weapon bay doors should contain integral safety locking features for use during maintenance and weapon loading and
downloading.
SAFE-13 It should not be possible to unsafe a weapon bay door integral lock when a door closed signal is present.
SE-01 Wheel chocks for all types of ground and airborne vehicles should contain the following features:
- Be nestable for low volume during storage or transport
- Be manufactured from corrosion-resistant materials
- Be releasable from tire pinch
- Be highly visible for day and night operations
- Be impervious to all types of fluids used to service or maintain the vehicles
- Be of light weight
SE-02 Wheel chocks for airborne vehicles should also contain the following features:
- Contain provisions for securing to ramp or flight decks
- Contain provisions to secure chocks at wheels
- Releasable/removable from outside of hot brake envelope
- Contain provisions to enable chock to be used as a tire blowout device
- Contain provisions to prevent skidding on snow or ice

C-41
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX C

List of Guidelines (Cont'd)

Guideline Numbers Guideline

SE-03 Wheel chock design guideline discussion. Wheel chocks have historically contributed to numerous accidents and incidents across the
entire design spectrum, yet have received the least design attention of any ground handling/support equipment. Directly and indirectly,
poorly designed chocks have:
- Resulted in numerous "jumping the chocks" incidents due to improper use or positioning, and improper chock sizing for the tire
size/power application. Some instances result in destruction of the aircraft.
- Resulted in vehicle movement/sliding across wet, snowy and icy surfaces as a result of improper grip.
- Resulted in unwarranted tire damage and/or engine FOD.
- Resulted in tertiary damage to other vehicles or ground equipment as a result of being blown about by jet/propeller blast.
- Damaged surfaces due to temporary placement of chocks on vehicle surfaces during vehicle movement.
- Resulted in personnel sliver/s abrasions (wooden chocks) and cuts (metal chocks) even when chocks were in decent useable condition.
- Resulted in varied personnel ground accidents during attempts to use chocks as a temporary work stand.
- Lost aircraft "over the side" on carriers.
SE-04 Gun port covers or plugs should be lightweight, 100% effective, and easy to install or store.
SE-05 The geometric aspects of simple maintenance stands, ladders, and work platforms should enable high density stacking for storage and
mobility deployments.
Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

SE-06 Non-metallic materials should take preference over metals to enable simple manufacturing and repair by bonding in lieu of weldments
and/or mechanical fasteners.
SE-07 The design construction concept and material selection for support equipment structure should not rely or depend upon the use of
scheduled maintenance, NDI, or NDT to protect the durability or integrity of the equipment in the operational environment.
SE-08 Support legs, posts, arms for ladders and workstands should contain integral non-skid devices for safe use on ice or snow.
SE-09 Ladders and workstands used in close proximity to air and ground vehicles should contain effective buffers to protect finishes and
treatments.
SE-10 Protective finishes and coatings should meet the same ground environmental criteria as defined for air and ground vehicles.
SE-11 Avoid reliance on mechanical fasteners solely to facilitate manufacturing.
SEAT-01 Design personnel seats and padding materials, including the covers and fillers, so they are incapable of creating or emitting toxic fumes or
dense smoke when subjected to fire.
SEAT-02 Design personnel seats and padding materials so they are incapable of absorbing and holding fluids.
SEAT-03 Do not use seat and padding materials that can create static electricity in pyrotechnic or combustible fluid environments.
SEAT-04 Design ejection seats so they can be replaced with canopy or escape hatch installed.
SEAT-05 Design ejection seat pyrotechnic devices so they are 100 percent viewable and accessible with seat installed.
SEAT-06 Do not use seat removal as a means of access.
SI-01 Leading edges containing complex integrated antennas or sensors should be interchangeable to enhance repair of battle damage and
induced damage.

C-42
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX C

List of Guidelines (Cont'd)

Guideline Numbers Guideline

SI-02 Speed brake hinge and actuator attachment hardpoints should enable interchangeability of speed brake(s) and actuator(s) without need for
rigging.
SI-03 Parts and assemblies of a given model product or of models of a product in the same series should be interchangeable or replaceable.
SIMP-01 Location and design of all exterior lights should not require protective covers in ground environments.
SIMP-02 Landing and taxi lights should be mounted on landing gear struts or doors to eliminate separate compartments, doors, and
retraction/extension mechanisms.
SIMP-03 Speed brake or speed brake cavity should contain integral mechanical locking mechanism for personnel safety.
SKID-01 Design non-metallic floats to be impervious to all fluids used on board the host vehicle.
SKID-02 Design non-metallic floats to be highly resistant to scuffing and abrasion.
SKID-03 Design non-metallic floats with a color-coded inner ply to readily denote when maximum abrasion limits have been reached.
SKID-04 Design pneumatic floats with an integral air gage located adjacent to the air fill fitting.
SKID-05 Design metallic and composite floats and skids to the same environmental criteria as the airframe, including finishes.
SKID-06 Use non-skid finishes on the upper surfaces of skids and floats for use as steps and walkways.
Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

SKID-07 Design floats with simple drain provisions for each compartment.
SURV-01 Design containers used for dinghy stowage to be structurally capable of containing the dinghy within the event of unintentional or
uncommanded inflation.
SURV-02 Provide crew stations, crew compartments, and operator areas containing dinghies as emergency equipment with a suitable tool for
puncturing or cutting the dinghy in the event of inadvertent inflation. Locate the tool so that access is assured during dinghy inflation.
SURV-03 Survival gear containerization or storage should have a minimum twelve-month period between scheduled tests, checks, or replacements.
SURV-04 Do not seal battery power or battery-operated devices in survival packages or containers. When this guideline cannot be followed, provide
a remote way of ascertaining the status or condition of the battery.
SURV-05 Design survival equipment pods intended for external carriage or suspension to meet the same environmental and operational criteria as
the host vehicle structure.
T-01 Do not locate pyro, gas, and air (PGA) control system exhaust exits:
- In proximity to safe, arm, or servicing areas,
- Adjacent to auxiliary inlets,
- In close proximity to crew boarding areas, weapons, emergency ingress/egress areas, and optics or optical glass.
T-02 Design pyro type thruster exits associated with emergency use or backup with simple exit closure devices to identify if a thruster has been
fired.
T-03 Provide protective screens for PGA exits that normally remain open to prevent intrusions from fowl or wildlife.
T-04 Provide protective closure provisions for PGA exits located or oriented to exposure from the elements.

C-43
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX C

List of Guidelines (Cont'd)

Guideline Numbers Guideline

T-05 Design single-shot (one time use) type thrusters with a minimum 6-year shelf life and a 7-year installed life.
TCR-01 For each transmission, clutch, or rotor, provide a dedicated lubricating oil supply tank and system that is not shared with any other oil
lubricating system.
TCR-02 Provide each dedicated oil supply system with a separate servicing port/interface, pressure gauging, and quantity gauging system as
applicable.
TCR-03 Use a singular gage capable of reading pressures or quantities from two or more lubricating systems in preference to individual gages.
TCR-04 Provide each dedicated system with an on-board spectrometric oil analysis program capability, separate oil filter, and separate oil, fuel, or
air heat exchanger capability.
TCR-05 Use the item's self-contained oil system to provide drive/interface spline lubrication, if required.
TCR-06 In complex units, use different tracer elements in multiple gears, plates, discs, etc., so the source of wear can be easily identified by
spectrometric oil analysis monitoring units.
TCR-07 Design mechanical interfaces to transmissions, clutches, and rotors so that the respective unit can be replaced without the need for
rigging.
Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

TCR-08 Incorporate vibration pick-up sensors to isolate the respective unit from other potential sources of vibration, and to enhance the prognostic
potential for monitoring equipment health.
TP-01 Locate Input/Output (I/O) test points and associated readouts in close proximity to each other so that one person can perform testing.
TP-02 Protect test points against the environment and from induced contamination.
TP-03 Protect test points from outside signal generation.
W-01 Hat section type structural stiffeners with sufficient cross sectional area should be considered as a routing tunnel for wiring and coax.
WBAY-01 Equipment bays and compartments should not require installation of special cavity fillers when equipment is not installed.
WBAY-02 Pylon-to-wing electrical or plumbing interfaces should have automatic close-out covers when pylon is jettisoned or not installed.
WBAY-03 The method and position of the pylon-to-wing gap scale should not form a drip edge for leakage into the pylon cavity.
WBAY-04 The gap treatment should be a permanent installation on the pylon, wing, or both, not a separate seal.
WBAY-05 Gap treatment should not interfere with or be damaged by existing pylon handling support equipment.
WBAY-06 Pylon rigging should not be required for gap seal control.
WBAY-07 Gap seal should not degrade interchangeability of pylon.
WBAY-08 Gap seal and treatment should be fully compatible with steam from carrier catapults.
WBAY-09 Gap seal/pylon should not cover or hamper access to low point wing drains.
WBAY-10 No loose hardware should exist before or after pylon is installed.
WBAY-11 Gap seal should match pylon and wing/fuselage surface impedance.

C-44
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX C

List of Guidelines (Cont'd)

Guideline Numbers Guideline

WBAY-12 Pylon-to-store/weapon gap seal should permit visual and physical access during loading for all interfaces between bomb rack-to-store,
bomb rack-to-launcher, and launcher-to-store.
WBAY-13 Pylon-to-store/weapon gap seal should not interfere with automatic sway brace function.
WBAY-14 Pylon-to-store/weapon gap seal should permit physical access to lanyards.
WBAY-15 Gap seals should not hinder pilot or ground crew preflight inspection.
WBAY-16 Gap seals should not degrade loading while wearing arctic or chemical, biological, or radiation protective clothing.
WBAY-17 Special coatings or conductive paints on pylons, launchers, racks, launchers, tanks, pods, etc. should have the durability to withstand
contact with support stands/cradles during storage.
WBAY-18 The proximity of the gun firing barrel to structure should be such that structural furrows or channels are not required for projectile
clearances during firing.
WBAY-19 Frangible gun ports should take preference over mechanized gun port doors.
WBAY-20 Gun plugs required solely to maintain a given signature level should be capable of on-board stowage for use only when a threat requires
their presence.
Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

WBAY-21 Coatings and finishes in the area of gun barrels should be durable to withstand the effect of exiting projectile shockwaves.
WBAY-22 The proximity of the gun blast deflector to structure should not require reliance on high-temperature paints or coatings to protect the
structure.
WIND-01 Optical window materials should be scratch resistant, easy to clean, and dissipate electrostatic charges.
WIND-02 Optic windows should be located for ease of inspection, cleaning, and induced damage potential from personnel or support equipment.
WIND-03 Window locations should minimize the effects of contamination by salt spray, bugs, oils, fuels, and icing.
WIND-04 Window, canopy, and windshield material should be designed to withstand the effects of sandstorms in the ground environment and the
effects of rain and hail during thunderstorm penetration in the airborne environment.
WIND-05 Design interior surfaces to be reachable for cleaning without reliance on hinging, equipment removal, or use of support equipment.
WIND-06 Do not locate windows in the proximity of rooster tails created by wheels/tires passing through water or slush.
WIND-07 Use materials that are highly resistive to thermal shock.
WIND-11 For dome-shaped optic window concepts, the dome should be easily removable for cleaning without affecting LO integrity.
WIND-12 Design EO windows and optics to be interchangeable among the same air vehicle types or same ground vehicle types.
WIND-13 The combination of material layers and coatings for optics and windows should be such that static charge buildup for worst case
conditions should not exceed 10,000 volts.
WIND-14 Exterior lights should permit simple and rapid bulb replacement without disturbing LO treatments.
WIND-15 Design light covers and lenses to be sufficiently durable so that protective covers are not needed during maintenance.
WIND-16 Lens shape should enhance LO capability to reduce need, care, and expense for special coatings.

C-45
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:
 MIL-HDBK-470A

APPENDIX C

List of Guidelines (Cont'd)

Guideline Numbers Guideline

WT&B-01 Wheel bearings should be lubricated by oil-bath concepts and should not be integral with the wheel assembly.
WT&B-02 Brake-wear indicating pins should be highly visible during day and night operations.
WT&B-03 Provide a parking brake capability to simplify wheel and tire replacements and to reduce operator fatigue during prolonged engine ground
operations.
WT&B-04 Tires should contain a color band to provide easy visual indication that maximum wear has been achieved.
WT&B-05 Locking ring type concepts for retaining wheel halves should be given preference over multiple tie bolts.
WT&B-06 Locate brake anti-skid system components, including brake control valves, for easy access in low-vibration environments.
WT&B-07 Landing gear caution and warning systems should contain both initiated and periodic BIT and be capable of fault-isolating to each
component in the system.
WT&B-08 Do not use microswitches (mechanical) in gear caution and warning systems.
WT&B-09 Brake clips, end plates, retainers, etc. used to build up wheel, tire, and brake assemblies should not be capable of reverse or improper
installation.
WT&B-10 No hubcaps or covers should be installed in a manner that prevents full visual viewing of the wheel retaining nut. In instances where this
Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

may not be possible, the design should ensure that the hubcap/cover cannot be installed unless the retaining nut is properly installed.
WT&B-11 Wheel axle nuts should contain integral retention devices or safetying features. In rare instances where this cannot be accomplished, a bolt
and self-locking nut should be used. Locking rings and similar devices that can fail and cause FOD should be avoided.
WT&B-12 Avoid the use of rivets to retain pressure pads, clips, brackets, and similar items in wheel/brake assemblies unless:
- Rivet failure will not permit a part or item to fall into the brake disc/pad area, and
- Exceptional quality control can be assured during manufacture of the part or rivet attachments, and
- Frequent scheduled inspections will not be imposed to protect product integrity or reliability.
WT&B-13 Emergency brake handles should not be similar in shape or color as other handles nor should they be located in close proximity to such
other handles.
WT&B-14 Wheel assemblies should contain built-in dial type pressure gages.
WT&B-15 Anti-skid and anti-lock brake systems should contain periodic and initiated BIT. All components, including speed sensors, comparators,
wiring, connectors, control boxes, etc., should be included in the BIT system.
WT&B-16 Do not use potting compounds for electrical connector environmental protection because it tends to revert and significantly increases
repair time.
WT&B-17 Electrical connector environmental protection should be capable of withstanding water pressure streams up to 120 psi encountered during
decontamination, wash, etc.
WT&B-18 Route brake lines so that line failure will not occur due to tire blow out or separation of recapped treads.

C-46
Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
2.01 Accessibility A-01 Seal equipment bays and compartments against the environmental elements including all types of servicing fluids used for
the vehicle, all types of anti-ice and de-ice fluids, and all types of fluids used for chemical, biological, or nuclear

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

decontamination
A-08 Plumbing penetrations into a compartment should not be on a vertical axis due to difficulty in making or breaking
vertically-oriented connections. When compartment access is from the bottom, vertically-oriented connections can allow
fluid to leak onto the maintainer. When access is from the top, such connections can allow foreign matter to enter the
line. Use horizontal penetrations whenever possible.
A-09 Any heat or temperature sensitive structure within a compartment should contain heat-sensitive tape or appropriate heat
sensor for easy indication of over-temperature excursions.
A-10 Provide a sufficient number of compartment fluid drains to ensure fluid drainage for varying aircraft static attitudes and
varying terrain slopes for ground vehicles.
A-11 Locate compartment electrical penetrations close to the access opening for ease of sight, probing, repair, and to eliminate
fluid soaking, wicking, or contamination.
A-12 Locate compartment electrical penetrations far enough from the access opening to prevent damage resulting from
improper (over-length) panel fasteners.
A-13 Two-sided or two-surfaced access should not be required for access to equipment interfaces and hardpoints. The term
two-sided infers top/bottom, left/right, front/back, or combinations thereof.
A-14 Do not locate nutplates or gang channels in inaccessible areas that would require extensive disassembly or equipment
removal to gain access.
A-16 Structural design should provide good access to corrosion-prone areas for inspection and treatment.
A-17 All structural fasteners in an access door or panel should be of identical grip and diameter. In rare cases where this is not
possible, fasteners of different grip must have different diameters to prevent a shorter fastener being substituted for the
correct, longer fastener.
A-18 Use transparent windows, quick-opening covers, or openings without any cover to permit quick visual inspections where
needed.
ARM-01 For an aircraft, the fuselage lower shear moldline should be no less than 38" above the ground when external weapons
only will be carried on the fuselage.
ARM-02 For an aircraft, the fuselage lower shear moldline should be no less than 50" above the ground when internal weapons
will be carried in the fuselage and weapon bay door widths exceed 22".
ARM-03 Locate fuselage weapon bays a minimum of 18" from the nose landing gear and main landing gear of an aircraft.
ARM-04 No single weapon/store mounted on a transporter should intrude into the service/turnaround envelope of another station.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

ARM-05 All servicing and turnaround functions (including movement envelopes) should be outside the gun firing envelope.
ARM-06 The relationship of the nose landing gear to the main landing gear should not restrict the positioning of weapon
transporters under the fuselage of an aircraft.
ARM-12 Missile and weapon cooling provisions should have the capability to be serviced in-situ or rapidly replaced as a pre-
charged assembly.
CONT-06 Design all pulleys and brackets associated with cable installations so they are accessible by a 75 percentile male hand.
CREW-04 Avoid wiring, coax, and plumbing penetrations through the floor of crew cabs, operators' compartments, crew stations,
cockpits, and passenger compartments.
CREW-05 Structural instrument panels, dashboards, and control panels should be modularized for easy and adequate access to all

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
interfaces, to simplify manufacturing, and to reduce maintenance-induced problems.

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

CREW-10 Design cameras, recorders, and sensors to be fully interchangeable and quickly replaceable.
EC-08 Locate and position electrical connectors such that all pin identification for either half can be easily seen.
EC-09 Electrical connectors selected for critical applications on ground vehicles should be both accessible and capable of being
connected disconnected by a fifty percentile gloved male hand.

C-47
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
2.01 Accessibility EC-10 Separation between grouped electrical connectors should be sufficient to ensure make or break of any connector by a
fifty percentile gloved male hand. Where this is not possible, an alternate method should be used such as the use of stand-

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

offs, long-shelled connectors alternated with standard connectors, 180-degree connectors alternated with 90-degree
connectors, or innovative equivalents.
EC-13 Electrical, electronic, and coaxial interfaces between fixed and moveable surfaces should contain quick disconnects to
simplify replacement of the moveable surface or the electronic module.
EC-14 Scoop proof connectors should be used throughout unless their use would require an increase in the volume of the
aircraft, in which case deviations will be considered on an individual basis.
EC-15 The removal or replacement of electronic equipment should not require the removal of any other piece of equipment or
armament.
ECS-01 Design so that equipment servicing status are accessible and readable from the ground level for air vehicles and from the
operator's position for ground and water vehicles.
ECS-05 Access, removal, and installation of all type filter elements should be possible without removing the assembly or
disconnecting any filter package interfaces.
ECS-21 Do not locate ground cooling or circulation fans that operate at high noise levels in operator, crew, or passenger
compartments.
ECS-28 Install and orient air supply and distribution ducts so they clear all access openings and equipment removal envelopes.
ENG(G)-01 Provide access to all engine mounts for ground vehicles so that hoisting or crawling under the vehicle is not required.
ENG(G)-03 Design hard points for hoisting or positioning the engine during installation and removal to be integral to the engine and
capable of hoisting and supporting a fully-built-up engine package.
ENG(G)-04 Do not use downward engine removal concepts that require jacking or hoisting of the ground vehicle.
ENG(G)-05 Use concepts for removing ground vehicle engines from the front, rear, or side rather than from overhead (using
hoisting).
ENG(G)-06 The distance between the engine and firewall should ensure the access envelopes to lines, fittings, wiring, and
adjustments will accommodate the 75 percentile male hand.
ENG(G)-07 The distance between the cooling fan and radiator core should ensure that access envelopes will not require removal of
the core.
ENG(G)-08 The interface of the engine assembly to the engine compartment and structure should be designed to ensure all spark
plugs, glo-plugs, and igniters can be replaced within 30 minutes elapsed time.
ENG(G)-10 Design attaching hardware for all mechanical engine-to-vehicle interfaces to be captive and with integral safeties.
ENG(G)-12 Provide a clear and viewable access envelope to fuel and oil filters.
ENG(G)-13 Locate fuel filters to ensure no safety hazard will exist due to residual fuel during filter change.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

ENG(G)-14 Access envelopes to fuel and oil filters should not be in close proximity to exhaust manifolds or cooling system return
lines.
ENG(G)-15 Any single drive belt (excluding timing belts) should be capable of replacement within 30 minutes elapsed time
ENG(G)-16 Do not locate batteries in the engine compartment. In those instances where this is not possible:
- The battery support structure should be of a material that is impervious to acid leakage or boil-over.
- The battery support structure should serve as a scupper to collect and direct the acid out of the engine compartment.
ENG(G)-17 Install simple, lightweight shields over cooling system return lines to protect personnel from hose or line blowout during
maintenance.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
ENG(G)-20 Design all firewall fittings, connectors, and penetrations to be fully viewable and directly accessible to the maintainers.

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

ENG-05 All engine-mounted air and fluid lines should be located next to the fan case, engine case, or full-length fan duct to
ensure quick and simple replacement of accessories and components.
ENG-12 All engine-mounted accessories must be capable of being removed and installed through the available airframe access
openings.

C-48
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
2.01 Accessibility ENG-15 Engine removal for aircraft intended to be operated off carriers should be accomplished within the shadow of the
aircraft.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

ENG-16 Aircraft jacking should not be required for engine removal.
ENG-17 Aft engine removal should be an acceptable alternative for USAF aircraft.
ENG-18 For either downward or aft engine removal, it should be possible to maintain control of the engine on all axis during the
entire removal and installation process.
ENG-19 The minimum clearance between engine and airframe should be 1 inch, including removal and installation.
ENG-20 Do not locate equipment or components in the engine cavity except for those components associated with the engine or
engine installation.
ENG-21 Do not locate equipment or components in the engine bay cavity in a manner that would require removal or repositioning
for engine removal.
ENG-23 All engine borescope provisions should be accessible with the engine installed and hooked up.
ENG-24 Replacement of all ignitors should be possible with the engine installed.
ENG-25 All engine-to-airframe plumbing, wiring, and duct interfaces should be capable of being connected or disconnected by
hand, should contain integral safety provisions, and should not require torquing.
ENG-30 It should not be necessary to close or reinstall engine access doors for engine ground operation up to and including
military power.
ENG-33 Engine access doors and panels and their integral support struts should be capable of withstanding 60 MPH winds in the
opened position.
ENG-34 Identification plates on the engine and all engine-mounted components should be viewable with the engine installed and
engine access doors opened.
ENG-35 No time-change components or scheduled actions should be planned solely to protect component integrity or reliability.
ENG-45 Provide remote servicing points accessible from the ground to service engine accessories mounted on top of the engine
(e.g., oil tanks, gear boxes, generators, etc.) to eliminate climbing upon or atop the host vehicle.
ENG-52 Incorporate provisions to enable very slow rotation of the fan, compressor, and turbine during borescope inspections.
EXT-01 Locate Tanks, Pods, Containers, and Devices (TPCD's) so they do not block or restrict access to existing vehicle access
areas or access approach envelopes.
EXT-05 Design access doors for cargo type TPCD's to be non-load carrying and with simple latches for all doors and panels.
EXT-06 Design cargo TPCD's to ensure all cargo and equipment can be downloaded and uploaded with the TPCD installed on the
host vehicle.
F-01 Use blind fasteners only where absolutely necessary or where considerable cost can be saved.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

F-02 Minimize access fasteners while making them quick release, easily removed and replaced, and captive.
F-03 Choose fasteners based on the requirement top operate by hand or with common hand tools rather than special tools.
F-04 Whenever possible, incorporate barrel type fasteners as opposed to hi-torque fasteners. Failure of Hi-torque fasteners
due to stripping are common and a source of potential foreign object damage (FOD).
FUEL-01 Locate fuel vent and dump masts to ensure exiting fuel will be clear of servicing, loading, arming and safing areas for all
types of ground and airborne vehicles.
FUEL-05 Intersecting of two or more surfaces in a fuel wetted area of less than 90 degrees should be avoided to simplify
manufacture and repair.
FUEL-06 Where maintaining a minimum angle of 90 degrees is not possible, sufficient depth, width, and height should be

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
maintained to provide tool clearances for all tools used in the manufacturing processes and in the operational field repair

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

environment.
FUEL-07 When feed tanks are designed such that the lower portion of the tank serves as a surge chamber, the top closure deck of
the surge chamber should provide the strength to support the weight of a 95 percentile male.
FUEL-08 The size and number of fuel cell and tank access doors should be sufficient to ensure no wetted area of the cell or tank is
beyond a maximum 18" distance from the edge of the access opening. This guideline applies to only non-man rated cells.

C-49
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
2.01 Accessibility FUEL-09 All fuel cell or tank access doors not mounted on the exterior surface should contain sealing provisions other than the
channel type.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

FUEL-10 Provide access from the wing closure ribs in lieu of the moldline when access is required in close proximity to the wing
fold area.
HF-01 Steps and handholds for all ground vehicles should be parasitic to the surface and capable of safely supporting a 95
percentile male wearing arctic boots.
HF-02 Locate identification and modification plates for all major structural assemblies and subassemblies so as to be fully visible
and legible when viewed through normal access provisions. Avoid the need to remove equipment or components to view
the plates.
HF-03 Provide hoist fittings or hardpoints for hoist fitting attachments that are readily accessible.
HF-04 Size structural openings into man-rated fuel cells to enable entry by a 75 percentile male.
HF-05 In designing the vehicle, system, subsystem, and equipment, attempt to satisfy the personnel spectrum from the 5th
percentile female to the 95th percentile male.
HF-09 Develop decals, placards and instruction media around an 8th grade reading level and a 10th grade level of
comprehension.
HOOK-06 Avoid the need to remove the tail hook to facilitate engine access or removal.
HYD-01 For military combat vehicles having two or more hydraulic power systems, provide a minimum 30-inch spacing between
ground power and servicing interfaces to ensure:
- Design flexibility in locating and arranging equipment in high-density vehicles such as fighters and helicopters,
- Work area separation to enable concurrent service/maintenance on systems,
- Systems vulnerability enhancement,
- Reduction in turn-around elapsed time due to concurrent servicing capability.
IN(V)-01 Design inlet door actuators and door actuation mechanisms so they not protrude into the air inlet flow field to eliminate
FOD potential.
IN(V)-02 Do not use loose structural fasteners in the access area to inlet door actuators and mechanisms. Where this guideline
cannot be followed, design the actuator door to be accessible only when the inlet doors are fully closed.
IN(V)-03 For engine inlet bellmouth fairings, use methods of retention other than fasteners. Latches may be considered as an
acceptable alternative only if latch-to-panel retention is from the inner mold line.
IN(V)-04 Design inlet doors and inlet bellmouth fairings to be fully interchangeable to eliminate the need to cut, file, or trim at the
engine face.
IN(V)-06 Use captive fasteners on all access doors forward of the inlet to significantly reduce engine FOD potential.
IN-01 Low Observable (LO) engine face frames should be within 10 inches of the first stage fan or compressor blades.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

IN-03 Openings throughout the engine face frame should be sufficient to permit minor blending or repair of FOD without
removing the engine.
IN-04 For frames not integral with the engine, frame removal should be achievable from the engine cavity.
LG-14 All interfaces from the airframe to the struts should be visible and accessible, and not require removal of airframe
structure for access.
LG-23 Design strut fittings for servicing nitrogen or hydraulic fluid to be easily accessible and adjacent to the appropriate strut
pressure gage.
LG-24 Design struts so they can be serviced with clean, dry air in lieu of nitrogen during deployments without affecting the
overall reliability.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
LO-03 Equipment and support structure requiring shrouds to reduce radar returns should not cause increases in equipment

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

service/repair time.
LO-04 Infrequently-accessed structural doors and panels incorporating special coatings or conductive paints should contain
provisions for prying the door or panel clear of moldline with standard screwdriver without damage.
MC-06 Locate, position, orient all plumbing and duct electrical connectors to prevent the need for sequential installation or
removal.

C-50
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
2.01 Accessibility MC-07 Maximize areas of constant web thickness in firewalls, carry-through bulkheads, major frames, structural ribs, spars,
webs, keels, and close-outs to provide flexibility in locating penetration fittings. Stepped chem milling, stepped machining,

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

stepped composite layup concepts all tend to result in minimal available surface area for penetrations.
MC-08 All in-line plumbing connections within a fuel tank or cell should be capable of making/breaking the interface by hand,
require no torque, contain integral safety locking mechanisms, and should be void of any requirement for safety wire.
MC-09 All plumbing connections and fittings used for fuel systems should contain integral bonding features to eliminate the need
for bonding clamps or jumper cables.
MC-10 In rare instances where a plumbing run contains complex form or geometry that would require removal of other plumbing
or equipment for access, in-line connectors should be incorporated to maintain the integrity of other plumbing or
equipment.
MC-12 All plumbing and connectors containing liquids should be meniscus-free.
MC-13 In instances where plumbing or connector interfaces cannot or are not keyed for a specific orientation, all identification,
markings, cautions, and directions should be placed 360 degrees around the tube or duct.
MC-14 Where multiple connectors are located in close proximity, ensure (1) a minimum hand tool arc of 120 degrees can be
maintained, and (2) stagger fittings to ensure firm coupling interface/hand tool interface can be accomplished without
inducing damage to adjacent lines.
OXY-05 Locate liquid oxygen (LOX) containers in a sealed, dedicated compartment to eliminate need for frequent visual
inspections.
OXY-07 Locate liquid oxygen containers to ensure simultaneous replacement with other turnaround activities.
P-01 Access door and panel fastener types for airborne vehicles should meet the following criteria:
- use latches for a frequency of access of 0 to 40 flight hours
- use High Strength Quick Release fasteners for a frequency of access of 40-400 flight hours
- use structural screws for a frequency of access of 400 flight hours or more
P-02 Access door and panel fastener types for surface vehicles should meet the following criteria:
- use a spring loaded or latch fastener for an opening frequency of daily
- use a one quarter turn fastener (or equivalent) for a opening frequency of weekly
- use screws or bolts for all other cases
P-03 All doors and panels subject to environmental elements should contain form-in-place seals (or equivalent) attached to the
door structure, not substructure, to prevent damage during maintenance.
P-04 Door and panel seals should be compatible with all types of on-board servicing fluids, de-ice and anti-ice fluids, and all
fluids used for chemical, biological, and nuclear decontamination.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

P-05 Piano type hinges should not be used on doors or panels because they are subject to wear, corrosion, and sand and fluid
entry.
P-06 Access door and panel devices used to support door in opened position should meet the following criteria:
- for airborne vehicles, design for 60 knot gust loads (or equivalent jet blast loads)
- for ground vehicles, design for 50 mph gust loads
P-07 Hinged access doors and panels capable of remaining in the opened position should not have sharp edges or corners.
P-08 Removable access door and panel fasteners should be of identical grip length and diameter.
P-09 Acceptable door and panel hold-open devices include over-center sheet metal spring, over-center spring link, spring
cartridge, support strut, and pinned goose neck hinge.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
P-10 Access doors and panels requiring non-captive fasteners should not be located forward of air inlet ducts or high-energy

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

rotating components (e.g., prop fans, engine cooling fans, etc.).
P-11 Access doors and panels should be interchangeable as justified by operation and support costs or life cycle costs.
PYRO-19 Locate built-in grounding receptacles clear of weapon approach and loading envelopes.
PYRO-20 Weapon bay doors, when opened, should not block or restrict access to other servicing points.

C-51
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
2.01 Accessibility PYRO-24 Ammo loader interface should not be less than 30" nor more than 50" above the ground to ensure loading can be
accomplished by a wide range of percentiles wearing chemical or biological protective gear.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

PYRO-25 Gun loading and servicing should be possible concurrently with all other weapon loading and servicing activities to
minimize the elapsed downtime.
PYRO-29 Provide quick mechanical over-travel (no power) for weapon bay doors to maximize the weapon/store loading envelope.
PYRO-30 Ensure weapon bay door arc (both normal and over-travel) does not block or intrude into adjacent service points or
envelopes.
PYRO-32 Provide sufficient longitudinal clearance between weapon bays to enable simultaneous loading of two bays.
PYRO-33 Provide sufficient lateral clearance between weapon bays to enable simultaneous loading of two bays.
PYRO-35 Suspension system should permit any single weapon or store to be loaded by a two man crew.
PYRO-36 Suspension system design and spacing should enable any combination of eight weapons to be loaded by two two-man
crews within the refueling time of the vehicle (excludes nuclear weapons).
PYRO-40 All weapon and store loading functions should be within the percentile range of 5% female to 95% male standing at
ground level.
SABCH-01 Do not locate auxiliary air inlets, sensors, access doors, or drains in boundary bleed areas.
SEAT-04 Design ejection seats so they can be replaced with canopy or escape hatch installed.
SEAT-05 Design ejection seat pyrotechnic devices so they are 100 percent viewable and accessible with seat installed.
SEAT-06 Do not use seat removal as a means of access.
SIMP-01 Location and design of all exterior lights should not require protective covers in ground environments.
SIMP-02 Landing and taxi lights should be mounted on landing gear struts or doors to eliminate separate compartments, doors, and
retraction/extension mechanisms.
SIMP-03 Speed brake or speed brake cavity should contain integral mechanical locking mechanism for personnel safety.
TP-03 Protect test points from outside signal generation.
WBAY-12 Pylon-to-store/weapon gap seal should permit visual and physical access during loading for all interfaces between bomb
rack-to-store, bomb rack-to-launcher, and launcher-to-store.
WBAY-16 Gap seals should not degrade loading while wearing arctic or chemical, biological, or radiation protective clothing.
WIND-05 Design interior surfaces to be reachable for cleaning without reliance on hinging, equipment removal, or use of support
equipment.
WIND-11 For dome-shaped optic window concepts, the dome should be easily removable for cleaning without affecting LO
integrity.
WIND-14 Exterior lights should permit simple and rapid bulb replacement without disturbing LO treatments.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

WT&B-06 Locate brake anti-skid system components, including brake control valves, for easy access in low-vibration environments.
2.02 Fasteners A-02 Equipment bay and compartment structure should be bonded, co-cured, welded, machined, or combinations thereof to
eliminate or minimize the use of mechanical fasteners.
A-03 All equipment bay and compartment structural flanges and stiffeners should be external to the compartment to maximize
the volume available for equipment installation and arrangement.
A-04 Use stiffening beads in lieu of flanges to the maximum extent to enhance compartment volume and simplify repairs.
Stiffening beads should have the convex surface toward the compartment to eliminate fluid traps.
A-05 Keep all machined compartment frames, webs, and closure panels to a constant thickness (e.g., not stepped or tapered) to
ease simplicity of fluid or electrical penetrations and ease and simplicity of structural repair.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
A-06 Hardpoints (structural attachment and load bearing areas) within a compartment to assist in equipment mounting or

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

support should not be integral with the machined part. Hardpoints should be parasitic to enable quick repair in case of
wear or damage in lieu of precise ream/bush repair typical of machined hardpoints.
CONT-01 Control rods should use Boyd or impedance type bolts (or equivalent) to eliminate the need for cotter pins or safety wire.
ECS-16 All components contained in the systems, including all attaching brackets and supports, should use hex-head self-locking
bolts for ease and simplicity of installation.

C-52
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
2.02 Fasteners ENG(G)-02 Use torque-limiting bolts or torque washers as engine mount attaching hardware to eliminate the need for torque
wrenches.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

ENG-41 Use captive fasteners containing self-locking features to attach the nose dome to the engine face. The fasteners should
be fully viewable during engine face FOD inspections.
EXT-05 Design access doors for cargo type TPCD's to be non-load carrying and with simple latches for all doors and panels.
F-01 Use blind fasteners only where absolutely necessary or where considerable cost can be saved.
F-02 Minimize access fasteners while making them quick release, easily removed and replaced, and captive.
F-03 Choose fasteners based on the requirement top operate by hand or with common hand tools rather than special tools.
F-04 Whenever possible, incorporate barrel type fasteners as opposed to hi-torque fasteners. Failure of Hi-torque fasteners
due to stripping are common and a source of potential foreign object damage (FOD).
FUEL-03 Structural bolts, screws, and fasteners should not penetrate into integral fuel cells or tanks other than those used for
access door attachment.
FUEL-06 Where maintaining a minimum angle of 90 degrees is not possible, sufficient depth, width, and height should be
maintained to provide tool clearances for all tools used in the manufacturing processes and in the operational field repair
environment.
FUEL-11 Through-the-tank fasteners should not be used for fuel cells or tanks in areas where a leak path could be established into
an inaccessible portion of the vehicle.
HYD-06 Mount hydraulic pumps to the gear box flange with v-band clamps containing a torq-set or equivalent fastener.
IN(V)-03 For engine inlet bellmouth fairings, use methods of retention other than fasteners. Latches may be considered as an
acceptable alternative only if latch-to-panel retention is from the inner mold line.
IN(V)-06 Use captive fasteners on all access doors forward of the inlet to significantly reduce engine FOD potential.
LG-04 Do not use Beryllium and Beryllium base alloys in any location subject to wear or corrosive atmospheres or in installations
where machining may be required.
LG-05 All bolts or similar threaded means used as adjustable stops should be positively retained in the adjusted reference without
reliance on jam nuts, cotter pins, or safety wire.
MC-01 All clamps should contain torque-set or torque-limiting connections to prevent clamp or component failure due to over-
torque. Clamp installation call outs should not depend on special tools to establish the required torque values.
MC-02 Avoid the use of cotter pins, safety wire, safety clips, and similar devices to prevent maintenance-induced events leading
to ground vehicle accidents or loss of air vehicles.
MC-03 All tubing connections and interfaces should use rosan/dynatube (or equivalent) to (1) enable connect or disconnect with
one hand, one tool, (2) eliminate the need to safety the connection, (3) provide a superior seal, and (4) negate need to
reposition line(s) during component replacement.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

MC-04 No trombone type, flared tube type, or piloted line type interfaces should be used to avoid the need for removal or
repositioning during equipment removal.
MC-05 Avoid potential foreign object traps during manufacturing or operational maintenance by eliminating vertical penetrations
of plumbing/fittings into tanks, compartments, or cells
P-01 Access door and panel fastener types for airborne vehicles should meet the following criteria:
- use latches for a frequency of access of 0 to 40 flight hours
- use High Strength Quick Release fasteners for a frequency of access of 40-400 flight hours
- use structural screws for a frequency of access of 400 flight hours or more
P-02 Access door and panel fastener types for surface vehicles should meet the following criteria:

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
- use a spring loaded or latch fastener for an opening frequency of daily
- use a one quarter turn fastener (or equivalent) for a opening frequency of weekly
- use screws or bolts for all other cases
P-06 Access door and panel devices used to support door in opened position should meet the following criteria:
- for airborne vehicles, design for 60 knot gust loads (or equivalent jet blast loads)
- for ground vehicles, design for 50 mph gust loads

C-53
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
2.02 Fasteners P-10 Access doors and panels requiring non-captive fasteners should not be located forward of air inlet ducts or high-energy
rotating components (e.g., prop fans, engine cooling fans, etc.).

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

R-01 Large radomes wherein the combination of the diameter and length exceeds 60" should be top-hinged. Hinge should be
load-carrying to reduce radome retention fastener count.
SABCH-02 All flush type structural screws should have identical head drives for the entire vehicle.
SABCH-03 All non-flush type structural screws should have identical head drive recesses for the entire vehicle.
SABCH-04 Special high strength bolts, such as twelve-point heads, should be fully justified from standpoint of the cost of ownership
and effectiveness.
SABCH-05 Structural design should avoid the reliance on blind fasteners unless fully supported by cost, weight, schedule, and
effectiveness analysis.
SABCH-06 Structural design should avoid the potential of dissimilar material or fastener corrosion.
SABCH-07 No structural fasteners should be used that require special tools for installation.
SABCH-08 Taper pins should be threaded and retained with self-locking hardware.
SABCH-09 Pins and collars (lockbolts) should only be used in applications which do not normally require removal.
SABCH-10 Do not use lockbolts in composites.
SABCH-12 Avoid tapping threads into structural members. Use of heli-coil type or similar insert concepts is permissible.
SABCH-14 No structural fastener intended to carry shear or tension loads should be smaller than 1/4" diameter (.25").
SABCH-16 Wing-to-fuselage attachment should give preference to tension ties over shear ties to improve overall volumetric
efficiency.
SE-06 Non-metallic materials should take preference over metals to enable simple manufacturing and repair by bonding in lieu
of weldments and/or mechanical fasteners.
SE-11 Avoid reliance on mechanical fasteners solely to facilitate manufacturing.
WT&B-05 Locking ring type concepts for retaining wheel halves should be given preference over multiple tie bolts.
WT&B-11 Wheel axle nuts should contain integral retention devices or safetying features. In rare instances where this cannot be
accomplished, a bolt and self-locking nut should be used. Locking rings and similar devices that can fail and cause FOD
should be avoided.
WT&B-12 Avoid the use of rivets to retain pressure pads, clips, brackets, and similar items in wheel/brake assemblies unless:
- Rivet failure will not permit a part or item to fall into the brake disc/pad area, and
- Exceptional quality control can be assured during manufacture of the part or rivet attachments, and
- Frequent scheduled inspections will not be imposed to protect product integrity or reliability.
2.03 Human Factors (including A-07 Paint equipment bay and compartment interiors a high gloss white to maximize lighting reflectivity, visibility, and rapid

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

Anthropometric Considerations) leak detection capability.
A-10 Provide a sufficient number of compartment fluid drains to ensure fluid drainage for varying aircraft static attitudes and
varying terrain slopes for ground vehicles.
ARM-01 For an aircraft, the fuselage lower shear moldline should be no less than 38" above the ground when external weapons
only will be carried on the fuselage.
ARM-02 For an aircraft, the fuselage lower shear moldline should be no less than 50" above the ground when internal weapons
will be carried in the fuselage and weapon bay door widths exceed 22".
ARM-09 Weapon and store ejectors containing adjustable pitch control devices should ensure devices are easily accessible and
adjustments are Murphy-free.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
C-54
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
2.03 Human Factors (including CARGO-01 Ground vehicles with storage bays or compartments accessible from outside the vehicle should:
Anthropometric Considerations) - Have the door sill located no lower than knee height to accommodate a wide range of percentiles while standing.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

- Ensure door handles are flush with outer surface to protect personnel.
- Contain goose neck hinges to protect the hinge from the elements.
- Contain peripheral door seals that will protect against blowing sand entry at 50 mph.
- Ensure door can be opened with transport tie downs installed.
- Ensure door opening envelope does not intrude into the opening envelope of an adjacent door.
- Contain simple sheet metal hold-open spring or mechanism.
- Ensure floor of bay or compartment is flush with sill to simplify cleanout and drainage.
- Ensure door unlocking and opening mechanism can be actuated by a 95 percentile male hand while wearing arctic
gloves.
- Contain 15 percent added volume for density growth.
CARGO-02 Ground vehicles with small exterior storage bays or compartments containing emergency equipment or supplies should:
- Be located at chest height of the 50 percentile male.
- Contain unlatching mechanisms activated by pushing inward on the door.
- Meet all other generic bay and compartment requirements.
CBR-01 Orient all vehicle liquid servicing fittings to ensure fluids will not come in contact with protective garb during
connect/disconnect activities.
CBR-02 Ensure vehicle overboard passive liquid drains are clearly marked or visible to enable personnel to remain clear of area.
CBR-03 Design fuel cell drains so they can not be activated in a manner that would allow fuel to come in contact with a protected
hand.
CBR-04 Design emergency ingress provisions so they can be activated by a 95 percentile male wearing full protective chemical
or biological protection gear.
CBR-05 Size rescue doors, panels, and "cut here" areas to accommodate the 95 percentile shoulder width wearing full protective
chemical or biological protection gear.
CBR-06 Consider the reduction in peripheral vision resulting from wearing chemical or biological protection gear when designing
intended fire paths and crash rescue paths into a vehicle.
CC-11 Orient spare wires and cable pigtails along the outer diameter or periphery of connectors to make access easier.
CC-12 Build up and assemble straight and angle connector shells or back shells in a manner that ensures that wire or cable strain
or wear is not possible.
CONT-01 Control rods should use Boyd or impedance type bolts (or equivalent) to eliminate the need for cotter pins or safety wir e.
CONT-02 Do not use metal control cables for vehicles that will operate in salt water or salt air environments.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

CONT-03 Use control rods rather than control cables for non-complex applications and non-complex routing within the vehicle.
CONT-04 Use control cables rather than control rods for most complex applications.
CONT-05 Route cables so that 100 percent of a cable will be viewable for inspection.
CONT-06 Design all pulleys and brackets associated with cable installations so they are accessible by a 75 percentile male hand.
CREW-06 Film magazines, tapes, and removable modules should permit considerable handling without reliance on special support
equipment protection.
CREW-09 Crew and operator station cassettes or magazines should be capable of being removed and installed with one hand while
the operator or air crew is seated and strapped in.
CREW-11 Design cameras, lenses, reconnaissance pods, aiming devices, and related equipment so they can be reconfigured by one

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
individual.
EC-16 Select connectors so that contacts on the "live" or "hot" side of the connection are socket type rather than pin type to
minimize personnel hazard and to prevent accidental shorting of live circuits.
EC-17 Whenever possible, use self-locking connector plugs of a type not requiring safety wire.
EC-20 Use quick disconnect connectors where allowed and identify all pins on each connector.

C-55
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
2.03 Human Factors (including EC-21 Locate connectors far enough apart so that they meet specified requirements.
Anthropometric Considerations)

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

EC-22 All connectors should be keyed differently with aligning pins that extend beyond the electrical pins. Connector pins and
sockets should engage after key position is entered.
EC-23 Design connectors so that plugs are cold and receptacles are hot.
EC-24 Use electrical connectors that incorporate alignment key-ways to reduce incidents of damage due to improper
engagement.
EC-25 Use positive locking, quick disconnect electrical connectors to save man-hours, prevent foreign object damage (FOD)
and decrease the chance of personal injury.
EC-26 Avoid using identical electrical connectors in adjacent areas.
ECS-01 Design so that equipment servicing status are accessible and readable from the ground level for air vehicles and from the
operator's position for ground and water vehicles.
ECS-02 Do not locate equipment servicing points in crew, passenger, or operator areas.
ECS-03 Heat exchangers using hot liquids as the heat source should not be located inside the compartments used for operator,
crew, or passengers.
ECS-04 Plumbing, lines, or hoses containing hot liquids, toxic gases or liquids should be external to operator, crew, or passenger
stations.
ECS-18 Avoid the use of insulation blankets containing polyvinyl for any application due to the dense smoke and toxic fumes if
burned or subjected to high temperature bleed air leakage.
ECS-26 Design and integrate components whose proper operation depends on the direction of flow such that they cannot be
incorrectly installed.
EDECOM-01 Provide surface sensors on equipment located in compartments containing louvers, screens, flush inlets, or similar
openings to the environment to indicate the presence of chem/bio contaminants.
EDECOM-02 Provide integral sensors (viewable from the exterior) for equipment subject to internal forced-air cooling from outside or
external air to indicate the presence of contaminants.
EDECOM-03 Design equipment surfaces and structure to be compatible with all decontamination agents and methods.
EDECOM-04 Provide passive overboard drains in compartments subject to decontamination processes to void the area of contaminants.
EDECOM-05 Provide hoist, lift or transport handles for equipment requiring removal from the host vehicle for decontamination. In
instances where this may not be practical, design the equipment with hardpoints for attaching parasitic carrying provisions
ENG(G)-06 The distance between the engine and firewall should ensure the access envelopes to lines, fittings, wiring, and
adjustments will accommodate the 75 percentile male hand.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

ENG(G)-07 The distance between the cooling fan and radiator core should ensure that access envelopes will not require removal of
the core.
ENG(G)-10 Design attaching hardware for all mechanical engine-to-vehicle interfaces to be captive and with integral safeties.
ENG(G)-11 Use "torq-set" type clamps or equivalent in all cooling system hose interfaces to eliminate torque wrenches and the
potential for error.
ENG(G)-12 Provide a clear and viewable access envelope to fuel and oil filters.
ENG(G)-13 Locate fuel filters to ensure no safety hazard will exist due to residual fuel during filter change.
ENG(G)-14 Access envelopes to fuel and oil filters should not be in close proximity to exhaust manifolds or cooling system return
lines.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
ENG(G)-19 Paint engine compartments gloss white to enhance light reflectivity and enhance fluid leak detection.

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

ENG(G)-20 Design all firewall fittings, connectors, and penetrations to be fully viewable and directly accessible to the maintainers.
ENG-07 Plumbing and wiring spanning two or more engine modules should contain in-line disconnects to enhance and simplify
engine modularization.
ENG-17 Aft engine removal should be an acceptable alternative for USAF aircraft.
ENG-19 The minimum clearance between engine and airframe should be 1 inch, including removal and installation.

C-56
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
2.03 Human Factors (including ENG-25 All engine-to-airframe plumbing, wiring, and duct interfaces should be capable of being connected or disconnected by
Anthropometric Considerations) hand, should contain integral safety provisions, and should not require torquing.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

ENG-26 Locate and position engine overheat and fire warning sensors so that damage cannot occur during engine maintenance or
replacement.
ENG-49 Design engine fuel and oil filters with integral locking features so they can be installed and removed by hand, and require
no torquing.
ENG-50 Design engine fuel and oil filter delta pressure indicators so they can be reset only from within the filter housing.
EXTING-05 Route and locate all tube, wire, and plumbing interfaces in a manner that prevents induced damage during maintenance.
EXTING-06 Provide an alternate capability to activate the system remotely from the cockpit/crew station, or operator's position to
satisfy emergency situations during vehicle maintenance.
EXTING-09 Do not locate provisions for overboard venting or dumping of extinguishing agents in areas that could create hazards for
personnel.
FUEL-07 When feed tanks are designed such that the lower portion of the tank serves as a surge chamber, the top closure deck of
the surge chamber should provide the strength to support the weight of a 95 percentile male.
FUEL-08 The size and number of fuel cell and tank access doors should be sufficient to ensure no wetted area of the cell or tank is
beyond a maximum 18" distance from the edge of the access opening. This guideline applies to only non-man rated cells.
HF-01 Steps and handholds for all ground vehicles should be parasitic to the surface and capable of safely supporting a 95
percentile male wearing arctic boots.
HF-04 Size structural openings into man-rated fuel cells to enable entry by a 75 percentile male.
HF-05 In designing the vehicle, system, subsystem, and equipment, attempt to satisfy the personnel spectrum from the 5th
percentile female to the 95th percentile male.
HF-06 Recognize that design ingenuity cannot overcome the fact that certain tasks may be outside of the capabilities of females
in the lower percentile ranges. Many of these tasks may also be outside the capability of a large portion of the male
lower percentile ranges. In designing, proactively recognize these inabilities so the necessary scope and depth of good
design tradeoffs can be identified or expanded. The tasks include:
- Manually loading many types of weapons.
- Pushing an engine/transport trailer combination.
- Handling various large actuators, motors, or generators.
- Removing, installing, and handling many built-up wheel and tire assemblies.
- Lifting a large percentage of avionics.
- Reaching all areas of windshield/canopy surfaces for cleaning.
- Moving major support equipment.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

- Handling tie-down chains.
- Pulling or removing pinched chocks.
- Lifting tool boxes.
- Aiding in pilot rescue.
- Safely moving about in high over-the-deck or ground surface winds.
- Riding brakes or taxiing aircraft.
- Lifting and connecting refueling hoses.
- Changing or repairing tank treads.
- Handling small ammunition containers.
- Achieving high torque values.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
C-57
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
2.03 Human Factors (including HF-07 Recognize that design ingenuity cannot overcome certain tasks that are not within the capability of the 95 percentile male.
Anthropometric Considerations) In designing, proactively recognize these inabilities so the necessary scope and depth of good design tradeoffs can be

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

identified or expanded. The tasks include:
- Pulling circuit breakers with a gloved hand.
- Achieving good working access inside of many equipment bays and compartments.
- Working under air vehicles with lower shears less than 32 inches above the static ground line.
- Connecting and disconnecting electrical connectors that are generally considered to be sufficiently spaced.
- Recovering a dropped tool from many different bays and compartments.
- Preparing many different types of vehicles for operation while wearing arctic clothing or chemical/biological
protective gear.
HF-08 Avoid solely relying on decals, placards, or instruction media to simplify or negate redesign. In rare instances such use of
decals, etc. may lead to significant payoffs, the decision should be supported by complete analysis and supporting
rationale.
HF-09 Develop decals, placards and instruction media around an 8th grade reading level and a 10th grade level of
comprehension.
HOOK-02 Design NGT/NGH mechanisms with integral provisions to visually indicate correct hookup/attachment. The indication
must be visible during all day and night carrier operations.
HOOK-03 NGT/NGH mechanisms should not require scheduled visual or NDI type inspections.
HOOK-05 Design tail hook points so they can not be incorrectly installed.
HYD-04 For vehicles containing two or more systems with different fluids, use different service fittings and different ground
power interfaces for each fluid type.
IN(V)-07 Ensure that no ground safety pins or streamers are used forward of the inlet or within a 3-foot radius aft of the inlet.
LG-18 Landing gear ground safety down locks should be an integral part of the overall design. Use or reliance on loose pins
(support equipment) should be avoided.
LG-19 When deemed necessary for the respective design, pilots, flight crews, or operators should have an indication of the
downlock status in the cockpit or crew station to avoid the necessity of a flight abort.
LG-20 Special locks and pins used solely for landing gear ground maintenance safety should be used only in those cases
substantiated by cost effectiveness analysis.
LG-23 Design strut fittings for servicing nitrogen or hydraulic fluid to be easily accessible and adjacent to the appropriate strut
pressure gage.
LG-24 Design struts so they can be serviced with clean, dry air in lieu of nitrogen during deployments without affecting the
overall reliability.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

LG-28 Landing gear control handle should have only "up" or "down" detents with no neutral or intermediate positions.
LG-29 Basic gear design combined with manufacturing tolerances should ensure that no uplock or downlock rigging is required.
LG-30 Do not use landing gear wells to locate any type of auxiliary air inlet.
LG-31 Landing gear doors designed to close after gear is extended should be capable of being manually opened on the ground
without reliance on electrical or hydraulic power.
LG-32 Design of landing gear doors normally closed after gear extension should ensure failure modes will not enable
uncommanded opening on the ground.
LG-33 Design of landing gear doors normally left open after gear extension should ensure no failure mode will enable closing on
the ground.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
LG-34 Avoid sharp edges and corners on landing gear doors or fairings.

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

LG-36 Location of integral wheel jack points on a strut should provide a minimum 6-1/2 inch clearance for positioning the jack
with tire ruptured and wheel ground 2 inches off ground.
LG-40 Nose gear design and selection of nose gear seals should ensure strut will gradually compress while aircraft is being
fueled. Sticking struts followed by sudden compressing is highly hazardous to personnel and equipment.
LG-42 Landing gear struts should contain built-in, dial type pressure gages.

C-58
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
2.03 Human Factors (including LG-43 Incorporate low pressure warning sensors in nose landing gear whenever under-servicing of the gear could result in
Anthropometric Considerations) failure to rotate aircraft during takeoff. This feature will eliminate many aborted take-offs, many of which result in

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

blown tires or aircraft leaving the runway.
LO-02 Avoid scheduled forced inspections or replacement of materials, coatings, or finishes solely to protect either the reliability
or the signature.
LO-03 Equipment and support structure requiring shrouds to reduce radar returns should not cause increases in equipment
service/repair time.
LO-04 Infrequently-accessed structural doors and panels incorporating special coatings or conductive paints should contain
provisions for prying the door or panel clear of moldline with standard screwdriver without damage.
LO-05 Do not locate flush mounted LO screens for auxiliary air inlets and exits in walkway areas unless durability has been
proven.
MC-02 Avoid the use of cotter pins, safety wire, safety clips, and similar devices to prevent maintenance-induced events leading
to ground vehicle accidents or loss of air vehicles.
MC-06 Locate, position, orient all plumbing and duct electrical connectors to prevent the need for sequential installation or
removal.
MC-09 All plumbing connections and fittings used for fuel systems should contain integral bonding features to eliminate the need
for bonding clamps or jumper cables.
MC-12 All plumbing and connectors containing liquids should be meniscus-free.
MC-13 In instances where plumbing or connector interfaces cannot or are not keyed for a specific orientation, all identification,
markings, cautions, and directions should be placed 360 degrees around the tube or duct.
MC-14 Where multiple connectors are located in close proximity, ensure (1) a minimum hand tool arc of 120 degrees can be
maintained, and (2) stagger fittings to ensure firm coupling interface/hand tool interface can be accomplished without
inducing damage to adjacent lines.
NDI-01 Avoid reliance of extensive interpretation by NDI equipment operators to detect structural flaws.
P-07 Hinged access doors and panels capable of remaining in the opened position should not have sharp edges or corners.
PERS-01 Group man-machine interfaces manifold-style to enable connect/disconnect in a single action.
PERS-02 Include an integral, highly visible indicator in a man-machine interface connector to denote connector is seated and
locked.
PERS-03 Design interface connectors so that a distinct action is required by an individual to effect a disconnect. (Excludes
airframe-to-ejection seat personnel interfaces.)
PERS-04 Interfaces should contain an emergency release mechanism that can be activated by rescue personnel with a 95
percentile gloved hand.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

PERS-05 Design emergency interface release mechanisms to be clearly visible under all types of lighting situations.
PERS-06 Storage bins, compartments, sacks, or bags should be available within the vehicle to store/protect all personal equipment
required to conduct operations.
PERS-07 All flight and ground vehicles should contain one cubic foot minimum storage compartment(s) for various loose and
sundry personal items (for each individual).
PERS-08 Design stowage and mounting provisions for portable air or oxygen containers to withstand 40G crash or impact loads.
PERS-09 Design portable emergency locator beacons, radio receiver/transmitters, global positioning systems, and similar battery
operated devices with integral provisions for determining battery health or status and remaining battery life.
PYRO-01 Provide the "safe/arm" status to the pilot, crew, or gunner in the cockpit, crew station, or operator station as appropriate.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
PYRO-02 Provide the "safe/arm" status as an external cue discernible from a distance of 10-20 feet.
PYRO-07 Manual "safe/arm" mechanisms should be well-clear of inlet ducts, propellers, rotors, and similar rotating components.
PYRO-08 Manual "safe/arm" mechanisms should be well-clear of engine exhausts, fuel/toxic vents, fluid drains, control surface
deflection envelopes, and rescue path envelopes.
PYRO-09 Provide positive, Murphy-proof locking detents for both the "safe" and "arm" positions of mechanical mechanisms.

C-59
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
2.03 Human Factors (including PYRO-10 Provide a numerical maintenance code on maintenance panels or maintenance recorder/memory systems to denote the
Anthropometric Considerations) "safe/arm" status for each weapon or store.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

PYRO-17 In rare instances where use of CADs may be required, a positive indication to denote "cartridge installed" should be
provided.
PYRO-18 Mechanical "safe/arm" mechanism design should enable activation by a 95 percentile male wearing arctic mittens.
PYRO-21 Weapon bays should contain internal lighting controlled by a separate switch that is only functional when doors are open
PYRO-22 A "rounds remaining" status should be available at the gun loading interface, maintenance panel, or cockpit/crew
station/operator station.
PYRO-23 Crew size for full ammo load should not exceed two persons.
PYRO-24 Ammo loader interface should not be less than 30" nor more than 50" above the ground to ensure loading can be
accomplished by a wide range of percentiles wearing chemical or biological protective gear.
PYRO-25 Gun loading and servicing should be possible concurrently with all other weapon loading and servicing activities to
minimize the elapsed downtime.
PYRO-29 Provide quick mechanical over-travel (no power) for weapon bay doors to maximize the weapon/store loading envelope.
PYRO-30 Ensure weapon bay door arc (both normal and over-travel) does not block or intrude into adjacent service points or
envelopes.
PYRO-36 Suspension system design and spacing should enable any combination of eight weapons to be loaded by two two-man
crews within the refueling time of the vehicle (excludes nuclear weapons).
PYRO-40 All weapon and store loading functions should be within the percentile range of 5% female to 95% male standing at
ground level.
SAFE-01 Drag chute installation designs not containing electrical safing should contain remote safe/arm provisions reachable from
ground level by 5 percentile females. Remove location should be clear of engine exhaust areas and flight control
deflection envelopes.
SAFE-02 Emergency ingress actuation provisions into cockpits, crew stations, passenger compartments, and operator stations
should be accessible from the ground by 5 percentile females.
SAFE-03 Stored energy devices (e.g., accumulators, nitrogen bottles, gas generators, etc.), that could cause injury, harm, or
damage if inadvertently actuated, should contain integral safing provisions.
SAFE-05 Crash locator beacon door opening/ejection mechanisms should contain integral electrical safe/arm features.
SAFE-06 Wing fold locking mechanisms should provide a moldline indication that locks are in place. Loose or separate safety
devices that must be installed manually should be avoided.
SAFE-07 Landing and alighting gear design should ensure downlocks are integral to the mechanisms and provide a clear indication
of position status. This guideline also applies to tail hooks.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

SAFE-08 A single lever safety should, when positioned, safe the entire escape/ejection system. Use of the single lever to "arm"
should require two hands.
SAFE-09 Safing the canopy jettison system should be accomplished through the same lever device used to safe the ejection seat.
SAFE-10 The single lever safing concept should apply to day-to-day flight operations. Individual or multiple safety pins for
pyrotechnic devices should only be required during escape system maintenance.
SAFE-11 All individual safety pins used for ground maintenance should be clearly visible and coupled together to ensure no single
pin will be overlooked during arming.
SAFE-12 Internal weapon bay doors should contain integral safety locking features for use during maintenance and weapon
loading and downloading.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
SAFE-13 It should not be possible to unsafe a weapon bay door integral lock when a door closed signal is present.

C-60
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
2.03 Human Factors (including SE-01 Wheel chocks for all types of ground and airborne vehicles should contain the following features:
Anthropometric Considerations) - Be nestable for low volume during storage or transport

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

- Be manufactured from corrosion-resistant materials
- Be releasable from tire pinch
- Be highly visible for day and night operations
- Be impervious to all types of fluids used to service or maintain the vehicles
- Be of light weight
SE-02 Wheel chocks for airborne vehicles should also contain the following features:
- Contain provisions for securing to ramp or flight decks
- Contain provisions to secure chocks at wheels
- Releasable/removable from outside of hot brake envelope
- Contain provisions to enable chock to be used as a tire blowout device
- Contain provisions to prevent skidding on snow or ice
SE-03 Wheel chock design guideline discussion. Wheel chocks have historically contributed to numerous accidents and
incidents across the entire design spectrum, yet have received the least design attention of any ground handling/support
equipment. Directly and indirectly, poorly designed chocks have:
- Resulted in numerous "jumping the chocks" incidents due to improper use or positioning, and improper chock sizing for
the tire size/power application. Some instances result in destruction of the aircraft.
- Resulted in vehicle movement/sliding across wet, snowy and icy surfaces as a result of improper grip.
- Resulted in unwarranted tire damage and/or engine FOD.
- Resulted in tertiary damage to other vehicles or ground equipment as a result of being blown about by jet/propeller
blast.
- Damaged surfaces due to temporary placement of chocks on vehicle surfaces during vehicle movement.
- Resulted in personnel sliver/s abrasions (wooden chocks) and cuts (metal chocks) even when chocks were in decent
useable condition.
- Resulted in varied personnel ground accidents during attempts to use chocks as a temporary work stand.
- Lost aircraft "over the side" on carriers.
SE-04 Gun port covers or plugs should be lightweight, 100% effective, and easy to install or store.
SEAT-01 Design personnel seats and padding materials, including the covers and fillers, so they are incapable of creating or
emitting toxic fumes or dense smoke when subjected to fire.
SKID-04 Design pneumatic floats with an integral air gage located adjacent to the air fill fitting.
SKID-06 Use non-skid finishes on the upper surfaces of skids and floats for use as steps and walkways.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

SKID-07 Design floats with simple drain provisions for each compartment.
SURV-01 Design containers used for dinghy stowage to be structurally capable of containing the dinghy within the event of
unintentional or uncommanded inflation.
SURV-02 Provide crew stations, crew compartments, and operator areas containing dinghies as emergency equipment with a
suitable tool for puncturing or cutting the dinghy in the event of inadvertent inflation. Locate the tool so that access is
assured during dinghy inflation.
SURV-03 Survival gear containerization or storage should have a minimum twelve-month period between scheduled tests, checks,
or replacements.
SURV-04 Do not seal battery power or battery-operated devices in survival packages or containers. When this guideline cannot be

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
followed, provide a remote way of ascertaining the status or condition of the battery.

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

SURV-05 Design survival equipment pods intended for external carriage or suspension to meet the same environmental and
operational criteria as the host vehicle structure.
WBAY-15 Gap seals should not hinder pilot or ground crew preflight inspection.
WBAY-16 Gap seals should not degrade loading while wearing arctic or chemical, biological, or radiation protective clothing.
WT&B-02 Brake-wear indicating pins should be highly visible during day and night operations.

C-61
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
2.03 Human Factors (including WT&B-03 Provide a parking brake capability to simplify wheel and tire replacements and to reduce operator fatigue during
Anthropometric Considerations) prolonged engine ground operations.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

WT&B-10 No hubcaps or covers should be installed in a manner that prevents full visual viewing of the wheel retaining nut. In
instances where this may not be possible, the design should ensure that the hubcap/cover cannot be installed unless the
retaining nut is properly installed.
WT&B-13 Emergency brake handles should not be similar in shape or color as other handles nor should they be located in close
proximity to such other handles.
2.04 Mating and Connections A-02 Equipment bay and compartment structure should be bonded, co-cured, welded, machined, or combinations thereof to
eliminate or minimize the use of mechanical fasteners.
A-03 All equipment bay and compartment structural flanges and stiffeners should be external to the compartment to maximize
the volume available for equipment installation and arrangement.
A-08 Plumbing penetrations into a compartment should not be on a vertical axis due to difficulty in making or breaking
vertically-oriented connections. When compartment access is from the bottom, vertically-oriented connections can allow
fluid to leak onto the maintainer. When access is from the top, such connections can allow foreign matter to enter the
line. Use horizontal penetrations whenever possible.
A-11 Locate compartment electrical penetrations close to the access opening for ease of sight, probing, repair, and to eliminate
fluid soaking, wicking, or contamination.
A-12 Locate compartment electrical penetrations far enough from the access opening to prevent damage resulting from
improper (over-length) panel fasteners.
A-13 Two-sided or two-surfaced access should not be required for access to equipment interfaces and hardpoints. The term
two-sided infers top/bottom, left/right, front/back, or combinations thereof.
BIT-06 Mission critical functions should be monitored by BIT.
BIT-09 Use concurrent BIT to monitor system critical functions.
BIT-16 Critical voltages should be visually monitored by sending the voltage signals to visible LEDs.
BIT-17 BIT failures should be latched on the module. This makes it easier for the system or ATE to poll the error bit at any time.
BIT-18 If many BIT routines exist on a module, then ATE should have access and the ability to control each routine individually.
BIT-19 Design BIT to have a very low false alarm rate; otherwise BIT will not be an effective maintenance tool. As a goal, the
false alarm rate should be 1% or less.
BIT-20 The BIT should be mechanized so that when a piece of equipment is not installed in a subsystem or the product, a failure
will not be indicated.
BIT-26 Locate routinely used test points so they are accessible without removing or disassembling other equipment
CC-01 Use fiber-optic technologies in preference to conventional interconnect concepts to reduce the number of

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

interconnects/interfaces, reduce manufacturing and ownership costs, and significantly improve R&M.
CC-02 Standardize connector and wire types to improve testability and logistic support. Keep the number of "different" standard
connectors to a minimum. Use the same connector type keyed differently where possible.
CC-03 Provide clearance around connectors for engagement/disengagement of cables and proper connector orientation under
anticipated environmental conditions (e.g., bare hand of 50 percentile male in an enclosed or protected environment and
a gloved hand of a 50 percentile male in an open or unprotected environment).
CC-04 Use quick release cables and locate cables to make removal and replacement easy and to avoid having to remove one
cable to gain access to another. Provide adequate space for cables, including sleeving and tie-downs, and adequate
service loops for ease of assembly/disassembly

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
CC-05 Orient and space connectors to allow a sufficient grip on the connector for cable or wire extraction without fear of using
the wiring or cable for additional leverage.
CC-06 Label, and where possible color code, each wire in a harness or cable to facilitate tracking from origin to termination.
Each wire, cable, and coax-to-connector interface should be provided with a source of identification to aidin trouble
shooting, repair, or modification. Marking the cable designator on the cable along with bar codes is also recommended.

C-62
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
2.04 Mating and Connections CC-07 Do not manufacture or dress connectors containing more than 25 wires or cables as a single integrated harness. Group
the wires or cables into runs of no more than 25 wires or cables each. In addition to making trouble shooting and repair

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

easier, this approach help avoid large bend radii, thereby simplifying routing, packaging, and stowage.
CC-08 Standardize connector pin assignments for power, ground, and other frequently used signals.
CC-09 Locate LRU/subsystem critical nodes (and or test points) so they are accessible from a connector to prevent the need for
internal LRU probing or access.
CC-10 Avoid hidden cables. Visually inspecting and tracing all assembly cables rather than having hidden cables (such as
behind other cables or even LRUs) allows for a quick system and cable integrity check which aids in overall system
integrity and debug. This also implies quick access for manipulative actions.
CC-11 Orient spare wires and cable pigtails along the outer diameter or periphery of connectors to make access easier.
CC-12 Build up and assemble straight and angle connector shells or back shells in a manner that ensures that wire or cable strain
or wear is not possible.
CO-01 Design automated systems and programs with provisions to enable "stop test" and "resume" without the need to cycle back
or repeat the entire test.
CO-03 Use a test connector to provide test and maintenance bus access to all system and subsystem faults.
CO-04 Design systems and subsystems so that ATE can be used to access, read, and control internal components in concert with
the test or checkout program.
CO-05 Avoid the need for costly adapters for signal communications between system, subsystems, line replaceable units (LRUs)
or Weapon Replaceable Assemblies (WRAs), and ATE.
CONT-01 Control rods should use Boyd or impedance type bolts (or equivalent) to eliminate the need for cotter pins or safety wire.
CONT-02 Do not use metal control cables for vehicles that will operate in salt water or salt air environments.
CONT-03 Use control rods rather than control cables for non-complex applications and non-complex routing within the vehicle.
CONT-04 Use control cables rather than control rods for most complex applications.
CONT-05 Route cables so that 100 percent of a cable will be viewable for inspection.
CONT-06 Design all pulleys and brackets associated with cable installations so they are accessible by a 75 percentile male hand.
EC-01 A threaded electrical connector should contain integral locking mechanisms and visual indications that the connector is
properly seated and locked.
EC-02 An electrical connector requiring less than one full turn to connect or disconnect should contain integral locking
mechanisms and visual indications that the connector is properly seated and locked.
EC-03 A push-pull electrical connector (excluding rack-and-panel type) should contain integral locking features and visual
indication that the connector is properly seated and locked.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

EC-04 All electrical connectors should be keyed or asymmetrically shaped to ensure proper alignment.
EC-05 All electrical connectors should contain scoop-proof shells to ensure pin damage will not occur prior to engaging key
way.
EC-06 All electrical connectors should be corrosion resistant to reduce or eliminate the need for scheduled inspections or
corrosion prevention measures.
EC-07 Avoid using electrical connectors requiring any type or form of soldering.
EC-08 Locate and position electrical connectors such that all pin identification for either half can be easily seen.
EC-09 Electrical connectors selected for critical applications on ground vehicles should be both accessible and capable of being
connected disconnected by a fifty percentile gloved male hand.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
EC-10 Separation between grouped electrical connectors should be sufficient to ensure make or break of any connector by a

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

fifty percentile gloved male hand. Where this is not possible, an alternate method should be used such as the use of stand-
offs, long-shelled connectors alternated with standard connectors, 180-degree connectors alternated with 90-degree
connectors, or innovative equivalents.
EC-11 Avoid connectors requiring potting as a method for environmental protection due to lengthy repair time and tendency for
potting compound reversion.

C-63
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
2.04 Mating and Connections EC-12 Electrical penetrations into a compartment should not be on a vertical axis to ensure foreign matter does not enter
connector.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

EC-13 Electrical, electronic, and coaxial interfaces between fixed and moveable surfaces should contain quick disconnects to
simplify replacement of the moveable surface or the electronic module.
EC-14 Scoop proof connectors should be used throughout unless their use would require an increase in the volume of the
aircraft, in which case deviations will be considered on an individual basis.
EC-15 The removal or replacement of electronic equipment should not require the removal of any other piece of equipment or
armament.
EC-16 Select connectors so that contacts on the "live" or "hot" side of the connection are socket type rather than pin type to
minimize personnel hazard and to prevent accidental shorting of live circuits.
EC-17 Whenever possible, use self-locking connector plugs of a type not requiring safety wire.
EC-18 All electric connectors should be environment resistant.
EC-19 Connectors containing fiber optic contacts should, whenever possible, be mounted on a vertical surface to prevent
particle and fluid contamination.
EC-20 Use quick disconnect connectors where allowed and identify all pins on each connector.
EC-21 Locate connectors far enough apart so that they meet specified requirements.
EC-22 All connectors should be keyed differently with aligning pins that extend beyond the electrical pins. Connector pins and
sockets should engage after key position is entered.
EC-23 Design connectors so that plugs are cold and receptacles are hot.
EC-24 Use electrical connectors that incorporate alignment key-ways to reduce incidents of damage due to improper
engagement.
EC-25 Use positive locking, quick disconnect electrical connectors to save man-hours, prevent foreign object damage (FOD)
and decrease the chance of personal injury.
EC-26 Avoid using identical electrical connectors in adjacent areas.
ECS-26 Design and integrate components whose proper operation depends on the direction of flow such that they cannot be
incorrectly installed.
ENG(G)-01 Provide access to all engine mounts for ground vehicles so that hoisting or crawling under the vehicle is not required.
ENG(G)-02 Use torque-limiting bolts or torque washers as engine mount attaching hardware to eliminate the need for torque
wrenches.
ENG(G)-03 Design hard points for hoisting or positioning the engine during installation and removal to be integral to the engine and
capable of hoisting and supporting a fully-built-up engine package.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

ENG(G)-04 Do not use downward engine removal concepts that require jacking or hoisting of the ground vehicle.
ENG(G)-05 Use concepts for removing ground vehicle engines from the front, rear, or side rather than from overhead (using
hoisting).
ENG(G)-10 Design attaching hardware for all mechanical engine-to-vehicle interfaces to be captive and with integral safeties.
ENG(G)-11 Use "torq-set" type clamps or equivalent in all cooling system hose interfaces to eliminate torque wrenches and the
potential for error.
ENG(G)-12 Provide a clear and viewable access envelope to fuel and oil filters.
ENG(G)-13 Locate fuel filters to ensure no safety hazard will exist due to residual fuel during filter change.
ENG(G)-14 Access envelopes to fuel and oil filters should not be in close proximity to exhaust manifolds or cooling system return

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
lines.

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

ENG(G)-16 Do not locate batteries in the engine compartment. In those instances where this is not possible:
- The battery support structure should be of a material that is impervious to acid leakage or boil-over.
- The battery support structure should serve as a scupper to collect and direct the acid out of the engine compartment.
ENG(G)-17 Install simple, lightweight shields over cooling system return lines to protect personnel from hose or line blowout during
maintenance.

C-64
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
2.04 Mating and Connections ENG(G)-20 Design all firewall fittings, connectors, and penetrations to be fully viewable and directly accessible to the maintainers.
ENG-05 All engine-mounted air and fluid lines should be located next to the fan case, engine case, or full-length fan duct to

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

ensure quick and simple replacement of accessories and components.
ENG-07 Plumbing and wiring spanning two or more engine modules should contain in-line disconnects to enhance and simplify
engine modularization.
ENG-08 Use V-band clamps to mount accessories to engine-mounted gear boxes.
ENG-09 On multi-engine air vehicles, the engines should be capable of being installed in any engine cavity without need for
reconfiguration.
ENG-10 On multi-engine air vehicles, the airframe-to-engine interfaces should be in identical positions or orientations for each
engine cavity.
ENG-11 Control-by-wire or control-by-light throttling concepts should take precedence over mechanical controls.
ENG-12 All engine-mounted accessories must be capable of being removed and installed through the available airframe access
openings.
ENG-25 All engine-to-airframe plumbing, wiring, and duct interfaces should be capable of being connected or disconnected by
hand, should contain integral safety provisions, and should not require torquing.
ENG-31 No rigging or calibration should be required subsequent to replacement of any engine-mounted component.
ENG-36 All borescope mechanisms should have positive integral locking features.
ENG-37 Gravity type servicing fittings, covers, and caps should have integral locking features, openable by hand, and contain a
cable or chain to prevent loss or dropping.
ENG-38 The characteristics of engine-to-vehicle interfaces coupled with the capabilities of electronic engine controls, should
negate the necessity for making any type of engine rigging including maximum power, idle, and idle cut-off.
ENG-39 Engine-to-vehicle plumbing quick disconnects should contain positive visual indication that the interface is fully seated
and locked.
ENG-41 Use captive fasteners containing self-locking features to attach the nose dome to the engine face. The fasteners should
be fully viewable during engine face FOD inspections.
ENG-42 Attach engine-to-inlet duct interface seals to the vehicle so they can be left in place during engine removal.
ENG-43 Design engine-to-inlet duct seal so the interface is automatic during engine installation without needing any form of
alignment, adjustment, or mechanical attachment interface.
ENG-44 Select engine-to-inlet duct seal material to ensure seal life is sufficient for the life of the vehicle.
ENG-45 Provide remote servicing points accessible from the ground to service engine accessories mounted on top of the engine
(e.g., oil tanks, gear boxes, generators, etc.) to eliminate climbing upon or atop the host vehicle.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

ENG-46 Design the basic engine and engine-mounted accessory interface so that no fluid traps or bathtubs exist regardless of
engine-mounted accessory location.
ENG-47 Design the engine, including all accessories, plumbing, wiring, ducts, and mechanisms, to meet the same environmental
protection and compatibility requirements as the host vehicle.
ENG-48 Do not drain or dump residual fuel in the engine fuel control/manifold overboard. When it is not possible to follow this
guideline, route the fuel to an engine-mounted collector tank capable of retaining fuel from two shutdowns.
ENG-49 Design engine fuel and oil filters with integral locking features so they can be installed and removed by hand, and require
no torquing.
ENG-50 Design engine fuel and oil filter delta pressure indicators so they can be reset only from within the filter housing.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
ENG-51 Provide engine fuel and oil filters with anti-surge protection to ensure false delta pressure indications do not occur.

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

ENG-53 Design magnetic chip detectors to ensure that oil shut-off will occur as the detector is being removed for visual
inspection.
ENG-54 Incorporate provisions for fuzz burn-off. in magnetic chip detectors.
EXT-01 Locate Tanks, Pods, Containers, and Devices (TPCD's) so they do not block or restrict access to existing vehicle access
areas or access approach envelopes.

C-65
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
2.04 Mating and Connections EXT-02 Design TPCD's for fuel containment to automatically interface to the host vehicle during installation or removal.
EXT-03 Design TPCD's to be fully compatible with the existing vehicle built-in hoisting provisions and locking devices.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

HF-09 Develop decals, placards and instruction media around an 8th grade reading level and a 10th grade level of
comprehension.
HOOK-01 Locate, orient, and mechanize Nose Gear Tow/Nose Gear Holdback (NGT/NGH) mechanisms so they do not interfere
with the hookup and attachment of standard towbars.
HOOK-02 Design NGT/NGH mechanisms with integral provisions to visually indicate correct hookup/attachment. The indication
must be visible during all day and night carrier operations.
HOOK-06 Avoid the need to remove the tail hook to facilitate engine access or removal.
HYD-01 For military combat vehicles having two or more hydraulic power systems, provide a minimum 30-inch spacing between
ground power and servicing interfaces to ensure:
- Design flexibility in locating and arranging equipment in high-density vehicles such as fighters and helicopters,
- Work area separation to enable concurrent service/maintenance on systems,
- Systems vulnerability enhancement,
- Reduction in turn-around elapsed time due to concurrent servicing capability.
HYD-06 Mount hydraulic pumps to the gear box flange with v-band clamps containing a torq-set or equivalent fastener.
IN(V)-01 Design inlet door actuators and door actuation mechanisms so they not protrude into the air inlet flow field to eliminate
FOD potential.
IN(V)-02 Do not use loose structural fasteners in the access area to inlet door actuators and mechanisms. Where this guideline
cannot be followed, design the actuator door to be accessible only when the inlet doors are fully closed.
IN(V)-08 Incorporate an inlet closure door sealing concept that prevents entry of fluid, dust, or sand across the entire airborne and
ground environment spectrum.
LG-02 Hardpoints for attachment of landing gear trunnions should be capable of carrying all induced gear loads for the life of
the airframe.
LG-03 Hardpoints for attachment for landing gear trunnions should not be machined as an integral part of the airframe structure
when normal design sink rates over 25 feet per second are required.
LG-04 Do not use Beryllium and Beryllium base alloys in any location subject to wear or corrosive atmospheres or in installations
where machining may be required.
LG-05 All bolts or similar threaded means used as adjustable stops should be positively retained in the adjusted reference without
reliance on jam nuts, cotter pins, or safety wire.
LG-06 Design struts, attachments, and interfaces so they do not depend on scheduled visual inspections, non-destructive
inspection (NDI), or non-destructive test (NDT) to ensure the reliability or integrity of the system in the operational

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

environment.
LG-07 No portion of the landing gear struts, drag braces, or interfaces should contain pockets or bathtubs that can trap or hold
moisture. In rare instances where this is not possible, holes should be drilled as appropriate to prevent moisture/liquid
accumulation.
LG-08 Brackets, levers, links, rods, et al mounted on the struts should either be symmetrical to tolerate reverse installation or
should be impossible to reverse.
LG-09 Use coiled tubing in lieu of flex lines or hoses for hydraulic line routing from the airframe to the strut.
LG-10 All wiring or coax mounted to a strut should have appropriate interface connectors to simplify strut removal and
installation.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
LG-11 All microswitches, proximity switches, lights, sensors, etc. mounted to a strut should have individual interface connectors.

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

Wiring pigtails requiring in-line splices should be avoided.
LG-14 All interfaces from the airframe to the struts should be visible and accessible, and not require removal of airframe
structure for access.
LG-15 No portion of the landing gear closure door(s) should be attached to the strut. In rare instances where this may not be
possible, that attached portion should not require alignment or rigging.

C-66
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
2.04 Mating and Connections MC-01 All clamps should contain torque-set or torque-limiting connections to prevent clamp or component failure due to over-
torque. Clamp installation call outs should not depend on special tools to establish the required torque values.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

MC-02 Avoid the use of cotter pins, safety wire, safety clips, and similar devices to prevent maintenance-induced events leading
to ground vehicle accidents or loss of air vehicles.
MC-03 All tubing connections and interfaces should use rosan/dynatube (or equivalent) to (1) enable connect or disconnect with
one hand, one tool, (2) eliminate the need to safety the connection, (3) provide a superior seal, and (4) negate need to
reposition line(s) during component replacement.
MC-04 No trombone type, flared tube type, or piloted line type interfaces should be used to avoid the need for removal or
repositioning during equipment removal.
MC-06 Locate, position, orient all plumbing and duct electrical connectors to prevent the need for sequential installation or
removal.
MC-07 Maximize areas of constant web thickness in firewalls, carry-through bulkheads, major frames, structural ribs, spars,
webs, keels, and close-outs to provide flexibility in locating penetration fittings. Stepped chem milling, stepped machining,
stepped composite layup concepts all tend to result in minimal available surface area for penetrations.
MC-08 All in-line plumbing connections within a fuel tank or cell should be capable of making/breaking the interface by hand,
require no torque, contain integral safety locking mechanisms, and should be void of any requirement for safety wire.
MC-09 All plumbing connections and fittings used for fuel systems should contain integral bonding features to eliminate the need
for bonding clamps or jumper cables.
MC-10 In rare instances where a plumbing run contains complex form or geometry that would require removal of other plumbing
or equipment for access, in-line connectors should be incorporated to maintain the integrity of other plumbing or
equipment.
MC-11 No subsystem plumbing, equipment, or wiring should use a tank, cell, or compartment containing liquids as a means for
routing or penetration simplicity during manufacture.
MC-12 All plumbing and connectors containing liquids should be meniscus-free.
MC-13 In instances where plumbing or connector interfaces cannot or are not keyed for a specific orientation, all identification,
markings, cautions, and directions should be placed 360 degrees around the tube or duct.
MC-14 Where multiple connectors are located in close proximity, ensure (1) a minimum hand tool arc of 120 degrees can be
maintained, and (2) stagger fittings to ensure firm coupling interface/hand tool interface can be accomplished without
inducing damage to adjacent lines.
MP-01 Avoid the use epoxies to mount parts on repairable modules because they make repair extremely difficult.
MP-02 Use a unique identification (ID) resistor incorporated in each system module to verify that the proper module is mounted
on ATE.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

MP-03 Design modules so that lengthy warm-up times, special coding and air purity levels, and similar constraints are not
necessary.
OXY-08 LOX containers should contain rear mounted, automatic interfaces.
P-01 Access door and panel fastener types for airborne vehicles should meet the following criteria:
- use latches for a frequency of access of 0 to 40 flight hours
- use High Strength Quick Release fasteners for a frequency of access of 40-400 flight hours
- use structural screws for a frequency of access of 400 flight hours or more
P-02 Access door and panel fastener types for surface vehicles should meet the following criteria:
- use a spring loaded or latch fastener for an opening frequency of daily

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
- use a one quarter turn fastener (or equivalent) for a opening frequency of weekly
- use screws or bolts for all other cases
PERS-01 Group man-machine interfaces manifold-style to enable connect/disconnect in a single action.
PERS-02 Include an integral, highly visible indicator in a man-machine interface connector to denote connector is seated and
locked.

C-67
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
2.04 Mating and Connections PERS-03 Design interface connectors so that a distinct action is required by an individual to effect a disconnect. (Excludes
airframe-to-ejection seat personnel interfaces.)

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

PERS-04 Interfaces should contain an emergency release mechanism that can be activated by rescue personnel with a 95
percentile gloved hand.
PERS-05 Design emergency interface release mechanisms to be clearly visible under all types of lighting situations.
PERS-08 Design stowage and mounting provisions for portable air or oxygen containers to withstand 40G crash or impact loads.
PYRO-24 Ammo loader interface should not be less than 30" nor more than 50" above the ground to ensure loading can be
accomplished by a wide range of percentiles wearing chemical or biological protective gear.
PYRO-25 Gun loading and servicing should be possible concurrently with all other weapon loading and servicing activities to
minimize the elapsed downtime.
PYRO-26 Do not locate ammunition loader interfaces close to inlets, exhausts, fuel dumps and drains, antennas, sensors, lights, or
hazardous protrusions.
PYRO-27 Incorporate integral hoisting provisions at each weapon/store station to enable direct lift from the container or carrier to
the attachment hardpoints.
PYRO-45 Missile ejectors should be provided with repeatable missile motor fire wires to simplify loading and reduce elapsed time.
SABCH-15 Give preference to butt type splices over lap type splices in the design of manufacturing splices.
SEAT-04 Design ejection seats so they can be replaced with canopy or escape hatch installed.
TP-01 Locate Input/Output (I/O) test points and associated readouts in close proximity to each other so that one person can
perform testing.
TP-02 Protect test points against the environment and from induced contamination.
WBAY-02 Pylon-to-wing electrical or plumbing interfaces should have automatic close-out covers when pylon is jettisoned or not
installed.
WBAY-03 The method and position of the pylon-to-wing gap scale should not form a drip edge for leakage into the pylon cavity.
WBAY-04 The gap treatment should be a permanent installation on the pylon, wing, or both, not a separate seal.
WBAY-05 Gap treatment should not interfere with or be damaged by existing pylon handling support equipment.
WBAY-06 Pylon rigging should not be required for gap seal control.
WBAY-07 Gap seal should not degrade interchangeability of pylon.
WBAY-08 Gap seal and treatment should be fully compatible with steam from carrier catapults.
WBAY-09 Gap seal/pylon should not cover or hamper access to low point wing drains.
WBAY-10 No loose hardware should exist before or after pylon is installed.
WBAY-11 Gap seal should match pylon and wing/fuselage surface impedance.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

WBAY-12 Pylon-to-store/weapon gap seal should permit visual and physical access during loading for all interfaces between bomb
rack-to-store, bomb rack-to-launcher, and launcher-to-store.
WBAY-13 Pylon-to-store/weapon gap seal should not interfere with automatic sway brace function.
WBAY-14 Pylon-to-store/weapon gap seal should permit physical access to lanyards.
WBAY-15 Gap seals should not hinder pilot or ground crew preflight inspection.
WBAY-16 Gap seals should not degrade loading while wearing arctic or chemical, biological, or radiation protective clothing.
WBAY-17 Special coatings or conductive paints on pylons, launchers, racks, launchers, tanks, pods, etc. should have the durability to
withstand contact with support stands/cradles during storage.
WT&B-09 Brake clips, end plates, retainers, etc. used to build up wheel, tire, and brake assemblies should not be capable of reverse

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
or improper installation.
2.05 Standardization and Interchangeability A-14 Do not locate nutplates or gang channels in inaccessible areas that would require extensive disassembly or equipment
removal to gain access.
A-15 Locate tie-down attachment points such that tie-down chains, straps, or cables do not prevent or restrict normal servicing,
weapon loading, or safe/arm functions.

C-68
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
2.05 Standardization and Interchangeability A-16 Structural design should provide good access to corrosion-prone areas for inspection and treatment.
A-17 All structural fasteners in an access door or panel should be of identical grip and diameter. In rare cases where this is not

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

possible, fasteners of different grip must have different diameters to prevent a shorter fastener being substituted for the
correct, longer fastener.
A-18 Use transparent windows, quick-opening covers, or openings without any cover to permit quick visual inspections where
needed.
BIT-01 During design of the BIT, use worst-case stress analysis to ensure that any circuit failures induced by temperature
extremes, tolerance build-up, power supply variations, and combinations thereof are identified.
BIT-02 Ensure that BIT system thresholds are consistent with those across the system, subsystem, item, module, and piece-part
levels to prevent excessive numbers of Cannot Duplicate (CND) and Retest OK (RTOK) events from occurring.
BIT-03 The degree of BIT required or proposed should be based on the respective failure rates and the appropriate FMECA at
all equipment indenture levels.
BIT-05 Incorporate testability design features as an integral part of equipment preliminary design process.
BIT-06 Mission critical functions should be monitored by BIT.
BIT-09 Use concurrent BIT to monitor system critical functions.
BIT-11 In the area of software design and test responsibility, the responsibility for the design and development of verification
testing of an end item (e.g., digital filter) should reside with the same engineer(s).
BIT-12 Define stimuli and response data for each diagnostic test at the system/subsystem level. The same data should be planned
for use both in factory testing as well as in field maintenance of the equipment. These data minimize the amount of
unique software to be written.
BIT-13 Provide for manual control to test sequences, so that the test can be selected individually, and appropriate test
combinations can be executed at the operator's discretion.
BIT-14 Provide access to all BIT control and status signals at module connector pins. This will enable ATE to directly connect to
BIT circuitry.
BIT-15 Incorporate complete BIT functions and BITE on module. If only a portion of the BIT routine or BITE circuitry exists on
the module, then ATE cannot utilize the BIT routine without providing the missing BIT functions.
BIT-16 Critical voltages should be visually monitored by sending the voltage signals to visible LEDs.
BIT-17 BIT failures should be latched on the module. This makes it easier for the system or ATE to poll the error bit at any time.
BIT-18 If many BIT routines exist on a module, then ATE should have access and the ability to control each routine individually.
BIT-19 Design BIT to have a very low false alarm rate; otherwise BIT will not be an effective maintenance tool. As a goal, the
false alarm rate should be 1% or less.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

BIT-20 The BIT should be mechanized so that when a piece of equipment is not installed in a subsystem or the product, a failure
will not be indicated.
BIT-21 The failure detection function should provide the equipment operator with a go/no-go indication of equipment readiness.
BIT-22 The BIT should be designed so that auxiliary test devices or external equipment are not needed for daily and other
regular checks.
BIT-23 Design BIT so it is initiated automatically upon equipment power-up.
BIT-24 Test points should be functionally grouped together and clearly labeled for convenience and ease of maintenance.
BIT-25 Equipment should not require manual probing to fault isolate.
BIT-26 Locate routinely used test points so they are accessible without removing or disassembling other equipment

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
BIT-27 Periodic and initiated BIT should detect at least 98% of all failures and isolate a minimum 99% of those failures detected

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

to a single LRU or WRA.
BIT-28 Design BIT to have the same level of EMI protection as the system or equipment being monitored.
CC-01 Use fiber-optic technologies in preference to conventional interconnect concepts to reduce the number of
interconnects/interfaces, reduce manufacturing and ownership costs, and significantly improve R&M.

C-69
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
2.05 Standardization and Interchangeability CC-02 Standardize connector and wire types to improve testability and logistic support. Keep the number of "different" standard
connectors to a minimum. Use the same connector type keyed differently where possible.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

CC-03 Provide clearance around connectors for engagement/disengagement of cables and proper connector orientation under
anticipated environmental conditions (e.g., bare hand of 50 percentile male in an enclosed or protected environment and
a gloved hand of a 50 percentile male in an open or unprotected environment).
CC-04 Use quick release cables and locate cables to make removal and replacement easy and to avoid having to remove one
cable to gain access to another. Provide adequate space for cables, including sleeving and tie-downs, and adequate
service loops for ease of assembly/disassembly.
CC-05 Orient and space connectors to allow a sufficient grip on the connector for cable or wire extraction without fear of using
the wiring or cable for additional leverage.
CC-06 Label, and where possible color code, each wire in a harness or cable to facilitate tracking from origin to termination.
Each wire, cable, and coax-to-connector interface should be provided with a source of identification to aidin trouble
shooting, repair, or modification. Marking the cable designator on the cable along with bar codes is also recommended.
CC-07 Do not manufacture or dress connectors containing more than 25 wires or cables as a single integrated harness. Group
the wires or cables into runs of no more than 25 wires or cables each. In addition to making trouble shooting and repair
easier, this approach help avoid large bend radii, thereby simplifying routing, packaging, and stowage.
CC-08 Standardize connector pin assignments for power, ground, and other frequently used signals.
CC-09 Locate LRU/subsystem critical nodes (and or test points) so they are accessible from a connector to prevent the need for
internal LRU probing or access.
CC-10 Avoid hidden cables. Visually inspecting and tracing all assembly cables rather than having hidden cables (such as
behind other cables or even LRUs) allows for a quick system and cable integrity check which aids in overall system
integrity and debug. This also implies quick access for manipulative actions.
CC-11 Orient spare wires and cable pigtails along the outer diameter or periphery of connectors to make access easier.
CC-12 Build up and assemble straight and angle connector shells or back shells in a manner that ensures that wire or cable strain
or wear is not possible.
CO-01 Design automated systems and programs with provisions to enable "stop test" and "resume" without the need to cycle back
or repeat the entire test.
CO-02 In the event of program loss or hang-up, automated systems and programs should have provisions for reverting to manual
test and operation.
CO-03 Use a test connector to provide test and maintenance bus access to all system and subsystem faults.
CO-04 Design systems and subsystems so that ATE can be used to access, read, and control internal components in concert with
the test or checkout program.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

CO-05 Avoid the need for costly adapters for signal communications between system, subsystems, line replaceable units (LRUs)
or Weapon Replaceable Assemblies (WRAs), and ATE.
CONT-01 Control rods should use Boyd or impedance type bolts (or equivalent) to eliminate the need for cotter pins or safety wire.
CONT-02 Do not use metal control cables for vehicles that will operate in salt water or salt air environments.
CONT-03 Use control rods rather than control cables for non-complex applications and non-complex routing within the vehicle.
CONT-04 Use control cables rather than control rods for most complex applications.
CONT-05 Route cables so that 100 percent of a cable will be viewable for inspection.
CONT-06 Design all pulleys and brackets associated with cable installations so they are accessible by a 75 percentile male hand.
CREW-03 In rare cases where armor is parasitic, armor should be interchangeable and easily installed.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
CREW-05 Structural instrument panels, dashboards, and control panels should be modularized for easy and adequate access to all

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

interfaces, to simplify manufacturing, and to reduce maintenance-induced problems.
EC-01 A threaded electrical connector should contain integral locking mechanisms and visual indications that the connector is
properly seated and locked.
EC-02 An electrical connector requiring less than one full turn to connect or disconnect should contain integral locking
mechanisms and visual indications that the connector is properly seated and locked.

C-70
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
2.05 Standardization and Interchangeability EC-03 A push-pull electrical connector (excluding rack-and-panel type) should contain integral locking features and visual
indication that the connector is properly seated and locked.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

EC-04 All electrical connectors should be keyed or asymmetrically shaped to ensure proper alignment.
EC-05 All electrical connectors should contain scoop-proof shells to ensure pin damage will not occur prior to engaging key
way.
EC-06 All electrical connectors should be corrosion resistant to reduce or eliminate the need for scheduled inspections or
corrosion prevention measures.
EC-07 Avoid using electrical connectors requiring any type or form of soldering.
EC-08 Locate and position electrical connectors such that all pin identification for either half can be easily seen.
EC-09 Electrical connectors selected for critical applications on ground vehicles should be both accessible and capable of being
connected disconnected by a fifty percentile gloved male hand.
EC-10 Separation between grouped electrical connectors should be sufficient to ensure make or break of any connector by a
fifty percentile gloved male hand. Where this is not possible, an alternate method should be used such as the use of stand-
offs, long-shelled connectors alternated with standard connectors, 180-degree connectors alternated with 90-degree
connectors, or innovative equivalents.
EC-11 Avoid connectors requiring potting as a method for environmental protection due to lengthy repair time and tendency for
potting compound reversion.
EC-16 Select connectors so that contacts on the "live" or "hot" side of the connection are socket type rather than pin type to
minimize personnel hazard and to prevent accidental shorting of live circuits.
EC-17 Whenever possible, use self-locking connector plugs of a type not requiring safety wire.
EC-18 All electric connectors should be environment resistant.
EC-19 Connectors containing fiber optic contacts should, whenever possible, be mounted on a vertical surface to prevent
particle and fluid contamination.
EC-20 Use quick disconnect connectors where allowed and identify all pins on each connector.
EC-21 Locate connectors far enough apart so that they meet specified requirements.
EC-22 All connectors should be keyed differently with aligning pins that extend beyond the electrical pins. Connector pins and
sockets should engage after key position is entered.
EC-23 Design connectors so that plugs are cold and receptacles are hot.
EC-24 Use electrical connectors that incorporate alignment key-ways to reduce incidents of damage due to improper
engagement.
EC-25 Use positive locking, quick disconnect electrical connectors to save man-hours, prevent foreign object damage (FOD)

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

and decrease the chance of personal injury.
EC-26 Avoid using identical electrical connectors in adjacent areas.
EG-01 Design feedback loops so that the loop can be broken during test to ensure that faults do not propagate to the point where
they cannot be isolated.
EG-02 Avoid using external feedback loops requiring complex circuitry to simulate feedback I/Os.
EG-03 In rare instances when complex external feedback loops cannot be avoided, incorporate simple interruptible control
points.
EG-04 Avoid long sequences of vectors to initialize or alter device outputs to minimize potential testability problems.
EG-05 Avoid the need to have test equipment generate complex, phased or time related signals.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
EG-06 Test points should be located on all circuit nodes that are useful in determining the module's health.

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

EG-07 Test points should be designed so that functional circuitry cannot be damaged or degraded due to the routing or accidental
shorting of a signal at a test point. Some type of test point isolation technique should be used (buffers, isolator, etc.).
EG-08 Test points should be easily accessed and clearly marked.
EG-10 Design redundant circuits to be independently testable to ensure errors are not masked.

C-71
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
2.05 Standardization and Interchangeability EG-11 To improve the probability of fault detection, avoid shorting signals together to achieve a specific test function or
condition.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

EG-12 Incorporate concept for partitioning module functions to simplify test equipment or eliminate the need for ancillary test
equipment..
EG-13 Design oscillators or clocks that are resident on the module to be replaceable by a signal from a connector to avoid the
need to synchronize ATE to on-board signals.
ENG(G)-02 Use torque-limiting bolts or torque washers as engine mount attaching hardware to eliminate the need for torque
wrenches.
ENG(G)-19 Paint engine compartments gloss white to enhance light reflectivity and enhance fluid leak detection.
ENG(G)-20 Design all firewall fittings, connectors, and penetrations to be fully viewable and directly accessible to the maintainers.
ENG-05 All engine-mounted air and fluid lines should be located next to the fan case, engine case, or full-length fan duct to
ensure quick and simple replacement of accessories and components.
ENG-09 On multi-engine air vehicles, the engines should be capable of being installed in any engine cavity without need for
reconfiguration.
ENG-10 On multi-engine air vehicles, the airframe-to-engine interfaces should be in identical positions or orientations for each
engine cavity.
ENG-23 All engine borescope provisions should be accessible with the engine installed and hooked up.
ENG-24 Replacement of all ignitors should be possible with the engine installed.
ENG-25 All engine-to-airframe plumbing, wiring, and duct interfaces should be capable of being connected or disconnected by
hand, should contain integral safety provisions, and should not require torquing.
ENG-36 All borescope mechanisms should have positive integral locking features.
ENG-37 Gravity type servicing fittings, covers, and caps should have integral locking features, openable by hand, and contain a
cable or chain to prevent loss or dropping.
ENG-40 Design of electronic engine controls should be such that no single failure of a sub-component within can result in over
speed, over temperature, stagnation, or shut-down.
F-01 Use blind fasteners only where absolutely necessary or where considerable cost can be saved.
F-02 Minimize access fasteners while making them quick release, easily removed and replaced, and captive.
F-03 Choose fasteners based on the requirement top operate by hand or with common hand tools rather than special tools.
F-04 Whenever possible, incorporate barrel type fasteners as opposed to hi-torque fasteners. Failure of Hi-torque fasteners
due to stripping are common and a source of potential foreign object damage (FOD).
FI-01 Design each FI test to be independent of all other tests.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

FI-02 Design FI initiation to be subordinate to the higher priority predecessor tests.
FI-03 Design each test so that it can be terminated prior to completion and then re-initiated at its start point.
FI-04 Design the unit tests so that they can accommodate the following subsystem response modes:
- Incorrect response
- No response
- Inconsistent response
- Unexpected condition
FI-05 Design all software so that it is structured by test priority. The test software should take advantage of both subroutine
constructs for all message outputs and of failure dictionaries which identify the location of the most likely failed

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
replaceable unit.

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

FI-06 In an airborne avionics system, consider indicating mission critical faults on a pilots "head-up" display accompanied with
an audible alarm, so that the pilot can easily check for critical system or mission threatening problems.
FI-07 Ensure that system user manuals include instructions for faults not covered by BIT such as, system will not power up or
system is being used in an incorrect environment such as, at the wrong altitude, etc.
FI-08 Interlock the high power sections of systems and subsystems with visual/audible BIT to ensure safe system activation.

C-72
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
2.05 Standardization and Interchangeability FI-09 Design BIT to first conduct self-test for circuitry integrity before conducting system test.
FI-10 Use clear text to report failures rather than alpha-numeric codes, lights, indicators, etc.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

FI-11 Locate BIT circuitry on the same level of the subsystem under test to simplify test and repair when it is removed from the
main system.
HOOK-04 Design tail hook points to be interchangeable and easily replaceable.
IN(V)-04 Design inlet doors and inlet bellmouth fairings to be fully interchangeable to eliminate the need to cut, file, or trim at the
engine face.
IN(V)-05 Locate the inlet duct edge a minimum of 60 inches from the cockpit or crew station to eliminate restricting engine
operation to canopy-closed conditions.
IN-05 Both integral and remote engine front frames should be interchangeable.
LG-21 Proximity type switches used in landing gear design should meet a minimum of 200 volt-amperes to eliminate
Electromagnetic Interference (EMI) or Radiation Hazard (RADHAD) problems. Wiring associated with the landing gear
design should meet the same requirements.
LG-23 Design strut fittings for servicing nitrogen or hydraulic fluid to be easily accessible and adjacent to the appropriate strut
pressure gage.
LG-24 Design struts so they can be serviced with clean, dry air in lieu of nitrogen during deployments without affecting the
overall reliability.
LG-38 All landing gear doors should be interchangeable.
LG-39 Gear-mounted tie-down or chain-down fittings should be interchangeable and easily replaceable.
LO-07 Flush and non-flush LO screens should be interchangeable.
MC-01 All clamps should contain torque-set or torque-limiting connections to prevent clamp or component failure due to over-
torque. Clamp installation call outs should not depend on special tools to establish the required torque values.
MC-02 Avoid the use of cotter pins, safety wire, safety clips, and similar devices to prevent maintenance-induced events leading
to ground vehicle accidents or loss of air vehicles.
MC-03 All tubing connections and interfaces should use rosan/dynatube (or equivalent) to (1) enable connect or disconnect with
one hand, one tool, (2) eliminate the need to safety the connection, (3) provide a superior seal, and (4) negate need to
reposition line(s) during component replacement.
MC-04 No trombone type, flared tube type, or piloted line type interfaces should be used to avoid the need for removal or
repositioning during equipment removal.
MC-05 Avoid potential foreign object traps during manufacturing or operational maintenance by eliminating vertical penetrations
of plumbing/fittings into tanks, compartments, or cells

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

MC-06 Locate, position, orient all plumbing and duct electrical connectors to prevent the need for sequential installation or
removal.
MC-07 Maximize areas of constant web thickness in firewalls, carry-through bulkheads, major frames, structural ribs, spars,
webs, keels, and close-outs to provide flexibility in locating penetration fittings. Stepped chem milling, stepped machining,
stepped composite layup concepts all tend to result in minimal available surface area for penetrations.
MC-08 All in-line plumbing connections within a fuel tank or cell should be capable of making/breaking the interface by hand,
require no torque, contain integral safety locking mechanisms, and should be void of any requirement for safety wire.
MC-09 All plumbing connections and fittings used for fuel systems should contain integral bonding features to eliminate the need
for bonding clamps or jumper cables.
MC-10 In rare instances where a plumbing run contains complex form or geometry that would require removal of other plumbing

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
or equipment for access, in-line connectors should be incorporated to maintain the integrity of other plumbing or
equipment.
MC-11 No subsystem plumbing, equipment, or wiring should use a tank, cell, or compartment containing liquids as a means for
routing or penetration simplicity during manufacture.
MC-12 All plumbing and connectors containing liquids should be meniscus-free.

C-73
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
2.05 Standardization and Interchangeability MC-13 In instances where plumbing or connector interfaces cannot or are not keyed for a specific orientation, all identification,
markings, cautions, and directions should be placed 360 degrees around the tube or duct.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

MC-14 Where multiple connectors are located in close proximity, ensure (1) a minimum hand tool arc of 120 degrees can be
maintained, and (2) stagger fittings to ensure firm coupling interface/hand tool interface can be accomplished without
inducing damage to adjacent lines.
MC-15 Route, orient, and position plumbing, wiring, ducts, and connectors sufficiently away from the outer surface of the vehicle
to preclude induced damage due to minor dents, drill bits during repair, etc. Minimum rule of thumb is 1" away from the
inner surface and 1" below a plate nut channel.
MG-01 Mount LRUs/sub-systems on drawer slides or extender racks to provide easier accessibility during integration, testing,
debug, and repair of Units Under Test (UUTs).
MG-02 Use a modular system design so that each subassembly is designed as a functionally complete entity. Then when a
subassembly was removed for testing, ATE will not need custom circuitry to simulate missing functions.
MG-03 Clearly mark all subsystems/LRUs to make system integration, test, debug, and repair easier.
MP-01 Avoid the use epoxies to mount parts on repairable modules because they make repair extremely difficult.
MP-02 Use a unique identification (ID) resistor incorporated in each system module to verify that the proper module is mounted
on ATE.
MP-03 Design modules so that lengthy warm-up times, special coding and air purity levels, and similar constraints are not
necessary.
P-11 Access doors and panels should be interchangeable as justified by operation and support costs or life cycle costs.
PYRO-39 Weapon bay ejectors and launchers should have the capability for total interchangeability and reconfigurability.
SABCH-02 All flush type structural screws should have identical head drives for the entire vehicle.
SABCH-03 All non-flush type structural screws should have identical head drive recesses for the entire vehicle.
SABCH-04 Special high strength bolts, such as twelve-point heads, should be fully justified from standpoint of the cost of ownership
and effectiveness.
SABCH-05 Structural design should avoid the reliance on blind fasteners unless fully supported by cost, weight, schedule, and
effectiveness analysis.
SE-01 Wheel chocks for all types of ground and airborne vehicles should contain the following features:
- Be nestable for low volume during storage or transport
- Be manufactured from corrosion-resistant materials
- Be releasable from tire pinch
- Be highly visible for day and night operations
- Be impervious to all types of fluids used to service or maintain the vehicles

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

- Be of light weight
SE-02 Wheel chocks for airborne vehicles should also contain the following features:
- Contain provisions for securing to ramp or flight decks
- Contain provisions to secure chocks at wheels
- Releasable/removable from outside of hot brake envelope
- Contain provisions to enable chock to be used as a tire blowout device
- Contain provisions to prevent skidding on snow or ice

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
C-74
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
2.05 Standardization and Interchangeability SE-03 Wheel chock design guideline discussion. Wheel chocks have historically contributed to numerous accidents and
incidents across the entire design spectrum, yet have received the least design attention of any ground handling/support

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

equipment. Directly and indirectly, poorly designed chocks have:
- Resulted in numerous "jumping the chocks" incidents due to improper use or positioning, and improper chock sizing for
the tire size/power application. Some instances result in destruction of the aircraft.
- Resulted in vehicle movement/sliding across wet, snowy and icy surfaces as a result of improper grip.
- Resulted in unwarranted tire damage and/or engine FOD.
- Resulted in tertiary damage to other vehicles or ground equipment as a result of being blown about by jet/propeller
blast.
- Damaged surfaces due to temporary placement of chocks on vehicle surfaces during vehicle movement.
- Resulted in personnel sliver/s abrasions (wooden chocks) and cuts (metal chocks) even when chocks were in decent
useable condition.
- Resulted in varied personnel ground accidents during attempts to use chocks as a temporary work stand.
- Lost aircraft "over the side" on carriers.
SIMP-01 Location and design of all exterior lights should not require protective covers in ground environments.
SIMP-02 Landing and taxi lights should be mounted on landing gear struts or doors to eliminate separate compartments, doors, and
retraction/extension mechanisms.
SIMP-03 Speed brake or speed brake cavity should contain integral mechanical locking mechanism for personnel safety.
T-05 Design single-shot (one time use) type thrusters with a minimum 6-year shelf life and a 7-year installed life.
TP-01 Locate Input/Output (I/O) test points and associated readouts in close proximity to each other so that one person can
perform testing.
TP-02 Protect test points against the environment and from induced contamination.
TP-03 Protect test points from outside signal generation.
WBAY-01 Equipment bays and compartments should not require installation of special cavity fillers when equipment is not installed.
WBAY-07 Gap seal should not degrade interchangeability of pylon.
WIND-12 Design EO windows and optics to be interchangeable among the same air vehicle types or same ground vehicle types.
2.06 Simplification A-02 Equipment bay and compartment structure should be bonded, co-cured, welded, machined, or combinations thereof to
eliminate or minimize the use of mechanical fasteners.
A-03 All equipment bay and compartment structural flanges and stiffeners should be external to the compartment to maximize
the volume available for equipment installation and arrangement.
A-04 Use stiffening beads in lieu of flanges to the maximum extent to enhance compartment volume and simplify repairs.
Stiffening beads should have the convex surface toward the compartment to eliminate fluid traps.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

A-05 Keep all machined compartment frames, webs, and closure panels to a constant thickness (e.g., not stepped or tapered) to
ease simplicity of fluid or electrical penetrations and ease and simplicity of structural repair.
A-06 Hardpoints (structural attachment and load bearing areas) within a compartment to assist in equipment mounting or
support should not be integral with the machined part. Hardpoints should be parasitic to enable quick repair in case of
wear or damage in lieu of precise ream/bush repair typical of machined hardpoints.
A-07 Paint equipment bay and compartment interiors a high gloss white to maximize lighting reflectivity, visibility, and rapid
leak detection capability.
A-08 Plumbing penetrations into a compartment should not be on a vertical axis due to difficulty in making or breaking
vertically-oriented connections. When compartment access is from the bottom, vertically-oriented connections can allow

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
fluid to leak onto the maintainer. When access is from the top, such connections can allow foreign matter to enter the

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

line. Use horizontal penetrations whenever possible.
A-09 Any heat or temperature sensitive structure within a compartment should contain heat-sensitive tape or appropriate heat
sensor for easy indication of over-temperature excursions.
A-10 Provide a sufficient number of compartment fluid drains to ensure fluid drainage for varying aircraft static attitudes and
varying terrain slopes for ground vehicles.

C-75
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
2.06 Simplification A-11 Locate compartment electrical penetrations close to the access opening for ease of sight, probing, repair, and to eliminate
fluid soaking, wicking, or contamination.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

A-12 Locate compartment electrical penetrations far enough from the access opening to prevent damage resulting from
improper (over-length) panel fasteners.
A-13 Two-sided or two-surfaced access should not be required for access to equipment interfaces and hardpoints. The term
two-sided infers top/bottom, left/right, front/back, or combinations thereof.
A-14 Do not locate nutplates or gang channels in inaccessible areas that would require extensive disassembly or equipment
removal to gain access.
A-15 Locate tie-down attachment points such that tie-down chains, straps, or cables do not prevent or restrict normal servicing,
weapon loading, or safe/arm functions.
A-16 Structural design should provide good access to corrosion-prone areas for inspection and treatment.
A-17 All structural fasteners in an access door or panel should be of identical grip and diameter. In rare cases where this is not
possible, fasteners of different grip must have different diameters to prevent a shorter fastener being substituted for the
correct, longer fastener.
A-18 Use transparent windows, quick-opening covers, or openings without any cover to permit quick visual inspections where
needed.
BIT-01 During design of the BIT, use worst-case stress analysis to ensure that any circuit failures induced by temperature
extremes, tolerance build-up, power supply variations, and combinations thereof are identified.
BIT-02 Ensure that BIT system thresholds are consistent with those across the system, subsystem, item, module, and piece-part
levels to prevent excessive numbers of Cannot Duplicate (CND) and Retest OK (RTOK) events from occurring.
BIT-03 The degree of BIT required or proposed should be based on the respective failure rates and the appropriate FMECA at
all equipment indenture levels.
BIT-04 Limit the amount of data that is recorded to a manageable size by:
- Limiting the number of signals that are monitored
- Limiting the maximum sampling rate
- Reducing the time span over which data is accumulated
- Restricting the type of data accumulated
BIT-05 Incorporate testability design features as an integral part of equipment preliminary design process.
BIT-06 Mission critical functions should be monitored by BIT.
BIT-09 Use concurrent BIT to monitor system critical functions.
BIT-11 In the area of software design and test responsibility, the responsibility for the design and development of verification

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

testing of an end item (e.g., digital filter) should reside with the same engineer(s).
BIT-12 Define stimuli and response data for each diagnostic test at the system/subsystem level. The same data should be planned
for use both in factory testing as well as in field maintenance of the equipment. These data minimize the amount of
unique software to be written.
BIT-13 Provide for manual control to test sequences, so that the test can be selected individually, and appropriate test
combinations can be executed at the operator's discretion.
BIT-14 Provide access to all BIT control and status signals at module connector pins. This will enable ATE to directly connect to
BIT circuitry.
BIT-15 Incorporate complete BIT functions and BITE on module. If only a portion of the BIT routine or BITE circuitry exists on
the module, then ATE cannot utilize the BIT routine without providing the missing BIT functions.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
BIT-16 Critical voltages should be visually monitored by sending the voltage signals to visible LEDs.
BIT-17 BIT failures should be latched on the module. This makes it easier for the system or ATE to poll the error bit at any time.
BIT-18 If many BIT routines exist on a module, then ATE should have access and the ability to control each routine individually.
BIT-19 Design BIT to have a very low false alarm rate; otherwise BIT will not be an effective maintenance tool. As a goal, the
false alarm rate should be 1% or less.

C-76
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
2.06 Simplification BIT-20 The BIT should be mechanized so that when a piece of equipment is not installed in a subsystem or the product, a failure
will not be indicated.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

BIT-21 The failure detection function should provide the equipment operator with a go/no-go indication of equipment readiness.
BIT-22 The BIT should be designed so that auxiliary test devices or external equipment are not needed for daily and other
regular checks.
BIT-23 Design BIT so it is initiated automatically upon equipment power-up.
BIT-24 Test points should be functionally grouped together and clearly labeled for convenience and ease of maintenance.
BIT-25 Equipment should not require manual probing to fault isolate.
BIT-26 Locate routinely used test points so they are accessible without removing or disassembling other equipment
BIT-27 Periodic and initiated BIT should detect at least 98% of all failures and isolate a minimum 99% of those failures detected
to a single LRU or WRA.
BIT-28 Design BIT to have the same level of EMI protection as the system or equipment being monitored.
C-01 Avoid swivel type connectors and fittings for air, fuel, or hydraulic line interfaces due to their history of low reliability.
C-02 Provide spacing between parallel plumbing runs so that in-line couplings can be replaced without removing lines or
disconnecting any line support devices.
CC-01 Use fiber-optic technologies in preference to conventional interconnect concepts to reduce the number of
interconnects/interfaces, reduce manufacturing and ownership costs, and significantly improve R&M.
CC-02 Standardize connector and wire types to improve testability and logistic support. Keep the number of "different" standard
connectors to a minimum. Use the same connector type keyed differently where possible.
CC-03 Provide clearance around connectors for engagement/disengagement of cables and proper connector orientation under
anticipated environmental conditions (e.g., bare hand of 50 percentile male in an enclosed or protected environment and
a gloved hand of a 50 percentile male in an open or unprotected environment).
CC-04 Use quick release cables and locate cables to make removal and replacement easy and to avoid having to remove one
cable to gain access to another. Provide adequate space for cables, including sleeving and tie-downs, and adequate
service loops for ease of assembly/disassembly
CC-05 Orient and space connectors to allow a sufficient grip on the connector for cable or wire extraction without fear of using
the wiring or cable for additional leverage.
CC-06 Label, and where possible color code, each wire in a harness or cable to facilitate tracking from origin to termination.
Each wire, cable, and coax-to-connector interface should be provided with a source of identification to aidin trouble
shooting, repair, or modification. Marking the cable designator on the cable along with bar codes is also recommended.
CC-07 Do not manufacture or dress connectors containing more than 25 wires or cables as a single integrated harness. Group
the wires or cables into runs of no more than 25 wires or cables each. In addition to making trouble shooting and repair

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

easier, this approach help avoid large bend radii, thereby simplifying routing, packaging, and stowage.
CC-08 Standardize connector pin assignments for power, ground, and other frequently used signals.
CC-09 Locate LRU/subsystem critical nodes (and or test points) so they are accessible from a connector to prevent the need for
internal LRU probing or access.
CC-10 Avoid hidden cables. Visually inspecting and tracing all assembly cables rather than having hidden cables (such as
behind other cables or even LRUs) allows for a quick system and cable integrity check which aids in overall system
integrity and debug. This also implies quick access for manipulative actions.
CO-01 Design automated systems and programs with provisions to enable "stop test" and "resume" without the need to cycle back
or repeat the entire test.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
CO-02 In the event of program loss or hang-up, automated systems and programs should have provisions for reverting to manual
test and operation.
CO-03 Use a test connector to provide test and maintenance bus access to all system and subsystem faults.
CO-04 Design systems and subsystems so that ATE can be used to access, read, and control internal components in concert with
the test or checkout program.

C-77
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
2.06 Simplification CO-05 Avoid the need for costly adapters for signal communications between system, subsystems, line replaceable units (LRUs)
or Weapon Replaceable Assemblies (WRAs), and ATE.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

CONT-01 Control rods should use Boyd or impedance type bolts (or equivalent) to eliminate the need for cotter pins or safety wire.
CONT-02 Do not use metal control cables for vehicles that will operate in salt water or salt air environments.
CONT-03 Use control rods rather than control cables for non-complex applications and non-complex routing within the vehicle.
CONT-04 Use control cables rather than control rods for most complex applications.
CONT-05 Route cables so that 100 percent of a cable will be viewable for inspection.
CONT-06 Design all pulleys and brackets associated with cable installations so they are accessible by a 75 percentile male hand.
CREW-03 In rare cases where armor is parasitic, armor should be interchangeable and easily installed.
CREW-10 Design cameras, recorders, and sensors to be fully interchangeable and quickly replaceable.
CREW-12 Requirements for boresighting should not be part of the design or integration.
EC-01 A threaded electrical connector should contain integral locking mechanisms and visual indications that the connector is
properly seated and locked.
EC-02 An electrical connector requiring less than one full turn to connect or disconnect should contain integral locking
mechanisms and visual indications that the connector is properly seated and locked.
EC-03 A push-pull electrical connector (excluding rack-and-panel type) should contain integral locking features and visual
indication that the connector is properly seated and locked.
EC-04 All electrical connectors should be keyed or asymmetrically shaped to ensure proper alignment.
EC-05 All electrical connectors should contain scoop-proof shells to ensure pin damage will not occur prior to engaging key
way.
EC-06 All electrical connectors should be corrosion resistant to reduce or eliminate the need for scheduled inspections or
corrosion prevention measures.
EC-07 Avoid using electrical connectors requiring any type or form of soldering.
EC-08 Locate and position electrical connectors such that all pin identification for either half can be easily seen.
EC-09 Electrical connectors selected for critical applications on ground vehicles should be both accessible and capable of being
connected disconnected by a fifty percentile gloved male hand.
EC-10 Separation between grouped electrical connectors should be sufficient to ensure make or break of any connector by a
fifty percentile gloved male hand. Where this is not possible, an alternate method should be used such as the use of stand-
offs, long-shelled connectors alternated with standard connectors, 180-degree connectors alternated with 90-degree
connectors, or innovative equivalents.
EC-11 Avoid connectors requiring potting as a method for environmental protection due to lengthy repair time and tendency for

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

potting compound reversion.
EC-12 Electrical penetrations into a compartment should not be on a vertical axis to ensure foreign matter does not enter
connector.
EC-13 Electrical, electronic, and coaxial interfaces between fixed and moveable surfaces should contain quick disconnects to
simplify replacement of the moveable surface or the electronic module.
EC-15 The removal or replacement of electronic equipment should not require the removal of any other piece of equipment or
armament.
EC-16 Select connectors so that contacts on the "live" or "hot" side of the connection are socket type rather than pin type to
minimize personnel hazard and to prevent accidental shorting of live circuits.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
EC-17 Whenever possible, use self-locking connector plugs of a type not requiring safety wire.

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

EC-18 All electric connectors should be environment resistant.
EC-19 Connectors containing fiber optic contacts should, whenever possible, be mounted on a vertical surface to prevent
particle and fluid contamination.
EC-20 Use quick disconnect connectors where allowed and identify all pins on each connector.

C-78
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
2.06 Simplification EG-01 Design feedback loops so that the loop can be broken during test to ensure that faults do not propagate to the point where
they cannot be isolated.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

EG-02 Avoid using external feedback loops requiring complex circuitry to simulate feedback I/Os.
EG-03 In rare instances when complex external feedback loops cannot be avoided, incorporate simple interruptible control
points.
EG-04 Avoid long sequences of vectors to initialize or alter device outputs to minimize potential testability problems.
EG-05 Avoid the need to have test equipment generate complex, phased or time related signals.
EG-06 Test points should be located on all circuit nodes that are useful in determining the module's health.
EG-07 Test points should be designed so that functional circuitry cannot be damaged or degraded due to the routing or accidental
shorting of a signal at a test point. Some type of test point isolation technique should be used (buffers, isolator, etc.).
EG-08 Test points should be easily accessed and clearly marked.
EG-10 Design redundant circuits to be independently testable to ensure errors are not masked.
EG-11 To improve the probability of fault detection, avoid shorting signals together to achieve a specific test function or
condition.
EG-12 Incorporate concept for partitioning module functions to simplify test equipment or eliminate the need for ancillary test
equipment..
EG-13 Design oscillators or clocks that are resident on the module to be replaceable by a signal from a connector to avoid the
need to synchronize ATE to on-board signals.
ENG(G)-02 Use torque-limiting bolts or torque washers as engine mount attaching hardware to eliminate the need for torque
wrenches.
ENG(G)-03 Design hard points for hoisting or positioning the engine during installation and removal to be integral to the engine and
capable of hoisting and supporting a fully-built-up engine package.
ENG(G)-04 Do not use downward engine removal concepts that require jacking or hoisting of the ground vehicle.
ENG(G)-05 Use concepts for removing ground vehicle engines from the front, rear, or side rather than from overhead (using
hoisting).
ENG(G)-06 The distance between the engine and firewall should ensure the access envelopes to lines, fittings, wiring, and
adjustments will accommodate the 75 percentile male hand.
ENG(G)-07 The distance between the cooling fan and radiator core should ensure that access envelopes will not require removal of
the core.
ENG(G)-08 The interface of the engine assembly to the engine compartment and structure should be designed to ensure all spark
plugs, glo-plugs, and igniters can be replaced within 30 minutes elapsed time.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

ENG(G)-10 Design attaching hardware for all mechanical engine-to-vehicle interfaces to be captive and with integral safeties.
ENG(G)-11 Use "torq-set" type clamps or equivalent in all cooling system hose interfaces to eliminate torque wrenches and the
potential for error.
ENG(G)-12 Provide a clear and viewable access envelope to fuel and oil filters.
ENG(G)-13 Locate fuel filters to ensure no safety hazard will exist due to residual fuel during filter change.
ENG(G)-14 Access envelopes to fuel and oil filters should not be in close proximity to exhaust manifolds or cooling system return
lines.
ENG(G)-15 Any single drive belt (excluding timing belts) should be capable of replacement within 30 minutes elapsed time
ENG(G)-18 Incorporate appropriate sensors to enhance the diagnostic and prognostic capabilities for the following:

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
- Oil temperature - Fuel filter bypass

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

- Oil pressure - Coolant pressure
- Oil filter bypass - Coolant level
- Oil cooler bypass valve position - Coolant temperature
- Oil level - Vibration pickups
- Oil return line particle count - Chip detector

C-79
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
2.06 Simplification ENG(G)-19 Paint engine compartments gloss white to enhance light reflectivity and enhance fluid leak detection.
ENG(G)-20 Design all firewall fittings, connectors, and penetrations to be fully viewable and directly accessible to the maintainers.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

ENG-01 All facets of engine design should take advantage of Electrostatic Engine Monitoring Systems (EEMS) and Inductive
Debris Monitoring (IDM) toward achievement of on-condition maintenance and engine health monitoring.
ENG-02 Each different component of rotating machinery should contain different tracer elements to enhance EEMS and IDM
isolation and tracking of wear.
ENG-03 Digital electronic controls, fully automatic digital electronic controls, and similar concepts should contain the highest
degree of BIT and diagnostics commensurate with affordability, operation and maintenance, and life cycle costs as
appropriate.
ENG-05 All engine-mounted air and fluid lines should be located next to the fan case, engine case, or full-length fan duct to
ensure quick and simple replacement of accessories and components.
ENG-07 Plumbing and wiring spanning two or more engine modules should contain in-line disconnects to enhance and simplify
engine modularization.
ENG-08 Use V-band clamps to mount accessories to engine-mounted gear boxes.
ENG-09 On multi-engine air vehicles, the engines should be capable of being installed in any engine cavity without need for
reconfiguration.
ENG-10 On multi-engine air vehicles, the airframe-to-engine interfaces should be in identical positions or orientations for each
engine cavity.
ENG-11 Control-by-wire or control-by-light throttling concepts should take precedence over mechanical controls.
ENG-12 All engine-mounted accessories must be capable of being removed and installed through the available airframe access
openings.
ENG-13 Engine oil systems should contain on-board spectrometric oil analysis devices located on the engine.
ENG-14 Coring of engine gear box cases and housings to provide for fuel heat sink routing should take precedence over dedicated
fuel or oil heat exchangers.
ENG-16 Aircraft jacking should not be required for engine removal.
ENG-17 Aft engine removal should be an acceptable alternative for USAF aircraft.
ENG-18 For either downward or aft engine removal, it should be possible to maintain control of the engine on all axis during the
entire removal and installation process.
ENG-19 The minimum clearance between engine and airframe should be 1 inch, including removal and installation.
ENG-20 Do not locate equipment or components in the engine cavity except for those components associated with the engine or
engine installation.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

ENG-21 Do not locate equipment or components in the engine bay cavity in a manner that would require removal or repositioning
for engine removal.
ENG-23 All engine borescope provisions should be accessible with the engine installed and hooked up.
ENG-27 No rigging or calibration should be required following engine replacement.
ENG-28 No engine operational start and checkout should be required following engine replacement.
ENG-29 No functional check flight should be required following engine change. On twin engine aircraft where both engines were
changed simultaneously, a functional test flight is permissible.
ENG-30 It should not be necessary to close or reinstall engine access doors for engine ground operation up to and including
military power.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
ENG-31 No rigging or calibration should be required subsequent to replacement of any engine-mounted component.

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

ENG-32 Design the engine fuel controls and electronic controllers so that no manual fuel grade adjustments are required.
ENG-36 All borescope mechanisms should have positive integral locking features.
ENG-37 Gravity type servicing fittings, covers, and caps should have integral locking features, openable by hand, and contain a
cable or chain to prevent loss or dropping.

C-80
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
2.06 Simplification ENG-38 The characteristics of engine-to-vehicle interfaces coupled with the capabilities of electronic engine controls, should
negate the necessity for making any type of engine rigging including maximum power, idle, and idle cut-off.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

ENG-39 Engine-to-vehicle plumbing quick disconnects should contain positive visual indication that the interface is fully seated
and locked.
ENG-40 Design of electronic engine controls should be such that no single failure of a sub-component within can result in over
speed, over temperature, stagnation, or shut-down.
ENG-42 Attach engine-to-inlet duct interface seals to the vehicle so they can be left in place during engine removal.
ENG-43 Design engine-to-inlet duct seal so the interface is automatic during engine installation without needing any form of
alignment, adjustment, or mechanical attachment interface.
ENG-44 Select engine-to-inlet duct seal material to ensure seal life is sufficient for the life of the vehicle.
ENG-45 Provide remote servicing points accessible from the ground to service engine accessories mounted on top of the engine
(e.g., oil tanks, gear boxes, generators, etc.) to eliminate climbing upon or atop the host vehicle.
ENG-49 Design engine fuel and oil filters with integral locking features so they can be installed and removed by hand, and require
no torquing.
ENG-50 Design engine fuel and oil filter delta pressure indicators so they can be reset only from within the filter housing.
ENG-51 Provide engine fuel and oil filters with anti-surge protection to ensure false delta pressure indications do not occur.
ENG-53 Design magnetic chip detectors to ensure that oil shut-off will occur as the detector is being removed for visual
inspection.
ENG-54 Incorporate provisions for fuzz burn-off. in magnetic chip detectors.
ENV-01 Materials, treatments, coatings, finishes should be compatible with all anti-ice and de-ice fluids, chemical and biological
decontamination fluids, washing and cleaning fluids, and all vehicle subsystem fluids.
ENV-02 There should be no top coat or treatment deterioration throughout the standard temperature and humidity spectrum.
ENV-06 For ground vehicles, the finishes should be compatible with and durable against all rain, hail, sleet, snow, and ice
conditions experienced in all intended operational environments.
ENV-07 The finishes and surfaces should be capable of low velocity impact (LVI) of 10 foot-pounds with no visual or detectable
damage with a design goal of 30 foot-pounds.
F-01 Use blind fasteners only where absolutely necessary or where considerable cost can be saved.
F-02 Minimize access fasteners while making them quick release, easily removed and replaced, and captive.
F-03 Choose fasteners based on the requirement top operate by hand or with common hand tools rather than special tools.
F-04 Whenever possible, incorporate barrel type fasteners as opposed to hi-torque fasteners. Failure of Hi-torque fasteners
due to stripping are common and a source of potential foreign object damage (FOD).

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

FI-01 Design each FI test to be independent of all other tests.
FI-02 Design FI initiation to be subordinate to the higher priority predecessor tests.
FI-03 Design each test so that it can be terminated prior to completion and then re-initiated at its start point.
FI-04 Design the unit tests so that they can accommodate the following subsystem response modes:
- Incorrect response
- No response
- Inconsistent response
- Unexpected condition
FI-05 Design all software so that it is structured by test priority. The test software should take advantage of both subroutine

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
constructs for all message outputs and of failure dictionaries which identify the location of the most likely failed

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

replaceable unit.
FI-06 In an airborne avionics system, consider indicating mission critical faults on a pilots "head-up" display accompanied with
an audible alarm, so that the pilot can easily check for critical system or mission threatening problems.
FI-07 Ensure that system user manuals include instructions for faults not covered by BIT such as, system will not power up or
system is being used in an incorrect environment such as, at the wrong altitude, etc.

C-81
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
2.06 Simplification FI-08 Interlock the high power sections of systems and subsystems with visual/audible BIT to ensure safe system activation.
FI-09 Design BIT to first conduct self-test for circuitry integrity before conducting system test.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

FI-10 Use clear text to report failures rather than alpha-numeric codes, lights, indicators, etc.
FI-11 Locate BIT circuitry on the same level of the subsystem under test to simplify test and repair when it is removed from the
main system.
HOOK-05 Design tail hook points so they can not be incorrectly installed.
HOOK-06 Avoid the need to remove the tail hook to facilitate engine access or removal.
HYD-06 Mount hydraulic pumps to the gear box flange with v-band clamps containing a torq-set or equivalent fastener.
HYD-07 Modularize electric-driven hydraulic pumps to enable replacement of the drive motor without interruption of the fluid
lines.
HYD-08 Design hydraulic pumps and motors with tracer elements to detect wear through on-board spectrometric oil analysis
devices.
HYD-11 Design flexible hose with molded-in color bands to clearly indicate when the maximum wear/abrasion has been reached.
IN(V)-01 Design inlet door actuators and door actuation mechanisms so they not protrude into the air inlet flow field to eliminate
FOD potential.
IN(V)-06 Use captive fasteners on all access doors forward of the inlet to significantly reduce engine FOD potential.
IN(V)-07 Ensure that no ground safety pins or streamers are used forward of the inlet or within a 3-foot radius aft of the inlet.
IN(V)-08 Incorporate an inlet closure door sealing concept that prevents entry of fluid, dust, or sand across the entire airborne and
ground environment spectrum.
IN-01 Low Observable (LO) engine face frames should be within 10 inches of the first stage fan or compressor blades.
IN-02 Openings throughout the engine face frame should be sufficient to perform a 100% FOD inspection of the engine face.
IN-03 Openings throughout the engine face frame should be sufficient to permit minor blending or repair of FOD without
removing the engine.
IN-04 For frames not integral with the engine, frame removal should be achievable from the engine cavity.
IN-05 Both integral and remote engine front frames should be interchangeable.
IN-06 Front frame anti-ice and de-ice provisions should give preference to engine hot bleed air.
LG-12 All struts should contain a spare strut lower seal stowed in the strut collar to avoid removing the lower strut for leak
repair.
LG-15 No portion of the landing gear closure door(s) should be attached to the strut. In rare instances where this may not be
possible, that attached portion should not require alignment or rigging.
LG-16 No portion of the landing gear rigging process should require support equipment type templates, gauges, or tools. Indexes,

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

reference points, etc., should be an integral part of the landing gear/airframe design.
LG-17 Hydraulic, pneumatic, or electrical actuators associated with landing gear systems should not require adjustment or
rigging once installed in the air vehicle. Spare units should be rigged at the time of manufacture or overhaul.
LG-18 Landing gear ground safety down locks should be an integral part of the overall design. Use or reliance on loose pins
(support equipment) should be avoided.
LG-19 When deemed necessary for the respective design, pilots, flight crews, or operators should have an indication of the
downlock status in the cockpit or crew station to avoid the necessity of a flight abort.
LG-20 Special locks and pins used solely for landing gear ground maintenance safety should be used only in those cases
substantiated by cost effectiveness analysis.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
LG-23 Design strut fittings for servicing nitrogen or hydraulic fluid to be easily accessible and adjacent to the appropriate strut

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

pressure gage.
LG-24 Design struts so they can be serviced with clean, dry air in lieu of nitrogen during deployments without affecting the
overall reliability.
LG-26 Gravitational emergency extension of landing gear should be given preference over all other concepts.
MATL-06 Repair criteria, repairs, and instructions should not be classified.

C-82
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
2.06 Simplification MC-01 All clamps should contain torque-set or torque-limiting connections to prevent clamp or component failure due to over-
torque. Clamp installation call outs should not depend on special tools to establish the required torque values.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

MC-02 Avoid the use of cotter pins, safety wire, safety clips, and similar devices to prevent maintenance-induced events leading
to ground vehicle accidents or loss of air vehicles.
MC-03 All tubing connections and interfaces should use rosan/dynatube (or equivalent) to (1) enable connect or disconnect with
one hand, one tool, (2) eliminate the need to safety the connection, (3) provide a superior seal, and (4) negate need to
reposition line(s) during component replacement.
MC-04 No trombone type, flared tube type, or piloted line type interfaces should be used to avoid the need for removal or
repositioning during equipment removal.
MC-05 Avoid potential foreign object traps during manufacturing or operational maintenance by eliminating vertical penetrations
of plumbing/fittings into tanks, compartments, or cells
MC-06 Locate, position, orient all plumbing and duct electrical connectors to prevent the need for sequential installation or
removal.
MC-07 Maximize areas of constant web thickness in firewalls, carry-through bulkheads, major frames, structural ribs, spars,
webs, keels, and close-outs to provide flexibility in locating penetration fittings. Stepped chem milling, stepped machining,
stepped composite layup concepts all tend to result in minimal available surface area for penetrations.
MC-08 All in-line plumbing connections within a fuel tank or cell should be capable of making/breaking the interface by hand,
require no torque, contain integral safety locking mechanisms, and should be void of any requirement for safety wire.
MC-09 All plumbing connections and fittings used for fuel systems should contain integral bonding features to eliminate the need
for bonding clamps or jumper cables.
MC-10 In rare instances where a plumbing run contains complex form or geometry that would require removal of other plumbing
or equipment for access, in-line connectors should be incorporated to maintain the integrity of other plumbing or
equipment.
MC-11 No subsystem plumbing, equipment, or wiring should use a tank, cell, or compartment containing liquids as a means for
routing or penetration simplicity during manufacture.
MC-12 All plumbing and connectors containing liquids should be meniscus-free.
MC-13 In instances where plumbing or connector interfaces cannot or are not keyed for a specific orientation, all identification,
markings, cautions, and directions should be placed 360 degrees around the tube or duct.
MC-14 Where multiple connectors are located in close proximity, ensure (1) a minimum hand tool arc of 120 degrees can be
maintained, and (2) stagger fittings to ensure firm coupling interface/hand tool interface can be accomplished without
inducing damage to adjacent lines.
MC-15 Route, orient, and position plumbing, wiring, ducts, and connectors sufficiently away from the outer surface of the vehicle

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

to preclude induced damage due to minor dents, drill bits during repair, etc. Minimum rule of thumb is 1" away from the
inner surface and 1" below a plate nut channel.
MG-03 Clearly mark all subsystems/LRUs to make system integration, test, debug, and repair easier.
MP-01 Avoid the use epoxies to mount parts on repairable modules because they make repair extremely difficult.
MP-02 Use a unique identification (ID) resistor incorporated in each system module to verify that the proper module is mounted
on ATE.
MP-03 Design modules so that lengthy warm-up times, special coding and air purity levels, and similar constraints are not
necessary.
PYRO-01 Provide the "safe/arm" status to the pilot, crew, or gunner in the cockpit, crew station, or operator station as appropriate.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
PYRO-02 Provide the "safe/arm" status as an external cue discernible from a distance of 10-20 feet.

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

PYRO-42 In weapons carriage design and integration, avoid dependence of on-board high pressure nitrogen.
R-01 Large radomes wherein the combination of the diameter and length exceeds 60" should be top-hinged. Hinge should be
load-carrying to reduce radome retention fastener count.
R-02 Radome and radar array support structure design and material selection should eliminate the need for LO type fillers or
shrouds.

C-83
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
2.06 Simplification SEAT-04 Design ejection seats so they can be replaced with canopy or escape hatch installed.
SEAT-06 Do not use seat removal as a means of access.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

SIMP-01 Location and design of all exterior lights should not require protective covers in ground environments.
SIMP-02 Landing and taxi lights should be mounted on landing gear struts or doors to eliminate separate compartments, doors, and
retraction/extension mechanisms.
SIMP-03 Speed brake or speed brake cavity should contain integral mechanical locking mechanism for personnel safety.
TP-01 Locate Input/Output (I/O) test points and associated readouts in close proximity to each other so that one person can
perform testing.
TP-02 Protect test points against the environment and from induced contamination.
TP-03 Protect test points from outside signal generation.
W-01 Hat section type structural stiffeners with sufficient cross sectional area should be considered as a routing tunnel for
wiring and coax.
WBAY-01 Equipment bays and compartments should not require installation of special cavity fillers when equipment is not installed.
WBAY-21 Coatings and finishes in the area of gun barrels should be durable to withstand the effect of exiting projectile shockwaves.
WBAY-22 The proximity of the gun blast deflector to structure should not require reliance on high-temperature paints or coatings to
protect the structure.
2.07 Modularization BIT-05 Incorporate testability design features as an integral part of equipment preliminary design process.
BIT-14 Provide access to all BIT control and status signals at module connector pins. This will enable ATE to directly connect to
BIT circuitry.
BIT-15 Incorporate complete BIT functions and BITE on module. If only a portion of the BIT routine or BITE circuitry exists on
the module, then ATE cannot utilize the BIT routine without providing the missing BIT functions.
BIT-21 The failure detection function should provide the equipment operator with a go/no-go indication of equipment readiness.
BIT-22 The BIT should be designed so that auxiliary test devices or external equipment are not needed for daily and other
regular checks.
BIT-23 Design BIT so it is initiated automatically upon equipment power-up.
BIT-24 Test points should be functionally grouped together and clearly labeled for convenience and ease of maintenance.
BIT-25 Equipment should not require manual probing to fault isolate.
BIT-26 Locate routinely used test points so they are accessible without removing or disassembling other equipment
BIT-27 Periodic and initiated BIT should detect at least 98% of all failures and isolate a minimum 99% of those failures detected
to a single LRU or WRA.
BIT-28 Design BIT to have the same level of EMI protection as the system or equipment being monitored.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

CREW-05 Structural instrument panels, dashboards, and control panels should be modularized for easy and adequate access to all
interfaces, to simplify manufacturing, and to reduce maintenance-induced problems.
CREW-06 Film magazines, tapes, and removable modules should permit considerable handling without reliance on special support
equipment protection.
EG-01 Design feedback loops so that the loop can be broken during test to ensure that faults do not propagate to the point where
they cannot be isolated.
EG-02 Avoid using external feedback loops requiring complex circuitry to simulate feedback I/Os.
EG-03 In rare instances when complex external feedback loops cannot be avoided, incorporate simple interruptible control

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
points.

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

EG-04 Avoid long sequences of vectors to initialize or alter device outputs to minimize potential testability problems.
EG-05 Avoid the need to have test equipment generate complex, phased or time related signals.
EG-06 Test points should be located on all circuit nodes that are useful in determining the module's health.
EG-07 Test points should be designed so that functional circuitry cannot be damaged or degraded due to the routing or accidental
shorting of a signal at a test point. Some type of test point isolation technique should be used (buffers, isolator, etc.).

C-84
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
2.07 Modularization EG-08 Test points should be easily accessed and clearly marked.
EG-10 Design redundant circuits to be independently testable to ensure errors are not masked.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

EG-11 To improve the probability of fault detection, avoid shorting signals together to achieve a specific test function or
condition.
EG-12 Incorporate concept for partitioning module functions to simplify test equipment or eliminate the need for ancillary test
equipment.
EG-13 Design oscillators or clocks that are resident on the module to be replaceable by a signal from a connector to avoid the
need to synchronize ATE to on-board signals.
ENG-02 Each different component of rotating machinery should contain different tracer elements to enhance EEMS and IDM
isolation and tracking of wear.
FI-01 Design each FI test to be independent of all other tests.
FI-03 Design each test so that it can be terminated prior to completion and then re-initiated at its start point.
FI-04 Design the unit tests so that they can accommodate the following subsystem response modes:
- Incorrect response
- No response
- Inconsistent response
- Unexpected condition
FI-05 Design all software so that it is structured by test priority. The test software should take advantage of both subroutine
constructs for all message outputs and of failure dictionaries which identify the location of the most likely failed
replaceable unit.
FI-06 In an airborne avionics system, consider indicating mission critical faults on a pilots "head-up" display accompanied with
an audible alarm, so that the pilot can easily check for critical system or mission threatening problems.
FI-07 Ensure that system user manuals include instructions for faults not covered by BIT such as, system will not power up or
system is being used in an incorrect environment such as, at the wrong altitude, etc.
FI-08 Interlock the high power sections of systems and subsystems with visual/audible BIT to ensure safe system activation.
FI-09 Design BIT to first conduct self-test for circuitry integrity before conducting system test.
FI-10 Use clear text to report failures rather than alpha-numeric codes, lights, indicators, etc.
FI-11 Locate BIT circuitry on the same level of the subsystem under test to simplify test and repair when it is removed from the
main system.
HYD-07 Modularize electric-driven hydraulic pumps to enable replacement of the drive motor without interruption of the fluid
lines.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

MC-02 Avoid the use of cotter pins, safety wire, safety clips, and similar devices to prevent maintenance-induced events leading
to ground vehicle accidents or loss of air vehicles.
MC-09 All plumbing connections and fittings used for fuel systems should contain integral bonding features to eliminate the need
for bonding clamps or jumper cables.
MG-01 Mount LRUs/sub-systems on drawer slides or extender racks to provide easier accessibility during integration, testing,
debug, and repair of Units Under Test (UUTs).
MG-02 Use a modular system design so that each subassembly is designed as a functionally complete entity. Then when a
subassembly was removed for testing, ATE will not need custom circuitry to simulate missing functions.
MG-03 Clearly mark all subsystems/LRUs to make system integration, test, debug, and repair easier.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
MP-01 Avoid the use epoxies to mount parts on repairable modules because they make repair extremely difficult.
MP-02 Use a unique identification (ID) resistor incorporated in each system module to verify that the proper module is mounted
on ATE.
MP-03 Design modules so that lengthy warm-up times, special coding and air purity levels, and similar constraints are not
necessary.

C-85
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
2.07 Modularization TP-01 Locate Input/Output (I/O) test points and associated readouts in close proximity to each other so that one person can
perform testing.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

TP-02 Protect test points against the environment and from induced contamination.
TP-03 Protect test points from outside signal generation.
2.08 Testability and Diagnostic Techniques BIT-01 During design of the BIT, use worst-case stress analysis to ensure that any circuit failures induced by temperature
extremes, tolerance build-up, power supply variations, and combinations thereof are identified
BIT-02 Ensure that BIT system thresholds are consistent with those across the system, subsystem, item, module, and piece-part
levels to prevent excessive numbers of Cannot Duplicate (CND) and Retest OK (RTOK) events from occurring.
BIT-03 The degree of BIT required or proposed should be based on the respective failure rates and the appropriate FMECA at
all equipment indenture levels.
BIT-04 Limit the amount of data that is recorded to a manageable size by:
- Limiting the number of signals that are monitored
- Limiting the maximum sampling rate
- Reducing the time span over which data is accumulated
- Restricting the type of data accumulated
BIT-05 Incorporate testability design features as an integral part of equipment preliminary design process.
BIT-06 Mission critical functions should be monitored by BIT.
BIT-07 Set BIT tolerances to maximize fault detection and minimize false alarm rate in the expected operating environment.
BIT-08 Design BIT fault detectors to accommodate the needs of operator maintenance personnel.
BIT-09 Use concurrent BIT to monitor system critical functions.
BIT-10 Design the BIT and BITE so that no fault or failure within the BIT or BITE will degrade, disrupt, or fail the system being
monitored.
BIT-11 In the area of software design and test responsibility, the responsibility for the design and development of verification
testing of an end item (e.g., digital filter) should reside with the same engineer(s).
BIT-12 Define stimuli and response data for each diagnostic test at the system/subsystem level. The same data should be planned
for use both in factory testing as well as in field maintenance of the equipment. These data minimize the amount of
unique software to be written.
BIT-13 Provide for manual control to test sequences, so that the test can be selected individually, and appropriate test
combinations can be executed at the operator's discretion.
BIT-14 Provide access to all BIT control and status signals at module connector pins. This will enable ATE to directly connect to
BIT circuitry.
BIT-15 Incorporate complete BIT functions and BITE on module. If only a portion of the BIT routine or BITE circuitry exists on

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

the module, then ATE cannot utilize the BIT routine without providing the missing BIT functions.
BIT-16 Critical voltages should be visually monitored by sending the voltage signals to visible LEDs.
BIT-17 BIT failures should be latched on the module. This makes it easier for the system or ATE to poll the error bit at any time.
BIT-18 If many BIT routines exist on a module, then ATE should have access and the ability to control each routine individually.
BIT-19 Design BIT to have a very low false alarm rate; otherwise BIT will not be an effective maintenance tool. As a goal, the
false alarm rate should be 1% or less.
BIT-20 The BIT should be mechanized so that when a piece of equipment is not installed in a subsystem or the product, a failure
will not be indicated.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
BIT-21 The failure detection function should provide the equipment operator with a go/no-go indication of equipment readiness.

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

BIT-22 The BIT should be designed so that auxiliary test devices or external equipment are not needed for daily and other
regular checks.
BIT-23 Design BIT so it is initiated automatically upon equipment power-up.
BIT-24 Test points should be functionally grouped together and clearly labeled for convenience and ease of maintenance.
BIT-25 Equipment should not require manual probing to fault isolate.

C-86
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
2.08 Testability and Diagnostic Techniques BIT-26 Locate routinely used test points so they are accessible without removing or disassembling other equipment
BIT-27 Periodic and initiated BIT should detect at least 98% of all failures and isolate a minimum 99% of those failures detected

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

to a single LRU or WRA.
BIT-28 Design BIT to have the same level of EMI protection as the system or equipment being monitored.
BIT/BITE-01 Design to keep false alarm rates below 1%. Higher false alarm rates can limit the effectiveness of BIT as a maintenance
tool.
BIT/BITE-02 Design EMI protection to eliminate finger type EMI contact devices.
CO-01 Design automated systems and programs with provisions to enable "stop test" and "resume" without the need to cycle back
or repeat the entire test.
CO-02 In the event of program loss or hang-up, automated systems and programs should have provisions for reverting to manual
test and operation.
CO-03 Use a test connector to provide test and maintenance bus access to all system and subsystem faults.
CO-04 Design systems and subsystems so that ATE can be used to access, read, and control internal components in concert with
the test or checkout program.
CO-05 Avoid the need for costly adapters for signal communications between system, subsystems, line replaceable units (LRUs)
or Weapon Replaceable Assemblies (WRAs), and ATE.
EG-01 Design feedback loops so that the loop can be broken during test to ensure that faults do not propagate to the point where
they cannot be isolated.
EG-02 Avoid using external feedback loops requiring complex circuitry to simulate feedback I/Os.
EG-03 In rare instances when complex external feedback loops cannot be avoided, incorporate simple interruptible control
points.
EG-04 Avoid long sequences of vectors to initialize or alter device outputs to minimize potential testability problems.
EG-05 Avoid the need to have test equipment generate complex, phased or time related signals.
EG-06 Test points should be located on all circuit nodes that are useful in determining the module's health.
EG-07 Test points should be designed so that functional circuitry cannot be damaged or degraded due to the routing or accidental
shorting of a signal at a test point. Some type of test point isolation technique should be used (buffers, isolator, etc.).
EG-08 Test points should be easily accessed and clearly marked.
EG-10 Design redundant circuits to be independently testable to ensure errors are not masked.
EG-11 To improve the probability of fault detection, avoid shorting signals together to achieve a specific test function or
condition.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

EG-12 Incorporate concept for partitioning module functions to simplify test equipment or eliminate the need for ancillary test
equipment..
EG-13 Design oscillators or clocks that are resident on the module to be replaceable by a signal from a connector to avoid the
need to synchronize ATE to on-board signals.
ENG(G)-18 Incorporate appropriate sensors to enhance the diagnostic and prognostic capabilities for the following:
- Oil temperature - Fuel filter bypass
- Oil pressure - Coolant pressure
- Oil filter bypass - Coolant level
- Oil cooler bypass valve position - Coolant temperature

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
- Oil level - Vibration pickups

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

- Oil return line particle count - Chip detector
ENG-01 All facets of engine design should take advantage of Electrostatic Engine Monitoring Systems (EEMS) and Inductive
Debris Monitoring (IDM) toward achievement of on-condition maintenance and engine health monitoring.
ENG-02 Each different component of rotating machinery should contain different tracer elements to enhance EEMS and IDM
isolation and tracking of wear.

C-87
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
2.08 Testability and Diagnostic Techniques ENG-03 Digital electronic controls, fully automatic digital electronic controls, and similar concepts should contain the highest
degree of BIT and diagnostics commensurate with affordability, operation and maintenance, and life cycle costs as

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

appropriate.
ENG-36 All borescope mechanisms should have positive integral locking features.
ENG-37 Gravity type servicing fittings, covers, and caps should have integral locking features, openable by hand, and contain a
cable or chain to prevent loss or dropping.
ENG-40 Design of electronic engine controls should be such that no single failure of a sub-component within can result in over
speed, over temperature, stagnation, or shut-down.
FI-01 Design each FI test to be independent of all other tests.
FI-02 Design FI initiation to be subordinate to the higher priority predecessor tests.
FI-03 Design each test so that it can be terminated prior to completion and then re-initiated at its start point.
FI-04 Design the unit tests so that they can accommodate the following subsystem response modes:
- Incorrect response
- No response
- Inconsistent response
- Unexpected condition
FI-05 Design all software so that it is structured by test priority. The test software should take advantage of both subroutine
constructs for all message outputs and of failure dictionaries which identify the location of the most likely failed
replaceable unit.
FI-06 In an airborne avionics system, consider indicating mission critical faults on a pilots "head-up" display accompanied with
an audible alarm, so that the pilot can easily check for critical system or mission threatening problems.
FI-07 Ensure that system user manuals include instructions for faults not covered by BIT such as, system will not power up or
system is being used in an incorrect environment such as, at the wrong altitude, etc.
FI-08 Interlock the high power sections of systems and subsystems with visual/audible BIT to ensure safe system activation.
FI-09 Design BIT to first conduct self-test for circuitry integrity before conducting system test.
FI-10 Use clear text to report failures rather than alpha-numeric codes, lights, indicators, etc.
FI-11 Locate BIT circuitry on the same level of the subsystem under test to simplify test and repair when it is removed from the
main system.
HYD-08 Design hydraulic pumps and motors with tracer elements to detect wear through on-board spectrometric oil analysis
devices.
OXY-11 System operational and service condition status should be capable of being downlinked to centralized maintenance

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

facilities.
PYRO-15 Pylon-to-weapon and pylon-to-air vehicle electrical interfaces should contain built-in test/fault location capabilities.
TCR-08 Incorporate vibration pick-up sensors to isolate the respective unit from other potential sources of vibration, and to
enhance the prognostic potential for monitoring equipment health.
TP-01 Locate Input/Output (I/O) test points and associated readouts in close proximity to each other so that one person can
perform testing.
TP-02 Protect test points against the environment and from induced contamination.
TP-03 Protect test points from outside signal generation.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
WT&B-07 Landing gear caution and warning systems should contain both initiated and periodic BIT and be capable of fault-isolating

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

to each component in the system.
WT&B-15 Anti-skid and anti-lock brake systems should contain periodic and initiated BIT. All components, including speed sensors,
comparators, wiring, connectors, control boxes, etc., should be included in the BIT system.
2.08.01 System Testability Design BIT-01 During design of the BIT, use worst-case stress analysis to ensure that any circuit failures induced by temperature
extremes, tolerance build-up, power supply variations, and combinations thereof are identified.

C-88
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
2.08.01 System Testability Design BIT-02 Ensure that BIT system thresholds are consistent with those across the system, subsystem, item, module, and piece-part
levels to prevent excessive numbers of Cannot Duplicate (CND) and Retest OK (RTOK) events from occurring.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

BIT-03 The degree of BIT required or proposed should be based on the respective failure rates and the appropriate FMECA at
all equipment indenture levels.
BIT-04 Limit the amount of data that is recorded to a manageable size by:
- Limiting the number of signals that are monitored
- Limiting the maximum sampling rate
- Reducing the time span over which data is accumulated
- Restricting the type of data accumulated
BIT-05 Incorporate testability design features as an integral part of equipment preliminary design process.
BIT-06 Mission critical functions should be monitored by BIT.
BIT-07 Set BIT tolerances to maximize fault detection and minimize false alarm rate in the expected operating environment.
BIT-08 Design BIT fault detectors to accommodate the needs of operator maintenance personnel.
BIT-09 Use concurrent BIT to monitor system critical functions.
BIT-10 Design the BIT and BITE so that no fault or failure within the BIT or BITE will degrade, disrupt, or fail the system being
monitored.
BIT-11 In the area of software design and test responsibility, the responsibility for the design and development of verification
testing of an end item (e.g., digital filter) should reside with the same engineer(s).
BIT-12 Define stimuli and response data for each diagnostic test at the system/subsystem level. The same data should be planned
for use both in factory testing as well as in field maintenance of the equipment. These data minimize the amount of
unique software to be written.
BIT-13 Provide for manual control to test sequences, so that the test can be selected individually, and appropriate test
combinations can be executed at the operator's discretion.
BIT-14 Provide access to all BIT control and status signals at module connector pins. This will enable ATE to directly connect to
BIT circuitry.
BIT-15 Incorporate complete BIT functions and BITE on module. If only a portion of the BIT routine or BITE circuitry exists on
the module, then ATE cannot utilize the BIT routine without providing the missing BIT functions.
BIT-16 Critical voltages should be visually monitored by sending the voltage signals to visible LEDs.
BIT-17 BIT failures should be latched on the module. This makes it easier for the system or ATE to poll the error bit at any time.
BIT-18 If many BIT routines exist on a module, then ATE should have access and the ability to control each routine individually.
BIT-19 Design BIT to have a very low false alarm rate; otherwise BIT will not be an effective maintenance tool. As a goal, the
false alarm rate should be 1% or less.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

BIT-21 The failure detection function should provide the equipment operator with a go/no-go indication of equipment readiness.
BIT-22 The BIT should be designed so that auxiliary test devices or external equipment are not needed for daily and other
regular checks.
BIT-23 Design BIT so it is initiated automatically upon equipment power-up.
BIT-24 Test points should be functionally grouped together and clearly labeled for convenience and ease of maintenance.
BIT-25 Equipment should not require manual probing to fault isolate.
BIT-26 Locate routinely used test points so they are accessible without removing or disassembling other equipment
BIT-27 Periodic and initiated BIT should detect at least 98% of all failures and isolate a minimum 99% of those failures detected

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
to a single LRU or WRA.

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

BIT-28 Design BIT to have the same level of EMI protection as the system or equipment being monitored.
BIT/BITE-01 Design to keep false alarm rates below 1%. Higher false alarm rates can limit the effectiveness of BIT as a maintenance
tool.
BIT/BITE-02 Design EMI protection to eliminate finger type EMI contact devices.
CC-11 Orient spare wires and cable pigtails along the outer diameter or periphery of connectors to make access easier.

C-89
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
2.08.01 System Testability Design CC-12 Build up and assemble straight and angle connector shells or back shells in a manner that ensures that wire or cable strain
or wear is not possible.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

CO-01 Design automated systems and programs with provisions to enable "stop test" and "resume" without the need to cycle back
or repeat the entire test.
CO-02 In the event of program loss or hang-up, automated systems and programs should have provisions for reverting to manual
test and operation.
CO-03 Use a test connector to provide test and maintenance bus access to all system and subsystem faults.
CO-04 Design systems and subsystems so that ATE can be used to access, read, and control internal components in concert with
the test or checkout program.
CO-05 Avoid the need for costly adapters for signal communications between system, subsystems, line replaceable units (LRUs)
or Weapon Replaceable Assemblies (WRAs), and ATE.
EG-01 Design feedback loops so that the loop can be broken during test to ensure that faults do not propagate to the point where
they cannot be isolated.
EG-02 Avoid using external feedback loops requiring complex circuitry to simulate feedback I/Os.
EG-03 In rare instances when complex external feedback loops cannot be avoided, incorporate simple interruptible control
points.
EG-04 Avoid long sequences of vectors to initialize or alter device outputs to minimize potential testability problems.
EG-05 Avoid the need to have test equipment generate complex, phased or time related signals.
EG-06 Test points should be located on all circuit nodes that are useful in determining the module's health.
EG-07 Test points should be designed so that functional circuitry cannot be damaged or degraded due to the routing or accidental
shorting of a signal at a test point. Some type of test point isolation technique should be used (buffers, isolator, etc.).
EG-08 Test points should be easily accessed and clearly marked.
EG-10 Design redundant circuits to be independently testable to ensure errors are not masked.
EG-11 To improve the probability of fault detection, avoid shorting signals together to achieve a specific test function or
condition.
EG-12 Incorporate concept for partitioning module functions to simplify test equipment or eliminate the need for ancillary test
equipment..
EG-13 Design oscillators or clocks that are resident on the module to be replaceable by a signal from a connector to avoid the
need to synchronize ATE to on-board signals.
ENG(G)-18 Incorporate appropriate sensors to enhance the diagnostic and prognostic capabilities for the following:
- Oil temperature - Fuel filter bypass
- Oil pressure - Coolant pressure

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

- Oil filter bypass - Coolant level
- Oil cooler bypass valve position - Coolant temperature
- Oil level - Vibration pickups
- Oil return line particle count - Chip detector
ENG-01 All facets of engine design should take advantage of Electrostatic Engine Monitoring Systems (EEMS) and Inductive
Debris Monitoring (IDM) toward achievement of on-condition maintenance and engine health monitoring.
ENG-02 Each different component of rotating machinery should contain different tracer elements to enhance EEMS and IDM
isolation and tracking of wear.
ENG-03 Digital electronic controls, fully automatic digital electronic controls, and similar concepts should contain the highest

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
degree of BIT and diagnostics commensurate with affordability, operation and maintenance, and life cycle costs as

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

appropriate.
ENG-36 All borescope mechanisms should have positive integral locking features.
ENG-38 The characteristics of engine-to-vehicle interfaces coupled with the capabilities of electronic engine controls, should
negate the necessity for making any type of engine rigging including maximum power, idle, and idle cut-off.
FI-01 Design each FI test to be independent of all other tests.

C-90
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
2.08.01 System Testability Design FI-02 Design FI initiation to be subordinate to the higher priority predecessor tests.
FI-03 Design each test so that it can be terminated prior to completion and then re-initiated at its start point.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

FI-04 Design the unit tests so that they can accommodate the following subsystem response modes:
- Incorrect response
- No response
- Inconsistent response
- Unexpected condition
FI-05 Design all software so that it is structured by test priority. The test software should take advantage of both subroutine
constructs for all message outputs and of failure dictionaries which identify the location of the most likely failed
replaceable unit.
FI-06 In an airborne avionics system, consider indicating mission critical faults on a pilots "head-up" display accompanied with
an audible alarm, so that the pilot can easily check for critical system or mission threatening problems.
FI-07 Ensure that system user manuals include instructions for faults not covered by BIT such as, system will not power up or
system is being used in an incorrect environment such as, at the wrong altitude, etc.
FI-08 Interlock the high power sections of systems and subsystems with visual/audible BIT to ensure safe system activation.
FI-09 Design BIT to first conduct self-test for circuitry integrity before conducting system test.
FI-10 Use clear text to report failures rather than alpha-numeric codes, lights, indicators, etc.
FI-11 Locate BIT circuitry on the same level of the subsystem under test to simplify test and repair when it is removed from the
main system.
OXY-01 System should contain automatic BIT for warning indicators to eliminate dedicated test switches and/or test requirements.
OXY-11 System operational and service condition status should be capable of being downlinked to centralized maintenance
facilities.
PYRO-15 Pylon-to-weapon and pylon-to-air vehicle electrical interfaces should contain built-in test/fault location capabilities.
TCR-08 Incorporate vibration pick-up sensors to isolate the respective unit from other potential sources of vibration, and to
enhance the prognostic potential for monitoring equipment health.
TP-01 Locate Input/Output (I/O) test points and associated readouts in close proximity to each other so that one person can
perform testing.
TP-02 Protect test points against the environment and from induced contamination.
TP-03 Protect test points from outside signal generation.
WT&B-07 Landing gear caution and warning systems should contain both initiated and periodic BIT and be capable of fault-isolating

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

to each component in the system.
WT&B-15 Anti-skid and anti-lock brake systems should contain periodic and initiated BIT. All components, including speed sensors,
comparators, wiring, connectors, control boxes, etc., should be included in the BIT system.
2.08.02 System/Subsystem Built-in-Test/Built-in- A-11 Locate compartment electrical penetrations close to the access opening for ease of sight, probing, repair, and to
Test Equipment (BIT/BITE) eliminate fluid soaking, wicking, or contamination.
A-12 Locate compartment electrical penetrations far enough from the access opening to prevent damage resulting from
improper (over-length) panel fasteners.
A-13 Two-sided or two-surfaced access should not be required for access to equipment interfaces and hardpoints. The term
two-sided infers top/bottom, left/right, front/back, or combinations thereof.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
ACS-10 Ensure all diagnostic and prognostic logic, intelligence, and status type informational data are storable and viewable

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

within the crew station.
ACS-11 Provide crew station personnel with the capability to manually initiate selective BIT and interrogate the prognostics
system without interrupting the full-time or periodic BIT routines.
BIT-01 During design of the BIT, use worst-case stress analysis to ensure that any circuit failures induced by temperature
extremes, tolerance build-up, power supply variations, and combinations thereof are identified.

C-91
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
2.08.02 System/Subsystem Built-in-Test/Built-in- BIT-02 Ensure that BIT system thresholds are consistent with those across the system, subsystem, item, module, and piece-part
Test Equipment (BIT/BITE) levels to prevent excessive numbers of Cannot Duplicate (CND) and Retest OK (RTOK) events from occurring.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

BIT-03 The degree of BIT required or proposed should be based on the respective failure rates and the appropriate FMECA at
all equipment indenture levels.
BIT-04 Limit the amount of data that is recorded to a manageable size by:
- Limiting the number of signals that are monitored
- Limiting the maximum sampling rate
- Reducing the time span over which data is accumulated
- Restricting the type of data accumulated
BIT-05 Incorporate testability design features as an integral part of equipment preliminary design process.
BIT-06 Mission critical functions should be monitored by BIT.
BIT-07 Set BIT tolerances to maximize fault detection and minimize false alarm rate in the expected operating environment.
BIT-08 Design BIT fault detectors to accommodate the needs of operator maintenance personnel.
BIT-09 Use concurrent BIT to monitor system critical functions.
BIT-10 Design the BIT and BITE so that no fault or failure within the BIT or BITE will degrade, disrupt, or fail the system being
monitored.
BIT-11 In the area of software design and test responsibility, the responsibility for the design and development of verification
testing of an end item (e.g., digital filter) should reside with the same engineer(s).
BIT-12 Define stimuli and response data for each diagnostic test at the system/subsystem level. The same data should be planned
for use both in factory testing as well as in field maintenance of the equipment. These data minimize the amount of
unique software to be written.
BIT-13 Provide for manual control to test sequences, so that the test can be selected individually, and appropriate test
combinations can be executed at the operator's discretion.
BIT-14 Provide access to all BIT control and status signals at module connector pins. This will enable ATE to directly connect to
BIT circuitry.
BIT-15 Incorporate complete BIT functions and BITE on module. If only a portion of the BIT routine or BITE circuitry exists on
the module, then ATE cannot utilize the BIT routine without providing the missing BIT functions.
BIT-16 Critical voltages should be visually monitored by sending the voltage signals to visible LEDs.
BIT-17 BIT failures should be latched on the module. This makes it easier for the system or ATE to poll the error bit at any time.
BIT-18 If many BIT routines exist on a module, then ATE should have access and the ability to control each routine individually.
BIT-19 Design BIT to have a very low false alarm rate; otherwise BIT will not be an effective maintenance tool. As a goal, the

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

false alarm rate should be 1% or less.
BIT-20 The BIT should be mechanized so that when a piece of equipment is not installed in a subsystem or the product, a failure
will not be indicated.
BIT-21 The failure detection function should provide the equipment operator with a go/no-go indication of equipment readiness.
BIT-22 The BIT should be designed so that auxiliary test devices or external equipment are not needed for daily and other
regular checks.
BIT-23 Design BIT so it is initiated automatically upon equipment power-up.
BIT-24 Test points should be functionally grouped together and clearly labeled for convenience and ease of maintenance.
BIT-25 Equipment should not require manual probing to fault isolate.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
BIT-26 Locate routinely used test points so they are accessible without removing or disassembling other equipment

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

BIT-27 Periodic and initiated BIT should detect at least 98% of all failures and isolate a minimum 99% of those failures detected
to a single LRU or WRA.
BIT-28 Design BIT to have the same level of EMI protection as the system or equipment being monitored.
BIT/BITE-01 Design to keep false alarm rates below 1%. Higher false alarm rates can limit the effectiveness of BIT as a maintenance
tool.

C-92
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
2.08.02 System/Subsystem Built-in-Test/Built-in- BIT/BITE-02 Design EMI protection to eliminate finger type EMI contact devices.
Test Equipment (BIT/BITE)

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

CC-01 Use fiber-optic technologies in preference to conventional interconnect concepts to reduce the number of
interconnects/interfaces, reduce manufacturing and ownership costs, and significantly improve R&M.
CC-02 Standardize connector and wire types to improve testability and logistic support. Keep the number of "different" standard
connectors to a minimum. Use the same connector type keyed differently where possible.
CC-03 Provide clearance around connectors for engagement/disengagement of cables and proper connector orientation under
anticipated environmental conditions (e.g., bare hand of 50 percentile male in an enclosed or protected environment and
a gloved hand of a 50 percentile male in an open or unprotected environment).
CC-04 Use quick release cables and locate cables to make removal and replacement easy and to avoid having to remove one
cable to gain access to another. Provide adequate space for cables, including sleeving and tie-downs, and adequate
service loops for ease of assembly/disassembly
CC-05 Orient and space connectors to allow a sufficient grip on the connector for cable or wire extraction without fear of using
the wiring or cable for additional leverage.
CC-06 Label, and where possible color code, each wire in a harness or cable to facilitate tracking from origin to termination.
Each wire, cable, and coax-to-connector interface should be provided with a source of identification to aidin trouble
shooting, repair, or modification. Marking the cable designator on the cable along with bar codes is also recommended.
CC-07 Do not manufacture or dress connectors containing more than 25 wires or cables as a single integrated harness. Group
the wires or cables into runs of no more than 25 wires or cables each. In addition to making trouble shooting and repair
easier, this approach help avoid large bend radii, thereby simplifying routing, packaging, and stowage.
CC-08 Standardize connector pin assignments for power, ground, and other frequently used signals.
CC-09 Locate LRU/subsystem critical nodes (and or test points) so they are accessible from a connector to prevent the need for
internal LRU probing or access.
CC-10 Avoid hidden cables. Visually inspecting and tracing all assembly cables rather than having hidden cables (such as
behind other cables or even LRUs) allows for a quick system and cable integrity check which aids in overall system
integrity and debug. This also implies quick access for manipulative actions.
CC-11 Orient spare wires and cable pigtails along the outer diameter or periphery of connectors to make access easier.
CC-12 Build up and assemble straight and angle connector shells or back shells in a manner that ensures that wire or cable strain
or wear is not possible.
CO-01 Design automated systems and programs with provisions to enable "stop test" and "resume" without the need to cycle back
or repeat the entire test.
CO-02 In the event of program loss or hang-up, automated systems and programs should have provisions for reverting to manual
test and operation.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

CO-03 Use a test connector to provide test and maintenance bus access to all system and subsystem faults.
CO-04 Design systems and subsystems so that ATE can be used to access, read, and control internal components in concert with
the test or checkout program.
CO-05 Avoid the need for costly adapters for signal communications between system, subsystems, line replaceable units (LRUs)
or Weapon Replaceable Assemblies (WRAs), and ATE.
EG-01 Design feedback loops so that the loop can be broken during test to ensure that faults do not propagate to the point where
they cannot be isolated.
EG-02 Avoid using external feedback loops requiring complex circuitry to simulate feedback I/Os.
EG-03 In rare instances when complex external feedback loops cannot be avoided, incorporate simple interruptible control
points.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
EG-04 Avoid long sequences of vectors to initialize or alter device outputs to minimize potential testability problems.
EG-05 Avoid the need to have test equipment generate complex, phased or time related signals.
EG-06 Test points should be located on all circuit nodes that are useful in determining the module's health.
EG-07 Test points should be designed so that functional circuitry cannot be damaged or degraded due to the routing or accidental
shorting of a signal at a test point. Some type of test point isolation technique should be used (buffers, isolator, etc.).

C-93
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
2.08.02 System/Subsystem Built-in-Test/Built-in- EG-08 Test points should be easily accessed and clearly marked.
Test Equipment (BIT/BITE)

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

EG-10 Design redundant circuits to be independently testable to ensure errors are not masked.
EG-11 To improve the probability of fault detection, avoid shorting signals together to achieve a specific test function or
condition.
EG-12 Incorporate concept for partitioning module functions to simplify test equipment or eliminate the need for ancillary test
equipment..
EG-13 Design oscillators or clocks that are resident on the module to be replaceable by a signal from a connector to avoid the
need to synchronize ATE to on-board signals.
ENG(G)-18 Incorporate appropriate sensors to enhance the diagnostic and prognostic capabilities for the following:
- Oil temperature - Fuel filter bypass
- Oil pressure - Coolant pressure
- Oil filter bypass - Coolant level
- Oil cooler bypass valve position - Coolant temperature
- Oil level - Vibration pickups
- Oil return line particle count - Chip detector
ENG-01 All facets of engine design should take advantage of Electrostatic Engine Monitoring Systems (EEMS) and Inductive
Debris Monitoring (IDM) toward achievement of on-condition maintenance and engine health monitoring.
ENG-02 Each different component of rotating machinery should contain different tracer elements to enhance EEMS and IDM
isolation and tracking of wear.
ENG-03 Digital electronic controls, fully automatic digital electronic controls, and similar concepts should contain the highest
degree of BIT and diagnostics commensurate with affordability, operation and maintenance, and life cycle costs as
appropriate.
ENG-38 The characteristics of engine-to-vehicle interfaces coupled with the capabilities of electronic engine controls, should
negate the necessity for making any type of engine rigging including maximum power, idle, and idle cut-off.
FI-01 Design each FI test to be independent of all other tests.
FI-02 Design FI initiation to be subordinate to the higher priority predecessor tests.
FI-03 Design each test so that it can be terminated prior to completion and then re-initiated at its start point.
FI-04 Design the unit tests so that they can accommodate the following subsystem response modes:
- Incorrect response
- No response
- Inconsistent response

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

- Unexpected condition
FI-05 Design all software so that it is structured by test priority. The test software should take advantage of both subroutine
constructs for all message outputs and of failure dictionaries which identify the location of the most likely failed
replaceable unit.
FI-06 In an airborne avionics system, consider indicating mission critical faults on a pilots "head-up" display accompanied with
an audible alarm, so that the pilot can easily check for critical system or mission threatening problems.
FI-07 Ensure that system user manuals include instructions for faults not covered by BIT such as, system will not power up or
system is being used in an incorrect environment such as, at the wrong altitude, etc.
FI-08 Interlock the high power sections of systems and subsystems with visual/audible BIT to ensure safe system activation.
FI-09 Design BIT to first conduct self-test for circuitry integrity before conducting system test.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
FI-10 Use clear text to report failures rather than alpha-numeric codes, lights, indicators, etc.
FI-11 Locate BIT circuitry on the same level of the subsystem under test to simplify test and repair when it is removed from the
main system.
HYD-08 Design hydraulic pumps and motors with tracer elements to detect wear through on-board spectrometric oil analysis
devices.

C-94
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
2.08.02 System/Subsystem Built-in-Test/Built-in- MC-10 In rare instances where a plumbing run contains complex form or geometry that would require removal of other plumbing
Test Equipment (BIT/BITE) or equipment for access, in-line connectors should be incorporated to maintain the integrity of other plumbing or

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

equipment.
MC-12 All plumbing and connectors containing liquids should be meniscus-free.
MC-14 Where multiple connectors are located in close proximity, ensure (1) a minimum hand tool arc of 120 degrees can be
maintained, and (2) stagger fittings to ensure firm coupling interface/hand tool interface can be accomplished without
inducing damage to adjacent lines.
MG-01 Mount LRUs/sub-systems on drawer slides or extender racks to provide easier accessibility during integration, testing,
debug, and repair of Units Under Test (UUTs).
MG-02 Use a modular system design so that each subassembly is designed as a functionally complete entity. Then when a
subassembly was removed for testing, ATE will not need custom circuitry to simulate missing functions.
MG-03 Clearly mark all subsystems/LRUs to make system integration, test, debug, and repair easier.
MP-01 Avoid the use epoxies to mount parts on repairable modules because they make repair extremely difficult.
MP-02 Use a unique identification (ID) resistor incorporated in each system module to verify that the proper module is mounted
on ATE.
MP-03 Design modules so that lengthy warm-up times, special coding and air purity levels, and similar constraints are not
necessary.
OXY-01 System should contain automatic BIT for warning indicators to eliminate dedicated test switches and/or test requirements.
PYRO-15 Pylon-to-weapon and pylon-to-air vehicle electrical interfaces should contain built-in test/fault location capabilities.
TP-01 Locate Input/Output (I/O) test points and associated readouts in close proximity to each other so that one person can
perform testing.
TP-02 Protect test points against the environment and from induced contamination.
TP-03 Protect test points from outside signal generation.
WT&B-07 Landing gear caution and warning systems should contain both initiated and periodic BIT and be capable of fault-isolating
to each component in the system.
WT&B-15 Anti-skid and anti-lock brake systems should contain periodic and initiated BIT. All components, including speed sensors,
comparators, wiring, connectors, control boxes, etc., should be included in the BIT system.
2.08.03 Module Level Testability Guidelines ACS-10 Ensure all diagnostic and prognostic logic, intelligence, and status type informational data are storable and viewable
within the crew station.
ACS-11 Provide crew station personnel with the capability to manually initiate selective BIT and interrogate the prognostics
system without interrupting the full-time or periodic BIT routines.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

BIT-01 During design of the BIT, use worst-case stress analysis to ensure that any circuit failures induced by temperature
extremes, tolerance build-up, power supply variations, and combinations thereof are identified.
BIT-02 Ensure that BIT system thresholds are consistent with those across the system, subsystem, item, module, and piece-part
levels to prevent excessive numbers of Cannot Duplicate (CND) and Retest OK (RTOK) events from occurring.
BIT-03 The degree of BIT required or proposed should be based on the respective failure rates and the appropriate FMECA at
all equipment indenture levels.
BIT-04 Limit the amount of data that is recorded to a manageable size by:
- Limiting the number of signals that are monitored
- Limiting the maximum sampling rate
- Reducing the time span over which data is accumulated

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
- Restricting the type of data accumulated
BIT-05 Incorporate testability design features as an integral part of equipment preliminary design process.
BIT-06 Mission critical functions should be monitored by BIT.
BIT-07 Set BIT tolerances to maximize fault detection and minimize false alarm rate in the expected operating environment.
BIT-08 Design BIT fault detectors to accommodate the needs of operator maintenance personnel.

C-95
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
2.08.03 Module Level Testability Guidelines BIT-09 Use concurrent BIT to monitor system critical functions.
BIT-10 Design the BIT and BITE so that no fault or failure within the BIT or BITE will degrade, disrupt, or fail the system being

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

monitored.
BIT-11 In the area of software design and test responsibility, the responsibility for the design and development of verification
testing of an end item (e.g., digital filter) should reside with the same engineer(s).
BIT-12 Define stimuli and response data for each diagnostic test at the system/subsystem level. The same data should be planned
for use both in factory testing as well as in field maintenance of the equipment. These data minimize the amount of
unique software to be written.
BIT-16 Critical voltages should be visually monitored by sending the voltage signals to visible LEDs.
BIT-17 BIT failures should be latched on the module. This makes it easier for the system or ATE to poll the error bit at any time.
BIT-18 If many BIT routines exist on a module, then ATE should have access and the ability to control each routine individually.
BIT-19 Design BIT to have a very low false alarm rate; otherwise BIT will not be an effective maintenance tool. As a goal, the
false alarm rate should be 1% or less.
BIT-20 The BIT should be mechanized so that when a piece of equipment is not installed in a subsystem or the product, a failure
will not be indicated.
BIT-21 The failure detection function should provide the equipment operator with a go/no-go indication of equipment readiness.
BIT-22 The BIT should be designed so that auxiliary test devices or external equipment are not needed for daily and other
regular checks.
BIT-23 Design BIT so it is initiated automatically upon equipment power-up.
BIT-24 Test points should be functionally grouped together and clearly labeled for convenience and ease of maintenance.
BIT-25 Equipment should not require manual probing to fault isolate.
BIT-26 Locate routinely used test points so they are accessible without removing or disassembling other equipment
BIT-27 Periodic and initiated BIT should detect at least 98% of all failures and isolate a minimum 99% of those failures detected
to a single LRU or WRA.
BIT-28 Design BIT to have the same level of EMI protection as the system or equipment being monitored.
BIT/BITE-01 Design to keep false alarm rates below 1%. Higher false alarm rates can limit the effectiveness of BIT as a maintenance
tool.
BIT/BITE-02 Design EMI protection to eliminate finger type EMI contact devices.
CC-01 Use fiber-optic technologies in preference to conventional interconnect concepts to reduce the number of
interconnects/interfaces, reduce manufacturing and ownership costs, and significantly improve R&M.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

CC-02 Standardize connector and wire types to improve testability and logistic support. Keep the number of "different" standard
connectors to a minimum. Use the same connector type keyed differently where possible.
CC-03 Provide clearance around connectors for engagement/disengagement of cables and proper connector orientation under
anticipated environmental conditions (e.g., bare hand of 50 percentile male in an enclosed or protected environment and
a gloved hand of a 50 percentile male in an open or unprotected environment).
CC-04 Use quick release cables and locate cables to make removal and replacement easy and to avoid having to remove one
cable to gain access to another. Provide adequate space for cables, including sleeving and tie-downs, and adequate
service loops for ease of assembly/disassembly.
CC-05 Orient and space connectors to allow a sufficient grip on the connector for cable or wire extraction without fear of using
the wiring or cable for additional leverage.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
CC-06 Label, and where possible color code, each wire in a harness or cable to facilitate tracking from origin to termination.

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

Each wire, cable, and coax-to-connector interface should be provided with a source of identification to aidin trouble
shooting, repair, or modification. Marking the cable designator on the cable along with bar codes is also recommended.
CC-07 Do not manufacture or dress connectors containing more than 25 wires or cables as a single integrated harness. Group
the wires or cables into runs of no more than 25 wires or cables each. In addition to making trouble shooting and repair
easier, this approach help avoid large bend radii, thereby simplifying routing, packaging, and stowage.

C-96
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
2.08.03 Module Level Testability Guidelines CC-08 Standardize connector pin assignments for power, ground, and other frequently used signals.
CC-09 Locate LRU/subsystem critical nodes (and or test points) so they are accessible from a connector to prevent the need for

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

internal LRU probing or access.
CC-10 Avoid hidden cables. Visually inspecting and tracing all assembly cables rather than having hidden cables (such as
behind other cables or even LRUs) allows for a quick system and cable integrity check which aids in overall system
integrity and debug. This also implies quick access for manipulative actions.
CO-01 Design automated systems and programs with provisions to enable "stop test" and "resume" without the need to cycle back
or repeat the entire test.
CO-02 In the event of program loss or hang-up, automated systems and programs should have provisions for reverting to manual
test and operation.
CO-03 Use a test connector to provide test and maintenance bus access to all system and subsystem faults.
CO-04 Design systems and subsystems so that ATE can be used to access, read, and control internal components in concert with
the test or checkout program.
CO-05 Avoid the need for costly adapters for signal communications between system, subsystems, line replaceable units (LRUs)
or Weapon Replaceable Assemblies (WRAs), and ATE.
EG-01 Design feedback loops so that the loop can be broken during test to ensure that faults do not propagate to the point where
they cannot be isolated.
EG-02 Avoid using external feedback loops requiring complex circuitry to simulate feedback I/Os.
EG-03 In rare instances when complex external feedback loops cannot be avoided, incorporate simple interruptible control
points.
EG-04 Avoid long sequences of vectors to initialize or alter device outputs to minimize potential testability problems.
EG-05 Avoid the need to have test equipment generate complex, phased or time related signals.
EG-06 Test points should be located on all circuit nodes that are useful in determining the module's health.
EG-07 Test points should be designed so that functional circuitry cannot be damaged or degraded due to the routing or accidental
shorting of a signal at a test point. Some type of test point isolation technique should be used (buffers, isolator, etc.).
EG-08 Test points should be easily accessed and clearly marked.
EG-10 Design redundant circuits to be independently testable to ensure errors are not masked.
EG-11 To improve the probability of fault detection, avoid shorting signals together to achieve a specific test function or
condition.
EG-12 Incorporate concept for partitioning module functions to simplify test equipment or eliminate the need for ancillary test
equipment..

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

EG-13 Design oscillators or clocks that are resident on the module to be replaceable by a signal from a connector to avoid the
need to synchronize ATE to on-board signals.
ENG-02 Each different component of rotating machinery should contain different tracer elements to enhance EEMS and IDM
isolation and tracking of wear.
FI-01 Design each FI test to be independent of all other tests.
FI-02 Design FI initiation to be subordinate to the higher priority predecessor tests.
FI-03 Design each test so that it can be terminated prior to completion and then re-initiated at its start point.
FI-04 Design the unit tests so that they can accommodate the following subsystem response modes:
- Incorrect response

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
- No response

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

- Inconsistent response
- Unexpected condition
FI-05 Design all software so that it is structured by test priority. The test software should take advantage of both subroutine
constructs for all message outputs and of failure dictionaries which identify the location of the most likely failed
replaceable unit.

C-97
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
2.08.03 Module Level Testability Guidelines FI-06 In an airborne avionics system, consider indicating mission critical faults on a pilots "head-up" display accompanied with
an audible alarm, so that the pilot can easily check for critical system or mission threatening problems.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

FI-07 Ensure that system user manuals include instructions for faults not covered by BIT such as, system will not power up or
system is being used in an incorrect environment such as, at the wrong altitude, etc.
FI-08 Interlock the high power sections of systems and subsystems with visual/audible BIT to ensure safe system activation.
FI-09 Design BIT to first conduct self-test for circuitry integrity before conducting system test.
FI-10 Use clear text to report failures rather than alpha-numeric codes, lights, indicators, etc.
FI-11 Locate BIT circuitry on the same level of the subsystem under test to simplify test and repair when it is removed from the
main system.
MG-02 Use a modular system design so that each subassembly is designed as a functionally complete entity. Then when a
subassembly was removed for testing, ATE will not need custom circuitry to simulate missing functions.
MG-03 Clearly mark all subsystems/LRUs to make system integration, test, debug, and repair easier.
MP-01 Avoid the use epoxies to mount parts on repairable modules because they make repair extremely difficult.
MP-02 Use a unique identification (ID) resistor incorporated in each system module to verify that the proper module is mounted
on ATE.
MP-03 Design modules so that lengthy warm-up times, special coding and air purity levels, and similar constraints are not
necessary.
TP-01 Locate Input/Output (I/O) test points and associated readouts in close proximity to each other so that one person can
perform testing.
TP-02 Protect test points against the environment and from induced contamination.
TP-03 Protect test points from outside signal generation.
2.09 Module BIT/BITE ACS-10 Ensure all diagnostic and prognostic logic, intelligence, and status type informational data are storable and viewable
within the crew station.
ACS-11 Provide crew station personnel with the capability to manually initiate selective BIT and interrogate the prognostics
system without interrupting the full-time or periodic BIT routines.
BIT-01 During design of the BIT, use worst-case stress analysis to ensure that any circuit failures induced by temperature
extremes, tolerance build-up, power supply variations, and combinations thereof are identified.
BIT-02 Ensure that BIT system thresholds are consistent with those across the system, subsystem, item, module, and piece-part
levels to prevent excessive numbers of Cannot Duplicate (CND) and Retest OK (RTOK) events from occurring.
BIT-03 The degree of BIT required or proposed should be based on the respective failure rates and the appropriate FMECA at
all equipment indenture levels.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

BIT-04 Limit the amount of data that is recorded to a manageable size by:
- Limiting the number of signals that are monitored
- Limiting the maximum sampling rate
- Reducing the time span over which data is accumulated
- Restricting the type of data accumulated
BIT-05 Incorporate testability design features as an integral part of equipment preliminary design process.
BIT-06 Mission critical functions should be monitored by BIT.
BIT-07 Set BIT tolerances to maximize fault detection and minimize false alarm rate in the expected operating environment.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
BIT-08 Design BIT fault detectors to accommodate the needs of operator maintenance personnel.

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

BIT-09 Use concurrent BIT to monitor system critical functions.
BIT-10 Design the BIT and BITE so that no fault or failure within the BIT or BITE will degrade, disrupt, or fail the system being
monitored.
BIT-11 In the area of software design and test responsibility, the responsibility for the design and development of verification
testing of an end item (e.g., digital filter) should reside with the same engineer(s).

C-98
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
2.09 Module BIT/BITE BIT-12 Define stimuli and response data for each diagnostic test at the system/subsystem level. The same data should be planned
for use both in factory testing as well as in field maintenance of the equipment. These data minimize the amount of

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

unique software to be written.
BIT-13 Provide for manual control to test sequences, so that the test can be selected individually, and appropriate test
combinations can be executed at the operator's discretion.
BIT-14 Provide access to all BIT control and status signals at module connector pins. This will enable ATE to directly connect to
BIT circuitry.
BIT-15 Incorporate complete BIT functions and BITE on module. If only a portion of the BIT routine or BITE circuitry exists on
the module, then ATE cannot utilize the BIT routine without providing the missing BIT functions.
BIT-16 Critical voltages should be visually monitored by sending the voltage signals to visible LEDs.
BIT-17 BIT failures should be latched on the module. This makes it easier for the system or ATE to poll the error bit at any time.
BIT-18 If many BIT routines exist on a module, then ATE should have access and the ability to control each routine individually.
BIT-19 Design BIT to have a very low false alarm rate; otherwise BIT will not be an effective maintenance tool. As a goal, the
false alarm rate should be 1% or less.
BIT-20 The BIT should be mechanized so that when a piece of equipment is not installed in a subsystem or the product, a failure
will not be indicated.
BIT-21 The failure detection function should provide the equipment operator with a go/no-go indication of equipment readiness.
BIT-22 The BIT should be designed so that auxiliary test devices or external equipment are not needed for daily and other
regular checks.
BIT-23 Design BIT so it is initiated automatically upon equipment power-up.
BIT-24 Test points should be functionally grouped together and clearly labeled for convenience and ease of maintenance.
BIT-25 Equipment should not require manual probing to fault isolate.
BIT-26 Locate routinely used test points so they are accessible without removing or disassembling other equipment
BIT-27 Periodic and initiated BIT should detect at least 98% of all failures and isolate a minimum 99% of those failures detected
to a single LRU or WRA.
BIT-28 Design BIT to have the same level of EMI protection as the system or equipment being monitored.
BIT/BITE-01 Design to keep false alarm rates below 1%. Higher false alarm rates can limit the effectiveness of BIT as a maintenance
tool.
BIT/BITE-02 Design EMI protection to eliminate finger type EMI contact devices.
CC-11 Orient spare wires and cable pigtails along the outer diameter or periphery of connectors to make access easier.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

CC-12 Build up and assemble straight and angle connector shells or back shells in a manner that ensures that wire or cable strain
or wear is not possible.
CO-01 Design automated systems and programs with provisions to enable "stop test" and "resume" without the need to cycle back
or repeat the entire test.
CO-02 In the event of program loss or hang-up, automated systems and programs should have provisions for reverting to manual
test and operation.
CO-03 Use a test connector to provide test and maintenance bus access to all system and subsystem faults.
CO-04 Design systems and subsystems so that ATE can be used to access, read, and control internal components in concert with
the test or checkout program.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
CO-05 Avoid the need for costly adapters for signal communications between system, subsystems, line replaceable units (LRUs)

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

or Weapon Replaceable Assemblies (WRAs), and ATE.
ECS-06 All electrical control, sensing, sensor, warning, caution, or signal interface and wiring should be fully BIT compatible.
EG-01 Design feedback loops so that the loop can be broken during test to ensure that faults do not propagate to the point where
they cannot be isolated.
EG-02 Avoid using external feedback loops requiring complex circuitry to simulate feedback I/Os.

C-99
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
2.09 Module BIT/BITE EG-03 In rare instances when complex external feedback loops cannot be avoided, incorporate simple interruptible control
points.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

EG-04 Avoid long sequences of vectors to initialize or alter device outputs to minimize potential testability problems.
EG-05 Avoid the need to have test equipment generate complex, phased or time related signals.
EG-06 Test points should be located on all circuit nodes that are useful in determining the module's health.
EG-07 Test points should be designed so that functional circuitry cannot be damaged or degraded due to the routing or accidental
shorting of a signal at a test point. Some type of test point isolation technique should be used (buffers, isolator, etc.).
EG-08 Test points should be easily accessed and clearly marked.
EG-10 Design redundant circuits to be independently testable to ensure errors are not masked.
EG-11 To improve the probability of fault detection, avoid shorting signals together to achieve a specific test function or
condition.
EG-12 Incorporate concept for partitioning module functions to simplify test equipment or eliminate the need for ancillary test
equipment..
EG-13 Design oscillators or clocks that are resident on the module to be replaceable by a signal from a connector to avoid the
need to synchronize ATE to on-board signals.
ENG-13 Engine oil systems should contain on-board spectrometric oil analysis devices located on the engine.
FI-01 Design each FI test to be independent of all other tests.
FI-02 Design FI initiation to be subordinate to the higher priority predecessor tests.
FI-03 Design each test so that it can be terminated prior to completion and then re-initiated at its start point.
FI-04 Design the unit tests so that they can accommodate the following subsystem response modes:
- Incorrect response
- No response
- Inconsistent response
- Unexpected condition
FI-05 Design all software so that it is structured by test priority. The test software should take advantage of both subroutine
constructs for all message outputs and of failure dictionaries which identify the location of the most likely failed
replaceable unit.
FI-06 In an airborne avionics system, consider indicating mission critical faults on a pilots "head-up" display accompanied with
an audible alarm, so that the pilot can easily check for critical system or mission threatening problems.
FI-07 Ensure that system user manuals include instructions for faults not covered by BIT such as, system will not power up or
system is being used in an incorrect environment such as, at the wrong altitude, etc.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

FI-08 Interlock the high power sections of systems and subsystems with visual/audible BIT to ensure safe system activation.
FI-09 Design BIT to first conduct self-test for circuitry integrity before conducting system test.
FI-10 Use clear text to report failures rather than alpha-numeric codes, lights, indicators, etc.
FI-11 Locate BIT circuitry on the same level of the subsystem under test to simplify test and repair when it is removed from the
main system.
MG-02 Use a modular system design so that each subassembly is designed as a functionally complete entity. Then when a
subassembly was removed for testing, ATE will not need custom circuitry to simulate missing functions.
MP-01 Avoid the use epoxies to mount parts on repairable modules because they make repair extremely difficult.
MP-02 Use a unique identification (ID) resistor incorporated in each system module to verify that the proper module is mounted

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
on ATE.

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

MP-03 Design modules so that lengthy warm-up times, special coding and air purity levels, and similar constraints are not
necessary.
PYRO-15 Pylon-to-weapon and pylon-to-air vehicle electrical interfaces should contain built-in test/fault location capabilities.
TCR-08 Incorporate vibration pick-up sensors to isolate the respective unit from other potential sources of vibration, and to
enhance the prognostic potential for monitoring equipment health.

C-100
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
2.09 Module BIT/BITE TP-01 Locate Input/Output (I/O) test points and associated readouts in close proximity to each other so that one person can
perform testing.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

TP-02 Protect test points against the environment and from induced contamination.
TP-03 Protect test points from outside signal generation.
WT&B-07 Landing gear caution and warning systems should contain both initiated and periodic BIT and be capable of fault-isolating
to each component in the system.
WT&B-15 Anti-skid and anti-lock brake systems should contain periodic and initiated BIT. All components, including speed sensors,
comparators, wiring, connectors, control boxes, etc., should be included in the BIT system.
2.09.01 General BIT Techniques (applicable to BIT-01 During design of the BIT, use worst-case stress analysis to ensure that any circuit failures induced by temperature
any technology) extremes, tolerance build-up, power supply variations, and combinations thereof are identified.
BIT-02 Ensure that BIT system thresholds are consistent with those across the system, subsystem, item, module, and piece-part
levels to prevent excessive numbers of Cannot Duplicate (CND) and Retest OK (RTOK) events from occurring.
BIT-03 The degree of BIT required or proposed should be based on the respective failure rates and the appropriate FMECA at
all equipment indenture levels.
BIT-04 Limit the amount of data that is recorded to a manageable size by:
- Limiting the number of signals that are monitored
- Limiting the maximum sampling rate
- Reducing the time span over which data is accumulated
- Restricting the type of data accumulated
BIT-05 Incorporate testability design features as an integral part of equipment preliminary design process.
BIT-06 Mission critical functions should be monitored by BIT.
BIT-07 Set BIT tolerances to maximize fault detection and minimize false alarm rate in the expected operating environment.
BIT-08 Design BIT fault detectors to accommodate the needs of operator maintenance personnel.
BIT-09 Use concurrent BIT to monitor system critical functions.
BIT-10 Design the BIT and BITE so that no fault or failure within the BIT or BITE will degrade, disrupt, or fail the system being
monitored.
BIT-11 In the area of software design and test responsibility, the responsibility for the design and development of verification
testing of an end item (e.g., digital filter) should reside with the same engineer(s).
BIT-12 Define stimuli and response data for each diagnostic test at the system/subsystem level. The same data should be planned
for use both in factory testing as well as in field maintenance of the equipment. These data minimize the amount of
unique software to be written.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

BIT-13 Provide for manual control to test sequences, so that the test can be selected individually, and appropriate test
combinations can be executed at the operator's discretion.
BIT-14 Provide access to all BIT control and status signals at module connector pins. This will enable ATE to directly connect to
BIT circuitry.
BIT-15 Incorporate complete BIT functions and BITE on module. If only a portion of the BIT routine or BITE circuitry exists on
the module, then ATE cannot utilize the BIT routine without providing the missing BIT functions.
BIT-16 Critical voltages should be visually monitored by sending the voltage signals to visible LEDs.
BIT-17 BIT failures should be latched on the module. This makes it easier for the system or ATE to poll the error bit at any time.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
BIT-18 If many BIT routines exist on a module, then ATE should have access and the ability to control each routine individually.

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

BIT-19 Design BIT to have a very low false alarm rate; otherwise BIT will not be an effective maintenance tool. As a goal, the
false alarm rate should be 1% or less.
BIT-20 The BIT should be mechanized so that when a piece of equipment is not installed in a subsystem or the product, a failure
will not be indicated.
BIT-21 The failure detection function should provide the equipment operator with a go/no-go indication of equipment readiness.

C-101
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
2.09.01 General BIT Techniques (applicable to BIT-22 The BIT should be designed so that auxiliary test devices or external equipment are not needed for daily and other
any technology) regular checks.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

BIT-23 Design BIT so it is initiated automatically upon equipment power-up.
BIT-24 Test points should be functionally grouped together and clearly labeled for convenience and ease of maintenance.
BIT-25 Equipment should not require manual probing to fault isolate.
BIT-26 Locate routinely used test points so they are accessible without removing or disassembling other equipment.
BIT-27 Periodic and initiated BIT should detect at least 98% of all failures and isolate a minimum 99% of those failures detected
to a single LRU or WRA.
BIT-28 Design BIT to have the same level of EMI protection as the system or equipment being monitored.
BIT/BITE-01 Design to keep false alarm rates below 1%. Higher false alarm rates can limit the effectiveness of BIT as a maintenance
tool.
BIT/BITE-02 Design EMI protection to eliminate finger type EMI contact devices.
CC-01 Use fiber-optic technologies in preference to conventional interconnect concepts to reduce the number of
interconnects/interfaces, reduce manufacturing and ownership costs, and significantly improve R&M.
CC-02 Standardize connector and wire types to improve testability and logistic support. Keep the number of "different" standard
connectors to a minimum. Use the same connector type keyed differently where possible.
CC-03 Provide clearance around connectors for engagement/disengagement of cables and proper connector orientation under
anticipated environmental conditions (e.g., bare hand of 50 percentile male in an enclosed or protected environment and
a gloved hand of a 50 percentile male in an open or unprotected environment).
CC-04 Use quick release cables and locate cables to make removal and replacement easy and to avoid having to remove one
cable to gain access to another. Provide adequate space for cables, including sleeving and tie-downs, and adequate
service loops for ease of assembly/disassembly
CC-05 Orient and space connectors to allow a sufficient grip on the connector for cable or wire extraction without fear of using
the wiring or cable for additional leverage.
CC-06 Label, and where possible color code, each wire in a harness or cable to facilitate tracking from origin to termination.
Each wire, cable, and coax-to-connector interface should be provided with a source of identification to aidin trouble
shooting, repair, or modification. Marking the cable designator on the cable along with bar codes is also recommended.
CC-07 Do not manufacture or dress connectors containing more than 25 wires or cables as a single integrated harness. Group
the wires or cables into runs of no more than 25 wires or cables each. In addition to making trouble shooting and repair
easier, this approach help avoid large bend radii, thereby simplifying routing, packaging, and stowage.
CC-08 Standardize connector pin assignments for power, ground, and other frequently used signals.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

CC-09 Locate LRU/subsystem critical nodes (and or test points) so they are accessible from a connector to prevent the need for
internal LRU probing or access.
CC-10 Avoid hidden cables. Visually inspecting and tracing all assembly cables rather than having hidden cables (such as
behind other cables or even LRUs) allows for a quick system and cable integrity check which aids in overall system
integrity and debug. This also implies quick access for manipulative actions.
CC-11 Orient spare wires and cable pigtails along the outer diameter or periphery of connectors to make access easier.
CC-12 Build up and assemble straight and angle connector shells or back shells in a manner that ensures that wire or cable strain
or wear is not possible.
CO-01 Design automated systems and programs with provisions to enable "stop test" and "resume" without the need to cycle back

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
or repeat the entire test.

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

CO-02 In the event of program loss or hang-up, automated systems and programs should have provisions for reverting to manual
test and operation.
CO-03 Use a test connector to provide test and maintenance bus access to all system and subsystem faults.
CO-04 Design systems and subsystems so that ATE can be used to access, read, and control internal components in concert with
the test or checkout program.

C-102
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
2.09.01 General BIT Techniques (applicable to CO-05 Avoid the need for costly adapters for signal communications between system, subsystems, line replaceable units (LRUs)
any technology) or Weapon Replaceable Assemblies (WRAs), and ATE.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

ECS-06 All electrical control, sensing, sensor, warning, caution, or signal interface and wiring should be fully BIT compatible.
EG-01 Design feedback loops so that the loop can be broken during test to ensure that faults do not propagate to the point where
they cannot be isolated.
EG-02 Avoid using external feedback loops requiring complex circuitry to simulate feedback I/Os.
EG-03 In rare instances when complex external feedback loops cannot be avoided, incorporate simple interruptible control
points.
EG-04 Avoid long sequences of vectors to initialize or alter device outputs to minimize potential testability problems.
EG-05 Avoid the need to have test equipment generate complex, phased or time related signals.
EG-06 Test points should be located on all circuit nodes that are useful in determining the module's health.
EG-07 Test points should be designed so that functional circuitry cannot be damaged or degraded due to the routing or accidental
shorting of a signal at a test point. Some type of test point isolation technique should be used (buffers, isolator, etc.).
EG-08 Test points should be easily accessed and clearly marked.
EG-10 Design redundant circuits to be independently testable to ensure errors are not masked.
EG-11 To improve the probability of fault detection, avoid shorting signals together to achieve a specific test function or
condition.
EG-12 Incorporate concept for partitioning module functions to simplify test equipment or eliminate the need for ancillary test
equipment..
EG-13 Design oscillators or clocks that are resident on the module to be replaceable by a signal from a connector to avoid the
need to synchronize ATE to on-board signals.
ENG(G)-18 Incorporate appropriate sensors to enhance the diagnostic and prognostic capabilities for the following:
- Oil temperature - Fuel filter bypass
- Oil pressure - Coolant pressure
- Oil filter bypass - Coolant level
- Oil cooler bypass valve position - Coolant temperature
- Oil level - Vibration pickups
- Oil return line particle count - Chip detector
ENG-01 All facets of engine design should take advantage of Electrostatic Engine Monitoring Systems (EEMS) and Inductive
Debris Monitoring (IDM) toward achievement of on-condition maintenance and engine health monitoring.
ENG-02 Each different component of rotating machinery should contain different tracer elements to enhance EEMS and IDM
isolation and tracking of wear.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

ENG-03 Digital electronic controls, fully automatic digital electronic controls, and similar concepts should contain the highest
degree of BIT and diagnostics commensurate with affordability, operation and maintenance, and life cycle costs as
appropriate.
ENG-13 Engine oil systems should contain on-board spectrometric oil analysis devices located on the engine.
ENG-38 The characteristics of engine-to-vehicle interfaces coupled with the capabilities of electronic engine controls, should
negate the necessity for making any type of engine rigging including maximum power, idle, and idle cut-off.
FI-01 Design each FI test to be independent of all other tests.
FI-02 Design FI initiation to be subordinate to the higher priority predecessor tests.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
FI-03 Design each test so that it can be terminated prior to completion and then re-initiated at its start point.

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

FI-04 Design the unit tests so that they can accommodate the following subsystem response modes:
- Incorrect response
- No response
- Inconsistent response
- Unexpected condition

C-103
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
2.09.01 General BIT Techniques (applicable to FI-05 Design all software so that it is structured by test priority. The test software should take advantage of both subroutine
any technology) constructs for all message outputs and of failure dictionaries which identify the location of the most likely failed

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

replaceable unit.
FI-06 In an airborne avionics system, consider indicating mission critical faults on a pilots "head-up" display accompanied with
an audible alarm, so that the pilot can easily check for critical system or mission threatening problems.
FI-07 Ensure that system user manuals include instructions for faults not covered by BIT such as, system will not power up or
system is being used in an incorrect environment such as, at the wrong altitude, etc.
FI-08 Interlock the high power sections of systems and subsystems with visual/audible BIT to ensure safe system activation.
FI-09 Design BIT to first conduct self-test for circuitry integrity before conducting system test.
FI-10 Use clear text to report failures rather than alpha-numeric codes, lights, indicators, etc.
FI-11 Locate BIT circuitry on the same level of the subsystem under test to simplify test and repair when it is removed from the
main system.
MP-01 Avoid the use epoxies to mount parts on repairable modules because they make repair extremely difficult.
MP-02 Use a unique identification (ID) resistor incorporated in each system module to verify that the proper module is mounted
on ATE.
MP-03 Design modules so that lengthy warm-up times, special coding and air purity levels, and similar constraints are not
necessary.
OXY-01 System should contain automatic BIT for warning indicators to eliminate dedicated test switches and/or test requirements.
PYRO-15 Pylon-to-weapon and pylon-to-air vehicle electrical interfaces should contain built-in test/fault location capabilities.
TCR-08 Incorporate vibration pick-up sensors to isolate the respective unit from other potential sources of vibration, and to
enhance the prognostic potential for monitoring equipment health.
TP-01 Locate Input/Output (I/O) test points and associated readouts in close proximity to each other so that one person can
perform testing.
TP-02 Protect test points against the environment and from induced contamination.
TP-03 Protect test points from outside signal generation.
WT&B-07 Landing gear caution and warning systems should contain both initiated and periodic BIT and be capable of fault-isolating
to each component in the system.
WT&B-15 Anti-skid and anti-lock brake systems should contain periodic and initiated BIT. All components, including speed sensors,
comparators, wiring, connectors, control boxes, etc., should be included in the BIT system.
2.10 Inherent Testability Design Checklist ACS-10 Ensure all diagnostic and prognostic logic, intelligence, and status type informational data are storable and viewable
within the crew station.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

ACS-11 Provide crew station personnel with the capability to manually initiate selective BIT and interrogate the prognostics
system without interrupting the full-time or periodic BIT routines.
BIT-01 During design of the BIT, use worst-case stress analysis to ensure that any circuit failures induced by temperature
extremes, tolerance build-up, power supply variations, and combinations thereof are identified.
BIT-02 Ensure that BIT system thresholds are consistent with those across the system, subsystem, item, module, and piece-part
levels to prevent excessive numbers of Cannot Duplicate (CND) and Retest OK (RTOK) events from occurring.
BIT-03 The degree of BIT required or proposed should be based on the respective failure rates and the appropriate FMECA at
all equipment indenture levels.
BIT-04 Limit the amount of data that is recorded to a manageable size by:

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
- Limiting the number of signals that are monitored

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

- Limiting the maximum sampling rate
- Reducing the time span over which data is accumulated
- Restricting the type of data accumulated
BIT-05 Incorporate testability design features as an integral part of equipment preliminary design process.
BIT-06 Mission critical functions should be monitored by BIT.

C-104
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
2.10 Inherent Testability Design Checklist BIT-07 Set BIT tolerances to maximize fault detection and minimize false alarm rate in the expected operating environment.
BIT-08 Design BIT fault detectors to accommodate the needs of operator maintenance personnel.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

BIT-09 Use concurrent BIT to monitor system critical functions.
BIT-10 Design the BIT and BITE so that no fault or failure within the BIT or BITE will degrade, disrupt, or fail the system being
monitored.
BIT-11 In the area of software design and test responsibility, the responsibility for the design and development of verification
testing of an end item (e.g., digital filter) should reside with the same engineer(s).
BIT-12 Define stimuli and response data for each diagnostic test at the system/subsystem level. The same data should be planned
for use both in factory testing as well as in field maintenance of the equipment. These data minimize the amount of
unique software to be written.
BIT-13 Provide for manual control to test sequences, so that the test can be selected individually, and appropriate test
combinations can be executed at the operator's discretion.
BIT-14 Provide access to all BIT control and status signals at module connector pins. This will enable ATE to directly connect to
BIT circuitry.
BIT-15 Incorporate complete BIT functions and BITE on module. If only a portion of the BIT routine or BITE circuitry exists on
the module, then ATE cannot utilize the BIT routine without providing the missing BIT functions.
BIT-16 Critical voltages should be visually monitored by sending the voltage signals to visible LEDs.
BIT-17 BIT failures should be latched on the module. This makes it easier for the system or ATE to poll the error bit at any time.
BIT-18 If many BIT routines exist on a module, then ATE should have access and the ability to control each routine individually.
BIT-19 Design BIT to have a very low false alarm rate; otherwise BIT will not be an effective maintenance tool. As a goal, the
false alarm rate should be 1% or less.
BIT-20 The BIT should be mechanized so that when a piece of equipment is not installed in a subsystem or the product, a failure
will not be indicated.
BIT-21 The failure detection function should provide the equipment operator with a go/no-go indication of equipment readiness.
BIT-22 The BIT should be designed so that auxiliary test devices or external equipment are not needed for daily and other
regular checks.
BIT-23 Design BIT so it is initiated automatically upon equipment power-up.
BIT-24 Test points should be functionally grouped together and clearly labeled for convenience and ease of maintenance.
BIT-25 Equipment should not require manual probing to fault isolate.
BIT-26 Locate routinely used test points so they are accessible without removing or disassembling other equipment
BIT-27 Periodic and initiated BIT should detect at least 98% of all failures and isolate a minimum 99% of those failures detected

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

to a single LRU or WRA.
BIT-28 Design BIT to have the same level of EMI protection as the system or equipment being monitored.
BIT/BITE-01 Design to keep false alarm rates below 1%. Higher false alarm rates can limit the effectiveness of BIT as a maintenance
tool.
BIT/BITE-02 Design EMI protection to eliminate finger type EMI contact devices.
CC-01 Use fiber-optic technologies in preference to conventional interconnect concepts to reduce the number of
interconnects/interfaces, reduce manufacturing and ownership costs, and significantly improve R&M.
CC-02 Standardize connector and wire types to improve testability and logistic support. Keep the number of "different" standard
connectors to a minimum. Use the same connector type keyed differently where possible.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
CC-03 Provide clearance around connectors for engagement/disengagement of cables and proper connector orientation under

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

anticipated environmental conditions (e.g., bare hand of 50 percentile male in an enclosed or protected environment and
a gloved hand of a 50 percentile male in an open or unprotected environment).
CC-04 Use quick release cables and locate cables to make removal and replacement easy and to avoid having to remove one
cable to gain access to another. Provide adequate space for cables, including sleeving and tie-downs, and adequate
service loops for ease of assembly/disassembly

C-105
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
2.10 Inherent Testability Design Checklist CC-05 Orient and space connectors to allow a sufficient grip on the connector for cable or wire extraction without fear of using
the wiring or cable for additional leverage.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

CC-06 Label, and where possible color code, each wire in a harness or cable to facilitate tracking from origin to termination.
Each wire, cable, and coax-to-connector interface should be provided with a source of identification to aidin trouble
shooting, repair, or modification. Marking the cable designator on the cable along with bar codes is also recommended.
CC-07 Do not manufacture or dress connectors containing more than 25 wires or cables as a single integrated harness. Group
the wires or cables into runs of no more than 25 wires or cables each. In addition to making trouble shooting and repair
easier, this approach help avoid large bend radii, thereby simplifying routing, packaging, and stowage.
CC-08 Standardize connector pin assignments for power, ground, and other frequently used signals.
CC-09 Locate LRU/subsystem critical nodes (and or test points) so they are accessible from a connector to prevent the need for
internal LRU probing or access.
CC-10 Avoid hidden cables. Visually inspecting and tracing all assembly cables rather than having hidden cables (such as
behind other cables or even LRUs) allows for a quick system and cable integrity check which aids in overall system
integrity and debug. This also implies quick access for manipulative actions.
CO-01 Design automated systems and programs with provisions to enable "stop test" and "resume" without the need to cycle back
or repeat the entire test.
CO-02 In the event of program loss or hang-up, automated systems and programs should have provisions for reverting to manual
test and operation.
CO-03 Use a test connector to provide test and maintenance bus access to all system and subsystem faults.
CO-04 Design systems and subsystems so that ATE can be used to access, read, and control internal components in concert with
the test or checkout program.
CO-05 Avoid the need for costly adapters for signal communications between system, subsystems, line replaceable units (LRUs)
or Weapon Replaceable Assemblies (WRAs), and ATE.
ECS-06 All electrical control, sensing, sensor, warning, caution, or signal interface and wiring should be fully BIT compatible.
EG-01 Design feedback loops so that the loop can be broken during test to ensure that faults do not propagate to the point where
they cannot be isolated.
EG-02 Avoid using external feedback loops requiring complex circuitry to simulate feedback I/Os.
EG-03 In rare instances when complex external feedback loops cannot be avoided, incorporate simple interruptible control
points.
EG-04 Avoid long sequences of vectors to initialize or alter device outputs to minimize potential testability problems.
EG-05 Avoid the need to have test equipment generate complex, phased or time related signals.
EG-06 Test points should be located on all circuit nodes that are useful in determining the module's health.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

EG-07 Test points should be designed so that functional circuitry cannot be damaged or degraded due to the routing or accidental
shorting of a signal at a test point. Some type of test point isolation technique should be used (buffers, isolator, etc.).
EG-08 Test points should be easily accessed and clearly marked.
EG-10 Design redundant circuits to be independently testable to ensure errors are not masked.
EG-11 To improve the probability of fault detection, avoid shorting signals together to achieve a specific test function or
condition.
EG-12 Incorporate concept for partitioning module functions to simplify test equipment or eliminate the need for ancillary test
equipment..

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
EG-13 Design oscillators or clocks that are resident on the module to be replaceable by a signal from a connector to avoid the

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

need to synchronize ATE to on-board signals.

C-106
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
2.10 Inherent Testability Design Checklist ENG(G)-18 Incorporate appropriate sensors to enhance the diagnostic and prognostic capabilities for the following:
- Oil temperature - Fuel filter bypass

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

- Oil pressure - Coolant pressure
- Oil filter bypass - Coolant level
- Oil cooler bypass valve position - Coolant temperature
- Oil level - Vibration pickups
- Oil return line particle count - Chip detector
ENG-01 All facets of engine design should take advantage of Electrostatic Engine Monitoring Systems (EEMS) and Inductive
Debris Monitoring (IDM) toward achievement of on-condition maintenance and engine health monitoring.
ENG-02 Each different component of rotating machinery should contain different tracer elements to enhance EEMS and IDM
isolation and tracking of wear.
ENG-03 Digital electronic controls, fully automatic digital electronic controls, and similar concepts should contain the highest
degree of BIT and diagnostics commensurate with affordability, operation and maintenance, and life cycle costs as
appropriate.
ENG-13 Engine oil systems should contain on-board spectrometric oil analysis devices located on the engine.
ENG-38 The characteristics of engine-to-vehicle interfaces coupled with the capabilities of electronic engine controls, should
negate the necessity for making any type of engine rigging including maximum power, idle, and idle cut-off.
FI-01 Design each FI test to be independent of all other tests.
FI-02 Design FI initiation to be subordinate to the higher priority predecessor tests.
FI-03 Design each test so that it can be terminated prior to completion and then re-initiated at its start point.
FI-04 Design the unit tests so that they can accommodate the following subsystem response modes:
- Incorrect response
- No response
- Inconsistent response
- Unexpected condition
FI-05 Design all software so that it is structured by test priority. The test software should take advantage of both subroutine
constructs for all message outputs and of failure dictionaries which identify the location of the most likely failed
replaceable unit.
FI-06 In an airborne avionics system, consider indicating mission critical faults on a pilots "head-up" display accompanied with
an audible alarm, so that the pilot can easily check for critical system or mission threatening problems.
FI-07 Ensure that system user manuals include instructions for faults not covered by BIT such as, system will not power up or
system is being used in an incorrect environment such as, at the wrong altitude, etc.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

FI-08 Interlock the high power sections of systems and subsystems with visual/audible BIT to ensure safe system activation.
FI-09 Design BIT to first conduct self-test for circuitry integrity before conducting system test.
FI-10 Use clear text to report failures rather than alpha-numeric codes, lights, indicators, etc.
FI-11 Locate BIT circuitry on the same level of the subsystem under test to simplify test and repair when it is removed from the
main system.
HYD-08 Design hydraulic pumps and motors with tracer elements to detect wear through on-board spectrometric oil analysis
devices.
MG-01 Mount LRUs/sub-systems on drawer slides or extender racks to provide easier accessibility during integration, testing,
debug, and repair of Units Under Test (UUTs).

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
MG-02 Use a modular system design so that each subassembly is designed as a functionally complete entity. Then when a

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

subassembly was removed for testing, ATE will not need custom circuitry to simulate missing functions.
MG-03 Clearly mark all subsystems/LRUs to make system integration, test, debug, and repair easier.
MP-01 Avoid the use epoxies to mount parts on repairable modules because they make repair extremely difficult.
MP-02 Use a unique identification (ID) resistor incorporated in each system module to verify that the proper module is mounted
on ATE.

C-107
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
2.10 Inherent Testability Design Checklist MP-03 Design modules so that lengthy warm-up times, special coding and air purity levels, and similar constraints are not
necessary.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

OXY-01 System should contain automatic BIT for warning indicators to eliminate dedicated test switches and/or test requirements.
OXY-11 System operational and service condition status should be capable of being downlinked to centralized maintenance
facilities.
PYRO-15 Pylon-to-weapon and pylon-to-air vehicle electrical interfaces should contain built-in test/fault location capabilities.
TP-01 Locate Input/Output (I/O) test points and associated readouts in close proximity to each other so that one person can
perform testing.
TP-02 Protect test points against the environment and from induced contamination.
TP-03 Protect test points from outside signal generation.
WBAY-21 Coatings and finishes in the area of gun barrels should be durable to withstand the effect of exiting projectile shockwaves.
WBAY-22 The proximity of the gun blast deflector to structure should not require reliance on high-temperature paints or coatings to
protect the structure.
WT&B-07 Landing gear caution and warning systems should contain both initiated and periodic BIT and be capable of fault-isolating
to each component in the system.
WT&B-15 Anti-skid and anti-lock brake systems should contain periodic and initiated BIT. All components, including speed sensors,
comparators, wiring, connectors, control boxes, etc., should be included in the BIT system.
2.11 Preventive Maintenance A-09 Any heat or temperature sensitive structure within a compartment should contain heat-sensitive tape or appropriate heat
sensor for easy indication of over-temperature excursions.
A-16 Structural design should provide good access to corrosion-prone areas for inspection and treatment.
A-17 All structural fasteners in an access door or panel should be of identical grip and diameter. In rare cases where this is not
possible, fasteners of different grip must have different diameters to prevent a shorter fastener being substituted for the
correct, longer fastener.
A-18 Use transparent windows, quick-opening covers, or openings without any cover to permit quick visual inspections where
needed.
ACS-06 Do not try to achieve high reliability by requiring frequent visual inspections or scheduled replacement at predetermined
calendar or operating hour intervals.
BIT-05 Incorporate testability design features as an integral part of equipment preliminary design process.
C-01 Avoid swivel type connectors and fittings for air, fuel, or hydraulic line interfaces due to their history of low reliability.
C-02 Provide spacing between parallel plumbing runs so that in-line couplings can be replaced without removing lines or
disconnecting any line support devices.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

CONT-01 Control rods should use Boyd or impedance type bolts (or equivalent) to eliminate the need for cotter pins or safety wire.
CREW-04 Avoid wiring, coax, and plumbing penetrations through the floor of crew cabs, operators' compartments, crew stations,
cockpits, and passenger compartments.
CREW-05 Structural instrument panels, dashboards, and control panels should be modularized for easy and adequate access to all
interfaces, to simplify manufacturing, and to reduce maintenance-induced problems.
D&V-01 The geometric aspects of structural design and interfaces should not result in any natural bathtubs.
D&V-02 Closed structural sections subject to condensation or fluid migration should contain drainage provisions.
D&V-03 Crew cabs, operators' compartments, crew stations, cockpits, and passenger compartments should be subject to the same
corrosion prevention measures as the exteriors of the vehicles. Low points, pockets, and related fluid collection points

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
within should be provided with low point drains.

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

EC-06 All electrical connectors should be corrosion resistant to reduce or eliminate the need for scheduled inspections or
corrosion prevention measures.
EC-07 Avoid using electrical connectors requiring any type or form of soldering.
EC-08 Locate and position electrical connectors such that all pin identification for either half can be easily seen.

C-108
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
2.11 Preventive Maintenance EC-11 Avoid connectors requiring potting as a method for environmental protection due to lengthy repair time and tendency for
potting compound reversion.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

EC-15 The removal or replacement of electronic equipment should not require the removal of any other piece of equipment or
armament.
ECS-01 Design so that equipment servicing status are accessible and readable from the ground level for air vehicles and from the
operator's position for ground and water vehicles.
ECS-21 Do not locate ground cooling or circulation fans that operate at high noise levels in operator, crew, or passenger
compartments.
ENG(G)-16 Do not locate batteries in the engine compartment. In those instances where this is not possible:
- The battery support structure should be of a material that is impervious to acid leakage or boil-over.
- The battery support structure should serve as a scupper to collect and direct the acid out of the engine compartment
ENG(G)-18 Incorporate appropriate sensors to enhance the diagnostic and prognostic capabilities for the following:
- Oil temperature - Fuel filter bypass
- Oil pressure - Coolant pressure
- Oil filter bypass - Coolant level
- Oil cooler bypass valve position - Coolant temperature
- Oil level - Vibration pickups
- Oil return line particle count - Chip detector
ENG(G)-19 Paint engine compartments gloss white to enhance light reflectivity and enhance fluid leak detection.
ENG-01 All facets of engine design should take advantage of Electrostatic Engine Monitoring Systems (EEMS) and Inductive
Debris Monitoring (IDM) toward achievement of on-condition maintenance and engine health monitoring.
ENG-02 Each different component of rotating machinery should contain different tracer elements to enhance EEMS and IDM
isolation and tracking of wear.
ENG-03 Digital electronic controls, fully automatic digital electronic controls, and similar concepts should contain the highest
degree of BIT and diagnostics commensurate with affordability, operation and maintenance, and life cycle costs as
appropriate.
ENG-06 All other engine surfaces and engine-mounted accessory surfaces should be free of pockets, channels, and bathtubs that
could trap and retain fluids.
ENG-13 Engine oil systems should contain on-board spectrometric oil analysis devices located on the engine.
ENG-20 Do not locate equipment or components in the engine cavity except for those components associated with the engine or
engine installation.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

ENG-21 Do not locate equipment or components in the engine bay cavity in a manner that would require removal or repositioning
for engine removal.
ENG-23 All engine borescope provisions should be accessible with the engine installed and hooked up.
ENG-35 No time-change components or scheduled actions should be planned solely to protect component integrity or reliability.
ENG-36 All borescope mechanisms should have positive integral locking features.
ENG-38 The characteristics of engine-to-vehicle interfaces coupled with the capabilities of electronic engine controls, should
negate the necessity for making any type of engine rigging including maximum power, idle, and idle cut-off.
ENG-49 Design engine fuel and oil filters with integral locking features so they can be installed and removed by hand, and require
no torquing.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
ENG-50 Design engine fuel and oil filter delta pressure indicators so they can be reset only from within the filter housing.

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

ENG-51 Provide engine fuel and oil filters with anti-surge protection to ensure false delta pressure indications do not occur.
ENG-52 Incorporate provisions to enable very slow rotation of the fan, compressor, and turbine during borescope inspections.
ENG-53 Design magnetic chip detectors to ensure that oil shut-off will occur as the detector is being removed for visual
inspection.
ENG-54 Incorporate provisions for fuzz burn-off. in magnetic chip detectors.

C-109
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
2.11 Preventive Maintenance ENV-01 Materials, treatments, coatings, finishes should be compatible with all anti-ice and de-ice fluids, chemical and biological
decontamination fluids, washing and cleaning fluids, and all vehicle subsystem fluids.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

ENV-02 There should be no top coat or treatment deterioration throughout the standard temperature and humidity spectrum.
ENV-03 For airborne vehicles, the finishes should be durable against rain, hail, and dynamic erosion throughout the flight
envelope.
ENV-04 For airborne and ground vehicles, the finishes should be durable against sand erosion throughout all surface wind speeds
experienced in arid or desert geographical locations.
ENV-05 For airborne vehicles, materials and all finishes with the engine inlet should be durable against hammer shock and
compressor stalls.
ENV-06 For ground vehicles, the finishes should be compatible with and durable against all rain, hail, sleet, snow, and ice
conditions experienced in all intended operational environments.
ENV-07 The finishes and surfaces should be capable of low velocity impact (LVI) of 10 foot-pounds with no visual or detectable
damage with a design goal of 30 foot-pounds.
EXH-01 Treatments required for engine hot sections and exhaust areas should not require scheduled removals for the purposes of
recoating.
EXH-02 High temperature exhaust patterns should flow away from or be directed away from treated surrounding structure,
coatings, or finishes.
HYD-08 Design hydraulic pumps and motors with tracer elements to detect wear through on-board spectrometric oil analysis
devices.
HYD-11 Design flexible hose with molded-in color bands to clearly indicate when the maximum wear/abrasion has been reached.
IN-01 Low Observable (LO) engine face frames should be within 10 inches of the first stage fan or compressor blades.
IN-02 Openings throughout the engine face frame should be sufficient to perform a 100% FOD inspection of the engine face.
IN-03 Openings throughout the engine face frame should be sufficient to permit minor blending or repair of FOD without
removing the engine.
IN-04 For frames not integral with the engine, frame removal should be achievable from the engine cavity.
IN-05 Both integral and remote engine front frames should be interchangeable.
IN-06 Front frame anti-ice and de-ice provisions should give preference to engine hot bleed air.
LG-01 Bearings, excluding wheel bearings, should not require lubrication during the expected life of the air vehicle airframe.
LG-04 Do not use Beryllium and Beryllium base alloys in any location subject to wear or corrosive atmospheres or in installations
where machining may be required.
LG-06 Design struts, attachments, and interfaces so they do not depend on scheduled visual inspections, non-destructive

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

inspection (NDI), or non-destructive test (NDT) to ensure the reliability or integrity of the system in the operational
environment.
LG-07 No portion of the landing gear struts, drag braces, or interfaces should contain pockets or bathtubs that can trap or hold
moisture. In rare instances where this is not possible, holes should be drilled as appropriate to prevent moisture/liquid
accumulation.
LG-15 No portion of the landing gear closure door(s) should be attached to the strut. In rare instances where this may not be
possible, that attached portion should not require alignment or rigging.
LG-26 Gravitational emergency extension of landing gear should be given preference over all other concepts.
LG-29 Basic gear design combined with manufacturing tolerances should ensure that no uplock or downlock rigging is required.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
LO-02 Avoid scheduled forced inspections or replacement of materials, coatings, or finishes solely to protect either the reliability

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

or the signature.
OXY-01 System should contain automatic BIT for warning indicators to eliminate dedicated test switches and/or test requirements.
OXY-03 Provide condition sensors for oxygen concentrators to eliminate periodic and/or forced replacement.
OXY-11 System operational and service condition status should be capable of being downlinked to centralized maintenance
facilities.

C-110
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
2.11 Preventive Maintenance P-04 Door and panel seals should be compatible with all types of on-board servicing fluids, de-ice and anti-ice fluids, and all
fluids used for chemical, biological, and nuclear decontamination.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

P-05 Piano type hinges should not be used on doors or panels because they are subject to wear, corrosion, and sand and fluid
entry.
PYRO-12 Design of weapons, flare/chaff packages, and airborne pyrotechnic containers should follow the "wooden round" design
concept to eliminate scheduled tests, checks, and inspections throughout its intended life cycle.
PYRO-16 Do not use cartridge actuated devices (CADs) for store or weapon ejection or for pylon jettison due to inherent ground
safety hazards, stray energy hazards, and scheduled cleaning requirements.
SABCH-13 No structural design concept should rely on frequent scheduled inspections to monitor or otherwise ensure structural
integrity.
SE-07 The design construction concept and material selection for support equipment structure should not rely or depend upon
the use of scheduled maintenance, NDI, or NDT to protect the durability or integrity of the equipment in the operational
environment.
SEAT-01 Design personnel seats and padding materials, including the covers and fillers, so they are incapable of creating or
emitting toxic fumes or dense smoke when subjected to fire.
SEAT-02 Design personnel seats and padding materials so they are incapable of absorbing and holding fluids.
SEAT-06 Do not use seat removal as a means of access.
SKID-04 Design pneumatic floats with an integral air gage located adjacent to the air fill fitting.
SURV-03 Survival gear containerization or storage should have a minimum twelve-month period between scheduled tests, checks,
or replacements.
TCR-01 For each transmission, clutch, or rotor, provide a dedicated lubricating oil supply tank and system that is not shared with
any other oil lubricating system.
TCR-02 Provide each dedicated oil supply system with a separate servicing port/interface, pressure gauging, and quantity gauging
system as applicable.
TCR-03 Use a singular gage capable of reading pressures or quantities from two or more lubricating systems in preference to
individual gages.
TCR-04 Provide each dedicated system with an on-board spectrometric oil analysis program capability, separate oil filter, and
separate oil, fuel, or air heat exchanger capability.
TCR-05 Use the item's self-contained oil system to provide drive/interface spline lubrication, if required.
TCR-06 In complex units, use different tracer elements in multiple gears, plates, discs, etc., so the source of wear can be easily
identified by spectrometric oil analysis monitoring units.
TCR-07 Design mechanical interfaces to transmissions, clutches, and rotors so that the respective unit can be replaced without the

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

need for rigging.
TCR-08 Incorporate vibration pick-up sensors to isolate the respective unit from other potential sources of vibration, and to
enhance the prognostic potential for monitoring equipment health.
WBAY-20 Gun plugs required solely to maintain a given signature level should be capable of on-board stowage for use only when a
threat requires their presence.
WIND-01 Optical window materials should be scratch resistant, easy to clean, and dissipate electrostatic charges.
WIND-02 Optic windows should be located for ease of inspection, cleaning, and induced damage potential from personnel or
support equipment.
WIND-03 Window locations should minimize the effects of contamination by salt spray, bugs, oils, fuels, and icing.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
WIND-04 Window, canopy, and windshield material should be designed to withstand the effects of sandstorms in the ground
environment and the effects of rain and hail during thunderstorm penetration in the airborne environment.
WIND-05 Design interior surfaces to be reachable for cleaning without reliance on hinging, equipment removal, or use of support
equipment.
WIND-06 Do not locate windows in the proximity of rooster tails created by wheels/tires passing through water or slush.

C-111
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
2.11 Preventive Maintenance WIND-11 For dome-shaped optic window concepts, the dome should be easily removable for cleaning without affecting LO
integrity.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

WT&B-14 Wheel assemblies should contain built-in dial type pressure gages.
2.11.1 Environmental Factors A-01 Seal equipment bays and compartments against the environmental elements including all types of servicing fluids used for
the vehicle, all types of anti-ice and de-ice fluids, and all types of fluids used for chemical, biological, or nuclear
decontamination
A-09 Any heat or temperature sensitive structure within a compartment should contain heat-sensitive tape or appropriate heat
sensor for easy indication of over-temperature excursions.
A-11 Locate compartment electrical penetrations close to the access opening for ease of sight, probing, repair, and to eliminate
fluid soaking, wicking, or contamination.
A-12 Locate compartment electrical penetrations far enough from the access opening to prevent damage resulting from
improper (over-length) panel fasteners.
A-16 Structural design should provide good access to corrosion-prone areas for inspection and treatment.
A-18 Use transparent windows, quick-opening covers, or openings without any cover to permit quick visual inspections where
needed.
AA&S-02 Closure and sealing of cavities, compartments, and wells for retractable antennas should be mechanized to function as
part of the extend and retract cycle.
AA&S-03 Closure and sealing of cavities, compartments, and wells for retractable antennas should be maintained when antennas
are not installed without need for ancillary measures or equipment.
AA&S-04 LO antennas should be designed to be tolerant of accumulations of grime or dirt without degrading performance or
biasing the BIT/fault isolate performance.
ACS-01 Design air cushion skirt surfaces to be highly resistant to high velocity blowing sand and stones.
ACS-02 Design skirt surfaces to the same operational and environmental criteria as that identified for low observable surfaces.
ACS-07 Design skirt repair kits and select materials for the kits so they are not subject to a predetermined shelf-life or special
storage requirements.
ARM-13 Do not locate magnesium fittings or structure in the motor plume of rail-launched missiles.
CBR-01 Orient all vehicle liquid servicing fittings to ensure fluids will not come in contact with protective garb during
connect/disconnect activities.
CBR-02 Ensure vehicle overboard passive liquid drains are clearly marked or visible to enable personnel to remain clear of area.
CBR-03 Design fuel cell drains so they can not be activated in a manner that would allow fuel to come in contact with a protected
hand.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

CBR-04 Design emergency ingress provisions so they can be activated by a 95 percentile male wearing full protective chemical
or biological protection gear.
CBR-05 Size rescue doors, panels, and "cut here" areas to accommodate the 95 percentile shoulder width wearing full protective
chemical or biological protection gear.
CBR-06 Consider the reduction in peripheral vision resulting from wearing chemical or biological protection gear when designing
intended fire paths and crash rescue paths into a vehicle.
CC-11 Orient spare wires and cable pigtails along the outer diameter or periphery of connectors to make access easier.
CC-12 Build up and assemble straight and angle connector shells or back shells in a manner that ensures that wire or cable strain
or wear is not possible.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
CONT-02 Do not use metal control cables for vehicles that will operate in salt water or salt air environments.

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

D&V-01 The geometric aspects of structural design and interfaces should not result in any natural bathtubs.
D&V-02 Closed structural sections subject to condensation or fluid migration should contain drainage provisions.
D&V-03 Crew cabs, operators' compartments, crew stations, cockpits, and passenger compartments should be subject to the same
corrosion prevention measures as the exteriors of the vehicles. Low points, pockets, and related fluid collection points
within should be provided with low point drains.

C-112
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
2.11.1 Environmental Factors EC-06 All electrical connectors should be corrosion resistant to reduce or eliminate the need for scheduled inspections or
corrosion prevention measures.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

EC-07 Avoid using electrical connectors requiring any type or form of soldering.
EC-08 Locate and position electrical connectors such that all pin identification for either half can be easily seen.
EC-11 Avoid connectors requiring potting as a method for environmental protection due to lengthy repair time and tendency for
potting compound reversion.
EC-12 Electrical penetrations into a compartment should not be on a vertical axis to ensure foreign matter does not enter
connector.
EC-18 All electric connectors should be environment resistant.
EC-20 Use quick disconnect connectors where allowed and identify all pins on each connector.
ECS-12 Design air inlets, outlets, and exhausts with screens to prevent bird or rodent entry.
ECS-14 Instances where air inlets, outlets, and exhausts are subject to water entry, passive drains should be employed capable of
handling 4" of rain per hour.
ECS-18 Avoid the use of insulation blankets containing polyvinyl for any application due to the dense smoke and toxic fumes if
burned or subjected to high temperature bleed air leakage.
ECS-27 Use temperature-limiting devices with high temperature air systems to ensure no single or combination of surface wind,
cross wind, ground operation or flight operation will damage windshields, canopies, windows or optics.
EDECOM-01 Provide surface sensors on equipment located in compartments containing louvers, screens, flush inlets, or similar
openings to the environment to indicate the presence of chem/bio contaminants.
EDECOM-02 Provide integral sensors (viewable from the exterior) for equipment subject to internal forced-air cooling from outside or
external air to indicate the presence of contaminants.
EDECOM-03 Design equipment surfaces and structure to be compatible with all decontamination agents and methods.
EDECOM-04 Provide passive overboard drains in compartments subject to decontamination processes to void the area of contaminants.
EDECOM-05 Provide hoist, lift or transport handles for equipment requiring removal from the host vehicle for decontamination. In
instances where this may not be practical, design the equipment with hardpoints for attaching parasitic carrying provisions
ENG(G)-01 Provide access to all engine mounts for ground vehicles so that hoisting or crawling under the vehicle is not required.
ENG(G)-16 Do not locate batteries in the engine compartment. In those instances where this is not possible:
- The battery support structure should be of a material that is impervious to acid leakage or boil-over.
- The battery support structure should serve as a scupper to collect and direct the acid out of the engine compartment.
ENG-06 All other engine surfaces and engine-mounted accessory surfaces should be free of pockets, channels, and bathtubs that
could trap and retain fluids.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

ENG-46 Design the basic engine and engine-mounted accessory interface so that no fluid traps or bathtubs exist regardless of
engine-mounted accessory location.
ENG-47 Design the engine, including all accessories, plumbing, wiring, ducts, and mechanisms, to meet the same environmental
protection and compatibility requirements as the host vehicle.
ENG-48 Do not drain or dump residual fuel in the engine fuel control/manifold overboard. When it is not possible to follow this
guideline, route the fuel to an engine-mounted collector tank capable of retaining fuel from two shutdowns.
ENV-01 Materials, treatments, coatings, finishes should be compatible with all anti-ice and de-ice fluids, chemical and biological
decontamination fluids, washing and cleaning fluids, and all vehicle subsystem fluids.
ENV-02 There should be no top coat or treatment deterioration throughout the standard temperature and humidity spectrum.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
ENV-03 For airborne vehicles, the finishes should be durable against rain, hail, and dynamic erosion throughout the flight

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

envelope.
ENV-04 For airborne and ground vehicles, the finishes should be durable against sand erosion throughout all surface wind speeds
experienced in arid or desert geographical locations.
ENV-05 For airborne vehicles, materials and all finishes with the engine inlet should be durable against hammer shock and
compressor stalls.

C-113
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
2.11.1 Environmental Factors EXH-01 Treatments required for engine hot sections and exhaust areas should not require scheduled removals for the purposes of
recoating.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

EXH-02 High temperature exhaust patterns should flow away from or be directed away from treated surrounding structure,
coatings, or finishes.
EXTING-01 Use extinguishing concepts dedicated to each individual fire zone in preference to manifold systems operating from a
central source.
FUEL-01 Locate fuel vent and dump masts to ensure exiting fuel will be clear of servicing, loading, arming and safing areas for all
types of ground and airborne vehicles.
HYD-05 Design protective caps or covers over service fittings with steel cable lanyards to prevent loss and migration in the
vehicle.
IN-06 Front frame anti-ice and de-ice provisions should give preference to engine hot bleed air.
LG-01 Bearings, excluding wheel bearings, should not require lubrication during the expected life of the air vehicle airframe.
LG-04 Do not use Beryllium and Beryllium base alloys in any location subject to wear or corrosive atmospheres or in installations
where machining may be required.
LG-07 No portion of the landing gear struts, drag braces, or interfaces should contain pockets or bathtubs that can trap or hold
moisture. In rare instances where this is not possible, holes should be drilled as appropriate to prevent moisture/liquid
accumulation.
LG-11 All microswitches, proximity switches, lights, sensors, etc. mounted to a strut should have individual interface connectors.
Wiring pigtails requiring in-line splices should be avoided.
LG-21 Proximity type switches used in landing gear design should meet a minimum of 200 volt-amperes to eliminate
Electromagnetic Interference (EMI) or Radiation Hazard (RADHAD) problems. Wiring associated with the landing gear
design should meet the same requirements.
LG-30 Do not use landing gear wells to locate any type of auxiliary air inlet.
LO-01 Use LO compatible gap fillers for manufactured gaps in lieu of tape and butter (surface coating compound).
LO-02 Avoid scheduled forced inspections or replacement of materials, coatings, or finishes solely to protect either the reliability
or the signature.
LO-03 Equipment and support structure requiring shrouds to reduce radar returns should not cause increases in equipment
service/repair time.
LO-06 Size flush mounted LO screens for auxiliary air inlets and exits to ensure functionality with up to 25 percent of the
openings plugged.
LO-07 Flush and non-flush LO screens should be interchangeable.
MATL-02 Cosmetic type repairs should not exceed 1 hours including cure or drying times.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

MATL-03 Cosmetic and vehicle repair material shelf life should not be less than 24 months.
MATL-05 Cosmetic and vehicle repair materials should not require refrigeration or special facilities or atmospheres for storage.
MATL-07 All cosmetic touch-up and repair materials should be environmentally safe.
MATL-08 Repairs (other than major depot repair) should not require autoclave type facilities.
MATL-09 A high degree of durability should be achieved across all walkway areas on the top surfaces of all vehicles up to and
including 95 percentile personnel.
MATL-10 Coatings and finishes should be durable against the effects of missile gases, velocities, and particles emanating from the
missile motor.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
MATL-11 Coatings and finishes should be durable against the effects of gun gases, projectile shock waves, and brass particles

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

emanating from the projectile seal rings.
MATL-12 Leading edge materials and coatings should be durable against fragments from frangible gun port plugs.
MP-03 Design modules so that lengthy warm-up times, special coding and air purity levels, and similar constraints are not
necessary.
OXY-02 Provide sensors to denote occurrence of On-Board Oxygen Generating Systems (OBOGS) bleed air over temperature.

C-114
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
2.11.1 Environmental Factors P-03 All doors and panels subject to environmental elements should contain form-in-place seals (or equivalent) attached to the
door structure, not substructure, to prevent damage during maintenance.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

P-04 Door and panel seals should be compatible with all types of on-board servicing fluids, de-ice and anti-ice fluids, and all
fluids used for chemical, biological, and nuclear decontamination.
P-05 Piano type hinges should not be used on doors or panels because they are subject to wear, corrosion, and sand and fluid
entry.
PYRO-07 Manual "safe/arm" mechanisms should be well-clear of inlet ducts, propellers, rotors, and similar rotating components.
PYRO-13 Container design for shipping, handling, and storing weapons, flares, chaff, and similar devices should not require special
atmospheres.
PYRO-26 Do not locate ammunition loader interfaces close to inlets, exhausts, fuel dumps and drains, antennas, sensors, lights, or
hazardous protrusions.
PYRO-34 Weapon bay door seals should be bonded or attached to door structure to minimize induced seal damage during weapon
or store loading.
SAFE-03 Stored energy devices (e.g., accumulators, nitrogen bottles, gas generators, etc.), that could cause injury, harm, or
damage if inadvertently actuated, should contain integral safing provisions.
SE-02 Wheel chocks for airborne vehicles should also contain the following features:
- Contain provisions for securing to ramp or flight decks
- Contain provisions to secure chocks at wheels
- Releasable/removable from outside of hot brake envelope
- Contain provisions to enable chock to be used as a tire blowout device
- Contain provisions to prevent skidding on snow or ice
SE-03 Wheel chock design guideline discussion. Wheel chocks have historically contributed to numerous accidents and
incidents across the entire design spectrum, yet have received the least design attention of any ground handling/support
equipment. Directly and indirectly, poorly designed chocks have:
- Resulted in numerous "jumping the chocks" incidents due to improper use or positioning, and improper chock sizing for
the tire size/power application. Some instances result in destruction of the aircraft.
- Resulted in vehicle movement/sliding across wet, snowy and icy surfaces as a result of improper grip.
- Resulted in unwarranted tire damage and/or engine FOD.
- Resulted in tertiary damage to other vehicles or ground equipment as a result of being blown about by jet/propeller
blast.
- Damaged surfaces due to temporary placement of chocks on vehicle surfaces during vehicle movement.
- Resulted in personnel sliver/s abrasions (wooden chocks) and cuts (metal chocks) even when chocks were in decent
useable condition.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

- Resulted in varied personnel ground accidents during attempts to use chocks as a temporary work stand.
- Lost aircraft "over the side" on carriers.
SE-04 Gun port covers or plugs should be lightweight, 100% effective, and easy to install or store.
SE-08 Support legs, posts, arms for ladders and workstands should contain integral non-skid devices for safe use on ice or snow.
SEAT-01 Design personnel seats and padding materials, including the covers and fillers, so they are incapable of creating or
emitting toxic fumes or dense smoke when subjected to fire.
SEAT-02 Design personnel seats and padding materials so they are incapable of absorbing and holding fluids.
SIMP-01 Location and design of all exterior lights should not require protective covers in ground environments.
SIMP-02 Landing and taxi lights should be mounted on landing gear struts or doors to eliminate separate compartments, doors, and

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
retraction/extension mechanisms.

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

SKID-01 Design non-metallic floats to be impervious to all fluids used on board the host vehicle.
SKID-02 Design non-metallic floats to be highly resistant to scuffing and abrasion.
SKID-03 Design non-metallic floats with a color-coded inner ply to readily denote when maximum abrasion limits have been
reached.
SKID-05 Design metallic and composite floats and skids to the same environmental criteria as the airframe, including finishes.

C-115
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
2.11.1 Environmental Factors SKID-07 Design floats with simple drain provisions for each compartment.
T-04 Provide protective closure provisions for PGA exits located or oriented to exposure from the elements.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

WBAY-03 The method and position of the pylon-to-wing gap scale should not form a drip edge for leakage into the pylon cavity.
WBAY-04 The gap treatment should be a permanent installation on the pylon, wing, or both, not a separate seal.
WBAY-05 Gap treatment should not interfere with or be damaged by existing pylon handling support equipment.
WBAY-06 Pylon rigging should not be required for gap seal control.
WBAY-07 Gap seal should not degrade interchangeability of pylon.
WBAY-08 Gap seal and treatment should be fully compatible with steam from carrier catapults.
WBAY-09 Gap seal/pylon should not cover or hamper access to low point wing drains.
WBAY-10 No loose hardware should exist before or after pylon is installed.
WBAY-11 Gap seal should match pylon and wing/fuselage surface impedance.
WBAY-12 Pylon-to-store/weapon gap seal should permit visual and physical access during loading for all interfaces between bomb
rack-to-store, bomb rack-to-launcher, and launcher-to-store.
WBAY-13 Pylon-to-store/weapon gap seal should not interfere with automatic sway brace function.
WBAY-14 Pylon-to-store/weapon gap seal should permit physical access to lanyards.
WBAY-15 Gap seals should not hinder pilot or ground crew preflight inspection.
WBAY-16 Gap seals should not degrade loading while wearing arctic or chemical, biological, or radiation protective clothing.
WBAY-17 Special coatings or conductive paints on pylons, launchers, racks, launchers, tanks, pods, etc. should have the durability to
withstand contact with support stands/cradles during storage.
WBAY-18 The proximity of the gun firing barrel to structure should be such that structural furrows or channels are not required for
projectile clearances during firing.
WBAY-21 Coatings and finishes in the area of gun barrels should be durable to withstand the effect of exiting projectile shockwaves.
WBAY-22 The proximity of the gun blast deflector to structure should not require reliance on high-temperature paints or coatings to
protect the structure.
WIND-01 Optical window materials should be scratch resistant, easy to clean, and dissipate electrostatic charges.
WIND-02 Optic windows should be located for ease of inspection, cleaning, and induced damage potential from personnel or
support equipment.
WIND-03 Window locations should minimize the effects of contamination by salt spray, bugs, oils, fuels, and icing.
WIND-04 Window, canopy, and windshield material should be designed to withstand the effects of sandstorms in the ground
environment and the effects of rain and hail during thunderstorm penetration in the airborne environment.
WIND-05 Design interior surfaces to be reachable for cleaning without reliance on hinging, equipment removal, or use of support

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

equipment.
WIND-07 Use materials that are highly resistive to thermal shock.
WT&B-06 Locate brake anti-skid system components, including brake control valves, for easy access in low-vibration environments.
WT&B-16 Do not use potting compounds for electrical connector environmental protection because it tends to revert and
significantly increases repair time.
WT&B-17 Electrical connector environmental protection should be capable of withstanding water pressure streams up to 120 psi
encountered during decontamination, wash, etc.
3.01 Connections A-07 Paint equipment bay and compartment interiors a high gloss white to maximize lighting reflectivity, visibility, and rapid
leak detection capability.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
A-10 Provide a sufficient number of compartment fluid drains to ensure fluid drainage for varying aircraft static attitudes and
varying terrain slopes for ground vehicles.
A-11 Locate compartment electrical penetrations close to the access opening for ease of sight, probing, repair, and to eliminate
fluid soaking, wicking, or contamination.

C-116
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.01 Connections A-12 Locate compartment electrical penetrations far enough from the access opening to prevent damage resulting from
improper (over-length) panel fasteners.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

A-13 Two-sided or two-surfaced access should not be required for access to equipment interfaces and hardpoints. The term
two-sided infers top/bottom, left/right, front/back, or combinations thereof.
A-14 Do not locate nutplates or gang channels in inaccessible areas that would require extensive disassembly or equipment
removal to gain access.
A-15 Locate tie-down attachment points such that tie-down chains, straps, or cables do not prevent or restrict normal servicing,
weapon loading, or safe/arm functions.
BIT-05 Incorporate testability design features as an integral part of equipment preliminary design process.
BIT-06 Mission critical functions should be monitored by BIT.
BIT-09 Use concurrent BIT to monitor system critical functions.
BIT/BITE-02 Design EMI protection to eliminate finger type EMI contact devices.
C-01 Avoid swivel type connectors and fittings for air, fuel, or hydraulic line interfaces due to their history of low reliability.
C-02 Provide spacing between parallel plumbing runs so that in-line couplings can be replaced without removing lines or
disconnecting any line support devices.
CBR-01 Orient all vehicle liquid servicing fittings to ensure fluids will not come in contact with protective garb during
connect/disconnect activities.
CC-01 Use fiber-optic technologies in preference to conventional interconnect concepts to reduce the number of
interconnects/interfaces, reduce manufacturing and ownership costs, and significantly improve R&M.
CC-02 Standardize connector and wire types to improve testability and logistic support. Keep the number of "different" standard
connectors to a minimum. Use the same connector type keyed differently where possible.
CC-03 Provide clearance around connectors for engagement/disengagement of cables and proper connector orientation under
anticipated environmental conditions (e.g., bare hand of 50 percentile male in an enclosed or protected environment and
a gloved hand of a 50 percentile male in an open or unprotected environment).
CC-04 Use quick release cables and locate cables to make removal and replacement easy and to avoid having to remove one
cable to gain access to another. Provide adequate space for cables, including sleeving and tie-downs, and adequate
service loops for ease of assembly/disassembly
CC-05 Orient and space connectors to allow a sufficient grip on the connector for cable or wire extraction without fear of using
the wiring or cable for additional leverage.
CC-06 Label, and where possible color code, each wire in a harness or cable to facilitate tracking from origin to termination.
Each wire, cable, and coax-to-connector interface should be provided with a source of identification to aidin trouble
shooting, repair, or modification. Marking the cable designator on the cable along with bar codes is also recommended.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

CC-07 Do not manufacture or dress connectors containing more than 25 wires or cables as a single integrated harness. Group
the wires or cables into runs of no more than 25 wires or cables each. In addition to making trouble shooting and repair
easier, this approach help avoid large bend radii, thereby simplifying routing, packaging, and stowage.
CC-08 Standardize connector pin assignments for power, ground, and other frequently used signals.
CC-09 Locate LRU/subsystem critical nodes (and or test points) so they are accessible from a connector to prevent the need for
internal LRU probing or access.
CC-10 Avoid hidden cables. Visually inspecting and tracing all assembly cables rather than having hidden cables (such as
behind other cables or even LRUs) allows for a quick system and cable integrity check which aids in overall system
integrity and debug. This also implies quick access for manipulative actions.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
CONT-01 Control rods should use Boyd or impedance type bolts (or equivalent) to eliminate the need for cotter pins or safety wir e.
CONT-02 Do not use metal control cables for vehicles that will operate in salt water or salt air environments.
CONT-03 Use control rods rather than control cables for non-complex applications and non-complex routing within the vehicle.
CONT-04 Use control cables rather than control rods for most complex applications.
CONT-05 Route cables so that 100 percent of a cable will be viewable for inspection.

C-117
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.01 Connections CONT-06 Design all pulleys and brackets associated with cable installations so they are accessible by a 75 percentile male hand.
CREW-04 Avoid wiring, coax, and plumbing penetrations through the floor of crew cabs, operators' compartments, crew stations,

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

cockpits, and passenger compartments.
EC-01 A threaded electrical connector should contain integral locking mechanisms and visual indications that the connector is
properly seated and locked.
EC-02 An electrical connector requiring less than one full turn to connect or disconnect should contain integral locking
mechanisms and visual indications that the connector is properly seated and locked.
EC-03 A push-pull electrical connector (excluding rack-and-panel type) should contain integral locking features and visual
indication that the connector is properly seated and locked.
EC-04 All electrical connectors should be keyed or asymmetrically shaped to ensure proper alignment.
EC-05 All electrical connectors should contain scoop-proof shells to ensure pin damage will not occur prior to engaging key
way.
EC-06 All electrical connectors should be corrosion resistant to reduce or eliminate the need for scheduled inspections or
corrosion prevention measures.
EC-07 Avoid using electrical connectors requiring any type or form of soldering.
EC-08 Locate and position electrical connectors such that all pin identification for either half can be easily seen.
EC-09 Electrical connectors selected for critical applications on ground vehicles should be both accessible and capable of being
connected disconnected by a fifty percentile gloved male hand.
EC-10 Separation between grouped electrical connectors should be sufficient to ensure make or break of any connector by a
fifty percentile gloved male hand. Where this is not possible, an alternate method should be used such as the use of stand-
offs, long-shelled connectors alternated with standard connectors, 180-degree connectors alternated with 90-degree
connectors, or innovative equivalents.
EC-11 Avoid connectors requiring potting as a method for environmental protection due to lengthy repair time and tendency for
potting compound reversion.
EC-12 Electrical penetrations into a compartment should not be on a vertical axis to ensure foreign matter does not enter
connector.
EC-13 Electrical, electronic, and coaxial interfaces between fixed and moveable surfaces should contain quick disconnects to
simplify replacement of the moveable surface or the electronic module.
EC-14 Scoop proof connectors should be used throughout unless their use would require an increase in the volume of the
aircraft, in which case deviations will be considered on an individual basis.
EC-15 The removal or replacement of electronic equipment should not require the removal of any other piece of equipment or
armament.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

EC-16 Select connectors so that contacts on the "live" or "hot" side of the connection are socket type rather than pin type to
minimize personnel hazard and to prevent accidental shorting of live circuits.
EC-17 Whenever possible, use self-locking connector plugs of a type not requiring safety wire.
EC-18 All electric connectors should be environment resistant.
EC-19 Connectors containing fiber optic contacts should, whenever possible, be mounted on a vertical surface to prevent
particle and fluid contamination.
EC-20 Use quick disconnect connectors where allowed and identify all pins on each connector.
EC-21 Locate connectors far enough apart so that they meet specified requirements.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
EC-22 All connectors should be keyed differently with aligning pins that extend beyond the electrical pins. Connector pins and

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

sockets should engage after key position is entered.
EC-23 Design connectors so that plugs are cold and receptacles are hot.
EC-24 Use electrical connectors that incorporate alignment key-ways to reduce incidents of damage due to improper
engagement.

C-118
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.01 Connections EC-25 Use positive locking, quick disconnect electrical connectors to save man-hours, prevent foreign object damage (FOD)
and decrease the chance of personal injury.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

EC-26 Avoid using identical electrical connectors in adjacent areas.
ECS-07 Liquid type refrigeration compressors/packages should contain highly reliable quick disconnects to negate servicing or
bleeding subsequent to replacement.
ENG(G)-01 Provide access to all engine mounts for ground vehicles so that hoisting or crawling under the vehicle is not required.
ENG(G)-02 Use torque-limiting bolts or torque washers as engine mount attaching hardware to eliminate the need for torque
wrenches.
ENG(G)-03 Design hard points for hoisting or positioning the engine during installation and removal to be integral to the engine and
capable of hoisting and supporting a fully-built-up engine package.
ENG(G)-04 Do not use downward engine removal concepts that require jacking or hoisting of the ground vehicle.
ENG(G)-05 Use concepts for removing ground vehicle engines from the front, rear, or side rather than from overhead (using
hoisting).
ENG(G)-06 The distance between the engine and firewall should ensure the access envelopes to lines, fittings, wiring, and
adjustments will accommodate the 75 percentile male hand.
ENG(G)-07 The distance between the cooling fan and radiator core should ensure that access envelopes will not require removal of
the core.
ENG(G)-08 The interface of the engine assembly to the engine compartment and structure should be designed to ensure all spark
plugs, glo-plugs, and igniters can be replaced within 30 minutes elapsed time.
ENG(G)-10 Design attaching hardware for all mechanical engine-to-vehicle interfaces to be captive and with integral safeties.
ENG(G)-11 Use "torq-set" type clamps or equivalent in all cooling system hose interfaces to eliminate torque wrenches and the
potential for error.
ENG(G)-12 Provide a clear and viewable access envelope to fuel and oil filters.
ENG(G)-13 Locate fuel filters to ensure no safety hazard will exist due to residual fuel during filter change.
ENG(G)-14 Access envelopes to fuel and oil filters should not be in close proximity to exhaust manifolds or cooling system return
lines.
ENG(G)-15 Any single drive belt (excluding timing belts) should be capable of replacement within 30 minutes elapsed time
ENG(G)-16 Do not locate batteries in the engine compartment. In those instances where this is not possible:
- The battery support structure should be of a material that is impervious to acid leakage or boil-over.
- The battery support structure should serve as a scupper to collect and direct the acid out of the engine compartment.
ENG(G)-17 Install simple, lightweight shields over cooling system return lines to protect personnel from hose or line blowout during

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

maintenance.
ENG(G)-20 Design all firewall fittings, connectors, and penetrations to be fully viewable and directly accessible to the maintainers.
ENG-07 Plumbing and wiring spanning two or more engine modules should contain in-line disconnects to enhance and simplify
engine modularization.
ENG-08 Use V-band clamps to mount accessories to engine-mounted gear boxes.
ENG-09 On multi-engine air vehicles, the engines should be capable of being installed in any engine cavity without need for
reconfiguration.
ENG-10 On multi-engine air vehicles, the airframe-to-engine interfaces should be in identical positions or orientations for each
engine cavity.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
ENG-11 Control-by-wire or control-by-light throttling concepts should take precedence over mechanical controls.

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

ENG-12 All engine-mounted accessories must be capable of being removed and installed through the available airframe access
openings.
ENG-23 All engine borescope provisions should be accessible with the engine installed and hooked up.
ENG-24 Replacement of all ignitors should be possible with the engine installed.

C-119
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.01 Connections ENG-25 All engine-to-airframe plumbing, wiring, and duct interfaces should be capable of being connected or disconnected by
hand, should contain integral safety provisions, and should not require torquing.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

ENG-26 Locate and position engine overheat and fire warning sensors so that damage cannot occur during engine maintenance or
replacement.
ENG-31 No rigging or calibration should be required subsequent to replacement of any engine-mounted component.
ENG-36 All borescope mechanisms should have positive integral locking features.
ENG-38 The characteristics of engine-to-vehicle interfaces coupled with the capabilities of electronic engine controls, should
negate the necessity for making any type of engine rigging including maximum power, idle, and idle cut-off.
ENG-39 Engine-to-vehicle plumbing quick disconnects should contain positive visual indication that the interface is fully seated
and locked.
ENG-41 Use captive fasteners containing self-locking features to attach the nose dome to the engine face. The fasteners should
be fully viewable during engine face FOD inspections.
ENG-42 Attach engine-to-inlet duct interface seals to the vehicle so they can be left in place during engine removal.
ENG-43 Design engine-to-inlet duct seal so the interface is automatic during engine installation without needing any form of
alignment, adjustment, or mechanical attachment interface.
ENG-44 Select engine-to-inlet duct seal material to ensure seal life is sufficient for the life of the vehicle.
ENG-45 Provide remote servicing points accessible from the ground to service engine accessories mounted on top of the engine
(e.g., oil tanks, gear boxes, generators, etc.) to eliminate climbing upon or atop the host vehicle.
ENG-46 Design the basic engine and engine-mounted accessory interface so that no fluid traps or bathtubs exist regardless of
engine-mounted accessory location.
ENG-47 Design the engine, including all accessories, plumbing, wiring, ducts, and mechanisms, to meet the same environmental
protection and compatibility requirements as the host vehicle.
ENG-49 Design engine fuel and oil filters with integral locking features so they can be installed and removed by hand, and require
no torquing.
ENG-50 Design engine fuel and oil filter delta pressure indicators so they can be reset only from within the filter housing.
ENG-51 Provide engine fuel and oil filters with anti-surge protection to ensure false delta pressure indications do not occur.
EXT-01 Locate Tanks, Pods, Containers, and Devices (TPCD's) so they do not block or restrict access to existing vehicle access
areas or access approach envelopes.
EXT-02 Design TPCD's for fuel containment to automatically interface to the host vehicle during installation or removal.
EXT-03 Design TPCD's to be fully compatible with the existing vehicle built-in hoisting provisions and locking devices.
FUEL-04 Where the fuel wetted area inside a fuel cell or tank is void of blade, knife, and hat stiffeners for use as hardpoint

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

attachment, standoffs bonded to the cell surface should be used as attachments for clamps, and brackets to eliminate
fastener penetration of the fuel cavity.
HOOK-01 Locate, orient, and mechanize Nose Gear Tow/Nose Gear Holdback (NGT/NGH) mechanisms so they do not interfere
with the hookup and attachment of standard towbars.
HOOK-02 Design NGT/NGH mechanisms with integral provisions to visually indicate correct hookup/attachment. The indication
must be visible during all day and night carrier operations.
HOOK-03 NGT/NGH mechanisms should not require scheduled visual or NDI type inspections.
HYD-01 For military combat vehicles having two or more hydraulic power systems, provide a minimum 30-inch spacing between
ground power and servicing interfaces to ensure:

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
- Design flexibility in locating and arranging equipment in high-density vehicles such as fighters and helicopters,

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

- Work area separation to enable concurrent service/maintenance on systems,
- Systems vulnerability enhancement,
- Reduction in turn-around elapsed time due to concurrent servicing capability.
HYD-05 Design protective caps or covers over service fittings with steel cable lanyards to prevent loss and migration in the
vehicle.

C-120
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.01 Connections HYD-06 Mount hydraulic pumps to the gear box flange with v-band clamps containing a torq-set or equivalent fastener.
HYD-11 Design flexible hose with molded-in color bands to clearly indicate when the maximum wear/abrasion has been reached.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

IN(V)-01 Design inlet door actuators and door actuation mechanisms so they not protrude into the air inlet flow field to eliminate
FOD potential.
IN(V)-02 Do not use loose structural fasteners in the access area to inlet door actuators and mechanisms. Where this guideline
cannot be followed, design the actuator door to be accessible only when the inlet doors are fully closed.
IN(V)-03 For engine inlet bellmouth fairings, use methods of retention other than fasteners. Latches may be considered as an
acceptable alternative only if latch-to-panel retention is from the inner mold line.
LG-02 Hardpoints for attachment of landing gear trunnions should be capable of carrying all induced gear loads for the life of
the airframe.
LG-03 Hardpoints for attachment for landing gear trunnions should not be machined as an integral part of the airframe structure
when normal design sink rates over 25 feet per second are required.
LG-06 Design struts, attachments, and interfaces so they do not depend on scheduled visual inspections, non-destructive
inspection (NDI), or non-destructive test (NDT) to ensure the reliability or integrity of the system in the operational
environment.
LG-07 No portion of the landing gear struts, drag braces, or interfaces should contain pockets or bathtubs that can trap or hold
moisture. In rare instances where this is not possible, holes should be drilled as appropriate to prevent moisture/liquid
accumulation.
LG-08 Brackets, levers, links, rods, et al mounted on the struts should either be symmetrical to tolerate reverse installation or
should be impossible to reverse.
LG-09 Use coiled tubing in lieu of flex lines or hoses for hydraulic line routing from the airframe to the strut.
LG-10 All wiring or coax mounted to a strut should have appropriate interface connectors to simplify strut removal and
installation.
LG-14 All interfaces from the airframe to the struts should be visible and accessible, and not require removal of airframe
structure for access.
LG-15 No portion of the landing gear closure door(s) should be attached to the strut. In rare instances where this may not be
possible, that attached portion should not require alignment or rigging.
LG-16 No portion of the landing gear rigging process should require support equipment type templates, gauges, or tools. Indexes,
reference points, etc., should be an integral part of the landing gear/airframe design.
LG-18 Landing gear ground safety down locks should be an integral part of the overall design. Use or reliance on loose pins
(support equipment) should be avoided.
LG-19 When deemed necessary for the respective design, pilots, flight crews, or operators should have an indication of the

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

downlock status in the cockpit or crew station to avoid the necessity of a flight abort.
LG-20 Special locks and pins used solely for landing gear ground maintenance safety should be used only in those cases
substantiated by cost effectiveness analysis.
LG-21 Proximity type switches used in landing gear design should meet a minimum of 200 volt-amperes to eliminate
Electromagnetic Interference (EMI) or Radiation Hazard (RADHAD) problems. Wiring associated with the landing gear
design should meet the same requirements.
LG-23 Design strut fittings for servicing nitrogen or hydraulic fluid to be easily accessible and adjacent to the appropriate strut
pressure gage.
LG-24 Design struts so they can be serviced with clean, dry air in lieu of nitrogen during deployments without affecting the

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
overall reliability.

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

LG-25 Mechanical shrink struts, when used, should not permit gear to jam in wheel well if failure of shrink mechanism occurs.
LG-31 Landing gear doors designed to close after gear is extended should be capable of being manually opened on the ground
without reliance on electrical or hydraulic power.
LG-32 Design of landing gear doors normally closed after gear extension should ensure failure modes will not enable
uncommanded opening on the ground.

C-121
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.01 Connections LG-33 Design of landing gear doors normally left open after gear extension should ensure no failure mode will enable closing on
the ground.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

LG-34 Avoid sharp edges and corners on landing gear doors or fairings.
MC-01 All clamps should contain torque-set or torque-limiting connections to prevent clamp or component failure due to over-
torque. Clamp installation call outs should not depend on special tools to establish the required torque values.
MC-02 Avoid the use of cotter pins, safety wire, safety clips, and similar devices to prevent maintenance-induced events leading
to ground vehicle accidents or loss of air vehicles.
MC-03 All tubing connections and interfaces should use rosan/dynatube (or equivalent) to (1) enable connect or disconnect with
one hand, one tool, (2) eliminate the need to safety the connection, (3) provide a superior seal, and (4) negate need to
reposition line(s) during component replacement.
MC-04 No trombone type, flared tube type, or piloted line type interfaces should be used to avoid the need for removal or
repositioning during equipment removal.
MC-05 Avoid potential foreign object traps during manufacturing or operational maintenance by eliminating vertical penetrations
of plumbing/fittings into tanks, compartments, or cells
MC-06 Locate, position, orient all plumbing and duct electrical connectors to prevent the need for sequential installation or
removal.
MC-07 Maximize areas of constant web thickness in firewalls, carry-through bulkheads, major frames, structural ribs, spars,
webs, keels, and close-outs to provide flexibility in locating penetration fittings. Stepped chem milling, stepped machining,
stepped composite layup concepts all tend to result in minimal available surface area for penetrations.
MC-08 All in-line plumbing connections within a fuel tank or cell should be capable of making/breaking the interface by hand,
require no torque, contain integral safety locking mechanisms, and should be void of any requirement for safety wire.
MC-09 All plumbing connections and fittings used for fuel systems should contain integral bonding features to eliminate the need
for bonding clamps or jumper cables.
MC-10 In rare instances where a plumbing run contains complex form or geometry that would require removal of other plumbing
or equipment for access, in-line connectors should be incorporated to maintain the integrity of other plumbing or
equipment.
MC-11 No subsystem plumbing, equipment, or wiring should use a tank, cell, or compartment containing liquids as a means for
routing or penetration simplicity during manufacture.
MC-12 All plumbing and connectors containing liquids should be meniscus-free.
MC-13 In instances where plumbing or connector interfaces cannot or are not keyed for a specific orientation, all identification,
markings, cautions, and directions should be placed 360 degrees around the tube or duct.
MC-14 Where multiple connectors are located in close proximity, ensure (1) a minimum hand tool arc of 120 degrees can be

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

maintained, and (2) stagger fittings to ensure firm coupling interface/hand tool interface can be accomplished without
inducing damage to adjacent lines.
MC-15 Route, orient, and position plumbing, wiring, ducts, and connectors sufficiently away from the outer surface of the vehicle
to preclude induced damage due to minor dents, drill bits during repair, etc. Minimum rule of thumb is 1" away from the
inner surface and 1" below a plate nut channel.
MP-01 Avoid the use epoxies to mount parts on repairable modules because they make repair extremely difficult.
MP-02 Use a unique identification (ID) resistor incorporated in each system module to verify that the proper module is mounted
on ATE.
MP-03 Design modules so that lengthy warm-up times, special coding and air purity levels, and similar constraints are not

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
necessary.

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

PERS-01 Group man-machine interfaces manifold-style to enable connect/disconnect in a single action.
PERS-02 Include an integral, highly visible indicator in a man-machine interface connector to denote connector is seated and
locked.
PERS-03 Design interface connectors so that a distinct action is required by an individual to effect a disconnect. (Excludes
airframe-to-ejection seat personnel interfaces.)

C-122
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.01 Connections PERS-04 Interfaces should contain an emergency release mechanism that can be activated by rescue personnel with a 95
percentile gloved hand.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

PERS-05 Design emergency interface release mechanisms to be clearly visible under all types of lighting situations.
PYRO-14 Design weapon drop and fire/release circuits with frequency-coded firing systems or similar concepts to ensure stray
energy tests and checks will not be required and that stray energy will not impose a safety hazard or problem.
PYRO-15 Pylon-to-weapon and pylon-to-air vehicle electrical interfaces should contain built-in test/fault location capabilities.
PYRO-27 Incorporate integral hoisting provisions at each weapon/store station to enable direct lift from the container or carrier to
the attachment hardpoints.
PYRO-45 Missile ejectors should be provided with repeatable missile motor fire wires to simplify loading and reduce elapsed time.
R-01 Large radomes wherein the combination of the diameter and length exceeds 60" should be top-hinged. Hinge should be
load-carrying to reduce radome retention fastener count.
SABCH-06 Structural design should avoid the potential of dissimilar material or fastener corrosion.
SABCH-07 No structural fasteners should be used that require special tools for installation.
SABCH-08 Taper pins should be threaded and retained with self-locking hardware.
SABCH-09 Pins and collars (lockbolts) should only be used in applications which do not normally require removal.
SABCH-10 Do not use lockbolts in composites.
SIMP-03 Speed brake or speed brake cavity should contain integral mechanical locking mechanism for personnel safety.
SKID-04 Design pneumatic floats with an integral air gage located adjacent to the air fill fitting.
TCR-07 Design mechanical interfaces to transmissions, clutches, and rotors so that the respective unit can be replaced without the
need for rigging.
WBAY-02 Pylon-to-wing electrical or plumbing interfaces should have automatic close-out covers when pylon is jettisoned or not
installed.
WBAY-06 Pylon rigging should not be required for gap seal control.
WBAY-07 Gap seal should not degrade interchangeability of pylon.
WBAY-08 Gap seal and treatment should be fully compatible with steam from carrier catapults.
WBAY-09 Gap seal/pylon should not cover or hamper access to low point wing drains.
WBAY-10 No loose hardware should exist before or after pylon is installed.
WBAY-12 Pylon-to-store/weapon gap seal should permit visual and physical access during loading for all interfaces between bomb
rack-to-store, bomb rack-to-launcher, and launcher-to-store.
WBAY-13 Pylon-to-store/weapon gap seal should not interfere with automatic sway brace function.
WBAY-14 Pylon-to-store/weapon gap seal should permit physical access to lanyards.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

WBAY-16 Gap seals should not degrade loading while wearing arctic or chemical, biological, or radiation protective clothing.
WT&B-09 Brake clips, end plates, retainers, etc. used to build up wheel, tire, and brake assemblies should not be capable of reverse
or improper installation.
WT&B-11 Wheel axle nuts should contain integral retention devices or safetying features. In rare instances where this cannot be
accomplished, a bolt and self-locking nut should be used. Locking rings and similar devices that can fail and cause FOD
should be avoided.
WT&B-16 Do not use potting compounds for electrical connector environmental protection because it tends to revert and
significantly increases repair time.
WT&B-17 Electrical connector environmental protection should be capable of withstanding water pressure streams up to 120 psi

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
encountered during decontamination, wash, etc.

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

WT&B-18 Route brake lines so that line failure will not occur due to tire blow out or separation of recapped treads.
3.01.01 Plumbing, Hoses, Fittings, and Quick A-08 Plumbing penetrations into a compartment should not be on a vertical axis due to difficulty in making or breaking
Disconnects vertically-oriented connections. When compartment access is from the bottom, vertically-oriented connections can allow
fluid to leak onto the maintainer. When access is from the top, such connections can allow foreign matter to enter the
line. Use horizontal penetrations whenever possible.

C-123
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.01.01 Plumbing, Hoses, Fittings, and Quick A-13 Two-sided or two-surfaced access should not be required for access to equipment interfaces and hardpoints. The term
Disconnects two-sided infers top/bottom, left/right, front/back, or combinations thereof.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

BIT-06 Mission critical functions should be monitored by BIT.
BIT-09 Use concurrent BIT to monitor system critical functions.
C-01 Avoid swivel type connectors and fittings for air, fuel, or hydraulic line interfaces due to their history of low reliability.
C-02 Provide spacing between parallel plumbing runs so that in-line couplings can be replaced without removing lines or
disconnecting any line support devices.
CBR-01 Orient all vehicle liquid servicing fittings to ensure fluids will not come in contact with protective garb during
connect/disconnect activities.
CC-11 Orient spare wires and cable pigtails along the outer diameter or periphery of connectors to make access easier.
CC-12 Build up and assemble straight and angle connector shells or back shells in a manner that ensures that wire or cable strain
or wear is not possible.
CREW-04 Avoid wiring, coax, and plumbing penetrations through the floor of crew cabs, operators' compartments, crew stations,
cockpits, and passenger compartments.
ECS-04 Plumbing, lines, or hoses containing hot liquids, toxic gases or liquids should be external to operator, crew, or passenger
stations.
ECS-07 Liquid type refrigeration compressors/packages should contain highly reliable quick disconnects to negate servicing or
bleeding subsequent to replacement.
ECS-24 System design and integration and technology application should be such that requirements for torque is not required.
ECS-26 Design and integrate components whose proper operation depends on the direction of flow such that they cannot be
incorrectly installed.
ENG(G)-06 The distance between the engine and firewall should ensure the access envelopes to lines, fittings, wiring, and
adjustments will accommodate the 75 percentile male hand.
ENG(G)-10 Design attaching hardware for all mechanical engine-to-vehicle interfaces to be captive and with integral safeties.
ENG(G)-11 Use "torq-set" type clamps or equivalent in all cooling system hose interfaces to eliminate torque wrenches and the
potential for error.
ENG(G)-12 Provide a clear and viewable access envelope to fuel and oil filters.
ENG(G)-13 Locate fuel filters to ensure no safety hazard will exist due to residual fuel during filter change.
ENG(G)-14 Access envelopes to fuel and oil filters should not be in close proximity to exhaust manifolds or cooling system return
lines.
ENG(G)-20 Design all firewall fittings, connectors, and penetrations to be fully viewable and directly accessible to the maintainers.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

ENG-05 All engine-mounted air and fluid lines should be located next to the fan case, engine case, or full-length fan duct to
ensure quick and simple replacement of accessories and components.
ENG-07 Plumbing and wiring spanning two or more engine modules should contain in-line disconnects to enhance and simplify
engine modularization.
ENG-08 Use V-band clamps to mount accessories to engine-mounted gear boxes.
ENG-10 On multi-engine air vehicles, the airframe-to-engine interfaces should be in identical positions or orientations for each
engine cavity.
ENG-25 All engine-to-airframe plumbing, wiring, and duct interfaces should be capable of being connected or disconnected by
hand, should contain integral safety provisions, and should not require torquing.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
ENG-38 The characteristics of engine-to-vehicle interfaces coupled with the capabilities of electronic engine controls, should

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

negate the necessity for making any type of engine rigging including maximum power, idle, and idle cut-off.
ENG-39 Engine-to-vehicle plumbing quick disconnects should contain positive visual indication that the interface is fully seated
and locked.
ENG-46 Design the basic engine and engine-mounted accessory interface so that no fluid traps or bathtubs exist regardless of
engine-mounted accessory location.

C-124
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.01.01 Plumbing, Hoses, Fittings, and Quick ENG-47 Design the engine, including all accessories, plumbing, wiring, ducts, and mechanisms, to meet the same environmental
Disconnects protection and compatibility requirements as the host vehicle.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

EXTING-05 Route and locate all tube, wire, and plumbing interfaces in a manner that prevents induced damage during maintenance.
FUEL-04 Where the fuel wetted area inside a fuel cell or tank is void of blade, knife, and hat stiffeners for use as hardpoint
attachment, standoffs bonded to the cell surface should be used as attachments for clamps, and brackets to eliminate
fastener penetration of the fuel cavity.
HYD-01 For military combat vehicles having two or more hydraulic power systems, provide a minimum 30-inch spacing between
ground power and servicing interfaces to ensure:
- Design flexibility in locating and arranging equipment in high-density vehicles such as fighters and helicopters,
- Work area separation to enable concurrent service/maintenance on systems,
- Systems vulnerability enhancement,
- Reduction in turn-around elapsed time due to concurrent servicing capability.
HYD-05 Design protective caps or covers over service fittings with steel cable lanyards to prevent loss and migration in the
vehicle.
HYD-06 Mount hydraulic pumps to the gear box flange with v-band clamps containing a torq-set or equivalent fastener.
HYD-11 Design flexible hose with molded-in color bands to clearly indicate when the maximum wear/abrasion has been reached.
IN(V)-01 Design inlet door actuators and door actuation mechanisms so they not protrude into the air inlet flow field to eliminate
FOD potential.
LG-06 Design struts, attachments, and interfaces so they do not depend on scheduled visual inspections, non-destructive
inspection (NDI), or non-destructive test (NDT) to ensure the reliability or integrity of the system in the operational
environment.
LG-07 No portion of the landing gear struts, drag braces, or interfaces should contain pockets or bathtubs that can trap or hold
moisture. In rare instances where this is not possible, holes should be drilled as appropriate to prevent moisture/liquid
accumulation.
LG-08 Brackets, levers, links, rods, et al mounted on the struts should either be symmetrical to tolerate reverse installation or
should be impossible to reverse.
LG-09 Use coiled tubing in lieu of flex lines or hoses for hydraulic line routing from the airframe to the strut.
LG-10 All wiring or coax mounted to a strut should have appropriate interface connectors to simplify strut removal and
installation.
MC-01 All clamps should contain torque-set or torque-limiting connections to prevent clamp or component failure due to over-
torque. Clamp installation call outs should not depend on special tools to establish the required torque values.
MC-02 Avoid the use of cotter pins, safety wire, safety clips, and similar devices to prevent maintenance-induced events leading

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

to ground vehicle accidents or loss of air vehicles.
MC-03 All tubing connections and interfaces should use rosan/dynatube (or equivalent) to (1) enable connect or disconnect with
one hand, one tool, (2) eliminate the need to safety the connection, (3) provide a superior seal, and (4) negate need to
reposition line(s) during component replacement.
MC-04 No trombone type, flared tube type, or piloted line type interfaces should be used to avoid the need for removal or
repositioning during equipment removal.
MC-05 Avoid potential foreign object traps during manufacturing or operational maintenance by eliminating vertical penetrations
of plumbing/fittings into tanks, compartments, or cells
MC-06 Locate, position, orient all plumbing and duct electrical connectors to prevent the need for sequential installation or

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
removal.
MC-07 Maximize areas of constant web thickness in firewalls, carry-through bulkheads, major frames, structural ribs, spars,
webs, keels, and close-outs to provide flexibility in locating penetration fittings. Stepped chem milling, stepped machining,
stepped composite layup concepts all tend to result in minimal available surface area for penetrations.
MC-08 All in-line plumbing connections within a fuel tank or cell should be capable of making/breaking the interface by hand,
require no torque, contain integral safety locking mechanisms, and should be void of any requirement for safety wire.

C-125
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.01.01 Plumbing, Hoses, Fittings, and Quick MC-09 All plumbing connections and fittings used for fuel systems should contain integral bonding features to eliminate the need
Disconnects for bonding clamps or jumper cables.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

MC-10 In rare instances where a plumbing run contains complex form or geometry that would require removal of other plumbing
or equipment for access, in-line connectors should be incorporated to maintain the integrity of other plumbing or
equipment.
MC-11 No subsystem plumbing, equipment, or wiring should use a tank, cell, or compartment containing liquids as a means for
routing or penetration simplicity during manufacture.
MC-12 All plumbing and connectors containing liquids should be meniscus-free.
MC-13 In instances where plumbing or connector interfaces cannot or are not keyed for a specific orientation, all identification,
markings, cautions, and directions should be placed 360 degrees around the tube or duct.
MC-14 Where multiple connectors are located in close proximity, ensure (1) a minimum hand tool arc of 120 degrees can be
maintained, and (2) stagger fittings to ensure firm coupling interface/hand tool interface can be accomplished without
inducing damage to adjacent lines.
OXY-08 LOX containers should contain rear mounted, automatic interfaces.
PERS-01 Group man-machine interfaces manifold-style to enable connect/disconnect in a single action.
PERS-02 Include an integral, highly visible indicator in a man-machine interface connector to denote connector is seated and
locked.
PERS-03 Design interface connectors so that a distinct action is required by an individual to effect a disconnect. (Excludes
airframe-to-ejection seat personnel interfaces.)
PERS-04 Interfaces should contain an emergency release mechanism that can be activated by rescue personnel with a 95
percentile gloved hand.
PERS-05 Design emergency interface release mechanisms to be clearly visible under all types of lighting situations.
W-01 Hat section type structural stiffeners with sufficient cross sectional area should be considered as a routing tunnel for
wiring and coax.
WBAY-02 Pylon-to-wing electrical or plumbing interfaces should have automatic close-out covers when pylon is jettisoned or not
installed.
WBAY-10 No loose hardware should exist before or after pylon is installed.
WT&B-18 Route brake lines so that line failure will not occur due to tire blow out or separation of recapped treads.
3.01.02 Wiring, Connectors, and Fiber Optics A-11 Locate compartment electrical penetrations close to the access opening for ease of sight, probing, repair, and to eliminate
fluid soaking, wicking, or contamination.
A-12 Locate compartment electrical penetrations far enough from the access opening to prevent damage resulting from
improper (over-length) panel fasteners.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

A-13 Two-sided or two-surfaced access should not be required for access to equipment interfaces and hardpoints. The term
two-sided infers top/bottom, left/right, front/back, or combinations thereof.
ARM-08 Weapon and store ejectors containing arming solenoids should ensure the solenoids can be rapidly replaced while
installed.
BIT-01 During design of the BIT, use worst-case stress analysis to ensure that any circuit failures induced by temperature
extremes, tolerance build-up, power supply variations, and combinations thereof are identified.
BIT-02 Ensure that BIT system thresholds are consistent with those across the system, subsystem, item, module, and piece-part
levels to prevent excessive numbers of Cannot Duplicate (CND) and Retest OK (RTOK) events from occurring.
BIT-03 The degree of BIT required or proposed should be based on the respective failure rates and the appropriate FMECA at

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
all equipment indenture levels.

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

BIT-04 Limit the amount of data that is recorded to a manageable size by:
- Limiting the number of signals that are monitored
- Limiting the maximum sampling rate
- Reducing the time span over which data is accumulated
- Restricting the type of data accumulated

C-126
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.01.02 Wiring, Connectors, and Fiber Optics BIT-05 Incorporate testability design features as an integral part of equipment preliminary design process.
BIT-06 Mission critical functions should be monitored by BIT.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

BIT-09 Use concurrent BIT to monitor system critical functions.
BIT-14 Provide access to all BIT control and status signals at module connector pins. This will enable ATE to directly connect to
BIT circuitry.
BIT-16 Critical voltages should be visually monitored by sending the voltage signals to visible LEDs.
BIT-20 The BIT should be mechanized so that when a piece of equipment is not installed in a subsystem or the product, a failure
will not be indicated.
BIT-26 Locate routinely used test points so they are accessible without removing or disassembling other equipment
CC-01 Use fiber-optic technologies in preference to conventional interconnect concepts to reduce the number of
interconnects/interfaces, reduce manufacturing and ownership costs, and significantly improve R&M.
CC-02 Standardize connector and wire types to improve testability and logistic support. Keep the number of "different" standard
connectors to a minimum. Use the same connector type keyed differently where possible.
CC-03 Provide clearance around connectors for engagement/disengagement of cables and proper connector orientation under
anticipated environmental conditions (e.g., bare hand of 50 percentile male in an enclosed or protected environment and
a gloved hand of a 50 percentile male in an open or unprotected environment).
CC-04 Use quick release cables and locate cables to make removal and replacement easy and to avoid having to remove one
cable to gain access to another. Provide adequate space for cables, including sleeving and tie-downs, and adequate
service loops for ease of assembly/disassembly
CC-05 Orient and space connectors to allow a sufficient grip on the connector for cable or wire extraction without fear of using
the wiring or cable for additional leverage.
CC-06 Label, and where possible color code, each wire in a harness or cable to facilitate tracking from origin to termination.
Each wire, cable, and coax-to-connector interface should be provided with a source of identification to aidin trouble
shooting, repair, or modification. Marking the cable designator on the cable along with bar codes is also recommended.
CC-07 Do not manufacture or dress connectors containing more than 25 wires or cables as a single integrated harness. Group
the wires or cables into runs of no more than 25 wires or cables each. In addition to making trouble shooting and repair
easier, this approach help avoid large bend radii, thereby simplifying routing, packaging, and stowage.
CC-08 Standardize connector pin assignments for power, ground, and other frequently used signals.
CC-09 Locate LRU/subsystem critical nodes (and or test points) so they are accessible from a connector to prevent the need for
internal LRU probing or access.
CC-10 Avoid hidden cables. Visually inspecting and tracing all assembly cables rather than having hidden cables (such as
behind other cables or even LRUs) allows for a quick system and cable integrity check which aids in overall system

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

integrity and debug. This also implies quick access for manipulative actions.
CC-11 Orient spare wires and cable pigtails along the outer diameter or periphery of connectors to make access easier.
CC-12 Build up and assemble straight and angle connector shells or back shells in a manner that ensures that wire or cable strain
or wear is not possible.
CREW-04 Avoid wiring, coax, and plumbing penetrations through the floor of crew cabs, operators' compartments, crew stations,
cockpits, and passenger compartments.
EC-01 A threaded electrical connector should contain integral locking mechanisms and visual indications that the connector is
properly seated and locked.
EC-02 An electrical connector requiring less than one full turn to connect or disconnect should contain integral locking

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
mechanisms and visual indications that the connector is properly seated and locked.

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

EC-03 A push-pull electrical connector (excluding rack-and-panel type) should contain integral locking features and visual
indication that the connector is properly seated and locked.
EC-04 All electrical connectors should be keyed or asymmetrically shaped to ensure proper alignment.
EC-05 All electrical connectors should contain scoop-proof shells to ensure pin damage will not occur prior to engaging key
way.

C-127
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.01.02 Wiring, Connectors, and Fiber Optics EC-06 All electrical connectors should be corrosion resistant to reduce or eliminate the need for scheduled inspections or
corrosion prevention measures.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

EC-07 Avoid using electrical connectors requiring any type or form of soldering.
EC-08 Locate and position electrical connectors such that all pin identification for either half can be easily seen.
EC-09 Electrical connectors selected for critical applications on ground vehicles should be both accessible and capable of being
connected disconnected by a fifty percentile gloved male hand.
EC-10 Separation between grouped electrical connectors should be sufficient to ensure make or break of any connector by a
fifty percentile gloved male hand. Where this is not possible, an alternate method should be used such as the use of stand-
offs, long-shelled connectors alternated with standard connectors, 180-degree connectors alternated with 90-degree
connectors, or innovative equivalents.
EC-11 Avoid connectors requiring potting as a method for environmental protection due to lengthy repair time and tendency for
potting compound reversion.
EC-12 Electrical penetrations into a compartment should not be on a vertical axis to ensure foreign matter does not enter
connector.
EC-13 Electrical, electronic, and coaxial interfaces between fixed and moveable surfaces should contain quick disconnects to
simplify replacement of the moveable surface or the electronic module.
EC-14 Scoop proof connectors should be used throughout unless their use would require an increase in the volume of the
aircraft, in which case deviations will be considered on an individual basis.
EC-15 The removal or replacement of electronic equipment should not require the removal of any other piece of equipment or
armament.
EC-16 Select connectors so that contacts on the "live" or "hot" side of the connection are socket type rather than pin type to
minimize personnel hazard and to prevent accidental shorting of live circuits.
EC-17 Whenever possible, use self-locking connector plugs of a type not requiring safety wire.
EC-18 All electric connectors should be environment resistant.
EC-19 Connectors containing fiber optic contacts should, whenever possible, be mounted on a vertical surface to prevent
particle and fluid contamination.
EC-20 Use quick disconnect connectors where allowed and identify all pins on each connector.
EC-21 Locate connectors far enough apart so that they meet specified requirements.
EC-22 All connectors should be keyed differently with aligning pins that extend beyond the electrical pins. Connector pins and
sockets should engage after key position is entered.
EC-23 Design connectors so that plugs are cold and receptacles are hot.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

EC-24 Use electrical connectors that incorporate alignment key-ways to reduce incidents of damage due to improper
engagement.
EC-25 Use positive locking, quick disconnect electrical connectors to save man-hours, prevent foreign object damage (FOD)
and decrease the chance of personal injury.
EC-26 Avoid using identical electrical connectors in adjacent areas.
ENG(G)-06 The distance between the engine and firewall should ensure the access envelopes to lines, fittings, wiring, and
adjustments will accommodate the 75 percentile male hand.
ENG(G)-10 Design attaching hardware for all mechanical engine-to-vehicle interfaces to be captive and with integral safeties.
ENG(G)-20 Design all firewall fittings, connectors, and penetrations to be fully viewable and directly accessible to the maintainers.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
ENG-07 Plumbing and wiring spanning two or more engine modules should contain in-line disconnects to enhance and simplify

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

engine modularization.
ENG-10 On multi-engine air vehicles, the airframe-to-engine interfaces should be in identical positions or orientations for each
engine cavity.
ENG-11 Control-by-wire or control-by-light throttling concepts should take precedence over mechanical controls.

C-128
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.01.02 Wiring, Connectors, and Fiber Optics ENG-25 All engine-to-airframe plumbing, wiring, and duct interfaces should be capable of being connected or disconnected by
hand, should contain integral safety provisions, and should not require torquing.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

ENG-26 Locate and position engine overheat and fire warning sensors so that damage cannot occur during engine maintenance or
replacement.
ENG-38 The characteristics of engine-to-vehicle interfaces coupled with the capabilities of electronic engine controls, should
negate the necessity for making any type of engine rigging including maximum power, idle, and idle cut-off.
ENG-39 Engine-to-vehicle plumbing quick disconnects should contain positive visual indication that the interface is fully seated
and locked.
ENG-47 Design the engine, including all accessories, plumbing, wiring, ducts, and mechanisms, to meet the same environmental
protection and compatibility requirements as the host vehicle.
EXT-01 Locate Tanks, Pods, Containers, and Devices (TPCD's) so they do not block or restrict access to existing vehicle access
areas or access approach envelopes.
EXT-02 Design TPCD's for fuel containment to automatically interface to the host vehicle during installation or removal.
EXT-03 Design TPCD's to be fully compatible with the existing vehicle built-in hoisting provisions and locking devices.
EXTING-05 Route and locate all tube, wire, and plumbing interfaces in a manner that prevents induced damage during maintenance.
LG-08 Brackets, levers, links, rods, et al mounted on the struts should either be symmetrical to tolerate reverse installation or
should be impossible to reverse.
LG-09 Use coiled tubing in lieu of flex lines or hoses for hydraulic line routing from the airframe to the strut.
LG-10 All wiring or coax mounted to a strut should have appropriate interface connectors to simplify strut removal and
installation.
LG-11 All microswitches, proximity switches, lights, sensors, etc. mounted to a strut should have individual interface connectors.
Wiring pigtails requiring in-line splices should be avoided.
LG-14 All interfaces from the airframe to the struts should be visible and accessible, and not require removal of airframe
structure for access.
LG-21 Proximity type switches used in landing gear design should meet a minimum of 200 volt-amperes to eliminate
Electromagnetic Interference (EMI) or Radiation Hazard (RADHAD) problems. Wiring associated with the landing gear
design should meet the same requirements.
MC-02 Avoid the use of cotter pins, safety wire, safety clips, and similar devices to prevent maintenance-induced events leading
to ground vehicle accidents or loss of air vehicles.
MC-06 Locate, position, orient all plumbing and duct electrical connectors to prevent the need for sequential installation or
removal.
MC-10 In rare instances where a plumbing run contains complex form or geometry that would require removal of other plumbing

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

or equipment for access, in-line connectors should be incorporated to maintain the integrity of other plumbing or
equipment.
MC-12 All plumbing and connectors containing liquids should be meniscus-free.
MC-14 Where multiple connectors are located in close proximity, ensure (1) a minimum hand tool arc of 120 degrees can be
maintained, and (2) stagger fittings to ensure firm coupling interface/hand tool interface can be accomplished without
inducing damage to adjacent lines.
PYRO-15 Pylon-to-weapon and pylon-to-air vehicle electrical interfaces should contain built-in test/fault location capabilities.
PYRO-45 Missile ejectors should be provided with repeatable missile motor fire wires to simplify loading and reduce elapsed time.
TP-01 Locate Input/Output (I/O) test points and associated readouts in close proximity to each other so that one person can

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
perform testing.
TP-02 Protect test points against the environment and from induced contamination.
TP-03 Protect test points from outside signal generation.
W-01 Hat section type structural stiffeners with sufficient cross sectional area should be considered as a routing tunnel for
wiring and coax.

C-129
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.01.02 Wiring, Connectors, and Fiber Optics WBAY-02 Pylon-to-wing electrical or plumbing interfaces should have automatic close-out covers when pylon is jettisoned or not
installed.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

WBAY-10 No loose hardware should exist before or after pylon is installed.
WBAY-16 Gap seals should not degrade loading while wearing arctic or chemical, biological, or radiation protective clothing.
WT&B-16 Do not use potting compounds for electrical connector environmental protection because it tends to revert and
significantly increases repair time.
WT&B-17 Electrical connector environmental protection should be capable of withstanding water pressure streams up to 120 psi
encountered during decontamination, wash, etc.
3.01.03 Electrical Connectors A-11 Locate compartment electrical penetrations close to the access opening for ease of sight, probing, repair, and to eliminate
fluid soaking, wicking, or contamination.
A-12 Locate compartment electrical penetrations far enough from the access opening to prevent damage resulting from
improper (over-length) panel fasteners.
A-13 Two-sided or two-surfaced access should not be required for access to equipment interfaces and hardpoints. The term
two-sided infers top/bottom, left/right, front/back, or combinations thereof.
BIT-01 During design of the BIT, use worst-case stress analysis to ensure that any circuit failures induced by temperature
extremes, tolerance build-up, power supply variations, and combinations thereof are identified.
BIT-02 Ensure that BIT system thresholds are consistent with those across the system, subsystem, item, module, and piece-part
levels to prevent excessive numbers of Cannot Duplicate (CND) and Retest OK (RTOK) events from occurring.
BIT-03 The degree of BIT required or proposed should be based on the respective failure rates and the appropriate FMECA at
all equipment indenture levels.
BIT-04 Limit the amount of data that is recorded to a manageable size by:
- Limiting the number of signals that are monitored
- Limiting the maximum sampling rate
- Reducing the time span over which data is accumulated
- Restricting the type of data accumulated
BIT-05 Incorporate testability design features as an integral part of equipment preliminary design process.
BIT-06 Mission critical functions should be monitored by BIT.
BIT-09 Use concurrent BIT to monitor system critical functions.
BIT-14 Provide access to all BIT control and status signals at module connector pins. This will enable ATE to directly connect to
BIT circuitry.
BIT-16 Critical voltages should be visually monitored by sending the voltage signals to visible LEDs.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

BIT-20 The BIT should be mechanized so that when a piece of equipment is not installed in a subsystem or the product, a failure
will not be indicated.
BIT-26 Locate routinely used test points so they are accessible without removing or disassembling other equipment
CC-01 Use fiber-optic technologies in preference to conventional interconnect concepts to reduce the number of
interconnects/interfaces, reduce manufacturing and ownership costs, and significantly improve R&M.
CC-02 Standardize connector and wire types to improve testability and logistic support. Keep the number of "different" standard
connectors to a minimum. Use the same connector type keyed differently where possible.
CC-03 Provide clearance around connectors for engagement/disengagement of cables and proper connector orientation under
anticipated environmental conditions (e.g., bare hand of 50 percentile male in an enclosed or protected environment and

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
a gloved hand of a 50 percentile male in an open or unprotected environment).

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

CC-04 Use quick release cables and locate cables to make removal and replacement easy and to avoid having to remove one
cable to gain access to another. Provide adequate space for cables, including sleeving and tie-downs, and adequate
service loops for ease of assembly/disassembly
CC-05 Orient and space connectors to allow a sufficient grip on the connector for cable or wire extraction without fear of using
the wiring or cable for additional leverage.

C-130
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.01.03 Electrical Connectors CC-06 Label, and where possible color code, each wire in a harness or cable to facilitate tracking from origin to termination.
Each wire, cable, and coax-to-connector interface should be provided with a source of identification to aidin trouble

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

shooting, repair, or modification. Marking the cable designator on the cable along with bar codes is also recommended.
CC-07 Do not manufacture or dress connectors containing more than 25 wires or cables as a single integrated harness. Group
the wires or cables into runs of no more than 25 wires or cables each. In addition to making trouble shooting and repair
easier, this approach help avoid large bend radii, thereby simplifying routing, packaging, and stowage.
CC-08 Standardize connector pin assignments for power, ground, and other frequently used signals.
CC-09 Locate LRU/subsystem critical nodes (and or test points) so they are accessible from a connector to prevent the need for
internal LRU probing or access.
CC-10 Avoid hidden cables. Visually inspecting and tracing all assembly cables rather than having hidden cables (such as
behind other cables or even LRUs) allows for a quick system and cable integrity check which aids in overall system
integrity and debug. This also implies quick access for manipulative actions.
CC-11 Orient spare wires and cable pigtails along the outer diameter or periphery of connectors to make access easier.
CC-12 Build up and assemble straight and angle connector shells or back shells in a manner that ensures that wire or cable strain
or wear is not possible.
CREW-04 Avoid wiring, coax, and plumbing penetrations through the floor of crew cabs, operators' compartments, crew stations,
cockpits, and passenger compartments.
EC-01 A threaded electrical connector should contain integral locking mechanisms and visual indications that the connector is
properly seated and locked.
EC-02 An electrical connector requiring less than one full turn to connect or disconnect should contain integral locking
mechanisms and visual indications that the connector is properly seated and locked.
EC-03 A push-pull electrical connector (excluding rack-and-panel type) should contain integral locking features and visual
indication that the connector is properly seated and locked.
EC-04 All electrical connectors should be keyed or asymmetrically shaped to ensure proper alignment.
EC-05 All electrical connectors should contain scoop-proof shells to ensure pin damage will not occur prior to engaging key
way.
EC-06 All electrical connectors should be corrosion resistant to reduce or eliminate the need for scheduled inspections or
corrosion prevention measures.
EC-07 Avoid using electrical connectors requiring any type or form of soldering.
EC-08 Locate and position electrical connectors such that all pin identification for either half can be easily seen.
EC-09 Electrical connectors selected for critical applications on ground vehicles should be both accessible and capable of being
connected disconnected by a fifty percentile gloved male hand.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

EC-10 Separation between grouped electrical connectors should be sufficient to ensure make or break of any connector by a
fifty percentile gloved male hand. Where this is not possible, an alternate method should be used such as the use of stand-
offs, long-shelled connectors alternated with standard connectors, 180-degree connectors alternated with 90-degree
connectors, or innovative equivalents.
EC-11 Avoid connectors requiring potting as a method for environmental protection due to lengthy repair time and tendency for
potting compound reversion.
EC-12 Electrical penetrations into a compartment should not be on a vertical axis to ensure foreign matter does not enter
connector.
EC-13 Electrical, electronic, and coaxial interfaces between fixed and moveable surfaces should contain quick disconnects to

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
simplify replacement of the moveable surface or the electronic module.
EC-14 Scoop proof connectors should be used throughout unless their use would require an increase in the volume of the
aircraft, in which case deviations will be considered on an individual basis.
EC-15 The removal or replacement of electronic equipment should not require the removal of any other piece of equipment or
armament.

C-131
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.01.03 Electrical Connectors EC-16 Select connectors so that contacts on the "live" or "hot" side of the connection are socket type rather than pin type to
minimize personnel hazard and to prevent accidental shorting of live circuits.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

EC-17 Whenever possible, use self-locking connector plugs of a type not requiring safety wire.
EC-18 All electric connectors should be environment resistant.
EC-19 Connectors containing fiber optic contacts should, whenever possible, be mounted on a vertical surface to prevent
particle and fluid contamination.
EC-20 Use quick disconnect connectors where allowed and identify all pins on each connector.
EC-21 Locate connectors far enough apart so that they meet specified requirements.
EC-22 All connectors should be keyed differently with aligning pins that extend beyond the electrical pins. Connector pins and
sockets should engage after key position is entered.
EC-23 Design connectors so that plugs are cold and receptacles are hot.
EC-24 Use electrical connectors that incorporate alignment key-ways to reduce incidents of damage due to improper
engagement.
EC-25 Use positive locking, quick disconnect electrical connectors to save man-hours, prevent foreign object damage (FOD)
and decrease the chance of personal injury.
EC-26 Avoid using identical electrical connectors in adjacent areas.
ENG(G)-06 The distance between the engine and firewall should ensure the access envelopes to lines, fittings, wiring, and
adjustments will accommodate the 75 percentile male hand.
ENG(G)-10 Design attaching hardware for all mechanical engine-to-vehicle interfaces to be captive and with integral safeties.
ENG(G)-20 Design all firewall fittings, connectors, and penetrations to be fully viewable and directly accessible to the maintainers.
ENG-07 Plumbing and wiring spanning two or more engine modules should contain in-line disconnects to enhance and simplify
engine modularization.
ENG-10 On multi-engine air vehicles, the airframe-to-engine interfaces should be in identical positions or orientations for each
engine cavity.
ENG-24 Replacement of all ignitors should be possible with the engine installed.
ENG-25 All engine-to-airframe plumbing, wiring, and duct interfaces should be capable of being connected or disconnected by
hand, should contain integral safety provisions, and should not require torquing.
ENG-38 The characteristics of engine-to-vehicle interfaces coupled with the capabilities of electronic engine controls, should
negate the necessity for making any type of engine rigging including maximum power, idle, and idle cut-off.
ENG-39 Engine-to-vehicle plumbing quick disconnects should contain positive visual indication that the interface is fully seated
and locked.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

ENG-47 Design the engine, including all accessories, plumbing, wiring, ducts, and mechanisms, to meet the same environmental
protection and compatibility requirements as the host vehicle.
EXT-01 Locate Tanks, Pods, Containers, and Devices (TPCD's) so they do not block or restrict access to existing vehicle access
areas or access approach envelopes.
EXT-02 Design TPCD's for fuel containment to automatically interface to the host vehicle during installation or removal.
EXT-03 Design TPCD's to be fully compatible with the existing vehicle built-in hoisting provisions and locking devices.
LG-08 Brackets, levers, links, rods, et al mounted on the struts should either be symmetrical to tolerate reverse installation or
should be impossible to reverse.
LG-09 Use coiled tubing in lieu of flex lines or hoses for hydraulic line routing from the airframe to the strut.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
LG-10 All wiring or coax mounted to a strut should have appropriate interface connectors to simplify strut removal and

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

installation.
LG-11 All microswitches, proximity switches, lights, sensors, etc. mounted to a strut should have individual interface connectors.
Wiring pigtails requiring in-line splices should be avoided.
LG-14 All interfaces from the airframe to the struts should be visible and accessible, and not require removal of airframe
structure for access.

C-132
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.01.03 Electrical Connectors LG-21 Proximity type switches used in landing gear design should meet a minimum of 200 volt-amperes to eliminate
Electromagnetic Interference (EMI) or Radiation Hazard (RADHAD) problems. Wiring associated with the landing gear

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

design should meet the same requirements.
MC-02 Avoid the use of cotter pins, safety wire, safety clips, and similar devices to prevent maintenance-induced events leading
to ground vehicle accidents or loss of air vehicles.
MC-10 In rare instances where a plumbing run contains complex form or geometry that would require removal of other plumbing
or equipment for access, in-line connectors should be incorporated to maintain the integrity of other plumbing or
equipment.
MC-12 All plumbing and connectors containing liquids should be meniscus-free.
MC-14 Where multiple connectors are located in close proximity, ensure (1) a minimum hand tool arc of 120 degrees can be
maintained, and (2) stagger fittings to ensure firm coupling interface/hand tool interface can be accomplished without
inducing damage to adjacent lines.
PYRO-14 Design weapon drop and fire/release circuits with frequency-coded firing systems or similar concepts to ensure stray
energy tests and checks will not be required and that stray energy will not impose a safety hazard or problem.
PYRO-45 Missile ejectors should be provided with repeatable missile motor fire wires to simplify loading and reduce elapsed time.
TP-01 Locate Input/Output (I/O) test points and associated readouts in close proximity to each other so that one person can
perform testing.
TP-02 Protect test points against the environment and from induced contamination.
TP-03 Protect test points from outside signal generation.
W-01 Hat section type structural stiffeners with sufficient cross sectional area should be considered as a routing tunnel for
wiring and coax.
WBAY-02 Pylon-to-wing electrical or plumbing interfaces should have automatic close-out covers when pylon is jettisoned or not
installed.
WBAY-10 No loose hardware should exist before or after pylon is installed.
WBAY-12 Pylon-to-store/weapon gap seal should permit visual and physical access during loading for all interfaces between bomb
rack-to-store, bomb rack-to-launcher, and launcher-to-store.
WBAY-13 Pylon-to-store/weapon gap seal should not interfere with automatic sway brace function.
WBAY-14 Pylon-to-store/weapon gap seal should permit physical access to lanyards.
WBAY-16 Gap seals should not degrade loading while wearing arctic or chemical, biological, or radiation protective clothing.
WT&B-16 Do not use potting compounds for electrical connector environmental protection because it tends to revert and
significantly increases repair time.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

WT&B-17 Electrical connector environmental protection should be capable of withstanding water pressure streams up to 120 psi
encountered during decontamination, wash, etc.
3.01.04 Coaxial Connectors and Wave Guides A-11 Locate compartment electrical penetrations close to the access opening for ease of sight, probing, repair, and to eliminate
fluid soaking, wicking, or contamination.
A-12 Locate compartment electrical penetrations far enough from the access opening to prevent damage resulting from
improper (over-length) panel fasteners.
A-13 Two-sided or two-surfaced access should not be required for access to equipment interfaces and hardpoints. The term
two-sided infers top/bottom, left/right, front/back, or combinations thereof.
BIT-01 During design of the BIT, use worst-case stress analysis to ensure that any circuit failures induced by temperature
extremes, tolerance build-up, power supply variations, and combinations thereof are identified.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
BIT-02 Ensure that BIT system thresholds are consistent with those across the system, subsystem, item, module, and piece-part
levels to prevent excessive numbers of Cannot Duplicate (CND) and Retest OK (RTOK) events from occurring.
BIT-03 The degree of BIT required or proposed should be based on the respective failure rates and the appropriate FMECA at
all equipment indenture levels.

C-133
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.01.04 Coaxial Connectors and Wave Guides BIT-04 Limit the amount of data that is recorded to a manageable size by:
- Limiting the number of signals that are monitored

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

- Limiting the maximum sampling rate
- Reducing the time span over which data is accumulated
- Restricting the type of data accumulated
BIT-05 Incorporate testability design features as an integral part of equipment preliminary design process.
BIT-06 Mission critical functions should be monitored by BIT.
BIT-09 Use concurrent BIT to monitor system critical functions.
BIT-14 Provide access to all BIT control and status signals at module connector pins. This will enable ATE to directly connect to
BIT circuitry.
BIT-16 Critical voltages should be visually monitored by sending the voltage signals to visible LEDs.
BIT-20 The BIT should be mechanized so that when a piece of equipment is not installed in a subsystem or the product, a failure
will not be indicated.
CC-01 Use fiber-optic technologies in preference to conventional interconnect concepts to reduce the number of
interconnects/interfaces, reduce manufacturing and ownership costs, and significantly improve R&M.
CC-02 Standardize connector and wire types to improve testability and logistic support. Keep the number of "different" standard
connectors to a minimum. Use the same connector type keyed differently where possible.
CC-03 Provide clearance around connectors for engagement/disengagement of cables and proper connector orientation under
anticipated environmental conditions (e.g., bare hand of 50 percentile male in an enclosed or protected environment and
a gloved hand of a 50 percentile male in an open or unprotected environment).
CC-04 Use quick release cables and locate cables to make removal and replacement easy and to avoid having to remove one
cable to gain access to another. Provide adequate space for cables, including sleeving and tie-downs, and adequate
service loops for ease of assembly/disassembly
CC-05 Orient and space connectors to allow a sufficient grip on the connector for cable or wire extraction without fear of using
the wiring or cable for additional leverage.
CC-06 Label, and where possible color code, each wire in a harness or cable to facilitate tracking from origin to termination.
Each wire, cable, and coax-to-connector interface should be provided with a source of identification to aidin trouble
shooting, repair, or modification. Marking the cable designator on the cable along with bar codes is also recommended.
CC-07 Do not manufacture or dress connectors containing more than 25 wires or cables as a single integrated harness. Group
the wires or cables into runs of no more than 25 wires or cables each. In addition to making trouble shooting and repair
easier, this approach help avoid large bend radii, thereby simplifying routing, packaging, and stowage.
CC-08 Standardize connector pin assignments for power, ground, and other frequently used signals.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

CC-09 Locate LRU/subsystem critical nodes (and or test points) so they are accessible from a connector to prevent the need for
internal LRU probing or access.
CC-10 Avoid hidden cables. Visually inspecting and tracing all assembly cables rather than having hidden cables (such as
behind other cables or even LRUs) allows for a quick system and cable integrity check which aids in overall system
integrity and debug. This also implies quick access for manipulative actions.
CO-03 Use a test connector to provide test and maintenance bus access to all system and subsystem faults.
CO-05 Avoid the need for costly adapters for signal communications between system, subsystems, line replaceable units (LRUs)
or Weapon Replaceable Assemblies (WRAs), and ATE.
CREW-04 Avoid wiring, coax, and plumbing penetrations through the floor of crew cabs, operators' compartments, crew stations,

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
cockpits, and passenger compartments.
EC-01 A threaded electrical connector should contain integral locking mechanisms and visual indications that the connector is
properly seated and locked.
EC-02 An electrical connector requiring less than one full turn to connect or disconnect should contain integral locking
mechanisms and visual indications that the connector is properly seated and locked.

C-134
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.01.04 Coaxial Connectors and Wave Guides EC-03 A push-pull electrical connector (excluding rack-and-panel type) should contain integral locking features and visual
indication that the connector is properly seated and locked.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

EC-04 All electrical connectors should be keyed or asymmetrically shaped to ensure proper alignment.
EC-05 All electrical connectors should contain scoop-proof shells to ensure pin damage will not occur prior to engaging key
way.
EC-06 All electrical connectors should be corrosion resistant to reduce or eliminate the need for scheduled inspections or
corrosion prevention measures.
EC-07 Avoid using electrical connectors requiring any type or form of soldering.
EC-08 Locate and position electrical connectors such that all pin identification for either half can be easily seen.
EC-09 Electrical connectors selected for critical applications on ground vehicles should be both accessible and capable of being
connected disconnected by a fifty percentile gloved male hand.
EC-10 Separation between grouped electrical connectors should be sufficient to ensure make or break of any connector by a
fifty percentile gloved male hand. Where this is not possible, an alternate method should be used such as the use of stand-
offs, long-shelled connectors alternated with standard connectors, 180-degree connectors alternated with 90-degree
connectors, or innovative equivalents.
EC-11 Avoid connectors requiring potting as a method for environmental protection due to lengthy repair time and tendency for
potting compound reversion.
EC-12 Electrical penetrations into a compartment should not be on a vertical axis to ensure foreign matter does not enter
connector.
EC-13 Electrical, electronic, and coaxial interfaces between fixed and moveable surfaces should contain quick disconnects to
simplify replacement of the moveable surface or the electronic module.
EC-14 Scoop proof connectors should be used throughout unless their use would require an increase in the volume of the
aircraft, in which case deviations will be considered on an individual basis.
EC-15 The removal or replacement of electronic equipment should not require the removal of any other piece of equipment or
armament.
EC-16 Select connectors so that contacts on the "live" or "hot" side of the connection are socket type rather than pin type to
minimize personnel hazard and to prevent accidental shorting of live circuits.
EC-17 Whenever possible, use self-locking connector plugs of a type not requiring safety wire.
EC-18 All electric connectors should be environment resistant.
EC-19 Connectors containing fiber optic contacts should, whenever possible, be mounted on a vertical surface to prevent
particle and fluid contamination.
EC-20 Use quick disconnect connectors where allowed and identify all pins on each connector.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

EC-21 Locate connectors far enough apart so that they meet specified requirements.
EC-22 All connectors should be keyed differently with aligning pins that extend beyond the electrical pins. Connector pins and
sockets should engage after key position is entered.
EC-23 Design connectors so that plugs are cold and receptacles are hot.
EC-24 Use electrical connectors that incorporate alignment key-ways to reduce incidents of damage due to improper
engagement.
EC-25 Use positive locking, quick disconnect electrical connectors to save man-hours, prevent foreign object damage (FOD)
and decrease the chance of personal injury.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
EC-26 Avoid using identical electrical connectors in adjacent areas.

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

ENG(G)-06 The distance between the engine and firewall should ensure the access envelopes to lines, fittings, wiring, and
adjustments will accommodate the 75 percentile male hand.
ENG(G)-10 Design attaching hardware for all mechanical engine-to-vehicle interfaces to be captive and with integral safeties.
ENG(G)-20 Design all firewall fittings, connectors, and penetrations to be fully viewable and directly accessible to the maintainers.

C-135
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.01.04 Coaxial Connectors and Wave Guides ENG-07 Plumbing and wiring spanning two or more engine modules should contain in-line disconnects to enhance and simplify
engine modularization.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

ENG-25 All engine-to-airframe plumbing, wiring, and duct interfaces should be capable of being connected or disconnected by
hand, should contain integral safety provisions, and should not require torquing.
ENG-38 The characteristics of engine-to-vehicle interfaces coupled with the capabilities of electronic engine controls, should
negate the necessity for making any type of engine rigging including maximum power, idle, and idle cut-off.
ENG-39 Engine-to-vehicle plumbing quick disconnects should contain positive visual indication that the interface is fully seated
and locked.
ENG-47 Design the engine, including all accessories, plumbing, wiring, ducts, and mechanisms, to meet the same environmental
protection and compatibility requirements as the host vehicle.
LG-11 All microswitches, proximity switches, lights, sensors, etc. mounted to a strut should have individual interface connectors.
Wiring pigtails requiring in-line splices should be avoided.
LG-14 All interfaces from the airframe to the struts should be visible and accessible, and not require removal of airframe
structure for access.
LG-21 Proximity type switches used in landing gear design should meet a minimum of 200 volt-amperes to eliminate
Electromagnetic Interference (EMI) or Radiation Hazard (RADHAD) problems. Wiring associated with the landing gear
design should meet the same requirements.
MC-02 Avoid the use of cotter pins, safety wire, safety clips, and similar devices to prevent maintenance-induced events leading
to ground vehicle accidents or loss of air vehicles.
MC-06 Locate, position, orient all plumbing and duct electrical connectors to prevent the need for sequential installation or
removal.
MC-10 In rare instances where a plumbing run contains complex form or geometry that would require removal of other plumbing
or equipment for access, in-line connectors should be incorporated to maintain the integrity of other plumbing or
equipment.
MC-12 All plumbing and connectors containing liquids should be meniscus-free.
MC-14 Where multiple connectors are located in close proximity, ensure (1) a minimum hand tool arc of 120 degrees can be
maintained, and (2) stagger fittings to ensure firm coupling interface/hand tool interface can be accomplished without
inducing damage to adjacent lines.
TP-01 Locate Input/Output (I/O) test points and associated readouts in close proximity to each other so that one person can
perform testing.
TP-02 Protect test points against the environment and from induced contamination.
TP-03 Protect test points from outside signal generation.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

W-01 Hat section type structural stiffeners with sufficient cross sectional area should be considered as a routing tunnel for
wiring and coax.
3.01.05 Control Rods, Cables, and Controlex A-13 Two-sided or two-surfaced access should not be required for access to equipment interfaces and hardpoints. The term
Concept two-sided infers top/bottom, left/right, front/back, or combinations thereof.
BIT-06 Mission critical functions should be monitored by BIT.
BIT-09 Use concurrent BIT to monitor system critical functions.
CONT-01 Control rods should use Boyd or impedance type bolts (or equivalent) to eliminate the need for cotter pins or safety wire.
CONT-02 Do not use metal control cables for vehicles that will operate in salt water or salt air environments.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
CONT-03 Use control rods rather than control cables for non-complex applications and non-complex routing within the vehicle.

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

CONT-04 Use control cables rather than control rods for most complex applications.
CONT-05 Route cables so that 100 percent of a cable will be viewable for inspection.
CONT-06 Design all pulleys and brackets associated with cable installations so they are accessible by a 75 percentile male hand.
CREW-04 Avoid wiring, coax, and plumbing penetrations through the floor of crew cabs, operators' compartments, crew stations,
cockpits, and passenger compartments.

C-136
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.01.05 Control Rods, Cables, and Controlex ENG(G)-06 The distance between the engine and firewall should ensure the access envelopes to lines, fittings, wiring, and
Concept adjustments will accommodate the 75 percentile male hand.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

ENG(G)-10 Design attaching hardware for all mechanical engine-to-vehicle interfaces to be captive and with integral safeties.
ENG(G)-20 Design all firewall fittings, connectors, and penetrations to be fully viewable and directly accessible to the maintainers.
ENG-07 Plumbing and wiring spanning two or more engine modules should contain in-line disconnects to enhance and simplify
engine modularization.
ENG-10 On multi-engine air vehicles, the airframe-to-engine interfaces should be in identical positions or orientations for each
engine cavity.
ENG-25 All engine-to-airframe plumbing, wiring, and duct interfaces should be capable of being connected or disconnected by
hand, should contain integral safety provisions, and should not require torquing.
ENG-31 No rigging or calibration should be required subsequent to replacement of any engine-mounted component.
ENG-38 The characteristics of engine-to-vehicle interfaces coupled with the capabilities of electronic engine controls, should
negate the necessity for making any type of engine rigging including maximum power, idle, and idle cut-off.
ENG-39 Engine-to-vehicle plumbing quick disconnects should contain positive visual indication that the interface is fully seated
and locked.
ENG-47 Design the engine, including all accessories, plumbing, wiring, ducts, and mechanisms, to meet the same environmental
protection and compatibility requirements as the host vehicle.
IN(V)-01 Design inlet door actuators and door actuation mechanisms so they not protrude into the air inlet flow field to eliminate
FOD potential.
LG-04 Do not use Beryllium and Beryllium base alloys in any location subject to wear or corrosive atmospheres or in installations
where machining may be required.
LG-05 All bolts or similar threaded means used as adjustable stops should be positively retained in the adjusted reference without
reliance on jam nuts, cotter pins, or safety wire.
LG-16 No portion of the landing gear rigging process should require support equipment type templates, gauges, or tools. Indexes,
reference points, etc., should be an integral part of the landing gear/airframe design.
MC-02 Avoid the use of cotter pins, safety wire, safety clips, and similar devices to prevent maintenance-induced events leading
to ground vehicle accidents or loss of air vehicles.
MC-06 Locate, position, orient all plumbing and duct electrical connectors to prevent the need for sequential installation or
removal.
MC-10 In rare instances where a plumbing run contains complex form or geometry that would require removal of other plumbing
or equipment for access, in-line connectors should be incorporated to maintain the integrity of other plumbing or
equipment.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

MC-14 Where multiple connectors are located in close proximity, ensure (1) a minimum hand tool arc of 120 degrees can be
maintained, and (2) stagger fittings to ensure firm coupling interface/hand tool interface can be accomplished without
inducing damage to adjacent lines.
PYRO-27 Incorporate integral hoisting provisions at each weapon/store station to enable direct lift from the container or carrier to
the attachment hardpoints.
W-01 Hat section type structural stiffeners with sufficient cross sectional area should be considered as a routing tunnel for
wiring and coax.
3.02 Power A-07 Paint equipment bay and compartment interiors a high gloss white to maximize lighting reflectivity, visibility, and rapid
leak detection capability.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
A-10 Provide a sufficient number of compartment fluid drains to ensure fluid drainage for varying aircraft static attitudes and
varying terrain slopes for ground vehicles.
A-11 Locate compartment electrical penetrations close to the access opening for ease of sight, probing, repair, and to eliminate
fluid soaking, wicking, or contamination.
A-12 Locate compartment electrical penetrations far enough from the access opening to prevent damage resulting from
improper (over-length) panel fasteners.

C-137
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.02 Power A-14 Do not locate nutplates or gang channels in inaccessible areas that would require extensive disassembly or equipment
removal to gain access.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

A-15 Locate tie-down attachment points such that tie-down chains, straps, or cables do not prevent or restrict normal servicing,
weapon loading, or safe/arm functions.
BIT-05 Incorporate testability design features as an integral part of equipment preliminary design process.
CBR-01 Orient all vehicle liquid servicing fittings to ensure fluids will not come in contact with protective garb during
connect/disconnect activities.
CBR-02 Ensure vehicle overboard passive liquid drains are clearly marked or visible to enable personnel to remain clear of area.
CONT-01 Control rods should use Boyd or impedance type bolts (or equivalent) to eliminate the need for cotter pins or safety wire.
CONT-02 Do not use metal control cables for vehicles that will operate in salt water or salt air environments.
CONT-03 Use control rods rather than control cables for non-complex applications and non-complex routing within the vehicle.
CONT-04 Use control cables rather than control rods for most complex applications.
CONT-05 Route cables so that 100 percent of a cable will be viewable for inspection.
CONT-06 Design all pulleys and brackets associated with cable installations so they are accessible by a 75 percentile male hand.
ENG(G)-01 Provide access to all engine mounts for ground vehicles so that hoisting or crawling under the vehicle is not required.
ENG(G)-02 Use torque-limiting bolts or torque washers as engine mount attaching hardware to eliminate the need for torque
wrenches.
ENG(G)-03 Design hard points for hoisting or positioning the engine during installation and removal to be integral to the engine and
capable of hoisting and supporting a fully-built-up engine package.
ENG(G)-04 Do not use downward engine removal concepts that require jacking or hoisting of the ground vehicle.
ENG(G)-05 Use concepts for removing ground vehicle engines from the front, rear, or side rather than from overhead (using
hoisting).
ENG(G)-06 The distance between the engine and firewall should ensure the access envelopes to lines, fittings, wiring, and
adjustments will accommodate the 75 percentile male hand.
ENG(G)-07 The distance between the cooling fan and radiator core should ensure that access envelopes will not require removal of
the core.
ENG(G)-08 The interface of the engine assembly to the engine compartment and structure should be designed to ensure all spark
plugs, glo-plugs, and igniters can be replaced within 30 minutes elapsed time.
ENG(G)-10 Design attaching hardware for all mechanical engine-to-vehicle interfaces to be captive and with integral safeties.
ENG(G)-11 Use "torq-set" type clamps or equivalent in all cooling system hose interfaces to eliminate torque wrenches and the

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

potential for error.
ENG(G)-12 Provide a clear and viewable access envelope to fuel and oil filters.
ENG(G)-13 Locate fuel filters to ensure no safety hazard will exist due to residual fuel during filter change.
ENG(G)-14 Access envelopes to fuel and oil filters should not be in close proximity to exhaust manifolds or cooling system return
lines.
ENG(G)-15 Any single drive belt (excluding timing belts) should be capable of replacement within 30 minutes elapsed time
ENG(G)-16 Do not locate batteries in the engine compartment. In those instances where this is not possible:
- The battery support structure should be of a material that is impervious to acid leakage or boil-over.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
- The battery support structure should serve as a scupper to collect and direct the acid out of the engine compartment.

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

ENG(G)-17 Install simple, lightweight shields over cooling system return lines to protect personnel from hose or line blowout during
maintenance.

C-138
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.02 Power ENG(G)-18 Incorporate appropriate sensors to enhance the diagnostic and prognostic capabilities for the following:
- Oil temperature - Fuel filter bypass

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

- Oil pressure - Coolant pressure
- Oil filter bypass - Coolant level
- Oil cooler bypass valve position - Coolant temperature
- Oil level - Vibration pickups
- Oil return line particle count - Chip detector
ENG(G)-19 Paint engine compartments gloss white to enhance light reflectivity and enhance fluid leak detection.
ENG(G)-20 Design all firewall fittings, connectors, and penetrations to be fully viewable and directly accessible to the maintainers.
ENG-01 All facets of engine design should take advantage of Electrostatic Engine Monitoring Systems (EEMS) and Inductive
Debris Monitoring (IDM) toward achievement of on-condition maintenance and engine health monitoring.
ENG-02 Each different component of rotating machinery should contain different tracer elements to enhance EEMS and IDM
isolation and tracking of wear.
ENG-03 Digital electronic controls, fully automatic digital electronic controls, and similar concepts should contain the highest
degree of BIT and diagnostics commensurate with affordability, operation and maintenance, and life cycle costs as
appropriate.
ENG-04 The engine and engine-mounted gear box should have individual oil supplies to ensure wear or failures in one will not
contaminate or fail the other.
ENG-05 All engine-mounted air and fluid lines should be located next to the fan case, engine case, or full-length fan duct to
ensure quick and simple replacement of accessories and components.
ENG-06 All other engine surfaces and engine-mounted accessory surfaces should be free of pockets, channels, and bathtubs that
could trap and retain fluids.
ENG-07 Plumbing and wiring spanning two or more engine modules should contain in-line disconnects to enhance and simplify
engine modularization.
ENG-08 Use V-band clamps to mount accessories to engine-mounted gear boxes.
ENG-09 On multi-engine air vehicles, the engines should be capable of being installed in any engine cavity without need for
reconfiguration.
ENG-10 On multi-engine air vehicles, the airframe-to-engine interfaces should be in identical positions or orientations for each
engine cavity.
ENG-11 Control-by-wire or control-by-light throttling concepts should take precedence over mechanical controls.
ENG-12 All engine-mounted accessories must be capable of being removed and installed through the available airframe access
openings.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

ENG-13 Engine oil systems should contain on-board spectrometric oil analysis devices located on the engine.
ENG-14 Coring of engine gear box cases and housings to provide for fuel heat sink routing should take precedence over dedicated
fuel or oil heat exchangers.
ENG-15 Engine removal for aircraft intended to be operated off carriers should be accomplished within the shadow of the
aircraft.
ENG-16 Aircraft jacking should not be required for engine removal.
ENG-17 Aft engine removal should be an acceptable alternative for USAF aircraft.
ENG-18 For either downward or aft engine removal, it should be possible to maintain control of the engine on all axis during the

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
entire removal and installation process.

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

ENG-19 The minimum clearance between engine and airframe should be 1 inch, including removal and installation.
ENG-20 Do not locate equipment or components in the engine cavity except for those components associated with the engine or
engine installation.
ENG-21 Do not locate equipment or components in the engine bay cavity in a manner that would require removal or repositioning
for engine removal.

C-139
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.02 Power ENG-22 The engine cavity structure should be capable of withstanding a 2000-degree Fahrenheit fire for 10 minutes without
jeopardizing loss of the vehicle.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

ENG-23 All engine borescope provisions should be accessible with the engine installed and hooked up.
ENG-24 Replacement of all ignitors should be possible with the engine installed.
ENG-25 All engine-to-airframe plumbing, wiring, and duct interfaces should be capable of being connected or disconnected by
hand, should contain integral safety provisions, and should not require torquing.
ENG-26 Locate and position engine overheat and fire warning sensors so that damage cannot occur during engine maintenance or
replacement.
ENG-27 No rigging or calibration should be required following engine replacement.
ENG-28 No engine operational start and checkout should be required following engine replacement.
ENG-29 No functional check flight should be required following engine change. On twin engine aircraft where both engines were
changed simultaneously, a functional test flight is permissible.
ENG-30 It should not be necessary to close or reinstall engine access doors for engine ground operation up to and including
military power.
ENG-31 No rigging or calibration should be required subsequent to replacement of any engine-mounted component.
ENG-32 Design the engine fuel controls and electronic controllers so that no manual fuel grade adjustments are required.
ENG-33 Engine access doors and panels and their integral support struts should be capable of withstanding 60 MPH winds in the
opened position.
ENG-34 Identification plates on the engine and all engine-mounted components should be viewable with the engine installed and
engine access doors opened.
ENG-35 No time-change components or scheduled actions should be planned solely to protect component integrity or reliability.
ENG-36 All borescope mechanisms should have positive integral locking features.
ENG-37 Gravity type servicing fittings, covers, and caps should have integral locking features, openable by hand, and contain a
cable or chain to prevent loss or dropping.
ENG-38 The characteristics of engine-to-vehicle interfaces coupled with the capabilities of electronic engine controls, should
negate the necessity for making any type of engine rigging including maximum power, idle, and idle cut-off.
ENG-39 Engine-to-vehicle plumbing quick disconnects should contain positive visual indication that the interface is fully seated
and locked.
ENG-40 Design of electronic engine controls should be such that no single failure of a sub-component within can result in over
speed, over temperature, stagnation, or shut-down.
ENG-41 Use captive fasteners containing self-locking features to attach the nose dome to the engine face. The fasteners should

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

be fully viewable during engine face FOD inspections.
ENG-42 Attach engine-to-inlet duct interface seals to the vehicle so they can be left in place during engine removal.
ENG-43 Design engine-to-inlet duct seal so the interface is automatic during engine installation without needing any form of
alignment, adjustment, or mechanical attachment interface.
ENG-44 Select engine-to-inlet duct seal material to ensure seal life is sufficient for the life of the vehicle.
ENG-45 Provide remote servicing points accessible from the ground to service engine accessories mounted on top of the engine
(e.g., oil tanks, gear boxes, generators, etc.) to eliminate climbing upon or atop the host vehicle.
ENG-46 Design the basic engine and engine-mounted accessory interface so that no fluid traps or bathtubs exist regardless of
engine-mounted accessory location.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
ENG-47 Design the engine, including all accessories, plumbing, wiring, ducts, and mechanisms, to meet the same environmental
protection and compatibility requirements as the host vehicle.
ENG-48 Do not drain or dump residual fuel in the engine fuel control/manifold overboard. When it is not possible to follow this
guideline, route the fuel to an engine-mounted collector tank capable of retaining fuel from two shutdowns.
ENG-49 Design engine fuel and oil filters with integral locking features so they can be installed and removed by hand, and require
no torquing.

C-140
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.02 Power ENG-50 Design engine fuel and oil filter delta pressure indicators so they can be reset only from within the filter housing.
ENG-51 Provide engine fuel and oil filters with anti-surge protection to ensure false delta pressure indications do not occur.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

ENG-52 Incorporate provisions to enable very slow rotation of the fan, compressor, and turbine during borescope inspections.
ENG-53 Design magnetic chip detectors to ensure that oil shut-off will occur as the detector is being removed for visual
inspection.
ENG-54 Incorporate provisions for fuzz burn-off. in magnetic chip detectors.
ENV-05 For airborne vehicles, materials and all finishes with the engine inlet should be durable against hammer shock and
compressor stalls.
ENV-06 For ground vehicles, the finishes should be compatible with and durable against all rain, hail, sleet, snow, and ice
conditions experienced in all intended operational environments.
ENV-07 The finishes and surfaces should be capable of low velocity impact (LVI) of 10 foot-pounds with no visual or detectable
damage with a design goal of 30 foot-pounds.
EXH-01 Treatments required for engine hot sections and exhaust areas should not require scheduled removals for the purposes of
recoating.
EXH-02 High temperature exhaust patterns should flow away from or be directed away from treated surrounding structure,
coatings, or finishes.
EXTING-01 Use extinguishing concepts dedicated to each individual fire zone in preference to manifold systems operating from a
central source.
EXTING-02 Design sealed extinguishing agent containers with an integral pressure/volume gage and a pressure-sensing transmitter
for remote read-out.
EXTING-03 Keep each individual fire zone over-temperature/fire warning system separate from those in other fire zones.
EXTING-04 Design individual fire zone over-temperature/fire warning system to be fully BIT capable (the BIT concept should permit
both initiated and periodic BIT).
EXTING-05 Route and locate all tube, wire, and plumbing interfaces in a manner that prevents induced damage during maintenance.
HOOK-06 Avoid the need to remove the tail hook to facilitate engine access or removal.
HYD-09 Provide hydraulic devices used in critical applications with integral 5 micron filtering.
IN(V)-01 Design inlet door actuators and door actuation mechanisms so they not protrude into the air inlet flow field to eliminate
FOD potential.
IN(V)-02 Do not use loose structural fasteners in the access area to inlet door actuators and mechanisms. Where this guideline
cannot be followed, design the actuator door to be accessible only when the inlet doors are fully closed.
IN(V)-03 For engine inlet bellmouth fairings, use methods of retention other than fasteners. Latches may be considered as an

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

acceptable alternative only if latch-to-panel retention is from the inner mold line.
IN(V)-04 Design inlet doors and inlet bellmouth fairings to be fully interchangeable to eliminate the need to cut, file, or trim at the
engine face.
IN(V)-05 Locate the inlet duct edge a minimum of 60 inches from the cockpit or crew station to eliminate restricting engine
operation to canopy-closed conditions.
IN(V)-06 Use captive fasteners on all access doors forward of the inlet to significantly reduce engine FOD potential.
IN(V)-07 Ensure that no ground safety pins or streamers are used forward of the inlet or within a 3-foot radius aft of the inlet.
IN(V)-08 Incorporate an inlet closure door sealing concept that prevents entry of fluid, dust, or sand across the entire airborne and
ground environment spectrum.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
IN-01 Low Observable (LO) engine face frames should be within 10 inches of the first stage fan or compressor blades.

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

IN-02 Openings throughout the engine face frame should be sufficient to perform a 100% FOD inspection of the engine face.
IN-03 Openings throughout the engine face frame should be sufficient to permit minor blending or repair of FOD without
removing the engine.
IN-04 For frames not integral with the engine, frame removal should be achievable from the engine cavity.
IN-05 Both integral and remote engine front frames should be interchangeable.

C-141
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.02 Power IN-06 Front frame anti-ice and de-ice provisions should give preference to engine hot bleed air.
LG-04 Do not use Beryllium and Beryllium base alloys in any location subject to wear or corrosive atmospheres or in installations

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

where machining may be required.
LG-05 All bolts or similar threaded means used as adjustable stops should be positively retained in the adjusted reference without
reliance on jam nuts, cotter pins, or safety wire.
MC-01 All clamps should contain torque-set or torque-limiting connections to prevent clamp or component failure due to over-
torque. Clamp installation call outs should not depend on special tools to establish the required torque values.
MC-02 Avoid the use of cotter pins, safety wire, safety clips, and similar devices to prevent maintenance-induced events leading
to ground vehicle accidents or loss of air vehicles.
MC-03 All tubing connections and interfaces should use rosan/dynatube (or equivalent) to (1) enable connect or disconnect with
one hand, one tool, (2) eliminate the need to safety the connection, (3) provide a superior seal, and (4) negate need to
reposition line(s) during component replacement.
MC-04 No trombone type, flared tube type, or piloted line type interfaces should be used to avoid the need for removal or
repositioning during equipment removal.
MC-05 Avoid potential foreign object traps during manufacturing or operational maintenance by eliminating vertical penetrations
of plumbing/fittings into tanks, compartments, or cells
MC-06 Locate, position, orient all plumbing and duct electrical connectors to prevent the need for sequential installation or
removal.
MC-09 All plumbing connections and fittings used for fuel systems should contain integral bonding features to eliminate the need
for bonding clamps or jumper cables.
MC-10 In rare instances where a plumbing run contains complex form or geometry that would require removal of other plumbing
or equipment for access, in-line connectors should be incorporated to maintain the integrity of other plumbing or
equipment.
MC-11 No subsystem plumbing, equipment, or wiring should use a tank, cell, or compartment containing liquids as a means for
routing or penetration simplicity during manufacture.
MC-12 All plumbing and connectors containing liquids should be meniscus-free.
MC-13 In instances where plumbing or connector interfaces cannot or are not keyed for a specific orientation, all identification,
markings, cautions, and directions should be placed 360 degrees around the tube or duct.
MC-14 Where multiple connectors are located in close proximity, ensure (1) a minimum hand tool arc of 120 degrees can be
maintained, and (2) stagger fittings to ensure firm coupling interface/hand tool interface can be accomplished without
inducing damage to adjacent lines.
MC-15 Route, orient, and position plumbing, wiring, ducts, and connectors sufficiently away from the outer surface of the vehicle

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

to preclude induced damage due to minor dents, drill bits during repair, etc. Minimum rule of thumb is 1" away from the
inner surface and 1" below a plate nut channel.
TCR-01 For each transmission, clutch, or rotor, provide a dedicated lubricating oil supply tank and system that is not shared with
any other oil lubricating system.
TCR-02 Provide each dedicated oil supply system with a separate servicing port/interface, pressure gauging, and quantity gauging
system as applicable.
TCR-03 Use a singular gage capable of reading pressures or quantities from two or more lubricating systems in preference to
individual gages.
TCR-04 Provide each dedicated system with an on-board spectrometric oil analysis program capability, separate oil filter, and

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
separate oil, fuel, or air heat exchanger capability.

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

TCR-05 Use the item's self-contained oil system to provide drive/interface spline lubrication, if required.
TCR-06 In complex units, use different tracer elements in multiple gears, plates, discs, etc., so the source of wear can be easily
identified by spectrometric oil analysis monitoring units.
TCR-07 Design mechanical interfaces to transmissions, clutches, and rotors so that the respective unit can be replaced without the
need for rigging.

C-142
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.02 Power TCR-08 Incorporate vibration pick-up sensors to isolate the respective unit from other potential sources of vibration, and to
enhance the prognostic potential for monitoring equipment health.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

3.02.01 Engines (Gasoline and Diesel) A-04 Use stiffening beads in lieu of flanges to the maximum extent to enhance compartment volume and simplify repairs.
Stiffening beads should have the convex surface toward the compartment to eliminate fluid traps.
A-05 Keep all machined compartment frames, webs, and closure panels to a constant thickness (e.g., not stepped or tapered) to
ease simplicity of fluid or electrical penetrations and ease and simplicity of structural repair.
A-06 Hardpoints (structural attachment and load bearing areas) within a compartment to assist in equipment mounting or
support should not be integral with the machined part. Hardpoints should be parasitic to enable quick repair in case of
wear or damage in lieu of precise ream/bush repair typical of machined hardpoints.
A-08 Plumbing penetrations into a compartment should not be on a vertical axis due to difficulty in making or breaking
vertically-oriented connections. When compartment access is from the bottom, vertically-oriented connections can allow
fluid to leak onto the maintainer. When access is from the top, such connections can allow foreign matter to enter the
line. Use horizontal penetrations whenever possible.
A-09 Any heat or temperature sensitive structure within a compartment should contain heat-sensitive tape or appropriate heat
sensor for easy indication of over-temperature excursions.
A-13 Two-sided or two-surfaced access should not be required for access to equipment interfaces and hardpoints. The term
two-sided infers top/bottom, left/right, front/back, or combinations thereof.
A-18 Use transparent windows, quick-opening covers, or openings without any cover to permit quick visual inspections where
needed.
BIT-01 During design of the BIT, use worst-case stress analysis to ensure that any circuit failures induced by temperature
extremes, tolerance build-up, power supply variations, and combinations thereof are identified.
BIT-02 Ensure that BIT system thresholds are consistent with those across the system, subsystem, item, module, and piece-part
levels to prevent excessive numbers of Cannot Duplicate (CND) and Retest OK (RTOK) events from occurring.
BIT-03 The degree of BIT required or proposed should be based on the respective failure rates and the appropriate FMECA at
all equipment indenture levels.
BIT-04 Limit the amount of data that is recorded to a manageable size by:
- Limiting the number of signals that are monitored
- Limiting the maximum sampling rate
- Reducing the time span over which data is accumulated
- Restricting the type of data accumulated
BIT-05 Incorporate testability design features as an integral part of equipment preliminary design process.
BIT-06 Mission critical functions should be monitored by BIT.
BIT-09 Use concurrent BIT to monitor system critical functions.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

BIT-20 The BIT should be mechanized so that when a piece of equipment is not installed in a subsystem or the product, a failure
will not be indicated.
BIT-26 Locate routinely used test points so they are accessible without removing or disassembling other equipment
C-01 Avoid swivel type connectors and fittings for air, fuel, or hydraulic line interfaces due to their history of low reliability.
C-02 Provide spacing between parallel plumbing runs so that in-line couplings can be replaced without removing lines or
disconnecting any line support devices.
CBR-01 Orient all vehicle liquid servicing fittings to ensure fluids will not come in contact with protective garb during
connect/disconnect activities.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
CBR-02 Ensure vehicle overboard passive liquid drains are clearly marked or visible to enable personnel to remain clear of area.

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

CONT-01 Control rods should use Boyd or impedance type bolts (or equivalent) to eliminate the need for cotter pins or safety wire.
CONT-02 Do not use metal control cables for vehicles that will operate in salt water or salt air environments.
CONT-03 Use control rods rather than control cables for non-complex applications and non-complex routing within the vehicle.
CONT-04 Use control cables rather than control rods for most complex applications.

C-143
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.02.01 Engines (Gasoline and Diesel) CONT-05 Route cables so that 100 percent of a cable will be viewable for inspection.
CONT-06 Design all pulleys and brackets associated with cable installations so they are accessible by a 75 percentile male hand.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

ENG(G)-01 Provide access to all engine mounts for ground vehicles so that hoisting or crawling under the vehicle is not required.
ENG(G)-02 Use torque-limiting bolts or torque washers as engine mount attaching hardware to eliminate the need for torque
wrenches.
ENG(G)-03 Design hard points for hoisting or positioning the engine during installation and removal to be integral to the engine and
capable of hoisting and supporting a fully-built-up engine package.
ENG(G)-04 Do not use downward engine removal concepts that require jacking or hoisting of the ground vehicle.
ENG(G)-05 Use concepts for removing ground vehicle engines from the front, rear, or side rather than from overhead (using
hoisting).
ENG(G)-06 The distance between the engine and firewall should ensure the access envelopes to lines, fittings, wiring, and
adjustments will accommodate the 75 percentile male hand.
ENG(G)-07 The distance between the cooling fan and radiator core should ensure that access envelopes will not require removal of
the core.
ENG(G)-08 The interface of the engine assembly to the engine compartment and structure should be designed to ensure all spark
plugs, glo-plugs, and igniters can be replaced within 30 minutes elapsed time.
ENG(G)-10 Design attaching hardware for all mechanical engine-to-vehicle interfaces to be captive and with integral safeties.
ENG(G)-11 Use "torq-set" type clamps or equivalent in all cooling system hose interfaces to eliminate torque wrenches and the
potential for error.
ENG(G)-12 Provide a clear and viewable access envelope to fuel and oil filters.
ENG(G)-13 Locate fuel filters to ensure no safety hazard will exist due to residual fuel during filter change.
ENG(G)-14 Access envelopes to fuel and oil filters should not be in close proximity to exhaust manifolds or cooling system return
lines.
ENG(G)-15 Any single drive belt (excluding timing belts) should be capable of replacement within 30 minutes elapsed time
ENG(G)-16 Do not locate batteries in the engine compartment. In those instances where this is not possible:
- The battery support structure should be of a material that is impervious to acid leakage or boil-over.
- The battery support structure should serve as a scupper to collect and direct the acid out of the engine compartment.
ENG(G)-17 Install simple, lightweight shields over cooling system return lines to protect personnel from hose or line blowout during
maintenance.
ENG(G)-18 Incorporate appropriate sensors to enhance the diagnostic and prognostic capabilities for the following:
- Oil temperature - Fuel filter bypass

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

- Oil pressure - Coolant pressure
- Oil filter bypass - Coolant level
- Oil cooler bypass valve position - Coolant temperature
- Oil level - Vibration pickups
- Oil return line particle count - Chip detector
ENG(G)-19 Paint engine compartments gloss white to enhance light reflectivity and enhance fluid leak detection.
ENG(G)-20 Design all firewall fittings, connectors, and penetrations to be fully viewable and directly accessible to the maintainers.
ENV-05 For airborne vehicles, materials and all finishes with the engine inlet should be durable against hammer shock and
compressor stalls.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
ENV-06 For ground vehicles, the finishes should be compatible with and durable against all rain, hail, sleet, snow, and ice
conditions experienced in all intended operational environments.
EXH-01 Treatments required for engine hot sections and exhaust areas should not require scheduled removals for the purposes of
recoating.
EXH-02 High temperature exhaust patterns should flow away from or be directed away from treated surrounding structure,
coatings, or finishes.

C-144
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.02.01 Engines (Gasoline and Diesel) EXTING-01 Use extinguishing concepts dedicated to each individual fire zone in preference to manifold systems operating from a
central source.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

EXTING-02 Design sealed extinguishing agent containers with an integral pressure/volume gage and a pressure-sensing transmitter
for remote read-out.
EXTING-03 Keep each individual fire zone over-temperature/fire warning system separate from those in other fire zones.
EXTING-04 Design individual fire zone over-temperature/fire warning system to be fully BIT capable (the BIT concept should permit
both initiated and periodic BIT).
EXTING-05 Route and locate all tube, wire, and plumbing interfaces in a manner that prevents induced damage during maintenance.
GBD-01 Guidelines for transmissions, clutches, and rotors apply.
GBD-02 Use the host gear box lubricating system to provide lubrication of the drive shaft spline.
GBD-03 Design drive shafts using the "blind spline" concept to ensure correct mating of the shaft to the gear box.
GBD-04 Design drive shafts with a simple, light-weight cover to protect personnel.
GBD-05 Design drive shaft covers with a hole or slot type opening to prevent the masking of leakage or damage.
HOOK-06 Avoid the need to remove the tail hook to facilitate engine access or removal.
LG-04 Do not use Beryllium and Beryllium base alloys in any location subject to wear or corrosive atmospheres or in installations
where machining may be required.
LG-05 All bolts or similar threaded means used as adjustable stops should be positively retained in the adjusted reference without
reliance on jam nuts, cotter pins, or safety wire.
MC-01 All clamps should contain torque-set or torque-limiting connections to prevent clamp or component failure due to over-
torque. Clamp installation call outs should not depend on special tools to establish the required torque values.
MC-02 Avoid the use of cotter pins, safety wire, safety clips, and similar devices to prevent maintenance-induced events leading
to ground vehicle accidents or loss of air vehicles.
MC-03 All tubing connections and interfaces should use rosan/dynatube (or equivalent) to (1) enable connect or disconnect with
one hand, one tool, (2) eliminate the need to safety the connection, (3) provide a superior seal, and (4) negate need to
reposition line(s) during component replacement.
MC-04 No trombone type, flared tube type, or piloted line type interfaces should be used to avoid the need for removal or
repositioning during equipment removal.
MC-05 Avoid potential foreign object traps during manufacturing or operational maintenance by eliminating vertical penetrations
of plumbing/fittings into tanks, compartments, or cells
MC-06 Locate, position, orient all plumbing and duct electrical connectors to prevent the need for sequential installation or
removal.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

MC-09 All plumbing connections and fittings used for fuel systems should contain integral bonding features to eliminate the need
for bonding clamps or jumper cables.
MC-10 In rare instances where a plumbing run contains complex form or geometry that would require removal of other plumbing
or equipment for access, in-line connectors should be incorporated to maintain the integrity of other plumbing or
equipment.
MC-11 No subsystem plumbing, equipment, or wiring should use a tank, cell, or compartment containing liquids as a means for
routing or penetration simplicity during manufacture.
MC-12 All plumbing and connectors containing liquids should be meniscus-free.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
MC-13 In instances where plumbing or connector interfaces cannot or are not keyed for a specific orientation, all identification,

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

markings, cautions, and directions should be placed 360 degrees around the tube or duct.
MC-14 Where multiple connectors are located in close proximity, ensure (1) a minimum hand tool arc of 120 degrees can be
maintained, and (2) stagger fittings to ensure firm coupling interface/hand tool interface can be accomplished without
inducing damage to adjacent lines.
MP-01 Avoid the use epoxies to mount parts on repairable modules because they make repair extremely difficult.

C-145
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.02.01 Engines (Gasoline and Diesel) MP-02 Use a unique identification (ID) resistor incorporated in each system module to verify that the proper module is mounted
on ATE.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

MP-03 Design modules so that lengthy warm-up times, special coding and air purity levels, and similar constraints are not
necessary.
TCR-01 For each transmission, clutch, or rotor, provide a dedicated lubricating oil supply tank and system that is not shared with
any other oil lubricating system.
TCR-02 Provide each dedicated oil supply system with a separate servicing port/interface, pressure gauging, and quantity gauging
system as applicable.
TCR-03 Use a singular gage capable of reading pressures or quantities from two or more lubricating systems in preference to
individual gages.
TCR-04 Provide each dedicated system with an on-board spectrometric oil analysis program capability, separate oil filter, and
separate oil, fuel, or air heat exchanger capability.
TCR-05 Use the item's self-contained oil system to provide drive/interface spline lubrication, if required.
TCR-06 In complex units, use different tracer elements in multiple gears, plates, discs, etc., so the source of wear can be easily
identified by spectrometric oil analysis monitoring units.
TCR-07 Design mechanical interfaces to transmissions, clutches, and rotors so that the respective unit can be replaced without the
need for rigging.
TCR-08 Incorporate vibration pick-up sensors to isolate the respective unit from other potential sources of vibration, and to
enhance the prognostic potential for monitoring equipment health.
3.02.02 Engines (Turbine-driven) A-04 Use stiffening beads in lieu of flanges to the maximum extent to enhance compartment volume and simplify repairs.
Stiffening beads should have the convex surface toward the compartment to eliminate fluid traps.
A-05 Keep all machined compartment frames, webs, and closure panels to a constant thickness (e.g., not stepped or tapered) to
ease simplicity of fluid or electrical penetrations and ease and simplicity of structural repair.
A-06 Hardpoints (structural attachment and load bearing areas) within a compartment to assist in equipment mounting or
support should not be integral with the machined part. Hardpoints should be parasitic to enable quick repair in case of
wear or damage in lieu of precise ream/bush repair typical of machined hardpoints.
A-08 Plumbing penetrations into a compartment should not be on a vertical axis due to difficulty in making or breaking
vertically-oriented connections. When compartment access is from the bottom, vertically-oriented connections can allow
fluid to leak onto the maintainer. When access is from the top, such connections can allow foreign matter to enter the
line. Use horizontal penetrations whenever possible.
A-09 Any heat or temperature sensitive structure within a compartment should contain heat-sensitive tape or appropriate heat
sensor for easy indication of over-temperature excursions.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

A-13 Two-sided or two-surfaced access should not be required for access to equipment interfaces and hardpoints. The term
two-sided infers top/bottom, left/right, front/back, or combinations thereof.
A-18 Use transparent windows, quick-opening covers, or openings without any cover to permit quick visual inspections where
needed.
BIT-01 During design of the BIT, use worst-case stress analysis to ensure that any circuit failures induced by temperature
extremes, tolerance build-up, power supply variations, and combinations thereof are identified.
BIT-02 Ensure that BIT system thresholds are consistent with those across the system, subsystem, item, module, and piece-part
levels to prevent excessive numbers of Cannot Duplicate (CND) and Retest OK (RTOK) events from occurring.
BIT-03 The degree of BIT required or proposed should be based on the respective failure rates and the appropriate FMECA at

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
all equipment indenture levels.
BIT-04 Limit the amount of data that is recorded to a manageable size by:
- Limiting the number of signals that are monitored
- Limiting the maximum sampling rate
- Reducing the time span over which data is accumulated
- Restricting the type of data accumulated

C-146
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.02.02 Engines (Turbine-driven) BIT-05 Incorporate testability design features as an integral part of equipment preliminary design process.
BIT-06 Mission critical functions should be monitored by BIT.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

BIT-09 Use concurrent BIT to monitor system critical functions.
BIT-20 The BIT should be mechanized so that when a piece of equipment is not installed in a subsystem or the product, a failure
will not be indicated.
BIT-26 Locate routinely used test points so they are accessible without removing or disassembling other equipment
C-01 Avoid swivel type connectors and fittings for air, fuel, or hydraulic line interfaces due to their history of low reliability.
C-02 Provide spacing between parallel plumbing runs so that in-line couplings can be replaced without removing lines or
disconnecting any line support devices.
CBR-01 Orient all vehicle liquid servicing fittings to ensure fluids will not come in contact with protective garb during
connect/disconnect activities.
CBR-02 Ensure vehicle overboard passive liquid drains are clearly marked or visible to enable personnel to remain clear of area.
CONT-01 Control rods should use Boyd or impedance type bolts (or equivalent) to eliminate the need for cotter pins or safety wire.
CONT-02 Do not use metal control cables for vehicles that will operate in salt water or salt air environments.
CONT-03 Use control rods rather than control cables for non-complex applications and non-complex routing within the vehicle.
CONT-04 Use control cables rather than control rods for most complex applications.
CONT-05 Route cables so that 100 percent of a cable will be viewable for inspection.
CONT-06 Design all pulleys and brackets associated with cable installations so they are accessible by a 75 percentile male hand.
ENG-01 All facets of engine design should take advantage of Electrostatic Engine Monitoring Systems (EEMS) and Inductive
Debris Monitoring (IDM) toward achievement of on-condition maintenance and engine health monitoring.
ENG-02 Each different component of rotating machinery should contain different tracer elements to enhance EEMS and IDM
isolation and tracking of wear.
ENG-03 Digital electronic controls, fully automatic digital electronic controls, and similar concepts should contain the highest
degree of BIT and diagnostics commensurate with affordability, operation and maintenance, and life cycle costs as
appropriate.
ENG-04 The engine and engine-mounted gear box should have individual oil supplies to ensure wear or failures in one will not
contaminate or fail the other.
ENG-05 All engine-mounted air and fluid lines should be located next to the fan case, engine case, or full-length fan duct to
ensure quick and simple replacement of accessories and components.
ENG-06 All other engine surfaces and engine-mounted accessory surfaces should be free of pockets, channels, and bathtubs that
could trap and retain fluids.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

ENG-07 Plumbing and wiring spanning two or more engine modules should contain in-line disconnects to enhance and simplify
engine modularization.
ENG-08 Use V-band clamps to mount accessories to engine-mounted gear boxes.
ENG-09 On multi-engine air vehicles, the engines should be capable of being installed in any engine cavity without need for
reconfiguration.
ENG-10 On multi-engine air vehicles, the airframe-to-engine interfaces should be in identical positions or orientations for each
engine cavity.
ENG-11 Control-by-wire or control-by-light throttling concepts should take precedence over mechanical controls.
ENG-12 All engine-mounted accessories must be capable of being removed and installed through the available airframe access
openings.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
ENG-13 Engine oil systems should contain on-board spectrometric oil analysis devices located on the engine.
ENG-14 Coring of engine gear box cases and housings to provide for fuel heat sink routing should take precedence over dedicated
fuel or oil heat exchangers.
ENG-15 Engine removal for aircraft intended to be operated off carriers should be accomplished within the shadow of the
aircraft.

C-147
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.02.02 Engines (Turbine-driven) ENG-16 Aircraft jacking should not be required for engine removal.
ENG-17 Aft engine removal should be an acceptable alternative for USAF aircraft.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

ENG-18 For either downward or aft engine removal, it should be possible to maintain control of the engine on all axis during the
entire removal and installation process.
ENG-19 The minimum clearance between engine and airframe should be 1 inch, including removal and installation.
ENG-20 Do not locate equipment or components in the engine cavity except for those components associated with the engine or
engine installation.
ENG-21 Do not locate equipment or components in the engine bay cavity in a manner that would require removal or repositioning
for engine removal.
ENG-22 The engine cavity structure should be capable of withstanding a 2000-degree Fahrenheit fire for 10 minutes without
jeopardizing loss of the vehicle.
ENG-23 All engine borescope provisions should be accessible with the engine installed and hooked up.
ENG-24 Replacement of all ignitors should be possible with the engine installed.
ENG-25 All engine-to-airframe plumbing, wiring, and duct interfaces should be capable of being connected or disconnected by
hand, should contain integral safety provisions, and should not require torquing.
ENG-26 Locate and position engine overheat and fire warning sensors so that damage cannot occur during engine maintenance or
replacement.
ENG-27 No rigging or calibration should be required following engine replacement.
ENG-28 No engine operational start and checkout should be required following engine replacement.
ENG-29 No functional check flight should be required following engine change. On twin engine aircraft where both engines were
changed simultaneously, a functional test flight is permissible.
ENG-30 It should not be necessary to close or reinstall engine access doors for engine ground operation up to and including
military power.
ENG-31 No rigging or calibration should be required subsequent to replacement of any engine-mounted component.
ENG-32 Design the engine fuel controls and electronic controllers so that no manual fuel grade adjustments are required.
ENG-33 Engine access doors and panels and their integral support struts should be capable of withstanding 60 MPH winds in the
opened position.
ENG-34 Identification plates on the engine and all engine-mounted components should be viewable with the engine installed and
engine access doors opened.
ENG-35 No time-change components or scheduled actions should be planned solely to protect component integrity or reliability.
ENG-36 All borescope mechanisms should have positive integral locking features.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

ENG-37 Gravity type servicing fittings, covers, and caps should have integral locking features, openable by hand, and contain a
cable or chain to prevent loss or dropping.
ENG-38 The characteristics of engine-to-vehicle interfaces coupled with the capabilities of electronic engine controls, should
negate the necessity for making any type of engine rigging including maximum power, idle, and idle cut-off.
ENG-39 Engine-to-vehicle plumbing quick disconnects should contain positive visual indication that the interface is fully seated
and locked.
ENG-40 Design of electronic engine controls should be such that no single failure of a sub-component within can result in over
speed, over temperature, stagnation, or shut-down.
ENG-41 Use captive fasteners containing self-locking features to attach the nose dome to the engine face. The fasteners should

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
be fully viewable during engine face FOD inspections.
ENG-42 Attach engine-to-inlet duct interface seals to the vehicle so they can be left in place during engine removal.
ENG-43 Design engine-to-inlet duct seal so the interface is automatic during engine installation without needing any form of
alignment, adjustment, or mechanical attachment interface.
ENG-44 Select engine-to-inlet duct seal material to ensure seal life is sufficient for the life of the vehicle.

C-148
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.02.02 Engines (Turbine-driven) ENG-45 Provide remote servicing points accessible from the ground to service engine accessories mounted on top of the engine
(e.g., oil tanks, gear boxes, generators, etc.) to eliminate climbing upon or atop the host vehicle.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

ENG-46 Design the basic engine and engine-mounted accessory interface so that no fluid traps or bathtubs exist regardless of
engine-mounted accessory location.
ENG-47 Design the engine, including all accessories, plumbing, wiring, ducts, and mechanisms, to meet the same environmental
protection and compatibility requirements as the host vehicle.
ENG-48 Do not drain or dump residual fuel in the engine fuel control/manifold overboard. When it is not possible to follow this
guideline, route the fuel to an engine-mounted collector tank capable of retaining fuel from two shutdowns.
ENG-49 Design engine fuel and oil filters with integral locking features so they can be installed and removed by hand, and require
no torquing.
ENG-50 Design engine fuel and oil filter delta pressure indicators so they can be reset only from within the filter housing.
ENG-51 Provide engine fuel and oil filters with anti-surge protection to ensure false delta pressure indications do not occur.
ENG-52 Incorporate provisions to enable very slow rotation of the fan, compressor, and turbine during borescope inspections.
ENG-53 Design magnetic chip detectors to ensure that oil shut-off will occur as the detector is being removed for visual
inspection.
ENG-54 Incorporate provisions for fuzz burn-off. in magnetic chip detectors.
ENV-05 For airborne vehicles, materials and all finishes with the engine inlet should be durable against hammer shock and
compressor stalls.
ENV-06 For ground vehicles, the finishes should be compatible with and durable against all rain, hail, sleet, snow, and ice
conditions experienced in all intended operational environments.
EXH-01 Treatments required for engine hot sections and exhaust areas should not require scheduled removals for the purposes of
recoating.
EXH-02 High temperature exhaust patterns should flow away from or be directed away from treated surrounding structure,
coatings, or finishes.
EXTING-01 Use extinguishing concepts dedicated to each individual fire zone in preference to manifold systems operating from a
central source.
EXTING-02 Design sealed extinguishing agent containers with an integral pressure/volume gage and a pressure-sensing transmitter
for remote read-out.
EXTING-03 Keep each individual fire zone over-temperature/fire warning system separate from those in other fire zones.
EXTING-04 Design individual fire zone over-temperature/fire warning system to be fully BIT capable (the BIT concept should permit
both initiated and periodic BIT).

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

EXTING-05 Route and locate all tube, wire, and plumbing interfaces in a manner that prevents induced damage during maintenance.
GBD-01 Guidelines for transmissions, clutches, and rotors apply.
GBD-02 Use the host gear box lubricating system to provide lubrication of the drive shaft spline.
GBD-03 Design drive shafts using the "blind spline" concept to ensure correct mating of the shaft to the gear box.
GBD-04 Design drive shafts with a simple, light-weight cover to protect personnel.
GBD-05 Design drive shaft covers with a hole or slot type opening to prevent the masking of leakage or damage.
HF-03 Provide hoist fittings or hardpoints for hoist fitting attachments that are readily accessible.
HOOK-06 Avoid the need to remove the tail hook to facilitate engine access or removal.
IN(V)-01 Design inlet door actuators and door actuation mechanisms so they not protrude into the air inlet flow field to eliminate

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
FOD potential.

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

IN(V)-02 Do not use loose structural fasteners in the access area to inlet door actuators and mechanisms. Where this guideline
cannot be followed, design the actuator door to be accessible only when the inlet doors are fully closed.
IN(V)-03 For engine inlet bellmouth fairings, use methods of retention other than fasteners. Latches may be considered as an
acceptable alternative only if latch-to-panel retention is from the inner mold line.

C-149
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.02.02 Engines (Turbine-driven) IN(V)-04 Design inlet doors and inlet bellmouth fairings to be fully interchangeable to eliminate the need to cut, file, or trim at the
engine face.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

IN(V)-05 Locate the inlet duct edge a minimum of 60 inches from the cockpit or crew station to eliminate restricting engine
operation to canopy-closed conditions.
IN(V)-06 Use captive fasteners on all access doors forward of the inlet to significantly reduce engine FOD potential.
IN(V)-07 Ensure that no ground safety pins or streamers are used forward of the inlet or within a 3-foot radius aft of the inlet.
IN(V)-08 Incorporate an inlet closure door sealing concept that prevents entry of fluid, dust, or sand across the entire airborne and
ground environment spectrum.
IN-01 Low Observable (LO) engine face frames should be within 10 inches of the first stage fan or compressor blades.
IN-02 Openings throughout the engine face frame should be sufficient to perform a 100% FOD inspection of the engine face.
IN-03 Openings throughout the engine face frame should be sufficient to permit minor blending or repair of FOD without
removing the engine.
IN-04 For frames not integral with the engine, frame removal should be achievable from the engine cavity.
IN-05 Both integral and remote engine front frames should be interchangeable.
IN-06 Front frame anti-ice and de-ice provisions should give preference to engine hot bleed air.
LG-04 Do not use Beryllium and Beryllium base alloys in any location subject to wear or corrosive atmospheres or in installations
where machining may be required.
LG-05 All bolts or similar threaded means used as adjustable stops should be positively retained in the adjusted reference without
reliance on jam nuts, cotter pins, or safety wire.
MC-01 All clamps should contain torque-set or torque-limiting connections to prevent clamp or component failure due to over-
torque. Clamp installation call outs should not depend on special tools to establish the required torque values.
MC-02 Avoid the use of cotter pins, safety wire, safety clips, and similar devices to prevent maintenance-induced events leading
to ground vehicle accidents or loss of air vehicles.
MC-03 All tubing connections and interfaces should use rosan/dynatube (or equivalent) to (1) enable connect or disconnect with
one hand, one tool, (2) eliminate the need to safety the connection, (3) provide a superior seal, and (4) negate need to
reposition line(s) during component replacement.
MC-04 No trombone type, flared tube type, or piloted line type interfaces should be used to avoid the need for removal or
repositioning during equipment removal.
MC-05 Avoid potential foreign object traps during manufacturing or operational maintenance by eliminating vertical penetrations
of plumbing/fittings into tanks, compartments, or cells
MC-06 Locate, position, orient all plumbing and duct electrical connectors to prevent the need for sequential installation or

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

removal.
MC-09 All plumbing connections and fittings used for fuel systems should contain integral bonding features to eliminate the need
for bonding clamps or jumper cables.
MC-10 In rare instances where a plumbing run contains complex form or geometry that would require removal of other plumbing
or equipment for access, in-line connectors should be incorporated to maintain the integrity of other plumbing or
equipment.
MC-11 No subsystem plumbing, equipment, or wiring should use a tank, cell, or compartment containing liquids as a means for
routing or penetration simplicity during manufacture.
MC-12 All plumbing and connectors containing liquids should be meniscus-free.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
MC-13 In instances where plumbing or connector interfaces cannot or are not keyed for a specific orientation, all identification,

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

markings, cautions, and directions should be placed 360 degrees around the tube or duct.
MC-14 Where multiple connectors are located in close proximity, ensure (1) a minimum hand tool arc of 120 degrees can be
maintained, and (2) stagger fittings to ensure firm coupling interface/hand tool interface can be accomplished without
inducing damage to adjacent lines.
MP-01 Avoid the use epoxies to mount parts on repairable modules because they make repair extremely difficult.

C-150
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.02.02 Engines (Turbine-driven) MP-02 Use a unique identification (ID) resistor incorporated in each system module to verify that the proper module is mounted
on ATE.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

MP-03 Design modules so that lengthy warm-up times, special coding and air purity levels, and similar constraints are not
necessary.
TCR-01 For each transmission, clutch, or rotor, provide a dedicated lubricating oil supply tank and system that is not shared with
any other oil lubricating system.
TCR-02 Provide each dedicated oil supply system with a separate servicing port/interface, pressure gauging, and quantity gauging
system as applicable.
TCR-03 Use a singular gage capable of reading pressures or quantities from two or more lubricating systems in preference to
individual gages.
TCR-04 Provide each dedicated system with an on-board spectrometric oil analysis program capability, separate oil filter, and
separate oil, fuel, or air heat exchanger capability.
TCR-05 Use the item's self-contained oil system to provide drive/interface spline lubrication, if required.
TCR-06 In complex units, use different tracer elements in multiple gears, plates, discs, etc., so the source of wear can be easily
identified by spectrometric oil analysis monitoring units.
TCR-07 Design mechanical interfaces to transmissions, clutches, and rotors so that the respective unit can be replaced without the
need for rigging.
TCR-08 Incorporate vibration pick-up sensors to isolate the respective unit from other potential sources of vibration, and to
enhance the prognostic potential for monitoring equipment health.
3.02.03 Transmissions, Clutches, and Rotors A-04 Use stiffening beads in lieu of flanges to the maximum extent to enhance compartment volume and simplify repairs.
Stiffening beads should have the convex surface toward the compartment to eliminate fluid traps.
A-05 Keep all machined compartment frames, webs, and closure panels to a constant thickness (e.g., not stepped or tapered) to
ease simplicity of fluid or electrical penetrations and ease and simplicity of structural repair.
A-06 Hardpoints (structural attachment and load bearing areas) within a compartment to assist in equipment mounting or
support should not be integral with the machined part. Hardpoints should be parasitic to enable quick repair in case of
wear or damage in lieu of precise ream/bush repair typical of machined hardpoints.
A-08 Plumbing penetrations into a compartment should not be on a vertical axis due to difficulty in making or breaking
vertically-oriented connections. When compartment access is from the bottom, vertically-oriented connections can allow
fluid to leak onto the maintainer. When access is from the top, such connections can allow foreign matter to enter the
line. Use horizontal penetrations whenever possible.
A-09 Any heat or temperature sensitive structure within a compartment should contain heat-sensitive tape or appropriate heat
sensor for easy indication of over-temperature excursions.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

A-13 Two-sided or two-surfaced access should not be required for access to equipment interfaces and hardpoints. The term
two-sided infers top/bottom, left/right, front/back, or combinations thereof.
A-18 Use transparent windows, quick-opening covers, or openings without any cover to permit quick visual inspections where
needed.
BIT-01 During design of the BIT, use worst-case stress analysis to ensure that any circuit failures induced by temperature
extremes, tolerance build-up, power supply variations, and combinations thereof are identified.
BIT-02 Ensure that BIT system thresholds are consistent with those across the system, subsystem, item, module, and piece-part
levels to prevent excessive numbers of Cannot Duplicate (CND) and Retest OK (RTOK) events from occurring.
BIT-03 The degree of BIT required or proposed should be based on the respective failure rates and the appropriate FMECA at

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
all equipment indenture levels.

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

BIT-04 Limit the amount of data that is recorded to a manageable size by:
- Limiting the number of signals that are monitored
- Limiting the maximum sampling rate
- Reducing the time span over which data is accumulated
- Restricting the type of data accumulated

C-151
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.02.03 Transmissions, Clutches, and Rotors BIT-05 Incorporate testability design features as an integral part of equipment preliminary design process.
BIT-06 Mission critical functions should be monitored by BIT.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

BIT-09 Use concurrent BIT to monitor system critical functions.
BIT-20 The BIT should be mechanized so that when a piece of equipment is not installed in a subsystem or the product, a failure
will not be indicated.
BIT-26 Locate routinely used test points so they are accessible without removing or disassembling other equipment
C-01 Avoid swivel type connectors and fittings for air, fuel, or hydraulic line interfaces due to their history of low reliability.
C-02 Provide spacing between parallel plumbing runs so that in-line couplings can be replaced without removing lines or
disconnecting any line support devices.
CBR-01 Orient all vehicle liquid servicing fittings to ensure fluids will not come in contact with protective garb during
connect/disconnect activities.
CBR-02 Ensure vehicle overboard passive liquid drains are clearly marked or visible to enable personnel to remain clear of area.
CONT-01 Control rods should use Boyd or impedance type bolts (or equivalent) to eliminate the need for cotter pins or safety wire.
CONT-02 Do not use metal control cables for vehicles that will operate in salt water or salt air environments.
CONT-03 Use control rods rather than control cables for non-complex applications and non-complex routing within the vehicle.
CONT-04 Use control cables rather than control rods for most complex applications.
CONT-05 Route cables so that 100 percent of a cable will be viewable for inspection.
CONT-06 Design all pulleys and brackets associated with cable installations so they are accessible by a 75 percentile male hand.
ENG-01 All facets of engine design should take advantage of Electrostatic Engine Monitoring Systems (EEMS) and Inductive
Debris Monitoring (IDM) toward achievement of on-condition maintenance and engine health monitoring.
ENG-02 Each different component of rotating machinery should contain different tracer elements to enhance EEMS and IDM
isolation and tracking of wear.
ENG-03 Digital electronic controls, fully automatic digital electronic controls, and similar concepts should contain the highest
degree of BIT and diagnostics commensurate with affordability, operation and maintenance, and life cycle costs as
appropriate.
ENG-04 The engine and engine-mounted gear box should have individual oil supplies to ensure wear or failures in one will not
contaminate or fail the other.
ENG-05 All engine-mounted air and fluid lines should be located next to the fan case, engine case, or full-length fan duct to
ensure quick and simple replacement of accessories and components.
ENG-06 All other engine surfaces and engine-mounted accessory surfaces should be free of pockets, channels, and bathtubs that
could trap and retain fluids.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

ENG-07 Plumbing and wiring spanning two or more engine modules should contain in-line disconnects to enhance and simplify
engine modularization.
ENG-08 Use V-band clamps to mount accessories to engine-mounted gear boxes.
ENG-09 On multi-engine air vehicles, the engines should be capable of being installed in any engine cavity without need for
reconfiguration.
ENG-10 On multi-engine air vehicles, the airframe-to-engine interfaces should be in identical positions or orientations for each
engine cavity.
ENG-12 All engine-mounted accessories must be capable of being removed and installed through the available airframe access
openings.
ENG-13 Engine oil systems should contain on-board spectrometric oil analysis devices located on the engine.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
ENG-14 Coring of engine gear box cases and housings to provide for fuel heat sink routing should take precedence over dedicated
fuel or oil heat exchangers.
ENG-20 Do not locate equipment or components in the engine cavity except for those components associated with the engine or
engine installation.
ENG-31 No rigging or calibration should be required subsequent to replacement of any engine-mounted component.

C-152
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.02.03 Transmissions, Clutches, and Rotors ENG-34 Identification plates on the engine and all engine-mounted components should be viewable with the engine installed and
engine access doors opened.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

ENG-35 No time-change components or scheduled actions should be planned solely to protect component integrity or reliability.
ENG-36 All borescope mechanisms should have positive integral locking features.
ENG-37 Gravity type servicing fittings, covers, and caps should have integral locking features, openable by hand, and contain a
cable or chain to prevent loss or dropping.
ENG-46 Design the basic engine and engine-mounted accessory interface so that no fluid traps or bathtubs exist regardless of
engine-mounted accessory location.
ENG-49 Design engine fuel and oil filters with integral locking features so they can be installed and removed by hand, and require
no torquing.
ENG-50 Design engine fuel and oil filter delta pressure indicators so they can be reset only from within the filter housing.
ENG-53 Design magnetic chip detectors to ensure that oil shut-off will occur as the detector is being removed for visual
inspection.
ENG-54 Incorporate provisions for fuzz burn-off. in magnetic chip detectors.
ENV-05 For airborne vehicles, materials and all finishes with the engine inlet should be durable against hammer shock and
compressor stalls.
ENV-06 For ground vehicles, the finishes should be compatible with and durable against all rain, hail, sleet, snow, and ice
conditions experienced in all intended operational environments.
EXTING-01 Use extinguishing concepts dedicated to each individual fire zone in preference to manifold systems operating from a
central source.
EXTING-02 Design sealed extinguishing agent containers with an integral pressure/volume gage and a pressure-sensing transmitter
for remote read-out.
EXTING-03 Keep each individual fire zone over-temperature/fire warning system separate from those in other fire zones.
EXTING-04 Design individual fire zone over-temperature/fire warning system to be fully BIT capable (the BIT concept should permit
both initiated and periodic BIT).
EXTING-05 Route and locate all tube, wire, and plumbing interfaces in a manner that prevents induced damage during maintenance.
GBD-01 Guidelines for transmissions, clutches, and rotors apply.
GBD-02 Use the host gear box lubricating system to provide lubrication of the drive shaft spline.
GBD-03 Design drive shafts using the "blind spline" concept to ensure correct mating of the shaft to the gear box.
GBD-04 Design drive shafts with a simple, light-weight cover to protect personnel.
GBD-05 Design drive shaft covers with a hole or slot type opening to prevent the masking of leakage or damage.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

LG-04 Do not use Beryllium and Beryllium base alloys in any location subject to wear or corrosive atmospheres or in installations
where machining may be required.
LG-05 All bolts or similar threaded means used as adjustable stops should be positively retained in the adjusted reference without
reliance on jam nuts, cotter pins, or safety wire.
MC-01 All clamps should contain torque-set or torque-limiting connections to prevent clamp or component failure due to over-
torque. Clamp installation call outs should not depend on special tools to establish the required torque values.
MC-02 Avoid the use of cotter pins, safety wire, safety clips, and similar devices to prevent maintenance-induced events leading
to ground vehicle accidents or loss of air vehicles.
MC-03 All tubing connections and interfaces should use rosan/dynatube (or equivalent) to (1) enable connect or disconnect with

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
one hand, one tool, (2) eliminate the need to safety the connection, (3) provide a superior seal, and (4) negate need to

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

reposition line(s) during component replacement.
MC-04 No trombone type, flared tube type, or piloted line type interfaces should be used to avoid the need for removal or
repositioning during equipment removal.
MC-05 Avoid potential foreign object traps during manufacturing or operational maintenance by eliminating vertical penetrations
of plumbing/fittings into tanks, compartments, or cells

C-153
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.02.03 Transmissions, Clutches, and Rotors MC-06 Locate, position, orient all plumbing and duct electrical connectors to prevent the need for sequential installation or
removal.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

MC-09 All plumbing connections and fittings used for fuel systems should contain integral bonding features to eliminate the need
for bonding clamps or jumper cables.
MC-10 In rare instances where a plumbing run contains complex form or geometry that would require removal of other plumbing
or equipment for access, in-line connectors should be incorporated to maintain the integrity of other plumbing or
equipment.
MC-11 No subsystem plumbing, equipment, or wiring should use a tank, cell, or compartment containing liquids as a means for
routing or penetration simplicity during manufacture.
MC-12 All plumbing and connectors containing liquids should be meniscus-free.
MC-13 In instances where plumbing or connector interfaces cannot or are not keyed for a specific orientation, all identification,
markings, cautions, and directions should be placed 360 degrees around the tube or duct.
MC-14 Where multiple connectors are located in close proximity, ensure (1) a minimum hand tool arc of 120 degrees can be
maintained, and (2) stagger fittings to ensure firm coupling interface/hand tool interface can be accomplished without
inducing damage to adjacent lines.
MP-01 Avoid the use epoxies to mount parts on repairable modules because they make repair extremely difficult.
MP-02 Use a unique identification (ID) resistor incorporated in each system module to verify that the proper module is mounted
on ATE.
MP-03 Design modules so that lengthy warm-up times, special coding and air purity levels, and similar constraints are not
necessary.
TCR-01 For each transmission, clutch, or rotor, provide a dedicated lubricating oil supply tank and system that is not shared with
any other oil lubricating system.
TCR-02 Provide each dedicated oil supply system with a separate servicing port/interface, pressure gauging, and quantity gauging
system as applicable.
TCR-03 Use a singular gage capable of reading pressures or quantities from two or more lubricating systems in preference to
individual gages.
TCR-04 Provide each dedicated system with an on-board spectrometric oil analysis program capability, separate oil filter, and
separate oil, fuel, or air heat exchanger capability.
TCR-05 Use the item's self-contained oil system to provide drive/interface spline lubrication, if required.
TCR-06 In complex units, use different tracer elements in multiple gears, plates, discs, etc., so the source of wear can be easily
identified by spectrometric oil analysis monitoring units.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

TCR-07 Design mechanical interfaces to transmissions, clutches, and rotors so that the respective unit can be replaced without the
need for rigging.
TCR-08 Incorporate vibration pick-up sensors to isolate the respective unit from other potential sources of vibration, and to
enhance the prognostic potential for monitoring equipment health.
3.02.04 Auxiliary, Secondary, and Emergency A-04 Use stiffening beads in lieu of flanges to the maximum extent to enhance compartment volume and simplify repairs.
Power Stiffening beads should have the convex surface toward the compartment to eliminate fluid traps.
A-05 Keep all machined compartment frames, webs, and closure panels to a constant thickness (e.g., not stepped or tapered) to
ease simplicity of fluid or electrical penetrations and ease and simplicity of structural repair.
A-06 Hardpoints (structural attachment and load bearing areas) within a compartment to assist in equipment mounting or

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
support should not be integral with the machined part. Hardpoints should be parasitic to enable quick repair in case of

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

wear or damage in lieu of precise ream/bush repair typical of machined hardpoints.
A-08 Plumbing penetrations into a compartment should not be on a vertical axis due to difficulty in making or breaking
vertically-oriented connections. When compartment access is from the bottom, vertically-oriented connections can allow
fluid to leak onto the maintainer. When access is from the top, such connections can allow foreign matter to enter the
line. Use horizontal penetrations whenever possible.

C-154
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.02.04 Auxiliary, Secondary, and Emergency A-09 Any heat or temperature sensitive structure within a compartment should contain heat-sensitive tape or appropriate heat
Power sensor for easy indication of over-temperature excursions.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

A-13 Two-sided or two-surfaced access should not be required for access to equipment interfaces and hardpoints. The term
two-sided infers top/bottom, left/right, front/back, or combinations thereof.
A-18 Use transparent windows, quick-opening covers, or openings without any cover to permit quick visual inspections where
needed.
BIT-01 During design of the BIT, use worst-case stress analysis to ensure that any circuit failures induced by temperature
extremes, tolerance build-up, power supply variations, and combinations thereof are identified.
BIT-02 Ensure that BIT system thresholds are consistent with those across the system, subsystem, item, module, and piece-part
levels to prevent excessive numbers of Cannot Duplicate (CND) and Retest OK (RTOK) events from occurring.
BIT-03 The degree of BIT required or proposed should be based on the respective failure rates and the appropriate FMECA at
all equipment indenture levels.
BIT-04 Limit the amount of data that is recorded to a manageable size by:
- Limiting the number of signals that are monitored
- Limiting the maximum sampling rate
- Reducing the time span over which data is accumulated
- Restricting the type of data accumulated
BIT-05 Incorporate testability design features as an integral part of equipment preliminary design process.
BIT-06 Mission critical functions should be monitored by BIT.
BIT-09 Use concurrent BIT to monitor system critical functions.
BIT-20 The BIT should be mechanized so that when a piece of equipment is not installed in a subsystem or the product, a failure
will not be indicated.
BIT-26 Locate routinely used test points so they are accessible without removing or disassembling other equipment
C-01 Avoid swivel type connectors and fittings for air, fuel, or hydraulic line interfaces due to their history of low reliability.
C-02 Provide spacing between parallel plumbing runs so that in-line couplings can be replaced without removing lines or
disconnecting any line support devices.
CBR-01 Orient all vehicle liquid servicing fittings to ensure fluids will not come in contact with protective garb during
connect/disconnect activities.
CBR-02 Ensure vehicle overboard passive liquid drains are clearly marked or visible to enable personnel to remain clear of area.
CONT-01 Control rods should use Boyd or impedance type bolts (or equivalent) to eliminate the need for cotter pins or safety wire.
CONT-02 Do not use metal control cables for vehicles that will operate in salt water or salt air environments.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

CONT-03 Use control rods rather than control cables for non-complex applications and non-complex routing within the vehicle.
CONT-04 Use control cables rather than control rods for most complex applications.
CONT-05 Route cables so that 100 percent of a cable will be viewable for inspection.
CONT-06 Design all pulleys and brackets associated with cable installations so they are accessible by a 75 percentile male hand.
ENG-01 All facets of engine design should take advantage of Electrostatic Engine Monitoring Systems (EEMS) and Inductive
Debris Monitoring (IDM) toward achievement of on-condition maintenance and engine health monitoring.
ENG-02 Each different component of rotating machinery should contain different tracer elements to enhance EEMS and IDM
isolation and tracking of wear.
ENG-03 Digital electronic controls, fully automatic digital electronic controls, and similar concepts should contain the highest

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
degree of BIT and diagnostics commensurate with affordability, operation and maintenance, and life cycle costs as

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

appropriate.
ENG-04 The engine and engine-mounted gear box should have individual oil supplies to ensure wear or failures in one will not
contaminate or fail the other.
ENG-05 All engine-mounted air and fluid lines should be located next to the fan case, engine case, or full-length fan duct to
ensure quick and simple replacement of accessories and components.

C-155
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.02.04 Auxiliary, Secondary, and Emergency ENG-06 All other engine surfaces and engine-mounted accessory surfaces should be free of pockets, channels, and bathtubs that
Power could trap and retain fluids.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

ENG-07 Plumbing and wiring spanning two or more engine modules should contain in-line disconnects to enhance and simplify
engine modularization.
ENG-08 Use V-band clamps to mount accessories to engine-mounted gear boxes.
ENG-09 On multi-engine air vehicles, the engines should be capable of being installed in any engine cavity without need for
reconfiguration.
ENG-10 On multi-engine air vehicles, the airframe-to-engine interfaces should be in identical positions or orientations for each
engine cavity.
ENG-11 Control-by-wire or control-by-light throttling concepts should take precedence over mechanical controls.
ENG-12 All engine-mounted accessories must be capable of being removed and installed through the available airframe access
openings.
ENG-13 Engine oil systems should contain on-board spectrometric oil analysis devices located on the engine.
ENG-14 Coring of engine gear box cases and housings to provide for fuel heat sink routing should take precedence over dedicated
fuel or oil heat exchangers.
ENG-20 Do not locate equipment or components in the engine cavity except for those components associated with the engine or
engine installation.
ENG-34 Identification plates on the engine and all engine-mounted components should be viewable with the engine installed and
engine access doors opened.
ENG-35 No time-change components or scheduled actions should be planned solely to protect component integrity or reliability.
ENG-36 All borescope mechanisms should have positive integral locking features.
ENG-37 Gravity type servicing fittings, covers, and caps should have integral locking features, openable by hand, and contain a
cable or chain to prevent loss or dropping.
ENG-40 Design of electronic engine controls should be such that no single failure of a sub-component within can result in over
speed, over temperature, stagnation, or shut-down.
ENG-49 Design engine fuel and oil filters with integral locking features so they can be installed and removed by hand, and require
no torquing.
ENG-50 Design engine fuel and oil filter delta pressure indicators so they can be reset only from within the filter housing.
ENG-53 Design magnetic chip detectors to ensure that oil shut-off will occur as the detector is being removed for visual
inspection.
ENG-54 Incorporate provisions for fuzz burn-off. in magnetic chip detectors.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

ENV-05 For airborne vehicles, materials and all finishes with the engine inlet should be durable against hammer shock and
compressor stalls.
ENV-06 For ground vehicles, the finishes should be compatible with and durable against all rain, hail, sleet, snow, and ice
conditions experienced in all intended operational environments.
EXH-01 Treatments required for engine hot sections and exhaust areas should not require scheduled removals for the purposes of
recoating.
EXH-02 High temperature exhaust patterns should flow away from or be directed away from treated surrounding structure,
coatings, or finishes.
EXTING-01 Use extinguishing concepts dedicated to each individual fire zone in preference to manifold systems operating from a

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
central source.

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

EXTING-02 Design sealed extinguishing agent containers with an integral pressure/volume gage and a pressure-sensing transmitter
for remote read-out.
EXTING-03 Keep each individual fire zone over-temperature/fire warning system separate from those in other fire zones.
EXTING-04 Design individual fire zone over-temperature/fire warning system to be fully BIT capable (the BIT concept should permit
both initiated and periodic BIT).

C-156
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.02.04 Auxiliary, Secondary, and Emergency EXTING-05 Route and locate all tube, wire, and plumbing interfaces in a manner that prevents induced damage during maintenance.
Power

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

GBD-01 Guidelines for transmissions, clutches, and rotors apply.
GBD-02 Use the host gear box lubricating system to provide lubrication of the drive shaft spline.
GBD-03 Design drive shafts using the "blind spline" concept to ensure correct mating of the shaft to the gear box.
GBD-04 Design drive shafts with a simple, light-weight cover to protect personnel.
GBD-05 Design drive shaft covers with a hole or slot type opening to prevent the masking of leakage or damage.
HF-03 Provide hoist fittings or hardpoints for hoist fitting attachments that are readily accessible.
LG-04 Do not use Beryllium and Beryllium base alloys in any location subject to wear or corrosive atmospheres or in installations
where machining may be required.
LG-05 All bolts or similar threaded means used as adjustable stops should be positively retained in the adjusted reference without
reliance on jam nuts, cotter pins, or safety wire.
MC-01 All clamps should contain torque-set or torque-limiting connections to prevent clamp or component failure due to over-
torque. Clamp installation call outs should not depend on special tools to establish the required torque values.
MC-02 Avoid the use of cotter pins, safety wire, safety clips, and similar devices to prevent maintenance-induced events leading
to ground vehicle accidents or loss of air vehicles.
MC-03 All tubing connections and interfaces should use rosan/dynatube (or equivalent) to (1) enable connect or disconnect with
one hand, one tool, (2) eliminate the need to safety the connection, (3) provide a superior seal, and (4) negate need to
reposition line(s) during component replacement.
MC-04 No trombone type, flared tube type, or piloted line type interfaces should be used to avoid the need for removal or
repositioning during equipment removal.
MC-05 Avoid potential foreign object traps during manufacturing or operational maintenance by eliminating vertical penetrations
of plumbing/fittings into tanks, compartments, or cells
MC-06 Locate, position, orient all plumbing and duct electrical connectors to prevent the need for sequential installation or
removal.
MC-09 All plumbing connections and fittings used for fuel systems should contain integral bonding features to eliminate the need
for bonding clamps or jumper cables.
MC-10 In rare instances where a plumbing run contains complex form or geometry that would require removal of other plumbing
or equipment for access, in-line connectors should be incorporated to maintain the integrity of other plumbing or
equipment.
MC-11 No subsystem plumbing, equipment, or wiring should use a tank, cell, or compartment containing liquids as a means for
routing or penetration simplicity during manufacture.
MC-12 All plumbing and connectors containing liquids should be meniscus-free.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

MC-13 In instances where plumbing or connector interfaces cannot or are not keyed for a specific orientation, all identification,
markings, cautions, and directions should be placed 360 degrees around the tube or duct.
MC-14 Where multiple connectors are located in close proximity, ensure (1) a minimum hand tool arc of 120 degrees can be
maintained, and (2) stagger fittings to ensure firm coupling interface/hand tool interface can be accomplished without
inducing damage to adjacent lines.
MP-01 Avoid the use epoxies to mount parts on repairable modules because they make repair extremely difficult.
MP-02 Use a unique identification (ID) resistor incorporated in each system module to verify that the proper module is mounted
on ATE.
MP-03 Design modules so that lengthy warm-up times, special coding and air purity levels, and similar constraints are not
necessary.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
TCR-01 For each transmission, clutch, or rotor, provide a dedicated lubricating oil supply tank and system that is not shared with
any other oil lubricating system.
TCR-02 Provide each dedicated oil supply system with a separate servicing port/interface, pressure gauging, and quantity gauging
system as applicable.

C-157
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.02.04 Auxiliary, Secondary, and Emergency TCR-03 Use a singular gage capable of reading pressures or quantities from two or more lubricating systems in preference to
Power individual gages.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

TCR-04 Provide each dedicated system with an on-board spectrometric oil analysis program capability, separate oil filter, and
separate oil, fuel, or air heat exchanger capability.
TCR-05 Use the item's self-contained oil system to provide drive/interface spline lubrication, if required.
TCR-06 In complex units, use different tracer elements in multiple gears, plates, discs, etc., so the source of wear can be easily
identified by spectrometric oil analysis monitoring units.
TCR-07 Design mechanical interfaces to transmissions, clutches, and rotors so that the respective unit can be replaced without the
need for rigging.
TCR-08 Incorporate vibration pick-up sensors to isolate the respective unit from other potential sources of vibration, and to
enhance the prognostic potential for monitoring equipment health.
3.02.05 Gear Boxes and Drives A-04 Use stiffening beads in lieu of flanges to the maximum extent to enhance compartment volume and simplify repairs.
Stiffening beads should have the convex surface toward the compartment to eliminate fluid traps.
A-05 Keep all machined compartment frames, webs, and closure panels to a constant thickness (e.g., not stepped or tapered) to
ease simplicity of fluid or electrical penetrations and ease and simplicity of structural repair.
A-06 Hardpoints (structural attachment and load bearing areas) within a compartment to assist in equipment mounting or
support should not be integral with the machined part. Hardpoints should be parasitic to enable quick repair in case of
wear or damage in lieu of precise ream/bush repair typical of machined hardpoints.
A-08 Plumbing penetrations into a compartment should not be on a vertical axis due to difficulty in making or breaking
vertically-oriented connections. When compartment access is from the bottom, vertically-oriented connections can allow
fluid to leak onto the maintainer. When access is from the top, such connections can allow foreign matter to enter the
line. Use horizontal penetrations whenever possible.
A-09 Any heat or temperature sensitive structure within a compartment should contain heat-sensitive tape or appropriate heat
sensor for easy indication of over-temperature excursions.
A-13 Two-sided or two-surfaced access should not be required for access to equipment interfaces and hardpoints. The term
two-sided infers top/bottom, left/right, front/back, or combinations thereof.
A-18 Use transparent windows, quick-opening covers, or openings without any cover to permit quick visual inspections where
needed.
BIT-01 During design of the BIT, use worst-case stress analysis to ensure that any circuit failures induced by temperature
extremes, tolerance build-up, power supply variations, and combinations thereof are identified.
BIT-02 Ensure that BIT system thresholds are consistent with those across the system, subsystem, item, module, and piece-part

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

levels to prevent excessive numbers of Cannot Duplicate (CND) and Retest OK (RTOK) events from occurring.
BIT-03 The degree of BIT required or proposed should be based on the respective failure rates and the appropriate FMECA at
all equipment indenture levels.
BIT-04 Limit the amount of data that is recorded to a manageable size by:
- Limiting the number of signals that are monitored
- Limiting the maximum sampling rate
- Reducing the time span over which data is accumulated
- Restricting the type of data accumulated

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
BIT-05 Incorporate testability design features as an integral part of equipment preliminary design process.

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

BIT-06 Mission critical functions should be monitored by BIT.
BIT-09 Use concurrent BIT to monitor system critical functions.
BIT-26 Locate routinely used test points so they are accessible without removing or disassembling other equipment
C-01 Avoid swivel type connectors and fittings for air, fuel, or hydraulic line interfaces due to their history of low reliability.
C-02 Provide spacing between parallel plumbing runs so that in-line couplings can be replaced without removing lines or
disconnecting any line support devices.

C-158
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.02.05 Gear Boxes and Drives CBR-01 Orient all vehicle liquid servicing fittings to ensure fluids will not come in contact with protective garb during
connect/disconnect activities.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

CBR-02 Ensure vehicle overboard passive liquid drains are clearly marked or visible to enable personnel to remain clear of area.
CONT-01 Control rods should use Boyd or impedance type bolts (or equivalent) to eliminate the need for cotter pins or safety wire.
CONT-02 Do not use metal control cables for vehicles that will operate in salt water or salt air environments.
CONT-03 Use control rods rather than control cables for non-complex applications and non-complex routing within the vehicle.
CONT-04 Use control cables rather than control rods for most complex applications.
CONT-05 Route cables so that 100 percent of a cable will be viewable for inspection.
CONT-06 Design all pulleys and brackets associated with cable installations so they are accessible by a 75 percentile male hand.
ENG-01 All facets of engine design should take advantage of Electrostatic Engine Monitoring Systems (EEMS) and Inductive
Debris Monitoring (IDM) toward achievement of on-condition maintenance and engine health monitoring.
ENG-02 Each different component of rotating machinery should contain different tracer elements to enhance EEMS and IDM
isolation and tracking of wear.
ENG-04 The engine and engine-mounted gear box should have individual oil supplies to ensure wear or failures in one will not
contaminate or fail the other.
ENG-05 All engine-mounted air and fluid lines should be located next to the fan case, engine case, or full-length fan duct to
ensure quick and simple replacement of accessories and components.
ENG-06 All other engine surfaces and engine-mounted accessory surfaces should be free of pockets, channels, and bathtubs that
could trap and retain fluids.
ENG-07 Plumbing and wiring spanning two or more engine modules should contain in-line disconnects to enhance and simplify
engine modularization.
ENG-08 Use V-band clamps to mount accessories to engine-mounted gear boxes.
ENG-09 On multi-engine air vehicles, the engines should be capable of being installed in any engine cavity without need for
reconfiguration.
ENG-10 On multi-engine air vehicles, the airframe-to-engine interfaces should be in identical positions or orientations for each
engine cavity.
ENG-12 All engine-mounted accessories must be capable of being removed and installed through the available airframe access
openings.
ENG-13 Engine oil systems should contain on-board spectrometric oil analysis devices located on the engine.
ENG-14 Coring of engine gear box cases and housings to provide for fuel heat sink routing should take precedence over dedicated
fuel or oil heat exchangers.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

ENG-20 Do not locate equipment or components in the engine cavity except for those components associated with the engine or
engine installation.
ENG-21 Do not locate equipment or components in the engine bay cavity in a manner that would require removal or repositioning
for engine removal.
ENG-27 No rigging or calibration should be required following engine replacement.
ENG-28 No engine operational start and checkout should be required following engine replacement.
ENG-29 No functional check flight should be required following engine change. On twin engine aircraft where both engines were
changed simultaneously, a functional test flight is permissible.
ENG-31 No rigging or calibration should be required subsequent to replacement of any engine-mounted component.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
ENG-34 Identification plates on the engine and all engine-mounted components should be viewable with the engine installed and

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

engine access doors opened.
ENG-35 No time-change components or scheduled actions should be planned solely to protect component integrity or reliability.
ENG-36 All borescope mechanisms should have positive integral locking features.
ENG-37 Gravity type servicing fittings, covers, and caps should have integral locking features, openable by hand, and contain a
cable or chain to prevent loss or dropping.

C-159
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.02.05 Gear Boxes and Drives ENG-46 Design the basic engine and engine-mounted accessory interface so that no fluid traps or bathtubs exist regardless of
engine-mounted accessory location.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

ENG-47 Design the engine, including all accessories, plumbing, wiring, ducts, and mechanisms, to meet the same environmental
protection and compatibility requirements as the host vehicle.
ENG-48 Do not drain or dump residual fuel in the engine fuel control/manifold overboard. When it is not possible to follow this
guideline, route the fuel to an engine-mounted collector tank capable of retaining fuel from two shutdowns.
ENG-49 Design engine fuel and oil filters with integral locking features so they can be installed and removed by hand, and require
no torquing.
ENG-50 Design engine fuel and oil filter delta pressure indicators so they can be reset only from within the filter housing.
ENV-05 For airborne vehicles, materials and all finishes with the engine inlet should be durable against hammer shock and
compressor stalls.
ENV-06 For ground vehicles, the finishes should be compatible with and durable against all rain, hail, sleet, snow, and ice
conditions experienced in all intended operational environments.
EXTING-01 Use extinguishing concepts dedicated to each individual fire zone in preference to manifold systems operating from a
central source.
EXTING-02 Design sealed extinguishing agent containers with an integral pressure/volume gage and a pressure-sensing transmitter
for remote read-out.
EXTING-03 Keep each individual fire zone over-temperature/fire warning system separate from those in other fire zones.
EXTING-04 Design individual fire zone over-temperature/fire warning system to be fully BIT capable (the BIT concept should permit
both initiated and periodic BIT).
EXTING-05 Route and locate all tube, wire, and plumbing interfaces in a manner that prevents induced damage during maintenance.
GBD-01 Guidelines for transmissions, clutches, and rotors apply.
GBD-02 Use the host gear box lubricating system to provide lubrication of the drive shaft spline.
GBD-03 Design drive shafts using the "blind spline" concept to ensure correct mating of the shaft to the gear box.
GBD-04 Design drive shafts with a simple, light-weight cover to protect personnel.
GBD-05 Design drive shaft covers with a hole or slot type opening to prevent the masking of leakage or damage.
HYD-06 Mount hydraulic pumps to the gear box flange with v-band clamps containing a torq-set or equivalent fastener.
HYD-08 Design hydraulic pumps and motors with tracer elements to detect wear through on-board spectrometric oil analysis
devices.
LG-04 Do not use Beryllium and Beryllium base alloys in any location subject to wear or corrosive atmospheres or in installations
where machining may be required.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

LG-05 All bolts or similar threaded means used as adjustable stops should be positively retained in the adjusted reference without
reliance on jam nuts, cotter pins, or safety wire.
MC-01 All clamps should contain torque-set or torque-limiting connections to prevent clamp or component failure due to over-
torque. Clamp installation call outs should not depend on special tools to establish the required torque values.
MC-02 Avoid the use of cotter pins, safety wire, safety clips, and similar devices to prevent maintenance-induced events leading
to ground vehicle accidents or loss of air vehicles.
MC-03 All tubing connections and interfaces should use rosan/dynatube (or equivalent) to (1) enable connect or disconnect with
one hand, one tool, (2) eliminate the need to safety the connection, (3) provide a superior seal, and (4) negate need to
reposition line(s) during component replacement.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
MC-04 No trombone type, flared tube type, or piloted line type interfaces should be used to avoid the need for removal or

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

repositioning during equipment removal.
MC-05 Avoid potential foreign object traps during manufacturing or operational maintenance by eliminating vertical penetrations
of plumbing/fittings into tanks, compartments, or cells
MC-06 Locate, position, orient all plumbing and duct electrical connectors to prevent the need for sequential installation or
removal.

C-160
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.02.05 Gear Boxes and Drives MC-09 All plumbing connections and fittings used for fuel systems should contain integral bonding features to eliminate the need
for bonding clamps or jumper cables.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

MC-10 In rare instances where a plumbing run contains complex form or geometry that would require removal of other plumbing
or equipment for access, in-line connectors should be incorporated to maintain the integrity of other plumbing or
equipment.
MC-11 No subsystem plumbing, equipment, or wiring should use a tank, cell, or compartment containing liquids as a means for
routing or penetration simplicity during manufacture.
MC-12 All plumbing and connectors containing liquids should be meniscus-free.
MC-13 In instances where plumbing or connector interfaces cannot or are not keyed for a specific orientation, all identification,
markings, cautions, and directions should be placed 360 degrees around the tube or duct.
MC-14 Where multiple connectors are located in close proximity, ensure (1) a minimum hand tool arc of 120 degrees can be
maintained, and (2) stagger fittings to ensure firm coupling interface/hand tool interface can be accomplished without
inducing damage to adjacent lines.
MP-01 Avoid the use epoxies to mount parts on repairable modules because they make repair extremely difficult.
MP-02 Use a unique identification (ID) resistor incorporated in each system module to verify that the proper module is mounted
on ATE.
MP-03 Design modules so that lengthy warm-up times, special coding and air purity levels, and similar constraints are not
necessary.
SABCH-06 Structural design should avoid the potential of dissimilar material or fastener corrosion.
SABCH-07 No structural fasteners should be used that require special tools for installation.
SABCH-08 Taper pins should be threaded and retained with self-locking hardware.
SABCH-09 Pins and collars (lockbolts) should only be used in applications which do not normally require removal.
SABCH-10 Do not use lockbolts in composites.
TCR-01 For each transmission, clutch, or rotor, provide a dedicated lubricating oil supply tank and system that is not shared with
any other oil lubricating system.
TCR-02 Provide each dedicated oil supply system with a separate servicing port/interface, pressure gauging, and quantity gauging
system as applicable.
TCR-03 Use a singular gage capable of reading pressures or quantities from two or more lubricating systems in preference to
individual gages.
TCR-04 Provide each dedicated system with an on-board spectrometric oil analysis program capability, separate oil filter, and
separate oil, fuel, or air heat exchanger capability.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

TCR-05 Use the item's self-contained oil system to provide drive/interface spline lubrication, if required.
TCR-06 In complex units, use different tracer elements in multiple gears, plates, discs, etc., so the source of wear can be easily
identified by spectrometric oil analysis monitoring units.
TCR-07 Design mechanical interfaces to transmissions, clutches, and rotors so that the respective unit can be replaced without the
need for rigging.
TCR-08 Incorporate vibration pick-up sensors to isolate the respective unit from other potential sources of vibration, and to
enhance the prognostic potential for monitoring equipment health.
3.02.06 Exhaust Exits, Nozzles, and Outlets A-13 Two-sided or two-surfaced access should not be required for access to equipment interfaces and hardpoints. The term
two-sided infers top/bottom, left/right, front/back, or combinations thereof.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
BIT-06 Mission critical functions should be monitored by BIT.

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

BIT-09 Use concurrent BIT to monitor system critical functions.
D&V-01 The geometric aspects of structural design and interfaces should not result in any natural bathtubs.
D&V-02 Closed structural sections subject to condensation or fluid migration should contain drainage provisions.

C-161
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.02.06 Exhaust Exits, Nozzles, and Outlets D&V-03 Crew cabs, operators' compartments, crew stations, cockpits, and passenger compartments should be subject to the same
corrosion prevention measures as the exteriors of the vehicles. Low points, pockets, and related fluid collection points

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

within should be provided with low point drains.
ECS-11 Design air inlets, outlets, and exhausts to be accessible without reliance on ladders or work stands for ease of installing
protective plugs or covers.
ECS-12 Design air inlets, outlets, and exhausts with screens to prevent bird or rodent entry.
ECS-13 Design air inlets, outlets, and exhausts to be meniscus-free to prevent a bathtub effect. In remote instances where this is
not possible, passive drains should be provided at all low points to prevent liquid accumulation with the vehicle in its
normal static attitude.
ECS-14 Instances where air inlets, outlets, and exhausts are subject to water entry, passive drains should be employed capable of
handling 4" of rain per hour.
ECS-15 Locate and orient air inlets, outlets, and exhausts in a manner that prevents their use as footholds during maintenance.
EDECOM-01 Provide surface sensors on equipment located in compartments containing louvers, screens, flush inlets, or similar
openings to the environment to indicate the presence of chem/bio contaminants.
EDECOM-02 Provide integral sensors (viewable from the exterior) for equipment subject to internal forced-air cooling from outside or
external air to indicate the presence of contaminants.
EDECOM-03 Design equipment surfaces and structure to be compatible with all decontamination agents and methods.
EDECOM-04 Provide passive overboard drains in compartments subject to decontamination processes to void the area of contaminants.
EDECOM-05 Provide hoist, lift or transport handles for equipment requiring removal from the host vehicle for decontamination. In
instances where this may not be practical, design the equipment with hardpoints for attaching parasitic carrying provisions
ENG-01 All facets of engine design should take advantage of Electrostatic Engine Monitoring Systems (EEMS) and Inductive
Debris Monitoring (IDM) toward achievement of on-condition maintenance and engine health monitoring.
ENG-02 Each different component of rotating machinery should contain different tracer elements to enhance EEMS and IDM
isolation and tracking of wear.
ENG-12 All engine-mounted accessories must be capable of being removed and installed through the available airframe access
openings.
ENG-22 The engine cavity structure should be capable of withstanding a 2000-degree Fahrenheit fire for 10 minutes without
jeopardizing loss of the vehicle.
ENG-23 All engine borescope provisions should be accessible with the engine installed and hooked up.
ENG-27 No rigging or calibration should be required following engine replacement.
ENG-28 No engine operational start and checkout should be required following engine replacement.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

ENG-29 No functional check flight should be required following engine change. On twin engine aircraft where both engines were
changed simultaneously, a functional test flight is permissible.
ENG-31 No rigging or calibration should be required subsequent to replacement of any engine-mounted component.
ENG-34 Identification plates on the engine and all engine-mounted components should be viewable with the engine installed and
engine access doors opened.
ENG-35 No time-change components or scheduled actions should be planned solely to protect component integrity or reliability.
ENG-36 All borescope mechanisms should have positive integral locking features.
ENG-47 Design the engine, including all accessories, plumbing, wiring, ducts, and mechanisms, to meet the same environmental
protection and compatibility requirements as the host vehicle.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
ENV-01 Materials, treatments, coatings, finishes should be compatible with all anti-ice and de-ice fluids, chemical and biological

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

decontamination fluids, washing and cleaning fluids, and all vehicle subsystem fluids.
ENV-02 There should be no top coat or treatment deterioration throughout the standard temperature and humidity spectrum.
ENV-03 For airborne vehicles, the finishes should be durable against rain, hail, and dynamic erosion throughout the flight
envelope.

C-162
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.02.06 Exhaust Exits, Nozzles, and Outlets ENV-04 For airborne and ground vehicles, the finishes should be durable against sand erosion throughout all surface wind speeds
experienced in arid or desert geographical locations.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

ENV-06 For ground vehicles, the finishes should be compatible with and durable against all rain, hail, sleet, snow, and ice
conditions experienced in all intended operational environments.
EXH-01 Treatments required for engine hot sections and exhaust areas should not require scheduled removals for the purposes of
recoating.
EXH-02 High temperature exhaust patterns should flow away from or be directed away from treated surrounding structure,
coatings, or finishes.
EXTING-01 Use extinguishing concepts dedicated to each individual fire zone in preference to manifold systems operating from a
central source.
EXTING-02 Design sealed extinguishing agent containers with an integral pressure/volume gage and a pressure-sensing transmitter
for remote read-out.
EXTING-03 Keep each individual fire zone over-temperature/fire warning system separate from those in other fire zones.
EXTING-04 Design individual fire zone over-temperature/fire warning system to be fully BIT capable (the BIT concept should permit
both initiated and periodic BIT).
EXTING-05 Route and locate all tube, wire, and plumbing interfaces in a manner that prevents induced damage during maintenance.
F-01 Use blind fasteners only where absolutely necessary or where considerable cost can be saved.
F-02 Minimize access fasteners while making them quick release, easily removed and replaced, and captive.
F-03 Choose fasteners based on the requirement top operate by hand or with common hand tools rather than special tools.
F-04 Whenever possible, incorporate barrel type fasteners as opposed to hi-torque fasteners. Failure of Hi-torque fasteners
due to stripping are common and a source of potential foreign object damage (FOD).
HOOK-06 Avoid the need to remove the tail hook to facilitate engine access or removal.
HOOK-07 Incorporate remote means to read the tail hook dampener pressure charge to enhance carrier suitability.
LO-05 Do not locate flush mounted LO screens for auxiliary air inlets and exits in walkway areas unless durability has been
proven.
LO-06 Size flush mounted LO screens for auxiliary air inlets and exits to ensure functionality with up to 25 percent of the
openings plugged.
LO-07 Flush and non-flush LO screens should be interchangeable.
MATL-02 Cosmetic type repairs should not exceed 1 hours including cure or drying times.
MATL-03 Cosmetic and vehicle repair material shelf life should not be less than 24 months.
MATL-04 Cosmetic and vehicle repair materials should be non-proprietary and non-single source.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

MATL-05 Cosmetic and vehicle repair materials should not require refrigeration or special facilities or atmospheres for storage.
MATL-06 Repair criteria, repairs, and instructions should not be classified.
MATL-07 All cosmetic touch-up and repair materials should be environmentally safe.
MATL-08 Repairs (other than major depot repair) should not require autoclave type facilities.
MATL-09 A high degree of durability should be achieved across all walkway areas on the top surfaces of all vehicles up to and
including 95 percentile personnel.
MATL-10 Coatings and finishes should be durable against the effects of missile gases, velocities, and particles emanating from the
missile motor.
MATL-11 Coatings and finishes should be durable against the effects of gun gases, projectile shock waves, and brass particles

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
emanating from the projectile seal rings.

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

MATL-13 Special handling or shipping requirements of repair materials should be avoided.
MATL-15 Doors and panels containing blade seals used for signature reduction should be interchangeable or contain
interchangeable blade seals. Deviation is acceptable where repairs can be accomplished on the vehicle in a time equal to
or less than door or seal remove and replace time.

C-163
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.02.06 Exhaust Exits, Nozzles, and Outlets MC-01 All clamps should contain torque-set or torque-limiting connections to prevent clamp or component failure due to over-
torque. Clamp installation call outs should not depend on special tools to establish the required torque values.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

MC-02 Avoid the use of cotter pins, safety wire, safety clips, and similar devices to prevent maintenance-induced events leading
to ground vehicle accidents or loss of air vehicles.
MC-05 Avoid potential foreign object traps during manufacturing or operational maintenance by eliminating vertical penetrations
of plumbing/fittings into tanks, compartments, or cells
MC-06 Locate, position, orient all plumbing and duct electrical connectors to prevent the need for sequential installation or
removal.
MC-14 Where multiple connectors are located in close proximity, ensure (1) a minimum hand tool arc of 120 degrees can be
maintained, and (2) stagger fittings to ensure firm coupling interface/hand tool interface can be accomplished without
inducing damage to adjacent lines.
P-01 Access door and panel fastener types for airborne vehicles should meet the following criteria:
- use latches for a frequency of access of 0 to 40 flight hours
- use High Strength Quick Release fasteners for a frequency of access of 40-400 flight hours
- use structural screws for a frequency of access of 400 flight hours or more
P-02 Access door and panel fastener types for surface vehicles should meet the following criteria:
- use a spring loaded or latch fastener for an opening frequency of daily
- use a one quarter turn fastener (or equivalent) for a opening frequency of weekly
- use screws or bolts for all other cases
P-03 All doors and panels subject to environmental elements should contain form-in-place seals (or equivalent) attached to the
door structure, not substructure, to prevent damage during maintenance.
P-04 Door and panel seals should be compatible with all types of on-board servicing fluids, de-ice and anti-ice fluids, and all
fluids used for chemical, biological, and nuclear decontamination.
P-05 Piano type hinges should not be used on doors or panels because they are subject to wear, corrosion, and sand and fluid
entry.
P-06 Access door and panel devices used to support door in opened position should meet the following criteria:
- for airborne vehicles, design for 60 knot gust loads (or equivalent jet blast loads)
- for ground vehicles, design for 50 mph gust loads
P-07 Hinged access doors and panels capable of remaining in the opened position should not have sharp edges or corners.
P-08 Removable access door and panel fasteners should be of identical grip length and diameter.
P-09 Acceptable door and panel hold-open devices include over-center sheet metal spring, over-center spring link, spring

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

cartridge, support strut, and pinned goose neck hinge.
P-10 Access doors and panels requiring non-captive fasteners should not be located forward of air inlet ducts or high-energy
rotating components (e.g., prop fans, engine cooling fans, etc.).
P-11 Access doors and panels should be interchangeable as justified by operation and support costs or life cycle costs.
PYRO-26 Do not locate ammunition loader interfaces close to inlets, exhausts, fuel dumps and drains, antennas, sensors, lights, or
hazardous protrusions.
SABCH-06 Structural design should avoid the potential of dissimilar material or fastener corrosion.
SABCH-07 No structural fasteners should be used that require special tools for installation.
SABCH-08 Taper pins should be threaded and retained with self-locking hardware.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
SABCH-09 Pins and collars (lockbolts) should only be used in applications which do not normally require removal.

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

SABCH-10 Do not use lockbolts in composites.
SAFE-01 Drag chute installation designs not containing electrical safing should contain remote safe/arm provisions reachable from
ground level by 5 percentile females. Remove location should be clear of engine exhaust areas and flight control
deflection envelopes.

C-164
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.02.06 Exhaust Exits, Nozzles, and Outlets T-01 Do not locate pyro, gas, and air (PGA) control system exhaust exits:
- In proximity to safe, arm, or servicing areas,

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

- Adjacent to auxiliary inlets,
- In close proximity to crew boarding areas, weapons, emergency ingress/egress areas, and optics or optical glass.
T-02 Design pyro type thruster exits associated with emergency use or backup with simple exit closure devices to identify if a
thruster has been fired.
T-03 Provide protective screens for PGA exits that normally remain open to prevent intrusions from fowl or wildlife.
T-04 Provide protective closure provisions for PGA exits located or oriented to exposure from the elements.
3.02.07 Inlets and Inlet Ducts A-13 Two-sided or two-surfaced access should not be required for access to equipment interfaces and hardpoints. The term
two-sided infers top/bottom, left/right, front/back, or combinations thereof.
A-16 Structural design should provide good access to corrosion-prone areas for inspection and treatment.
A-18 Use transparent windows, quick-opening covers, or openings without any cover to permit quick visual inspections where
needed.
BIT-06 Mission critical functions should be monitored by BIT.
BIT-09 Use concurrent BIT to monitor system critical functions.
D&V-01 The geometric aspects of structural design and interfaces should not result in any natural bathtubs.
D&V-02 Closed structural sections subject to condensation or fluid migration should contain drainage provisions.
D&V-03 Crew cabs, operators' compartments, crew stations, cockpits, and passenger compartments should be subject to the same
corrosion prevention measures as the exteriors of the vehicles. Low points, pockets, and related fluid collection points
within should be provided with low point drains.
ECS-11 Design air inlets, outlets, and exhausts to be accessible without reliance on ladders or work stands for ease of installing
protective plugs or covers.
ECS-12 Design air inlets, outlets, and exhausts with screens to prevent bird or rodent entry.
ECS-13 Design air inlets, outlets, and exhausts to be meniscus-free to prevent a bathtub effect. In remote instances where this is
not possible, passive drains should be provided at all low points to prevent liquid accumulation with the vehicle in its
normal static attitude.
ECS-14 Instances where air inlets, outlets, and exhausts are subject to water entry, passive drains should be employed capable of
handling 4" of rain per hour.
ECS-15 Locate and orient air inlets, outlets, and exhausts in a manner that prevents their use as footholds during maintenance.
ECS-28 Install and orient air supply and distribution ducts so they clear all access openings and equipment removal envelopes.
EDECOM-01 Provide surface sensors on equipment located in compartments containing louvers, screens, flush inlets, or similar

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

openings to the environment to indicate the presence of chem/bio contaminants.
EDECOM-02 Provide integral sensors (viewable from the exterior) for equipment subject to internal forced-air cooling from outside or
external air to indicate the presence of contaminants.
EDECOM-03 Design equipment surfaces and structure to be compatible with all decontamination agents and methods.
EDECOM-04 Provide passive overboard drains in compartments subject to decontamination processes to void the area of contaminants.
EDECOM-05 Provide hoist, lift or transport handles for equipment requiring removal from the host vehicle for decontamination. In
instances where this may not be practical, design the equipment with hardpoints for attaching parasitic carrying provisions
ENG-22 The engine cavity structure should be capable of withstanding a 2000-degree Fahrenheit fire for 10 minutes without
jeopardizing loss of the vehicle.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
ENG-23 All engine borescope provisions should be accessible with the engine installed and hooked up.

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

ENG-27 No rigging or calibration should be required following engine replacement.
ENG-28 No engine operational start and checkout should be required following engine replacement.
ENG-29 No functional check flight should be required following engine change. On twin engine aircraft where both engines were
changed simultaneously, a functional test flight is permissible.
ENG-42 Attach engine-to-inlet duct interface seals to the vehicle so they can be left in place during engine removal.

C-165
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.02.07 Inlets and Inlet Ducts ENG-43 Design engine-to-inlet duct seal so the interface is automatic during engine installation without needing any form of
alignment, adjustment, or mechanical attachment interface.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

ENG-44 Select engine-to-inlet duct seal material to ensure seal life is sufficient for the life of the vehicle.
ENG-47 Design the engine, including all accessories, plumbing, wiring, ducts, and mechanisms, to meet the same environmental
protection and compatibility requirements as the host vehicle.
ENV-01 Materials, treatments, coatings, finishes should be compatible with all anti-ice and de-ice fluids, chemical and biological
decontamination fluids, washing and cleaning fluids, and all vehicle subsystem fluids.
ENV-02 There should be no top coat or treatment deterioration throughout the standard temperature and humidity spectrum.
ENV-03 For airborne vehicles, the finishes should be durable against rain, hail, and dynamic erosion throughout the flight
envelope.
ENV-04 For airborne and ground vehicles, the finishes should be durable against sand erosion throughout all surface wind speeds
experienced in arid or desert geographical locations.
ENV-05 For airborne vehicles, materials and all finishes with the engine inlet should be durable against hammer shock and
compressor stalls.
ENV-06 For ground vehicles, the finishes should be compatible with and durable against all rain, hail, sleet, snow, and ice
conditions experienced in all intended operational environments.
F-01 Use blind fasteners only where absolutely necessary or where considerable cost can be saved.
F-02 Minimize access fasteners while making them quick release, easily removed and replaced, and captive.
F-03 Choose fasteners based on the requirement top operate by hand or with common hand tools rather than special tools.
F-04 Whenever possible, incorporate barrel type fasteners as opposed to hi-torque fasteners. Failure of Hi-torque fasteners
due to stripping are common and a source of potential foreign object damage (FOD).
IN(V)-02 Do not use loose structural fasteners in the access area to inlet door actuators and mechanisms. Where this guideline
cannot be followed, design the actuator door to be accessible only when the inlet doors are fully closed.
IN(V)-03 For engine inlet bellmouth fairings, use methods of retention other than fasteners. Latches may be considered as an
acceptable alternative only if latch-to-panel retention is from the inner mold line.
IN(V)-04 Design inlet doors and inlet bellmouth fairings to be fully interchangeable to eliminate the need to cut, file, or trim at the
engine face.
IN(V)-05 Locate the inlet duct edge a minimum of 60 inches from the cockpit or crew station to eliminate restricting engine
operation to canopy-closed conditions.
IN(V)-06 Use captive fasteners on all access doors forward of the inlet to significantly reduce engine FOD potential.
IN(V)-07 Ensure that no ground safety pins or streamers are used forward of the inlet or within a 3-foot radius aft of the inlet.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

IN(V)-08 Incorporate an inlet closure door sealing concept that prevents entry of fluid, dust, or sand across the entire airborne and
ground environment spectrum.
IN-01 Low Observable (LO) engine face frames should be within 10 inches of the first stage fan or compressor blades.
IN-02 Openings throughout the engine face frame should be sufficient to perform a 100% FOD inspection of the engine face.
IN-03 Openings throughout the engine face frame should be sufficient to permit minor blending or repair of FOD without
removing the engine.
IN-04 For frames not integral with the engine, frame removal should be achievable from the engine cavity.
IN-05 Both integral and remote engine front frames should be interchangeable.
IN-06 Front frame anti-ice and de-ice provisions should give preference to engine hot bleed air.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
LG-30 Do not use landing gear wells to locate any type of auxiliary air inlet.

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

LO-05 Do not locate flush mounted LO screens for auxiliary air inlets and exits in walkway areas unless durability has been
proven.
LO-06 Size flush mounted LO screens for auxiliary air inlets and exits to ensure functionality with up to 25 percent of the
openings plugged.
LO-07 Flush and non-flush LO screens should be interchangeable.

C-166
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.02.07 Inlets and Inlet Ducts MATL-02 Cosmetic type repairs should not exceed 1 hours including cure or drying times.
MATL-03 Cosmetic and vehicle repair material shelf life should not be less than 24 months.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

MATL-04 Cosmetic and vehicle repair materials should be non-proprietary and non-single source.
MATL-05 Cosmetic and vehicle repair materials should not require refrigeration or special facilities or atmospheres for storage.
MATL-06 Repair criteria, repairs, and instructions should not be classified.
MATL-07 All cosmetic touch-up and repair materials should be environmentally safe.
MATL-08 Repairs (other than major depot repair) should not require autoclave type facilities.
MATL-09 A high degree of durability should be achieved across all walkway areas on the top surfaces of all vehicles up to and
including 95 percentile personnel.
MATL-10 Coatings and finishes should be durable against the effects of missile gases, velocities, and particles emanating from the
missile motor.
MATL-11 Coatings and finishes should be durable against the effects of gun gases, projectile shock waves, and brass particles
emanating from the projectile seal rings.
MATL-12 Leading edge materials and coatings should be durable against fragments from frangible gun port plugs.
MATL-13 Special handling or shipping requirements of repair materials should be avoided.
MATL-15 Doors and panels containing blade seals used for signature reduction should be interchangeable or contain
interchangeable blade seals. Deviation is acceptable where repairs can be accomplished on the vehicle in a time equal to
or less than door or seal remove and replace time.
MC-02 Avoid the use of cotter pins, safety wire, safety clips, and similar devices to prevent maintenance-induced events leading
to ground vehicle accidents or loss of air vehicles.
MC-05 Avoid potential foreign object traps during manufacturing or operational maintenance by eliminating vertical penetrations
of plumbing/fittings into tanks, compartments, or cells
P-01 Access door and panel fastener types for airborne vehicles should meet the following criteria:
- use latches for a frequency of access of 0 to 40 flight hours
- use High Strength Quick Release fasteners for a frequency of access of 40-400 flight hours
- use structural screws for a frequency of access of 400 flight hours or more
P-02 Access door and panel fastener types for surface vehicles should meet the following criteria:
- use a spring loaded or latch fastener for an opening frequency of daily
- use a one quarter turn fastener (or equivalent) for a opening frequency of weekly
- use screws or bolts for all other cases
P-03 All doors and panels subject to environmental elements should contain form-in-place seals (or equivalent) attached to the

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

door structure, not substructure, to prevent damage during maintenance.
P-04 Door and panel seals should be compatible with all types of on-board servicing fluids, de-ice and anti-ice fluids, and all
fluids used for chemical, biological, and nuclear decontamination.
P-05 Piano type hinges should not be used on doors or panels because they are subject to wear, corrosion, and sand and fluid
entry.
P-06 Access door and panel devices used to support door in opened position should meet the following criteria:
- for airborne vehicles, design for 60 knot gust loads (or equivalent jet blast loads)
- for ground vehicles, design for 50 mph gust loads
P-07 Hinged access doors and panels capable of remaining in the opened position should not have sharp edges or corners.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
PYRO-26 Do not locate ammunition loader interfaces close to inlets, exhausts, fuel dumps and drains, antennas, sensors, lights, or

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

hazardous protrusions.
SABCH-01 Do not locate auxiliary air inlets, sensors, access doors, or drains in boundary bleed areas.
SABCH-02 All flush type structural screws should have identical head drives for the entire vehicle.
SABCH-03 All non-flush type structural screws should have identical head drive recesses for the entire vehicle.

C-167
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.02.07 Inlets and Inlet Ducts SABCH-04 Special high strength bolts, such as twelve-point heads, should be fully justified from standpoint of the cost of ownership
and effectiveness.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

SABCH-05 Structural design should avoid the reliance on blind fasteners unless fully supported by cost, weight, schedule, and
effectiveness analysis.
SABCH-11 In rare instances where the use of dissimilar material in immediate contact cannot be avoided, they should be sufficiently
insulated to endure for the life of the vehicle.
SABCH-12 Avoid tapping threads into structural members. Use of heli-coil type or similar insert concepts is permissible.
SABCH-13 No structural design concept should rely on frequent scheduled inspections to monitor or otherwise ensure structural
integrity.
SABCH-14 No structural fastener intended to carry shear or tension loads should be smaller than 1/4" diameter (.25").
SABCH-15 Give preference to butt type splices over lap type splices in the design of manufacturing splices.
3.02.08 Electrical A-11 Locate compartment electrical penetrations close to the access opening for ease of sight, probing, repair, and to eliminate
fluid soaking, wicking, or contamination.
A-12 Locate compartment electrical penetrations far enough from the access opening to prevent damage resulting from
improper (over-length) panel fasteners.
A-13 Two-sided or two-surfaced access should not be required for access to equipment interfaces and hardpoints. The term
two-sided infers top/bottom, left/right, front/back, or combinations thereof.
BIT-01 During design of the BIT, use worst-case stress analysis to ensure that any circuit failures induced by temperature
extremes, tolerance build-up, power supply variations, and combinations thereof are identified.
BIT-02 Ensure that BIT system thresholds are consistent with those across the system, subsystem, item, module, and piece-part
levels to prevent excessive numbers of Cannot Duplicate (CND) and Retest OK (RTOK) events from occurring.
BIT-03 The degree of BIT required or proposed should be based on the respective failure rates and the appropriate FMECA at
all equipment indenture levels.
BIT-04 Limit the amount of data that is recorded to a manageable size by:
- Limiting the number of signals that are monitored
- Limiting the maximum sampling rate
- Reducing the time span over which data is accumulated
- Restricting the type of data accumulated
BIT-05 Incorporate testability design features as an integral part of equipment preliminary design process.
BIT-06 Mission critical functions should be monitored by BIT.
BIT-09 Use concurrent BIT to monitor system critical functions.
BIT-26 Locate routinely used test points so they are accessible without removing or disassembling other equipment

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

BIT-27 Periodic and initiated BIT should detect at least 98% of all failures and isolate a minimum 99% of those failures detected
to a single LRU or WRA.
BIT-28 Design BIT to have the same level of EMI protection as the system or equipment being monitored.
CC-01 Use fiber-optic technologies in preference to conventional interconnect concepts to reduce the number of
interconnects/interfaces, reduce manufacturing and ownership costs, and significantly improve R&M.
CC-02 Standardize connector and wire types to improve testability and logistic support. Keep the number of "different" standard
connectors to a minimum. Use the same connector type keyed differently where possible.
CC-03 Provide clearance around connectors for engagement/disengagement of cables and proper connector orientation under
anticipated environmental conditions (e.g., bare hand of 50 percentile male in an enclosed or protected environment and

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
a gloved hand of a 50 percentile male in an open or unprotected environment).

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

CC-04 Use quick release cables and locate cables to make removal and replacement easy and to avoid having to remove one
cable to gain access to another. Provide adequate space for cables, including sleeving and tie-downs, and adequate
service loops for ease of assembly/disassembly
CC-05 Orient and space connectors to allow a sufficient grip on the connector for cable or wire extraction without fear of using
the wiring or cable for additional leverage.

C-168
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.02.08 Electrical CC-06 Label, and where possible color code, each wire in a harness or cable to facilitate tracking from origin to termination.
Each wire, cable, and coax-to-connector interface should be provided with a source of identification to aidin trouble

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

shooting, repair, or modification. Marking the cable designator on the cable along with bar codes is also recommended.
CC-07 Do not manufacture or dress connectors containing more than 25 wires or cables as a single integrated harness. Group
the wires or cables into runs of no more than 25 wires or cables each. In addition to making trouble shooting and repair
easier, this approach help avoid large bend radii, thereby simplifying routing, packaging, and stowage.
CC-08 Standardize connector pin assignments for power, ground, and other frequently used signals.
CC-09 Locate LRU/subsystem critical nodes (and or test points) so they are accessible from a connector to prevent the need for
internal LRU probing or access.
CC-10 Avoid hidden cables. Visually inspecting and tracing all assembly cables rather than having hidden cables (such as
behind other cables or even LRUs) allows for a quick system and cable integrity check which aids in overall system
integrity and debug. This also implies quick access for manipulative actions.
CC-11 Orient spare wires and cable pigtails along the outer diameter or periphery of connectors to make access easier.
CC-12 Build up and assemble straight and angle connector shells or back shells in a manner that ensures that wire or cable strain
or wear is not possible.
CO-01 Design automated systems and programs with provisions to enable "stop test" and "resume" without the need to cycle back
or repeat the entire test.
CO-02 In the event of program loss or hang-up, automated systems and programs should have provisions for reverting to manual
test and operation.
CO-03 Use a test connector to provide test and maintenance bus access to all system and subsystem faults.
CO-04 Design systems and subsystems so that ATE can be used to access, read, and control internal components in concert with
the test or checkout program.
CO-05 Avoid the need for costly adapters for signal communications between system, subsystems, line replaceable units (LRUs)
or Weapon Replaceable Assemblies (WRAs), and ATE.
EC-01 A threaded electrical connector should contain integral locking mechanisms and visual indications that the connector is
properly seated and locked.
EC-02 An electrical connector requiring less than one full turn to connect or disconnect should contain integral locking
mechanisms and visual indications that the connector is properly seated and locked.
EC-03 A push-pull electrical connector (excluding rack-and-panel type) should contain integral locking features and visual
indication that the connector is properly seated and locked.
EC-04 All electrical connectors should be keyed or asymmetrically shaped to ensure proper alignment.
EC-05 All electrical connectors should contain scoop-proof shells to ensure pin damage will not occur prior to engaging key

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

way.
EC-06 All electrical connectors should be corrosion resistant to reduce or eliminate the need for scheduled inspections or
corrosion prevention measures.
EC-07 Avoid using electrical connectors requiring any type or form of soldering.
EC-08 Locate and position electrical connectors such that all pin identification for either half can be easily seen.
EC-09 Electrical connectors selected for critical applications on ground vehicles should be both accessible and capable of being
connected disconnected by a fifty percentile gloved male hand.
EC-10 Separation between grouped electrical connectors should be sufficient to ensure make or break of any connector by a
fifty percentile gloved male hand. Where this is not possible, an alternate method should be used such as the use of stand-
offs, long-shelled connectors alternated with standard connectors, 180-degree connectors alternated with 90-degree

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
connectors, or innovative equivalents.
EC-16 Select connectors so that contacts on the "live" or "hot" side of the connection are socket type rather than pin type to
minimize personnel hazard and to prevent accidental shorting of live circuits.
EC-17 Whenever possible, use self-locking connector plugs of a type not requiring safety wire.
EC-18 All electric connectors should be environment resistant.

C-169
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.02.08 Electrical EC-19 Connectors containing fiber optic contacts should, whenever possible, be mounted on a vertical surface to prevent
particle and fluid contamination.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

EC-20 Use quick disconnect connectors where allowed and identify all pins on each connector.
EC-21 Locate connectors far enough apart so that they meet specified requirements.
EC-22 All connectors should be keyed differently with aligning pins that extend beyond the electrical pins. Connector pins and
sockets should engage after key position is entered.
EC-23 Design connectors so that plugs are cold and receptacles are hot.
EC-24 Use electrical connectors that incorporate alignment key-ways to reduce incidents of damage due to improper
engagement.
EC-25 Use positive locking, quick disconnect electrical connectors to save man-hours, prevent foreign object damage (FOD)
and decrease the chance of personal injury.
EC-26 Avoid using identical electrical connectors in adjacent areas.
ECS-06 All electrical control, sensing, sensor, warning, caution, or signal interface and wiring should be fully BIT compatible.
EG-01 Design feedback loops so that the loop can be broken during test to ensure that faults do not propagate to the point where
they cannot be isolated.
EG-02 Avoid using external feedback loops requiring complex circuitry to simulate feedback I/Os.
EG-03 In rare instances when complex external feedback loops cannot be avoided, incorporate simple interruptible control
points.
EG-04 Avoid long sequences of vectors to initialize or alter device outputs to minimize potential testability problems.
EG-05 Avoid the need to have test equipment generate complex, phased or time related signals.
EG-06 Test points should be located on all circuit nodes that are useful in determining the module's health.
EG-07 Test points should be designed so that functional circuitry cannot be damaged or degraded due to the routing or accidental
shorting of a signal at a test point. Some type of test point isolation technique should be used (buffers, isolator, etc.).
EG-08 Test points should be easily accessed and clearly marked.
EG-10 Design redundant circuits to be independently testable to ensure errors are not masked.
EG-11 To improve the probability of fault detection, avoid shorting signals together to achieve a specific test function or
condition.
EG-12 Incorporate concept for partitioning module functions to simplify test equipment or eliminate the need for ancillary test
equipment..
EG-13 Design oscillators or clocks that are resident on the module to be replaceable by a signal from a connector to avoid the
need to synchronize ATE to on-board signals.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

ENG(G)-18 Incorporate appropriate sensors to enhance the diagnostic and prognostic capabilities for the following:
- Oil temperature - Fuel filter bypass
- Oil pressure - Coolant pressure
- Oil filter bypass - Coolant level
- Oil cooler bypass valve position - Coolant temperature
- Oil level - Vibration pickups
- Oil return line particle count - Chip detector
ENG(G)-20 Design all firewall fittings, connectors, and penetrations to be fully viewable and directly accessible to the maintainers.
ENG-24 Replacement of all ignitors should be possible with the engine installed.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
ENG-25 All engine-to-airframe plumbing, wiring, and duct interfaces should be capable of being connected or disconnected by

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

hand, should contain integral safety provisions, and should not require torquing.
ENG-26 Locate and position engine overheat and fire warning sensors so that damage cannot occur during engine maintenance or
replacement.
ENG-46 Design the basic engine and engine-mounted accessory interface so that no fluid traps or bathtubs exist regardless of
engine-mounted accessory location.

C-170
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.02.08 Electrical ENG-47 Design the engine, including all accessories, plumbing, wiring, ducts, and mechanisms, to meet the same environmental
protection and compatibility requirements as the host vehicle.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

LG-11 All microswitches, proximity switches, lights, sensors, etc. mounted to a strut should have individual interface connectors.
Wiring pigtails requiring in-line splices should be avoided.
LG-14 All interfaces from the airframe to the struts should be visible and accessible, and not require removal of airframe
structure for access.
LG-21 Proximity type switches used in landing gear design should meet a minimum of 200 volt-amperes to eliminate
Electromagnetic Interference (EMI) or Radiation Hazard (RADHAD) problems. Wiring associated with the landing gear
design should meet the same requirements.
MC-02 Avoid the use of cotter pins, safety wire, safety clips, and similar devices to prevent maintenance-induced events leading
to ground vehicle accidents or loss of air vehicles.
MC-06 Locate, position, orient all plumbing and duct electrical connectors to prevent the need for sequential installation or
removal.
MC-10 In rare instances where a plumbing run contains complex form or geometry that would require removal of other plumbing
or equipment for access, in-line connectors should be incorporated to maintain the integrity of other plumbing or
equipment.
MC-12 All plumbing and connectors containing liquids should be meniscus-free.
MC-14 Where multiple connectors are located in close proximity, ensure (1) a minimum hand tool arc of 120 degrees can be
maintained, and (2) stagger fittings to ensure firm coupling interface/hand tool interface can be accomplished without
inducing damage to adjacent lines.
MG-01 Mount LRUs/sub-systems on drawer slides or extender racks to provide easier accessibility during integration, testing,
debug, and repair of Units Under Test (UUTs).
PYRO-21 Weapon bays should contain internal lighting controlled by a separate switch that is only functional when doors are open
SIMP-01 Location and design of all exterior lights should not require protective covers in ground environments.
SIMP-02 Landing and taxi lights should be mounted on landing gear struts or doors to eliminate separate compartments, doors, and
retraction/extension mechanisms.
SURV-04 Do not seal battery power or battery-operated devices in survival packages or containers. When this guideline cannot be
followed, provide a remote way of ascertaining the status or condition of the battery.
W-01 Hat section type structural stiffeners with sufficient cross sectional area should be considered as a routing tunnel for
wiring and coax.
WT&B-08 Do not use microswitches (mechanical) in gear caution and warning systems.
WT&B-16 Do not use potting compounds for electrical connector environmental protection because it tends to revert and

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

significantly increases repair time.
WT&B-17 Electrical connector environmental protection should be capable of withstanding water pressure streams up to 120 psi
encountered during decontamination, wash, etc.
3.03 Structures A-08 Plumbing penetrations into a compartment should not be on a vertical axis due to difficulty in making or breaking
vertically-oriented connections. When compartment access is from the bottom, vertically-oriented connections can allow
fluid to leak onto the maintainer. When access is from the top, such connections can allow foreign matter to enter the
line. Use horizontal penetrations whenever possible.
A-09 Any heat or temperature sensitive structure within a compartment should contain heat-sensitive tape or appropriate heat
sensor for easy indication of over-temperature excursions.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
A-10 Provide a sufficient number of compartment fluid drains to ensure fluid drainage for varying aircraft static attitudes and
varying terrain slopes for ground vehicles.
A-11 Locate compartment electrical penetrations close to the access opening for ease of sight, probing, repair, and to eliminate
fluid soaking, wicking, or contamination.
A-12 Locate compartment electrical penetrations far enough from the access opening to prevent damage resulting from
improper (over-length) panel fasteners.

C-171
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.03 Structures A-13 Two-sided or two-surfaced access should not be required for access to equipment interfaces and hardpoints. The term
two-sided infers top/bottom, left/right, front/back, or combinations thereof.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

A-15 Locate tie-down attachment points such that tie-down chains, straps, or cables do not prevent or restrict normal servicing,
weapon loading, or safe/arm functions.
A-17 All structural fasteners in an access door or panel should be of identical grip and diameter. In rare cases where this is not
possible, fasteners of different grip must have different diameters to prevent a shorter fastener being substituted for the
correct, longer fastener.
A-18 Use transparent windows, quick-opening covers, or openings without any cover to permit quick visual inspections where
needed.
AA&S-01 Flush mounted antennas, sensors, and air data devices should have a good color contrast to surrounding structure when
located in walkway areas.
AA&S-02 Closure and sealing of cavities, compartments, and wells for retractable antennas should be mechanized to function as
part of the extend and retract cycle.
AA&S-03 Closure and sealing of cavities, compartments, and wells for retractable antennas should be maintained when antennas
are not installed without need for ancillary measures or equipment.
AA&S-04 LO antennas should be designed to be tolerant of accumulations of grime or dirt without degrading performance or
biasing the BIT/fault isolate performance.
AA&S-05 Multi-function antennas, arrays, and sensors located in leading edges should be modularized to reduce vehicle downtime
through simplified replacement of a faulty module.
AA&S-06 Moveable flaps or slats containing integral antennas, arrays, or sensors should be interchangeable to provide the option
for on-vehicle or off-vehicle repair.
ARM-01 For an aircraft, the fuselage lower shear moldline should be no less than 38" above the ground when external weapons
only will be carried on the fuselage.
ARM-02 For an aircraft, the fuselage lower shear moldline should be no less than 50" above the ground when internal weapons
will be carried in the fuselage and weapon bay door widths exceed 22".
ARM-03 Locate fuselage weapon bays a minimum of 18" from the nose landing gear and main landing gear of an aircraft.
ARM-04 No single weapon/store mounted on a transporter should intrude into the service/turnaround envelope of another station.
ARM-05 All servicing and turnaround functions (including movement envelopes) should be outside the gun firing envelope.
ARM-06 The relationship of the nose landing gear to the main landing gear should not restrict the positioning of weapon
transporters under the fuselage of an aircraft.
ARM-10 Weapon and store stations should be located to ensure vehicle ballasting will not be required under any combination of
weapon/store configurations.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

BIT-05 Incorporate testability design features as an integral part of equipment preliminary design process.
BIT-06 Mission critical functions should be monitored by BIT.
BIT-09 Use concurrent BIT to monitor system critical functions.
BIT/BITE-02 Design EMI protection to eliminate finger type EMI contact devices.
C-01 Avoid swivel type connectors and fittings for air, fuel, or hydraulic line interfaces due to their history of low reliability.
C-02 Provide spacing between parallel plumbing runs so that in-line couplings can be replaced without removing lines or
disconnecting any line support devices.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
C-172
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.03 Structures CARGO-01 Ground vehicles with storage bays or compartments accessible from outside the vehicle should:
- Have the door sill located no lower than knee height to accommodate a wide range of percentiles while standing.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

- Ensure door handles are flush with outer surface to protect personnel.
- Contain goose neck hinges to protect the hinge from the elements.
- Contain peripheral door seals that will protect against blowing sand entry at 50 mph.
- Ensure door can be opened with transport tie downs installed.
- Ensure door opening envelope does not intrude into the opening envelope of an adjacent door.
- Contain simple sheet metal hold-open spring or mechanism.
- Ensure floor of bay or compartment is flush with sill to simplify cleanout and drainage.
- Ensure door unlocking and opening mechanism can be actuated by a 95 percentile male hand while wearing arctic
gloves.
- Contain 15 percent added volume for density growth.
CARGO-02 Ground vehicles with small exterior storage bays or compartments containing emergency equipment or supplies should:
- Be located at chest height of the 50 percentile male.
- Contain unlatching mechanisms activated by pushing inward on the door.
- Meet all other generic bay and compartment requirements.
CBR-01 Orient all vehicle liquid servicing fittings to ensure fluids will not come in contact with protective garb during
connect/disconnect activities.
CBR-02 Ensure vehicle overboard passive liquid drains are clearly marked or visible to enable personnel to remain clear of area.
CBR-03 Design fuel cell drains so they can not be activated in a manner that would allow fuel to come in contact with a protected
hand.
CBR-04 Design emergency ingress provisions so they can be activated by a 95 percentile male wearing full protective chemical
or biological protection gear.
CBR-05 Size rescue doors, panels, and "cut here" areas to accommodate the 95 percentile shoulder width wearing full protective
chemical or biological protection gear.
CBR-06 Consider the reduction in peripheral vision resulting from wearing chemical or biological protection gear when designing
intended fire paths and crash rescue paths into a vehicle.
CREW-01 Canopy attachment/hinge hardpoints should be located on the same structural subassembly as the canopy locking
hardpoints.
CREW-02 Armor protection integrated with the vehicle structure should be given preference over parasitic armor.
CREW-03 In rare cases where armor is parasitic, armor should be interchangeable and easily installed.
CREW-04 Avoid wiring, coax, and plumbing penetrations through the floor of crew cabs, operators' compartments, crew stations,

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

cockpits, and passenger compartments.
CREW-05 Structural instrument panels, dashboards, and control panels should be modularized for easy and adequate access to all
interfaces, to simplify manufacturing, and to reduce maintenance-induced problems.
CREW-12 Requirements for boresighting should not be part of the design or integration.
CREW-13 Provide storage provisions in each vehicle type (ground and airborne) to store extra tapes, modules, canisters, cassettes,
as appropriate to the intended vehicle use/mission.
D&V-01 The geometric aspects of structural design and interfaces should not result in any natural bathtubs.
D&V-02 Closed structural sections subject to condensation or fluid migration should contain drainage provisions.
D&V-03 Crew cabs, operators' compartments, crew stations, cockpits, and passenger compartments should be subject to the same

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
corrosion prevention measures as the exteriors of the vehicles. Low points, pockets, and related fluid collection points
within should be provided with low point drains.
ECS-11 Design air inlets, outlets, and exhausts to be accessible without reliance on ladders or work stands for ease of installing
protective plugs or covers.
ECS-12 Design air inlets, outlets, and exhausts with screens to prevent bird or rodent entry.

C-173
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.03 Structures ECS-13 Design air inlets, outlets, and exhausts to be meniscus-free to prevent a bathtub effect. In remote instances where this is
not possible, passive drains should be provided at all low points to prevent liquid accumulation with the vehicle in its

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

normal static attitude.
ECS-14 Instances where air inlets, outlets, and exhausts are subject to water entry, passive drains should be employed capable of
handling 4" of rain per hour.
ECS-15 Locate and orient air inlets, outlets, and exhausts in a manner that prevents their use as footholds during maintenance.
ECS-16 All components contained in the systems, including all attaching brackets and supports, should use hex-head self-locking
bolts for ease and simplicity of installation.
ECS-17 Do not use air ejectors due to their low reliability and susceptibility to clogging.
ECS-21 Do not locate ground cooling or circulation fans that operate at high noise levels in operator, crew, or passenger
compartments.
EDECOM-01 Provide surface sensors on equipment located in compartments containing louvers, screens, flush inlets, or similar
openings to the environment to indicate the presence of chem/bio contaminants.
EDECOM-02 Provide integral sensors (viewable from the exterior) for equipment subject to internal forced-air cooling from outside or
external air to indicate the presence of contaminants.
EDECOM-03 Design equipment surfaces and structure to be compatible with all decontamination agents and methods.
EDECOM-04 Provide passive overboard drains in compartments subject to decontamination processes to void the area of contaminants.
EDECOM-05 Provide hoist, lift or transport handles for equipment requiring removal from the host vehicle for decontamination. In
instances where this may not be practical, design the equipment with hardpoints for attaching parasitic carrying provisions
ENG(G)-01 Provide access to all engine mounts for ground vehicles so that hoisting or crawling under the vehicle is not required.
ENG(G)-02 Use torque-limiting bolts or torque washers as engine mount attaching hardware to eliminate the need for torque
wrenches.
ENG(G)-03 Design hard points for hoisting or positioning the engine during installation and removal to be integral to the engine and
capable of hoisting and supporting a fully-built-up engine package.
ENG(G)-04 Do not use downward engine removal concepts that require jacking or hoisting of the ground vehicle.
ENG(G)-05 Use concepts for removing ground vehicle engines from the front, rear, or side rather than from overhead (using
hoisting).
ENG(G)-06 The distance between the engine and firewall should ensure the access envelopes to lines, fittings, wiring, and
adjustments will accommodate the 75 percentile male hand.
ENG(G)-07 The distance between the cooling fan and radiator core should ensure that access envelopes will not require removal of
the core.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

ENG(G)-08 The interface of the engine assembly to the engine compartment and structure should be designed to ensure all spark
plugs, glo-plugs, and igniters can be replaced within 30 minutes elapsed time.
ENG(G)-10 Design attaching hardware for all mechanical engine-to-vehicle interfaces to be captive and with integral safeties.
ENG(G)-16 Do not locate batteries in the engine compartment. In those instances where this is not possible:
- The battery support structure should be of a material that is impervious to acid leakage or boil-over.
- The battery support structure should serve as a scupper to collect and direct the acid out of the engine compartment.
ENG(G)-19 Paint engine compartments gloss white to enhance light reflectivity and enhance fluid leak detection.
ENG(G)-20 Design all firewall fittings, connectors, and penetrations to be fully viewable and directly accessible to the maintainers.
ENG-09 On multi-engine air vehicles, the engines should be capable of being installed in any engine cavity without need for

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
reconfiguration.

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

ENG-10 On multi-engine air vehicles, the airframe-to-engine interfaces should be in identical positions or orientations for each
engine cavity.
ENG-15 Engine removal for aircraft intended to be operated off carriers should be accomplished within the shadow of the
aircraft.
ENG-16 Aircraft jacking should not be required for engine removal.

C-174
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.03 Structures ENG-17 Aft engine removal should be an acceptable alternative for USAF aircraft.
ENG-18 For either downward or aft engine removal, it should be possible to maintain control of the engine on all axis during the

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

entire removal and installation process.
ENG-19 The minimum clearance between engine and airframe should be 1 inch, including removal and installation.
ENG-20 Do not locate equipment or components in the engine cavity except for those components associated with the engine or
engine installation.
ENG-21 Do not locate equipment or components in the engine bay cavity in a manner that would require removal or repositioning
for engine removal.
ENG-22 The engine cavity structure should be capable of withstanding a 2000-degree Fahrenheit fire for 10 minutes without
jeopardizing loss of the vehicle.
ENG-23 All engine borescope provisions should be accessible with the engine installed and hooked up.
ENG-24 Replacement of all ignitors should be possible with the engine installed.
ENG-25 All engine-to-airframe plumbing, wiring, and duct interfaces should be capable of being connected or disconnected by
hand, should contain integral safety provisions, and should not require torquing.
ENG-26 Locate and position engine overheat and fire warning sensors so that damage cannot occur during engine maintenance or
replacement.
ENG-30 It should not be necessary to close or reinstall engine access doors for engine ground operation up to and including
military power.
ENG-33 Engine access doors and panels and their integral support struts should be capable of withstanding 60 MPH winds in the
opened position.
ENG-34 Identification plates on the engine and all engine-mounted components should be viewable with the engine installed and
engine access doors opened.
ENG-42 Attach engine-to-inlet duct interface seals to the vehicle so they can be left in place during engine removal.
ENG-43 Design engine-to-inlet duct seal so the interface is automatic during engine installation without needing any form of
alignment, adjustment, or mechanical attachment interface.
ENG-44 Select engine-to-inlet duct seal material to ensure seal life is sufficient for the life of the vehicle.
ENG-45 Provide remote servicing points accessible from the ground to service engine accessories mounted on top of the engine
(e.g., oil tanks, gear boxes, generators, etc.) to eliminate climbing upon or atop the host vehicle.
ENG-47 Design the engine, including all accessories, plumbing, wiring, ducts, and mechanisms, to meet the same environmental
protection and compatibility requirements as the host vehicle.
ENG-48 Do not drain or dump residual fuel in the engine fuel control/manifold overboard. When it is not possible to follow this

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

guideline, route the fuel to an engine-mounted collector tank capable of retaining fuel from two shutdowns.
ENV-01 Materials, treatments, coatings, finishes should be compatible with all anti-ice and de-ice fluids, chemical and biological
decontamination fluids, washing and cleaning fluids, and all vehicle subsystem fluids.
ENV-02 There should be no top coat or treatment deterioration throughout the standard temperature and humidity spectrum.
ENV-03 For airborne vehicles, the finishes should be durable against rain, hail, and dynamic erosion throughout the flight
envelope.
ENV-04 For airborne and ground vehicles, the finishes should be durable against sand erosion throughout all surface wind speeds
experienced in arid or desert geographical locations.
ENV-05 For airborne vehicles, materials and all finishes with the engine inlet should be durable against hammer shock and

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
compressor stalls.

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

ENV-06 For ground vehicles, the finishes should be compatible with and durable against all rain, hail, sleet, snow, and ice
conditions experienced in all intended operational environments.
EXH-01 Treatments required for engine hot sections and exhaust areas should not require scheduled removals for the purposes of
recoating.

C-175
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.03 Structures EXH-02 High temperature exhaust patterns should flow away from or be directed away from treated surrounding structure,
coatings, or finishes.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

EXT-01 Locate Tanks, Pods, Containers, and Devices (TPCD's) so they do not block or restrict access to existing vehicle access
areas or access approach envelopes.
EXT-02 Design TPCD's for fuel containment to automatically interface to the host vehicle during installation or removal.
EXT-03 Design TPCD's to be fully compatible with the existing vehicle built-in hoisting provisions and locking devices.
EXT-05 Design access doors for cargo type TPCD's to be non-load carrying and with simple latches for all doors and panels.
EXT-06 Design cargo TPCD's to ensure all cargo and equipment can be downloaded and uploaded with the TPCD installed on the
host vehicle.
EXTING-01 Use extinguishing concepts dedicated to each individual fire zone in preference to manifold systems operating from a
central source.
EXTING-03 Keep each individual fire zone over-temperature/fire warning system separate from those in other fire zones.
EXTING-04 Design individual fire zone over-temperature/fire warning system to be fully BIT capable (the BIT concept should permit
both initiated and periodic BIT).
F-01 Use blind fasteners only where absolutely necessary or where considerable cost can be saved.
F-02 Minimize access fasteners while making them quick release, easily removed and replaced, and captive.
F-03 Choose fasteners based on the requirement top operate by hand or with common hand tools rather than special tools.
F-04 Whenever possible, incorporate barrel type fasteners as opposed to hi-torque fasteners. Failure of Hi-torque fasteners
due to stripping are common and a source of potential foreign object damage (FOD).
FUEL-01 Locate fuel vent and dump masts to ensure exiting fuel will be clear of servicing, loading, arming and safing areas for all
types of ground and airborne vehicles.
FUEL-02 Manufacturing splices for major sub-assemblies should not intrude into or through integral fuel cells or tanks.
FUEL-03 Structural bolts, screws, and fasteners should not penetrate into integral fuel cells or tanks other than those used for
access door attachment.
FUEL-04 Where the fuel wetted area inside a fuel cell or tank is void of blade, knife, and hat stiffeners for use as hardpoint
attachment, standoffs bonded to the cell surface should be used as attachments for clamps, and brackets to eliminate
fastener penetration of the fuel cavity.
FUEL-05 Intersecting of two or more surfaces in a fuel wetted area of less than 90 degrees should be avoided to simplify
manufacture and repair.
FUEL-06 Where maintaining a minimum angle of 90 degrees is not possible, sufficient depth, width, and height should be
maintained to provide tool clearances for all tools used in the manufacturing processes and in the operational field repair

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

environment.
FUEL-07 When feed tanks are designed such that the lower portion of the tank serves as a surge chamber, the top closure deck of
the surge chamber should provide the strength to support the weight of a 95 percentile male.
FUEL-08 The size and number of fuel cell and tank access doors should be sufficient to ensure no wetted area of the cell or tank is
beyond a maximum 18" distance from the edge of the access opening. This guideline applies to only non-man rated cells.
FUEL-09 All fuel cell or tank access doors not mounted on the exterior surface should contain sealing provisions other than the
channel type.
FUEL-10 Provide access from the wing closure ribs in lieu of the moldline when access is required in close proximity to the wing
fold area.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
FUEL-11 Through-the-tank fasteners should not be used for fuel cells or tanks in areas where a leak path could be established into

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

an inaccessible portion of the vehicle.
HOOK-06 Avoid the need to remove the tail hook to facilitate engine access or removal.
HOOK-07 Incorporate remote means to read the tail hook dampener pressure charge to enhance carrier suitability.

C-176
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.03 Structures HYD-01 For military combat vehicles having two or more hydraulic power systems, provide a minimum 30-inch spacing between
ground power and servicing interfaces to ensure:

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

- Design flexibility in locating and arranging equipment in high-density vehicles such as fighters and helicopters,
- Work area separation to enable concurrent service/maintenance on systems,
- Systems vulnerability enhancement,
- Reduction in turn-around elapsed time due to concurrent servicing capability.
IN(V)-01 Design inlet door actuators and door actuation mechanisms so they not protrude into the air inlet flow field to eliminate
FOD potential.
IN(V)-02 Do not use loose structural fasteners in the access area to inlet door actuators and mechanisms. Where this guideline
cannot be followed, design the actuator door to be accessible only when the inlet doors are fully closed.
IN(V)-03 For engine inlet bellmouth fairings, use methods of retention other than fasteners. Latches may be considered as an
acceptable alternative only if latch-to-panel retention is from the inner mold line.
IN(V)-04 Design inlet doors and inlet bellmouth fairings to be fully interchangeable to eliminate the need to cut, file, or trim at the
engine face.
IN(V)-05 Locate the inlet duct edge a minimum of 60 inches from the cockpit or crew station to eliminate restricting engine
operation to canopy-closed conditions.
IN(V)-06 Use captive fasteners on all access doors forward of the inlet to significantly reduce engine FOD potential.
IN(V)-07 Ensure that no ground safety pins or streamers are used forward of the inlet or within a 3-foot radius aft of the inlet.
IN(V)-08 Incorporate an inlet closure door sealing concept that prevents entry of fluid, dust, or sand across the entire airborne and
ground environment spectrum.
IN-01 Low Observable (LO) engine face frames should be within 10 inches of the first stage fan or compressor blades.
IN-02 Openings throughout the engine face frame should be sufficient to perform a 100% FOD inspection of the engine face.
IN-03 Openings throughout the engine face frame should be sufficient to permit minor blending or repair of FOD without
removing the engine.
IN-04 For frames not integral with the engine, frame removal should be achievable from the engine cavity.
IN-05 Both integral and remote engine front frames should be interchangeable.
IN-06 Front frame anti-ice and de-ice provisions should give preference to engine hot bleed air.
LG-02 Hardpoints for attachment of landing gear trunnions should be capable of carrying all induced gear loads for the life of
the airframe.
LG-03 Hardpoints for attachment for landing gear trunnions should not be machined as an integral part of the airframe structure
when normal design sink rates over 25 feet per second are required.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

LG-04 Do not use Beryllium and Beryllium base alloys in any location subject to wear or corrosive atmospheres or in installations
where machining may be required.
LG-06 Design struts, attachments, and interfaces so they do not depend on scheduled visual inspections, non-destructive
inspection (NDI), or non-destructive test (NDT) to ensure the reliability or integrity of the system in the operational
environment.
LG-09 Use coiled tubing in lieu of flex lines or hoses for hydraulic line routing from the airframe to the strut.
LG-14 All interfaces from the airframe to the struts should be visible and accessible, and not require removal of airframe
structure for access.
LG-15 No portion of the landing gear closure door(s) should be attached to the strut. In rare instances where this may not be

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
possible, that attached portion should not require alignment or rigging.

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

LG-16 No portion of the landing gear rigging process should require support equipment type templates, gauges, or tools. Indexes,
reference points, etc., should be an integral part of the landing gear/airframe design.
LG-17 Hydraulic, pneumatic, or electrical actuators associated with landing gear systems should not require adjustment or
rigging once installed in the air vehicle. Spare units should be rigged at the time of manufacture or overhaul.
LG-25 Mechanical shrink struts, when used, should not permit gear to jam in wheel well if failure of shrink mechanism occurs.

C-177
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.03 Structures LG-26 Gravitational emergency extension of landing gear should be given preference over all other concepts.
LG-30 Do not use landing gear wells to locate any type of auxiliary air inlet.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

LG-31 Landing gear doors designed to close after gear is extended should be capable of being manually opened on the ground
without reliance on electrical or hydraulic power.
LG-32 Design of landing gear doors normally closed after gear extension should ensure failure modes will not enable
uncommanded opening on the ground.
LG-33 Design of landing gear doors normally left open after gear extension should ensure no failure mode will enable closing on
the ground.
LG-34 Avoid sharp edges and corners on landing gear doors or fairings.
LG-35 Avoid the use of landing gear doors to mount or house antennas, arrays, or air data sensors.
LG-36 Location of integral wheel jack points on a strut should provide a minimum 6-1/2 inch clearance for positioning the jack
with tire ruptured and wheel ground 2 inches off ground.
LG-37 Integral hardpoints to jack the entire vehicle should ensure that identical jacks can be used at all jack points.
LG-38 All landing gear doors should be interchangeable.
LG-39 Gear-mounted tie-down or chain-down fittings should be interchangeable and easily replaceable.
LG-41 No more than 1 jack should be required to change any singular wheel/tire assembly.
LG-44 Landing gear door mechanisms and interfaces should ensure that multiple cycles or occasional exceedence of maximum
gear-down speed do not result in loss of doors
LO-01 Use LO compatible gap fillers for manufactured gaps in lieu of tape and butter (surface coating compound).
LO-02 Avoid scheduled forced inspections or replacement of materials, coatings, or finishes solely to protect either the reliability
or the signature.
LO-03 Equipment and support structure requiring shrouds to reduce radar returns should not cause increases in equipment
service/repair time.
LO-04 Infrequently-accessed structural doors and panels incorporating special coatings or conductive paints should contain
provisions for prying the door or panel clear of moldline with standard screwdriver without damage.
LO-05 Do not locate flush mounted LO screens for auxiliary air inlets and exits in walkway areas unless durability has been
proven.
LO-06 Size flush mounted LO screens for auxiliary air inlets and exits to ensure functionality with up to 25 percent of the
openings plugged.
LO-07 Flush and non-flush LO screens should be interchangeable.
MATL-01 A high degree of durability should be maintained for a minimum distance of 36 inches forward of the inflight refueling

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

receptacle.
MATL-02 Cosmetic type repairs should not exceed 1 hours including cure or drying times.
MATL-03 Cosmetic and vehicle repair material shelf life should not be less than 24 months.
MATL-04 Cosmetic and vehicle repair materials should be non-proprietary and non-single source.
MATL-05 Cosmetic and vehicle repair materials should not require refrigeration or special facilities or atmospheres for storage.
MATL-06 Repair criteria, repairs, and instructions should not be classified.
MATL-07 All cosmetic touch-up and repair materials should be environmentally safe.
MATL-08 Repairs (other than major depot repair) should not require autoclave type facilities.
MATL-09 A high degree of durability should be achieved across all walkway areas on the top surfaces of all vehicles up to and

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
including 95 percentile personnel.
MATL-10 Coatings and finishes should be durable against the effects of missile gases, velocities, and particles emanating from the
missile motor.
MATL-11 Coatings and finishes should be durable against the effects of gun gases, projectile shock waves, and brass particles
emanating from the projectile seal rings.

C-178
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.03 Structures MATL-12 Leading edge materials and coatings should be durable against fragments from frangible gun port plugs.
MATL-13 Special handling or shipping requirements of repair materials should be avoided.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

MATL-14 Leading edges, including chines, containing or constructed of radar absorbing materials, should be interchangeable to
reduce vehicle downtime and simplify repairs.
MATL-15 Doors and panels containing blade seals used for signature reduction should be interchangeable or contain
interchangeable blade seals. Deviation is acceptable where repairs can be accomplished on the vehicle in a time equal to
or less than door or seal remove and replace time.
MC-02 Avoid the use of cotter pins, safety wire, safety clips, and similar devices to prevent maintenance-induced events leading
to ground vehicle accidents or loss of air vehicles.
MC-05 Avoid potential foreign object traps during manufacturing or operational maintenance by eliminating vertical penetrations
of plumbing/fittings into tanks, compartments, or cells
MC-07 Maximize areas of constant web thickness in firewalls, carry-through bulkheads, major frames, structural ribs, spars,
webs, keels, and close-outs to provide flexibility in locating penetration fittings. Stepped chem milling, stepped machining,
stepped composite layup concepts all tend to result in minimal available surface area for penetrations.
MC-08 All in-line plumbing connections within a fuel tank or cell should be capable of making/breaking the interface by hand,
require no torque, contain integral safety locking mechanisms, and should be void of any requirement for safety wire.
MC-15 Route, orient, and position plumbing, wiring, ducts, and connectors sufficiently away from the outer surface of the vehicle
to preclude induced damage due to minor dents, drill bits during repair, etc. Minimum rule of thumb is 1" away from the
inner surface and 1" below a plate nut channel.
MG-01 Mount LRUs/sub-systems on drawer slides or extender racks to provide easier accessibility during integration, testing,
debug, and repair of Units Under Test (UUTs).
OXY-05 Locate liquid oxygen (LOX) containers in a sealed, dedicated compartment to eliminate need for frequent visual
inspections.
OXY-07 Locate liquid oxygen containers to ensure simultaneous replacement with other turnaround activities.
OXY-12 LOX compartments should be sealed from adjacent compartments and should contain dedicated overboard drains.
P-01 Access door and panel fastener types for airborne vehicles should meet the following criteria:
- use latches for a frequency of access of 0 to 40 flight hours
- use High Strength Quick Release fasteners for a frequency of access of 40-400 flight hours
- use structural screws for a frequency of access of 400 flight hours or more
P-02 Access door and panel fastener types for surface vehicles should meet the following criteria:
- use a spring loaded or latch fastener for an opening frequency of daily
- use a one quarter turn fastener (or equivalent) for a opening frequency of weekly

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

- use screws or bolts for all other cases
P-03 All doors and panels subject to environmental elements should contain form-in-place seals (or equivalent) attached to the
door structure, not substructure, to prevent damage during maintenance.
P-04 Door and panel seals should be compatible with all types of on-board servicing fluids, de-ice and anti-ice fluids, and all
fluids used for chemical, biological, and nuclear decontamination.
P-05 Piano type hinges should not be used on doors or panels because they are subject to wear, corrosion, and sand and fluid
entry.
P-06 Access door and panel devices used to support door in opened position should meet the following criteria:

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
- for airborne vehicles, design for 60 knot gust loads (or equivalent jet blast loads)

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

- for ground vehicles, design for 50 mph gust loads
P-07 Hinged access doors and panels capable of remaining in the opened position should not have sharp edges or corners.
P-08 Removable access door and panel fasteners should be of identical grip length and diameter.
P-09 Acceptable door and panel hold-open devices include over-center sheet metal spring, over-center spring link, spring
cartridge, support strut, and pinned goose neck hinge.

C-179
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.03 Structures P-10 Access doors and panels requiring non-captive fasteners should not be located forward of air inlet ducts or high-energy
rotating components (e.g., prop fans, engine cooling fans, etc.).

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

P-11 Access doors and panels should be interchangeable as justified by operation and support costs or life cycle costs.
PERS-06 Storage bins, compartments, sacks, or bags should be available within the vehicle to store/protect all personal equipment
required to conduct operations.
PERS-07 All flight and ground vehicles should contain one cubic foot minimum storage compartment(s) for various loose and
sundry personal items (for each individual).
PERS-08 Design stowage and mounting provisions for portable air or oxygen containers to withstand 40G crash or impact loads.
PYRO-07 Manual "safe/arm" mechanisms should be well-clear of inlet ducts, propellers, rotors, and similar rotating components.
PYRO-08 Manual "safe/arm" mechanisms should be well-clear of engine exhausts, fuel/toxic vents, fluid drains, control surface
deflection envelopes, and rescue path envelopes.
PYRO-20 Weapon bay doors, when opened, should not block or restrict access to other servicing points.
PYRO-26 Do not locate ammunition loader interfaces close to inlets, exhausts, fuel dumps and drains, antennas, sensors, lights, or
hazardous protrusions.
PYRO-27 Incorporate integral hoisting provisions at each weapon/store station to enable direct lift from the container or carrier to
the attachment hardpoints.
PYRO-29 Provide quick mechanical over-travel (no power) for weapon bay doors to maximize the weapon/store loading envelope.
PYRO-30 Ensure weapon bay door arc (both normal and over-travel) does not block or intrude into adjacent service points or
envelopes.
PYRO-32 Provide sufficient longitudinal clearance between weapon bays to enable simultaneous loading of two bays.
PYRO-33 Provide sufficient lateral clearance between weapon bays to enable simultaneous loading of two bays.
PYRO-34 Weapon bay door seals should be bonded or attached to door structure to minimize induced seal damage during weapon
or store loading.
PYRO-35 Suspension system should permit any single weapon or store to be loaded by a two man crew.
PYRO-36 Suspension system design and spacing should enable any combination of eight weapons to be loaded by two two-man
crews within the refueling time of the vehicle (excludes nuclear weapons).
PYRO-37 Internal weapon suspension arrangements should preclude sequential weapon loading.
PYRO-39 Weapon bay ejectors and launchers should have the capability for total interchangeability and reconfigurability.
PYRO-43 Launcher or ejector design/interface should not require a dual function of carrying airframe structural loads.
PYRO-46 Design pylons, launchers, and ejector racks so that weapon loading, servicing, and reconfigurations can be accomplished
using standard hand tools.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

PYRO-47 Installation design of ejectors, launchers, racks, and associated hardware interfaces should avoid reliance on torque
wrenches.
R-01 Large radomes wherein the combination of the diameter and length exceeds 60" should be top-hinged. Hinge should be
load-carrying to reduce radome retention fastener count.
R-02 Radome and radar array support structure design and material selection should eliminate the need for LO type fillers or
shrouds.
SABCH-01 Do not locate auxiliary air inlets, sensors, access doors, or drains in boundary bleed areas.
SABCH-02 All flush type structural screws should have identical head drives for the entire vehicle.
SABCH-03 All non-flush type structural screws should have identical head drive recesses for the entire vehicle.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
SABCH-04 Special high strength bolts, such as twelve-point heads, should be fully justified from standpoint of the cost of ownership

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

and effectiveness.
SABCH-05 Structural design should avoid the reliance on blind fasteners unless fully supported by cost, weight, schedule, and
effectiveness analysis.
SABCH-06 Structural design should avoid the potential of dissimilar material or fastener corrosion.
SABCH-07 No structural fasteners should be used that require special tools for installation.

C-180
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.03 Structures SABCH-08 Taper pins should be threaded and retained with self-locking hardware.
SABCH-09 Pins and collars (lockbolts) should only be used in applications which do not normally require removal.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

SABCH-10 Do not use lockbolts in composites.
SABCH-11 In rare instances where the use of dissimilar material in immediate contact cannot be avoided, they should be sufficiently
insulated to endure for the life of the vehicle.
SABCH-12 Avoid tapping threads into structural members. Use of heli-coil type or similar insert concepts is permissible.
SABCH-13 No structural design concept should rely on frequent scheduled inspections to monitor or otherwise ensure structural
integrity.
SABCH-14 No structural fastener intended to carry shear or tension loads should be smaller than 1/4" diameter (.25").
SABCH-15 Give preference to butt type splices over lap type splices in the design of manufacturing splices.
SABCH-16 Wing-to-fuselage attachment should give preference to tension ties over shear ties to improve overall volumetric
efficiency.
SABCH-17 Hardpoints for securing tie down chains, cables, and devices during transport should not require reaching under or
crawling under the vehicle.
SABCH-18 Rings, posts, and clevis devices used for attaching tie downs should not require opening of doors or panels for access.
SABCH-19 Avoid tie down concepts requiring attaching hardpoints as a prerequisite.
SABCH-20 Location of hardpoints used for tie down attachment should:
- Remain outside of door and panel opening envelopes.
- Be clear of exhaust pipes, ducts, manifolds, and mufflers.
- Be clear of overboard fluid drains and vents.
SABCH-21 Tire pressure reduction should not be required prior to tie down solely to increase the tire footprint
SAFE-01 Drag chute installation designs not containing electrical safing should contain remote safe/arm provisions reachable from
ground level by 5 percentile females. Remove location should be clear of engine exhaust areas and flight control
deflection envelopes.
SAFE-02 Emergency ingress actuation provisions into cockpits, crew stations, passenger compartments, and operator stations
should be accessible from the ground by 5 percentile females.
SAFE-05 Crash locator beacon door opening/ejection mechanisms should contain integral electrical safe/arm features.
SAFE-06 Wing fold locking mechanisms should provide a moldline indication that locks are in place. Loose or separate safety
devices that must be installed manually should be avoided.
SAFE-08 A single lever safety should, when positioned, safe the entire escape/ejection system. Use of the single lever to "arm"
should require two hands.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

SAFE-09 Safing the canopy jettison system should be accomplished through the same lever device used to safe the ejection seat.
SAFE-12 Internal weapon bay doors should contain integral safety locking features for use during maintenance and weapon
loading and downloading.
SAFE-13 It should not be possible to unsafe a weapon bay door integral lock when a door closed signal is present.
SE-07 The design construction concept and material selection for support equipment structure should not rely or depend upon
the use of scheduled maintenance, NDI, or NDT to protect the durability or integrity of the equipment in the operational
environment.
SEAT-04 Design ejection seats so they can be replaced with canopy or escape hatch installed.
SEAT-05 Design ejection seat pyrotechnic devices so they are 100 percent viewable and accessible with seat installed.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
SEAT-06 Do not use seat removal as a means of access.

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

SIMP-01 Location and design of all exterior lights should not require protective covers in ground environments.
SIMP-02 Landing and taxi lights should be mounted on landing gear struts or doors to eliminate separate compartments, doors, and
retraction/extension mechanisms.
SIMP-03 Speed brake or speed brake cavity should contain integral mechanical locking mechanism for personnel safety.
SKID-06 Use non-skid finishes on the upper surfaces of skids and floats for use as steps and walkways.

C-181
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.03 Structures SKID-07 Design floats with simple drain provisions for each compartment.
SURV-01 Design containers used for dinghy stowage to be structurally capable of containing the dinghy within the event of

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

unintentional or uncommanded inflation.
SURV-02 Provide crew stations, crew compartments, and operator areas containing dinghies as emergency equipment with a
suitable tool for puncturing or cutting the dinghy in the event of inadvertent inflation. Locate the tool so that access is
assured during dinghy inflation.
T-01 Do not locate pyro, gas, and air (PGA) control system exhaust exits:
- In proximity to safe, arm, or servicing areas,
- Adjacent to auxiliary inlets,
- In close proximity to crew boarding areas, weapons, emergency ingress/egress areas, and optics or optical glass.
T-02 Design pyro type thruster exits associated with emergency use or backup with simple exit closure devices to identify if a
thruster has been fired.
T-03 Provide protective screens for PGA exits that normally remain open to prevent intrusions from fowl or wildlife.
T-04 Provide protective closure provisions for PGA exits located or oriented to exposure from the elements.
W-01 Hat section type structural stiffeners with sufficient cross sectional area should be considered as a routing tunnel for
wiring and coax.
WBAY-01 Equipment bays and compartments should not require installation of special cavity fillers when equipment is not installed.
WBAY-02 Pylon-to-wing electrical or plumbing interfaces should have automatic close-out covers when pylon is jettisoned or not
installed.
WBAY-04 The gap treatment should be a permanent installation on the pylon, wing, or both, not a separate seal.
WBAY-06 Pylon rigging should not be required for gap seal control.
WBAY-07 Gap seal should not degrade interchangeability of pylon.
WBAY-16 Gap seals should not degrade loading while wearing arctic or chemical, biological, or radiation protective clothing.
WBAY-17 Special coatings or conductive paints on pylons, launchers, racks, launchers, tanks, pods, etc. should have the durability to
withstand contact with support stands/cradles during storage.
WBAY-18 The proximity of the gun firing barrel to structure should be such that structural furrows or channels are not required for
projectile clearances during firing.
WBAY-19 Frangible gun ports should take preference over mechanized gun port doors.
WBAY-20 Gun plugs required solely to maintain a given signature level should be capable of on-board stowage for use only when a
threat requires their presence.
WBAY-21 Coatings and finishes in the area of gun barrels should be durable to withstand the effect of exiting projectile shockwaves.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

WBAY-22 The proximity of the gun blast deflector to structure should not require reliance on high-temperature paints or coatings to
protect the structure.
WIND-02 Optic windows should be located for ease of inspection, cleaning, and induced damage potential from personnel or
support equipment.
WIND-06 Do not locate windows in the proximity of rooster tails created by wheels/tires passing through water or slush.
WIND-12 Design EO windows and optics to be interchangeable among the same air vehicle types or same ground vehicle types.
3.03.01 Radomes A-10 Provide a sufficient number of compartment fluid drains to ensure fluid drainage for varying aircraft static attitudes and
varying terrain slopes for ground vehicles.
A-11 Locate compartment electrical penetrations close to the access opening for ease of sight, probing, repair, and to eliminate

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
fluid soaking, wicking, or contamination.

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

A-12 Locate compartment electrical penetrations far enough from the access opening to prevent damage resulting from
improper (over-length) panel fasteners.
A-17 All structural fasteners in an access door or panel should be of identical grip and diameter. In rare cases where this is not
possible, fasteners of different grip must have different diameters to prevent a shorter fastener being substituted for the
correct, longer fastener.

C-182
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.03.01 Radomes A-18 Use transparent windows, quick-opening covers, or openings without any cover to permit quick visual inspections where
needed.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

BIT-01 During design of the BIT, use worst-case stress analysis to ensure that any circuit failures induced by temperature
extremes, tolerance build-up, power supply variations, and combinations thereof are identified.
BIT-02 Ensure that BIT system thresholds are consistent with those across the system, subsystem, item, module, and piece-part
levels to prevent excessive numbers of Cannot Duplicate (CND) and Retest OK (RTOK) events from occurring.
BIT-03 The degree of BIT required or proposed should be based on the respective failure rates and the appropriate FMECA at
all equipment indenture levels.
BIT-04 Limit the amount of data that is recorded to a manageable size by:
- Limiting the number of signals that are monitored
- Limiting the maximum sampling rate
- Reducing the time span over which data is accumulated
- Restricting the type of data accumulated
BIT/BITE-02 Design EMI protection to eliminate finger type EMI contact devices.
D&V-01 The geometric aspects of structural design and interfaces should not result in any natural bathtubs.
D&V-02 Closed structural sections subject to condensation or fluid migration should contain drainage provisions.
D&V-03 Crew cabs, operators' compartments, crew stations, cockpits, and passenger compartments should be subject to the same
corrosion prevention measures as the exteriors of the vehicles. Low points, pockets, and related fluid collection points
within should be provided with low point drains.
EDECOM-01 Provide surface sensors on equipment located in compartments containing louvers, screens, flush inlets, or similar
openings to the environment to indicate the presence of chem/bio contaminants.
EDECOM-02 Provide integral sensors (viewable from the exterior) for equipment subject to internal forced-air cooling from outside or
external air to indicate the presence of contaminants.
EDECOM-03 Design equipment surfaces and structure to be compatible with all decontamination agents and methods.
EDECOM-04 Provide passive overboard drains in compartments subject to decontamination processes to void the area of contaminants.
EDECOM-05 Provide hoist, lift or transport handles for equipment requiring removal from the host vehicle for decontamination. In
instances where this may not be practical, design the equipment with hardpoints for attaching parasitic carrying provisions
ENV-01 Materials, treatments, coatings, finishes should be compatible with all anti-ice and de-ice fluids, chemical and biological
decontamination fluids, washing and cleaning fluids, and all vehicle subsystem fluids.
ENV-02 There should be no top coat or treatment deterioration throughout the standard temperature and humidity spectrum.
ENV-03 For airborne vehicles, the finishes should be durable against rain, hail, and dynamic erosion throughout the flight

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

envelope.
ENV-04 For airborne and ground vehicles, the finishes should be durable against sand erosion throughout all surface wind speeds
experienced in arid or desert geographical locations.
EXTING-06 Provide an alternate capability to activate the system remotely from the cockpit/crew station, or operator's position to
satisfy emergency situations during vehicle maintenance.
EXTING-07 Analyze the vehicle operational environment and type of fire zones to determine if remote stop/shut-off of equipment is
warranted.
EXTING-08 Analyze the vehicle operational environment and type of fire zones to determine if remote alarm and/or visual indication
of a fire is warranted.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
EXTING-09 Do not locate provisions for overboard venting or dumping of extinguishing agents in areas that could create hazards for

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

personnel.
F-01 Use blind fasteners only where absolutely necessary or where considerable cost can be saved.
F-02 Minimize access fasteners while making them quick release, easily removed and replaced, and captive.
LO-01 Use LO compatible gap fillers for manufactured gaps in lieu of tape and butter (surface coating compound).

C-183
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.03.01 Radomes LO-02 Avoid scheduled forced inspections or replacement of materials, coatings, or finishes solely to protect either the reliability
or the signature.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

LO-03 Equipment and support structure requiring shrouds to reduce radar returns should not cause increases in equipment
service/repair time.
LO-04 Infrequently-accessed structural doors and panels incorporating special coatings or conductive paints should contain
provisions for prying the door or panel clear of moldline with standard screwdriver without damage.
LO-06 Size flush mounted LO screens for auxiliary air inlets and exits to ensure functionality with up to 25 percent of the
openings plugged.
LO-07 Flush and non-flush LO screens should be interchangeable.
MATL-02 Cosmetic type repairs should not exceed 1 hours including cure or drying times.
MATL-03 Cosmetic and vehicle repair material shelf life should not be less than 24 months.
MATL-04 Cosmetic and vehicle repair materials should be non-proprietary and non-single source.
MATL-05 Cosmetic and vehicle repair materials should not require refrigeration or special facilities or atmospheres for storage.
MATL-06 Repair criteria, repairs, and instructions should not be classified.
MATL-07 All cosmetic touch-up and repair materials should be environmentally safe.
MATL-08 Repairs (other than major depot repair) should not require autoclave type facilities.
MATL-09 A high degree of durability should be achieved across all walkway areas on the top surfaces of all vehicles up to and
including 95 percentile personnel.
MATL-10 Coatings and finishes should be durable against the effects of missile gases, velocities, and particles emanating from the
missile motor.
R-01 Large radomes wherein the combination of the diameter and length exceeds 60" should be top-hinged. Hinge should be
load-carrying to reduce radome retention fastener count.
R-02 Radome and radar array support structure design and material selection should eliminate the need for LO type fillers or
shrouds.
TP-01 Locate Input/Output (I/O) test points and associated readouts in close proximity to each other so that one person can
perform testing.
TP-02 Protect test points against the environment and from induced contamination.
TP-03 Protect test points from outside signal generation.
WBAY-01 Equipment bays and compartments should not require installation of special cavity fillers when equipment is not installed.
3.03.02 Drains and Vents A-08 Plumbing penetrations into a compartment should not be on a vertical axis due to difficulty in making or breaking
vertically-oriented connections. When compartment access is from the bottom, vertically-oriented connections can allow

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

fluid to leak onto the maintainer. When access is from the top, such connections can allow foreign matter to enter the
line. Use horizontal penetrations whenever possible.
A-10 Provide a sufficient number of compartment fluid drains to ensure fluid drainage for varying aircraft static attitudes and
varying terrain slopes for ground vehicles.
A-17 All structural fasteners in an access door or panel should be of identical grip and diameter. In rare cases where this is not
possible, fasteners of different grip must have different diameters to prevent a shorter fastener being substituted for the
correct, longer fastener.
C-01 Avoid swivel type connectors and fittings for air, fuel, or hydraulic line interfaces due to their history of low reliability.
C-02 Provide spacing between parallel plumbing runs so that in-line couplings can be replaced without removing lines or

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
disconnecting any line support devices.

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

D&V-01 The geometric aspects of structural design and interfaces should not result in any natural bathtubs.
D&V-02 Closed structural sections subject to condensation or fluid migration should contain drainage provisions.
D&V-03 Crew cabs, operators' compartments, crew stations, cockpits, and passenger compartments should be subject to the same
corrosion prevention measures as the exteriors of the vehicles. Low points, pockets, and related fluid collection points
within should be provided with low point drains.

C-184
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.03.02 Drains and Vents EDECOM-04 Provide passive overboard drains in compartments subject to decontamination processes to void the area of contaminants.
ENG-06 All other engine surfaces and engine-mounted accessory surfaces should be free of pockets, channels, and bathtubs that

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

could trap and retain fluids.
ENG-48 Do not drain or dump residual fuel in the engine fuel control/manifold overboard. When it is not possible to follow this
guideline, route the fuel to an engine-mounted collector tank capable of retaining fuel from two shutdowns.
ENV-01 Materials, treatments, coatings, finishes should be compatible with all anti-ice and de-ice fluids, chemical and biological
decontamination fluids, washing and cleaning fluids, and all vehicle subsystem fluids.
ENV-02 There should be no top coat or treatment deterioration throughout the standard temperature and humidity spectrum.
FUEL-01 Locate fuel vent and dump masts to ensure exiting fuel will be clear of servicing, loading, arming and safing areas for all
types of ground and airborne vehicles.
LO-06 Size flush mounted LO screens for auxiliary air inlets and exits to ensure functionality with up to 25 percent of the
openings plugged.
LO-07 Flush and non-flush LO screens should be interchangeable.
MC-01 All clamps should contain torque-set or torque-limiting connections to prevent clamp or component failure due to over-
torque. Clamp installation call outs should not depend on special tools to establish the required torque values.
MC-02 Avoid the use of cotter pins, safety wire, safety clips, and similar devices to prevent maintenance-induced events leading
to ground vehicle accidents or loss of air vehicles.
MC-03 All tubing connections and interfaces should use rosan/dynatube (or equivalent) to (1) enable connect or disconnect with
one hand, one tool, (2) eliminate the need to safety the connection, (3) provide a superior seal, and (4) negate need to
reposition line(s) during component replacement.
MC-04 No trombone type, flared tube type, or piloted line type interfaces should be used to avoid the need for removal or
repositioning during equipment removal.
MC-05 Avoid potential foreign object traps during manufacturing or operational maintenance by eliminating vertical penetrations
of plumbing/fittings into tanks, compartments, or cells
MC-06 Locate, position, orient all plumbing and duct electrical connectors to prevent the need for sequential installation or
removal.
MC-07 Maximize areas of constant web thickness in firewalls, carry-through bulkheads, major frames, structural ribs, spars,
webs, keels, and close-outs to provide flexibility in locating penetration fittings. Stepped chem milling, stepped machining,
stepped composite layup concepts all tend to result in minimal available surface area for penetrations.
MC-08 All in-line plumbing connections within a fuel tank or cell should be capable of making/breaking the interface by hand,
require no torque, contain integral safety locking mechanisms, and should be void of any requirement for safety wire.
MC-09 All plumbing connections and fittings used for fuel systems should contain integral bonding features to eliminate the need

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

for bonding clamps or jumper cables.
MC-10 In rare instances where a plumbing run contains complex form or geometry that would require removal of other plumbing
or equipment for access, in-line connectors should be incorporated to maintain the integrity of other plumbing or
equipment.
MC-11 No subsystem plumbing, equipment, or wiring should use a tank, cell, or compartment containing liquids as a means for
routing or penetration simplicity during manufacture.
MC-12 All plumbing and connectors containing liquids should be meniscus-free.
MC-13 In instances where plumbing or connector interfaces cannot or are not keyed for a specific orientation, all identification,
markings, cautions, and directions should be placed 360 degrees around the tube or duct.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
MC-14 Where multiple connectors are located in close proximity, ensure (1) a minimum hand tool arc of 120 degrees can be
maintained, and (2) stagger fittings to ensure firm coupling interface/hand tool interface can be accomplished without
inducing damage to adjacent lines.
OXY-12 LOX compartments should be sealed from adjacent compartments and should contain dedicated overboard drains.
PYRO-26 Do not locate ammunition loader interfaces close to inlets, exhausts, fuel dumps and drains, antennas, sensors, lights, or
hazardous protrusions.

C-185
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.03.03 Crew Stations, Crew Cabs, Cockpits, and A-01 Seal equipment bays and compartments against the environmental elements including all types of servicing fluids used for
Personnel Enclosures the vehicle, all types of anti-ice and de-ice fluids, and all types of fluids used for chemical, biological, or nuclear

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

decontamination
A-04 Use stiffening beads in lieu of flanges to the maximum extent to enhance compartment volume and simplify repairs.
Stiffening beads should have the convex surface toward the compartment to eliminate fluid traps.
A-05 Keep all machined compartment frames, webs, and closure panels to a constant thickness (e.g., not stepped or tapered) to
ease simplicity of fluid or electrical penetrations and ease and simplicity of structural repair.
A-06 Hardpoints (structural attachment and load bearing areas) within a compartment to assist in equipment mounting or
support should not be integral with the machined part. Hardpoints should be parasitic to enable quick repair in case of
wear or damage in lieu of precise ream/bush repair typical of machined hardpoints.
A-07 Paint equipment bay and compartment interiors a high gloss white to maximize lighting reflectivity, visibility, and rapid
leak detection capability.
A-08 Plumbing penetrations into a compartment should not be on a vertical axis due to difficulty in making or breaking
vertically-oriented connections. When compartment access is from the bottom, vertically-oriented connections can allow
fluid to leak onto the maintainer. When access is from the top, such connections can allow foreign matter to enter the
line. Use horizontal penetrations whenever possible.
A-09 Any heat or temperature sensitive structure within a compartment should contain heat-sensitive tape or appropriate heat
sensor for easy indication of over-temperature excursions.
A-10 Provide a sufficient number of compartment fluid drains to ensure fluid drainage for varying aircraft static attitudes and
varying terrain slopes for ground vehicles.
A-11 Locate compartment electrical penetrations close to the access opening for ease of sight, probing, repair, and to eliminate
fluid soaking, wicking, or contamination.
A-12 Locate compartment electrical penetrations far enough from the access opening to prevent damage resulting from
improper (over-length) panel fasteners.
A-13 Two-sided or two-surfaced access should not be required for access to equipment interfaces and hardpoints. The term
two-sided infers top/bottom, left/right, front/back, or combinations thereof.
A-14 Do not locate nutplates or gang channels in inaccessible areas that would require extensive disassembly or equipment
removal to gain access.
A-18 Use transparent windows, quick-opening covers, or openings without any cover to permit quick visual inspections where
needed.
BIT-01 During design of the BIT, use worst-case stress analysis to ensure that any circuit failures induced by temperature
extremes, tolerance build-up, power supply variations, and combinations thereof are identified.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

BIT-02 Ensure that BIT system thresholds are consistent with those across the system, subsystem, item, module, and piece-part
levels to prevent excessive numbers of Cannot Duplicate (CND) and Retest OK (RTOK) events from occurring.
BIT-03 The degree of BIT required or proposed should be based on the respective failure rates and the appropriate FMECA at
all equipment indenture levels.
BIT-04 Limit the amount of data that is recorded to a manageable size by:
- Limiting the number of signals that are monitored
- Limiting the maximum sampling rate
- Reducing the time span over which data is accumulated
- Restricting the type of data accumulated

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
BIT-05 Incorporate testability design features as an integral part of equipment preliminary design process.

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

BIT-06 Mission critical functions should be monitored by BIT.
BIT-09 Use concurrent BIT to monitor system critical functions.
BIT-26 Locate routinely used test points so they are accessible without removing or disassembling other equipment
BIT-27 Periodic and initiated BIT should detect at least 98% of all failures and isolate a minimum 99% of those failures detected
to a single LRU or WRA.

C-186
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.03.03 Crew Stations, Crew Cabs, Cockpits, and BIT-28 Design BIT to have the same level of EMI protection as the system or equipment being monitored.
Personnel Enclosures

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

BIT/BITE-02 Design EMI protection to eliminate finger type EMI contact devices.
C-01 Avoid swivel type connectors and fittings for air, fuel, or hydraulic line interfaces due to their history of low reliability.
C-02 Provide spacing between parallel plumbing runs so that in-line couplings can be replaced without removing lines or
disconnecting any line support devices.
CARGO-01 Ground vehicles with storage bays or compartments accessible from outside the vehicle should:
- Have the door sill located no lower than knee height to accommodate a wide range of percentiles while standing.
- Ensure door handles are flush with outer surface to protect personnel.
- Contain goose neck hinges to protect the hinge from the elements.
- Contain peripheral door seals that will protect against blowing sand entry at 50 mph.
- Ensure door can be opened with transport tie downs installed.
- Ensure door opening envelope does not intrude into the opening envelope of an adjacent door.
- Contain simple sheet metal hold-open spring or mechanism.
- Ensure floor of bay or compartment is flush with sill to simplify cleanout and drainage.
- Ensure door unlocking and opening mechanism can be actuated by a 95 percentile male hand while wearing arctic
gloves.
- Contain 15 percent added volume for density growth.
CARGO-02 Ground vehicles with small exterior storage bays or compartments containing emergency equipment or supplies should:
- Be located at chest height of the 50 percentile male.
- Contain unlatching mechanisms activated by pushing inward on the door.
- Meet all other generic bay and compartment requirements.
CBR-02 Ensure vehicle overboard passive liquid drains are clearly marked or visible to enable personnel to remain clear of area.
CBR-04 Design emergency ingress provisions so they can be activated by a 95 percentile male wearing full protective chemical
or biological protection gear.
CBR-05 Size rescue doors, panels, and "cut here" areas to accommodate the 95 percentile shoulder width wearing full protective
chemical or biological protection gear.
CBR-06 Consider the reduction in peripheral vision resulting from wearing chemical or biological protection gear when designing
intended fire paths and crash rescue paths into a vehicle.
CONT-01 Control rods should use Boyd or impedance type bolts (or equivalent) to eliminate the need for cotter pins or safety wire.
CONT-02 Do not use metal control cables for vehicles that will operate in salt water or salt air environments.
CONT-03 Use control rods rather than control cables for non-complex applications and non-complex routing within the vehicle.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

CONT-04 Use control cables rather than control rods for most complex applications.
CONT-05 Route cables so that 100 percent of a cable will be viewable for inspection.
CONT-06 Design all pulleys and brackets associated with cable installations so they are accessible by a 75 percentile male hand.
CREW-01 Canopy attachment/hinge hardpoints should be located on the same structural subassembly as the canopy locking
hardpoints.
CREW-02 Armor protection integrated with the vehicle structure should be given preference over parasitic armor.
CREW-03 In rare cases where armor is parasitic, armor should be interchangeable and easily installed.
CREW-04 Avoid wiring, coax, and plumbing penetrations through the floor of crew cabs, operators' compartments, crew stations,
cockpits, and passenger compartments.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
CREW-05 Structural instrument panels, dashboards, and control panels should be modularized for easy and adequate access to all
interfaces, to simplify manufacturing, and to reduce maintenance-induced problems.
CREW-06 Film magazines, tapes, and removable modules should permit considerable handling without reliance on special support
equipment protection.
CREW-07 Electronic and photosensitive storage media should withstand the adverse environment created by ground, flightline, or
shipboard electromagnetic fields and light sources.

C-187
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.03.03 Crew Stations, Crew Cabs, Cockpits, and CREW-08 Data storage media containers and modules should be capable of chemical and biological decontamination processes.
Personnel Enclosures

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

CREW-09 Crew and operator station cassettes or magazines should be capable of being removed and installed with one hand while
the operator or air crew is seated and strapped in.
CREW-10 Design cameras, recorders, and sensors to be fully interchangeable and quickly replaceable.
CREW-11 Design cameras, lenses, reconnaissance pods, aiming devices, and related equipment so they can be reconfigured by one
individual.
CREW-12 Requirements for boresighting should not be part of the design or integration.
CREW-13 Provide storage provisions in each vehicle type (ground and airborne) to store extra tapes, modules, canisters, cassettes,
as appropriate to the intended vehicle use/mission.
D&V-01 The geometric aspects of structural design and interfaces should not result in any natural bathtubs.
D&V-02 Closed structural sections subject to condensation or fluid migration should contain drainage provisions.
D&V-03 Crew cabs, operators' compartments, crew stations, cockpits, and passenger compartments should be subject to the same
corrosion prevention measures as the exteriors of the vehicles. Low points, pockets, and related fluid collection points
within should be provided with low point drains.
EC-01 A threaded electrical connector should contain integral locking mechanisms and visual indications that the connector is
properly seated and locked.
EC-02 An electrical connector requiring less than one full turn to connect or disconnect should contain integral locking
mechanisms and visual indications that the connector is properly seated and locked.
EC-03 A push-pull electrical connector (excluding rack-and-panel type) should contain integral locking features and visual
indication that the connector is properly seated and locked.
EC-04 All electrical connectors should be keyed or asymmetrically shaped to ensure proper alignment.
EC-05 All electrical connectors should contain scoop-proof shells to ensure pin damage will not occur prior to engaging key
way.
EC-06 All electrical connectors should be corrosion resistant to reduce or eliminate the need for scheduled inspections or
corrosion prevention measures.
EC-07 Avoid using electrical connectors requiring any type or form of soldering.
EC-08 Locate and position electrical connectors such that all pin identification for either half can be easily seen.
EC-09 Electrical connectors selected for critical applications on ground vehicles should be both accessible and capable of being
connected disconnected by a fifty percentile gloved male hand.
EC-10 Separation between grouped electrical connectors should be sufficient to ensure make or break of any connector by a
fifty percentile gloved male hand. Where this is not possible, an alternate method should be used such as the use of stand-

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

offs, long-shelled connectors alternated with standard connectors, 180-degree connectors alternated with 90-degree
connectors, or innovative equivalents.
ECS-01 Design so that equipment servicing status are accessible and readable from the ground level for air vehicles and from the
operator's position for ground and water vehicles.
ECS-02 Do not locate equipment servicing points in crew, passenger, or operator areas.
ECS-03 Heat exchangers using hot liquids as the heat source should not be located inside the compartments used for operator,
crew, or passengers.
ECS-04 Plumbing, lines, or hoses containing hot liquids, toxic gases or liquids should be external to operator, crew, or passenger
stations.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
ECS-11 Design air inlets, outlets, and exhausts to be accessible without reliance on ladders or work stands for ease of installing

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

protective plugs or covers.
ECS-12 Design air inlets, outlets, and exhausts with screens to prevent bird or rodent entry.
ECS-13 Design air inlets, outlets, and exhausts to be meniscus-free to prevent a bathtub effect. In remote instances where this is
not possible, passive drains should be provided at all low points to prevent liquid accumulation with the vehicle in its
normal static attitude.

C-188
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.03.03 Crew Stations, Crew Cabs, Cockpits, and ECS-14 Instances where air inlets, outlets, and exhausts are subject to water entry, passive drains should be employed capable of
Personnel Enclosures handling 4" of rain per hour.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

ECS-15 Locate and orient air inlets, outlets, and exhausts in a manner that prevents their use as footholds during maintenance.
ECS-16 All components contained in the systems, including all attaching brackets and supports, should use hex-head self-locking
bolts for ease and simplicity of installation.
ECS-17 Do not use air ejectors due to their low reliability and susceptibility to clogging.
ECS-18 Avoid the use of insulation blankets containing polyvinyl for any application due to the dense smoke and toxic fumes if
burned or subjected to high temperature bleed air leakage.
ECS-19 Thermal blankets and covers used in ground vehicles should be replaceable.
ECS-20 Minor rips, tears, and punctures in ground vehicle thermal blankets and covers should be capable of being repaired in
place.
ECS-21 Do not locate ground cooling or circulation fans that operate at high noise levels in operator, crew, or passenger
compartments.
ECS-27 Use temperature-limiting devices with high temperature air systems to ensure no single or combination of surface wind,
cross wind, ground operation or flight operation will damage windshields, canopies, windows or optics.
ENG-11 Control-by-wire or control-by-light throttling concepts should take precedence over mechanical controls.
ENV-01 Materials, treatments, coatings, finishes should be compatible with all anti-ice and de-ice fluids, chemical and biological
decontamination fluids, washing and cleaning fluids, and all vehicle subsystem fluids.
ENV-02 There should be no top coat or treatment deterioration throughout the standard temperature and humidity spectrum.
ENV-03 For airborne vehicles, the finishes should be durable against rain, hail, and dynamic erosion throughout the flight
envelope.
ENV-04 For airborne and ground vehicles, the finishes should be durable against sand erosion throughout all surface wind speeds
experienced in arid or desert geographical locations.
ENV-06 For ground vehicles, the finishes should be compatible with and durable against all rain, hail, sleet, snow, and ice
conditions experienced in all intended operational environments.
EXT-01 Locate Tanks, Pods, Containers, and Devices (TPCD's) so they do not block or restrict access to existing vehicle access
areas or access approach envelopes.
EXT-02 Design TPCD's for fuel containment to automatically interface to the host vehicle during installation or removal.
EXT-03 Design TPCD's to be fully compatible with the existing vehicle built-in hoisting provisions and locking devices.
EXT-05 Design access doors for cargo type TPCD's to be non-load carrying and with simple latches for all doors and panels.
EXT-06 Design cargo TPCD's to ensure all cargo and equipment can be downloaded and uploaded with the TPCD installed on the

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

host vehicle.
EXTING-06 Provide an alternate capability to activate the system remotely from the cockpit/crew station, or operator's position to
satisfy emergency situations during vehicle maintenance.
EXTING-07 Analyze the vehicle operational environment and type of fire zones to determine if remote stop/shut-off of equipment is
warranted.
EXTING-08 Analyze the vehicle operational environment and type of fire zones to determine if remote alarm and/or visual indication
of a fire is warranted.
EXTING-09 Do not locate provisions for overboard venting or dumping of extinguishing agents in areas that could create hazards for
personnel.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
FI-06 In an airborne avionics system, consider indicating mission critical faults on a pilots "head-up" display accompanied with

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

an audible alarm, so that the pilot can easily check for critical system or mission threatening problems.
FI-07 Ensure that system user manuals include instructions for faults not covered by BIT such as, system will not power up or
system is being used in an incorrect environment such as, at the wrong altitude, etc.
FI-08 Interlock the high power sections of systems and subsystems with visual/audible BIT to ensure safe system activation.
FI-09 Design BIT to first conduct self-test for circuitry integrity before conducting system test.

C-189
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.03.03 Crew Stations, Crew Cabs, Cockpits, and FI-10 Use clear text to report failures rather than alpha-numeric codes, lights, indicators, etc.
Personnel Enclosures

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

FI-11 Locate BIT circuitry on the same level of the subsystem under test to simplify test and repair when it is removed from the
main system.
FUEL-01 Locate fuel vent and dump masts to ensure exiting fuel will be clear of servicing, loading, arming and safing areas for all
types of ground and airborne vehicles.
FUEL-02 Manufacturing splices for major sub-assemblies should not intrude into or through integral fuel cells or tanks.
FUEL-03 Structural bolts, screws, and fasteners should not penetrate into integral fuel cells or tanks other than those used for
access door attachment.
IN(V)-05 Locate the inlet duct edge a minimum of 60 inches from the cockpit or crew station to eliminate restricting engine
operation to canopy-closed conditions.
LG-02 Hardpoints for attachment of landing gear trunnions should be capable of carrying all induced gear loads for the life of
the airframe.
LG-03 Hardpoints for attachment for landing gear trunnions should not be machined as an integral part of the airframe structure
when normal design sink rates over 25 feet per second are required.
LG-04 Do not use Beryllium and Beryllium base alloys in any location subject to wear or corrosive atmospheres or in installations
where machining may be required.
LG-19 When deemed necessary for the respective design, pilots, flight crews, or operators should have an indication of the
downlock status in the cockpit or crew station to avoid the necessity of a flight abort.
LO-01 Use LO compatible gap fillers for manufactured gaps in lieu of tape and butter (surface coating compound).
LO-02 Avoid scheduled forced inspections or replacement of materials, coatings, or finishes solely to protect either the reliability
or the signature.
LO-03 Equipment and support structure requiring shrouds to reduce radar returns should not cause increases in equipment
service/repair time.
LO-04 Infrequently-accessed structural doors and panels incorporating special coatings or conductive paints should contain
provisions for prying the door or panel clear of moldline with standard screwdriver without damage.
LO-05 Do not locate flush mounted LO screens for auxiliary air inlets and exits in walkway areas unless durability has been
proven.
LO-06 Size flush mounted LO screens for auxiliary air inlets and exits to ensure functionality with up to 25 percent of the
openings plugged.
LO-07 Flush and non-flush LO screens should be interchangeable.
MATL-02 Cosmetic type repairs should not exceed 1 hours including cure or drying times.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

MATL-03 Cosmetic and vehicle repair material shelf life should not be less than 24 months.
MATL-04 Cosmetic and vehicle repair materials should be non-proprietary and non-single source.
MATL-05 Cosmetic and vehicle repair materials should not require refrigeration or special facilities or atmospheres for storage.
MATL-06 Repair criteria, repairs, and instructions should not be classified.
MATL-07 All cosmetic touch-up and repair materials should be environmentally safe.
MATL-08 Repairs (other than major depot repair) should not require autoclave type facilities.
MATL-09 A high degree of durability should be achieved across all walkway areas on the top surfaces of all vehicles up to and
including 95 percentile personnel.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
MATL-10 Coatings and finishes should be durable against the effects of missile gases, velocities, and particles emanating from the

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

missile motor.
MATL-11 Coatings and finishes should be durable against the effects of gun gases, projectile shock waves, and brass particles
emanating from the projectile seal rings.
MATL-13 Special handling or shipping requirements of repair materials should be avoided.

C-190
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.03.03 Crew Stations, Crew Cabs, Cockpits, and MATL-15 Doors and panels containing blade seals used for signature reduction should be interchangeable or contain
Personnel Enclosures interchangeable blade seals. Deviation is acceptable where repairs can be accomplished on the vehicle in a time equal to

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

or less than door or seal remove and replace time.
MC-01 All clamps should contain torque-set or torque-limiting connections to prevent clamp or component failure due to over-
torque. Clamp installation call outs should not depend on special tools to establish the required torque values.
MC-02 Avoid the use of cotter pins, safety wire, safety clips, and similar devices to prevent maintenance-induced events leading
to ground vehicle accidents or loss of air vehicles.
MC-03 All tubing connections and interfaces should use rosan/dynatube (or equivalent) to (1) enable connect or disconnect with
one hand, one tool, (2) eliminate the need to safety the connection, (3) provide a superior seal, and (4) negate need to
reposition line(s) during component replacement.
MC-04 No trombone type, flared tube type, or piloted line type interfaces should be used to avoid the need for removal or
repositioning during equipment removal.
MC-05 Avoid potential foreign object traps during manufacturing or operational maintenance by eliminating vertical penetrations
of plumbing/fittings into tanks, compartments, or cells
MC-06 Locate, position, orient all plumbing and duct electrical connectors to prevent the need for sequential installation or
removal.
MC-09 All plumbing connections and fittings used for fuel systems should contain integral bonding features to eliminate the need
for bonding clamps or jumper cables.
MC-10 In rare instances where a plumbing run contains complex form or geometry that would require removal of other plumbing
or equipment for access, in-line connectors should be incorporated to maintain the integrity of other plumbing or
equipment.
MC-11 No subsystem plumbing, equipment, or wiring should use a tank, cell, or compartment containing liquids as a means for
routing or penetration simplicity during manufacture.
MC-12 All plumbing and connectors containing liquids should be meniscus-free.
MC-13 In instances where plumbing or connector interfaces cannot or are not keyed for a specific orientation, all identification,
markings, cautions, and directions should be placed 360 degrees around the tube or duct.
MC-14 Where multiple connectors are located in close proximity, ensure (1) a minimum hand tool arc of 120 degrees can be
maintained, and (2) stagger fittings to ensure firm coupling interface/hand tool interface can be accomplished without
inducing damage to adjacent lines.
MC-15 Route, orient, and position plumbing, wiring, ducts, and connectors sufficiently away from the outer surface of the vehicle
to preclude induced damage due to minor dents, drill bits during repair, etc. Minimum rule of thumb is 1" away from the
inner surface and 1" below a plate nut channel.
MP-01 Avoid the use epoxies to mount parts on repairable modules because they make repair extremely difficult.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

MP-02 Use a unique identification (ID) resistor incorporated in each system module to verify that the proper module is mounted
on ATE.
MP-03 Design modules so that lengthy warm-up times, special coding and air purity levels, and similar constraints are not
necessary.
OXY-05 Locate liquid oxygen (LOX) containers in a sealed, dedicated compartment to eliminate need for frequent visual
inspections.
OXY-12 LOX compartments should be sealed from adjacent compartments and should contain dedicated overboard drains.
P-01 Access door and panel fastener types for airborne vehicles should meet the following criteria:
- use latches for a frequency of access of 0 to 40 flight hours

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
- use High Strength Quick Release fasteners for a frequency of access of 40-400 flight hours

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

- use structural screws for a frequency of access of 400 flight hours or more
P-02 Access door and panel fastener types for surface vehicles should meet the following criteria:
- use a spring loaded or latch fastener for an opening frequency of daily
- use a one quarter turn fastener (or equivalent) for a opening frequency of weekly
- use screws or bolts for all other cases

C-191
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.03.03 Crew Stations, Crew Cabs, Cockpits, and P-03 All doors and panels subject to environmental elements should contain form-in-place seals (or equivalent) attached to the
Personnel Enclosures door structure, not substructure, to prevent damage during maintenance.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

P-04 Door and panel seals should be compatible with all types of on-board servicing fluids, de-ice and anti-ice fluids, and all
fluids used for chemical, biological, and nuclear decontamination.
P-05 Piano type hinges should not be used on doors or panels because they are subject to wear, corrosion, and sand and fluid
entry.
P-06 Access door and panel devices used to support door in opened position should meet the following criteria:
- for airborne vehicles, design for 60 knot gust loads (or equivalent jet blast loads)
- for ground vehicles, design for 50 mph gust loads
P-07 Hinged access doors and panels capable of remaining in the opened position should not have sharp edges or corners.
P-08 Removable access door and panel fasteners should be of identical grip length and diameter.
P-09 Acceptable door and panel hold-open devices include over-center sheet metal spring, over-center spring link, spring
cartridge, support strut, and pinned goose neck hinge.
P-10 Access doors and panels requiring non-captive fasteners should not be located forward of air inlet ducts or high-energy
rotating components (e.g., prop fans, engine cooling fans, etc.).
P-11 Access doors and panels should be interchangeable as justified by operation and support costs or life cycle costs.
PERS-01 Group man-machine interfaces manifold-style to enable connect/disconnect in a single action.
PERS-02 Include an integral, highly visible indicator in a man-machine interface connector to denote connector is seated and
locked.
PERS-03 Design interface connectors so that a distinct action is required by an individual to effect a disconnect. (Excludes
airframe-to-ejection seat personnel interfaces.)
PERS-04 Interfaces should contain an emergency release mechanism that can be activated by rescue personnel with a 95
percentile gloved hand.
PERS-05 Design emergency interface release mechanisms to be clearly visible under all types of lighting situations.
PERS-06 Storage bins, compartments, sacks, or bags should be available within the vehicle to store/protect all personal equipment
required to conduct operations.
PERS-07 All flight and ground vehicles should contain one cubic foot minimum storage compartment(s) for various loose and
sundry personal items (for each individual).
PERS-08 Design stowage and mounting provisions for portable air or oxygen containers to withstand 40G crash or impact loads.
PERS-09 Design portable emergency locator beacons, radio receiver/transmitters, global positioning systems, and similar battery
operated devices with integral provisions for determining battery health or status and remaining battery life.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

PYRO-01 Provide the "safe/arm" status to the pilot, crew, or gunner in the cockpit, crew station, or operator station as appropriate.
PYRO-02 Provide the "safe/arm" status as an external cue discernible from a distance of 10-20 feet.
PYRO-07 Manual "safe/arm" mechanisms should be well-clear of inlet ducts, propellers, rotors, and similar rotating components.
PYRO-08 Manual "safe/arm" mechanisms should be well-clear of engine exhausts, fuel/toxic vents, fluid drains, control surface
deflection envelopes, and rescue path envelopes.
PYRO-14 Design weapon drop and fire/release circuits with frequency-coded firing systems or similar concepts to ensure stray
energy tests and checks will not be required and that stray energy will not impose a safety hazard or problem.
PYRO-22 A "rounds remaining" status should be available at the gun loading interface, maintenance panel, or cockpit/crew
station/operator station.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
PYRO-32 Provide sufficient longitudinal clearance between weapon bays to enable simultaneous loading of two bays.

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

PYRO-33 Provide sufficient lateral clearance between weapon bays to enable simultaneous loading of two bays.
SABCH-01 Do not locate auxiliary air inlets, sensors, access doors, or drains in boundary bleed areas.
SABCH-02 All flush type structural screws should have identical head drives for the entire vehicle.
SABCH-03 All non-flush type structural screws should have identical head drive recesses for the entire vehicle.

C-192
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.03.03 Crew Stations, Crew Cabs, Cockpits, and SABCH-04 Special high strength bolts, such as twelve-point heads, should be fully justified from standpoint of the cost of ownership
Personnel Enclosures and effectiveness.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

SABCH-05 Structural design should avoid the reliance on blind fasteners unless fully supported by cost, weight, schedule, and
effectiveness analysis.
SABCH-06 Structural design should avoid the potential of dissimilar material or fastener corrosion.
SABCH-07 No structural fasteners should be used that require special tools for installation.
SABCH-08 Taper pins should be threaded and retained with self-locking hardware.
SABCH-09 Pins and collars (lockbolts) should only be used in applications which do not normally require removal.
SABCH-10 Do not use lockbolts in composites.
SABCH-11 In rare instances where the use of dissimilar material in immediate contact cannot be avoided, they should be sufficiently
insulated to endure for the life of the vehicle.
SABCH-12 Avoid tapping threads into structural members. Use of heli-coil type or similar insert concepts is permissible.
SABCH-13 No structural design concept should rely on frequent scheduled inspections to monitor or otherwise ensure structural
integrity.
SABCH-14 No structural fastener intended to carry shear or tension loads should be smaller than 1/4" diameter (.25").
SABCH-15 Give preference to butt type splices over lap type splices in the design of manufacturing splices.
SABCH-16 Wing-to-fuselage attachment should give preference to tension ties over shear ties to improve overall volumetric
efficiency.
SABCH-17 Hardpoints for securing tie down chains, cables, and devices during transport should not require reaching under or
crawling under the vehicle.
SABCH-18 Rings, posts, and clevis devices used for attaching tie downs should not require opening of doors or panels for access.
SABCH-19 Avoid tie down concepts requiring attaching hardpoints as a prerequisite.
SABCH-20 Location of hardpoints used for tie down attachment should:
- Remain outside of door and panel opening envelopes.
- Be clear of exhaust pipes, ducts, manifolds, and mufflers.
- Be clear of overboard fluid drains and vents.
SAFE-02 Emergency ingress actuation provisions into cockpits, crew stations, passenger compartments, and operator stations
should be accessible from the ground by 5 percentile females.
SAFE-03 Stored energy devices (e.g., accumulators, nitrogen bottles, gas generators, etc.), that could cause injury, harm, or
damage if inadvertently actuated, should contain integral safing provisions.
SAFE-05 Crash locator beacon door opening/ejection mechanisms should contain integral electrical safe/arm features.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

SAFE-08 A single lever safety should, when positioned, safe the entire escape/ejection system. Use of the single lever to "arm"
should require two hands.
SAFE-09 Safing the canopy jettison system should be accomplished through the same lever device used to safe the ejection seat.
SAFE-11 All individual safety pins used for ground maintenance should be clearly visible and coupled together to ensure no single
pin will be overlooked during arming.
SEAT-01 Design personnel seats and padding materials, including the covers and fillers, so they are incapable of creating or
emitting toxic fumes or dense smoke when subjected to fire.
SEAT-02 Design personnel seats and padding materials so they are incapable of absorbing and holding fluids.
SEAT-04 Design ejection seats so they can be replaced with canopy or escape hatch installed.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
SEAT-05 Design ejection seat pyrotechnic devices so they are 100 percent viewable and accessible with seat installed.
SEAT-06 Do not use seat removal as a means of access.
SURV-01 Design containers used for dinghy stowage to be structurally capable of containing the dinghy within the event of
unintentional or uncommanded inflation.

C-193
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.03.03 Crew Stations, Crew Cabs, Cockpits, and SURV-02 Provide crew stations, crew compartments, and operator areas containing dinghies as emergency equipment with a
Personnel Enclosures suitable tool for puncturing or cutting the dinghy in the event of inadvertent inflation. Locate the tool so that access is

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

assured during dinghy inflation.
T-01 Do not locate pyro, gas, and air (PGA) control system exhaust exits:
- In proximity to safe, arm, or servicing areas,
- Adjacent to auxiliary inlets,
- In close proximity to crew boarding areas, weapons, emergency ingress/egress areas, and optics or optical glass.
T-02 Design pyro type thruster exits associated with emergency use or backup with simple exit closure devices to identify if a
thruster has been fired.
T-03 Provide protective screens for PGA exits that normally remain open to prevent intrusions from fowl or wildlife.
T-04 Provide protective closure provisions for PGA exits located or oriented to exposure from the elements.
T-05 Design single-shot (one time use) type thrusters with a minimum 6-year shelf life and a 7-year installed life.
W-01 Hat section type structural stiffeners with sufficient cross sectional area should be considered as a routing tunnel for
wiring and coax.
WBAY-01 Equipment bays and compartments should not require installation of special cavity fillers when equipment is not installed.
WBAY-18 The proximity of the gun firing barrel to structure should be such that structural furrows or channels are not required for
projectile clearances during firing.
WIND-01 Optical window materials should be scratch resistant, easy to clean, and dissipate electrostatic charges.
WIND-02 Optic windows should be located for ease of inspection, cleaning, and induced damage potential from personnel or
support equipment.
WIND-03 Window locations should minimize the effects of contamination by salt spray, bugs, oils, fuels, and icing.
WIND-04 Window, canopy, and windshield material should be designed to withstand the effects of sandstorms in the ground
environment and the effects of rain and hail during thunderstorm penetration in the airborne environment.
WIND-05 Design interior surfaces to be reachable for cleaning without reliance on hinging, equipment removal, or use of support
equipment.
WIND-06 Do not locate windows in the proximity of rooster tails created by wheels/tires passing through water or slush.
WIND-07 Use materials that are highly resistive to thermal shock.
WIND-11 For dome-shaped optic window concepts, the dome should be easily removable for cleaning without affecting LO
integrity.
WIND-12 Design EO windows and optics to be interchangeable among the same air vehicle types or same ground vehicle types.
WIND-13 The combination of material layers and coatings for optics and windows should be such that static charge buildup for

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

worst case conditions should not exceed 10,000 volts.
WIND-14 Exterior lights should permit simple and rapid bulb replacement without disturbing LO treatments.
WIND-15 Design light covers and lenses to be sufficiently durable so that protective covers are not needed during maintenance.
WIND-16 Lens shape should enhance LO capability to reduce need, care, and expense for special coatings.
WT&B-13 Emergency brake handles should not be similar in shape or color as other handles nor should they be located in close
proximity to such other handles.
3.03.04 Access Doors, Panels, and Openings A-01 Seal equipment bays and compartments against the environmental elements including all types of servicing fluids used for
the vehicle, all types of anti-ice and de-ice fluids, and all types of fluids used for chemical, biological, or nuclear
decontamination

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
A-07 Paint equipment bay and compartment interiors a high gloss white to maximize lighting reflectivity, visibility, and rapid

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

leak detection capability.
A-11 Locate compartment electrical penetrations close to the access opening for ease of sight, probing, repair, and to eliminate
fluid soaking, wicking, or contamination.
A-12 Locate compartment electrical penetrations far enough from the access opening to prevent damage resulting from
improper (over-length) panel fasteners.

C-194
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.03.04 Access Doors, Panels, and Openings A-13 Two-sided or two-surfaced access should not be required for access to equipment interfaces and hardpoints. The term
two-sided infers top/bottom, left/right, front/back, or combinations thereof.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

A-14 Do not locate nutplates or gang channels in inaccessible areas that would require extensive disassembly or equipment
removal to gain access.
A-15 Locate tie-down attachment points such that tie-down chains, straps, or cables do not prevent or restrict normal servicing,
weapon loading, or safe/arm functions.
A-16 Structural design should provide good access to corrosion-prone areas for inspection and treatment.
A-17 All structural fasteners in an access door or panel should be of identical grip and diameter. In rare cases where this is not
possible, fasteners of different grip must have different diameters to prevent a shorter fastener being substituted for the
correct, longer fastener.
A-18 Use transparent windows, quick-opening covers, or openings without any cover to permit quick visual inspections where
needed.
AA&S-02 Closure and sealing of cavities, compartments, and wells for retractable antennas should be mechanized to function as
part of the extend and retract cycle.
AA&S-03 Closure and sealing of cavities, compartments, and wells for retractable antennas should be maintained when antennas
are not installed without need for ancillary measures or equipment.
ARM-02 For an aircraft, the fuselage lower shear moldline should be no less than 50" above the ground when internal weapons
will be carried in the fuselage and weapon bay door widths exceed 22".
BIT-06 Mission critical functions should be monitored by BIT.
BIT-09 Use concurrent BIT to monitor system critical functions.
BIT/BITE-02 Design EMI protection to eliminate finger type EMI contact devices.
CBR-01 Orient all vehicle liquid servicing fittings to ensure fluids will not come in contact with protective garb during
connect/disconnect activities.
CBR-02 Ensure vehicle overboard passive liquid drains are clearly marked or visible to enable personnel to remain clear of area.
CBR-03 Design fuel cell drains so they can not be activated in a manner that would allow fuel to come in contact with a protected
hand.
CBR-04 Design emergency ingress provisions so they can be activated by a 95 percentile male wearing full protective chemical
or biological protection gear.
CBR-05 Size rescue doors, panels, and "cut here" areas to accommodate the 95 percentile shoulder width wearing full protective
chemical or biological protection gear.
CONT-06 Design all pulleys and brackets associated with cable installations so they are accessible by a 75 percentile male hand.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

D&V-01 The geometric aspects of structural design and interfaces should not result in any natural bathtubs.
D&V-02 Closed structural sections subject to condensation or fluid migration should contain drainage provisions.
D&V-03 Crew cabs, operators' compartments, crew stations, cockpits, and passenger compartments should be subject to the same
corrosion prevention measures as the exteriors of the vehicles. Low points, pockets, and related fluid collection points
within should be provided with low point drains.
EC-08 Locate and position electrical connectors such that all pin identification for either half can be easily seen.
ECS-01 Design so that equipment servicing status are accessible and readable from the ground level for air vehicles and from the
operator's position for ground and water vehicles.
ECS-02 Do not locate equipment servicing points in crew, passenger, or operator areas.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
ECS-04 Plumbing, lines, or hoses containing hot liquids, toxic gases or liquids should be external to operator, crew, or passenger

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

stations.
ECS-05 Access, removal, and installation of all type filter elements should be possible without removing the assembly or
disconnecting any filter package interfaces.
ECS-11 Design air inlets, outlets, and exhausts to be accessible without reliance on ladders or work stands for ease of installing
protective plugs or covers.

C-195
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.03.04 Access Doors, Panels, and Openings ECS-12 Design air inlets, outlets, and exhausts with screens to prevent bird or rodent entry.
ECS-13 Design air inlets, outlets, and exhausts to be meniscus-free to prevent a bathtub effect. In remote instances where this is

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

not possible, passive drains should be provided at all low points to prevent liquid accumulation with the vehicle in its
normal static attitude.
ECS-14 Instances where air inlets, outlets, and exhausts are subject to water entry, passive drains should be employed capable of
handling 4" of rain per hour.
ECS-15 Locate and orient air inlets, outlets, and exhausts in a manner that prevents their use as footholds during maintenance.
ECS-28 Install and orient air supply and distribution ducts so they clear all access openings and equipment removal envelopes.
EDECOM-01 Provide surface sensors on equipment located in compartments containing louvers, screens, flush inlets, or similar
openings to the environment to indicate the presence of chem/bio contaminants.
EDECOM-02 Provide integral sensors (viewable from the exterior) for equipment subject to internal forced-air cooling from outside or
external air to indicate the presence of contaminants.
EDECOM-03 Design equipment surfaces and structure to be compatible with all decontamination agents and methods.
EDECOM-04 Provide passive overboard drains in compartments subject to decontamination processes to void the area of contaminants.
EDECOM-05 Provide hoist, lift or transport handles for equipment requiring removal from the host vehicle for decontamination. In
instances where this may not be practical, design the equipment with hardpoints for attaching parasitic carrying provisions
ENG-09 On multi-engine air vehicles, the engines should be capable of being installed in any engine cavity without need for
reconfiguration.
ENG-10 On multi-engine air vehicles, the airframe-to-engine interfaces should be in identical positions or orientations for each
engine cavity.
ENG-12 All engine-mounted accessories must be capable of being removed and installed through the available airframe access
openings.
ENG-16 Aircraft jacking should not be required for engine removal.
ENG-17 Aft engine removal should be an acceptable alternative for USAF aircraft.
ENG-18 For either downward or aft engine removal, it should be possible to maintain control of the engine on all axis during the
entire removal and installation process.
ENG-19 The minimum clearance between engine and airframe should be 1 inch, including removal and installation.
ENG-20 Do not locate equipment or components in the engine cavity except for those components associated with the engine or
engine installation.
ENG-21 Do not locate equipment or components in the engine bay cavity in a manner that would require removal or repositioning
for engine removal.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

ENG-22 The engine cavity structure should be capable of withstanding a 2000-degree Fahrenheit fire for 10 minutes without
jeopardizing loss of the vehicle.
ENG-23 All engine borescope provisions should be accessible with the engine installed and hooked up.
ENG-24 Replacement of all ignitors should be possible with the engine installed.
ENG-25 All engine-to-airframe plumbing, wiring, and duct interfaces should be capable of being connected or disconnected by
hand, should contain integral safety provisions, and should not require torquing.
ENG-26 Locate and position engine overheat and fire warning sensors so that damage cannot occur during engine maintenance or
replacement.
ENG-30 It should not be necessary to close or reinstall engine access doors for engine ground operation up to and including

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
military power.

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

ENV-01 Materials, treatments, coatings, finishes should be compatible with all anti-ice and de-ice fluids, chemical and biological
decontamination fluids, washing and cleaning fluids, and all vehicle subsystem fluids.
ENV-02 There should be no top coat or treatment deterioration throughout the standard temperature and humidity spectrum.
ENV-06 For ground vehicles, the finishes should be compatible with and durable against all rain, hail, sleet, snow, and ice
conditions experienced in all intended operational environments.

C-196
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.03.04 Access Doors, Panels, and Openings EXT-01 Locate Tanks, Pods, Containers, and Devices (TPCD's) so they do not block or restrict access to existing vehicle access
areas or access approach envelopes.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

EXT-05 Design access doors for cargo type TPCD's to be non-load carrying and with simple latches for all doors and panels.
FUEL-01 Locate fuel vent and dump masts to ensure exiting fuel will be clear of servicing, loading, arming and safing areas for all
types of ground and airborne vehicles.
FUEL-02 Manufacturing splices for major sub-assemblies should not intrude into or through integral fuel cells or tanks.
FUEL-03 Structural bolts, screws, and fasteners should not penetrate into integral fuel cells or tanks other than those used for
access door attachment.
FUEL-04 Where the fuel wetted area inside a fuel cell or tank is void of blade, knife, and hat stiffeners for use as hardpoint
attachment, standoffs bonded to the cell surface should be used as attachments for clamps, and brackets to eliminate
fastener penetration of the fuel cavity.
FUEL-05 Intersecting of two or more surfaces in a fuel wetted area of less than 90 degrees should be avoided to simplify
manufacture and repair.
FUEL-06 Where maintaining a minimum angle of 90 degrees is not possible, sufficient depth, width, and height should be
maintained to provide tool clearances for all tools used in the manufacturing processes and in the operational field repair
environment.
FUEL-08 The size and number of fuel cell and tank access doors should be sufficient to ensure no wetted area of the cell or tank is
beyond a maximum 18" distance from the edge of the access opening. This guideline applies to only non-man rated cells.
FUEL-09 All fuel cell or tank access doors not mounted on the exterior surface should contain sealing provisions other than the
channel type.
FUEL-10 Provide access from the wing closure ribs in lieu of the moldline when access is required in close proximity to the wing
fold area.
FUEL-11 Through-the-tank fasteners should not be used for fuel cells or tanks in areas where a leak path could be established into
an inaccessible portion of the vehicle.
HOOK-06 Avoid the need to remove the tail hook to facilitate engine access or removal.
HYD-01 For military combat vehicles having two or more hydraulic power systems, provide a minimum 30-inch spacing between
ground power and servicing interfaces to ensure:
- Design flexibility in locating and arranging equipment in high-density vehicles such as fighters and helicopters,
- Work area separation to enable concurrent service/maintenance on systems,
- Systems vulnerability enhancement,
- Reduction in turn-around elapsed time due to concurrent servicing capability.
IN(V)-02 Do not use loose structural fasteners in the access area to inlet door actuators and mechanisms. Where this guideline

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

cannot be followed, design the actuator door to be accessible only when the inlet doors are fully closed.
IN(V)-03 For engine inlet bellmouth fairings, use methods of retention other than fasteners. Latches may be considered as an
acceptable alternative only if latch-to-panel retention is from the inner mold line.
IN(V)-04 Design inlet doors and inlet bellmouth fairings to be fully interchangeable to eliminate the need to cut, file, or trim at the
engine face.
IN(V)-05 Locate the inlet duct edge a minimum of 60 inches from the cockpit or crew station to eliminate restricting engine
operation to canopy-closed conditions.
IN(V)-06 Use captive fasteners on all access doors forward of the inlet to significantly reduce engine FOD potential.
IN(V)-08 Incorporate an inlet closure door sealing concept that prevents entry of fluid, dust, or sand across the entire airborne and

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
ground environment spectrum.
LG-31 Landing gear doors designed to close after gear is extended should be capable of being manually opened on the ground
without reliance on electrical or hydraulic power.
LG-32 Design of landing gear doors normally closed after gear extension should ensure failure modes will not enable
uncommanded opening on the ground.

C-197
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.03.04 Access Doors, Panels, and Openings LG-33 Design of landing gear doors normally left open after gear extension should ensure no failure mode will enable closing on
the ground.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

LG-34 Avoid sharp edges and corners on landing gear doors or fairings.
LG-35 Avoid the use of landing gear doors to mount or house antennas, arrays, or air data sensors.
LO-01 Use LO compatible gap fillers for manufactured gaps in lieu of tape and butter (surface coating compound).
LO-02 Avoid scheduled forced inspections or replacement of materials, coatings, or finishes solely to protect either the reliability
or the signature.
LO-03 Equipment and support structure requiring shrouds to reduce radar returns should not cause increases in equipment
service/repair time.
LO-04 Infrequently-accessed structural doors and panels incorporating special coatings or conductive paints should contain
provisions for prying the door or panel clear of moldline with standard screwdriver without damage.
LO-05 Do not locate flush mounted LO screens for auxiliary air inlets and exits in walkway areas unless durability has been
proven.
LO-06 Size flush mounted LO screens for auxiliary air inlets and exits to ensure functionality with up to 25 percent of the
openings plugged.
LO-07 Flush and non-flush LO screens should be interchangeable.
MATL-02 Cosmetic type repairs should not exceed 1 hours including cure or drying times.
MATL-03 Cosmetic and vehicle repair material shelf life should not be less than 24 months.
MATL-04 Cosmetic and vehicle repair materials should be non-proprietary and non-single source.
MATL-05 Cosmetic and vehicle repair materials should not require refrigeration or special facilities or atmospheres for storage.
MATL-06 Repair criteria, repairs, and instructions should not be classified.
MATL-07 All cosmetic touch-up and repair materials should be environmentally safe.
MATL-08 Repairs (other than major depot repair) should not require autoclave type facilities.
MATL-09 A high degree of durability should be achieved across all walkway areas on the top surfaces of all vehicles up to and
including 95 percentile personnel.
MATL-10 Coatings and finishes should be durable against the effects of missile gases, velocities, and particles emanating from the
missile motor.
MATL-11 Coatings and finishes should be durable against the effects of gun gases, projectile shock waves, and brass particles
emanating from the projectile seal rings.
MATL-13 Special handling or shipping requirements of repair materials should be avoided.
MATL-15 Doors and panels containing blade seals used for signature reduction should be interchangeable or contain

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

interchangeable blade seals. Deviation is acceptable where repairs can be accomplished on the vehicle in a time equal to
or less than door or seal remove and replace time.
MC-06 Locate, position, orient all plumbing and duct electrical connectors to prevent the need for sequential installation or
removal.
MC-09 All plumbing connections and fittings used for fuel systems should contain integral bonding features to eliminate the need
for bonding clamps or jumper cables.
MC-14 Where multiple connectors are located in close proximity, ensure (1) a minimum hand tool arc of 120 degrees can be
maintained, and (2) stagger fittings to ensure firm coupling interface/hand tool interface can be accomplished without
inducing damage to adjacent lines.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
MC-15 Route, orient, and position plumbing, wiring, ducts, and connectors sufficiently away from the outer surface of the vehicle

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

to preclude induced damage due to minor dents, drill bits during repair, etc. Minimum rule of thumb is 1" away from the
inner surface and 1" below a plate nut channel.
OXY-07 Locate liquid oxygen containers to ensure simultaneous replacement with other turnaround activities.
OXY-12 LOX compartments should be sealed from adjacent compartments and should contain dedicated overboard drains.

C-198
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.03.04 Access Doors, Panels, and Openings P-01 Access door and panel fastener types for airborne vehicles should meet the following criteria:
- use latches for a frequency of access of 0 to 40 flight hours

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

- use High Strength Quick Release fasteners for a frequency of access of 40-400 flight hours
- use structural screws for a frequency of access of 400 flight hours or more
P-02 Access door and panel fastener types for surface vehicles should meet the following criteria:
- use a spring loaded or latch fastener for an opening frequency of daily
- use a one quarter turn fastener (or equivalent) for a opening frequency of weekly
- use screws or bolts for all other cases
P-03 All doors and panels subject to environmental elements should contain form-in-place seals (or equivalent) attached to the
door structure, not substructure, to prevent damage during maintenance.
P-04 Door and panel seals should be compatible with all types of on-board servicing fluids, de-ice and anti-ice fluids, and all
fluids used for chemical, biological, and nuclear decontamination.
P-05 Piano type hinges should not be used on doors or panels because they are subject to wear, corrosion, and sand and fluid
entry.
P-06 Access door and panel devices used to support door in opened position should meet the following criteria:
- for airborne vehicles, design for 60 knot gust loads (or equivalent jet blast loads)
- for ground vehicles, design for 50 mph gust loads
P-07 Hinged access doors and panels capable of remaining in the opened position should not have sharp edges or corners.
P-08 Removable access door and panel fasteners should be of identical grip length and diameter.
P-09 Acceptable door and panel hold-open devices include over-center sheet metal spring, over-center spring link, spring
cartridge, support strut, and pinned goose neck hinge.
P-10 Access doors and panels requiring non-captive fasteners should not be located forward of air inlet ducts or high-energy
rotating components (e.g., prop fans, engine cooling fans, etc.).
P-11 Access doors and panels should be interchangeable as justified by operation and support costs or life cycle costs.
PERS-06 Storage bins, compartments, sacks, or bags should be available within the vehicle to store/protect all personal equipment
required to conduct operations.
PERS-07 All flight and ground vehicles should contain one cubic foot minimum storage compartment(s) for various loose and
sundry personal items (for each individual).
PERS-08 Design stowage and mounting provisions for portable air or oxygen containers to withstand 40G crash or impact loads.
PYRO-20 Weapon bay doors, when opened, should not block or restrict access to other servicing points.
PYRO-31 Ensure weapon bay door open positions do not intrude into any other door opening envelope.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

PYRO-32 Provide sufficient longitudinal clearance between weapon bays to enable simultaneous loading of two bays.
PYRO-33 Provide sufficient lateral clearance between weapon bays to enable simultaneous loading of two bays.
PYRO-34 Weapon bay door seals should be bonded or attached to door structure to minimize induced seal damage during weapon
or store loading.
SABCH-01 Do not locate auxiliary air inlets, sensors, access doors, or drains in boundary bleed areas.
SABCH-02 All flush type structural screws should have identical head drives for the entire vehicle.
SABCH-03 All non-flush type structural screws should have identical head drive recesses for the entire vehicle.
SABCH-04 Special high strength bolts, such as twelve-point heads, should be fully justified from standpoint of the cost of ownership
and effectiveness.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
SABCH-05 Structural design should avoid the reliance on blind fasteners unless fully supported by cost, weight, schedule, and

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

effectiveness analysis.
SABCH-06 Structural design should avoid the potential of dissimilar material or fastener corrosion.
SABCH-07 No structural fasteners should be used that require special tools for installation.
SABCH-08 Taper pins should be threaded and retained with self-locking hardware.
SABCH-09 Pins and collars (lockbolts) should only be used in applications which do not normally require removal.

C-199
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.03.04 Access Doors, Panels, and Openings SABCH-10 Do not use lockbolts in composites.
SABCH-11 In rare instances where the use of dissimilar material in immediate contact cannot be avoided, they should be sufficiently

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

insulated to endure for the life of the vehicle.
SABCH-12 Avoid tapping threads into structural members. Use of heli-coil type or similar insert concepts is permissible.
SABCH-13 No structural design concept should rely on frequent scheduled inspections to monitor or otherwise ensure structural
integrity.
SABCH-14 No structural fastener intended to carry shear or tension loads should be smaller than 1/4" diameter (.25").
SABCH-15 Give preference to butt type splices over lap type splices in the design of manufacturing splices.
SAFE-01 Drag chute installation designs not containing electrical safing should contain remote safe/arm provisions reachable from
ground level by 5 percentile females. Remove location should be clear of engine exhaust areas and flight control
deflection envelopes.
SAFE-05 Crash locator beacon door opening/ejection mechanisms should contain integral electrical safe/arm features.
SE-04 Gun port covers or plugs should be lightweight, 100% effective, and easy to install or store.
SEAT-04 Design ejection seats so they can be replaced with canopy or escape hatch installed.
SEAT-05 Design ejection seat pyrotechnic devices so they are 100 percent viewable and accessible with seat installed.
SEAT-06 Do not use seat removal as a means of access.
SIMP-01 Location and design of all exterior lights should not require protective covers in ground environments.
SIMP-02 Landing and taxi lights should be mounted on landing gear struts or doors to eliminate separate compartments, doors, and
retraction/extension mechanisms.
SIMP-03 Speed brake or speed brake cavity should contain integral mechanical locking mechanism for personnel safety.
WBAY-01 Equipment bays and compartments should not require installation of special cavity fillers when equipment is not installed.
WBAY-12 Pylon-to-store/weapon gap seal should permit visual and physical access during loading for all interfaces between bomb
rack-to-store, bomb rack-to-launcher, and launcher-to-store.
WBAY-17 Special coatings or conductive paints on pylons, launchers, racks, launchers, tanks, pods, etc. should have the durability to
withstand contact with support stands/cradles during storage.
WBAY-19 Frangible gun ports should take preference over mechanized gun port doors.
WBAY-20 Gun plugs required solely to maintain a given signature level should be capable of on-board stowage for use only when a
threat requires their presence.
3.03.05 Windshields, Windows, Canopies, and A-01 Seal equipment bays and compartments against the environmental elements including all types of servicing fluids used for
Optics the vehicle, all types of anti-ice and de-ice fluids, and all types of fluids used for chemical, biological, or nuclear
decontamination

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

A-02 Equipment bay and compartment structure should be bonded, co-cured, welded, machined, or combinations thereof to
eliminate or minimize the use of mechanical fasteners.
A-03 All equipment bay and compartment structural flanges and stiffeners should be external to the compartment to maximize
the volume available for equipment installation and arrangement.
A-13 Two-sided or two-surfaced access should not be required for access to equipment interfaces and hardpoints. The term
two-sided infers top/bottom, left/right, front/back, or combinations thereof.
BIT-06 Mission critical functions should be monitored by BIT.
BIT-09 Use concurrent BIT to monitor system critical functions.
BIT/BITE-02 Design EMI protection to eliminate finger type EMI contact devices.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
CREW-07 Electronic and photosensitive storage media should withstand the adverse environment created by ground, flightline, or

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

shipboard electromagnetic fields and light sources.
D&V-01 The geometric aspects of structural design and interfaces should not result in any natural bathtubs.
D&V-02 Closed structural sections subject to condensation or fluid migration should contain drainage provisions.

C-200
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.03.05 Windshields, Windows, Canopies, and D&V-03 Crew cabs, operators' compartments, crew stations, cockpits, and passenger compartments should be subject to the same
Optics corrosion prevention measures as the exteriors of the vehicles. Low points, pockets, and related fluid collection points

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

within should be provided with low point drains.
ECS-27 Use temperature-limiting devices with high temperature air systems to ensure no single or combination of surface wind,
cross wind, ground operation or flight operation will damage windshields, canopies, windows or optics.
ENV-01 Materials, treatments, coatings, finishes should be compatible with all anti-ice and de-ice fluids, chemical and biological
decontamination fluids, washing and cleaning fluids, and all vehicle subsystem fluids.
ENV-02 There should be no top coat or treatment deterioration throughout the standard temperature and humidity spectrum.
ENV-03 For airborne vehicles, the finishes should be durable against rain, hail, and dynamic erosion throughout the flight
envelope.
ENV-04 For airborne and ground vehicles, the finishes should be durable against sand erosion throughout all surface wind speeds
experienced in arid or desert geographical locations.
ENV-06 For ground vehicles, the finishes should be compatible with and durable against all rain, hail, sleet, snow, and ice
conditions experienced in all intended operational environments.
LO-01 Use LO compatible gap fillers for manufactured gaps in lieu of tape and butter (surface coating compound).
LO-02 Avoid scheduled forced inspections or replacement of materials, coatings, or finishes solely to protect either the reliability
or the signature.
LO-03 Equipment and support structure requiring shrouds to reduce radar returns should not cause increases in equipment
service/repair time.
LO-04 Infrequently-accessed structural doors and panels incorporating special coatings or conductive paints should contain
provisions for prying the door or panel clear of moldline with standard screwdriver without damage.
LO-05 Do not locate flush mounted LO screens for auxiliary air inlets and exits in walkway areas unless durability has been
proven.
LO-06 Size flush mounted LO screens for auxiliary air inlets and exits to ensure functionality with up to 25 percent of the
openings plugged.
LO-07 Flush and non-flush LO screens should be interchangeable.
MATL-06 Repair criteria, repairs, and instructions should not be classified.
MATL-07 All cosmetic touch-up and repair materials should be environmentally safe.
MATL-10 Coatings and finishes should be durable against the effects of missile gases, velocities, and particles emanating from the
missile motor.
MATL-11 Coatings and finishes should be durable against the effects of gun gases, projectile shock waves, and brass particles
emanating from the projectile seal rings.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

MC-02 Avoid the use of cotter pins, safety wire, safety clips, and similar devices to prevent maintenance-induced events leading
to ground vehicle accidents or loss of air vehicles.
MC-06 Locate, position, orient all plumbing and duct electrical connectors to prevent the need for sequential installation or
removal.
MC-09 All plumbing connections and fittings used for fuel systems should contain integral bonding features to eliminate the need
for bonding clamps or jumper cables.
MC-10 In rare instances where a plumbing run contains complex form or geometry that would require removal of other plumbing
or equipment for access, in-line connectors should be incorporated to maintain the integrity of other plumbing or
equipment.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
MC-12 All plumbing and connectors containing liquids should be meniscus-free.

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

MC-14 Where multiple connectors are located in close proximity, ensure (1) a minimum hand tool arc of 120 degrees can be
maintained, and (2) stagger fittings to ensure firm coupling interface/hand tool interface can be accomplished without
inducing damage to adjacent lines.
PYRO-31 Ensure weapon bay door open positions do not intrude into any other door opening envelope.
PYRO-32 Provide sufficient longitudinal clearance between weapon bays to enable simultaneous loading of two bays.

C-201
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.03.05 Windshields, Windows, Canopies, and PYRO-33 Provide sufficient lateral clearance between weapon bays to enable simultaneous loading of two bays.
Optics

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

SABCH-01 Do not locate auxiliary air inlets, sensors, access doors, or drains in boundary bleed areas.
SABCH-02 All flush type structural screws should have identical head drives for the entire vehicle.
SABCH-03 All non-flush type structural screws should have identical head drive recesses for the entire vehicle.
SABCH-04 Special high strength bolts, such as twelve-point heads, should be fully justified from standpoint of the cost of ownership
and effectiveness.
SABCH-05 Structural design should avoid the reliance on blind fasteners unless fully supported by cost, weight, schedule, and
effectiveness analysis.
SABCH-06 Structural design should avoid the potential of dissimilar material or fastener corrosion.
SABCH-07 No structural fasteners should be used that require special tools for installation.
SABCH-08 Taper pins should be threaded and retained with self-locking hardware.
SABCH-09 Pins and collars (lockbolts) should only be used in applications which do not normally require removal.
SABCH-10 Do not use lockbolts in composites.
SABCH-11 In rare instances where the use of dissimilar material in immediate contact cannot be avoided, they should be sufficiently
insulated to endure for the life of the vehicle.
SABCH-12 Avoid tapping threads into structural members. Use of heli-coil type or similar insert concepts is permissible.
SABCH-13 No structural design concept should rely on frequent scheduled inspections to monitor or otherwise ensure structural
integrity.
SABCH-14 No structural fastener intended to carry shear or tension loads should be smaller than 1/4" diameter (.25").
SABCH-15 Give preference to butt type splices over lap type splices in the design of manufacturing splices.
SAFE-08 A single lever safety should, when positioned, safe the entire escape/ejection system. Use of the single lever to "arm"
should require two hands.
SAFE-09 Safing the canopy jettison system should be accomplished through the same lever device used to safe the ejection seat.
WIND-01 Optical window materials should be scratch resistant, easy to clean, and dissipate electrostatic charges.
WIND-02 Optic windows should be located for ease of inspection, cleaning, and induced damage potential from personnel or
support equipment.
WIND-03 Window locations should minimize the effects of contamination by salt spray, bugs, oils, fuels, and icing.
WIND-04 Window, canopy, and windshield material should be designed to withstand the effects of sandstorms in the ground
environment and the effects of rain and hail during thunderstorm penetration in the airborne environment.
WIND-05 Design interior surfaces to be reachable for cleaning without reliance on hinging, equipment removal, or use of support

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

equipment.
WIND-06 Do not locate windows in the proximity of rooster tails created by wheels/tires passing through water or slush.
WIND-07 Use materials that are highly resistive to thermal shock.
WIND-11 For dome-shaped optic window concepts, the dome should be easily removable for cleaning without affecting LO
integrity.
WIND-12 Design EO windows and optics to be interchangeable among the same air vehicle types or same ground vehicle types.
WIND-13 The combination of material layers and coatings for optics and windows should be such that static charge buildup for
worst case conditions should not exceed 10,000 volts.
WIND-14 Exterior lights should permit simple and rapid bulb replacement without disturbing LO treatments.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
WIND-15 Design light covers and lenses to be sufficiently durable so that protective covers are not needed during maintenance.

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

WIND-16 Lens shape should enhance LO capability to reduce need, care, and expense for special coatings.
3.03.06 Structures, Airframes, Bodies, Chassis, A-01 Seal equipment bays and compartments against the environmental elements including all types of servicing fluids used for
and Hulls the vehicle, all types of anti-ice and de-ice fluids, and all types of fluids used for chemical, biological, or nuclear
decontamination

C-202
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.03.06 Structures, Airframes, Bodies, Chassis, A-02 Equipment bay and compartment structure should be bonded, co-cured, welded, machined, or combinations thereof to
and Hulls eliminate or minimize the use of mechanical fasteners.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

A-03 All equipment bay and compartment structural flanges and stiffeners should be external to the compartment to maximize
the volume available for equipment installation and arrangement.
A-04 Use stiffening beads in lieu of flanges to the maximum extent to enhance compartment volume and simplify repairs.
Stiffening beads should have the convex surface toward the compartment to eliminate fluid traps.
A-05 Keep all machined compartment frames, webs, and closure panels to a constant thickness (e.g., not stepped or tapered) to
ease simplicity of fluid or electrical penetrations and ease and simplicity of structural repair.
A-06 Hardpoints (structural attachment and load bearing areas) within a compartment to assist in equipment mounting or
support should not be integral with the machined part. Hardpoints should be parasitic to enable quick repair in case of
wear or damage in lieu of precise ream/bush repair typical of machined hardpoints.
A-07 Paint equipment bay and compartment interiors a high gloss white to maximize lighting reflectivity, visibility, and rapid
leak detection capability.
A-08 Plumbing penetrations into a compartment should not be on a vertical axis due to difficulty in making or breaking
vertically-oriented connections. When compartment access is from the bottom, vertically-oriented connections can allow
fluid to leak onto the maintainer. When access is from the top, such connections can allow foreign matter to enter the
line. Use horizontal penetrations whenever possible.
A-09 Any heat or temperature sensitive structure within a compartment should contain heat-sensitive tape or appropriate heat
sensor for easy indication of over-temperature excursions.
A-10 Provide a sufficient number of compartment fluid drains to ensure fluid drainage for varying aircraft static attitudes and
varying terrain slopes for ground vehicles.
A-13 Two-sided or two-surfaced access should not be required for access to equipment interfaces and hardpoints. The term
two-sided infers top/bottom, left/right, front/back, or combinations thereof.
A-16 Structural design should provide good access to corrosion-prone areas for inspection and treatment.
A-18 Use transparent windows, quick-opening covers, or openings without any cover to permit quick visual inspections where
needed.
AA&S-01 Flush mounted antennas, sensors, and air data devices should have a good color contrast to surrounding structure when
located in walkway areas.
AA&S-02 Closure and sealing of cavities, compartments, and wells for retractable antennas should be mechanized to function as
part of the extend and retract cycle.
AA&S-03 Closure and sealing of cavities, compartments, and wells for retractable antennas should be maintained when antennas
are not installed without need for ancillary measures or equipment.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

AA&S-04 LO antennas should be designed to be tolerant of accumulations of grime or dirt without degrading performance or
biasing the BIT/fault isolate performance.
AA&S-05 Multi-function antennas, arrays, and sensors located in leading edges should be modularized to reduce vehicle downtime
through simplified replacement of a faulty module.
AA&S-06 Moveable flaps or slats containing integral antennas, arrays, or sensors should be interchangeable to provide the option
for on-vehicle or off-vehicle repair.
ARM-01 For an aircraft, the fuselage lower shear moldline should be no less than 38" above the ground when external weapons
only will be carried on the fuselage.
ARM-02 For an aircraft, the fuselage lower shear moldline should be no less than 50" above the ground when internal weapons

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
will be carried in the fuselage and weapon bay door widths exceed 22".

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

ARM-03 Locate fuselage weapon bays a minimum of 18" from the nose landing gear and main landing gear of an aircraft.
ARM-04 No single weapon/store mounted on a transporter should intrude into the service/turnaround envelope of another station.
ARM-05 All servicing and turnaround functions (including movement envelopes) should be outside the gun firing envelope.
ARM-06 The relationship of the nose landing gear to the main landing gear should not restrict the positioning of weapon
transporters under the fuselage of an aircraft.

C-203
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.03.06 Structures, Airframes, Bodies, Chassis, ARM-10 Weapon and store stations should be located to ensure vehicle ballasting will not be required under any combination of
and Hulls weapon/store configurations.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

BIT-05 Incorporate testability design features as an integral part of equipment preliminary design process.
BIT-06 Mission critical functions should be monitored by BIT.
BIT-09 Use concurrent BIT to monitor system critical functions.
BIT-26 Locate routinely used test points so they are accessible without removing or disassembling other equipment
BIT/BITE-02 Design EMI protection to eliminate finger type EMI contact devices.
C-01 Avoid swivel type connectors and fittings for air, fuel, or hydraulic line interfaces due to their history of low reliability.
C-02 Provide spacing between parallel plumbing runs so that in-line couplings can be replaced without removing lines or
disconnecting any line support devices.
CARGO-01 Ground vehicles with storage bays or compartments accessible from outside the vehicle should:
- Have the door sill located no lower than knee height to accommodate a wide range of percentiles while standing.
- Ensure door handles are flush with outer surface to protect personnel.
- Contain goose neck hinges to protect the hinge from the elements.
- Contain peripheral door seals that will protect against blowing sand entry at 50 mph.
- Ensure door can be opened with transport tie downs installed.
- Ensure door opening envelope does not intrude into the opening envelope of an adjacent door.
- Contain simple sheet metal hold-open spring or mechanism.
- Ensure floor of bay or compartment is flush with sill to simplify cleanout and drainage.
- Ensure door unlocking and opening mechanism can be actuated by a 95 percentile male hand while wearing arctic
gloves.
- Contain 15 percent added volume for density growth.
CARGO-02 Ground vehicles with small exterior storage bays or compartments containing emergency equipment or supplies should:
- Be located at chest height of the 50 percentile male.
- Contain unlatching mechanisms activated by pushing inward on the door.
- Meet all other generic bay and compartment requirements.
CBR-01 Orient all vehicle liquid servicing fittings to ensure fluids will not come in contact with protective garb during
connect/disconnect activities.
CBR-02 Ensure vehicle overboard passive liquid drains are clearly marked or visible to enable personnel to remain clear of area.
CBR-03 Design fuel cell drains so they can not be activated in a manner that would allow fuel to come in contact with a protected
hand.
CBR-04 Design emergency ingress provisions so they can be activated by a 95 percentile male wearing full protective chemical

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

or biological protection gear.
CBR-05 Size rescue doors, panels, and "cut here" areas to accommodate the 95 percentile shoulder width wearing full protective
chemical or biological protection gear.
CBR-06 Consider the reduction in peripheral vision resulting from wearing chemical or biological protection gear when designing
intended fire paths and crash rescue paths into a vehicle.
CREW-01 Canopy attachment/hinge hardpoints should be located on the same structural subassembly as the canopy locking
hardpoints.
CREW-02 Armor protection integrated with the vehicle structure should be given preference over parasitic armor.
CREW-03 In rare cases where armor is parasitic, armor should be interchangeable and easily installed.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
CREW-04 Avoid wiring, coax, and plumbing penetrations through the floor of crew cabs, operators' compartments, crew stations,
cockpits, and passenger compartments.
CREW-05 Structural instrument panels, dashboards, and control panels should be modularized for easy and adequate access to all
interfaces, to simplify manufacturing, and to reduce maintenance-induced problems.
CREW-06 Film magazines, tapes, and removable modules should permit considerable handling without reliance on special support
equipment protection.

C-204
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.03.06 Structures, Airframes, Bodies, Chassis, CREW-07 Electronic and photosensitive storage media should withstand the adverse environment created by ground, flightline, or
and Hulls shipboard electromagnetic fields and light sources.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

CREW-08 Data storage media containers and modules should be capable of chemical and biological decontamination processes.
CREW-09 Crew and operator station cassettes or magazines should be capable of being removed and installed with one hand while
the operator or air crew is seated and strapped in.
CREW-10 Design cameras, recorders, and sensors to be fully interchangeable and quickly replaceable.
CREW-11 Design cameras, lenses, reconnaissance pods, aiming devices, and related equipment so they can be reconfigured by one
individual.
CREW-12 Requirements for boresighting should not be part of the design or integration.
CREW-13 Provide storage provisions in each vehicle type (ground and airborne) to store extra tapes, modules, canisters, cassettes,
as appropriate to the intended vehicle use/mission.
D&V-01 The geometric aspects of structural design and interfaces should not result in any natural bathtubs.
D&V-02 Closed structural sections subject to condensation or fluid migration should contain drainage provisions.
D&V-03 Crew cabs, operators' compartments, crew stations, cockpits, and passenger compartments should be subject to the same
corrosion prevention measures as the exteriors of the vehicles. Low points, pockets, and related fluid collection points
within should be provided with low point drains.
ECS-01 Design so that equipment servicing status are accessible and readable from the ground level for air vehicles and from the
operator's position for ground and water vehicles.
ECS-02 Do not locate equipment servicing points in crew, passenger, or operator areas.
ECS-03 Heat exchangers using hot liquids as the heat source should not be located inside the compartments used for operator,
crew, or passengers.
ECS-04 Plumbing, lines, or hoses containing hot liquids, toxic gases or liquids should be external to operator, crew, or passenger
stations.
ECS-05 Access, removal, and installation of all type filter elements should be possible without removing the assembly or
disconnecting any filter package interfaces.
ECS-11 Design air inlets, outlets, and exhausts to be accessible without reliance on ladders or work stands for ease of installing
protective plugs or covers.
ECS-12 Design air inlets, outlets, and exhausts with screens to prevent bird or rodent entry.
ECS-13 Design air inlets, outlets, and exhausts to be meniscus-free to prevent a bathtub effect. In remote instances where this is
not possible, passive drains should be provided at all low points to prevent liquid accumulation with the vehicle in its
normal static attitude.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

ECS-14 Instances where air inlets, outlets, and exhausts are subject to water entry, passive drains should be employed capable of
handling 4" of rain per hour.
ECS-15 Locate and orient air inlets, outlets, and exhausts in a manner that prevents their use as footholds during maintenance.
ECS-16 All components contained in the systems, including all attaching brackets and supports, should use hex-head self-locking
bolts for ease and simplicity of installation.
ECS-17 Do not use air ejectors due to their low reliability and susceptibility to clogging.
ECS-21 Do not locate ground cooling or circulation fans that operate at high noise levels in operator, crew, or passenger
compartments.
ENG(G)-01 Provide access to all engine mounts for ground vehicles so that hoisting or crawling under the vehicle is not required.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
ENG(G)-02 Use torque-limiting bolts or torque washers as engine mount attaching hardware to eliminate the need for torque

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

wrenches.
ENG(G)-03 Design hard points for hoisting or positioning the engine during installation and removal to be integral to the engine and
capable of hoisting and supporting a fully-built-up engine package.
ENG(G)-04 Do not use downward engine removal concepts that require jacking or hoisting of the ground vehicle.

C-205
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.03.06 Structures, Airframes, Bodies, Chassis, ENG(G)-05 Use concepts for removing ground vehicle engines from the front, rear, or side rather than from overhead (using
and Hulls hoisting).

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

ENG(G)-06 The distance between the engine and firewall should ensure the access envelopes to lines, fittings, wiring, and
adjustments will accommodate the 75 percentile male hand.
ENG(G)-07 The distance between the cooling fan and radiator core should ensure that access envelopes will not require removal of
the core.
ENG(G)-08 The interface of the engine assembly to the engine compartment and structure should be designed to ensure all spark
plugs, glo-plugs, and igniters can be replaced within 30 minutes elapsed time.
ENG(G)-10 Design attaching hardware for all mechanical engine-to-vehicle interfaces to be captive and with integral safeties.
ENG(G)-16 Do not locate batteries in the engine compartment. In those instances where this is not possible:
- The battery support structure should be of a material that is impervious to acid leakage or boil-over.
- The battery support structure should serve as a scupper to collect and direct the acid out of the engine compartment.
ENG(G)-18 Incorporate appropriate sensors to enhance the diagnostic and prognostic capabilities for the following:
- Oil temperature - Fuel filter bypass
- Oil pressure - Coolant pressure
- Oil filter bypass - Coolant level
- Oil cooler bypass valve position - Coolant temperature
- Oil level - Vibration pickups
- Oil return line particle count - Chip detector
ENG(G)-19 Paint engine compartments gloss white to enhance light reflectivity and enhance fluid leak detection.
ENG(G)-20 Design all firewall fittings, connectors, and penetrations to be fully viewable and directly accessible to the maintainers.
ENG-09 On multi-engine air vehicles, the engines should be capable of being installed in any engine cavity without need for
reconfiguration.
ENG-10 On multi-engine air vehicles, the airframe-to-engine interfaces should be in identical positions or orientations for each
engine cavity.
ENG-12 All engine-mounted accessories must be capable of being removed and installed through the available airframe access
openings.
ENG-15 Engine removal for aircraft intended to be operated off carriers should be accomplished within the shadow of the
aircraft.
ENG-16 Aircraft jacking should not be required for engine removal.
ENG-17 Aft engine removal should be an acceptable alternative for USAF aircraft.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

ENG-18 For either downward or aft engine removal, it should be possible to maintain control of the engine on all axis during the
entire removal and installation process.
ENG-19 The minimum clearance between engine and airframe should be 1 inch, including removal and installation.
ENG-20 Do not locate equipment or components in the engine cavity except for those components associated with the engine or
engine installation.
ENG-21 Do not locate equipment or components in the engine bay cavity in a manner that would require removal or repositioning
for engine removal.
ENG-22 The engine cavity structure should be capable of withstanding a 2000-degree Fahrenheit fire for 10 minutes without
jeopardizing loss of the vehicle.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
ENG-23 All engine borescope provisions should be accessible with the engine installed and hooked up.

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

ENG-24 Replacement of all ignitors should be possible with the engine installed.
ENG-25 All engine-to-airframe plumbing, wiring, and duct interfaces should be capable of being connected or disconnected by
hand, should contain integral safety provisions, and should not require torquing.
ENG-26 Locate and position engine overheat and fire warning sensors so that damage cannot occur during engine maintenance or
replacement.

C-206
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.03.06 Structures, Airframes, Bodies, Chassis, ENG-30 It should not be necessary to close or reinstall engine access doors for engine ground operation up to and including
and Hulls military power.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

ENG-33 Engine access doors and panels and their integral support struts should be capable of withstanding 60 MPH winds in the
opened position.
ENG-34 Identification plates on the engine and all engine-mounted components should be viewable with the engine installed and
engine access doors opened.
ENG-42 Attach engine-to-inlet duct interface seals to the vehicle so they can be left in place during engine removal.
ENG-43 Design engine-to-inlet duct seal so the interface is automatic during engine installation without needing any form of
alignment, adjustment, or mechanical attachment interface.
ENG-44 Select engine-to-inlet duct seal material to ensure seal life is sufficient for the life of the vehicle.
ENG-45 Provide remote servicing points accessible from the ground to service engine accessories mounted on top of the engine
(e.g., oil tanks, gear boxes, generators, etc.) to eliminate climbing upon or atop the host vehicle.
ENG-47 Design the engine, including all accessories, plumbing, wiring, ducts, and mechanisms, to meet the same environmental
protection and compatibility requirements as the host vehicle.
ENG-48 Do not drain or dump residual fuel in the engine fuel control/manifold overboard. When it is not possible to follow this
guideline, route the fuel to an engine-mounted collector tank capable of retaining fuel from two shutdowns.
ENV-01 Materials, treatments, coatings, finishes should be compatible with all anti-ice and de-ice fluids, chemical and biological
decontamination fluids, washing and cleaning fluids, and all vehicle subsystem fluids.
ENV-02 There should be no top coat or treatment deterioration throughout the standard temperature and humidity spectrum.
ENV-03 For airborne vehicles, the finishes should be durable against rain, hail, and dynamic erosion throughout the flight
envelope.
ENV-04 For airborne and ground vehicles, the finishes should be durable against sand erosion throughout all surface wind speeds
experienced in arid or desert geographical locations.
ENV-05 For airborne vehicles, materials and all finishes with the engine inlet should be durable against hammer shock and
compressor stalls.
ENV-06 For ground vehicles, the finishes should be compatible with and durable against all rain, hail, sleet, snow, and ice
conditions experienced in all intended operational environments.
EXH-01 Treatments required for engine hot sections and exhaust areas should not require scheduled removals for the purposes of
recoating.
EXH-02 High temperature exhaust patterns should flow away from or be directed away from treated surrounding structure,
coatings, or finishes.
EXT-01 Locate Tanks, Pods, Containers, and Devices (TPCD's) so they do not block or restrict access to existing vehicle access

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

areas or access approach envelopes.
EXT-02 Design TPCD's for fuel containment to automatically interface to the host vehicle during installation or removal.
EXT-03 Design TPCD's to be fully compatible with the existing vehicle built-in hoisting provisions and locking devices.
EXT-05 Design access doors for cargo type TPCD's to be non-load carrying and with simple latches for all doors and panels.
EXT-06 Design cargo TPCD's to ensure all cargo and equipment can be downloaded and uploaded with the TPCD installed on the
host vehicle.
EXTING-01 Use extinguishing concepts dedicated to each individual fire zone in preference to manifold systems operating from a
central source.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
EXTING-03 Keep each individual fire zone over-temperature/fire warning system separate from those in other fire zones.

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

EXTING-04 Design individual fire zone over-temperature/fire warning system to be fully BIT capable (the BIT concept should permit
both initiated and periodic BIT).
EXTING-06 Provide an alternate capability to activate the system remotely from the cockpit/crew station, or operator's position to
satisfy emergency situations during vehicle maintenance.

C-207
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.03.06 Structures, Airframes, Bodies, Chassis, EXTING-07 Analyze the vehicle operational environment and type of fire zones to determine if remote stop/shut-off of equipment is
and Hulls warranted.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

EXTING-08 Analyze the vehicle operational environment and type of fire zones to determine if remote alarm and/or visual indication
of a fire is warranted.
EXTING-09 Do not locate provisions for overboard venting or dumping of extinguishing agents in areas that could create hazards for
personnel.
F-01 Use blind fasteners only where absolutely necessary or where considerable cost can be saved.
F-02 Minimize access fasteners while making them quick release, easily removed and replaced, and captive.
F-03 Choose fasteners based on the requirement top operate by hand or with common hand tools rather than special tools.
F-04 Whenever possible, incorporate barrel type fasteners as opposed to hi-torque fasteners. Failure of Hi-torque fasteners
due to stripping are common and a source of potential foreign object damage (FOD).
FUEL-01 Locate fuel vent and dump masts to ensure exiting fuel will be clear of servicing, loading, arming and safing areas for all
types of ground and airborne vehicles.
FUEL-02 Manufacturing splices for major sub-assemblies should not intrude into or through integral fuel cells or tanks.
FUEL-03 Structural bolts, screws, and fasteners should not penetrate into integral fuel cells or tanks other than those used for
access door attachment.
FUEL-04 Where the fuel wetted area inside a fuel cell or tank is void of blade, knife, and hat stiffeners for use as hardpoint
attachment, standoffs bonded to the cell surface should be used as attachments for clamps, and brackets to eliminate
fastener penetration of the fuel cavity.
FUEL-05 Intersecting of two or more surfaces in a fuel wetted area of less than 90 degrees should be avoided to simplify
manufacture and repair.
FUEL-06 Where maintaining a minimum angle of 90 degrees is not possible, sufficient depth, width, and height should be
maintained to provide tool clearances for all tools used in the manufacturing processes and in the operational field repair
environment.
FUEL-07 When feed tanks are designed such that the lower portion of the tank serves as a surge chamber, the top closure deck of
the surge chamber should provide the strength to support the weight of a 95 percentile male.
FUEL-08 The size and number of fuel cell and tank access doors should be sufficient to ensure no wetted area of the cell or tank is
beyond a maximum 18" distance from the edge of the access opening. This guideline applies to only non-man rated cells.
FUEL-09 All fuel cell or tank access doors not mounted on the exterior surface should contain sealing provisions other than the
channel type.
FUEL-10 Provide access from the wing closure ribs in lieu of the moldline when access is required in close proximity to the wing
fold area.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

FUEL-11 Through-the-tank fasteners should not be used for fuel cells or tanks in areas where a leak path could be established into
an inaccessible portion of the vehicle.
HOOK-06 Avoid the need to remove the tail hook to facilitate engine access or removal.
HYD-01 For military combat vehicles having two or more hydraulic power systems, provide a minimum 30-inch spacing between
ground power and servicing interfaces to ensure:
- Design flexibility in locating and arranging equipment in high-density vehicles such as fighters and helicopters,
- Work area separation to enable concurrent service/maintenance on systems,
- Systems vulnerability enhancement,
- Reduction in turn-around elapsed time due to concurrent servicing capability.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
IN(V)-01 Design inlet door actuators and door actuation mechanisms so they not protrude into the air inlet flow field to eliminate

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

FOD potential.
IN(V)-02 Do not use loose structural fasteners in the access area to inlet door actuators and mechanisms. Where this guideline
cannot be followed, design the actuator door to be accessible only when the inlet doors are fully closed.
IN(V)-03 For engine inlet bellmouth fairings, use methods of retention other than fasteners. Latches may be considered as an
acceptable alternative only if latch-to-panel retention is from the inner mold line.

C-208
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.03.06 Structures, Airframes, Bodies, Chassis, IN(V)-04 Design inlet doors and inlet bellmouth fairings to be fully interchangeable to eliminate the need to cut, file, or trim at the
and Hulls engine face.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

IN(V)-05 Locate the inlet duct edge a minimum of 60 inches from the cockpit or crew station to eliminate restricting engine
operation to canopy-closed conditions.
IN(V)-06 Use captive fasteners on all access doors forward of the inlet to significantly reduce engine FOD potential.
IN(V)-07 Ensure that no ground safety pins or streamers are used forward of the inlet or within a 3-foot radius aft of the inlet.
IN(V)-08 Incorporate an inlet closure door sealing concept that prevents entry of fluid, dust, or sand across the entire airborne and
ground environment spectrum.
IN-01 Low Observable (LO) engine face frames should be within 10 inches of the first stage fan or compressor blades.
IN-02 Openings throughout the engine face frame should be sufficient to perform a 100% FOD inspection of the engine face.
IN-03 Openings throughout the engine face frame should be sufficient to permit minor blending or repair of FOD without
removing the engine.
IN-04 For frames not integral with the engine, frame removal should be achievable from the engine cavity.
IN-05 Both integral and remote engine front frames should be interchangeable.
IN-06 Front frame anti-ice and de-ice provisions should give preference to engine hot bleed air.
LG-02 Hardpoints for attachment of landing gear trunnions should be capable of carrying all induced gear loads for the life of
the airframe.
LG-03 Hardpoints for attachment for landing gear trunnions should not be machined as an integral part of the airframe structure
when normal design sink rates over 25 feet per second are required.
LG-04 Do not use Beryllium and Beryllium base alloys in any location subject to wear or corrosive atmospheres or in installations
where machining may be required.
LG-06 Design struts, attachments, and interfaces so they do not depend on scheduled visual inspections, non-destructive
inspection (NDI), or non-destructive test (NDT) to ensure the reliability or integrity of the system in the operational
environment.
LG-09 Use coiled tubing in lieu of flex lines or hoses for hydraulic line routing from the airframe to the strut.
LG-14 All interfaces from the airframe to the struts should be visible and accessible, and not require removal of airframe
structure for access.
LG-15 No portion of the landing gear closure door(s) should be attached to the strut. In rare instances where this may not be
possible, that attached portion should not require alignment or rigging.
LG-16 No portion of the landing gear rigging process should require support equipment type templates, gauges, or tools. Indexes,
reference points, etc., should be an integral part of the landing gear/airframe design.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

LG-17 Hydraulic, pneumatic, or electrical actuators associated with landing gear systems should not require adjustment or
rigging once installed in the air vehicle. Spare units should be rigged at the time of manufacture or overhaul.
LG-25 Mechanical shrink struts, when used, should not permit gear to jam in wheel well if failure of shrink mechanism occurs.
LG-26 Gravitational emergency extension of landing gear should be given preference over all other concepts.
LG-30 Do not use landing gear wells to locate any type of auxiliary air inlet.
LG-31 Landing gear doors designed to close after gear is extended should be capable of being manually opened on the ground
without reliance on electrical or hydraulic power.
LG-32 Design of landing gear doors normally closed after gear extension should ensure failure modes will not enable
uncommanded opening on the ground.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
LG-33 Design of landing gear doors normally left open after gear extension should ensure no failure mode will enable closing on

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

the ground.
LG-34 Avoid sharp edges and corners on landing gear doors or fairings.
LG-35 Avoid the use of landing gear doors to mount or house antennas, arrays, or air data sensors.
LG-36 Location of integral wheel jack points on a strut should provide a minimum 6-1/2 inch clearance for positioning the jack
with tire ruptured and wheel ground 2 inches off ground.

C-209
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.03.06 Structures, Airframes, Bodies, Chassis, LG-37 Integral hardpoints to jack the entire vehicle should ensure that identical jacks can be used at all jack points.
and Hulls

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

LG-38 All landing gear doors should be interchangeable.
LG-39 Gear-mounted tie-down or chain-down fittings should be interchangeable and easily replaceable.
LG-41 No more than 1 jack should be required to change any singular wheel/tire assembly.
LG-44 Landing gear door mechanisms and interfaces should ensure that multiple cycles or occasional exceedence of maximum
gear-down speed do not result in loss of doors
LO-01 Use LO compatible gap fillers for manufactured gaps in lieu of tape and butter (surface coating compound).
LO-02 Avoid scheduled forced inspections or replacement of materials, coatings, or finishes solely to protect either the reliability
or the signature.
LO-03 Equipment and support structure requiring shrouds to reduce radar returns should not cause increases in equipment
service/repair time.
LO-04 Infrequently-accessed structural doors and panels incorporating special coatings or conductive paints should contain
provisions for prying the door or panel clear of moldline with standard screwdriver without damage.
LO-05 Do not locate flush mounted LO screens for auxiliary air inlets and exits in walkway areas unless durability has been
proven.
LO-06 Size flush mounted LO screens for auxiliary air inlets and exits to ensure functionality with up to 25 percent of the
openings plugged.
LO-07 Flush and non-flush LO screens should be interchangeable.
MATL-01 A high degree of durability should be maintained for a minimum distance of 36 inches forward of the inflight refueling
receptacle.
MATL-02 Cosmetic type repairs should not exceed 1 hours including cure or drying times.
MATL-03 Cosmetic and vehicle repair material shelf life should not be less than 24 months.
MATL-04 Cosmetic and vehicle repair materials should be non-proprietary and non-single source.
MATL-05 Cosmetic and vehicle repair materials should not require refrigeration or special facilities or atmospheres for storage.
MATL-06 Repair criteria, repairs, and instructions should not be classified.
MATL-07 All cosmetic touch-up and repair materials should be environmentally safe.
MATL-08 Repairs (other than major depot repair) should not require autoclave type facilities.
MATL-09 A high degree of durability should be achieved across all walkway areas on the top surfaces of all vehicles up to and
including 95 percentile personnel.
MATL-10 Coatings and finishes should be durable against the effects of missile gases, velocities, and particles emanating from the

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

missile motor.
MATL-11 Coatings and finishes should be durable against the effects of gun gases, projectile shock waves, and brass particles
emanating from the projectile seal rings.
MATL-12 Leading edge materials and coatings should be durable against fragments from frangible gun port plugs.
MATL-13 Special handling or shipping requirements of repair materials should be avoided.
MATL-14 Leading edges, including chines, containing or constructed of radar absorbing materials, should be interchangeable to
reduce vehicle downtime and simplify repairs.
MATL-15 Doors and panels containing blade seals used for signature reduction should be interchangeable or contain
interchangeable blade seals. Deviation is acceptable where repairs can be accomplished on the vehicle in a time equal to

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
or less than door or seal remove and replace time.

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

MC-01 All clamps should contain torque-set or torque-limiting connections to prevent clamp or component failure due to over-
torque. Clamp installation call outs should not depend on special tools to establish the required torque values.
MC-02 Avoid the use of cotter pins, safety wire, safety clips, and similar devices to prevent maintenance-induced events leading
to ground vehicle accidents or loss of air vehicles.

C-210
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.03.06 Structures, Airframes, Bodies, Chassis, MC-03 All tubing connections and interfaces should use rosan/dynatube (or equivalent) to (1) enable connect or disconnect with
and Hulls one hand, one tool, (2) eliminate the need to safety the connection, (3) provide a superior seal, and (4) negate need to

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

reposition line(s) during component replacement.
MC-04 No trombone type, flared tube type, or piloted line type interfaces should be used to avoid the need for removal or
repositioning during equipment removal.
MC-05 Avoid potential foreign object traps during manufacturing or operational maintenance by eliminating vertical penetrations
of plumbing/fittings into tanks, compartments, or cells
MC-06 Locate, position, orient all plumbing and duct electrical connectors to prevent the need for sequential installation or
removal.
MC-07 Maximize areas of constant web thickness in firewalls, carry-through bulkheads, major frames, structural ribs, spars,
webs, keels, and close-outs to provide flexibility in locating penetration fittings. Stepped chem milling, stepped machining,
stepped composite layup concepts all tend to result in minimal available surface area for penetrations.
MC-08 All in-line plumbing connections within a fuel tank or cell should be capable of making/breaking the interface by hand,
require no torque, contain integral safety locking mechanisms, and should be void of any requirement for safety wire.
MC-09 All plumbing connections and fittings used for fuel systems should contain integral bonding features to eliminate the need
for bonding clamps or jumper cables.
MC-10 In rare instances where a plumbing run contains complex form or geometry that would require removal of other plumbing
or equipment for access, in-line connectors should be incorporated to maintain the integrity of other plumbing or
equipment.
MC-12 All plumbing and connectors containing liquids should be meniscus-free.
MC-13 In instances where plumbing or connector interfaces cannot or are not keyed for a specific orientation, all identification,
markings, cautions, and directions should be placed 360 degrees around the tube or duct.
MC-14 Where multiple connectors are located in close proximity, ensure (1) a minimum hand tool arc of 120 degrees can be
maintained, and (2) stagger fittings to ensure firm coupling interface/hand tool interface can be accomplished without
inducing damage to adjacent lines.
MC-15 Route, orient, and position plumbing, wiring, ducts, and connectors sufficiently away from the outer surface of the vehicle
to preclude induced damage due to minor dents, drill bits during repair, etc. Minimum rule of thumb is 1" away from the
inner surface and 1" below a plate nut channel.
MG-01 Mount LRUs/sub-systems on drawer slides or extender racks to provide easier accessibility during integration, testing,
debug, and repair of Units Under Test (UUTs).
OXY-05 Locate liquid oxygen (LOX) containers in a sealed, dedicated compartment to eliminate need for frequent visual
inspections.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

OXY-07 Locate liquid oxygen containers to ensure simultaneous replacement with other turnaround activities.
OXY-12 LOX compartments should be sealed from adjacent compartments and should contain dedicated overboard drains.
P-01 Access door and panel fastener types for airborne vehicles should meet the following criteria:
- use latches for a frequency of access of 0 to 40 flight hours
- use High Strength Quick Release fasteners for a frequency of access of 40-400 flight hours
- use structural screws for a frequency of access of 400 flight hours or more
P-02 Access door and panel fastener types for surface vehicles should meet the following criteria:
- use a spring loaded or latch fastener for an opening frequency of daily
- use a one quarter turn fastener (or equivalent) for a opening frequency of weekly

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
- use screws or bolts for all other cases
P-03 All doors and panels subject to environmental elements should contain form-in-place seals (or equivalent) attached to the
door structure, not substructure, to prevent damage during maintenance.
P-04 Door and panel seals should be compatible with all types of on-board servicing fluids, de-ice and anti-ice fluids, and all
fluids used for chemical, biological, and nuclear decontamination.

C-211
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.03.06 Structures, Airframes, Bodies, Chassis, P-05 Piano type hinges should not be used on doors or panels because they are subject to wear, corrosion, and sand and fluid
and Hulls entry.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

P-06 Access door and panel devices used to support door in opened position should meet the following criteria:
- for airborne vehicles, design for 60 knot gust loads (or equivalent jet blast loads)
- for ground vehicles, design for 50 mph gust loads
P-07 Hinged access doors and panels capable of remaining in the opened position should not have sharp edges or corners.
P-08 Removable access door and panel fasteners should be of identical grip length and diameter.
P-09 Acceptable door and panel hold-open devices include over-center sheet metal spring, over-center spring link, spring
cartridge, support strut, and pinned goose neck hinge.
P-10 Access doors and panels requiring non-captive fasteners should not be located forward of air inlet ducts or high-energy
rotating components (e.g., prop fans, engine cooling fans, etc.).
P-11 Access doors and panels should be interchangeable as justified by operation and support costs or life cycle costs.
PERS-01 Group man-machine interfaces manifold-style to enable connect/disconnect in a single action.
PERS-02 Include an integral, highly visible indicator in a man-machine interface connector to denote connector is seated and
locked.
PERS-03 Design interface connectors so that a distinct action is required by an individual to effect a disconnect. (Excludes
airframe-to-ejection seat personnel interfaces.)
PERS-04 Interfaces should contain an emergency release mechanism that can be activated by rescue personnel with a 95
percentile gloved hand.
PERS-05 Design emergency interface release mechanisms to be clearly visible under all types of lighting situations.
PERS-06 Storage bins, compartments, sacks, or bags should be available within the vehicle to store/protect all personal equipment
required to conduct operations.
PERS-07 All flight and ground vehicles should contain one cubic foot minimum storage compartment(s) for various loose and
sundry personal items (for each individual).
PERS-08 Design stowage and mounting provisions for portable air or oxygen containers to withstand 40G crash or impact loads.
PYRO-07 Manual "safe/arm" mechanisms should be well-clear of inlet ducts, propellers, rotors, and similar rotating components.
PYRO-08 Manual "safe/arm" mechanisms should be well-clear of engine exhausts, fuel/toxic vents, fluid drains, control surface
deflection envelopes, and rescue path envelopes.
PYRO-20 Weapon bay doors, when opened, should not block or restrict access to other servicing points.
PYRO-26 Do not locate ammunition loader interfaces close to inlets, exhausts, fuel dumps and drains, antennas, sensors, lights, or
hazardous protrusions.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

PYRO-27 Incorporate integral hoisting provisions at each weapon/store station to enable direct lift from the container or carrier to
the attachment hardpoints.
PYRO-28 Automatic locking of the retention hooks should be accomplished for each respective weapon and store.
PYRO-29 Provide quick mechanical over-travel (no power) for weapon bay doors to maximize the weapon/store loading envelope.
PYRO-30 Ensure weapon bay door arc (both normal and over-travel) does not block or intrude into adjacent service points or
envelopes.
PYRO-32 Provide sufficient longitudinal clearance between weapon bays to enable simultaneous loading of two bays.
PYRO-33 Provide sufficient lateral clearance between weapon bays to enable simultaneous loading of two bays.
PYRO-34 Weapon bay door seals should be bonded or attached to door structure to minimize induced seal damage during weapon

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
or store loading.

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

PYRO-35 Suspension system should permit any single weapon or store to be loaded by a two man crew.
PYRO-36 Suspension system design and spacing should enable any combination of eight weapons to be loaded by two two-man
crews within the refueling time of the vehicle (excludes nuclear weapons).
PYRO-37 Internal weapon suspension arrangements should preclude sequential weapon loading.
PYRO-39 Weapon bay ejectors and launchers should have the capability for total interchangeability and reconfigurability.

C-212
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.03.06 Structures, Airframes, Bodies, Chassis, PYRO-43 Launcher or ejector design/interface should not require a dual function of carrying airframe structural loads.
and Hulls

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

PYRO-46 Design pylons, launchers, and ejector racks so that weapon loading, servicing, and reconfigurations can be accomplished
using standard hand tools.
PYRO-47 Installation design of ejectors, launchers, racks, and associated hardware interfaces should avoid reliance on torque
wrenches.
R-01 Large radomes wherein the combination of the diameter and length exceeds 60" should be top-hinged. Hinge should be
load-carrying to reduce radome retention fastener count.
R-02 Radome and radar array support structure design and material selection should eliminate the need for LO type fillers or
shrouds.
SABCH-01 Do not locate auxiliary air inlets, sensors, access doors, or drains in boundary bleed areas.
SABCH-02 All flush type structural screws should have identical head drives for the entire vehicle.
SABCH-03 All non-flush type structural screws should have identical head drive recesses for the entire vehicle.
SABCH-04 Special high strength bolts, such as twelve-point heads, should be fully justified from standpoint of the cost of ownership
and effectiveness.
SABCH-05 Structural design should avoid the reliance on blind fasteners unless fully supported by cost, weight, schedule, and
effectiveness analysis.
SABCH-06 Structural design should avoid the potential of dissimilar material or fastener corrosion.
SABCH-07 No structural fasteners should be used that require special tools for installation.
SABCH-08 Taper pins should be threaded and retained with self-locking hardware.
SABCH-09 Pins and collars (lockbolts) should only be used in applications which do not normally require removal.
SABCH-10 Do not use lockbolts in composites.
SABCH-11 In rare instances where the use of dissimilar material in immediate contact cannot be avoided, they should be sufficiently
insulated to endure for the life of the vehicle.
SABCH-12 Avoid tapping threads into structural members. Use of heli-coil type or similar insert concepts is permissible.
SABCH-13 No structural design concept should rely on frequent scheduled inspections to monitor or otherwise ensure structural
integrity.
SABCH-14 No structural fastener intended to carry shear or tension loads should be smaller than 1/4" diameter (.25").
SABCH-15 Give preference to butt type splices over lap type splices in the design of manufacturing splices.
SABCH-16 Wing-to-fuselage attachment should give preference to tension ties over shear ties to improve overall volumetric
efficiency.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

SABCH-17 Hardpoints for securing tie down chains, cables, and devices during transport should not require reaching under or
crawling under the vehicle.
SABCH-18 Rings, posts, and clevis devices used for attaching tie downs should not require opening of doors or panels for access.
SABCH-19 Avoid tie down concepts requiring attaching hardpoints as a prerequisite.
SABCH-20 Location of hardpoints used for tie down attachment should:
- Remain outside of door and panel opening envelopes.
- Be clear of exhaust pipes, ducts, manifolds, and mufflers.
- Be clear of overboard fluid drains and vents.
SAFE-01 Drag chute installation designs not containing electrical safing should contain remote safe/arm provisions reachable from

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
ground level by 5 percentile females. Remove location should be clear of engine exhaust areas and flight control

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

deflection envelopes.
SAFE-02 Emergency ingress actuation provisions into cockpits, crew stations, passenger compartments, and operator stations
should be accessible from the ground by 5 percentile females.
SAFE-05 Crash locator beacon door opening/ejection mechanisms should contain integral electrical safe/arm features.

C-213
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.03.06 Structures, Airframes, Bodies, Chassis, SAFE-08 A single lever safety should, when positioned, safe the entire escape/ejection system. Use of the single lever to "arm"
and Hulls should require two hands.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

SAFE-09 Safing the canopy jettison system should be accomplished through the same lever device used to safe the ejection seat.
SAFE-12 Internal weapon bay doors should contain integral safety locking features for use during maintenance and weapon
loading and downloading.
SAFE-13 It should not be possible to unsafe a weapon bay door integral lock when a door closed signal is present.
SEAT-01 Design personnel seats and padding materials, including the covers and fillers, so they are incapable of creating or
emitting toxic fumes or dense smoke when subjected to fire.
SEAT-02 Design personnel seats and padding materials so they are incapable of absorbing and holding fluids.
SEAT-04 Design ejection seats so they can be replaced with canopy or escape hatch installed.
SEAT-05 Design ejection seat pyrotechnic devices so they are 100 percent viewable and accessible with seat installed.
SEAT-06 Do not use seat removal as a means of access.
SIMP-01 Location and design of all exterior lights should not require protective covers in ground environments.
SIMP-02 Landing and taxi lights should be mounted on landing gear struts or doors to eliminate separate compartments, doors, and
retraction/extension mechanisms.
SURV-01 Design containers used for dinghy stowage to be structurally capable of containing the dinghy within the event of
unintentional or uncommanded inflation.
SURV-02 Provide crew stations, crew compartments, and operator areas containing dinghies as emergency equipment with a
suitable tool for puncturing or cutting the dinghy in the event of inadvertent inflation. Locate the tool so that access is
assured during dinghy inflation.
T-01 Do not locate pyro, gas, and air (PGA) control system exhaust exits:
- In proximity to safe, arm, or servicing areas,
- Adjacent to auxiliary inlets,
- In close proximity to crew boarding areas, weapons, emergency ingress/egress areas, and optics or optical glass.
T-02 Design pyro type thruster exits associated with emergency use or backup with simple exit closure devices to identify if a
thruster has been fired.
T-03 Provide protective screens for PGA exits that normally remain open to prevent intrusions from fowl or wildlife.
T-04 Provide protective closure provisions for PGA exits located or oriented to exposure from the elements.
W-01 Hat section type structural stiffeners with sufficient cross sectional area should be considered as a routing tunnel for
wiring and coax.
WBAY-01 Equipment bays and compartments should not require installation of special cavity fillers when equipment is not installed.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

WBAY-02 Pylon-to-wing electrical or plumbing interfaces should have automatic close-out covers when pylon is jettisoned or not
installed.
WBAY-04 The gap treatment should be a permanent installation on the pylon, wing, or both, not a separate seal.
WBAY-05 Gap treatment should not interfere with or be damaged by existing pylon handling support equipment.
WBAY-06 Pylon rigging should not be required for gap seal control.
WBAY-07 Gap seal should not degrade interchangeability of pylon.
WBAY-08 Gap seal and treatment should be fully compatible with steam from carrier catapults.
WBAY-09 Gap seal/pylon should not cover or hamper access to low point wing drains.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
WBAY-10 No loose hardware should exist before or after pylon is installed.

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

WBAY-16 Gap seals should not degrade loading while wearing arctic or chemical, biological, or radiation protective clothing.
WBAY-17 Special coatings or conductive paints on pylons, launchers, racks, launchers, tanks, pods, etc. should have the durability to
withstand contact with support stands/cradles during storage.
WBAY-18 The proximity of the gun firing barrel to structure should be such that structural furrows or channels are not required for
projectile clearances during firing.

C-214
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.03.06 Structures, Airframes, Bodies, Chassis, WBAY-19 Frangible gun ports should take preference over mechanized gun port doors.
and Hulls

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

WBAY-20 Gun plugs required solely to maintain a given signature level should be capable of on-board stowage for use only when a
threat requires their presence.
WBAY-21 Coatings and finishes in the area of gun barrels should be durable to withstand the effect of exiting projectile shockwaves.
WBAY-22 The proximity of the gun blast deflector to structure should not require reliance on high-temperature paints or coatings to
protect the structure.
WIND-01 Optical window materials should be scratch resistant, easy to clean, and dissipate electrostatic charges.
WIND-02 Optic windows should be located for ease of inspection, cleaning, and induced damage potential from personnel or
support equipment.
WIND-03 Window locations should minimize the effects of contamination by salt spray, bugs, oils, fuels, and icing.
WIND-04 Window, canopy, and windshield material should be designed to withstand the effects of sandstorms in the ground
environment and the effects of rain and hail during thunderstorm penetration in the airborne environment.
WIND-05 Design interior surfaces to be reachable for cleaning without reliance on hinging, equipment removal, or use of support
equipment.
WIND-06 Do not locate windows in the proximity of rooster tails created by wheels/tires passing through water or slush.
WIND-11 For dome-shaped optic window concepts, the dome should be easily removable for cleaning without affecting LO
integrity.
WIND-12 Design EO windows and optics to be interchangeable among the same air vehicle types or same ground vehicle types.
WIND-13 The combination of material layers and coatings for optics and windows should be such that static charge buildup for
worst case conditions should not exceed 10,000 volts.
WIND-14 Exterior lights should permit simple and rapid bulb replacement without disturbing LO treatments.
WIND-15 Design light covers and lenses to be sufficiently durable so that protective covers are not needed during maintenance.
WIND-16 Lens shape should enhance LO capability to reduce need, care, and expense for special coatings.
3.03.07 Cargo Holds, Storage Bays, and Storage A-01 Seal equipment bays and compartments against the environmental elements including all types of servicing fluids used for
Compartments the vehicle, all types of anti-ice and de-ice fluids, and all types of fluids used for chemical, biological, or nuclear
decontamination
A-02 Equipment bay and compartment structure should be bonded, co-cured, welded, machined, or combinations thereof to
eliminate or minimize the use of mechanical fasteners.
A-03 All equipment bay and compartment structural flanges and stiffeners should be external to the compartment to maximize
the volume available for equipment installation and arrangement.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

A-04 Use stiffening beads in lieu of flanges to the maximum extent to enhance compartment volume and simplify repairs.
Stiffening beads should have the convex surface toward the compartment to eliminate fluid traps.
A-05 Keep all machined compartment frames, webs, and closure panels to a constant thickness (e.g., not stepped or tapered) to
ease simplicity of fluid or electrical penetrations and ease and simplicity of structural repair.
A-06 Hardpoints (structural attachment and load bearing areas) within a compartment to assist in equipment mounting or
support should not be integral with the machined part. Hardpoints should be parasitic to enable quick repair in case of
wear or damage in lieu of precise ream/bush repair typical of machined hardpoints.
A-07 Paint equipment bay and compartment interiors a high gloss white to maximize lighting reflectivity, visibility, and rapid
leak detection capability.
A-08 Plumbing penetrations into a compartment should not be on a vertical axis due to difficulty in making or breaking

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
vertically-oriented connections. When compartment access is from the bottom, vertically-oriented connections can allow
fluid to leak onto the maintainer. When access is from the top, such connections can allow foreign matter to enter the
line. Use horizontal penetrations whenever possible.
A-09 Any heat or temperature sensitive structure within a compartment should contain heat-sensitive tape or appropriate heat
sensor for easy indication of over-temperature excursions.

C-215
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.03.07 Cargo Holds, Storage Bays, and Storage A-10 Provide a sufficient number of compartment fluid drains to ensure fluid drainage for varying aircraft static attitudes and
Compartments varying terrain slopes for ground vehicles.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

A-11 Locate compartment electrical penetrations close to the access opening for ease of sight, probing, repair, and to eliminate
fluid soaking, wicking, or contamination.
A-12 Locate compartment electrical penetrations far enough from the access opening to prevent damage resulting from
improper (over-length) panel fasteners.
A-13 Two-sided or two-surfaced access should not be required for access to equipment interfaces and hardpoints. The term
two-sided infers top/bottom, left/right, front/back, or combinations thereof.
A-15 Locate tie-down attachment points such that tie-down chains, straps, or cables do not prevent or restrict normal servicing,
weapon loading, or safe/arm functions.
A-16 Structural design should provide good access to corrosion-prone areas for inspection and treatment.
A-18 Use transparent windows, quick-opening covers, or openings without any cover to permit quick visual inspections where
needed.
BIT-06 Mission critical functions should be monitored by BIT.
BIT-09 Use concurrent BIT to monitor system critical functions.
BIT/BITE-02 Design EMI protection to eliminate finger type EMI contact devices.
C-01 Avoid swivel type connectors and fittings for air, fuel, or hydraulic line interfaces due to their history of low reliability.
C-02 Provide spacing between parallel plumbing runs so that in-line couplings can be replaced without removing lines or
disconnecting any line support devices.
CARGO-01 Ground vehicles with storage bays or compartments accessible from outside the vehicle should:
- Have the door sill located no lower than knee height to accommodate a wide range of percentiles while standing.
- Ensure door handles are flush with outer surface to protect personnel.
- Contain goose neck hinges to protect the hinge from the elements.
- Contain peripheral door seals that will protect against blowing sand entry at 50 mph.
- Ensure door can be opened with transport tie downs installed.
- Ensure door opening envelope does not intrude into the opening envelope of an adjacent door.
- Contain simple sheet metal hold-open spring or mechanism.
- Ensure floor of bay or compartment is flush with sill to simplify cleanout and drainage.
- Ensure door unlocking and opening mechanism can be actuated by a 95 percentile male hand while wearing arctic
gloves.
- Contain 15 percent added volume for density growth.
CARGO-02 Ground vehicles with small exterior storage bays or compartments containing emergency equipment or supplies should:

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

- Be located at chest height of the 50 percentile male.
- Contain unlatching mechanisms activated by pushing inward on the door.
- Meet all other generic bay and compartment requirements.
CBR-01 Orient all vehicle liquid servicing fittings to ensure fluids will not come in contact with protective garb during
connect/disconnect activities.
CBR-02 Ensure vehicle overboard passive liquid drains are clearly marked or visible to enable personnel to remain clear of area.
CBR-05 Size rescue doors, panels, and "cut here" areas to accommodate the 95 percentile shoulder width wearing full protective
chemical or biological protection gear.
D&V-01 The geometric aspects of structural design and interfaces should not result in any natural bathtubs.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
D&V-02 Closed structural sections subject to condensation or fluid migration should contain drainage provisions.

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

D&V-03 Crew cabs, operators' compartments, crew stations, cockpits, and passenger compartments should be subject to the same
corrosion prevention measures as the exteriors of the vehicles. Low points, pockets, and related fluid collection points
within should be provided with low point drains.
ECS-01 Design so that equipment servicing status are accessible and readable from the ground level for air vehicles and from the
operator's position for ground and water vehicles.

C-216
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.03.07 Cargo Holds, Storage Bays, and Storage ECS-02 Do not locate equipment servicing points in crew, passenger, or operator areas.
Compartments

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

ECS-03 Heat exchangers using hot liquids as the heat source should not be located inside the compartments used for operator,
crew, or passengers.
ECS-04 Plumbing, lines, or hoses containing hot liquids, toxic gases or liquids should be external to operator, crew, or passenger
stations.
ECS-05 Access, removal, and installation of all type filter elements should be possible without removing the assembly or
disconnecting any filter package interfaces.
ECS-11 Design air inlets, outlets, and exhausts to be accessible without reliance on ladders or work stands for ease of installing
protective plugs or covers.
ECS-12 Design air inlets, outlets, and exhausts with screens to prevent bird or rodent entry.
ECS-13 Design air inlets, outlets, and exhausts to be meniscus-free to prevent a bathtub effect. In remote instances where this is
not possible, passive drains should be provided at all low points to prevent liquid accumulation with the vehicle in its
normal static attitude.
ECS-14 Instances where air inlets, outlets, and exhausts are subject to water entry, passive drains should be employed capable of
handling 4" of rain per hour.
ECS-15 Locate and orient air inlets, outlets, and exhausts in a manner that prevents their use as footholds during maintenance.
EDECOM-01 Provide surface sensors on equipment located in compartments containing louvers, screens, flush inlets, or similar
openings to the environment to indicate the presence of chem/bio contaminants.
EDECOM-02 Provide integral sensors (viewable from the exterior) for equipment subject to internal forced-air cooling from outside or
external air to indicate the presence of contaminants.
EDECOM-03 Design equipment surfaces and structure to be compatible with all decontamination agents and methods.
EDECOM-04 Provide passive overboard drains in compartments subject to decontamination processes to void the area of contaminants.
EDECOM-05 Provide hoist, lift or transport handles for equipment requiring removal from the host vehicle for decontamination. In
instances where this may not be practical, design the equipment with hardpoints for attaching parasitic carrying provisions
ENV-01 Materials, treatments, coatings, finishes should be compatible with all anti-ice and de-ice fluids, chemical and biological
decontamination fluids, washing and cleaning fluids, and all vehicle subsystem fluids.
ENV-02 There should be no top coat or treatment deterioration throughout the standard temperature and humidity spectrum.
ENV-03 For airborne vehicles, the finishes should be durable against rain, hail, and dynamic erosion throughout the flight
envelope.
ENV-04 For airborne and ground vehicles, the finishes should be durable against sand erosion throughout all surface wind speeds
experienced in arid or desert geographical locations.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

ENV-06 For ground vehicles, the finishes should be compatible with and durable against all rain, hail, sleet, snow, and ice
conditions experienced in all intended operational environments.
EXT-01 Locate Tanks, Pods, Containers, and Devices (TPCD's) so they do not block or restrict access to existing vehicle access
areas or access approach envelopes.
EXT-02 Design TPCD's for fuel containment to automatically interface to the host vehicle during installation or removal.
EXT-03 Design TPCD's to be fully compatible with the existing vehicle built-in hoisting provisions and locking devices.
EXT-05 Design access doors for cargo type TPCD's to be non-load carrying and with simple latches for all doors and panels.
EXT-06 Design cargo TPCD's to ensure all cargo and equipment can be downloaded and uploaded with the TPCD installed on the
host vehicle.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
EXTING-01 Use extinguishing concepts dedicated to each individual fire zone in preference to manifold systems operating from a
central source.
EXTING-03 Keep each individual fire zone over-temperature/fire warning system separate from those in other fire zones.
EXTING-04 Design individual fire zone over-temperature/fire warning system to be fully BIT capable (the BIT concept should permit
both initiated and periodic BIT).

C-217
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.03.07 Cargo Holds, Storage Bays, and Storage EXTING-06 Provide an alternate capability to activate the system remotely from the cockpit/crew station, or operator's position to
Compartments satisfy emergency situations during vehicle maintenance.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

EXTING-07 Analyze the vehicle operational environment and type of fire zones to determine if remote stop/shut-off of equipment is
warranted.
EXTING-08 Analyze the vehicle operational environment and type of fire zones to determine if remote alarm and/or visual indication
of a fire is warranted.
EXTING-09 Do not locate provisions for overboard venting or dumping of extinguishing agents in areas that could create hazards for
personnel.
F-01 Use blind fasteners only where absolutely necessary or where considerable cost can be saved.
F-02 Minimize access fasteners while making them quick release, easily removed and replaced, and captive.
F-03 Choose fasteners based on the requirement top operate by hand or with common hand tools rather than special tools.
F-04 Whenever possible, incorporate barrel type fasteners as opposed to hi-torque fasteners. Failure of Hi-torque fasteners
due to stripping are common and a source of potential foreign object damage (FOD).
FUEL-01 Locate fuel vent and dump masts to ensure exiting fuel will be clear of servicing, loading, arming and safing areas for all
types of ground and airborne vehicles.
FUEL-02 Manufacturing splices for major sub-assemblies should not intrude into or through integral fuel cells or tanks.
FUEL-03 Structural bolts, screws, and fasteners should not penetrate into integral fuel cells or tanks other than those used for
access door attachment.
FUEL-04 Where the fuel wetted area inside a fuel cell or tank is void of blade, knife, and hat stiffeners for use as hardpoint
attachment, standoffs bonded to the cell surface should be used as attachments for clamps, and brackets to eliminate
fastener penetration of the fuel cavity.
FUEL-05 Intersecting of two or more surfaces in a fuel wetted area of less than 90 degrees should be avoided to simplify
manufacture and repair.
FUEL-06 Where maintaining a minimum angle of 90 degrees is not possible, sufficient depth, width, and height should be
maintained to provide tool clearances for all tools used in the manufacturing processes and in the operational field repair
environment.
FUEL-07 When feed tanks are designed such that the lower portion of the tank serves as a surge chamber, the top closure deck of
the surge chamber should provide the strength to support the weight of a 95 percentile male.
FUEL-08 The size and number of fuel cell and tank access doors should be sufficient to ensure no wetted area of the cell or tank is
beyond a maximum 18" distance from the edge of the access opening. This guideline applies to only non-man rated cells.
FUEL-09 All fuel cell or tank access doors not mounted on the exterior surface should contain sealing provisions other than the
channel type.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

FUEL-10 Provide access from the wing closure ribs in lieu of the moldline when access is required in close proximity to the wing
fold area.
FUEL-11 Through-the-tank fasteners should not be used for fuel cells or tanks in areas where a leak path could be established into
an inaccessible portion of the vehicle.
LG-02 Hardpoints for attachment of landing gear trunnions should be capable of carrying all induced gear loads for the life of
the airframe.
LG-03 Hardpoints for attachment for landing gear trunnions should not be machined as an integral part of the airframe structure
when normal design sink rates over 25 feet per second are required.
LG-04 Do not use Beryllium and Beryllium base alloys in any location subject to wear or corrosive atmospheres or in installations

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
where machining may be required.
LG-31 Landing gear doors designed to close after gear is extended should be capable of being manually opened on the ground
without reliance on electrical or hydraulic power.
LG-32 Design of landing gear doors normally closed after gear extension should ensure failure modes will not enable
uncommanded opening on the ground.

C-218
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.03.07 Cargo Holds, Storage Bays, and Storage LG-33 Design of landing gear doors normally left open after gear extension should ensure no failure mode will enable closing on
Compartments the ground.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

LG-34 Avoid sharp edges and corners on landing gear doors or fairings.
LG-35 Avoid the use of landing gear doors to mount or house antennas, arrays, or air data sensors.
LG-36 Location of integral wheel jack points on a strut should provide a minimum 6-1/2 inch clearance for positioning the jack
with tire ruptured and wheel ground 2 inches off ground.
LG-37 Integral hardpoints to jack the entire vehicle should ensure that identical jacks can be used at all jack points.
LG-38 All landing gear doors should be interchangeable.
LG-39 Gear-mounted tie-down or chain-down fittings should be interchangeable and easily replaceable.
LO-01 Use LO compatible gap fillers for manufactured gaps in lieu of tape and butter (surface coating compound).
LO-02 Avoid scheduled forced inspections or replacement of materials, coatings, or finishes solely to protect either the reliability
or the signature.
LO-04 Infrequently-accessed structural doors and panels incorporating special coatings or conductive paints should contain
provisions for prying the door or panel clear of moldline with standard screwdriver without damage.
LO-05 Do not locate flush mounted LO screens for auxiliary air inlets and exits in walkway areas unless durability has been
proven.
LO-06 Size flush mounted LO screens for auxiliary air inlets and exits to ensure functionality with up to 25 percent of the
openings plugged.
LO-07 Flush and non-flush LO screens should be interchangeable.
MATL-02 Cosmetic type repairs should not exceed 1 hours including cure or drying times.
MATL-03 Cosmetic and vehicle repair material shelf life should not be less than 24 months.
MATL-04 Cosmetic and vehicle repair materials should be non-proprietary and non-single source.
MATL-05 Cosmetic and vehicle repair materials should not require refrigeration or special facilities or atmospheres for storage.
MATL-06 Repair criteria, repairs, and instructions should not be classified.
MATL-07 All cosmetic touch-up and repair materials should be environmentally safe.
MATL-08 Repairs (other than major depot repair) should not require autoclave type facilities.
MATL-09 A high degree of durability should be achieved across all walkway areas on the top surfaces of all vehicles up to and
including 95 percentile personnel.
MATL-10 Coatings and finishes should be durable against the effects of missile gases, velocities, and particles emanating from the
missile motor.
MATL-11 Coatings and finishes should be durable against the effects of gun gases, projectile shock waves, and brass particles

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

emanating from the projectile seal rings.
MATL-12 Leading edge materials and coatings should be durable against fragments from frangible gun port plugs.
MATL-13 Special handling or shipping requirements of repair materials should be avoided.
MATL-14 Leading edges, including chines, containing or constructed of radar absorbing materials, should be interchangeable to
reduce vehicle downtime and simplify repairs.
MATL-15 Doors and panels containing blade seals used for signature reduction should be interchangeable or contain
interchangeable blade seals. Deviation is acceptable where repairs can be accomplished on the vehicle in a time equal to
or less than door or seal remove and replace time.
MC-03 All tubing connections and interfaces should use rosan/dynatube (or equivalent) to (1) enable connect or disconnect with

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
one hand, one tool, (2) eliminate the need to safety the connection, (3) provide a superior seal, and (4) negate need to

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

reposition line(s) during component replacement.
MC-05 Avoid potential foreign object traps during manufacturing or operational maintenance by eliminating vertical penetrations
of plumbing/fittings into tanks, compartments, or cells
MC-06 Locate, position, orient all plumbing and duct electrical connectors to prevent the need for sequential installation or
removal.

C-219
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.03.07 Cargo Holds, Storage Bays, and Storage MC-09 All plumbing connections and fittings used for fuel systems should contain integral bonding features to eliminate the need
Compartments for bonding clamps or jumper cables.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

MC-10 In rare instances where a plumbing run contains complex form or geometry that would require removal of other plumbing
or equipment for access, in-line connectors should be incorporated to maintain the integrity of other plumbing or
equipment.
MC-11 No subsystem plumbing, equipment, or wiring should use a tank, cell, or compartment containing liquids as a means for
routing or penetration simplicity during manufacture.
MC-12 All plumbing and connectors containing liquids should be meniscus-free.
MC-13 In instances where plumbing or connector interfaces cannot or are not keyed for a specific orientation, all identification,
markings, cautions, and directions should be placed 360 degrees around the tube or duct.
MC-14 Where multiple connectors are located in close proximity, ensure (1) a minimum hand tool arc of 120 degrees can be
maintained, and (2) stagger fittings to ensure firm coupling interface/hand tool interface can be accomplished without
inducing damage to adjacent lines.
MC-15 Route, orient, and position plumbing, wiring, ducts, and connectors sufficiently away from the outer surface of the vehicle
to preclude induced damage due to minor dents, drill bits during repair, etc. Minimum rule of thumb is 1" away from the
inner surface and 1" below a plate nut channel.
OXY-05 Locate liquid oxygen (LOX) containers in a sealed, dedicated compartment to eliminate need for frequent visual
inspections.
P-01 Access door and panel fastener types for airborne vehicles should meet the following criteria:
- use latches for a frequency of access of 0 to 40 flight hours
- use High Strength Quick Release fasteners for a frequency of access of 40-400 flight hours
- use structural screws for a frequency of access of 400 flight hours or more
P-02 Access door and panel fastener types for surface vehicles should meet the following criteria:
- use a spring loaded or latch fastener for an opening frequency of daily
- use a one quarter turn fastener (or equivalent) for a opening frequency of weekly
- use screws or bolts for all other cases
P-03 All doors and panels subject to environmental elements should contain form-in-place seals (or equivalent) attached to the
door structure, not substructure, to prevent damage during maintenance.
P-04 Door and panel seals should be compatible with all types of on-board servicing fluids, de-ice and anti-ice fluids, and all
fluids used for chemical, biological, and nuclear decontamination.
P-05 Piano type hinges should not be used on doors or panels because they are subject to wear, corrosion, and sand and fluid
entry.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

P-06 Access door and panel devices used to support door in opened position should meet the following criteria:
- for airborne vehicles, design for 60 knot gust loads (or equivalent jet blast loads)
- for ground vehicles, design for 50 mph gust loads
P-07 Hinged access doors and panels capable of remaining in the opened position should not have sharp edges or corners.
P-08 Removable access door and panel fasteners should be of identical grip length and diameter.
P-09 Acceptable door and panel hold-open devices include over-center sheet metal spring, over-center spring link, spring
cartridge, support strut, and pinned goose neck hinge.
P-10 Access doors and panels requiring non-captive fasteners should not be located forward of air inlet ducts or high-energy
rotating components (e.g., prop fans, engine cooling fans, etc.).

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
P-11 Access doors and panels should be interchangeable as justified by operation and support costs or life cycle costs.
PERS-06 Storage bins, compartments, sacks, or bags should be available within the vehicle to store/protect all personal equipment
required to conduct operations.
PERS-07 All flight and ground vehicles should contain one cubic foot minimum storage compartment(s) for various loose and
sundry personal items (for each individual).
PERS-08 Design stowage and mounting provisions for portable air or oxygen containers to withstand 40G crash or impact loads.

C-220
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.03.07 Cargo Holds, Storage Bays, and Storage PERS-09 Design portable emergency locator beacons, radio receiver/transmitters, global positioning systems, and similar battery
Compartments operated devices with integral provisions for determining battery health or status and remaining battery life.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

PYRO-26 Do not locate ammunition loader interfaces close to inlets, exhausts, fuel dumps and drains, antennas, sensors, lights, or
hazardous protrusions.
PYRO-27 Incorporate integral hoisting provisions at each weapon/store station to enable direct lift from the container or carrier to
the attachment hardpoints.
PYRO-28 Automatic locking of the retention hooks should be accomplished for each respective weapon and store.
PYRO-32 Provide sufficient longitudinal clearance between weapon bays to enable simultaneous loading of two bays.
PYRO-33 Provide sufficient lateral clearance between weapon bays to enable simultaneous loading of two bays.
PYRO-34 Weapon bay door seals should be bonded or attached to door structure to minimize induced seal damage during weapon
or store loading.
PYRO-35 Suspension system should permit any single weapon or store to be loaded by a two man crew.
SABCH-01 Do not locate auxiliary air inlets, sensors, access doors, or drains in boundary bleed areas.
SABCH-02 All flush type structural screws should have identical head drives for the entire vehicle.
SABCH-03 All non-flush type structural screws should have identical head drive recesses for the entire vehicle.
SABCH-04 Special high strength bolts, such as twelve-point heads, should be fully justified from standpoint of the cost of ownership
and effectiveness.
SABCH-05 Structural design should avoid the reliance on blind fasteners unless fully supported by cost, weight, schedule, and
effectiveness analysis.
SABCH-06 Structural design should avoid the potential of dissimilar material or fastener corrosion.
SABCH-07 No structural fasteners should be used that require special tools for installation.
SABCH-08 Taper pins should be threaded and retained with self-locking hardware.
SABCH-09 Pins and collars (lockbolts) should only be used in applications which do not normally require removal.
SABCH-10 Do not use lockbolts in composites.
SABCH-11 In rare instances where the use of dissimilar material in immediate contact cannot be avoided, they should be sufficiently
insulated to endure for the life of the vehicle.
SABCH-12 Avoid tapping threads into structural members. Use of heli-coil type or similar insert concepts is permissible.
SABCH-13 No structural design concept should rely on frequent scheduled inspections to monitor or otherwise ensure structural
integrity.
SABCH-14 No structural fastener intended to carry shear or tension loads should be smaller than 1/4" diameter (.25").
SABCH-15 Give preference to butt type splices over lap type splices in the design of manufacturing splices.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

SABCH-16 Wing-to-fuselage attachment should give preference to tension ties over shear ties to improve overall volumetric
efficiency.
SABCH-17 Hardpoints for securing tie down chains, cables, and devices during transport should not require reaching under or
crawling under the vehicle.
SABCH-18 Rings, posts, and clevis devices used for attaching tie downs should not require opening of doors or panels for access.
SABCH-19 Avoid tie down concepts requiring attaching hardpoints as a prerequisite.
SABCH-20 Location of hardpoints used for tie down attachment should:
- Remain outside of door and panel opening envelopes.
- Be clear of exhaust pipes, ducts, manifolds, and mufflers.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
- Be clear of overboard fluid drains and vents.

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

SAFE-01 Drag chute installation designs not containing electrical safing should contain remote safe/arm provisions reachable from
ground level by 5 percentile females. Remove location should be clear of engine exhaust areas and flight control
deflection envelopes.
SAFE-02 Emergency ingress actuation provisions into cockpits, crew stations, passenger compartments, and operator stations
should be accessible from the ground by 5 percentile females.

C-221
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.03.07 Cargo Holds, Storage Bays, and Storage SAFE-05 Crash locator beacon door opening/ejection mechanisms should contain integral electrical safe/arm features.
Compartments

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

SIMP-01 Location and design of all exterior lights should not require protective covers in ground environments.
SIMP-03 Speed brake or speed brake cavity should contain integral mechanical locking mechanism for personnel safety.
SURV-01 Design containers used for dinghy stowage to be structurally capable of containing the dinghy within the event of
unintentional or uncommanded inflation.
SURV-02 Provide crew stations, crew compartments, and operator areas containing dinghies as emergency equipment with a
suitable tool for puncturing or cutting the dinghy in the event of inadvertent inflation. Locate the tool so that access is
assured during dinghy inflation.
W-01 Hat section type structural stiffeners with sufficient cross sectional area should be considered as a routing tunnel for
wiring and coax.
WBAY-01 Equipment bays and compartments should not require installation of special cavity fillers when equipment is not installed.
WBAY-11 Gap seal should match pylon and wing/fuselage surface impedance.
WBAY-12 Pylon-to-store/weapon gap seal should permit visual and physical access during loading for all interfaces between bomb
rack-to-store, bomb rack-to-launcher, and launcher-to-store.
WBAY-13 Pylon-to-store/weapon gap seal should not interfere with automatic sway brace function.
WBAY-14 Pylon-to-store/weapon gap seal should permit physical access to lanyards.
WBAY-15 Gap seals should not hinder pilot or ground crew preflight inspection.
WBAY-17 Special coatings or conductive paints on pylons, launchers, racks, launchers, tanks, pods, etc. should have the durability to
withstand contact with support stands/cradles during storage.
WBAY-18 The proximity of the gun firing barrel to structure should be such that structural furrows or channels are not required for
projectile clearances during firing.
3.03.08 Weapon Bays, Racks, Compartments, A-01 Seal equipment bays and compartments against the environmental elements including all types of servicing fluids used for
Pylons, Housings, and Turrets the vehicle, all types of anti-ice and de-ice fluids, and all types of fluids used for chemical, biological, or nuclear
decontamination
A-04 Use stiffening beads in lieu of flanges to the maximum extent to enhance compartment volume and simplify repairs.
Stiffening beads should have the convex surface toward the compartment to eliminate fluid traps.
A-05 Keep all machined compartment frames, webs, and closure panels to a constant thickness (e.g., not stepped or tapered) to
ease simplicity of fluid or electrical penetrations and ease and simplicity of structural repair.
A-06 Hardpoints (structural attachment and load bearing areas) within a compartment to assist in equipment mounting or
support should not be integral with the machined part. Hardpoints should be parasitic to enable quick repair in case of
wear or damage in lieu of precise ream/bush repair typical of machined hardpoints.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

A-07 Paint equipment bay and compartment interiors a high gloss white to maximize lighting reflectivity, visibility, and rapid
leak detection capability.
A-08 Plumbing penetrations into a compartment should not be on a vertical axis due to difficulty in making or breaking
vertically-oriented connections. When compartment access is from the bottom, vertically-oriented connections can allow
fluid to leak onto the maintainer. When access is from the top, such connections can allow foreign matter to enter the
line. Use horizontal penetrations whenever possible.
A-09 Any heat or temperature sensitive structure within a compartment should contain heat-sensitive tape or appropriate heat
sensor for easy indication of over-temperature excursions.
A-10 Provide a sufficient number of compartment fluid drains to ensure fluid drainage for varying aircraft static attitudes and

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
varying terrain slopes for ground vehicles.
A-11 Locate compartment electrical penetrations close to the access opening for ease of sight, probing, repair, and to eliminate
fluid soaking, wicking, or contamination.
A-12 Locate compartment electrical penetrations far enough from the access opening to prevent damage resulting from
improper (over-length) panel fasteners.

C-222
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.03.08 Weapon Bays, Racks, Compartments, A-13 Two-sided or two-surfaced access should not be required for access to equipment interfaces and hardpoints. The term
Pylons, Housings, and Turrets two-sided infers top/bottom, left/right, front/back, or combinations thereof.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

A-14 Do not locate nutplates or gang channels in inaccessible areas that would require extensive disassembly or equipment
removal to gain access.
A-15 Locate tie-down attachment points such that tie-down chains, straps, or cables do not prevent or restrict normal servicing,
weapon loading, or safe/arm functions.
A-16 Structural design should provide good access to corrosion-prone areas for inspection and treatment.
A-17 All structural fasteners in an access door or panel should be of identical grip and diameter. In rare cases where this is not
possible, fasteners of different grip must have different diameters to prevent a shorter fastener being substituted for the
correct, longer fastener.
A-18 Use transparent windows, quick-opening covers, or openings without any cover to permit quick visual inspections where
needed.
ARM-01 For an aircraft, the fuselage lower shear moldline should be no less than 38" above the ground when external weapons
only will be carried on the fuselage.
ARM-02 For an aircraft, the fuselage lower shear moldline should be no less than 50" above the ground when internal weapons
will be carried in the fuselage and weapon bay door widths exceed 22".
ARM-03 Locate fuselage weapon bays a minimum of 18" from the nose landing gear and main landing gear of an aircraft.
ARM-04 No single weapon/store mounted on a transporter should intrude into the service/turnaround envelope of another station.
ARM-05 All servicing and turnaround functions (including movement envelopes) should be outside the gun firing envelope.
ARM-06 The relationship of the nose landing gear to the main landing gear should not restrict the positioning of weapon
transporters under the fuselage of an aircraft.
ARM-07 The design of weapon and store ejectors and launchers should not require scheduled servicing, maintenance, or
inspection requirements prior to upload of the weapon or store.
ARM-08 Weapon and store ejectors containing arming solenoids should ensure the solenoids can be rapidly replaced while
installed.
ARM-09 Weapon and store ejectors containing adjustable pitch control devices should ensure devices are easily accessible and
adjustments are Murphy-free.
ARM-10 Weapon and store stations should be located to ensure vehicle ballasting will not be required under any combination of
weapon/store configurations.
BIT-01 During design of the BIT, use worst-case stress analysis to ensure that any circuit failures induced by temperature
extremes, tolerance build-up, power supply variations, and combinations thereof are identified.
BIT-02 Ensure that BIT system thresholds are consistent with those across the system, subsystem, item, module, and piece-part

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

levels to prevent excessive numbers of Cannot Duplicate (CND) and Retest OK (RTOK) events from occurring.
BIT-03 The degree of BIT required or proposed should be based on the respective failure rates and the appropriate FMECA at
all equipment indenture levels.
BIT-04 Limit the amount of data that is recorded to a manageable size by:
- Limiting the number of signals that are monitored
- Limiting the maximum sampling rate
- Reducing the time span over which data is accumulated
- Restricting the type of data accumulated
BIT-05 Incorporate testability design features as an integral part of equipment preliminary design process.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
BIT-06 Mission critical functions should be monitored by BIT.
BIT-09 Use concurrent BIT to monitor system critical functions.
BIT-26 Locate routinely used test points so they are accessible without removing or disassembling other equipment
BIT/BITE-02 Design EMI protection to eliminate finger type EMI contact devices.
C-01 Avoid swivel type connectors and fittings for air, fuel, or hydraulic line interfaces due to their history of low reliability.

C-223
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.03.08 Weapon Bays, Racks, Compartments, C-02 Provide spacing between parallel plumbing runs so that in-line couplings can be replaced without removing lines or
Pylons, Housings, and Turrets disconnecting any line support devices.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

CARGO-01 Ground vehicles with storage bays or compartments accessible from outside the vehicle should:
- Have the door sill located no lower than knee height to accommodate a wide range of percentiles while standing.
- Ensure door handles are flush with outer surface to protect personnel.
- Contain goose neck hinges to protect the hinge from the elements.
- Contain peripheral door seals that will protect against blowing sand entry at 50 mph.
- Ensure door can be opened with transport tie downs installed.
- Ensure door opening envelope does not intrude into the opening envelope of an adjacent door.
- Contain simple sheet metal hold-open spring or mechanism.
- Ensure floor of bay or compartment is flush with sill to simplify cleanout and drainage.
- Ensure door unlocking and opening mechanism can be actuated by a 95 percentile male hand while wearing arctic
gloves.
- Contain 15 percent added volume for density growth.
CARGO-02 Ground vehicles with small exterior storage bays or compartments containing emergency equipment or supplies should:
- Be located at chest height of the 50 percentile male.
- Contain unlatching mechanisms activated by pushing inward on the door.
- Meet all other generic bay and compartment requirements
CBR-01 Orient all vehicle liquid servicing fittings to ensure fluids will not come in contact with protective garb during
connect/disconnect activities.
CBR-02 Ensure vehicle overboard passive liquid drains are clearly marked or visible to enable personnel to remain clear of area.
CONT-01 Control rods should use Boyd or impedance type bolts (or equivalent) to eliminate the need for cotter pins or safety wire.
CONT-02 Do not use metal control cables for vehicles that will operate in salt water or salt air environments.
CONT-03 Use control rods rather than control cables for non-complex applications and non-complex routing within the vehicle.
CONT-04 Use control cables rather than control rods for most complex applications.
CONT-05 Route cables so that 100 percent of a cable will be viewable for inspection.
CONT-06 Design all pulleys and brackets associated with cable installations so they are accessible by a 75 percentile male hand.
D&V-01 The geometric aspects of structural design and interfaces should not result in any natural bathtubs.
D&V-02 Closed structural sections subject to condensation or fluid migration should contain drainage provisions.
D&V-03 Crew cabs, operators' compartments, crew stations, cockpits, and passenger compartments should be subject to the same
corrosion prevention measures as the exteriors of the vehicles. Low points, pockets, and related fluid collection points
within should be provided with low point drains.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

ECS-11 Design air inlets, outlets, and exhausts to be accessible without reliance on ladders or work stands for ease of installing
protective plugs or covers.
ECS-12 Design air inlets, outlets, and exhausts with screens to prevent bird or rodent entry.
ECS-13 Design air inlets, outlets, and exhausts to be meniscus-free to prevent a bathtub effect. In remote instances where this is
not possible, passive drains should be provided at all low points to prevent liquid accumulation with the vehicle in its
normal static attitude.
ECS-14 Instances where air inlets, outlets, and exhausts are subject to water entry, passive drains should be employed capable of
handling 4" of rain per hour.
ECS-15 Locate and orient air inlets, outlets, and exhausts in a manner that prevents their use as footholds during maintenance.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
EDECOM-01 Provide surface sensors on equipment located in compartments containing louvers, screens, flush inlets, or similar

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

openings to the environment to indicate the presence of chem/bio contaminants.
EDECOM-02 Provide integral sensors (viewable from the exterior) for equipment subject to internal forced-air cooling from outside or
external air to indicate the presence of contaminants.
EDECOM-03 Design equipment surfaces and structure to be compatible with all decontamination agents and methods.
EDECOM-04 Provide passive overboard drains in compartments subject to decontamination processes to void the area of contaminants.

C-224
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.03.08 Weapon Bays, Racks, Compartments, EDECOM-05 Provide hoist, lift or transport handles for equipment requiring removal from the host vehicle for decontamination. In
Pylons, Housings, and Turrets instances where this may not be practical, design the equipment with hardpoints for attaching parasitic carrying provisions

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

ENV-01 Materials, treatments, coatings, finishes should be compatible with all anti-ice and de-ice fluids, chemical and biological
decontamination fluids, washing and cleaning fluids, and all vehicle subsystem fluids.
ENV-02 There should be no top coat or treatment deterioration throughout the standard temperature and humidity spectrum.
ENV-03 For airborne vehicles, the finishes should be durable against rain, hail, and dynamic erosion throughout the flight
envelope.
ENV-04 For airborne and ground vehicles, the finishes should be durable against sand erosion throughout all surface wind speeds
experienced in arid or desert geographical locations.
EXT-01 Locate Tanks, Pods, Containers, and Devices (TPCD's) so they do not block or restrict access to existing vehicle access
areas or access approach envelopes.
EXT-02 Design TPCD's for fuel containment to automatically interface to the host vehicle during installation or removal.
EXT-03 Design TPCD's to be fully compatible with the existing vehicle built-in hoisting provisions and locking devices.
EXT-05 Design access doors for cargo type TPCD's to be non-load carrying and with simple latches for all doors and panels.
EXT-06 Design cargo TPCD's to ensure all cargo and equipment can be downloaded and uploaded with the TPCD installed on the
host vehicle.
EXTING-01 Use extinguishing concepts dedicated to each individual fire zone in preference to manifold systems operating from a
central source.
EXTING-03 Keep each individual fire zone over-temperature/fire warning system separate from those in other fire zones.
EXTING-04 Design individual fire zone over-temperature/fire warning system to be fully BIT capable (the BIT concept should permit
both initiated and periodic BIT).
EXTING-06 Provide an alternate capability to activate the system remotely from the cockpit/crew station, or operator's position to
satisfy emergency situations during vehicle maintenance.
EXTING-07 Analyze the vehicle operational environment and type of fire zones to determine if remote stop/shut-off of equipment is
warranted.
EXTING-08 Analyze the vehicle operational environment and type of fire zones to determine if remote alarm and/or visual indication
of a fire is warranted.
EXTING-09 Do not locate provisions for overboard venting or dumping of extinguishing agents in areas that could create hazards for
personnel.
F-01 Use blind fasteners only where absolutely necessary or where considerable cost can be saved.
F-02 Minimize access fasteners while making them quick release, easily removed and replaced, and captive.
F-03 Choose fasteners based on the requirement top operate by hand or with common hand tools rather than special tools.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

F-04 Whenever possible, incorporate barrel type fasteners as opposed to hi-torque fasteners. Failure of Hi-torque fasteners
due to stripping are common and a source of potential foreign object damage (FOD).
FUEL-01 Locate fuel vent and dump masts to ensure exiting fuel will be clear of servicing, loading, arming and safing areas for all
types of ground and airborne vehicles.
FUEL-02 Manufacturing splices for major sub-assemblies should not intrude into or through integral fuel cells or tanks.
FUEL-03 Structural bolts, screws, and fasteners should not penetrate into integral fuel cells or tanks other than those used for
access door attachment.
FUEL-04 Where the fuel wetted area inside a fuel cell or tank is void of blade, knife, and hat stiffeners for use as hardpoint
attachment, standoffs bonded to the cell surface should be used as attachments for clamps, and brackets to eliminate

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
fastener penetration of the fuel cavity.

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

FUEL-05 Intersecting of two or more surfaces in a fuel wetted area of less than 90 degrees should be avoided to simplify
manufacture and repair.
FUEL-06 Where maintaining a minimum angle of 90 degrees is not possible, sufficient depth, width, and height should be
maintained to provide tool clearances for all tools used in the manufacturing processes and in the operational field repair
environment.

C-225
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.03.08 Weapon Bays, Racks, Compartments, FUEL-07 When feed tanks are designed such that the lower portion of the tank serves as a surge chamber, the top closure deck of
Pylons, Housings, and Turrets the surge chamber should provide the strength to support the weight of a 95 percentile male.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

FUEL-08 The size and number of fuel cell and tank access doors should be sufficient to ensure no wetted area of the cell or tank is
beyond a maximum 18" distance from the edge of the access opening. This guideline applies to only non-man rated cells.
FUEL-09 All fuel cell or tank access doors not mounted on the exterior surface should contain sealing provisions other than the
channel type.
FUEL-10 Provide access from the wing closure ribs in lieu of the moldline when access is required in close proximity to the wing
fold area.
FUEL-11 Through-the-tank fasteners should not be used for fuel cells or tanks in areas where a leak path could be established into
an inaccessible portion of the vehicle.
LG-02 Hardpoints for attachment of landing gear trunnions should be capable of carrying all induced gear loads for the life of
the airframe.
LG-03 Hardpoints for attachment for landing gear trunnions should not be machined as an integral part of the airframe structure
when normal design sink rates over 25 feet per second are required.
LG-04 Do not use Beryllium and Beryllium base alloys in any location subject to wear or corrosive atmospheres or in installations
where machining may be required.
LG-05 All bolts or similar threaded means used as adjustable stops should be positively retained in the adjusted reference without
reliance on jam nuts, cotter pins, or safety wire.
LG-31 Landing gear doors designed to close after gear is extended should be capable of being manually opened on the ground
without reliance on electrical or hydraulic power.
LG-32 Design of landing gear doors normally closed after gear extension should ensure failure modes will not enable
uncommanded opening on the ground.
LG-33 Design of landing gear doors normally left open after gear extension should ensure no failure mode will enable closing on
the ground.
LG-34 Avoid sharp edges and corners on landing gear doors or fairings.
LG-35 Avoid the use of landing gear doors to mount or house antennas, arrays, or air data sensors.
LG-36 Location of integral wheel jack points on a strut should provide a minimum 6-1/2 inch clearance for positioning the jack
with tire ruptured and wheel ground 2 inches off ground.
LG-37 Integral hardpoints to jack the entire vehicle should ensure that identical jacks can be used at all jack points.
LG-38 All landing gear doors should be interchangeable.
LG-39 Gear-mounted tie-down or chain-down fittings should be interchangeable and easily replaceable.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

LO-01 Use LO compatible gap fillers for manufactured gaps in lieu of tape and butter (surface coating compound).
LO-02 Avoid scheduled forced inspections or replacement of materials, coatings, or finishes solely to protect either the reliability
or the signature.
LO-04 Infrequently-accessed structural doors and panels incorporating special coatings or conductive paints should contain
provisions for prying the door or panel clear of moldline with standard screwdriver without damage.
LO-05 Do not locate flush mounted LO screens for auxiliary air inlets and exits in walkway areas unless durability has been
proven.
LO-06 Size flush mounted LO screens for auxiliary air inlets and exits to ensure functionality with up to 25 percent of the
openings plugged.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
LO-07 Flush and non-flush LO screens should be interchangeable.

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

MATL-01 A high degree of durability should be maintained for a minimum distance of 36 inches forward of the inflight refueling
receptacle.
MATL-02 Cosmetic type repairs should not exceed 1 hours including cure or drying times.
MATL-03 Cosmetic and vehicle repair material shelf life should not be less than 24 months.
MATL-04 Cosmetic and vehicle repair materials should be non-proprietary and non-single source.

C-226
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.03.08 Weapon Bays, Racks, Compartments, MATL-05 Cosmetic and vehicle repair materials should not require refrigeration or special facilities or atmospheres for storage.
Pylons, Housings, and Turrets

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

MATL-06 Repair criteria, repairs, and instructions should not be classified.
MATL-07 All cosmetic touch-up and repair materials should be environmentally safe.
MATL-08 Repairs (other than major depot repair) should not require autoclave type facilities.
MATL-09 A high degree of durability should be achieved across all walkway areas on the top surfaces of all vehicles up to and
including 95 percentile personnel.
MATL-10 Coatings and finishes should be durable against the effects of missile gases, velocities, and particles emanating from the
missile motor.
MATL-11 Coatings and finishes should be durable against the effects of gun gases, projectile shock waves, and brass particles
emanating from the projectile seal rings.
MATL-12 Leading edge materials and coatings should be durable against fragments from frangible gun port plugs.
MATL-13 Special handling or shipping requirements of repair materials should be avoided.
MATL-14 Leading edges, including chines, containing or constructed of radar absorbing materials, should be interchangeable to
reduce vehicle downtime and simplify repairs.
MATL-15 Doors and panels containing blade seals used for signature reduction should be interchangeable or contain
interchangeable blade seals. Deviation is acceptable where repairs can be accomplished on the vehicle in a time equal to
or less than door or seal remove and replace time.
MC-01 All clamps should contain torque-set or torque-limiting connections to prevent clamp or component failure due to over-
torque. Clamp installation call outs should not depend on special tools to establish the required torque values.
MC-02 Avoid the use of cotter pins, safety wire, safety clips, and similar devices to prevent maintenance-induced events leading
to ground vehicle accidents or loss of air vehicles.
MC-03 All tubing connections and interfaces should use rosan/dynatube (or equivalent) to (1) enable connect or disconnect with
one hand, one tool, (2) eliminate the need to safety the connection, (3) provide a superior seal, and (4) negate need to
reposition line(s) during component replacement.
MC-04 No trombone type, flared tube type, or piloted line type interfaces should be used to avoid the need for removal or
repositioning during equipment removal.
MC-05 Avoid potential foreign object traps during manufacturing or operational maintenance by eliminating vertical penetrations
of plumbing/fittings into tanks, compartments, or cells
MC-06 Locate, position, orient all plumbing and duct electrical connectors to prevent the need for sequential installation or
removal.
MC-09 All plumbing connections and fittings used for fuel systems should contain integral bonding features to eliminate the need

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

for bonding clamps or jumper cables.
MC-10 In rare instances where a plumbing run contains complex form or geometry that would require removal of other plumbing
or equipment for access, in-line connectors should be incorporated to maintain the integrity of other plumbing or
equipment.
MC-11 No subsystem plumbing, equipment, or wiring should use a tank, cell, or compartment containing liquids as a means for
routing or penetration simplicity during manufacture.
MC-12 All plumbing and connectors containing liquids should be meniscus-free.
MC-13 In instances where plumbing or connector interfaces cannot or are not keyed for a specific orientation, all identification,
markings, cautions, and directions should be placed 360 degrees around the tube or duct.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
MC-14 Where multiple connectors are located in close proximity, ensure (1) a minimum hand tool arc of 120 degrees can be
maintained, and (2) stagger fittings to ensure firm coupling interface/hand tool interface can be accomplished without
inducing damage to adjacent lines.
MC-15 Route, orient, and position plumbing, wiring, ducts, and connectors sufficiently away from the outer surface of the vehicle
to preclude induced damage due to minor dents, drill bits during repair, etc. Minimum rule of thumb is 1" away from the
inner surface and 1" below a plate nut channel.

C-227
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.03.08 Weapon Bays, Racks, Compartments, MP-01 Avoid the use epoxies to mount parts on repairable modules because they make repair extremely difficult.
Pylons, Housings, and Turrets

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

MP-02 Use a unique identification (ID) resistor incorporated in each system module to verify that the proper module is mounted
on ATE.
MP-03 Design modules so that lengthy warm-up times, special coding and air purity levels, and similar constraints are not
necessary.
P-01 Access door and panel fastener types for airborne vehicles should meet the following criteria:
- use latches for a frequency of access of 0 to 40 flight hours
- use High Strength Quick Release fasteners for a frequency of access of 40-400 flight hours
- use structural screws for a frequency of access of 400 flight hours or more
P-02 Access door and panel fastener types for surface vehicles should meet the following criteria:
- use a spring loaded or latch fastener for an opening frequency of daily
- use a one quarter turn fastener (or equivalent) for a opening frequency of weekly
- use screws or bolts for all other cases
P-03 All doors and panels subject to environmental elements should contain form-in-place seals (or equivalent) attached to the
door structure, not substructure, to prevent damage during maintenance.
P-04 Door and panel seals should be compatible with all types of on-board servicing fluids, de-ice and anti-ice fluids, and all
fluids used for chemical, biological, and nuclear decontamination.
P-05 Piano type hinges should not be used on doors or panels because they are subject to wear, corrosion, and sand and fluid
entry.
P-06 Access door and panel devices used to support door in opened position should meet the following criteria:
- for airborne vehicles, design for 60 knot gust loads (or equivalent jet blast loads)
- for ground vehicles, design for 50 mph gust loads
P-07 Hinged access doors and panels capable of remaining in the opened position should not have sharp edges or corners.
P-08 Removable access door and panel fasteners should be of identical grip length and diameter.
P-09 Acceptable door and panel hold-open devices include over-center sheet metal spring, over-center spring link, spring
cartridge, support strut, and pinned goose neck hinge.
P-10 Access doors and panels requiring non-captive fasteners should not be located forward of air inlet ducts or high-energy
rotating components (e.g., prop fans, engine cooling fans, etc.).
P-11 Access doors and panels should be interchangeable as justified by operation and support costs or life cycle costs.
PYRO-01 Provide the "safe/arm" status to the pilot, crew, or gunner in the cockpit, crew station, or operator station as appropriate.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

PYRO-02 Provide the "safe/arm" status as an external cue discernible from a distance of 10-20 feet.
PYRO-06 "Safe/arm" mechanism design should be free from FOD potential.
PYRO-07 Manual "safe/arm" mechanisms should be well-clear of inlet ducts, propellers, rotors, and similar rotating components.
PYRO-08 Manual "safe/arm" mechanisms should be well-clear of engine exhausts, fuel/toxic vents, fluid drains, control surface
deflection envelopes, and rescue path envelopes.
PYRO-09 Provide positive, Murphy-proof locking detents for both the "safe" and "arm" positions of mechanical mechanisms.
PYRO-10 Provide a numerical maintenance code on maintenance panels or maintenance recorder/memory systems to denote the
"safe/arm" status for each weapon or store.
PYRO-11 Design electrical/electronic "safe/arm" systems to eliminate the need for mechanical type system interrupt devices.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
PYRO-12 Design of weapons, flare/chaff packages, and airborne pyrotechnic containers should follow the "wooden round" design

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

concept to eliminate scheduled tests, checks, and inspections throughout its intended life cycle.
PYRO-13 Container design for shipping, handling, and storing weapons, flares, chaff, and similar devices should not require special
atmospheres.
PYRO-14 Design weapon drop and fire/release circuits with frequency-coded firing systems or similar concepts to ensure stray
energy tests and checks will not be required and that stray energy will not impose a safety hazard or problem.

C-228
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.03.08 Weapon Bays, Racks, Compartments, PYRO-15 Pylon-to-weapon and pylon-to-air vehicle electrical interfaces should contain built-in test/fault location capabilities.
Pylons, Housings, and Turrets

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

PYRO-16 Do not use cartridge actuated devices (CADs) for store or weapon ejection or for pylon jettison due to inherent ground
safety hazards, stray energy hazards, and scheduled cleaning requirements.
PYRO-17 In rare instances where use of CADs may be required, a positive indication to denote "cartridge installed" should be
provided.
PYRO-20 Weapon bay doors, when opened, should not block or restrict access to other servicing points.
PYRO-21 Weapon bays should contain internal lighting controlled by a separate switch that is only functional when doors are open
PYRO-22 A "rounds remaining" status should be available at the gun loading interface, maintenance panel, or cockpit/crew
station/operator station.
PYRO-23 Crew size for full ammo load should not exceed two persons.
PYRO-24 Ammo loader interface should not be less than 30" nor more than 50" above the ground to ensure loading can be
accomplished by a wide range of percentiles wearing chemical or biological protective gear.
PYRO-25 Gun loading and servicing should be possible concurrently with all other weapon loading and servicing activities to
minimize the elapsed downtime.
PYRO-26 Do not locate ammunition loader interfaces close to inlets, exhausts, fuel dumps and drains, antennas, sensors, lights, or
hazardous protrusions.
PYRO-27 Incorporate integral hoisting provisions at each weapon/store station to enable direct lift from the container or carrier to
the attachment hardpoints.
PYRO-28 Automatic locking of the retention hooks should be accomplished for each respective weapon and store.
PYRO-29 Provide quick mechanical over-travel (no power) for weapon bay doors to maximize the weapon/store loading envelope.
PYRO-30 Ensure weapon bay door arc (both normal and over-travel) does not block or intrude into adjacent service points or
envelopes.
PYRO-32 Provide sufficient longitudinal clearance between weapon bays to enable simultaneous loading of two bays.
PYRO-33 Provide sufficient lateral clearance between weapon bays to enable simultaneous loading of two bays.
PYRO-34 Weapon bay door seals should be bonded or attached to door structure to minimize induced seal damage during weapon
or store loading.
PYRO-35 Suspension system should permit any single weapon or store to be loaded by a two man crew.
PYRO-36 Suspension system design and spacing should enable any combination of eight weapons to be loaded by two two-man
crews within the refueling time of the vehicle (excludes nuclear weapons).
PYRO-37 Internal weapon suspension arrangements should preclude sequential weapon loading.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

PYRO-39 Weapon bay ejectors and launchers should have the capability for total interchangeability and reconfigurability.
PYRO-41 Weapon or store handling and transportation equipment should be compatible with rough terrain and capable of 25 mph
towing speeds minimum.
PYRO-42 In weapons carriage design and integration, avoid dependence of on-board high pressure nitrogen.
PYRO-43 Launcher or ejector design/interface should not require a dual function of carrying airframe structural loads.
PYRO-44 Launcher and ejector design should incorporate automatic sway bracing.
PYRO-45 Missile ejectors should be provided with repeatable missile motor fire wires to simplify loading and reduce elapsed time.
PYRO-46 Design pylons, launchers, and ejector racks so that weapon loading, servicing, and reconfigurations can be accomplished
using standard hand tools.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
PYRO-47 Installation design of ejectors, launchers, racks, and associated hardware interfaces should avoid reliance on torque

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

wrenches.
SABCH-01 Do not locate auxiliary air inlets, sensors, access doors, or drains in boundary bleed areas.
SABCH-02 All flush type structural screws should have identical head drives for the entire vehicle.
SABCH-03 All non-flush type structural screws should have identical head drive recesses for the entire vehicle.

C-229
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.03.08 Weapon Bays, Racks, Compartments, SABCH-04 Special high strength bolts, such as twelve-point heads, should be fully justified from standpoint of the cost of ownership
Pylons, Housings, and Turrets and effectiveness.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

SABCH-05 Structural design should avoid the reliance on blind fasteners unless fully supported by cost, weight, schedule, and
effectiveness analysis.
SABCH-06 Structural design should avoid the potential of dissimilar material or fastener corrosion.
SABCH-07 No structural fasteners should be used that require special tools for installation.
SABCH-08 Taper pins should be threaded and retained with self-locking hardware.
SABCH-09 Pins and collars (lockbolts) should only be used in applications which do not normally require removal.
SABCH-10 Do not use lockbolts in composites.
SABCH-11 In rare instances where the use of dissimilar material in immediate contact cannot be avoided, they should be sufficiently
insulated to endure for the life of the vehicle.
SABCH-12 Avoid tapping threads into structural members. Use of heli-coil type or similar insert concepts is permissible.
SABCH-13 No structural design concept should rely on frequent scheduled inspections to monitor or otherwise ensure structural
integrity.
SABCH-14 No structural fastener intended to carry shear or tension loads should be smaller than 1/4" diameter (.25").
SABCH-15 Give preference to butt type splices over lap type splices in the design of manufacturing splices.
SABCH-16 Wing-to-fuselage attachment should give preference to tension ties over shear ties to improve overall volumetric
efficiency.
SABCH-17 Hardpoints for securing tie down chains, cables, and devices during transport should not require reaching under or
crawling under the vehicle.
SABCH-18 Rings, posts, and clevis devices used for attaching tie downs should not require opening of doors or panels for access.
SABCH-19 Avoid tie down concepts requiring attaching hardpoints as a prerequisite.
SABCH-20 Location of hardpoints used for tie down attachment should:
- Remain outside of door and panel opening envelopes.
- Be clear of exhaust pipes, ducts, manifolds, and mufflers.
- Be clear of overboard fluid drains and vents.
SAFE-12 Internal weapon bay doors should contain integral safety locking features for use during maintenance and weapon
loading and downloading.
SAFE-13 It should not be possible to unsafe a weapon bay door integral lock when a door closed signal is present.
SE-04 Gun port covers or plugs should be lightweight, 100% effective, and easy to install or store.
W-01 Hat section type structural stiffeners with sufficient cross sectional area should be considered as a routing tunnel for

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

wiring and coax.
WBAY-01 Equipment bays and compartments should not require installation of special cavity fillers when equipment is not installed.
WBAY-02 Pylon-to-wing electrical or plumbing interfaces should have automatic close-out covers when pylon is jettisoned or not
installed.
WBAY-03 The method and position of the pylon-to-wing gap scale should not form a drip edge for leakage into the pylon cavity.
WBAY-04 The gap treatment should be a permanent installation on the pylon, wing, or both, not a separate seal.
WBAY-05 Gap treatment should not interfere with or be damaged by existing pylon handling support equipment.
WBAY-06 Pylon rigging should not be required for gap seal control.
WBAY-07 Gap seal should not degrade interchangeability of pylon.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
WBAY-08 Gap seal and treatment should be fully compatible with steam from carrier catapults.
WBAY-09 Gap seal/pylon should not cover or hamper access to low point wing drains.
WBAY-10 No loose hardware should exist before or after pylon is installed.
WBAY-11 Gap seal should match pylon and wing/fuselage surface impedance.

C-230
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.03.08 Weapon Bays, Racks, Compartments, WBAY-12 Pylon-to-store/weapon gap seal should permit visual and physical access during loading for all interfaces between bomb
Pylons, Housings, and Turrets rack-to-store, bomb rack-to-launcher, and launcher-to-store.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

WBAY-13 Pylon-to-store/weapon gap seal should not interfere with automatic sway brace function.
WBAY-14 Pylon-to-store/weapon gap seal should permit physical access to lanyards.
WBAY-15 Gap seals should not hinder pilot or ground crew preflight inspection.
WBAY-16 Gap seals should not degrade loading while wearing arctic or chemical, biological, or radiation protective clothing.
WBAY-17 Special coatings or conductive paints on pylons, launchers, racks, launchers, tanks, pods, etc. should have the durability to
withstand contact with support stands/cradles during storage.
WBAY-18 The proximity of the gun firing barrel to structure should be such that structural furrows or channels are not required for
projectile clearances during firing.
WBAY-19 Frangible gun ports should take preference over mechanized gun port doors.
WBAY-20 Gun plugs required solely to maintain a given signature level should be capable of on-board stowage for use only when a
threat requires their presence.
WBAY-21 Coatings and finishes in the area of gun barrels should be durable to withstand the effect of exiting projectile shockwaves.
WBAY-22 The proximity of the gun blast deflector to structure should not require reliance on high-temperature paints or coatings to
protect the structure.
WIND-01 Optical window materials should be scratch resistant, easy to clean, and dissipate electrostatic charges.
WIND-02 Optic windows should be located for ease of inspection, cleaning, and induced damage potential from personnel or
support equipment.
WIND-03 Window locations should minimize the effects of contamination by salt spray, bugs, oils, fuels, and icing.
WIND-04 Window, canopy, and windshield material should be designed to withstand the effects of sandstorms in the ground
environment and the effects of rain and hail during thunderstorm penetration in the airborne environment.
WIND-05 Design interior surfaces to be reachable for cleaning without reliance on hinging, equipment removal, or use of support
equipment.
3.03.09 External and Parasitic Tanks, Pods, A-01 Seal equipment bays and compartments against the environmental elements including all types of servicing fluids used for
Containers, and Devices the vehicle, all types of anti-ice and de-ice fluids, and all types of fluids used for chemical, biological, or nuclear
decontamination
A-06 Hardpoints (structural attachment and load bearing areas) within a compartment to assist in equipment mounting or
support should not be integral with the machined part. Hardpoints should be parasitic to enable quick repair in case of
wear or damage in lieu of precise ream/bush repair typical of machined hardpoints.
A-07 Paint equipment bay and compartment interiors a high gloss white to maximize lighting reflectivity, visibility, and rapid

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

leak detection capability.
A-08 Plumbing penetrations into a compartment should not be on a vertical axis due to difficulty in making or breaking
vertically-oriented connections. When compartment access is from the bottom, vertically-oriented connections can allow
fluid to leak onto the maintainer. When access is from the top, such connections can allow foreign matter to enter the
line. Use horizontal penetrations whenever possible.
A-09 Any heat or temperature sensitive structure within a compartment should contain heat-sensitive tape or appropriate heat
sensor for easy indication of over-temperature excursions.
A-10 Provide a sufficient number of compartment fluid drains to ensure fluid drainage for varying aircraft static attitudes and
varying terrain slopes for ground vehicles.
A-11 Locate compartment electrical penetrations close to the access opening for ease of sight, probing, repair, and to eliminate

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
fluid soaking, wicking, or contamination.
A-12 Locate compartment electrical penetrations far enough from the access opening to prevent damage resulting from
improper (over-length) panel fasteners.
A-13 Two-sided or two-surfaced access should not be required for access to equipment interfaces and hardpoints. The term
two-sided infers top/bottom, left/right, front/back, or combinations thereof.

C-231
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.03.09 External and Parasitic Tanks, Pods, A-14 Do not locate nutplates or gang channels in inaccessible areas that would require extensive disassembly or equipment
Containers, and Devices removal to gain access.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

A-15 Locate tie-down attachment points such that tie-down chains, straps, or cables do not prevent or restrict normal servicing,
weapon loading, or safe/arm functions.
A-16 Structural design should provide good access to corrosion-prone areas for inspection and treatment.
A-17 All structural fasteners in an access door or panel should be of identical grip and diameter. In rare cases where this is not
possible, fasteners of different grip must have different diameters to prevent a shorter fastener being substituted for the
correct, longer fastener.
A-18 Use transparent windows, quick-opening covers, or openings without any cover to permit quick visual inspections where
needed.
ARM-01 For an aircraft, the fuselage lower shear moldline should be no less than 38" above the ground when external weapons
only will be carried on the fuselage.
ARM-02 For an aircraft, the fuselage lower shear moldline should be no less than 50" above the ground when internal weapons
will be carried in the fuselage and weapon bay door widths exceed 22".
ARM-03 Locate fuselage weapon bays a minimum of 18" from the nose landing gear and main landing gear of an aircraft.
ARM-04 No single weapon/store mounted on a transporter should intrude into the service/turnaround envelope of another station.
ARM-05 All servicing and turnaround functions (including movement envelopes) should be outside the gun firing envelope.
ARM-06 The relationship of the nose landing gear to the main landing gear should not restrict the positioning of weapon
transporters under the fuselage of an aircraft.
ARM-07 The design of weapon and store ejectors and launchers should not require scheduled servicing, maintenance, or
inspection requirements prior to upload of the weapon or store.
ARM-08 Weapon and store ejectors containing arming solenoids should ensure the solenoids can be rapidly replaced while
installed.
ARM-09 Weapon and store ejectors containing adjustable pitch control devices should ensure devices are easily accessible and
adjustments are Murphy-free.
ARM-10 Weapon and store stations should be located to ensure vehicle ballasting will not be required under any combination of
weapon/store configurations.
BIT-01 During design of the BIT, use worst-case stress analysis to ensure that any circuit failures induced by temperature
extremes, tolerance build-up, power supply variations, and combinations thereof are identified.
BIT-02 Ensure that BIT system thresholds are consistent with those across the system, subsystem, item, module, and piece-part
levels to prevent excessive numbers of Cannot Duplicate (CND) and Retest OK (RTOK) events from occurring.
BIT-03 The degree of BIT required or proposed should be based on the respective failure rates and the appropriate FMECA at

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

all equipment indenture levels.
BIT-04 Limit the amount of data that is recorded to a manageable size by:
- Limiting the number of signals that are monitored
- Limiting the maximum sampling rate
- Reducing the time span over which data is accumulated
- Restricting the type of data accumulated
BIT-05 Incorporate testability design features as an integral part of equipment preliminary design process.
BIT-06 Mission critical functions should be monitored by BIT.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
BIT-09 Use concurrent BIT to monitor system critical functions.

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

BIT-26 Locate routinely used test points so they are accessible without removing or disassembling other equipment
BIT/BITE-02 Design EMI protection to eliminate finger type EMI contact devices.
C-01 Avoid swivel type connectors and fittings for air, fuel, or hydraulic line interfaces due to their history of low reliability.
C-02 Provide spacing between parallel plumbing runs so that in-line couplings can be replaced without removing lines or
disconnecting any line support devices.

C-232
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.03.09 External and Parasitic Tanks, Pods, CARGO-01 Ground vehicles with storage bays or compartments accessible from outside the vehicle should:
Containers, and Devices - Have the door sill located no lower than knee height to accommodate a wide range of percentiles while standing.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

- Ensure door handles are flush with outer surface to protect personnel.
- Contain goose neck hinges to protect the hinge from the elements.
- Contain peripheral door seals that will protect against blowing sand entry at 50 mph.
- Ensure door can be opened with transport tie downs installed.
- Ensure door opening envelope does not intrude into the opening envelope of an adjacent door.
- Contain simple sheet metal hold-open spring or mechanism.
- Ensure floor of bay or compartment is flush with sill to simplify cleanout and drainage.
- Ensure door unlocking and opening mechanism can be actuated by a 95 percentile male hand while wearing arctic
gloves.
- Contain 15 percent added volume for density growth.
CARGO-02 Ground vehicles with small exterior storage bays or compartments containing emergency equipment or supplies should:
- Be located at chest height of the 50 percentile male.
- Contain unlatching mechanisms activated by pushing inward on the door.
- Meet all other generic bay and compartment requirements.
CBR-01 Orient all vehicle liquid servicing fittings to ensure fluids will not come in contact with protective garb during
connect/disconnect activities.
CBR-02 Ensure vehicle overboard passive liquid drains are clearly marked or visible to enable personnel to remain clear of area.
CONT-01 Control rods should use Boyd or impedance type bolts (or equivalent) to eliminate the need for cotter pins or safety wire.
CONT-02 Do not use metal control cables for vehicles that will operate in salt water or salt air environments.
CONT-03 Use control rods rather than control cables for non-complex applications and non-complex routing within the vehicle.
CONT-04 Use control cables rather than control rods for most complex applications.
CONT-05 Route cables so that 100 percent of a cable will be viewable for inspection.
CONT-06 Design all pulleys and brackets associated with cable installations so they are accessible by a 75 percentile male hand.
CREW-11 Design cameras, lenses, reconnaissance pods, aiming devices, and related equipment so they can be reconfigured by one
individual.
CREW-13 Provide storage provisions in each vehicle type (ground and airborne) to store extra tapes, modules, canisters, cassettes,
as appropriate to the intended vehicle use/mission.
D&V-01 The geometric aspects of structural design and interfaces should not result in any natural bathtubs.
D&V-02 Closed structural sections subject to condensation or fluid migration should contain drainage provisions.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

D&V-03 Crew cabs, operators' compartments, crew stations, cockpits, and passenger compartments should be subject to the same
corrosion prevention measures as the exteriors of the vehicles. Low points, pockets, and related fluid collection points
within should be provided with low point drains.
EDECOM-01 Provide surface sensors on equipment located in compartments containing louvers, screens, flush inlets, or similar
openings to the environment to indicate the presence of chem/bio contaminants.
EDECOM-02 Provide integral sensors (viewable from the exterior) for equipment subject to internal forced-air cooling from outside or
external air to indicate the presence of contaminants.
EDECOM-03 Design equipment surfaces and structure to be compatible with all decontamination agents and methods.
EDECOM-04 Provide passive overboard drains in compartments subject to decontamination processes to void the area of contaminants.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
EDECOM-05 Provide hoist, lift or transport handles for equipment requiring removal from the host vehicle for decontamination. In

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

instances where this may not be practical, design the equipment with hardpoints for attaching parasitic carrying
provisions.
ENV-01 Materials, treatments, coatings, finishes should be compatible with all anti-ice and de-ice fluids, chemical and biological
decontamination fluids, washing and cleaning fluids, and all vehicle subsystem fluids.
ENV-02 There should be no top coat or treatment deterioration throughout the standard temperature and humidity spectrum.

C-233
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.03.09 External and Parasitic Tanks, Pods, ENV-03 For airborne vehicles, the finishes should be durable against rain, hail, and dynamic erosion throughout the flight
Containers, and Devices envelope.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

ENV-04 For airborne and ground vehicles, the finishes should be durable against sand erosion throughout all surface wind speeds
experienced in arid or desert geographical locations.
ENV-06 For ground vehicles, the finishes should be compatible with and durable against all rain, hail, sleet, snow, and ice
conditions experienced in all intended operational environments.
EXH-01 Treatments required for engine hot sections and exhaust areas should not require scheduled removals for the purposes of
recoating.
EXH-02 High temperature exhaust patterns should flow away from or be directed away from treated surrounding structure,
coatings, or finishes.
EXT-01 Locate Tanks, Pods, Containers, and Devices (TPCD's) so they do not block or restrict access to existing vehicle access
areas or access approach envelopes.
EXT-02 Design TPCD's for fuel containment to automatically interface to the host vehicle during installation or removal.
EXT-03 Design TPCD's to be fully compatible with the existing vehicle built-in hoisting provisions and locking devices.
EXT-04 Design TPCD's used for fuel containment so that post-installation operational tests or checks are not required.
EXT-05 Design access doors for cargo type TPCD's to be non-load carrying and with simple latches for all doors and panels.
EXT-06 Design cargo TPCD's to ensure all cargo and equipment can be downloaded and uploaded with the TPCD installed on the
host vehicle.
EXTING-01 Use extinguishing concepts dedicated to each individual fire zone in preference to manifold systems operating from a
central source.
EXTING-03 Keep each individual fire zone over-temperature/fire warning system separate from those in other fire zones.
EXTING-04 Design individual fire zone over-temperature/fire warning system to be fully BIT capable (the BIT concept should permit
both initiated and periodic BIT).
F-01 Use blind fasteners only where absolutely necessary or where considerable cost can be saved.
F-02 Minimize access fasteners while making them quick release, easily removed and replaced, and captive.
F-03 Choose fasteners based on the requirement top operate by hand or with common hand tools rather than special tools.
F-04 Whenever possible, incorporate barrel type fasteners as opposed to hi-torque fasteners. Failure of Hi-torque fasteners
due to stripping are common and a source of potential foreign object damage (FOD).
FUEL-01 Locate fuel vent and dump masts to ensure exiting fuel will be clear of servicing, loading, arming and safing areas for all
types of ground and airborne vehicles.
FUEL-02 Manufacturing splices for major sub-assemblies should not intrude into or through integral fuel cells or tanks.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

FUEL-03 Structural bolts, screws, and fasteners should not penetrate into integral fuel cells or tanks other than those used for
access door attachment.
FUEL-04 Where the fuel wetted area inside a fuel cell or tank is void of blade, knife, and hat stiffeners for use as hardpoint
attachment, standoffs bonded to the cell surface should be used as attachments for clamps, and brackets to eliminate
fastener penetration of the fuel cavity.
FUEL-05 Intersecting of two or more surfaces in a fuel wetted area of less than 90 degrees should be avoided to simplify
manufacture and repair.
FUEL-06 Where maintaining a minimum angle of 90 degrees is not possible, sufficient depth, width, and height should be
maintained to provide tool clearances for all tools used in the manufacturing processes and in the operational field repair

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
environment.

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

FUEL-07 When feed tanks are designed such that the lower portion of the tank serves as a surge chamber, the top closure deck of
the surge chamber should provide the strength to support the weight of a 95 percentile male.
FUEL-08 The size and number of fuel cell and tank access doors should be sufficient to ensure no wetted area of the cell or tank is
beyond a maximum 18" distance from the edge of the access opening. This guideline applies to only non-man rated cells.

C-234
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.03.09 External and Parasitic Tanks, Pods, FUEL-09 All fuel cell or tank access doors not mounted on the exterior surface should contain sealing provisions other than the
Containers, and Devices channel type.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

FUEL-10 Provide access from the wing closure ribs in lieu of the moldline when access is required in close proximity to the wing
fold area.
FUEL-11 Through-the-tank fasteners should not be used for fuel cells or tanks in areas where a leak path could be established into
an inaccessible portion of the vehicle.
LG-02 Hardpoints for attachment of landing gear trunnions should be capable of carrying all induced gear loads for the life of
the airframe.
LG-03 Hardpoints for attachment for landing gear trunnions should not be machined as an integral part of the airframe structure
when normal design sink rates over 25 feet per second are required.
LG-04 Do not use Beryllium and Beryllium base alloys in any location subject to wear or corrosive atmospheres or in installations
where machining may be required.
LG-05 All bolts or similar threaded means used as adjustable stops should be positively retained in the adjusted reference without
reliance on jam nuts, cotter pins, or safety wire.
LG-31 Landing gear doors designed to close after gear is extended should be capable of being manually opened on the ground
without reliance on electrical or hydraulic power.
LG-32 Design of landing gear doors normally closed after gear extension should ensure failure modes will not enable
uncommanded opening on the ground.
LG-35 Avoid the use of landing gear doors to mount or house antennas, arrays, or air data sensors.
LG-36 Location of integral wheel jack points on a strut should provide a minimum 6-1/2 inch clearance for positioning the jack
with tire ruptured and wheel ground 2 inches off ground.
LG-37 Integral hardpoints to jack the entire vehicle should ensure that identical jacks can be used at all jack points.
LG-38 All landing gear doors should be interchangeable.
LG-39 Gear-mounted tie-down or chain-down fittings should be interchangeable and easily replaceable.
LO-01 Use LO compatible gap fillers for manufactured gaps in lieu of tape and butter (surface coating compound).
LO-02 Avoid scheduled forced inspections or replacement of materials, coatings, or finishes solely to protect either the reliability
or the signature.
LO-03 Equipment and support structure requiring shrouds to reduce radar returns should not cause increases in equipment
service/repair time.
LO-04 Infrequently-accessed structural doors and panels incorporating special coatings or conductive paints should contain
provisions for prying the door or panel clear of moldline with standard screwdriver without damage.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

LO-05 Do not locate flush mounted LO screens for auxiliary air inlets and exits in walkway areas unless durability has been
proven.
LO-06 Size flush mounted LO screens for auxiliary air inlets and exits to ensure functionality with up to 25 percent of the
openings plugged.
LO-07 Flush and non-flush LO screens should be interchangeable.
MATL-01 A high degree of durability should be maintained for a minimum distance of 36 inches forward of the inflight refueling
receptacle.
MATL-02 Cosmetic type repairs should not exceed 1 hours including cure or drying times.
MATL-03 Cosmetic and vehicle repair material shelf life should not be less than 24 months.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
MATL-04 Cosmetic and vehicle repair materials should be non-proprietary and non-single source.

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

MATL-05 Cosmetic and vehicle repair materials should not require refrigeration or special facilities or atmospheres for storage.
MATL-11 Coatings and finishes should be durable against the effects of gun gases, projectile shock waves, and brass particles
emanating from the projectile seal rings.
MATL-12 Leading edge materials and coatings should be durable against fragments from frangible gun port plugs.
MATL-13 Special handling or shipping requirements of repair materials should be avoided.

C-235
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.03.09 External and Parasitic Tanks, Pods, MATL-14 Leading edges, including chines, containing or constructed of radar absorbing materials, should be interchangeable to
Containers, and Devices reduce vehicle downtime and simplify repairs.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

MATL-15 Doors and panels containing blade seals used for signature reduction should be interchangeable or contain
interchangeable blade seals. Deviation is acceptable where repairs can be accomplished on the vehicle in a time equal to
or less than door or seal remove and replace time.
MC-01 All clamps should contain torque-set or torque-limiting connections to prevent clamp or component failure due to over-
torque. Clamp installation call outs should not depend on special tools to establish the required torque values.
MC-02 Avoid the use of cotter pins, safety wire, safety clips, and similar devices to prevent maintenance-induced events leading
to ground vehicle accidents or loss of air vehicles.
MC-03 All tubing connections and interfaces should use rosan/dynatube (or equivalent) to (1) enable connect or disconnect with
one hand, one tool, (2) eliminate the need to safety the connection, (3) provide a superior seal, and (4) negate need to
reposition line(s) during component replacement.
MC-04 No trombone type, flared tube type, or piloted line type interfaces should be used to avoid the need for removal or
repositioning during equipment removal.
MC-05 Avoid potential foreign object traps during manufacturing or operational maintenance by eliminating vertical penetrations
of plumbing/fittings into tanks, compartments, or cells
MC-06 Locate, position, orient all plumbing and duct electrical connectors to prevent the need for sequential installation or
removal.
MC-07 Maximize areas of constant web thickness in firewalls, carry-through bulkheads, major frames, structural ribs, spars,
webs, keels, and close-outs to provide flexibility in locating penetration fittings. Stepped chem milling, stepped machining,
stepped composite layup concepts all tend to result in minimal available surface area for penetrations.
MC-08 All in-line plumbing connections within a fuel tank or cell should be capable of making/breaking the interface by hand,
require no torque, contain integral safety locking mechanisms, and should be void of any requirement for safety wire.
MC-09 All plumbing connections and fittings used for fuel systems should contain integral bonding features to eliminate the need
for bonding clamps or jumper cables.
MC-10 In rare instances where a plumbing run contains complex form or geometry that would require removal of other plumbing
or equipment for access, in-line connectors should be incorporated to maintain the integrity of other plumbing or
equipment.
MC-11 No subsystem plumbing, equipment, or wiring should use a tank, cell, or compartment containing liquids as a means for
routing or penetration simplicity during manufacture.
MC-12 All plumbing and connectors containing liquids should be meniscus-free.
MC-13 In instances where plumbing or connector interfaces cannot or are not keyed for a specific orientation, all identification,

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

markings, cautions, and directions should be placed 360 degrees around the tube or duct.
MC-14 Where multiple connectors are located in close proximity, ensure (1) a minimum hand tool arc of 120 degrees can be
maintained, and (2) stagger fittings to ensure firm coupling interface/hand tool interface can be accomplished without
inducing damage to adjacent lines.
MC-15 Route, orient, and position plumbing, wiring, ducts, and connectors sufficiently away from the outer surface of the vehicle
to preclude induced damage due to minor dents, drill bits during repair, etc. Minimum rule of thumb is 1" away from the
inner surface and 1" below a plate nut channel.
MP-01 Avoid the use epoxies to mount parts on repairable modules because they make repair extremely difficult.
MP-02 Use a unique identification (ID) resistor incorporated in each system module to verify that the proper module is mounted

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
on ATE.

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

MP-03 Design modules so that lengthy warm-up times, special coding and air purity levels, and similar constraints are not
necessary.
OXY-05 Locate liquid oxygen (LOX) containers in a sealed, dedicated compartment to eliminate need for frequent visual
inspections.

C-236
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.03.09 External and Parasitic Tanks, Pods, P-01 Access door and panel fastener types for airborne vehicles should meet the following criteria:
Containers, and Devices - use latches for a frequency of access of 0 to 40 flight hours

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

- use High Strength Quick Release fasteners for a frequency of access of 40-400 flight hours
- use structural screws for a frequency of access of 400 flight hours or more
P-02 Access door and panel fastener types for surface vehicles should meet the following criteria:
- use a spring loaded or latch fastener for an opening frequency of daily
- use a one quarter turn fastener (or equivalent) for a opening frequency of weekly
- use screws or bolts for all other cases
P-03 All doors and panels subject to environmental elements should contain form-in-place seals (or equivalent) attached to the
door structure, not substructure, to prevent damage during maintenance.
P-04 Door and panel seals should be compatible with all types of on-board servicing fluids, de-ice and anti-ice fluids, and all
fluids used for chemical, biological, and nuclear decontamination.
P-05 Piano type hinges should not be used on doors or panels because they are subject to wear, corrosion, and sand and fluid
entry.
P-06 Access door and panel devices used to support door in opened position should meet the following criteria:
- for airborne vehicles, design for 60 knot gust loads (or equivalent jet blast loads)
- for ground vehicles, design for 50 mph gust loads
P-07 Hinged access doors and panels capable of remaining in the opened position should not have sharp edges or corners.
P-08 Removable access door and panel fasteners should be of identical grip length and diameter.
P-09 Acceptable door and panel hold-open devices include over-center sheet metal spring, over-center spring link, spring
cartridge, support strut, and pinned goose neck hinge.
P-10 Access doors and panels requiring non-captive fasteners should not be located forward of air inlet ducts or high-energy
rotating components (e.g., prop fans, engine cooling fans, etc.).
P-11 Access doors and panels should be interchangeable as justified by operation and support costs or life cycle costs.
PYRO-06 "Safe/arm" mechanism design should be free from FOD potential.
PYRO-07 Manual "safe/arm" mechanisms should be well-clear of inlet ducts, propellers, rotors, and similar rotating components.
PYRO-08 Manual "safe/arm" mechanisms should be well-clear of engine exhausts, fuel/toxic vents, fluid drains, control surface
deflection envelopes, and rescue path envelopes.
PYRO-09 Provide positive, Murphy-proof locking detents for both the "safe" and "arm" positions of mechanical mechanisms.
PYRO-10 Provide a numerical maintenance code on maintenance panels or maintenance recorder/memory systems to denote the
"safe/arm" status for each weapon or store.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

PYRO-11 Design electrical/electronic "safe/arm" systems to eliminate the need for mechanical type system interrupt devices.
PYRO-12 Design of weapons, flare/chaff packages, and airborne pyrotechnic containers should follow the "wooden round" design
concept to eliminate scheduled tests, checks, and inspections throughout its intended life cycle.
PYRO-13 Container design for shipping, handling, and storing weapons, flares, chaff, and similar devices should not require special
atmospheres.
PYRO-14 Design weapon drop and fire/release circuits with frequency-coded firing systems or similar concepts to ensure stray
energy tests and checks will not be required and that stray energy will not impose a safety hazard or problem.
PYRO-15 Pylon-to-weapon and pylon-to-air vehicle electrical interfaces should contain built-in test/fault location capabilities.
PYRO-16 Do not use cartridge actuated devices (CADs) for store or weapon ejection or for pylon jettison due to inherent ground

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
safety hazards, stray energy hazards, and scheduled cleaning requirements.

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

PYRO-17 In rare instances where use of CADs may be required, a positive indication to denote "cartridge installed" should be
provided.
PYRO-21 Weapon bays should contain internal lighting controlled by a separate switch that is only functional when doors are open.
PYRO-22 A "rounds remaining" status should be available at the gun loading interface, maintenance panel, or cockpit/crew
station/operator station.

C-237
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.03.09 External and Parasitic Tanks, Pods, PYRO-23 Crew size for full ammo load should not exceed two persons.
Containers, and Devices

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

PYRO-24 Ammo loader interface should not be less than 30" nor more than 50" above the ground to ensure loading can be
accomplished by a wide range of percentiles wearing chemical or biological protective gear.
PYRO-25 Gun loading and servicing should be possible concurrently with all other weapon loading and servicing activities to
minimize the elapsed downtime.
PYRO-26 Do not locate ammunition loader interfaces close to inlets, exhausts, fuel dumps and drains, antennas, sensors, lights, or
hazardous protrusions.
PYRO-27 Incorporate integral hoisting provisions at each weapon/store station to enable direct lift from the container or carrier to
the attachment hardpoints.
PYRO-28 Automatic locking of the retention hooks should be accomplished for each respective weapon and store.
PYRO-29 Provide quick mechanical over-travel (no power) for weapon bay doors to maximize the weapon/store loading envelope.
PYRO-30 Ensure weapon bay door arc (both normal and over-travel) does not block or intrude into adjacent service points or
envelopes.
PYRO-32 Provide sufficient longitudinal clearance between weapon bays to enable simultaneous loading of two bays.
PYRO-33 Provide sufficient lateral clearance between weapon bays to enable simultaneous loading of two bays.
PYRO-34 Weapon bay door seals should be bonded or attached to door structure to minimize induced seal damage during weapon
or store loading.
PYRO-35 Suspension system should permit any single weapon or store to be loaded by a two man crew.
PYRO-36 Suspension system design and spacing should enable any combination of eight weapons to be loaded by two two-man
crews within the refueling time of the vehicle (excludes nuclear weapons).
PYRO-37 Internal weapon suspension arrangements should preclude sequential weapon loading.
PYRO-39 Weapon bay ejectors and launchers should have the capability for total interchangeability and reconfigurability.
PYRO-41 Weapon or store handling and transportation equipment should be compatible with rough terrain and capable of 25 mph
towing speeds minimum.
PYRO-42 In weapons carriage design and integration, avoid dependence of on-board high pressure nitrogen.
PYRO-43 Launcher or ejector design/interface should not require a dual function of carrying airframe structural loads.
PYRO-44 Launcher and ejector design should incorporate automatic sway bracing.
PYRO-45 Missile ejectors should be provided with repeatable missile motor fire wires to simplify loading and reduce elapsed time.
PYRO-46 Design pylons, launchers, and ejector racks so that weapon loading, servicing, and reconfigurations can be accomplished
using standard hand tools.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

PYRO-47 Installation design of ejectors, launchers, racks, and associated hardware interfaces should avoid reliance on torque
wrenches.
SABCH-01 Do not locate auxiliary air inlets, sensors, access doors, or drains in boundary bleed areas.
SABCH-02 All flush type structural screws should have identical head drives for the entire vehicle.
SABCH-03 All non-flush type structural screws should have identical head drive recesses for the entire vehicle.
SABCH-04 Special high strength bolts, such as twelve-point heads, should be fully justified from standpoint of the cost of ownership
and effectiveness.
SABCH-05 Structural design should avoid the reliance on blind fasteners unless fully supported by cost, weight, schedule, and
effectiveness analysis.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
SABCH-06 Structural design should avoid the potential of dissimilar material or fastener corrosion.

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

SABCH-07 No structural fasteners should be used that require special tools for installation.
SABCH-08 Taper pins should be threaded and retained with self-locking hardware.
SABCH-09 Pins and collars (lockbolts) should only be used in applications which do not normally require removal.
SABCH-10 Do not use lockbolts in composites.

C-238
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.03.09 External and Parasitic Tanks, Pods, SABCH-11 In rare instances where the use of dissimilar material in immediate contact cannot be avoided, they should be sufficiently
Containers, and Devices insulated to endure for the life of the vehicle.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

SABCH-12 Avoid tapping threads into structural members. Use of heli-coil type or similar insert concepts is permissible.
SABCH-13 No structural design concept should rely on frequent scheduled inspections to monitor or otherwise ensure structural
integrity.
SABCH-14 No structural fastener intended to carry shear or tension loads should be smaller than 1/4" diameter (.25").
SABCH-15 Give preference to butt type splices over lap type splices in the design of manufacturing splices.
SABCH-16 Wing-to-fuselage attachment should give preference to tension ties over shear ties to improve overall volumetric
efficiency.
SABCH-17 Hardpoints for securing tie down chains, cables, and devices during transport should not require reaching under or
crawling under the vehicle.
SABCH-18 Rings, posts, and clevis devices used for attaching tie downs should not require opening of doors or panels for access.
SABCH-19 Avoid tie down concepts requiring attaching hardpoints as a prerequisite.
SABCH-20 Location of hardpoints used for tie down attachment should:
- Remain outside of door and panel opening envelopes.
- Be clear of exhaust pipes, ducts, manifolds, and mufflers.
- Be clear of overboard fluid drains and vents.
SAFE-12 Internal weapon bay doors should contain integral safety locking features for use during maintenance and weapon
loading and downloading.
SAFE-13 It should not be possible to unsafe a weapon bay door integral lock when a door closed signal is present.
SE-04 Gun port covers or plugs should be lightweight, 100% effective, and easy to install or store.
SIMP-01 Location and design of all exterior lights should not require protective covers in ground environments.
SURV-05 Design survival equipment pods intended for external carriage or suspension to meet the same environmental and
operational criteria as the host vehicle structure.
W-01 Hat section type structural stiffeners with sufficient cross sectional area should be considered as a routing tunnel for
wiring and coax.
WBAY-01 Equipment bays and compartments should not require installation of special cavity fillers when equipment is not installed.
WBAY-02 Pylon-to-wing electrical or plumbing interfaces should have automatic close-out covers when pylon is jettisoned or not
installed.
WBAY-03 The method and position of the pylon-to-wing gap scale should not form a drip edge for leakage into the pylon cavity.
WBAY-04 The gap treatment should be a permanent installation on the pylon, wing, or both, not a separate seal.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

WBAY-05 Gap treatment should not interfere with or be damaged by existing pylon handling support equipment.
WBAY-06 Pylon rigging should not be required for gap seal control.
WBAY-07 Gap seal should not degrade interchangeability of pylon.
WBAY-08 Gap seal and treatment should be fully compatible with steam from carrier catapults.
WBAY-09 Gap seal/pylon should not cover or hamper access to low point wing drains.
WBAY-10 No loose hardware should exist before or after pylon is installed.
WBAY-11 Gap seal should match pylon and wing/fuselage surface impedance.
WBAY-12 Pylon-to-store/weapon gap seal should permit visual and physical access during loading for all interfaces between bomb
rack-to-store, bomb rack-to-launcher, and launcher-to-store.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
WBAY-13 Pylon-to-store/weapon gap seal should not interfere with automatic sway brace function.
WBAY-14 Pylon-to-store/weapon gap seal should permit physical access to lanyards.
WBAY-15 Gap seals should not hinder pilot or ground crew preflight inspection.
WBAY-16 Gap seals should not degrade loading while wearing arctic or chemical, biological, or radiation protective clothing.

C-239
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.03.09 External and Parasitic Tanks, Pods, WBAY-17 Special coatings or conductive paints on pylons, launchers, racks, launchers, tanks, pods, etc. should have the durability to
Containers, and Devices withstand contact with support stands/cradles during storage.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

WBAY-18 The proximity of the gun firing barrel to structure should be such that structural furrows or channels are not required for
projectile clearances during firing.
WBAY-21 Coatings and finishes in the area of gun barrels should be durable to withstand the effect of exiting projectile shockwaves.
WBAY-22 The proximity of the gun blast deflector to structure should not require reliance on high-temperature paints or coatings to
protect the structure.
WIND-01 Optical window materials should be scratch resistant, easy to clean, and dissipate electrostatic charges.
WIND-02 Optic windows should be located for ease of inspection, cleaning, and induced damage potential from personnel or
support equipment.
WIND-03 Window locations should minimize the effects of contamination by salt spray, bugs, oils, fuels, and icing.
WIND-04 Window, canopy, and windshield material should be designed to withstand the effects of sandstorms in the ground
environment and the effects of rain and hail during thunderstorm penetration in the airborne environment.
WIND-05 Design interior surfaces to be reachable for cleaning without reliance on hinging, equipment removal, or use of support
equipment.
WIND-06 Do not locate windows in the proximity of rooster tails created by wheels/tires passing through water or slush.
WIND-07 Use materials that are highly resistive to thermal shock.
WIND-11 For dome-shaped optic window concepts, the dome should be easily removable for cleaning without affecting LO
integrity.
WIND-12 Design EO windows and optics to be interchangeable among the same air vehicle types or same ground vehicle types.
WIND-13 The combination of material layers and coatings for optics and windows should be such that static charge buildup for
worst case conditions should not exceed 10,000 volts.
WIND-14 Exterior lights should permit simple and rapid bulb replacement without disturbing LO treatments.
WIND-15 Design light covers and lenses to be sufficiently durable so that protective covers are not needed during maintenance.
WIND-16 Lens shape should enhance LO capability to reduce need, care, and expense for special coatings.
3.03.10 Personnel Seats (Crew and Passenger), A-06 Hardpoints (structural attachment and load bearing areas) within a compartment to assist in equipment mounting or
Ejection Seats, Benches, and Chairs support should not be integral with the machined part. Hardpoints should be parasitic to enable quick repair in case of
wear or damage in lieu of precise ream/bush repair typical of machined hardpoints.
A-13 Two-sided or two-surfaced access should not be required for access to equipment interfaces and hardpoints. The term
two-sided infers top/bottom, left/right, front/back, or combinations thereof.
BIT-06 Mission critical functions should be monitored by BIT.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

BIT-09 Use concurrent BIT to monitor system critical functions.
BIT-26 Locate routinely used test points so they are accessible without removing or disassembling other equipment
CONT-01 Control rods should use Boyd or impedance type bolts (or equivalent) to eliminate the need for cotter pins or safety wir e.
CONT-02 Do not use metal control cables for vehicles that will operate in salt water or salt air environments.
CONT-03 Use control rods rather than control cables for non-complex applications and non-complex routing within the vehicle.
CONT-04 Use control cables rather than control rods for most complex applications.
CONT-05 Route cables so that 100 percent of a cable will be viewable for inspection.
CONT-06 Design all pulleys and brackets associated with cable installations so they are accessible by a 75 percentile male hand.
D&V-01 The geometric aspects of structural design and interfaces should not result in any natural bathtubs.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
D&V-02 Closed structural sections subject to condensation or fluid migration should contain drainage provisions.
D&V-03 Crew cabs, operators' compartments, crew stations, cockpits, and passenger compartments should be subject to the same
corrosion prevention measures as the exteriors of the vehicles. Low points, pockets, and related fluid collection points
within should be provided with low point drains.

C-240
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.03.10 Personnel Seats (Crew and Passenger), LG-05 All bolts or similar threaded means used as adjustable stops should be positively retained in the adjusted reference without
Ejection Seats, Benches, and Chairs reliance on jam nuts, cotter pins, or safety wire.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

MC-01 All clamps should contain torque-set or torque-limiting connections to prevent clamp or component failure due to over-
torque. Clamp installation call outs should not depend on special tools to establish the required torque values.
MC-02 Avoid the use of cotter pins, safety wire, safety clips, and similar devices to prevent maintenance-induced events leading
to ground vehicle accidents or loss of air vehicles.
MC-03 All tubing connections and interfaces should use rosan/dynatube (or equivalent) to (1) enable connect or disconnect with
one hand, one tool, (2) eliminate the need to safety the connection, (3) provide a superior seal, and (4) negate need to
reposition line(s) during component replacement.
MC-04 No trombone type, flared tube type, or piloted line type interfaces should be used to avoid the need for removal or
repositioning during equipment removal.
MC-05 Avoid potential foreign object traps during manufacturing or operational maintenance by eliminating vertical penetrations
of plumbing/fittings into tanks, compartments, or cells
MC-06 Locate, position, orient all plumbing and duct electrical connectors to prevent the need for sequential installation or
removal.
MC-09 All plumbing connections and fittings used for fuel systems should contain integral bonding features to eliminate the need
for bonding clamps or jumper cables.
MC-11 No subsystem plumbing, equipment, or wiring should use a tank, cell, or compartment containing liquids as a means for
routing or penetration simplicity during manufacture.
MC-12 All plumbing and connectors containing liquids should be meniscus-free.
MC-13 In instances where plumbing or connector interfaces cannot or are not keyed for a specific orientation, all identification,
markings, cautions, and directions should be placed 360 degrees around the tube or duct.
MC-14 Where multiple connectors are located in close proximity, ensure (1) a minimum hand tool arc of 120 degrees can be
maintained, and (2) stagger fittings to ensure firm coupling interface/hand tool interface can be accomplished without
inducing damage to adjacent lines.
MP-01 Avoid the use epoxies to mount parts on repairable modules because they make repair extremely difficult.
MP-02 Use a unique identification (ID) resistor incorporated in each system module to verify that the proper module is mounted
on ATE.
MP-03 Design modules so that lengthy warm-up times, special coding and air purity levels, and similar constraints are not
necessary.
SABCH-21 Tire pressure reduction should not be required prior to tie down solely to increase the tire footprint
SAFE-08 A single lever safety should, when positioned, safe the entire escape/ejection system. Use of the single lever to "arm"

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

should require two hands.
SAFE-09 Safing the canopy jettison system should be accomplished through the same lever device used to safe the ejection seat.
SEAT-01 Design personnel seats and padding materials, including the covers and fillers, so they are incapable of creating or
emitting toxic fumes or dense smoke when subjected to fire.
SEAT-02 Design personnel seats and padding materials so they are incapable of absorbing and holding fluids.
SEAT-03 Do not use seat and padding materials that can create static electricity in pyrotechnic or combustible fluid environments.
SEAT-04 Design ejection seats so they can be replaced with canopy or escape hatch installed.
SEAT-05 Design ejection seat pyrotechnic devices so they are 100 percent viewable and accessible with seat installed.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
SEAT-06 Do not use seat removal as a means of access.

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

SIMP-01 Location and design of all exterior lights should not require protective covers in ground environments.
SURV-02 Provide crew stations, crew compartments, and operator areas containing dinghies as emergency equipment with a
suitable tool for puncturing or cutting the dinghy in the event of inadvertent inflation. Locate the tool so that access is
assured during dinghy inflation.

C-241
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.03.11 Materials, Treatments, Coatings, and A-01 Seal equipment bays and compartments against the environmental elements including all types of servicing fluids used for
Finishes the vehicle, all types of anti-ice and de-ice fluids, and all types of fluids used for chemical, biological, or nuclear

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

decontamination.
A-02 Equipment bay and compartment structure should be bonded, co-cured, welded, machined, or combinations thereof to
eliminate or minimize the use of mechanical fasteners.
A-03 All equipment bay and compartment structural flanges and stiffeners should be external to the compartment to maximize
the volume available for equipment installation and arrangement.
A-04 Use stiffening beads in lieu of flanges to the maximum extent to enhance compartment volume and simplify repairs.
Stiffening beads should have the convex surface toward the compartment to eliminate fluid traps.
A-05 Keep all machined compartment frames, webs, and closure panels to a constant thickness (e.g., not stepped or tapered) to
ease simplicity of fluid or electrical penetrations and ease and simplicity of structural repair.
A-16 Structural design should provide good access to corrosion-prone areas for inspection and treatment.
CREW-07 Electronic and photosensitive storage media should withstand the adverse environment created by ground, flightline, or
shipboard electromagnetic fields and light sources.
CREW-08 Data storage media containers and modules should be capable of chemical and biological decontamination processes.
D&V-03 Crew cabs, operators' compartments, crew stations, cockpits, and passenger compartments should be subject to the same
corrosion prevention measures as the exteriors of the vehicles. Low points, pockets, and related fluid collection points
within should be provided with low point drains.
ECS-18 Avoid the use of insulation blankets containing polyvinyl for any application due to the dense smoke and toxic fumes if
burned or subjected to high temperature bleed air leakage.
ECS-19 Thermal blankets and covers used in ground vehicles should be replaceable.
ECS-20 Minor rips, tears, and punctures in ground vehicle thermal blankets and covers should be capable of being repaired in
place.
ECS-25 Technology, material selection, and treatments should combine to provide a corrosion-resistant system.
ENG(G)-16 Do not locate batteries in the engine compartment. In those instances where this is not possible:
- The battery support structure should be of a material that is impervious to acid leakage or boil-over.
- The battery support structure should serve as a scupper to collect and direct the acid out of the engine compartment.
ENG(G)-19 Paint engine compartments gloss white to enhance light reflectivity and enhance fluid leak detection.
ENG-47 Design the engine, including all accessories, plumbing, wiring, ducts, and mechanisms, to meet the same environmental
protection and compatibility requirements as the host vehicle.
ENV-01 Materials, treatments, coatings, finishes should be compatible with all anti-ice and de-ice fluids, chemical and biological

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

decontamination fluids, washing and cleaning fluids, and all vehicle subsystem fluids.
ENV-02 There should be no top coat or treatment deterioration throughout the standard temperature and humidity spectrum.
ENV-03 For airborne vehicles, the finishes should be durable against rain, hail, and dynamic erosion throughout the flight
envelope.
ENV-04 For airborne and ground vehicles, the finishes should be durable against sand erosion throughout all surface wind speeds
experienced in arid or desert geographical locations.
ENV-05 For airborne vehicles, materials and all finishes with the engine inlet should be durable against hammer shock and
compressor stalls.
EXH-01 Treatments required for engine hot sections and exhaust areas should not require scheduled removals for the purposes of

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
recoating.

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

EXH-02 High temperature exhaust patterns should flow away from or be directed away from treated surrounding structure,
coatings, or finishes.
IN(V)-08 Incorporate an inlet closure door sealing concept that prevents entry of fluid, dust, or sand across the entire airborne and
ground environment spectrum.
IN-01 Low Observable (LO) engine face frames should be within 10 inches of the first stage fan or compressor blades.

C-242
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.03.11 Materials, Treatments, Coatings, and IN-02 Openings throughout the engine face frame should be sufficient to perform a 100% FOD inspection of the engine face.
Finishes

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

IN-03 Openings throughout the engine face frame should be sufficient to permit minor blending or repair of FOD without
removing the engine.
IN-04 For frames not integral with the engine, frame removal should be achievable from the engine cavity.
IN-05 Both integral and remote engine front frames should be interchangeable.
IN-06 Front frame anti-ice and de-ice provisions should give preference to engine hot bleed air.
LG-04 Do not use Beryllium and Beryllium base alloys in any location subject to wear or corrosive atmospheres or in installations
where machining may be required.
LO-01 Use LO compatible gap fillers for manufactured gaps in lieu of tape and butter (surface coating compound).
LO-02 Avoid scheduled forced inspections or replacement of materials, coatings, or finishes solely to protect either the reliability
or the signature.
LO-03 Equipment and support structure requiring shrouds to reduce radar returns should not cause increases in equipment
service/repair time.
LO-04 Infrequently-accessed structural doors and panels incorporating special coatings or conductive paints should contain
provisions for prying the door or panel clear of moldline with standard screwdriver without damage.
LO-05 Do not locate flush mounted LO screens for auxiliary air inlets and exits in walkway areas unless durability has been
proven.
LO-06 Size flush mounted LO screens for auxiliary air inlets and exits to ensure functionality with up to 25 percent of the
openings plugged.
LO-07 Flush and non-flush LO screens should be interchangeable.
MATL-01 A high degree of durability should be maintained for a minimum distance of 36 inches forward of the inflight refueling
receptacle.
MATL-02 Cosmetic type repairs should not exceed 1 hours including cure or drying times.
MATL-03 Cosmetic and vehicle repair material shelf life should not be less than 24 months.
MATL-04 Cosmetic and vehicle repair materials should be non-proprietary and non-single source.
MATL-05 Cosmetic and vehicle repair materials should not require refrigeration or special facilities or atmospheres for storage.
MATL-06 Repair criteria, repairs, and instructions should not be classified.
MATL-07 All cosmetic touch-up and repair materials should be environmentally safe.
MATL-08 Repairs (other than major depot repair) should not require autoclave type facilities.
MATL-09 A high degree of durability should be achieved across all walkway areas on the top surfaces of all vehicles up to and

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

including 95 percentile personnel.
MATL-10 Coatings and finishes should be durable against the effects of missile gases, velocities, and particles emanating from the
missile motor.
MATL-11 Coatings and finishes should be durable against the effects of gun gases, projectile shock waves, and brass particles
emanating from the projectile seal rings.
MATL-12 Leading edge materials and coatings should be durable against fragments from frangible gun port plugs.
MATL-13 Special handling or shipping requirements of repair materials should be avoided.
MATL-14 Leading edges, including chines, containing or constructed of radar absorbing materials, should be interchangeable to
reduce vehicle downtime and simplify repairs.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
MATL-15 Doors and panels containing blade seals used for signature reduction should be interchangeable or contain

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

interchangeable blade seals. Deviation is acceptable where repairs can be accomplished on the vehicle in a time equal to
or less than door or seal remove and replace time.
P-03 All doors and panels subject to environmental elements should contain form-in-place seals (or equivalent) attached to the
door structure, not substructure, to prevent damage during maintenance.

C-243
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.03.11 Materials, Treatments, Coatings, and P-04 Door and panel seals should be compatible with all types of on-board servicing fluids, de-ice and anti-ice fluids, and all
Finishes fluids used for chemical, biological, and nuclear decontamination.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

P-05 Piano type hinges should not be used on doors or panels because they are subject to wear, corrosion, and sand and fluid
entry.
SABCH-06 Structural design should avoid the potential of dissimilar material or fastener corrosion.
SABCH-10 Do not use lockbolts in composites.
SABCH-11 In rare instances where the use of dissimilar material in immediate contact cannot be avoided, they should be sufficiently
insulated to endure for the life of the vehicle.
SE-01 Wheel chocks for all types of ground and airborne vehicles should contain the following features:
- Be nestable for low volume during storage or transport
- Be manufactured from corrosion-resistant materials
- Be releasable from tire pinch
- Be highly visible for day and night operations
- Be impervious to all types of fluids used to service or maintain the vehicles
- Be of light weight
SE-02 Wheel chocks for airborne vehicles should also contain the following features:
- Contain provisions for securing to ramp or flight decks
- Contain provisions to secure chocks at wheels
- Releasable/removable from outside of hot brake envelope
- Contain provisions to enable chock to be used as a tire blowout device
- Contain provisions to prevent skidding on snow or ice
SE-06 Non-metallic materials should take preference over metals to enable simple manufacturing and repair by bonding in lieu
of weldments and/or mechanical fasteners.
SE-07 The design construction concept and material selection for support equipment structure should not rely or depend upon
the use of scheduled maintenance, NDI, or NDT to protect the durability or integrity of the equipment in the operational
environment.
SE-09 Ladders and workstands used in close proximity to air and ground vehicles should contain effective buffers to protect
finishes and treatments.
SE-10 Protective finishes and coatings should meet the same ground environmental criteria as defined for air and ground
vehicles.
SEAT-01 Design personnel seats and padding materials, including the covers and fillers, so they are incapable of creating or
emitting toxic fumes or dense smoke when subjected to fire.
SEAT-02 Design personnel seats and padding materials so they are incapable of absorbing and holding fluids.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

SEAT-03 Do not use seat and padding materials that can create static electricity in pyrotechnic or combustible fluid environments.
SIMP-01 Location and design of all exterior lights should not require protective covers in ground environments.
SKID-01 Design non-metallic floats to be impervious to all fluids used on board the host vehicle.
SKID-02 Design non-metallic floats to be highly resistant to scuffing and abrasion.
SKID-03 Design non-metallic floats with a color-coded inner ply to readily denote when maximum abrasion limits have been
reached.
SKID-05 Design metallic and composite floats and skids to the same environmental criteria as the airframe, including finishes.
SKID-06 Use non-skid finishes on the upper surfaces of skids and floats for use as steps and walkways.
SKID-07 Design floats with simple drain provisions for each compartment.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
WBAY-01 Equipment bays and compartments should not require installation of special cavity fillers when equipment is not installed.
WBAY-03 The method and position of the pylon-to-wing gap scale should not form a drip edge for leakage into the pylon cavity.
WBAY-04 The gap treatment should be a permanent installation on the pylon, wing, or both, not a separate seal.
WBAY-05 Gap treatment should not interfere with or be damaged by existing pylon handling support equipment.
WBAY-11 Gap seal should match pylon and wing/fuselage surface impedance.

C-244
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.03.11 Materials, Treatments, Coatings, and WBAY-12 Pylon-to-store/weapon gap seal should permit visual and physical access during loading for all interfaces between bomb
Finishes rack-to-store, bomb rack-to-launcher, and launcher-to-store.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

WBAY-13 Pylon-to-store/weapon gap seal should not interfere with automatic sway brace function.
WBAY-14 Pylon-to-store/weapon gap seal should permit physical access to lanyards.
WBAY-15 Gap seals should not hinder pilot or ground crew preflight inspection.
WBAY-17 Special coatings or conductive paints on pylons, launchers, racks, launchers, tanks, pods, etc. should have the durability to
withstand contact with support stands/cradles during storage.
WBAY-18 The proximity of the gun firing barrel to structure should be such that structural furrows or channels are not required for
projectile clearances during firing.
WBAY-20 Gun plugs required solely to maintain a given signature level should be capable of on-board stowage for use only when a
threat requires their presence.
WBAY-21 Coatings and finishes in the area of gun barrels should be durable to withstand the effect of exiting projectile shockwaves.
WBAY-22 The proximity of the gun blast deflector to structure should not require reliance on high-temperature paints or coatings to
protect the structure.
WIND-01 Optical window materials should be scratch resistant, easy to clean, and dissipate electrostatic charges.
WIND-03 Window locations should minimize the effects of contamination by salt spray, bugs, oils, fuels, and icing.
WIND-04 Window, canopy, and windshield material should be designed to withstand the effects of sandstorms in the ground
environment and the effects of rain and hail during thunderstorm penetration in the airborne environment.
WIND-06 Do not locate windows in the proximity of rooster tails created by wheels/tires passing through water or slush.
WIND-07 Use materials that are highly resistive to thermal shock.
WIND-12 Design EO windows and optics to be interchangeable among the same air vehicle types or same ground vehicle types.
WIND-15 Design light covers and lenses to be sufficiently durable so that protective covers are not needed during maintenance.
WIND-16 Lens shape should enhance LO capability to reduce need, care, and expense for special coatings.
3.04 Control A-13 Two-sided or two-surfaced access should not be required for access to equipment interfaces and hardpoints. The term
two-sided infers top/bottom, left/right, front/back, or combinations thereof.
BIT-26 Locate routinely used test points so they are accessible without removing or disassembling other equipment
CONT-01 Control rods should use Boyd or impedance type bolts (or equivalent) to eliminate the need for cotter pins or safety wir e.
CONT-02 Do not use metal control cables for vehicles that will operate in salt water or salt air environments.
CONT-03 Use control rods rather than control cables for non-complex applications and non-complex routing within the vehicle.
CONT-04 Use control cables rather than control rods for most complex applications.
CONT-05 Route cables so that 100 percent of a cable will be viewable for inspection.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

CONT-06 Design all pulleys and brackets associated with cable installations so they are accessible by a 75 percentile male hand.
ECS-09 Design control valves, both manual and powered, with a visual pointer that clearly indicates the position of the valve.
ECS-10 The power actuation source used for valves that direct or control air, gas, or liquid flow should be parasitic to the valve
body to enable replacement without disturbing the integrity of the lines, ducts, or plenums.
HYD-09 Provide hydraulic devices used in critical applications with integral 5 micron filtering.
HYD-11 Design flexible hose with molded-in color bands to clearly indicate when the maximum wear/abrasion has been reached.
LG-05 All bolts or similar threaded means used as adjustable stops should be positively retained in the adjusted reference without
reliance on jam nuts, cotter pins, or safety wire.
LG-11 All microswitches, proximity switches, lights, sensors, etc. mounted to a strut should have individual interface connectors.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
Wiring pigtails requiring in-line splices should be avoided.
LG-14 All interfaces from the airframe to the struts should be visible and accessible, and not require removal of airframe
structure for access.
MC-02 Avoid the use of cotter pins, safety wire, safety clips, and similar devices to prevent maintenance-induced events leading
to ground vehicle accidents or loss of air vehicles.

C-245
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.04 Control MC-03 All tubing connections and interfaces should use rosan/dynatube (or equivalent) to (1) enable connect or disconnect with
one hand, one tool, (2) eliminate the need to safety the connection, (3) provide a superior seal, and (4) negate need to

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

reposition line(s) during component replacement.
MC-04 No trombone type, flared tube type, or piloted line type interfaces should be used to avoid the need for removal or
repositioning during equipment removal.
MC-05 Avoid potential foreign object traps during manufacturing or operational maintenance by eliminating vertical penetrations
of plumbing/fittings into tanks, compartments, or cells
MC-06 Locate, position, orient all plumbing and duct electrical connectors to prevent the need for sequential installation or
removal.
MC-09 All plumbing connections and fittings used for fuel systems should contain integral bonding features to eliminate the need
for bonding clamps or jumper cables.
MC-10 In rare instances where a plumbing run contains complex form or geometry that would require removal of other plumbing
or equipment for access, in-line connectors should be incorporated to maintain the integrity of other plumbing or
equipment.
MC-11 No subsystem plumbing, equipment, or wiring should use a tank, cell, or compartment containing liquids as a means for
routing or penetration simplicity during manufacture.
MC-12 All plumbing and connectors containing liquids should be meniscus-free.
MC-13 In instances where plumbing or connector interfaces cannot or are not keyed for a specific orientation, all identification,
markings, cautions, and directions should be placed 360 degrees around the tube or duct.
MC-14 Where multiple connectors are located in close proximity, ensure (1) a minimum hand tool arc of 120 degrees can be
maintained, and (2) stagger fittings to ensure firm coupling interface/hand tool interface can be accomplished without
inducing damage to adjacent lines.
MP-01 Avoid the use epoxies to mount parts on repairable modules because they make repair extremely difficult.
MP-02 Use a unique identification (ID) resistor incorporated in each system module to verify that the proper module is mounted
on ATE.
MP-03 Design modules so that lengthy warm-up times, special coding and air purity levels, and similar constraints are not
necessary.
T-01 Do not locate pyro, gas, and air (PGA) control system exhaust exits:
- In proximity to safe, arm, or servicing areas,
- Adjacent to auxiliary inlets,
- In close proximity to crew boarding areas, weapons, emergency ingress/egress areas, and optics or optical glass.
T-02 Design pyro type thruster exits associated with emergency use or backup with simple exit closure devices to identify if a

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

thruster has been fired.
T-03 Provide protective screens for PGA exits that normally remain open to prevent intrusions from fowl or wildlife.
T-04 Provide protective closure provisions for PGA exits located or oriented to exposure from the elements.
T-05 Design single-shot (one time use) type thrusters with a minimum 6-year shelf life and a 7-year installed life.
3.04.01 Steering and Directional Control A-06 Hardpoints (structural attachment and load bearing areas) within a compartment to assist in equipment mounting or
support should not be integral with the machined part. Hardpoints should be parasitic to enable quick repair in case of
wear or damage in lieu of precise ream/bush repair typical of machined hardpoints.
A-13 Two-sided or two-surfaced access should not be required for access to equipment interfaces and hardpoints. The term
two-sided infers top/bottom, left/right, front/back, or combinations thereof.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
BIT-01 During design of the BIT, use worst-case stress analysis to ensure that any circuit failures induced by temperature

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

extremes, tolerance build-up, power supply variations, and combinations thereof are identified.
BIT-02 Ensure that BIT system thresholds are consistent with those across the system, subsystem, item, module, and piece-part
levels to prevent excessive numbers of Cannot Duplicate (CND) and Retest OK (RTOK) events from occurring.
BIT-03 The degree of BIT required or proposed should be based on the respective failure rates and the appropriate FMECA at
all equipment indenture levels.

C-246
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.04.01 Steering and Directional Control BIT-04 Limit the amount of data that is recorded to a manageable size by:
- Limiting the number of signals that are monitored

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

- Limiting the maximum sampling rate
- Reducing the time span over which data is accumulated
- Restricting the type of data accumulated
BIT-05 Incorporate testability design features as an integral part of equipment preliminary design process.
BIT-06 Mission critical functions should be monitored by BIT.
BIT-09 Use concurrent BIT to monitor system critical functions.
BIT-26 Locate routinely used test points so they are accessible without removing or disassembling other equipment
CONT-01 Control rods should use Boyd or impedance type bolts (or equivalent) to eliminate the need for cotter pins or safety wir e.
CONT-02 Do not use metal control cables for vehicles that will operate in salt water or salt air environments.
CONT-03 Use control rods rather than control cables for non-complex applications and non-complex routing within the vehicle.
CONT-04 Use control cables rather than control rods for most complex applications.
CONT-05 Route cables so that 100 percent of a cable will be viewable for inspection.
CONT-06 Design all pulleys and brackets associated with cable installations so they are accessible by a 75 percentile male hand.
ENG(G)-20 Design all firewall fittings, connectors, and penetrations to be fully viewable and directly accessible to the maintainers.
ENV-06 For ground vehicles, the finishes should be compatible with and durable against all rain, hail, sleet, snow, and ice
conditions experienced in all intended operational environments.
HYD-09 Provide hydraulic devices used in critical applications with integral 5 micron filtering.
HYD-11 Design flexible hose with molded-in color bands to clearly indicate when the maximum wear/abrasion has been reached.
LG-01 Bearings, excluding wheel bearings, should not require lubrication during the expected life of the air vehicle airframe.
LG-04 Do not use Beryllium and Beryllium base alloys in any location subject to wear or corrosive atmospheres or in installations
where machining may be required.
LG-05 All bolts or similar threaded means used as adjustable stops should be positively retained in the adjusted reference without
reliance on jam nuts, cotter pins, or safety wire.
LG-11 All microswitches, proximity switches, lights, sensors, etc. mounted to a strut should have individual interface connectors.
Wiring pigtails requiring in-line splices should be avoided.
LG-14 All interfaces from the airframe to the struts should be visible and accessible, and not require removal of airframe
structure for access.
MC-02 Avoid the use of cotter pins, safety wire, safety clips, and similar devices to prevent maintenance-induced events leading
to ground vehicle accidents or loss of air vehicles.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

MC-03 All tubing connections and interfaces should use rosan/dynatube (or equivalent) to (1) enable connect or disconnect with
one hand, one tool, (2) eliminate the need to safety the connection, (3) provide a superior seal, and (4) negate need to
reposition line(s) during component replacement.
MC-04 No trombone type, flared tube type, or piloted line type interfaces should be used to avoid the need for removal or
repositioning during equipment removal.
MC-05 Avoid potential foreign object traps during manufacturing or operational maintenance by eliminating vertical penetrations
of plumbing/fittings into tanks, compartments, or cells
MC-06 Locate, position, orient all plumbing and duct electrical connectors to prevent the need for sequential installation or
removal.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
MC-09 All plumbing connections and fittings used for fuel systems should contain integral bonding features to eliminate the need

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

for bonding clamps or jumper cables.
MC-10 In rare instances where a plumbing run contains complex form or geometry that would require removal of other plumbing
or equipment for access, in-line connectors should be incorporated to maintain the integrity of other plumbing or
equipment.

C-247
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.04.01 Steering and Directional Control MC-11 No subsystem plumbing, equipment, or wiring should use a tank, cell, or compartment containing liquids as a means for
routing or penetration simplicity during manufacture.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

MC-12 All plumbing and connectors containing liquids should be meniscus-free.
MC-13 In instances where plumbing or connector interfaces cannot or are not keyed for a specific orientation, all identification,
markings, cautions, and directions should be placed 360 degrees around the tube or duct.
MC-14 Where multiple connectors are located in close proximity, ensure (1) a minimum hand tool arc of 120 degrees can be
maintained, and (2) stagger fittings to ensure firm coupling interface/hand tool interface can be accomplished without
inducing damage to adjacent lines.
MP-01 Avoid the use epoxies to mount parts on repairable modules because they make repair extremely difficult.
MP-02 Use a unique identification (ID) resistor incorporated in each system module to verify that the proper module is mounted
on ATE.
MP-03 Design modules so that lengthy warm-up times, special coding and air purity levels, and similar constraints are not
necessary.
T-01 Do not locate pyro, gas, and air (PGA) control system exhaust exits:
- In proximity to safe, arm, or servicing areas,
- Adjacent to auxiliary inlets,
- In close proximity to crew boarding areas, weapons, emergency ingress/egress areas, and optics or optical glass.
T-02 Design pyro type thruster exits associated with emergency use or backup with simple exit closure devices to identify if a
thruster has been fired.
T-03 Provide protective screens for PGA exits that normally remain open to prevent intrusions from fowl or wildlife.
T-04 Provide protective closure provisions for PGA exits located or oriented to exposure from the elements.
WT&B-02 Brake-wear indicating pins should be highly visible during day and night operations.
WT&B-06 Locate brake anti-skid system components, including brake control valves, for easy access in low-vibration environments.
WT&B-09 Brake clips, end plates, retainers, etc. used to build up wheel, tire, and brake assemblies should not be capable of reverse
or improper installation.
WT&B-10 No hubcaps or covers should be installed in a manner that prevents full visual viewing of the wheel retaining nut. In
instances where this may not be possible, the design should ensure that the hubcap/cover cannot be installed unless the
retaining nut is properly installed.
3.04.02 Flight Control Systems and Air Cushion A-06 Hardpoints (structural attachment and load bearing areas) within a compartment to assist in equipment mounting or
Systems support should not be integral with the machined part. Hardpoints should be parasitic to enable quick repair in case of
wear or damage in lieu of precise ream/bush repair typical of machined hardpoints.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

A-13 Two-sided or two-surfaced access should not be required for access to equipment interfaces and hardpoints. The term
two-sided infers top/bottom, left/right, front/back, or combinations thereof.
AA&S-05 Multi-function antennas, arrays, and sensors located in leading edges should be modularized to reduce vehicle downtime
through simplified replacement of a faulty module.
AA&S-06 Moveable flaps or slats containing integral antennas, arrays, or sensors should be interchangeable to provide the option
for on-vehicle or off-vehicle repair.
ACS-01 Design air cushion skirt surfaces to be highly resistant to high velocity blowing sand and stones.
ACS-02 Design skirt surfaces to the same operational and environmental criteria as that identified for low observable surfaces.
ACS-03 Select materials for the skirt surface so that bonded repairs can be used for punctures and tears across a wide

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
temperature spectrum/humidity index without relying on special facilities or equipment.

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

ACS-04 Incorporate rip-stop methodology in skirt construction to limit tears and rips and to prevent tear propagation.
ACS-05 Incorporate a color-coded interply in skirts to readily identify the maximum abrasion limit.
ACS-06 Do not try to achieve high reliability by requiring frequent visual inspections or scheduled replacement at predetermined
calendar or operating hour intervals.

C-248
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.04.02 Flight Control Systems and Air Cushion ACS-07 Design skirt repair kits and select materials for the kits so they are not subject to a predetermined shelf-life or special
Systems storage requirements.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

ACS-08 Design all elements making up the air cushion control system so they are capable of sustained operations in salt air/water
environments.
ACS-09 Employ control by wire or control by light technology to eliminate complex control mechanisms and associated
maintenance and support.
ACS-10 Ensure all diagnostic and prognostic logic, intelligence, and status type informational data are storable and viewable
within the crew station.
ACS-11 Provide crew station personnel with the capability to manually initiate selective BIT and interrogate the prognostics
system without interrupting the full-time or periodic BIT routines.
BIT-01 During design of the BIT, use worst-case stress analysis to ensure that any circuit failures induced by temperature
extremes, tolerance build-up, power supply variations, and combinations thereof are identified.
BIT-02 Ensure that BIT system thresholds are consistent with those across the system, subsystem, item, module, and piece-part
levels to prevent excessive numbers of Cannot Duplicate (CND) and Retest OK (RTOK) events from occurring.
BIT-03 The degree of BIT required or proposed should be based on the respective failure rates and the appropriate FMECA at
all equipment indenture levels.
BIT-04 Limit the amount of data that is recorded to a manageable size by:
- Limiting the number of signals that are monitored
- Limiting the maximum sampling rate
- Reducing the time span over which data is accumulated
- Restricting the type of data accumulated
BIT-05 Incorporate testability design features as an integral part of equipment preliminary design process.
BIT-06 Mission critical functions should be monitored by BIT.
BIT-09 Use concurrent BIT to monitor system critical functions.
BIT-26 Locate routinely used test points so they are accessible without removing or disassembling other equipment
CONT-01 Control rods should use Boyd or impedance type bolts (or equivalent) to eliminate the need for cotter pins or safety wir e.
CONT-02 Do not use metal control cables for vehicles that will operate in salt water or salt air environments.
CONT-03 Use control rods rather than control cables for non-complex applications and non-complex routing within the vehicle.
CONT-04 Use control cables rather than control rods for most complex applications.
CONT-05 Route cables so that 100 percent of a cable will be viewable for inspection.
CONT-06 Design all pulleys and brackets associated with cable installations so they are accessible by a 75 percentile male hand.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

ENV-01 Materials, treatments, coatings, finishes should be compatible with all anti-ice and de-ice fluids, chemical and biological
decontamination fluids, washing and cleaning fluids, and all vehicle subsystem fluids.
ENV-02 There should be no top coat or treatment deterioration throughout the standard temperature and humidity spectrum.
ENV-03 For airborne vehicles, the finishes should be durable against rain, hail, and dynamic erosion throughout the flight
envelope.
ENV-04 For airborne and ground vehicles, the finishes should be durable against sand erosion throughout all surface wind speeds
experienced in arid or desert geographical locations.
HYD-09 Provide hydraulic devices used in critical applications with integral 5 micron filtering.
HYD-11 Design flexible hose with molded-in color bands to clearly indicate when the maximum wear/abrasion has been reached.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
LG-01 Bearings, excluding wheel bearings, should not require lubrication during the expected life of the air vehicle airframe.

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

LG-04 Do not use Beryllium and Beryllium base alloys in any location subject to wear or corrosive atmospheres or in installations
where machining may be required.
LG-05 All bolts or similar threaded means used as adjustable stops should be positively retained in the adjusted reference without
reliance on jam nuts, cotter pins, or safety wire.

C-249
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.04.02 Flight Control Systems and Air Cushion MC-01 All clamps should contain torque-set or torque-limiting connections to prevent clamp or component failure due to over-
Systems torque. Clamp installation call outs should not depend on special tools to establish the required torque values.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

MC-02 Avoid the use of cotter pins, safety wire, safety clips, and similar devices to prevent maintenance-induced events leading
to ground vehicle accidents or loss of air vehicles.
MC-03 All tubing connections and interfaces should use rosan/dynatube (or equivalent) to (1) enable connect or disconnect with
one hand, one tool, (2) eliminate the need to safety the connection, (3) provide a superior seal, and (4) negate need to
reposition line(s) during component replacement.
MC-04 No trombone type, flared tube type, or piloted line type interfaces should be used to avoid the need for removal or
repositioning during equipment removal.
MC-05 Avoid potential foreign object traps during manufacturing or operational maintenance by eliminating vertical penetrations
of plumbing/fittings into tanks, compartments, or cells
MC-06 Locate, position, orient all plumbing and duct electrical connectors to prevent the need for sequential installation or
removal.
MC-09 All plumbing connections and fittings used for fuel systems should contain integral bonding features to eliminate the need
for bonding clamps or jumper cables.
MC-10 In rare instances where a plumbing run contains complex form or geometry that would require removal of other plumbing
or equipment for access, in-line connectors should be incorporated to maintain the integrity of other plumbing or
equipment.
MC-11 No subsystem plumbing, equipment, or wiring should use a tank, cell, or compartment containing liquids as a means for
routing or penetration simplicity during manufacture.
MC-12 All plumbing and connectors containing liquids should be meniscus-free.
MC-13 In instances where plumbing or connector interfaces cannot or are not keyed for a specific orientation, all identification,
markings, cautions, and directions should be placed 360 degrees around the tube or duct.
MC-14 Where multiple connectors are located in close proximity, ensure (1) a minimum hand tool arc of 120 degrees can be
maintained, and (2) stagger fittings to ensure firm coupling interface/hand tool interface can be accomplished without
inducing damage to adjacent lines.
MP-01 Avoid the use epoxies to mount parts on repairable modules because they make repair extremely difficult.
MP-02 Use a unique identification (ID) resistor incorporated in each system module to verify that the proper module is mounted
on ATE.
MP-03 Design modules so that lengthy warm-up times, special coding and air purity levels, and similar constraints are not
necessary.
SIMP-03 Speed brake or speed brake cavity should contain integral mechanical locking mechanism for personnel safety.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

W-01 Hat section type structural stiffeners with sufficient cross sectional area should be considered as a routing tunnel for
wiring and coax.
3.04.03 Thrusters A-09 Any heat or temperature sensitive structure within a compartment should contain heat-sensitive tape or appropriate heat
sensor for easy indication of over-temperature excursions.
A-13 Two-sided or two-surfaced access should not be required for access to equipment interfaces and hardpoints. The term
two-sided infers top/bottom, left/right, front/back, or combinations thereof.
BIT-01 During design of the BIT, use worst-case stress analysis to ensure that any circuit failures induced by temperature
extremes, tolerance build-up, power supply variations, and combinations thereof are identified.
BIT-02 Ensure that BIT system thresholds are consistent with those across the system, subsystem, item, module, and piece-part

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
levels to prevent excessive numbers of Cannot Duplicate (CND) and Retest OK (RTOK) events from occurring.
BIT-03 The degree of BIT required or proposed should be based on the respective failure rates and the appropriate FMECA at
all equipment indenture levels.

C-250
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.04.03 Thrusters BIT-04 Limit the amount of data that is recorded to a manageable size by:
- Limiting the number of signals that are monitored

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

- Limiting the maximum sampling rate
- Reducing the time span over which data is accumulated
- Restricting the type of data accumulated
BIT-05 Incorporate testability design features as an integral part of equipment preliminary design process.
BIT-06 Mission critical functions should be monitored by BIT.
BIT-09 Use concurrent BIT to monitor system critical functions.
MC-01 All clamps should contain torque-set or torque-limiting connections to prevent clamp or component failure due to over-
torque. Clamp installation call outs should not depend on special tools to establish the required torque values.
MC-02 Avoid the use of cotter pins, safety wire, safety clips, and similar devices to prevent maintenance-induced events leading
to ground vehicle accidents or loss of air vehicles.
MC-03 All tubing connections and interfaces should use rosan/dynatube (or equivalent) to (1) enable connect or disconnect with
one hand, one tool, (2) eliminate the need to safety the connection, (3) provide a superior seal, and (4) negate need to
reposition line(s) during component replacement.
MC-04 No trombone type, flared tube type, or piloted line type interfaces should be used to avoid the need for removal or
repositioning during equipment removal.
MC-06 Locate, position, orient all plumbing and duct electrical connectors to prevent the need for sequential installation or
removal.
MC-09 All plumbing connections and fittings used for fuel systems should contain integral bonding features to eliminate the need
for bonding clamps or jumper cables.
MC-10 In rare instances where a plumbing run contains complex form or geometry that would require removal of other plumbing
or equipment for access, in-line connectors should be incorporated to maintain the integrity of other plumbing or
equipment.
MC-11 No subsystem plumbing, equipment, or wiring should use a tank, cell, or compartment containing liquids as a means for
routing or penetration simplicity during manufacture.
MC-12 All plumbing and connectors containing liquids should be meniscus-free.
MC-13 In instances where plumbing or connector interfaces cannot or are not keyed for a specific orientation, all identification,
markings, cautions, and directions should be placed 360 degrees around the tube or duct.
MC-14 Where multiple connectors are located in close proximity, ensure (1) a minimum hand tool arc of 120 degrees can be
maintained, and (2) stagger fittings to ensure firm coupling interface/hand tool interface can be accomplished without
inducing damage to adjacent lines.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

PYRO-16 Do not use cartridge actuated devices (CADs) for store or weapon ejection or for pylon jettison due to inherent ground
safety hazards, stray energy hazards, and scheduled cleaning requirements.
PYRO-17 In rare instances where use of CADs may be required, a positive indication to denote "cartridge installed" should be
provided.
SAFE-03 Stored energy devices (e.g., accumulators, nitrogen bottles, gas generators, etc.), that could cause injury, harm, or
damage if inadvertently actuated, should contain integral safing provisions.
SAFE-04 Electrical and optical safe/arm system design should eliminate the need for mechanical type system interrupt devices.
3.05 Mechanisms A-13 Two-sided or two-surfaced access should not be required for access to equipment interfaces and hardpoints. The term
two-sided infers top/bottom, left/right, front/back, or combinations thereof.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
AA&S-02 Closure and sealing of cavities, compartments, and wells for retractable antennas should be mechanized to function as

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

part of the extend and retract cycle.
ACS-09 Employ control by wire or control by light technology to eliminate complex control mechanisms and associated
maintenance and support.
ARM-09 Weapon and store ejectors containing adjustable pitch control devices should ensure devices are easily accessible and
adjustments are Murphy-free.

C-251
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.05 Mechanisms BIT-05 Incorporate testability design features as an integral part of equipment preliminary design process.
BIT-06 Mission critical functions should be monitored by BIT.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

BIT-09 Use concurrent BIT to monitor system critical functions.
ENG(G)-01 Provide access to all engine mounts for ground vehicles so that hoisting or crawling under the vehicle is not required.
ENG(G)-02 Use torque-limiting bolts or torque washers as engine mount attaching hardware to eliminate the need for torque
wrenches.
ENG(G)-06 The distance between the engine and firewall should ensure the access envelopes to lines, fittings, wiring, and
adjustments will accommodate the 75 percentile male hand.
ENG(G)-10 Design attaching hardware for all mechanical engine-to-vehicle interfaces to be captive and with integral safeties.
ENG(G)-20 Design all firewall fittings, connectors, and penetrations to be fully viewable and directly accessible to the maintainers.
ENG-31 No rigging or calibration should be required subsequent to replacement of any engine-mounted component.
ENG-32 Design the engine fuel controls and electronic controllers so that no manual fuel grade adjustments are required.
ENG-38 The characteristics of engine-to-vehicle interfaces coupled with the capabilities of electronic engine controls, should
negate the necessity for making any type of engine rigging including maximum power, idle, and idle cut-off.
ENG-39 Engine-to-vehicle plumbing quick disconnects should contain positive visual indication that the interface is fully seated
and locked.
FUEL-04 Where the fuel wetted area inside a fuel cell or tank is void of blade, knife, and hat stiffeners for use as hardpoint
attachment, standoffs bonded to the cell surface should be used as attachments for clamps, and brackets to eliminate
fastener penetration of the fuel cavity.
HOOK-01 Locate, orient, and mechanize Nose Gear Tow/Nose Gear Holdback (NGT/NGH) mechanisms so they do not interfere
with the hookup and attachment of standard towbars.
HOOK-02 Design NGT/NGH mechanisms with integral provisions to visually indicate correct hookup/attachment. The indication
must be visible during all day and night carrier operations.
HOOK-03 NGT/NGH mechanisms should not require scheduled visual or NDI type inspections.
HOOK-04 Design tail hook points to be interchangeable and easily replaceable.
HOOK-05 Design tail hook points so they can not be incorrectly installed.
IN(V)-01 Design inlet door actuators and door actuation mechanisms so they not protrude into the air inlet flow field to eliminate
FOD potential.
IN(V)-07 Ensure that no ground safety pins or streamers are used forward of the inlet or within a 3-foot radius aft of the inlet.
LG-01 Bearings, excluding wheel bearings, should not require lubrication during the expected life of the air vehicle airframe.
LG-04 Do not use Beryllium and Beryllium base alloys in any location subject to wear or corrosive atmospheres or in installations

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

where machining may be required.
LG-05 All bolts or similar threaded means used as adjustable stops should be positively retained in the adjusted reference without
reliance on jam nuts, cotter pins, or safety wire.
LG-16 No portion of the landing gear rigging process should require support equipment type templates, gauges, or tools. Indexes,
reference points, etc., should be an integral part of the landing gear/airframe design.
LG-17 Hydraulic, pneumatic, or electrical actuators associated with landing gear systems should not require adjustment or
rigging once installed in the air vehicle. Spare units should be rigged at the time of manufacture or overhaul.
LG-18 Landing gear ground safety down locks should be an integral part of the overall design. Use or reliance on loose pins
(support equipment) should be avoided.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
LG-19 When deemed necessary for the respective design, pilots, flight crews, or operators should have an indication of the

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

downlock status in the cockpit or crew station to avoid the necessity of a flight abort.
LG-20 Special locks and pins used solely for landing gear ground maintenance safety should be used only in those cases
substantiated by cost effectiveness analysis.
LG-25 Mechanical shrink struts, when used, should not permit gear to jam in wheel well if failure of shrink mechanism occurs.
LG-26 Gravitational emergency extension of landing gear should be given preference over all other concepts.

C-252
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.05 Mechanisms LG-27 Downlocks should be over-center mechanical type and should not depend on hydraulic pressure to maintain the lock.
LG-28 Landing gear control handle should have only "up" or "down" detents with no neutral or intermediate positions.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

LG-29 Basic gear design combined with manufacturing tolerances should ensure that no uplock or downlock rigging is required.
LG-31 Landing gear doors designed to close after gear is extended should be capable of being manually opened on the ground
without reliance on electrical or hydraulic power.
LG-44 Landing gear door mechanisms and interfaces should ensure that multiple cycles or occasional exceedence of maximum
gear-down speed do not result in loss of doors
MC-01 All clamps should contain torque-set or torque-limiting connections to prevent clamp or component failure due to over-
torque. Clamp installation call outs should not depend on special tools to establish the required torque values.
MC-02 Avoid the use of cotter pins, safety wire, safety clips, and similar devices to prevent maintenance-induced events leading
to ground vehicle accidents or loss of air vehicles.
P-06 Access door and panel devices used to support door in opened position should meet the following criteria:
- for airborne vehicles, design for 60 knot gust loads (or equivalent jet blast loads)
- for ground vehicles, design for 50 mph gust loads
P-09 Acceptable door and panel hold-open devices include over-center sheet metal spring, over-center spring link, spring
cartridge, support strut, and pinned goose neck hinge.
PERS-01 Group man-machine interfaces manifold-style to enable connect/disconnect in a single action.
PERS-02 Include an integral, highly visible indicator in a man-machine interface connector to denote connector is seated and
locked.
PERS-03 Design interface connectors so that a distinct action is required by an individual to effect a disconnect. (Excludes
airframe-to-ejection seat personnel interfaces.)
PERS-04 Interfaces should contain an emergency release mechanism that can be activated by rescue personnel with a 95
percentile gloved hand.
PERS-05 Design emergency interface release mechanisms to be clearly visible under all types of lighting situations.
PYRO-02 Provide the "safe/arm" status as an external cue discernible from a distance of 10-20 feet.
PYRO-06 "Safe/arm" mechanism design should be free from FOD potential.
PYRO-07 Manual "safe/arm" mechanisms should be well-clear of inlet ducts, propellers, rotors, and similar rotating components.
PYRO-08 Manual "safe/arm" mechanisms should be well-clear of engine exhausts, fuel/toxic vents, fluid drains, control surface
deflection envelopes, and rescue path envelopes.
PYRO-09 Provide positive, Murphy-proof locking detents for both the "safe" and "arm" positions of mechanical mechanisms.
PYRO-11 Design electrical/electronic "safe/arm" systems to eliminate the need for mechanical type system interrupt devices.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

PYRO-18 Mechanical "safe/arm" mechanism design should enable activation by a 95 percentile male wearing arctic mittens.
PYRO-35 Suspension system should permit any single weapon or store to be loaded by a two man crew.
SAFE-07 Landing and alighting gear design should ensure downlocks are integral to the mechanisms and provide a clear indication
of position status. This guideline also applies to tail hooks.
SAFE-08 A single lever safety should, when positioned, safe the entire escape/ejection system. Use of the single lever to "arm"
should require two hands.
SAFE-09 Safing the canopy jettison system should be accomplished through the same lever device used to safe the ejection seat.
SAFE-11 All individual safety pins used for ground maintenance should be clearly visible and coupled together to ensure no single
pin will be overlooked during arming.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
SAFE-12 Internal weapon bay doors should contain integral safety locking features for use during maintenance and weapon

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

loading and downloading.
SAFE-13 It should not be possible to unsafe a weapon bay door integral lock when a door closed signal is present.
SEAT-04 Design ejection seats so they can be replaced with canopy or escape hatch installed.
SIMP-03 Speed brake or speed brake cavity should contain integral mechanical locking mechanism for personnel safety.

C-253
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.05 Mechanisms WT&B-02 Brake-wear indicating pins should be highly visible during day and night operations.
WT&B-13 Emergency brake handles should not be similar in shape or color as other handles nor should they be located in close

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

proximity to such other handles.
3.05.01 Bellcranks, Pivots, Mechanical A-06 Hardpoints (structural attachment and load bearing areas) within a compartment to assist in equipment mounting or
Advantage Devices, Shift Devices, support should not be integral with the machined part. Hardpoints should be parasitic to enable quick repair in case of
Ratio Changers, Pressure wear or damage in lieu of precise ream/bush repair typical of machined hardpoints.
Bulkhead/Firewall Penetrators, Etc.
A-13 Two-sided or two-surfaced access should not be required for access to equipment interfaces and hardpoints. The term
two-sided infers top/bottom, left/right, front/back, or combinations thereof.
ACS-09 Employ control by wire or control by light technology to eliminate complex control mechanisms and associated
maintenance and support.
BIT-05 Incorporate testability design features as an integral part of equipment preliminary design process.
BIT-06 Mission critical functions should be monitored by BIT.
CONT-01 Control rods should use Boyd or impedance type bolts (or equivalent) to eliminate the need for cotter pins or safety wir e.
CONT-02 Do not use metal control cables for vehicles that will operate in salt water or salt air environments.
CONT-03 Use control rods rather than control cables for non-complex applications and non-complex routing within the vehicle.
CONT-04 Use control cables rather than control rods for most complex applications.
CONT-05 Route cables so that 100 percent of a cable will be viewable for inspection.
CONT-06 Design all pulleys and brackets associated with cable installations so they are accessible by a 75 percentile male hand.
CREW-04 Avoid wiring, coax, and plumbing penetrations through the floor of crew cabs, operators' compartments, crew stations,
cockpits, and passenger compartments.
ENG(G)-06 The distance between the engine and firewall should ensure the access envelopes to lines, fittings, wiring, and
adjustments will accommodate the 75 percentile male hand.
ENG(G)-10 Design attaching hardware for all mechanical engine-to-vehicle interfaces to be captive and with integral safeties.
ENG(G)-20 Design all firewall fittings, connectors, and penetrations to be fully viewable and directly accessible to the maintainers.
ENG-09 On multi-engine air vehicles, the engines should be capable of being installed in any engine cavity without need for
reconfiguration.
ENG-10 On multi-engine air vehicles, the airframe-to-engine interfaces should be in identical positions or orientations for each
engine cavity.
ENG-31 No rigging or calibration should be required subsequent to replacement of any engine-mounted component.
ENG-38 The characteristics of engine-to-vehicle interfaces coupled with the capabilities of electronic engine controls, should

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

negate the necessity for making any type of engine rigging including maximum power, idle, and idle cut-off.
ENG-39 Engine-to-vehicle plumbing quick disconnects should contain positive visual indication that the interface is fully seated
and locked.
FUEL-04 Where the fuel wetted area inside a fuel cell or tank is void of blade, knife, and hat stiffeners for use as hardpoint
attachment, standoffs bonded to the cell surface should be used as attachments for clamps, and brackets to eliminate
fastener penetration of the fuel cavity.
IN(V)-01 Design inlet door actuators and door actuation mechanisms so they not protrude into the air inlet flow field to eliminate
FOD potential.
LG-01 Bearings, excluding wheel bearings, should not require lubrication during the expected life of the air vehicle airframe.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
LG-04 Do not use Beryllium and Beryllium base alloys in any location subject to wear or corrosive atmospheres or in installations

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

where machining may be required.
LG-05 All bolts or similar threaded means used as adjustable stops should be positively retained in the adjusted reference without
reliance on jam nuts, cotter pins, or safety wire.

C-254
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.05.01 Bellcranks, Pivots, Mechanical LG-06 Design struts, attachments, and interfaces so they do not depend on scheduled visual inspections, non-destructive
Advantage Devices, Shift Devices, inspection (NDI), or non-destructive test (NDT) to ensure the reliability or integrity of the system in the operational

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

Ratio Changers, Pressure environment.
Bulkhead/Firewall Penetrators, Etc.
LG-07 No portion of the landing gear struts, drag braces, or interfaces should contain pockets or bathtubs that can trap or hold
moisture. In rare instances where this is not possible, holes should be drilled as appropriate to prevent moisture/liquid
accumulation.
LG-08 Brackets, levers, links, rods, et al mounted on the struts should either be symmetrical to tolerate reverse installation or
should be impossible to reverse.
LG-16 No portion of the landing gear rigging process should require support equipment type templates, gauges, or tools. Indexes,
reference points, etc., should be an integral part of the landing gear/airframe design.
LG-44 Landing gear door mechanisms and interfaces should ensure that multiple cycles or occasional exceedence of maximum
gear-down speed do not result in loss of doors
MC-02 Avoid the use of cotter pins, safety wire, safety clips, and similar devices to prevent maintenance-induced events leading
to ground vehicle accidents or loss of air vehicles.
TCR-07 Design mechanical interfaces to transmissions, clutches, and rotors so that the respective unit can be replaced without the
need for rigging.
3.06 Avionics and Electronics A-10 Provide a sufficient number of compartment fluid drains to ensure fluid drainage for varying aircraft static attitudes and
varying terrain slopes for ground vehicles.
A-11 Locate compartment electrical penetrations close to the access opening for ease of sight, probing, repair, and to eliminate
fluid soaking, wicking, or contamination.
A-12 Locate compartment electrical penetrations far enough from the access opening to prevent damage resulting from
improper (over-length) panel fasteners.
A-13 Two-sided or two-surfaced access should not be required for access to equipment interfaces and hardpoints. The term
two-sided infers top/bottom, left/right, front/back, or combinations thereof.
A-15 Locate tie-down attachment points such that tie-down chains, straps, or cables do not prevent or restrict normal servicing,
weapon loading, or safe/arm functions.
A-18 Use transparent windows, quick-opening covers, or openings without any cover to permit quick visual inspections where
needed.
AA&S-01 Flush mounted antennas, sensors, and air data devices should have a good color contrast to surrounding structure when
located in walkway areas.
AA&S-02 Closure and sealing of cavities, compartments, and wells for retractable antennas should be mechanized to function as

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

part of the extend and retract cycle.
AA&S-03 Closure and sealing of cavities, compartments, and wells for retractable antennas should be maintained when antennas
are not installed without need for ancillary measures or equipment.
AA&S-04 LO antennas should be designed to be tolerant of accumulations of grime or dirt without degrading performance or
biasing the BIT/fault isolate performance.
AA&S-05 Multi-function antennas, arrays, and sensors located in leading edges should be modularized to reduce vehicle downtime
through simplified replacement of a faulty module.
AA&S-06 Moveable flaps or slats containing integral antennas, arrays, or sensors should be interchangeable to provide the option
for on-vehicle or off-vehicle repair.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
BIT-01 During design of the BIT, use worst-case stress analysis to ensure that any circuit failures induced by temperature

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

extremes, tolerance build-up, power supply variations, and combinations thereof are identified.
BIT-02 Ensure that BIT system thresholds are consistent with those across the system, subsystem, item, module, and piece-part
levels to prevent excessive numbers of Cannot Duplicate (CND) and Retest OK (RTOK) events from occurring.
BIT-03 The degree of BIT required or proposed should be based on the respective failure rates and the appropriate FMECA at
all equipment indenture levels.

C-255
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.06 Avionics and Electronics BIT-04 Limit the amount of data that is recorded to a manageable size by:
- Limiting the number of signals that are monitored

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

- Limiting the maximum sampling rate
- Reducing the time span over which data is accumulated
- Restricting the type of data accumulated
BIT-05 Incorporate testability design features as an integral part of equipment preliminary design process.
BIT-06 Mission critical functions should be monitored by BIT.
BIT-07 Set BIT tolerances to maximize fault detection and minimize false alarm rate in the expected operating environment.
BIT-08 Design BIT fault detectors to accommodate the needs of operator maintenance personnel.
BIT-09 Use concurrent BIT to monitor system critical functions.
BIT-10 Design the BIT and BITE so that no fault or failure within the BIT or BITE will degrade, disrupt, or fail the system being
monitored.
BIT-11 In the area of software design and test responsibility, the responsibility for the design and development of verification
testing of an end item (e.g., digital filter) should reside with the same engineer(s).
BIT-12 Define stimuli and response data for each diagnostic test at the system/subsystem level. The same data should be planned
for use both in factory testing as well as in field maintenance of the equipment. These data minimize the amount of
unique software to be written.
BIT-13 Provide for manual control to test sequences, so that the test can be selected individually, and appropriate test
combinations can be executed at the operator's discretion.
BIT-14 Provide access to all BIT control and status signals at module connector pins. This will enable ATE to directly connect to
BIT circuitry.
BIT-15 Incorporate complete BIT functions and BITE on module. If only a portion of the BIT routine or BITE circuitry exists on
the module, then ATE cannot utilize the BIT routine without providing the missing BIT functions.
BIT-21 The failure detection function should provide the equipment operator with a go/no-go indication of equipment readiness.
BIT-22 The BIT should be designed so that auxiliary test devices or external equipment are not needed for daily and other
regular checks.
BIT-23 Design BIT so it is initiated automatically upon equipment power-up.
BIT-24 Test points should be functionally grouped together and clearly labeled for convenience and ease of maintenance.
BIT-25 Equipment should not require manual probing to fault isolate.
BIT-26 Locate routinely used test points so they are accessible without removing or disassembling other equipment
BIT-27 Periodic and initiated BIT should detect at least 98% of all failures and isolate a minimum 99% of those failures detected

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

to a single LRU or WRA.
BIT-28 Design BIT to have the same level of EMI protection as the system or equipment being monitored.
BIT/BITE-02 Design EMI protection to eliminate finger type EMI contact devices.
CARGO-01 Ground vehicles with storage bays or compartments accessible from outside the vehicle should:
- Have the door sill located no lower than knee height to accommodate a wide range of percentiles while standing.
- Ensure door handles are flush with outer surface to protect personnel.
- Contain goose neck hinges to protect the hinge from the elements.
- Contain peripheral door seals that will protect against blowing sand entry at 50 mph.
- Ensure door can be opened with transport tie downs installed.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
- Ensure door opening envelope does not intrude into the opening envelope of an adjacent door.

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

- Contain simple sheet metal hold-open spring or mechanism.
- Ensure floor of bay or compartment is flush with sill to simplify cleanout and drainage.
- Ensure door unlocking and opening mechanism can be actuated by a 95 percentile male hand while wearing arctic
gloves.
- Contain 15 percent added volume for density growth.

C-256
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.06 Avionics and Electronics CARGO-02 Ground vehicles with small exterior storage bays or compartments containing emergency equipment or supplies should:
- Be located at chest height of the 50 percentile male.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

- Contain unlatching mechanisms activated by pushing inward on the door.
- Meet all other generic bay and compartment requirements.
CC-01 Use fiber-optic technologies in preference to conventional interconnect concepts to reduce the number of
interconnects/interfaces, reduce manufacturing and ownership costs, and significantly improve R&M.
CC-02 Standardize connector and wire types to improve testability and logistic support. Keep the number of "different" standard
connectors to a minimum. Use the same connector type keyed differently where possible.
CC-03 Provide clearance around connectors for engagement/disengagement of cables and proper connector orientation under
anticipated environmental conditions (e.g., bare hand of 50 percentile male in an enclosed or protected environment and
a gloved hand of a 50 percentile male in an open or unprotected environment).
CC-04 Use quick release cables and locate cables to make removal and replacement easy and to avoid having to remove one
cable to gain access to another. Provide adequate space for cables, including sleeving and tie-downs, and adequate
service loops for ease of assembly/disassembly
CC-05 Orient and space connectors to allow a sufficient grip on the connector for cable or wire extraction without fear of using
the wiring or cable for additional leverage.
CC-06 Label, and where possible color code, each wire in a harness or cable to facilitate tracking from origin to termination.
Each wire, cable, and coax-to-connector interface should be provided with a source of identification to aidin trouble
shooting, repair, or modification. Marking the cable designator on the cable along with bar codes is also recommended.
CC-07 Do not manufacture or dress connectors containing more than 25 wires or cables as a single integrated harness. Group
the wires or cables into runs of no more than 25 wires or cables each. In addition to making trouble shooting and repair
easier, this approach help avoid large bend radii, thereby simplifying routing, packaging, and stowage.
CC-08 Standardize connector pin assignments for power, ground, and other frequently used signals.
CC-09 Locate LRU/subsystem critical nodes (and or test points) so they are accessible from a connector to prevent the need for
internal LRU probing or access.
CC-10 Avoid hidden cables. Visually inspecting and tracing all assembly cables rather than having hidden cables (such as
behind other cables or even LRUs) allows for a quick system and cable integrity check which aids in overall system
integrity and debug. This also implies quick access for manipulative actions.
CC-11 Orient spare wires and cable pigtails along the outer diameter or periphery of connectors to make access easier.
CC-12 Build up and assemble straight and angle connector shells or back shells in a manner that ensures that wire or cable strain
or wear is not possible.
CO-01 Design automated systems and programs with provisions to enable "stop test" and "resume" without the need to cycle back

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

or repeat the entire test.
CO-02 In the event of program loss or hang-up, automated systems and programs should have provisions for reverting to manual
test and operation.
CO-03 Use a test connector to provide test and maintenance bus access to all system and subsystem faults.
CO-04 Design systems and subsystems so that ATE can be used to access, read, and control internal components in concert with
the test or checkout program.
CO-05 Avoid the need for costly adapters for signal communications between system, subsystems, line replaceable units (LRUs)
or Weapon Replaceable Assemblies (WRAs), and ATE.
CREW-04 Avoid wiring, coax, and plumbing penetrations through the floor of crew cabs, operators' compartments, crew stations,

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
cockpits, and passenger compartments.

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

CREW-06 Film magazines, tapes, and removable modules should permit considerable handling without reliance on special support
equipment protection.
CREW-07 Electronic and photosensitive storage media should withstand the adverse environment created by ground, flightline, or
shipboard electromagnetic fields and light sources.
CREW-08 Data storage media containers and modules should be capable of chemical and biological decontamination processes.

C-257
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.06 Avionics and Electronics CREW-09 Crew and operator station cassettes or magazines should be capable of being removed and installed with one hand while
the operator or air crew is seated and strapped in.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

CREW-10 Design cameras, recorders, and sensors to be fully interchangeable and quickly replaceable.
CREW-11 Design cameras, lenses, reconnaissance pods, aiming devices, and related equipment so they can be reconfigured by one
individual.
CREW-12 Requirements for boresighting should not be part of the design or integration.
CREW-13 Provide storage provisions in each vehicle type (ground and airborne) to store extra tapes, modules, canisters, cassettes,
as appropriate to the intended vehicle use/mission.
D&V-01 The geometric aspects of structural design and interfaces should not result in any natural bathtubs.
D&V-02 Closed structural sections subject to condensation or fluid migration should contain drainage provisions.
D&V-03 Crew cabs, operators' compartments, crew stations, cockpits, and passenger compartments should be subject to the same
corrosion prevention measures as the exteriors of the vehicles. Low points, pockets, and related fluid collection points
within should be provided with low point drains.
EC-01 A threaded electrical connector should contain integral locking mechanisms and visual indications that the connector is
properly seated and locked.
EC-02 An electrical connector requiring less than one full turn to connect or disconnect should contain integral locking
mechanisms and visual indications that the connector is properly seated and locked.
EC-03 A push-pull electrical connector (excluding rack-and-panel type) should contain integral locking features and visual
indication that the connector is properly seated and locked.
EC-04 All electrical connectors should be keyed or asymmetrically shaped to ensure proper alignment.
EC-05 All electrical connectors should contain scoop-proof shells to ensure pin damage will not occur prior to engaging key
way.
EC-06 All electrical connectors should be corrosion resistant to reduce or eliminate the need for scheduled inspections or
corrosion prevention measures.
EC-07 Avoid using electrical connectors requiring any type or form of soldering.
EC-08 Locate and position electrical connectors such that all pin identification for either half can be easily seen.
EC-09 Electrical connectors selected for critical applications on ground vehicles should be both accessible and capable of being
connected disconnected by a fifty percentile gloved male hand.
EC-10 Separation between grouped electrical connectors should be sufficient to ensure make or break of any connector by a
fifty percentile gloved male hand. Where this is not possible, an alternate method should be used such as the use of stand-
offs, long-shelled connectors alternated with standard connectors, 180-degree connectors alternated with 90-degree
connectors, or innovative equivalents.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

EC-16 Select connectors so that contacts on the "live" or "hot" side of the connection are socket type rather than pin type to
minimize personnel hazard and to prevent accidental shorting of live circuits.
EC-17 Whenever possible, use self-locking connector plugs of a type not requiring safety wire.
EC-18 All electric connectors should be environment resistant.
EC-19 Connectors containing fiber optic contacts should, whenever possible, be mounted on a vertical surface to prevent
particle and fluid contamination.
EC-20 Use quick disconnect connectors where allowed and identify all pins on each connector.
EC-21 Locate connectors far enough apart so that they meet specified requirements.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
EC-22 All connectors should be keyed differently with aligning pins that extend beyond the electrical pins. Connector pins and

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

sockets should engage after key position is entered.
EC-23 Design connectors so that plugs are cold and receptacles are hot.
EC-24 Use electrical connectors that incorporate alignment key-ways to reduce incidents of damage due to improper
engagement.

C-258
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.06 Avionics and Electronics EC-25 Use positive locking, quick disconnect electrical connectors to save man-hours, prevent foreign object damage (FOD)
and decrease the chance of personal injury.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

EC-26 Avoid using identical electrical connectors in adjacent areas.
EDECOM-02 Provide integral sensors (viewable from the exterior) for equipment subject to internal forced-air cooling from outside or
external air to indicate the presence of contaminants.
EG-01 Design feedback loops so that the loop can be broken during test to ensure that faults do not propagate to the point where
they cannot be isolated.
EG-02 Avoid using external feedback loops requiring complex circuitry to simulate feedback I/Os.
EG-03 In rare instances when complex external feedback loops cannot be avoided, incorporate simple interruptible control
points.
EG-04 Avoid long sequences of vectors to initialize or alter device outputs to minimize potential testability problems.
EG-05 Avoid the need to have test equipment generate complex, phased or time related signals.
EG-06 Test points should be located on all circuit nodes that are useful in determining the module's health.
EG-07 Test points should be designed so that functional circuitry cannot be damaged or degraded due to the routing or accidental
shorting of a signal at a test point. Some type of test point isolation technique should be used (buffers, isolator, etc.).
EG-08 Test points should be easily accessed and clearly marked.
EG-10 Design redundant circuits to be independently testable to ensure errors are not masked.
EG-11 To improve the probability of fault detection, avoid shorting signals together to achieve a specific test function or
condition.
EG-12 Incorporate concept for partitioning module functions to simplify test equipment or eliminate the need for ancillary test
equipment..
EG-13 Design oscillators or clocks that are resident on the module to be replaceable by a signal from a connector to avoid the
need to synchronize ATE to on-board signals.
ENG(G)-20 Design all firewall fittings, connectors, and penetrations to be fully viewable and directly accessible to the maintainers.
ENG-01 All facets of engine design should take advantage of Electrostatic Engine Monitoring Systems (EEMS) and Inductive
Debris Monitoring (IDM) toward achievement of on-condition maintenance and engine health monitoring.
ENG-03 Digital electronic controls, fully automatic digital electronic controls, and similar concepts should contain the highest
degree of BIT and diagnostics commensurate with affordability, operation and maintenance, and life cycle costs as
appropriate.
ENG-11 Control-by-wire or control-by-light throttling concepts should take precedence over mechanical controls.
ENG-20 Do not locate equipment or components in the engine cavity except for those components associated with the engine or

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

engine installation.
ENG-21 Do not locate equipment or components in the engine bay cavity in a manner that would require removal or repositioning
for engine removal.
ENG-26 Locate and position engine overheat and fire warning sensors so that damage cannot occur during engine maintenance or
replacement.
ENG-35 No time-change components or scheduled actions should be planned solely to protect component integrity or reliability.
ENG-38 The characteristics of engine-to-vehicle interfaces coupled with the capabilities of electronic engine controls, should
negate the necessity for making any type of engine rigging including maximum power, idle, and idle cut-off.
ENG-40 Design of electronic engine controls should be such that no single failure of a sub-component within can result in over

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
speed, over temperature, stagnation, or shut-down.

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

FI-01 Design each FI test to be independent of all other tests.
FI-02 Design FI initiation to be subordinate to the higher priority predecessor tests.
FI-03 Design each test so that it can be terminated prior to completion and then re-initiated at its start point.

C-259
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.06 Avionics and Electronics FI-04 Design the unit tests so that they can accommodate the following subsystem response modes:
- Incorrect response

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

- No response
- Inconsistent response
- Unexpected condition
FI-05 Design all software so that it is structured by test priority. The test software should take advantage of both subroutine
constructs for all message outputs and of failure dictionaries which identify the location of the most likely failed
replaceable unit.
FI-06 In an airborne avionics system, consider indicating mission critical faults on a pilots "head-up" display accompanied with
an audible alarm, so that the pilot can easily check for critical system or mission threatening problems.
FI-07 Ensure that system user manuals include instructions for faults not covered by BIT such as, system will not power up or
system is being used in an incorrect environment such as, at the wrong altitude, etc.
FI-08 Interlock the high power sections of systems and subsystems with visual/audible BIT to ensure safe system activation.
FI-09 Design BIT to first conduct self-test for circuitry integrity before conducting system test.
FI-10 Use clear text to report failures rather than alpha-numeric codes, lights, indicators, etc.
FI-11 Locate BIT circuitry on the same level of the subsystem under test to simplify test and repair when it is removed from the
main system.
LG-35 Avoid the use of landing gear doors to mount or house antennas, arrays, or air data sensors.
LO-01 Use LO compatible gap fillers for manufactured gaps in lieu of tape and butter (surface coating compound).
LO-02 Avoid scheduled forced inspections or replacement of materials, coatings, or finishes solely to protect either the reliability
or the signature.
LO-03 Equipment and support structure requiring shrouds to reduce radar returns should not cause increases in equipment
service/repair time.
LO-04 Infrequently-accessed structural doors and panels incorporating special coatings or conductive paints should contain
provisions for prying the door or panel clear of moldline with standard screwdriver without damage.
LO-05 Do not locate flush mounted LO screens for auxiliary air inlets and exits in walkway areas unless durability has been
proven.
LO-06 Size flush mounted LO screens for auxiliary air inlets and exits to ensure functionality with up to 25 percent of the
openings plugged.
LO-07 Flush and non-flush LO screens should be interchangeable.
MC-02 Avoid the use of cotter pins, safety wire, safety clips, and similar devices to prevent maintenance-induced events leading
to ground vehicle accidents or loss of air vehicles.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

MC-06 Locate, position, orient all plumbing and duct electrical connectors to prevent the need for sequential installation or
removal.
MC-10 In rare instances where a plumbing run contains complex form or geometry that would require removal of other plumbing
or equipment for access, in-line connectors should be incorporated to maintain the integrity of other plumbing or
equipment.
MC-12 All plumbing and connectors containing liquids should be meniscus-free.
MC-14 Where multiple connectors are located in close proximity, ensure (1) a minimum hand tool arc of 120 degrees can be
maintained, and (2) stagger fittings to ensure firm coupling interface/hand tool interface can be accomplished without
inducing damage to adjacent lines.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
MG-01 Mount LRUs/sub-systems on drawer slides or extender racks to provide easier accessibility during integration, testing,

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

debug, and repair of Units Under Test (UUTs).
MG-02 Use a modular system design so that each subassembly is designed as a functionally complete entity. Then when a
subassembly was removed for testing, ATE will not need custom circuitry to simulate missing functions.
MG-03 Clearly mark all subsystems/LRUs to make system integration, test, debug, and repair easier.
MP-01 Avoid the use epoxies to mount parts on repairable modules because they make repair extremely difficult.

C-260
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.06 Avionics and Electronics MP-02 Use a unique identification (ID) resistor incorporated in each system module to verify that the proper module is mounted
on ATE.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

MP-03 Design modules so that lengthy warm-up times, special coding and air purity levels, and similar constraints are not
necessary.
OXY-01 System should contain automatic BIT for warning indicators to eliminate dedicated test switches and/or test requirements.
P-06 Access door and panel devices used to support door in opened position should meet the following criteria:
- for airborne vehicles, design for 60 knot gust loads (or equivalent jet blast loads)
- for ground vehicles, design for 50 mph gust loads
P-07 Hinged access doors and panels capable of remaining in the opened position should not have sharp edges or corners.
P-08 Removable access door and panel fasteners should be of identical grip length and diameter.
P-09 Acceptable door and panel hold-open devices include over-center sheet metal spring, over-center spring link, spring
cartridge, support strut, and pinned goose neck hinge.
P-10 Access doors and panels requiring non-captive fasteners should not be located forward of air inlet ducts or high-energy
rotating components (e.g., prop fans, engine cooling fans, etc.).
P-11 Access doors and panels should be interchangeable as justified by operation and support costs or life cycle costs.
PERS-09 Design portable emergency locator beacons, radio receiver/transmitters, global positioning systems, and similar battery
operated devices with integral provisions for determining battery health or status and remaining battery life.
PYRO-26 Do not locate ammunition loader interfaces close to inlets, exhausts, fuel dumps and drains, antennas, sensors, lights, or
hazardous protrusions.
SABCH-06 Structural design should avoid the potential of dissimilar material or fastener corrosion.
SABCH-07 No structural fasteners should be used that require special tools for installation.
SABCH-08 Taper pins should be threaded and retained with self-locking hardware.
SABCH-09 Pins and collars (lockbolts) should only be used in applications which do not normally require removal.
SABCH-10 Do not use lockbolts in composites.
TP-01 Locate Input/Output (I/O) test points and associated readouts in close proximity to each other so that one person can
perform testing.
TP-02 Protect test points against the environment and from induced contamination.
TP-03 Protect test points from outside signal generation.
W-01 Hat section type structural stiffeners with sufficient cross sectional area should be considered as a routing tunnel for
wiring and coax.
WBAY-01 Equipment bays and compartments should not require installation of special cavity fillers when equipment is not installed.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

WIND-01 Optical window materials should be scratch resistant, easy to clean, and dissipate electrostatic charges.
WIND-02 Optic windows should be located for ease of inspection, cleaning, and induced damage potential from personnel or
support equipment.
WIND-03 Window locations should minimize the effects of contamination by salt spray, bugs, oils, fuels, and icing.
WIND-04 Window, canopy, and windshield material should be designed to withstand the effects of sandstorms in the ground
environment and the effects of rain and hail during thunderstorm penetration in the airborne environment.
WIND-05 Design interior surfaces to be reachable for cleaning without reliance on hinging, equipment removal, or use of support
equipment.
WIND-11 For dome-shaped optic window concepts, the dome should be easily removable for cleaning without affecting LO

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
integrity.

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

WIND-12 Design EO windows and optics to be interchangeable among the same air vehicle types or same ground vehicle types.
WIND-13 The combination of material layers and coatings for optics and windows should be such that static charge buildup for
worst case conditions should not exceed 10,000 volts.
WIND-14 Exterior lights should permit simple and rapid bulb replacement without disturbing LO treatments.

C-261
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.06 Avionics and Electronics WIND-15 Design light covers and lenses to be sufficiently durable so that protective covers are not needed during maintenance.
WIND-16 Lens shape should enhance LO capability to reduce need, care, and expense for special coatings.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

3.06.01 Antennas, Apertures, and Sensors A-11 Locate compartment electrical penetrations close to the access opening for ease of sight, probing, repair, and to eliminate
fluid soaking, wicking, or contamination.
A-12 Locate compartment electrical penetrations far enough from the access opening to prevent damage resulting from
improper (over-length) panel fasteners.
AA&S-01 Flush mounted antennas, sensors, and air data devices should have a good color contrast to surrounding structure when
located in walkway areas.
AA&S-02 Closure and sealing of cavities, compartments, and wells for retractable antennas should be mechanized to function as
part of the extend and retract cycle.
AA&S-03 Closure and sealing of cavities, compartments, and wells for retractable antennas should be maintained when antennas
are not installed without need for ancillary measures or equipment.
AA&S-04 LO antennas should be designed to be tolerant of accumulations of grime or dirt without degrading performance or
biasing the BIT/fault isolate performance.
AA&S-05 Multi-function antennas, arrays, and sensors located in leading edges should be modularized to reduce vehicle downtime
through simplified replacement of a faulty module.
AA&S-06 Moveable flaps or slats containing integral antennas, arrays, or sensors should be interchangeable to provide the option
for on-vehicle or off-vehicle repair.
BIT-01 During design of the BIT, use worst-case stress analysis to ensure that any circuit failures induced by temperature
extremes, tolerance build-up, power supply variations, and combinations thereof are identified.
BIT-02 Ensure that BIT system thresholds are consistent with those across the system, subsystem, item, module, and piece-part
levels to prevent excessive numbers of Cannot Duplicate (CND) and Retest OK (RTOK) events from occurring.
BIT-03 The degree of BIT required or proposed should be based on the respective failure rates and the appropriate FMECA at
all equipment indenture levels.
BIT-04 Limit the amount of data that is recorded to a manageable size by:
- Limiting the number of signals that are monitored
- Limiting the maximum sampling rate
- Reducing the time span over which data is accumulated
- Restricting the type of data accumulated
BIT-05 Incorporate testability design features as an integral part of equipment preliminary design process.
BIT-06 Mission critical functions should be monitored by BIT.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

BIT-09 Use concurrent BIT to monitor system critical functions.
BIT-26 Locate routinely used test points so they are accessible without removing or disassembling other equipment
CC-01 Use fiber-optic technologies in preference to conventional interconnect concepts to reduce the number of
interconnects/interfaces, reduce manufacturing and ownership costs, and significantly improve R&M.
CC-02 Standardize connector and wire types to improve testability and logistic support. Keep the number of "different" standard
connectors to a minimum. Use the same connector type keyed differently where possible.
CC-03 Provide clearance around connectors for engagement/disengagement of cables and proper connector orientation under
anticipated environmental conditions (e.g., bare hand of 50 percentile male in an enclosed or protected environment and
a gloved hand of a 50 percentile male in an open or unprotected environment).

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
CC-04 Use quick release cables and locate cables to make removal and replacement easy and to avoid having to remove one

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

cable to gain access to another. Provide adequate space for cables, including sleeving and tie-downs, and adequate
service loops for ease of assembly/disassembly
CC-05 Orient and space connectors to allow a sufficient grip on the connector for cable or wire extraction without fear of using
the wiring or cable for additional leverage.

C-262
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.06.01 Antennas, Apertures, and Sensors CC-06 Label, and where possible color code, each wire in a harness or cable to facilitate tracking from origin to termination.
Each wire, cable, and coax-to-connector interface should be provided with a source of identification to aidin trouble

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

shooting, repair, or modification. Marking the cable designator on the cable along with bar codes is also recommended.
CC-07 Do not manufacture or dress connectors containing more than 25 wires or cables as a single integrated harness. Group
the wires or cables into runs of no more than 25 wires or cables each. In addition to making trouble shooting and repair
easier, this approach help avoid large bend radii, thereby simplifying routing, packaging, and stowage.
CC-08 Standardize connector pin assignments for power, ground, and other frequently used signals.
CC-09 Locate LRU/subsystem critical nodes (and or test points) so they are accessible from a connector to prevent the need for
internal LRU probing or access.
CC-10 Avoid hidden cables. Visually inspecting and tracing all assembly cables rather than having hidden cables (such as
behind other cables or even LRUs) allows for a quick system and cable integrity check which aids in overall system
integrity and debug. This also implies quick access for manipulative actions.
CC-11 Orient spare wires and cable pigtails along the outer diameter or periphery of connectors to make access easier.
CC-12 Build up and assemble straight and angle connector shells or back shells in a manner that ensures that wire or cable strain
or wear is not possible.
CO-01 Design automated systems and programs with provisions to enable "stop test" and "resume" without the need to cycle back
or repeat the entire test.
CO-02 In the event of program loss or hang-up, automated systems and programs should have provisions for reverting to manual
test and operation.
CO-03 Use a test connector to provide test and maintenance bus access to all system and subsystem faults.
CO-04 Design systems and subsystems so that ATE can be used to access, read, and control internal components in concert with
the test or checkout program.
CO-05 Avoid the need for costly adapters for signal communications between system, subsystems, line replaceable units (LRUs)
or Weapon Replaceable Assemblies (WRAs), and ATE.
D&V-01 The geometric aspects of structural design and interfaces should not result in any natural bathtubs.
D&V-02 Closed structural sections subject to condensation or fluid migration should contain drainage provisions.
D&V-03 Crew cabs, operators' compartments, crew stations, cockpits, and passenger compartments should be subject to the same
corrosion prevention measures as the exteriors of the vehicles. Low points, pockets, and related fluid collection points
within should be provided with low point drains.
EC-01 A threaded electrical connector should contain integral locking mechanisms and visual indications that the connector is
properly seated and locked.
EC-02 An electrical connector requiring less than one full turn to connect or disconnect should contain integral locking

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

mechanisms and visual indications that the connector is properly seated and locked.
EC-03 A push-pull electrical connector (excluding rack-and-panel type) should contain integral locking features and visual
indication that the connector is properly seated and locked.
EC-04 All electrical connectors should be keyed or asymmetrically shaped to ensure proper alignment.
EC-05 All electrical connectors should contain scoop-proof shells to ensure pin damage will not occur prior to engaging key
way.
EC-06 All electrical connectors should be corrosion resistant to reduce or eliminate the need for scheduled inspections or
corrosion prevention measures.
EC-07 Avoid using electrical connectors requiring any type or form of soldering.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
EC-08 Locate and position electrical connectors such that all pin identification for either half can be easily seen.
EC-09 Electrical connectors selected for critical applications on ground vehicles should be both accessible and capable of being
connected disconnected by a fifty percentile gloved male hand.

C-263
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.06.01 Antennas, Apertures, and Sensors EC-10 Separation between grouped electrical connectors should be sufficient to ensure make or break of any connector by a
fifty percentile gloved male hand. Where this is not possible, an alternate method should be used such as the use of stand-

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

offs, long-shelled connectors alternated with standard connectors, 180-degree connectors alternated with 90-degree
connectors, or innovative equivalents.
EC-16 Select connectors so that contacts on the "live" or "hot" side of the connection are socket type rather than pin type to
minimize personnel hazard and to prevent accidental shorting of live circuits.
EC-17 Whenever possible, use self-locking connector plugs of a type not requiring safety wire.
EC-18 All electric connectors should be environment resistant.
EC-19 Connectors containing fiber optic contacts should, whenever possible, be mounted on a vertical surface to prevent
particle and fluid contamination.
EC-20 Use quick disconnect connectors where allowed and identify all pins on each connector.
EC-21 Locate connectors far enough apart so that they meet specified requirements.
EC-22 All connectors should be keyed differently with aligning pins that extend beyond the electrical pins. Connector pins and
sockets should engage after key position is entered.
EC-23 Design connectors so that plugs are cold and receptacles are hot.
EC-24 Use electrical connectors that incorporate alignment key-ways to reduce incidents of damage due to improper
engagement.
EC-25 Use positive locking, quick disconnect electrical connectors to save man-hours, prevent foreign object damage (FOD)
and decrease the chance of personal injury.
EC-26 Avoid using identical electrical connectors in adjacent areas.
ENV-01 Materials, treatments, coatings, finishes should be compatible with all anti-ice and de-ice fluids, chemical and biological
decontamination fluids, washing and cleaning fluids, and all vehicle subsystem fluids.
ENV-02 There should be no top coat or treatment deterioration throughout the standard temperature and humidity spectrum.
ENV-03 For airborne vehicles, the finishes should be durable against rain, hail, and dynamic erosion throughout the flight
envelope.
ENV-04 For airborne and ground vehicles, the finishes should be durable against sand erosion throughout all surface wind speeds
experienced in arid or desert geographical locations.
LG-35 Avoid the use of landing gear doors to mount or house antennas, arrays, or air data sensors.
LO-01 Use LO compatible gap fillers for manufactured gaps in lieu of tape and butter (surface coating compound).
LO-02 Avoid scheduled forced inspections or replacement of materials, coatings, or finishes solely to protect either the reliability
or the signature.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

LO-03 Equipment and support structure requiring shrouds to reduce radar returns should not cause increases in equipment
service/repair time.
LO-04 Infrequently-accessed structural doors and panels incorporating special coatings or conductive paints should contain
provisions for prying the door or panel clear of moldline with standard screwdriver without damage.
LO-05 Do not locate flush mounted LO screens for auxiliary air inlets and exits in walkway areas unless durability has been
proven.
LO-06 Size flush mounted LO screens for auxiliary air inlets and exits to ensure functionality with up to 25 percent of the
openings plugged.
LO-07 Flush and non-flush LO screens should be interchangeable.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
MATL-01 A high degree of durability should be maintained for a minimum distance of 36 inches forward of the inflight refueling

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

receptacle.
MATL-02 Cosmetic type repairs should not exceed 1 hours including cure or drying times.
MATL-03 Cosmetic and vehicle repair material shelf life should not be less than 24 months.
MATL-04 Cosmetic and vehicle repair materials should be non-proprietary and non-single source.
MATL-05 Cosmetic and vehicle repair materials should not require refrigeration or special facilities or atmospheres for storage.

C-264
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.06.01 Antennas, Apertures, and Sensors MATL-06 Repair criteria, repairs, and instructions should not be classified.
MATL-07 All cosmetic touch-up and repair materials should be environmentally safe.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

MATL-08 Repairs (other than major depot repair) should not require autoclave type facilities.
MATL-09 A high degree of durability should be achieved across all walkway areas on the top surfaces of all vehicles up to and
including 95 percentile personnel.
MATL-10 Coatings and finishes should be durable against the effects of missile gases, velocities, and particles emanating from the
missile motor.
MATL-11 Coatings and finishes should be durable against the effects of gun gases, projectile shock waves, and brass particles
emanating from the projectile seal rings.
MATL-12 Leading edge materials and coatings should be durable against fragments from frangible gun port plugs.
MATL-13 Special handling or shipping requirements of repair materials should be avoided.
MATL-14 Leading edges, including chines, containing or constructed of radar absorbing materials, should be interchangeable to
reduce vehicle downtime and simplify repairs.
MATL-15 Doors and panels containing blade seals used for signature reduction should be interchangeable or contain
interchangeable blade seals. Deviation is acceptable where repairs can be accomplished on the vehicle in a time equal to
or less than door or seal remove and replace time.
MC-02 Avoid the use of cotter pins, safety wire, safety clips, and similar devices to prevent maintenance-induced events leading
to ground vehicle accidents or loss of air vehicles.
MC-06 Locate, position, orient all plumbing and duct electrical connectors to prevent the need for sequential installation or
removal.
MC-10 In rare instances where a plumbing run contains complex form or geometry that would require removal of other plumbing
or equipment for access, in-line connectors should be incorporated to maintain the integrity of other plumbing or
equipment.
MC-12 All plumbing and connectors containing liquids should be meniscus-free.
MC-14 Where multiple connectors are located in close proximity, ensure (1) a minimum hand tool arc of 120 degrees can be
maintained, and (2) stagger fittings to ensure firm coupling interface/hand tool interface can be accomplished without
inducing damage to adjacent lines.
MG-02 Use a modular system design so that each subassembly is designed as a functionally complete entity. Then when a
subassembly was removed for testing, ATE will not need custom circuitry to simulate missing functions.
MP-01 Avoid the use epoxies to mount parts on repairable modules because they make repair extremely difficult.
MP-02 Use a unique identification (ID) resistor incorporated in each system module to verify that the proper module is mounted
on ATE.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

MP-03 Design modules so that lengthy warm-up times, special coding and air purity levels, and similar constraints are not
necessary.
PERS-09 Design portable emergency locator beacons, radio receiver/transmitters, global positioning systems, and similar battery
operated devices with integral provisions for determining battery health or status and remaining battery life.
PYRO-26 Do not locate ammunition loader interfaces close to inlets, exhausts, fuel dumps and drains, antennas, sensors, lights, or
hazardous protrusions.
R-01 Large radomes wherein the combination of the diameter and length exceeds 60" should be top-hinged. Hinge should be
load-carrying to reduce radome retention fastener count.
R-02 Radome and radar array support structure design and material selection should eliminate the need for LO type fillers or

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
shrouds.
SABCH-06 Structural design should avoid the potential of dissimilar material or fastener corrosion.
SABCH-07 No structural fasteners should be used that require special tools for installation.
SABCH-08 Taper pins should be threaded and retained with self-locking hardware.
SABCH-09 Pins and collars (lockbolts) should only be used in applications which do not normally require removal.

C-265
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.06.01 Antennas, Apertures, and Sensors SABCH-10 Do not use lockbolts in composites.
TP-01 Locate Input/Output (I/O) test points and associated readouts in close proximity to each other so that one person can

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

perform testing.
TP-02 Protect test points against the environment and from induced contamination.
TP-03 Protect test points from outside signal generation.
WIND-01 Optical window materials should be scratch resistant, easy to clean, and dissipate electrostatic charges.
WIND-02 Optic windows should be located for ease of inspection, cleaning, and induced damage potential from personnel or
support equipment.
WIND-03 Window locations should minimize the effects of contamination by salt spray, bugs, oils, fuels, and icing.
WIND-04 Window, canopy, and windshield material should be designed to withstand the effects of sandstorms in the ground
environment and the effects of rain and hail during thunderstorm penetration in the airborne environment.
WIND-05 Design interior surfaces to be reachable for cleaning without reliance on hinging, equipment removal, or use of support
equipment.
WIND-11 For dome-shaped optic window concepts, the dome should be easily removable for cleaning without affecting LO
integrity.
WIND-12 Design EO windows and optics to be interchangeable among the same air vehicle types or same ground vehicle types.
WIND-13 The combination of material layers and coatings for optics and windows should be such that static charge buildup for
worst case conditions should not exceed 10,000 volts.
WIND-14 Exterior lights should permit simple and rapid bulb replacement without disturbing LO treatments.
WIND-15 Design light covers and lenses to be sufficiently durable so that protective covers are not needed during maintenance.
WIND-16 Lens shape should enhance LO capability to reduce need, care, and expense for special coatings.
3.06.02 Communications, Command and Control A-11 Locate compartment electrical penetrations close to the access opening for ease of sight, probing, repair, and to eliminate
fluid soaking, wicking, or contamination.
A-12 Locate compartment electrical penetrations far enough from the access opening to prevent damage resulting from
improper (over-length) panel fasteners.
BIT-01 During design of the BIT, use worst-case stress analysis to ensure that any circuit failures induced by temperature
extremes, tolerance build-up, power supply variations, and combinations thereof are identified.
BIT-02 Ensure that BIT system thresholds are consistent with those across the system, subsystem, item, module, and piece-part
levels to prevent excessive numbers of Cannot Duplicate (CND) and Retest OK (RTOK) events from occurring.
BIT-03 The degree of BIT required or proposed should be based on the respective failure rates and the appropriate FMECA at
all equipment indenture levels.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

BIT-04 Limit the amount of data that is recorded to a manageable size by:
- Limiting the number of signals that are monitored
- Limiting the maximum sampling rate
- Reducing the time span over which data is accumulated
- Restricting the type of data accumulated
BIT-05 Incorporate testability design features as an integral part of equipment preliminary design process.
BIT-06 Mission critical functions should be monitored by BIT.
BIT-26 Locate routinely used test points so they are accessible without removing or disassembling other equipment
CC-01 Use fiber-optic technologies in preference to conventional interconnect concepts to reduce the number of

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
interconnects/interfaces, reduce manufacturing and ownership costs, and significantly improve R&M.

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

CC-02 Standardize connector and wire types to improve testability and logistic support. Keep the number of "different" standard
connectors to a minimum. Use the same connector type keyed differently where possible.
CC-03 Provide clearance around connectors for engagement/disengagement of cables and proper connector orientation under
anticipated environmental conditions (e.g., bare hand of 50 percentile male in an enclosed or protected environment and
a gloved hand of a 50 percentile male in an open or unprotected environment).

C-266
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.06.02 Communications, Command and Control CC-04 Use quick release cables and locate cables to make removal and replacement easy and to avoid having to remove one
cable to gain access to another. Provide adequate space for cables, including sleeving and tie-downs, and adequate

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

service loops for ease of assembly/disassembly
CC-05 Orient and space connectors to allow a sufficient grip on the connector for cable or wire extraction without fear of using
the wiring or cable for additional leverage.
CC-06 Label, and where possible color code, each wire in a harness or cable to facilitate tracking from origin to termination.
Each wire, cable, and coax-to-connector interface should be provided with a source of identification to aidin trouble
shooting, repair, or modification. Marking the cable designator on the cable along with bar codes is also recommended.
CC-07 Do not manufacture or dress connectors containing more than 25 wires or cables as a single integrated harness. Group
the wires or cables into runs of no more than 25 wires or cables each. In addition to making trouble shooting and repair
easier, this approach help avoid large bend radii, thereby simplifying routing, packaging, and stowage.
CC-08 Standardize connector pin assignments for power, ground, and other frequently used signals.
CC-09 Locate LRU/subsystem critical nodes (and or test points) so they are accessible from a connector to prevent the need for
internal LRU probing or access.
CC-10 Avoid hidden cables. Visually inspecting and tracing all assembly cables rather than having hidden cables (such as
behind other cables or even LRUs) allows for a quick system and cable integrity check which aids in overall system
integrity and debug. This also implies quick access for manipulative actions.
CC-11 Orient spare wires and cable pigtails along the outer diameter or periphery of connectors to make access easier.
CC-12 Build up and assemble straight and angle connector shells or back shells in a manner that ensures that wire or cable strain
or wear is not possible.
EC-01 A threaded electrical connector should contain integral locking mechanisms and visual indications that the connector is
properly seated and locked.
EC-02 An electrical connector requiring less than one full turn to connect or disconnect should contain integral locking
mechanisms and visual indications that the connector is properly seated and locked.
EC-03 A push-pull electrical connector (excluding rack-and-panel type) should contain integral locking features and visual
indication that the connector is properly seated and locked.
EC-04 All electrical connectors should be keyed or asymmetrically shaped to ensure proper alignment.
EC-05 All electrical connectors should contain scoop-proof shells to ensure pin damage will not occur prior to engaging key
way.
EC-06 All electrical connectors should be corrosion resistant to reduce or eliminate the need for scheduled inspections or
corrosion prevention measures.
EC-07 Avoid using electrical connectors requiring any type or form of soldering.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

EC-08 Locate and position electrical connectors such that all pin identification for either half can be easily seen.
EC-09 Electrical connectors selected for critical applications on ground vehicles should be both accessible and capable of being
connected disconnected by a fifty percentile gloved male hand.
EC-10 Separation between grouped electrical connectors should be sufficient to ensure make or break of any connector by a
fifty percentile gloved male hand. Where this is not possible, an alternate method should be used such as the use of stand-
offs, long-shelled connectors alternated with standard connectors, 180-degree connectors alternated with 90-degree
connectors, or innovative equivalents.
EC-16 Select connectors so that contacts on the "live" or "hot" side of the connection are socket type rather than pin type to
minimize personnel hazard and to prevent accidental shorting of live circuits.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
EC-17 Whenever possible, use self-locking connector plugs of a type not requiring safety wire.

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

EC-18 All electric connectors should be environment resistant.
EC-19 Connectors containing fiber optic contacts should, whenever possible, be mounted on a vertical surface to prevent
particle and fluid contamination.
EC-20 Use quick disconnect connectors where allowed and identify all pins on each connector.
EC-21 Locate connectors far enough apart so that they meet specified requirements.

C-267
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.06.02 Communications, Command and Control EC-22 All connectors should be keyed differently with aligning pins that extend beyond the electrical pins. Connector pins and
sockets should engage after key position is entered.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

EC-23 Design connectors so that plugs are cold and receptacles are hot.
EC-24 Use electrical connectors that incorporate alignment key-ways to reduce incidents of damage due to improper
engagement.
EC-25 Use positive locking, quick disconnect electrical connectors to save man-hours, prevent foreign object damage (FOD)
and decrease the chance of personal injury.
EC-26 Avoid using identical electrical connectors in adjacent areas.
LO-03 Equipment and support structure requiring shrouds to reduce radar returns should not cause increases in equipment
service/repair time.
MC-02 Avoid the use of cotter pins, safety wire, safety clips, and similar devices to prevent maintenance-induced events leading
to ground vehicle accidents or loss of air vehicles.
MC-06 Locate, position, orient all plumbing and duct electrical connectors to prevent the need for sequential installation or
removal.
MC-10 In rare instances where a plumbing run contains complex form or geometry that would require removal of other plumbing
or equipment for access, in-line connectors should be incorporated to maintain the integrity of other plumbing or
equipment.
MC-12 All plumbing and connectors containing liquids should be meniscus-free.
MC-14 Where multiple connectors are located in close proximity, ensure (1) a minimum hand tool arc of 120 degrees can be
maintained, and (2) stagger fittings to ensure firm coupling interface/hand tool interface can be accomplished without
inducing damage to adjacent lines.
MG-01 Mount LRUs/sub-systems on drawer slides or extender racks to provide easier accessibility during integration, testing,
debug, and repair of Units Under Test (UUTs).
MG-02 Use a modular system design so that each subassembly is designed as a functionally complete entity. Then when a
subassembly was removed for testing, ATE will not need custom circuitry to simulate missing functions.
MG-03 Clearly mark all subsystems/LRUs to make system integration, test, debug, and repair easier.
MP-01 Avoid the use epoxies to mount parts on repairable modules because they make repair extremely difficult.
MP-02 Use a unique identification (ID) resistor incorporated in each system module to verify that the proper module is mounted
on ATE.
MP-03 Design modules so that lengthy warm-up times, special coding and air purity levels, and similar constraints are not
necessary.
PERS-09 Design portable emergency locator beacons, radio receiver/transmitters, global positioning systems, and similar battery

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

operated devices with integral provisions for determining battery health or status and remaining battery life.
TP-01 Locate Input/Output (I/O) test points and associated readouts in close proximity to each other so that one person can
perform testing.
TP-02 Protect test points against the environment and from induced contamination.
TP-03 Protect test points from outside signal generation.
3.06.03 Computers A-11 Locate compartment electrical penetrations close to the access opening for ease of sight, probing, repair, and to eliminate
fluid soaking, wicking, or contamination.
A-12 Locate compartment electrical penetrations far enough from the access opening to prevent damage resulting from
improper (over-length) panel fasteners.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
BIT-01 During design of the BIT, use worst-case stress analysis to ensure that any circuit failures induced by temperature
extremes, tolerance build-up, power supply variations, and combinations thereof are identified.
BIT-02 Ensure that BIT system thresholds are consistent with those across the system, subsystem, item, module, and piece-part
levels to prevent excessive numbers of Cannot Duplicate (CND) and Retest OK (RTOK) events from occurring.
BIT-03 The degree of BIT required or proposed should be based on the respective failure rates and the appropriate FMECA at
all equipment indenture levels.

C-268
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.06.03 Computers BIT-04 Limit the amount of data that is recorded to a manageable size by:
- Limiting the number of signals that are monitored

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

- Limiting the maximum sampling rate
- Reducing the time span over which data is accumulated
- Restricting the type of data accumulated
BIT-05 Incorporate testability design features as an integral part of equipment preliminary design process.
BIT-06 Mission critical functions should be monitored by BIT.
BIT-09 Use concurrent BIT to monitor system critical functions.
BIT-26 Locate routinely used test points so they are accessible without removing or disassembling other equipment
CC-01 Use fiber-optic technologies in preference to conventional interconnect concepts to reduce the number of
interconnects/interfaces, reduce manufacturing and ownership costs, and significantly improve R&M.
CC-02 Standardize connector and wire types to improve testability and logistic support. Keep the number of "different" standard
connectors to a minimum. Use the same connector type keyed differently where possible.
CC-03 Provide clearance around connectors for engagement/disengagement of cables and proper connector orientation under
anticipated environmental conditions (e.g., bare hand of 50 percentile male in an enclosed or protected environment and
a gloved hand of a 50 percentile male in an open or unprotected environment).
CC-04 Use quick release cables and locate cables to make removal and replacement easy and to avoid having to remove one
cable to gain access to another. Provide adequate space for cables, including sleeving and tie-downs, and adequate
service loops for ease of assembly/disassembly
CC-05 Orient and space connectors to allow a sufficient grip on the connector for cable or wire extraction without fear of using
the wiring or cable for additional leverage.
CC-06 Label, and where possible color code, each wire in a harness or cable to facilitate tracking from origin to termination.
Each wire, cable, and coax-to-connector interface should be provided with a source of identification to aidin trouble
shooting, repair, or modification. Marking the cable designator on the cable along with bar codes is also recommended.
CC-07 Do not manufacture or dress connectors containing more than 25 wires or cables as a single integrated harness. Group
the wires or cables into runs of no more than 25 wires or cables each. In addition to making trouble shooting and repair
easier, this approach help avoid large bend radii, thereby simplifying routing, packaging, and stowage.
CC-08 Standardize connector pin assignments for power, ground, and other frequently used signals.
CC-09 Locate LRU/subsystem critical nodes (and or test points) so they are accessible from a connector to prevent the need for
internal LRU probing or access.
CC-10 Avoid hidden cables. Visually inspecting and tracing all assembly cables rather than having hidden cables (such as
behind other cables or even LRUs) allows for a quick system and cable integrity check which aids in overall system

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

integrity and debug. This also implies quick access for manipulative actions.
CC-11 Orient spare wires and cable pigtails along the outer diameter or periphery of connectors to make access easier.
CC-12 Build up and assemble straight and angle connector shells or back shells in a manner that ensures that wire or cable strain
or wear is not possible.
CO-01 Design automated systems and programs with provisions to enable "stop test" and "resume" without the need to cycle back
or repeat the entire test.
CO-02 In the event of program loss or hang-up, automated systems and programs should have provisions for reverting to manual
test and operation.
CO-03 Use a test connector to provide test and maintenance bus access to all system and subsystem faults.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
CO-04 Design systems and subsystems so that ATE can be used to access, read, and control internal components in concert with
the test or checkout program.
CO-05 Avoid the need for costly adapters for signal communications between system, subsystems, line replaceable units (LRUs)
or Weapon Replaceable Assemblies (WRAs), and ATE.
EC-01 A threaded electrical connector should contain integral locking mechanisms and visual indications that the connector is
properly seated and locked.

C-269
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.06.03 Computers EC-02 An electrical connector requiring less than one full turn to connect or disconnect should contain integral locking
mechanisms and visual indications that the connector is properly seated and locked.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

EC-03 A push-pull electrical connector (excluding rack-and-panel type) should contain integral locking features and visual
indication that the connector is properly seated and locked.
EC-04 All electrical connectors should be keyed or asymmetrically shaped to ensure proper alignment.
EC-05 All electrical connectors should contain scoop-proof shells to ensure pin damage will not occur prior to engaging key
way.
EC-06 All electrical connectors should be corrosion resistant to reduce or eliminate the need for scheduled inspections or
corrosion prevention measures.
EC-07 Avoid using electrical connectors requiring any type or form of soldering.
EC-08 Locate and position electrical connectors such that all pin identification for either half can be easily seen.
EC-09 Electrical connectors selected for critical applications on ground vehicles should be both accessible and capable of being
connected disconnected by a fifty percentile gloved male hand.
EC-10 Separation between grouped electrical connectors should be sufficient to ensure make or break of any connector by a
fifty percentile gloved male hand. Where this is not possible, an alternate method should be used such as the use of stand-
offs, long-shelled connectors alternated with standard connectors, 180-degree connectors alternated with 90-degree
connectors, or innovative equivalents.
EC-16 Select connectors so that contacts on the "live" or "hot" side of the connection are socket type rather than pin type to
minimize personnel hazard and to prevent accidental shorting of live circuits.
EC-17 Whenever possible, use self-locking connector plugs of a type not requiring safety wire.
EC-18 All electric connectors should be environment resistant.
EC-19 Connectors containing fiber optic contacts should, whenever possible, be mounted on a vertical surface to prevent
particle and fluid contamination.
EC-21 Locate connectors far enough apart so that they meet specified requirements.
EC-22 All connectors should be keyed differently with aligning pins that extend beyond the electrical pins. Connector pins and
sockets should engage after key position is entered.
EC-23 Design connectors so that plugs are cold and receptacles are hot.
EC-24 Use electrical connectors that incorporate alignment key-ways to reduce incidents of damage due to improper
engagement.
EC-25 Use positive locking, quick disconnect electrical connectors to save man-hours, prevent foreign object damage (FOD)
and decrease the chance of personal injury.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

EC-26 Avoid using identical electrical connectors in adjacent areas.
LO-03 Equipment and support structure requiring shrouds to reduce radar returns should not cause increases in equipment
service/repair time.
MC-06 Locate, position, orient all plumbing and duct electrical connectors to prevent the need for sequential installation or
removal.
MC-12 All plumbing and connectors containing liquids should be meniscus-free.
MC-14 Where multiple connectors are located in close proximity, ensure (1) a minimum hand tool arc of 120 degrees can be
maintained, and (2) stagger fittings to ensure firm coupling interface/hand tool interface can be accomplished without
inducing damage to adjacent lines.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
MG-01 Mount LRUs/sub-systems on drawer slides or extender racks to provide easier accessibility during integration, testing,

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

debug, and repair of Units Under Test (UUTs).
MG-02 Use a modular system design so that each subassembly is designed as a functionally complete entity. Then when a
subassembly was removed for testing, ATE will not need custom circuitry to simulate missing functions.
MG-03 Clearly mark all subsystems/LRUs to make system integration, test, debug, and repair easier.
MP-01 Avoid the use epoxies to mount parts on repairable modules because they make repair extremely difficult.

C-270
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.06.03 Computers MP-02 Use a unique identification (ID) resistor incorporated in each system module to verify that the proper module is mounted
on ATE.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

MP-03 Design modules so that lengthy warm-up times, special coding and air purity levels, and similar constraints are not
necessary.
TP-01 Locate Input/Output (I/O) test points and associated readouts in close proximity to each other so that one person can
perform testing.
TP-02 Protect test points against the environment and from induced contamination.
TP-03 Protect test points from outside signal generation.
3.06.04 Power Supply A-11 Locate compartment electrical penetrations close to the access opening for ease of sight, probing, repair, and to eliminate
fluid soaking, wicking, or contamination.
A-12 Locate compartment electrical penetrations far enough from the access opening to prevent damage resulting from
improper (over-length) panel fasteners.
BIT-01 During design of the BIT, use worst-case stress analysis to ensure that any circuit failures induced by temperature
extremes, tolerance build-up, power supply variations, and combinations thereof are identified.
BIT-02 Ensure that BIT system thresholds are consistent with those across the system, subsystem, item, module, and piece-part
levels to prevent excessive numbers of Cannot Duplicate (CND) and Retest OK (RTOK) events from occurring.
BIT-03 The degree of BIT required or proposed should be based on the respective failure rates and the appropriate FMECA at
all equipment indenture levels.
BIT-04 Limit the amount of data that is recorded to a manageable size by:
- Limiting the number of signals that are monitored
- Limiting the maximum sampling rate
- Reducing the time span over which data is accumulated
- Restricting the type of data accumulated
BIT-05 Incorporate testability design features as an integral part of equipment preliminary design process.
BIT-06 Mission critical functions should be monitored by BIT.
BIT-09 Use concurrent BIT to monitor system critical functions.
BIT-26 Locate routinely used test points so they are accessible without removing or disassembling other equipment
CC-01 Use fiber-optic technologies in preference to conventional interconnect concepts to reduce the number of
interconnects/interfaces, reduce manufacturing and ownership costs, and significantly improve R&M.
CC-02 Standardize connector and wire types to improve testability and logistic support. Keep the number of "different" standard
connectors to a minimum. Use the same connector type keyed differently where possible.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

CC-03 Provide clearance around connectors for engagement/disengagement of cables and proper connector orientation under
anticipated environmental conditions (e.g., bare hand of 50 percentile male in an enclosed or protected environment and
a gloved hand of a 50 percentile male in an open or unprotected environment).
CC-04 Use quick release cables and locate cables to make removal and replacement easy and to avoid having to remove one
cable to gain access to another. Provide adequate space for cables, including sleeving and tie-downs, and adequate
service loops for ease of assembly/disassembly
CC-05 Orient and space connectors to allow a sufficient grip on the connector for cable or wire extraction without fear of using
the wiring or cable for additional leverage.
CC-06 Label, and where possible color code, each wire in a harness or cable to facilitate tracking from origin to termination.
Each wire, cable, and coax-to-connector interface should be provided with a source of identification to aidin trouble

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
shooting, repair, or modification. Marking the cable designator on the cable along with bar codes is also recommended.
CC-07 Do not manufacture or dress connectors containing more than 25 wires or cables as a single integrated harness. Group
the wires or cables into runs of no more than 25 wires or cables each. In addition to making trouble shooting and repair
easier, this approach help avoid large bend radii, thereby simplifying routing, packaging, and stowage.
CC-08 Standardize connector pin assignments for power, ground, and other frequently used signals.

C-271
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.06.04 Power Supply CC-09 Locate LRU/subsystem critical nodes (and or test points) so they are accessible from a connector to prevent the need for
internal LRU probing or access.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

CC-10 Avoid hidden cables. Visually inspecting and tracing all assembly cables rather than having hidden cables (such as
behind other cables or even LRUs) allows for a quick system and cable integrity check which aids in overall system
integrity and debug. This also implies quick access for manipulative actions.
CC-11 Orient spare wires and cable pigtails along the outer diameter or periphery of connectors to make access easier.
CC-12 Build up and assemble straight and angle connector shells or back shells in a manner that ensures that wire or cable strain
or wear is not possible.
CO-01 Design automated systems and programs with provisions to enable "stop test" and "resume" without the need to cycle back
or repeat the entire test.
CO-02 In the event of program loss or hang-up, automated systems and programs should have provisions for reverting to manual
test and operation.
CO-03 Use a test connector to provide test and maintenance bus access to all system and subsystem faults.
CO-04 Design systems and subsystems so that ATE can be used to access, read, and control internal components in concert with
the test or checkout program.
CO-05 Avoid the need for costly adapters for signal communications between system, subsystems, line replaceable units (LRUs)
or Weapon Replaceable Assemblies (WRAs), and ATE.
EC-01 A threaded electrical connector should contain integral locking mechanisms and visual indications that the connector is
properly seated and locked.
EC-02 An electrical connector requiring less than one full turn to connect or disconnect should contain integral locking
mechanisms and visual indications that the connector is properly seated and locked.
EC-03 A push-pull electrical connector (excluding rack-and-panel type) should contain integral locking features and visual
indication that the connector is properly seated and locked.
EC-04 All electrical connectors should be keyed or asymmetrically shaped to ensure proper alignment.
EC-05 All electrical connectors should contain scoop-proof shells to ensure pin damage will not occur prior to engaging key
way.
EC-06 All electrical connectors should be corrosion resistant to reduce or eliminate the need for scheduled inspections or
corrosion prevention measures.
EC-07 Avoid using electrical connectors requiring any type or form of soldering.
EC-08 Locate and position electrical connectors such that all pin identification for either half can be easily seen.
EC-09 Electrical connectors selected for critical applications on ground vehicles should be both accessible and capable of being
connected disconnected by a fifty percentile gloved male hand.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

EC-10 Separation between grouped electrical connectors should be sufficient to ensure make or break of any connector by a
fifty percentile gloved male hand. Where this is not possible, an alternate method should be used such as the use of stand-
offs, long-shelled connectors alternated with standard connectors, 180-degree connectors alternated with 90-degree
connectors, or innovative equivalents.
EC-16 Select connectors so that contacts on the "live" or "hot" side of the connection are socket type rather than pin type to
minimize personnel hazard and to prevent accidental shorting of live circuits.
EC-17 Whenever possible, use self-locking connector plugs of a type not requiring safety wire.
EC-18 All electric connectors should be environment resistant.
EC-19 Connectors containing fiber optic contacts should, whenever possible, be mounted on a vertical surface to prevent

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
particle and fluid contamination.
EC-20 Use quick disconnect connectors where allowed and identify all pins on each connector.
EC-21 Locate connectors far enough apart so that they meet specified requirements.
EC-22 All connectors should be keyed differently with aligning pins that extend beyond the electrical pins. Connector pins and
sockets should engage after key position is entered.

C-272
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.06.04 Power Supply EC-23 Design connectors so that plugs are cold and receptacles are hot.
EC-24 Use electrical connectors that incorporate alignment key-ways to reduce incidents of damage due to improper

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

engagement.
EC-25 Use positive locking, quick disconnect electrical connectors to save man-hours, prevent foreign object damage (FOD)
and decrease the chance of personal injury.
EC-26 Avoid using identical electrical connectors in adjacent areas.
LO-03 Equipment and support structure requiring shrouds to reduce radar returns should not cause increases in equipment
service/repair time.
MC-06 Locate, position, orient all plumbing and duct electrical connectors to prevent the need for sequential installation or
removal.
MC-12 All plumbing and connectors containing liquids should be meniscus-free.
MC-14 Where multiple connectors are located in close proximity, ensure (1) a minimum hand tool arc of 120 degrees can be
maintained, and (2) stagger fittings to ensure firm coupling interface/hand tool interface can be accomplished without
inducing damage to adjacent lines.
MG-03 Clearly mark all subsystems/LRUs to make system integration, test, debug, and repair easier.
MP-01 Avoid the use epoxies to mount parts on repairable modules because they make repair extremely difficult.
MP-02 Use a unique identification (ID) resistor incorporated in each system module to verify that the proper module is mounted
on ATE.
MP-03 Design modules so that lengthy warm-up times, special coding and air purity levels, and similar constraints are not
necessary.
TP-01 Locate Input/Output (I/O) test points and associated readouts in close proximity to each other so that one person can
perform testing.
TP-02 Protect test points against the environment and from induced contamination.
TP-03 Protect test points from outside signal generation.
3.06.05 Information Systems A-11 Locate compartment electrical penetrations close to the access opening for ease of sight, probing, repair, and to eliminate
fluid soaking, wicking, or contamination.
A-12 Locate compartment electrical penetrations far enough from the access opening to prevent damage resulting from
improper (over-length) panel fasteners.
BIT-01 During design of the BIT, use worst-case stress analysis to ensure that any circuit failures induced by temperature
extremes, tolerance build-up, power supply variations, and combinations thereof are identified.
BIT-02 Ensure that BIT system thresholds are consistent with those across the system, subsystem, item, module, and piece-part

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

levels to prevent excessive numbers of Cannot Duplicate (CND) and Retest OK (RTOK) events from occurring.
BIT-03 The degree of BIT required or proposed should be based on the respective failure rates and the appropriate FMECA at
all equipment indenture levels.
BIT-04 Limit the amount of data that is recorded to a manageable size by:
- Limiting the number of signals that are monitored
- Limiting the maximum sampling rate
- Reducing the time span over which data is accumulated
- Restricting the type of data accumulated
BIT-05 Incorporate testability design features as an integral part of equipment preliminary design process.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
BIT-06 Mission critical functions should be monitored by BIT.

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

BIT-07 Set BIT tolerances to maximize fault detection and minimize false alarm rate in the expected operating environment.
BIT-08 Design BIT fault detectors to accommodate the needs of operator maintenance personnel.
BIT-09 Use concurrent BIT to monitor system critical functions.
BIT-10 Design the BIT and BITE so that no fault or failure within the BIT or BITE will degrade, disrupt, or fail the system being
monitored.

C-273
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.06.05 Information Systems BIT-11 In the area of software design and test responsibility, the responsibility for the design and development of verification
testing of an end item (e.g., digital filter) should reside with the same engineer(s).

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

BIT-12 Define stimuli and response data for each diagnostic test at the system/subsystem level. The same data should be planned
for use both in factory testing as well as in field maintenance of the equipment. These data minimize the amount of
unique software to be written.
BIT-13 Provide for manual control to test sequences, so that the test can be selected individually, and appropriate test
combinations can be executed at the operator's discretion.
BIT-14 Provide access to all BIT control and status signals at module connector pins. This will enable ATE to directly connect to
BIT circuitry.
BIT-15 Incorporate complete BIT functions and BITE on module. If only a portion of the BIT routine or BITE circuitry exists on
the module, then ATE cannot utilize the BIT routine without providing the missing BIT functions.
BIT-17 BIT failures should be latched on the module. This makes it easier for the system or ATE to poll the error bit at any time.
BIT-18 If many BIT routines exist on a module, then ATE should have access and the ability to control each routine individually.
BIT-19 Design BIT to have a very low false alarm rate; otherwise BIT will not be an effective maintenance tool. As a goal, the
false alarm rate should be 1% or less.
BIT-20 The BIT should be mechanized so that when a piece of equipment is not installed in a subsystem or the product, a failure
will not be indicated.
BIT-26 Locate routinely used test points so they are accessible without removing or disassembling other equipment
CC-06 Label, and where possible color code, each wire in a harness or cable to facilitate tracking from origin to termination.
Each wire, cable, and coax-to-connector interface should be provided with a source of identification to aidin trouble
shooting, repair, or modification. Marking the cable designator on the cable along with bar codes is also recommended.
CC-07 Do not manufacture or dress connectors containing more than 25 wires or cables as a single integrated harness. Group
the wires or cables into runs of no more than 25 wires or cables each. In addition to making trouble shooting and repair
easier, this approach help avoid large bend radii, thereby simplifying routing, packaging, and stowage.
CC-08 Standardize connector pin assignments for power, ground, and other frequently used signals.
CC-09 Locate LRU/subsystem critical nodes (and or test points) so they are accessible from a connector to prevent the need for
internal LRU probing or access.
CC-10 Avoid hidden cables. Visually inspecting and tracing all assembly cables rather than having hidden cables (such as
behind other cables or even LRUs) allows for a quick system and cable integrity check which aids in overall system
integrity and debug. This also implies quick access for manipulative actions.
CO-01 Design automated systems and programs with provisions to enable "stop test" and "resume" without the need to cycle back
or repeat the entire test.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

CO-02 In the event of program loss or hang-up, automated systems and programs should have provisions for reverting to manual
test and operation.
CO-03 Use a test connector to provide test and maintenance bus access to all system and subsystem faults.
CO-04 Design systems and subsystems so that ATE can be used to access, read, and control internal components in concert with
the test or checkout program.
CO-05 Avoid the need for costly adapters for signal communications between system, subsystems, line replaceable units (LRUs)
or Weapon Replaceable Assemblies (WRAs), and ATE.
EC-01 A threaded electrical connector should contain integral locking mechanisms and visual indications that the connector is
properly seated and locked.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
EC-02 An electrical connector requiring less than one full turn to connect or disconnect should contain integral locking
mechanisms and visual indications that the connector is properly seated and locked.
EC-03 A push-pull electrical connector (excluding rack-and-panel type) should contain integral locking features and visual
indication that the connector is properly seated and locked.
EC-04 All electrical connectors should be keyed or asymmetrically shaped to ensure proper alignment.

C-274
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.06.05 Information Systems EC-05 All electrical connectors should contain scoop-proof shells to ensure pin damage will not occur prior to engaging key
way.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

EC-06 All electrical connectors should be corrosion resistant to reduce or eliminate the need for scheduled inspections or
corrosion prevention measures.
EC-07 Avoid using electrical connectors requiring any type or form of soldering.
EC-08 Locate and position electrical connectors such that all pin identification for either half can be easily seen.
EC-09 Electrical connectors selected for critical applications on ground vehicles should be both accessible and capable of being
connected disconnected by a fifty percentile gloved male hand.
EC-10 Separation between grouped electrical connectors should be sufficient to ensure make or break of any connector by a
fifty percentile gloved male hand. Where this is not possible, an alternate method should be used such as the use of stand-
offs, long-shelled connectors alternated with standard connectors, 180-degree connectors alternated with 90-degree
connectors, or innovative equivalents.
EC-11 Avoid connectors requiring potting as a method for environmental protection due to lengthy repair time and tendency for
potting compound reversion.
EC-12 Electrical penetrations into a compartment should not be on a vertical axis to ensure foreign matter does not enter
connector.
EC-15 The removal or replacement of electronic equipment should not require the removal of any other piece of equipment or
armament.
EC-21 Locate connectors far enough apart so that they meet specified requirements.
EC-22 All connectors should be keyed differently with aligning pins that extend beyond the electrical pins. Connector pins and
sockets should engage after key position is entered.
EC-23 Design connectors so that plugs are cold and receptacles are hot.
EC-24 Use electrical connectors that incorporate alignment key-ways to reduce incidents of damage due to improper
engagement.
EC-25 Use positive locking, quick disconnect electrical connectors to save man-hours, prevent foreign object damage (FOD)
and decrease the chance of personal injury.
EC-26 Avoid using identical electrical connectors in adjacent areas.
ENG-01 All facets of engine design should take advantage of Electrostatic Engine Monitoring Systems (EEMS) and Inductive
Debris Monitoring (IDM) toward achievement of on-condition maintenance and engine health monitoring.
ENG-02 Each different component of rotating machinery should contain different tracer elements to enhance EEMS and IDM
isolation and tracking of wear.
ENG-03 Digital electronic controls, fully automatic digital electronic controls, and similar concepts should contain the highest

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

degree of BIT and diagnostics commensurate with affordability, operation and maintenance, and life cycle costs as
appropriate.
ENG-26 Locate and position engine overheat and fire warning sensors so that damage cannot occur during engine maintenance or
replacement.
LO-03 Equipment and support structure requiring shrouds to reduce radar returns should not cause increases in equipment
service/repair time.
MG-01 Mount LRUs/sub-systems on drawer slides or extender racks to provide easier accessibility during integration, testing,
debug, and repair of Units Under Test (UUTs).
MG-02 Use a modular system design so that each subassembly is designed as a functionally complete entity. Then when a

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
subassembly was removed for testing, ATE will not need custom circuitry to simulate missing functions.
MG-03 Clearly mark all subsystems/LRUs to make system integration, test, debug, and repair easier.
MP-01 Avoid the use epoxies to mount parts on repairable modules because they make repair extremely difficult.
MP-02 Use a unique identification (ID) resistor incorporated in each system module to verify that the proper module is mounted
on ATE.

C-275
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.06.05 Information Systems MP-03 Design modules so that lengthy warm-up times, special coding and air purity levels, and similar constraints are not
necessary.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

PYRO-10 Provide a numerical maintenance code on maintenance panels or maintenance recorder/memory systems to denote the
"safe/arm" status for each weapon or store.
TP-01 Locate Input/Output (I/O) test points and associated readouts in close proximity to each other so that one person can
perform testing.
TP-02 Protect test points against the environment and from induced contamination.
TP-03 Protect test points from outside signal generation.
3.07 Environmental Control, Air A-03 All equipment bay and compartment structural flanges and stiffeners should be external to the compartment to maximize
Conditioning, and Pressurization the volume available for equipment installation and arrangement.
A-04 Use stiffening beads in lieu of flanges to the maximum extent to enhance compartment volume and simplify repairs.
Stiffening beads should have the convex surface toward the compartment to eliminate fluid traps.
A-05 Keep all machined compartment frames, webs, and closure panels to a constant thickness (e.g., not stepped or tapered) to
ease simplicity of fluid or electrical penetrations and ease and simplicity of structural repair.
A-06 Hardpoints (structural attachment and load bearing areas) within a compartment to assist in equipment mounting or
support should not be integral with the machined part. Hardpoints should be parasitic to enable quick repair in case of
wear or damage in lieu of precise ream/bush repair typical of machined hardpoints.
A-07 Paint equipment bay and compartment interiors a high gloss white to maximize lighting reflectivity, visibility, and rapid
leak detection capability.
A-08 Plumbing penetrations into a compartment should not be on a vertical axis due to difficulty in making or breaking
vertically-oriented connections. When compartment access is from the bottom, vertically-oriented connections can allow
fluid to leak onto the maintainer. When access is from the top, such connections can allow foreign matter to enter the
line. Use horizontal penetrations whenever possible.
A-09 Any heat or temperature sensitive structure within a compartment should contain heat-sensitive tape or appropriate heat
sensor for easy indication of over-temperature excursions.
A-10 Provide a sufficient number of compartment fluid drains to ensure fluid drainage for varying aircraft static attitudes and
varying terrain slopes for ground vehicles.
A-11 Locate compartment electrical penetrations close to the access opening for ease of sight, probing, repair, and to eliminate
fluid soaking, wicking, or contamination.
A-12 Locate compartment electrical penetrations far enough from the access opening to prevent damage resulting from
improper (over-length) panel fasteners.
A-13 Two-sided or two-surfaced access should not be required for access to equipment interfaces and hardpoints. The term

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

two-sided infers top/bottom, left/right, front/back, or combinations thereof.
A-14 Do not locate nutplates or gang channels in inaccessible areas that would require extensive disassembly or equipment
removal to gain access.
A-18 Use transparent windows, quick-opening covers, or openings without any cover to permit quick visual inspections where
needed.
BIT-01 During design of the BIT, use worst-case stress analysis to ensure that any circuit failures induced by temperature
extremes, tolerance build-up, power supply variations, and combinations thereof are identified.
BIT-02 Ensure that BIT system thresholds are consistent with those across the system, subsystem, item, module, and piece-part
levels to prevent excessive numbers of Cannot Duplicate (CND) and Retest OK (RTOK) events from occurring.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
BIT-03 The degree of BIT required or proposed should be based on the respective failure rates and the appropriate FMECA at
all equipment indenture levels.

C-276
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.07 Environmental Control, Air BIT-04 Limit the amount of data that is recorded to a manageable size by:
Conditioning, and Pressurization - Limiting the number of signals that are monitored

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

- Limiting the maximum sampling rate
- Reducing the time span over which data is accumulated
- Restricting the type of data accumulated
BIT-05 Incorporate testability design features as an integral part of equipment preliminary design process.
BIT-06 Mission critical functions should be monitored by BIT.
BIT-09 Use concurrent BIT to monitor system critical functions.
BIT-16 Critical voltages should be visually monitored by sending the voltage signals to visible LEDs.
BIT-17 BIT failures should be latched on the module. This makes it easier for the system or ATE to poll the error bit at any time.
BIT-18 If many BIT routines exist on a module, then ATE should have access and the ability to control each routine individually.
BIT-19 Design BIT to have a very low false alarm rate; otherwise BIT will not be an effective maintenance tool. As a goal, the
false alarm rate should be 1% or less.
BIT-20 The BIT should be mechanized so that when a piece of equipment is not installed in a subsystem or the product, a failure
will not be indicated.
BIT-26 Locate routinely used test points so they are accessible without removing or disassembling other equipment.
CBR-01 Orient all vehicle liquid servicing fittings to ensure fluids will not come in contact with protective garb during
connect/disconnect activities.
CONT-01 Control rods should use Boyd or impedance type bolts (or equivalent) to eliminate the need for cotter pins or safety wire.
CONT-02 Do not use metal control cables for vehicles that will operate in salt water or salt air environments.
CONT-03 Use control rods rather than control cables for non-complex applications and non-complex routing within the vehicle.
CONT-04 Use control cables rather than control rods for most complex applications.
CONT-05 Route cables so that 100 percent of a cable will be viewable for inspection.
CONT-06 Design all pulleys and brackets associated with cable installations so they are accessible by a 75 percentile male hand.
CREW-04 Avoid wiring, coax, and plumbing penetrations through the floor of crew cabs, operators' compartments, crew stations,
cockpits, and passenger compartments.
D&V-01 The geometric aspects of structural design and interfaces should not result in any natural bathtubs.
D&V-02 Closed structural sections subject to condensation or fluid migration should contain drainage provisions.
D&V-03 Crew cabs, operators' compartments, crew stations, cockpits, and passenger compartments should be subject to the same
corrosion prevention measures as the exteriors of the vehicles. Low points, pockets, and related fluid collection points
within should be provided with low point drains.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

ECS-01 Design so that equipment servicing status are accessible and readable from the ground level for air vehicles and from the
operator's position for ground and water vehicles.
ECS-02 Do not locate equipment servicing points in crew, passenger, or operator areas.
ECS-03 Heat exchangers using hot liquids as the heat source should not be located inside the compartments used for operator,
crew, or passengers.
ECS-04 Plumbing, lines, or hoses containing hot liquids, toxic gases or liquids should be external to operator, crew, or passenger
stations.
ECS-05 Access, removal, and installation of all type filter elements should be possible without removing the assembly or
disconnecting any filter package interfaces.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
ECS-06 All electrical control, sensing, sensor, warning, caution, or signal interface and wiring should be fully BIT compatible.

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

ECS-07 Liquid type refrigeration compressors/packages should contain highly reliable quick disconnects to negate servicing or
bleeding subsequent to replacement.
ECS-08 All liquid type refrigeration compressors and packages stocked as spares should be pre-serviced wherein the servicing is
compatible with the shelf life of the unit.
ECS-09 Design control valves, both manual and powered, with a visual pointer that clearly indicates the position of the valve.

C-277
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.07 Environmental Control, Air ECS-10 The power actuation source used for valves that direct or control air, gas, or liquid flow should be parasitic to the valve
Conditioning, and Pressurization body to enable replacement without disturbing the integrity of the lines, ducts, or plenums.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

ECS-11 Design air inlets, outlets, and exhausts to be accessible without reliance on ladders or work stands for ease of installing
protective plugs or covers.
ECS-12 Design air inlets, outlets, and exhausts with screens to prevent bird or rodent entry.
ECS-13 Design air inlets, outlets, and exhausts to be meniscus-free to prevent a bathtub effect. In remote instances where this is
not possible, passive drains should be provided at all low points to prevent liquid accumulation with the vehicle in its
normal static attitude.
ECS-14 Instances where air inlets, outlets, and exhausts are subject to water entry, passive drains should be employed capable of
handling 4" of rain per hour.
ECS-15 Locate and orient air inlets, outlets, and exhausts in a manner that prevents their use as footholds during maintenance.
ECS-16 All components contained in the systems, including all attaching brackets and supports, should use hex-head self-locking
bolts for ease and simplicity of installation.
ECS-17 Do not use air ejectors due to their low reliability and susceptibility to clogging.
ECS-18 Avoid the use of insulation blankets containing polyvinyl for any application due to the dense smoke and toxic fumes if
burned or subjected to high temperature bleed air leakage.
ECS-19 Thermal blankets and covers used in ground vehicles should be replaceable.
ECS-20 Minor rips, tears, and punctures in ground vehicle thermal blankets and covers should be capable of being repaired in
place.
ECS-21 Do not locate ground cooling or circulation fans that operate at high noise levels in operator, crew, or passenger
compartments.
ECS-22 There should be no requirements for scheduled servicing or lubrication.
ECS-24 System design and integration and technology application should be such that requirements for torque is not required.
ECS-25 Technology, material selection, and treatments should combine to provide a corrosion-resistant system.
ECS-26 Design and integrate components whose proper operation depends on the direction of flow such that they cannot be
incorrectly installed.
ECS-27 Use temperature-limiting devices with high temperature air systems to ensure no single or combination of surface wind,
cross wind, ground operation or flight operation will damage windshields, canopies, windows or optics.
ECS-28 Install and orient air supply and distribution ducts so they clear all access openings and equipment removal envelopes.
EDECOM-02 Provide integral sensors (viewable from the exterior) for equipment subject to internal forced-air cooling from outside or
external air to indicate the presence of contaminants.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

ENG(G)-06 The distance between the engine and firewall should ensure the access envelopes to lines, fittings, wiring, and
adjustments will accommodate the 75 percentile male hand.
ENG(G)-10 Design attaching hardware for all mechanical engine-to-vehicle interfaces to be captive and with integral safeties.
ENG(G)-11 Use "torq-set" type clamps or equivalent in all cooling system hose interfaces to eliminate torque wrenches and the
potential for error.
ENG(G)-14 Access envelopes to fuel and oil filters should not be in close proximity to exhaust manifolds or cooling system return
lines.
ENG(G)-15 Any single drive belt (excluding timing belts) should be capable of replacement within 30 minutes elapsed time
ENG(G)-17 Install simple, lightweight shields over cooling system return lines to protect personnel from hose or line blowout during

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
maintenance.

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

C-278
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.07 Environmental Control, Air ENG(G)-18 Incorporate appropriate sensors to enhance the diagnostic and prognostic capabilities for the following:
Conditioning, and Pressurization - Oil temperature - Fuel filter bypass

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

- Oil pressure - Coolant pressure
- Oil filter bypass - Coolant level
- Oil cooler bypass valve position - Coolant temperature
- Oil level - Vibration pickups
- Oil return line particle count - Chip detector
ENG-27 No rigging or calibration should be required following engine replacement.
ENG-28 No engine operational start and checkout should be required following engine replacement.
ENG-47 Design the engine, including all accessories, plumbing, wiring, ducts, and mechanisms, to meet the same environmental
protection and compatibility requirements as the host vehicle.
ENV-01 Materials, treatments, coatings, finishes should be compatible with all anti-ice and de-ice fluids, chemical and biological
decontamination fluids, washing and cleaning fluids, and all vehicle subsystem fluids.
ENV-02 There should be no top coat or treatment deterioration throughout the standard temperature and humidity spectrum.
ENV-03 For airborne vehicles, the finishes should be durable against rain, hail, and dynamic erosion throughout the flight
envelope.
ENV-04 For airborne and ground vehicles, the finishes should be durable against sand erosion throughout all surface wind speeds
experienced in arid or desert geographical locations.
HYD-09 Provide hydraulic devices used in critical applications with integral 5 micron filtering.
LO-06 Size flush mounted LO screens for auxiliary air inlets and exits to ensure functionality with up to 25 percent of the
openings plugged.
LO-07 Flush and non-flush LO screens should be interchangeable.
MC-01 All clamps should contain torque-set or torque-limiting connections to prevent clamp or component failure due to over-
torque. Clamp installation call outs should not depend on special tools to establish the required torque values.
MC-02 Avoid the use of cotter pins, safety wire, safety clips, and similar devices to prevent maintenance-induced events leading
to ground vehicle accidents or loss of air vehicles.
MC-03 All tubing connections and interfaces should use rosan/dynatube (or equivalent) to (1) enable connect or disconnect with
one hand, one tool, (2) eliminate the need to safety the connection, (3) provide a superior seal, and (4) negate need to
reposition line(s) during component replacement.
MC-04 No trombone type, flared tube type, or piloted line type interfaces should be used to avoid the need for removal or
repositioning during equipment removal.
MC-05 Avoid potential foreign object traps during manufacturing or operational maintenance by eliminating vertical penetrations

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

of plumbing/fittings into tanks, compartments, or cells
MC-06 Locate, position, orient all plumbing and duct electrical connectors to prevent the need for sequential installation or
removal.
MC-09 All plumbing connections and fittings used for fuel systems should contain integral bonding features to eliminate the need
for bonding clamps or jumper cables.
MC-10 In rare instances where a plumbing run contains complex form or geometry that would require removal of other plumbing
or equipment for access, in-line connectors should be incorporated to maintain the integrity of other plumbing or
equipment.
MC-11 No subsystem plumbing, equipment, or wiring should use a tank, cell, or compartment containing liquids as a means for

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
routing or penetration simplicity during manufacture.
MC-12 All plumbing and connectors containing liquids should be meniscus-free.
MC-13 In instances where plumbing or connector interfaces cannot or are not keyed for a specific orientation, all identification,
markings, cautions, and directions should be placed 360 degrees around the tube or duct.

C-279
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.07 Environmental Control, Air MC-14 Where multiple connectors are located in close proximity, ensure (1) a minimum hand tool arc of 120 degrees can be
Conditioning, and Pressurization maintained, and (2) stagger fittings to ensure firm coupling interface/hand tool interface can be accomplished without

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

inducing damage to adjacent lines.
MP-01 Avoid the use epoxies to mount parts on repairable modules because they make repair extremely difficult.
MP-02 Use a unique identification (ID) resistor incorporated in each system module to verify that the proper module is mounted
on ATE.
MP-03 Design modules so that lengthy warm-up times, special coding and air purity levels, and similar constraints are not
necessary.
PERS-01 Group man-machine interfaces manifold-style to enable connect/disconnect in a single action.
PERS-02 Include an integral, highly visible indicator in a man-machine interface connector to denote connector is seated and
locked.
PERS-03 Design interface connectors so that a distinct action is required by an individual to effect a disconnect. (Excludes
airframe-to-ejection seat personnel interfaces.)
PERS-04 Interfaces should contain an emergency release mechanism that can be activated by rescue personnel with a 95
percentile gloved hand.
PERS-05 Design emergency interface release mechanisms to be clearly visible under all types of lighting situations.
PERS-08 Design stowage and mounting provisions for portable air or oxygen containers to withstand 40G crash or impact loads.
SABCH-02 All flush type structural screws should have identical head drives for the entire vehicle.
SABCH-03 All non-flush type structural screws should have identical head drive recesses for the entire vehicle.
SABCH-04 Special high strength bolts, such as twelve-point heads, should be fully justified from standpoint of the cost of ownership
and effectiveness.
SABCH-05 Structural design should avoid the reliance on blind fasteners unless fully supported by cost, weight, schedule, and
effectiveness analysis.
SEAT-01 Design personnel seats and padding materials, including the covers and fillers, so they are incapable of creating or
emitting toxic fumes or dense smoke when subjected to fire.
SI-03 Parts and assemblies of a given model product or of models of a product in the same series should be interchangeable or
replaceable.
3.07.01 Oxygen Systems A-03 All equipment bay and compartment structural flanges and stiffeners should be external to the compartment to maximize
the volume available for equipment installation and arrangement.
A-06 Hardpoints (structural attachment and load bearing areas) within a compartment to assist in equipment mounting or
support should not be integral with the machined part. Hardpoints should be parasitic to enable quick repair in case of
wear or damage in lieu of precise ream/bush repair typical of machined hardpoints.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

A-08 Plumbing penetrations into a compartment should not be on a vertical axis due to difficulty in making or breaking
vertically-oriented connections. When compartment access is from the bottom, vertically-oriented connections can allow
fluid to leak onto the maintainer. When access is from the top, such connections can allow foreign matter to enter the
line. Use horizontal penetrations whenever possible.
A-13 Two-sided or two-surfaced access should not be required for access to equipment interfaces and hardpoints. The term
two-sided infers top/bottom, left/right, front/back, or combinations thereof.
BIT-01 During design of the BIT, use worst-case stress analysis to ensure that any circuit failures induced by temperature
extremes, tolerance build-up, power supply variations, and combinations thereof are identified.
BIT-02 Ensure that BIT system thresholds are consistent with those across the system, subsystem, item, module, and piece-part

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
levels to prevent excessive numbers of Cannot Duplicate (CND) and Retest OK (RTOK) events from occurring.
BIT-03 The degree of BIT required or proposed should be based on the respective failure rates and the appropriate FMECA at
all equipment indenture levels.

C-280
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.07.01 Oxygen Systems BIT-04 Limit the amount of data that is recorded to a manageable size by:
- Limiting the number of signals that are monitored

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

- Limiting the maximum sampling rate
- Reducing the time span over which data is accumulated
- Restricting the type of data accumulated
BIT-05 Incorporate testability design features as an integral part of equipment preliminary design process.
BIT-06 Mission critical functions should be monitored by BIT.
BIT-09 Use concurrent BIT to monitor system critical functions.
BIT-20 The BIT should be mechanized so that when a piece of equipment is not installed in a subsystem or the product, a failure
will not be indicated.
BIT-26 Locate routinely used test points so they are accessible without removing or disassembling other equipment
CBR-01 Orient all vehicle liquid servicing fittings to ensure fluids will not come in contact with protective garb during
connect/disconnect activities.
CREW-04 Avoid wiring, coax, and plumbing penetrations through the floor of crew cabs, operators' compartments, crew stations,
cockpits, and passenger compartments.
D&V-01 The geometric aspects of structural design and interfaces should not result in any natural bathtubs.
D&V-02 Closed structural sections subject to condensation or fluid migration should contain drainage provisions.
D&V-03 Crew cabs, operators' compartments, crew stations, cockpits, and passenger compartments should be subject to the same
corrosion prevention measures as the exteriors of the vehicles. Low points, pockets, and related fluid collection points
within should be provided with low point drains.
MC-01 All clamps should contain torque-set or torque-limiting connections to prevent clamp or component failure due to over-
torque. Clamp installation call outs should not depend on special tools to establish the required torque values.
MC-02 Avoid the use of cotter pins, safety wire, safety clips, and similar devices to prevent maintenance-induced events leading
to ground vehicle accidents or loss of air vehicles.
MC-03 All tubing connections and interfaces should use rosan/dynatube (or equivalent) to (1) enable connect or disconnect with
one hand, one tool, (2) eliminate the need to safety the connection, (3) provide a superior seal, and (4) negate need to
reposition line(s) during component replacement.
MC-04 No trombone type, flared tube type, or piloted line type interfaces should be used to avoid the need for removal or
repositioning during equipment removal.
MC-05 Avoid potential foreign object traps during manufacturing or operational maintenance by eliminating vertical penetrations
of plumbing/fittings into tanks, compartments, or cells
MC-06 Locate, position, orient all plumbing and duct electrical connectors to prevent the need for sequential installation or

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

removal.
MC-09 All plumbing connections and fittings used for fuel systems should contain integral bonding features to eliminate the need
for bonding clamps or jumper cables.
MC-10 In rare instances where a plumbing run contains complex form or geometry that would require removal of other plumbing
or equipment for access, in-line connectors should be incorporated to maintain the integrity of other plumbing or
equipment.
MC-11 No subsystem plumbing, equipment, or wiring should use a tank, cell, or compartment containing liquids as a means for
routing or penetration simplicity during manufacture.
MC-12 All plumbing and connectors containing liquids should be meniscus-free.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
MC-13 In instances where plumbing or connector interfaces cannot or are not keyed for a specific orientation, all identification,

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

markings, cautions, and directions should be placed 360 degrees around the tube or duct.
MC-14 Where multiple connectors are located in close proximity, ensure (1) a minimum hand tool arc of 120 degrees can be
maintained, and (2) stagger fittings to ensure firm coupling interface/hand tool interface can be accomplished without
inducing damage to adjacent lines.
MP-01 Avoid the use epoxies to mount parts on repairable modules because they make repair extremely difficult.

C-281
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.07.01 Oxygen Systems MP-02 Use a unique identification (ID) resistor incorporated in each system module to verify that the proper module is mounted
on ATE.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

MP-03 Design modules so that lengthy warm-up times, special coding and air purity levels, and similar constraints are not
necessary.
OXY-01 System should contain automatic BIT for warning indicators to eliminate dedicated test switches and/or test requirements.
OXY-02 Provide sensors to denote occurrence of On-Board Oxygen Generating Systems (OBOGS) bleed air over temperature.
OXY-03 Provide condition sensors for oxygen concentrators to eliminate periodic and/or forced replacement.
OXY-04 OBOGS should be given preference over liquid oxygen systems.
OXY-05 Locate liquid oxygen (LOX) containers in a sealed, dedicated compartment to eliminate need for frequent visual
inspections.
OXY-06 Liquid oxygen container design and integration should contain appropriate sensors to detect and monitor air filter
brazement.
OXY-07 Locate liquid oxygen containers to ensure simultaneous replacement with other turnaround activities.
OXY-08 LOX containers should contain rear mounted, automatic interfaces.
OXY-09 Special or common hand tools should not be required to remove or replace LOX containers.
OXY-10 Effective leak detection sensors should be integral to the system.
OXY-11 System operational and service condition status should be capable of being downlinked to centralized maintenance
facilities.
OXY-12 LOX compartments should be sealed from adjacent compartments and should contain dedicated overboard drains.
P-06 Access door and panel devices used to support door in opened position should meet the following criteria:
- for airborne vehicles, design for 60 knot gust loads (or equivalent jet blast loads)
- for ground vehicles, design for 50 mph gust loads
P-07 Hinged access doors and panels capable of remaining in the opened position should not have sharp edges or corners.
P-08 Removable access door and panel fasteners should be of identical grip length and diameter.
P-09 Acceptable door and panel hold-open devices include over-center sheet metal spring, over-center spring link, spring
cartridge, support strut, and pinned goose neck hinge.
P-10 Access doors and panels requiring non-captive fasteners should not be located forward of air inlet ducts or high-energy
rotating components (e.g., prop fans, engine cooling fans, etc.).
P-11 Access doors and panels should be interchangeable as justified by operation and support costs or life cycle costs.
PERS-01 Group man-machine interfaces manifold-style to enable connect/disconnect in a single action.
PERS-02 Include an integral, highly visible indicator in a man-machine interface connector to denote connector is seated and

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

locked.
PERS-03 Design interface connectors so that a distinct action is required by an individual to effect a disconnect. (Excludes
airframe-to-ejection seat personnel interfaces.)
PERS-04 Interfaces should contain an emergency release mechanism that can be activated by rescue personnel with a 95
percentile gloved hand.
PERS-05 Design emergency interface release mechanisms to be clearly visible under all types of lighting situations.
PERS-08 Design stowage and mounting provisions for portable air or oxygen containers to withstand 40G crash or impact loads.
SABCH-02 All flush type structural screws should have identical head drives for the entire vehicle.
SABCH-03 All non-flush type structural screws should have identical head drive recesses for the entire vehicle.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
SABCH-04 Special high strength bolts, such as twelve-point heads, should be fully justified from standpoint of the cost of ownership
and effectiveness.
SABCH-05 Structural design should avoid the reliance on blind fasteners unless fully supported by cost, weight, schedule, and
effectiveness analysis.

C-282
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.07.01 Oxygen Systems SI-03 Parts and assemblies of a given model product or of models of a product in the same series should be interchangeable or
replaceable.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

3.08 Armament and Explosives A-04 Use stiffening beads in lieu of flanges to the maximum extent to enhance compartment volume and simplify repairs.
Stiffening beads should have the convex surface toward the compartment to eliminate fluid traps.
A-05 Keep all machined compartment frames, webs, and closure panels to a constant thickness (e.g., not stepped or tapered) to
ease simplicity of fluid or electrical penetrations and ease and simplicity of structural repair.
A-06 Hardpoints (structural attachment and load bearing areas) within a compartment to assist in equipment mounting or
support should not be integral with the machined part. Hardpoints should be parasitic to enable quick repair in case of
wear or damage in lieu of precise ream/bush repair typical of machined hardpoints.
A-07 Paint equipment bay and compartment interiors a high gloss white to maximize lighting reflectivity, visibility, and rapid
leak detection capability.
A-10 Provide a sufficient number of compartment fluid drains to ensure fluid drainage for varying aircraft static attitudes and
varying terrain slopes for ground vehicles.
A-11 Locate compartment electrical penetrations close to the access opening for ease of sight, probing, repair, and to eliminate
fluid soaking, wicking, or contamination.
A-12 Locate compartment electrical penetrations far enough from the access opening to prevent damage resulting from
improper (over-length) panel fasteners.
A-13 Two-sided or two-surfaced access should not be required for access to equipment interfaces and hardpoints. The term
two-sided infers top/bottom, left/right, front/back, or combinations thereof.
A-14 Do not locate nutplates or gang channels in inaccessible areas that would require extensive disassembly or equipment
removal to gain access.
A-18 Use transparent windows, quick-opening covers, or openings without any cover to permit quick visual inspections where
needed.
ARM-01 For an aircraft, the fuselage lower shear moldline should be no less than 38" above the ground when external weapons
only will be carried on the fuselage.
ARM-02 For an aircraft, the fuselage lower shear moldline should be no less than 50" above the ground when internal weapons
will be carried in the fuselage and weapon bay door widths exceed 22".
ARM-03 Locate fuselage weapon bays a minimum of 18" from the nose landing gear and main landing gear of an aircraft.
ARM-04 No single weapon/store mounted on a transporter should intrude into the service/turnaround envelope of another station.
ARM-05 All servicing and turnaround functions (including movement envelopes) should be outside the gun firing envelope.
ARM-06 The relationship of the nose landing gear to the main landing gear should not restrict the positioning of weapon
transporters under the fuselage of an aircraft.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

ARM-07 The design of weapon and store ejectors and launchers should not require scheduled servicing, maintenance, or
inspection requirements prior to upload of the weapon or store.
ARM-08 Weapon and store ejectors containing arming solenoids should ensure the solenoids can be rapidly replaced while
installed.
ARM-09 Weapon and store ejectors containing adjustable pitch control devices should ensure devices are easily accessible and
adjustments are Murphy-free.
ARM-10 Weapon and store stations should be located to ensure vehicle ballasting will not be required under any combination of
weapon/store configurations.
BIT-05 Incorporate testability design features as an integral part of equipment preliminary design process.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
BIT-06 Mission critical functions should be monitored by BIT.
BIT-09 Use concurrent BIT to monitor system critical functions.
BIT-20 The BIT should be mechanized so that when a piece of equipment is not installed in a subsystem or the product, a failure
will not be indicated.
BIT-26 Locate routinely used test points so they are accessible without removing or disassembling other equipment

C-283
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.08 Armament and Explosives D&V-01 The geometric aspects of structural design and interfaces should not result in any natural bathtubs.
D&V-02 Closed structural sections subject to condensation or fluid migration should contain drainage provisions.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

D&V-03 Crew cabs, operators' compartments, crew stations, cockpits, and passenger compartments should be subject to the same
corrosion prevention measures as the exteriors of the vehicles. Low points, pockets, and related fluid collection points
within should be provided with low point drains.
FUEL-01 Locate fuel vent and dump masts to ensure exiting fuel will be clear of servicing, loading, arming and safing areas for all
types of ground and airborne vehicles.
MC-02 Avoid the use of cotter pins, safety wire, safety clips, and similar devices to prevent maintenance-induced events leading
to ground vehicle accidents or loss of air vehicles.
MC-06 Locate, position, orient all plumbing and duct electrical connectors to prevent the need for sequential installation or
removal.
MC-09 All plumbing connections and fittings used for fuel systems should contain integral bonding features to eliminate the need
for bonding clamps or jumper cables.
MC-10 In rare instances where a plumbing run contains complex form or geometry that would require removal of other plumbing
or equipment for access, in-line connectors should be incorporated to maintain the integrity of other plumbing or
equipment.
MC-12 All plumbing and connectors containing liquids should be meniscus-free.
MC-13 In instances where plumbing or connector interfaces cannot or are not keyed for a specific orientation, all identification,
markings, cautions, and directions should be placed 360 degrees around the tube or duct.
MC-14 Where multiple connectors are located in close proximity, ensure (1) a minimum hand tool arc of 120 degrees can be
maintained, and (2) stagger fittings to ensure firm coupling interface/hand tool interface can be accomplished without
inducing damage to adjacent lines.
MP-01 Avoid the use epoxies to mount parts on repairable modules because they make repair extremely difficult.
MP-02 Use a unique identification (ID) resistor incorporated in each system module to verify that the proper module is mounted
on ATE.
MP-03 Design modules so that lengthy warm-up times, special coding and air purity levels, and similar constraints are not
necessary.
PYRO-01 Provide the "safe/arm" status to the pilot, crew, or gunner in the cockpit, crew station, or operator station as appropriate.
PYRO-02 Provide the "safe/arm" status as an external cue discernible from a distance of 10-20 feet.
PYRO-06 "Safe/arm" mechanism design should be free from FOD potential.
PYRO-07 Manual "safe/arm" mechanisms should be well-clear of inlet ducts, propellers, rotors, and similar rotating components.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

PYRO-08 Manual "safe/arm" mechanisms should be well-clear of engine exhausts, fuel/toxic vents, fluid drains, control surface
deflection envelopes, and rescue path envelopes.
PYRO-09 Provide positive, Murphy-proof locking detents for both the "safe" and "arm" positions of mechanical mechanisms.
PYRO-11 Design electrical/electronic "safe/arm" systems to eliminate the need for mechanical type system interrupt devices.
PYRO-12 Design of weapons, flare/chaff packages, and airborne pyrotechnic containers should follow the "wooden round" design
concept to eliminate scheduled tests, checks, and inspections throughout its intended life cycle.
PYRO-13 Container design for shipping, handling, and storing weapons, flares, chaff, and similar devices should not require special
atmospheres.
PYRO-14 Design weapon drop and fire/release circuits with frequency-coded firing systems or similar concepts to ensure stray

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
energy tests and checks will not be required and that stray energy will not impose a safety hazard or problem.

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

PYRO-15 Pylon-to-weapon and pylon-to-air vehicle electrical interfaces should contain built-in test/fault location capabilities.
PYRO-21 Weapon bays should contain internal lighting controlled by a separate switch that is only functional when doors are open
PYRO-22 A "rounds remaining" status should be available at the gun loading interface, maintenance panel, or cockpit/crew
station/operator station.
PYRO-23 Crew size for full ammo load should not exceed two persons.

C-284
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.08 Armament and Explosives PYRO-24 Ammo loader interface should not be less than 30" nor more than 50" above the ground to ensure loading can be
accomplished by a wide range of percentiles wearing chemical or biological protective gear.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

PYRO-25 Gun loading and servicing should be possible concurrently with all other weapon loading and servicing activities to
minimize the elapsed downtime.
PYRO-26 Do not locate ammunition loader interfaces close to inlets, exhausts, fuel dumps and drains, antennas, sensors, lights, or
hazardous protrusions.
PYRO-27 Incorporate integral hoisting provisions at each weapon/store station to enable direct lift from the container or carrier to
the attachment hardpoints.
PYRO-28 Automatic locking of the retention hooks should be accomplished for each respective weapon and store.
PYRO-29 Provide quick mechanical over-travel (no power) for weapon bay doors to maximize the weapon/store loading envelope.
PYRO-30 Ensure weapon bay door arc (both normal and over-travel) does not block or intrude into adjacent service points or
envelopes.
PYRO-32 Provide sufficient longitudinal clearance between weapon bays to enable simultaneous loading of two bays.
PYRO-33 Provide sufficient lateral clearance between weapon bays to enable simultaneous loading of two bays.
PYRO-34 Weapon bay door seals should be bonded or attached to door structure to minimize induced seal damage during weapon
or store loading.
PYRO-35 Suspension system should permit any single weapon or store to be loaded by a two man crew.
PYRO-36 Suspension system design and spacing should enable any combination of eight weapons to be loaded by two two-man
crews within the refueling time of the vehicle (excludes nuclear weapons).
PYRO-37 Internal weapon suspension arrangements should preclude sequential weapon loading.
PYRO-38 Any single pylon or built-up pylon/weapon package should have the capability for rapid reconfiguration.
PYRO-39 Weapon bay ejectors and launchers should have the capability for total interchangeability and reconfigurability.
PYRO-40 All weapon and store loading functions should be within the percentile range of 5% female to 95% male standing at
ground level.
PYRO-41 Weapon or store handling and transportation equipment should be compatible with rough terrain and capable of 25 mph
towing speeds minimum.
PYRO-42 In weapons carriage design and integration, avoid dependence of on-board high pressure nitrogen.
PYRO-43 Launcher or ejector design/interface should not require a dual function of carrying airframe structural loads.
PYRO-44 Launcher and ejector design should incorporate automatic sway bracing.
PYRO-45 Missile ejectors should be provided with repeatable missile motor fire wires to simplify loading and reduce elapsed time.
PYRO-46 Design pylons, launchers, and ejector racks so that weapon loading, servicing, and reconfigurations can be accomplished

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

using standard hand tools.
PYRO-47 Installation design of ejectors, launchers, racks, and associated hardware interfaces should avoid reliance on torque
wrenches.
SE-04 Gun port covers or plugs should be lightweight, 100% effective, and easy to install or store.
SI-03 Parts and assemblies of a given model product or of models of a product in the same series should be interchangeable or
replaceable.
WBAY-11 Gap seal should match pylon and wing/fuselage surface impedance.
WBAY-12 Pylon-to-store/weapon gap seal should permit visual and physical access during loading for all interfaces between bomb
rack-to-store, bomb rack-to-launcher, and launcher-to-store.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
WBAY-13 Pylon-to-store/weapon gap seal should not interfere with automatic sway brace function.

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

WBAY-14 Pylon-to-store/weapon gap seal should permit physical access to lanyards.
WBAY-15 Gap seals should not hinder pilot or ground crew preflight inspection.
WBAY-16 Gap seals should not degrade loading while wearing arctic or chemical, biological, or radiation protective clothing.

C-285
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.08 Armament and Explosives WBAY-17 Special coatings or conductive paints on pylons, launchers, racks, launchers, tanks, pods, etc. should have the durability to
withstand contact with support stands/cradles during storage.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

WBAY-18 The proximity of the gun firing barrel to structure should be such that structural furrows or channels are not required for
projectile clearances during firing.
3.08.01 Armor CREW-02 Armor protection integrated with the vehicle structure should be given preference over parasitic armor.
MC-02 Avoid the use of cotter pins, safety wire, safety clips, and similar devices to prevent maintenance-induced events leading
to ground vehicle accidents or loss of air vehicles.
PYRO-36 Suspension system design and spacing should enable any combination of eight weapons to be loaded by two two-man
crews within the refueling time of the vehicle (excludes nuclear weapons).
PYRO-37 Internal weapon suspension arrangements should preclude sequential weapon loading.
PYRO-38 Any single pylon or built-up pylon/weapon package should have the capability for rapid reconfiguration.
PYRO-39 Weapon bay ejectors and launchers should have the capability for total interchangeability and reconfigurability.
PYRO-40 All weapon and store loading functions should be within the percentile range of 5% female to 95% male standing at
ground level.
SI-03 Parts and assemblies of a given model product or of models of a product in the same series should be interchangeable or
replaceable.
3.08.02 Weapons, Guns, Flares, Chaff, and A-06 Hardpoints (structural attachment and load bearing areas) within a compartment to assist in equipment mounting or
Cannon support should not be integral with the machined part. Hardpoints should be parasitic to enable quick repair in case of
wear or damage in lieu of precise ream/bush repair typical of machined hardpoints.
A-09 Any heat or temperature sensitive structure within a compartment should contain heat-sensitive tape or appropriate heat
sensor for easy indication of over-temperature excursions.
A-15 Locate tie-down attachment points such that tie-down chains, straps, or cables do not prevent or restrict normal servicing,
weapon loading, or safe/arm functions.
ARM-01 For an aircraft, the fuselage lower shear moldline should be no less than 38" above the ground when external weapons
only will be carried on the fuselage.
ARM-02 For an aircraft, the fuselage lower shear moldline should be no less than 50" above the ground when internal weapons
will be carried in the fuselage and weapon bay door widths exceed 22".
ARM-03 Locate fuselage weapon bays a minimum of 18" from the nose landing gear and main landing gear of an aircraft.
ARM-04 No single weapon/store mounted on a transporter should intrude into the service/turnaround envelope of another station.
ARM-05 All servicing and turnaround functions (including movement envelopes) should be outside the gun firing envelope.
ARM-06 The relationship of the nose landing gear to the main landing gear should not restrict the positioning of weapon

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

transporters under the fuselage of an aircraft.
ARM-07 The design of weapon and store ejectors and launchers should not require scheduled servicing, maintenance, or
inspection requirements prior to upload of the weapon or store.
ARM-08 Weapon and store ejectors containing arming solenoids should ensure the solenoids can be rapidly replaced while
installed.
ARM-09 Weapon and store ejectors containing adjustable pitch control devices should ensure devices are easily accessible and
adjustments are Murphy-free.
ARM-10 Weapon and store stations should be located to ensure vehicle ballasting will not be required under any combination of
weapon/store configurations.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
BIT-01 During design of the BIT, use worst-case stress analysis to ensure that any circuit failures induced by temperature

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

extremes, tolerance build-up, power supply variations, and combinations thereof are identified.
BIT-02 Ensure that BIT system thresholds are consistent with those across the system, subsystem, item, module, and piece-part
levels to prevent excessive numbers of Cannot Duplicate (CND) and Retest OK (RTOK) events from occurring.
BIT-03 The degree of BIT required or proposed should be based on the respective failure rates and the appropriate FMECA at
all equipment indenture levels.

C-286
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.08.02 Weapons, Guns, Flares, Chaff, and BIT-04 Limit the amount of data that is recorded to a manageable size by:
Cannon - Limiting the number of signals that are monitored

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

- Limiting the maximum sampling rate
- Reducing the time span over which data is accumulated
- Restricting the type of data accumulated
BIT-05 Incorporate testability design features as an integral part of equipment preliminary design process.
BIT-06 Mission critical functions should be monitored by BIT.
BIT-09 Use concurrent BIT to monitor system critical functions.
BIT-20 The BIT should be mechanized so that when a piece of equipment is not installed in a subsystem or the product, a failure
will not be indicated.
BIT-26 Locate routinely used test points so they are accessible without removing or disassembling other equipment
CBR-01 Orient all vehicle liquid servicing fittings to ensure fluids will not come in contact with protective garb during
connect/disconnect activities.
CREW-03 In rare cases where armor is parasitic, armor should be interchangeable and easily installed.
D&V-01 The geometric aspects of structural design and interfaces should not result in any natural bathtubs.
D&V-02 Closed structural sections subject to condensation or fluid migration should contain drainage provisions.
D&V-03 Crew cabs, operators' compartments, crew stations, cockpits, and passenger compartments should be subject to the same
corrosion prevention measures as the exteriors of the vehicles. Low points, pockets, and related fluid collection points
within should be provided with low point drains.
ENV-01 Materials, treatments, coatings, finishes should be compatible with all anti-ice and de-ice fluids, chemical and biological
decontamination fluids, washing and cleaning fluids, and all vehicle subsystem fluids.
ENV-02 There should be no top coat or treatment deterioration throughout the standard temperature and humidity spectrum.
ENV-03 For airborne vehicles, the finishes should be durable against rain, hail, and dynamic erosion throughout the flight
envelope.
ENV-04 For airborne and ground vehicles, the finishes should be durable against sand erosion throughout all surface wind speeds
experienced in arid or desert geographical locations.
ENV-06 For ground vehicles, the finishes should be compatible with and durable against all rain, hail, sleet, snow, and ice
conditions experienced in all intended operational environments.
FUEL-01 Locate fuel vent and dump masts to ensure exiting fuel will be clear of servicing, loading, arming and safing areas for all
types of ground and airborne vehicles.
MC-01 All clamps should contain torque-set or torque-limiting connections to prevent clamp or component failure due to over-
torque. Clamp installation call outs should not depend on special tools to establish the required torque values.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

MC-02 Avoid the use of cotter pins, safety wire, safety clips, and similar devices to prevent maintenance-induced events leading
to ground vehicle accidents or loss of air vehicles.
MC-03 All tubing connections and interfaces should use rosan/dynatube (or equivalent) to (1) enable connect or disconnect with
one hand, one tool, (2) eliminate the need to safety the connection, (3) provide a superior seal, and (4) negate need to
reposition line(s) during component replacement.
MC-04 No trombone type, flared tube type, or piloted line type interfaces should be used to avoid the need for removal or
repositioning during equipment removal.
MC-06 Locate, position, orient all plumbing and duct electrical connectors to prevent the need for sequential installation or
removal.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
MC-09 All plumbing connections and fittings used for fuel systems should contain integral bonding features to eliminate the need

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

for bonding clamps or jumper cables.
MC-10 In rare instances where a plumbing run contains complex form or geometry that would require removal of other plumbing
or equipment for access, in-line connectors should be incorporated to maintain the integrity of other plumbing or
equipment.
MC-12 All plumbing and connectors containing liquids should be meniscus-free.

C-287
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.08.02 Weapons, Guns, Flares, Chaff, and MC-13 In instances where plumbing or connector interfaces cannot or are not keyed for a specific orientation, all identification,
Cannon markings, cautions, and directions should be placed 360 degrees around the tube or duct.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

MC-14 Where multiple connectors are located in close proximity, ensure (1) a minimum hand tool arc of 120 degrees can be
maintained, and (2) stagger fittings to ensure firm coupling interface/hand tool interface can be accomplished without
inducing damage to adjacent lines.
MP-01 Avoid the use epoxies to mount parts on repairable modules because they make repair extremely difficult.
MP-02 Use a unique identification (ID) resistor incorporated in each system module to verify that the proper module is mounted
on ATE.
MP-03 Design modules so that lengthy warm-up times, special coding and air purity levels, and similar constraints are not
necessary.
P-06 Access door and panel devices used to support door in opened position should meet the following criteria:
- for airborne vehicles, design for 60 knot gust loads (or equivalent jet blast loads)
- for ground vehicles, design for 50 mph gust loads
P-07 Hinged access doors and panels capable of remaining in the opened position should not have sharp edges or corners.
P-08 Removable access door and panel fasteners should be of identical grip length and diameter.
P-09 Acceptable door and panel hold-open devices include over-center sheet metal spring, over-center spring link, spring
cartridge, support strut, and pinned goose neck hinge.
P-10 Access doors and panels requiring non-captive fasteners should not be located forward of air inlet ducts or high-energy
rotating components (e.g., prop fans, engine cooling fans, etc.).
P-11 Access doors and panels should be interchangeable as justified by operation and support costs or life cycle costs.
PYRO-01 Provide the "safe/arm" status to the pilot, crew, or gunner in the cockpit, crew station, or operator station as appropriate.
PYRO-02 Provide the "safe/arm" status as an external cue discernible from a distance of 10-20 feet.
PYRO-06 "Safe/arm" mechanism design should be free from FOD potential.
PYRO-07 Manual "safe/arm" mechanisms should be well-clear of inlet ducts, propellers, rotors, and similar rotating components.
PYRO-08 Manual "safe/arm" mechanisms should be well-clear of engine exhausts, fuel/toxic vents, fluid drains, control surface
deflection envelopes, and rescue path envelopes.
PYRO-09 Provide positive, Murphy-proof locking detents for both the "safe" and "arm" positions of mechanical mechanisms.
PYRO-16 Do not use cartridge actuated devices (CADs) for store or weapon ejection or for pylon jettison due to inherent ground
safety hazards, stray energy hazards, and scheduled cleaning requirements.
PYRO-17 In rare instances where use of CADs may be required, a positive indication to denote "cartridge installed" should be
provided.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

PYRO-18 Mechanical "safe/arm" mechanism design should enable activation by a 95 percentile male wearing arctic mittens.
PYRO-19 Locate built-in grounding receptacles clear of weapon approach and loading envelopes.
PYRO-20 Weapon bay doors, when opened, should not block or restrict access to other servicing points.
PYRO-21 Weapon bays should contain internal lighting controlled by a separate switch that is only functional when doors are open
PYRO-22 A "rounds remaining" status should be available at the gun loading interface, maintenance panel, or cockpit/crew
station/operator station.
PYRO-23 Crew size for full ammo load should not exceed two persons.
PYRO-24 Ammo loader interface should not be less than 30" nor more than 50" above the ground to ensure loading can be
accomplished by a wide range of percentiles wearing chemical or biological protective gear.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
PYRO-25 Gun loading and servicing should be possible concurrently with all other weapon loading and servicing activities to

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

minimize the elapsed downtime.
PYRO-26 Do not locate ammunition loader interfaces close to inlets, exhausts, fuel dumps and drains, antennas, sensors, lights, or
hazardous protrusions.
PYRO-27 Incorporate integral hoisting provisions at each weapon/store station to enable direct lift from the container or carrier to
the attachment hardpoints.

C-288
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.08.02 Weapons, Guns, Flares, Chaff, and PYRO-28 Automatic locking of the retention hooks should be accomplished for each respective weapon and store.
Cannon

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

PYRO-29 Provide quick mechanical over-travel (no power) for weapon bay doors to maximize the weapon/store loading envelope.
PYRO-30 Ensure weapon bay door arc (both normal and over-travel) does not block or intrude into adjacent service points or
envelopes.
PYRO-32 Provide sufficient longitudinal clearance between weapon bays to enable simultaneous loading of two bays.
PYRO-33 Provide sufficient lateral clearance between weapon bays to enable simultaneous loading of two bays.
PYRO-34 Weapon bay door seals should be bonded or attached to door structure to minimize induced seal damage during weapon
or store loading.
PYRO-35 Suspension system should permit any single weapon or store to be loaded by a two man crew.
PYRO-36 Suspension system design and spacing should enable any combination of eight weapons to be loaded by two two-man
crews within the refueling time of the vehicle (excludes nuclear weapons).
PYRO-37 Internal weapon suspension arrangements should preclude sequential weapon loading.
PYRO-38 Any single pylon or built-up pylon/weapon package should have the capability for rapid reconfiguration.
PYRO-39 Weapon bay ejectors and launchers should have the capability for total interchangeability and reconfigurability.
PYRO-40 All weapon and store loading functions should be within the percentile range of 5% female to 95% male standing at
ground level.
PYRO-41 Weapon or store handling and transportation equipment should be compatible with rough terrain and capable of 25 mph
towing speeds minimum.
PYRO-42 In weapons carriage design and integration, avoid dependence of on-board high pressure nitrogen.
PYRO-43 Launcher or ejector design/interface should not require a dual function of carrying airframe structural loads.
PYRO-44 Launcher and ejector design should incorporate automatic sway bracing.
PYRO-45 Missile ejectors should be provided with repeatable missile motor fire wires to simplify loading and reduce elapsed time.
PYRO-46 Design pylons, launchers, and ejector racks so that weapon loading, servicing, and reconfigurations can be accomplished
using standard hand tools.
PYRO-47 Installation design of ejectors, launchers, racks, and associated hardware interfaces should avoid reliance on torque
wrenches.
SABCH-02 All flush type structural screws should have identical head drives for the entire vehicle.
SABCH-03 All non-flush type structural screws should have identical head drive recesses for the entire vehicle.
SABCH-04 Special high strength bolts, such as twelve-point heads, should be fully justified from standpoint of the cost of ownership
and effectiveness.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

SABCH-05 Structural design should avoid the reliance on blind fasteners unless fully supported by cost, weight, schedule, and
effectiveness analysis.
SAFE-12 Internal weapon bay doors should contain integral safety locking features for use during maintenance and weapon
loading and downloading.
SAFE-13 It should not be possible to unsafe a weapon bay door integral lock when a door closed signal is present.
SE-04 Gun port covers or plugs should be lightweight, 100% effective, and easy to install or store.
SI-03 Parts and assemblies of a given model product or of models of a product in the same series should be interchangeable or
replaceable.
WBAY-11 Gap seal should match pylon and wing/fuselage surface impedance.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
WBAY-12 Pylon-to-store/weapon gap seal should permit visual and physical access during loading for all interfaces between bomb

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

rack-to-store, bomb rack-to-launcher, and launcher-to-store.
WBAY-13 Pylon-to-store/weapon gap seal should not interfere with automatic sway brace function.
WBAY-14 Pylon-to-store/weapon gap seal should permit physical access to lanyards.
WBAY-15 Gap seals should not hinder pilot or ground crew preflight inspection.

C-289
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.08.02 Weapons, Guns, Flares, Chaff, and WBAY-16 Gap seals should not degrade loading while wearing arctic or chemical, biological, or radiation protective clothing.
Cannon

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

WBAY-17 Special coatings or conductive paints on pylons, launchers, racks, launchers, tanks, pods, etc. should have the durability to
withstand contact with support stands/cradles during storage.
WBAY-18 The proximity of the gun firing barrel to structure should be such that structural furrows or channels are not required for
projectile clearances during firing.
WBAY-19 Frangible gun ports should take preference over mechanized gun port doors.
WBAY-20 Gun plugs required solely to maintain a given signature level should be capable of on-board stowage for use only when a
threat requires their presence.
WBAY-21 Coatings and finishes in the area of gun barrels should be durable to withstand the effect of exiting projectile shockwaves.
WBAY-22 The proximity of the gun blast deflector to structure should not require reliance on high-temperature paints or coatings to
protect the structure.
3.08.03 Cartridge Actuated Devices, Shaped A-09 Any heat or temperature sensitive structure within a compartment should contain heat-sensitive tape or appropriate heat
Charges, Detonating Cord, and sensor for easy indication of over-temperature excursions.
Pyrotechnic Devices
ARM-08 Weapon and store ejectors containing arming solenoids should ensure the solenoids can be rapidly replaced while
installed.
BIT-05 Incorporate testability design features as an integral part of equipment preliminary design process.
BIT-06 Mission critical functions should be monitored by BIT.
BIT-09 Use concurrent BIT to monitor system critical functions.
BIT-20 The BIT should be mechanized so that when a piece of equipment is not installed in a subsystem or the product, a failure
will not be indicated.
BIT-26 Locate routinely used test points so they are accessible without removing or disassembling other equipment
CONT-01 Control rods should use Boyd or impedance type bolts (or equivalent) to eliminate the need for cotter pins or safety wir e.
CONT-02 Do not use metal control cables for vehicles that will operate in salt water or salt air environments.
CONT-03 Use control rods rather than control cables for non-complex applications and non-complex routing within the vehicle.
CONT-04 Use control cables rather than control rods for most complex applications.
CONT-05 Route cables so that 100 percent of a cable will be viewable for inspection.
CONT-06 Design all pulleys and brackets associated with cable installations so they are accessible by a 75 percentile male hand.
FUEL-01 Locate fuel vent and dump masts to ensure exiting fuel will be clear of servicing, loading, arming and safing areas for all
types of ground and airborne vehicles.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

MC-01 All clamps should contain torque-set or torque-limiting connections to prevent clamp or component failure due to over-
torque. Clamp installation call outs should not depend on special tools to establish the required torque values.
MC-02 Avoid the use of cotter pins, safety wire, safety clips, and similar devices to prevent maintenance-induced events leading
to ground vehicle accidents or loss of air vehicles.
MC-03 All tubing connections and interfaces should use rosan/dynatube (or equivalent) to (1) enable connect or disconnect with
one hand, one tool, (2) eliminate the need to safety the connection, (3) provide a superior seal, and (4) negate need to
reposition line(s) during component replacement.
MC-04 No trombone type, flared tube type, or piloted line type interfaces should be used to avoid the need for removal or
repositioning during equipment removal.
MC-06 Locate, position, orient all plumbing and duct electrical connectors to prevent the need for sequential installation or

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
removal.
MC-09 All plumbing connections and fittings used for fuel systems should contain integral bonding features to eliminate the need
for bonding clamps or jumper cables.
MC-10 In rare instances where a plumbing run contains complex form or geometry that would require removal of other plumbing
or equipment for access, in-line connectors should be incorporated to maintain the integrity of other plumbing or
equipment.

C-290
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.08.03 Cartridge Actuated Devices, Shaped MC-12 All plumbing and connectors containing liquids should be meniscus-free.
Charges, Detonating Cord, and

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

Pyrotechnic Devices
MC-13 In instances where plumbing or connector interfaces cannot or are not keyed for a specific orientation, all identification,
markings, cautions, and directions should be placed 360 degrees around the tube or duct.
MC-14 Where multiple connectors are located in close proximity, ensure (1) a minimum hand tool arc of 120 degrees can be
maintained, and (2) stagger fittings to ensure firm coupling interface/hand tool interface can be accomplished without
inducing damage to adjacent lines.
P-06 Access door and panel devices used to support door in opened position should meet the following criteria:
- for airborne vehicles, design for 60 knot gust loads (or equivalent jet blast loads)
- for ground vehicles, design for 50 mph gust loads
P-07 Hinged access doors and panels capable of remaining in the opened position should not have sharp edges or corners.
P-08 Removable access door and panel fasteners should be of identical grip length and diameter.
P-09 Acceptable door and panel hold-open devices include over-center sheet metal spring, over-center spring link, spring
cartridge, support strut, and pinned goose neck hinge.
P-10 Access doors and panels requiring non-captive fasteners should not be located forward of air inlet ducts or high-energy
rotating components (e.g., prop fans, engine cooling fans, etc.).
P-11 Access doors and panels should be interchangeable as justified by operation and support costs or life cycle costs.
PYRO-01 Provide the "safe/arm" status to the pilot, crew, or gunner in the cockpit, crew station, or operator station as appropriate.
PYRO-02 Provide the "safe/arm" status as an external cue discernible from a distance of 10-20 feet.
PYRO-06 "Safe/arm" mechanism design should be free from FOD potential.
PYRO-07 Manual "safe/arm" mechanisms should be well-clear of inlet ducts, propellers, rotors, and similar rotating components.
PYRO-08 Manual "safe/arm" mechanisms should be well-clear of engine exhausts, fuel/toxic vents, fluid drains, control surface
deflection envelopes, and rescue path envelopes.
PYRO-09 Provide positive, Murphy-proof locking detents for both the "safe" and "arm" positions of mechanical mechanisms.
PYRO-11 Design electrical/electronic "safe/arm" systems to eliminate the need for mechanical type system interrupt devices.
PYRO-12 Design of weapons, flare/chaff packages, and airborne pyrotechnic containers should follow the "wooden round" design
concept to eliminate scheduled tests, checks, and inspections throughout its intended life cycle.
PYRO-13 Container design for shipping, handling, and storing weapons, flares, chaff, and similar devices should not require special
atmospheres.
PYRO-14 Design weapon drop and fire/release circuits with frequency-coded firing systems or similar concepts to ensure stray

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

energy tests and checks will not be required and that stray energy will not impose a safety hazard or problem.
PYRO-15 Pylon-to-weapon and pylon-to-air vehicle electrical interfaces should contain built-in test/fault location capabilities.
PYRO-21 Weapon bays should contain internal lighting controlled by a separate switch that is only functional when doors are open
PYRO-22 A "rounds remaining" status should be available at the gun loading interface, maintenance panel, or cockpit/crew
station/operator station.
PYRO-23 Crew size for full ammo load should not exceed two persons.
PYRO-24 Ammo loader interface should not be less than 30" nor more than 50" above the ground to ensure loading can be
accomplished by a wide range of percentiles wearing chemical or biological protective gear.
PYRO-25 Gun loading and servicing should be possible concurrently with all other weapon loading and servicing activities to

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
minimize the elapsed downtime.

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

PYRO-26 Do not locate ammunition loader interfaces close to inlets, exhausts, fuel dumps and drains, antennas, sensors, lights, or
hazardous protrusions.
PYRO-27 Incorporate integral hoisting provisions at each weapon/store station to enable direct lift from the container or carrier to
the attachment hardpoints.
PYRO-32 Provide sufficient longitudinal clearance between weapon bays to enable simultaneous loading of two bays.

C-291
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.08.03 Cartridge Actuated Devices, Shaped PYRO-33 Provide sufficient lateral clearance between weapon bays to enable simultaneous loading of two bays.
Charges, Detonating Cord, and

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

Pyrotechnic Devices
PYRO-34 Weapon bay door seals should be bonded or attached to door structure to minimize induced seal damage during weapon
or store loading.
PYRO-35 Suspension system should permit any single weapon or store to be loaded by a two man crew.
PYRO-36 Suspension system design and spacing should enable any combination of eight weapons to be loaded by two two-man
crews within the refueling time of the vehicle (excludes nuclear weapons).
PYRO-37 Internal weapon suspension arrangements should preclude sequential weapon loading.
PYRO-38 Any single pylon or built-up pylon/weapon package should have the capability for rapid reconfiguration.
PYRO-39 Weapon bay ejectors and launchers should have the capability for total interchangeability and reconfigurability.
PYRO-40 All weapon and store loading functions should be within the percentile range of 5% female to 95% male standing at
ground level.
PYRO-41 Weapon or store handling and transportation equipment should be compatible with rough terrain and capable of 25 mph
towing speeds minimum.
PYRO-42 In weapons carriage design and integration, avoid dependence of on-board high pressure nitrogen.
PYRO-43 Launcher or ejector design/interface should not require a dual function of carrying airframe structural loads.
PYRO-44 Launcher and ejector design should incorporate automatic sway bracing.
PYRO-45 Missile ejectors should be provided with repeatable missile motor fire wires to simplify loading and reduce elapsed time.
PYRO-46 Design pylons, launchers, and ejector racks so that weapon loading, servicing, and reconfigurations can be accomplished
using standard hand tools.
PYRO-47 Installation design of ejectors, launchers, racks, and associated hardware interfaces should avoid reliance on torque
wrenches.
SABCH-02 All flush type structural screws should have identical head drives for the entire vehicle.
SABCH-03 All non-flush type structural screws should have identical head drive recesses for the entire vehicle.
SABCH-04 Special high strength bolts, such as twelve-point heads, should be fully justified from standpoint of the cost of ownership
and effectiveness.
SABCH-05 Structural design should avoid the reliance on blind fasteners unless fully supported by cost, weight, schedule, and
effectiveness analysis.
SEAT-01 Design personnel seats and padding materials, including the covers and fillers, so they are incapable of creating or
emitting toxic fumes or dense smoke when subjected to fire.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

SEAT-03 Do not use seat and padding materials that can create static electricity in pyrotechnic or combustible fluid environments.
SEAT-04 Design ejection seats so they can be replaced with canopy or escape hatch installed.
SEAT-05 Design ejection seat pyrotechnic devices so they are 100 percent viewable and accessible with seat installed.
SI-03 Parts and assemblies of a given model product or of models of a product in the same series should be interchangeable or
replaceable.
T-01 Do not locate pyro, gas, and air (PGA) control system exhaust exits:
- In proximity to safe, arm, or servicing areas,
- Adjacent to auxiliary inlets,
- In close proximity to crew boarding areas, weapons, emergency ingress/egress areas, and optics or optical glass.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
T-02 Design pyro type thruster exits associated with emergency use or backup with simple exit closure devices to identify if a

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

thruster has been fired.
T-03 Provide protective screens for PGA exits that normally remain open to prevent intrusions from fowl or wildlife.
T-04 Provide protective closure provisions for PGA exits located or oriented to exposure from the elements.
T-05 Design single-shot (one time use) type thrusters with a minimum 6-year shelf life and a 7-year installed life.
WBAY-16 Gap seals should not degrade loading while wearing arctic or chemical, biological, or radiation protective clothing.

C-292
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.08.03 Cartridge Actuated Devices, Shaped WBAY-17 Special coatings or conductive paints on pylons, launchers, racks, launchers, tanks, pods, etc. should have the durability to
Charges, Detonating Cord, and withstand contact with support stands/cradles during storage.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

Pyrotechnic Devices
3.09 Fluid Systems A-07 Paint equipment bay and compartment interiors a high gloss white to maximize lighting reflectivity, visibility, and rapid
leak detection capability.
A-10 Provide a sufficient number of compartment fluid drains to ensure fluid drainage for varying aircraft static attitudes and
varying terrain slopes for ground vehicles.
A-13 Two-sided or two-surfaced access should not be required for access to equipment interfaces and hardpoints. The term
two-sided infers top/bottom, left/right, front/back, or combinations thereof.
A-14 Do not locate nutplates or gang channels in inaccessible areas that would require extensive disassembly or equipment
removal to gain access.
A-15 Locate tie-down attachment points such that tie-down chains, straps, or cables do not prevent or restrict normal servicing,
weapon loading, or safe/arm functions.
A-18 Use transparent windows, quick-opening covers, or openings without any cover to permit quick visual inspections where
needed.
ARM-05 All servicing and turnaround functions (including movement envelopes) should be outside the gun firing envelope.
BIT-01 During design of the BIT, use worst-case stress analysis to ensure that any circuit failures induced by temperature
extremes, tolerance build-up, power supply variations, and combinations thereof are identified.
BIT-02 Ensure that BIT system thresholds are consistent with those across the system, subsystem, item, module, and piece-part
levels to prevent excessive numbers of Cannot Duplicate (CND) and Retest OK (RTOK) events from occurring.
BIT-03 The degree of BIT required or proposed should be based on the respective failure rates and the appropriate FMECA at
all equipment indenture levels.
BIT-04 Limit the amount of data that is recorded to a manageable size by:
- Limiting the number of signals that are monitored
- Limiting the maximum sampling rate
- Reducing the time span over which data is accumulated
- Restricting the type of data accumulated
BIT-05 Incorporate testability design features as an integral part of equipment preliminary design process.
BIT-06 Mission critical functions should be monitored by BIT.
BIT-09 Use concurrent BIT to monitor system critical functions.
BIT-16 Critical voltages should be visually monitored by sending the voltage signals to visible LEDs.
BIT-20 The BIT should be mechanized so that when a piece of equipment is not installed in a subsystem or the product, a failure

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

will not be indicated.
BIT-26 Locate routinely used test points so they are accessible without removing or disassembling other equipment
C-01 Avoid swivel type connectors and fittings for air, fuel, or hydraulic line interfaces due to their history of low reliability.
C-02 Provide spacing between parallel plumbing runs so that in-line couplings can be replaced without removing lines or
disconnecting any line support devices.
CBR-01 Orient all vehicle liquid servicing fittings to ensure fluids will not come in contact with protective garb during
connect/disconnect activities.
CBR-02 Ensure vehicle overboard passive liquid drains are clearly marked or visible to enable personnel to remain clear of area.
CBR-03 Design fuel cell drains so they can not be activated in a manner that would allow fuel to come in contact with a protected

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
hand.

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

D&V-01 The geometric aspects of structural design and interfaces should not result in any natural bathtubs.
D&V-02 Closed structural sections subject to condensation or fluid migration should contain drainage provisions.
D&V-03 Crew cabs, operators' compartments, crew stations, cockpits, and passenger compartments should be subject to the same
corrosion prevention measures as the exteriors of the vehicles. Low points, pockets, and related fluid collection points
within should be provided with low point drains.

C-293
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.09 Fluid Systems ECS-01 Design so that equipment servicing status are accessible and readable from the ground level for air vehicles and from the
operator's position for ground and water vehicles.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

ECS-03 Heat exchangers using hot liquids as the heat source should not be located inside the compartments used for operator,
crew, or passengers.
ECS-04 Plumbing, lines, or hoses containing hot liquids, toxic gases or liquids should be external to operator, crew, or passenger
stations.
ECS-07 Liquid type refrigeration compressors/packages should contain highly reliable quick disconnects to negate servicing or
bleeding subsequent to replacement.
ECS-08 All liquid type refrigeration compressors and packages stocked as spares should be pre-serviced wherein the servicing is
compatible with the shelf life of the unit.
ECS-10 The power actuation source used for valves that direct or control air, gas, or liquid flow should be parasitic to the valve
body to enable replacement without disturbing the integrity of the lines, ducts, or plenums.
ENG(G)-06 The distance between the engine and firewall should ensure the access envelopes to lines, fittings, wiring, and
adjustments will accommodate the 75 percentile male hand.
ENG(G)-10 Design attaching hardware for all mechanical engine-to-vehicle interfaces to be captive and with integral safeties.
ENG(G)-12 Provide a clear and viewable access envelope to fuel and oil filters.
ENG(G)-13 Locate fuel filters to ensure no safety hazard will exist due to residual fuel during filter change.
ENG(G)-15 Any single drive belt (excluding timing belts) should be capable of replacement within 30 minutes elapsed time
ENG(G)-18 Incorporate appropriate sensors to enhance the diagnostic and prognostic capabilities for the following:
- Oil temperature - Fuel filter bypass
- Oil pressure - Coolant pressure
- Oil filter bypass - Coolant level
- Oil cooler bypass valve position - Coolant temperature
- Oil level - Vibration pickups
- Oil return line particle count - Chip detector
ENG(G)-20 Design all firewall fittings, connectors, and penetrations to be fully viewable and directly accessible to the maintainers.
ENG-02 Each different component of rotating machinery should contain different tracer elements to enhance EEMS and IDM
isolation and tracking of wear.
ENG-03 Digital electronic controls, fully automatic digital electronic controls, and similar concepts should contain the highest
degree of BIT and diagnostics commensurate with affordability, operation and maintenance, and life cycle costs as
appropriate.
ENG-04 The engine and engine-mounted gear box should have individual oil supplies to ensure wear or failures in one will not

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

contaminate or fail the other.
ENG-05 All engine-mounted air and fluid lines should be located next to the fan case, engine case, or full-length fan duct to
ensure quick and simple replacement of accessories and components.
ENG-06 All other engine surfaces and engine-mounted accessory surfaces should be free of pockets, channels, and bathtubs that
could trap and retain fluids.
ENG-10 On multi-engine air vehicles, the airframe-to-engine interfaces should be in identical positions or orientations for each
engine cavity.
ENG-13 Engine oil systems should contain on-board spectrometric oil analysis devices located on the engine.
ENG-14 Coring of engine gear box cases and housings to provide for fuel heat sink routing should take precedence over dedicated

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
fuel or oil heat exchangers.

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

ENG-22 The engine cavity structure should be capable of withstanding a 2000-degree Fahrenheit fire for 10 minutes without
jeopardizing loss of the vehicle.
ENG-25 All engine-to-airframe plumbing, wiring, and duct interfaces should be capable of being connected or disconnected by
hand, should contain integral safety provisions, and should not require torquing.
ENG-27 No rigging or calibration should be required following engine replacement.

C-294
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.09 Fluid Systems ENG-28 No engine operational start and checkout should be required following engine replacement.
ENG-47 Design the engine, including all accessories, plumbing, wiring, ducts, and mechanisms, to meet the same environmental

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

protection and compatibility requirements as the host vehicle.
ENG-48 Do not drain or dump residual fuel in the engine fuel control/manifold overboard. When it is not possible to follow this
guideline, route the fuel to an engine-mounted collector tank capable of retaining fuel from two shutdowns.
ENG-49 Design engine fuel and oil filters with integral locking features so they can be installed and removed by hand, and require
no torquing.
ENG-50 Design engine fuel and oil filter delta pressure indicators so they can be reset only from within the filter housing.
ENG-51 Provide engine fuel and oil filters with anti-surge protection to ensure false delta pressure indications do not occur.
FUEL-01 Locate fuel vent and dump masts to ensure exiting fuel will be clear of servicing, loading, arming and safing areas for all
types of ground and airborne vehicles.
FUEL-02 Manufacturing splices for major sub-assemblies should not intrude into or through integral fuel cells or tanks.
FUEL-03 Structural bolts, screws, and fasteners should not penetrate into integral fuel cells or tanks other than those used for
access door attachment.
FUEL-04 Where the fuel wetted area inside a fuel cell or tank is void of blade, knife, and hat stiffeners for use as hardpoint
attachment, standoffs bonded to the cell surface should be used as attachments for clamps, and brackets to eliminate
fastener penetration of the fuel cavity.
FUEL-05 Intersecting of two or more surfaces in a fuel wetted area of less than 90 degrees should be avoided to simplify
manufacture and repair.
FUEL-06 Where maintaining a minimum angle of 90 degrees is not possible, sufficient depth, width, and height should be
maintained to provide tool clearances for all tools used in the manufacturing processes and in the operational field repair
environment.
FUEL-07 When feed tanks are designed such that the lower portion of the tank serves as a surge chamber, the top closure deck of
the surge chamber should provide the strength to support the weight of a 95 percentile male.
FUEL-08 The size and number of fuel cell and tank access doors should be sufficient to ensure no wetted area of the cell or tank is
beyond a maximum 18" distance from the edge of the access opening. This guideline applies to only non-man rated cells.
FUEL-09 All fuel cell or tank access doors not mounted on the exterior surface should contain sealing provisions other than the
channel type.
FUEL-10 Provide access from the wing closure ribs in lieu of the moldline when access is required in close proximity to the wing
fold area.
FUEL-11 Through-the-tank fasteners should not be used for fuel cells or tanks in areas where a leak path could be established into
an inaccessible portion of the vehicle.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

GBD-01 Guidelines for transmissions, clutches, and rotors apply.
GBD-02 Use the host gear box lubricating system to provide lubrication of the drive shaft spline.
GBD-03 Design drive shafts using the "blind spline" concept to ensure correct mating of the shaft to the gear box.
GBD-04 Design drive shafts with a simple, light-weight cover to protect personnel.
GBD-05 Design drive shaft covers with a hole or slot type opening to prevent the masking of leakage or damage.
HYD-01 For military combat vehicles having two or more hydraulic power systems, provide a minimum 30-inch spacing between
ground power and servicing interfaces to ensure:
- Design flexibility in locating and arranging equipment in high-density vehicles such as fighters and helicopters,

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
- Work area separation to enable concurrent service/maintenance on systems,

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

- Systems vulnerability enhancement,
- Reduction in turn-around elapsed time due to concurrent servicing capability.
HYD-02 Use identical components, such as pumps, reservoirs, and accumulators, in each individual power subsystem. In instances
where this is not fully possible, perform and document trade studies or appropriate analysis to provide justification and
supporting rationale.

C-295
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.09 Fluid Systems HYD-03 Use identical types of fluid in all hydraulic subsystems. Brakes may be the exception only if the system is totally separated
from the independent of other hydraulic systems.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

HYD-04 For vehicles containing two or more systems with different fluids, use different service fittings and different ground
power interfaces for each fluid type.
HYD-05 Design protective caps or covers over service fittings with steel cable lanyards to prevent loss and migration in the
vehicle.
HYD-06 Mount hydraulic pumps to the gear box flange with v-band clamps containing a torq-set or equivalent fastener.
HYD-07 Modularize electric-driven hydraulic pumps to enable replacement of the drive motor without interruption of the fluid
lines.
HYD-08 Design hydraulic pumps and motors with tracer elements to detect wear through on-board spectrometric oil analysis
devices.
HYD-09 Provide hydraulic devices used in critical applications with integral 5 micron filtering.
HYD-10 Design the fluid storage system so it can be serviced in one-quart increments to eliminate the effects of handling and
storing partially-filled cans.
HYD-11 Design flexible hose with molded-in color bands to clearly indicate when the maximum wear/abrasion has been reached.
LG-12 All struts should contain a spare strut lower seal stowed in the strut collar to avoid removing the lower strut for leak
repair.
MC-01 All clamps should contain torque-set or torque-limiting connections to prevent clamp or component failure due to over-
torque. Clamp installation call outs should not depend on special tools to establish the required torque values.
MC-02 Avoid the use of cotter pins, safety wire, safety clips, and similar devices to prevent maintenance-induced events leading
to ground vehicle accidents or loss of air vehicles.
MC-03 All tubing connections and interfaces should use rosan/dynatube (or equivalent) to (1) enable connect or disconnect with
one hand, one tool, (2) eliminate the need to safety the connection, (3) provide a superior seal, and (4) negate need to
reposition line(s) during component replacement.
MC-04 No trombone type, flared tube type, or piloted line type interfaces should be used to avoid the need for removal or
repositioning during equipment removal.
MC-05 Avoid potential foreign object traps during manufacturing or operational maintenance by eliminating vertical penetrations
of plumbing/fittings into tanks, compartments, or cells
MC-06 Locate, position, orient all plumbing and duct electrical connectors to prevent the need for sequential installation or
removal.
MC-07 Maximize areas of constant web thickness in firewalls, carry-through bulkheads, major frames, structural ribs, spars,
webs, keels, and close-outs to provide flexibility in locating penetration fittings. Stepped chem milling, stepped machining,

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

stepped composite layup concepts all tend to result in minimal available surface area for penetrations.
MC-08 All in-line plumbing connections within a fuel tank or cell should be capable of making/breaking the interface by hand,
require no torque, contain integral safety locking mechanisms, and should be void of any requirement for safety wire.
MC-09 All plumbing connections and fittings used for fuel systems should contain integral bonding features to eliminate the need
for bonding clamps or jumper cables.
MC-10 In rare instances where a plumbing run contains complex form or geometry that would require removal of other plumbing
or equipment for access, in-line connectors should be incorporated to maintain the integrity of other plumbing or
equipment.
MC-11 No subsystem plumbing, equipment, or wiring should use a tank, cell, or compartment containing liquids as a means for

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
routing or penetration simplicity during manufacture.
MC-12 All plumbing and connectors containing liquids should be meniscus-free.
MC-13 In instances where plumbing or connector interfaces cannot or are not keyed for a specific orientation, all identification,
markings, cautions, and directions should be placed 360 degrees around the tube or duct.

C-296
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.09 Fluid Systems MC-14 Where multiple connectors are located in close proximity, ensure (1) a minimum hand tool arc of 120 degrees can be
maintained, and (2) stagger fittings to ensure firm coupling interface/hand tool interface can be accomplished without

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

inducing damage to adjacent lines.
MP-01 Avoid the use epoxies to mount parts on repairable modules because they make repair extremely difficult.
MP-02 Use a unique identification (ID) resistor incorporated in each system module to verify that the proper module is mounted
on ATE.
MP-03 Design modules so that lengthy warm-up times, special coding and air purity levels, and similar constraints are not
necessary.
OXY-05 Locate liquid oxygen (LOX) containers in a sealed, dedicated compartment to eliminate need for frequent visual
inspections.
P-01 Access door and panel fastener types for airborne vehicles should meet the following criteria:
- use latches for a frequency of access of 0 to 40 flight hours
- use High Strength Quick Release fasteners for a frequency of access of 40-400 flight hours
- use structural screws for a frequency of access of 400 flight hours or more
P-02 Access door and panel fastener types for surface vehicles should meet the following criteria:
- use a spring loaded or latch fastener for an opening frequency of daily
- use a one quarter turn fastener (or equivalent) for a opening frequency of weekly
- use screws or bolts for all other cases
P-03 All doors and panels subject to environmental elements should contain form-in-place seals (or equivalent) attached to the
door structure, not substructure, to prevent damage during maintenance.
P-04 Door and panel seals should be compatible with all types of on-board servicing fluids, de-ice and anti-ice fluids, and all
fluids used for chemical, biological, and nuclear decontamination.
P-05 Piano type hinges should not be used on doors or panels because they are subject to wear, corrosion, and sand and fluid
entry.
P-06 Access door and panel devices used to support door in opened position should meet the following criteria:
- for airborne vehicles, design for 60 knot gust loads (or equivalent jet blast loads)
- for ground vehicles, design for 50 mph gust loads
P-07 Hinged access doors and panels capable of remaining in the opened position should not have sharp edges or corners.
P-08 Removable access door and panel fasteners should be of identical grip length and diameter.
P-09 Acceptable door and panel hold-open devices include over-center sheet metal spring, over-center spring link, spring
cartridge, support strut, and pinned goose neck hinge.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

P-10 Access doors and panels requiring non-captive fasteners should not be located forward of air inlet ducts or high-energy
rotating components (e.g., prop fans, engine cooling fans, etc.).
P-11 Access doors and panels should be interchangeable as justified by operation and support costs or life cycle costs.
SABCH-02 All flush type structural screws should have identical head drives for the entire vehicle.
SABCH-03 All non-flush type structural screws should have identical head drive recesses for the entire vehicle.
SABCH-04 Special high strength bolts, such as twelve-point heads, should be fully justified from standpoint of the cost of ownership
and effectiveness.
SABCH-05 Structural design should avoid the reliance on blind fasteners unless fully supported by cost, weight, schedule, and
effectiveness analysis.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
SEAT-02 Design personnel seats and padding materials so they are incapable of absorbing and holding fluids.

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

SI-03 Parts and assemblies of a given model product or of models of a product in the same series should be interchangeable or
replaceable.
WBAY-09 Gap seal/pylon should not cover or hamper access to low point wing drains.

C-297
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.09.01 Fuel Systems, Tanks, Containers, Pumps, A-01 Seal equipment bays and compartments against the environmental elements including all types of servicing fluids used for
Trucks, and Bladders the vehicle, all types of anti-ice and de-ice fluids, and all types of fluids used for chemical, biological, or nuclear

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

decontamination
A-02 Equipment bay and compartment structure should be bonded, co-cured, welded, machined, or combinations thereof to
eliminate or minimize the use of mechanical fasteners.
A-03 All equipment bay and compartment structural flanges and stiffeners should be external to the compartment to maximize
the volume available for equipment installation and arrangement.
A-04 Use stiffening beads in lieu of flanges to the maximum extent to enhance compartment volume and simplify repairs.
Stiffening beads should have the convex surface toward the compartment to eliminate fluid traps.
A-05 Keep all machined compartment frames, webs, and closure panels to a constant thickness (e.g., not stepped or tapered) to
ease simplicity of fluid or electrical penetrations and ease and simplicity of structural repair.
A-06 Hardpoints (structural attachment and load bearing areas) within a compartment to assist in equipment mounting or
support should not be integral with the machined part. Hardpoints should be parasitic to enable quick repair in case of
wear or damage in lieu of precise ream/bush repair typical of machined hardpoints.
A-08 Plumbing penetrations into a compartment should not be on a vertical axis due to difficulty in making or breaking
vertically-oriented connections. When compartment access is from the bottom, vertically-oriented connections can allow
fluid to leak onto the maintainer. When access is from the top, such connections can allow foreign matter to enter the
line. Use horizontal penetrations whenever possible.
A-11 Locate compartment electrical penetrations close to the access opening for ease of sight, probing, repair, and to eliminate
fluid soaking, wicking, or contamination.
A-12 Locate compartment electrical penetrations far enough from the access opening to prevent damage resulting from
improper (over-length) panel fasteners.
ARM-05 All servicing and turnaround functions (including movement envelopes) should be outside the gun firing envelope.
BIT-01 During design of the BIT, use worst-case stress analysis to ensure that any circuit failures induced by temperature
extremes, tolerance build-up, power supply variations, and combinations thereof are identified.
BIT-02 Ensure that BIT system thresholds are consistent with those across the system, subsystem, item, module, and piece-part
levels to prevent excessive numbers of Cannot Duplicate (CND) and Retest OK (RTOK) events from occurring.
BIT-03 The degree of BIT required or proposed should be based on the respective failure rates and the appropriate FMECA at
all equipment indenture levels.
BIT-04 Limit the amount of data that is recorded to a manageable size by:
- Limiting the number of signals that are monitored
- Limiting the maximum sampling rate

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

- Reducing the time span over which data is accumulated
- Restricting the type of data accumulated
BIT-05 Incorporate testability design features as an integral part of equipment preliminary design process.
BIT-06 Mission critical functions should be monitored by BIT.
BIT-09 Use concurrent BIT to monitor system critical functions.
BIT-16 Critical voltages should be visually monitored by sending the voltage signals to visible LEDs.
BIT-20 The BIT should be mechanized so that when a piece of equipment is not installed in a subsystem or the product, a failure
will not be indicated.
BIT-26 Locate routinely used test points so they are accessible without removing or disassembling other equipment

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
C-01 Avoid swivel type connectors and fittings for air, fuel, or hydraulic line interfaces due to their history of low reliability.

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

C-02 Provide spacing between parallel plumbing runs so that in-line couplings can be replaced without removing lines or
disconnecting any line support devices.
CBR-01 Orient all vehicle liquid servicing fittings to ensure fluids will not come in contact with protective garb during
connect/disconnect activities.
CBR-02 Ensure vehicle overboard passive liquid drains are clearly marked or visible to enable personnel to remain clear of area.

C-298
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.09.01 Fuel Systems, Tanks, Containers, Pumps, CBR-03 Design fuel cell drains so they can not be activated in a manner that would allow fuel to come in contact with a protected
Trucks, and Bladders hand.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

D&V-01 The geometric aspects of structural design and interfaces should not result in any natural bathtubs.
D&V-02 Closed structural sections subject to condensation or fluid migration should contain drainage provisions.
D&V-03 Crew cabs, operators' compartments, crew stations, cockpits, and passenger compartments should be subject to the same
corrosion prevention measures as the exteriors of the vehicles. Low points, pockets, and related fluid collection points
within should be provided with low point drains.
EC-12 Electrical penetrations into a compartment should not be on a vertical axis to ensure foreign matter does not enter
connector.
ENG(G)-06 The distance between the engine and firewall should ensure the access envelopes to lines, fittings, wiring, and
adjustments will accommodate the 75 percentile male hand.
ENG(G)-10 Design attaching hardware for all mechanical engine-to-vehicle interfaces to be captive and with integral safeties.
ENG(G)-12 Provide a clear and viewable access envelope to fuel and oil filters.
ENG(G)-13 Locate fuel filters to ensure no safety hazard will exist due to residual fuel during filter change.
ENG(G)-15 Any single drive belt (excluding timing belts) should be capable of replacement within 30 minutes elapsed time
ENG(G)-18 Incorporate appropriate sensors to enhance the diagnostic and prognostic capabilities for the following:
- Oil temperature - Fuel filter bypass
- Oil pressure - Coolant pressure
- Oil filter bypass - Coolant level
- Oil cooler bypass valve position - Coolant temperature
- Oil level - Vibration pickups
- Oil return line particle count - Chip detector
ENG(G)-20 Design all firewall fittings, connectors, and penetrations to be fully viewable and directly accessible to the maintainers.
ENG-02 Each different component of rotating machinery should contain different tracer elements to enhance EEMS and IDM
isolation and tracking of wear.
ENG-05 All engine-mounted air and fluid lines should be located next to the fan case, engine case, or full-length fan duct to
ensure quick and simple replacement of accessories and components.
ENG-06 All other engine surfaces and engine-mounted accessory surfaces should be free of pockets, channels, and bathtubs that
could trap and retain fluids.
ENG-10 On multi-engine air vehicles, the airframe-to-engine interfaces should be in identical positions or orientations for each
engine cavity.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

ENG-20 Do not locate equipment or components in the engine cavity except for those components associated with the engine or
engine installation.
ENG-21 Do not locate equipment or components in the engine bay cavity in a manner that would require removal or repositioning
for engine removal.
ENG-22 The engine cavity structure should be capable of withstanding a 2000-degree Fahrenheit fire for 10 minutes without
jeopardizing loss of the vehicle.
ENG-25 All engine-to-airframe plumbing, wiring, and duct interfaces should be capable of being connected or disconnected by
hand, should contain integral safety provisions, and should not require torquing.
ENG-27 No rigging or calibration should be required following engine replacement.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
ENG-28 No engine operational start and checkout should be required following engine replacement.

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

ENG-31 No rigging or calibration should be required subsequent to replacement of any engine-mounted component.
ENG-32 Design the engine fuel controls and electronic controllers so that no manual fuel grade adjustments are required.
ENG-37 Gravity type servicing fittings, covers, and caps should have integral locking features, openable by hand, and contain a
cable or chain to prevent loss or dropping.

C-299
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.09.01 Fuel Systems, Tanks, Containers, Pumps, ENG-45 Provide remote servicing points accessible from the ground to service engine accessories mounted on top of the engine
Trucks, and Bladders (e.g., oil tanks, gear boxes, generators, etc.) to eliminate climbing upon or atop the host vehicle.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

ENG-46 Design the basic engine and engine-mounted accessory interface so that no fluid traps or bathtubs exist regardless of
engine-mounted accessory location.
ENG-47 Design the engine, including all accessories, plumbing, wiring, ducts, and mechanisms, to meet the same environmental
protection and compatibility requirements as the host vehicle.
ENG-48 Do not drain or dump residual fuel in the engine fuel control/manifold overboard. When it is not possible to follow this
guideline, route the fuel to an engine-mounted collector tank capable of retaining fuel from two shutdowns.
ENG-49 Design engine fuel and oil filters with integral locking features so they can be installed and removed by hand, and require
no torquing.
ENG-50 Design engine fuel and oil filter delta pressure indicators so they can be reset only from within the filter housing.
ENG-51 Provide engine fuel and oil filters with anti-surge protection to ensure false delta pressure indications do not occur.
EXT-01 Locate Tanks, Pods, Containers, and Devices (TPCD's) so they do not block or restrict access to existing vehicle access
areas or access approach envelopes.
EXT-04 Design TPCD's used for fuel containment so that post-installation operational tests or checks are not required.
EXTING-01 Use extinguishing concepts dedicated to each individual fire zone in preference to manifold systems operating from a
central source.
EXTING-03 Keep each individual fire zone over-temperature/fire warning system separate from those in other fire zones.
EXTING-04 Design individual fire zone over-temperature/fire warning system to be fully BIT capable (the BIT concept should permit
both initiated and periodic BIT).
EXTING-06 Provide an alternate capability to activate the system remotely from the cockpit/crew station, or operator's position to
satisfy emergency situations during vehicle maintenance.
EXTING-07 Analyze the vehicle operational environment and type of fire zones to determine if remote stop/shut-off of equipment is
warranted.
EXTING-08 Analyze the vehicle operational environment and type of fire zones to determine if remote alarm and/or visual indication
of a fire is warranted.
EXTING-09 Do not locate provisions for overboard venting or dumping of extinguishing agents in areas that could create hazards for
personnel.
FUEL-01 Locate fuel vent and dump masts to ensure exiting fuel will be clear of servicing, loading, arming and safing areas for all
types of ground and airborne vehicles.
FUEL-02 Manufacturing splices for major sub-assemblies should not intrude into or through integral fuel cells or tanks.
FUEL-03 Structural bolts, screws, and fasteners should not penetrate into integral fuel cells or tanks other than those used for

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

access door attachment.
FUEL-04 Where the fuel wetted area inside a fuel cell or tank is void of blade, knife, and hat stiffeners for use as hardpoint
attachment, standoffs bonded to the cell surface should be used as attachments for clamps, and brackets to eliminate
fastener penetration of the fuel cavity.
FUEL-05 Intersecting of two or more surfaces in a fuel wetted area of less than 90 degrees should be avoided to simplify
manufacture and repair.
FUEL-06 Where maintaining a minimum angle of 90 degrees is not possible, sufficient depth, width, and height should be
maintained to provide tool clearances for all tools used in the manufacturing processes and in the operational field repair
environment.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
FUEL-07 When feed tanks are designed such that the lower portion of the tank serves as a surge chamber, the top closure deck of

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

the surge chamber should provide the strength to support the weight of a 95 percentile male.
FUEL-08 The size and number of fuel cell and tank access doors should be sufficient to ensure no wetted area of the cell or tank is
beyond a maximum 18" distance from the edge of the access opening. This guideline applies to only non-man rated cells.
FUEL-09 All fuel cell or tank access doors not mounted on the exterior surface should contain sealing provisions other than the
channel type.

C-300
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.09.01 Fuel Systems, Tanks, Containers, Pumps, FUEL-10 Provide access from the wing closure ribs in lieu of the moldline when access is required in close proximity to the wing
Trucks, and Bladders fold area.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

FUEL-11 Through-the-tank fasteners should not be used for fuel cells or tanks in areas where a leak path could be established into
an inaccessible portion of the vehicle.
HYD-09 Provide hydraulic devices used in critical applications with integral 5 micron filtering.
MC-01 All clamps should contain torque-set or torque-limiting connections to prevent clamp or component failure due to over-
torque. Clamp installation call outs should not depend on special tools to establish the required torque values.
MC-02 Avoid the use of cotter pins, safety wire, safety clips, and similar devices to prevent maintenance-induced events leading
to ground vehicle accidents or loss of air vehicles.
MC-03 All tubing connections and interfaces should use rosan/dynatube (or equivalent) to (1) enable connect or disconnect with
one hand, one tool, (2) eliminate the need to safety the connection, (3) provide a superior seal, and (4) negate need to
reposition line(s) during component replacement.
MC-04 No trombone type, flared tube type, or piloted line type interfaces should be used to avoid the need for removal or
repositioning during equipment removal.
MC-05 Avoid potential foreign object traps during manufacturing or operational maintenance by eliminating vertical penetrations
of plumbing/fittings into tanks, compartments, or cells
MC-06 Locate, position, orient all plumbing and duct electrical connectors to prevent the need for sequential installation or
removal.
MC-07 Maximize areas of constant web thickness in firewalls, carry-through bulkheads, major frames, structural ribs, spars,
webs, keels, and close-outs to provide flexibility in locating penetration fittings. Stepped chem milling, stepped machining,
stepped composite layup concepts all tend to result in minimal available surface area for penetrations.
MC-08 All in-line plumbing connections within a fuel tank or cell should be capable of making/breaking the interface by hand,
require no torque, contain integral safety locking mechanisms, and should be void of any requirement for safety wire.
MC-09 All plumbing connections and fittings used for fuel systems should contain integral bonding features to eliminate the need
for bonding clamps or jumper cables.
MC-10 In rare instances where a plumbing run contains complex form or geometry that would require removal of other plumbing
or equipment for access, in-line connectors should be incorporated to maintain the integrity of other plumbing or
equipment.
MC-11 No subsystem plumbing, equipment, or wiring should use a tank, cell, or compartment containing liquids as a means for
routing or penetration simplicity during manufacture.
MC-12 All plumbing and connectors containing liquids should be meniscus-free.
MC-13 In instances where plumbing or connector interfaces cannot or are not keyed for a specific orientation, all identification,

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

markings, cautions, and directions should be placed 360 degrees around the tube or duct.
MC-14 Where multiple connectors are located in close proximity, ensure (1) a minimum hand tool arc of 120 degrees can be
maintained, and (2) stagger fittings to ensure firm coupling interface/hand tool interface can be accomplished without
inducing damage to adjacent lines.
MC-15 Route, orient, and position plumbing, wiring, ducts, and connectors sufficiently away from the outer surface of the vehicle
to preclude induced damage due to minor dents, drill bits during repair, etc. Minimum rule of thumb is 1" away from the
inner surface and 1" below a plate nut channel.
MP-01 Avoid the use epoxies to mount parts on repairable modules because they make repair extremely difficult.
MP-02 Use a unique identification (ID) resistor incorporated in each system module to verify that the proper module is mounted

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
on ATE.

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

MP-03 Design modules so that lengthy warm-up times, special coding and air purity levels, and similar constraints are not
necessary.

C-301
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.09.01 Fuel Systems, Tanks, Containers, Pumps, P-01 Access door and panel fastener types for airborne vehicles should meet the following criteria:
Trucks, and Bladders - use latches for a frequency of access of 0 to 40 flight hours

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

- use High Strength Quick Release fasteners for a frequency of access of 40-400 flight hours
- use structural screws for a frequency of access of 400 flight hours or more
P-02 Access door and panel fastener types for surface vehicles should meet the following criteria:
- use a spring loaded or latch fastener for an opening frequency of daily
- use a one quarter turn fastener (or equivalent) for a opening frequency of weekly
- use screws or bolts for all other cases
P-03 All doors and panels subject to environmental elements should contain form-in-place seals (or equivalent) attached to the
door structure, not substructure, to prevent damage during maintenance.
P-04 Door and panel seals should be compatible with all types of on-board servicing fluids, de-ice and anti-ice fluids, and all
fluids used for chemical, biological, and nuclear decontamination.
P-05 Piano type hinges should not be used on doors or panels because they are subject to wear, corrosion, and sand and fluid
entry.
P-06 Access door and panel devices used to support door in opened position should meet the following criteria:
- for airborne vehicles, design for 60 knot gust loads (or equivalent jet blast loads)
- for ground vehicles, design for 50 mph gust loads
P-07 Hinged access doors and panels capable of remaining in the opened position should not have sharp edges or corners.
P-08 Removable access door and panel fasteners should be of identical grip length and diameter.
P-09 Acceptable door and panel hold-open devices include over-center sheet metal spring, over-center spring link, spring
cartridge, support strut, and pinned goose neck hinge.
P-10 Access doors and panels requiring non-captive fasteners should not be located forward of air inlet ducts or high-energy
rotating components (e.g., prop fans, engine cooling fans, etc.).
P-11 Access doors and panels should be interchangeable as justified by operation and support costs or life cycle costs.
SABCH-02 All flush type structural screws should have identical head drives for the entire vehicle.
SABCH-03 All non-flush type structural screws should have identical head drive recesses for the entire vehicle.
SABCH-04 Special high strength bolts, such as twelve-point heads, should be fully justified from standpoint of the cost of ownership
and effectiveness.
SABCH-05 Structural design should avoid the reliance on blind fasteners unless fully supported by cost, weight, schedule, and
effectiveness analysis.
SABCH-11 In rare instances where the use of dissimilar material in immediate contact cannot be avoided, they should be sufficiently

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

insulated to endure for the life of the vehicle.
SABCH-12 Avoid tapping threads into structural members. Use of heli-coil type or similar insert concepts is permissible.
SABCH-13 No structural design concept should rely on frequent scheduled inspections to monitor or otherwise ensure structural
integrity.
SABCH-14 No structural fastener intended to carry shear or tension loads should be smaller than 1/4" diameter (.25").
SABCH-15 Give preference to butt type splices over lap type splices in the design of manufacturing splices.
SEAT-02 Design personnel seats and padding materials so they are incapable of absorbing and holding fluids.
SI-03 Parts and assemblies of a given model product or of models of a product in the same series should be interchangeable or
replaceable.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
WBAY-09 Gap seal/pylon should not cover or hamper access to low point wing drains.

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

3.09.02 Pneumatic Systems and Pumps A-08 Plumbing penetrations into a compartment should not be on a vertical axis due to difficulty in making or breaking
vertically-oriented connections. When compartment access is from the bottom, vertically-oriented connections can allow
fluid to leak onto the maintainer. When access is from the top, such connections can allow foreign matter to enter the
line. Use horizontal penetrations whenever possible.
ARM-05 All servicing and turnaround functions (including movement envelopes) should be outside the gun firing envelope.

C-302
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.09.02 Pneumatic Systems and Pumps BIT-06 Mission critical functions should be monitored by BIT.
BIT-09 Use concurrent BIT to monitor system critical functions.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

BIT-20 The BIT should be mechanized so that when a piece of equipment is not installed in a subsystem or the product, a failure
will not be indicated.
BIT-26 Locate routinely used test points so they are accessible without removing or disassembling other equipment
CBR-01 Orient all vehicle liquid servicing fittings to ensure fluids will not come in contact with protective garb during
connect/disconnect activities.
CBR-02 Ensure vehicle overboard passive liquid drains are clearly marked or visible to enable personnel to remain clear of area.
CBR-03 Design fuel cell drains so they can not be activated in a manner that would allow fuel to come in contact with a protected
hand.
ENG(G)-12 Provide a clear and viewable access envelope to fuel and oil filters.
ENG(G)-13 Locate fuel filters to ensure no safety hazard will exist due to residual fuel during filter change.
ENG(G)-18 Incorporate appropriate sensors to enhance the diagnostic and prognostic capabilities for the following:
- Oil temperature - Fuel filter bypass
- Oil pressure - Coolant pressure
- Oil filter bypass - Coolant level
- Oil cooler bypass valve position - Coolant temperature
- Oil level - Vibration pickups
- Oil return line particle count - Chip detector
ENG(G)-20 Design all firewall fittings, connectors, and penetrations to be fully viewable and directly accessible to the maintainers.
ENG-02 Each different component of rotating machinery should contain different tracer elements to enhance EEMS and IDM
isolation and tracking of wear.
ENG-04 The engine and engine-mounted gear box should have individual oil supplies to ensure wear or failures in one will not
contaminate or fail the other.
ENG-05 All engine-mounted air and fluid lines should be located next to the fan case, engine case, or full-length fan duct to
ensure quick and simple replacement of accessories and components.
ENG-06 All other engine surfaces and engine-mounted accessory surfaces should be free of pockets, channels, and bathtubs that
could trap and retain fluids.
ENG-10 On multi-engine air vehicles, the airframe-to-engine interfaces should be in identical positions or orientations for each
engine cavity.
ENG-13 Engine oil systems should contain on-board spectrometric oil analysis devices located on the engine.
ENG-14 Coring of engine gear box cases and housings to provide for fuel heat sink routing should take precedence over dedicated

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

fuel or oil heat exchangers.
ENG-20 Do not locate equipment or components in the engine cavity except for those components associated with the engine or
engine installation.
ENG-21 Do not locate equipment or components in the engine bay cavity in a manner that would require removal or repositioning
for engine removal.
ENG-22 The engine cavity structure should be capable of withstanding a 2000-degree Fahrenheit fire for 10 minutes without
jeopardizing loss of the vehicle.
ENG-25 All engine-to-airframe plumbing, wiring, and duct interfaces should be capable of being connected or disconnected by
hand, should contain integral safety provisions, and should not require torquing.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
ENG-37 Gravity type servicing fittings, covers, and caps should have integral locking features, openable by hand, and contain a
cable or chain to prevent loss or dropping.
ENG-45 Provide remote servicing points accessible from the ground to service engine accessories mounted on top of the engine
(e.g., oil tanks, gear boxes, generators, etc.) to eliminate climbing upon or atop the host vehicle.
ENG-49 Design engine fuel and oil filters with integral locking features so they can be installed and removed by hand, and require
no torquing.

C-303
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.09.02 Pneumatic Systems and Pumps ENG-50 Design engine fuel and oil filter delta pressure indicators so they can be reset only from within the filter housing.
ENG-51 Provide engine fuel and oil filters with anti-surge protection to ensure false delta pressure indications do not occur.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

GBD-01 Guidelines for transmissions, clutches, and rotors apply.
GBD-02 Use the host gear box lubricating system to provide lubrication of the drive shaft spline.
GBD-03 Design drive shafts using the "blind spline" concept to ensure correct mating of the shaft to the gear box.
GBD-04 Design drive shafts with a simple, light-weight cover to protect personnel.
GBD-05 Design drive shaft covers with a hole or slot type opening to prevent the masking of leakage or damage.
HYD-01 For military combat vehicles having two or more hydraulic power systems, provide a minimum 30-inch spacing between
ground power and servicing interfaces to ensure:
- Design flexibility in locating and arranging equipment in high-density vehicles such as fighters and helicopters,
- Work area separation to enable concurrent service/maintenance on systems,
- Systems vulnerability enhancement,
- Reduction in turn-around elapsed time due to concurrent servicing capability.
HYD-02 Use identical components, such as pumps, reservoirs, and accumulators, in each individual power subsystem. In instances
where this is not fully possible, perform and document trade studies or appropriate analysis to provide justification and
supporting rationale.
HYD-03 Use identical types of fluid in all hydraulic subsystems. Brakes may be the exception only if the system is totally separated
from the independent of other hydraulic systems.
HYD-04 For vehicles containing two or more systems with different fluids, use different service fittings and different ground
power interfaces for each fluid type.
HYD-05 Design protective caps or covers over service fittings with steel cable lanyards to prevent loss and migration in the
vehicle.
HYD-06 Mount hydraulic pumps to the gear box flange with v-band clamps containing a torq-set or equivalent fastener.
HYD-07 Modularize electric-driven hydraulic pumps to enable replacement of the drive motor without interruption of the fluid
lines.
HYD-08 Design hydraulic pumps and motors with tracer elements to detect wear through on-board spectrometric oil analysis
devices.
HYD-09 Provide hydraulic devices used in critical applications with integral 5 micron filtering.
HYD-10 Design the fluid storage system so it can be serviced in one-quart increments to eliminate the effects of handling and
storing partially-filled cans.
HYD-11 Design flexible hose with molded-in color bands to clearly indicate when the maximum wear/abrasion has been reached.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

LG-01 Bearings, excluding wheel bearings, should not require lubrication during the expected life of the air vehicle airframe.
LG-04 Do not use Beryllium and Beryllium base alloys in any location subject to wear or corrosive atmospheres or in installations
where machining may be required.
LG-12 All struts should contain a spare strut lower seal stowed in the strut collar to avoid removing the lower strut for leak
repair.
MC-01 All clamps should contain torque-set or torque-limiting connections to prevent clamp or component failure due to over-
torque. Clamp installation call outs should not depend on special tools to establish the required torque values.
MC-02 Avoid the use of cotter pins, safety wire, safety clips, and similar devices to prevent maintenance-induced events leading
to ground vehicle accidents or loss of air vehicles.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
MC-03 All tubing connections and interfaces should use rosan/dynatube (or equivalent) to (1) enable connect or disconnect with

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

one hand, one tool, (2) eliminate the need to safety the connection, (3) provide a superior seal, and (4) negate need to
reposition line(s) during component replacement.
MC-04 No trombone type, flared tube type, or piloted line type interfaces should be used to avoid the need for removal or
repositioning during equipment removal.

C-304
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.09.02 Pneumatic Systems and Pumps MC-05 Avoid potential foreign object traps during manufacturing or operational maintenance by eliminating vertical penetrations
of plumbing/fittings into tanks, compartments, or cells

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

MC-06 Locate, position, orient all plumbing and duct electrical connectors to prevent the need for sequential installation or
removal.
MC-07 Maximize areas of constant web thickness in firewalls, carry-through bulkheads, major frames, structural ribs, spars,
webs, keels, and close-outs to provide flexibility in locating penetration fittings. Stepped chem milling, stepped machining,
stepped composite layup concepts all tend to result in minimal available surface area for penetrations.
MC-08 All in-line plumbing connections within a fuel tank or cell should be capable of making/breaking the interface by hand,
require no torque, contain integral safety locking mechanisms, and should be void of any requirement for safety wire.
MC-09 All plumbing connections and fittings used for fuel systems should contain integral bonding features to eliminate the need
for bonding clamps or jumper cables.
MC-10 In rare instances where a plumbing run contains complex form or geometry that would require removal of other plumbing
or equipment for access, in-line connectors should be incorporated to maintain the integrity of other plumbing or
equipment.
MC-11 No subsystem plumbing, equipment, or wiring should use a tank, cell, or compartment containing liquids as a means for
routing or penetration simplicity during manufacture.
MC-12 All plumbing and connectors containing liquids should be meniscus-free.
MC-13 In instances where plumbing or connector interfaces cannot or are not keyed for a specific orientation, all identification,
markings, cautions, and directions should be placed 360 degrees around the tube or duct.
MC-14 Where multiple connectors are located in close proximity, ensure (1) a minimum hand tool arc of 120 degrees can be
maintained, and (2) stagger fittings to ensure firm coupling interface/hand tool interface can be accomplished without
inducing damage to adjacent lines.
P-01 Access door and panel fastener types for airborne vehicles should meet the following criteria:
- use latches for a frequency of access of 0 to 40 flight hours
- use High Strength Quick Release fasteners for a frequency of access of 40-400 flight hours
- use structural screws for a frequency of access of 400 flight hours or more
P-02 Access door and panel fastener types for surface vehicles should meet the following criteria:
- use a spring loaded or latch fastener for an opening frequency of daily
- use a one quarter turn fastener (or equivalent) for a opening frequency of weekly
- use screws or bolts for all other cases
P-03 All doors and panels subject to environmental elements should contain form-in-place seals (or equivalent) attached to the
door structure, not substructure, to prevent damage during maintenance.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

P-04 Door and panel seals should be compatible with all types of on-board servicing fluids, de-ice and anti-ice fluids, and all
fluids used for chemical, biological, and nuclear decontamination.
P-05 Piano type hinges should not be used on doors or panels because they are subject to wear, corrosion, and sand and fluid
entry.
P-06 Access door and panel devices used to support door in opened position should meet the following criteria:
- for airborne vehicles, design for 60 knot gust loads (or equivalent jet blast loads)
- for ground vehicles, design for 50 mph gust loads
P-07 Hinged access doors and panels capable of remaining in the opened position should not have sharp edges or corners.
P-08 Removable access door and panel fasteners should be of identical grip length and diameter.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
P-09 Acceptable door and panel hold-open devices include over-center sheet metal spring, over-center spring link, spring

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

cartridge, support strut, and pinned goose neck hinge.
P-10 Access doors and panels requiring non-captive fasteners should not be located forward of air inlet ducts or high-energy
rotating components (e.g., prop fans, engine cooling fans, etc.).
P-11 Access doors and panels should be interchangeable as justified by operation and support costs or life cycle costs.
SABCH-02 All flush type structural screws should have identical head drives for the entire vehicle.

C-305
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.09.02 Pneumatic Systems and Pumps SABCH-03 All non-flush type structural screws should have identical head drive recesses for the entire vehicle.
SABCH-04 Special high strength bolts, such as twelve-point heads, should be fully justified from standpoint of the cost of ownership

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

and effectiveness.
SABCH-05 Structural design should avoid the reliance on blind fasteners unless fully supported by cost, weight, schedule, and
effectiveness analysis.
SEAT-02 Design personnel seats and padding materials so they are incapable of absorbing and holding fluids.
SI-03 Parts and assemblies of a given model product or of models of a product in the same series should be interchangeable or
replaceable.
TCR-01 For each transmission, clutch, or rotor, provide a dedicated lubricating oil supply tank and system that is not shared with
any other oil lubricating system.
TCR-02 Provide each dedicated oil supply system with a separate servicing port/interface, pressure gauging, and quantity gauging
system as applicable.
TCR-03 Use a singular gage capable of reading pressures or quantities from two or more lubricating systems in preference to
individual gages.
TCR-04 Provide each dedicated system with an on-board spectrometric oil analysis program capability, separate oil filter, and
separate oil, fuel, or air heat exchanger capability.
TCR-05 Use the item's self-contained oil system to provide drive/interface spline lubrication, if required.
TCR-06 In complex units, use different tracer elements in multiple gears, plates, discs, etc., so the source of wear can be easily
identified by spectrometric oil analysis monitoring units.
WT&B-01 Wheel bearings should be lubricated by oil-bath concepts and should not be integral with the wheel assembly.
3.09.03 Hydraulic Systems, Tanks, Pumps, A-02 Equipment bay and compartment structure should be bonded, co-cured, welded, machined, or combinations thereof to
Accumulators, and Reservoirs eliminate or minimize the use of mechanical fasteners.
A-03 All equipment bay and compartment structural flanges and stiffeners should be external to the compartment to maximize
the volume available for equipment installation and arrangement.
A-04 Use stiffening beads in lieu of flanges to the maximum extent to enhance compartment volume and simplify repairs.
Stiffening beads should have the convex surface toward the compartment to eliminate fluid traps.
A-05 Keep all machined compartment frames, webs, and closure panels to a constant thickness (e.g., not stepped or tapered) to
ease simplicity of fluid or electrical penetrations and ease and simplicity of structural repair.
A-08 Plumbing penetrations into a compartment should not be on a vertical axis due to difficulty in making or breaking
vertically-oriented connections. When compartment access is from the bottom, vertically-oriented connections can allow
fluid to leak onto the maintainer. When access is from the top, such connections can allow foreign matter to enter the
line. Use horizontal penetrations whenever possible.
ARM-05 All servicing and turnaround functions (including movement envelopes) should be outside the gun firing envelope.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

BIT-05 Incorporate testability design features as an integral part of equipment preliminary design process.
BIT-06 Mission critical functions should be monitored by BIT.
BIT-09 Use concurrent BIT to monitor system critical functions.
BIT-20 The BIT should be mechanized so that when a piece of equipment is not installed in a subsystem or the product, a failure
will not be indicated.
BIT-26 Locate routinely used test points so they are accessible without removing or disassembling other equipment
D&V-01 The geometric aspects of structural design and interfaces should not result in any natural bathtubs.
D&V-02 Closed structural sections subject to condensation or fluid migration should contain drainage provisions.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
D&V-03 Crew cabs, operators' compartments, crew stations, cockpits, and passenger compartments should be subject to the same

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

corrosion prevention measures as the exteriors of the vehicles. Low points, pockets, and related fluid collection points
within should be provided with low point drains.
ENG(G)-06 The distance between the engine and firewall should ensure the access envelopes to lines, fittings, wiring, and
adjustments will accommodate the 75 percentile male hand.
ENG(G)-10 Design attaching hardware for all mechanical engine-to-vehicle interfaces to be captive and with integral safeties.

C-306
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.09.03 Hydraulic Systems, Tanks, Pumps, ENG(G)-18 Incorporate appropriate sensors to enhance the diagnostic and prognostic capabilities for the following:
Accumulators, and Reservoirs - Oil temperature - Fuel filter bypass

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

- Oil pressure - Coolant pressure
- Oil filter bypass - Coolant level
- Oil cooler bypass valve position - Coolant temperature
- Oil level - Vibration pickups
- Oil return line particle count - Chip detector
ENG(G)-20 Design all firewall fittings, connectors, and penetrations to be fully viewable and directly accessible to the maintainers.
ENG-02 Each different component of rotating machinery should contain different tracer elements to enhance EEMS and IDM
isolation and tracking of wear.
ENG-05 All engine-mounted air and fluid lines should be located next to the fan case, engine case, or full-length fan duct to
ensure quick and simple replacement of accessories and components.
ENG-20 Do not locate equipment or components in the engine cavity except for those components associated with the engine or
engine installation.
ENG-21 Do not locate equipment or components in the engine bay cavity in a manner that would require removal or repositioning
for engine removal.
ENG-22 The engine cavity structure should be capable of withstanding a 2000-degree Fahrenheit fire for 10 minutes without
jeopardizing loss of the vehicle.
ENG-25 All engine-to-airframe plumbing, wiring, and duct interfaces should be capable of being connected or disconnected by
hand, should contain integral safety provisions, and should not require torquing.
ENG-45 Provide remote servicing points accessible from the ground to service engine accessories mounted on top of the engine
(e.g., oil tanks, gear boxes, generators, etc.) to eliminate climbing upon or atop the host vehicle.
HYD-01 For military combat vehicles having two or more hydraulic power systems, provide a minimum 30-inch spacing between
ground power and servicing interfaces to ensure:
- Design flexibility in locating and arranging equipment in high-density vehicles such as fighters and helicopters,
- Work area separation to enable concurrent service/maintenance on systems,
- Systems vulnerability enhancement,
- Reduction in turn-around elapsed time due to concurrent servicing capability.
HYD-09 Provide hydraulic devices used in critical applications with integral 5 micron filtering.
HYD-11 Design flexible hose with molded-in color bands to clearly indicate when the maximum wear/abrasion has been reached.
MC-01 All clamps should contain torque-set or torque-limiting connections to prevent clamp or component failure due to over-
torque. Clamp installation call outs should not depend on special tools to establish the required torque values.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

MC-02 Avoid the use of cotter pins, safety wire, safety clips, and similar devices to prevent maintenance-induced events leading
to ground vehicle accidents or loss of air vehicles.
MC-03 All tubing connections and interfaces should use rosan/dynatube (or equivalent) to (1) enable connect or disconnect with
one hand, one tool, (2) eliminate the need to safety the connection, (3) provide a superior seal, and (4) negate need to
reposition line(s) during component replacement.
MC-04 No trombone type, flared tube type, or piloted line type interfaces should be used to avoid the need for removal or
repositioning during equipment removal.
MC-05 Avoid potential foreign object traps during manufacturing or operational maintenance by eliminating vertical penetrations
of plumbing/fittings into tanks, compartments, or cells
MC-06 Locate, position, orient all plumbing and duct electrical connectors to prevent the need for sequential installation or

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
removal.
MC-09 All plumbing connections and fittings used for fuel systems should contain integral bonding features to eliminate the need
for bonding clamps or jumper cables.
MC-10 In rare instances where a plumbing run contains complex form or geometry that would require removal of other plumbing
or equipment for access, in-line connectors should be incorporated to maintain the integrity of other plumbing or
equipment.

C-307
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.09.03 Hydraulic Systems, Tanks, Pumps, MC-11 No subsystem plumbing, equipment, or wiring should use a tank, cell, or compartment containing liquids as a means for
Accumulators, and Reservoirs routing or penetration simplicity during manufacture.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

MC-12 All plumbing and connectors containing liquids should be meniscus-free.
MC-13 In instances where plumbing or connector interfaces cannot or are not keyed for a specific orientation, all identification,
markings, cautions, and directions should be placed 360 degrees around the tube or duct.
MC-14 Where multiple connectors are located in close proximity, ensure (1) a minimum hand tool arc of 120 degrees can be
maintained, and (2) stagger fittings to ensure firm coupling interface/hand tool interface can be accomplished without
inducing damage to adjacent lines.
MP-01 Avoid the use epoxies to mount parts on repairable modules because they make repair extremely difficult.
MP-02 Use a unique identification (ID) resistor incorporated in each system module to verify that the proper module is mounted
on ATE.
MP-03 Design modules so that lengthy warm-up times, special coding and air purity levels, and similar constraints are not
necessary.
P-01 Access door and panel fastener types for airborne vehicles should meet the following criteria:
- use latches for a frequency of access of 0 to 40 flight hours
- use High Strength Quick Release fasteners for a frequency of access of 40-400 flight hours
- use structural screws for a frequency of access of 400 flight hours or more
P-02 Access door and panel fastener types for surface vehicles should meet the following criteria:
- use a spring loaded or latch fastener for an opening frequency of daily
- use a one quarter turn fastener (or equivalent) for a opening frequency of weekly
- use screws or bolts for all other cases
P-03 All doors and panels subject to environmental elements should contain form-in-place seals (or equivalent) attached to the
door structure, not substructure, to prevent damage during maintenance.
P-04 Door and panel seals should be compatible with all types of on-board servicing fluids, de-ice and anti-ice fluids, and all
fluids used for chemical, biological, and nuclear decontamination.
P-05 Piano type hinges should not be used on doors or panels because they are subject to wear, corrosion, and sand and fluid
entry.
P-06 Access door and panel devices used to support door in opened position should meet the following criteria:
- for airborne vehicles, design for 60 knot gust loads (or equivalent jet blast loads)
- for ground vehicles, design for 50 mph gust loads
P-07 Hinged access doors and panels capable of remaining in the opened position should not have sharp edges or corners.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

P-08 Removable access door and panel fasteners should be of identical grip length and diameter.
P-09 Acceptable door and panel hold-open devices include over-center sheet metal spring, over-center spring link, spring
cartridge, support strut, and pinned goose neck hinge.
P-10 Access doors and panels requiring non-captive fasteners should not be located forward of air inlet ducts or high-energy
rotating components (e.g., prop fans, engine cooling fans, etc.).
P-11 Access doors and panels should be interchangeable as justified by operation and support costs or life cycle costs.
PYRO-42 In weapons carriage design and integration, avoid dependence of on-board high pressure nitrogen.
SABCH-02 All flush type structural screws should have identical head drives for the entire vehicle.
SABCH-03 All non-flush type structural screws should have identical head drive recesses for the entire vehicle.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
SABCH-04 Special high strength bolts, such as twelve-point heads, should be fully justified from standpoint of the cost of ownership

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

and effectiveness.
SABCH-05 Structural design should avoid the reliance on blind fasteners unless fully supported by cost, weight, schedule, and
effectiveness analysis.
SAFE-03 Stored energy devices (e.g., accumulators, nitrogen bottles, gas generators, etc.), that could cause injury, harm, or
damage if inadvertently actuated, should contain integral safing provisions.

C-308
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.09.03 Hydraulic Systems, Tanks, Pumps, SI-03 Parts and assemblies of a given model product or of models of a product in the same series should be interchangeable or
Accumulators, and Reservoirs replaceable.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

3.10 Wheels and Related A-10 Provide a sufficient number of compartment fluid drains to ensure fluid drainage for varying aircraft static attitudes and
varying terrain slopes for ground vehicles.
A-13 Two-sided or two-surfaced access should not be required for access to equipment interfaces and hardpoints. The term
two-sided infers top/bottom, left/right, front/back, or combinations thereof.
A-18 Use transparent windows, quick-opening covers, or openings without any cover to permit quick visual inspections where
needed.
ARM-03 Locate fuselage weapon bays a minimum of 18" from the nose landing gear and main landing gear of an aircraft.
BIT-01 During design of the BIT, use worst-case stress analysis to ensure that any circuit failures induced by temperature
extremes, tolerance build-up, power supply variations, and combinations thereof are identified.
BIT-02 Ensure that BIT system thresholds are consistent with those across the system, subsystem, item, module, and piece-part
levels to prevent excessive numbers of Cannot Duplicate (CND) and Retest OK (RTOK) events from occurring.
BIT-03 The degree of BIT required or proposed should be based on the respective failure rates and the appropriate FMECA at
all equipment indenture levels.
BIT-04 Limit the amount of data that is recorded to a manageable size by:
- Limiting the number of signals that are monitored
- Limiting the maximum sampling rate
- Reducing the time span over which data is accumulated
- Restricting the type of data accumulated
BIT-05 Incorporate testability design features as an integral part of equipment preliminary design process.
BIT-06 Mission critical functions should be monitored by BIT.
BIT-09 Use concurrent BIT to monitor system critical functions.
BIT-16 Critical voltages should be visually monitored by sending the voltage signals to visible LEDs.
BIT-20 The BIT should be mechanized so that when a piece of equipment is not installed in a subsystem or the product, a failure
will not be indicated.
BIT-26 Locate routinely used test points so they are accessible without removing or disassembling other equipment
CONT-01 Control rods should use Boyd or impedance type bolts (or equivalent) to eliminate the need for cotter pins or safety wir e.
CONT-02 Do not use metal control cables for vehicles that will operate in salt water or salt air environments.
CONT-03 Use control rods rather than control cables for non-complex applications and non-complex routing within the vehicle.
CONT-04 Use control cables rather than control rods for most complex applications.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

CONT-05 Route cables so that 100 percent of a cable will be viewable for inspection.
CONT-06 Design all pulleys and brackets associated with cable installations so they are accessible by a 75 percentile male hand.
D&V-01 The geometric aspects of structural design and interfaces should not result in any natural bathtubs.
D&V-02 Closed structural sections subject to condensation or fluid migration should contain drainage provisions.
D&V-03 Crew cabs, operators' compartments, crew stations, cockpits, and passenger compartments should be subject to the same
corrosion prevention measures as the exteriors of the vehicles. Low points, pockets, and related fluid collection points
within should be provided with low point drains.
ENV-04 For airborne and ground vehicles, the finishes should be durable against sand erosion throughout all surface wind speeds
experienced in arid or desert geographical locations.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
HYD-09 Provide hydraulic devices used in critical applications with integral 5 micron filtering.

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

HYD-11 Design flexible hose with molded-in color bands to clearly indicate when the maximum wear/abrasion has been reached.
LG-01 Bearings, excluding wheel bearings, should not require lubrication during the expected life of the air vehicle airframe.
LG-02 Hardpoints for attachment of landing gear trunnions should be capable of carrying all induced gear loads for the life of
the airframe.

C-309
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.10 Wheels and Related LG-03 Hardpoints for attachment for landing gear trunnions should not be machined as an integral part of the airframe structure
when normal design sink rates over 25 feet per second are required.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

LG-04 Do not use Beryllium and Beryllium base alloys in any location subject to wear or corrosive atmospheres or in installations
where machining may be required.
LG-05 All bolts or similar threaded means used as adjustable stops should be positively retained in the adjusted reference without
reliance on jam nuts, cotter pins, or safety wire.
LG-06 Design struts, attachments, and interfaces so they do not depend on scheduled visual inspections, non-destructive
inspection (NDI), or non-destructive test (NDT) to ensure the reliability or integrity of the system in the operational
environment.
LG-07 No portion of the landing gear struts, drag braces, or interfaces should contain pockets or bathtubs that can trap or hold
moisture. In rare instances where this is not possible, holes should be drilled as appropriate to prevent moisture/liquid
accumulation.
LG-08 Brackets, levers, links, rods, et al mounted on the struts should either be symmetrical to tolerate reverse installation or
should be impossible to reverse.
LG-09 Use coiled tubing in lieu of flex lines or hoses for hydraulic line routing from the airframe to the strut.
LG-10 All wiring or coax mounted to a strut should have appropriate interface connectors to simplify strut removal and
installation.
LG-11 All microswitches, proximity switches, lights, sensors, etc. mounted to a strut should have individual interface connectors.
Wiring pigtails requiring in-line splices should be avoided.
LG-13 No special tools or equipment should be required to maintain/service struts in normal day-to-day operational
environments.
LG-14 All interfaces from the airframe to the struts should be visible and accessible, and not require removal of airframe
structure for access.
LG-16 No portion of the landing gear rigging process should require support equipment type templates, gauges, or tools. Indexes,
reference points, etc., should be an integral part of the landing gear/airframe design.
LG-17 Hydraulic, pneumatic, or electrical actuators associated with landing gear systems should not require adjustment or
rigging once installed in the air vehicle. Spare units should be rigged at the time of manufacture or overhaul.
LG-18 Landing gear ground safety down locks should be an integral part of the overall design. Use or reliance on loose pins
(support equipment) should be avoided.
LG-20 Special locks and pins used solely for landing gear ground maintenance safety should be used only in those cases
substantiated by cost effectiveness analysis.
LG-21 Proximity type switches used in landing gear design should meet a minimum of 200 volt-amperes to eliminate

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

Electromagnetic Interference (EMI) or Radiation Hazard (RADHAD) problems. Wiring associated with the landing gear
design should meet the same requirements.
LG-41 No more than 1 jack should be required to change any singular wheel/tire assembly.
MC-01 All clamps should contain torque-set or torque-limiting connections to prevent clamp or component failure due to over-
torque. Clamp installation call outs should not depend on special tools to establish the required torque values.
MC-02 Avoid the use of cotter pins, safety wire, safety clips, and similar devices to prevent maintenance-induced events leading
to ground vehicle accidents or loss of air vehicles.
MC-03 All tubing connections and interfaces should use rosan/dynatube (or equivalent) to (1) enable connect or disconnect with
one hand, one tool, (2) eliminate the need to safety the connection, (3) provide a superior seal, and (4) negate need to

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
reposition line(s) during component replacement.

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

MC-04 No trombone type, flared tube type, or piloted line type interfaces should be used to avoid the need for removal or
repositioning during equipment removal.
MC-13 In instances where plumbing or connector interfaces cannot or are not keyed for a specific orientation, all identification,
markings, cautions, and directions should be placed 360 degrees around the tube or duct.

C-310
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.10 Wheels and Related MC-14 Where multiple connectors are located in close proximity, ensure (1) a minimum hand tool arc of 120 degrees can be
maintained, and (2) stagger fittings to ensure firm coupling interface/hand tool interface can be accomplished without

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

inducing damage to adjacent lines.
SE-01 Wheel chocks for all types of ground and airborne vehicles should contain the following features:
- Be nestable for low volume during storage or transport
- Be manufactured from corrosion-resistant materials
- Be releasable from tire pinch
- Be highly visible for day and night operations
- Be impervious to all types of fluids used to service or maintain the vehicles
- Be of light weight
SE-02 Wheel chocks for airborne vehicles should also contain the following features:
- Contain provisions for securing to ramp or flight decks
- Contain provisions to secure chocks at wheels
- Releasable/removable from outside of hot brake envelope
- Contain provisions to enable chock to be used as a tire blowout device
- Contain provisions to prevent skidding on snow or ice
SE-03 Wheel chock design guideline discussion. Wheel chocks have historically contributed to numerous accidents and
incidents across the entire design spectrum, yet have received the least design attention of any ground handling/support
equipment. Directly and indirectly, poorly designed chocks have:
- Resulted in numerous "jumping the chocks" incidents due to improper use or positioning, and improper chock sizing for
the tire size/power application. Some instances result in destruction of the aircraft.
- Resulted in vehicle movement/sliding across wet, snowy and icy surfaces as a result of improper grip.
- Resulted in unwarranted tire damage and/or engine FOD.
- Resulted in tertiary damage to other vehicles or ground equipment as a result of being blown about by jet/propeller
blast.
- Damaged surfaces due to temporary placement of chocks on vehicle surfaces during vehicle movement.
- Resulted in personnel sliver/s abrasions (wooden chocks) and cuts (metal chocks) even when chocks were in decent
useable condition.
- Resulted in varied personnel ground accidents during attempts to use chocks as a temporary work stand.
- Lost aircraft "over the side" on carriers.
SI-03 Parts and assemblies of a given model product or of models of a product in the same series should be interchangeable or
replaceable.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

WT&B-01 Wheel bearings should be lubricated by oil-bath concepts and should not be integral with the wheel assembly.
WT&B-02 Brake-wear indicating pins should be highly visible during day and night operations.
WT&B-03 Provide a parking brake capability to simplify wheel and tire replacements and to reduce operator fatigue during
prolonged engine ground operations.
WT&B-04 Tires should contain a color band to provide easy visual indication that maximum wear has been achieved.
WT&B-05 Locking ring type concepts for retaining wheel halves should be given preference over multiple tie bolts.
WT&B-06 Locate brake anti-skid system components, including brake control valves, for easy access in low-vibration environments.
WT&B-07 Landing gear caution and warning systems should contain both initiated and periodic BIT and be capable of fault-isolating
to each component in the system.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
WT&B-08 Do not use microswitches (mechanical) in gear caution and warning systems.

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

WT&B-09 Brake clips, end plates, retainers, etc. used to build up wheel, tire, and brake assemblies should not be capable of reverse
or improper installation.
WT&B-10 No hubcaps or covers should be installed in a manner that prevents full visual viewing of the wheel retaining nut. In
instances where this may not be possible, the design should ensure that the hubcap/cover cannot be installed unless the
retaining nut is properly installed.

C-311
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.10 Wheels and Related WT&B-11 Wheel axle nuts should contain integral retention devices or safetying features. In rare instances where this cannot be
accomplished, a bolt and self-locking nut should be used. Locking rings and similar devices that can fail and cause FOD

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

should be avoided.
WT&B-12 Avoid the use of rivets to retain pressure pads, clips, brackets, and similar items in wheel/brake assemblies unless:
- Rivet failure will not permit a part or item to fall into the brake disc/pad area, and
- Exceptional quality control can be assured during manufacture of the part or rivet attachments, and
- Frequent scheduled inspections will not be imposed to protect product integrity or reliability
WT&B-13 Emergency brake handles should not be similar in shape or color as other handles nor should they be located in close
proximity to such other handles.
WT&B-14 Wheel assemblies should contain built-in dial type pressure gages.
WT&B-15 Anti-skid and anti-lock brake systems should contain periodic and initiated BIT. All components, including speed sensors,
comparators, wiring, connectors, control boxes, etc., should be included in the BIT system.
WT&B-16 Do not use potting compounds for electrical connector environmental protection because it tends to revert and
significantly increases repair time.
WT&B-17 Electrical connector environmental protection should be capable of withstanding water pressure streams up to 120 psi
encountered during decontamination, wash, etc.
WT&B-18 Route brake lines so that line failure will not occur due to tire blow out or separation of recapped treads.
3.10.01 Tracks A-05 Keep all machined compartment frames, webs, and closure panels to a constant thickness (e.g., not stepped or tapered) to
ease simplicity of fluid or electrical penetrations and ease and simplicity of structural repair.
A-15 Locate tie-down attachment points such that tie-down chains, straps, or cables do not prevent or restrict normal servicing,
weapon loading, or safe/arm functions.
BIT-05 Incorporate testability design features as an integral part of equipment preliminary design process.
BIT-06 Mission critical functions should be monitored by BIT.
BIT-09 Use concurrent BIT to monitor system critical functions.
BIT-16 Critical voltages should be visually monitored by sending the voltage signals to visible LEDs.
BIT-20 The BIT should be mechanized so that when a piece of equipment is not installed in a subsystem or the product, a failure
will not be indicated.
BIT-26 Locate routinely used test points so they are accessible without removing or disassembling other equipment
CONT-01 Control rods should use Boyd or impedance type bolts (or equivalent) to eliminate the need for cotter pins or safety wir e.
CONT-02 Do not use metal control cables for vehicles that will operate in salt water or salt air environments.
CONT-03 Use control rods rather than control cables for non-complex applications and non-complex routing within the vehicle.

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

CONT-04 Use control cables rather than control rods for most complex applications.
CONT-05 Route cables so that 100 percent of a cable will be viewable for inspection.
CONT-06 Design all pulleys and brackets associated with cable installations so they are accessible by a 75 percentile male hand.
ENV-04 For airborne and ground vehicles, the finishes should be durable against sand erosion throughout all surface wind speeds
experienced in arid or desert geographical locations.
ENV-06 For ground vehicles, the finishes should be compatible with and durable against all rain, hail, sleet, snow, and ice
conditions experienced in all intended operational environments.
HYD-09 Provide hydraulic devices used in critical applications with integral 5 micron filtering.
LG-01 Bearings, excluding wheel bearings, should not require lubrication during the expected life of the air vehicle airframe.

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
LG-02 Hardpoints for attachment of landing gear trunnions should be capable of carrying all induced gear loads for the life of

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

the airframe.
LG-03 Hardpoints for attachment for landing gear trunnions should not be machined as an integral part of the airframe structure
when normal design sink rates over 25 feet per second are required.
LG-04 Do not use Beryllium and Beryllium base alloys in any location subject to wear or corrosive atmospheres or in installations
where machining may be required.

C-312
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.10.01 Tracks LG-05 All bolts or similar threaded means used as adjustable stops should be positively retained in the adjusted reference without
reliance on jam nuts, cotter pins, or safety wire.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

LG-06 Design struts, attachments, and interfaces so they do not depend on scheduled visual inspections, non-destructive
inspection (NDI), or non-destructive test (NDT) to ensure the reliability or integrity of the system in the operational
environment.
LG-07 No portion of the landing gear struts, drag braces, or interfaces should contain pockets or bathtubs that can trap or hold
moisture. In rare instances where this is not possible, holes should be drilled as appropriate to prevent moisture/liquid
accumulation.
LG-08 Brackets, levers, links, rods, et al mounted on the struts should either be symmetrical to tolerate reverse installation or
should be impossible to reverse.
LG-09 Use coiled tubing in lieu of flex lines or hoses for hydraulic line routing from the airframe to the strut.
LG-10 All wiring or coax mounted to a strut should have appropriate interface connectors to simplify strut removal and
installation.
LG-11 All microswitches, proximity switches, lights, sensors, etc. mounted to a strut should have individual interface connectors.
Wiring pigtails requiring in-line splices should be avoided.
LG-13 No special tools or equipment should be required to maintain/service struts in normal day-to-day operational
environments.
LG-14 All interfaces from the airframe to the struts should be visible and accessible, and not require removal of airframe
structure for access.
LG-15 No portion of the landing gear closure door(s) should be attached to the strut. In rare instances where this may not be
possible, that attached portion should not require alignment or rigging.
LG-16 No portion of the landing gear rigging process should require support equipment type templates, gauges, or tools. Indexes,
reference points, etc., should be an integral part of the landing gear/airframe design.
LG-17 Hydraulic, pneumatic, or electrical actuators associated with landing gear systems should not require adjustment or
rigging once installed in the air vehicle. Spare units should be rigged at the time of manufacture or overhaul.
LG-30 Do not use landing gear wells to locate any type of auxiliary air inlet.
LG-41 No more than 1 jack should be required to change any singular wheel/tire assembly.
MC-01 All clamps should contain torque-set or torque-limiting connections to prevent clamp or component failure due to over-
torque. Clamp installation call outs should not depend on special tools to establish the required torque values.
MC-02 Avoid the use of cotter pins, safety wire, safety clips, and similar devices to prevent maintenance-induced events leading
to ground vehicle accidents or loss of air vehicles.
MC-03 All tubing connections and interfaces should use rosan/dynatube (or equivalent) to (1) enable connect or disconnect with

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

one hand, one tool, (2) eliminate the need to safety the connection, (3) provide a superior seal, and (4) negate need to
reposition line(s) during component replacement.
MC-04 No trombone type, flared tube type, or piloted line type interfaces should be used to avoid the need for removal or
repositioning during equipment removal.
MC-12 All plumbing and connectors containing liquids should be meniscus-free.
MC-13 In instances where plumbing or connector interfaces cannot or are not keyed for a specific orientation, all identification,
markings, cautions, and directions should be placed 360 degrees around the tube or duct.
MC-14 Where multiple connectors are located in close proximity, ensure (1) a minimum hand tool arc of 120 degrees can be
maintained, and (2) stagger fittings to ensure firm coupling interface/hand tool interface can be accomplished without

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002
inducing damage to adjacent lines.

C-313
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.10.01 Tracks SE-01 Wheel chocks for all types of ground and airborne vehicles should contain the following features:
- Be nestable for low volume during storage or transport

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

- Be manufactured from corrosion-resistant materials
- Be releasable from tire pinch
- Be highly visible for day and night operations
- Be impervious to all types of fluids used to service or maintain the vehicles
- Be of light weight
SE-02 Wheel chocks for airborne vehicles should also contain the following features:
- Contain provisions for securing to ramp or flight decks
- Contain provisions to secure chocks at wheels
- Releasable/removable from outside of hot brake envelope
- Contain provisions to enable chock to be used as a tire blowout device
- Contain provisions to prevent skidding on snow or ice
SE-03 Wheel chock design guideline discussion. Wheel chocks have historically contributed to numerous accidents and
incidents across the entire design spectrum, yet have received the least design attention of any ground handling/support
equipment. Directly and indirectly, poorly designed chocks have:
- Resulted in numerous "jumping the chocks" incidents due to improper use or positioning, and improper chock sizing for
the tire size/power application. Some instances result in destruction of the aircraft.
Resulted in vehicle movement/sliding across wet, snowy and icy surfaces as a result of improper grip.
- Resulted in unwarranted tire damage and/or engine FOD.
- Resulted in tertiary damage to other vehicles or ground equipment as a result of being blown about by jet/propeller
blast.
- Damaged surfaces due to temporary placement of chocks on vehicle surfaces during vehicle movement.
- Resulted in personnel sliver/s abrasions (wooden chocks) and cuts (metal chocks) even when chocks were in decent
useable condition.
- Resulted in varied personnel ground accidents during attempts to use chocks as a temporary work stand.
- Lost aircraft "over the side" on carriers.
SI-03 Parts and assemblies of a given model product or of models of a product in the same series should be interchangeable or
replaceable.
WT&B-01 Wheel bearings should be lubricated by oil-bath concepts and should not be integral with the wheel assembly.
WT&B-02 Brake-wear indicating pins should be highly visible during day and night operations.
WT&B-09 Brake clips, end plates, retainers, etc. used to build up wheel, tire, and brake assemblies should not be capable of reverse

Policy Management Group at 1-800-451-1584.

or improper installation.
WT&B-11 Wheel axle nuts should contain integral retention devices or safetying features. In rare instances where this cannot be
accomplished, a bolt and self-locking nut should be used. Locking rings and similar devices that can fail and cause FOD
should be avoided.
WT&B-12 Avoid the use of rivets to retain pressure pads, clips, brackets, and similar items in wheel/brake assemblies unless:
- Rivet failure will not permit a part or item to fall into the brake disc/pad area, and
- Exceptional quality control can be assured during manufacture of the part or rivet attachments, and
- Frequent scheduled inspections will not be imposed to protect product integrity or reliability.
WT&B-13 Emergency brake handles should not be similar in shape or color as other handles nor should they be located in close

13:09:17 MDT Questions or comments about this message: please call the Document
proximity to such other handles.

Document provided by IHS Licensee=Lockheed Martin/5904361100, User=, 07/31/2002

WT&B-14 Wheel assemblies should contain built-in dial type pressure gages.
WT&B-15 Anti-skid and anti-lock brake systems should contain periodic and initiated BIT. All components, including speed sensors,
comparators, wiring, connectors, control boxes, etc., should be included in the BIT system.
WT&B-16 Do not use potting compounds for electrical connector environmental protection because it tends to revert and
significantly increases repair time.

C-314
 MIL-HDBK-470A
APPENDIX C
Guidelines by Category (Contd)
Category No. Category Title Guideline No. Guideline
3.10.01 Tracks WT&B-17 Electrical connector environmental protection should be capable of withstanding water pressure streams up to 120 psi
encountered during decontamination, wash, etc.

Document provided by IHS solely for internal use of:

WT&B-18 Route brake lines so that line failure will not occur due to tire blow out or separation of recapped treads.
3.10.02 Wheels, Tires, and Brakes A-04 Use stiffening beads in lieu of flanges to the maximum extent to enhance compartment volume and simplify repairs.
Stiffening beads should have the convex surface toward the compartment to eliminate fluid traps.
A-15 Locate tie-down attachment points such that tie-down chains, straps, or cables do not prevent or restrict normal servicing,
weapon loading, or safe/arm functions.
ARM-03 Locate fuselage weapon bays a minimum of 18" from the nose landing gear and main landing gear of an aircraft.
BIT-01 During design of the BIT, use worst-case stress analysis to ensure that any circuit failures induced by temperature
extremes, tolerance build-up, power supply variations, and combinations thereof are identified.
BIT-02 Ensure that BIT system thresholds are consistent with those across the system, subsystem, item, module, and piece-part
levels to prevent excessive numbers of Cannot Duplicate (CND) and Retest OK (RTOK) events from occurring.
BIT-03 The degree of BIT required or proposed should be based on the respective failure rates and the appropriate FMECA at
all equipment indenture levels.
BIT-04 Limit the amount of data that is recorded to a manageable size by:
- Limiting the number of signals that are monitored
- Limiting the maximum sampling rate
- Reducing the time span over which data is accumulated
- Restricting the type of data accumulated
BIT-05 Incorporate testability design features as an integral part of equipment preliminary design process.
BIT-06 Mission critical functions should be monitored by BIT.
BIT-09 Use concurrent BIT to monitor system critical functions.
BIT-16 Critical voltages should be visually monitored by sending the voltage signals to visible LEDs.
BIT-20 The BIT should be mechanized so that when a piece of equipment is not installed in a subsystem or the product, a failure
will not be indicated.
BIT-26 Locate routinely used test points so they are accessible without removing or disassembling other equipment
CONT-01 Control rods should use Boyd or impedance type bolts (or equivalent) to eliminate the need for cotter pins or safety wir e.
CONT-02 Do not use metal control cables for vehicles that will operate in salt water or salt air environments.
CONT-03 Use control rods rather than control cables for non-complex applications and non-complex routing within the vehicle.
CONT-04 Use control cables rather than control rods for most complex applications.