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(ArunMishraandAmitavaRoy,JJ.)

T.Ravi&Anr.____________________________________Appellant(s)

v.

B.ChinnaNarasimha&Ors.etc.____________________Respondent(s)

CivilAppealNos.47314732of2010,decidedonMarch21,2017

With

[CivilAppealNos.4733of2010,473435of2010,4736of2010,483738of2010,653637of
2010,427677of2011,CivilAppealNo.431920of2017(@SLP(C)Nos.2386423865of
2011),CivilAppealNos.119697of2012andCivilAppealNos.710506of2010]

TheJudgementoftheCourtwasdeliveredby

ArunMishra,J.:
1.LeavegrantedinS.L.P.(C)Nos.2386423865of2011.

2.Intheappeals,thefinaldecreewhichhasbeendrawnupinapartitionsuitwithrespecttoitem
No.6ofScheduleBpertainingtolandadmeasuring68acres10guntascomprisedinsurvey
Nos.63,68,69and70situatedatvillageMadhapur,DistrictRangaReddy,Hyderabadisin
question.

3.ThepropertywasmatrukapropertyofLateMohd.NawabJungwhopassedawayon
25.4.1935.CivilSuitNo.82/1935wasinstitutedbyMohd.HashimAliKhan,sonofMohd.
Nawab,inDarulQazaCityCourt,Hyderabad,forpartitionofmatrukapropertiesofLateNawab
comprisedinSchedulesA,BandC.Thesuitwascontested,interalia,bydefendantNo.1.
DarulQazaCourtwasabolishedintheyear1951.Onabolitionoforiginaljurisdictionofthe
HighCourt,thecasewasassignedtotheCityCivilCourt.Itappearsthatlateronasthefilewas
notreceivedbytheCityCivilCourtfromtheCustodian,itpassedorderdated8.1.1955tothe
effectthatthefileofthecasewasnotyetreceived,theplaintiffwasalsoabsent,assuchthecase
beclosedforthetimebeingandberevivedonlyonreceiptofthefileandonanapplicationtobe
filedbytheplaintiff.Thecitycivilcourtunderstoodtheordertobeofdismissalofsuitin
default.Theplaintiffmovedanapplicationforrevivalofthesuit.Thecitycivilcourtdirectedthe
plaintiffvideorderdated1.12.1955todepositRs.50towardscostsandifthecostswerenotpaid
by15.12.1955,thesuitshallstanddismissed.Theplaintiffcouldnotpaythecostwithinthe
stipulatedtimeandprayedforextensionoftimewhichwasnotextended.Theorderwas
questionedbytheplaintiffintheHighCourtbywayoffilinganappeal.TheHighCourtdecided
theappealvideorderdated23.1.1962andheldthatvideorderdated8.1.1955,thesuitwasnot
dismissedfordefault.Itwasanorderadjourningthesuitwithadirectionthatitmayberevived
onlyonreceiptofthefilefromtheCustodian,therefore,therewasnonecessityfortheplaintiff
tofileanapplicationunderOrder9Rule9CPCforrestoration.Thusthetrialcourthadno
jurisdictiontodirecttheplaintiffvideorderdated1.12.1955topaythecostofRs.50tothe
defendantsonorbefore15.12.1955asaconditionprecedent.Theappealwasallowedandthe
orderdated1.12.1955wassetaside.TheorderpassedbytheHighCourtattainedfinality.
Thereafter,thesuitwasrenumberedasCivilSuitNo.42/1962inthecitycivilcourt.HamidAli
Khan,defendantNo.1soldItemNo.6ofScheduleBpropertyinarea68acres10guntason
23.11.1959toBalaMallaiahvideregisteredsaledeed.Hesoldtheshareinheritedbyotherco
heirsalsotoBalaMallaiah.Itwasfoundinthepreliminarydecreeforpartitiondated24.11.1970
thatdefendantNo.1,HamidAliKhan,washavingonly14/104thshareinmatrukaproperties.
Theplaintiff,anddefendantNos.2,3and12werealsohaving14/104thshareeach.Defendant
Nos.4to6,daughtersofNawabhad7/104thshareinmatrukaproperties.NurunnisaBegum,
widowofLateNawab,defendantNo.7wasentitledto13/104thshareinmatrukaproperties.
4.Aggrievedbythepreliminarydecreeforpartitiondeterminingthesharestotheaforesaid
extent,theplaintiffandlegalheirsofdefendantNo.1i.e.defendantNos.23to25anddefendant
No.27preferredappealintheyear1972beforetheHighCourt.Crossobjectionswerealso
preferredbydefendantNo.6ShareefunnisaBegum.TheHighCourtdismissedtheappealsand
allowedthecrossobjectionsofdefendantNo.6withrespecttoitemNo.4ofScheduleA
property.TheplaintiffquestionedthedecisionbywayoffilingLPANo.199/1977andthesame
wasdismissedvideorderdated12.11.1976,thedecisionwithrespecttopreliminarydecreehas
attainedfinality.

5.DefendantNo.25daughterofdefendantNo.1filedIANo.854/1984forpassingafinal
decreeintermsofthepreliminarydecreepassedinthepartitionsuit.Duringthependencyofthe
finaldecreeproceedings,anAdvocateCommissionerwasappointedtodividethesuitschedule
landbymetesandboundsasperthepreliminarydecreepassedon24.11.1970forwhichan
application(IANo.31/1989)wasfiledon16.1.1989.HesubmittedareportinDecember,1993
inrespectofitemNo.6ofScheduleBofpreliminarydecreedated24.11.1970.TheAdvocate
Commissionerdividedthesuitschedulepropertyon28.11.1993.Healsonoticedthatthird
partieswereinpossessionofthelandandhehadalsoseenasignboardofSuryaEnclave
Developers.Thesaletransactiontookplaceduringthependencyofthepreliminarydecree
proceedingson23.11.1959.TheLRs.ofBalaMallaiahwereentitledtotheshareofHamidAli
Khan,defendantNo.1.On6.10.1997,pendingfinaldecreeproceedings,plaintiffanddefendant
Nos.4and14to17i.e.LRs.ofdefendantNo.5assignedtheirinterestinitemNo.6ofplaintB
schedulepropertiesinfavourofD.A.P.ContainersPvt.Ltd.Theassigneeswerebroughton
recordasdefendantNos.99to112inthefinaldecreeproceedingsvideorderdated22.4.1999
passedbytheSeniorCivilJudge,CityCivilCourt,Hyderabad.

6.On16.7.2001,L.Rs.ofBalaMallaiahfiledIANo.978/2001andsoughtimpleadmentto
contestthematterinrespectofitemNo.6ofplaintBScheduleproperties.Videorderdated
14.10.2003,LRs.ofBalaMallaiahwereimpleaded.On2.4.2004,subsequentpurchasersofthe
disputedpropertyfiledanapplication(IANo.544/2004)underOrderVIIRule11CPCfor
rejectionofthefinaldecreeproceedings.Itwasresistedbyappellantsandrejectedbythecourt
videorderdated5.7.2005andultimatelythefinaldecreecametobepassedon7.7.2005interms
ofthepreliminarydecreedated24.11.1970.InthefinaldecreeproceedingsinitiatedbyIANo.
854/1984,shareofeachheirwasrecognizedinthedisputedpropertybeingItemNo.6of
ScheduleBplaint.TherightsofHamidAli,vendorofBalaMallaiahandsubsequent
purchaser'ssharewasrecognizedtotheextentof14/104thshare.Rightsofthe
assignees/appellantswerealsorecognizedintermsoftheassignmentdeedandseparate
possessionwasgiventothem.ThefinaldecreewasquestionedinAppealNos.385and386of
2006whichwerefiledbyLRs.ofBalaMallaiahandpurchasersfromthemwithrespecttoitem
No.6ofplaintBscheduleproperty.Theappealsweredismissedon27.4.2007.Aggrieved
thereby,SecondAppealNo.410/2008waspreferred.Appealhadbeenallowedbytheimpugned
judgmentanddecreedated15.4.2010.

7.Beforethefinaldecreecouldbepassedinthecase,civilsuitbeingOSNo.294/1993wasfiled
forperpetualinjunctionbyL.Rs.ofBalaMallaiahagainstHashimAliKhanandothersonthe
basisofsaledeeddated23.11.1959.ThesuitwasdismissedbyJuniorCivilJudge,Hyderabad
West&Southvidejudgmentanddecreedated8.6.1998.Itwasheldthattheplaintiffswerenot
entitledtoclaimadversepossessionoverthesuitschedulepropertyandthattheirpurchaseand
possessionwassubjecttotheresultofthepartitionsuit,O.S.No.42/1962.Itwasalsoheldthat
thepossessionoftheplaintiffcouldnotbesaidtoberightfulpossessionandtheycouldclaim
onlytotheextentoftheirvendor'sshareandnotovertheentireproperty,andthus,theywerenot
entitledtothereliefofinjunctionagainstthedefendants.Asagainstthejudgmentanddecreeof
thetrialcourt,anappealwaspreferredintheCourtofAdditionalDistrictJudge,NTRNagar,
Hyderabadandthesamewasdismissedon20.7.2000.SecondAppealNo.465/2001preferred
againstthesameintheHighCourtwasdismissedvidejudgmentandorderdated26.9.2001.

8.LandgrabbingproceedingsundertheAndhraPradeshLandGrabbing(Prohibition)Act,1982
initiatedbytheL.Rs.ofBalaMallaiahweredismissedbytheSpecialCourtinLGCNo.
148/1996videorderdated13.5.1997.Itwasheldthattheapplicationwasnotmaintainable.The
courttookcognizanceofthepreliminarydecreeproceedings,appointmentoftheCommissioner
andalsoheldthatitwasnotopentocontendthatthedoctrineoflispendenshadnoapplication.
Theapplicationwasultimatelydismissed.TheorderwasquestionedbywayoffilingW.P.No.
15577/2001intheHighCourtofAndhraPradesh.TheHighCourtsimplyobservedthatthe
observationsmadebythespecialcourtwouldnotcomeinthewayofthepetitionerstoworkout
theirrightsinaccordancewithlawinthepartitionsuit,thatistosayinthefinaldecree
proceedings.

9.TherewasyetanotherlitigationinitiatedbyBoddamNarsimha,nephewofBalaMallaiah.On
16.12.1998anapplicationwasfiledbeforetheTribunal,RangaReddyDistrict,seeking
declarationofprotectedtenancyundersection37AoftheA.P.(TelanganaArea)Tenancyand
AgriculturalLandsAct,1950.Thesamewasdismissedvideorderdated24.8.1999.Theappeal
preferredtotheJointCollectorwasalsodismissedon13.3.2000.CRPNo.2229/2000beforethe
HighCourtofJudicatureatAndhraPradeshwasdismissedbytheSingleJudgevideorderdated
16.4.2001.Aggrievedthereby,C.A.No.3429/2002BoddamNarsimhav.HasanAliKhan
(dead)byLRs.(2007)11SCC410wasfiled,andthesamewasalsodismissedbythisCourt.
10.TheHighCourtwhilepassingtheimpugnedjudgmentanddecreeunderappealhasheldthat
thesaledeeddated23.11.1959wasnothitbytheprincipleoflispendensundersection52ofthe
TransferofPropertyAct.Duringthependencyofthesuit,defendantNo.1hadleasedoutthe
landtoBalaMallaiahandlateronhadalienatedthesameon23.11.1959.Thedecisionofthis
CourtinBoddamNarsimha(supra)hadbeenreliedupontoholdthatBalaMallaiahwasdeclared
asPattedar,thatwouldbindalltheparties.Itwasnecessaryfortheplaintifftotakestepstoget
thesaledeeddated23.11.1959cancelledinaccordancewithlaw.Ithasalsobeenheldthatasthe
salebydefendantNo.1toBalaMallaiahwasnoteffectedduringlispendens,intheabsenceof
challengetothesaledeedandduetononimpleadmentinthesuit,byvirtueofadverse
possession,titlehasbeenperfected.Atthesametime,theHighCourthasheldthattillthefinal
decreeispassedthesuitissaidtobependingandthepreliminarydecreeonlydeterminesthe
rightsoftheparties.Thus,thefinaldecreewhichhasbeenpassedbythetrialcourtwithrespect
toitemNo.6ofplaintBschedulepropertywasimpracticable.

11.Itwassubmittedbylearnedseniorcounselappearingonbehalfoftheappellantsthatinfact
therewasnodismissalofthesuitin1955asheldbytheHighCourtintheyear1962.Thus,the
saledeeddated23.11.1959wasclearlyduringlispendens.Thesuitwasfiledintheyear1935
andthepreliminarydecreeforpartitionwaspassedintheyear1970andfinaldecreehasbeen
passedin2005.ItwasfurthercontendedthatitwasnotopentodefendantNo.1tosellmorethan
hisshare.HehadnoauthoritytosellthelandbelongingtotheshareofothercoheirsasMuslims
inheritthepropertyastenantsincommonandnotasjointtenants.Itwasfurthersubmittedthat
therewasnonecessityofquestioningthesaledeedasitwassubjecttotheprovisionsoflis
pendenscontainedinsection52ofT.P.Act.TheHighCourthasgravelyerredinlawinholding
thatthetitlehadbeenperfectedbyvirtueofadversepossession.Itwasalsocontendedthatthis
CourtinBoddamNarsimha(supra)didnotadjudicatethequestionoftitleofBalaMallaiah.
Thus,theHighCourthasgravelyerredinlawinreversingthejudgmentanddecreepassedby
thetrialcourtasaffirmedbythefirstappellatecourt.TheHighCourthasalsoerredinlawin
holdingthatitwasimpracticabletopassthedecreewithrespecttoitemNo.6ofscheduleB
property.

12.Learnedseniorcounselappearingonbehalfoftheappellantssubmittedthatthedecisionin
CivilSuitNo.289/1993forpermanentinjunctionwhichwasbasedupontitle,operatesasres
judicataonvariousissues.Thepleaofestoppelhasalsobeenraisedonbehalfoftheappellants.
Itwasfurthersubmittedthatthepleaofequitywithrespecttopartitionofpropertywasnot
availabletoBalaMallaiahortothepurchasersfromhim.

13.Itwasalsosubmittedonbehalfoftheappellantsthatthefinaldecreeproceedingsquaother
itemNo.2ofscheduleBpropertyhaveattainedfinalityinwhichtheorderpassedbythe
DivisionBenchoftheHighCourtofAndhraPradeshinLPANo.104/1997hasbeenaffirmedby
thisCourtbyaspeakingorderpassedinSLP[C]No.3558/1999decidedon1.10.1999.Thus,the
decisionofthisCourtisbindinguponthepartiesandthefindingsrecordedbytheHighCourt
thereinonquestionsoflawinitsjudgmenthaveattainedfinality.Thus,theHighCourthaserred
inlawinholdingotherwise.

14.Learnedseniorcounselappearingonbehalfofrespondentshavesubmittedthatthesaledeed
dated23.11.1959infavourofBalaMallaiahisvalidandbindingasdisputedlandcouldhave
beenalienatedevenduringthependencyofthesuitforpartition.Itwasstrenuouslysubmittedon
behalfoftherespondentsthatthesaleinquestioncouldnotbesaidtobeduringlispendensas
thesuitinfactstooddismissedin1955andwaslateronrevivedbytheHighCourtin1962.The
decisionofthisCourtinBoddamNarsimha(supra)isbindinginwhichfoundationalbasisforthe
judgmentwasthefactthatBalaMallaiahwasapattedaroftheland,anditwasnecessaryto
avoidthesaledeedinquestionbygettingitcancelledinaccordancewithlawwithintheperiod
oflimitationandthatbyvirtueofadversepossession,therightandinteresthadbeenperfectedby
thepurchasers.Itwasalsosubmittedthatevenotherwise,theequitiesavailabletoapurchaser
oughttohavebeenappliedinthepresentcaseastheprincipleofequitableadjustmentis
applicabletoMohammedanLawandthedisputedpropertyoughttohavebeenallottedtothe
shareofdefendantNo.1inordertoadjusttheequitieswithoutaffectingtherightsofotherco
heirs.

15.ItwasfurtherurgedthatinviewofthedecisioninCivilSuitNo.294/1993,variousquestions
wereleftopentobeagitatedinthefinaldecreeproceedings.Itwasalsosubmittedthatinthe
judgmentdated24.11.1970withregardtopreliminarydecreeinpara93,purchasersweregiven
thelibertytoraisethequestionofequityinthefinaldecreeproceedings.Thus,theHighCourt
hasrightlyinterferedwiththefinaldecreewithrespecttothedisputedproperty.Evenifsection
52oftheT.P.Actisapplicable,thetransactionshitbylispendensarenotvoid.BalaMallaiah
hadacquiredtherightsofapattedar,nodecreecouldhavebeenpassedinfavourofL.Rs.ofLate
NawabJung.Consideringtheconductoftheappellants,nocaseforinterferenceismadeout.
Theycannotapprobateandreprobate.

16.Followingquestionsariseforconsiderationundertheappeals:

(i)WhetherthedecisioninOriginalSuitNo.294of1993operatesasresjudicata,ifyestowhat
extent?
(ii)Whetherthesaledeeddated23.11.1959executedbydefendantno.1infavourofBala
Mallaiahishitbydoctrineoflispendens?

(iii)Whethersection52ofT.P.Actrendersatransferpendentelitevoid?

(iv)Whatistheeffectofpreliminarydecreeforpartitionandtheextenttowhichitisbinding?

(v)Whetheritwasnecessarytofileasuitforcancellationofsaledeeddated23.11.1959?

(vi)WhetherBalaMallaiah,hisheirsandpurchasershadperfectedtheirright,titleandinterest
byvirtueofadversepossession?

(vii)WhetherundertheMuslimlaw,defendantno.1beingacosharercouldhavealienatedthe
shareofothercosharersinthedisputedproperty?

(viii)WhetherthepurchaserhasarighttoclaimequityforallotmentofItemNo.6ofSchedule
Bpropertyinfinaldecreeproceedingsinsuitforpartition?Ifyes,towhatextent?

(ix)Whethersalewasforlegalnecessity,andthusbinding?

(x)WhatistheeffectofproceedingsundertheTenancyAct,1950?

(xi)WhatistheeffectofdecisionofthisCourtandHighCourtwithrespecttofinaldecree
proceedingsinItemNo.2ofScheduleBproperty?

(xii)Whetherthereiswaiverofrightbyappellants?
(xiii)Whetherappellantsareguiltyofdelayorlaches?

(xiv)WhatistheeffectofthedecisionoftheCourtundertheUrbanLandCeilingAct?

,if
(i)Inre:whetherthedecisioninOriginalSuitNo.294of1993operatesasresjudicata
yes,towhatextent?

17.TwelveLRs.ofBalaMallaiahfiledtheaforesaidsuitagainstMohd.HasimAliKhanand13
otherheirsofLateNawabJung.ThesuitwaswithrespecttoItemNo.6ofScheduleBthatis
withrespecttosurveyNos.63and68to70comprisedinarea68acres10guntassituatedat
villageMadhapurinerstwhileWestTaluk,HyderabaddistrictnowknownasSerilingampally
Mandal.

18.ItwasaverredintheplaintthatHamidAliKhanhadsoldthelandtoBalaMallaiahbysale
deeddated23.11.1959afterobtainingduepermissionundertheAndhraPradeshTenancyand
AgriculturalLandsAct,1950(hereinafterreferredtoastheActof1950).Thoughthelandwas
purchasedinthenameofBalaMallaiahbutitwashisjointfamilypropertyalongwithtwo
brothers,namely,KomaraiahandAgaiah.BalaMallaiahdiedintheyear1975.Hisundivided
1/3rdsharedevolveduponplaintiffNos.1and2.PlaintiffNos.3and4aresonsofplaintiffNo.1
andplaintiffNo.5isthesonofplaintiffNo.2.Komaraiah,brotherofBalaMallaiahalsodied
andhis1/3rdinteresthaddevolveduponplaintiffNos.6and7.AgaiahplaintiffNo.8isthe
brotherofBalaMallaiahandplaintiffNos.9to12arehissons.

19.Itwasfurtheraverredthattheplaintiffenteredintoadeveloper'sagreementwithrespectto
residentialplotswithM/s.SuryaLandDevelopers&Promoterswithrespectto13acres17
guntasformingpartofsurveyNo.68and12acres31guntasinsurveyNo.69.Another
agreementwasenteredintowithBapujiEstateswithrespectto6acresofareaoutofsurveyNo.
69.PlotscomprisedinsurveyNos.68&69werealsosoldtovariouspersons.SurveyNo.69
wasalsosoldinentirety.ApreliminarydecreeforpartitionwaspassedinO.S.No.42/1962in
theyear1970whichcomprisedofdisputedpropertyalso.BalaMallaiahortheplaintiffsand
otherheirswerenotimpleadedaspartiesintheaforesaidsuitforpartitionandundertheguiseof
decreethedefendantswereclaimingownershipandthreateningtodispossesstheplaintiffs
forcibly.Inthesuitforpartition,duringfinaldecreeproceedings,anAdvocateCommissioner
hadbeenappointedwhovisitedthedisputedpropertyon15.8.1993.Hence,suitNo.294/1993
wasfiledforperpetualinjunction.

20.Thedefendantsintheirwrittenstatementcontendedthatthesuitwasnotmaintainable.The
preliminarydecreeforpartitiondated24.11.1970wasbindinginwhichsharesofrespective
partieshadbeendeclared.Suitforpartitionwasfiledintheyear1935.Thesaletransaction
betweenHamidAliKhanandBalaMallaiahwasvoidandconferrednoright,titleorinterest
upontheplaintiffs.Plaintiffshadnorighttointerfereinthesharesallottedtoothercoheirsin
thesuitforpartition.Thepropertyinquestionwasancestralproperty.Thefindingsrecordedin
preliminarydecreeagainstdefendantNo.1,vendorofBalaMallaiaharebindinguponthe
plaintiffs,andassuchtheyarenotentitledforanyrelief.

21.Itisapparentthatthesuitforpermanentinjunctionwasfiledbytheplaintiffsonthebasisof
saledeeddated23.11.1959inwhichitwasalsosubmittedthatitwasnotduringlispendens.Plea
ofadversepossessionhadalsobeenraisedwhichwasnegatived.Theyclaimedinjunctiononthe
basisofpossessionunderthesaledeeddated23.11.1959.Thetrialcourtintheaforesaidcivil
suitgavethefollowingfindingsagainsttheplaintiff:(i)thatthepurchasewashitbydoctrineof
lispendenssothattheyarenotentitledforreliefofinjunctionagainstthedefendantswhoareco
sharersasperthepreliminarydecreedated24.11.1970passedinthepartitionsuit;(ii)itwasalso
heldthatthepossessionoftheplaintiffcouldnotbesaidtobearightfulpossession.Itisnotopen
totheplaintifftoclaimrightonthebasisofsaledeedonthegroundthattheywerenotpartiesto
thepartitionsuit.Itwasalsoheldthatwhatevertheirvendorswouldgetinthesuitforpartition,
tothatextenttheywouldbeentitledtoandtheycouldnotclaimrightsovertheentireproperty;
(iii)thepleaofadversepossessionwasalsonegativedbythetrialcourtonthegroundthatthe
purchasewasduringlispendensandtherewasnopleadingorevidenceregardingadverse
possession.

22.Thejudgmentwasaffirmedinthefirstappealvidejudgmentanddecreedated8.6.1988
passedbytheCourtofIIAdditionalDistrictJudge,NTRNagar,HyderabadinA.S.No.72/1998.
Itwasheldthatthesaledeedwashitbydoctrineoflispendens.Thefirstappellatecourtalso
heldthatthevendorofBalaMallaiahnamely,HamidAliKhan,defendant1,hadnorighttosell
theentiredisputepropertytoBalaMalliahasabsoluteowner.Theplaintiffscouldclaimright
overthepropertytotheextentofvendorofBalaMallaiah.Itwasalsoheldthatthelandgrabbing
caseLGCNo.148/1996wasdismissedwhichorderhadattainedfinalityandbarredthepresent
suit.Injunctioncouldnotbegrantedinviewofthepreliminarydecreeforpartitionwhichhad
beenpassedasitwouldtantamounttograntinginjunctionagainstthedecreeholdersfor
enforcingtheirlawfuldecree.Beingapurchaserlispendens,itisopentotheplaintiffto
approachthecourtwherethefinaldecreeproceedingswerependingtoworkoutavailableequity
totheextentofvendor'sshare.Againstthesaiddecisioninfirstappeal,SecondAppealNo.
465/2011wasfiledintheHighCourtofAndhraPradeshatHyderabadwhichwasdismissedin
liminevideorderdated26.9.2011asnosubstantialquestionoflawwasfoundinvolvedinthe
appeal.Judgmentanddecreesofcourtsbelowwerethusaffirmed.

23.Inviewofthecategoricalfindingsrecordedbythetrialcourtandfirstappellatecourtitis
apparentthatthesaledeeddated23.11.1959washitbydoctrineoflispendensandsecondlyon
thebasisofthesaidsaledeed,L.Rs.ofBalaMallaiahcouldhaveclaimedonlytotheextentof
theshareofhisvendorandnottheentireland,i.e.onlytotheextentof14/104thshareof
defendantNo.1.

24.Withrespecttoeffectofsuitforpermanentinjunctionbasedupontitle,effectofnegativing
titlehasbeenconsideredbythisCourt.InSajjadanashinSayedMd.B.E.Edr.(D)byLRs.v.
MusaDadabhaiUmmer(2000)3SCC350,ithasbeenheld:

24.Beforepartingwiththispoint,wewouldliketorefertotwomorerulings.InSulochana
Ammav.NarayananNair(1994)2SCC14thisCourtheldthatafindingastotitlegiveninan
earlierinjunctionsuitwouldberesjudicatainasubsequentsuitontitle.Ontheotherhand,the
MadrasHighCourt,inVanagiriSriSelliammanAyyanarUthirasomasundareswararTemplev.
RajangaAsariAIR1965Madras355held(seepara8therein)thattheprevioussuitwasonlyfor
injunctionrelatingtothecrops.Maybe,thequestionoftitlewasdecided,thoughnotraisedinthe
plaint.Inthelattersuitontitle,thefindingintheearliersuitontitlewouldnotberesjudicataas
theearliersuitwasconcernedonlywithapossessoryright.Thesetwodecisions,inouropinion,
cannotbetreatedasbeingcontrarytoeachotherbutshouldbeunderstoodinthecontextofthe
testsreferredtoabove.Eachofthemcanperhapsbetreatedascorrectiftheyareunderstoodin
thelightofthetestsstatedabove.InthefirstcasedecidedbythisCourt,itistobeassumedthat
thetestsabovereferredtoweresatisfiedforholdingthatthefindingastopossessionwas
substantiallyrestedontitleuponwhichafindingwasfeltnecessaryandinthelattercase
decidedbytheMadrasHighCourt,itmustbeassumedthatthetestswerenotsatisfied.Asstated
inMulla,italldependsonthefactsofeachcaseandwhetherthefindingastotitlewastreated
asnecessaryforgrantofaninjunctionintheearliersuitandwasalsothesubstantivebasisfor
grantofinjunction.Inthiscontext,wemayrefertoCorpusJurisSecundum(Vol.50,para735,
p.229)whereasimilaraspectinregardtofindingsonpossessionandincidentalfindingson
titleweredealtwith.Itisstated:

Wheretitletopropertyisthebasisoftherightofpossession,adecisiononthequestionof
possessionisresjudicataonthequestionoftitletotheextentthatadjudicationoftitlewas
essentialtothejudgment;butwherethequestionoftherighttopossessionwastheonlyissue
actuallyornecessarilyinvolved,thejudgmentisnotconclusiveonthequestionofownershipor
title.

25.Wehavegoneintotheaboveaspectsinsomedetailsothatwhenaquestionarisesbeforethe
Courtsastowhetheranissuewasearlierdecidedonlyincidentallyorcollaterally,theCourts
coulddealwiththequestionasamatteroflegalprincipleratherthanonvaguegrounds.Point1
isdecidedaccordingly.

(emphasisaddedbyus)

25.InCommissionerofEndowmentsv.VittalRao(2005)4SCC120,ithasbeenheldthus:

28.Insupportofhissubmission,thelearnedcounselforRespondent1contendedthataslongas
anissuearisessubstantiallyinalitigationirrespectiveofthefactwhetherornotaformalissue
hasbeenframedoraformalreliefhasbeenclaimed,afindingonthesaidissuewouldoperateas
resjudicata,stronglyreliedonthedecisionofthisCourtinSajjadanashinSayedMd.B.E.Edr.v.
MusaDadabhaiUmmer(supra).Paras18and19ofthesaidjudgmentread:(SCCpp.35960)

18.InIndia,Mullahasreferredtosimilartests(Mulla,15thEdn.,p.104).Thelearnedauthor
says:amatterinrespectofwhichreliefisclaimedinanearliersuitcanbesaidtobegenerallya
matterdirectlyandsubstantiallyinissuebutitdoesnotmeanthatifthematterisoneinrespect
ofwhichnoreliefissoughtitisnotdirectlyorsubstantiallyinissue.Itmayormaynotbe.Itis
possiblethatitwasdirectlyandsubstantiallyinissueanditmayalsobepossiblethatitwasonly
collaterallyorincidentallyinissue,dependinguponthefactsofthecase.Thequestionarisesas
towhatisthetestfordecidingintowhichcategoryacasefalls?Onetestisthatiftheissuewas
necessarytobedecidedforadjudicatingontheprincipalissueandwasdecided,itwouldhave
tobetreatedasdirectlyandsubstantiallyinissueandifitisclearthatthejudgmentwasin
factbaseduponthatdecision,thenitwouldberesjudicatainalattercase(Mulla,p.104).One
hastoexaminetheplaint,thewrittenstatement,theissuesandthejudgmenttofindoutifthe
matterwasdirectlyandsubstantiallyinissue(IsherSinghv.SarwanSinghAIR1965SC948
andSyedMohd.SalieLabbaiv.Mohd.Hanifa(1976)4SCC780).Weareoftheviewthatthe
abovesummaryinMullaisacorrectstatementofthelaw.

19.WehaveheretoadverttoanotherprincipleofcautionreferredtobyMulla(p.105):
Itisnottobeassumedthatmattersinrespectofwhichissueshavebeenframedareallofthem
directlyandsubstantiallyinissue.Noristhereanyspecialsignificancetobeattachedtothefact
thataparticularissueisthefirstinthelistofissues.Whichofthemattersaredirectlyinissue
andwhichcollaterallyorincidentally,mustbedeterminedonthefactsofeachcase.Amaterial
testtobeappliediswhetherthecourtconsiderstheadjudicationoftheissuematerialand
essentialforitsdecision.

(emphasisinoriginalandsupplied)

29.Inthelightofwhatisstatedabove,inthecaseonhand,inourview,itwasnecessaryforthe
CourtintheearlierroundoflitigationtodecidethenatureandscopeofgiftdeedExt.A1.
Accordingly,thecourtsdecidedthatthegiftmadeinfavourofancestorsofRespondent1ofthe
landwasabsoluteanditwasnotanendowmentforapublicorcharitablepurpose.Onthefacts
ofthecase,itisclearthatthoughanissuewasnotformallyframed,theissuewasmaterialand
essentialforthedecisionofthecaseintheearlierproceeding.Hence,thebarofresjudicata
appliestothefactsofthepresentcase.

26.Reliancehasbeenplacedbylearnedseniorcounselfortherespondentsonadecisionin
AnathulaSudhakarv.P.BuchiReddy(dead)byLRs.(2008)4SCC594whereintheCourthad
summarizedtheconclusionsthus::

21.Tosummarise,thepositioninregardtosuitsforprohibitoryinjunctionrelatingto
immovableproperty,isasunder:

(a)Whereacloudisraisedovertheplaintiff'stitleandhedoesnothavepossession,asuitfor
declarationandpossession,withorwithoutaconsequentialinjunction,istheremedy.Wherethe
plaintiff'stitleisnotindisputeorunderacloud,butheisoutofpossession,hehastosuefor
possessionwithaconsequentialinjunction.Wherethereismerelyaninterferencewiththe
plaintiff'slawfulpossessionorthreatofdispossession,itissufficienttosueforaninjunction
simpliciter.
(b)Asasuitforinjunctionsimpliciterisconcernedonlywithpossession,normallytheissueof
titlewillnotbedirectlyandsubstantiallyinissue.Theprayerforinjunctionwillbedecidedwith
referencetothefindingonpossession.Butincaseswheredejurepossessionhastobe
establishedonthebasisoftitletotheproperty,asinthecaseofvacantsites,theissueoftitle
maydirectlyandsubstantiallyariseforconsideration,aswithoutafindingthereon,itwillnotbe
possibletodecidetheissueofpossession.

(c)Butafindingontitlecannotberecordedinasuitforinjunction,unlesstherearenecessary
pleadingsandappropriateissueregardingtitle(eitherspecific,orimpliedasnoticedin
AnnaimuthuThevarv.Alagammal(2005)6SCC202.Wheretheavermentsregardingtitleare
absentinaplaintandwherethereisnoissuerelatingtotitle,thecourtwillnotinvestigateor
examineorrenderafindingonaquestionoftitle,inasuitforinjunction.Evenwherethereare
necessarypleadingsandissue,ifthematterinvolvescomplicatedquestionsoffactandlaw
relatingtotitle,thecourtwillrelegatethepartiestotheremedybywayofcomprehensivesuitfor
declarationoftitle,insteadofdecidingtheissueinasuitformereinjunction.

(d)Wheretherearenecessarypleadingsregardingtitle,andappropriateissuerelatingtotitleon
whichpartiesleadevidence,ifthematterinvolvedissimpleandstraightforward,thecourtmay
decideupontheissueregardingtitle,eveninasuitforinjunction.Butsuchcases,arethe
exceptiontothenormalrulethatquestionoftitlewillnotbedecidedinsuitsforinjunction.But
personshavingcleartitleandpossessionsuingforinjunction,shouldnotbedriventothecostlier
andmorecumbersomeremedyofasuitfordeclaration,merelybecausesomemeddler
vexatiouslyorwrongfullymakesaclaimortriestoencroachuponhisproperty.Thecourtshould
useitsdiscretioncarefullytoidentifycaseswhereitwillenquireintotitleandcaseswhereitwill
refertotheplaintifftoamorecomprehensivedeclaratorysuit,dependinguponthefactsofthe
case.

27.ItwassubmittedonbehalfofrespondentsthatthefindingsinO.S.No.294/1993donot
operateasresjudicataasitwasleftultimatelytoraisetheobjectionsinthefinaldecree
proceedings.Weareunabletoaccepttheaforesaidsubmissionastherewasclearinabilityto
grantinjunctionandthesubmissionoftheplaintiffsthattheywerehavingtitleonentirelandon
thebasisofsaledeeddated23.11.1959,hadbeennegatived.ItwasfoundthatBalaMallaiah
couldhavepurchasedonlytheshareofhisvendorHamidAliandnottheentiredisputed
propertyandthepurchasewasaffectedbylispendens.Weareoftheconsideredopinionthatthe
findingwithrespecttopurchasebeingmadeduringlispendenshadattainedfinalityandwasnot
opentoquestioninthepresentproceedings.Besides,thevalidityofthesaledeedtotheextentof
theshareofthevendorwhichwassoughttobereagitatedinthefinaldecreeproceedings,was
alsonotopentoberaisedinviewofclearfindingsrecordedinthesuitof1993.Thoughwehave
heldso,howevernothingturnsontheaforesaidfindingastoresjudicataasweproposeto
examinebothaspectsonmeritsafresh,inviewoftheconclusionswhichweproposetorecord
hereinafter.

(ii)Inre:Whetherthesaledeeddated23.11.1959executedbydefendantNo.1infavourof
?
BalaMallaiahishitbydoctrineoflispendens

28.Intheinstantcase,asuitforpartitionwasfiledintheyear1935.OnabolitionofDarulQaza
Courtin1951thecasewastransferredtotheHighCourt.Onabolitionoforiginaljurisdictionof
theHighCourt,filewassenttothecitycivilcourt.ItappearsthatwhenthefilefromCustodian
didnotreachthecitycivilcourt,henceorderdated8.1.1955waspassedtothefollowingeffect:

8.1.1955ThisfilesummonedbytheCustodianisnotyetreceived.Astheplaintifftoois
absentandthefilenotyetreceivedthecasebeclosed.Itmayberevivedonlyonthereceiptof
thefileandtheapplicationoftheplaintiff.

29.Itisapparentfromtheaforesaidorderthatitwasclearlyanorderofkeepingthecasesinedie
tobetakenuponlyonreceiptofthefileonbeinginformedbyfilinganapplicationbythe
plaintiff.Thefilewasnotbeforethecourt.Thus,therewasnoquestionofdismissalofthecase
indefaultnorwasitsodismissedbythecourt.Howevertheplaintifflabouredunderwrong
impression,assuchfiledapplicationunderOrder9Rule9CPCandprayedforrestorationofthe
suit.Anorderwaspassedon1.12.1955bythecitycivilcourt,restoringthesuitonthebasisof
paymentofRs.50ascoststobepaidonorbefore15.12.1955.Costscouldnotbedepositedby
theplaintiffby15.12.1955.Theprayerwasmadetoacceptthecostson16.12.1955byextending
timeundersection148CPC.However,thecitycivilcourtdismissedthesaidapplication.The
orderwasquestionedintheHighCourtinappealfiledbytheplaintiffinwhichtheDivision
BenchoftheHighCourtvideorderdated5.2.1962hadheldthatthesuitinfactwasnot
dismissedfordefaulton8.1.1955bythetrialcourt.Itwasanorderadjourningthesuitwitha
directiontoberevivedonlyonthefilebeingreceivedfromtheCustodian.Therefore,therewas
nonecessityfortheplaintifftofileanapplicationunderOrder9Rule9CPC.TheHighCourt
hadsetasidetheorderdated8.1.1955andalsoheldthattherewasnojurisdictionwiththecity
civilcourttopassanorderon1.12.1955toimposeandpaycostsofRs.50.Thefollowingorder
waspassedintheyear1962bytheDivisionBenchoftheHighCourt:

Itisclearfromtheorderdated8155,thatthesuitwasnotdismissedfordefault.Virtually,itis
anorderadjourningthesuitwithadirectionthatitmayberevivedonlyonthereceiptofthefile
fromtheCustodian.Thereforetherewasnonecessityfortheplaintifftofiletheapplication
underOr.9,Rule9,CPC,prayingthatthesuitberestoredtoitsoriginalnumberaftersetting
asidetheorderdated8155.Theplaintiffcouldhavemerelyaskedthecourttotakeupthesuit
andtoproceedwiththetrial.ThelearnedJudgehasnojurisdictiontodirecttheplaintiffbyhis
orderdated11255topaydaycostsviz.,Rs.50/tothedefendantsonorbefore151255asa
conditionprecedent.Thisorderisclearlyillegalandhastobesetaside.

Intheresult,theappealisallowed,andtheorderdated11255directingtheplaintifftopaythe
defendantsRs.50/onorbefore151255asaconditionprecedenttorestrainingthesuitisset
aside.Asaconsequence,theorderdated7156isvacated.Sincethisisasuitof1951whichhas
beenpendingforalongtime,thelowercourtwilldisposeofthesameasexpeditiouslyas
possible.Thecontestingrespondentsshallpaythecostsoftheappellant.

30.Apreliminaryobjectionhasbeenraisedonbehalfoftherespondentsastoveryapplicability
ofdoctrineoflispendenstoMohammedanlawbaseduponprovisionscontainedinsection2of
T.P.Act.Section2isextractedhereunder:

2.RepealofActs.Savingofcertainenactments,incidents,rights,liabilities,etc.Inthe
territoriestowhichthisActextendsforthetimebeingtheenactmentsspecifiedintheSchedule
heretoannexedshallberepealedtotheextentthereinmentioned.Butnothinghereincontained
shallbedeemedtoaffect

(a)theprovisionsofanyenactmentnotherebyexpresslyrepealed;

(b)anytermsorincidentsofanycontractorconstitutionofpropertywhichareconsistentwith
theprovisionsofthisAct,andareallowedbythelawforthetimebeinginforce;

(c)anyrightorliabilityarisingoutofalegalrelationconstitutedbeforethisActcomesinto
force,oranyreliefinrespectofanysuchrightorliability;or

(d)saveasprovidedbysection57andChapterIVofthisAct,anytransferbyoperationoflawor
by,orinexecutionof,adecreeororderofaCourtofcompetentjurisdiction,
andnothinginthesecondChapterofthisActshallbedeemedtoaffectanyruleof
Muhammadanlaw.

31.Nodoubtaboutitthatsection2ofT.P.ActprotectsruleofMohammedanlawbyexcluding
theprovisionsofChapterIIcontainingsections5to53Athereof.Inouropinion,exclusionis
conditionaluponexistenceofruleofMohammedanlawinthatregard,thatistosayif
principle/ruleofMohammedanlawprovidesastotransferslispendens,thesamewouldprevail
andnothinginsection52ofT.P.Actshallbedeemedtoaffectanysuchrule.However,wehave
notbeenshownanysuchruleofMohammedanlawcontainingprovisionastolispendensand
thus,intheabsencewhereoftheprovisionsofsection52T.P.Actwouldbeattracted.The
submissionastononapplicabilityofsection52ofT.P.ActtoMohammedanlawishereby
rejected.

32.Itwassubmittedonbehalfoftherespondentsthatthesaledeedhadbeenexecutedafter
dismissalofthesuiton16.12.1955intermsoftheorderdated1.12.1955assuchdoctrineoflis
pendenswasnotattracted.Thus,itwassubmittedthatbetween15.12.1955and23.1.1962nosuit
waspending.ReliancehasbeenplacedonadecisioninBhutnathDasv.SahadebChandra
PanjaAIR1962Cal.485:

4.Therealquestion,therefore,iswhetherinacaselikethiswhereanorderhasbeenmade
forthepaymentofcertainmoneywithinacertaintimeforthepurposeofgettingspecific
performanceandatthesametimeanorderhasalsobeenmadethatifthemoneyisnotpaidthe
suitwillstanddismissed,thecourtretainsjurisdiction.Thoughnotwithouthesitation,Ihave
reachedtheconclusionthatinsuchacaseitwillbeunrealisticandunjusttosaythatthecourt
retainsjurisdiction.Whetherthecourthasretainedjurisdictionornotwill,inmyview,depend
verymuchonthesubstanceofthedirectionsgiven..Where..thecourtmakesalsoanorder
thatiftheamountisnotdepositedwithinthetimespecifiedthesuitwillstanddismissed,Ifindit
difficulttoagreethatthecourtretainsanyjurisdictionwhatsoever.

6...thetrialcourtlostjurisdictioninthesuitassoonasitmadetheorderdirectingthepayment
withinacertaintimeandfurtherdirectingthatonfailureofthedepositbeingmadewithinthe
timelimitedthecaseshouldstanddismissed.
33.ThedecisionofthisCourtinVareedJacobv.SosammaGeevarghese(2004)6SCC378has
beenrelieduponinwhichithasbeenlaiddownthus:

18.InthecaseofSaranathaAyyangarv.MuthiahMoopanarAIR1934Mad49ithasbeen
heldthatonrestorationofthesuitdismissedfordefaultallinterlocutorymattersshallstand
restored,unlesstheorderofrestorationsaystothecontrary.Thatasamatterofgeneralruleon
restorationofthesuitdismissedfordefault,allinterlocutoryordersshallstandrevivedunless
duringtheinterregnumbetweenthedismissalofthesuitandrestoration,thereisanyalienation
infavourofathirdparty.

EventhedissentingjudgmentofS.B.Sinha,J.hadonthispointnoted:

62.Itisalsoofsomeimportancethatthereexistsaviewthatanorderofdismissalofasuitdoes
notrenderanorderofattachmentvoidabinitioasasaleofpropertyunderorderofattachment
wouldbeinvalidevenafterthedateofsuchsaleandtheorderofattachmentiswithdrawn.

63.Aconversecasemayarisewhenthepropertyissoldafterthesuitisdismissedfordefaultand
beforethesameisrestored.Isitpossibletotakeaviewthatuponrestorationofsuitthesaleof
propertyunderattachmentbeforejudgmentbecomesinvalid?Theanswertothesaidquestion
mustberenderedinthenegative.Bytakingrecoursetotheinterpretationoftheprovisionsofthe
statute,thecourtcannotsaythatalthoughsuchasaleshallbevalidbuttheorderofattachment
shallrevive.Suchaconclusionbyreasonofajudgemadelawmaybeanillogicalone.

34.Itwassubmittedonbehalfoftheappellantsthatthesalewassubjecttothedoctrineoflis
pendensundersection52oftheT.P.Act.Itwasfurthersubmittedthatthesaidprovisionisclear
andunambiguousandthestatutoryexplanationtotheprovisionmakesitclearthatthependency
ofthesuitorproceedingshallbedeemedtocommencefromthedateofpresentationoftheplaint
ortheinstitutionoftheproceedinginthecourtofcompetentjurisdiction,andtocontinueuntil
thesuitorproceedinghasbeendisposedofbyadecreeoranorderandcompletesatisfactionof
orderordischargeofsuchorderordecreehasbeenobtainedorhasbecomeunobtainableby
reasonoftheexpirationofanyperiodoflimitationprescribedfortheexecutionthereof.Thus,
thetransferifanymadeincontraventionofSection52rendersitsubservienttotherightsofthe
partiesinlitigationsothattherightswouldeventuallybedeterminedinasuit.ThomsonPress
(India)Ltd.v.NanakBuildersandInvestorsPvt.Ltd.(2013)5SCC397,hasbeenreliedonin
whichthisCourthaslaiddownthus:
26.Itwouldalsobeworthdiscussingsomeoftherelevantlawsinordertoappreciatethecase
onhand.Section52oftheTransferofPropertyActspeaksaboutthedoctrineoflispendens.
Section52readsasunder:

52.Transferofpropertypendingsuitrelatingthereto.Duringthependencyinanycourt
havingauthoritywithinthelimitsofIndiaexcludingtheStateofJammuandKashmiror
establishedbeyondsuchlimitsbytheCentralGovernmentofanysuitorproceedingwhichisnot
collusiveandinwhichanyrighttoimmovablepropertyisdirectlyandspecificallyinquestion,
thepropertycannotbetransferredorotherwisedealtwithbyanypartytothesuitorproceeding
soastoaffecttherightsofanyotherpartytheretounderthedecreeororderwhichmaybemade
therein,exceptundertheauthorityofthecourtandonsuchtermsasitmayimpose.

Explanation.Forthepurposesofthissection,thependencyofasuitorproceedingshallbe
deemedtocommencefromthedateofthepresentationoftheplaintortheinstitutionofthe
proceedinginacourtofcompetentjurisdiction,andtocontinueuntilthesuitorproceedinghas
beendisposedofbyafinaldecreeororderandcompletesatisfactionordischargeofsuchdecree
ororderhasbeenobtained,orhasbecomeunobtainablebyreasonoftheexpirationofanyperiod
oflimitationprescribedfortheexecutionthereofbyanylawforthetimebeinginforce.

Itiswellsettledthatthedoctrineoflispendensisadoctrinebasedonthegroundthatitis
necessaryfortheadministrationofjusticethatthedecisionofacourtinasuitshouldbebinding
notonlyonthelitigatingpartiesbutonthosewhoderivetitlependentelite.Theprovisionofthis
sectiondoesnotindeedannultheconveyanceorthetransferotherwise,buttorenderit
subservienttotherightsofthepartiestoalitigation.

27.Discussingtheprinciplesoflispendens,thePrivyCouncilinGouriDuttMaharajv.Sk.
SukurMohammedAIR1948PC147observedasunder:(IAp.170)

ThebroadpurposeofSection52istomaintainthestatusquounaffectedbytheactofany
partytothelitigationpendingitsdetermination.Theapplicabilityofthesectioncannotdepend
onmattersofprooforthestrengthorweaknessofthecaseononesideortheotherinbonafide
proceedings.Toapplyanysuchtestistomisconceivetheobjectoftheenactmentand,inthe
viewoftheBoard,thelearnedSubordinateJudgewasinerrorinthisrespectinlayingstress,as
hedid,onthefactthattheagreementof861932,hadnotbeenregistered.
28.InKedarNathLalv.GaneshRamAIR1970SC1717,thisCourtreferredtheearlierdecision
inSamarendraNathSinhav.KrishnaKumarNagAIR1967SC1440andobserved:(Kedar
NathLalcase(supra),SCCp.792,para17)

17.16.Thepurchaserpendenteliteunderthisdoctrineisboundbytheresultofthe
litigationontheprinciplethatsincetheresultmustbindthepartytoitsomustitbindtheperson
derivinghisright,titleandinterestfromorthroughhim.Thisprincipleiswellillustratedin
RadhamadhubHolderv.MonohurMookerji(188788)15IA97wherethefactswerealmost
similartothoseintheinstantcase.ItistruethatSection52strictlyspeakingdoesnotapplyto
involuntaryalienationssuchascourtsalesbutitiswellestablishedthattheprincipleoflis
pendensappliestosuchalienations.(SeeNilakantBanerjiv.SureshChunderMullick(188485)
12IA171andMotiLalv.KarrabulDin(189697)24IA170)(SamarendraNathcase(supra),
AIRp.1445,para16)

29.TheaforesaidSection52oftheTransferofPropertyActagaincameupforconsideration
beforethisCourtinRajenderSinghv.SantaSinghAIR1973SC2537andTheirLordshipswith
approvaloftheprincipleslaiddowninJayaramMudaliarv.Ayyaswami(1972)2SCC200
reiterated:(RajenderSinghcase(supra),SCCp.711,para15)

15.Thedoctrineoflispendenswasintendedtostrikeatattemptsbypartiestoalitigationto
circumventthejurisdictionofacourt,inwhichadisputeonrightsorinterestsinimmovable
propertyispending,byprivatedealingswhichmayremovethesubjectmatteroflitigationfrom
theambitofthecourt'spowertodecideapendingdisputeorfrustrateitsdecree.Alienees
acquiringanyimmovablepropertyduringalitigationoveritareheldtobebound,byan
applicationofthedoctrine,bythedecreepassedinthesuiteventhoughtheymaynothavebeen
impleadedinit.Thewholeobjectofthedoctrineoflispendensistosubjectpartiestothe
litigationaswellasothers,whoseektoacquirerightsinimmovableproperty,whicharethe
subjectmatterofalitigation,tothepowerandjurisdictionofthecourtsoastopreventtheobject
ofapendingactionfrombeingdefeated.

35.ReliancehasbeenplacedonA.NawabJohnv.V.N.Subramaniyam(2012)7SCC738,
layingdownthus:
18.ItissettledlegalpositionthattheeffectofSection52isnottorendertransferseffected
duringthependencyofasuitbyapartytothesuitvoid;butonlytorendersuchtransfers
subservienttotherightsofthepartiestosuchsuit,asmaybe,eventually,determinedinthesuit.
Inotherwords,thetransferremainsvalidsubject,ofcourse,totheresultofthesuit.The
pendentelitepurchaserwouldbeentitledtoorsufferthesamelegalrightsandobligationsofhis
vendorasmaybeeventuallydeterminedbythecourt.

12.Themerependencyofasuitdoesnotpreventoneofthepartiesfromdealingwiththe
propertyconstitutingthesubjectmatterofthesuit.Thesectiononlypostulatesaconditionthat
thealienationwillinnomanneraffecttherightsoftheotherpartyunderanydecreewhichmay
bepassedinthesuitunlessthepropertywasalienatedwiththepermissionofthecourt.(Sanjay
Vermav.ManikRoy(2006)13SCC608,SCCp.612,para12.)

36.ReliancehasbeenplacedonSanjayVermav.ManikRoy,(2006)13SCC608,inwhichthis
Courtlaiddown:

10.BibiZubaidaKhatooncase(2004)1SCC191onwhichlearnedcounselfortherespondents
hadplacedrelianceinfactgoesagainstthestandoftherespondents.Thoughacasualreadingof
para9supportsthestandtakenbytherespondents,itistobenotedthatthefactualpositionwas
entirelydifferent.Infactacrosssuithadbeenfiledinthesuitinthatcase.Therespondents
beingtransfereespendentelitewithoutleaveofthecourtcannotasofrightseekimpleadmentin
thesuitwhichwasintheinstantcasependingforaverylongtime.Infactinpara10ofthe
judgmentthisCourthasheldthatthereisabsolutelynorulethatthetransfereependentelite
withoutleaveofthecourtshouldinallcasescontestthependingsuit.InSarvinderSinghv.
DalipSingh(1996)5SCC539itwasobservedinpara6asfollows:(SCCpp.54142,para6)

6.Section52oftheTransferofPropertyActenvisagesthat:

DuringthependencyinanycourthavingauthoritywithinthelimitsofIndiaofanysuitor
proceedingwhichisnotcollusiveandinwhichanyrighttoimmovablepropertyisdirectlyand
specificallyinquestion,thepropertycannotbetransferredorotherwisedealtwithbyanyparty
tothesuitorproceedingsoastoaffecttherightsofanyotherpartytheretounderthedecreeor
orderwhichmaybemadetherein,exceptundertheauthorityofthecourtandonsuchtermsasit
mayimpose.
Itwould,therefore,beclearthatthedefendantsinthesuitwereprohibitedbyoperationof
Section52todealwiththepropertyandcouldnottransferorotherwisedealwithitinanyway
affectingtherightsoftheappellantexceptwiththeorderorauthorityofthecourt.Admittedly,
theauthorityororderofthecourthadnotbeenobtainedforalienationofthoseproperties.
Therefore,thealienationobviouslywouldbehitbythedoctrineoflispendensbyoperationof
Section52.Underthesecircumstances,therespondentscannotbeconsideredtobeeither
necessaryorproperpartiestothesuit.

12.TheprinciplesspecifiedinSection52oftheTPActareinaccordancewithequity,good
conscienceorjusticebecausetheyrestuponanequitableandjustfoundationthatitwillbe
impossibletobringanactionorsuittoasuccessfulterminationifalienationsarepermittedto
prevail.Atransfereependenteliteisboundbythedecreejustasmuchashewasapartytothe
suit.TheprincipleoflispendensembodiedinSection52oftheTPActbeingaprincipleof
publicpolicy,noquestionofgoodfaithorbonafidearises.TheprincipleunderlyingSection52
isthatalitigatingpartyisexemptedfromtakingnoticeofatitleacquiredduringthependencyof
thelitigation.Themerependencyofasuitdoesnotpreventoneofthepartiesfromdealingwith
thepropertyconstitutingthesubjectmatterofthesuit.Thesectiononlypostulatesacondition
thatthealienationwillinnomanneraffecttherightsoftheotherpartyunderanydecreewhich
maybepassedinthesuitunlessthepropertywasalienatedwiththepermissionofthecourt.

37.Itwasalsosubmittedonbehalfoftheappellantsthattheexpressioninsection52oftheT.P.
Actsuitorproceedingsisalsoapplicabletotheapplications.Anapplicationseekingextension
oftimeisalsoaproceedingwithinthemeaningofthesaidprovisionandappealfiledisalso
continuationofthesuitorproceedingsbutcomeswithinthemeaningoftheproceedings.The
legislativeintentbehindtheamendmentofsection52wasnotonlytocoverthesuitbutalsoto
coverappealsandproceedingsandsamewouldincludeallapplications/appealsundertheCPC.
AnapplicationunderOrder9Rule9wouldalsobecoveredwithinthemeaningoftheexpression
suitorotherproceedingstowhichthedoctrineoflispendenswouldapply.Itwasalsosubmitted
thatsection52priortoamendmentprohibitedtransfermadeduringtheactiveprosecutionofa
suit.Section52oftheTransferofPropertyAct,embodiestheruleoflispendens,whichpriorto
itsamendmentonlyprohibitedatransfermadeduringtheactiveprosecutionofasuitora
proceedinginwhichanyrighttoimmoveablepropertywasdirectlyandspecificallyinquestion.
Theexpressionactiveprosecution,whichexistedinthesectionbeforeitsamendmentin1929,
ledtomuchuncertaintyintheapplicationoftherule,andcausedadivergenceofjudicial
opinion.Itwasfeltthatthestandardofdiligence,whichwouldconstituteactiveprosecution,
couldnotbedefinedwithprecision.Toremovethisuncertainty,thelawwasamendedin1929,
andtheAmendingActXXof1929substitutedthewordpendencyforthephraseactive
prosecution;andtherecannowbenodifficultyindecidingwhetherthetransferwasmade
duringthependencyofasuitorproceeding.InParmeshariDinv.RamCharanAIR1937PC
260,itwasheld:
2.Itisclearthatthequestionoftheactiveprosecutionofasuitisoneoffact,butitwasnot
suggestedineitheroftheCourtsinIndiathattheplaintiffshadnotactivelyprosecutedthesuit,
andwereconsequentlydebarredfromavailingthemselvesoftheruleoflispendens.Thelearned
JudgesoftheCourtofAppealhad,therefore,noopportunitytoexpresstheiropiniononthis
point;andtheirLordshipscannotentertainanobjection,whichdependsuponaquestionoffact
notdealtwithbelow.Upontherecordbeforethem,thereisnoindicationofanydelayor
remissnessintheprosecutionofthesuit,forwhichtheplaintiffscanbeheldresponsible.Their
Lordships,therefore,agreewiththeHighCourtthatthetransferrelieduponbytheappellant
cannotprejudicetherightsofthedecreeholders,andthathecannotresistthedecreeobtainedby
them.

38.Theabovesaidprincipleoflawsettledintheyear1937bythePrivyCouncilisstillvalidas
discernedfromthelatestjudgmentofthisCourtrenderedinthecaseofKirpalKaurv.Jitender
PalSingh(2015)9SCC356:

21.Theexecutionoftheallegedgiftdeedbythedeceasedfirstdefendantinfavourofthe
seconddefendantisalsohitbySection52oftheTransferofPropertyAct,1882,asthesaiddeed
wasexecutedduringthependencyoftheproceedingsandbeforetheexpiryoftheperiodof
limitationforfilingSLP.Further,duringthependencyoftheseproceedings,thesecond
defendant,whohasclaimedtobetheallegedbeneficiaryofthesuitScheduleBpropertyon
thebasisofallegedgiftdeedshouldhavesoughtleaveofthisCourtasthedoneeandbroughtthe
aforesaidfactofexecutionoftheallegedgiftdeedinrespectofBschedulepropertybythe
deceasedfirstdefendant,whichpropertyhasbeendevolvedinhisfavour,tothenoticeofthis
CourtasprovidedunderOrder22Rule10oftheCPCanddefendedhisrightasrequiredunder
thelawaslaiddownbythisCourtinacatenaofcases.

xxxxx

26.Thelegalityoftheallegedgiftdeedexecutedinfavouroftheseconddefendantbythe
deceasedfirstdefendantinrespectoftheScheduleBpropertyhasbeenfurtherexaminedbyus
andthesameishitbySection52oftheTransferofPropertyAct,1882,inthelightofthe
decisionofthisCourtinthecaseofJaganSinghv.Dhanwanti(2012)2SCC628,whereinthis
CourthaslaiddownthelegalprinciplethatunderSection52oftheTransferofPropertyAct,
1882,theliscontinuessolongasafinaldecreeororderhasnotbeenobtainedfromtheCourt
andacompletesatisfactionthereofhasnotbeenrenderedtotheaggrievedpartycontestingthe
civilsuit.IthasbeenfurtherheldbythisCourtthatitwouldbeplainlyimpossiblethatanyaction
orsuitcouldbebroughttoasuccessfulterminationifalienationspendentelitewerepermittedto
prevail.

39.WhereinthefactumoftheallegedgiftdeedwasnotmadeknowntotheCourt.Thishasbeen
extrapolatedinthecaseofJaganSingh(dead)throughLRs.v.Dhanwanti(2012)2SCC628
thus:

32.ThebroadprincipleunderlyingSection52oftheTPActistomaintainthestatusquo
unaffectedbytheactofanypartytothelitigationpendingitsdetermination.Evenafterthe
dismissalofasuit,apurchaserissubjecttolispendens,ifanappealisafterwardsfiled,asheldin
KrishanajiPandharinathv.AnusayabaiAIR(1959)Bom475.Inthatmattertherespondent
(originalplaintiff)hadfiledasuitformaintenanceagainstherhusbandandclaimedachargeon
hishouse.Thesuitwasdismissedon15.7.1952underOrder9Rule2,oftheCodeofCivil
Procedure1908,fornonpaymentofprocessfee.Thehusbandsoldthehouseimmediatelyon
17.7.1952.Therespondentappliedforrestorationon29.7.1952,andthesuitwasrestoredleading
toadecreeformaintenanceandachargewasdeclaredonthehouse.Theplaintiffimpleadedthe
appellanttothedarkhastaspurchaser.TheAppellantresistedthesamebycontendingthatthe
salewasaffectedwhenthesuitwasdismissed.RejectingthecontentiontheHighCourtheldin
para4asfollows:

..InSection52oftheTransferofPropertyAct,asitstoodbeforeitwasamendedbyAct20of
1929,theexpressionactiveprosecutionofanysuitorproceedingwasused.Thatexpression
hasnowbeenomitted,andtheExplanationmakesitabundantlyclearthattheliscontinuesso
longasafinaldecreeororderhasnotbeenobtainedandcompletesatisfactionthereofhasnot
beenrendered.Atp.228inSirDinshahMulla'sTransferofPropertyAct,4thEdn.,after
referringtoseveralauthorities,thelawisstatedthus:

Evenafterthedismissalofasuitapurchaserissubjecttolispendens,ifanappealis
afterwardsfiled.

Ifafterthedismissalofasuitandbeforeanappealispresented,theliscontinuessoasto
preventthedefendantfromtransferringthepropertytotheprejudiceoftheplaintiff,Ifailtosee
anyreasonforholdingthatbetweenthedateofdismissalofthesuitunderOrder9Rule2ofthe
CivilProcedureCodeandthedateofitsrestoration,thelisdoesnotcontinue.
33.ItisrelevanttonotethatevenwhenSection52ofTPActwasnotsoamended,aDivision
BenchofAllahabadHighCourthadfollowingtosayinMotiChandv.BritishIndiaCorpn.Ltd.
AIR(1932)All210:

10,.TheprovisionoflawwhichhasbeenrelieduponbytheappellantsiscontainedinSection
52,TPAct.Theactiveprosecutioninthissectionmustbedeemedtocontinuesolongasthesuit
ispendinginappeal,sincetheproceedingsintheappellatecourtaremerelycontinuationofthose
inthesuit(seeGobindChunderRoyv.GuruChurnKurmokarILR198815Cal.94).

34.Ifsuchaviewisnottaken,itwouldplainlybeimpossiblethatanyactionorsuitcouldbe
broughttoasuccessfulterminationifalienationspendentelitewerepermittedtoprevail.The
Explanationtothissectionlaysdownthatthependencyofasuitoraproceedingshallbedeemed
tocontinueuntilthesuitoraproceedingisdisposedofbyfinaldecreeororder,andcomplete
satisfactionordischargeofsuchdecreeororderhasbeenobtainedorhasbecomeunobtainable
byreasonoftheexpirationofanyperiodoflimitationprescribedfortheexecutionthereofbyany
lawforthetimebeinginforce.

35.Inthepresentcase,itwouldbecanvassedonbehalfoftherespondentandtheapplicantthat
thesalehastakenplaceinfavouroftheapplicantatatimewhentherewasnostayoperating
againstsuchsale,andinfactwhenthesecondappealhadnotbeenfiled.Wewouldhowever,
prefertofollowthedictainKrishanajiPandharinathAIR1959Bom475tocoverthepresent
situationundertheprincipleoflispendenssincethesalewasexecutedatatimewhenthesecond
appealhadnotbeenfiledbutwhichcametobefiledafterwardswithintheperiodoflimitation.
Thedoctrineoflispendensisfoundedinpublicpolicyandequity,andifithastoberead
meaningfullysuchasaleasinthepresentcaseuntiltheperiodoflimitationforsecondappealis
overwillhavetobeheldascoveredunderSection52oftheTPAct.

40.Thedoctrineoflispendenswouldbeapplicableeventotheproceedingsinthenatureofan
appealashasbeenemphasizedinthecaseofKrishanajiPandharinathv.AnusayabaiAIR1959
Bom475thus:

3.ItistruethatinthiscasethesaleeffectedbySidramwasafterthedismissalofthesuitfiled
byAnusayabaiandbeforethesuitwasrestored,butthealienationbeingbefore,thefinaldecree
ororderwaspassedandcompletesatisfactionordischargeofthedecreewasobtained,itmustbe
regardedaspendentelite.Ins.52oftheTransferofPropertyAct,asitstoodbeforeitwas
amendedbyActXXof1929,theexpressionactiveprosecutionofanysuitorproceedingwas
used.Thatexpressionhasnowbeenomitted,andtheExplanationmakesitabundantlyclearthat
theliscontinuessolongasafinaldecreeororderhasnotbeenobtainedandcomplete
satisfactionthereofhasnotbeenrendered.Atpage228inSirDinshahMulla'sTransferof
PropertyAct,4thedn.,afterreferringtoseveralauthorities,thelawisstatedthus:

Evenafterthedismissalofasuitapurchaserissubjecttolispendens,ifanappealis
afterwardsfiled.

41.Weareunabletoacceptthesubmissionsraisedonbehalfoftherespondentsthattherewas
hiatusbetween10.12.1955and1962tilltheorderwaspassedbytheHighCourtasitwas
misunderstoodbythepartiesthatthesuithadbeendismissed.Inouropinion,whenthesuititself
hadnotbeendismissedvideorderdated8.1.1955,theeventssubsequenttheretoi.e.thetrial
courtvideorderdated1.12.1955treateditashavingbeendismissedorthattheplaintiffalsowas
leftunderawrongimpressionthatthesuithadbeendismissedindefaultandcostwasimposed
on1.12.1955anditwasnotpaidupto15.12.1955,wouldmakenodifference.Duetonon
paymentofcosts,byorderdated1.12.1955thesuitstooddismissed,cannotbeaccepted,asthe
orderwasnonestintheeyeoflaw.Itwasanillegalorderoftreatingapendingsuitashaving
beendismissed.Nolegalfictioncanbecreatedsoastotreatthesuitashavingbeendismissed
wheninfactithadnotbeendismissedatallandasamatteroffactsuithadnotbeendismissed
on8.1.1955.Subsequentorderorimpositionofcostsforitsrestorationwasnonestandillegal
andwasrightlysetasidebytheHighCourt.Whensuithadnotbeendismissedatallintheeyeof
law,itistobetreatedaspendingonly.Nolegalfictioncanbecreatedinfavourofthe
respondentsthatthesuititselfhadbeendismissedon15.12.1955duetononpaymentofcostsfor
restoration;whereasitwasnotdismissedatallandtheHighCourthasalsoheldthattheorder
dated1.12.1955waswithoutjurisdiction.Thesaidorderhastobeignoredandwasinfactset
asidebytheHighCourt.Thusthesuitwasinfactpendingandwaswronglytreatedashaving
beendismissed.TheHighCourthasrightlyheldthatitwasneverdismissed.Thus,inour
opinion,thesaledeedinquestiondated23.11.1959wasexecutedduringlispendensandthe
HighCourthaserredinlawinholdingotherwiseinthejudgmentimpugnedherein.

void?
(iii)Inre:whethersection52ofT.P.Actrendersatransferpendentelite

42.ReliancehasbeenplacedbylearnedseniorcounselfortherespondentsonVinodSethv.
DevinderBajaj(2010)8SCC1inwhichthisCourthaslaiddownthatthedoctrineoflis
pendensdoesnotaffecttheconveyancebyapartytothesuitbutonlyrendersitsubservientto
therightsofotherpartiestothelitigation.Section52willnotthereforerenderatransactionvoid.
ThisCourthaslaiddownthus:

42.Itiswellsettledthatthedoctrineoflispendensdoesnotannultheconveyancebyapartyto
thesuit,butonlyrendersitsubservienttotherightsoftheotherpartiestothelitigation.Section
52willnotthereforerenderatransactionrelatingtothesuitpropertyduringthependencyofthe
suitvoidbutrenderthetransferinoperativeinsofarastheotherpartiestothesuit.Transferofany
right,titleorinterestinthesuitpropertyortheconsequentialacquisitionofanyright,titleor
interest,duringthependencyofthesuitwillbesubjecttothedecisioninthesuit.

43.TheprincipleunderlyingSection52oftheTPActisbasedonjusticeandequity.The
operationofthebarunderSection52ishoweversubjecttothepowerofthecourttoexemptthe
suitpropertyfromtheoperationofSection52subjecttosuchconditionsitmayimpose.That
meansthatthecourtinwhichthesuitispending,hasthepower,inappropriatecases,topermita
partytotransferthepropertywhichisthesubjectmatterofthesuitwithoutbeingsubjectedto
therightsofanyparttothesuit,byimposingsuchtermsasitdeemsfit.Havingregardtothe
factsandcircumstances,weareoftheviewthatthisisafitcasewherethesuitpropertyshould
beexemptedfromtheoperationofSection52oftheTPAct,subjecttoaconditionrelatingto
reasonablesecurity,sothatthedefendantswillhavethelibertytodealwiththepropertyinany
mannertheymaydeemfit,inspiteofthependencyofthesuit.

43.ReliancehasalsobeenplacedonA.NawabJohnv.V.N.Subramaniyam(2012)7SCC738in
whichthisCourthaslaiddownthus:

18.ItissettledlegalpositionthattheeffectofSection52isnottorendertransferseffected
duringthependencyofasuitbyapartytothesuitvoid;butonlytorendersuchtransfers
subservienttotherightsofthepartiestosuchsuit,asmaybe,eventually,determinedinthesuit.
Inotherwords,thetransferremainsvalidsubject,ofcourse,totheresultofthesuit.The
pendentelitepurchaserwouldbeentitledtoorsufferthesamelegalrightsandobligationsofhis
vendorasmaybeeventuallydeterminedbythecourt.

12.Themerependencyofasuitdoesnotpreventoneofthepartiesfromdealingwiththe
propertyconstitutingthesubjectmatterofthesuit.Thesectiononlypostulatesaconditionthat
thealienationwillinnomanneraffecttherightsoftheotherpartyunderanydecreewhichmay
bepassedinthesuitunlessthepropertywasalienatedwiththepermissionofthecourt.(Sanjay
Vermav.ManikRoy,(2006)13SCC608,SCCp.612,para12.)

44.InThomsonPress(India)Ltd.v.NanakBuilders&Investors(P)Ltd.(2013)5SCC397,this
Courthaslaiddownthus:

53.Thereis,therefore,littleroomforanydoubtthatthetransferofthesuitpropertypendente
liteisnotvoidabinitioandthatthepurchaserofanysuchpropertytakesthebargainsubjectto
therightsoftheplaintiffinthependingsuit.Althoughtheabovedecisionsdonotdealwithafact
situationwherethesaledeedisexecutedinbreachofaninjunctionissuedbyacompetentcourt,
wedonotseeanyreasonwhythebreachofanysuchinjunctionshouldrenderthetransfer
whetherbywayofanabsolutesaleorotherwiseineffective.Thepartycommittingthebreach
maydoubtlessincurtheliabilitytobepunishedforthebreachcommittedbyitbutthesaleby
itselfmayremainvalidasbetweenthepartiestothetransactionsubjectonlytoanydirections
whichthecompetentcourtmayissueinthesuitagainstthevendor.

45.Inouropinionthesaledeedisnotvoidbutonlyvalidtotheextentoftheshareofvendorof
BalaMallaiahi.e.itisvalidtotheextentof14/104thsharewhichhasbeenfoundinthe
preliminarydecreeandaffirmedinthefinaldecree.Thesaledeedwassubjecttotheoutcomeof
thesuitwhichwastotheaforesaideffect.

(iv)Inre:Whatistheeffectofpreliminarydecreeforpartitionandtheextenttowhichit
isbinding:

46.Intheinstantcasepreliminarydecreewaspassedintheyear1970andtheshareswere
declaredtotheaforesaidextentoftherespectivepartiesthereinwhoweretheheirsofLate
NawabJung.HamidAliKhan,defendantNo.1,hadonly14/104thshareinthedisputedproperty.
Preliminarydecreedated24.11.1970hasattainedfinalitywhichwasquestionedinappealon
limitedextentintheHighCourtwhichhasattainedfinalitybydismissalofLPAon12.10.1977.
Thusthedeterminationofsharesasperpreliminarydecreehasattainedfinality,sharesofthe
partieshadbeencrystallisedineachandeveryproperty.Purchaserpendenteliteisboundbythe
preliminarydecreewithrespecttothesharessodeterminedanditcannotbereopenedand
whateverequitycouldhavebeenclaimedinthefinaldecreeproceedingstotheextentofvendor's
sharehasalreadybeenextendedtothepurchasers.
47.InVenkataReddyv.PethiReddyAIR1963SC992,ithasbeenlaiddownthatthe
preliminarydecreeforpartitionisfinal.Italsoembodiesthefinaldecisionofthecourt.The
questionoffinalityhasbeendiscussedthus:

6.Thenewprovisionmakesitclearthatthelawisandhasalwaysbeenthatuponthefather's
insolvencyhisdisposingpowerovertheinterestofhisundividedsonsinthejointfamily
propertyvestsintheOfficialReceiverandthatconsequentlythelatterhasarighttosellthat
interest.Theprovisionisthusdeclaratoryofthelawandwasintendedtoapplytoallcases
exceptthosecoveredbythetwoprovisos.Weareconcernedhereonlywiththefirstproviso.
ThisprovisoexceptsfromtheoperationoftheActatransactionsuchasasalebyanOfficial
ReceiverwhichhasbeenthesubjectofafinaldecisionbyacompetentCourt.Theshort
question,therefore,iswhetherthepreliminarydecreeforpartitionpassedinthiscasewhichwas
affirmedfinallyinsecondappealbytheHighCourtofMadrascanberegardedasafinal
decision.Thecompetenceofthecourtisnotinquestionhere.Whatis,however,contendedis
thatinapartitionsuittheonlydecisionwhichcanbesaidtobeafinaldecisionisthefinaldecree
passedinthecaseandthatsincefinaldecreeproceedingswerestillgoingonwhentheAmending
Actcameintoforcethefirstprovisowasnotavailabletotheappellants.Itiscontendedonbehalf
oftheappellantsthatsincetherightsofthepartiesareadjudicateduponbythecourtbeforea
preliminarydecreeispassedthatdecreemust,insofarasrightsadjudicateduponareconcerned,
bedeemedtobeafinaldecision.Theworddecisioneveninitspopularsensemeansa
concludedopinion(seeStroud'sJudicialDictionary3rded.Vol.I,p.743).Where,therefore,the
decisionisembodiedinthejudgmentwhichisfollowedbyadecreefinalitymustnaturallyattach
itselftoitinthesensethatitisnolongeropentoquestionbyeitherpartyexceptinanappeal,
revieworrevisionpetitionasprovidedforbylaw.TheHighCourthas,however,observed:

Themeredeclarationoftherightsoftheplaintiffbythepreliminarydecree,would,inour
opinionnotamounttoafinaldecisionforitiswellknownthatevenifapreliminarydecreeis
passedeitherinamortgagesuitorinapartitionsuit,therearecertaincontingenciesinwhich
suchapreliminarydecreecanbemodifiedoramendedandthereforewouldnotbecomefinal.

ItisnotclearfromthejudgmentwhatthecontingenciesreferredtobytheHighCourtarein
whichapreliminarydecreecanbemodifiedoramendedunlesswhatthelearnedJudgesmeant
wasmodifiedoramendedinappealorinrevieworinrevisionorinexceptionalcircumstances
byresortingtothepowersconferredbySections151and152oftheCodeofCivilProcedure.If
thatiswhattheHighCourtmeanttheneverydecreepassedbyaCourtincludingdecreespassed
incaseswhichdonotcontemplatemakingofapreliminarydecreeareliabletobemodifiedand
amended.Therefore,ifthereasongivenbytheHighCourtisaccepteditwouldmeanthatno
finalityattachestodecreeatall.Thatisnotthelaw.Adecisionissaidtobefinalwhen,sofaras
theCourtrenderingitisconcerned,itisunalterableexceptbyresorttosuchprovisionsofthe
CodeofCivilProcedureaspermititsreversal,modificationoramendment.Similarly,afinal
decisionwouldmeanadecisionwhichwouldoperateasresjudicatabetweenthepartiesifitis
notsoughttobemodifiedorreversedbypreferringanappealorarevisionorareview
applicationasispermittedbytheCode.Apreliminarydecreepassed,whetheritisinamortgage
suitorapartitionsuit,isnotatentativedecreebutmust,insofarasthemattersdealtwithbyit
areconcerned,beregardedasconclusive.Nodoubt,insuitswhichcontemplatethemakingof
twodecreesapreliminarydecreeandafinaldecreethedecreewhichwouldbeexecutable
wouldbethefinaldecree.Butthefinalityofadecreeoradecisiondoesnotnecessarilydepend
uponitsbeingexecutable.Thelegislatureinitswisdomhasthoughtthatsuitsofcertaintypes
shouldbedecidedinstagesandthoughthesuitinsuchcasescanberegardedasfullyand
completelydecidedonlyafterafinaldecreeismadethedecisionofthecourtarrivedatthe
earlierstagealsohasafinalityattachedtoit.ItwouldberelevanttorefertoS.97oftheCodeof
CivilProcedurewhichprovidesthatwhereapartyaggrievedbyapreliminarydecreedoesnot
appealfromit,heisprecludedfromdisputingitscorrectnessinanyappealwhichmaybe
preferredfromthefinaldecree.Thisprovisionthusclearlyindicatesthatastothematters
coveredbyit,apreliminarydecreeisregardedasembodyingthefinaldecisionofthecourt
passingthatdecree.

48.Moreover,itisprovidedinsection97oftheC.P.C.asunder:

97.Appealfromfinaldecreewherenoappealfrompreliminarydecree.Whereanyparty
aggrievedbyapreliminarydecreepassedafterthecommencementofthisCodedoesnotappeal
fromsuchdecree,heshallbeprecludedfromdisputingitscorrectnessinanyappealwhichmay
bepreferredfromthefinaldecree.

49.ItisapparentfromtheaforesaidSectionthatthematterswhichareconcludedbypreliminary
decreecannotbereagitatedinanappealagainstthefinaldecree.Noappealwaspreferredbythe
purchasersorbydefendantNo.1asagainstthepreliminarydecree.

(v)Inre:whetheritwasnecessarytofileasuitforcancellationofsaledeeddated
23.11.1959?
50.Inouropinion,whenthesaledeedhadbeenexecutedduringthependencyofsuitthe
purchaserpendenteliteisboundbytheoutcomeofthesuit.Theprovisionsofsection52prevent
multiplicityoftheproceedings.Itwasnotatallnecessarytofileasuitforcancellationofthesale
deedasthevendorhadnoauthoritytoselllandofothercosharers.Hehadrighttoalienatehis
ownshareonlywhichhehadinthepropertytotheextentof14/104th.Assuchtheright,titleand
interestofBalaMallaiahweresubjecttothependingsuitforpartitioninwhichapreliminary
decreewaspassedintheyear1970whichhadattainedfinalityinwhichvendorofBalaMallaiah,
defendantNo.1wasfoundtobehavingshareonlytotheextentof14/104th.Thepreliminary
decreewasnotbaseduponfraudorcollusion.Thesaledeedwasnotundertheauthorityofthe
courtandthependencyofthesuitundersection52commencedfromthedateofpresentationof
theplaintandcontinueduntilthesuitorproceedingsweredisposedofbyafinaldecree,andona
completesatisfactionofthedischargeofsuchdecree,anorderhadbeenobtained.Thelis
pendensoperatesduringexecutionalso.BalaMallaiah,hisL.Rs.andpurchasersfromthemare
boundbythedecisionofthecase.Theycannotcircumventthejurisdictionofthecourtand
wriggleoutofthedecree.Thetransferremainedvalidsubjecttotheresultofthesuitand
pendentelitepurchaserissubjecttothelegalrightsandobligationsofhisvendorasdecidedby
thecourt.OurconclusionisbuttressedbydecisioninK.N.AswathnarayanaSetty(dead)through
LRs.v.StateofKarnataka(2014)15SCC394,questionhasbeendiscussedbythisCourtthus:

11.Thedoctrineoflispendensisbasedonlegalmaximutlitependentenihilinnovetur(during
alitigationnothingnewshouldbeintroduced).ThisdoctrinestoodembodiedinSection52ofthe
TransferofPropertyAct,1882.Theprincipleoflispendensisinaccordancewiththeequity,
goodconscienceorjusticebecausetheyrestuponanequitableandjustfoundationthatitwillbe
impossibletobringanactionorsuittoasuccessfulterminationifalienationsarepermittedto
prevail.Atransfereependenteliteisboundbythedecreejustasmuchashewasapartytothe
suit.Alitigatingpartyisexemptedfromtakingnoticeofatitleacquiredduringthependencyof
thelitigation.However,itmustbeclearthatmerependencyofasuitdoesnotpreventoneofthe
partiesfromdealingwiththepropertyconstitutingthesubjectmatterofthesuit.Thelawsimply
postulatesaconditionthatthealienationwill,innomanner,affecttherightsoftheotherparty
underanydecreewhichmaybepassedinthesuitunlessthepropertywasalienatedwiththe
permissionofthecourt.Thetransfereecannotdeprivethesuccessfulplaintiffofthefruitsofthe
decreeifhepurchasedthepropertypendentelite.(VideK.AdiviNaiduv.E.DuruvasuluNaidu
(1995)6SCC150,VenkatraoAnantdeoJoshiv.Malatibai(2003)1SCC722,RajKumarv.
SardariLal(2004)2SCC601andSanjayVermav.ManikRoy(2006)13SCC608.)

(vi)Inre:whetherBalaMallaiah,hisheirsandpurchasershadperfectedtheirright,title
andinterestbyvirtueofadversepossession?
51.TheHighCourthasheldthattherewasnolispendens,andassuchitwasnecessaryto
questionthesaledeedandforwantofquestioningthesaledeed,theplaintiffshadperfectedtheir
titlebyvirtueofadversepossession.Thesameisclearlyaperversefinding.Firstly,intheearlier
civilsuitof1993submissionwasraisedwithrespecttoadversepossessionwhichwasnegatived.
Secondly,inouropinionaswehaveheldthatthesaledeedwashitbythedoctrineoflis
pendens,thepurchaserswereboundbytheresultofthesuit.Thustherewasnoquestionof
perfectingthetitlebyadversepossessionduringpendencyofsuit.Section52negatesthevery
pleaofadversepossession.Trialcourtandfirstappellatecourthaverightlyheldthattherewas
noquestionofadversepossession.TheHighCourthassimplywithoutanydiscussionheldthat
thetitlewasperfectedbyadversepossession.Merelyabaldstatementthattherewasadverse
possessionisnotenoughtosetupapleaofadversepossession.Ithastobeclearlysetoutfrom
whichdateitcommenced,andbecamehostilewhentherewasrepudiationofthetitle.Nosuch
pleahasbeenraised.Thereare3classicrequirementsofpleaofadversepossessioni.e.necvi,
necclam,necprecarioi.e.,peaceful,openandcontinuous.Nosuchpleadinghasbeenraised
muchlessthereisquestionofanyproofandmoreover,thispleawasnotavailabletoberaisedin
viewofdoctrineoflispendens.Possessionneverbecameadverseintheinstantcaseasthe
propertywaspurchasedsubjecttotheoutcomeofthelitigation.InKarnatakaBoardofWakfv.
GovernmentofIndia(2004)10SCC779itwasheldthatwhenlitigationwaspendingitcould
notbesaidthatthepossessionwaspeacefulorhostileinanyviewofthematter.Itwasheld
thus:

11.Intheeyeofthelaw,anownerwouldbedeemedtobeinpossessionofapropertysolong
asthereisnointrusion.Nonuseofthepropertybytheownerevenforalongtimewon'taffect
histitle.Butthepositionwillbealteredwhenanotherpersontakespossessionoftheproperty
andassertsarightoverit.Adversepossessionisahostilepossessionbyclearlyassertinghostile
titleindenialofthetitleofthetrueowner.Itisawellsettledprinciplethatapartyclaiming
adversepossessionmustprovethathispossessionisnecvi,necclam,necprecario,thatis,
peaceful,openandcontinuous.Thepossessionmustbeadequateincontinuity,inpublicityand
inextenttoshowthattheirpossessionisadversetothetrueowner.Itmuststartwithawrongful
dispositionoftherightfulownerandbeactual,visible,exclusive,hostileandcontinuedoverthe
statutoryperiod.(SeeS.M.Karimv.BibiSakinaAIR1964SC1254,Parsinniv.Sukhi(1993)4
SCC375andD.N.Venkatarayappav.StateofKarnataka(1997)7SCC567.)Physicalfactof
exclusivepossessionandtheanimuspossidenditoholdasownerinexclusiontotheactual
ownerarethemostimportantfactorsthataretobeaccountedincasesofthisnature.Pleaof
adversepossessionisnotapurequestionoflawbutablendedoneoffactandlaw.Therefore,a
personwhoclaimsadversepossessionshouldshow:(a)onwhatdatehecameintopossession,
(b)whatwasthenatureofhispossession,(c)whetherthefactumofpossessionwasknowntothe
otherparty,(d)howlonghispossessionhascontinued,and(e)hispossessionwasopenand
undisturbed.Apersonpleadingadversepossessionhasnoequitiesinhisfavour.Sinceheis
tryingtodefeattherightsofthetrueowner,itisforhimtoclearlypleadandestablishallfacts
necessarytoestablishhisadversepossession.[MaheshChandSharma(Dr.)v.RajKumari
Sharma(1996)8SCC128.]
12.Aplaintifffilingatitlesuitshouldbeveryclearabouttheoriginoftitleovertheproperty.He
mustspecificallypleadit.(SeeS.M.Karimv.BibiSakina(Supra).)InP.Periasamiv.P.
Periathambi(1995)6SCC523thisCourtruledthat:(SCCp.527,para5)

Wheneverthepleaofadversepossessionisprojected,inherentinthepleaisthatsomeoneelse
wastheowneroftheproperty.

Thepleasontitleandadversepossessionaremutuallyinconsistentandthelatterdoesnotbegin
tooperateuntiltheformerisrenounced.DealingwithMohanLalv.MirzaAbdulGaffar(1996)
1SCC639thatissimilartothecaseinhand,thisCourtheld:(SCCpp.64041,para4)

4.Asregardsthefirstplea,itisinconsistentwiththesecondplea.Havingcomeintopossession
undertheagreement,hemustdisclaimhisrightthereunderandpleadandproveassertionofhis
independenthostileadversepossessiontotheknowledgeofthetransferororhissuccessorintitle
orinterestandthatthelatterhadacquiescedtohisillegalpossessionduringtheentireperiodof
12yearsi.e.uptocompletingtheperiodhistitlebyprescriptionnecvi,necclam,necprecario.
Sincetheappellant'sclaimisfoundedonSection53A,itgoeswithoutsayingthatheadmitsby
implicationthathecameintopossessionoflandlawfullyundertheagreementandcontinuedto
remaininpossessiontilldateofthesuit.Therebythepleaofadversepossessionisnotavailable
totheappellant.

52.Inouropinion,theHighCourthaserredinlawinholdingthattheplaintiffsperfectedtheir
titlebyvirtueofadversepossession.Thefindingisperverseandhasnofoundationalbasis.

(vii)Inre:whetherundertheMuslimLaw,defendantNo.1beingacosharercouldhave
alienatedtheshareofothercosharersinthedisputedproperty?

53.Intheinstantcase,thepropertywasancestralpropertyofLateNawabJung.Itisnotin
disputethatNawabJungdiedintestate.ThelegalheirsofLateNawabJungsucceededtothe
estateastenantsincommonandnotasjointtenants.Theheirssucceededtotheestateinspecific
shares.InOutlinesofMuhammadanLawbyAsafA.A.Fyzee,4thEdn,ithasbeenobservedthat
generalprinciplesofIslamicjurisprudencedonotcontemplateadministration,butamere
distributionoftheestateaspertheprincipleslaiddowninSirajiyyah.AspertheSunnilaw,a
testatorcanleavealegacytoanheironlytotheextentof1/3rdofestateandnotexceedingthat.
Afterdeathofapersonthefirststepistomakepaymentoffuneralexpenses,debtsandlegacies.
Thereafter,distributionofestateamonglegalheirs,firstlytosharers,intheabsencethereof,to
residuaries,andincaseofabsenceofbothtodistantkindred.AsperMulla,distributiontakes
placeinthefollowingmanner:

61.ClassesofheirsTherearethreeclassesofheirs,namely,(1)Sharers,(2)Residuaries,and
(3)DistantKindred:

(1)Sharersarethosewhoareentitledtoaprescribedshareoftheinheritance;

(2)Residuariesarethosewhotakenoprescribedshare,butsucceedtotheresidueafterthe
claimsofthesharersaresatisfied;

(3)DistantKindredareallthoserelationsbybloodwhoareneitherSharersnorResiduaries.

Sharerstakeinthefollowingmanner:

63.SharersAfterpaymentoffuneralexpenses,debts,andlegacies,thefirststepinthe
distributionoftheestate,ofadeceasedMahomedanistoascertainwhichofthesurviving
relationsbelongtotheclassofsharers,andwhichagainoftheseareentitledtoashareofthe
inheritance,and,afterthisisdone,toproceedtoassigntheirrespectivesharestosuchofthe
sharersasare,underthecircumstancesofthecase,entitledtosucceedtoashare.Thefirst
columnintheaccompanyingtable(p.66A)containsalistofSharers;thesecondcolumn
specifiesthenormalshareofeachsharer;thethirdcolumnspecifiestheconditionswhich
determinetherightofeachsharertoashare,andthefourthcolumnsetsoutthesharesasvaried
byspecialcircumstances.

54.Residuariestakeiftherearenosharersoriftherearesharers,aftersatisfyingtheirclaims.As
perMulla,theywilltakeinthefollowingmanner:
65.ResiduariesIftherearenoSharers,orifthereareSharers,butthereisaresidueleftafter
satisfyingtheirclaims,thewholeinheritanceortheresidue,asthecasemaybe,devolvesupon
Residuariesintheordersetforthintheannexedtable(p.74A).

TheResiduariesorAgnaticheirsweretheprincipalheirsbeforeIslam;theycontinuetoremain
theprincipalheirsinSunnilaw.Theirpremierpositionis,inIslam,alwayssubjecttotheclaims
ofnearrelationsmentionedastheKoranicheirs.Firsttheyaresatisfiedbygivingthemtheir
Koranicshares.Residuariesaretherelationswhoserightswerealsorecognizedbytriballawsin
SaudiArabiabeforeIslam.

TherightsofresiduariesarerecognizedbytheHolyQuran(byimplication)andbythetraditions
oftheprophet(PBUH)inveryspecificterms.

TheHolyQurandeclares:

fromwhatisleftbyparentsandnearkindred,thereisashareformenandashareforwoman,
whetherthepropertybesmallorlargeadeterminateshare.

To(benefit)everyone,wehaveappointedsharesandheirstopropertyleftbyparentsandnear
relatives

Allahdirectsyouconcerningyourchildren(theirinheritance),tothemaleaportionequalto
thatoftwofemales..

Theyasktheeforalegaldecision.Say:Allahdirects(thus)aboutthosewholeaveno
descendantsorascendantsasheir.Ifitisamanthatdies,leavingasisterbutnochild,sheshall
havehalftheinheritance.If(suchadeceasedwas)awomanwholeftnochild,herbrothertakes
herinheritanceIftheyarebrothersandsisters,(theyshare),themalehavingtwicetheshareof
thefemale.
Thefirsttwoversesareclearproofthatbloodrelationsareentitledtoinherit.Bloodrelations
definitelyincluderesiduaries(themaleagnates).[see,MohammadMustafaAliKhan,Islamic
LawofInheritance,1stedition.]

55.Thedistantkindredisdealtwithinsection67inMulla'sPrinciplesofMahomedanLaw
thus:

67.DistantKindred(1)IftherebenosharesorResiduaries,theinheritanceisdividedamongst
DistantKindred.

(2)Iftheonlysharerbeahusbandorwife,andtherebenorelationbelongingtotheclassof
Residuaries,thehusbandorwifewilltakehisorherfullshare,andtheremainderoftheestate
willbedividedamongDistantKindred.

56.IncidentsoftenancyincommonhavebeencitedfromHalsbury'sLawsofEngland,5thEdn.,
vol.87inwhichnatureofsuchtenancyhasbeendiscussedbefore1925inpara220.Inpara221
natureofsuchtenancysince1925hasbeendiscussed.Ithasbeenobservedthattenantsin
commonhaveseveralinterests,wherejointtenants,whetheratlaworinequity,haveone
interest.Thetenantsincommonmaybeentitledtoequitablesharesinthelandinunequalshares
andforinterestswhichmaybeunequalinduration;differentshareswouldbesubjecttodifferent
limitationsandthelimitationsmayincludeentailedinterests.Nonewentailedinterestscanbe
createdeitherinrealorpersonalproperty,butthisdoesnotaffectanyentailedinterestscreated
before1.1.1997consideringtheprovisionsoftheTrustsofLandandAppointmentofTrustees
Act,1996asapplicableintheareaforwhichithasbeenenacted.Thereisnorightof
survivorshipandonthedeathofatenantincommon,hissharepassesaccordingtoitsown
limitation.Inpara224themodesofeffectingpartitionoftenanciesincommonhavebeendealt
withingeneralandthepositionbefore1925andsubsequenttheretohasbeentakeninto
considerationconsideringtheenactmentswhichhavebeenmadeapplicablefromtimetotime.

57.Thus,itisapparentthattheincidentsofsuchjointtenancyandtenantsincommonarefurther
subjecttothelawbywhichpartiesaregovernedandinthatcontext,wehavetoexamineacase.
Thereisnodisputewiththegeneralprinciplesofjointtenancyandtenantsincommonbutthe
samewouldalsodependuponintheirapplicationwithrespecttothelawbywhichtheparties
andthelisinquestionaregoverned.InacasebelongingtoMuslims,incidentsofMuslimLaw,
theirlawofinheritancehastobeconsidered,inparticularwithrespecttorightsoftenantsin
common.RightofdispositionbyatestamentisalsodifferentintheMuslimlaw.Therecannotbe
testamentarydispositionformorethan1/3rdofthepropertyheldbytestator.Thepowerof
alienationinMuslimlawisdifferentfromHindulaw.InHindulaw,thereisdifferencein
DayabhagaandMitakshraschooloflaw.MuslimlawmaybeakininsomerespecttoDayabhaga
lawbutnotwithMitaksharaLaw.However,inMitakshraLawinBombaySchoolandinBanaras
School,powerofalenationisdifferent.Acoparcenercannotalienatewithoutconsentofother
coparcenersinBanarasSchoolofMitaksharaLaw.InBombaySchoolofMitaksharaLaw,aco
parcenercanalienateforvaluehisundividedinterestorhiscoparcenerypropertywithout
consentofothercoparceners.HoweverintheareawhichisgovernedbytheBanarasSchoolof
MitaksharaLaw,saleofhisundividedshareinacoparcenerypropertywithoutconsentofother
coparcenersisvoidableattheinstanceofnonalienatingcoparcener.

58.AFullBenchoftheM.P.HighCourtinRamdayalv.ManaklalAIR1973MP222hasmade
certainobservationswithrespecttoapplicabilityofMitaksharalawasadministeredinBombay,
MadrasandM.P.Acoparcenermaysell,mortgageorotherwisealienateforvaluehisundivided
interestincoparcenerypropertywithouttheconsentofothercoparceners.Decisionin
Ramdayal'scase(supra)hasbeenexplainedbyadecisionofanotherFullBenchoftheM.P.
HighCourtinDiwanSinghv.BhaiyaLalAIR1997MP210.IthasbeenheldthatinMadhya
Bharat,VindhyaPradeshetc.ofMadhyaPradesh,BanarasSchoolofHinduLawapplies.Thus
theapplicabilityofthelawattheplaceinquestionandcertaincustomswhichwouldbe
prevailingincertainareasarealsorelevant.AsincertainpartsofA.P.orelsewheretheremaybe
differentcustomsprevailinginMuslimswhicharetobetakenintoconsiderationwhiledeciding
amatter.InHalsburyalsodistinctionhasbeenmadebetweenthelawwhichwasapplicable
before1925andthelawwhichisapplicableafter1925andthediscussionoflawiswithrespect
tovariousActsonthebasisofwhichthedecisionshavebeenreferredherein.

59.Whenweconsidertheincidentsofdispositionofpropertyunderdifferentlaws,wehaveto
considerthepersonallawandthentoapplythegeneralprinciplesoftenancylawtothe
permissiblenonconflictzonetopersonallawwhichholdsthefieldforthepartiestoarriveata
decision.ThePrivyCouncilinthecaseofImambandiv.Mutsaddi(1918)L.R.45I.A.73
consideringthedistinctionbetweenthelawwhichisapplicabletoMohammedans,hasheldthat
thereisasharpdistinctionwhichhastobedrawnwithotherlawswithrespecttoitsspecial
nature.TheCourtcautionedtoapplytheforeigndecisionswhichareonconsiderationsand
conditionstotallydifferingfromthoseapplicabletoorprevailinginIndia.ThePrivyCouncilhas
observedthus:

45.TheirLordshipscannothelpdeprecatingthepracticewhichseemstobegrowinginsomeof
theIndianCourtsofreferringlargelytoforeigndecisions.Howeverusefulinthescientificstudy
ofcomparativejurisprudence,referencetojudgmentsofforeignCourts,towhichIndian
practitionerscannotbeexpectedtohaveaccess,basedoftenonconsiderationsandconditions
totallydifferingfromthoseapplicabletoorprevailinginIndia,isonlylikelytoconfusethe
administrationofjustice.

60.Thus,inouropinion,courtshavetobecarefultoapplythedecisionofMuslimlawtoacase
relatingtoHindulawandtheforeigndecisionsandviceversa.Therecannotbeuniversal
applicationofprinciplesoflawonaparticularsubject.Speciallawsbywhichpartiesare
governedarealsotobetakenintoconsiderationsoastoarriveatajustconclusion.

61.Keepinginviewaforesaidprincipleweproceedtoconsiderthequestionfurther.InSyed
ShahGhulamGhouseMohiuddinv.SyedShahAhmedMohiuddinKamisulQuadri(died)byl.rs.
(1971)1SCC597,thisCourthaslaiddownthatMuslimheirsaretenantsincommonandthey
succeedtotheirdefinitefractionofeverypartofestateofthedeceased.Thesharesoftheheirs
aredefiniteandknownbeforeactualpartition.Therefore,onpartitionofthepropertiesthereis
divisionbymetesandboundsinaccordancewithspecificsharesofeachsharerwhichhave
alreadybeendeterminedbylaw.ThisCourthasobservedthus:

20.Thecauseofactionforpartitionofpropertiesissaidtobeaperpetuallyrecurringone
(SeeMonsharamChakravartyv.GaneshChandraChakravarty,17CWN521.InMohammedan
lawthedoctrineofpartialpartitionisnotapplicablebecausetheheirsaretenantsincommon
andtheheirsofthedeceasedMuslimsucceedtothedefinitefractionofeverypartofhisestate.
ThesharesofheirsunderMohammedanlawaredefiniteandknownbeforeactualpartition.
ThereforeonpartitionofpropertiesbelongingtoadeceasedMuslimthereisdivisionbymetes
andboundsinaccordancewiththespecificshareofeachheirbeingalreadydeterminedbythe
law.

62.InP.N.VeetilNarayaniv.PathummaBeevi(1990)4SCC672,itwasreiteratedthatsince
heirssucceedtotheestateastenantsincommon,thus,theliabilityofheirsofaMuslimdying
intestateorthatofthedeceasedistotheextentofhisshareofdebtproportionatetohisshareof
estate.Ifthatisproportionatetoshareofthedeceasedasinheritanceisastenantsincommon
andasindependentdebtors,notcodebtorsorjointdebtors.Cosharerscanhardlybeclassified
asjointcontractors,partners,executorsormortgagees.Theyareindependentdebtorsandthe
debthavingbeensplitbyoperationoflaw.ThisCourthaslaiddownthus:
10.TheseobservationsinJafriBegamcaseILR(1885)7All822areprimerootsofthetheory
astothedivisibilityofthedebtinthehandsofheirsofaMuslimintestate.Soitwouldberightto
treatitsettledthatMuslimheirsareindependentownersoftheirspecificsharessimultaneously
intheestateanddebtsofthedeceased,theirliabilityfixedunderthepersonallawproportionate
totheextentoftheirshares.Inthisstateoflawitwouldbeunnecessarytorefertoother
decisionsofvariousHighCourtstouchingthesubject.Soweproceedonthefootingthatas
manyheirsasaredefendingthiscause,therearedebtsinthatnumber.

14.TheheirsofaMuslimdyingintestateonwhomfallstheliabilitytodischargethedebt,
proportionatetotheirrespectivesharesintheestatedevolved,canhardlybeclassifiedasjoint
contractors,partners,executorsormortgagees.Asheldabovetheyarebythemselves
independentdebtors;thedebthavingbeensplitbyoperationoflaw.Intersetheyhavenojural
relationshipascodebtorsorjointdebtorssoastofallwithintheshadowofcontractors,partners,
executorsormortgageesorinaclassakintothem.Theysucceedtotheestateastenantsin
commoninspecificshares.Evenasignedwrittenacknowledgmentbytheprincipalorthrough
hisagentwouldbindtheprincipalandnotanyoneelsestandinginjuralrelationshipwiththe
principalinaccordancewithSection20(2).TheMuslimheirsintersehavenosuchrelationship.
Inthisviewofthematter,wetaketheviewthattheHighCourtwasrightinconfiningthe
acknowledgmentofthedebtsonlytorespondent2andnotextendingtheacknowledgmenttothe
othercoheirsfortheirindependentposition.

16.Inthecontext,ifthedebtisoneandindivisible,paymentbyonewillinterruptlimitation
againstallthedebtorsunlesstheycomewithintheexceptionlaiddowninSection20(2)which
hasbeentakennoteofearlier.Andifthedebtissusceptibleofdivisionandthoughseemingly
oneconsistsreallyofseveraldistinctdebtseachoneofwhichispayablebyoneoftheobligors
separatelyandnotbytherest,Section20keepsalivehispartofthedebtwhichhasgottobe
dischargedbythepersonwhohasmadepaymentofinterest.Itcannotaffectseparatesharesof
theotherdebtorsunlessontheprincipal(sicprinciple)ofagency,expressorimplied,the
paymentcanbesaidtobeapaymentontheirbehalfalso.SeeinthisconnectionAbheswari
Dasyav.BaburaliShaikhAIR1937Cal191.Thepaymentmadeonaccountofdebtby
defendantrespondent2asanindependentdebtor,andnotasanagent,expressorimplied,on
behalfofothercoheirscouldhardly,inthefactsestablished,herebesaidtobeapaymenton
behalfofallsoastoextendperiodoflimitationasagainstall.Wearethusoftheconsidered
viewthattheHighCourtwasrightinconfiningtheextensionoflimitationonpaymentofapart
ofdebtonlyagainstdefendantrespondent2,proportionatetohisshareoftheestatedevolvedon
himwhichwasonefourth.WearefurtheroftheviewthattheHighCourtwasrightinholding
thesuitagainstothercoheirstobebarredbylimitationrelatingtotheirsharesofthedebt.
63.ThisCourthasalsolaiddownthatinthatcasepaymentmadeonaccountofdebtby
defendantrespondent2asanindependentdebtor,andnotasanagent,expressorimplied,on
behalfofothercoheirs,inthefactsestablished,couldnotbesaidtobeapaymentonbehalfof
all.

64.ThisCourtagaininKasambhaiSheikhv.AbdullaKasambhaiSheikh(2004)13SCC385has
heldthatsuccessioninMohammedanLawisinspecificsharesastenantsincommon.

65.ItwasobservedinRamAwalambv.JataShankarAIR1969All.526thatajointtenancy
connotesunityoftitle,possession,interestandcommencementoftitle;intenancyincommon
theremaybeunityofpossessionandcommencementoftitlebuttheothertwofeaturesasto
unityoftitleandinterestaremissing.

66.InMansabAliKhanv.Mt.NabiunnisaAIR1934All702,asuitwasfiledbytheplaintiffs
whohadacquiredrightsin12/24sihamsinthepropertyindispute.Theyclaimedpossession
overtheshareofthewholepropertyonthegroundthatoneofthedefendantrespondents,Mt.
Nabiunnissa,hadsoldcertainpropertytothedefendantrespondentsNos.2and3.Therewasan
agreementthatMt.Nabiunnisashouldremaininpossessionontheconditionthatshebecame
liabletopayallthedebtsduefromthedeceased.Thoughtheagreementwasnotproved,thetrial
courtfoundthatcertaindebtswerepaidbyMt.Nabiunnisa.Itwasheldthatoneoftheheirsofa
deceasedMohamedanwasperfectlyentitledtoalienatehisshareofthepropertywithoutgetting
itpartitionedprovidedhehadpaidtheproportionateshareofdebtonassessmentofproperty.

67.MuhammadanLawdoesnotrecognizetherightofanyoneoftheshareholdersbeingtenants
incommon,foractingonbehalfofcoheirsaslaiddowninAbdulMajeethKhanSahibv.C.
KrishnamachariarAIR1918Mad1049(FB).Ithasbeenlaiddownthatoneheirhasno
authorityinlawtodealwiththeshareofhiscoheirs.Relevantportionisextractedhereunder:

Thisisabsolutelyclearauthorityinproofofthepositionthatoneheirhasnoauthority,inlaw,
todealwiththesharesofhiscoheirs.Infaceofit,itisnotnecessarytorefertootheroriginal
textbooks.Itisstated,however,inPathummabiv.VittilUmmachabiI.L.R.26Mad.734that,
ifthecreditorofthedeceasedcanseekhisreliefagainstoneofseveralcoheirsinacasewhere
alltheeffectsofthedeceasedareinthehandsofthatheir,itcanmakenodifferencewhetherthe
heirmeetsthedemandbyabonafidevoluntarysale,orthepropertyisbroughttosalein
executionofadecreeobtainedagainsthim.TothesameeffectisadecisionoftheAllahabad
HighCourtinHasanAliv.MedhiHusainI.L.R.1All.533.ThestatementinPathummabiv.
VittilUmmachabiI.L.R.(supra)waspurelybywayofobiterdictumandwithallrespecttothe
learnedJudges,theyfailedtobearinmindthat,theprovisionoftheMuhammadanLaw,thata
decreeagainstoneheirinpossessionofalltheeffectsofthedeceased,isbindingonallif
obtainedaftercontest,ispartoftheprocessuallawofthatsystemandisnotbasedontheground
thatasingleheir,ifhehappenstobeinpossessionoftheestateofthedeceased,representsthe
restoftheheirsforthepurposesofadministrationgenerally.Thegroundonwhichadecree
againstoneoftheheirs,insuchcircumstances,istreatedasresjudicatais,asstatedinthebooks,
thatthedecreeinsuchcasesis,inlaw,againstthedeceasedandnotagainsttheparticularheir
whoismadedefendantinthesuit.

xxxxxxxxx

Sofarasvoluntaryalienationsareconcerned,whichaloneformthesubjectmatterofreference,
theMuhammadanLawisclearthatoneoftheheirsofadeceasedpersonisnotcompetentto
bindtheotherheirsbyhisacts,

Spencer,J.IagreewiththejudgmentofMr.JusticeAbdurRahimjustnowpronounced.

SrinivasaAiyangar,J.Iagree.Intheabsenceofanyrightinoneoftheheirstorepresentthe
coheirs,oneofseveralcoheirscanonlydealwithhisorherinterestintheancestor'sproperty
inheritedbythem.MylearnedbrotherhasshownthatthereisnothingintheMuhammadanLaw
givingsucharighttooneofthecoheirswhomayhappentobeinactualpossessionofthewhole
oftheancestor'sestate;suchpossession,itmustberemembered,ispresumablyonbehalfofall
thecoheirs.Heisnotconstitutedtherepresentativeofthedeceasedandcannotadministerhis
propertyevenforthelimitedpurposeofpayingoffhisdebts.InKhiarajmalv.DaimL.R.,32
Ind.App.,23,LordDaveyreferringtoasalebyoneoftheheirsofaMuhammadanfor
dischargingthedebtduebytheancestorsaidprimafaciehisconveyancewouldpassonlyhis
share,See.p.37.Representationinasuitmayconceivablystandonadifferentfootingforas
statedbytheirLordshipsinthesamejudgmentatpage35,TheIndianCourtshaveexerciseda
widediscretioninallowingtheestateofadeceaseddebtortoberepresentedbyonememberof
thefamily,andinrefusingtodisturbjudicialsalesonthemeregroundthatsomemembersofthe
family,whowereminors,werenotmadepartiestotheproceedings,ifitappearsthattherewasa
debtjustlyduefromthedeceased,andnoprejudiceisshowntotheabsentminors.Buttheseare
usuallycaseswherethepersonnamedasdefendantisdefactomanagerofaHindufamily
property,orhastheassetsoutofwhichthedecreeistobesatisfiedunderhiscontrol;andthey
appliedthisprincipleinthatverycasetotheestateofNabibaksh.However,thatisnotthe
questionhere.

68.InMohammadAfzalKhan,Hajiv.AbdulRahman,MalikAIR1932PC235,thePrivy
Councilhasheldthatincaseoneoftwoormorecosharershadmortgagedanundividedshare,
themortgageetakesthesecuritysubjecttorightsofothercosharers,andthepartitionifeffected,
themortgagedpropertiesareallottedtotheothercosharers,theytakethosepropertiesinthe
absenceoffraud,freefromthemortgageandthemortgageecanproceedonlyagainstthe
propertiesallottedtothemortgagorinsubstitutionofhisundividedshare.Theprinciplethat
emanatesfromtheaforesaiddecisionisthatcosharercanbindhispropertyandcannotcreate
chargeonthepropertyofothercosharers.ThePrivyCouncilhadrelieduponthedecisioninthe
caseofByjnathLallv.RamoodeenChowdry(1874)LR1Ind.App.106,therelevantportionof
MohammadAfzalKhan,Haji(supra)isextractedhereunder:

Asregardsthefirstpoint,theirLordshipsareofopinionthatwhereoneoftwoormoreco
sharersmortgageshisundividedshareinsomeofthepropertiesheldjointlybythem,the
mortgageetakesthesecuritysubjecttotherightoftheothercosharerstoenforceapartitionand
therebytoconvertwhatwasanundividedshareofthewholeintoadefinedportionheldin
severalty.Ifthemortgage,therefore,isfollowedbyapartitionandthemortgagedpropertiesare
allottedtotheothercosharers,theytakethoseproperties,intheabsenceoffraud,freefromthe
mortgage,andthemortgageecanproceedonlyagainstthepropertiesallottedtothemortgagorin
substitutionofhisundividedshare.ThiswastheviewtakenbytheBoardinByjnathLallv.
RamoodeenChowdry(1874)LR1Ind.App.106.Inthatcasethepartitionwasmadebythe
CollectorunderRegulationXIXof1814(Bengal),andthemortgageewasseekingtoenforcehis
remedynotagainstthepropertiesmortgagedtohim,butagainstthepropertieswhichhadbeen
allottedtothemortgagorinlieuofhisundividedshare;buttheBoardheldthatnotonlyhehada
righttodoso,butthatitwasinthecircumstancesofthecasehissoleright,andthathecouldnot
successfullyhavesoughttochargeanyotherparceloftheestateinthehandsofanyofthe
formercosharers.TheirLordshipsthinkthattheprincipleenunciatedinthatcaseappliesequally
toapartitionbyarbitrationsuchastheoneinthepresentcase.TheirLordshipsarethereforeof
opinionthattheappellantisnotentitledtoenforcehischargeagainstthepropertiesallottedto
thefirstandsecondrespondents.Thethirdrespondent(themortgagor)hasnotappearedbefore
theirLordships,andtheirLordshipsexpressnoopinionastoanyotherrightswhichtheappellant
mayhaveinrespectofhismortgage.

69.ItwassubmittedonbehalfoftheappellantsthatinMohammedanlawthedoctrineofpartial
partitionisnotapplicablebecausetheheirsaretenantsincommon.Reliancehasbeenplaced
uponthedecisionofthisCourtinSyedShahGhulamGhouseMohiuddinv.SyedShahAhmed
MohiuddinKamisul(supra).InS.M.A.Samadv.ShahidHussainAIR1963Patna375,thePatna
HighCourtreferringtothevariousdecisionsindicatedthatitwouldbeinexpedienttoallowsuits
forpartitionofaportionoftheproperties,becauseitwouldleadtoamultiplicityofsuits.Itis
merelyaruleofprocedurallaw.Mohammedansareneverjointinestatebutonlytenantsin
common.Ithasbeenobservedthattherulewithrespecttothepartialpartitionisnotsorigid,it
canbeallowedincertaincircumstances.ReliancehasalsobeenplacedonadecisionoftheHigh
CourtofMadhyaPradeshinAbdulKarimv.HafijMohammad(1989)MPLJ178,inwhichit
hadbeenheldthatsuitforpartialpartitionwasmaintainable.Referencehasalsobeenmadeto
thecaseofA.J.Pintov.Smt.SahebbiKomMuktumSaheb(Dead)byLRs(1972)4SCC238,
whereinthisCourthasleftopenthequestionwhetherpartialpartitionispossibleunderMuslim
Lawandnoopinionwasexpressed.Theaforesaiddecisionastothepartialpartitionhadbeen
citedtoemphasizethatwhenMuslimsinheritinspecificshare,theirshareisdetermined.
However,thequestionofpartialpartitionisnotinvolvedintheinstantcase,assuch,weneednot
gointotheaforesaidquestionastothepermissibilityofthepartialpartition,asthesuitinthe
instantcasewasfiledforpartitionoftheentirematrukaproperty.

70.AFullBenchdecisionoftheHighCourtofSindinVaziraliasDinov.DwarkamalAIR
1922Sind41hasalsobeenreferredto,whereinreferringtothecaseofMangaldasv.Abdul
Razak(1916)16BombayL.R.224,ithasbeenobservedthatthenotionsofjointfamily,joint
familypropertyandjointfamilybusinessareutterlyunknowntoMohammedanLaw.

71.AdecisioninJanMahomedv.DattuJaffer(1913)38Bombay449hasalsobeenreferredto
andithasbeenheldthatMohammedansundertheirownlawareneverjointinestatewhether
theylivetogetherorwhethertheydonot.OndeathofaMuslimhisheirsatoncebecomevested
withthesharestowhichtheIslamicLawentitlesthem.Theyhavenottowaituntiltheproperty
isdividedbymetesandbounds.Ithasalsobeenobservedthatsometimeanerroriscausedby
applicationofHindulawtothecaseofMohammedanlaw.Ithasalsobeenfurtherobservedthat
aMohammedanheirisnotacoparcener.Hehasnotmerelyarighttoadefinedandimmediate
shareineachportionoftheestatebutifanyportionoftheestateisinanycasemarkedoffand
dividedfromtherestoftheestate,hehasarighttoanimmediateshareinthatportion.

72.ReliancehasalsobeenplaceduponthedecisioninGhumanmalLokumalv.FaizMuhammad
HajiKhanAIR1948Sind83inwhichithasbeenobservedthus:

15.Itmaybeconcededthatthequestionofadjustmentofequitiesbetweenthevendorand
vendeeuponasuitbyaMuslimcosharerforpartitionoftheentirepropertyheldinco
ownershipmightproperlyarise,butwecannotacceptthepositionthat,whileaMuslimcosharer
electstosueforpartitionofsomeofthepropertiesonlyheldincoownership,avendeecan
compelhimtosueforageneralpartition,forthepurposeofadjustingequitiesbetweentheco
sharervendorandhimself.IfMr.Kimatrai'scontentionweretoprevail,itwouldputfettersupon
whatthisCourtinsecondAppealNo.64of1942hasheldtobeanunfetteredrightofaMuslim
cosharertoclaimpartitionofsomeofthepropertiesonlyheldincoownership,whileretaining
hiscoownershipintheremainingproperties.

16.If,then,avendeecannotrequireaMuslimcosharertosueforageneralpartition,muchless
canheinstituteasuitforthesolepurposeofadjustingequitiesbetweenhimselfandhisMuslim
cosharervendorinregardtopropertywhichhasnotbeenalienatedtohim,asissoughttobe
doneinthecasebeforeus.

73.IthasbeenobservedthatavendeecannotcompelaMuslimtosueforageneralpartitionfor
thepurposeofadjustingequitiesbetweenthecosharervendorandhimself.Thelogicbehind
thisisthatspecificshareisinheritedbyacosharerinaspecificproperty.

74.RightofpreemptionunderMohammedanLawhasbeenreliedupontoinvalidatethesaleto
strangereventotheextentofvendor'sshare.AFullBenchoftheAllahabadHighCourtin
Inayatullahv.GobindDayal(1885)ILR7All775hasobservedthatrightofpreemptionis
closelyconnectedwiththeMohammedanlawofinheritance.Thefollowingistheobservation
madewithrespecttotherightofpreemptionintheaforesaiddecision:

7.Uponthepresentoccasionitisunnecessarytoconsiderwhethergiftcanproperlybe
describedasareligioususageorinstitutionwithinthemeaningofSection24.Iamhere
concernedonlywiththequestionwhetherpreemptioncanbesodescribed.Myownopinionis
thatitcan,andalthoughIcannotaddmuchtothereasonsgivenbySPANKIB,J.,Imayobserve
thatpreemptioniscloselyconnectedwiththeMuhammadanLawofinheritance.Thatlawwas
foundedbytheProphetuponrepublicanprinciples,atatimewhenthemoderndemocratic
conceptionofequalityanddivisionofpropertywasunknowneveninthemostadvanced
countriesofEurope.Itprovidesthat,uponthedeathofanowner,hispropertyistobedivided
intonumerousfractions,accordingtoextremelyrigidrules,sorigidastopracticallyexcludeall
poweroftestamentarydisposition,andtopreventanydiversionofthepropertymadeevenwith
theconsentoftheheirs,unlessthatconsentisgivenaftertheowner'sdeath,whenthereasonis,
notthatthetestatorhadpowertodefeatthelawofinheritance,butthattheheirs,havingbecome
ownersoftheproperty,coulddealwithitastheyliked,andcouldthereforeratifytheactoftheir
ancestor.NoMuhammadanisallowedtomakeawillinfavourofanyofhisheirs,andabequest
toastrangerisallowedonlytotheextentofonethirdoftheproperty.Underthese
circumstances,toallowtheMuhammadanLawofinheritance,andtodisallowtheMuhammadan
Lawofpreemption,wouldbetocarryoutthelawinanimperfectmanner;forthelatterisin
realitythepropercomplementoftheformer,andonedepartmentofthelawcannotbe
administeredwithouttakingcognizanceoftheother

75.IthasalsobeenobservedthatundertheMohammedanlaw,theruleofpreemptionproceeds
uponaprincipleanalogoustothemaximsicuteretuoutalienumnonleadas.Therightof
preemptionisbaseduponthefactthattherecanbelargenumberofcosharers,thepreference
hastobegiventopreemptorasarightofsubstitution,butnotasarepurchaseinMohammedan
lawtocutshortthelitigation.

76.Forthepurposeofpreemption,reliancehasalsobeenplacedonthedecisioninZamir
Ahmadv.S.HaidarNazarAIR1952All541,inwhichithasbeenobservedthatwherethereisa
customrelatingtopreemption,theruleofMohammedanlawofpreemptionisnottobeapplied
evenonthegroundofequityandgoodconscience.InviewoftheentryinWajibularzthecustom
iscompletebyitselfandcanbeenforced.Theplaintiffbeingarelativeandacosharer,
accordingly,hadapreferentialrightofpreemptionasagainstthevendeesandwasentitledto
preempt.

77.ThedecisioninNagammalv.Nanjammal(1970)1MLJ358hasalsobeenreferredto,
whereinithasbeenobservedthatthepreferentialrighttoacquiretheshareofacoheirwho
proposestotransferhisinterestinthepropertyorbusinessofthepropositusislimitedtocasesof
simultaneoussuccessionanddevolutionofpropertyupontwoormoreheirsbelongingtoClassI.
Obviously,thesectionhasbeenaimedatreducingtosomeextentatleasttheinconvenient
effectsofsimultaneoussuccessionbyseveralpersonsatoneandthesametimeasmembersof
ClassIleadingtofragmentationandparcellingup,ofevensmallholdingsofproperty.Toa
degreethesectionenablesacoheirtoretainthepropertyinthefamilyandavoidthe
introductionofastrangerintheenjoymentoffamilypropertyifhesodesired.Relyingupon
Inayatullah(supra),ithasbeenobservedthatitisnotlawfulforanyonetosellhisownsharetill
hehasinformedhiscosharerwhomaytakeorleaveitashewishes;andifhehassoldwithout
suchinformation,thecosharerhasapreferentialrighttotheshare.Ithasalsobeenobservedthat
theexistenceofrightofpreemptionispatentandtheburdenisonthepurchasertoestablishthat
othercoheirsdeclareorwaivetheirpreferentialrightwhenoccasionarose.Itisnotpretended
thatpurchasermadeanyreferencetononalienatingcoheirsbeforehispurchase.Itfollowsthat
plaintiffshavenotlosttheirpreferentialrightofpurchasebysaleandareentitledtohave
propertyconveyedtothem.
78.Onthebasisoftheaforesaiddecisionswithrespecttothepreferentialrightitissoughttobe
contendedonbehalfoftheappellantsthatthereisnoequityinfavourofthepurchaser,butunder
Muslimlawcoheirshavetherightofpreferentialpurchaseandinthiscaseevenitisnot
pretendedbythepurchaserthathehadofferedtothecoheirsbeforepurchasingthesamevide
saledeeddated23.11.1959.Wedeclinetoacceptthesubmissionasthepropertyinquestionis
capableofdivisionanditisnotasmallfractionofproperty,butpartitionisofhugeproperty,and
asthepropertyadmittedlyhasexchangedseveralhandsbynow,wearenotinclinedtoinvalidate
thesaledeedexecutedbydefendantNo.1infavourofBalaMallaiaheventotheextentofhis
sharei.e.14/104thonthebasisofprincipleofpreemptionofMuslimlaw.Itwouldbetoolate
andiniquitoustoinvoketheprincipleofpreemptioninsuchacase,particularlywhennosuch
pleawasraisedattherelevanttimeandinthecourtsbelow.Incaseheirsweredesirousofraising
it,theyshouldhaveraisedtheirpleatimely.

79.InShaikMohd.AliAnsariv.ShaikAbdulSamed(Died)perLRs(2012)4ALD680(DB),the
questionoffiduciaryrelationshiphasbeendiscussed,butintheinstantcaseitisnotthecaseset
upbytheobjectors/purchasersthatthesaledeedwastheoutcomeoffiduciaryrelationship.

80.Thepartieshavebeenlitigatingsince1935forpartitionofproperty.Intheinstantcasesale
byHamidAliKhan,defendantNo.1isnotofundividedsharebutthatofaspecificpropertyi.e.
68acres10guntasinwhichhehadonly14/104thshare.Thusbeingatenantincommonhehad
noauthorityorrighttoselltheshareofothercoowners.Thevendorhadtherighttoselltothe
extentofhisownshareconsideringthenatureofsuccessionamongstMohammedans.Thusthe
saleofpropertyofothercosharerswasillegalandvoid.

81.SimilarquestionaroseinMansabAliKhan(supra)inwhichithasbeenlaiddownthatif
partitionhasnotbeeneffectedtheheircanonlysellhisundividedshareandcannotsella
particularplot.Itwassubmittedthatthoughthespecificplothasbeenalienatedbutinthewhole
undividedpropertyitwouldamounttolessthantheshareofanalienatingcoshareri.e.
defendantNo.1.Hehadshareofapproximately250acresinthematrukapropertiesleftbyLate
NawabJung.SimilarsubmissionwasrepelledbytheAllahabadHighCourtanditwasheldthat
totheextentoftheshareofvendoronlyinthespecificproperty,thesalecouldbeenforcedand
thevendorhadnorighttosellthespecificpropertywhichbelongedtoothercosharers.Thesale
ofaspecificpartofthepropertywhichwasnotinthevendor'sexclusiveownership,wasset
aside.AllahabadHighCourthaslaiddownthus:

3.ThesimplequestionthatIhavetodecideiswhetherinthesecircumstancestheplaintiff
appellantsareentitledtoadecreeforpossessionoftheirshareinthepropertyinsuit,including
thatportionofitwhichwastransferredin1920and1922byMt.NabiunnissatodefendantsNos.
2and3,ortoanyotherrelief.ItisnotquiteclearwhatthelowerappellateCourtmeantby
sayingthatthesaledeedwasnotchallengedbytheplaintiffsintheplaintonthegroundthatit
dealtwithonespecificplot,orinexpressingtheopinionthatsuchasaledeedisonlyvoidableat
theopinionofajointownerwithinsixyearsofthetransfer.Thewholeoftheplaintshowsthat
theplaintiffsclaimedtobeownersof12outof24sihamsinthepropertywhichhadbeenleftby
Mt.Wasiunnisa.TheyalsoclaimtohavebeeninjointpossessionwithMt.Nabiunnissaalthough
thelatter'snamealonehadbeenrecordedintherevenuepapers.Theircauseofactionwasthat
Mt.Nabiunnissahadtransferredpartofthepropertyandwhethertheirgrievancewasthatshe
hadtransferredmorethanherpropershareorthatshehadtransferredaspecificpartofthe
propertywhichwasnotinherownexclusiveownership,itisquiteclearthattheplaintiffs'object
wastodispelthecloudontheirtitleto12/24sihamsofthewholepropertywhichhadarisen
owingtothesaledeedsof1920and1922.Ithasnotbeenclearlyprovedthattheplaintiffshave
beeninjointpossessionofthewholeofthepropertyandtheyhavethereforepaidtheCourtfees
necessaryforadecreeforpossession.Whatiswanted,however,isadeclarationthattheyare
entitledtojointpossession,andinthecircumstancesitappearstomethattheyoughttoobtain
suchadecree.InthecaseofJafriBegamv.AmirMohammadKhan(1885)7All.822,itwas
heldthatinsomewhatsimilarcircumstancesaplaintiffcouldrecoverfromtheauctionpurchaser
hisshareinthepropertysoldonconditionthathepaidaproportionateshareoftheancestor's
debtforwhichthedecree(inexecutionofwhichthepropertyhadbeensold)waspassed.

4.AsregardsthequestionoftheamountwhichissaidtohavebeenpaidbyMt.Nabiunnissain
liquidationofhermother'sdebts,thetrialCourtfoundthatshepaidasumofRs.1,800andthat
theplaintiffswereliabletopayaproportionateamountviz.Rs.853140.Thelowerappellate
CourthasfoundthatsofarasRs.1,000isconcernedithasnotbeenprovedthatthedebtwasdue
orthatMt.Nabiunnissahasliquidatedit.Thereis,howevernofindingasregardsthebalanceof
Rs.800.Mr.Mohd.Husain,whoappearedinthisCourtonbehalfofMt.Nabiunnissa,has
arguedthatheisnotboundbythefindingsofthelowerappellateCourtwithregardtothese
debtsatall,becausethedecreeofthelowerappellateCourtwasinhisfavourandthesefindings
werethereforeirrelevant.Mt.Nabiunnissawashoweveroneofthepartiestotheappealinthe
lowerappellateCourtwherethesequestionsastothedebtswereagitatedanddecided,andsofar
asthefindingsofthelowerappellateCourtarefindingsoffacttheymustbeheldtobebinding
onMt.Nabiunnissa.

82.InAbdulMajeethKhanSahibv.C.Krishnamachariar(1917)5LW767,aFullBenchofthe
PrivyCouncilwasfacedwiththeissuethatifoneofthecoheirsofadeceasedMuhammadanin
possessionofthewholeestateofthedeceasedorofanypartofitsellsthepropertyinhis
possessionformingpartoftheestatefordischargingthedebtsofthedeceased,issuchsale
bindingonothercoheirsorcreditorsofthedeceased,andifso,towhatextent?Itwasheldthat
propertyofadeceasedMuhammadanvestsinhisheiruponhisdeathinspecifiedshare.Heirsof
thedeceasedtaketheirsharesinseveralty,astenantsincommonandunderMuhammadanLaw
oneheirofthedeceasedcannotbindsharestohiscoheirs.

83.Inouropinion,salebeyond14/104thsharebyHamidAlitoBalaMalliahwasvoid.The
MohammedanLawdoesnotrecognizetherightofoneofshareholdersbeingtenantsincommon
foractingonbehalfofothers.Whiledischargingdebtalsotheyactasindependentdebtors.Aco
sharercannotcreatechargeonpropertyofcoheir.TherightofMuslimheirisimmediately
definedineachfractionofestate.NotionofjointfamilypropertyisunknowntoMuslimlaw.Co
heirdoesnotactasagentwhiledischargingdebtbutisanindependentdebtornotascodebtoror
jointdebtor.Cosharersarenotdefinedasjointcontractors,partners,executorsormortgagees.

(viii)Inre:whetherthepurchaserhasarighttoclaimequityforallotmentofItemNo.6of
ScheduleBpropertyinfinaldecreeproceedingsinsuitforpartition?Ifyes,towhat
extent?

84.Itwascontendedonbehalfoftherespondentsthatinrespectoftransactionswhicharehitby
section52canbelookedintoatthetimeoffinaldecreeproceedings.However,preliminary
decreeintheinstantcaseidentifiesdifferentmodesandmannersunderwhichequitiescouldbe
adjustedatthetimeoffinaldecreeproceedings.Reliancehasbeenplaceduponfollowing
paragraphs81and93ofthejudgmentofthetrialcourtwhilepassingthepreliminarydecreein
theyear1970:

81.ItisfactestablishedthatthedeceasedhadgiftedthelandtoD1butthenextpointfor
considerationis,whethertheentirelandmeasuring24bigasand10bamswasgiftedtohimora
portionofitfortheconstructionofthehouse.ThelearnedcounselforD25arguedthattheentire
landwasgiventoD1andevenincludingS.No.22/2anotheritemaboutwhichIwilldeallater.
ThelearnedcounselsforD6andplaintiffcontendedthatthehouseofD1wasonlyonportion
oflandandthatitcannotbepresumedthattheentirelandofmorethan18acreswouldbegiven
fortheconstructionofthehouse.AsalreadyobservedthehouseofD1aroundthehouse.There
isnoevidenceonrecordtoshowtheextentoflandwithinthecompound.Oneofthewitness
statedthatitwas4or5acresandanotherstatedthatitwasabout15acres.Theplanofthe
compoundandtheareaofthehouseisnotmadetherecordofthesuit.OfcourseEx.Alif2while
givingpermissionfortheconstructionofthecompoundmentionedabouttheplanbutitdidnot
givetheareacoveredbyit.Subsequently,i.e.aftertheinstitutionofthesuitD1hadbuilta
cinemahouseandthehotelandmalgi.Anotherwitnesssaidthattherewasnoopenlandbetween
thecompoundandtheroad.Thereisnoclearpictureaboutthelocationforwantofsufficient
materialonrecord.Theprinciplescanbeworkedoutinthefinaldecreeproceedings.Inmyview
thedeceaseddidnotgifttheentirelandsituatedinAsifnagarbutonlysuchportionoflandon
whichD1hadbuiltthehouseandthecompound.Asalreadystatedbymethatthelandwas
givenforpurposeofconstructingresidentialhouse.ItisafactthatinEx.Alif4hegavethe
boundariesandstatedthataplanwasalsopreparedaftersurveyandsettlementbutitisnotfiled
andnothingcanbemadeoutfromtheboundariesgiveninEx.Alif4andalsoEx.Alif.Iamnot
inclinedtobelievethatonlythatportionoflandwasgiftedtohimonwhichthehousestands
excludingthecompoundbutinmyviewallthatportionoflandwasgiventoD1onwhichthe
housestandsandthelandwasgivenforthepurposeofconstructionthehouseandifmoreland
wasgiventohimhecouldhaveencloseditwiththecompoundorwithsomefence.My
conclusionisthatthelandcoveredbytheresidentialhouseandthecompoundwallwasgiftedto
D1andtheremaininglandoutsidethecompoundismatrukaproperty.Ifthecinemahousewas
builtonthelandoutsidethecompound,itcanbeadjustedtowardstheshareofD1inthefinal
decreeproceedings.

xxxxx

93.ItisafactandalsoadmittedinsomecasesthatD1hadsoldsomelandsinsomevillages.
Ex.B2toB9aresuchsaledeedsexecutedbyD1.ItwasexplainedbyD1thathewastopay
thelandrevenuetotheGovernmentandforthatpurposehehadtosellthelands.Ineednotgo
intothequestionaboutthelandssoldbyD1andaboutthesaleamountsrealized.Inthefinal
decreeproceedingsthesefactscanbetakenintoconsideration.D1wouldbeliabletoaccount
forthemoniesrealized.

85.Itisapparentthatthesaledeedinquestionwasnotreferredtoinpara93.Evenifthe
aforesaidobservationshadnotbeenmade,itwasopentotheexecutingcourttoadjustequityof
purchaserstothepermissibleextentaspurchaserspendentelitecanworkouttheequitiesin
accordancewithlawinthefinaldecreeproceedings.

86.ReliancehasbeenplacedbytherespondentsonadecisioninJayaramMudaliarv.
Ayyaswami(1972)2SCC200:

47.Itisevidentthatthedoctrine,asstatedinSection52,appliesnotmerelytoactualtransfers
orrightswhicharesubjectmatteroflitigationbuttootherdealingswithitbyanypartytothe
suitorproceeding,soastoaffecttherightofanyotherpartythereto.Hence,itcouldbeurged
thatwhereitisnotapartytothelitigationbutanoutsideagency,suchasthetaxcollecting
authoritiesoftheGovernment,whichproceedsagainstthesubjectmatteroflitigation,without
anythingdonebyalitigatingparty,theresultingtransactionwillnotbehitbySection52.Again,
whereallthepartieswhichcouldbeaffectedbyapendinglitigationarethemselvespartiestoa
transferordealingswithpropertyinsuchawaythattheycannotresilefromordisownthe
transactionimpugnedbeforetheCourtdealingwiththelitigation,theCourtmaybindthemto
theirownacts.AllthesearematterswhichtheCourtcouldhaveproperlyconsidered.The
purposeofSection52oftheTransferofPropertyActisnottodefeatanyjustandequitable
claimbutonlytosubjectthemtotheauthorityoftheCourtwhichisdealingwiththepropertyto
whichclaimsareputforward.

(emphasisaddedbyus)

87.ReliancehasalsobeenplacedonVinodanv.Vishwanathan(2009)4SCC66thus:

11.Inthefactsandcircumstancesofthecase,whilebalancingtheequitiesandforkeeping
peaceandhappinessinthefamily,wethinkitwouldbejustandpropertodirecttheappellantto
payRs.5,50,000totherespondentwithinaperiodoffourmonths.Onreceivingthesaidamount,
therespondentmayconstructasuitablehouseinhisportionofthelandandforthatpurposewe
grantoneyear'stimefromthedateofpaymentofRs.5,50,000totherespondenttovacatethe
portionofthebuildingwhichispresentlyinhispossessionandgivevacantandpeaceful
possessionofhisportionofthebuildingtotheappellantinlieuofpaymentofRs.5,50,000.We
aregrantingalongtimetotherespondenttovacatetheportionofthebuildinginhispossession
toavoidanyinconveniencetotherespondent.

88.DecisioninDhanlakshmiv.P.Mohan,(2007)10SCC719hasbeenreferredlayingdown
that:

5.Section52dealswithatransferofpropertypendingsuit.Intheinstantcase,theappellants
haveadmittedlypurchasedtheundividedsharesofRespondents2,3,4and6.Itisnotindispute
thatthefirstrespondentP.Mohanhasgotanundividedshareinthesaidsuitproperty.Because
ofthepurchasebytheappellantsoftheundividedshareinthesuitproperty,therightsofthefirst
respondenthereininthesuitorproceedingwillnotaffecthisrightinthesuitpropertyby
enforcingapartition.Admittedly,theappellants,havingpurchasedthepropertyfromtheother
cosharers,inouropinion,areentitledtocomeonrecordinordertoworkouttheequityintheir
favourinthefinaldecreeproceedings.Inouropinion,theappellantsarenecessaryandproper
partiestothesuit,whichisnowpendingbeforethetrialcourt.Wealsomakeitclearthatweare
notconcernedwiththeothersuitfiledbythemortgageeintheseproceedings.

89.Thoughitistruethatpurchaserscanworkouttheequityinthefinaldecreeproceedingsbutit
isonlytothelegallypermissibleextentandnotbeyondthat.Thepreliminarydecreedeclaredthe
sharesinitemNo.6ofScheduleBpropertyinspecifiedshares.Thepreliminarydecreeis
bindingandevenotherwisethesalewasvalidonlytotheextentoftheshareofdefendantNo.1
i.e.14/104thshareinthespecificpropertyandnotbeyondit.ThisCourtinK.AdiviNaiduv.E.
DuruvasuluNaidu(1995)6SCC150,haslaiddownthatwhenaspecificpropertycomprisingof
undividedshareinjointfamilypropertiesispurchasedbyappellantsfromalieneeofKartaofthe
jointfamilypriortopartitionsuitandwherethepreliminarydecreeinpartitionsuitdirectedthat
propertiesbedividedbymetesandbounds,takingthegoodandbadqualitiesthereof,thenthe
preliminarydecreewasallowedtobecomefinal.ThisCourtheldthatthetrialcourtshouldgive
effecttothepreliminarydecree,andthoughtheappellantshadnoequities,therestrictiveshareto
whichtheprincipalalienatorwasentitled,shouldbeallottedtothemasaspecialcase.Inthe
instantcase,preliminarydecreehasdeclaredtheshareonlytotheextentof14/104thinthe
disputedpropertyinitemNo.6,scheduleB.Thus,bynoequitableprinciplethepurchasercan
claimtheentirepropertytobeallottedtohim.

90.TherespondentshaveplacedrelianceonadecisionoftheHighCourtofMadrasinKhatoon
Bibiv.AbdulWahabSahibAIR1939Mad.306soastocontendthatthesaledeedinfavourof
BalaMallaiahdated23.11.1959isvalidandbindingondefendantNo.1,HamidAliKhan
notwithstandingthependencyofthepartitionsuit.InMuslimlawpropertycanbealienatedby
heirduringthependencyofthesuitforitspartition.InKhatoonBibi(supra)ithasbeenobserved
thatinheritancevestsimmediately,inMohammedanlaw,inhisheirandisnotsuspendedby
reasonofdebtsbeingduefromtheestateofthedeceasedandagainsttheothercoheirs,the
claimofbonafidepurchaserstohavetheshareintheparticularplotisnotabsolute.Itiswell
recognizedprincipleoflawrelatingtocoownersortenantsincommonthatanalienationbya
coowneroratenantincommonofashareinanyitemofthepropertyissubjecttotherightsand
equitiesoftheothercoownersortenantsincommon.Ithasalsobeenobservedonthebasisof
Cooperv.Fisher(1841)10LJCh221thatifpersonsdealinsuchinterestsasundividedshares,
theydosowiththeliabilityofhavingsomethingassignedtothemdifferentfromwhatthey
mightoriginallypossess.Thealieneeofpartofanundividedestatemusttakehisinterestsubject
toabillofpartitionbeingfiledagainsthim.Thecourtfurtherobservedthat:

11.Acoowneroratenantincommoncanalwaysfileasuitforpartitionandhavehisshare
definedanddeliveredtohim.TheCourtineffectingapartitionisboundtoadjustalltheequities
existingbetweenthepartiesandarisingoutoftheirrelationtothepropertytobedivided.The
equitiestobeadjustedwouldinvolveeverymatterrelatingtothecommonpropertywith
referencetowhichonetenantincommonmayequitablydemandanythingoftheothersuchas
contributionforrepairsorimprovementstothecommonproperty,accountingforwasteofthe
commonpropertyandtheenforcementofanylienorchargewhichatenantincommonmay
claimagainsttheotherinrespectofanymatterconcerningthecommonproperty.Inregardtothe
methodofdivisiontheCourtisnotboundtoallotanaliquotshareofeachspeciesofpropertyto
eachoftheparties.Itisenoughifeachtenantincommonhasanequalshareofthewhole.This
issubjecttotheotherequitieswhichmayhavetobeadjusted.Inthiscasetheplaintiffis
admittedlyentitledtoahalfshareintheestatebutsheisnotabletogetherdueandlegitimate
sharebyvirtueofthefactthatdefendants1to3havedissipatedamajorportionoftheestate
consistingofthemoveableproperty.Theplaintiffisthereforejustlyentitledtodemandthatall
theimmovablepropertyshouldbeassignedtoherandthatnoportionoftheimmovableproperty
shouldbeclaimedbydefendants1to3.FreemanonCotenancyandPartitiondealingwith
equitieswhichmaybeenforcedinasuitforpartitionobservedatpage676thus:

Ifoneofthecotenantshaswastedanypartofthelandsofthecotenancy,theCourtmaytake
thatfactintoconsiderationanddojusticebetweenthepartiesbyassigningtothewrongdoerthe
partwhichhehaswasted.

xxxxx

13.Thequestionnowarises,shouldanyportionofthepropertybyvirtueofthealienationby
defendants1to3pendentelitebeallottedtotheshareofthedefendantsinordertogiveeffectto
theallegedequitablerightinfavourofthealienees?Ordinarilyitwouldbejustandproperto
allocatepropertieswhichhavebeenalienatedtothesharesofthealienor.Butwhereitisnot
practicableorequitable,theCourtisnotboundtoallotthosepropertiesbutmightallotanyother
propertiesandthealieneesonlyrightistohaverecoursetothepropertiessoallotted.Itmaybe
thatthesubstitutedpropertyorsecuritymayproveworthlessbutitisariskeveryalieneeofan
undividedinterestofatenantincommoninaspecificitemofpropertytakesasanecessary
incidentofthealienation.ThereforethereisnothingtoprecludeaCourtfromawardingtothe
plaintifftheimmovablepropertiesandawardingtothedefendantsthemoveablepropertieswhich
havebeenwastedbythem,theonlyremedyofthealieneebeingtoproceedagainstthemoveable
propertiesintheirhands.Butwhatisallegedinthiscaseisthatthealieneesarebonafide
alieneesandtheyhavegotthereforeanequityintheirfavour.Butitseemstometheequityof
theplaintiffinthiscaseisparamounttotheequityinfavourofthealienees.Shehasbeen
unjustlydeprivedofherlegitimateshareinthepropertybythewrongfulactofdefendants1to3
aidedbydefendant4,andthepropertywasconvertedandappropriatedfortheiruseduringher
minority.Shelostnotimeinenforcingherclaimassoonassheattainedmajorityandthe
alienationswerependentelite.Thealieneesallegethattheywereignorantoftheinstitutionofthe
suitbutthatfactisinmyopinionimmaterialastheycannotgethigherrightsthantheiralienors,
i.e.analieneefromacotenanttakeshisinterestsubjecttotheequitiesoftheothercotenants.
Butthisisacaseinwhich,ifthealieneeswerenotparties,theywillbeaffectedbythedoctrine
oflispendens.Thetitletotheimmovablepropertyisspecificallyinquestionwithinthemeaning
ofSection52oftheTransferofPropertyAct.

14.Aquestionoftitlehasbeenraised,namelywhetherthepropertyinthesuitbelongedsolelyto
AbdulRahimanorwasthejointpropertyofdefendants1to3andAbdulRahiman.Thisissue
wouldbequitesufficienttoattracttheoperationoflispendens.Nodoubtasuitfor
administrationhasbeenheldnottoattracttheoperationoflispendensuntilapreliminarydecree
foradministrationhasbeenpassed.Butinthiscasetheplaintiffhasalsoprayedforpartitionand
deliveryofhershareandforanaccountonthebasisthatdefendants1to3havewrongfully
possessedthemselvesofherfather'spropertyandmisappropriatedthebulkofitandthissuit
cannotthereforebeviewedasabareadministrationsuit.Butsincethealieneesareformallyon
recordandtheywillbeboundbyanydecreepassedinthesuit,thereisnoneedtoconsiderthe
applicabilityofSection52oftheTransferofPropertyAct.Buttheprincipleunderlyingthe
Sectionwillhavetobeappliedinfavouroftheplaintiff,i.e.theCourtinmakingtheadjustment
ofequitiesingivingrelieftoheroughttoconfineitselftothelegalrightsofthecoheirsonthe
dateoftheinstitutionofthesuitwithoutreferencetotheequitablerightsofpersonswhoderived
titlefromthempendenteliteasherrightsshouldnotbeprejudicedbyanyinterveningequityin
thealienees.Theplaintiffisentitledtosaythatsofarassheisconcerned,sheisnotboundto
takeanynoticeofatitleacquiredsincethefilingofthesuitandastothemitisasifnosuch
titleexisted.

91.TheCourthasreiteratedtheprinciplethatanalieneefromacotenanttakessubjecttothe
equitiesfromothercotenantsandincasealieneeswerenotpartiestheywouldbeaffectedbythe
doctrineoflispendens.Thedecisionisofnoapplicationinthefactsoftheinstantcaseas
alienationmadewasbeyondtheinterestinthepropertyofalienatingcosharerandinthe
proceedingsforfinaldecreeitself,nosuchequitablerighthasbeenclaimedbypurchaseras
discussedhereinafter.Toclaimsuchanequityseparatebundleoffactswasrequiredtobe
pleadedandestablished.Thus,inabsencethereof,itisnotpossibleintheinstantcasetowork
outtheequitiesofthepurchasersinotherpropertiesallottedtotheshareofthevendor.

92.ReliancehasbeenplacedonadecisionoftheHighCourtofM.P.inAbdulRahmanv.
HamidAliShahAIR1959MP190.Themainquestionforconsiderationwaswithrespectto
maintainabilityofthesuitforpartialpartitionorthesuithastobefiledforgeneralpartitionofall
theproperties.Ithasbeenobservedthatanalieneeofspecificitemofpropertyhasalsotobe
givenarighttosueforgeneralpartitionsoastoclaimequitablerightagainsthisvendor.Inthe
instantcasethepropositionhasnoapplicationfirstlyforthereasonthatnosuchequityhasbeen
claimedbythepurchasersintheobjectionsfiledinthefinaldecreeproceedings.Theclaimwas
toretainonlythespecificpropertywhichhadbeenalienatedbydefendantNo.1.

93.ReliancehasalsobeenplacedonTikamChandLuniav.RahimKhanIshakKhanAIR1971
MP23.FollowingtheaforesaiddecisionoftheM.P.HighCourtinAbdulRahman(supra),law
tothesimilareffecthasbeenlaiddown.Inthelatterdecisionithasbeenheldthatwhenspecific
propertycannotbeallottedtotheshareofthealienor,salemustbeconstruedtobesaleofso
muchportionascanjustlybegiventotheshareofthealienor.Intheinstantcasethealienorhad
only14/104thshareandthathasbeenrightlyallottedtohim.

94.ReliancehasalsobeenplacedonT.G.AshokKumarv.Govindammal(2010)14SCC370in
whichithasbeenlaiddownthatinthecaseofpendentelitetransferofpropertyduringthe
pendencyofthepartitionsuitheldbytheothercoowner,salependenteliteisnotvoidbut
subjecttothedecreeinpartitionsuit.Thetitleofthevendeewoulddependuponthedecisionin
thepartitionsuitinregardtothetitleofvendor.Ifthevendorhastitleonlyinrespectofapartof
theproperty,vendee'stitlewouldbesavedonlytothatextent.Thesaleoftheremainingportion
whichfelltotheshareofothercoownerwouldbeineffective.Onthebasisoftheaforesaid
decision,BalaMallaiah,hisheirsandpurchaserscangetwhatcanbeallottedtovendorHamid
AliKhan'sshare.Thatpreciselyisthepreliminaryaswellasthefinaldecree.ThisCourtinT.G.
AshokKumar(supra)haslaiddownthusandtherelevantportionisextractedhereunder:

14.Ontheotherhand,ifthetitleofthependentelitetransferorisrecognisedoracceptedonly
inregardtoapartofthetransferredproperty,thenthetransferee'stitlewillbesavedonlyin
regardtothatextentandthetransferinregardtotheremainingportionofthetransferred
propertytowhichthetransferorisfoundnotentitled,willbeinvalidandthetransfereewillnot
getanyright,titleorinterestinthatportion.

15.Ifthepropertytransferredpendentelite,isallottedinentiretytosomeotherpartyorparties
orifthetransferorisheldtohavenorightortitleinthatproperty,thetransfereewillnothave
anytitletotheproperty.Whereacoowneralienatesapropertyoraportionofaproperty
representingtobetheabsoluteowner,equitiescannodoubtbeadjustedwhilemakingthe
divisionduringthefinaldecreeproceedings,iffeasibleandpractical(thatis,withoutcausing
lossorhardshiporinconveniencetootherparties)byallottingthepropertyorportionofthe
propertytransferredpendentelite,totheshareofthetransferor,sothatthebonafidetransferee's
rightandtitlearesavedfullyorpartially.
95.Itisapparentfromtheaforesaiddecisionthatatransfereemaylosetheentirepropertyalso
thoughequitiescanbeworkedoutbymakingallotmentofpropertywhichhasbeentransferred
pendentelitebutintheinstantcasesuchequityisnotpermissibleinviewoftheprovisionsof
MohammedanLawaswellasthefactthatnosuchequityhasbeenclaimedforallotmentoutof
otherpropertiesfallentotheshareofthevendor.

96.ReliancehasalsobeenplacedonKhemchandShankarChaudhariv.VishnuHariPatil
(1983)1SCC18inwhichthisCourthaslaiddownthus:

6.Section52oftheTransferofPropertyActnodoubtlaysdownthatatransfereependentelite
ofaninterestinanimmovablepropertywhichisthesubjectmatterofasuitfromanyofthe
partiestothesuitwillbeboundinsofarasthatinterestisconcernedbytheproceedingsinthe
suit.Suchatransfereeisarepresentativeininterestofthepartyfromwhomhehasacquiredthat
interest.Rule10ofOrder22oftheCodeofCivilProcedureclearlyrecognisestherightofa
transfereetobeimpleadedasapartytotheproceedingsandtobeheardbeforeanyorderis
made.Itmaybethatifhedoesnotapplytobeimpleaded,hemaysufferbydefaultonaccountof
anyorderpassedintheproceedings.Butifheappliestobeimpleadedasapartyandtobeheard,
hehasgottobesoimpleadedandheard.Hecanalsopreferanappealagainstanordermadein
thesaidproceedingsbutwiththeleaveoftheappellatecourtwhereheisnotalreadybroughton
record.Thepositionofapersononwhomanyinteresthasdevolvedonaccountofatransfer
duringthependencyofanysuitoraproceedingissomewhatsimilartothepositionofanheiror
alegateeofapartywhodiesduringthependencyofasuitoraproceeding,oranOfficial
Receiverwhotakesovertheassetsofsuchapartyonhisinsolvency.Anheiroralegateeoran
OfficialReceiveroratransfereecanparticipateintheexecutionproceedingseventhoughtheir
namesmaynothavebeenshowninthedecree,preliminaryorfinal.Iftheyapplytothecourtto
beimpleadedaspartiestheycannotbeturnedout.TheCollectorwhohastoeffectpartitionofan
estateunderSection54oftheCodeofCivilProcedurehasnodoubttodivideitinaccordance
withthedecreesenttohim.Butifapartytosuchadecreediesleavingsomeheirsaboutwhose
interestthereisnodisputeshouldhefolduphishandsandreturnthepaperstothecivilcourt?
Heneednotdoso.Hemayproceedtoallottheshareofthedeceasedpartytohisheirs.Similarly
hemay,whenthereisnodispute,allottheshareofadeceasedpartyinfavourofhislegatees.In
thecaseofinsolvencyofaparty,theOfficialReceivermaybeallottedtheshareoftheinsolvent.
Inthecaseoftransfereespendentelitealso,ifthereisnodispute,theCollectormayproceedto
makeallotmentofpropertiesinanequitablemannerinsteadofrejectingtheirclaimforsuch
equitablepartitiononthegroundthattheyhavenolocusstandi.Atransfereefromapartyofa
propertywhichisthesubjectmatterofpartitioncanexercisealltherightsofthetransferor.
Thereisnodisputethatapartycanaskforanequitablepartition.Atransfereefromhim,
therefore,canalsodoso.SuchaconstructionofSection54oftheCodeofCivilProcedure
advancesthecauseofjustice.Otherwiseineverycasewhereapartydies,orwhereapartyis
adjudicatedasaninsolventorwherehetransferssomeinterestinthesuitpropertypendentelite
thematterhasgottobereferredbacktothecivilcourteventhoughtheremaybenodispute
aboutthesuccession,devolutionortransferofinterest.Inanysuchcasewherethereisnodispute
iftheCollectormakesanequitablepartitiontakingintoconsiderationtheinterestsofall
concernedincludingthoseonwhomanyinterestinthesubjectmatterhasdevolved,hewould
neitherbeviolatingthedecreenortransgressinganylaw.Hisactionwouldnotbeultravires.On
theotherhand,itwouldbeinconformitywiththeintentionofthelegislaturewhichhasplaced
theworkofpartitionoflandssubjecttopaymentofassessmenttotheGovernmentinhishands
tobecarriedoutinaccordancewiththelaw(ifany)forthetimebeinginforcerelatingtothe
partitionortheseparatepossessionofshares.

97.Thereisnodisputeontheaforesaidprinciple.Theaforesaidprinciplehasbeenfollowedin
theinstantcaseandpermissiblesharehasbeenallotted.Thusthedecisionisofnofurther
assistancetothecauseespoused.

98.InJayaramMudaliarv.Ayyaswami(1972)2SCC200,ithasbeenlaiddownthus:

47.Itisevidentthatthedoctrine,asstatedinSection52,appliesnotmerelytoactualtransfers
orrightswhicharesubjectmatteroflitigationbuttootherdealingswithitbyanypartytothe
suitorproceeding,soastoaffecttherightofanyotherpartythereto.Hence,itcouldbeurged
thatwhereitisnotapartytothelitigationbutanoutsideagency,suchasthetaxcollecting
authoritiesoftheGovernment,whichproceedsagainstthesubjectmatteroflitigation,without
anythingdonebyalitigatingparty,theresultingtransactionwillnotbehitbySection52.Again,
whereallthepartieswhichcouldbeaffectedbyapendinglitigationarethemselvespartiestoa
transferordealingswithpropertyinsuchawaythattheycannotresilefromordisownthe
transactionimpugnedbeforetheCourtdealingwiththelitigation,theCourtmaybindthemto
theirownacts.AllthesearematterswhichtheCourtcouldhaveproperlyconsidered.The
purposeofSection52oftheTransferofPropertyActisnottodefeatanyjustandequitable
claimbutonlytosubjectthemtotheauthorityoftheCourtwhichisdealingwiththepropertyto
whichclaimsareputforward.

48.Inthecasebeforeus,theCourtshadgivendirectionstosafeguardsuchjustandequitable
claimsasthepurchaserappellantmayhaveobtainedwithouttrespassingontherightsofthe
plaintiffrespondentinthejointpropertyinvolvedinthepartitionsuitbeforetheCourt.Hence,
thedoctrineoflispendenswascorrectlyapplied.
99.InMarirudraiahv.B.Sarojamma(2009)12SCC710,aConstitutionBenchofthisCourtset
asideanorderpassedbytheHighCourtdirectingallotmentofItemNo.9soldpendenteliteto
purchaserandcompensationtothecosharersofhispredecessorininterestintermsofmoney
basedonthemarketvalueofthepropertywhichwasalienatedtohim.ThisCourthaslaiddown
thatcourtsarenotsupposedtoencouragependentelitetransactions,andregularizingtheir
conductbyshowingequityintheirfavouratthecostofcosharers.

100.InKammanaSambamurthy(Dead)byLRs.v.KalipatnapuAtchutamma(Dead)(2011)11
SCC153,thisCourthaslaiddownthatwhenthevendorwashavingonlyshareintheproperty
butexecutedthecontractforsaleoftheentireproperty,thevendeewouldbeentitledtodecree
forspecificperformanceonlytotheextentofshareofthevendorandnotbeyondit.

101.InNovaAdsv.MetropolitanTransportCorporation(2015)13SCC257,thisCourthas
consideredvariousdecisionslikeRajaRamMahadevParanjypev.AbaMarutiMaliAIR1962
SC753,P.M.Lathav.StateofKerala(2003)3SCC541,RaghunathRajBarejav.Punjab
NationalBank(2007)2SCC230,MadamanchiRamappav.MothaluruBojjappaAIR1963SC
1633,LaxminarayanR.Bhattadv.StateofMaharashtra(2003)5SCC413,Nasiruddinv.Sita
RamAgarwal(2003)2SCC577,E.Palanisamyv.Palanisamy(2003)1SCC123,IndiaHouse
v.KishanN.Lalwani(2003)9SCC393andhasobservedthatlawwillprevailovertheequity
principlewhentheycannotbeharmonizedthus:

45.InRajaRamMahadevParanjypev.AbaMarutiMaliAIR1962SC753,athreeJudge
Benchhasopinedthat:(AIRp.756,para9)

9.Equitydoesnotoperatetoannulastatute.Thisappearstoustobewellestablishedbutwe
mayrefertoWhiteandTudor'sLeadingcasesonEquity(9thEdn.,p.238),whereitisstated:

Although,incasesofcontractbetweenparties,equitywilloftenrelieveagainstpenaltiesand
forfeitures,wherecompensationcanbegranted,reliefcanneverbegivenagainsttheprovisions
ofastatute.

46.InP.M.Lathav.StateofKerala(2003)3SCC541,ithasbeenopined:(SCCp.546,para
13)
13.Equityandlawaretwinbrothersandlawshouldbeappliedandinterpretedequitablybut
equitycannotoverridewrittenorsettledlaw.

47.InRaghunathRajBarejav.PunjabNationalBank(2007)2SCC230,theCourtobserved
thatitiswellsettledthatwhenthereisaconflictbetweenlawandequity,itisthelawwhichhas
toprevail.TheCourtfurtherruledthatequitycansupplementthelaw,butitcannotsupplantor
overrideit.Inthiscontext,reliancewasalsoplaceduponMadamanchiRamappav.Muthaluru
BojjappaAIR1963SC1633,LaxminarayanR.Bhattadv.StateofMaharashtra(2003)5SCC
413,Nasiruddinv.SitaRamAgarwal(2003)2SCC577,E.Palanisamyv.Palanisamy(2003)1
SCC123,andIndiaHousev.KishanN.Lalwani(2003)9SCC393.

102.ReliancehasbeenplacedonRaghunathRaiBarejav.PunjabNationalBank(2007)2SCC
230,inwhichtheLatinmaximduralexsedlexwhichmeansthelawishard,butitisthelaw
wasapplied.Relyinguponthatithasbeenobservedthatequitycanonlysupplementthelaw,but
itcannotsupplantoroverrideit.Butwhenthereisaconflictbetweenlawandequity,itisthelaw
whichhastoprevail.

103.Intheinstantcase,equitablerightofallotmentofsomelandotherthanwhichwas
purchasedoutofsomeotherpropertiesallottedtotheshareofvendorHamidAliKhan,D1has
notbeenclaimedintheobjectionsfiledduringthefinaldecreeproceedingsfiledbythe
purchasers.Thepropertyadmittedlyhasexchangedhandsanumberoftimesduringthe
pendencyofsuitfrom1935tilldateandhowtheequityistobeworkedoutisalwaysaquestion
offactineverycase,howmuchsharehasbeenallottedtotheshareofonevendorandhowmuch
propertyhehadalreadyalienatedtillthattimeandwhatarethedebtsorchargesontheproperty
thatarelegallypermissible,wouldbesomeoftherelevantconsiderations.Nothingofthatsort
hasbeenpleadedbythepurchasersintheobjectionsfiledinthefinaldecreeproceedings.
Thoughintheabsenceofclaimingequitablerightintheshareofvendor'sotherproperties,it
cannotbeworkedoutanditisdoubtfulwhenundividedsharehasnotbeensoldandthespecific
propertyhadbeenpurchased,suchequitablerightcanbeenforced.Evenassumingthatthe
purchasercouldworkouttheequity,howeverintheabsenceofpleadingsandevidencerequired
forthepurpose,itwouldamounttomisadventure.Wedonotproposetogiveanyfindingon
submissionanditscorrectness,madeonbehalfoftheappellantsthatdefendantNo.1hadgone
onasellingspreelikeanythingandbeforeexecutingthesaledeedon23.11.1959hehadalready
soldmorethan1000acresoflandwhichwasinexcessofhisentitlement,intheabsenceof
pleadingbyappellantsorpurchasersonthebasisoforalsubmissionsmadebeforeus.Inthe
absenceofrequisitedata,pleadingsandevidence,questionofworkingoutequityinaforesaid
manner,cannotbeexaminedorgoneintobythisCourtatthisstage.Theclaimofequityis
outcomeofingenuityofargumentsmadeonlyinthisCourtlikeadrowningfishtryingtocatch
laststraw.Wearenotatallimpressedbythesubmission,andconsequentlythesameisrepelled,
moresoconsideringtheprovisionsoftheMohammedanLawthatsalebeyondtheextentofthe
shareofthevendorinspecificpropertywasvoid.

(ix)Inre:whethersalewasforlegalnecessity,andthusbinding:

104.Itwassubmittedthatsalewasforlegalnecessityforbenefitofestate.Ithasbeenaverredin
theobjectionspreferredbythepurchasersthatsalewasmadebyHamidAliKhan,defendantNo.
1,forpaymentoflandrevenue.Thusitwascontendedthatthepaymentoflandrevenuehas
enuredforthebenefitoftheentireestate.Thussalewouldbevalidandbindingoncoheirs.
Exceptmakingtheaforesaidbaldstatement,nothinghasbeenplacedonrecordtoindicatethat
thesalewasforpaymentoflandrevenue.Ontheotherhand,whenweperusethesaledeed,
recitalofitmakesitclearthatthesalewaseffectedbyHamidAliKhanforhispersonal
necessity.Hehadnotexecutedthesaledeedforpaymentoflandrevenueasitsrecitalis
otherwisewhichwouldprevail.Northesaledeedhadbeenexecutedinthefiduciarycapacity
actingonbehalfofcosharersratherhehasclaimedinthesaledeedthathewastheexclusive
ownerof68acres10guntasareaofpropertyandwasinpossessionthereof.Hehadsoldtheland
foraconsiderationofRs.2000inviewofhispersonalnecessity.Thesalewasmadeaftertaking
permissionfromtheDeputyCollectorDivision,Distt.West,Hyderabad.Thus,thesaledeed
negatestheaforesaidbaldavermentmadeintheobjectionpetition.Evenotherwiseunderthe
MohammedanLaw,itwasnotopentoHamidAliKhan,defendantNo.1toactinfiduciary
capacitytosellthepropertyandbindsharesofothers.Itisnotmentionedinsaledeedthat
HamidAliKhanhadsoldforanylegalnecessityorforthebenefitoftheentireestate.Therecital
insaledeedhastheevidentiaryvalueandBalaMallaiahandhissuccessorsareboundbywhat
hasbeenmentionedtherein.Thus,nocaseismadeoutonthebasisoftheaforesaidsubmission
alsotomakeaninterference.

(x)Inre:theeffectofproceedingsundertheTenancyAct,1950:

105.Itwascontendedonbehalfoftherespondentsthatwithrespecttothedisputedpropertythe
proceedingswereinitiatedbyBoddamNarsimhaundertheActof1950.BoddamMallaiahwasa
lesseefor3years.Hewasinductedintheaforesaidlandsunderakouldated1.3.1953executed
byHamidAliKhan,whowasdefendantNo.1inthepartitionsuit.Initially,itwasforoneyear
andwasrenewedeachyearlateron.HamidAliKhanexecutedasaledeedinfavourofBala
Mallaiahon23.11.1959.Afterthesaledeed,BalaMallaiahbecameapattedarinplaceofHamid
AliKhaninrespectofthesuitland.BalaMallaiahwasthepaternaluncleofBoddamNarsimha.
AnapplicationwasfiledbyBoddamNarsimhaundersection37AoftheTenancyActonthe
groundthatLateBalaMallaiahwasaprotectedtenantandprayedforissuanceofownership
certificateundersection38EoftheActof1950.Thetribunalvideorderdated24.8.1999held
thatBalaMallaiahneverprotestedtheomissionofentryoftenancyfromtherevenuerecordsas
deemedtenant,anditwasfoundthattherewerenoprotectedtenantsinMadhapurvillage.The
orderwasquestionedintheappealundersection90oftheActwhichwasdismissedbytheJoint
Collectoron13.3.2000.Thereafter,WritPetitionNo.2229/2000waspreferredbeforetheHigh
CourtofJudicatureatAndhraPradeshwhichwasalsodismissedbytheHighCourton16.4.2001
andthesamewasquestionedbeforethisCourtwhichdismissedappealinBoddamNarsimha
(supra).

106.However,onbehalfoftherespondentsithasbeensubmittedthatBalaMallaiahhasbecome
pattedarvideconveyancedeeddated23.11.1959.ThecasesetupbyBalaMallaiahthathewas
jointlycultivatingthesuitlandalongwithhistwobrothersKomaraiahandAgaiahwasfoundto
bemeritlessandnegativedfortheperiodbetween1952and1959.On1.1.1973whenthe
notificationcametobeissued,BalaMallaiahwasnottheprotectedtenant.Thecasesetupby
BoddamNarsimharegardingprotectedtenancyandissuanceofownershipcertificatewas
negatived.ThisCourtnotedthatevenforthesakeofargumentsifitisacceptedthatBalawasa
protectedtenanton12.2.1956,hestillbecameapattedarvideconveyancedeeddated
23.11.1959,andinanyeventassumedprotectedtenancydidnotcontinueupto1.1.1973,and
therefore,theappellantwasnotentitledtoownershipcertificateundersection38E.Section38E
oftheActof1950hadnoapplicationtothefactsofthecase.ThisCourthasdiscussedthematter
thus:

13.BalawasakaulwhohadtakenanannualleasefromHamidAliKhan.Hewasatenantat
will.Thiswasduringthependencyofthepartitionsuit.Hebecameapattedarvideconveyance
dated23111959.Thekaulitselfindicates,thatBalawastocultivateinhisindividualcapacity;
thatattheendoftheyear,Balahadtoreturnthelandstotheowner;thatBalawasnotgiventhe
righttoincludeanyothercultivator.Therefore,thereisnomeritinthecontentionofthe
appellantthatBalawasjointlycultivatingthesuitlandswithhistwobrothersAgaiah(fatherof
theappellant)andKomaraiah.Further,betweentenancyandtheconveyance,therewasatime
gap.HamidAliKhanwasapattedar.HisrightswerepurchasedbyBalavideconveyancedated
23111959,therefore,on111973,whenthenotificationcametobeissued,Balawasnotthe
tenant.Hewasapattedar.Moreover,theappellanthereinisnottheLRofBala.Balawashis
paternaluncle.Atnopointoftime,eventheLRsofBalahadclaimedthatBalawasaprotected
tenant.ItisevidentfromSection38Ethatthesaidsectionhasbeenenactedforthoseprotected
tenantswhoaredeclaredtobeprotectedtenantsandincludedintheregisterpreparedforthat
purpose.Apersonbecomesaprotectedtenantwhenheisaholderonthedatesorfortheperiods
mentionedinSections35,37and37A.Onceapersonbecomesaprotectedtenant,heisentitled
toanownershipcertificateunderSection38E.InSadav.TahsildarAIR1988AP77FullBench
oftheAndhraPradeshHighCourtheldthatapersonholdsthelandasprotectedtenantifheis
stillaprotectedtenantonthenotifieddatei.e.111973,thoughoutofpossession.Aslongashis
rightasprotectedtenanthasnotbeendeterminedbythedateofnotificationinamannerknown
totheAct,heholdsthelandasaprotectedtenant,whetherphysicallyinpossessionornot.For
thevestingofownershipoflandheldbyaprotectedtenantunderSection38E,itisnot
necessarythattheprotectedtenantshouldbeinphysicalpossessionon111973.Itissufficient
ifhecontinuestoholdthestatusofaprotectedtenantonthenotifieddate,evenifheisnotin
physicalpossession.TheActdoesnotmerelyregulatetherelationshipoflandlordandtenantbut
dealswiththealienationofagriculturallandandincludestransferofthelandholder'sinterestto
theprotectedtenants.Therefore,thegrantofpattedari(ownershiprights)alsofindsplaceinthe
Act.

14.Onthefactsandcircumstancesofthepresentcase,Balahadbecomeapattedar(owner)
undertheconveyancedeeddated23111959.Hisnamewasshownasapattedarevenpriorto1
11973.ThebenefitofSection38Eisgiventopersonswhoholdthelandsasprotectedtenants
andwhocontinuetoholdthelandsasprotectedtenantson111973.Theprotectedtenancyhas
tobeenforcedon111973.UnderSection38E,ownershiprightsareconferredonlyupon
personswhocontinuetobeprotectedtenantsason111973.Theyformaspecialclass.Inthe
presentcase,asstatedabove,Balabecameapattedarin1959.InSada(supra)ithasbeenheld
thatprotectedtenantsarecoveredbyChapterIVoftheAct.Theyfallunderalimitedcategory.
TheyarereferredtoinSections34,37and37A.Inthesaidjudgment,ithasbeenheldthat
Section37A,introducedbyAct3of1956dealswithaseparateclassofpersonsdeemedtobe
protectedtenants.Thisclassofpersonsisdifferentfromthecategoryofprotectedtenantswho
fallunderSections34and37respectively.Section37Areferstopersonswhoareholdersofthe
landatthecommencementofamendingActof1955(1231956).Thesepersonswererequired
tobetenantson1231956andthattheyshouldcontinuetobetenantstill111973.Onlysuch
categoryofpersonsareentitledtoownershipcertificateunderSection38E.Inthepresentcase,
evenforthesakeofargument,ifweweretoproceedonthebasisthatBalawasaprotected
tenanton1231956,stillBalabecameapattedarvideconveyancedeeddated23111959,
therefore,inanyevent,theassumedprotectedtenancydidnotcontinueupto111973.Inour
opinion,therefore,inanyviewofthematter,theappellanthereinwasnotentitledtothe
ownershipcertificateunderSection38EoftheAct.Section38Ehasnoapplicationtothefacts
ofthepresentcase.

107.ThisCourtinaforesaidcasehasonlydecidedthequestionaboutprotectedtenancywhich
wasclaimedandissuanceofownershipcertificatebyBoddamNarsimhaundersection38E.No
otherquestionwasinvolvedforconsiderationintheproceedingsundertheActof1950.Thus,
thedecisioncannotbetakentobeanauthorityonaquestionwhichwasnotagitated.Boddam
NarsimhawhofiledthesaidproceedingshadlostuptothisCourtandinthattherewasamere
mentionofthefactthatbyvirtueoftheconveyancedeed,BalaMallaiahbecamepattedarvide
registeredsaledeeddated23.11.1959.Therewasnoadjudicationonthevariousissuesastothe
legalityorvalidityofthesaidrightswhichcouldbeconferredbysaledeedandtowhatextent
HamidAliKhancouldhavealienatedtoBalaMallaiahandissueaboutlispendensetc.never
cameupforconsideration.Thus,thedecisionisofnohelpandcannotbetakentobean
adjudicationbythisCourtwithrespecttotherightsofHamidAliKhanorBalaMallaiahin
matrukapropertieswhichwasnotanissueintheaforesaidcase.Thescopeoftheproceedings
andtheissueinvolvedweretotallydifferent.Thus,nosustenancecanbederivedbythe
respondentsbyrelyingupontheaforesaiddecisioninwhichBoddamNarsimhainfacthadlost.

108.ItwasalsocontendedthatHamidAliKhanwasrecordedaspattedarafterthedeathof
NawabJung.TheplaintiffsandotherheirsofLateNawabJungwereawarethatthenameof
HamidAliKhanhadbeenrecordedintherevenuerecords.Thetransferwasmadewiththe
permissionoftheCollectorundersection47ofthe1950Act.Anypersonaffectedbyanyentry
insuchrecordofrightsunderRegulation4oftheHyderabadRecordofRightsinLand
Regulations,1948wasrequiredtoquestionthesamewithintwoyears.BalaMallaiahwasin
possession.Thus,thedecreewhichhasbeenpassedignoringtherightsofthepattedarisbadin
law.Inouropinion,admittedly,itwasamatrukapropertyofLateNawabJung.Thesuitfor
partitionwaspendingw.e.f.1935andmutationsimpliciterinthenameofHamidAliKhan
conferrednoright,titleorinterest.Themutationisonlyforthefiscalpurposeandisnotdecisive
ofright,titleorinterestinthepropertywhichiswithinthedomainofthecivilcourt.Thegrantof
pattafrom1953onwardsbyHamidAliKhantoBalaMallaiahwasonyearlybasisandthe
executionofsaledeedandthegrantoflandonyearlybasiswereduringlispendens.Thus,the
transactionsarecoveredbythedoctrineoflispendensandwereclearlysubjecttotheoutcomeof
thependingpartitionproceedings.InVenkatraoAnantdeoJoshiv.Malatibai(2003)1SCC722,
aquestioncameupforconsiderationassumingthatpendingsuitforpartition,abataipatrawas
executedonthebasisofwhichtenancyrightswereclaimed.Itwasheldthatsuchbataipatra
wouldnotconferanyrightontheperson.Itbeinghitbytheprincipleoflispendens.ThisCourt
hasheldthus:

8.Atthetimeofhearingofthisappeal,learnedcounselfortheappellantssubmittedthatthe
pleaoftenancyraisedbyBaburaoisonthefaceofit,bogussoastodefeattherightsofthe
appellantswhicharecrystallisedatthetimeofpassingofthepreliminarydecree.Presumingthat
pendingthesuitforpartition,evenifbataipatraisexecuted,itwouldnotconferanyrightson
Baburaoasitishitbyprinciplesoflispendens.Inanycase,asthepreliminarydecreebecomes
final,itwasnotopenforBaburaotoraisesuchcontentionatthetimeofpassingoffinaldecree
forpartition.

9.Withregardtolispendens,learnedcounselfortheappellantsrightlyreferredtothejudgment
anddecreepassedinRegularCivilSuitNo.51of1973andcontendedthatpresumingthatthe
socalledbataipatrawasatallexecutedbyAnantdeo,itwasnotopentohimtoexecutethe
samependingdisposalofthesuitfiledbyAppellant1forpartitionoftheproperty.Inthatsuit,
Appellant1andhismotherhadchallengedthetransferoflandoutofSurveyNo.60/Aandalso
forpartitionofthesuitproperty.Byelaboratejudgmentandorder,thesuitfiledbytheappellants
wasdecreedtotheextentthattheywereentitledto2/3rdshareinthesuitproperties.Thecourt
hadalsodirectedmesneprofits.Tillthedateofthedecree,itwascontendedbyAnantdeothathe
wasinpossessionofportionofthesuitlandandtheremainingportionwasinpossessionof
Malatibai,inviewofthesaledeedinherfavour.Ithasalsobeenspecificallycontendedthatfor
sometime,propertywasinpossessionofBaburaopriortomarriageofShakuntalaBaiandthen
inpossessionofonePandurangSaokarandlastlyitwasinpossessionofMalatibaiandhimself.
ThecourtspecificallyarrivedattheconclusionthatAnantdeowasinpossessionofthesuit
propertyandthesocalledtransferwaswithoutanylegalandfamilynecessityasallegedand,
therefore,theappellantswereentitledto2/3rdshareinthesuitproperty.Intherevenuerecords
also,thereisnomutationinfavourofBaburao.Further,thesocalledcompromisedecreein
CivilSuitNo.288of1981againstAnantdeoandMalatibaiwouldnotconferanytitleagainstthe
appellant.

10.Further,inasuitforpartitionwherepreliminarydecreeispassed,atthetimeofpassingof
thefinaldecreeitwasnotopentotherespondenttoraisethecontentionthathewasatenantof
thesuitpremises.Section97CPCspecificallyprovidesthatwhereanypartyaggrievedbythe
preliminarydecreedoesnotappealfromthesaiddecree,heisprecludedfromdisputingits
correctnessinanyappealwhichmaybepreferredfromthefinaldecree.

109.Inviewoftheaforesaid,wefindnoforceinthesubmissionsraisedonbehalfofthe
respondentsbaseduponpattedarrightsasitwassubjecttosection52ofT.P.Actandthesameis
herebyrejected.

(xi)Inre:whatistheeffectofdecisionofthisCourtandHighCourtwithrespecttofinal
decreeproceedingsinItemNo.2ofScheduleBproperty:

110.WithrespecttoitemNo.2ofPlaintBschedulepropertyonePadminiCooperative
HousingSocietyLtd.filedanobjectioninthefinaldecreeproceedings.Thetrialcourtvideorder
dated29.3.1996rejectedtheobjectionwhichwaspreferred.Firstappealpreferredwasalso
dismissedbyaSingleJudgeon23.4.1997.LPANo.104/1997wasfiledwhichwasdismissedby
aDivisionBenchoftheHighCourton20.11.1998.ThenSLP[C]No.3558/1999wasfiledin
thisCourtwhichhasbeendismissedbyaspeakingorderaffirmingthejudgmentandorder
passedbytheexecutingcourtandtheHighCourt.AperusalofthejudgmentoftheHighCourt
inLPAindicatesthattheHighCourthadheldthatinMohammedanLawthereisnorecognition
forasalebyacoshareroftheentireestateandthattheothercosharersarenotboundbysuch
saleandsaiddecisionevenwenttotheextentofsayingthatevenwhenthesalewasmeantfor
dischargingthedebtsofancestor,whosepropertyhaddevolveduponthesharers,thesaidsale
withouttheconsentofothercosharersisinvalidanddoesnotconferanyrightonthepurchaser
withregardtosuchcosharerswhodonotjointhesaidsale.Thedecisionhasbeenaffirmedby
thisCourtvideorderdated1.10.1999inSLP[C]No.3558/1999.Followingorderwaspassedby
thisCourt:

Afterhearingargumentsexhaustivelyformorethantwohoursandafterconsideringthe
preliminarydecreedated24.11.70,themodifiedpreliminarydecreepassedbytheHighCourt,
theCommissioner'sreportdated14.7.95,finaldecreepassedbytheCityCivilCourtdated
11.2.96,thejudgmentofthelearnedSingleJudgedated23.4.97,thejudgmentoftheDivision
Benchdated24.11.93andtheotherpassedbytheHighCourtinCRP.No.700/94dated30.8.94
andafterconsideringthevariousrulingsoftheCourtscitedbeforeusbythelearnedsenior
counselonbothsides,wearenotinclinedtointerferewithinSLP.TheSLPisdismissed.

111.AtleastonpointoflawthedecisionofthisCourtbeingareasonedorderhasrelevanceand
thedecisionintheaforesaidmatterinsamecasealsosupportstheviewwhichhasbeentakenby
usonmerits.

(xii)Inre:whetherthereiswaiverofrightbyappellants:

112.Itwasalsosubmittedthatonbehalfoftherespondentsthatthereiswaiverofrightsbythe
plaintiffandotherheirsofLateNawabJungwithrespecttodisputedproperty,andtheycannot
bepermittedtoapprobateandreprobate.InBoddamNarsimha(supra),standwastakenthatBala
Mallaiahwasthepattedar,thus,theyareboundbytheirsaidrepresentationandcannotwriggle
outofit.TheyhaverelieduponthedecisioninC.Beepathumav.VelasariShankaranarayana
KadambolithayaAIR1965SC241ontheprincipleofapprobateandreprobateasalsothe
decisioninMumbaiInternationalAirport(P)Ltd.v.GoldenChariotAirport(2010)10SCC422
inwhichithasbeenobservedthatthecontestingrespondenthasblownhotandcoldbytaking
inconsistentstandswhichisnotpermissible.

113.Infact,duringthependencyofthepartitionsuitwithrespecttoancestralpropertyofLate
NawabJang,HamidAliKhandefendantNo.1hadalienatedthepropertytreatingitashis
ownwhereasitwasobviouslysubjecttotherightofothercosharesfinallydeclaredinthe
preliminarydecree.BalaMallaiahandhissuccessorshavefiledseveralproceedings,civilsuitof
1993inwhichtheyhavefailed.BoddamNarsimha,nephewofBalaMallaiahalsofiled
proceedingsundertheActof1950forissuanceofownershipcertificatebyvirtueoftheirbeing
protectedtenantswhichcasewasalsodismissed.Thus,thestandwhichwastakenbyappellants
undertheprotectedTenancyActwasnotatallinconsistentanddidnotamounttoapprobation
andreprobationonthepartoftheheirsofLateNawabJung.Landgrabbingproceedingswere
alsoinstitutedbyLRs.ofBalaMallaiahandhisbrothers.Theproceedingsweredismissedand
W.P.No.15577/2001filedbeforetheHighCourtwasalsodismissedvideorderdated30.1.2002.
Afterhavinglostintheaforesaidproceedings,belatedlytheobjectionhadbeenpreferredinthe
finaldecreeproceedingsforpartition.Theconductofpurchasersmakesitclearthatthey
institutedmultifariousproceedings,andtookinconsistentstandswhichwerenotacceptedbythis
CourtinBoddamNarsimha(supra).Theappellantsortheirpredecessorshadnottaken
inconsistentstands.Theywereclearlyprotectedbydoctrineoflispendens.

(xiii)Inre:whetherappellantsareguiltyofdelayorlaches:

114.Itwasalsosubmittedthatapreliminarydecreerecognizedtherightsofthetransfereestobe
adjudicatedatthetimeoffinaldecreeproceedingsandnostepsweretakenbythelegalheirs
afterpassingofthepreliminarydecreewaybackin1970toimpleadthem.Theproceedingsfor
finaldecreewereinitiatedintheyear1984.Theappellantshavenottakenpromptsteps,assuch
theyarenotentitledtoanyindulgencefromthisCourt.Reliancehasbeenplacedupon
MunicipalCouncil,Ahmednagarv.ShahHyderBeig(2000)2SCC48tocontendthatanydelay
onthepartofthepartiesdefeatstherights.

115.Wearenotimpressedbyanyoftheaforesaidsubmissions.Thepreliminarydecreepassed
in1970wasclearlyagainsttheinterestofthepurchasersastheirvendorwasnotfoundtohave
therightswhichwasnotassailedbythem.Thepreliminarydecreeattainedfinalityintheyear
1976andproceedingsforfinaldecreetakenin1984werewithintheperiodoflimitation.Asa
matteroffact,LRs.ofBalaMallaiahandhisbrotheretc.tookstepsintheyear1993and
onwardsbyfilingsuccessivecasesasenumeratedabove.Therewasnodelayonthepartofthe
appellantsdefeatingtheirrights.Itwastherespondentswhohavinglostinthethreeproceedings
oneaftertheother,raisedobjectionintheyear2004inthefinaldecreeproceedings.What
preventedthemfromdoingsointheyear1993,hasnotatallbeenexplained.Thus,itisthey
whoareresponsibletodelayinthefinaldecreeproceedingsinapartitioncaseinstitutedinthe
year1935andthematterisstillpendingintheshapeofinstantappealsbeforethisCourt.

(xiv)Inre:theeffectundertheUrbanLandCeilingAct:
116.ItwasalsosubmittedthatundertheUrbanLandCeilingActproceedings,thelandwasnot
showntobebelongingtotheheirsofLateNawabJung.Theorderspassedinurbanlandceiling
casehavenotbeenplacedonrecord.Thatapart,itwasstatedthattheproceedingslapseddueto
repealofUrbanLandCeilingAct.Bethatasitmay.Therespondentsarepurchasersfrombranch
ofBalaMallaiahwhosevendorwasdefendantNo.1.Thepropertyhasfurtherexchangedhands.
Sincetheordershavenotbeenplacedonrecord,intheaforesaidfactualscenario,wedeclineto
examinetheaforesaidpropositionfurtherandwewerenotapprisedhowthepurchaserscould
claimabetterrightthantheonepossessedbytheirvendor.WeleaveitopentotheState
Governmenttoexaminethequestionofceilingandeffectofthedecision.

117.Acompromisepetitionhasbeenfiledwithrespecttoarea18acres25guntas.Asperthe
compromisethedivisionofthepropertyhastotakeplacebetweentheappellantsandthenewly
addedrespondentNos.87to127.Samewasobjectedtobyoneofheirs.Itwillinvolvetransfer
oftheproperty,hence,weleavethepartiestohaveresorttoanappropriateremedyinthisregard.
Itisfoundnottoberecordableintheformoftransactioninwhichithasbeenfiled.

118.Resultantly,theappealsareallowed.ImpugnedjudgmentanddecreepassedbytheHigh
Courtissetaside.ThefinaldecreeoftheTrialCourtisrestored.CostsofRs.1,00,000/tobe
paidwithintwomonthsfromtoday.

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