CASE 8

In re: Petiton to disqualify Atty. Leonardo de Vera

FACTS:

Atty. De Vera made some remarks to the Philippine Daily Inquirer regarding a pending case
involving the constitutionality of the Plunder Law. In one statement, he asked the SC to dispel
rumors that it would vote in favor of a petition filed by Estradas lawyers to declare the plunder law
unconstitutional and that his group was greatly disturbed by the rumors. In another statement, he
said that a decision in favor of the laws unconstitutionality would trigger mass actions and the
people would not just swallow any SC decision that is basically wrong. Atty. De Vera admitted to
making the statements but that these were factually accurate and that these are within his right to
freedom of speech. Also, his second statement is allegedly historically correct (Marcos and Erap
times) but that both statements are not to degrade the court, to destroy public confidence and to
bring it into disrepute. The SC found that de Veras acts constitute indirect contempt and fined him
P20, 000.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Atty. De Veras acts constitute a violation of the provisions of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

RULING:

Yes. Freedom of speech is not absolute, and must be balanced with the requirements of equally
important public interests, such as the maintenance of the integrity of the courts and orderly
functioning of the administration of justice. De Vera is in abuse of his right. Unwarranted attacks
on the dignity of the courts cannot be disguised as free speech, for the exercise of said right
cannot be used to impair the independence and efficiency of courts or public respect and
confidence thereof. His statements are not fair criticisms of any decision of the Court, but are
threats made against it to force the Court to decide the issue in a particular manner, or risk
earning the ire of the public. It tends to promote distrust an undermines public confidence in the
judiciary, by creating the impression that the Court cannot be trusted to resolve cases impartially,
uninfluenced by public clamor and other extraneous influences.
CASE 13

DIGEST Letter of Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo, Jr. B.M. No. 1370 May 9, 2005

FACTS:

Petitioners files a motion for exemption for paying his IBP dues from 1977-2005 in the amount of
P12,035.00. He contends that after admission to the Bar he worked at the Phil. Civil Service then
migrated to the US until his retirement. His contention to be exempt is that his employment with
the CSC prohibits him to practice his law profession and he did not practice the same while in the
US. The compulsion that he pays his IBP annual membership is oppressive since he has an
inactive status as a lawyer. His removal from the profession because of non-payment of the same
constitutes to the deprivation of his property rights bereft of due process of the law.

ISSUE:

WON inactive practice of the law profession is an exemption to payment for IBP annual
membership.

RULING:

The court held that the imposition of the membership fee is a matter of regulatory measure by the
State, which is a necessary consequence for being a member of the Philippine Bar. The
compulsory requirement to pay the fees subsists for as long as one remains to be a member
regardless whether one is a practicing lawyer or not. Thus, his petition for exemption from paying
his IBP membership fee dues is denied.
CASE 16 LINSANGAN VS. ATTY. TOLENTINO

FACTS:

Atty. Pedro Linsangan filed an administrative complaint against Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino alleging
that Atty. Tolentino, through his paralegal Fe Marie Labiano, pirated a client of Atty. Linsangan.
Said client later executed an affidavit in support of Atty. Linsangans allegations.
Atty. Linsangan also questioned the propriety of Labianos calling card. In his defense, Atty.
Tolentino denied knowing Labiano. He also denied authorizing the printing of such calling cards.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino encroached upon the professional services of Atty.
Pedro Linsangan.
2. Whether or not Atty. Tolentino is liable for the improper calling card of Labiano.

RULING:

1. Yes. Atty. Tolentino violated Rule 8.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. A lawyer
should not steal another lawyers client nor induce the latter to retain him by a promise of better
service, good result or reduced fees for his services. By recruiting Atty. Linsangans clients, Atty.
Tolentino committed an unethical, predatory overstep into anothers legal practice.
2. Yes. Atty. Tolentino violated Rules 1.03, 2.03, and 16.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Although Atty. Tolentino initially denied knowing Labiano, he admitted he actually
knew her later in the proceedings. It is thus clear that Labiano was connected to his law
office. Through Labianos actions, Atty. Tolentinos law practice was benefited. Hapless seamen
were enticed to transfer representation on the strength of Labianos word that Atty. Tolentino could
produce a more favorable result.
Labianos calling card is improper. The card made it appear that the law office will finance legal
actions for the clients. The rule is, a lawyer shall not lend money to a client except, when in the
interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling for the
client. The rule is intended to safeguard the lawyers independence of mind so that the free
exercise of his judgment may not be adversely affected. If the lawyer lends money to the client in
connection with the clients case, the lawyer in effect acquires an interest in the subject matter of
the case or an additional stake in its outcome. These circumstances may lead the lawyer to
consider his own recovery rather than that of his client, or to accept a settlement which may take
care of his interest in the verdict to the prejudice of the client in violation of his duty of undivided
fidelity to the clients cause.
The phrase in the calling card which states w/ financial assistance, was clearly used to entice
clients (who already had representation) to change counsels with a promise of loans to finance
their legal actions.
However, since there is no substantial evidence to prove that Atty. Tolentino had a personal and
direct hand in the printing of said calling cards, he cannot be punished with severity. At any rate,
for all the infractions Atty. Tolentino committed, he was suspended by the Supreme Court for one
year.
CASE 23

OMAR P. ALI, complainant, vs. ATTY. MOSIB A. BUBONG, respondent. A.C. No. 4018.
March 8, 2005

FACTS:

This is a verified petition for disbarment filed against Atty. Mosib Ali Bubong for having been found
guilty of grave misconduct while holding the position of Register of Deeds of Marawi City. It
appears that this disbarment proceeding is an off-shoot of the administrative case earlier filed by
complainant against respondent, which was initially investigated by the Land Registration
Authority (LRA), complainant charged respondent with illegal exaction; indiscriminate issuance of
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT); and manipulating the criminal complaint filed against Hadji
Serad Bauduli Datu and others for violation of the Anti-Squatting Law. It appears from the records
that the Baudali Datus are relatives of respondent. The initial inquiry by the LRA was resolved in
favor of respondent, absolved respondent of all the charges brought against him.

The case was then forwarded to the DOJ for review, then SoJ Franklin Drilon exonerated
respondent of the charges of illegal exaction and infidelity in the custody of documents, but held
guilty of grave misconduct for his imprudent issuance of TCT and manipulating the criminal case
for violation of the Anti-Squatting Law instituted against Hadji Serad Bauduli Datu and the latters
co-accused. As a result of this finding, former President FVR issued AO No. 41 adopting in
toto the conclusion reached by Secretary Drilon.
On the disbarment proceeding, complainant claims that it has become obvious that respondent
had proven himself unfit to be further entrusted with the duties of an attorney and that he poses a
serious threat to the integrity of the legal profession. Respondent maintains that there was
nothing irregular with his issuance of the TCT in the name of the Bauduli Datus.

The IBP commenced the investigation of this disbarment suit. The finding of Grave Misconduct on
the part of respondent by the Office of the President was fully supported by evidence and as such
carries a very strong weight in considering the professional misconduct of respondent in the
present case. The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved, with modification, which
pertained solely to the period of suspension from the practice of law from a five-year suspension
to a two-year suspension to be proper.

ISSUE:

WON respondent may be disbarred for grave misconduct committed while he was in the employ
of the government.

RULING:

yes.
The Code of Professional Responsibility does not cease to apply to a lawyer simply because he
has joined the government service. In fact, by the express provision of Canon 6 thereof, the rules
governing the conduct of lawyers shall apply to lawyers in government service in the discharge of
their official tasks. Thus, where a lawyers misconduct as a government official is of such nature
as to affect his qualification as a lawyer or to show moral delinquency, then he may be disciplined
as a member of the bar on such grounds. Although the general rule is that a lawyer who holds a
government office may not be disciplined as a member of the bar for infractions he committed as
a government official, he may, however, be disciplined as a lawyer if his misconduct constitutes a
violation of his oath a member of the legal profession.
In the case at bar, respondents grave misconduct, as established by the Office of the President
and subsequently affirmed by this Court, deals with his qualification as a lawyer. By taking
advantage of his office as the Register of Deeds of Marawi City and employing his knowledge of
the rules governing land registration for the benefit of his relatives, respondent had clearly
demonstrated his unfitness not only to perform the functions of a civil servant but also to retain his
membership in the bar. Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is explicit on this
matter. It reads: Rule 6.02 A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to
promote or advance his private interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his public duties.

As for the letter sent by Bainar Ali, the deceased complainants daughter, requesting for the
withdrawal of this case, we cannot possibly favorably act on the same as proceedings of this
nature cannot be interrupted or terminated by reason of desistance, settlement, compromise,
restitution, withdrawal of the charges or failure of the complainant to prosecute the same. As we
have previously explained in the case of Irene Rayos-Ombac v. Atty. Orlando A. Rayos:
A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest of the
complainant. What matters is whether, on the basis of the facts borne out by the record, the
charge of deceit and grossly immoral conduct has been duly proven. This rule is premised on the
nature of disciplinary proceedings. A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not in any sense
a civil action where the complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant.
Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance.
They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare. They are undertaken for the
purpose of preserving courts of justice from the official ministration of persons unfit to practice in
them. The attorney is called to answer to the court for his conduct as an officer of the court. The
complainant or the person who called the attention of the court to the attorneys alleged
misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome except as all
good citizens may have in the proper administrative of justice.
The respondent Atty. Mosib A. Bubong is hereby DISBARRED.

CASE 27

[A.M. No. P-220. December 20, 1978.]

FACTS:

Apart from appearing as counsel in various municipal courts without prior permission of his
superiors in violation of civil service rules and regulations, respondent court interpreter also
falsified his time records by making it appear therein that he was present in his office on
occasions when in fact he was in the municipal court appearing as counsel, without being a
member of the bar, which furthermore, constitutes illegal practice of law. The investigating judge
recommended the reprimand of respondent.
The Supreme Court dismissed the respondent from his position as court interpreter.

ISSUE:

IS THE RESPONDENT AS COURT INTERPRETER ALLOWED TO PRACTICE LAW?

RULING:

NO.
Only members of the bar are allowed to practice law. The fact that respondent court interpreter
appeared a number of times as counsel indicates that he was doing it as a regular practice
obviously for considerations other than pure love of justice; and his appearance as counsel,
without being a member
The appearance as counsel in various municipal courts by a court interpreter, without prior
permission of his superiors in violation of civil service rules and regulations, and the falsification of
his daily time record to make it appear therein that he was present in his office when in fact he
was not, are grave offenses which warrant his separation from the service.

Respondent Felicisimo Malinao is dismissed from his position as interpreter in the Court of First
Instance, CFI, Zumarraga, Western Samar, with prejudice to reemployment in the judicial branch
of the government.
CASE 29

LUZVIMINDA C. LIJAUCO vs. ATTY. ROGELIO P. TERRADO

FACTS:

Luzviminda C. Lijauco engaged the services of Atty. Rogelio P. Terrado for P 70,000 to assist in
recovering her deposit with Planters Development Bank in the amount of P180,000 and the
release of her foreclosed house and lot located in Calamba, Laguna. The said foreclosed house
and lot is the subject of a petition for the issuance of writ of possession then pending before the
RTC of Binan Laguna.

Ms. Lijauco alleged that Atty. Terrado failed to appear in the hearing for the issuance of Writ of
Possession and did not protect her interest in allowing her to participate in a Compromise
Agreement in order to end the case. She filed an administrative complaint against Atty. Terrado
for gross misconduct, malpractice and conduct unbecoming of an officer of the court. In his
defense, Atty. Terrado claims that the P 70,000 legal fees he received is purely and solely for the
recovery of the P 180,000 savings account. The complaint was then referred to the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. The Investigating
Commissioner submitted his report finding Atty. Terrado guilty of violating Rule 1.01 and 9.02 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) and recommended that he be suspended from the
practice of law for six (6) months. The IBP Board of Governors adopted the recommendation of
the investigating commissioner.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the ruling of the IBP Board of Governors is proper?

RULING:

Yes. The Supreme Court agreed with the findings of the IBP. The records show that Atty. Terrado
acted as complainants counsel in the drafting of the compromise agreement between Ms. Lijauco
and the bank regarding the case. He lured Ms. Lijauco to participate in a compromise agreement
with a false and misleading assurance that the latter can still recover her foreclosed property even
after three years from foreclosure. Atty. Terrado violated Rule 1.01 Canon 1 of the CPR which
says that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Furthermore, the Investigating Commissioner observed that the fee of P 70,000 for legal
assistance in the recovery of the deposit amounting to P 180,000 is unreasonable and is violative
of Canon 20 of the CPR. Atty. Terrada was also found guilty of violating Rule 9.02 of the CPR by
openly admitting that he divided the legal fees with two other people as a referral fee.