Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Baguio City

SECOND DIVISION

FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR. G.R. No. 189434

Petitioner,

- versus -

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,

represented by the Presidential
Commission on Good Government,
Respondent.

x--------------------------x G.R. No. 189505

IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS,
Petitioner , Present:

- versus - BRION, J.,

Acting Chairperson,
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, ABAD,
Respondent. PEREZ,
SERENO, and
REYES, JJ.

Promulgated:

April 25, 2012

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION
SERENO, J.:

These two consolidated Petitions filed under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure pray for the reversal of the 2 April 2009 Decision of the
Sandiganbayan in Civil Case No. 0141 entitled Republic of the Philippines v.
Heirs of Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos.[1] The anti-graft court
granted the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment filed by respondent Republic
of the Philippines (Republic) and declared all assets and properties of Arelma,
S.A., an entity created by the late Ferdinand E. Marcos, forfeited in favor of the
government.

On 17 December 1991, the Republic, through the Presidential Commission on

Good Government (PCGG), filed a Petition for Forfeiture[2] before the
Sandiganbayan pursuant to the forfeiture law, Republic Act No. 1379 (R.A. 1379)
[3]
in relation to Executive Order Nos. 1, 2 and 14.[4] The petition was docketed as
Civil Case No. 0141.

Respondent Republic, through the PCGG and the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), sought the declaration of Swiss bank accounts totaling USD 356 million
(now USD 658 million), and two treasury notes worth USD 25 million and USD 5
million, as ill-gotten wealth.[5] The Swiss accounts, previously held by five groups
of foreign foundations,[6]were deposited in escrow with the Philippine National
Bank (PNB), while the treasury notes were frozen by the Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas (BSP).

Respondent also sought the forfeiture of the assets of dummy corporations

and entities established by nominees of Marcos and his wife, Petitioner Imelda
Romualdez-Marcos, as well as real and personal properties manifestly out of
proportion to the spouses lawful income. This claim was based on evidence
collated by the PCGG with the assistance of the United States Justice Department
and the Swiss Federal Police Department. [7] The Petition for Forfeiture described
among others, a corporate entity by the name Arelma, Inc., which maintained an
account and portfolio in Merrill Lynch, New York, and which was purportedly
organized for the same purpose of hiding ill-gotten wealth.[8]

Before the case was set for pretrial, the Marcos children and PCGG
Chairperson Magtanggol Gunigundo signed several Compromise Agreements (a
General Agreement and Supplemental Agreements) all dated 28 December 1993
for a global settlement of the Marcos assets. One of the whereas clauses in the
General Agreement specified that the Republic obtained a judgment from the Swiss
Federal Tribunal on December 21, 1990, that the Three Hundred Fifty-six Million
U.S. dollars (USD 356 million) belongs in principle to the Republic of the
Philippines provided certain conditionalities are met xxx. This Decision was in turn
based on the finding of Zurich District Attorney Peter Cosandey that the deposits in
the name of the foundations were of illegal provenance.[9]

On 18 October 1996, respondent Republic filed a Motion for Summary

Judgment and/or judgment on the pleadings (the 1996 Motion) pertaining to the
forfeiture of the USD 356 million. The Sandiganbayan denied the 1996 Motion on
the sole ground that the Marcoses had earlier moved for approval of the
Compromise Agreements, and that this latter Motion took precedence over that for
summary judgment. Petitioner Imelda Marcos filed a manifestation claiming she
was not a party to the Motion for Approval of the Compromise Agreements, and
that she owned 90% of the funds while the remaining 10% belonged to the Marcos
estate.[10]

On 10 March 2000, the Republic filed another Motion for Summary

Judgment (the 2000 Motion), based on the grounds that: (1) the essential facts that
warrant the forfeiture of the funds subject of the Petition under R.A. 1379 are
admitted by respondents in their pleadings and other submissions; and (2) the
respondent Marcoses pretrial admission that they did not have any interest or
ownership over the funds subject of the action for forfeiture tendered no genuine
issue or controversy as to any material fact.

In a 19 September 2000 Decision, the Sandiganbayan initially granted the

2000 Motion, declaring that the Swiss deposits held in escrow at the PNB were ill-
gotten wealth, and, thus, forfeited in favor of the State. [11] In a Resolution dated 31
January 2002, the Sandiganbayan reversed its earlier ruling and denied the 2000
Motion. Alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the court in rendering the
later Resolution, the Republic filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Supreme
Court. In G.R. No. 152154 entitledRepublic of the Philippines v.
Sandiganbayan (for brevity, the Swiss Deposits Decision),[12] this Court set aside
the 31 January 2002 Sandiganbayan Resolution and reinstated the 19 September
2000 Decision, including the declaration that the Swiss deposits are ill-gotten
wealth. On 18 November 2003, the Court denied with finality petitioner Marcoses
Motion for Reconsideration.
 On 16 July 2004, the Republic filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
(2004 Motion) to declare the funds, properties, shares in and interests of
ARELMA, wherever they may be located, as ill-gotten assets and forfeited in favor
of the Republic of the Philippines pursuant to R.A. 1379 in the same manner (that)
the Honorable Supreme Court forfeited in favor of the petitioner the funds and
assets of similar Marcos foundations such as AVERTINA, VIBUR, AGUAMINA,
MALER and PALMY.[13] Petitioner contends that: (1) respondents are deemed to
have admitted the allegations of the Petition as regards Arelma; and (2) there is no
dispute that the combined lawful income of the Marcoses is grossly
disproportionate to the deposits of their foundations and dummy corporations,
including Arelma. Ferdinand Marcos, Jr., Imelda Marcos, and Imee Marcos-
Manotoc filed their respective Oppositions. Irene Marcos-Araneta filed a Motion to
Expunge on the ground that the proceedings in Civil Case No. 0141 had already
terminated.

On 2 April 2009, the Sandiganbayan rendered the assailed Decision granting

respondents Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. [14] It found that the
proceedings in Civil Case No. 0141 had not yet terminated, as the Petition for
Forfeiture included numerous other properties, which the Sandiganbayan and
Supreme Court had not yet ruled upon. The Republics 1996 Motion was merely
held in abeyance to await the outcome of the global settlement of the Marcos
assets. Further, this development had prompted the Republic to file the 2000
Motion, which was clearly limited only to the Swiss accounts amounting to USD
356 million. Thus, according to the Sandiganbayan, its 19 September 2000
Decision as affirmed by the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 152154, was in the nature
of a separate judgment over the Swiss accounts and did not preclude a subsequent
judgment over the other properties subject of the same Petition for Forfeiture, such
as those of Arelma.[15] The Sandiganbayan held as follows:

WHEREFORE, considering all the foregoing, the Motion for Partial

Summary Judgment dated July 16, 2004 of petitioner is
hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, Partial Summary Judgment is hereby rendered
declaring the assets, investments, securities, properties, shares, interests, and
funds of Arelma, Inc., presently under management and/or in an account at the
Meryll (sic) Lynch Asset Management, New York, U.S.A., in the estimated
aggregate amount of US$3,369,975.00 as of 1983, plus all interests and all other
income that accrued thereon, until the time or specific day that all money or
 monies are released and/or transferred to the possession of the Republic of the
Philippines, are hereby forfeited in favor of petitioner Republic of the Philippines.

SO ORDERED.[16]

On 22 October 2009, Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr. filed the instant Rule 45

Petition, questioning the said Decision. [17] One week later, Imelda Marcos filed a
separate Rule 45 Petition[18] on essentially identical grounds, which was later
consolidated with the first Petition. The grievances of both petitioners boil down to
the following issues:

1. Whether the forfeiture proceeding, Civil Case No. 0141 with the
Sandiganbayan is criminal in nature, such that summary judgment is not
allowed;

2. Whether petitioner Republic complied with Section 3, subparagraphs

c, d, and e of R.A. 1375;

3. Whether Civil Case No. 0141 has been terminated such that a motion
for partial summary judgment may no longer be allowed; and

4. Whether in this case there are genuine, triable issues which would
preclude the application of the rule on summary judgment.

I. Forfeiture proceedings are civil

in nature

Petitioner Ferdinand Marcos, Jr. argues that R.A. 1379 is a penal law; therefore a
person charged under its provisions must be accorded all the rights granted to an
accused under the Constitution and penal laws. [19] He asserts that the Marcoses
were entitled to all the substantial rights of an accused, one of these being the right
to present their evidence to a full blown trial as per Section 5 of R.A. 1379. [20] He
relies on the 1962 case, Cabal v. Kapunan,[21] where the Court ruled that:

We are not unmindful of the doctrine laid down in Almeda vs. Perez, L-
18428 (August 30, 1962) in which the theory that, after the filing of respondents'
answer to a petition for forfeiture under Republic Act No. 1379, said petition may
 not be amended as to substance pursuant to our rules of criminal procedure, was
rejected by this Court upon the ground that said forfeiture proceeding is civil in
nature. This doctrine refers, however, to the purely procedural aspect of said
proceeding, and has no bearing on the substantial rights of the respondents
therein, particularly their constitutional right against self-incrimination.

This argument fails to convince. Petitioner conveniently neglects to quote from the
preceding paragraphs of Cabal, which clearly classified forfeiture proceedings as
quasi-criminal, not criminal. And even so, Cabal declared that forfeiture cases
partake of a quasi-criminal nature only in the sense that the right against self-
incrimination is applicable to the proceedings, i.e., in which the owner of the
property to be forfeited is relieved from the compulsory production of his books
and papers:

Generally speaking, informations for the forfeiture of goods that seek no

judgment of fine or imprisonment against any person are deemed to be civil
proceedings in rem. Such proceedings are criminal in nature to the extent that
where the person using the res illegally is the owner or rightful possessor of it,
the forfeiture proceeding is in the nature of a punishment.

xxx xxx xxx

Proceedings for forfeitures are generally considered to be civil and in the

nature of proceedings in rem. The statute providing that no judgment or other
proceedings in civil cases shall be arrested or reversed for any defect or want of
form is applicable to them. In some aspects, however, suits for penalties and
forfeitures are of quasi-criminal nature and within the reason of criminal
proceedings for all the purposes of * * * that portion of the Fifth Amendment
which declares that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself. The proceeding is one against the owner, as well as
against the goods; for it is his breach of the laws which has to be proved to
establish the forfeiture and his property is sought to be forfeited.

xxx xxx xxx

As already observed, the various constitutions provide that no person shall

be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. This
prohibition against compelling a person to take the stand as a witness against
himself applies only to criminal, quasi-criminal, and penal
proceedings, including a proceeding civil in form for forfeiture of property by
reason of the commission of an offense, but not a proceeding in which the
penalty recoverable is civil or remedial in nature. (Emphasis supplied.)[22]
 The right of the Marcoses against self-incrimination has been amply
protected by the provisions of R.A. 1379, which prohibits the criminal prosecution
of individuals for or on account of any transaction, matter or thing concerning
which they are compelled -- after having claimed the privilege against self-
incrimination -- to testify or produce evidence, documentary or otherwise. [23] Since
this cases inception in 1991, petitioners have participated in the hearings, argued
their case, and submitted their pleadings and other documents, never once putting
at issue their right against self-incrimination or the violation thereof.[24]

More importantly, the factual context in the present case is wholly disparate
from that in Cabal, which was originally initiated as an action in personam.
Manuel C. Cabal, then Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, was
charged with graft, corrupt practices, unexplained wealth, conduct unbecoming of
an officer and gentleman, dictatorial tendencies, giving false statements of his
assets and liabilities in 1958 and other equally reprehensible acts. [25] In
contradistinction, the crux of the present case devolves solely upon the recovery of
assets presumptively characterized by the law as ill-gotten, and owned by the State;
hence, it is an action in rem. In Republic v. Sandiganbayan, this Court settled the
rule that forfeiture proceedings are actions in rem and therefore civil in nature.
[26]
Proceedings under R.A. 1379 do not terminate in the imposition of a penalty but
merely in the forfeiture of the properties illegally acquired in favor of the State.[27]

As early as Almeda v. Judge Perez,[28] we have already delineated the

difference between criminal and civil forfeiture and classified the proceedings
under R.A. 1379 as belonging to the latter, viz:

Forfeiture proceedings may be either civil or criminal in nature,

and may be in rem or in personam. If they are under a statute such
that if an indictment is presented the forfeiture can be included in
the criminal case, they are criminal in nature, although they may be
civil in form; and where it must be gathered from the statute that
the action is meant to be criminal in its nature it cannot be
considered as civil. If, however, the proceeding does not involve
the conviction of the wrongdoer for the offense charged the
proceeding is of a civil nature; and under statutes which
specifically so provide, where the act or omission for which the
forfeiture is imposed is not also a misdemeanor, such forfeiture
may be sued for and recovered in a civil action.
 In the first place a proceeding under the Act (Rep. Act No. 1379) does not
terminate in the imposition of a penalty but merely in the forfeiture of the
properties illegally acquired in favor of the state. (Sec. 6) In the second place the
procedure outlined in the law leading to forfeiture is that provided for in a civil
action. Thus there is a petition (Sec. 3), then an answer (Sec. 4), and lastly, a
hearing. The preliminary investigation which is required prior to the filing of the
petition, in accordance with Sec. 2 of the Act, is provided expressly to be
one similar to a preliminary investigation in a criminal case. If the investigation is
only similar to that in a criminal case, but the other steps in the proceedings are
those for civil proceedings, it stands to reason that the proceeding is not criminal.
xxx. (citations omitted)

Forfeiture cases impose neither a personal criminal liability, nor the civil
liability that arises from the commission of a crime (ex delicto). The liability is
based solely on a statute that safeguards the right of the State to recover unlawfully
acquired properties.[29] Executive Order No. 14 (E.O. No. 14), Defining the
Jurisdiction Over Cases Involving the Ill-gotten Wealth of Former President
Ferdinand Marcos, authorizes the filing of forfeiture suits that will proceed
independently of any criminal proceedings. Section 3 of E.O. 14 empowered the
PCGG to file independent civil actions separate from the criminal actions.[30]

Thus, petitioners cannot equate the present case with a criminal case and
assail the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan on the bare claim that they were
deprived of a full-blown trial. In affirming the Sandiganbayan and denying
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration in the Swiss Deposits Decision, the Court
held:

Section 5 of RA 1379 provides:

The court shall set a date for a hearing which may be open
to the public, and during which the respondent shall be given
ample opportunity to explain, to the satisfaction of the court,
how he has acquired the property in question.

And pursuant to Section 6 of the said law, if the respondent is unable to

show to the satisfaction of the court that he has lawfully acquired the property in
question, then the court shall declare such property forfeited in favor of the State.

xxx xxx xxx

 A careful analysis of Section 5 of RA 1379 readily discloses that the word
hearing does not always require the formal introduction of evidence in a trial, only
that the parties are given the occasion to participate and explain how they
acquired the property in question. If they are unable to show to the satisfaction of
the court that they lawfully acquired the property in question, then the court shall
declare such property forfeited in favor of the State. There is no provision in the
law that a full blown trial ought to be conducted before the court declares the
forfeiture of the subject property. Thus, even if the forfeiture proceedings do not
reach trial, the court is not precluded from determining the nature of the
acquisition of the property in question even in a summary proceeding.[31]

As forfeiture suits under R.A. 1379 are civil in nature, it follows that Rule 35
of the Rules of Court on Summary Judgment may be applied to the present case.
This is consistent with our ruling in the Swiss Deposits Decision upholding the
summary judgment rendered by the Sandiganbayan over the Swiss deposits, which
are subject of the same Petition for Forfeiture as the Arelma assets.

II. Republic complied with Section

3 (c), (d), and (e) of R.A. 1375

Petitioner Marcos, Jr. argues that there are genuine issues of fact as borne by
the Pre-trial Order, Supplemental Pre-trial Order, and the Pre-trial Briefs of the
parties. He laments that the Republic was unable to meet the necessary averments
under the forfeiture law, which requires a comparison between the approximate
amount of property acquired during the incumbency of Ferdinand Marcos, and the
total amount of governmental salaries and other earnings. [32] While the Petition
contained an analysis of Ferdinand Marcoss income from 1965 to 1986 (during his
incumbency), there was purportedly no mention of the latters income from 1940 to
1965 when he was a practicing lawyer, congressman and senator; other earnings
until the year 1985; and real properties that were auctioned off to satisfy the estate
tax assessed by the Bureau of Internal Revenue.[33]

Petitioner Marcos, Jr. implores us herein to revisit and reverse our earlier ruling in
the Swiss Deposits Decision and argues that the pronouncements in that case are
contrary to law and its basic tenets. The Court in that case allegedly applied a
lenient standard for the Republic, but a strict one for the Marcoses. He finds fault
in the ruling therein which was grounded on public policy and the ultimate goal of
the forfeiture law, arguing that public policy is better served if the Court gave more
importance to the substantive rights of the Marcoses.

In accordance with the principle of immutability of judgments, petitioners can no

longer use the present forum to assail the ruling in the Swiss Deposits Decision,
which has become final and executory. Aside from the fact that the method
employed by petitioner is improper and redundant, we also find no cogent reason
to revisit the factual findings of the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case No. 0141, which
this Court in the Swiss Deposits Decision found to be thorough and convincing. In
the first place, using a Rule 45 Petition to question a judgment that has already
become final is improper, especially when it seeks reconsideration of factual
issues, such as the earnings of the late President from 1940 to 1965 and the
existence of real properties that petitioners claim were auctioned off to pay the
taxes. Secondly, petitioners never raised the existence of these earnings and real
properties at the outset and never mentioned these alleged other incomes by way of
defense in their Answer. In their Answer, and even in their subsequent pleadings,
they merely made general denials of the allegations without stating facts
admissible in evidence at the hearing. As will be discussed later, both the
Sandiganbayan and the Supreme Court found that the Marcoses unsupported
denials of matters patently and necessarily within their knowledge were
inexcusable, and that a trial would have served no purpose at all.[34]

R.A. 1379 provides that whenever any public officer or employee has acquired
during his incumbency an amount of property manifestly out of proportion to his
salary as such public officer and to his other lawful income, said property shall be
presumed prima facie to have been unlawfully acquired.[35] The elements that must
concur for this prima facie presumption to apply are the following: (1) the offender
is a public officer or employee; (2) he must have acquired a considerable amount
of money or property during his incumbency; and (3) said amount is manifestly out
of proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee and to his other
lawful income and income from legitimately acquired property.

Thus, in determining whether the presumption of ill-gotten wealth should be

applied, the relevant period is incumbency, or the period in which the public officer
served in that position. The amount of the public officers salary and lawful income
is compared against any property or amount acquired for that same period. In the
Swiss Deposits Decision, the Court ruled that petitioner Republic was able to
establish the prima facie presumption that the assets and properties acquired by the
Marcoses were manifestly and patently disproportionate to their aggregate salaries
as public officials.[36]

For a petition to flourish under the forfeiture law, it must contain the following:

(a) The name and address of the respondent.

(b) The public officer or employment he holds and such other public offices or
employment which he has previously held.

(c) The approximate amount of property he has acquired during his

incumbency in his past and present offices and employments.

(d) A description of said property, or such thereof as has been identified by

the Solicitor General.

(e) The total amount of his government salary and other proper earnings
and incomes from legitimately acquired property, and

(f) Such other information as may enable the court to determine whether or not
the respondent has unlawfully acquired property during his incumbency.
[37]
(Emphasis supplied)

Petitioners claim that the Republic failed to comply with subparagraphs c, d, and e
above, because the latter allegedly never took into account the years when
Ferdinand Marcos served as a war veteran with back pay, a practicing lawyer, a
trader and investor, a congressman and senator. We find this claim to be a
haphazard rehash of what has already been conclusively determined by the
Sandiganbayan and the Supreme Court in the Swiss Deposits Decision. The alleged
receivables from prior years were without basis, because Marcos never had a
known law office nor any known clients, and neither did he file any withholding
tax certificate that would prove the existence of a supposedly profitable law
practice before he became President. As discussed in the Swiss Deposits Decision:

The Solicitor General made a very thorough presentation of its case for
forfeiture:
 xxx xxx xxx

4. Respondent Ferdinand E. Marcos (now deceased and represented by his

Estate/Heirs) was a public officer for several decades continuously and without
interruption as Congressman, Senator, Senate President and President of the
Republic of the Philippines from December 31, 1965 up to his ouster by direct
action of the people of EDSA on February 22-25, 1986.

5. Respondent Imelda Romualdez Marcos (Imelda, for short) the former

First Lady who ruled with FM (Ferdinand Marcos) during the 14-year martial law
regime, occupied the position of Minister of Human Settlements from June 1976
up to the peaceful revolution in February 22-25, 1986. She likewise served once
as a member of the Interim Batasang Pambansa during the early years of martial
law from 1978 to 1984 and as Metro Manila Governor in concurrent capacity as
Minister of Human Settlements.

xxx xxx xxx

11. At the outset, however, it must be pointed out that based on the Official
Report of the Minister of Budget, the total salaries of former President Marcos
as President from 1966 to 1976 was 60,000 a year and from 1977 to
1985, 100,000 a year; while that of the former First Lady, Imelda R.
Marcos, as Minister of Human Settlements from June 1976 to February 22-
25, 1986 was 75,000 a year.[38]

The Sandiganbayan found that neither the late Ferdinand Marcos nor petitioner
Imelda Marcos filed any Statement of Assets and Liabilities, as required by law,
from which their net worth could be determined. Coupled with the fact that the
Answer consisted of general denials and a standard plea of lack of knowledge or
information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations what the
Court characterized as foxy replies and mere pretense fairness dictates that what
must be considered as lawful income should only be the accumulated salaries of
the spouses and what are shown in the public documents they submitted, such as
their Income Tax Return (ITR) and their Balance Sheets. The amounts representing
the combined salaries of the spouses were admitted by petitioner Imelda Marcos in
paragraph 10 of her Answer, and reflected in the Certification dated May 27, 1986
issued by then Minister of Budget and Management Alberto Romulo:

Ferdinand E. Marcos, as President

1966-1976 at 60,000/year 660,000

 1977-1984 at 100,000/year 800,000

1985 at 110,000/year 110,000

1,570,00

Imelda R. Marcos, as Minister

June 1976-1985 at 75,000/year 718,000

In addition to their accumulated salaries from 1966 to 1985 are the Marcos
couple's combined salaries from January to February 1986 in the amount
of 30,833.33. Hence, their total accumulated salaries amounted
to 2,319,583.33. Converted to U.S. dollars on the basis of the corresponding
peso-dollar exchange rates prevailing during the applicable period when said
salaries were received, the total amount had an equivalent value of $304,372.43.
[39]

The date contained in the ITRs and Balance Sheets filed by the Marcoses are
summarized in Schedules A to D submitted as evidence by the Republic. Schedule
A showed that from 1965 to 1984, the Marcoses reported Php 16,408,442.00 or
USD 2,414,484.91 in total income, comprised of:

Income Amount Percentage

Source

Official - 2,627,581.00 - 16.01%

Salaries

Legal Practice - 11,109,836.00 - 67.71%

Farm Income - 149,700.00 - .91%

Others - 2,521,325.00 - 15.37%

Total 16,408,442.00 - 100.00%

The amount reported by the Marcos couple as their combined salaries more or less
coincided with the Official Report submitted by the Minister of Budget. Yet what
appeared anomalous was the Php 11,109,836 representing Legal Practice, which
accounted for 67% or more than three-fourths of their reported income. Out of this
anomalous amount, Php 10,649,836, or 96% thereof, represented receivables from
prior years during the period 1967 to 1984. The Court cited the Solicitor Generals
findings:

In the guise of reporting income using the cash method under Section 38
of the National Internal Revenue Code, FM made it appear that he had an
extremely profitable legal practice before he became a President (FM being
barred by law from practicing his law profession during his entire presidency) and
that, incredibly, he was still receiving payments almost 20 years after. The only
problem is that in his Balance Sheet attached to his 1965 ITR immediately
preceding his ascendancy to the presidency he did not show any Receivables
from client at all, much less the 10.65-M that he decided to later recognize
as income. There are no documents showing any withholding tax certificates.
Likewise, there is nothing on record that will show any known Marcos client
as he has no known law office. As previously stated, his net worth was a
mere 120,000.00 in December, 1965. The joint income tax returns of FM and
Imelda cannot, therefore, conceal the skeletons of their kleptocracy.[40]

In addition, the former President also reported a total of Php 2,521,325 which he
referred to as Miscellaneous Items and Various Corporations under Other Income
for 1972-1976. Spouses Marcos did not declare any income from any deposits that
may be subject to a 5% withholding tax, nor did they file any capital gains tax
returns from 1960 to 1965. The Bureau of Internal Revenue attested that there are
no records pertaining to the tax transactions of the spouses in Baguio City, Manila,
Quezon City, and Tacloban.

The Balance Sheet attached to the couples ITR for 1965 indicates an ending net
worth of Php 120,000, which covered the year immediately preceding their
ascendancy to the presidency. As previously mentioned, the combined salaries of
the spouses for the period 1966 to 1986, or in the two decades that they stayed in
power, totaled only USD 304,372.43. In stark contrast, as shown by Schedule D,
computations establish the total net worth of the spouses for the years 1965 until
1984 in the total amount of USD 957,487.75, assuming that the income from legal
practice is real and valid.[41] The combined salaries make up only 31.79% of the
spouses total net worth from 1965 to 1984. This means petitioners are unable
to account for or explain more than two-thirds of the total net worth of the
Marcos spouses from 1965 to 1984.

Thus, for the final time, we soundly reiterate that the Republic was able to
establish the prima facie presumption that the assets and properties acquired by the
Marcoses were manifestly and patently disproportionate to their aggregate salaries
as public officials. The Republic presented further evidence that they had bigger
deposits beyond their lawful incomes, foremost of which were the Swiss accounts
deposited in the names of five foundations spirited away by the couple to different
countries. Petitioners herein thus failed to overturn this presumption when they
merely presented vague denials and pleaded lack of sufficient knowledge in their
Answer.

In any case, petitioners may no longer question the findings of the

Sandiganbayan affirmed by the Supreme Court in the Swiss Deposits Decision, as
these issues have long become the law of the case in the original Petition for
Forfeiture. As held in Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc.
(COCOFED) v. Republic:[42]
Law of the case is a term applied to an established rule that when an
appellate court passes on a question and remands the case to the lower court for
further proceedings, the question there settled becomes the law of the case upon
subsequent appeal. It means that whatever is once irrevocably established as the
controlling legal rule or decision between the same parties in the same case
continues to be the law of the case, so long as the facts on which such decision
was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the court.

Otherwise put, the principle means that questions of law that have been
previously raised and disposed of in the proceedings shall be controlling in
succeeding instances where the same legal question is raised, provided that the
facts on which the legal issue was predicated continue to be the facts of the case
before the court.

In the case at bar, the same legal issues are being raised by petitioners. In
fact, petitioner Marcos Jr. admits outright that what he seeks is a reversal of the
issues identical to those already decided by the Court in the Swiss Deposits
Decision.[43] He may not resuscitate, via another petition for review, the same issues
long laid to rest and established as the law of the case.
III. Civil Case No. 0141 has not yet
terminated

Petitioners next argue that the law of the case doctrine should be applied, not to the
ruling affirming the forfeiture, but to the grant of the summary judgment over the
Swiss accounts as affirmed by the Supreme Court in the Swiss Deposits Decision.
They contend that since the Courts Decision mentioned only the deposits under the
five Swiss foundations, then the Republic can no longer seek partial summary
judgment for forfeiture over the Arelma account. And since the said Decision has
long become final and has in fact been executed, they insist that the Sandiganbayan
has lost its jurisdiction over the case.

Petitioners are under the mistaken impression that the Swiss Deposits Decision
serves as the entire judgment in Civil Case No. 0141. Just because respondent
Republic succeeded in obtaining summary judgment over the Swiss accounts does
not mean it is precluded from seeking partial summary judgment over a different
subject matter covered by the same petition for forfeiture. In fact, Civil Case No.
0141 pertains to the recovery of all the assets enumerated therein, such as (1)
holding companies, agro-industrial ventures and other investments; (2)
landholdings, buildings, condominium units, mansions; (3) New York properties;
(4) bills amounting to Php 27,744,535, time deposits worth Php 46.4 million,
foreign currencies and jewelry seized by the United States customs authorities in
Honolulu, Hawaii; (5) USD 30 million in the custody of the Central Bank in dollar-
denominated Treasury Bills; shares of stock, private vehicles, and real estate in the
United States, among others.[44]

In the enumeration of properties included in the Petition, the Arelma assets were
described as Assets owned by Arelma, Inc., a Panamanian corporation organized in
Liechtenstein, for sole purpose (sic) of maintaining an account in Merrill Lynch,
New York.[45] Paragraph 59 of the Petition for Forfeiture states:

59. FM and Imelda used a number of their close business associations or favorite
cronies in opening bank accounts abroad for the purpose of laundering their filthy
riches. Aside from the foundations and corporations established by their
dummies/nominees to hide their ill-gotten wealth as had already been discussed,
several other corporate entities had been formed for the same purpose, to wit:
 (1). ARELMA, INC (T)his was organized for the sole purpose of
maintaining an account and portfolio in Merrill Lynch, New York.

(2). Found among Malacaang documents is a letter dated September 21,

1972 by J.L. Sunier, Senior Vice President of SBC to Mr. Jose V. Campos, a
known Marcos crony (See Annex V-21 hereof). In the said letter, instructions
were given by Sunier to their Panama office to constitute a Panamanian company,
the name of which will be either Larema, Inc. or Arelma, Inc., orRelma, Inc. this
company will have the same set-up as Maler; the appointment of Sunier and Dr.
Barbey as attorneys and appointment of selected people in Panama as directors;
the opening of direct account in the name of the new company with Merrill
Lynch, New York, giving them authority to operate the account, but excluding
withdrawals of cash, securities or pledging of portfolio; and sending of money in
favor of the new company under reference AZUR in order to cut links with the
present account already opened with Merrill Lynch under an individuals name.

(3). Also found was a letter dated November 14, 1972 and signed by Jose
Y. Campos (Annex V-21-a hereof). The letter was addressed to SEC, Geneva, and
Sunier duly authorized by their mutual friend regarding the opening of an account
of Arelma, Inc. with Merrill Lynch, New York to the attention of Mr. Saccardi,
Vice-President.

(4). On May 19, 1983, J. L. Sunier wrote a letter with a reference

SAPPHIRE and a salutation Dear Excellency stating, among others, the current
valuation by Merrill Lynch of the assets of Arelma, Inc. amounting to $3,369,975
(Annex V-21-b hereof).

(5). Included in the documents sent by SBC, Geneva, through the Swiss
Federal Department of Justice and Police were those related to Arelma, Inc. as
follows:

(a) Opening bank documents for Account No. 53.145 A.R. dated
September 17, 1972, signed by Dr. Barbey and Mr. Sunier. This was later on
cancelled as a result of the change in attorneys and authorized signatories of the
company (Annexes V-21-c and V-21-d hereof).

(b) Opening bank documents for Account No. 53. 145 A.R. signed by new
attorneys led by Michel Amandruz (Annexes V-21-e and V-21-f hereof).

(c). Bank statements for Account No. 53.145 A.R. with ending balance of
$26.10 as of 12-31-85 (Annex V-21-g and V-21-h hereof).

(d). An informative letter stating that Account 53. 145 A.R. was related to
an account opened with Merrill Lynch Asset Management, Inc., New York for
 Arelma, Inc. The opening of this account slowly made Account 53. 145 A.R. an
inactive account (See Annexes V-21-I and V-21-j hereof).[46]

When the Marcos family fled Manila in 1986, they left behind several documents
that revealed the existence of secret bank deposits in Switzerland and other
financial centers.[47] These papers, referred to by respondent as Malacaang
documents, detailed how Arelma, Inc.[48] was established. Attached as Annex V-21
was the Letter of Instruction sent to the Panamanian branch of the Sunier company
to open Arelma. The latter was to have the same set-up as Maler, one of the five
Swiss foundations, subject of the 2000 Motion. Annexes V-21-c to V-21-j pertained
to documents to be used to open an account with Merrill Lynch Asset
Management, Inc. in New York.

The Swiss Deposits Decision dealt only with the summary judgment as to the five
Swiss accounts, because the 2000 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment dated 7
March 2000 specifically identified the five Swiss accounts only. It did not include
the Arelma account. There was a prayer for general reliefs in the 1996 Motion, but
as has been discussed, this prayer was dismissed by the Sandiganbayan. The
dismissal was based solely on the existence of the Compromise Agreements for a
global settlement of the Marcos assets, which the Supreme Court later invalidated.
The 2000 Motion for Summary Judgment was confined only to the five accounts
amounting to USD 356 million held by five Swiss foundations.

As clarified by the Solicitor General during the hearing of 24 March 2000 in the
Sandiganbayan:

PJ: The Court is of the impression and the Court is willing to be corrected,
that ones (sic) the plaintiff makes a claim for summary judgment it in fact states it
no longer intends to present evidence and based on this motion to render
judgment, is that correct?

SOL. BALLACILLO: Yes, your Honors.

PJ: In other words, on the basis of pre-trial, you are sayingbecause if we

are talking of a partial claim, then there is summary judgment, unless there is
preliminary issue to the claim which is a matter of stipulation.
 SOL. BALLACILLO: We submit, your Honors, that there can be partial
summary judgment on this matter.

PJ: But in this instance, you are making summary judgment on the
entire case?

SOL. BALLACILLO: With respect to the $365 million.

PJ: In the complaint you asked for the relief over several topics. You
have $356 million, $25 million and $5 million. Now with regards to the $365
million, you are asking for summary judgment?

SOL. BALLACILLO: Yes, your Honor.

PJ: And, therefore, you are telling us now, thats it, we need not have
to prove.

SOL. BALLACILLO: Yes, your Honors.[49] (Emphasis supplied.)

The Courts discussion clearly did not include the Arelma account. The dispositive
portion of the Swiss Deposits Decision states:

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed

Resolution of the Sandiganbayan dated January 31, 2002 is SET ASIDE. The
Swiss deposits which were transferred to and are now deposited in escrow at the
Philippine National Bank in the estimated aggregate amount of
US$658,175,373.60 as of January 31, 2002, plus interest, are hereby forfeited in
favor of petitioner Republic of the Philippines.[50]

Thus, the other properties, which were subjects of the Petition for Forfeiture, but
were not included in the 2000 Motion, can still be subjects of a subsequent motion
for summary judgment. To rule otherwise would run counter to this Courts long
established policy on asset recovery which, in turn, is anchored on considerations
of national survival.

E.O. 14, Series of 1986,[51] and Section 1(d) of Proclamation No. 3[52] declared the
national policy after the Marcos regime. The government aimed to implement the
reforms mandated by the people: protecting their basic rights, adopting a
provisional constitution, and providing for an orderly transition to a government
under a new constitution. The said Proclamation further states that The President
shall give priority to measures to achieve the mandate of the people to recover ill-
gotten properties amassed by the leaders and supporters of the previous regime and
protect the interest of the people through orders of sequestration or freezing of
assets or accounts. One of the whereas clauses of E.O. 14 entrusts the PCGG with
the just and expeditious recovery of such ill-gotten wealth in order that the funds,
assets and other properties may be used to hasten national economic recovery.
These clauses are anchored on the overriding considerations of national interest
and national survival, always with due regard to the requirements of fairness and
due process.

With the myriad of properties and interconnected accounts used to hide these assets
that are in danger of dissipation, it would be highly unreasonable to require the
government to ascertain their exact locations and recover them simultaneously, just
so there would be one comprehensive judgment covering the different subject
matters.

In any case, the Sandiganbayan rightly characterized their ruling on the 2004
Motion as a separate judgment, which is allowed by the Rules of Court under
Section 5 of Rule 36:

Separate judgments.When more than one claim for relief is presented in an

action, the court, at any stage, upon a determination of the issues material to a
particular claim and all counterclaims arising out of the transaction or occurrence
which is the subject matter of the claim, may render a separate judgment
disposing of such claim. The judgment shall terminate the action with respect to
the claim so disposed of and the action shall proceed as to the remaining claims.
In case a separate judgment is rendered, the court by order may stay its
enforcement until the rendition of a subsequent judgment or judgments and may
prescribe such conditions as may be necessary to secure the benefit thereof to the
party in whose favor the judgment is rendered.[53]

Rule 35 on summary judgments, admits of a situation in which a case is not fully

adjudicated on motion,[54] and judgment is not rendered upon all of the reliefs
sought. InPhilippine Business Bank v. Chua,[55] we had occasion to rule that a
careful reading of its Section 4 reveals that a partial summary judgment was never
intended to be considered a final judgment, as it does not [put] an end to an action
at law by declaring that the plaintiff either has or has not entitled himself to recover
the remedy he sues for. In this case, there was never any final or complete
adjudication of Civil Case No. 0141, as the Sandiganbayans partial summary
judgment in the Swiss Deposits Decision made no mention of the Arelma account.

Section 4 of Rule 35 pertains to a situation in which separate judgments were

necessary because some facts existed without controversy, while others were
controverted. However, there is nothing in this provision or in the Rules that
prohibits a subsequent separate judgment after a partial summary judgment on an
entirely different subject matter had earlier been rendered. There is no legal basis
for petitioners contention that a judgment over the Swiss accounts bars a motion
for summary judgment over the Arelma account.

Thus, the Swiss Deposits Decision has finally and thoroughly disposed of the
forfeiture case only as to the five Swiss accounts. Respondents 2004 Motion is in
the nature of a separate judgment, which is authorized under Section 5 of Rule 36.
More importantly respondent has brought to our attention the reasons why a
motion for summary judgment over the Arelma account was prompted only at this
stage. In Republic of the Philippines v. Pimentel,[56] a case filed by human rights
victims in the United States decided by the US Supreme Court only in 2008, the
antecedents of the Arelma account were described as follows:

In 1972, Ferdinand Marcos, then President of the Republic, incorporated Arelma,

S.A. (Arelma), under Panamanian law. Around the same time, Arelma opened a
brokerage account with Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. (Merrill
Lynch) in New York, in which it deposited $2 million. As of the year 2000, the
account had grown to approximately $35 million.

Alleged crimes and misfeasance by Marcos during his presidency became

the subject of worldwide attention and protest. A class action by and on behalf of
some 9,539 of his human rights victims was filed against Marcos and his estate,
among others. The class action was tried in the United States District Court for the
District of Hawaii and resulted in a nearly $2 billion judgment for the class.
See Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767 (C.A.9 1996). We refer to that
litigation as the Pimentel case and to its class members as the Pimentel class. In a
related action, the Estate of Roger Roxas and Golden Budha [sic] Corporation
(the Roxas claimants) claim a right to execute against the assets to satisfy their
own judgment against Marcos' widow, Imelda Marcos. See Roxas v. Marcos, 89
Hawaii 91, 113-115, 969 P.2d 1209, 1231-1233 (1998).
 The Pimentel class claims a right to enforce its judgment by attaching
the Arelma assets held by Merrill Lynch. The Republic and the Commission
claim a right to the assets under a 1955 Philippine law providing that
property derived from the misuse of public office is forfeited to the Republic
from the moment of misappropriation. See An Act Declaring Forfeiture in
Favor of the State Any Property Found To Have Been Unlawfully Acquired by
Any Public Officer or Employee and Providing for the Proceedings Therefor, Rep.
Act No. 1379, 51:9 O.G. 4457 (June 18, 1955).

After Marcos fled the Philippines in 1986, the Commission was created to
recover any property he wrongfully took. Almost immediately the Commission
asked the Swiss Government for assistance in recovering assets-including shares
in Arelma-that Marcos had moved to Switzerland. In compliance the Swiss
Government froze certain assets and, in 1990, that freeze was upheld by the Swiss
Federal Supreme Court. In 1991, the Commission asked the Sandiganbayan, a
Philippine court of special jurisdiction over corruption cases, to declare forfeited
to the Republic any property Marcos had obtained through misuse of his office.
That litigation is still pending in the Sandiganbayan. (Citations omitted.)

The pursuit of the Arelma account encountered several hindrances, as it was

subject to not one, but two claims of human rights victims in foreign courts: the
Pimentel class and the Roxas claimants. The government and the PCGG were able
to obtain a Stay Order at the appellate level, but the trial court judge vacated the
stay and awarded the Arelma assets to the Pimentel class of human rights victims.

As early as 1986, the PCGG had already sought assistance from the Swiss
government to recover the Arelma assets; however, it was only in 2000 that the
Swiss authorities turned over two Stock Certificates, which were assets of Arelma.
The transfer by Switzerland of the Stock Certificates to the Republic was made
under the same conditions as the bank deposits of the five Swiss foundations.[57]

Meanwhile, the Pimentel case was tried as a class action before Judge Manuel Real
of the United States District Court for the Central District of California. Judge Real
was sitting by designation in the District of Hawaii after the Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation consolidated the various human rights Complaints against
Marcos in that court.[58] Judge Real directed Merrill Lynch to file an action for
interpleader in the District of Hawaii, where he presided over the matter, and where
the Republic and the PCGG were named as defendants. In Pimentel, the Court
further narrates how Judge Real ruled that the pending litigation in Philippine
courts could not determine entitlement to the Arelma assets:

After being named as defendants in the interpleader action, the Republic and the
Commission asserted sovereign immunity under the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. 1604. They moved to dismiss pursuant
to Rule 19(b), based on the premise that the action could not proceed without
them Judge Real initially rejected the request by the Republic and the
Commission to dismiss the interpleader action. They appealed, and the Court of
Appeals reversed. It held the Republic and the Commission are entitled to
sovereign immunity and that under Rule 19(a) they are required parties (or
necessary parties under the old terminology). See In re Republic of the
Philippines, 309 F.3d 1143, 1149-1152 (C.A.9 2002). The Court of Appeals
entered a stay pending the outcome of the litigation in the Sandiganbayan over the
Marcos assets.

After concluding that the pending litigation in the Sandiganbayan could not
determine entitlement to the Arelma assets, Judge Real vacated the stay,
allowed the action to proceed, and awarded the assets to the Pimentel class. A
week later, in the case initiated before the Sandiganbayan in 1991, the
Republic asked that court to declare the Arelma assets forfeited, arguing the
matter was ripe for decision. The Sandiganbayan has not yet ruled. In the
interpleader case the Republic, the Commission, Arelma, and PNB appealed
the District Court's judgment in favor of the Pimentel claimants. This time
the Court of Appeals affirmed. Dismissal of the interpleader suit, it held, was
not warranted under Rule 19(b)because, though the Republic and the
Commission were required (necessary) parties under Rule 19(a), their claim
had so little likelihood of success on the merits that the interpleader action
could proceed without them. One of the reasons the court gave was that any
action commenced by the Republic and the Commission to recover the assets
would be barred by New York's 6-year statute of limitations for claims
involving the misappropriation of public property.[59] (Citations omitted)

The American Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit and remanded the case with instructions to order the District
Court to dismiss the interpleader action. The former held that the District Court and
the Court of Appeals failed to give full effect to sovereign immunity when they
held that the action could proceed without the Republic and the Commission:

Comity and dignity interests take concrete form in this case. The claims of
the Republic and the Commission arise from events of historical and political
significance for the Republic and its people. The Republic and the Commission
have a unique interest in resolving the ownership of or claims to the Arelma assets
 and in determining if, and how, the assets should be used to compensate those
persons who suffered grievous injury under Marcos. There is a comity interest in
allowing a foreign state to use its own courts for a dispute if it has a right to do so.
The dignity of a foreign state is not enhanced if other nations bypass its courts
without right or good cause. Then, too, there is the more specific affront that
could result to the Republic and the Commission if property they claim is seized
by the decree of a foreign court.[60]

Thus it was only in 2008 that the Republic was finally able to obtain a favorable
judgment from the American Supreme Court with regard to the different claims
against the Arelma assets. Petitioners never intervened or lifted a finger in any of
the litigation proceedings involving the enforcement of judgment against the
Arelma assets abroad. We find merit in respondents observation that petitioner
Imelda Marcoss participation in the proceedings in the Philippines, particularly her
invocation of her right against undue deprivation of property, is inconsistent with
her and Ferdinand Marcos, Jr.s insistence that the properties in question do not
belong to them, and that they are mere beneficiaries.[61]

Indeed, it is clear that the Arelma assets are in danger of dissipation. Even as the
United States Supreme Court gave weight to the likely prejudice to be suffered by
the Republic when it dismissed the interpleader in Pimentel, it also considered that
the balance of equities may change in due course. One relevant change may occur
if it appears that the Sandiganbayan cannot or will not issue its ruling within a
reasonable period of time. If the Sandiganbayan rules that the Republic and the
Commission have no right to the assets, their claims in some later interpleader suit
would be less substantial than they are now.[62]

IV. Petitioners sham denials justify

the application of summary
judgment

As already settled in the Swiss Deposits Decision and reiterated in the

discussion above as the law of the case, the lawful income of the Marcoses is only
USD 304,372.43. As discussed in paragraph 9 of the Petition for Forfeiture, Annex
V-21-b states that Arelmas assets as of 19 May 1983 were worth USD
3,369,975.00.[63] The entirety of the lawful income of the Marcoses represents
only 9% of the entire assets of Arelma, which petitioners remain unable to
explain.

In their Answer to the Petition for Forfeiture, petitioners employ the same
tactic, consisting of general denials based on a purported lack of knowledge
regarding the whereabouts of the Arelma assets. Paragraph 32 of the said pleading
states:

Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 59 of the Petition insofar as it

alleges that the Marcoses used their cronies and engaged in laundering their filthy
riches for being false and conclusory of the truth being that the Marcoses did not
engage in any such illegal acts and that all the properties they acquired were
lawfully acquired; and specifically DENY the rest for lack of knowledge or
information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegation since
Respondents are not privy to the alleged transactions.[64]

This particular denial mimics petitioners similar denials of the allegations in

the forfeiture Petition pertaining to the Swiss accounts and is practically identical
to paragraphs 7 to 37 of the Answer. The Swiss Deposits Decision has
characterized these as sham denials:

17. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 18 of the Petition for lack

of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the
allegation since Respondents cannot remember with exactitude the contents of
the alleged ITRs.

18. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 19 of the Petition for lack

of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the
allegation since Respondents cannot remember with exactitude the contents of
the alleged ITRs and that they are not privy to the activities of the BIR.

19. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 20 of the Petition for lack

of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the
allegation since Respondents cannot remember with exactitude the contents of
the alleged ITRs.

20. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 21 of the Petition for lack

of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the
allegation since Respondents cannot remember with exactitude the contents of
the alleged ITRs.
 21. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 22 of the Petition for lack
of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the
allegation since Respondents cannot remember with exactitude the contents of
the alleged ITRs.

22. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 23 insofar as it alleges that

Respondents clandestinely stashed the country's wealth in Switzerland and hid the
same under layers and layers of foundation and corporate entities for being false,
the truth being that Respondents aforesaid properties were lawfully acquired.

23. Respondents specifically DENY paragraphs 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29 and
30 of the Petition for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a
belief as to the truth of the allegation since Respondents were not privy to the
transactions regarding the alleged Azio-Verso-Vibur Foundation accounts, except
that as to Respondent Imelda R. Marcos she specifically remembers that the funds
involved were lawfully acquired.

24. Respondents specifically DENY paragraphs 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36,37,
38, 39, 40, and 41 of the Petition for lack of knowledge or information
sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations since Respondents
are not privy to the transactions and as to such transaction they were privy to they
cannot remember with exactitude the same having occurred a long time ago,
except that as to Respondent Imelda R. Marcos she specifically remembers that
the funds involved were lawfully acquired.

25. Respondents specifically DENY paragraphs 42, 43, 44, 45, and 46, of
the Petition for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as
to the truth of the allegations since Respondents were not privy to the
transactions and as to such transaction they were privy to they cannot remember
with exactitude the same having occurred a long time ago, except that as to
Respondent Imelda R. Marcos she specifically remembers that the funds involved
were lawfully acquired.

26. Respondents specifically DENY paragraphs 49, 50, 51 and 52, of the
Petition for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to
the truth of the allegationssince Respondents were not privy to the transactions
and as to such transaction they were privy to they cannot remember with
exactitude the same having occurred a long time ago, except that as to Respondent
Imelda R. Marcos she specifically remembers that the funds involved were
lawfully acquired.

Upon careful perusal of the foregoing, the Court finds that respondent
Mrs. Marcos and the Marcos children indubitably failed to tender genuine
issues in their answer to the petition for forfeiture. A genuine issue is an issue
of fact which calls for the presentation of evidence as distinguished from an
issue which is fictitious and contrived, set up in bad faith or patently lacking
in substance so as not to constitute a genuine issue for trial. Respondents'
 defenses of "lack of knowledge for lack of privity" or "(inability to) recall
because it happened a long time ago" or, on the part of Mrs. Marcos, that
"the funds were lawfully acquired" are fully insufficient to tender genuine
issues. Respondent Marcoses' defenses were a sham and evidently calibrated
to compound and confuse the issues.[65] (Emphasis supplied.)

In the case at bar, petitioners give the same stock answer to the effect that the
Marcoses did not engage in any illegal activities, and that all their properties were
lawfully acquired. They fail to state with particularity the ultimate facts
surrounding the alleged lawfulness of the mode of acquiring the funds in Arelma
(which totaled USD 3,369,975.00 back in 1983), considering that the entirety of
their lawful income amounted only to USD 304,372.43, or only 9% of the entire
Arelma fund. Then, as now, they employ what the Court in G.R. No. 152154
characterized as a negative pregnant, not just in denying the criminal provenance
of the Arelma funds, but in the matter of ownership of the said funds. As discussed
by the Court in the first Republic case, cited by the Sandiganbayan:

Evidently, this particular denial had the earmark of what is called in the
law on pleadings as a negative pregnant, that is, a denial pregnant with the
admission of the substantial facts in the pleading responded to which are not
squarely denied. It was in effect an admission of the averments it was directed at.
Stated otherwise, a negative pregnant is a form of negative expression which
carries with it an affirmation or at least an implication of some kind favorable to
the adverse party. It is a denial pregnant with an admission of the substantial facts
alleged in the pleading. Where a fact is alleged with qualifying or modifying
language and the words of the allegation as so qualified or modified are
literally denied, it has been held that the qualifying circumstances alone are
denied while the fact itself is admitted.[66]

Due to the insufficiency of petitioners denial of paragraph 59 which in effect

denies only the qualifying circumstances, and by virtue of the Courts ruling in the
Swiss Deposits Decision, petitioners are deemed to have admitted the factual
antecedents and the establishment of Arelma. In paragraph 32 of their Answer, they
only deny the first few sentences of paragraph 59, while conveniently neglecting to
address subparagraphs 1 to 5 and the opening bank documents described in 5 (a) to
(d) of the Petition for Forfeiture. Paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Petition discusses the
establishment of a Panamanian company to be named either Larema, Inc. or
Arelma, Inc., or Relma, Inc.; the appointment of several people as directors; and
the opening of a direct account with Merrill Lynch. Paragraphs 3 to 5 also of the
Petition for Forfeiture detail correspondences between a J.L. Sunier and a letter
addressed to Malacaang with the salutation Dear Excellency.

Regarding the averment of petitioners that they lack knowledge sufficient to

form a belief as to the truth of the above allegations in the Petition for Forfeiture,
the Courts discussion in the Swiss Deposits Decision bears reiterating:

Here, despite the serious and specific allegations against them, the
Marcoses responded by simply saying that they had no knowledge or information
sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of such allegations. Such a general, self-
serving claim of ignorance of the facts alleged in the petition for forfeiture was
insufficient to raise an issue. Respondent Marcoses should have positively stated
how it was that they were supposedly ignorant of the facts alleged.[67]

Petitioners cannot escape the fact that there is manifest disparity between the
amount of the Arelma funds and the lawful income of the Marcoses as shown in
the ITRs filed by spouses Marcos. The Swiss Deposits Decision found that the
genuineness of the said ITRs and balance sheets of the Marcos spouses have
already been admitted by petitioners themselves:
Not only that. Respondents answer also technically admitted the
genuineness and due execution of the Income Tax Returns (ITRs) and the balance
sheets of the late Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos attached to the
petition for forfeiture, as well as the veracity of the contents thereof.

The answer again premised its denials of said ITRs and balance sheets on
the ground of lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to
the truth of the contents thereof. Petitioner correctly points out that respondents'
denial was not really grounded on lack of knowledge or information sufficient to
form a belief but was based on lack of recollection. By reviewing their own
records, respondent Marcoses could have easily determined the genuineness and
due execution of the ITRs and the balance sheets. They also had the means and
opportunity of verifying the same from the records of the BIR and the Office of
the President. They did not.

When matters regarding which respondents claim to have no knowledge or

information sufficient to form a belief are plainly and necessarily within their
knowledge, their alleged ignorance or lack of information will not be considered a
specific denial. An unexplained denial of information within the control of the
pleader, or is readily accessible to him, is evasive and is insufficient to constitute
an effective denial.[68] (Footnotes omitted.)
 We find that petitioners have again attempted to delay the goal of asset
recovery by their evasiveness and the expedient profession of ignorance. It is well-
established that a profession of ignorance about a fact that is necessarily within the
pleaders knowledge or means of knowing is as ineffective as no denial at all. On a
similar vein, there is a failure by petitioners to properly tender an issue, which as
correctly ruled by the Sandiganbayan, justifies the Republics resort to summary
judgment.

Summary judgment may be allowed where there is no genuine issue as to

any material fact and where the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter
of law.[69] InYuchengco v. Sandiganbayan, the Court has previously discussed the
importance of summary judgment in weeding out sham claims or defenses at an
early stage of the litigation in order to avoid the expense and loss of time involved
in a trial, viz:

Even if the pleadings appear, on their face, to raise issues, summary

judgment may still ensue as a matter of law if the affidavits, depositions and
admissions show that such issues are not genuine. The presence or absence of a
genuine issue as to any material fact determines, at bottom, the propriety of
summary judgment. A genuine issue, as differentiated from a fictitious or
contrived one, is an issue of fact that requires the presentation of evidence. To the
party who moves for summary judgment rests the onus of demonstrating clearly
the absence of any genuine issue of fact, or that the issue posed in the complaint is
patently unsubstantial so as not to constitute a genuine issue for trial. [70]

Even if in the Answer itself there appears to be a tender of issues requiring

trial, yet when the relevant affidavits, depositions, or admissions demonstrate that
those issues are not genuine but sham or fictitious, the Court is justified in
dispensing with the trial and rendering summary judgment for plaintiff.[71]

Summary judgment, or accelerated judgment as it is sometimes known, may

also call for a hearing so that both the movant and the adverse party may justify
their positions. However, the hearing contemplated (with 10-day notice) is for the
purpose of determining whether the issues are genuine or not, not to receive
evidence of the issues set up in the pleadings. In Carcon Development Corporation
v. Court of Appeals, [72] the Court ruled that a hearing is not de riguer. The matter
may be resolved, and usually is, on the basis of affidavits, depositions, and
admissions. This does not mean that the hearing is superfluous; only that the court
is empowered to determine its necessity.

It is the law itself that determines when a summary judgment is proper.

Under the rules, summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine
issues of fact that call for the presentation of evidence in a full-blown trial. Even if
on their face the pleadings appear to raise issues, when the affidavits, depositions
and admissions show that such issues are not genuine, then summary judgment as
prescribed by the rules must ensue as a matter of law. What is crucial to a
determination, therefore, is the presence or absence of a genuine issue as to any
material fact. When the facts as pleaded appear uncontested or undisputed, then
summary judgment is called for.[73]

Guided by the principles above indicated, we hold that under the

circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, summary judgment is proper. The
Sandiganbayan did not commit a reversible error in granting the corresponding
2004 Motion for Summary Judgment filed by respondent. The latter is well within
its right to avail itself of summary judgment and obtain immediate relief,
considering the insufficient denials and pleas of ignorance made by petitioners on
matters that are supposedly within their knowledge.

These denials and pleas constitute admissions of material allegations under

paragraph 59 of the Petition for Forfeiture a tact they have employed repeatedly in
Civil Case No. 0141. As discussed, the purpose of summary judgment is precisely
to avoid long drawn litigations and useless delays. [74] We also affirm the
Sandiganbayans findings that the moving party, the Republic, is now entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 2 April

2009 of the Sandiganbayan is AFFIRMED. All assets, properties, and funds
belonging to Arelma, S.A., with an estimated aggregate amount of USD 3,369,975 as
of 1983, plus all interests and all other income that accrued thereon, until the time or
specific day that all money or monies are released and/or transferred to the possession
of the Republic of the Philippines, are hereby forfeited in favor of Respondent
Republic of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson

ROBERTO A. ABAD JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

AT T E S TAT I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson

C E R T I F I C AT I O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division
Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

Acting chairperson in lieu of Justice Antonio T. Carpio, who took no part due to previous inhibition in a related
case.

Per Raffle dated 25 April 2012.

[1]
Penned by Justice Norberto Y. Geraldez (Chairperson) and concurred in by Associate Justices Efren N. de la Cruz,
and Teresita V. Diaz Baldos.
[2]
Petition for Forfeiture, rollo (G.R. No. 189434), pp. 110-188.
[3]
An Act Declaring Forfeiture in Favor of the State Any Property Found To Have Been Unlawfully Acquired By
Any Public Officer or Employee and Providing for the Procedure Therefor.
[4]
Series of 1986, issued by then President Corazon C. Aquino on 28 February 1986. E.O. 14, as amended by E.O.
14-A, tasked the PCGG with the conduct of investigations in criminal and civil actions for the recovery of
unlawfully acquired property and vested the Sandiganbayan with exclusive and original jurisdiction over these
cases.
[5]
Supra note 2.
[6]
Identified as the (1) Azio-Verso-Vibur Foundation accounts; (2) Xandy-Wintrop: Charis-Scolari-Valamo-Spinus-
Avertina Foundation accounts; (3) Trinidad-Rayby-Palmy Foundation accounts; (4) Rosalys-Aguamina Foundation
accounts,and (5) Maler Foundation accounts. (Sandiganbayan Decision dated 2 April 2009, p. 24); rollo [G.R. No.
189434], p. 74.
[7]
Supra note 2, at 115.
[8]
Supra note 2, at 170.
[9]
Republic of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan, 453 Phil. 1059 (2003).
[10]
Id., citing the Sandiganbayan Resolution dated 20 November 1997.
[11]
Penned by Justice Catalino R. Castaeda and concurred in by Presiding Justice Francis E. Garchitorena and
Associate Justice Gregory S. Ong (Special Division).
[12]
Republic of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan, supra note 9.
[13]
Sandiganbayan Decision, rollo (G.R. No. 189505), p. 10.
[14]
Sandiganbayan Decision, rollo (G.R. No. 189505), pp. 7-62.
[15]
Id. at 43.
[16]
Id. at 61.
[17]
Petition, rollo (G.R. No. 189434), p. 12-54.
[18]
Petition, rollo, (G.R. No. 189505), pp. 65-101.
[19]
Petition, rollo (G.R. No. 189434), p. 27.
[20]
Id. at 32.
[21]
116 Phil. 1361, 1369 (1962).
[22]
Id. at 1366-1368, citing 23 Am. Jur. 612, 15 Am. Jur., Sec. 104, p. 368, 58 Am. Jur., Section 44, p. 49.
[23]
Section 8. Protection against self-incrimination. Neither the respondent nor any other person shall be excused
from attending and testifying or from producing books, papers, correspondence, memoranda and other records on
the ground that the testimony or evidence, documentary or otherwise, required of him may tend to incriminate him
or subject him to prosecution; but no individual shall be prosecuted criminally for or on account of any transaction,
matter or thing concerning which he is compelled, after having claimed his privilege against self-incrimination, to
testify or produce evidence, documentary or otherwise, except that such individual so testifying shall not be exempt
from prosecution and conviction for perjury or false testimony committed in so testifying or from administrative
proceedings.
[24]
Republic of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan (18 November 2003, on the Marcoses Motion for Reconsideration),
461 Phil. 598, 614 (2003).
[25]
Cabal v. Kapunan, supra note 21, at 1362.
[26]
G.R. No. 90529, 16 August 1991, 200 SCRA 667.
[27]
Supra note 24, at 611.
[28]
G.R. No. L-18428, 115 Phil. 120 (1962).
[29]
Depakakibo Garcia v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 170122 & 171381, 12 October 2009, 603 SCRA 348.
[30]
Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 255 Phil. 71 (1989).
[31]
Supra note 24 at 613-614.
[32]
R.A. 1375, Sec. 3 c, d, and e.
[33]
Petition for Review, rollo (G.R. No. 189434), p. 30.
[34]
Republic of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan, supra note 9, at 1119.
[35]
R.A. 1379, Sec. 2.
[36]
Republic of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan, supra note 9, at 1143.
[37]
R.A. 1375, Sec. 3.
[38]
Republic of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan, supra note 9, at 1089-90.
[39]
Republic of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan, supra note 8, at 1128-1129.
[40]
Republic v. Sandiganbayan, supra note 9, at 1091.
[41]
Supra note 9, at 1092-1093.
[42]
G.R. Nos. 177857-58, 11 February 2010, 612 SCRA 255.
[43]
Petitioner Marcos, Jr. states: Thus, before the ground relied upon is discussed, Petitioner implores this Honorable
Court to look at Civil Case No. 0141 anew and to not apply in this instance the pronouncements in S.C. G.r. No.
152154 entitledRepublic of the Philippines vs. Hon. Sandiganbayan, et al. for, with all due respect, this Honorable
Court should abandon its pronouncements therein for being contrary to law and its basic tenets. Rollo (G.R. No.
189434), p. 26.
[44]
See Annexes to the Petition for Foreclosure, Annexes A to G, I to P, V, and their sub-annexes, as cited in footnote
25 of the Sandiganbayan Decision.
[45]
Footnote 25 of the Sandiganbayan Decision, rollo, p. 80.
[46]
Petition for Forfeiture, p. 61, supra note 2, at 170.
[47]
Bautista, Jaime, S., Recovery of the Marcos Assets, delivered at the International Law Association, presented by
Levy V. Mendoza, Director of the Presidential Commission on Good
Governance,www.unafei.or.jp/english/pdf/PDF.../Third_GGSeminar_P72-79.pdf, accessed on 7 March 2012.
[48]
More accurately known as Arelma, S.A.
[49]
TSN, 24 March 2000, pp. 13-14.
[50]
Supra note 9, at 1150.
[51]
E.O. 14, Series of 1984, Defining The Jurisdiction Over Cases Involving The Ill-Gotten Wealth of Former
President Ferdinand E. Marcos, Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos, Members of Their Immediate Family, Close Relatives,
Subordinates, Close and/or Business Associates, Dummies, Agents and Nominees.
[52]
Dated 25 March 1986.
[53]
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 36, Sec. 5.
[54]
Sec. 4 states: Case not fully adjudicated on motion.If on motion under this Rule, judgment is not rendered upon
the whole case or for all the reliefs sought and a trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by
examining the pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel shall ascertain what material facts
exist without substantial controversy and what are actually and in good faith controverted. It shall thereupon make
an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of
damages or other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the action as are just. The
facts so specified shall be deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted on the controverted facts accordingly.
[55]
G.R. No. 178899, 15 November 2010, 634 SCRA 635.
[56]
553 U.S. 851, 858, 128 S. Ct. 2180.
[57]
Supra note 47.
[58]
Supra note 56, at 859, citing Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767 (C.A.9 1996), at 771.
[59]
Supra note 56, at 859.
[60]
Supra note 56, at 866.
[61]
Rollo (G.R. No. 189434), p. 514.
[62]
Supra note 56, at 873.
[63]
Found among the Malacaang documents and attached as Annex V-21-b of the Petition was a letter written by J.L.
Sunier with a reference to SAPPHIRE and a salutation Dear Excellency stating, among others, the current valuation
by Merrill Lynch of Arelma, Inc. at USD 3,369,975.
[64]
Rollo (G.R. No. 189434), p. 196.
[65]
Supra note 9 at 1101-1103.
[66]
Supra note 9, at 1107.
[67]
Supra note 9 at 1106.
[68]
Supra note 9 at 1111-1112.
[69]
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 35, Sec. 3.
[70]
515 Phil. 1, 12 (2006).
[71]
Carcon Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 259 Phil 836, 840 (1989).
[72]
Supra.
[73]
Evadel Realty v. Spouses Antero and Virginia Soriano, 409 Phil. 450 (2001).
[74]
Nocom v. Camerino, G.R. No. 182984, 10 February 2009, 578 SCRA 390, 409-410.