170285-2014-Government Service Insurance System V.
170285-2014-Government Service Insurance System V.
170285-2014-Government Service Insurance System V.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO , J : p
Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 are 1) the October 30, 2009 Decision 2 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 85908 which set aside the June 24, 2004
Decision 3 of the Employees' Compensation Commission (ECC) in ECC Case No. GM-
16174-0209-04 and ordered the payment of disability bene ts to the herein respondent
Aurelia Y. Calumpiano; and 2) the CA's February 23, 2011 Resolution 4 denying
reconsideration of the assailed CA Decision.
Factual Antecedents
As determined by the CA, the facts are as follows:
. . . Aurelia Y. Calumpiano 5 was employed as Court Stenographer at the then
Court of First Instance of Samar from January 5, 1972 until her retirement on
March 30, 2002. HEASaC
On March 7, 2002, shortly before her retirement, [respondent] led before the
Supreme Court, an application for disability retirement on account of her
ailment[s], Hypertensive Cardiovascular Disease [ a n d ] Acute Angle Closure
Glaucoma. To bolster her claim, [respondent] submitted the medical certi cates
issued by her attending physicians, Dr. Alfred I. Lim and Dr. Elmer Montes, both of
whom are Op[h]thalmologists [at] Eastern Samar Provincial Hospital. She
submitted them together with the results of her perimetry test, [a certi cate of]
which . . . was issued by Dr. Lim. On September 30, 2002, the Supreme Court
approved [respondent's] application for disability retirement, under Republic Act
No. 8291 (New GSIS Act of 1997).
[Respondent's] disability claim was forwarded to GSIS, 6 but the latter denied her
claim for the reason that hypertension and glaucoma, which were her illnesses,
were not work[-]related. Her motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the
GSIS.
Petitioner led an appeal [with] the ECC, which rendered the assailed Decision, 7
the dispositive portion of which stated:
"Hypertension is an increase in the blood pressure within the normal of less than
120/80 mm Hg as de ned by the Joint National Committee VII. Primary risk
factor for developing hypertension is smoking. Other important risk factors are
excess body weight, high salt intake, nutritional factors, high alcohol
consumption, physical inactivity and psychological factors, including stress."
(Principles of Internal Medicine)
Appellant 9 worked as a Court Stenographer III of the Supreme Court for thirty (30)
years. Her duties were no doubt stressful and the same may have caused her to
develop her ailment, hypertension. However, to make the same compensable, it is
necessary that there must be impairment of function of her body organs like
kidneys, heart, eyes and brain resulting in her permanent disability. An
examination of the appellant's records would show that she was not suffering
from end[-]organ damage. This was shown in the . . . report [of the ECG] that was
taken on the appellant on January 21, 2002. Thus, the same cannot be
considered compensable and work-connected. IESAac
SO ORDERED. 12
The CA held that while respondent's hypertension and glaucoma are not listed as
occupational diseases under the implementing rules of the Employee Compensation
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Program under Presidential Decree No. 626 13 (PD 626), they were nonetheless contracted
and became aggravated during her employment as court stenographer; that under the
"increased risk theory," a "non-occupational disease" is compensable as long as proof of a
causal connection between the work and the ailment is established; 14 that respondent's
illnesses are connected to her work, given the nature of and pressure involved in her
functions and duties as a court stenographer; that the certi cations issued by the
attending physicians certifying to respondent's illnesses should be given credence; that
the ECC itself conceded that respondent's duties were "no doubt stressful and the same
may have caused her to develop her ailment, hypertension;" and that while the presumption
of compensability has been abrogated with the issuance of PD 626, employees'
compensation laws nevertheless constitute social legislation which allows for liberality in
interpretation to the bene t of the employee, and the policy has always been to extend the
applicability of said laws to as many employees who can avail of the bene ts thereunder.
15 HaAIES
Petitioner led a Motion for Reconsideration, but the CA denied the same in its February
23, 2011 Resolution. Hence, the instant Petition.
Issues
Petitioner submits the following issues for resolution:
1. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT
RESPONDENT'S DISEASES (HYPERTENSION AND GLAUCOMA) ARE
COMPENSABLE UNDER THE INCREASED RISK THEORY; AND
Petitioner's Arguments
Praying that the assailed CA pronouncements be set aside and that the June 24, 2004
Decision of the ECC be reinstated, petitioner argues in its Petition and Reply 17 that
respondent's hypertension and glaucoma are not compensable under the principle of
increased risk; that although essential hypertension is listed as an occupational disease, it
is not compensable per se as the conditions under Section 1, Rule III of the Amended Rules
on Employees' Compensation 18 should be satis ed; that hypertension is compensable
only "if it causes impairment of function of body organs like kidneys, heart, eyes and brain,
resulting in permanent disability;" 19 that since respondent did not suffer "end-organ
damage" to or impairment of her kidneys, heart, eyes and brain which resulted in
permanent disability, her illness is not compensable; that respondent's other illness
glaucoma is not compensable; 20 and that the ndings of the ECC should be accorded
respect and nality, as it has the expertise and knowledge on account of its specialized
jurisdiction over employee compensation cases.
Respondent's Arguments
In her Comment, 2 1 respondent seeks the denial of the Petition, arguing relevantly that the
"increased risk theory," which applies to her, has been upheld in several decided cases; 2 2
that in disability compensation cases, it is not the injury which is compensated for but
rather the incapacity to work resulting in the impairment of the employee's earning
capacity; 2 3 and that while the ECC has the expertise and knowledge relative to
compensation cases, the CA is not precluded from making its own assessment of the
case which goes against that of the ECC's.
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Our Ruling
The Court denies the Petition. TcSHaD
In resolving this case, the case of Government Service Insurance System v. Baul 2 4 comes
into mind and lays the groundwork for a similar ruling. In said case, the Court held:
Cerebro-vascular accident and essential hypertension are considered as
occupational diseases under Nos. 19 and 29, respectively, of Annex "A" of the
Implementing Rules of P.D. No. 626, as amended. Thus, it is not necessary
that there be proof of causal relation between the work and the illness
which resulted in the respondent's disability. The open-ended Table of
Occupational Diseases requires no proof of causation. In general, a
covered claimant suffering from an occupational disease is
automatically paid benefits .
However, although cerebro-vascular accident and essential hypertension are listed
occupational diseases, their compensability requires compliance with all the
conditions set forth in the Rules. In short, both are quali ed occupational
diseases. For cerebro-vascular accident, the claimant must prove the following:
(1) there must be a history, which should be proved, of trauma at work (to the
head speci cally) due to unusual and extraordinary physical or mental strain or
event, or undue exposure to noxious gases in industry; (2) there must be a direct
connection between the trauma or exertion in the course of the employment and
the cerebro-vascular attack; and (3) the trauma or exertion then and there caused
a brain hemorrhage. On the other hand, essential hypertension is
compensable only if it causes impairment of function of body organs
like kidneys, heart, eyes and brain, resulting in permanent disability ,
provided that, the following documents substantiate it: (a) chest X-ray report; (b)
ECG report; (c) blood chemistry report; (d) funduscopy report; and (e) C-T scan.
HcTEaA
Significantly, even medical authorities have established that the exact etiology of
essential hypertension cannot be accurately traced:
The term essential hypertension has been employed to indicate
those cases of hypertension for which a speci c endocrine or renal basis
cannot be found, and in which the neural element may be only a
mediator of other in uences. Since even this latter relationship is not
entirely clear, it is more properly listed for the moment in the category of
unknown etiology. The term essential hypertension de nes simply by
failing to de ne; hence, it is of limited use except as an expression of our
inability to understand adequately the forces at work. 2 5 ITSacC
Also, in Government Service Insurance System v. De Castro, 2 7 this Court made the
following pronouncement:
Other than the given facts, another undisputed aspect of the case is the status of
the ailments that precipitated De Castro's separation from the military service
CAD and hypertensive cardiovascular disease. These are occupational diseases.
No less than the ECC itself con rmed the status of these ailments when it
declared that "Contrary to the ruling of the System, CAD is a form of
cardiovascular disease which is included in the list of Occupational Diseases."
Essential hypertension is also listed under Item 29 in Annex "A" of the
Amended ECC Rules as an occupational disease .
Despite the compensable character of his ailments, both the GSIS and the ECC
found De Castro's CAD to be non-work related and, therefore, non-compensable.
To use the wording of the ECC decision, it denied De Castro's claim
"due to the presence of factors which are not work-related, such as
smoking and alcohol consumption." De Castro's own military records
triggered this conclusion as his Admitting Notes, made when he entered the V.
Luna General Hospital due to chest pains and hypertension, were that he was a
smoker and a drinker.
As the CA did, we cannot accept the validity of this conclusion at face value
because it considers only one side the purely medical side of De Castro's
case and even then may not be completely correct. The ECC itself, in its decision,
recites that CAD is caused, among others, by atherosclerosis of the coronary
arteries that in turn, and lists the following major causes: increasing age; male
gender; cigarette smoking; lipid disorder due to accumulation of too much fats in
the body; hypertension or high blood pressure; insulin resistance due to diabetes;
family history of CAD. The minor factors are: obesity; physical inactivity; stress;
menopausal estrogen deficiency; high carbohydrate intake; and alcohol. cSCTEH
We nd it strange that both the ECC and the GSIS singled out the presence of
smoking and drinking as the factors that rendered De Castro's ailments, otherwise
listed as occupational, to be non-compensable. To be sure, the causes of CAD
and hypertension that the ECC listed and explained in its decision
cannot be denied; smoking and drinking are undeniably among these
causes. However, they are not the sole causes of CAD and hypertension
and, at least, not under the circumstances of the present case. For this reason, we
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fear for the implication of the ECC ruling if it will prevail and be read as de nitive
on the effects of smoking and drinking on compensability issues, even on
diseases that are listed as occupational in character. The ruling raises the
possible reading that smoking and drinking, by themselves, are factors that can
bar compensability.
We ask the question of whether these factors can be sole determinants of
compensability as the ECC has apparently failed to consider other factors such as
age and gender from among those that the ECC itself listed as major and minor
causes of atherosclerosis and, ultimately, of CAD. While age and gender are
characteristics inherent in the person (and thereby may be considered
non-work related factors), they also do affect a worker's job
performance and may in this sense, together with stresses of the job,
signi cantly contribute to illnesses such as CAD and hypertension . To
cite an example, some workplace activities are appropriate only for the young
(such as the lifting of heavy objects although these may simply be of ce les),
and when repeatedly undertaken by older workers, may lead to ailments and
disability. Thus, age coupled with an age-affected work activity may lead to
compensability. From this perspective, none of the ECC's listed factors should be
disregarded to the exclusion of others in determining compensability. DAEcIS
This case should not have been dif cult for the petitioner to resolve on its own, given that
so many cases have been decided in the past which should have provided it the guiding
hand to decide disability cases on its own rightly instead of putting claimants in the
unfortunate position of having to chase the bene ts they are clearly entitled to, and waste
years prosecuting their claims in spite of their adverse circumstances in life. This Court
should not have to parrot over and over again what clearly has been the settled rule; in
many ways, this is a waste of time, and it only indicates that petitioner has either not
learned its lesson, or it refuses to realize it.
Applying Baul and De Castro to the instant case and looking at the factual milieu, the Court
agrees with the CA's conclusion and so declares that respondent's illness is compensable.
HCaDIS
Respondent served the government for 30 long years; veritably, as the ECC itself said, "
[h]er duties were no doubt stressful and the same may have caused her to develop her
ailment, hypertension" 2 9 which is a listed occupational disease, contrary to the CA's
pronouncement that it is not. And because it is a listed occupational disease, the
"increased risk theory" does not apply again, contrary to the CA's declaration; no proof of
causation is required.
It can also be said that given respondent's age at the time, and taking into account the
nature, working conditions, and pressures of her work as court stenographer which
requires her to faithfully record each and every day virtually all of the court's proceedings;
transcribe these notes immediately in order to make them available to the court or the
parties who require them; take down dictations by the judge, and transcribe them; and type
in nal form the judge's decisions, which activities extend beyond of ce hours and without
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additional compensation or overtime pay 3 0 all these contributed to the development of
her hypertension or hypertensive cardiovascular disease, as petitioner would call it. 3 1
Consequently, her age, work, and hypertension caused the impairment of vision in both
eyes due to "advanced to late stage glaucoma", which rendered her "legally blind." 3 2
Contrary to petitioner's submissions, there appears to be a link between blood pressure
and the development of glaucoma, which leads the Court to conclude that respondent's
glaucoma developed as a result of her hypertension.
Although intraocular pressure (IOP) remains an important risk factor for
glaucoma, it is clear that other factors can also in uence disease
development and progression . More recently, the role that blood pressure (BP)
has in the genesis of glaucoma has attracted attention, as it represents a
clinically modi able risk factor and thus provides the potential for new treatment
strategies beyond IOP reduction. The interplay between blood pressure and
IOP determines the ocular perfusion pressure (OPP), which regulates
blood ow to the optic nerve . If OPP is a more important determinant of
ganglion cell injury than IOP, then hypotension should exacerbate the detrimental
effects of IOP elevation, whereas hypertension should provide protection against
IOP elevation. Epidemiological evidence provides some con icting
outcomes of the role of systemic hypertension in the development and
progression of glaucoma. The most recent study showed that patients
at both extremes of the blood pressure spectrum show an increased
prevalence of glaucoma . Those with low blood pressure would have low OPP
and thus reduced blood ow; however, that people with hypertension also show
increased risk is more dif cult to reconcile. This nding may re ect an inherent
blood ow dysregulation secondary to chronic hypertension that would render
retinal blood ow less able to resist changes in ocular perfusion pressure. 3 3 . . .
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied) cAaDCE
In recent years, we've learned a lot about ocular perfusion pressure (OPP), i.e., the
pressure difference between blood entering the eye and IOP. It's clear that three
forces OPP, IOP and blood pressure are interconnected in the glaucoma
disease process. The mechanics of that relationship, however, remain
ambiguous. ASTDCH
The ties between hypertension and glaucoma are less well established but the
data, in addition to my involvement in a new study (discussed below), have
convinced me they probably do exist. Therefore, I believe potential hypertension,
along with potential low blood pressure, should be investigated in patients whose
glaucoma continues to progress despite what appears to be well controlled IOP.
xxx xxx xxx
We suspect there is a close relationship among IOP, OPP, blood pressure and
glaucoma, but the exact nature of these associations remains elusive.
Complicating matters is the physiological phenomenon known as autoregulation.
34
Abstract
Aims: To determine whether systemic hypertension and glaucoma might coexist
more often than expected, with possible implications for treatment.
While some of the above conclusions are not de nitive, it must be stressed that
probability, not certainty, is the test of proof in compensation cases." 3 6 It does not
preclude the Court from concluding that respondent's hypertension apart from her age,
work, and working conditions impaired her vision as a result.
The Court likewise disregards the ECC's nding, which petitioner relies upon, that the
primary and important risk factors for developing hypertension are smoking, excess body
weight, high salt intake, nutritional factors, high alcohol consumption, physical inactivity
and psychological factors, including stress. As the Court held in De Castro, these are not
the sole causes of hypertension; age, gender, and work stress signi cantly contribute to
its development, and the nature and characteristics of the employment are as important as
raw medical findings and a claimant's personal and social history.
Finally, while the ECC possesses the requisite expertise and knowledge in compensation
cases, its decision in respondent's case is nonetheless erroneous and contrary to law. The
Court cannot uphold its ndings; its specialized training, experience and expertise did not
serve justice well in this case. The medical certi cates and relevant reports issued by
respondent's attending physicians Drs. Alfred I. Lim, Elmer Montes, and Salvador R.
Salceda as well as hospital records, 3 7 deserve credence. The identical ndings of these
three eye specialists simply cannot be ignored. AEScHa
In arriving at the above conclusions, the Court is well guided by the principles, declared in
Baul and De Castro, that probability, not certainty, is the test of proof in compensation
cases; that the primordial and paramount consideration is the employee's welfare; that the
strict rules of evidence need not be observed in claims for compensation; that medical
ndings of the attending physician may be received in evidence and used as proof of the
facts in dispute; that in any determination of compensability, the nature and characteristics
of the job are as important as raw medical ndings and a claimant's personal and social
history; that where the primary injury is shown to have arisen in the course of employment,
every natural consequence that ows from the injury likewise arises out of the
employment, unless it is the result of an independent intervening cause attributable to
claimant's own negligence or misconduct; and that the policy is to extend the application
of the law on employees' compensation to as many employees who can avail of the
benefits thereunder.
WHEREFORE , the Petition is DENIED . The assailed October 30, 2009 Decision and
February 23, 2011 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 85908 are
AFFIRMED .
SO ORDERED . TAEDcS
9. Herein respondent.
10. Rollo, pp. 33-34.
11. CA rollo, pp. 2-9.
12. Rollo, p. 26.
13. FURTHER AMENDING CERTAIN ARTICLES OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 442 ENTITLED
"LABOR CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES."
14. Citing Government Service Insurance System v. Court of Appeals, 417 Phil. 102 (2001);
Government Service Insurance System v. Ibarra, 562 Phil. 924 (2007); Bonilla v. Court of
Appeals, 395 Phil. 162 (2000); Government Service Insurance System v. Cordero, 600
Phil. 678 (2009); and Castor-Garupa v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 521 Phil.
311 (2006).
15. Citing Government Service Insurance System v. Cuanang, G.R. No. 158846, June 3, 2004,
430 SCRA 639.
16. Rollo, p. at 7.
17. Id. at 61-70.
18. SECTION 1. Grounds. (a) For the injury and the resulting disability or death to be
compensable, the injury must be the result of employment accident satisfying all of the
following conditions:
1) "a common form of hypertension that occurs in the absence of any evident cause, is
marked hemodynamically by elevated peripheral vascular resistance, and has multiple
risk factors (as family history of hypertension, high dietary sodium intake, obesity,
sedentary lifestyle, and emotional stress) called also idiopathic hypertension, primary
hypertension." http://www.merriam-webster.com/medical/essential%20hypertension.
Last visited November 19, 2014.
2) "persistent and pathological high blood pressure for which no cause can be found."
http://medical-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/essential+hypertension. Last visited
November 19, 2014.
In other words, "essential hypertension" means elevated blood pressure that does not
have a known cause .
31. Rollo, p. 6.