G.R. No.

118861 April 27, 1995 The antecedent facts that led to the filing of this action are
uncomplicated and undisputed.
EMMANUEL M. RELAMPAGOS, petitioner,
vs. In the synchronized elections of 11 May 1992, the
ROSITA C. CUMBA and the COMMISSION ON petitioner and private respondent Rosita Cumba were
ELECTIONS, respondents. candidates for the position of Mayor in the municipality of
Magallanes, Agusan del Norte. The latter was proclaimed
the winning candidate, with a margin of only twenty-two
votes over the former.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

Unwilling to accept defeat, the petitioner filed an election
protest with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Agusan del
This special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Norte, which was assigned to Branch 2 thereof in Butuan
Rules of Court revives the issue of whether or not the
City.
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) has jurisdiction over
petitions for, certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus in
election cases where it has exclusive appellate jurisdiction On 29 June 1994, the trial court, per Judge Rosario F.
In the split decision of 4 March 1992 in the consolidated Dabalos, found the petitioner to have won with a margin of
cases of Garcia vs. De Jesus and Uy vs. Commission on six votes over the private respondent and rendered
Elections, 1 this Court ruled in the negative because of the judgement in favor of the petitioner as follows:
absence of any specific conferment upon the COMELEC,
either by the constitution or by legislative fiat, of WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing results, the
jurisdiction to issue such extraordinary writs. It held that court hereby declares the protestant as having
jurisdiction or the legal power to hear and determine a won the mayoralty election and as duly elected
cause or causes of action, must exist as a matter of law, Mayor of the Municipality of Magallanes, Agusan
whether the jurisdiction is original or appellate, and since del Norte in the local election held on May 11,
these two classes of jursdiction are exclusive of each other, 1992, the protestant having obtained six (6) votes
each must expressly conferred by law. One does not flow, more than that of the protestee's votes.
nor is inferred, from the other. This Court proceeded to
state that in the Philippine setting, the authority to issue Copies of the decision were sent to and received by the
the aforesaid writs involves the exercise of original petitioner and the private respondent on 1 July 1994.
jurisdiction which has always been expressly conferred
either by Constitution or by law. It is never derived by
On 4 July 1994, the private respondent appealed the
implication. Although the Constitution grants the COMELEC
decision to the COMELEC by filing her notice of appeal and
appellate jurisdiction, it does not grant it any power to
paying the appellate docket fees.
exercise original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari,
prohibition, and mandamus unlike the case of this Court
which is specifically conferred with such authority in On 8 July 1994, the trial court gave due course to the
Section 5(1) of Article VIII. It also pointed out that the appeal.
doctrines laid down in Pimentel vs. COMELEC 2 that
neither the Constitution nor any law has conferred On 12 July 1994, the petitioner filed with the trial court a
jurisdiction on the COMELEC to issue such writs still finds motion for execution pending appeal, which the private
application under the 1987 Constitution. respondent opposed on 22 July 1994.

In the decision of 29 July 1992 in Veloria vs. Commission on On 3 August 1994, the trial court granted the petitioner's
Elections, 3 this Court reiterated the Garcia and Uy motion for execution pending appeal. The corresponding
doctrine. writ of execution was forthwith issued. Thereafter, the
private respondent filed a motion for a reconsideration of
In the challenged resolution at bench, the respondent the order of execution and the sheriff held in abeyance the
COMELEC adhered to the affirmative view of the issue, implementation of the writ. This motion was denied on 5
citing as authority therefore its own decision of 29 July August 1994.
1993 in Dictado vs. Cosico and the last paragraph of
Section 50 of B. P. Blg. 697, which reads: The private respondent then filed with the respondent
COMELEC a petition for certiorari to annul the aforesaid
Sec. 50. Definition. other of the trial court granting the motion for execution
pending appeal and the writ of execution. The petition was
docketed as SPR No. 1-94.
xxx xxx xxx

On 9 February 1995, the COMELEC promulgated its

The Commission is hereby vested with exclusive
resolution granting the petition. 4 The dispositive portion
authority to hear and decide petitions
thereof reads as follows:
for certiorari prohibition, and mandamus involving
election cases.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission
RESOLVES that is [sic] has exclusive authority to
The petitioner herein pleads that this resolution be set
hear and decide petitions for certiorari, prohibition
aside and nullified for having been issued with grave abuse
and mandamus in election cases as authorized by
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. He
law, and therefore, assumes jurisdiction of the
contends that while the COMELEC's position is inherently
instant petition for certiorari which is hereby
compelling, it deserves scant consideration in view of
GRANTED. The Order of the court a quo of August
Garcia and Uy and Veloria and the nature and purpose of B.
3, 1994 is hereby declared NULL and VOID and the
P. Blg. 697 which was to govern solely the Batasang
Writ of Execution issued on August 4, 1994 LIFTED.
Pambansa election of 14 May 1984; hence, it was a
temporary statute which self-destructed after such
election.
 Accordingly, petitioner Rosita Cumba is ordered B.P. Blg. 697 has not been expressly repealed, and
restored to her position .as Municipality Mayor of Section 50 thereof is not inconsistent with the
Magallanes, Agusan del Norte, pending resolution provisions of the Omnibus Election Code. Besides,
of the appeal before this Commission in the case of in the cited Garcia/Uy cases, as reiterated in the
Relampagos vs. Cumba in EAC No. 108-94. Veloria case, the Supreme Court itself said,
reiterating previous cases, that implied repeal of
In upholding its jurisdiction in certiorari, prohibition, statutes is frowned upon, thus:
and mandamus cases, the respondent COMELEC maintains
that there is a special law granting it such Just as implied repeal of statutes frowned
jurisdiction, viz., Section 50 of B.P. Blg. 697, which remains upon, so also should the grant of original
in full force as it was not expressly repealed by the jurisdiction by mere implication to a quasi-
Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881),and that it is not judicial body be tabooed. (Garcia/Uy/Veloria
exactly correct that this law self-destructed after the May Cases: Emphasis supplied).
1984 election. It further reasoned out that in the
performance of its judicial functions, the COMELEC, is the xxx xxx xxx
most logical body to issue the extraordinary writs
of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus in election cases
It is equally clear that Executive Order No.
where it has appellate jurisdiction. It ratiocinated as
90 . . . did not modify or repeal, whether
follows:
expressly or impliedly, Section 23 of P.D. No.
1752. It is common place Learning
It is therefore clear that if there is a law which that implied repeal are not favored in Law
specifically confers jurisdiction to issue the and are not casually to be assumed. The first
prerogative Writs, then the Commission has effort of a court must always be to reconcile
jurisdiction. or adjust the provisions of one statute with
those of another so as to give sensible effect
Such a law exists. Section 50, B.P. Blg. 697 is that to both provisions (Jalandoni vs. Andaya, 55
law. SCRA 261 (1974); Villegas vs. Subido, 41
SCRA 190, 196-197 (1971); National Power
B.P. Blg. 697, approved on March 14, 1984, is Corporation vs. ARCA, 25 SCRA 931 (1968);
entitled "AN ACT TO GOVERN THE ELECTION OF U.S. vs. Palacios, 33 Phil. 208 (1916); and
MEMBERS OF THE BATASANG PAMBANSA ON MAY Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association,
14, 1984 AND THE SELECTION OF SECTORAL Inc. vs. Feliciano, 13 SCRA 377(1965). Only
REPRESENTATIVES THEREAFTER, APPROPRIATING when there is clear inconsistency and
FUNDS THEREFOR AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. conflict between the provisions of two (2)
Section 50 provides: statutes, may a court hold that the
provisions later in point of time have
impliedly repealed the earlier ones" that
Sec. 50. Definition. Pre-proclamation
(Philippine American Management Co., Inc.,
controversy refers to any question pertaining
vs. Philippine American Management
to or affecting the proceedings of the Board
Employees Association, 49 SCRA 194 (1973);
of Canvassers which may be raised by any
and Villegas vs. Subido, 41 SCRA 190 (1971)
candidate, political party or coalition of
(Larga vs. Ranada, Jr., No. L-7976, August 3,
political parties before the board or directly
1984, 164 SCRA 25).
with the Commission.

It was even suggested that Batas Pambansa Blg. 697

The Commission Elections shall be the sole
self-destructed after the Batasang Pambansa elections of
judge and shall have exclusive jurisdiction
1984; because of the provisions of Section 1 (Title and
over all pre-proclamation controversies.
Applicability) which provides: "This act shall be known
and cited as "The Law on the 1984 Batasang Pambansa
The Commission is hereby vested Election." It shall govern the election for the regular
with exclusive authority to hear and decide Batasang Pambansa which shall be held on May 14,
petitions for certiorari, prohibition 1984, and the selection of sectoral representatives
and mandamus involving election cases. thereafter as provided by the Constitution.
(Emphasis supplied).
While that may be true with most of its provisions which
We have debated among ourselves whether Section were applicable only for the particular election (like
50, B.P. Blg. 697, has been repealed. We have come election and campaign periods, voting constituency, etc.)
to the conclusion that it has not been repealed. The most if not all of the remaining provisions could be
repealing provision in the Omnibus Election Code applicable to future elections. It is not lost to the
(BP Blg. 881, December 3, 1985), provides: Commission that B.P. Blg. 697 was passed also "for other
purposes."
Sec. 282. Repealing Clause. Presidential
Decree No. 1296 otherwise known as the But the important consideration is that the authority
The 1978 Election Code, as amended, is granted to the Commission under B.P. Blg. 697 is not
hereby repealed. All other election Laws, inconsistent with our election laws. It should be
decrees, executive orders, rules and mentioned that the provisions of Republic Act No. 6638
regulations or parts thereof, inconsistent which governed the local elections of January 18, 1988,
with the provisions of this Code is hereby as to the number of councilors in specified cities (Sec. 3)
repealed, except Presidential Decree No. and the number of Sangguniang members in different
1618 and Batas Pambansa Blg. 20 governing provinces and cities (Sec. 4) are still applicable up to this
the election of the members of the day. In fact, it became one of the important controlling
Sangguniang Pampook of Regions IX and XII. provision which governed the May 11, 1992 elections. If
(Emphasis supplied). provisions of Republic Act No. 6636 which are not
inconsistent with the present election laws did not self- While these two appellate Courts do have the
destruct, why should Section 50 of B.P. Blg. 697? jurisdiction under the Constitution and the law,
it is most logical for the Commission whenever
Another provision which did not self-destruct is that it performs judicial functions to have the
which provides that "any city or municipal judge, who authority to issue these prerogative writs. . .
includes or excludes any voter without any legal basis in
inclusion and exclusion proceedings, shall be guilty of an In traversing the first issue, we are citing our
election offense," although this provision is found in decision laid down in the case of Antonio
Section 10 of Executive Order No. 134 supposedly with Dictado vs. Hon. Rodrigo N. Cosico and Emilio
limited application as the enabling act for the elections Tiongco promulgated on July 29, 1993. In this
for Members of Congress on May 11, 1987 and for other case, the Commission en banc had occasion to
purposes. rule on the question of whether or not the
Commission has the authority to hear and
Clearly the intent of the law, was to give certiorari, decide petitions for certiorari in election cases.
jurisdiction to the Commission on Elections because the
Pimentel case said there was none, to fill a void in the The Commission En Banc, speaking through
law, and avoid an incongruous situation. Hon. Commissioner Regalado E. Maambong,
ruled that there is [a] law which grants the
A statute's clauses and phrases must not be taken Commission, the exclusive authority to issue
separately but in its relation to the statute's totality. special writs of certiorari, prohibition
Each statute must, in fact, be construed as to and mandamus in election cases, and there are
"harmonized it with the pre-existing body of laws." also Supreme Court decisions, recent in fact,
Unless clearly repugnant, provisions of statutes must which declare that the Commission has no such
be reconciled. . . . (Commissioner of Customs vs. authority precisely because; according to the
ESSO Standard Eastern, Inc. L-28329, August 7, decisions, there is no law granting such
1975, 66 SCRA 113). authority, and without any hint whatsoever of
the existence of Sec. 50 of Batas vs. Pambansa
Blg. 697.
xxx xxx xxx

As gleaned from the case of Dictado,

The statutory construction rule is: "When the
respondents were arguing that Sec. 50 of BP
Legislature enacts provision, it is understood that it
Blg. 697 was repealed by the Omnibus Election
is aware of previous statutes relating to the same
Code (BP Blg. 881, December 3, 1985).
subject matter and that in the absence of any
Furthermore, in their answer, respondents cited
express repeal or amendment therein, the new
Supreme Court decisions where it was declared
provision should be deemed enacted pursuant to the
that, indeed, the Commission has no jurisdiction
legislative policy embodied in the prior statutes."
to issue special writs of certiorari, prohibition
(Legaspi vs. Executive Secretary, L-36153,
and mandamus in aid of its appellate
November 28, 1975, 68 SCRA 253).
jurisdiction.

The Commission is the most logical body whenever it

It is still the position of this Commission that
performs judicial functions to take jurisdiction of petitions
Sec. 50, BP Blg. 697 has not been repealed.
for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus because it has
appellate jurisdiction in election cases granted by the
Constitution itself. The Court of Appeals has no more As defined in the Constitution, "Judicial power"
appellate jurisdiction over such cases And in the case of includes the duty of the Courts of Justice to
the Supreme Court, Justice de Castro in the Pimentel settle actual controversies involving rights
case pointed out, in his dissenting opinion that under the which are legally demandable and enforceable,
Constitution the certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme and to determine whether or not there has been
Court in election cases should properly be limited to a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
decisions, orders or rulings of the Commission on excess, of jurisdiction on the part of any branch
Elections, not from lower courts. or instrumentality of the government (Sec. 1,
par. 2, Art. VII).

It was of course different under the Election Code of

1971 (R.A. No. 6388, September 2, 1971) because the Since the COMELEC, in discharging its appellate
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals then had jurisdiction pursuant to Sec. 2 (2), Art. IX-C, acts
appellate jurisdiction in election case decided by the as a court of justice performing judicial power
lower courts. and said power includes the determination of
whether or not there has been grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of
In the Veloria case, it now appears that only the Supreme
jurisdiction, it necessarily follows that the
Court and the Court of Appeals
Comelec, by constitutional mandate, is vested
have certiorari jurisdiction over election cases from the
with jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari in aid
lower courts because after reiterating the ruling in the
of its appellate jurisdiction. 5
Garcia and Uy cases, the Supreme Court said:

It set aside, for having been issued with grave abuse of

In view of this pronouncement, an
discretion, the trial court's order of execution pending
original civil action of certiorari,
appeal and the writ of execution because
prohibition or mandamus against a
regional trial court in an election contest
may be filed only in the Court of [a]t the time the Motion for Execution Pending
Appeals or in this Court being the only Appeal was filed on July 12, 1994 the court a
courts given such original jurisdiction quo had already lost jurisdiction over the case for
under the Constitution and the Law. as early as July 8, 1994, it had already
(Emphasis supplied). acknowledged through its order issued on that
date, the perfection of the appeal of petitioner as
 in fact it ordered the elevation of the records of As earlier stated, in Garcia and Uy, 9 and later, in
the case to this Honorable Commission. 6 Veloria, 10 this Court ruled that the COMELEC has no
jurisdiction over the extraordinary writs of certiorari,
Aggrieved by the resolution, the petitioner filed the instant prohibition, and mandamus because there is no specific
special civil action. constitutional or statutory conferment to it of such
jurisdiction.

In the resolution of 21 February 1985, the Court required

the respondents to comment on the petition and issued a The respondent COMELEC, however, points out that Section
temporary restraining order enjoining the respondent 50 of B.P. Blg. 697 expressly granted it such jurisdiction.
COMELEC to cease and desist from enforcing is challenged Indeed, it did. Nevertheless, considering that the said law
resolution. was, per Section 1 thereof, "to govern the election for the
regular Batasang Pambansa which shall be held on May 14,
1984, and the selection of sectoral representatives
As naturally expected, the private respondent, in her
thereafter as provided by the Constitution," and in view of
Comment, opposed the petition by invoking the very
the passage of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881)
arguments adduced by the respondent COMELEC in its
by the regular Batasang Pambansa, 11 this Court is then
challenged the resolution and the dissenting opinion in
confronted with the twin issues of whether said B.P. Blg.
the Garcia and Uy cases.
697 became functus officio after the 14 May 1984 election
of members of the regular Batasang Pambansa or the
In its comment filed by the Office of the Solicitor General, selection thereafter of the sectoral representatives at the
the respondent COMELEC postulates that it issued the said latest, and whether it was repealed by the Omnibus
resolution after it had taken cognizance of the appeal Election Code.
interposed by the private respondent from the RTC
decision, unlike in the Garcia and Uy cases, and therefore,
The Court agrees with the respondent COMELEC that there
in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, thus:
are provisions in B.P. Blg. 697 whose lifetime go beyond the
14 May 1984 election or the subsequent selection of
it cannot be gainsaid that [it] possesses inherent sectoral representatives. In fact, by the very wording of the
powers to employ means necessary to carry into last paragraph of its Section 50, to: wit:
effect the powers conferred upon it by law (Sec. 6,
Rule 135 of the Revised Rules of Court) and verily,
Sec. 50. Definition.
there was no need for any statutory grant for that
purpose. Indeed, in annulling the Order of
Execution of the Regional Trial Court, public xxx xxx xxx
respondent did not exceed its jurisdiction since its
action in this regard was necessary to preserve The Commission is hereby vested with
the subject of the appeal and to maintain the exclusive authority to hear and
the status quo of the parties pending the final decide petitions for certiorari, prohibition
outcome of its review of the correctness of the and mandamus involving election cases.
appealed decision. 7 (Emphasis supplied).

It tried to show that in Pimentel and Garcia, the trial courts it is quite clear that the exercise of the power was not
still had jurisdiction over the cases unlike in the instant restricted within a specific period of time. Taken in the
case where the trial court had already given due course to context of the conspicuous absence of such jurisdiction as
the appeal and elevated the records of the case to the ruled in Pimentel vs. Commission on Elections, 12 it seems
COMELEC which had taken cognizance of the appeal. quite obvious that the grant was intended as a remedial
legislation to eliminate the seeming incongruity or
This Court resolved to give due course to this petition and irrationality resulting in a splitting of jurisdiction pointed
to decide it on its merits. out in the dissenting opinion of Justice De Castro in the said
case.

The contention of the respondent COMELEC as advanced

by the Office of the Solicitor General is unacceptable. It But did not the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881)
goes against its theory in the assailed resolution and is not repeal B.P. Blg. 697? The repealing clause of the latter
supported by the facts. The challenged resolution involves reads as follows:
a case which the COMELEC docketed as a special
relief case (SPR. No. 1-94). Under Rule 28 of its Rules of Sec. 282. Repealing clause.
Procedure, the special relief cases are petitions Presidential decree No. 1296, otherwise
for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, and contempt known as The 1978 Election Code, as
proceedings. The ordinary appeal from the RTC decision amended, is hereby repealed. All other
was, as disclosed in the challenged resolution; docketed as election laws, decrees, executive orders,
EAC No. 108-94. 8 Clearly then, the COMELEC had rules and regulations, or parts thereof,
recognized and taken cognizance of two cases: one, the inconsistent with the provisions of this
ordinary appeal from the RTC decision (EAC No. 108-94), Code are hereby repealed, except
and two, the special civil action for certiorari docketed as Presidential Decree No. 1618 .and Batas
SPR No. 1-94. The two cases were not consolidated. The Pambansa Blg. 20 governing the election
dissimilarities between them need no further elaboration. of the members of the Sangguniang
Since it issued the challenged resolution under the latter Pampook of Regions IX and XII.
case, it cannot now be heard to state that it issued it as an
incident in the former, the ordinary appeal. This erroneous The second sentence is in the nature of a general repealing
contention of the Office of the of the Solicitor General clause. It has been said:
notwithstanding, the position taken by the COMELEC in its
resolution now in question paves the way for a re-
An express general repealing clause to
examination of this Court's pronouncement in
the effect that. all inconsistent
the Garcia and Uy cases.
enactments are repealed; is in legal
contemplation a nullity. Repeals must
 either be expressed or result by remains in full force and effect but only in such cases
implication. Although it has in some where, under paragraph (2), Section 1, Article IX-C of the
instances been held to be an express Constitution, it has exclusive appellate jurisdiction. Simply
recognition that there are acts in conflict put, the COMELEC has the authority to issue the
with the act in which it is included and as extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition,
indicative of the legislative intent to and mandamus only in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
repeal such acts, a general repealing
clause cannot be deemed an express The jurisdiction of the COMELEC having been settled, we
repeal because it fails to identify or now proceed to review the substance of the challenged
designate any act to be repealed. It resolution.
cannot be determinative of an implied
repeal for if does not declare any
That the trial court acted with palpable and whimsical
inconsistency but conversely, merely
abuse of discretion in granting the petitioner's motion for
predicates a repeal upon the condition
execution pending appeal and in issuing the writ of
that a substantial conflict is found under
execution is all too obvious. Since both the petitioner and
application of the rules of implied
the private respondent received copies of the decision on 1
repeals. If its inclusion is more than mere
July 1994, an appeal therefrom may be filed within five
mechahical verbiage, it is more often a
days 16 from 1 July 1994, or on or before 6 July 1994. Any
detriment than an aid to the
motion for execution pending appeal must be filed before
establishment of a repeal, for such clause
the period for the perfection of the appeal. Pursuant to
is construed as an express limitation of
Section 23 of the Interim Rules Implementing B.P. Blg. 129,
the repeal to inconsistent acts. 13
which is deemed to have supplementary effect to the
COMELEC Rules of Procedures pursuant to Rule 43 of the
This Court is not unaware of the equally settled rule in latter, an appeal would be deemed perfected on the last
statutory construction that in the revision or codification of day for any of the parties to appeal, 17 or on 6 July 1994. On
laws, all parts and provisions of the old laws that are 4 July 1994, the private respondent filed her notice of
omitted in the revised statute or code are deemed appeal and paid the appeal fee. On 8 July 1994, the trial
repealed, unless the statute or code provides otherwise court gave due course to the appeal and ordered the
expressly or impliedly. 14 elevation of the records of the case to the COMELEC. Upon
the perfection of the appeal, the trial court was divested of
By the tenor of its aforequoted Repealing Clause, it does its jurisdiction over the case. 18 Since the motion for
not evidently appear that the Batasang Pambansa had execution pending appeal was filed only on 12 July 1994, or
intended to codify all prior election statutes and to replace after the perfection of the appeal, the trial court could no
them with the new Code. It made, in fact, by the second longer validly act thereon. It could have been otherwise if
sentence, a reservation that all prior election statutes or the motion was filed before the perfection of the
parts thereof not inconsistent with any provisions of the appeal. 19 Accordingly, since the respondent COMELEC has
Code shall remain in force. That sentence the jurisdiction to issue the extraordinary writs of certiorari,
prohibition, and mandamus, then it correctly set aside the
predicates the intended repeal upon the challenged order granting the motion for execution pending
condition that a substantial conflict must appeal and writ of execution issued by the trial court.
be found on existing and prior acts of the
same subject matter. Such being the WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the
case, the presumption against implied challenged resolution of 9 February 1995 of the
repeals and the rule on strict construction Commission on Elections in SPR No. 1-94 entitled "Rosita
regarding implied repeals apply ex Cumba vs. Manuel M. Relampagos, et al. " is AFFIRMED.
proprio vigore. For the legislature is
presumed to know the existing laws so The temporary restraining order issued on 21 February
that, if repeal of particular or specific law 1995 is hereby LIFTED.
or laws is intended, the proper step is to
express it. The failure to add a specific
No pronouncemnt as to costs.
repealing clause particularly mentioning
the statute to be repealed indicates that
the intent was not to repeal any existing SO ORDERED.
law on the matter, unless an
irreconcilable inconsistency and
repugnancy exist in the terms of the new
and the old laws. 15

This being the case, the Court painstakingly examined the

aforesaid last paragraph of Section 50 of the Omnibus
Election Code to determine if the former is inconsistent
with any of the provisions of the latter, It found none.

In the face of the foregoing disquisitions, the Court must,

as it now does, abandon the ruling in
the Garcia and Uy and Veloria cases, We now hold that the
last paragraph of Section 50 of B.P. Blg. 697 providing as
follows:

The Commission is hereby vested with

exclusive authority to hear and decide
petitions for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus involving election cases.
 In an unverified motion, intervenor Cayetano moved for
reconsideration of the COMELEC Order insisting that it has
no jurisdiction to hear and decide a petition contesting the
results of a plebiscite.

In a complete turnaround, the COMELEC 2nd Division

issued an Order on November 29, 2001 granting the Motion
for Reconsideration. It dismissed the petition to annul the
results of the Taguig plebiscite and ruled that the COMELEC
has no jurisdiction over said case as it involves an exercise
of quasi-judicial powers not contemplated under Section 2
(2), Article IX (C) of the 1987 Constitution.[5]

On appeal, the COMELEC en banc affirmed the ruling of its

2nd Division. It held that the COMELEC cannot use its
power to enforce and administer all laws relative to
plebiscites as this power is purely administrative or
GR NO. 155855, January 26, 2004
MA. SALVACION BUAC & ANTONIO BAUTISTA, executive and not quasi-judicial in nature. It concluded that
PETITIONERS, the jurisdiction over the petition to annul the Taguig
~vs~ plebiscite results is lodged with the RTC under Section 19
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS & ALAN PETER S.
CAYETANO, RESPONDENTS. (6) of Batas Pambansa Big. 129 which provides that the RTC
DECISION shall have exclusive original jurisdiction in cases not within
the exclusive jurisdiction of any court or body exercising
PUNO, J.: judicial or quasi-judicial functions.[6]
This is a petition for certiorari and mandamus filed by Hence this petition.
petitioners Ma. Salvacion Buac and Antonio Bautista
assailing the October 28, 2002 en banc Resolution of the Petitioners Ma. Salvacion Buac and Antonio Bautista
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) which held that it has reiterate their submission that jurisdiction to decide
no jurisdiction over controversies involving the conduct of plebiscite protest cases is constitutionally vested with the
plebiscite and the annulment of its result. COMELEC. They likewise claim that the impugned Order is
discriminatory as during the pendency of the Taguig case,
The facts show that in April, 1988, a plebiscite was held in the COMELEC assumed jurisdiction over a similar case
Taguig for the ratification of the Taguig Cityhood Law concerning the revision and recount of the plebiscite ballots
(Republic Act No. 8487) proposing the conversion of Taguig involving the conversion of Malolos into a city. The
from a municipality into a city. Without completing the COMELEC resolved said case and already declared Malolos
canvass of sixty-four (64) other election returns, the a city.
Plebiscite Board of Canvassers declared that the NO
votes won and that the people rejected the conversion of Respondents contend that there is no such action as a
Taguig to a city. plebiscite protest under the Constitution, the laws and the
COMELEC rules as they provided only for election protests;
The Board of Canvassers was, however, ordered by the the quasi-judicial jurisdiction of the COMELEC over election
COMELEC en banc to reconvene and complete the canvass. contests extends only to cases enumerated in Section 2(2),
The Board did and in due time issued an Order proclaiming Article IX (C) of the Constitution, which does not include
that the negative votes prevailed in the plebiscite controversies over plebiscite results; and, even if the
conducted. petition to annul plebiscite results is akin to an election
Forthwith, petitioners filed with the COMELEC a petition to protest, it is the RTC that has jurisdiction over election
annul[1] the results of the plebiscite with a prayer for protests involving municipal officials, and the COMELEC has
revision and recount of the ballots cast therein. They only appellate jurisdiction in said cases.
alleged that fraud and irregularities attended the casting The petition is impressed with merit.
and counting of votes. The case was docketed as an
election protest and raffled to the COMELEC Second First. The key to the case at bar is its nature. The case at
Division.[2] bar involves the determination of whether the electorate of
Taguig voted in favor of, or against the conversion of the
Private respondent Cayetano intervened and moved to municipality of Taguig into a highly urbanized city in the
dismiss the petition on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of plebiscite conducted for the purpose. Respondents submit
the COMELEC. He claimed that a plebiscite cannot be the that the regular courts of justice, more specifically, the
subject of an election protest. He averred that the Regional Trial Court, has the jurisdiction to adjudicate any
jurisdiction to hear a complaint involving the conduct of a controversy concerning the conduct of said plebiscite. We
plebiscite is lodged with the Regional Trial Court (RTC). [3] hold that the invocation of judicial power to settle disputes
The COMELEC Second Division initially gave due course to involving the conduct of a plebiscite is misplaced. Section
the petition and ruled that it has jurisdiction over the case. 1, Article VIII of the Constitution defines judicial power as
It treated the petition as akin to an election protest including the duty of the courts of justice to settle
considering that the same allegations of fraud and actual controversies involving rights which are legally
irregularities in the casting and counting of ballots and demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or
preparation of returns are the same grounds for assailing not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
the results of an election. It then ordered the Taguig ballot to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
boxes to be brought to its Manila office and created revision instrumentality of the Government. According to Mr.
committees to revise and recount the plebiscite ballots.[4] Justice Isagani Cruz, the first part of the authority
represents the traditional concept of judicial power
involving the settlement of conflicting rights as conferred
by law.[7] The case at bar assailing the regularity of the COMELEC that should have jurisdiction over a petition to
conduct of the Taguig plebiscite does not fit the kind of a annul its results. If jurisdiction is given to the regular
case calling for the exercise of judicial power. It does not courts, the result will not enhance the orderly
involve the violation of any legally demandable right and administration of justice. Any regional trial court from
its enforcement. There is no plaintiff or defendant in the every nook and corner of the country will have jurisdiction
case at bar for it merely involves the ascertainment of the over a petition questioning the results of a nationwide
vote of the electorate of Taguig whether they approve or plebiscite. Bearing in mind that the jurisdiction of these
disapprove the conversion of their municipality to a highly courts is limited only within their respective judicial
urbanized city. There is no invocation of a private right regions, the difficulties that will attend their exercise of
conferred by law that has been violated and which can be jurisdiction would be many if not unmanageable.
vindicated alone in our courts of justice in an adversarial
Fourth. An eye contact with our Constitution and related
proceeding. Rather, the issue in the case at bar is the
laws will reveal that only contests relating to the elections,
determination of the sovereign decision of the electorate of
returns and qualifications of elected officials are subject to
Taguig. The purpose of this determination is more to
the exercise of judicial power of our courts or quasi-judicial
protect the sovereignty of the people and less to vindicate
power of our administrative agencies, thus: (a) contests
the private interest of any individual. Such a determination
involving elective municipal officials are tried and decided
does not contemplate the clash of private rights of
by trial courts of general jurisdiction, while those involving
individuals and hence cannot come under the traditional
barangay officials are tried and decided by trial courts of
jurisdiction of courts.
limited jurisdiction; in both cases, however, the COMELEC
Second. If the determination of the result of a plebiscite is exercises appellate jurisdiction; (b) contests involving all
not fit for the exercise ofjudicial power, the invocation of elective regional, provincial and city officials fall within the
Section 19 of B.P. Big. 129, as amended, otherwise known exclusive original jurisdiction of the COMELEC in the
as the Judiciary Reorganization Act, is ineluctably exercise of its quasi-judicial power; (c) contests involving
errant, viz: members of the House of Representatives fall within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the House of
Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. Regional
Representatives Electoral Tribunal in the exercise of quasi-
Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original
judicial power; (d) contests involving members of the
jurisdiction:
Senate fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Senate Electoral Tribunal in the exercise of quasi-judicial
power; and, (e) contests involving the President and the
1. In all civil actions in which the subject of the Vice President fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction
litigation is incapable of pecuniary of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal, also in the exercise of
estimation; quasi-judicial power.

What grabs the eyeball is the intent of our Constitution and

xxx xxx xxx election laws to subject only contests relating to the
elections, returns and qualifications of elected officials
from the barangay to the President of the Philippines to
6. In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction
the exercise of judicial or quasi-judicial powers of courts or
of any court, tribunal, person or body
administrative tribunals. Contests which do not involve the
exercising jurisdiction of any court, tribunal,
election, returns and qualifications of elected officials are
person or body exercising judicial or quasi-
not subjected to the exerci of the judicial or quasi-judicial
judicial functions.
powers of courts oradministra i agencies. Clearly,
controversies concerning the conduct plebiscite appertain
There cannot be any bout with doubt that the
to this category. In the case at bar. conduct of the Taguig
aforequoted provisions refer to civil cases or actions. A civil
plebiscite is the core of the controversy. This is a matter
action is one by which a party sues another for the
that involves the enforcement and administration of a law
enforcement or protection of a right or the prevention or
relative to a plebiscite. It falls under the jurisdiction of the
redress of a wrong.[8] As stressed above, a plebiscite
COMELEC under Section 2(1), Article IX (C) of the
involves the expression of the public will on a public issue.
Constitution which gives it the power to enforce and
The determination of the public will is a subject that does
administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct
not fit the jurisdiction of civil courts, for civil courts are
of a x x x plebiscite x x x.
established essentially to resolve controversies between
private persons.[9] Fifth. The Court agrees with the following submissions of
the Solicitor General, viz.
The case of Salva v. Macalintal [10] does not support the
overarching thesis that any question on the validity of xxx xxx xxx
plebiscite, or any dispute on the result of the plebiscite falls There can hardly be any doubt that the test
within the general jurisdiction of regular trial courts. and intent of the constitutional grant of
Looking at it with clear eyes, Salva resolved the validity, powers to the COMELEC is to give it all the
not of a plebiscite or its result, but of a provision in the necessary and incidental powers for it to
rules and regulations issued by the COMELEC governing the achieve the holding of free, orderly, honest
conduct of a plebiscite. and peaceful and credible elections [Maruhom
Third. To grant the RTC jurisdiction over petitions to annul v. COMELEC, 331 SCRA 473 (2000)]. Hence,
plebiscite results can lead to jumbled justice. Consider for the all encompassing power endowed the
instance where the plebiscite is national as it deals with COMELEC to enforce and administer all laws
the ratification of a proposed amendment to our and regulations relative to the conduct of an
Constitution. Snap thinking will tell us that it should be the election (or plebiscite, initiative, referendum
and recall) includes the power to cancel
proclamations [(Nolasco v. COMELEC, 275 power to enforce laws relative to the
SCRA 762 (1997)]. The COMELEC also has the conduct of plebiscite. It is not correct to argue
power to supervise and control the that the quasi-judicial power of the COMELEC
proceedings of the board of canvassers, is limited to contests relating to the elections,
suspend and/or annul illegal and void returns and qualifications of all elective
proclamations, declare a failure of elections regional, provincial and city officials, and
and promulgate rules and regulations appellate jurisdiction over all contests
concerning the conduct of elections. involving elective municipal officials decided
by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or
While the jurisdiction of the COMELEC is most
involving elective Barangay officials decided
commonly invoked over popular elections
by trial courts of limited jurisdiction. If the
that which involves the choice or selection of
COMELEC has quasi-judicial power to enforce
candidates to public office by popular vote,
laws relating to elective officials then there is
the same may likewise be invoked in
no reason why it cannot exercise the same
connection with the conduct of plebiscite.
power to ascertain the true results of a
In the present case, petitioners filed a petition plebiscite. All that the Constitution provides is
for revision of ballots cast in a plebiscite. The that the COMELEC shall exercise exclusive
COMELEC dismissed the petition on the jurisdiction over all contests relating to
ground that it has no jurisdiction over the elective officials. The provision is not a limiting
petition considering that the issue raised provision in the sense that it only limits the
therein calls for the exercise by the COMELEC quasi-judicial power of the COMELEC to said
of its judicial or quasi-judicial power. According cases. To repeat, the power of the COMELEC to
to the COMELEC, there is no law nor any ascertain the true results of the plebiscite is
constitutional provision that confers it with implicit in its power to enforce all laws relative
jurisdiction to hear and decide a case to the conduct of plebiscite.
contesting the officially proclaimed results of a
COMELECs claim that the petition for revision
plebiscite based on frauds and irregularities.
of ballots is cognizable by the Regional Trial
The COMELECs position is highly Courts pursuant to Section 19 (6) of the
untenable. Article LX-C, Section 2(1) is very Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 whieh
explicit that the COMELEC has the power to provides that Regional Trial Courts shall
enforce administer all laws and regulations exercise exclusive original jurisdiction x x x in
relative to the conduct of an election, cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of
plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall. any court tribunal, person or body
To enforce means to cause to take effect or to exercisingjudicial or quasi-judicial functions
cause the performance of such act or acts lacks merit. To repeat, the power to ascertain
necessary to bring into actual effect or the true results of the plebiscite is necessarily
operation, a plan or measure. When we say included in the power to enforce all laws
the COMELEC has the power to enforce all relative to the conduct of plebiscite.[11]
laws relative to the conduct of a plebiscite, it
necessarily entails all the necessary and SO ORDERED.
incidental power for it to achieve the holding
of an honest and credible plebiscite.
Obviously, the power of the COMELEC is not
limited to the mere administrative function of
conducting the plebiscite. The law is clear. It is
also mandated to enforce the laws relative to
the conduct of the plebiscite. Hence, the
COMELEC, whenever it is called upon to
correct or check what the Board of Canvassers
erroneously or fraudulently did during the
canvassing, can verify or ascertain the true
results of the plebiscite either through a pre-
proclamation case or through revision of
ballots. To remove from the COMELEC the
power to ascertain the true results of the
plebiscite through revision of ballots is to
render nugatory its constitutionally mandated