INDIA WINS

FREEDOM
An Autobiographical Narrative

MAULANA ABUL KALAM AZAD

ORIENT LONGMANS
BQM1J1\Y CJ\l,C"CrrI'J\ MADRAS NEW DELHI
INDIA WINS FREEDOM
r.alldhiji and Malilana i\bul Kalam zad (19 '\
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 FOR
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU
Friend and Comrade
 PREFACE

HEN a little over two years ago I approached Maulana

W Azad with the request that he should write his autobiogra-

phy, I never for a moment thought that it would b my
melancholy duty to write a pr face for the volume. H did not like to
talk about his personal life and was at first reluctant to und rtak tht:
work. It was with great difficulty that he could be p rsuaded that, as
one of the principal actors in the transfer of power from British to
Indian hands, he owed a duty to posterity to record his reading of
those memorable times. His reluctance was also partly due to his
shattered health. He felt that he needed all his energi s to cope with
the burden of work imposed on him by inescapable political and
administrative tasks. He finally agreed on my assuring him that I
would do my best to relieve him of the actual burden ofwriting. This
would of course mean that the Indian people would be deni d the
privilege of reading his autobiography in his own words. Indian liter-
ature in general and Urdu in particular would be the poorer for this,
but even a version in English written under his direction would be
better than no record at all.
I think it necessary to describe in some detail how the work hll5
been composed. During these last two years or so, I sp nt on an
average an hour or more every evening with Maulana Azad, except
on those occasions when I had to go out of Delhi. He was a wonderful
conversationalist and used to describe his experiences in vivid tenns.
I made fairly copious notes and also asked questions for clarification
of a point or elicitation of furth r information. He consistently r -
fused to speak on personal matters, but on all questions relating to
public affairs, he spoke with the utmost frankness and sincerity.
When I had collected sufficient material for a chapt r, I prepared
a draft in English which I handed over to him at the earliest oppor-
tunity. He read each chapter by himself and then we went over
it together. At this stage, he made many amendments by addition
viii Preface
and alteration, as well a3 by omission. We proceeded in this way
till I was able to give him the first draft of the completed book in
September 1957.
When he had the completed text in his hands, Maulana Azad
decided that some thirty pages of the text dealing with incidents
and reflections mainly of a personal character should not be published
for the present. He directed that a copy each of the complete text
should be deposited under sealed cover in the National Library,
Calcutta, and the National Archives, New Delhi. He was, however,
anxious that the exclusion of these passages should not in any way
alter either the outline of his picture or his general findings. I carried
out the changes according to his instructions and was able to present
to Maulan;,l. Azad the revised and abridged draft towards the end of
November, 1957.
He went through it once again during the period when I was
away in Australia. After my return we went through the manuscript
chapter by chapter and indeed sentence by sentence. He made
some minor alterations, but there was no major change. In some
cas s, a chapter was thus revised three or four times. On Republic
Day this year, Maulana Azad said that he was satisfied with the
manuscript and it could now be sent to the printers. The book as now
released represents the text as finally approved by him.
It was Maulana Azad's wish that the book should appear in
November 1958 to synchronise with his seventieth birthday. Fate
however willed otherwise and he will not be with us to see the book
when it appears.
As I have already stated, Maulana Azad was not in the beginning
very willing to undertake the preparation of this book. As the book
progressed his interest grew. In the last six months or so, he rarely
missed an evening for the preparation of the manuscript. He was
extremely reticent about his personal life, but in the end he volun-
teered to write a first volume which would have covered the earlier
phases of his life and brought the story up to 1937. He did in fact
approve a synopsis which, according to his own wishes, is included
in this volume as its first chapter. Jie had also intended to write a
third volume to deal with events since 1948. Unfortunately for
us, these volumes will now never be written.
The work in connexion with this book has been for me a labour of
love and I shall feel happy if it helps in forwarding an object that
was very dear to Maulana And's heart. This is the J)fomotion of
 Preface ix
greater understanding among the different Indian communities as a
first step towards greater understanding among peoples of the world.
He also wished that the people of India and Pakistan should look
upon one another as friends and neighbours. He regarded the
Indian Council for Cultural Relations as an instrument for the
achievement of this object and in his Presidential Address to the
Council- his last prepared and printed speech- he made a fervent
appeal for the strengthening of the bonds of understanding and
sympathy between the people of these two States which till only a
decade ago had been one undivided country. I feel that there can
be no better use of any income derived from this book than to make it
available to the Council for promoting better und rstanding among
~~e different communities which live in India and Pakistan. Apart
from a share to be paid to his nearest surviving r latives, royaltie
from thi:: book will therefore go to the Council for th annual award
of two priz~s for the best essay on Islam by a non-Muslim and
on Hinduism by a Muslim citizen of India or Pakistan. In view of
Maulana Azad's great love and consideration for the young, the
competition will be restricted to persons of thirty or below on the
22nd of February in any year .
.Before I conclude, I wish to make one other thing perf; ctly clear.
There are opinions and judgments in this book with which I do not
agr ,but since my function was only to record Maulana Azad's
findings, it would have been highly improper to let my views colour
the narrative. When he was alive, I often expressed my differences
to him, and with the open-mindedness which was so strong an element
in his nature, he has at times modified his views to meet my criticisms.
At other times, he smiled in his characteristic way and said, 'These
are my views and surely I have the right to express them as I will.'
Now that he is no more, his vi ws must stand in the form in which
he left them.
It is difficult for any man to reflect with complete accuracy the
views and opinions of another. Even when both use the same
language, the change of one word may alter the emphasis and bring
about a subtle difference in the shade of meaning. The difference
in the genius of Urdu and English makes the task of interpreting
Maulana Azad's thoughts still more difficult. Urdu like all other
Indian languages is rich, colourful and vigorous. English, on the other
hand, is essentially a language of undf!rstatement. And when the
ipCaker is a master of Urdu like Maulana Azad, the plight of the
x Pre/ate
writer who seeks to express his thoughts in English can easily be
imagined. In spite of these difficulties, I have tried to reflect as faith-
fully as I could the views of Maulana Azad, and 1 regard myself
as richly rewarded by the fact that the text had met with his approval.
New Delhi, HUMAYUN KABIR
15th Mrch 1958
 CONTENTS
Page
PREFACE vo
PROSPECTUS OF THE FIRST VOLUME 1
CONGRESS IN OFFICE 13
WAR IN EUROPE 24-
I BECOME CONGRESS PRESIDENT 31
A CHINESE INTERLUDE 42
THE CRIPPS MISSION 46
UNEASY INTERVAL 70
QUIT INDIA 80
AHl4EDNAOAR FORT JAIL 88
THE SIMLA CONFERENCE 101
GENERAL ELECTIONS 118
THE BRITISH CABINET MISSION 138
THE PRELUDE TO PARTITION 152
THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT 163
THE MOUNTBA TTEN MISSION 181
THE END OF A DREAM 191
DIVIDED INDIA 206
EPILOGUE 223
ApPENDIX 228
INDEX 247
 ILLUSTRATIONS
Frontispiece
Gandhiji and Maulana Abul Kalam Azad
Ftuinz pa;:e
Plate I 48
Azad arriving at the Viceregal Lodge
Azad and Asaf Ali meet the Cabinet Misslon

Plate II 49
Azad and Lord Pethick-Lawreno,
Azad and Lord Wavell
PJat$ III 112
Wardha Congress Session, 1942"
Meerut Congress Session, 1946
Plate IV 113
A.I.C.C. Meeting, D'lhi, 1947
Plate V 176
At the Central Institute of Education, Delhi
Return from European Tour
Plau VI 177
A.I.C.C. Meeting, Bombay, 1946
At the Mahatma's cremation
PROSPECTUS OF THE FIRST VOLUME

y forefathers cam to India from H rat in Babar's days.

M They first settled in Agra and later moved to Delhi. It was a

scholarly family and in Akbar's time, Maulana Jamaluddin
became famous as a religious divine. After him, the family became
more inclined to worldly affairs and several members occupied im-
portant civil positions. In Shahjehan's days, Mohammad Hadi was
appointed Governor of the Agra Fort.
My father's maternal grandfather was Maulana Munawaruddin.
He was one of the last Rukn-ul Mudarassin of the Moghul period.
This post had been first created in Shahjehan's time and was
intended to supervise the activities of the State for the promotion of
learning and scholarship. The officer had to administer gifts oflands,
endowments and pensions to scholars and teachers and could b
compared to a Director of Education in the modern world. Moghul
power had by this time declined but these major posts w reostill
retained.
My grandfath r died while my father Maulana Khairuddin was
still very young. My father was therefore brought up by his maternal
grandfather. Two years before the Mutiny, Maulana Munawarud-
din was disgusted with the state of affairs in India and d cided to
migrate to Mecca. When he reached Bhopal, Nawab Sikandar
Jehan Begum detained him. The Mutiny started while he was still
in Bhopal and for i'NO years he could not leave the plac . He then
came to Bombay but could not go to Mecca as death overtook him
there.
My father was then about twenty-five. He proceed d to Mecca
and settled there. He built a house for himself and m tried Sheikh
Mohamm d Zaher Watri's daughter. Sheikh Mohammed Zaher Will
a great scholar of Medina whose fame had travelled outside Arabia.
My father also became well known ~roughout the Islamic world
d'ter an Arabic work of his in ten volumell was published in Egypt.
2 India Wins Freedom
He came to Bombay several times and once came to Calcutta. In
both places many became his admirers and disciples. He had also
toured extensively in Iraq, Syria and Turkey.
In Mecca, the Nahr Zubeida was the main source of water for the
people. This was constructed by Begum Zubeida the wife of Khalif
Harun-al-Rashid. In course of time, the canal had deteriorated
and there was a great shortage of water in the city. This scarcity was
acutest during the Haj and pilgrims had to face great difficulties.
My fath r had this Nahr repaired. He raised a fund of twenty
lakh in India, Egypt, Syria and Turkey and improved the canal
in such a way that the Bedwin did not have an opportunity of
damaging it aga.in. Sultan Abdul Majid was then the Emperor of
Turkey and in recognition of his services, awarded him the first class
Majidi m dal.
I was born in Mecca in 1888. In 1890, my father came to Calcutta
with the whole family. Some time back he had fallen down in ]edda
and broken his shin bone. It had been set, but not well, and he was
advised that the surgeons in Calcutta could put it right. He had
intended to stay only for a short time but his disciples and admirers
would not let him go. A year after we came to Calcutta, my mother
died and was buried there.
My father was a man who believed in the old ways of life. He
had no faith in western education and never thought of giving me an
ducation of the modern type. He held that modem education
would destroy religious faith and arranged for my education in the
old traditional manner.
The old system of education for Muslims in India was that the boys
w re first taught Persian and then Arabic. When th y had acquired
som profici ncy in the language, they wer taught Philosophy, Geo-
metry, Mathematics and Algebra in Arabic. A course of Islamic
Theology was also required as an ssential part of such education.
My fath r had me taught at home, as he did not like to send me to
any Madrasa. There was of course the Calcutta Madrasa, but my
father did not have a very high opinion of it. At first he taught me
himself. Later he appointed different teachers for different subjects.
He wished me to be taught by the most eminent scholar in each field.
Students who followed the traditional system of education nor-
mally finished their course at an age between twenty and twenty-
five. This included a period wh n the young scholar had to teach
pupils and thus prove that he had acquired Dl&Stery over what he
Period of Great Mental Crisis 3
had learnt. I was able to complete the course by the time I was
sixteen, and my father got together some fifteen students to whom
I taught higher Philosophy, Mathematics and Logic.
It was soon after this that I first came across the writings of Sir
Syed Ahmed Khan. I was greatly impressed by his views on mod rn
education. I realized that a man could not be truly ducat d in the
modern world unless he studied modern science, philosophy and
literature. I decided that I must learn English. I spoke to Maulvi
Mohammed YusufJafri who was then chiefexamin r ofth Oriental
course of studies. He taught me the English alphab t and gave me
Peary Ohuran Sarkar's First Book. As soon as I gained some know-
ledge of the Janguag , I started to read the Bible. I secured English,
Persian and Urdu versions of the book and r ad them side by side.
This helped me greatly in understanding the text. I also started to
read English newspapers with the help of a dictionary. In this way,
I soon acquired enough knowledge to r ad English books and devoted
myself specially to the study of history and philosophy.
This was a period of great mental crisis for me. I was born into a
family which was deeply imbued wit;h religious traditions. All the
conventions of traditional life were accepted without question and the
family did not like the least deviation from orthodox ways. I could
not reconcile myself with the prevailing customs and beliefs and
my heart was full of a new sense of revolt. The id as r had acquired
from my family and early training could"'no long r satisfy me. I
felt tha t I must find the truth for myself. Almost instinctively I began
to move out of my family orbit and se k my own path.
The first thing which troubled me was the exhibition ofdifferenccs
among the different sects of Muslims. I could not understand why
they should be so opposed to one another when all of th m claimed
to derive their inspiration from the same source. Nor could I reconcile
myselfwith the dogmatic assurance with which eachs ct branded the
others as mistaken and heretical. Th s difli rences among th ortho-
dox schools began to raise doubts in my mind con ruing 11 ligion
itself. Ifreligion xpresses a universal truth, why should there be such
differences and conflicts among men professing different religions?
Why should each religion claim to be the sole repository of truth and
condemn all others as false?
For two or three years, this unrest continued and I longed to find
a solution of my doubts. I passed from one phase to another and a
.tase came when all the old bonds imposed on my mind by family and
4 India Wins Freedom
upbringing were completely shattered. I felt free of all conventional
ties and decided that I would chalk out my own path. It was about
this time that I decided to adopt the pen name 'Azad' or 'Free' to
indicate that I was no longer tied to my inherited beliefs. I propose
to give a more detailed account of these changes in the first volume
ormyautobiography.
This was also the period when my political ideas began to change.
Lord Curzon was then the Viceroy of India. His imperialist attitude
and administrative measur s raised the Indian political unrest to
new h ights. The disturbance was most marked in Bengal, as Lord
Curzon paid special attention to this province. It was politically
the most advanced part of India, and the Hindus of Bengal had
taken a leading part in Indian political awakening. In 1905, Lord
Curzon decided to partition the province in the belief that this would
weaken the Hindus and create a permanent division between the
Hindus and the Muslims of Bengal.
Bengal did not take this measure lying down. There was an un-
precedented outburst of political and revolutionary enthusiasm. Shri
Arabindo Ghosh left Baroda and came to Calcutta to make it the
centre of his activities. His paper Karmayogin became a symbol of
national awakening and revolt.
I t was during this period that I came into contact with Shri Shyam
Sund r Chakravarty, who was one of the important revolutionary
workers of th day. Tlirough him I met other revolutionaries. I
remember I met Shri Arabindo Gho e on two or three occasions.
The result was that I was attracted to revolutionary politics and
joined one of the groups.
In those days th revolutionary groups were recruited exclusively
from the Hindu middle classes. In fact all the revolutionary groups
w re then actively anti-Muslim. They saw that the British Govern- .
ment was using the Muslims against India's political struggle and the
Muslims were playing the Government's game. East Bengal had
become a s parate province and Barnfield Fuller, who was then
Lieutenant-Governor, openJy said that the Government looked upon
the Muslim community as fts favourite wife. The revolutionaries
felt that the Muslims were an obstacle to the attainment of Indian
freedom and must, like other obstacles, be removed.
One other factor was responsible for the revolutionaries' dislike of
Muslims. The Government felt that the political awakening among
the Hindus ofBcngal was so t that no Hindu officer could be funy
I Join the Revolutionaries 5
trusted in dealing with these revolutionary activities. They therefore
imported a number of Muslim officers from the Unit d Provine s
for the manning of the Intelligence Branch of the Police. The result
was that the Hindus of Bengal began to ~ el that Muslims a such were
against political freedom and against the Hindu community.
When Shyam Sunder Chakravarty introduced me to other revolu-
tionaries and my new friends found that I was willing to join th m,
they were greatly surprised. At first th y did not fully trust me
and tried to keep me outside their inner councils. In cours of time
they realiz d their mistake and I gained th ir confid nee. 1 b gan
to argue with them that they were wrong in thinking that Muslims
as a community w re their enemies. 1 told them that they should not
g neralize from their experience of a few Muslim offic rs in Bengal.
In Egypt, Iran and Turkey the Muslims w re engag d in revolution-
ary activities for the achievement of democracy and fr edom. The
Muslims of India would alsojoin in the political struggle if we worked
among them and tried to win them as our friends. I also pointed out
that active hostility, or even the indifference of Muslims, would make
the struggle for political liberty much more difficult. We must there-
fore make every effort to win the support and friendship of the
community.
I could not at first convince my revolutionary friends about the
correctness of my diagnosis. But in course of time some of them came
round to my point of view. During this period I had also start d to
work among Muslims and found that there was a group of young men
ready to take up new political tasks.
When I first joined the revolutionaries I found that their activities
were confined to Bengal and Bihar. I may add that Bihar was then
a part of the Province of Bengal I pointed out to my rri nds that we
must extend our activities to other parts of India. At first they were
reluctant and said that the nature of their activities was secret. There
were risks in extending their connexions and if branches were estab-
lished in other provinces it might be difficult to maintain the secrecy
which was essential for success. I was, however, able to persuade them
and within two years of the time that I joined, secret societies
~cre established in several of the important towns of Northern India
and Bombay. I could tell many interesting as well as amusing stories
of the way in which organizations were set up and new members
recruited, but the readers must wait for a fuller account till the first
volume of my autobiography is ready. .
 India Wins Freet/om
It was during this period that I had an occasion to go out ofIndia
and tour in Iraq, Egypt, Syria and Turkey. In all these countries
I found great interest in French. 1 also acquired a taste for the
language and started to learn it, but I found that English was fast
b coming the most widely spread international language and met
most ormy needs.
I would like to take this opportunity to correct a mistake that has
been given currency by the late Mahadev Desai. When he wrote
my biography, he put down a number of questions and asked me
to answ r them. In reply to one question I had said that when I was
about twenty I made a tour of the Middle East and spent along time
in Egypt. In reply to another question I had said that traditional
education was unsatisfactory and sterile not only in India, but also
in the famous university of al Azhar in Cairo. Somehow Mahadev
Desai came to the conclusion that I had gone to Egypt to study in al
Azhar. The truth is that I was not a student there for a single day.
Perhaps his mistake arose out of his idea that if a man has acquired
some learning, he must have gone to some university. WhenMahadev
D sai found that I had been to no Indian University, he inferred
that I must have taken a degree from al Azhar.
Wh n I visi ted Cairo in 1908, the system in al Azhar was so defective
that it neither trained the mind nor gave adequate knowledge of
ancient Islamic science and philosophy. Sheikh Mohammed Abduh
had tried to reform the system, but the old conservative ulamas
d feat d all his efforts. When he lost all hopes of improving al Azhar
h started a new College, Dar al-Ulum, in Cairo which exists to this date.
Since this was the state of affairs in al Azhar, there was no reason
why I should go to study there.
From Egypt I went to Turkey and France and had intended to go
to London. I could not do so, as I received news that my father was
ill. I rcturnedfrom Paris and did not see London till many years later.
I have already said that my political ideas had turned towards
revolutionary activities before I left Calcutta in 1908. When I came
to Iraq, I met some of the Iranian revolutionaries. In Egypt I came
into contact with the followers of Mustafa Kamal Pasha. 1 also met
a group of young Turks who had established a centre in Cairo and
were publishing a weekly from there. When I went to Turkey I
became friends with some of the leaders of the Young Turk movement.
I kept up my correspondence with them for many years after my
return to Ind.ia.
Publication of al Hilal 7
Contact with these Arab and Turk revolutionaries confirmed my
political beliefs. They expressed their surprise that Indian Musal-
mans were either indifferent to or against nationalist demand. Th y
were of the view that Indian Muslims should have led the national
struggle for freedom, and could not understand why Indian Musal-
mans were mere camp-follow rs of the British. I was more convinced
than ever that Indian Muslims must co-operate in th work of politi-
cal liberation of the country. Stcps must be tak n to nsur that they
were not exploited by the British Government. I flIt it n ce ary to
create a new movement among Indian Musalmans and decid d that
on my return to India, I would take up political work with great r
earnestness.
After my return, I thought for some tim about my futur program-
me of action. I came to the conclusion that we must build up public
opinion and for this a journal was essential. Ther w rc a numb r of
dailies, w kli s, and monthlies published in Urdu from the Punjab
and the U.P. but their standard was not vcry high. Th ir g t-up
and printing were as poor as their contents. They were produc d
by thc lithographic process and could not ther fore embody any of
the features of modem journalism. Nor were they able to print half-
tone pictures. I decided that my journal should be attractiv in get-up
and powerful in its appeal. I t must be set up in type and not r produc-
ed by the lithographic process. Accordingly I establish d the al Hilal
Press and the first number of the journal at Hilal wa publish d in
June 1912.
The publication of al Hilal marks a turning point in the history
of Urdu journalism. It achieved unpreced ntcd popularity within a
short time. The Public was attracted not only by the superior print-
ing and production of thc paper but even more by the new note of
strong nationalism preached by it. Al Hilal created a revolutionary
stir among the masses. The demand for al Hilal was so gr at that
within the first three months, all the old issues had to be reprint d
as every new subscriber wanted the entire set.
The leadership of Muslim politics at this time was in the hands of
the Aligarh party. Its members regarded themselves as the trustees
of Sir Syed Ahmed's policies. Their basic tenet was that Musal-
mans must be loyal to the British Crown and remain aloof from the
freedom movement. When al Hilal raised a different slogan and its
popularity and circulation increased fast, they felt that their leader-
thi was threatened, Th therefore be an to oppose al /filal an<t
8 India Wins Freedom
even went to the extent of threatening to kill its editor. The more
the old leadership opposed, the more popular al Hilal became with
the community. Within two years, al Hilal reached a circulation of
26,000 copies per week, a figure which was till then unheard of in Urdu
journalism.
The Government was also disturbed by this success of al Hilal.
It demanded a security ofRs 2,000 under the Press Act and thought
this might curb its tone. I did not allow myself to be daunted by
these pin-pricks. Soon the Government forfeited the deposit and
demanded a fr sh deposit of Rs 10,000. This also was soon lost. In
the meantime war had broken out in 1914 and the al Hilal Press
was confiscated in 1915. After five months, I started a new Press
called al Balagh and brought out a journal under the same name.
The Government now felt that th y could not stop my activities by
using only the Press Act. Accordingly th y resorted to the Defence
ofIndia Regulations and in April 1916 externed me from Calcutta.
The Governments of Punjab, Delhi, U.P. and Bombay had already
prohibited me from entering these provinces under the same Regula-
tions. The only place I could go to was Bihar and I went to Ranchi.
After another six months, I was interned in Ranchi and remained in
detention till 31 December 1919. On I January 1920 I was, along
with other internees and prisoners, released from internment under
the King's d claration.
Gandhiji had by this time appeared on the Indian political scene.
When I was an internee at Ranchi, he came there in connexion
with his work among the peasants in Champaran. He expressed a
wish to meet me but the Bihar Government did not give him the
necessary permission. It was therefore only after my release in
January 1920 that I met him for the first time ill Delhi. There was
a proposal to send a deputation to the Viceroy to acquaint him with
the feelings of Indian Muslims regarding the Khilafat and Turkey's
future. Gandhiji participated in the discussions and expressed his
compi te sympathy and interest in the proposal. He declared him-
self ready to be associated with the Muslims on this issue. On 20
January 1920, a m ting was -held in Delhi. Apart from Gandhiji,
Lokmanya Tilak and other Congress leaders also supported the stand
oflndian Muslims on the question of the Khilafat.
The deputation met the Viceroy. I had signed the memorial but
did not go with the deputation as I was of the view that matters had
gone beyond memorials and deputations. In his reply, the Vicero
Gandhiji's Programme 9
said that the Government would offer the necessary facilities if a
deputation was sent to London to present the Muslim point of view
before the British Government. He expressed his inability to do
anything himself.
The question now arose about the next st p. A meeting was h ld
in which Mr Mohammed Ali, Mr Shaukat Ali, Hakim Ajmal
Khan and Maulvi Abdul Bari of Firangi-Mahal, Lucknow, wer also
present. Gandhiji presented his programme of non-co-operation.
He said that the days of d putations and memorials were over. We
must withdraw all support from the Government and this alon .
would persuade the Government to come to terms. He sugg stcd that
all Government titles should be returned, law courts and educational
institutions should be boycotted, Indians should r sign from the
services and refuse to take any part in the newly constituted
legislatures.
As soon as Gandhiji described his proposal r rem mb r d that
dlis was the programme which Tolstoy had outlin d many y ars
ago. In 1901, an anarchist attack d the king of Italy. Tolstoy at
the time addressed an open letter to the anarchists that the method of
violence was morally wrong and politically of little use. If on man
was killed, another would always take his place. In fact violence
always engender d greater violenc . In the Greek 1 gend, 999
warriors sprouted out of the blood of every warrior killed. To indulge
in political murder was to sow the dragon's t tho Tolstoy advis d
that the proper method to paralyse an oppr ssive Govcrnm nt was
to refuse taxes, resign from all services and boycott institutions sup-
porting the Govenunent. He believed that such a programme would
compel any Government to come to terms. I also rememb red that I
had myself suggested a similar programme in some articles in at Hila!.
Others reacted according to their own backgrounds. Hakim
Ajmal Khan said that he wanted some time to consider the pro-
gramme. He would not like to advise others till he was willing to
accept the programme himself. Maulvi Abdul Bari said that
Gandhiji's suggestions raised fundamental issues and he could not
give a reply till he had meditated and sought divin guidance.
Mohammed Ali and Shaukat Ali said they would wait till Maulvi
Abdul Bari's decision was known. Gandhiji th n turned to mc.
I said without a moment's hesitation that I fully accept d the pro-
gramme. If people ~ally wanted to help 1 urkey, there was no
alternative to the programme sketched by Gandhiji.
10 India Wins Freedom
After a few weeks, a Khilafat Conference was held at Meerut.
It was in this conference that Gandhiji preached for the first time
the non-co-operation programme from a public platform. After he
had spoken, I followed him and gave him my unqualified support.
In S ptember 1920, a special session of the Congress was held at
Calcutta to consider the programme for action prepared by Gandhiji.
Gandhiji said that the programme of non-co-operation was necessary
if we wished to achieve Swaraj and solve the Khilafat problem in a
satisfactory manner. Lala Lajpat Rai was the President of this session
and Mr C. R. Das one of its leading figures. Neither of them agreed
with Gandhiji. Bipin Chandra Pal also spoke forcefully and said
that the best weapon to fight the British Government was to boycott
British goods. He did not have much faith in the other items of
Gandhiji's programme. In spite of their opposition, the resolution
for the non-eo-operation movement was passed with an overwhelm-
ing majority.
Th re followed a period of intensive touring to prepare the country
for the non-eo-operation programme. Gandhiji travelled extensively.
I was with him most of the time and Mohammed Ali and Shaukat
Ali were often our companions. In December 1920, the annual
session of the Congress was held in Nagpur. By this time, the temper
of the country had changed. Mr C. R. Das now openly favoured the
non-co-opera tion programme. Lala Lajpat Rai was at first somewhat
opposed but when he found that the Punjab delegates were all
supporting Gandhiji he also joined our ranks. It was during this
session that Mr Jinnah finally left the Congress.
The Government retaliated by arresting leaders throughout the
country. In Bengal, Mr C. R. Das and I were among the first to
be arrest d. Subhas Chandra Bose and Birendra Nath Sasmal also
join d us in prison. We were all placed in the European ward of the
Alipur CentralJail which b came a centre for political discussions.
Mr C. R. Das was sentenced to six months' imprisonment. I was
held und r trial for a long time and finally awarded one year's
imprisonment. I was in fact not rel ased till 1 January 1923. Mr C.
R. Das was released earli r and presided over the Congress at its
Ga ya s ssion. During this s ssion, sharp differences of opinion appear-
ed among th Congress leaders. C. R. Das, Motilal Nehru and Hakim
Ajmal Khan formed the Swaraj Party and presented the Council
entry programme which was opposed by the orthodox followers of
Gandhiji. Congress was thus divided between no-changers and
The Salt Sa~agraha tt
pro-changers. When 1 came out, I tried to bring about a reconcilia-
tion between the two groups and we were able to reach an agreement
in the special session of the Congress in September 1923. I was then
thirty-five and asked to preside over this session. It was said that I
was the youngest man to be elected President of the Congress.
After 1923, Congress activities remained mainly in the hands of
the Swaraj party. It obtained large majorities in almost alII gisla-
tures and carried the fight on the parliamentary front. Congressmen
who remained outside the Swaraj party continued with their con-
structive programme but they could not attract as much public
support or attention as the Swaraj party. There were many incidents
which have a bearing on the future development of Indian politics
but I must ask the reader to wait for a fuller account till the first
volume of my autobiography is published.
In 1928, political excitement mounted with the appointm nt of
the Simon Commission and its visit to India. In 1929, Congr ss pass-
ed the Independence resolution and gave the British Govemm nt one
y ar's notice of its intention to launch a mass movement if the national
demand was not fulfilled. The British r fused to comply with our
demand, and in 1930, Congress declared that Salt laws would be
violated. Many people were sceptical when the. Salt Satyagraha
began but as the movement gathered strength both the Government
and the people were taken by surprise. The Government took strong
action and declared the CongreslI an unlawful organization. It
ordered the arrest of the Congress President and his Working Com-
mittee. We met the challenge by authorizing each Congress President
to nominate the successor. I was elected one of the Presid nts and
nominated my Working Committee. Before I was arrested, r nomi-
nated Dr Ansari as my successor. At first he was not willing to join
the movement but I was able to persuade him. In this way, we
were able to baffle the Government and keep the movement going.
My arrest was on the basis of a speech I had delivered in Meerut.
I was therefore detained in the Meerut jail for about a year and a
half.
After the struggle had continued over a year, Lord Irwin released
Gandhiji and the other members of the Working Committee. We
met first at Allahabad and then at Delhi and the Gandhi-Irwin Pact
was signed. This led to a general release of Congressmen and the
participation of Congress in the Round T able Conference. Gandhiji
was sent as our sole representative but the negotiations proved
12 India Wins Freedom
abortive and Gandhiji returned empty-handed. On his return from
London, Gandhiji was again arrested and a policy offresh repression
launch d. Lord Willingdon was the new Viceroy and he took strong
action against all Congressmen. I was at Delhi and detained in
the Delhi jail for over a year. This period saw many incidents of
great significance in Indian political history but for these also the
readers must wait for the first volume.
In 1935, the Government of India Act was passed which provided
for provincial autonomy and a federal Government at the Centre.
It is here that the story I wish to tell in the prescnt volume begins.
 CONG RESS IN OFFICE

N the first elections h ld in accordance with the ov mm nt

I of India Act, 1935, the Congress won an overwhelming vi tory.

It secured an absolute majority in five of the major provinc sand
was the larg st single party in four. It was only in th Punjab and
Sind that the Congress did not achi vc comparabl succ ss.
This victory of the Congr S5 has to be judg d against th Con-
gr 88'S arly r luctance to cont 8t the e) ctions at all. The Gov m-
m nt ofIndia Act 1935 provided for provincial autonomy but th re
was a fly in th . ointment. Special pow rs wer r serv d to th Gov r-
nors to declare a state of emergency, and once a Gov mor did so,
he could suspend the constitution and assum all pow rs to hirns If.
Democracy in the provinces could th r fore function only so long
as the Gov mors p rmitted it. The position was v 11 wors so far
as the Central Government was cone med. Here th rc was an
att mpt to re-introduce the principle of diarchy which had alr ady
b en discr dit d in the provinces. Not only was th Central Gov m-
ment to be a weak federation but it was also ov rweighted in favour
of the princes and oth r vest d inter su. Th se could g n rally be
xpected to side with the British rul rs of th country.
It was th refore not surprising that the Congress which was
fighting for complete indep nd nee of the country was av rsc to
ace pting this arrangem nt. The Congr ss condemn d outright th
type oH deration proposed for the Central GOY rnm nt. For a long
time, the Cong s Working Committee was also against the schem
proposed for the provine s. It had a strong section which was opposed
ev n to participating in the lections. My views were quit dim r-
ent. I h Id that it would be a mista}Q to boycott th I ctions. If
the Congress did so, less desirable lem nts would capture the
central and provincial Legislatures and speak in the nam of the
Indian people. Besides, the election t;lmpaign om red a spi ndid
opportunity for eduCating the masses in the basic issues of Indian
 India Wins Freedom
politics. Ultimately the point of view I represented prevailed, and
the Congress participated in the elections with results which I have
already indicated.
New differences were now revealed within the leadership of the
Congress. A section of those who had participated in the elections
opposed assumption of office by Congress nominees. They argued
that, with special powers reserved to the Governors, provincial
autonomy was a mockery. Ministries would hold office at the
Governor's pleasure. If Congress wished to carry out its election
pledges, a clash with the Governor was inevitable. They argued that
Congress should therefore try to wreck the constitution from within
the Legislature. On this issue also I held the opposite view and argued
that the powers given to the Provincial Governments should be
exercised to the full. If a clash with the Governor arose, it should be
faced as and when occasion demanded. Without actual exercise
of power, the programme of the Congress could not be carried ou t.
If, on the other hand, Congress Ministries had to go out on a popular
issue, it would only strengthen the hold of the Congress on the popular
imagination.
The Governors did not wait for the conclusion of this debate.
When they found that Congress was hesitating to form the Ministry,
they sent for the parties which had the second largest support in the
Legislature, even though they did not command a majority. These
interim Ministries were formed by non-Congress and, in some cases,
anti-Congress elements. Congress indecision about acceptance of
office not only indicated divisions of opinion within its ranks, but
what is worse it allowed reactionary forces an opportunity to get
over the shock of the defeat in the General Elections and retrieve lost
ground. During the prolonged negotiations with the Viceroy, an
attempt was mad to wrest an assurance that the Governors would
not interfi re with the work of the Ministries. After the Viceroy
clarified the position, some members of the Working Committee
changed their opinion in favour of acceptance of office. Congress
had howev r spok n so strong_ly and insistently against the Govern-
ment of India Act that in spite of growing recognition of the need
to change the policy, nobody dared to suggest it openly. Jawaharlal
was Presid nt of the Congress at the time. He had expressed himself
in such categorical terms against the acceptance of office that it was
difficult for him to propo e acceptance now. When the Working Com-
mittee met at Wardha, I found a strange reluctance to face facts. I
Congress Porm Ministries
therefore proposed in clear terms that Congress should acc pt office.
After some discussion Gandhiji supported my vi wand Congr ss
decided to form Ministries in the provinces. This was a historic d ci-
sion, for 611 now Congress had followed only a negative poli y and
refused to undertake the responsibility of office. Now for the first
tim, Congr ss adopted a positive attitude towards administration
and agreed to take up the burd n of Govemment.
One incident happened at the time which I ft a bad impr ssion
about the attitude of the Provincial Congress ommitt es. Th
Congress had grown as a national organization and giv n the oppor-
tunity of leadership to men of different communiti s. In Bombay,
Mr Nariman was the acknowledged leader of the 10 al Congr ss.
When the qu stion of forming the provincial Gov mm nt aros ,
there was gen ral expecta60n that Mr Nariman would be asked to
lead it in view of his status and r cord. This was not howev r don.
Sardar Patel and his colI agues did not like Nariman and th r suIt
was that Mr B. G. Kher became the first Chi fMini st r of Bombay.
Since Nariman was a Parsec and Kher a Hindu, this led to wide
speculation that Nariman had b en by-pass d on communal grounds.
Even if it is not true, it is difficult to disprove such an allegation.
Mr Nariman was naturally upset about this decision. He rais d
the question before the Congress Working Committe. J awaharlal
was still President and many hoped that in view of his freedom from
communal bias, he would rec6fy the injustice to Nariman. Unfor-
tunately, this did not happen. Jawaharlal did not agree with Sardar
Pat I in many things but he did not also think that Sardar Pat I
would take a decision on communal considerations alone. He r acted
somewhat unfavourably and rejected Nariman's appeal.
Nariman was surprised at Jawaharlal's attitud . He th n ap-
proached Gandhiji and said that he would place his case in Gandhiji's
hands. Gandhiji listened pati ntly and dir cli d that th charg
against Sardar Patel should be investigat d by a n utral p rson.
Since N ariman was himself a Parsec, Sardar Pat I and his fri nds
suggest d that a Parsee should be entrust d with the enquiry. They
had planned their move carefully and prepared the case in a way
which clouded the issues. In addition, th y x rcised th ir influence
in various ways so that poor Nariman had lost th case ven before
the nquiry began. It was in any case very difficult to stablish
positively that Nariman had been overJooked only because he was a
Parsec. It was therefore held that nothing was proved against
16 India Wins Freedom
Sardar Pat]. Poor Nariman was heart-broken and his public life
cam' to an nd.
As I reflect on the treatment meted out to Mr Nariman, my mind
gocs back to Mr C. R. Das, one of the most powerful personali ties
thrown up by the Non-Co-operation Movement. Mr Das occupies
a v 'ry special position in the history of our national struggle. He
was a man of great vision and br adth of imagination. At the same
time he had a practical mind whi 11 looked at every question from the
point of view of a realist. He had the courage of his convictions and
stood up fearlessly for any position he regarded as being right. When
Gandhiji pIa cd the non-co-operation programme before the country,
Mr Das had at first opposed it in the special session held at Calcutta
in 1920. A year IMer, wllt'n the Congress met at Nagpur, he joined
our ranks and the programme of non-co-operation was launched.
Mr Das had a princely practice at the Calcutta Bar and was Olle of
th most su ct'ssful lawy rs in th country. He was also noted for
his fondness for luxury, but he gave up his practice without a mo-
m nt's he italion, donned khaddar and threw himselfwhol -hearted-
ly into tll' Congress movem nt. I was gr ally impressed by him.
As I b;w' s id, Mr Dus had a practical bent of mind. He looked at
politic. 1 qu tions from th point of vi w of what was both d sirable
and pm tic. bl . He h Id that if India was to win her freedom
through negotiations, we rou t. be prepared to achi ve it st p by step.
Tndcp ndcn could not com all of a sudden where the method
foUo\ d was that of discu ion and persuasion. Hc predicted that
tb first !Step would be thc acbi v m nt of Provincial Autonomy. He
tisfied that the rci of v n limited pow r would advance
ause of India's freed m and prepare Indians for undertaking
1 ger rc ponsibilitics and whcn they, re won. It is measure
f {r D s fc resight nd vision th t it was on t.h lines that the
o\'crnm nt of Indi~ t 1935 d lmosl ten years after his
d ath.
In 19_1 th th. P.ri.n of W I m (0 Indi in conn x.ion
til th in ugurntion of th Mont gu-Ch 1m ford ch.eme of re-
Ii rms. Til h d d cid to bo (ott aU pu organized
t" m: th Prin . Tltl pI th I'1lDlenl of lndi in
quand ry. The \ i h d ured th British Go\'~rnmeI\t that the
rill! uld wann lcome in the country. When he
1 .unt of th np tkociaion, he took JY possible measure to
dcll t lhe bo u. The Go'Yt'lDmeDl did DOl sue d in ita aims and
Boycott of Ihe Prince of Walls
the Prince on\ ale was coldly receiv din almo t every to\m he "i itt'd.
His last halt was in Calcutta which was then the mo t imporl.'lnt it of
India. The capit.1 had shifted to D Ihi but the , oi ('foy sprnt rvt'ry
hristmas in alcutta. A special funcLion had b en org'Uliud in the
ity and the Prince of Wales was to op n th Victoria Memori ' I
Hal!. Elaborat arrangements w r th r('fim'.' m. cle fI r his r(' ('plion
and the Government spared no effort to make his "isi t to Cal uttll
a success.
We wer th n all detained in th Alipore Crntral J.li!. Pnndit
Madan Mohan Ma\aviyawas trying toarrangr a srt llrm nl be-t\\' ('n
the Congr and the ovcmm(nl. lIe met the Vierro), ncl (.Im
back with th impr ion that if we agr cd nol to boy ott the" Prine
of \Val s in alcutta, the ovcmml'nt would orne to. (ul(,1n nl
with the ongr ss. Pandit Madan Mohan Malavir,l cam(' tn li)1 rc
Jail to discuss the proposal with Mr Dil~ and mr. The"' b;. si. of tit
proposal was that a Rouod T. bl Confncnc(' hould b ulkd to
~ttle the qu slioo oflndia's political [uture. W ' did not giv fin. I
reply to Pandit Malaviya as we wanted to discuss th que lion. mon
ou Iv s. Both Mr D as and I came to lhe on lusion th.11 it w
our boycott of the Prince ofWalc which had comp lied th ov ro-
ment of India to seek a settlement. W' h uld take adv.LOI ge of the
situation and meet in a Round Tabl nii-r nee. It w I ar to
us that this would not lead to our goal but none the It' it would
m k a great step forward in our political struggle. All lh ngre
lead 1'1 ex pt G ndhiji were then in jail. We pro ed th t w
should cc pt the British off, r but at th same timt' w laid it down
condition that all Congr lead rs must I d th
R und T ble n(i nee was held.
Wb n n t day Pandit Malaviy came to e UJ again, w
drum orour vi . We al 0 told him til t h Ih uld m l
and cu his consent. Pandit Malaviya r port d k to th Vi r y
d r two d ys . ited u again in the j il. He id til t th
Covertunent ofl eli were willing to I 11 til p)ili J I
who ere to tak part in the' . Th' in lu d th
broth n and many other ngr lead A !.at
cxi by in which we put down our vi in cl r tf r . P dit
viya toOk the docum nt and went t Bombay t m .t G dhijj.
To our .urprise and ~gret, Garulhiji did n t accept our IU'DlC11-
dOll. He insitted that all th political Jead n, p rtic:uJarly the AJj
brodaen, mOlt fint tie reJeued uncoadition.ally. He d clattd tb t
18 India Wins Freedom
we could consider the proposal for a Round Table only after they
had be n rcl ascd. Both Mr Das and 1 felt that this demand was a
mistakt'. Wh en the Government had agreed that the Congress lead-
f"rs would be rel eased beror th e Round Table, there was no point
in such special insiste nce . Pandit Malaviya went again to Gandhiji
with our comments but h did not agree. The result was that the
Vi ceroy dropped his proposal. His main purpose in making the offer
had bren to avoid a boycott of th e Prince of Wales in Calcutta.
Sin .e no seUI ment was made, th e boycott was a great success but
we had missrd a gol(len opportunity for a political settlem nt. Mr
D:u made no secret of his disapproval and disappointment.
G::\Odhiji th n called a Conf renee in Bombay with C. Sankaran
Nair as the Chairman. In 1his Confer nee, Gandhiji himsclfmade a
proposal for a Round T able Confr r nee. His t rms were almost the
same as those brought earlin by Pandit Malaviya. The Prince of
Wales had in the meantime left India and the Governmc-nt had no
In/mull Dissm.nolts in Congrus fg
ngffe with his analysis and remedy. I thought he w ov r-optiml~tlc
but I agreed with him that when he was r4"irased he should eon ult
fri ends and prepare a new programm for the country.
Mr Das came out on the eve of th Gnya i()ngrc s. The- Rt"crp.
(ion Commiu c dec(<'ci him tlll.' Pre-sid nt and [r Das fdt th t he
could carry thc country with his programme, lIe Wa.!; cnrourag d
all the more when he found that Hakim jmal Kh, n, randit MOli
Inl Nehru and Sardar Vithalbhai Paid agreni with hi~ appruach.
In his pre idential address, Mr Das propOllcd that th" .ongrt'
should ace pt the Council ("ntry programme and carry the r liti I
truggle into the legislatures. Gandhiji was at tht' tim!' in jail.
ection of the Congress led by Shri RajagopaJachari opposcd ir
Das. They {i It that if direct aClion was given up and }.ir D.lls
programme accepted, th Govcrnm('nl would illlC'I'})ITt it a.
rrpudiation of Gandhiji's lC'adership.
r do nol think that Shr; Rajagopalachari was right in hi. interpret< -
lion. Mr Dns was not s eking a compromi e with tile- Gov("rnm nt
but only extending th political stnJggle to anolh r field. Hr "xplain-
cd this at 1 ngth but he did not succeed in conv<'rting th nmJc
and til of the Congr SIl. Shri Rajagopalachari, Dr Rajcndm Pra
and oth rs opposed him and defeated his propOllaJ. The G y
CongJ' split and Mr Das lender d his r signation. All the n rgy
of ongressmen was now spent in an internecine slrug k bctwrcn
the two group called the no-changers nnd the pro-cbnngt' .
Mter another six months, I also came out of j iJ. I found lha lhe
ongr was facing a serious crisis. INtend ofth poHlicalltruggJe
agaizut the Briti.sh, the energy of all Congre5mlen WaJ being di j.
pated in internecine \ arfare. Mr D , Pandie MotHal and Hakim
Ajmal Khan were leading the camp of pro-chang . Rnjaji, at
P tel and Dr Rajendra Fraud were the spoke men 11 r tbe no-
chang n. Both groups tried to win m but I r fusrd identify
m II with either camp. I saw that these illt. mal . tuions we
da.nt rous and unle ~hec.ked jn tim might break up th n
1 ther fore decided to mnain outside both PI and tri d to di Ct
aU oue ttention to the political struggle. r am happy to y th l I
ccc ful in my efforts. A special, ion oCthe ngr w b Jd t
~lhi and I as eJected President with the pprov I of both til u.
In my presidential address, 1 .tressed the fac;t that our al obj Cl
the liberation of the c.ountry. Since 1919, we: bad been fonowin
prosramu:ae of direct acucm a1\Cl I.hi.t had yi lded id tabl
20 India Wins Freedom
r sulLS. If now some among us [<-It that we must carry the fight into
th I gis1, tures, th ere was no r ason why we should stick rigidly to
our arli er dc-cision. 0 long as the obj ctive was the same, each
group should be fr c to follow the programme which it consid red
brst.
The decision of th Delhi Congress was as I had anticipat d. It
was agrr('d that pro-chang rs and no-chang rs should be free to
pursll(~ their own programmes. Dr R ajendra Prasad, Shri R aja-
gopa lachari and th 'ir associates took up th con tructive programme.
Mr . R. D as, P andit Motilal and Hakim Ajmal Khan founded the
Swar.j Pa rty and decid d to ontest the lections. Their move cr at-
d sr at nthusiasm throughout th country. In th central as w 11
a~ in all th(' provincial A'Is<'mblies, the Swaraj Party won a v ry
la rge fi)lIowing.
ne' of tll(' major obj c tions of til no-changers h ad been that
alldhiji's 1 ad{'rship would be w ak ned by the Council entry
prog mme. Events prov d that they were wrong. In th ntral
Legislature, the war<j Party prop d a resolution urging th imme-
diat< rek:u of Mahatma Gandhi. Before th r solution ould be
d
C. R. Dos's DularoJion 21
which impressed not only Bengal but the whol of India. lk . nnount-
ed that when Congress secured the reins of power.; in Bengal, it would
reserve 60 per cent of all new appointments for the MUSl Imans till
such time as they achieved prop r rtpr stntalion according to popul -
tion. He went even further in respect of th aJ \llla rporntion
and oR'ered to r s rYe 80 per cent of the new appointments on similar
t rms. He pointed out that so long as the Mu. almam W(oI'C not pro-
perly represented in public life and in the servic("s, ther could be no
true democracy in B ngal. Once the inequalilies had b cn r (tined,
Musalmans would be able to compete on equal terms with other
communities and ther would be no need for any Spe' itl! rc CrY. tion.
This bold announcement shook the DC'ngal ogress to i very
foundation. Many of the Congress leaders violently oppo ed it and
started a campaign again t Mr Das. H' was a cused of opportulli m
and even partisanship for the Muslims but he stood solid as a rock.
He toured the whole province and xplained his point of view. WI
attitude made a great impression on Mu almans in Bengal and out-
side. I am convinced that if he had not died a premature d alh, he
would have created a new atmosphere in the:: country. It is m ltcr
for regret that after h died, some:: of his followers aMailed hi. P iuon
and his declaration was repudiated. The result w::u that the MUl llnu
of Bengal moved away from the Congress and the first. d. of
partition were sown.
r must however make one fact cl ar. The Provincial ngll
mmitt e of Bombay err d in denying local leadership to Mr
ariman and the Working Committee was not .trong nough to
rectify the wrong. Apart from this one lap e, Congress mad every
mrt Lo live up to its principles. Once the Mini.tri wert orm d,
ce measur were taken to ellJure justice to U minoriti
This was the first occasion on which Congress w: t.a.king up th
resp nsibillty of administration. It WaJ thUi a trial for the Con
and people watched how the organization would liv up to ill nation
cler. The Mu lim League. main propagand a ilut n
bad been th t it was national only in name. ot con lent with d
filming ogress in g n railel'Dll. the agu Iso v OUt tb 1 the
g ministries were trying out atrocities 'aul the:: miDOri ..
li . It ppoint d a committee whicb pr nted a rt'pOrt ina all
kinds of allegations about unfair tr un nt of IUllim d ow r
minorities. 1 can speak ftOm personal knowledge that tbClC all
&aa were abioluc.eJy unfounded. Thi was alto we view wbi
J
22 Inda Wns Freedom
held by th Viceroy and the Governors of different provinces. As
such, the Rt"J'ort prepared by the League carried no conviction
among sensible people.
Wh n Congr 'ss accepted office, a Parliamentary Board was formed
to supervise the work of the Ministries and give th m general guid-
ance on policy. The Board consisted of Sardar Patel, Dr Rajendra
Prasad and myself. I was thus in charge of the Parliamentary affairs
in several provinc s viz., Bengal, Bihar, U.P.) Punjab, Sind and
th Frontier. Every incident which involved communal issues came
up before m . From personal knowledge and with a full sense of
rellponsibiIi ty, I can tll rc:'fore say that the charges levelled by Mr
Jinnah and the Muslim L ague with regard to injustice to Muslims
and olh r minorities wer absolutely false. If there had been an iota
of truth in any of these charges, I would have seen to it that the
injustice was rectified. I was even prepared to resign, if 0. ("essary,
on an issue like this.
Til ngrrss Ministries were in office a little less than two years,
but during this short period several importaJlt issues w rc settled in
principle. Special m ntion may be made ofth legislation on Zamin-
daTi or proprielorship in land, of liquidating agricultural indebt d-
ness and und rtaking a vast programme of education both for
childrrn and adults.
Problems like the abolition of landlordism and the dissolution of
gricultural il\debtt-dn ss were not without difficulty. Many long-
standing interests were chalknged by such) gislatioo, It is therefore
not surpo ing that the vest d interests fought Congress at every
strp. In Bihar, thnc was strenuous opposition to measures of land
rl"fOml and I had to int rvcne personally in order to settle the issue,
ficr prolonged consult tion with the landlords, we were ble to
I e fonnula \ hich Hay d their legitimate fcal'S while guarantee-
in to the pe ts th ir rights.
That we w ~ ble to SOhfC such ticklish problems w ly due
to th Ii ct tIl t I h d never en identifi d with any particuJ r sec-
tion of th ngrt. I have already 'd how I helped to bring
tog th r the Pro-changtl'S and the No-ch Dg rs during the early
tWCtlti . 1 his c -nlliCt ow ov r but during the thirtie Cang
rpl)' djvid d betw en what were called the righti and the
Id\i ,TIle righti ~ regard d as the champi of the v t d
tnt . The 1 ru on th oth t hnud pl'OSJXred on their revoo.
luti J\ ry &cal. I 'e du weight to \he r. of the rip\i$ts but at
Rightists and Leftists
the same time my sympathi s were with U1C leftists in the matter
of reform. I was therefoN' able to mediate betwrcn the twO e
treme points of view and hoped that ongre would rry out ita
programme steadily and without conlict. All plans for the: g du I
fulfilment of the Congress Election Programme wcrt', hO\ e"er,
suspended in 1939 on account of the play f intt'mntional forces.
 WAR IN EUROPE

T
HE ev('nlsrclat d in the last chapt r were taking place against
the sombre background of imp nding war. During the entire
p Tiod und r r view an international crisis was deep ning in
Eur pe. It wa b c ming more and more vident that war was
unavoidabl . The incorporation of Austria into the G rman Reich
was follow d oon after by demands on Sudet nland.
War s m d almost in vitable when Mr Chamberlain made his
dramati \.fip to Muni h. Th r was an und rstanding b tw en
('rmany and Britain, and a parl of z choslovakia came under
rm. n occupation without war. For the mom nt it appeared as if
war was averted, but latt'f v nts prov d that the Munich Pact did
nol h lp th cause of p a . n the contrary, it brought war nearer
nd within y ar of Munich, Great Britain was forced to declare

d the

m British fomgn poll 'web

Gandltiji SuggtSts NOll.Parti.cipaliun lit ItW

has comistently aided the F cUt Powers lUld helped in the d lTU li n r
democratic countries. The Congress is opposed to I mpt"ri L1i m. n F In
alike and is convinced that world peace a.nd progreu required Ole
ending of bOlh of these. In the opini n of the ngress, it i urgent)
necessary for India to direct her own foreign policy It indepcnd nl
nalion, thereby keeping loof from b th I mperi li! m and F cUm, Md
pursuing her path of peace and freedom.
the storms gather d on th intern. lion, 1 sc n~,. d('t'p~ning
gloom descend don Gandhiji 5 mind. He was suffering through ul
this prriod from an intense mental crisis. His p rsonal ngony w'
aggravated by appeals made to him by irtirs Bnd individu u
from Europ and Am rica a king him to do omC'lhillg to \' rt the
impending war. Pacifists all over lh world lookrd to him tht'ir
n turalleader in securing the maint nan C of peR .
andhUi thought d cply over this qu~s lion and ultimat Iy ug-
g sted to th ongr ss Working ommitte' that lnw 01\1 t dct:i r
its stand in this international crisis. His view w thal lndi rnun
not participate in the impending w rill any ircumstancc. , v n i
such participation meant th achiev m nt ofIndia.n fr edom.
I differed from Gandhiji on this i ue. My view w lh. lEur p
w. divided into two camps. One camp r pr sent d th fore I of
Nazi m and Fascism, while thc other l' pre nt d lh ' d moe tic
(i rees. In a struggle b tween lhe!c two camps, I bad no doubt in my
mind that India should side wilh the democra it's provid d Ih
free. If, however, the Briti~h did not recognize lndi, 0 fr ed m, it
w too much to pecl that India should fight for til rr dom of
other nations whil h was denied h r own fI dom. In IU
situ tion lnw should non-co-operate and offl r no 11 Ip wl
to the British Government in its war efforU.
on rio other issUe!, the Congr 51 Working ommitt e w
divided on this as w U. In fact, some ofth members wren t cJ ar
i their vi . PanditJa\ aharla) Nehru generaUy gre d ilh me
but there w re many others who felt that lh Y I uld lid with
dhiji. They, however, r alized that if andhiji'. policy
11 d to i logical rond ion, it would le d to imp . Thc:y
&herd; in fix d the Congr W rking mmitl
red the . without coming to any d C on.
\ . e Con thus h 'tat tnll W P cipi
J ely aft r the declaration fwar. Wh . lb -
d mde I d ron rrn oyon S mber 1939
 India Wins Freedom
all members of the Commonw aith to do so. T he Dominion Parli a~
ments met and d elared war. In the case of India, the Viceroy on
his own declared war on Germany without even the formality of
consulting the Central L gislature. T he Viceroy's action proved
afr sh, if further proof was necessary, that th British Government
looked on India as a creature of its will and was not willing to
r cogniz India's right to decide her course for herself even in a
matt r like war.
Wh n India was thus unceremoniously dragged into the war,
Gandhiji's mental distress reached almost a breaking point. He
could not reconcil himself to India participating in the war in any
circumstances. But whatever he fclt, a decision of the Viceroy had
l.."lnd d India in the war without any refer nee to the will of the
Indian people .
. Th . views of ongress were clearly expr ssed in the Resolution
pas cd at th m ting of th Working Committee held at Wardha
on S pt 'mb r 8-15, 1939. I will quote this r solution in full, as it is
onC of the el are5t statl"m nt of the Congress attitude to the war and
on the role of th democracies in th international fi. Id. The r so-
lution runs as follows:
 Tht Congress Resolution
bch viour. IL has seen in F cism and Nazi m the intensific tion of the
principles of Imperia1ism again t which the Indian people luwC" (ruggled
for many years. The Working Committee must therefore unhoit 110 Iy
condemn the latest aggres ion of the Nazi Govcrnmenl in crm:an. runst
Poland and sympathise with those who resi t it.
The Congress has further laid down that lhe i!lI of war and pc. C'e for
India must be decidt"d by the Indian people. nnd nn (lut ide:' .ullhuril
can impose lhis decision upon them. nor can the Indian pt'opll" pt'rmil
their resources to be explOited for imperiali. I end. An) irnpo rU decision,
or atlempt 10 use India's resources, for purp<l5t". nOl appru\,('d hy Ult"ln.
will necessarily havc to be oppo cd by them. If co-operation i. desired in
a worthy cau e, this cannot be obtained by compulsion lit! imposition,
and the Committee cannot agree to the carrying out by the Indiall pt'ople
of orders issued by eXlernal HtJthorit}'. Co-operation IllU I he bt-tween
('qu,,1 by mutual consent for a cause which both c(ln~idcr to 1>1' wonhy.
The people of India have,in the recenl pa~ t, fnce:'d great ri ~k . lnti willing-
ly made great sacrifices to ('cur their own fncdom and e t hli\h .l free
democratic stale in India, and their ~>,mpathy is cntirdy on th sid.. of
democracy and freedom. But India c. II1l0t;U ocin lc he-rldf in n Wilt I id
to be for d mOCTatic fre doro when that very frt"1:dQIn i~ dc-oit'd II) h('r,
and such limited freedom as she possesses tnkt'n aw. y fl (1m her.
The Committee are aware that til ovcrnments of Grt'1ll Britain nd
France have declared that they are fighting for democrat), and freedom
and to put n end to aggression. But the history of the recent p t iJ full
of examples showing the constant divergence bctwc n the lpoken
ord, the ideal, proclaimed, and the real motives and objectives. 1 uring
the war of 1914-18, the declared w r aims were, pre.erv ti n of clem
cr cy, .df-determination, and the freedom of 1m II MUON, and yet
the very Governments which solemnly proclaimed thes ,lims entl"red into
'CCffl treaties embodying imperi list designs for the erving up of tht"
Ott man Empire. While slating that they did not want any a quititi n of
territory, the victorious Powers added larg Iy to their coloni I dam ins.
Th p t European war iuelf lignifi the abject failure of the It t)' of
C1'J&ilJe:s and of its makcn, who broke their pledged w rei and imposed
an imperialut peace On the defeated natiON. The ODe hopeful outCOme
of that Treaty, t.he L gue of N tions, was muzzled and .t gled t the
oubet d later killed by iu parent StaleS.
ubstquent history has demonstrated afresh how ven
fct\'ent declaration of faith rnay be followed by an ign ble d
laochwa the Britub Government connived t j n, in At>
they ac:quiesced in it. In Czec:hoslovaki and pain d acy w 10
peril and it was ddiberately betrayed, and tJ whole s" of coU j"
security was abotaged by the v~ powtn who bad pm,riouaJy declAred
Ibcir &rill faith in it.
 India Wins Freedom
Ag ain it is asserted that democracy is in danger and must be defended
and with thi! statement the Commillee are in entire agreement. The
Committee beli vc that the peoples of the West are moved by this ideal
and objective and for thelle they are prepared to make sacrifices. But
again and again the ideals and sentiments of the people and of those who
have ~acriliced themselves in the struggle have been ignored and faith has
not been kept with them.
If Lhe war ill to defend the status quo, imperialist possessions, colonic's,
vested interests and privileges, then India can have nothing to do with it.
If, however, the illsue is democracy and a world order based on democracy,
then India is intensely interested in it. The Committee are convinced that
the interests of Indian democracy do not conflict with the interests of
British democracy or of world democracy. But there is an inherent and
ineradicable conflict uetween democracy for India or elsewhere and im
pcrialism and fascism. If Great Britain fights for the maintenance and
xtension of democra y, then she must necessarily end imperialism in her
own possessioDlJ, establish full democracy in India, and the Indian people
must have the righ t of self-dctennination by framing their own constitution
through a Constituent Assembly without external, interference and must
guide th("ir own poticy. A free democratic India win gladly associate her
,df with ther free nalions for mutual defence against aggression and for
economic cooperation. She will work for the establishment of a real
world ord r based on freedom and democracy, utilising the world's know.
ledge and resources for the progress and advancement of humanity.
The crisis tit t h overtaken Europe is not of Europe only but ofhuma
nity and will not paulilte other crises or wars leaving the essential struc
ture of the presentday world inl ct. It is likely to refashion the world
for good or ill, politi Uy, socially and eoonomically. This crisis is the
inevit ble consequence of the social and political conflicts and conradie
tions which have grown alarmingly since the last Great War, and it will
nOl be fin Ity re olved till these conflicts and contradictions are removed
and an' equilibrium established. That equilibrium can onJy be based
on the oding o[ domination and exploitation of one country by another,
nd On reorganiz tion of economic relations On a ju ta basis for the
mm n good of U. Iodia istne crux of the problem, for Indi has been
the out., ding example of modern imperialim and 00 rdi hioning of
the world succeed which ignores this vital p blem, With her vast
ouree.. she mu t pi YM important part io any scheme of world reorga-
n' lion, But s.he n onl do so free nation ~ hose energies have
been re.1 cd to we rk [or this great eod. Freedom today is indivisible
and every ttempt to n imperialist domination in any pan of the
ld wID 1 dine i bly to fresh' ter.
Th Working "nee 11 v noted th t many Nlers orIndian SlAtes
h rrered their servi d rcsOIU'0e5 nd exp:rc:ucd thC'ir desire lO
DtClaralion of War Aims blVilta
support the cause of democracy in Europe. Ifthr-y must m: lr.e uldr prof, -
sions in favour of democracy abroad, the Commiu~ would suggest th 1
thcir ftrst concern should be the introduction of democracy within thl.'ir
own slates in which today undiluted autocracy r igns supremc. The: British
Government in India is more responsible for this autocracy thon I.'\'en
the rulers themselves, as has been made painfully eviu('nt during the p: t
ycar. This policy is the very negation of democracy nd ofthl.' new world
order for which Grcat Britain claims to be fighting in EuroJ'X'.
As tlte Working Committee view past e\'cnts in Europe, Arric and i,
and more particularly past and present occurrenccs in India . th y f:\il to
fmd any attempt to advance the cause of democracy or selfdc:-tt'rmin3ti 1\
or any evidence that the present war declarations of the 13rili ~h Gov('mm nl
are being, or are going to be, acted upon. The true m{"asure of dCllloaocy
is the ending of imperialism and fa.~cism alike and the aggrC'~sion t1l I lUll
accompanied them in the past and the presen t. nly Oil that basis ("Oln
II new order be built up. In the struggle for that new .... orld order, the
Committee are eager and desirous to help in every way. Dllt the- Com-
mittee cannot associate themselve., or offer any co-operation in II w r
which is conducted on imperialist lines and which is meant to consolidate
imperialism in India and elsewhere.
Jn view, however, ofllie gravity oftlte occasion nd the facl that Lhl" p ce
of events during the last few days has oneil been swifter than the working
ofmcn's minds, the Committee desire to take no finaldecuion at tlti tage,
so as to allow for the full elucidation ofm issues at stake, th r(';,lohjectiv
aimed at, and the position of India in the present and in the future. But
the decision cannot long be delayed as India is being committed from
day to day to a policy to which she is not a party and of which .he
daApprovcs.
The Working Committee therefore invite the British Government LO
declare in unequivocal terms whal their war ainu rc in regard to dcm~
aucy and imperialism and the new order that is envisaged, in p rticul r,
how these aims are going to apply to India and to be given cf.Tccl to in tbe
present. Do they include the ,elimination of imperialiml and the tr tmcnt
ofJ ndi as a rree nation whose policy will be guided in cor~nce wi1h the
wishes oCher people? A clear declaration about the future, pledgin the
Government to the ending oC Imperialism and Fascism alike win wet.
comed by the peopl of aU counuics, but it u far more: important to give
immediate effect to it, to the largest possible extent, for only this will ~n
"inee the peopJe that the declaration is JIleant to be honourrJd. 1'be real
t of ny declaration is its application in the preaent, Ii r it ill t.hc p l
that will govern action today and give shape to the (utur .
IU' bas broken out in Europe and the prcnpect if terrib con mp-
teo But war has been laking ita hea.vy toll ofhu n liti during recent yea ...
in byninill, pain an<$ hin. fnaum.c ble innocen( m wa d
 India Wins Freedom
children have been bombed to death from the air in open cities.
Id-blood d massacres, torture and utmost humiliation have followed
each other in quick succes ion during these years of horror. That horror
growl, and violence and the threat of violence shadow the world and, un-
1 IS checkrd and ended, will destroy th precious inheritance of past ages.
That horror has to be checked in Europe and China, but it will not end
till it root causes of Fascism and Imperialism are removed. To that end
th Working ommi ttee are prepared to give their co-operation. But
it willue infinite tragedy jf even this terrible war is carried on in the
spirit of imperialism and for th purpose of retaining this structure which
is it rlf th cause of war and human degradation.
'111(': Working Comrniltee wish to declare that the Indian people have
no quarr I with the G rman p ople. But they have a de p-rooted quarrel
with sys t rns which deny freedom and arc based on violene and aggression.
Th y do not look forward to a victory of one p ople over another or to a
dictated prace, but to a victory of real democracy for all the people of all
countrit's and a world fr cd from the nighlmar of viol nee and imperialist
oppre ion.
Th Comrnitt rnestlyapp a1 to the Indian people to end all internal
onfiiC't and ontrov r y and in this grave hour of peril, to ke p in readi-
ness od hold tog ther as united nati n, calm of purpose and determined
to achieve the freedom of India within the I rger freedom of the world.
 r BECOME CONGRE PRE:IDE T

T
HE war broke out in Europe on 3 rptrmbrr 1939. lkfort th
month was o\'er, Pol and lay prostratr under JC'rman arms.
To add to th misery of the Poks , th(' . (l\'i(, t Ilion had
occupied th east m half of thcir territory . nCl' Volish military
r i tane Wa! crush d, an uneasy lull descrndrd on Eumpl'. Fran ('
and Germany fac d one another across their fortified fronti( r. but
large-scale hOSlilities were suspended. E\'c!) body 51( lOrd to Lx-
w itjng for something to happen, but Ih('ir formkss ft'aJ~ wt'r' vague
and undefined.

ilU t ' J1
 India Wins Freedom
resulting from the war in Europe and British policy in regard to it,
approves of and endorses the resolutions passed and the action taken on
the war si tualion by the A.I.C.C. and the Working Committee. The
ongress considers the declaration by the British Government of India
a$ a b lligerent country, without any reference to the people ofIndia, and
the exploitation of India's resources in this War, as an affront to them,
which no self-respecting and freedom-loving people can accept or tolerate.
The recent pronouncements made on behalf of the British Government
in regard to I ndia demonstrate that Great Britain is carrying on the War
fundamental1y for imperialist ends and for the preservation and strength-
ening of her Empire, which is based On the exploitation of the people of
India, as well as of other Asiatic and African counlri s. Under these
ircullutanc 5, it is clear that the Congress cannot in any way, directly or
indir tly, be party to the War, which means continuance and perpetua-
ti n of this exploitation. The Congress therefore strongly disapproves of
Indian troops being made to fight for Creat Britain and of the drain
from India of men and material for the purpose of the War. Neitht"r
the recruiting nor the money raised in India can be considered to be
voluntary contributions from India. Congressmen, and those under the
C Ilgr 55 influence, cannot help in the prosecution of the War with men,
money or m lerial.
The ongress hereby declares ag in that nothing short of complete
iod pendence can be ccepted by the people of India. Indian freedom
. nnot exist within the orbit of imperi lism and Dominion or any other
tu. wiiliin the imperial structure is wholly in pplicable to India, is
not in kecping with the dignity of great n tion, and would bind India
in m ny w ys to British policies and economic structure. The people of
lndi lone can properly shape their own constitution and dctennine their
rel lions (0 the other countries of the world, through Constituent
mbly elected on the b is of dult .uffrage.
The ngress is further of opinion th.a t while it will always be ready,
it e er h been, to Illllke every effort to secure commun I harmony, no
perm nent solution is ible oept through Constituent se.mbly.
wb the ri hLS of all rcc:ognised minorities will be fully protected by
ent, far po sible, between the elected represeo tives of various
rity d minority groups, or by arbit.rati if agreement iJ not
cd on any into y tern ti\-e will 1 ck finality. lodi 's cons-
titution must be b d on independence. democracy and national unity,
d the 0 repudiates ttcmpts LO divide lodi or to split up her
n ti ohood. h w ys aimed at a constitution where the
full l of development are guaranteed to the
'a) inju tice yi I pI to a ju ter
Conficting Views in Congress Camp 3
One of my first tasks on taking over the Presid ntship from r
Rajendra Prasad was to reconstitute the Working Committ e. T en
members were common, viz.
Shrimati Sarojini Naidu
Sardar VaLlabhbhai Patel
Seth Jamnalal Bajaj (Treasurer)
Shri J. B. Kripalani (General Secretary)
Khan Abdul Gaffar Khan
Shri Bhulabhai Desai
Shri Shankar Rao Deo
Dr Profulla Chandra Ghosh
Dr Rajendra Prasad and myself.
One of the conspicuous absentees in Dr R aj e'ndra P d's
Committ e had been Jawaharlal Nehru. He had remainrd aloof
after Subhas Chandra Bose signrd from th . Congress prC'sidcnlSnip
owing to his differences with Gandhiji . I brought Jawnh rial ba k
and added Shri C. Rajagopalachari, Dr yed Mahmud and ir
Asaf Ali. A fift nth name was to be announced la((' f, but soon
aft r the session of the Congr ss we w re arrested and the pi c
r mained vacant.
It wa a very critical time in the history of Congress. W were
a1i cted by the world-shaking events out.',id . Ev n mor di turbing
wer the diff< rences among ourselves. I was the ongr sa P sid nt
and sought to take India into the camp ofth democraci es if only .he
w r free. The cause of democracy was on for whi hIndi ftJt
strongly. The only obstacle in our way was Indi 's bondage. 'or
Gandhiji, however, it was not so. For him th j u was one of paci-
rum and not of Indi 'a freedom. I declared openly th t the Indian
N tional Congr was not a pacifut organization but one for chi
ing India's freedom. To my mind therefore the . uc . d by
andhiji w irr levant.
G dhiji how ver, would not, change his view. H e was convinc d
t India ought not to take part in the war in y circu tan
HInt the iceroy and express d these vie to him. He l
n n letter to the British people ppe ling to tht'ln that they
ould nOl figbt Hitl r but 0PP bim by iritu Iii . It is n t
altogether rprising that Gandhiji'. app a1 fou
Bri' bans, for by this time France h dIre y
power stood at its zenith.
nus very di~cult tim for G dhiji. H saw that th
34 India Wins Freedom
was devastating the world and he could do nothing to prevent it.
He was so distressed that on several occasions he even spoke of
suicide. He lold me that if he was powerlrss to stop the suffering
causrc\ by th(' war, he could at least r fuse to be a witness to it by
putling an (:11(1 to his li~ ' . H pressed me again and again to lend
support to his views. I thought over the matter de ply but I could not
bring mys<'lfLO agree. For me, non-viol nee was a matter of policy,
not of creed. My vicw was that Indians had the right to take to the
sword if they had no other alternative. It would how v r be nobler
to achieve indept:ndencc through p acefuJ methods, and in any case
in tIL cir umstanccs which obtained in this country, Gandhiji's
method was right.
The ongr s Working Committee was divided on this basic
i. sue. In tit earlier stages, ]awaharJaJ Nehru, Sardar Patel, Shr;
Rajagopalachari and Khan Abdul Garrar Kllan sided with me.
Dr Rajtndra Prasad, Acharya Kripalani and Shri Shankar Rao
Deo were, however, whol -heart dly with Gandhiji. Thcy agreed
with him that one it was accepted that fr e India could participate
in war, the very basis of India's non-violent struggle for fre edom
would disappear. I, on the other hand, C'lt that ther was a distinc-
ti n brtwe n an internal truggl for fr dom and an external struggle
against aggr mono To struggle for freedom was one thing. To fight
fter the country be ame f~e w s different. I held that the two issu s
hou\d not be oofll d.
Rift in Congress Working Committee 3
internal struggl . He had felt that in the pres nt t mper of the country
the A.I.C.C. would readily accept my pmpo al that Indi hould
participate in the war ifher freedom was recognizcd. In vil'w ofthi
hl' had doubts if! could pl'rsuade the A.I.C.C. to pass the rc olution
on non-violence in respect of our intt'"mal struggle.
The members of the Working C'.ommittce, howcvrr, brgan to
waver in their atti tud towards the war. Nont'" of them c uld [i rg t
that Gandhiji was opposed, on principle, to any parti ip lion in
war. Nor could they forget that the Indian strugglt for freedom had
attained its present dimensions under his Icad("rship. They \\1rl"(" now
for th first time differing from him on a fundame-ntal i. sur and I :lV
ing him alone. His firm belief in non-violence as a creed bcgnn to
influence their judgment. Within a month of thl' Poona merting
Sardar Pat I changed his views and accepted Gandhijj's po~jtion. The
other memb rs also started to wav r. In July 1940, Dr R.jrndr
Prasad and several other members of the Working ommiut"e wrot
to me that they firmly believcd in Gandhiji's view regarding thr w r
and desired that the Congress should adhrr to them. Thcy went on
to say that since I held diffcrent vi ws and the A.I . .C. at Poon
had supported me, the signatori s doubtcd if they ould ontinue to
r main memb rs of the Working Committee. Th y had brrn nomi.
nated to the Working Committee to assist the President, but sine tbry
differ d on a basic question, they had no option but to off, r lh ir
re ignation. They had considered tbe matter deeply nd in order not
to embarrass me, they were willing to continu as mrmb n of lh
Working Committee so long as their differences did not have any
immedi te practical application. If, howey r, the BritL h ov mm nt
accepted my terms and participation in the w. r b ame liv i u ,
they felt that they would have no option but to I'Csign. Th yaddc-d
that ifI agreed to thU, they would continue to rve:t.J m mlxllof
the Working mmittee. therwi this lettershould j lfbe t d
a lelter of r . gnation.
I d eply hurt to receiv this letter whi w igned by
ttl mbenofthe Working Committee except Jaw: rl I,
chari Ali nd y d Mahmud. Even bdul
who bad e rlier b en one of my staunch t pp rt ,had now
og d his vi . I had n ver exptcted letter r . kind fr m
my toUeoagues. I immediately wrote in reply that 1 fully u t
their point of view and accepted the tion. The Briti
IIlalt', P Ilt attit~e b ld hardly y.bo f4 r th pti
36 India Wins Freedom
Indian freedom. 0 long as the British attitude did not change, the
question of participation in war was likely to remain an academic
issu . I would th r fore request them to continue as members of the
Working Committ e.
In August 1940, the Viceroy invited me to discuss with him the
participation of Congr ss in the Government on the basis of an ex-
t 'nded Execulive Council with larger powers. Even without consult-
ing my c Ikagu 's, I dedin d the offer. It appeared to me that there
was no common ground b tween the Congress demand for independ-
ence and the Vic roy's offer of an enlarged Executive Council. In
vi w f this there was no point in meeting him. I found that many
ongr ss mcn did not agr e with my d cision. They argued that I
should have accepted the invitation and m t th Viceroy but I was
and am still convinced that I took the corr ct decision.
Individual Satyagraha 31
Internal d bate within th Congress continu d. 0 far as G. ndhiji
was concern d, Congr S5 was not to parti cip. te in th(' war undrr. 1\
conditions. Whil we differed in our basic appro;\ h. wr wrr< .Igrt"rd
that India must withhold all up port to thl' Briti~h in th(' pr<' ent
situation. The conflict betw en my policy and G..Illllh ljl's rerd thw
r mained a theoretical one. The attitudr ofthl' British unitrd u. in
action even though our basic approach rl'maim'd c1iffen nl.
The question arose as to what Congress should do ill thr prr rnt
context, As a political organization, it could not just sit quiet while
tremendous vents w r happening throughout tl1(' world. ,.mdhiji
was at first opposed to any movement as it could be' only on
the issue of Indian frerdom and carry the implication lhat onr
frt'edom was gained,. India would partiripat in the war. Afta thc'
meetings at Delhi and Poona, whrn the British rc-fusI'C1 th .. Congn.
offer of co-operation, Candhiji thought ofa limitcd ivil di~obrdirnC'("
movC'ment. He proposed that men and wom!'n should protrst indivi-
dually against dragging India into th war. They would diuociatr
themselves from the war frort publicly and court arrest. I hdd that
ther should be a more xtensiv ' and active anti-war mo\,rmrnt but
to this Gandhiji would not agr ('. Since Gandhiji was not prl.'par Ii to
go further, I finally agr cd that at least the individual atyagr.lha
Movement should start.
Vinoba Bhave was accordingly select d as the fir t indi idu.lI
Satyagrahi or civil resist r to war. After Bhavc, llandit Nehru
ofti red himself as the second volunt cr and Candhiji aW'ptrd him.
A number of others follow d and soon th rc was a nation-wid
movem nl of individual Satyagraha, Th upshot \\ ' that thcJugh
I differed rarucally from Gandhiji in my attitude towards non-
violence, the actual programme follow d was one on which we both
agreed.
Th re also OC ionallya comic side to su h individu I ty-
grab , There w a man from the Punjab, ampuran ingh, who
ilhout taking the perrui ion ofGandhiji or lh Wotki ng
tee,olTered Satyagraha, When arrest d, he put up d('frn ,
the explicit instructio of the Cong . The trying" gi tt le con
~cted him and fined him one nna, which he p 'd fr m hi, wn
l,and thimfr e. Thi broughlsu hridiculeonth m mmt
in the Punj b that I had to go there to l tt n right. 00 my y
1 t d at Allahab . Th l i lrw not with ut

.
touch of humour. 1 was soing to the R fj hm Dt R m Ii r
. c: 1y
38 India Wins Freedom
cup oftc'a when the Superintendent of Police pres nt d me with the
warrant and his rcsp 'cts. I replied gravely:
I am honoured by lh(' special distinction that you have conferred on me.
You hu\ arrcslcu mt' ven before I had a chan e of offering individual
. atyagraha.
1 was S('ntcneed to imprisonment for two years and detained in the
Naini Jail. After SQm time Dr Katju also joined me there. We did
not, however, seN' the full term as two events of world-shatlering
importance soon transformed th ntirf' charactrr of th war. The
fi rst was Germany's allack on Sovirt Russia in June 1941. Within
six m nlhs, Japan struck at the U.S.A. at Pearl Harbour.
e'rmany's attack on Soviet Rus ia and japan's on the U.S.A.
mad > th war truly global. Before the German attack on Soviet
Ru sia, th . war had been one betw en W stem European countries.
Thf' erman attack extended the fronti rs of war to vast regions
hitherto untou he'd. The U.S.A. had been giving substantial help
to th(~ nited Kingdom but sh was still outside the war. The
American ontinent was untouched. The Japanese attack on Pearl
Harbour brought the United Stat s into the turmoil and the war
br amt' truly global.
Tht aslorn hing success ofJapan in the arlier slag s brought the
war righl to India's door. Within a few w ks, Japan had over-
run M lay. ,nd ingapore. Soon Burma, whi h before 1937 had
b 'cn. part of India, was oc upi d, A situation was created when it
s ('mc-d imminrnt that Indj herself would be attacked. Japan se
ship had Ire, dy app ared in the Bay of Bengal and soon the
mt nand Ni obars fell to the J pane N. vy.
With J pan' ('ntry the Unit d tates had to face rur ct re pon-
sibilit)' with ,gam to th \ ar. It h d \' n b fore this period sugg st-
d t th British that th y should com to lemu with India. Now it
suLrted to ppJy gre ter pc ure on the Unit d Kingdom to ettIe the
Iudi p b\ m n win Indi $, 'Uing co--operation. Though not
known t the tim 'P sid nt Roos vdt, immedi tely nfter the] p -
J\! tt k on P J H bour qu t d the Bri . h Gov mmeot that
Indi 1 d n. hould be nei li 1 d. Th vemm nt of! ndi could
e rt"qu $t and up to point it decided

iceroy d cidcd that ]awabarlal and I

won int ncl d to t t th Congre
situation. The mment wanted to
r1'orkillg Committee Afteting at Bardoli 39
watch our reactions and then decide "'hC'th rUle" otht"l"S hould be
released. In any case, it was necC' ary to rekasc m fM 0 long' I
was not free, no meeting of thr Working .ommiw' ould be hdd.
1 was in a state of mental distre S ",h(,11 the ont.;r of I'd a C' IT. dlt"c\
me. In fact, I fclt a sense ofhumiliatioll "hell I Wi ,l t fr e. n 11
pn'vious occasions, reI asc from jail had brought" ilh it a . rn r of
partial achievement. On this occasion I fdt k('rnly th;\( rHn th ugh
tht' war had been going on for over (wo yrars, w(' had not oc('n oil"
to take any effective steps towards achie\'ing Indiall frudom . We
st'f' med to be the victims of ircumstancrs and not the mastC' of UI'
destiny.
Imm("diateiy on my r ka e I called 1\ m('('ting of the- Worki ng
Committee at B rdoli. Gandhiji was taying there and h.ld r pIT d
a wi h that the me ting might be hdd there. I WC'llt to mee t hmdhiji
and immediately fell that \ e had moved furthrr apart. F<lrmrrly
we had diifncd on the qu('stion of principk alon!", but now thr,.
was also a basic difference between hi!; fI'ading of th!' si tuation
a.nd mine. Gandhiji now sermcd convincrd that the" l1riliKh .,ov('m-
ment was ready and willing to recognize India fr('c jf lndi
offered full co-op ration ;n the war effort. li e fdt that though
the Government was predominantly cons('rvativ(' and Mr ,hur hill
the Prime Minister, th war had rc a he'd a st. ge whrre thl' Urili h
would have no option but to recognize the fre('dom of India th
price of co-operation. My own reading was completdy dilTcn-nt. I
iliought the BriLi h Gov mm('nt w sincerdy anxious for our c0-
operation but iliat they were nol y t re dy to recogniz India frt'.
1 fd that while the war continu d, th(' utmo l the Britillll ro-
m nt would do would be to constitut an w Executiv( un il with
xpanded powe and give ngre adequate repre ("nt.-ulon n i .
We held Jong d.i cu ions over thi i uc but I w unable to convin
G dhiji.
n after my release, I heJd a pre conft'renct: at
fhen I k d wh ther ongre Wat willjng to h n (' i
the war, 1 r plied that jt d pended on th UilUd
mm nt. If the Gov mm nt chan d tLi
ngr . I madeitclc rthatth altitud f grr l nil
was not of the nature of n immu ble d I furth r
d what Indians should do if Jap in d In i . I repli d
I\bOUt a mom nt', he italian that 11 ladi h .k:c up th
to d~eq"d the c::ountry. I added 'We ~ do 10 only if the
 India Wins Freedom
bond~ which shackle our hands and feet are removed. How can we
fight if our hands and {i et arc tied?'
The Times and th' Daily News of London comment d on this
int rvi wand said that this s emed to indicate a difference of
opinion betw('('n Gandhiji and the Congress leadership. Gandhiji
had adopted an unchangeable attitude towards the war which left
no room or hope for negotiations. The statem nt of the Congr ss
Pn'sident on the other hand held out the hope of agr cment.
When the Working Commilt('t" met, Gandhiji referred to the press
cOmmt' nls in Britain. H admitted that these had influenced him to a
certain extent and strengthened his bclid that the British Govern-
mc-nt would b willing to change its attitude if Congress offered
co-operation in the war. The debate on what the Congress attitude
should b continued for two days but there was no agr cd decision.
Gandhiji stood firm in his view that non-violence was a ere d and
must not be giv('n up in any circumstances. As a corollary to this,
he could not, in any circumstanc s, approve India's entry into the
war. 1 r paled my arlier vi w that ongrcss must place greater
rmphnsis on th fr cdom ofIndia than on non-violenc as a cr d.
It w. s striking te timony to Gandhiji' capacity for finding a
solution to th mo t dimcult ofpr blems that v n in this impasse he
h d n formula which ould m('ct the two opposite points of vi w.
Hr nl 0 had wond rful capacity of understanding and r pr senting
fairly ontrary point of view. When he s w my firm attitude on the
quc tion of India's p. rticipation in war, he did not pre me any
longer to hnngc it. n the contr ry. he placed b fore the Working
ommitle a dmft R olution which faithfully r fleeted my point of
 Gandhiji Doubts Allied Victory
fro m Germany and Japan affected a large number ofp opl in Indi .
~{any were attracted by Japan se promi sand belil'ved th. tJ p n
was working for Indian fr edom and A~ian solidarity. Thcy held
that incr the Japancs attack weakened British pow<'r it hrlp('d our
freedom struggle, and we should take full advantage of til<' SilU lion.
There was therefor in the country a section of opinion whi h grcw
more and mor sympathetic to J apan.
There was another point on which my rcading of the situation
differed from Gandhiji's. Gandhiji by now inclim'd morc and more
to the view that the Allies could not win thc war. JIe fcaN'd t1l.1t it
might rnd in the triumph of Germany and Japan, or thitt at the 1><'.t
thl'rr might be a stalemate.
andhiji did not expr 55 this opinion about tht" ou tcome of the
war in clear-cut t rros but in discussions with him I fdt that hc w.
becoming more and mor doubtful about an Allied vi tory. 1 .11.0
saw that Subhas Bose's scape to crmany had madr a g"' t im-
prt'ssion on Gandhiji. H had not formerly approvcd many of no c',
anions, but now I found a change in hi s outlook. Many of hiJ I"C-
marks convinced me that he admired the courage and ICSQurerfulnt"
Subhas Bo e had displayed in making his escape from I ndi . J li
admiration for Subhas Bose unconsciowly colour d hi~ view bout
the whole war situation.
This admiration was also one of the factors whi h loudrd the
, di cussions during the Cripp Mission to India. I . hall di uss the
proposal br ught by Cripps and the r asons why we' rC'j' It-d it in
great r d tail in a later chapter, but h<'rr I would like to m .nlion
report which was circulated about the time of 'ripp' . rriv 1.
The~ was a news flash that Subhas Bose had died in an air cr h.
This created a ensation in India and andhiji, among orne-n, W
de ply moved. He 5 nt a m ge of condol nc to ubhaJ "
mother in which he spoke in glowing tenru bout her on and hll
rvice to India. Later on it turned out that the r port w false.
ripp , how r, complain d to m that he had not c:xp"ct('d
like andhiji to eak in 5uch glowin t rms abo t ub
hiji a conlinn d Hev r in non-violen ,while u
o nly ided with the po n and w rrying n
prop ganda for the de':; t of the Alli on th t1 6 Jd.
 A HINE E INTERLUDE

I
Chiang Kai-shek's Views 43
The Generalissimo and Madame Chiang Kai-shek tuTived in
Delhi on 9 February 194-2. Two days after hi arrival Jawahar-
lal and I called on him. One difficulty in talking to him w. th, I he
knew no foreign language. He had, of course, an int rpret r but
naturally this made conversation much slower and a little form I.
The Generalissimo made a long opening speech to pro e that depen-
dent nation could achieve fr edam in only one of two wa) . It could
(,ither tak to the sword and cxprllhe foreigner, or it could achirvr iu
fret'dom by peaceful m thods. But this meant that adv. nc toward
fr{'edom would be gradual. There would be prosrc s toward . sdC
government step by step till the goal was rea hed . These W(' rc
the only methods open to a nation which was fightin g against rithrr
a foreign or a national despot.
China, the Generalissimo said, was a clear c ampk of Iht \',\lidiIY
of this principle. The National Movement in .hilla beg.m in 11)11
bUI it had to pass through many stages before fn'edom wa 'lIl'lincd.
India would also have to fc 1I0w the sam path. Indian! mil t, of
course, decide how they would achieve th('ir goal. The en r"li. ,i mo
held that th re was no alt rnativ(' to the positi n that if frt dom
could not be attained at one strokc, India should a hic-v(' it by
gradual stag s. He then told me that he had b rn in tou h through-
out with the British Gov mmrnt and had sent d tail d mr . agt's to
the British Prime Minist r. He had also r(" civrd II reply from him
and he was convinced that jf Indians act d with wisdom and tau'
manship, they could fully utilize th war situation and a hi vc lhl'ir
fr edom.
The Generalissimo then asked mr, 'Wher do<" Indi. tightly
belong? I her place with Nazi Germany or with the dem ra ir ?'
I r plied that I had no hesitation in aying that if tht' 0 I d in
our way were r moved, I would leave no stone untum d to IC 1I t
rneli joined the camp of democracy.
The nerali imo th n put a rhetorical que tio to w. He
th l the' ue in the world war was fr edom or slavery for v t
of mankind. In vi wofth high stake., w it our duty to
with the .K. and China without insiJting on any condition ?
I replied that we were an.xious to join the de tic
pro rid d were free and could join tb democraci f
ind pendent choice.
The n rar imo gain 'd th t 10 far India w
his view that there was no au . ti I dim n
 India Wins Freedom
Dominion Status and compl 'te independenc . He dwelt at length
on this point and said that if the British Government offered self-
gov rnment with Dominion Status, India would be wise to ace pt
it. lIe add d that he knew that ]awaharJal did not agree with his
vicw and wanted complete independ nee, but as a well-wisher of
India, his advice would b that we shou ld not reject such an offi r.
Jawaharlal spoke to me in Urdu and said that as the Congress
Prrsident, it was for m to reply to this question.
1 told the G neralissimo that if during the war the British Govern-
ment offered Dominion Status and agr ed that Indian represcntativcs
could work with a sense of frc dom and responsibility, the Congress
would not rcfu c th off, r.
At this stag, Madame Chiang Kai-shck joined us and invited
us to t a. Her pn'senee made dis ussions asier as sh was educa-
trd ill the United tates and spoke English with p Iii et rase.
Th enrralissimo said that it was obvious that the British Govem-
m nt would have to should r th burden of war. It would not be
r 'a nabl to xpe t that they would giv on hundr d per cent
responsibility to Indians so long as hostilities continued.
I replied that a plan ould b made for the duration of the war
wili h would be ac ptable to both Indian I aders and th British
ov rnm nt. Th r I issu was, how ver, the post-war settlement
f th( Indian qu slion. nee the Briti h Government assured us
about Indian fre dom (ftcr thc war, w could com to terms.
M d mc hiang Kai-sh k asked m if th r would be any objec-
tion if ur dis u sions were brought to the notic of the British

th position Congress had taken in public and

tion to our vie, bing r port d to anybody.

wish to th T~. The

The Generalissimo M eets Gandhiji 45
Govemm nt had made a programme for an official visit whrn he:
would be accompani d by p rsOIlS chosen by the o\'rmmrnt.
!>.fadam Chiang Kai-shck, how('vrr, said thnt J aw. twrlal lIould
accompany them to Agra. He thu. became a member of Ihc' parI)'.
This al 0 was thoroughly disliked by the Gov(' mmnl( ofInclia.
From Delhi, th Generalissimo went to Cal ulta. Thc' GO\'l"nll11<'O(
of Bengal had arranged that the Gcncrdlissimo would tay in thr old
Government House at Barrackpur. The . en mli. imo infonn d
Jawaharlal about this and said that he hoped to m('e( him in Cairulta
again . Jawaharlal did go to al ulta and had furthrr talks witlt
him. Gandhiji was then staying in Birla Park and thr ~"n mlis imo
came to me t him ther . The ir meeting lasted for about t" hours
with Madam . Chiang Kai-shek as int<'rprt((r. Gandhiji lold him
how he had at first start d Satyagraha in outh Afri a .tIlt! how he
had gradually developed th techniqu of non-violent ll()n-CClopC"ra-
tion for tit solution of the Indian political probkm.
I was not in Calcutta during the Genc'rali imo's vi ~il. Jaw;lh r-
Ial told me later about th int rvi w. Durin g thc. r clilys Jaw;lharl.1
did not s e ye to eye with Gandhiji in all maUrfS. II<- fdl that the
way in which Gandhiji had spohn with th ,('nrralisSl mo had not
made a v ry good impr ssion on him . It is dillie-ult for me to cxpn
any opinion on this. It is possible that th ' ('nrralis~imo h.\o not
be n ble to follow all th implications of andhiji' stand . lIe- may
also have r mained unconvinc d by andhiji's argumrn , but I
would b surprised if he was not imprr. d by th rtl<lgn lic
influence which Gandhiji xercis d on for ign n.
Th Generalissimo, b forc h kft, mad a fc' rv nt appC'allo ' I"{ l
Britain to give r al political powC'r to India Ip ('dily ,hI,
but it " cl ar that he had nol b cn abl to convinn the VI ( Y
()r th British Government about the n d of immr dl' u. r('('ogniLion
ofIndia a D minion.
 THE CRIPP MI ION

th war crisis d p 'ned, people expected that there would

A be a chang in the British ov rnm nt's attitude' to the Indian

problem. This a tually happened and th e outcom was the
.ripps Mi ssion of 1942. Bcfor discussing this Mission, it is n cessary
to r('fn to a previous 0 casion when, soon after the outbreak of the
war, Sir Stafford ripps had visit d India. During thi visit he had
many disrussi ns with me. In fa t, he prnt s vera! days at Wardha
during the me ting of the ongr ss Working ommittee. The que -
tion f Indian parti ipation in the war eff, rt was naturally one of
the m Sl fr qu nl topics in our talks.
uring this visit, ir ufford Cripps mor than onc r marked
that .ndhiji' vicwsonth warwcr w llknownandh IdOUlhardly
nny hop ofagr('em nt with th Briti. h Government. My views were
al wid 'Iy kn wn and s mt'd to off, r a basis for discussions. He
nquirt'd from me in c uld ur him that ifth Briti h Government
n c pt d th d mand Ii r Indi. n fr dom, the Indian p ople would
c cpt my vi ws rath r than Gandhiji's. I told him that while we
all h ld dhiji in th greate t st em and paid th great t atten-
tion t what vcr h said, on this particular i ue I \ satisfied that
til m joril of the ngr and the country w r with me. I could
th r ur him that if Indi b me free, the \ hole country
w uld wbolch art dJy support the war effort. H also nquired from
me whether Indi would cc pt c nscription in uch an v ntuallty.
I r pli d th t w would w leom it and e to it th t the Indian war
effort to I.
ir 1 fIi rd
Cn'pps s Aide-Memoire 47
would be free to decide whether to remain within the British
Commonwealth or not. For the duration of the war, tllC E (' utive
Council would be reconstituted and th Me-mbers would hl1\,(' the
status of Ministers. The position of th e Vi croy would be thi'lt of
a constitutional h ad. It would thus be a dt faCIO lrallsfC.'rof powrr,
but the dt jure transfer could tak e place on ly aft r the war.
Sir Stafford asked for my reaction to his proposal. I replied lit. t
I could not commit myself definitely on a hypolhrlicO\I pr srntati n
of such an important issue but I could assure him thill onre- the-
Indian people were convinced that tht" British GO\'(' nunl'n t rt'ally
meant busi ness, a way to adjust our differences ('ould hI' found,
From India, ir Stafford Cripp~ wcnt as a non-offir;,a1 vi itor to
Russia. Soon a fter, he was appointed the British Ambassador t
Russia. It is sometimes held that ht, was t{'sponsi blr fot bringing
oviet Russia n arer to the allies. When finally ,("mully attaC'krd
Russia, a gr at deal of th e cr dit for this break b{'twrI'll Jlitler llnd
Stalin wt'nt to him. This gavC' him a great reputation and in (I';urd
his standing in British public lift'. I hav(' my doubts ifhr reall)' had
anyefli cuv influ nee on Sovi , t policy, but in any cast:", hiscrputiltion
soared high. When he returned to th e .K., m:my IxopJr t"wn rXI)(' I-
d that h might r 'place Mr Churchill as the h!'ad orlh!' Go"crnm<-nt.
r hav already referred to tit prfssure which President Roo~ vrh
was putting on the British Government for a sr ukm('J)1 of lht' Jndian
question. Aft r Pearl H arbour. American public opinion bream
more and more insistent and demanded that India's voluntary co-
operation in the war effort must be secured. Ev n Churchill fclt that
it was n cessary to make a g ture. He decided to ta.kr a n w t p
and s leet d Cripps as the spokesman ofa new policy.
After his return from the Soviet Union, Cripps's n'pulati n stood
very high. H ere was a man who, according to popular npiruon, h. d
handled a most delicate mission in M05COW with gre-at ucc . JIe
was th refore an obvious choice for a mi ion to rndia. Ik id ,hi.
inlere t in the Indian problcm had continued for many YC" 1 hay
reason to believe that he placed before Churchill the aidt- gi"
which he had drawn up at Ward:ba during his 1 t vi ' t to India. (y
view is that Churchill did not accept the pro in tb aib,mlmllift,
but Cripps fonned the impr 'on that the sch e w uJd be ace p
ble to Churchill, He therefore readily agr cd to me to India, ,'.
the light of his earlier disc ions with me, h relt that th w
ery fair qbancc of h:U proposals heiDI ilCUPtcd by tb
 India Wins Freedom
Th announccm nt by the B.B.C. of the Cripps Mission had a
mixed r c ption in India. While there had been a large spate ofspecu-
lad ru, no one knew definitely what exactly the British Government
would propose. The annou ncement was heard in India at 8 p.m. on
1) March 1942. Within an hour th e pr ss wanted my comments.
I said:
1
 T Ilt" C " ll l( I" " 1'1, , idnll. \1. ,,,1.111., \ /.,01 .. JlII\ III " .,t til' \" 'II.,.-:l l
J.(ldgt. I . /11 U : :-"11 .\ . \ . \ \'''"11,,1,, ..... " .... 1.111 ,,,I ( ' ''1'1'' . \ 1.1111 I
.\ 7.ld . L(lid 1'C'1 It II I-- L"" 14 "" \ 1.1\'" 1'111).

PI. TE. r

T he C llng- n '" I''''"il, 11 1 .",,1 \1 1 \ "oJ \), "" ,., ,I., ( .. 01",,, I " , flJll.
1. IIJ R : I." ,d P"llt H k- J..t\\I'II11. ,h,' \ 1.111).111 ... \11 \",1 '".
:\Ir .\ . \ . \ )",:.111,)..,. ~II "",.III .. ,d Crr!,!,
1'1. \ '11 : II

Lmd
:\ 1.1ll1.tn,1 ,\1.,1(1 ,1Ild
PClilid. - L;"'f('IHl', al
Ihr Tripolrlilt' C()nrerrn ('
ill Simla, ~1.1) 5, I ~) -l b,

of [ndi
Proposed Indian Executive Council 49
organizations would then be requested to send thtir nominee who
together would constitute the n w Exeeutiv Council. This Council
would function for the duration of the \~rar. Th(" British ,o\'{' nlllle""nl
would give a solcmn plcdgl' that as soon as hostilitie""s ('ased, dIe
question of Indian independence would be takrn up.
The net result of the proposal was that in place of the nldjorityof
.British Members in the existing Executive Council, thrrt' would be"" nn
Executive Council composed ofIndians alone. British officers ,,'ould
remain as Secretaries, but not as Members of tile Council. Tht syslt"m
of Government would not, however, be changrd.
I asked Sir Stafford what would be th(' position of the \ 'icrroy in
this Council. Sir Stafford replied that the Victroy would function as a
constitutional head like the King in Iht U.K. Tn orrln (0 r('Jnovc any
room for doubt, I asked him to confirm that this would mean thnt
th Viceroy, as a constitutional head, would be bound by Ule adv; '(:
of the Counci1. Sir Stafford said that this was the int('ntion. I id
again that the basic question was as to who would ('xc-rei C" powcr,
the proposed Councilor the Viceroy. Sir Stafford repellt('d thnt
power would r st with the Council as it r('sts with the Driti~h :'l incr.
I th n asked what would be the position of the India Offire in luch
a picture. Sir Stafford said that this was a maW'r of dnail whirh
he had not considered so far, but he would lik(' to as.~urc m that any
views th Congress had on the matter would be paid due regard. Sir
Stafford added as an afterthought that the India Offier would r('mrun
and th re would be a S cretary of Slale but his position would
lik that of the Dominion Secretary in respect oflhl" other ominioru.
I described in detail how, immediatdy aft r th outbreak of lite
War, India had repeatedly offered to participate in the war on ondi.
tion that her freedom was recogniz d. It was the Brilish who It d
failed to take advantage of this offer and wcrc thus rc~polUibJe for
India not playing a greater role in the war. Sir tafford id again
and again that h was sorry for the way things had happen d but h
(i It convinced that aU this would now nd if the offer ht h db u ht
on behalf of the British Cabinet wa., ace pled.
OUf fint interview th.U5 came to an end on a not of opti . m.
The m ling of the CongJ' Working Committ w i t t
29 March 1942, and it remai.n ed in 'on lillll April. rhi
perbap' the longest meeting that th Workin Commiu
thC'll held, \\-"3S to be expect d, th m m 1'1 PI'
proposals in different mood. and Crom dilli ~nt poin of vi
50 India Wins Freedom
Gandhiji was against the accrptance of the proposals from the very
first day. I fdt that this was due mor to his avrrsion to war than to
his obj(' lion to the proposals as such. In fact, his judgment of the
mrril!l ofthr proposal was coloured by his inh rent and unchangeable
aVC'rsion t anything which might involve India in war. Proposals
how('v('r favourablr to India, if they meant that India would have to
participate in war, went against his grain. He also did not like the
Jast parl of Ih(' ocrrr which said that after th war the Congress and
th(' Mu~lim League would b given an opportunity to settle th
ommunal issur,
When andhiji m t Cripps for the first time during this Mis ion,
.ripps reminded him of thc aide-memoire to which refcrence has
already bt'cn madC'. Cripps said that thc aide-memoire had becn
prepared aftt'fconsultation with Congr ss I aders, including Gandhiji,
Its substanc(, was that during th war th r would b complet India-
nizationofthe ExccutiveCouncil. Aftcrthcwar, India would bedeclar-
ru frcr. The proposalshe had now brought wrrc substantially the ame,
.Jandhiji said that h had no recollection of the aidt-memoire.
All that he could r 'memb r of his t Iks with Cripps during his last
vi . it Wtfl" some di cussions about vcg tari ani sm, Cripps rcp!i d that
it w. his misfortun that Gandhiji could remember his talks on food
but not th propo als he had so carefully prepared aftcr consulting
andhiji him~ if.
During lhdr dis u ions, G. ndhiji and Cripps exchanged many
pI ntri ., but tht"Te w re al 0 harp encounters, though in a friend-
ly spirit. ndhiji aid that the propo al wcr cut and dried and
1 ft hardly. oy op for neg tiation, He I ughingly warned Cripp
Lb. l I w. ghing him long rop but h should take care, Cripps
r torted th t h kn w th t I h d rope long nough to hang him.
J. \ h rl 1 w deeply troubled by the developments in Europe
nd i, Md w anoxiou concerning the fate of the democracies.
Hi n. tur I ymp thits were with t.h m nd he wanted to help them
f.\t p ibl. H lher fore inclined to consid r the prop Is
~ v urobl . Indian f, lin inst the Briti h 0 strong t the
lim th t he could not te hi p 'tion clearly and mphatically,
1 ould. h w v r, re d hi unspoken though and symp thized
g n n' 'ith hi vic\ ,
for the other m rob rs of the Working Committee,
m l of th m h d no t OplOJ n , They were U
lookins t rd ndhiji for plion lui
Sir SlojJortf s Ambiguous Replies
Rajagopalachari. He was all for acceptance but h is vi ws did not
carry much weight. It was unfortunate- that CongrC"ss cir ks looke-d
upon him as a man hardly distinguishable from a Moo C'r;ur.
The Working Committee debatcd on the propo. als for tw d~\).,
but th discussions were inconclusive . I th en fdt it nrcr ~al") to ('rk
furthcr clarification and more dC'taiJc-d information 011 srn'ral point
from Sir Stafford. The basic question was lh<:' powe- ofth(" ElC ('rllli\'e-
Council. Sir Stafford had proposed th a t th r Council would n tlhtin
but would br constitutC'd with Indian members ~dectrd by thr poli-
tical parties. He had verbally assured me th a t the- \'.crroy'. position
would be that of a constitutional he-ad. The Working Commillrl"
desired that this point should be brought out rkarly in th(' trnm of
the agreemrnt itsc lf. Accordingly, on 1 April 1942, I ilg"in ('.dlrd on
Cripps.
This mee ting with Sir Sta fford was d rcisi\'r. ur di,u .. ion
continued for some threc hours. I found th a t thr position had under-
gone a radical changc sin e I had las t mn him . lI is. nawl" wnc:-
now quite different in temprr from his f('pli ('s during the fi rst inlrr-
view. When I asked him about th e stalusofthr Exrcutivr Council, he
said that it was his hope that the Counci I would, ('V(' II duringthr w. r,
work lik a Cabinet. I enquired if this mrant th a.t th r Council would
decide all issues by majority and its d cisions would b r final. :ripp
gave an ambiguous r ply. He would not catl'gorically ~tat(' that the
Viceroy would have the final say but thr purport of what hr s;tid Wat
that the Council would not havr full and unf<'(tC"rrd frredom of
deci ion, He tried to explain this by saying tha t th( po ition now
njoy d by the Viceroy could not be changr d without a chang in the
law. However h str ssed again and again lhat whatrvrr might be
the po ilion in law, in actual practicr the Viuroy would b hay
constitutional head,
1 reminded ir Stafford that he had bern much morr c t 0 I
during the first interview, He argued with me and to d to onvince
me that his basic position bad not changed. What he intend d to
convey then was identical with wh the wat aying now. I rrmind d
him that in r ply to my qu estion, he had th en id (t' ori 1Iy that
the Executive Council would function e tly like a . binet. T y,
hower, he was saying that the legal positi n woul r main un-
changed, and he was only trying to r ur m y yin 1 tit
h.ia hope that the Council would function like b' n t. "hit
aot the impression which 1 had ~ni d way from lh Ii", int rvi
 ITldia Wins Freedom
I also remind d him of our talk about the India Office and the Sec
r tary of State for India. H e had then said that the Secretary of State
for India would act like the Commonwealth Secretary but h e was
now saying that any change in the status of the India Office or the
S crttary of Statc for India would require a new parliamentary
rnactmcnl. Cripps r<-plicd that his view was that in practice the
Illdia fHec would function on a frcsh basis but ther were practical
difficulties in ena ting a law which would change the status of the
ccrrtary of State to that of a Commonwr.alth Secretary.
1 tlll'n took up the quC'stion of th e recognition ofIndian ind pen-
Mnee on the rssation of hostilities. Cripps said that the problem of
India would b considered from a n wangle aftcr th e war and she
would gel the opportunj ty of deciding h er own fate. He added that,
as a friend, h would v 'nture to advise that we should not raise any
fresh difficulties b y asking new qu estions. India should accept the
proposals at their [ace va)u!' and go forward. He had no doubt in his
mind that if Indi a co-ope rat ed fully with Britain during the war, her
freedom after the war was assured.
Thert' has bt'rn a great deal of speculation in India and some
outside. to why Sir tafford Cripps changed his position between
the fi rst and th' St' ond interviews. One possible explanation is that
ir tafford had hoped to persuade the Congr 55 to accept the pra.
po Is. ven though th r was no change in ul e basic situation, by
hi prrsuasiv powers and pleasant manners. That is why he had
initially giv n (t'gori luran e in order to create a favourable
fi l impression. When, however, the propo als w re ex mined in
d uul and he w ubje t d to cr -examination, h f1 It that he must
be C uliou and r fr in from rai ing hop s ..... hich h was not in a posi-
ti n to ti fy. n ait mali e xpl It rion i that during this interval,
th inner . r 'I ' of th Gov mm nt of Indi had tru'ted to influence
him. H 'I constantly surround d by th Viceroy and his entour
ge. It \ rh p inevi ble th t th ir point of i w hould at
I t p rti Uy colour his vi 'on, A third all m tive pi nation is
til 1 during the int rvaJ, m h d between D !hi and
ndon, d the Briti \ tU' C bin t had sent him fr sh instructions
llich m him (i ('1 th t ifh ent lOO far be might be Kpudiated.
h i dim uit to i e t ri 1 sw r to b l the real
pi ti n i. It m y 11 be th llill the f; cton mentioned bove had
contribut d t bring a ut change in the situ lion. Cripps was
I)' te and such he inclined to paint thinp
I Sum Up the Position 53
in a rosier colour than was warranted by the f. cts, lIe was als inclined
to see things from his own point ofvi!:w and prt"scntlhe po ilion in
favourable a manner as possible so as to influence hi oppan nt, When
later we sought to pin him down, he was compclkd to r(' trace: his
steps, I heard later that in Moscow also, h e had occasionally C'l(ceed-
c.d his instructions in a similar manner. A more ch'lrit:l.blc cxplM.l-
tlon may also be offered. As an Englishman, hI' was prone to pia c
greater emphasis on practice and con ention lh. n on ",rill n agree-
ments. Itisprobablethathesincerdybrlic\,ctlth:\lon tOhispr pOS3l
were accepted, conventions would develop in lhe ",'''), I\(' had illdi :\l-
ed in his first interview. Naturally, howevt'f, he could not give any
formal assurances in this b ehalf and h ene ' when we "anted ,\ formn!
assurance he had to rt'treat from his ('arlin position.
It was therefore a complneJy nrw piCLUrt which I h, d to present
to the Working Committee when it mr t again on the morning of
2 April to consid r the result of my s('cond interview wiLh Sir
St.afford Cripps. I triedto sum up the position as folio", :
I . J now clearly saw that the British Cdhim'( Win not prepiucd to tnuu.-
fer power to India during the War. The Urili, h felt that to lin 10 would
be to take a risk, and they WCr! not prepared to l. kr it.
2. Circumstances of the war and specially Arnrrir.an prn,ure I d
brought about a slight modification in the British position. Even the
Churchill Government noW felt that I ndia must be given an opportunity
of co-operaling in the War on a voluntary ba., is, Thi5 was th re:uon why
they were prepared to set up a purely Indian Executive Council nd to
give it some more powers, In law the Council would, hl)wcver. retnoJio
only a Council and not a Cabinet.
3. I t was possible that in actua.l practice the Viceroy would ad pt
liberal altitude and normally accept the deci JOIll of the Coun il. 111
position of the Council would, however, remain ,ubordinatc to him, and
the fina.I responsibility would rest on him and not on the Coun("il.
4. It therefore followed that the answer to the ba.liC: qucstion raiJed by
the Working Committee as to who would have ulli.Jnatc deeisi WU

that it would be the Viceroy.

5. 0 far as the future was concerned, it W poSlible that the llrit' h
Government would iD the words of Cripps. coJUider the Indian problem
rom a fresh angle butit could not be. 'd with any ty ahat India
old become independent with the ccssaLion ofhOitiliti
6. Th rc".. of coune, a strong possibility that aft lbe war &h
be a new governmc:n t in pi ce of &he Conscn'lulve govc:m.tn t hi
.Ir. Churchill It was possible &hauuch a Govermncnl would COflilidlcr
the Indian qUCStlOD in ~ .pirit of palCl' undentandittS and .ymp my
54 India Wins Freedom
but obviou Iy sueh a contingency could not be a part of the proposals.
7. The resul t th refore was that if the Congress accepted the Cripps
offer, it would he without any clear assurance about the future of India
even after th c es~ alion of hostilities.
W e discussed thes ' points in:the lightofthe announcement made by
th!' B.B.C. on the occasion of the Cripps Mission. It had th n been
!carly statl'd that India would now have an opportuni ty to decide her
own fatc . This was also the note which Cripps had struck during the
farst inl(Tvicw, but as the negotiations continu d, the early mood
of onfaden e and optimism was gradually dissipated.
There wer . other r asons also for a change in the mood and atmos-
phcr '. I hay alrt'ady said that when Sir Stafford came to India, he
had ask d the Viceroy to issue invitations to a number of political
It'adrrs of whom one was the late Mr Allah Bux. After arriving in
India, Cripps appeared to modify his stand, perhaps as a result of
the influence of Viceregal Lodge. Allah Bux had come to Delhi on the
Viceroy's invitation and was waiting for an interview with SirStaflordJ
but th e interview was not being flxed. As this was creating an awk-
ward si tu tion, I poke to ri pps and he said that he would soon meet
Allah Bux. In spit of this promise, no int rview was actually fixed.
Allah Bux at last b came disgusted and refused to wait in Delhi any
long r. Wh n I heard this I spoke strongly to Sir Stafford and point-
d out that tlli w an insult not only to Allah Bll" but to the strong
body of Mu lims whom he represented. If Government had any
d ubts on the point, Allah Bux should not have been invited at all.
But since th in it. lion h. d b n iud, he should be properly met.
{y int rv ntion r suIted in an interview b tween ir Stafford and
All h Bux the' next day. The intervi w w for only an hour and was
onfin d to general di cu ions. Thi incident cr ated a bad impres-
ion on me. Ifi It that uli w. not th prop r m thod of de lingwith
dim ull poUti I i u . In my judgment. Cripp had not behaved
like talesman.
an ther in 'dent which left me with disagreeable
th t t of the '\ bin t s p p is rei
larg volume of criticism in the Indian pre Th
'0 r the p p which generally e p d the ngre
f i w. Whil th ogre Working Committ e was still in
ripp nt me 1 tt r in hich b .d th t though 'the
Hindu p h d nol w Ie d th off, f. h hoped that I would
'd r lh pro from a b der point of vi . Tbi reference
Working Commilkt in Susion 55
to the Hindu press appeared vt'ry odd to mt'. It. Iso occurrrd 10 me
Ulat.perhnps h wns putting the- emphasis on thr Hindu pt'C" br U\c
I am a Muslim. lfhe did nOI likC' thr commrnlS mi\dc b the p
he' could easily have r ferrt'd to the- Indian prC':t.~. or II ,ccti n ofit.
I replied that 1 was surprised at his rdnrne!.' t lhc Hindu pIT_ od
did not ulink Ulat lh('r was any justification for drawing . urh il eli.
tinction among the difr<'rC'nt sC'ctions of thr Indi,\I\ prl" . ~. J a lIN'd
him that th ongress Working Commiu<'r would oll~idrr Ih<' pm-
posals only from an J ndian point ofvicw ;ulcl it would I.lk ... inlo coJUi.
deration all sections of opinion bdor(' it came to a \lC'ci ion.
During this long session of th(' Working Commiu!'1' from 29
March to II April, I was with the Committrc for practimlly
the whole day. I also met Crippi! almost (' v('ry ('vrning artf'r 2
April. At most of these m ctingl! Jawaharlal Wil5 al 0 pr('~nl.
soon as I had received th intimation of :ripp. 's proposrd visit, 1 had
srnt a circular lett r to all membt'r of lhe- Working mmittre
that nobody should meet him se-paratdy. Til rr. on for lhi w
that such separate me lings may and somNimt'li do 1\'3d to C'onfusion
and mi understanding. r further said that if a mrmbt'r oCthe Work
ing Committee wanted t, meet .ripps on some sp rilll i "u r
becau C of hi'.! past associations with Cripps, he should fil"ll' infonn mc
of his intention.
Cripps complained to me t.hat during his last visit to Indi , h
had met many members ofth Working Cotnmittl'r, Thi. lime he
found that I had put a restraint on them and not one w willing to
meet him. They would not even expres." an pinion if th,.y mC't
him at lOme social function, Cor they ~ It that the Dgre President
might take objection. to such action,
I told opp that wh n a r 'sponsible organiza.tion was ne li ting
with the Government, it must do so only through its accredit dr.
p ntativc" The Working mmiltee had decided that the
.. grc. P 'dent should carry aD the n gOliatiOns, It would the -
fore not b prop r for other mnnbets of th Workin mmJ&tr LO
n gotiatcseparatcJy, If,howevcr. ripp.wan ml'l'l nymfflf r
oftbc' orting mmhtee for any re D. r woul gladly dt.
rip id that he was particularly anxiolU to meet JJhuJ' b j
i. He had tayed with him during hi. I ' it 1.0 b i . P inl..
ing to the i .wt
b then wearing. pps id with
ven th 10tb~ r am no carin are a in of but b
I . cd BhuJ bbai D . to d\ ir m and he did f().
 India Wins Freedom
Tbe d bate on the offer continu d in the Working Committee.
Gandhiji was against acceptance. Jawaharlal favoured the proposal.
1 dim rld from both of them. Gandhiji was opposed to the
proposal because of his opposition to war. Jawaharlal was in favour
be-caus of his attachment to th e democracies. He was also influenced
by tlw appeal which Marshal Chiang Kai-shck had addr ssed to
the Indian p opk. He was therefore for ace ptanee of the pro-
posals if this could be done without compromising the Congress
Muting with Lord Wavell 57
bim a report on the war situation, this would have: dr i ble
ffect. H c accordingly wrote to me to mrC't " avdl. I tl"Mil . gt"t"ctl
and Cripps arrangrd an intC'rviC'w.
Cripps pt'TSonally look Jawaharlal nnd mt" to W. vrll bllt ann
forma) introduction he left us and we rnlkt"d with W.lv( II fiJr ow r
an hour. Nothing, howevrr. rm('fg~ d from thrsr disru. 'IHlll\ whit-h
could offer a r('ply to our basic qurstion. On thi~ 0(:('1\5ion. W,I\'C' U
spoke more like a politician than a soldier and insi\trd lh.lt during
the war, slratrgic considerations must taKe I n 'C'rdC'I1(,1' U\'('r all Clthrr
isstles. I did not drny this but pointed out that our roornn w. I'"
to who would excrci~(' powrr in the administration of [ncl;.1 \\'.1 dl
could throw no light on this qll('stion.
As a resul t C'f our i nsistC'ncl" it had bt''(''rt prop(l~rd tlut 0111' (If t h('
m('mbC'rs oCthr Executive Coun il would d('al with prohkms rd.lllflg
to tht" war. Cripps tried to p('nuadr m that th i~ would I mute Incli;\Ij
participation in the rrspoll5ibilily for th(' conclurl of rhr war. lit'
could not however clt-arly say what would br thr rrJaliofl brl r n
the Indian Member and the Commandn-in- :hid: I I WiU mainly
to discuss this question that he arranged for my inll'rvirw with
WavcJJ. When I asked Wavdl iflhr rolc ofthr Ind ian Mrmbr-r of
the Council would be that of a responsible Cabinet Mini.trr, he
could gjv no direct reply. Th e concJwion I drrw from my t..'\lk wllh
him \ as that the Indian Member would have responsibility but no
power, He would be in charge ofCantrcns, Commissariat and TrailS-
port, but would have little say about the flghling force .
The posjtion may be briefly Jummed up as follows. The ripln
offer Ure ed that after the war, Indian indcpcndrnc(' would br:
tecogn.iz d. During the war, the only change w lhat th i!'.xC"cutivc
Coundl would be entirely Indian and consist of lead n of the
political parti s. R garding the communal problem. Cripp 'd!hat
after the war the Provinces would have t.he option to decide wh.'lher
to join the Union or not.
I had not objected to Cripps', bask principle that indept'ndt"ru:t
uld be recogniz d after the war. 1 felt. however. that unJe. u
jttd6 power and respolUibility were giv n the Council during the
war, the change would not be ignificant. Dlton .my 6 tint M
ilh him, Cripps had giv Jl me an Drance on this point
that the CounciJ would act like a Cabintt. In the (Dune ofdi
it bec:arne clear that this
aI quite difl'eICDt.
a pottle cxaggtrati H.
58 India Wins Freedom
An ven gr at r snag was the option given to the Provinces to
stay outsid th Union. This as well as the solution ofth communal
probJrm sugg sted by Cripps had greatly disturbed Gandhiji. He
had r act d violrntly against it. Wh n I met him after my first
iot rvicw with ripps, I immediately realized that Gandhiji regarded
the ripps off r as totally unacceptable. He ~ It that it would only
add to our difficulties and make a settl ment of the communal
probl m impossiblr.
I discussed in detail th implications of this item with Cripps. I
asked him to tdl us what exactly hI.' and his colleagues in the War
abinct had in vi w. Cripps tried to persuade me that the I ndian
politi al problc-m QuId not b solvrd till the communal problem
was settled. This could be don in on of two ways. On was to settle
it forthwith. Thc olhcr was to d fer a decision till after th war,
when power would be in Indian hands. Cripps said that in his
opinion it w uld br wrong to raise the issue at pres nt. It would
only add to the difficulties. The only fcasibl thing was therefore to
wail [I r the ('nd of th war. H assur d me, howev r, that if the
Hind\ls and th Mosl ms could come to an agr ement, a solution
ould be n 'n h\'d ven now.
ltold ripp that th right given to the Provinces to opt out meant
p ning th door to paration. ripps tried to def, nd his position
by pointing out that the right was giv n to a Province as a whole and
not to any p rlicul r ommunity, H was convinc d that once the
right of the Pro inc to opt out w recogniz d, no province would,
in {i t, demand that right, Not to cone de the right would on the
OUt r hand rouse su picion and doubt. The Province would be
bl to look t th qu tion obje tively only when they felt that they
b d P Iii ct fr edom to d cide th y chose.
\\' h d di u d tlli i' ue one morning, Cripp telephon d
to m in tb e coing and 'd that ir ikand r Hayat Khan was
ming to m l him th n xt d y, ripp hop d that Sir Sik ndar
uld p h'lpful in th lution of th mmunal problem,
~ b , 1 im m ~onty provin e d if Punj b decided to
m 'n "ilh Indi thi w uld gi e Ie d to the other 'luslim
m ~ rity p inc, I told him th t 1 w doubtful if it ibnd
uld 1 th probl m but 'n he eomin to Delhi, 1 would
gl d l him.
tingCripps
the best
Bn'tish Proposals UrulCuptahle 59
possible solution of the communal problrm. He w convin td th t
if the matter was put to the vote of the Punjab ssrmbly, iu de jsion
would be on national and not Oll communal linc's. I con("rd~d Ih t
if th vote was now taken, Ilis forecast was likely to be righi, bill
to what would happrn after the rnd oflh(' w;\r wns morc than h(" or
I could say. I told him that I could not ace<"pt th"t he:- would h VI" tl ('
same influence then as he had now
Regarding the Indian States, the Cripps o(fn gavr to tht" rrprt''It''n-
tativcs of the States full fn'edom to dC'cidr thdr future. Th'. in lulled
th power to opt out lik {he Provinces. I must, in [.lime',' to .ripp.
point out that in his discussions with th(" reprc's('nlatives of th
States, h e was cI ar and forthright. Ik told the Maharuja (If Kru h-
mir that th future of th e States was with India. No prinr(' hould
think for a moment that the British Crown would 0",(, 10 hiJ hrlp
if he d<-cided to opt out. The prince's mllKt thrrrforr 10(1)( to th ..
Jndjan Government and not to thc" .Briti3h Crown for tlwir futuff .
I remember that most of tht rq)r ntalivC's of the tat<'. lookrd
crcstfalkn aft r tht'ir interview with ripps.
The Working Committee had already approv d a draft rf'~Jution
on the proposals brought by Cripps. This WitS srnt to him on 2 April.
but not rei ased to the Press till the negotiation finally broke down.
Apart from the g ncral qu{'stion of th tran frr of powrr to Indi
the major difficulty had aris!'n over th e definition of III pow(" of
the Commander-in-Chi f and the Indian Mcmbrr of lht' Ex Ulive
Committee in charge of Defencc-. Cripps had Iuggc-.t<'d that til
Indian Member would be rcsponsibl mainly for public rdatioN.
demobilization, Post War Reconuruction nd merulj. for the
Dl mbenoftheD fence Forces. ongrr r gardt'd Ihc$t' functions
tally insufficient and made a count !1'-propOlllI that t.h efi n
finistcr would be in charge of all funcliolll xcepting thOJC (0 be
erci d by the mmandcr-in- hirf for the purpoIC f t.h n
duct of the war. CriPI made certain counter-suggesti JU. III the
proved unsati actory 3$ he wanted to reserve 11 im nant
(Untti to the CODllllander-in-Chief.
I had funlu:J' meeting with ripps in e tat
9 prll on the JOth morning report d
V'UI'UlJu'u th ult afmy diJcuaio . We Q
nel on that the British Gave
not c:ceptabfe,
oon:l.i11&ly on 10 Ap oJ 1 42, 1 wr:ot froM that
 India Wins Prudom
approach to th Indian problems in the Draft Declaration was not
only wrong but was likrly to lead to greater complications in the
future'. He wrote an answer on II April in which he tried to
argue that his proposals ofi'ered the bt'st possibl' solution of the
Indian probl m and insist d that he had not changed rus position at
any stage'. He now tried to shift the blame on to Congress and wanted
to publish his I tt r. I replj d on th same day refuting his conten-
tion and pointing out that the correspond nce would convince any
impartial observer that th fault for th failure of his mission lay with
him and not with Congress. Thc main points in my two letters are
giv('n bdow, but intn sted readers may fmd the whole corres-
ponden e in the Appendix.
Dridly, this is what I wrote to Sir Stafford in my two letters of
10 and 11 April 1942. The Draft Declaration laid much greater
mphnsis on the future than on th immediate present, while India
dt mandrd changes in the pres nt system. In spi te of i ts objections to
some of thl' proposals for the fu tur<:, ongress wa still willing to come
to a snlicm nt with the Gov rnment [or th sake of national defence.
communal problem as soon as the political question was sC'ukrl.
I then pointed out with rC'gTet thal the first imprC'ssion of the
picture created as a result of my carlin interviews with, ir StnfTurti
gradually became blurred as the discussions on matnial points
proceeded from stage to stage. When I last met him 011 tlu' night
of 9 April the picture had comp)etclr chang('d ,1Od hopl s of
settlement had faded out.
Since Sir taIford had said that he proposed 10 publi,h hi~ ktlt'r
to me, I wrote back that presumably he would not objntlrl rf"il'.\.\rd
th(" ("nlir(' correspondcnc ' as well as th e resolution we had p. !osrd.
Cripps wrote back to say that h e had no objl'ltion. An ul,,1mgly
these were rclcasrd to the Pr('ss on II April.
The resolution was in the following trrms:
The Working Committee have given their full and 1::. rue t ftm)idcr
tjon to the proposals made Ly the British War C.1Lil1ct in r!"gard to
India and the elucidation thereof by Sir Stafford Cripps. Thrse prupol 15,
which have been made at the very last hour becau5c of 11\1:' compubion
of events, have to be considered not only in relation to India', dent: nd
for independence, but more spccially in the pratnt grave': war ('rilil, with
view to meeting effectivel:' the perils and danger. tltat confront Inw
and envelop the world.
The Congress has repeatedly stated, ever since the commenct'menl of
the War in September 1939. that the people of India would line themselvc:a
with the progressive forces of the world and sume full rCllponaib,lity
to face the new problems and shoulder the new burdens that had n.cn,
and it asked. for the necesmry conditiol1l to en ble them to do I() to be
created. An essential condition W3$ the freedom of I nilia, for only the
rulization of present freedom could light the Dame which would illumine
million. of hearts and mo\'e them to action. At the last me tins of the
Alllndia Congras ColIUltittee after the COllUllenc:emcnl of the War in the
Pacific, it ltaled that: 'Only a free and independent India CUl Ix: in
pc:IIition to undertake the defence of the country on.li. n uooa! it and
be ofheJp in the furtherance of the larger t:aUICI that are emerging from
the storm ot war.'
The Britbh War Cabinet', new proposals "elate principally to tll future
upon the cessation of ho.t.iliuca. Tile Couuniu.ee. while recogniain that
Kif-detc:rmination for the people of India is accc:pu:d in principle: in tJ 1
'Ilna:rWn rutur~ regret that lhia i.1 feu.ercd and circ:u.mscribed nd
provUiom hav.: been intrOduced which gravely imperil the dcveJopm t
or. free and united nation and the establlihmc:nl of () auc; S Ie.
Evca t.he constitution-making body it 10 Wl1ItitulCld that th pc:op
to .ar~tioo is vitiated by Ihc muoduet.ion of n -rep
 India Wins Freedom
elements. The people of India have as a whole clearly demanded full in-
dep ndence and the Congress has repreatedly declared that no other status
x cpt that of independence for the whole of rndia could be agreed to or
could me t the e5scndal requirements of the present situation. The
Committe r cognise that future independence may be implicit in the
propo5als but the accompanying provisions and restrictions are such that
r al freedom may well become an illusion. The complete ignoring of the
nin ty milli()ns of the people of the J ndian States and their treatment as
commodi ties at the disposal of their rulers is a negation of both democracy
and self-d termination. While the representation of an I ndian State in the
comtitution-rnaking body is fixed on a population basi s, the pcople of the
tnt hav no oic in choosing thos r presentatives, nor are they to be
consulted at a ny stage, while decisions vitally affecting them are being
tak n. Such States may in many ways hecom barriers to the growth of
1ndiall frc dom, en laves where foreign authority still prevails and where
th(' possihility of maintaining foreign armed forccs has been stated to be a
likely conlingency, and a perpetual menace to the freedom of the people
of til tntes as well as f the rest of India .
The ncceptance beforehand of the novel principle of non-accession for a
provine is also a severe blow to the conception of I ndian unity and an
apple of discord likely to generate growing trouble in the pro\'incC"S, and
which m y weill d to further difficulties in the way of the Indian tatcs
merging themselves in the Indian Union. The Congress has been wedded
to Indi n freedom and unity and any bre k in that unity, specially
in the modern world when people's minds inevitably think in terms of
v r larg r fed r. ti n ,would be injurious to all concern d and exceedingly
p inf,,1 to ntemplat. everthe1ess the Committee cannot think in terms
f otnpelling the peopl in any territori 1 unit to remain in an Indian
nion g. in t their d lared and etabli hed will. While recognising this
principle, the mmitlee fccl that every effort should be made to create
ndili which would help the different units in developing a common
d co-oper tive n tionallife. The acceptance of the principle inevitably
invol Ih t no chang should be made which result in fresh problems
bing cr led nd compulsion being exercised on other ,ub tantial
up wiulin Ul t re. ch territorial unit should have the futfest
ible ulon rny within the Union, con i lemuy with a S og n tiona]
t t . The p no\ made on the part of the Brili h , ar Cabinet
and willI d 10 uempts t sepal" lion at the very inception of
d thu te Cricti n just \ hen the utm t co-operati n and
. This p posal h been p wnably made to
d, but it ",iU h other consequ nces Iso and
Ilary and 0 tist group am Dg dilTtTeDt
Ie trouble and divert publi lu:otion fi m the vital
Press Conference Held 6
Any propo al concerning the fulure of India muSI dC'rnn.nd Itt-nlion
and scrutiny, but in tOOay's grave crisis, it is the pr('s('nl Ih. I ('ount, nd
('\('n proposals for the future are important in so f;u 1\ 111<"), 1Tt'( I Ihe
presrnl. The Committee have neees al ily nttnchC'd thr gre It" t import. n ('
to this aspect of the queslion, and on thi ultimntdy d('JX'nd.~ Wlllll d\"ic
thry should give 10 those who look (0 them for guiU.1I1ft'. relf till' pr
the British War Cabinet's proposals arc \ague ,11\<1 .tlcogclhr r illntll1pl ,
and it would appear that no vital changes in tll(' prt~rnt 111Ic-tUlr Mr CCIO-
trrnplated. It has been made clear that the- Dc-frncr (If Indi,. \\;11 in lilly
('ve-nt remain under British control. At any timt" dt"frnC'C' i5 1\ \lt nl ~ lJhj('('(;
during wartime it is all imporlant and coven alm(lst r\'('1"\ phrr(' of lift'
nnd administration. To take away defencr fnlln Ihr phtre of rr POlllilll'
lity at thi stage is to reduce Ihat rrsponsihility to a f.u('r , nd Ilullit)"
and to make il perfectly clear thaI I ndin is not going to lit" frrl' ill lUI)' W Y
and her Government is not going to function n~ a frrr and jm.lq'K'lIdrnl
govemmc-nt during the pendency of the '''ar.
The GfIIfUlIi(lr(" would
repc-at that an essential and fundament",l rrcr('qui~ilC- for ulr. urnptiuh
of rcspom.ibility by the J ndian people in the prc-. rnt i. til( ir H 1t iljon il
fact that they nre free and are in charg of maim. ining . uti dc-frntling
their freedom. What is most wantcd i~ the CIHhu i: ~tic r }lfIllS" of lit
pt'"ople which cannot be evoked without the fllik t Irmt in t.llt"m and Ihe
d \olution of responsibility on them in th m; ttl'r of derC-lIte It i. ollty
thus that even at this grave eleventh hour it may be pos ibl( tf) Rillv III
the people ofIndia to rise to t.'le height ofthc oc ion. It i lI\;lnif".. t th t
Ule present Government oflndia as well iu provincial agrll("ir , rr I. rl-
iog in competence, and are incap ble of shouldering the outcl"n uf J neli "
defence. ] tis onJy the people of J ndia, through th"ir ptJpul,u repr mt -
livCl, who may shoulder thi. burden worthily. Bul that can ollly hc. done hy
p nt freed m, and full respon ibility being cast upon thc-m .
The Committee, ther fore, are unable to ace pt the pmpo ' 11 pill
forw rd On behalf of the British War abinel.

I also held a Press Conference on II April 1912 whrn I m 1

large numb r of journalists and explained to them the rt'
hieb had led to our rejection of the Cripps ofTer. I need n t ttpe I
them t length, for they are embodied in both lb R luti n and th
\,;(),~tno~nd nee. I 1 .d sp cial .trcsI on the poinl that as th iliJ..
c: 0 proceed d, we found that the rOl)' pictur t Ii t drawn
by ir Stafford gradu 11y faded. Thi chang< in th her
abo 11 eli d in my iDltrvi w with rd v II. [n the c.ou
our talb, ir Stafford ripp had pc tallyemp the l
cal difficulties in the way of xu1i rring d fen
It t hiJ ugg ti.o n that w had m t
 India Wins Freedom
he eQuId xpJain the technical side of the question much better.
Curiously enough, throughout our interview with the Commander-
in-Chief, at which other military officers were also prcsent, not a
word was spokrn about any technical difficulty. The ntire discussion
proc{'c'ded on poJiticallincs. It did not strike me for a moment that
we were in( rvil wing a military expert, for Lord Wavell spoke
like an expert politician.
DW'ing the Press Conti r 'nee, I also fclt it nec.essary to clarify the
posilion created by certain speculations in a section of the Press
regarding Mahatma Gandhi 's part in the discussion. Gandhiji's
views on the subje'ct of participation in any war were well known
and it would b ntircly un\r4c to suggest that the Working Com-
mitt c's dl;cisions were in any way influenced by those views.
Gandhiji mack it kar to the Working Committee that we were
prrfrctly frec to come to our own decisions on the merit of the
prop sals. H(' did not want to participate even in the earlier sittings
of the Working Committee and it was only because of my insistence
thal he agreed to stay on for several days. Eventually, he flJt that
h auld not stay any long r and all my persuasion failt'd to move
him.
I al 0 inform d the Press that t.he Working Committec's decision
, as at v'ry stag unanimous.
I concluded by saying that it was a matter for deep regrct that the
g al which all of us had passionately desired was not reach d,
but it should be placed on record that discussions were carried on
in n fri ndly atmosphrrc. ln.spite of profound difli rences, which at
tim 's led to heated controversy, Sir Stafford and we had parted
fri nds nnd th cordiality of the talks was maintained to Ule last.
o fnr as ongrcss was concerned, this was the way the Cripps
Mi 'on cnme to an end. It was not however the case withJawaharlal
Md It: Jagopnl chari. Before passing on to the n t phase in the
lOry of India's stn\gglc fod dom, I would like to make a special
reference to tb ir re ction to these nts.
Ja i l I gave an interview to the r pre ntative of the News
Clrnnic" soon aft r Gripp left. The whole tone and attitude of the
intcrvie pp r d to min.imi~e the diff1 renee betw II Congre
and th British. H tried to r prtsent that thougb Congt'c s h
je t d the ripps om r, Indi willing to h Ip the British.
I lumt that th re w a proposal that Jawaharlal ahould
broadcast from AlIlndia Radio. From what I k.Qew of his
Jawaharlal tht lnurnationalist 6S
attitude, I was afraid that his statement might cn' ate confusion ill tilt'
publjc nUnd. Jawaharlal had already left for Allahabad :lIld I had
also made arrangements for returning to Calcutta. I dr,idee! th.1l
I would stop on the way and have a further talk with him. I did . 0
and told Jawaharlal clearly tha t now that the Working ~(lmmiltrr
had passed a resolution, he must b very careful rrg.\rdlllg \\ h.lt he
said. If he gave a statement which created the impn. sion Ih. I
Congress was not going to oppose the war efforl, Ihl' whole df('("t
of the Congress R esolut.ion would be lost. Tilt' Congrns st.wd WitS
that India was willing to help Britain but could do so only .\$ .\ fIre
country. I was sure that this was also h is attitudr. If lit &.Iid 'LIlY-
thing which cr at d the impression th at Ind ia was willing to up-
port the war effort regardlcss of the British attitude, Ih(' Congn .
resolution would becom meaningless. I t)'er<"fore r( qUI's lnl him to
refrain from making any statement. At first hl' argll('d wilh Illr
but in the end he saw my point of view. I was ny gl.l(l whfu hr
deriarcd that he would make no statement at all and would ("'lC'ri
tilr broadcast which he had promised to maier.
J want to make it absolutely cJrar that J awaharlal\ attiludr WaJ
not due to any doubt r garding India's freedom . I Ii ~ attitudr w; .1
natural result of his understanding of the int('mation<1l situ.llioll.
He was from the b eginning a confirmed anti-Fascist. His vi\it to
China and his discussions with Chiang Kai-shek h.lel ~tfel1gth{ nrd
his antipathy to Fascism. H e was so impressed by China' struggle-
against J apan that he fe lt that the d mocracies must bl' Rupport('d
at any cost, In fact h e fel t genuine grief that I ndia should not ur
fighting by the side of the d emocracies.
I may also m ention thatJawaharlal has always bern morc moved
by international considerations than most Indians. I [, has Joo!tl'd ;tt
all qu nons from an international rather than a national point of
view. I aJ 0 shared his concern for the international i Uti, but to
me the qu tion of India's independ nc was paramount. I pre-
Ii m:d the democracies to the Fascist powers but I could nol forgc:t
that un! the democratic principle was applied to Indi.t.'. case, II
prof1 ions ofdemocracy sounded hollow andinsi r. I al r m .m-
~d the course of eventl since the t World W"r. Brit in
th n d dared that she was fighting German impcnaJi m to protc
the righb of the smaller nations. When the Unit.ed Stat cote
the ar, President Wilson formulated his f; mou Fourt en PtJin
aDd pleaded for the self--d termination ~f all nations. "e rth I
66 India Wins Freedom
th righl~ ofIndia were not respected. Nor were the Fourteen Points
V('r appli d to India's case. I thcr fore felt that all talk about the
democratic camp was meaningless unless I ndia's case was seriously
eonsid red. I made all thefe points in an interview I gave to the
NIWS Chronicle about a week later in Calcutta.
During the who I of this period, Jawaharlal was living under a
terrible mental strain. He had rec ntly r turned from China wh re
he had brcn greatly influenced by Generalissimo and Madam
Chiang Kai-shek. It was clear to him that India's help was essential
if hina was to resist Japan successfully. One evening during the
m ting of the Working Committee, Jawaharlal came to me and our
discussi n convinced me that he was in favour of accepting the
ripps offer ('ven though there was no change in the British stand.
He argued that in vi W ofth favourable assurances giv n by Cripps,
w(" should not hesitate. Jawaharlal did not say this in so many words
but thi s was the trend of all his argum nts.
I was grratly disturbed as a rrsult of lhis talk and could not sleep
till almo~t 2 o'clock in the morning. As soon as I woke, I went to
Shrimati Ramr hwari Nehru's house where Jawaharlal was staying.
We discusst'd the various issues for ov r an hour. I told him that the
tn'nd fhis thought was against our best interests. If real power was
not transfrrTed to India and only a new Executive Council was fonn-
cd, then the only thing we should receive from Cripps was a promise
which would bt' valid aft r th war. In th existing circumstances,
such a promise had little value. Who knew what would be the end
of the war? We wer prepar<"d to participate in the war as a free
c unlry. Tilt, .ripps offer gave us nothing on that point. Even
the d j ion to participate in the war was nOl ours, but the Viceroy's.
ripp kjng us to a cept this decision of the Viceroy without
giving u th(' opportunity of deciding for OUI'S Ives. If we still
c pt d thr offer, it would mean that all of our decisions till now
h. d b t'n wr ng.
I further rgurd that the world was bound to chang after the war.
No one who w aw re of the world's politi 1 situation could doubt
th t Indi would b come free. Hence the oID r of ripps really gave
us nothing. Ir, e cccpled hj offer, we might have cause to rue it
in the fUlu . In c; the Briti h nt bnck on th ir word, we should
not n hay th(' ju tin tion for Jaunching a fresb struggle. War
h d given Indi an opportunity for chieving her fre dom. We must
n tIe it by d P ntting upon mere prow .
 Rajogopolachari Sponsors 7
Jawaharlal was greatly depressed by all that was happrning. II
was clear that he was not sure of his position. Thr struggk in hi
mind made him fe el helpless. He rrmained silent forsotnr momC'nts,
Ihen said: 'I do not for a moment want to decidr according f O my
personal inclinations. R emove all doubt from your mind on thi~
point. My d cision will be th same as that of my colkagun'
Jawaharlal's nature is such that when there i some tension in his
mind, he talks even in his s)rcp. The day's preoccupati ons Olll!' to
him as dreams. When I came out, Shrimati Rameshwari Nehru lold
inC' that for the last two nights Jawaharlal had bern t.lking in hi;'
slrep. He was carrying on a d bate and was sOlnetimrs muttcring. nd
ometimes speaking loudly. She had heard ripps's name , sometimr
r('~ n'nces to Gandhiji and sometimes my nam . This wali addrd
proof of how great was the strain under whi h I.i. mind "a \\'01 king.
The second person on whom the negotiations had a profound (m I
was Shri Rajagopalachari. He had for some time b rrn <krply eli -
turbcd by the deteriorating ommunal situation in tht country. It
was his view that the independence of India was hrld up bec.lOs of
the differenc s between the ongress and tht Leagu,'. M y rc acting of
the situation was that the British did not wi h to taler any ri~k.~ dunng
the period of the war and the differences among the C"Olnmunitic.-
ga\ c them a pretext for keeping the power in thrir hand ~. Rajag()-
palachari did not agree and soon after the rejection of tllf' 'ripps
oITer, he began to say openly that if only the C ngr('.~ would. Clpt
the League's demands, the obstacks to Indian fr{'edom would be
r('moved. Not content with expressing this view gm( rally, hI' .p n-
orcd a resolution in the Madras Congress Lt"gislaturr Party to th
following ro ct:
TIle !t.-ladnu Legislature Congress ParlY notes with dt"rp rt'grrl th t tllt"
altetnpu to establish a National overnmcnt for India HI rnab!e ht"r 10
face the problems arising out of the present grave .iluaticlO have f: ilrd
and that, result of this, ationali51lndi haJ been pia cd in a dil rom .
I t i~ impos ible for the people to think in tennl of neutrality or p jvity
~unng an inv ion by an enemy power. either is it prartic: bIt: to org n
ue an)' effective defence independently and un-<:O- rdin ted with the d,...
fence m urC$ of the Government. It is absolutc1r and ur endy n
IU)' in the best interesu of the country at thil hour of )X'ril l<J do all t t
the n can po sibly do to remove every obs J in ti,e: y fie
bli hment of a national administration to Ii ce the pr ml it
, d, therd'ore, as much the Muslim League h ins' ttd on lh r
of the risht of eparalion of ~n re.I (rom United lndi
68 India Wins Freedom
the ascertainment of the wishes of the people of such areas as a condition
precedent for a united national action at this moment of grave national
danger, this parly is of opinion and recommends to the AlI.India Congress
Committee that to sacrifice the chances of the formation of a national
,Qvernmcnt at this grave crisis for the doubtful advantage of maintaining
a controversy over the unity of India is a most unwise policy and that it
has bc("ome nrcessary to choose the Jesser evil and acknowledge the
.fll~lim League's claim for separation; should the same be persisted in
when the tirn(' comt'S for framing a constitution for India and thereby
rrmove all doubts and fears in this regard and to invite the Muslim League
for a consultation for the purpose of arriving at an agreement and securing
the installation of a National overnment to meet the present emergency.
Rajagopalachari had not consulted me before he sponsored this
resolution. Nor, as far as I was aware, had he consulted any of our
olhrr colleagues. I was greatly disturbed when I read of the resolution
in the papers. Hone of my colleagues in the Working Commi ltee went
ab ut preaching against the decision ofCongrcs~, it would not only
weaken the discipline of the organization but create confusion in the
public mind and giv a handle to the imperial power. I accordingly
felt that the matt r should be discussed by the Working Committee.
I told Rajagopalachari that th~ resolutions passed by the Madras
Legislature wer not consistent with the declared policy of the
.ongrc- . As a responsible member of the Working Committee,
h should have avoided all association with such r solutions. Ifhe felt
strongly on th subj ct, he should have discussed the matter with his
11 gues in the Working Committee before giving expre sian to
his vi ws. If the Working Committee did not agree with him it was
op n to him to r sign and then propagate his views.
R jagop.lach ri admitted that he should have talked the matter
ov r in the Working Committe before the resolutions were moved
in the Madr Legisl tur . He WIU howe cr, unable to withdraw
the two r lutions, th y r pre ented his considered view. He
cd. letter to me in which he expre cd hi regret for publicly
v ntil tinghj viewson higblycontro\'ersiaJ qu lion before consult
in th Pr ident. I gi e the tcxt of his letter below:
t 9, Edmostone Road,
labab d
pm 30, 19-f2.
ull\1\ \cb,
, ith reference: to your observation on the resolutions passed on my
motion by the adruCoD8ftSI Lc:plative party, I admit lh.\t I should
tUlVe Iked the m Her over with you and other rolle IJU" or 1111:' Warkin
Committee: before moving the rt"wlulion'. knowing , I did thdr di
agrt'Cment on the subject. 1 write lhi 10 e:lCpr~u my 1'l"Krt"t.
I have explained to you alre dy how .tm0ltl . J (('C'1. I beliM'c th t I
should be r. iling in my dUlY i( I do not ('nde your to Ift'l people to think
and act in the direction which 01)' conviction Ie dt til . I (r'("llh I in the
public intereslll I should move the I'f':SOl1ition. All"(' d)' nOllfiC"d b . Mr.
n!'anam, I desire. Ihc:re(oN', to rt'<Juesl )ou 10 pt'nnit ffit' to rni n my
place in the Working Commiuc(',
Let me tendcr my gr le(ul thanb (or Ihe unqudlililtnlJl and fTeclion
bntowl"d on me by )'IlU and the other cnlic: ~llC:S during "th f' m ly
yean that J have s-':l'vC'd in th(' ornmill('('.
Your. inr....dy.
C, RAJAO() AL.o\CIIAIU
UNEASY INTERVAL
 '0 Aid in War from Ens/alVd India 7)
( 1 int~d ut th t wt' had Ir' r id(':\ of thr line'
commun I nd Olhrf problC'JlU "C'f(' to br h'C'd, lit 'U' did n r
lIo~ thi to influ('n (' our. ttitudt to thr Cril Jl a r. W juu d
the off('r b onl . on(' t t: ~ould it or would it not tr; 1\ f, r po rr
from Briti. h to I ndian hand ? I had no doubt th;u wr, ,uld h. Vf"
producrd 54 Ii, factory !Wlution hf the- ommlJll.ll problrm I thr
qUl". lion ofth tra frr ofpolilil'al pow r h.ul fif'lll.x-rn II fat toni
('ttl d.
7'1. Inda Wns Freedom
against the British which at times was so intense that they did not
think of the consequence ofaJapanese conquest ofIndia. ~
After Cripps departed, I also found a mark d change in Gandhiji's
altitude. I have already said how much opposed he was in the begin-
ning to any movement during the war. He had held that India
should stand for non-violence and not deviate from it for any reason.
Thatis why, in spite of my fforts, he would not consent to any mass
mov('ment, for he felt such a movement might lead to violence. In
fact it was with the gr atest difficulty that I could persuade him to
agr e to the individual Satyagraha or Civil Disobedience Movement.
Even then he laid down so many conditions that the movement
could b nothing more than a moral gestur .
Gandhiji's mind was now moving from the extreme of complete 1
inactivity 10 that of organized mass effort. The process had perhaps
b gun arli r but it became clear only after Cripps left. In June
1942, I wrnt to visit him at Wardha and stayed with him for about
five days. During my talks with him I saw that he had mov d far
away from the position he had taken at the outbreak of the war.
I now began to s ns that the Government anticipated a J apanese
attack on India. Thc Governm nt s emed to be of the view that even
if til whol country was not invest d, the J apanese would make an
attempt to 0 cupy Bengal. They thought that the J apanese would
attack by s a and advance on Calcutta from Diamond Harbour. )
I cam to know that Gov('rnment had decided to abandon Calcutta'"
in such a ontingency. A secr t cireular had be n i sued to selected
am ers in tru ling th m about th stag s at which they should leave
nlcutta, Howrah and the 24 Parganas and the routes til y should
follow. The Gov rnment had also taken c rtain necessary precau-
tionary m asur s. They had worked out a plan of resistance at differ-
ent places and even pr pared provisional orders about the line of
r treat in case withdrawal became nec ary. According to this.
th first line ofr sistance would be along the river Padma, the second
brt\ c ('n Asan 01 and Ranchi and the last near Allahabad. The
ov rnment h d also d cid d that in case of a Japanese attack,
m thing lik the corched arth policy must be followed. They had
10 prep red measures for the blowing up of important bridg sand
the d tructi n of facton s and industrial install tions in order to
d ny lh m to th J panes. Plans for the d struction of the Iron and
t 1 F ctory tJamsh dpur had om how become known and there
great anxiety and unrest in the whole area,
Plans to Resist the Japanese 73
I reported all these developments to Gandhiji. I al 0 told him that
it was my conviction that once the Japanese set foot on Indian soil, it
ould become our sacred duty to oppose them with very m ans at
our disposal. I felt that it would be intolerable to xchang an old
mastt'r for a new one. In fact it would be far more inimical to our
interests if a new and virile conqueror replaced th old Gov rnm nt
which in course of time had b come effete and was gradually losing
it grasp. I was convinced that it would be far more difficult to oust
a new imp rialism like the Japan se.
I had already taken some steps in anticipation of a possibl Japa-
nese attack on India. I had asked the Congress organization to carry
on propaganda to build up public resistanc against the Japanese.
\had divid d Calcutta into a number of wards and started to r cruit
and organize bands of volunteers pledged to oppose Japan. These
volunteers were instructed to place every possible obstacl in the
way of the Japanese army ifit should advance. Th scheme I had in
view was that as soon as the Japan 'se army r ached B ngal and
the British army withdrew towards Bihar, th Congress should st p
in and tak over the control of the country. With th . aid ofour vol un-
t('ers, we should capture power in the interregnum b for thcJapan se
could establish themselves. In this way alone could we hope to oppose
th new nemy and gain our freedom. In fact, most of my time
during May and June 1942 was spent in developing and carrying
d t this new line.
1 was surpris d to find that Gandhiji did not agree with me. He
told me in unqualified terms that if the Japanese army ever came into
India, it would come not as our enemies but as the enemy of the
.British. He said that if the British left immediately, he b lieved that
e Japanese would have no reason to attack India. I could not
ept his reading and in spite of long discussions we could not
acb agreement. I found that Sardar Patel held the same view and
rhaps he had influenced Gandhiji. We therefore part d on a note
f difference.
In the first week of J uly, there was a meeting of the Working
mmittee at Wardha. I reached Wardha on 5 July and
andhiji spoke to me for the first time about the 'Quit India'
ovement. I could not easily adjust my mind to this n w id .
felt that we w re facing an extraordinary dil mao Our sympa.
. were with the Allied powers but the Briti h GOY mm nl had
up an attitude which ~c it impo ible for us to co-operatc
 India Wins Freedom
with them. We could side with the British only as a free country but
the British want d us as mere camp-followers. On the other hand,
th Japan !Ie had occupi d Burma and w re advancing toward~
Assam. I ~ It that we must refrain from any word or action which
could offi r encouragement to the Japanese. It seemed to me that the
only thing we could do was to wait upon the course of events and
watch how the war situation developed. Gandhiji <lid not agree. He
insist d that the time had come when Congress should raise the
demand that the British must leave India. Uthe British agreed, we
could th n t 11 th Japanese that th y should not advance any further.
Inn spite of this they advanced, it would be an attack on India and
not on the British. If such a situation developed we must oppose
Japan with all our might. .,
I hav already said that I had b n in favour of organized opposi-
tion to th British at the outbreak of the war. GandhUi had not th n
agreed with me. Now that h had changed, I found mys If in a
peculiar position. I ould llot brli ve that with th enemy on the
Indian frontier, the British would tolerate an organized movement
of r sistance. Gandhiji se med to have a strange belief that they
would. He h Id that the British would allow him to develop his
mov 'ment in his own way. When I pr ssed him to t II us what exact-
ly would b the programme ofr sistance, he had no cl ar idea. The
only thing h m ntion d during our discussions was that unlike
previous occasions, this time th people would not court imprisov'-
m nl voluntarily. Th y should r sist arr st and submit to Govern-
m nt only if physically fore d to do so.
I was sc pticalofth Japan s attitude and h 'ld that we could not
pIn nny trust in] panese pro~ ssions. It seemed to me most unlikely
that th'y would stop their victorious march when th y saw the
British withdraw. To m it se moo that instead of stopping them,
such a st p might encourage th m in their march to India. Would
th y not regard th British withdrawal as the most favourable oppor-
tunity for occupying India? I could not give categorical answers to
th que tions and I th r fore h itat< d to adopt Gandhiji's line.
G dhiji h Id th t the Briti h would r gard his mo e for an organi ..
z d m movement a a warning and not take any pr cipitate action.
He would therefore hav tim to work out the details of the movement
and d lop it tempo accoroing to his plans. I was convinced that
thi would not b the e. The Governm nt would not wait but
t Gandhiji and other ngress 1 ad rs as soon as Congress passed
'Quit India' Movement 75
any resolution for launching a mass movement. In the abs nee of
the leaders, the country would be paralys d and tIl p opIe so deje t-
ed that they would be unable to take action against th Japan c if
they should attack India. The p opl were now responding to th
Congress call b cause of their faith in Gandhiji but when h and his
colleagues were in jail, th y would not know what to do. Aft ' r a
great d al of thought, I came to the conclusion that som thing mu t
be done to keep up th e people's spirit. If Gandhiji was allowed to
develop the movement in his own way, it would naturally proc' d
along non-violent lines. If, howev r, we were all arrested, the people
must not be allowed to fall into a stat' of inertia but be cnc uraged
to carry on the movement as b 's t as th y could without both ring
too much about viol nee or non-violenc .
When the Wurking Committee b gan its discussions, I r1aboratcd
thes points in detail. Among members of th Working ;ommittr
only Jawaharlal supported me and then only up to a point. The
olh r m mbers would not oppose Gandhiji 'ven when they w 're not
fully convine d. This was not a n w xpericll e for me. Apart from
Jawaharlal, who often agreed with m ,th other m mb'Ts wcr
generally content to follow Gandhiji's lead. Sardar Pat I, r
Rajendra Prasad and Acharya Kripalani had no cl ar id a about
th war. They rarely tried to judge things on th ir own, and in any
case they were accustomed to subordinate their judgm nt t
Gandhiji. As such, discussion with them was almost usel S5. Aft r
all our discussions, the only thing they could say was that we must
have faith in Gandhiji. They held that if we trust d him he would
find some way out. They cited the example of the Salt Satyagraha
Movement in 1930. When this had begun, nobody kn w what was
going to happen. The Govemm nt thems Ives were contemptuous
of the move and had openly ridiculed it. In th end how v r, th all
Satyagraha Mov ment had proved a great succ S5 and compcll d the
British to come to terms. Sardar Patel and his colleagues h ld that
this time also Gandhiji would have the same success. I corn; ss that
this kind of reasoning did not satisfy me.
Gandhiji's idea seemed to be that since the war was on the Indian
frontier, the British would come to tenm with the ongre as soon
as the movement was launched. Even if this did not take place,
he believed that the British would hesitate to take any drastic t p
with the Japanese knocking at India's doors. He thought that this
would give the Congre the time and the opportunity to org nize an
 India Wins Freedom
effective mov ment. My own reading was completely different.
I was convinc d that in this critical stage of the war, the Government
would not tolerate any mass movement. It was a question of life
and d ath for the British. They would th refore act swiftly and
drastically. I clearly saw that as soon as we decided on a movement,
th Govcmm nt would arr st all Congress leaders and then nobody
could say what would happen.
I had a strong conviction that a non-violent movement could not
be launched or carri d out in the xisting circumstances. A move-
ment could remain non-violent only if the leaders wer present and
able to guide it at very step and I was convinced that the leaders
would barr sled atth ftrsl sugg stion of a mov m nt. If, of course,
the ongre5S dccid d to abjure non-violence, there was scope for a
mov m nt. Evcn a )caderl S5 people could disrupt communications,
burn stores and depots and in a hundr d ways sabotage the war
frort. I also f('rognized that such a general uhpeaval might I ad to
a deadlo k and force lh British to come to terms. It would, however,
b a gr at risk but I h Id that if the risk was to be taken, it should be
don with op n ey s. On the oth r hand, 1 could not for a moment
see how th ' non-viol nt mov m nt of Gandhiji's conception could
be laun hed or maintained in war conditions.
Our discus ions start d on 5 July and continued for several
days. I had on arH r occasions also differed from Gandhiji on some
points but never b fo had our difference b en so complete. Things
reach d a climax when h sent me a letter to the effect that my stand
wa so dim' r nt from his that we could not work together. If Congress
want d Gandhiji to I ad th mov ment, I must resign from the Presi
d ntship and also withdraw from the Working Committee. Jawahar-
I I must do the sam . I immedialely'Sent for Jawaharlal and showed
him Gandhiji's 1 tt r. Sardar Patel had also dropped in and he was
shock d wh n h r ad the letter. H e imm diatcly went to Gandhiji
nnd p l t d trongly against hi action. Patel point d out that if
I r ign d from the Pr id ntship and both Jawaharlal and I left
the Working Committe, th r perc ions on the country would be
di trou. Not only would the p oplc be confused, but Congre
would b -en to i ery foundation.
G ndhiji had ent me this 1 It r lyon the morning of 7
JuI . At bout rnidd y h cnt 11 r me. He made a long speech
hut n th t h b d wrill ninth morning in haste.
R' h d n w thought furth r 0 r th matter and wanted to
Working Committee Pass Resolution 77
withdraw his letter. 1 could not but yi ld to his persuasion. When the
Working Committee met at three in the afternoon, t11(" first thing
Gandhiji said was that the penitent sinner has come back to the
Maulana!
We b gao to discuss in greater detail the various demrnl of the
proposed movement. Gandhiji mad it cl ar that lik other mov -
ments, this would also b e on the basis of non-violence. All mt"thods
short of violence would however b permissibk. During the dis-
cussions, Jawaharlal said that what Gandhiji had in view was in fact
an open rebellion even if the rebellion was non-violrnt. andhiji
liked the phrase and spoke of an open non-viol nt revol U lion several
times. On 14 July 194:2, the Working Commill C pass d the follow-
ing resolution on the National demand:
Events happening from day to day, and the cxpcri nee that the people
of I ndia are passing through, confirm the opinion of ongr("s~mcn that
British rule in India must end imm diately, not m r 'Iy bC'l'ausc ~ r ign
domination, even at its best, is an evil in iLSelfand a continuing injury I the
subject people, but because I ndia in bondage can play no eITretive part in
defending herself and in affecting the fortunes of the war that is de olating
humanity. The freedom ofIndia is tbus necessary not only in the interest
of! ndia but also for the safety of the world and for the ending of nazism,
fascism, militarism and other forms of imperialism, and th aggressi n of
one nation over another.
Ever since the outbreak of the world war, the Congress has studiedly
pursued a policy of non-embarrassment. Even at the risk of making its
satyagraha ineffective, it deliberately gave it a symbolic character, in the
hope that this policy of non-embarrassment, carried to iLS logical xtrcme
would be duly appreciated, and that real power would be tran ferred to
popular representatives, so as to enable the nation to make its fullest contri-
bution towards the realization of human freedom throughout th world,
which is in danger of being crushed. It has also hoped that n gativeiy
nothing would be done which was calculated to tighten Britain's strangle-
hold on India.
These hopes have, however, been dashed to pieces. The abortive
Cripps proposals showed in the clearest possible manner that th re wa no
change in the British Government's attitude towards India and th t the
British hold on India was in no way to be relaxed. In the negotiati os with
ir Stafford Cripps. Congress representatives tried their utmo t to achieve
minimum, consistent with the national d mand, but to no vail. Thi
frwtration h resulted in a rapid and wid pr diner of ill-will .. i t
Britain and growing ti fi etion t th succ of J pane. rm . Til'
WOrking Committee view this deY lopmenl with grave apprehension
 India Wins Freedom
this, unless checked, will inevitably lead to a passive acceptance of aggres-
sion. The Committee hold that all aggression must be resisted, for any
submission to it must mean the degradation of the Indian people and the
continuation of their subjection. The Congress is anxious to avoid the
experience of Malaya, Singapore, and Burma and desires to build resist-
ance to any aggression on or invasion of India by the J apanese or any
foreign power.
The Congress would change the present ill-will against Britain into
goodwill and make India a willing partner in ajoint enterprise of securing
fr edom of the nation and peoples of the world and in the trials and tribu-
lations which accompany it. This is only possible if India feels the glow
of freedom.
The Congress representatives have tried their utmost to bring about a
solution of the communal tangle. But this has been made impossible by the
presencc of the foreign power whose long record has been to pursue relent-
I ssly the policy of divide and rule. Only after the ending of foreign domi-
nation and intervention, can the present unreality give place to reality,
and the people of I ndia, belonging to all groups and parties, face J ndia's
problems and solve them on a mutually agreed basis. The present political
parties, formed chiefly with a view to attract the attention of and influence
th British power, will then probably cease to function. For the first time in
Jndia's history, realization will come home that princes, jagirdars, zamin-
dars and propertied and moni d classes, derive their wealth and property
from the workers in the fields and factories and elsewhere, to whom essen-
tially pow r and authority must belong. On th e withdrawal of British rule
in India, responsibl men and women of the country will come together to
form a provisional Gov rnment, representative of all important sections of
th p ople ofIndia which will later evolve a scheme whereby a Constituent
Assembly can be convened in order to prepare a constjtution for the
overnmcnt ofIndia ace ptable to all sections of the people. R epresenta-
tive of free I ndia and representatives of Great Britain will confer together
for th adjustment of future relations and co-operation of the two countries
iii s in the common task of meeting aggression. I t is the earnest desire
of the C IIgre~ to enable India to resist aggression efli ctively with the
people's united will and strength behind it.
In making the proposal for the withdrawal of British rule from India,
the ongress h d no desire whatsoever to embarrass Great Britain or the
Allied Powers in their prosecution of the war. in any way to encourage
ggression on Indi or incre ed pressure on China by the Japanese or any
other PO\ er soci ted with the Axi Group. Nor does the Congress
intend to jeopardi e the defensive capacity of the Allied Powen. The
Dgres . therefore agreeable to the sta tioning of the armed forces of the
Allie! in rndi~ should they.o de!lre, in order to ward off and resist Japan-
Cle or other aggreuion, and to protect and help China.
No Desire Jar All Britislln's to Withdraw 79
The proposal of withdrawal of the British Power from Indi was nev r
intended to mean the physical withdrawal of all Britishcrs from India, < nd
certainly not of those who would mak J ndia th ir hom and live th re
as citizens and as equals. The Working Committ c r fer th m (0 the
All-India Congress Committee for final decision. For thi purpose the
A.I.C.C. will meet in Bombay on 7 August 1942.
 QUIT INDIA

W
HENth r solutionofth WorkingCommitteewaspublish-
cd, it creat d an electric atmosphere in the country. People
didnotpausetoconsiderwhatw re the implications, but felt
that at last Congress was launching a mass movement to make the
British quit India. In fact, very soon the r solution came to be des-
cribed as the 'Quit India' resolution by both th p ople and the
Government. The masses, lik some of the m mb rs of the Working
Committ ' e,had an implicit faith in Gandhiji's I ader hipandfelt that
h ' had som move in his mind which would paralyse the Government
and fore it to come to t nns. I may her confi ss that ther w I' also
p oplc who thought that Gandhiji would bring freedom for India
by som magic or superhuman method and did not therefore think
it n c ssary to make any special personal ffort.
After passing the r solution, the Working Committee decided that
it would wait for Govemrnent reaction. Hth Government accepted
the demand or at I ast showed a conciliatory attitude there would
b ' op for further di cus ions. If, on the other hand, the Govern-
ment r j cted th d mand, a struggle would be launched under
ndhiji's I ad rship. I had little doubt in my mind that the Govern-
m nt , ould r fuse t n gotiate under duress. My anticipation was
justifi d by the course of events.
A v ry lnrg concourse of the for ign Press had come to Wnrdba
th y w r nnxiou to know what the Working Committee would
d de. n 15 July, Gandhiji h Id a Pre Conference. In reply to
~ qu ti n he 'd that if the movement w re launched, it would
b non-viol nt re olutioD against British power.
er th re lution, p d, Mahad Desai (who Gandhiji's
lacy) told ;fiss lad th t she should go and me t the ieeroy
nd plain t him th purp rt of the r solution. Miss Slad ,as th
d u ht r of British admit I but h d adopt d th Indian way of
lifi und andhiji's influ n . Popularly known as Mira .Ben, she
Viceroy's Refusal to Meet Mira Ben
was one of his staunchest disciples and had liv d for many years in
his Ashram. It was sugg sted that she should al 0 try to give an
account of the nature of the proposed movement and how it w uld
work. Miss Slade left Wardha to meet the Vi eroy and requested
an interview. Th Private Secretary to the Vic<"roy repli d that sin e
Gandhiji had declared that he was thinking in t 'rms ofrebc1lion, the
Viceroy was not prepar d to grant her an int rview. H made it
clear that the Government would not tol rate any reb Ilion during
the war, whether it was violent or non-violent. Nor w. the ern-
m nt prepared to meet or discuss with any r presentative of an or-
ganization which spoke in such terms. Mira Ben then met the Pri ate
Secretary to th e Viceroy and had a long talk with him. I was at th'
time in Delhi and she reported her conversation to m . She then
went back to Wardha and described the intcrvi w to Gandhiji.
Soon after this, Mahadev Desai issu d a statement that there
appeared to be some misunderstanding about Gandhiji's intention.
He said that it was not corr ct to say that Gandhiji had de ided to
launch an open non-violent r bellion against the British. I conCe
that Mahadev Desai's statement somewhat surprised m . Th fact
is that after Jawaharlal coined the phrase, Gandhiji had talk d of
non-violent revolution. He may have given some sp rial meaning
to it in his own mind, but to the general public his stat m nt meant
that Congress was now resolved to force the British Gov rnment to
give up their power by adopting all methods short of violent insurrec-
tion. I have already said that I had anticipated the likely British
r action and was not th refore surprised by the Vi eroy's r -fusal to
meet Gandhiji or his repr sentativ . As already decid d by the
A.I.C.C., a meeting of the A.I.C.C. was call d at Bombay on 7 August
1942 to consider the situation further.
From 14 July to 5 August, my time was taken up in a seci s of
me rings with Congress leaders from differ nt parts of the country.
I wanted to impress on them that if the Governm nt accept dour
demand or at least allowed WI to function, th mov mcnt must
develop strictly according to Gandhiji's instructions. If, how vcr, the
Government arrested Gandhiji and other Congress leaders, the
people would be free to adopt any method, violent or non-viol nt,
to oppose the violence of the Governmentin every po 'bI way. So
long as the leaders were free and abJe to function, they were respon-
sible for the course of events, but if the Governm nt arrest d them,
Government must take the relpomibility for the cons quences.
82 India Wins Freedom
Naturally, th se instructions were secret and never made public. The
pictur as it pres nted itself to m was that Bengal, Bihar, the United
Provinces, the C ntral Provinces, Bombay and Delhi were fully
pr pared and the movement would be strong in these Provinces.
Assam was th en th centre of th e British war effort and was full of
army offic rs and men. A~ such, no dir ct action was possible there.
Assam ould, how vcr, be r eached only through Bengal and Bihar
which gave an add ed importance to th e programme in th ese two
Provincrs. R garding th e olh r Provinces, I did my best to create
a proper atmosphere but I must confess th at th e picture was not very
cl ar to me.
The r fu sa l of the Viceroy cven to receive Mira Ben made Gandhiji
realize that th e Government would not easily yield. The confidence
he had in this regard was shaken but he still clung to th e belief that
Govcrnm nt would not take any drastic action. He thought that he
would have enough time after th e A.I.C.C. mee ting to prepare a
programme of work and gradually build up the tempo of the
mov(' mcnt. I could not share his optimism. On 28 July, I wrote
a d tailed 1' Her to him in which I said that the Government was
fully prepared and would take immediate action after the Bombay
meeting of the A.I.C.C. Gandhiji replicd that I should not draw any
hasty conclusions. H also was studying the situation and he still
belicv d that a way out might be found.
On 3 Augu t, 1 left Calcutta for Bombay. I was not absolutely
sur but I had a premonition that I was leaving Calcutta for a long
time. I had also received some reports that the Government had
completed it plans and proposed t<> arrest all the leaders immediately
after the re olution was passed.
Th Working Committee met on 5 August and prepared a draft
r olution which w s pI c d b fore the A.I.C.C. on the 7th. In my
opening r marks, I gav a bri fsurvey of the d veIoproent since the
1 t m ting of th ommilte. I also explained at some length the
which h d led the Working Committee to change its attitude
and call upon the nation to launch a truggle for India's freedom.
I point d ut th t the nation could Jlot watch passiv Iy while its fate
hung in th baJanc . India had ught to co-operate with the demo-
Tacie but the British Government made it impossible to offer
honourabl co-operation. Faced with the imminence of Japanese
invasion the nation was se king to gain strength to resist the aggres-
sor. The Briti h oould, if they wished, withd~w from Il\(Ii" as the
Plan to Arrest All Congress Leaders
had withdrawn from Singapore, Malaya and Burma. Indians could
not withdraw as it was their own homeland and must therefore
develop the strength to shak off the British chain and withstand
any attack by any new aggressor.
Except a handful of communists who opposed the mov<', all mem-
bers of the AJ.C.C. welcomed the resolution draft d by th Working
Committee. Gandhiji also address d the meeting, and aftcr two nays'
discussions, a resolution endorsingthestand of the Working ommittee
was passed with an overwhelming majority lat on th vt'ning ofB
August. The text of the resolution will be found in the Appendix.
During my visits to Bombay I generally sta.yed with thc late Bhula-
bhai Desai. I did so on this occasion as well. He was then ill and
had been unwell for some time. I was ther lore a little surpris d
when on my return after the meeting of the A.I.e.C., J found he was
waiting for me. It was very late and I was tired and thought that he
must have retired. I gently admonished him for staying up so late,
but he told me that Mohammed Taher, one of my relations, who had
his business in Bombay, had called for m and waited a long time.
When I did not return, h e had left a message with Bhulabhai Drsai.
Mohammad Taher had a friend in the Bombay Police and had learnt
from him that all the Congress leaders would be arrest dearly n xt
morning. Taher's friend also told him that he did not know it for
certain but it was reported that we would all be transported out of
India, perhaps to South Africa.
I had heard similar rumours in Calcutta before I lrft. Lat r I came
to know that the rumour was not without foundation. Wh n the
Government decided that w should all be arrest d, th Yalso thought
that it would not be politic to keep us in the country. In fact, ap-
proach s had been made to the Government of South Africa. Ther
must have been some last-minute hitch, for later th decision Wa!
changed. We soon found out that the Government had planned that
Gandhiji should be detained at Poona while the rest of u should b
imprisoned in the Ahmednagar Fort Jail.
Bhulabhai was greatly disturbed by this news and that is why he
was waiting for me. I was very tired and in no mood to luten to such
rumours. I told Bhulabhai that if the news was tru , 1 h only
few hours of freedom. It was better that I shouJd have my dinner
quickly and go to sleep SO that I could face the morning better. I
would rather sleep than spend my few hours offreedom in Ipeculat-
ing about rumours. Bliulabhai agreed and soon I lay down to sleep.
 India Wins Freedom
1 hav always b en in the habit of waking very early. This morning
also I got up at 4- a.m. I was however still very tired and had a feeling
of h aviness in my h ad. I took two aspirins and a cup of tea and
settled dawn to work. It had been decided that we should send a
copy of th resolution we had passed along with a covering letter to
Presid nt Roosevelt. We felt that this was the least we could do in
vi w of th interest he had been taking in the question of Indian
freedom. I began to draft a letter to President RoosevcJt but could
not finish it. Perhaps because I was tired or perhaps because of the
aspirin, I again felt drowsy and lay down to sleep.
I do not think I could have slept for more than fifteen minutes
wh n I felt someone touch my ~ et. I opened my eyes and found
Dhirubhai Desai, son of Bhulabhai, standing wih a sh et of paper
in his hand. I knew what itwaseven before Dhirubhai told me that the
Deputy Commissioner of Police, Bombay had brought this warrant
for my arrest. H also told me that the D puty Commission r was
wailing in th verandah. I told Dhirubhai to inform th Depu ty
ommi ion r that I would take a littl time to get ready.
I had my bath and then dr ssed. I also gave the nec ssary in-
slru lions to my Private Secretary, Mohammad Ajmal Khan, who
had by now join d me. I th n came out on th verandah. Bhula-
bhai and his daughter-in-law were talking with the Deputy Com-
mi sioner. I smiled at Bhulabhai and said that the information his
fri nd brought last v ning had proved correct. I th n turned to the
D pUly Commissioner and said 'I am ready.' It was then 5 a.m.
I g t into th D puty Commission e's car. A second car picked
up my b I ngings and follow d us. We drove straight to the Victoria
Terminus. It was time for the local trains but the station was com-
plet Iy mpty. P rhaps all trains and passengers had b n temporari-
Jy topp d. soon as I got down from the car, I aw Asoka Mehta.
H 1 had b n acre ted and brought to the Victoria Terminus.
I r liz d th t th Gov mm nt h d rr t d not only the members
orth W rking ommitte but also locall aders of the Congress in
B mbay. I umed thatthis being done throughout India. There
w a train waiting on the pJ tform to which I was brought. An
ngine w th n tt chjng a dining car to the train. It was a corridor
train whi u ually ran on the Bombay-Poon line. I was taken
to mp tm t wher I t down by the window.
m t immediately J wah rlal. Asaf Ali and Dr Syed Mahmud
ppeared on the scene. Jawaharlal told me that Gandhiji had abo
Talk with Gandhiji 85
been brought to the station and put in another compartm nt.
European Military Offic r came up to us and asked if we wantrd tea.
I had already had my cup but ord red some more.
At this stage a second Military Officer appeared and beg. n to
count us. Something was obviously puzzling him, for h counted
us several times. As he came up to our compartment, h said aloud
'Thirty'. When this had happened twice or thrice, I rrsrond d
equally loudly and said 'Thirty-two'. This seemed to confus him
furth r and he started to count once again. Soon, however, thr guard
blew his whistle and the train startrd to move. I noticrd Mrs A,af
Ali standing on the platform. She had com to sec her husband ofT.
As the train started to move, she looked at mr, and said, 'Plea,e
don't worry about me, I shall find som thing to do and shall not
remain idle.' Later ('vents showrd that she had meant what sh said.
I have already said that ours was a corridor train, Mrs Naidu now
came to our compartment and said that Gandh iji wantd to m~et
us. We walked down the corridor to his compartment whi h w
some distance away. Gandhiji was looking very d pressed. I have
nev r se n him looking so drjrctcd. I understood that he had not
expected this sudden arrest. H is reading of th e situ lion had b~ en
that the Government would take no drastic action. I had of course
warn d him again and again that he was laking lOO o;llimistic a view
but obviously he had placed greater faith in his own judgm: nt.
Now that his calculations had proved wrong, he was uncertain
as to what h e should do.
After we had talked for a minut or two, Gandhiji said, 'A. soon
as you reach your destination, you should inform the Government
that you wish to continue to function as Congress President. You
should ask for your Private Secretary and other necessary C cilities
for the purpose. When you were alT sted last time and detained in
Naini Jail, the Government had provided you with these facilities.
You hould ask for the same faciliti es again, and if necessary make
an issue of j t.'
I could not agree with Gandhiji. I told him that the lituation now
was completely different. We had cho en our path with open yel
and mwst take the consequ nccs. I could understand if he wanted
me to fight on the issuf's which had been adopted by Congr , but
did not see how I could fight on a minor' sue like the ext nsion of
certain penonal facilities to me. I did not think that I would be
justified in asking that my Private Secreta.ri should be allowed to be
7
86 India Wins Freedom
with me so that I might carry on Congress work. This was hardly
an issue on which I could fight in the present situation.
While we were talking the Police Commissioner of Bombay, who
also was in the train with us, came up. He asked us to return to our
own compartment. He told me that only Mrs Naidu could stay
with Gandhiji. Jawaharlal and I then returned to our compartment.
The train was now moving fast towards Kalyan. I t did not stop
th r but took th route for Poona. I thought that perhaps we would
b d tain d th re, and my belief became stronger wh n the train
stopped.
I t sec mcd tha t th e news of our arrest had somehow reached Poona.
The pla tform was full of police and no member of the public was
allow( d on it. There was how vcr a large crowd on the overbridge.
As th e train st<.'a m d in, they started to shout 'Mahatma Gandhi
ki Jai'. No sooner was this slogan raised than the Commissioner
ordered the police to make a lathi charge on the people. The
ommi sionr r said that he had r ceived Government orders that no
dt monstrations or slogans would be permitted. .
J aw. harlal was sitting by th window. As soon as h e saw that the
poli t ' Wl'r making a lathi charge, h jumped out of the compart-
ml'nt and rushed forward crying, 'You have no right to make a
I thi charg.' The Police Commissioner ran after him and tried
to bring J awaharlal back into his compartment. Jawaharlal would
not how 'v r list n to him and spoke angrily. By this time, another
memb r of th Working Committee, Shankar Rao Deo, had also
com out on th platform. Four policemen surrounded him and
ask d him to r turn to the train. When he refused to do so, they
lin d him up bodily and carried him back. I called out to J awahar-
lal that he should r tum. Jawaharlallooked angry but carried out my
r quest. The Police Commission r came up to me and said two or
thr tim , 'I am ver), sorry sir, but these are my orders and I must
cnrry them out.'
From my window I saw that Mrs Naidu and Gandhiji were taken
out of the train. We later learnt that they w r detain d in the ga
Kh n's hou e. popularly known as Aga Khan Palace. Another
art' t d man from Bomb y who had al 0 got down wanted to go
out on the pi tform, but the Polk pre ent d him. He would not
d i t till th potie physically stopped him. I beli he was trying
to at. tcording to Gandhiji's instructions. It will be remembered
that Gandhiji had said th t on the occasion of the present movement,
In Ahmednagar Fort
nobody should court arrest voluntarily. It was only when physical
force was applied that men should agree to go to pri on.
After Gandhiji had been taken away, the train again started to
move. I now realiz d we were being taken to Ahm dnagar. We
reached the station at about 1.30 p.m. The platform wa compl t ly
empty except for a handful of police officen and a singl army officer.
We were asked to get down and were put in waiting COlI'S. They
started immediately and did not stop till w arrived allh gate within
the Fort. An army officer was standing there. The ornmissioner of
Police brought out a list and handed it to him. The army officer
call'd out our names one by one and asked us to 'nter. The Polic
Commissioner was in fact handing us over to the milit ryauth rill s.
From now on we were under military control.
 AHMEDNAGAR FORT JAIL
I N E other members of the Working Committee were brought

N to Ahmednagar with me viz.,]awaharlal, Sardar Patel, Asaf

Ali, Shankar Rao Dco, Govind Ballabh Pant, Dr Pattabhi
Sitaramayya, Dr Sycd Mahmud, Acharya Kripalani and Dr Profulla
Gh sh. Rajcn Babu was also a m mber of the Working Committee
but as he did not attend the meeting at Bombay he was arrested
in Patna and dctained there.
We were taken inside the Fort and brought to a building which
looked lik a military barrack. There was an open courtyard about
200 fect long surrounded with rooms. We learnt lat r that foreign
prisoners had b en k pt ht're during the First World War. A jailor
from P ona was transfi rr d who checked our luggage as it was
brought in. I had a small portable radio which I always carried
with me. My oth r b longings were scnt in but the radio was
tnk n into custody and I did not see it again till my release.
Dinner wa serv d to u soon aft r on iron platters. We did not
lik them and I told the jailor that we were accustomed to eat from
china plates. The jailor apologiz d and said that he could not
supply us with a dinn r-set then but it would be obtained next
day. A convi t from Poona had been brought to serve us as our
cook. H could not prepare food according to our taste. He was
soon chang d but the new cook was no b tter.
Th plac of our d t ntion was kept a s cret. This seem d to me
foolish, for it was obvious that th e fact could not be concealed
for long. The Government action did not howe er surprise me.
P rhaps all Gov mments act fooli hJy on such occasions. After two
or three days, the Inspector-G neral of Prison Bombay came to
vi it us. He told us that Government orden were that we could
not writ v n to our r lations nor receive letters from them. Nor
hould we be upplicd with any newspapers. He was very apologetic
nd .d th t these were strict orden which he had to carry out.
 Gardening Our Hobby 89
He would, however, be glad to meet any oth r request that we might
make.
I was not well when I left Calcutta for Bombay on 3 August.
r was suffering from influenza ev n during th e m 'cting of the
A.I.e.C. and this fact was known to the Government. Th In pector-
General was a physician and wanted to examine me. I did not
however agree.
We wer completely cut off from the world and did not know what
was happening outside. We felt that we must draw out a programme
of activi ti es in order to maintain our h ealth and spi rits. A~ I have
said, the rooms were arranged round a quadrangle. I occupied th
first room in one line. The n xt was occupied by J awaharlal and
, the third by Asaf Ali and Dr Syed Mahmud. Th:; last room of lhi
line was our dining-room. We us 'd to me et for br akfast a t eight
in th morning and for our midday meal at 'leven. Aft ' rward we
mct in my room and discussed various topics for a coupl ' of hours.
Then we had a little rest and met again for tea at four. After Ie we
took some exercise in the quadrangle. Dinn r was served at eight
and we used to carry on our discussions till ten. Then we r tired
to our rooms.
The quadrangle was quite bare when we came. Jawaharlal pro-
posed that we should prepare a flower garden as this would k p
, us occupied and also b eautify the place. We w learned the id a
nd asked the Superintendent to write to Poona for seeds. We then
prepared the ground for flower beds. J awaharlal took the leading
role in this. We planted some thirty or forty kinds of seeds, watered
them every day and cleaned the beds. As the plants b gan to sprout,
we watched their growth with fascinated interest. When the flowers
started to bloom, the compound became a place of beauty and joy.
After w had been in the jail for about five days, an officer appeared
who, we learnt, had been appointed Superintendent oftheJ ail to look
after us. He stayed in the town, came every morning at 8 a.m. and
left in the evening. We did not know his name and thought we must
find a name for him. I remembered that when Chand Bibi was
d tained in this very jail, she had an Abyssinianjailor called Cheeta
Khan. I suggested that we should give the &arne name to our
Superintendent. My coUeagues readily agreed. The name became
10 popular that very soon everybody started calling him Cheet
Khan. I was surprised when three or four days later the jailor came
and told us that Cheeta Khan had left early that day.
go India Wins Freedom
Chc ta Khan, as I shall call him, had been in Port Blair when the
Japanese attacked and occupied the Andaman Islands.
On 25 August, I wrote a lett r to the Viceroy. I said that
I did not complain that the Government thought it necessary to
arrest my colleagues and me. I had, however, a complaint about the
tr 'atmcnt meted to us. Even convicted criminals arc allowed to
correspond with their ncar r lations. In our case this right had been
deni d. I wrote that I would wait for two weeks and if we had no
satisfactory reply from the Government, my colleagues and I would
decide what should be our course of action.
On 10 Sept mber, Ch eta Khan came and said that he had
r ' cciv d ord rs that we could correspond once a week with our
r lations. Wc w re also to be supplied with one newspap r a"
day. A copy of the Times oj India was plac d on my table and
from now on we rceeiv d it regularly. That night I read the paper
for a long time. We had b en without any news for over a month.
Now at last we came to know of the events in the country after our
arrest and about lh progress of the war.
Next day I ask d Ch eta Khah to send me the back numbers of
the newspaper. Now that Gov rnment had agr ed to supply us
with newspap rs regularly, there could be no obj ction to my
proposal. Ch ta Khan agreed with m and after two or three days
sent me a complete file of the Times oj India from the date of my
arr st.
As I r ad the reports, I realized that my reading of the situation
th t th r would be disturbances in the country after our arrest
had proved correct. B ngal, Bihar, U.P. and Bombay had taken the
lead in the struggle against the Government. Communications had
b n disrupt d and fa tori s closed down. Police stations were
raided and burnt. Railway tatio had been attacked and in some
s d stroy d. Military lorri had Iso been burnt in large num-
b ctorie h d closed down and production of w r materials
uspended or r duced. In word, the country had reacted violently
to the leonine violence of the Govemm nt. The mo ement was not
confined to non-violent resistance. Thi was wh t I had anticipated
and to orne extent e en dvised and di cu cd with our workers.
The rem .ning month of 1942, P d without any major incident.
E ly in 1943, ther w again change in th tmosphere. In
F bruary we r d in lh ne" p pe th t Gandhiji had written to
the' ic roy th t be would undertake. f1 t for twenty-on days. He
Gandhiji's Fast 91
described it as a fast for self-purification. I was convinced that
Gandhiji was prompted to take this step for two main reasons. As
I have said earlier, he had not expected that Government would
arrest the Congr ss leaders so suddenly. He had also ho d that
he would get time to develop the mov mcnt on non-violent lines
according to his own ideas. Both his hop shad b en shattered. He
ace pted the responsibility for what had happened and as w
usual with him, he was planning to undergo the fast as an xpiation
for the situation. I could not see any sense in his fast on any other
hypothesis.
The Government however look d at his action from an ('ntir ly
different point of view. They thought that h could not at his ag
and in the xisting state of his h aIth stand a fast for twenty- llC
days. To undertake th fast was in thei r vi w to court c rtain death.
The Government thought that this was Gandhiji's intention and h
wanted the Gov rnment to be held r sponsible for his d ath. L ter
we learnt that the Governm nt made all n c ssary arrangl" men ts on
this basis. Convinced that he would not surviv' the fast, lh('y v'n
brought sandalwood for his cremation. Thei r reaction was th t if
Gandhiji wanted to place the responsibility of his d ath on the
Government, Government would not change their policy on that
account. His last rites would be performed within the Aga Khan
Palace where he was held and his ashes deliver d to his sons.
Dr B. C. Roy wrote to the Government that he want d to act
as Gandhiji's physician during the period of his fast. To this the
Government raised no objection. At one stage during the fast it
seemed that Government's calculations were going to prove correct.
Even his physicians gave up hope. Gandhiji, however, upset aU the
calculations of the Government and his physicians. The extra-
ordinary capacity for suffering he had shawn on other occasions was
displayed in an amazing degree. His stamina overcame the challenge
of death and after twenty-one days he broke hi fast.
After the excitement of Gandhijj's fast, we again settled down to
our daily routine. During the period of his nut, we had felt acut ly
our utter helplessness in captivity. This came to me with added
poignancy in the course of the next year.
For several years my wife had been unwell. When r w in Naini
Jail in 1941, her condition had become very serio . Wh. I was
released, 1 consulted doctors and they advised a change. She went
to llanchi and returned only in July 194~. She was then somewhat
 India Wins Freedom
better but wh n I started for Bombay in the first week of August,
h'r health was again causing anxiety. Thc news of my arrest on
9 August must hay come as a great shock to her and h r health,
which was a lready frail, took a turn for the worse. One of my greatest
worries during imprisonment was the reports of her deteriorating
health. Early in 1944, I rec ived news from home that she was again
seriously ill. Lat ' r came more alarming news. H r physicians were
worri d about her and on th ir own initiative wrot to the Govern-
m nt that I should be allowed to sec her once as there was little hope
for h r survival. Covcmm nt ignored this Ie tter from the physicians.
I also wrote to the Viceroy but our correspondence was inconclusive.
0 .. day in April CheCla Khan came in the middle of the day.
This was most unusual. He said nothing and handed me a telegram.
It was in cypher but there was an Eng iish transcript. It was from
Calcutta and said that my wife was dead. I wrote to the Viceroy
that the Government of India could easi ly have arranged for my
transfer to Calculla on a temporary basis so that I could have seen
my wife b fore sh . di d. To this letter I r 'c ivrd no reply.
Aftn thr months, fate had another shock in store for me. My
sister Abru B(gum who Ii d in Bhopal [< 11 ill. In about two weeks
time I heard that she abo was dead.
About this time w sudd nly r ad in the pap rs that Gandhiji
was r leased. I am inclin d to think that he did not him.~ If realize
th r 'o.sons for this. He seem d to hav thought that he owed his
fre dam to a change in British policy. Later events showed that he
was again wrong. His health had been shattered by the fast he
had undertak n. Since then h e had suffered from one ailment after
another. The Civil Surg on of Poona examined him and reported
that he was not lik ly to survi e for long. The fast had been beyond
hi capacity and the Civil Surg on f It that his days were numbered.
When til Vic roy r c i d this r port, h e d cided to release him so
that the Government would not b e h eld responsible for his death.
B sides, the political situation h d chang d so much that the British
did not anticipate any danger from him. The crisis of the war was
over. Alii d victory was now only a qu stion of time. The Govern-
ment Iso felt th t with all the leaders of the Congress in jail.
Gandhiji alone could do little. On the contrary his presence might
act as a check on elements which were trying to adopt violent means.
For orne time after his fele c. Gandhiji was too ill to take any
dfi live step. He was for some months under treatment but as soon
 Gandhiji's Political Moves 93
as he felt a litlle better, he initiat d a number of political mov .
Two of th ' ID des rve sp cial mention. Gandhiji mad a fresh
attcmpt for an understanding with the Muslim League and arrang d
to mer t Mr Jinnah. His second move was an attempt to open
fresh negotiation wi th the Government. ontrary to his pr 'viou
declarations, he now issued a statement to th' N.ws Chronicle of
London that if Ind ia wcre declared fr , he w uld voluntarily ide
with the British and gi e full support to the war effort. I wa
completely taken aback when I r('ad his statements and kn w that
both these actions W('re doom cd to failure.
I think Gandhiji's approach to Mr Jinnah on thi occasion was
a great political blunder. It gave a ncw and added importan (' I
Mr Jinnah which he later xploited to thc full. Gandhiji had in
fact adoptcd a peculiar attitude to Jinnah from the very brginning.
Mr Jinnah had lost much of his political importan aft'r he
left th Congress in the twentil's. It was largely due to Gandhiji's
acts of commission and omission that Mr Jinnah regain d his impor-
tance in Indian political life. In fact, it is doubtful if Mr Jinnah
could ever have achieved supremacy but for Gandhiji's auitud .
Large sections offndian Musalmans were doubtful about Mr Jinnah
and his policy, but when th y found that Gandhiji was continually
running after him and entreating him, many of them developed
a new respect for Mr J;nnah. They also thought that he was
}Jerhaps the best man for getting advantag ous terms in th com-
munal settlement.
I may mention here that it was Gandhiji who first gave currency
to the title 'Qaid-i-Azam', or great leader, as applied to Mr Jinnah.
Gandhiji had in his camp a simple but well-intentioned woman call d
Miss Amtus Salam. She had seen in some Urdu papers a reli renee
to Mr Jinnah as Qaid-i~Azam. When Gandhiji was writing to
Mr Jinnah asking for an int rview, she told him thal Urdu papen
called Mr Jinnah Q aid-i-Azam and he should use the sam form of
addrc . Without pausing to consider the implications of his action
Gandhiji addressed Mr Jinnah as Qaid-i-Azam. Thil letter w
lOOn after publi hed in the pre . When Indian Musalmaru aw
that Gandhijl also addr d Mr Jinnah as Qaid-i-Azant. they felt
that he must really be so. When in July 1944, I read th report
that Gandhiji was corresponding with ir Jinnah and going to
Bombay to meet him, I told my colleagues that Gandhiji was making
a great mistake. His action ~ould not help to solve, but on the
94 India Wins Freedom
contrary aggravate the Indian political situation. Laterevcnts proved
that my appr hensions were correct. Mr Jinnah exploited the situa-
tion fully and built up his own position but did not say or do anything
which could in any way help the cause ofIndian freedom.
Gandhiji's second step in approaching the Government was also
ill-lim d. It will be recalled that when hostilities began, I had tried
hard to persuade Congress to take a r alistic and positive attitude
towards the war. Gandhiji at that time had taken the stand that
political independence of India was no doubt important but adher-
ence to non-violence was even more important. His declared policy
was that if the only way of achieving Indian independence was to
participate in the war, he for one would not adopt it. Now he said
that Congress would co-operate with th e British if India was
d 'elared fre . This was a complete reversal of his earlier views and
caused misunderstanding in India and abroad. The Indians were
confus d, while the impression created in Britain was still more
unhappy. Many Englishmen thought that Gandhiji had r [rained
from helping the British when the issue of war was in doubt. In this,
howev r, th y were wrong, for the issue of the war had no influence
on Gandhiji's views. They therefore interpr ted his present offer of
support as an att mpt to gain British sympathy now that the victory
of the Allies was assured. In consequence they did not pay the
att ntion to hi o~ r which he had expected . Besides, the British were
no longer so much in need of Indian support as they had been in the
carli r days of the war. This also contributed to their indiffer nee
to Gandhiji's move.
Now when I am writing in 1957 and looking at events in r trospect,
1 cannot r frain from saying that there was an astonishing trans-
formation in the attitude of some of his clo est followers on the
qu lion of viole nee v rsus non-violence. Sartiar Patel, Dr Rajendra
Pro d, Acbarya KripaJani and Dr Profulla Gho b had wanted
to resign from the Working Committee when the Congress passed
olution th t it would support the war effort if the .British
d elared Indi free. They then wrote to me that for them non-
viol nee w cr ed and even more important than Indian indepen-
denc . Wh n,how ver,Indiadidbecomefreein1947notoneofthem
aid th t the Indian army should be di banded. On the contrary,
th y irui ted th t the Indian army should be partitioned and brought
under the immediate control of the Gov rnment ofIndia. This was
contrary to the prop I made by the Commander-in-Chic:f of the
CD' Day 95
time. The Commander-in-Chief had suggested that for thrc yean
there should be a joint army and a joint command but they would
not agree. Unon-violence was really their crt' cd, how was it possible
for them to take responsibility in a Gov rnm nt which sp nt over
a hundred crores a year on th army? In fact, sam of th m want d
to increase and not diminish th xpenditurc on armed fore and
today the expenditure i som' two hundr d ror s.
I have always had the fecling that th se coil ague and friends
did not exercise their own minds on most politi al issu s. Th y w re
out-and-out followers of Gandhiji. When ver a qu slion aro th y
waited to see how he would react. I was not and I am not b 'hind any
of them in my regard and admiration for Gandhiji but 1 could not
for a moment accept the position that we should follow him blindly.
It is strange that th issu ' on which th se fri nds wantcd to r sign
from the Working Committ in 1940 compl tely ('scap 'd their
notice after India became frcc. They cannot for a mom nt thiJlk
of running the Government of India without an army and a large
defenc establishment. Kor have they ruled out war as an instrument
of policy. Jawaharlal was the only member of the Working om-
mittee who fully shared my views. I believe that \h logic of v n
has supported his stand and mine.
InJune 1944, we read reports about CD' Day. This was th turning
point of the war. The AlIi d victory was now certain and in sight.
The world also realized that the great 5t personality thrown up
during the war was Presid nt Roosevelt. It se m d that hi pietu
of the future was being st adily justified. In both Africa and Asia, the
Allied forces had triumphed and were now marching on Hitl r',
European citadel. This was no surprise to m . I had long h Jd that
as in World War I, this time also Germany had committ d the blund-
er of fighting on two front!. In fact the day Hit! r d cid d to tl ck
the U.S.S.R., he owed the seed of his downfall. There was now no
escape from ruin for him or his people.
An unexpected incident took place in our camp about thi time.
Cheeta Khan came one day and said that he had rec iv d orders
for Dr Syed Mabmud's release. We were aU surpris d for we could
not understand why he was singled out for such tr attn nt.
Some months ago, there had been the ri k ofa chol ra epid mic in
Ahmedoagar. Cheeta Khan advi ed us to be inocul ted gailUt
the disease. Five of us-Jawaharlal, Pattabbi Sitaramayy , f
Ali, Dy Syed Mabm.ud and I-acted according to hi advice. Four
96 India Wins Freedom
others-Sardar Patel, Acharya Kripalani, Shankar Rao Deo and
Dr Profulla Ghose-refused on grounds of conscience. I had a touch
off, ver as a reaction but it seemed Dr Mahmud had an allergy to the
inoculation He had unusually high and persistent fever for almost
a fortnight. We were all worried about him and Jawaharlal with his
customary fri ndliness acted as his nurse and mentor. Finally the
Ii 'ver left him but he continued to ble d from his gums. He was
under Checta Khan's treatment and had almost r covered when
th order for his release cam. His illn ss could not therefore be
sufficient ground for his release. We thought that perhaps it meant
a change in Gov'mmcnt's policy. 1 hey were now prepared to act
mor I 'niently and had r leas d Dr Syed Mahmud on the grounds
of h altho I later came to know the r al reason, but after the lapse
of so many years, I do not think it necessary to go into the details
of this unhappy incident.
Though w . did not know it for certain, we felt that the days of our
imprisonment were also drawing to a close. Some tim in the latter
half of 1944, the Gov mment ofIndia came to the conclusion that
il was no long r necessary to detain us in Ahmednagar. We had been
tak n there for s v ral reasons. Government had thought that our
d t nlion there would remain a secret. They also thought that if
we w rc k pt in a Civil jail, we might be able to establish contact
with thc world outside. Detention under military control would
prev nt this. In Ahm dnagar camp jail, ther were only European
rmy men and th y would sur ly prevent any communication with
the out id world. We had vidence of the Governm nt's anxiety to
block physical contacts with the world outside as soon as we arrived
at Ahmednagar. The barracks in which we w rc kept had skylights
through which onc could see the compound ofthc Fort. These were
completely blo ed b fore we w re brought there. The plaster was
o new thal it wa still damp when we arrived. During our
d l nlion in Ahmednagar we hardly ever saw an Indian from out-
3. y ars'

id . Once or twic orne small repairs had to be undertaken to the

buildings. Ev n for this no Indian I bour was used. We were thu
complcl Iy cut off from the world.
The Go rnment h d ucceeded in preventing any contacts with
the out ide world but their first objecti e had failed. The public
)me\ within we Ie. of our arrival that we were 11 held in Ahmed-
It gar Fort jail. By no the need for secrecy had also gone. British
victory \ now in sight. The Govemment of India therefore felt
Transfer to Civil Jails 97
that it was no longer necessary to keep us in this military pri on
and we could safely be transferred to the Civil jails in our own
provinces.
Sardar Patel and Shankar Rao Dca wer the first to mov and
went to Poona jail. Asaf Ali was sent to Batala where political
prisoners from Delhi werc generally held. J awaharlal was taken first
to Naini near Allahabad and then to Almora. As hI.' was leaving,
Jawaharlal said that perhaps the time of our releasr was approach-
ing. He requestrd me that I should not call a mrcting of the Working
Committee or the A.I.C.C. immcdiately on release. Hl' s. id h
want d a little time for rest and recreation, and also in ordrr to finish
a book on India which he was writing.
I told Jawaharlal that this was also what I would likr to do. I
too wanted a little time for rest and rccup('ration. I did nOt thrll
know that we should be frerd in circumstances which would drmand
immrdiate and hrctic political action and that no question of rcst
would arise for pcrhaps the remainder of our lives.
When the time for my transfer came, Chc ta Khan said thaI
since I was not well, Calcutta with its damp climat would not be a
suitable place for me. He hinted that I should b s nt to a dri r
place within Bengal. One afternoon he asked me to get ready. After
my things had been placed in the car, h e drove me, not to thr Ahmed-
nagar Station, but to a village station several miles away. Th rrason
was that if! trav Bed from Ahmednagar, th fact would immediately
be known. The Government did not want any publicity ab ut my
movem nts.
Most of the time I sp nt in the Ahm dnagar jail was pass d und r
conclitions of great mental strain. This had a very adverse {feet
on my health. When I was arrested, my weight was 170 Ibs. When
I was transferr d from Ahmednagar I was reduced to 130 Ibs. I h d
no appetite and could hardly eat.
A C.I.D. Inspector from Bengal had come with four constables to
escort me, When we reached the station, Gheeta Khan hand d me
over to their charge. W travelled from Ahmednagar to A ansol via
Kalyani. At Asansol, I was taken to the r tiring room, wh r special
arrangements had been made for me. In spite of ov mm nt',
attempt to keep the whole matter secret, the Pre S IOmt:how got
bold of the news. I found in Asamol some Pr reporters from
Calcutta and some friends from Allahabad. A crowd of local people
had also collected.
98 India Wills Freedom
Thr Sup rintrnd nt of Police, Asansol received me at the station
and mad a personal appeal. H e said that if I wanted to meet the
public, he could not stop me but if I did so, the Government would
come down heavily on him. He would therefore be very grateful if
I agre 'd to go upstairs to a room and avoided the public. I assured
him that r did not want to harm him or make him the subject of
th Gov rnmcnt's dispkasure. Accordingly I went with him to an
upstairs room.
The Superintendent of Polic was a connexion of the Nawab of
Dacca. Both he and his wife attended me and his wife insisted that
I should sign an autograph book. Th y did ev rylhing to make me
comfortable.
I now learnt that I was bing taken to Bankura. The train came
to lh platform at about 4 p.m. and soon after I was brought to my
compartm nL By now a huge crowd had collect d on the platform.
Apart from the local people, many had come from Calcutta, Allaha.
bad and Lucknow. The Superintendent of Police and his Inspector
s m d to be very anxious that I should not meet anybody. The sun
was v ry hot and they had brought an umbrella for me. The Inspec-
tor h Id it but in his anxiety to hide m from the crowd, he brought
it down lower and low r till it rested almost on my head. His object
was that the people should not see my face. He thought that in this
way th y could tak m to the compartment without attracting notice.
I had no sp cial desire to meet anyon , but when I saw that people
had com from Calcutta, Allahabad and Lucknow only to see me,
I thought it was very unfair that they should not get even a glimpse.
r th r for took the umbr lin from the rnspector and closed it. The
people now ran towards mc, but I asked them to stop. It was obvi-
ously impos ible for m to greet everyone individually, but I spoke
to th m g n rally and laughingly said, 'The Superintendent of Police
, nd th Inspector are getting more and more worried very moment
nd I do not want th m to g t a h adacbe on this hot day.'
Aft r w ving to the peopl J I got into my compartment but the
crowd surg d all round. Ap rt from the people on the platform,
quite 1. rg number cro d the line and cam to my compartment
from th oth r id . Soon the tr in left and by seven we reached
B nkura. Th Sup rint ndent of Police, Bankura and other officers
ree ived m and scort d me to a two-storeyed bungalow outside
the town.
It was the beginning of April and the days were getting warm,
Orders for Our Release 9
When, however, I sat on th verandah of the first floor, I felt the
pleasant evening breeze play on my face. Mornings and v lungs
were not too bad, but during the day it grew very hot. I had an el c-
tric fan and ice was also available but it was so hot at midday that
th y were of little use. The Coli ctor used to visit m once a we k.
One day he said that he had already written to the Gov rnment that
I could not stay in Bankura any longer. H e was waiting for a rt"ply
and would send me to a cooler place as soon as this was r c ived.
A good cook is always difficult to find. In Bankura also th r wa
some difficulty in the b ginning, but soon a good cook was engaged.
I liked his work so much that after my release, I brought him with
me to Calcutta.
I have already mentioned that when r entered Ahmednagar Fort,
my radio set was taken away from me. After a few days, h La
Khan had asked me ifhe could use it. I gladly gave him p nnission,
but I did not see that radio again till I left Ahmednagar. When I
was being transferred to Bengal, the radio set was placed among my
luggage. When I tri d to use it, r found it had gone outof order. The
District Magistrate of Bankura supplied me with anoth r stand
after so long a time I could hear directly the news from oth r
countries.
Towards the end of April, I learnt from Pr S5 r ports that af
Ali was very seriously ill in Batala jail. H was unconscious for a
long period and there was apprehension for his lifi. Govc:rnm nt
decided to rel ase him and return him to D Ihi.
In May 1945, Lord Way 11 went to London to have further
discussions on the Indian political situadon. Towards the nd of
May, he r turned to India. One evening inJune, r was listening to
the D lhi broadcast when I heard that the Vic roy had d elared that
in accordance with earlier British assurances, fr sh at ps would be
taken to solve the Indian political problem. A confer nee would be
held at Simla to which leaders of the Congress, the M uslim League
and other political parties were to be invited. The President and
Members of the Working Committee would b reI as d 0 that on-
gre could participat in that conferenc .
The n xt day I heard that orden had be n pass d for my and
my colleagues' release. I heard th.is n ws at about 9 p.m. The D.i.c-
triet Magistrate also heard the broadcast and sent m a m age at
10 p.m. that although h had hard the n WI, he had not recejv d
any official order. He would inform me a soon as this w received.
100 India Wins Freedom
Accordingly at midnight, the jailor came and informed me that
ord rs of release had come. No action could be taken at this late hour
and the District Magistrate came to see m e early next morning. He
read out the order ofrcIease and informrd me that the Calcutta Ex-
press left Bankura at 5 p.m. A first class coupe was bei ng reserved for
mc- on this train.
Within a few hour5, Press correspondents from Calcutta arrived
to mcc t mC'. Local people also came in th ir thousands. At 3.30
that afternoon th > local Congress Committee organized a meeting
which I attend d and addressed bri efly. I left for Calcutta by the
Express and reach d H owrah next morning.
The platform and sta ti on a t Howrah wrr' a weitrr of humanity.
It was with th e greatest difficulty tha t I could ge t out of my com-
partment and nler my car. The President of th Bengal Congr ss,
Mrs Labanya Prabha Datta and several oth er local leaders WCre in
th e car with m . Just as we were about to move, I noticed th at th f' re
was a band rlaying in front of my car. I asked Mrs Datta why they
had brought a band. She replied that it was to cele brate my rei ase.
I did not lik this and told her that this was no occasion for fes tiviti s.
It is true that r was r ' I 'as d, but thousands of my fri ends and col-
leagues w -r still in jail.
Th b nd was stopp d and remov d at my rcqu st. A the car was
crossing th Howrah bridge, my mind moved back to days of th past.
r r m mb r d th day wh n three y ar ago I started for Bombay to
att nd th' me tings of th W orking ommitte and the A.I.C.C.
My witi had com e up to th e gate of my hous e to bid me far well. I
was now r turning aft r three y ar! but she was in her grave and
my home wa empty. I remembered the lines of Wordsworth:
'But she s in her grave and oh
The difference to me.'
I told my companions to turn the car, for 1 wished to visit her
gr ve b for I went hom. My car was full of garlands, I took one
and placed it on h er grave and silently r ad the Fauna.
 THE SIMLA CONFEREN E

F
R 0 M the very beginning of the war, Americall public opinion
had recognized that India's full 0-01 rration in lhl' war effort
would not be available without a solution o[thc Indian politi al
problem. They th refore pressed the British ovcrnm nt to grant
India her freedom. Aft r the Jap anese attack on Pearl Harbour, the
U.S.A. became directly involved in the war. President R 0 ev It
repeatedly raised the issu with hurchilJ, ane! p rhaps the British
felt that something must be done to me t American demands. When
the Cripps Mission came, the Overseas S rvic afllt B.B. '. br ad-
cast again and again that India now had an opportunity of winning
her freedom and d ciding ablJut the war fr Iy. A personal rtpresen-
tative of President Roosevelt had also come to India and brought me
a letter from him. In his letter, the Pr sid nt had expressed thr hope
that India would accept the Cripps offer and join th war on tit sid
, of the democracies. The Cripps Mission, however, fail d and the
situation remained as before.
When we were arrested in August 194-2, this creatrd an unfavour-
able reaction against the British in China and the U . .A. We did
not know it then but later learnt that the p ople had expressed strong
disapproval of the British action. In Washington, th S nate and
the House of Representatives discussed the matter and vrry strong
speeches were made.
As the war situation improved in Europe, the Americans r n wed
th ir pressure for the solution of the Indian political pr bl m. This
may have been one reason why Lord Wavell w nt to London in May
1945 to discuss with the S cretary of Stat the n t Itep in India.
It was then decided to convene a Round Table Confi rence. The
war in Europe was practically over in April, but the war in Asia
showed no sign of an early termination. Ja an was still in p 'on
"Cvaat territories and her homeland was practicaUy untouched. The
greater weight of American arms had till now been used in the
102 India Wins Freedom
European theatre of war with the r suit that there was as yet hardly
any sign of Japanese defeat. For the United States, the defeat of
Japan was howev r even more importan t than the defeat ofGennany.
That is why President Roosevelt made Marshal Stalin promise that
Russia would attackJ apan when war came to an end in Europe. The
Americans also realized that a Japanese defeat would become much
asier if the full support of India could be secured. Japan was in
occupation of Bunna, Singapore and Indonesia. In all these areas,
India could offer the greatest hrlp. Though Hitler had been crushed
in Europe, Indian o-operation was necessary for the early defeat
of Japan. This was one main reason why American pressure for
s curing Indian support was so rersistent.
Calcutta was at this time one ofth biggest centres of the American
anny in th East. As such, it was full of American Press correspondents
and army officers. Th y wer anxious to meet me after my re]case
and r r ceived some ofth m the day aft r I reach d Calcutta. With-
out beating about the bush, they came straight to the point. They
ask d me what would be the Congr S5 reaction to the offer brought by
the Viceroy. I replied thatI was not in a position to give adefinite reply
till I knew the details of the offer. So long as India was under the
political domination of the British, it was self-evident that she could
not f, el any enthusiasm for the war. How could a man who was bound
hand and foot Ii el enthusiasm to fight the enemy of those who tied him ?
Th y countered by asking wheth r the independence ofIndia had
not be n guaranteed by the Atlantic Charter.
I retort d that I had not s en the Charter and did not know wh re
and what jt was.
I added that they must be r ferring to the well-known statem nt
i ued by Pr sident Roo evelt after his discussions with Mr Churchill.
Th Pr id nt had said that aft r the war, all nations would be given
the opportunity to decide their future according to the principle of
If-d t rmination. When Mr Churchill w asked in Parliament
whether th future of India would be d cided on the basis of this
stat nt, he had emphatically and categorically said 'No'. He had
de lared not once but three times that never would the o-called
h rter b pplied to India and made it cJ aT that the President's
t tement had no application to India. When Mr Roo evelt's atten-
tion was drawn to Mr Churchill's reply, the President admitted that
their discussion had been oral and that there wu no fo~~ ~cord. I ~
would
!~
therefore be wrong to call it a Chartet'..;
."
Mr Amery's Statement 103
The American correspondents were not unaware of the e fa t .
They therefore only smiled when I asked them wher and what w
the Charter. There was one woman among th correspondents.
She asked me if my rhetorical question about the exi tence of the
Charter referred to the President's admission that there was no
written record of his understanding with Mr Churchill.
I said, 'Of course this is what I have in mind.'
The last question th correspondents asked was wh ther I would
support conscription for India if the Wavell oro'r was ac cpted by
the Congress.
I replied that if India was assured of her fre dom sh would join
the war voluntarily. Our first duty then would b to mobiliz tot, I
national effort and we would support onscription.
I reminded th correspond nts of a stat m r.t 1 had mad as arly
as 1940 as the President ofth Indian National Congress. I h d d cl r-
ed that if India's political problem was solv d, 5h would not only
join the war of her own free will but would also adopt conscription
and send every able-bodied young man to the war front. I had then
also said that our offer was not merely to live but also to die for demo-
cracy. It was a pity, I added, that the British did not give us even the
opportunity of dying with honour and my offer was not accepted.
On 14 June 1945, Mr L. S. Amery, Secretary of State for Indi
made a statement in the House of Commons in which he dcc1ar d
that full scope would b e given to India to decide about the war a
a free nation. Asked further whether the leaders of th Indian
National Congress wOlilld be allowed to run the Government, Mr
Amery said that he was asking the representatives of the Congre
and the Muslim League to fonn the Government. The Congres
would thus have full freedom to choose any representatives they
liked, incJuding Maulana Azad and Pandit Nehru.
This statement creat d the g nera! impression in India that at
last the Indian political problem was about to b e solved. The
people felt that there was no reason now why Congress should not
accept the offer. r started receiving hundreds oft legrams and letten
every day pressing me that Congress should accept the offer. When
I saw this atmosphere in the country I sent a brief tatement to the
Press. I pointed out that Congre had never avoided responsibility
but always welcomed it. If India were offered the opportunity of
guiding her own political and administrative destiny, I would make
eftry eB'ort to .ee that the challenge was accepted. I declared in
 India Wins Freedom
categorical terms that our approach was constructive and not
destructiv .
A day after my rei ase, I r ceived in Calcutta the Viceroy's invita-
tion to the Round Table Conference which was to be held at Simla
on 25 June. I replied that I had called a meeting of the Working
Committee to m et at Bombay on 21 June. The Working Committee
would consider his letter and nominate its representatives. I also
wrote to him that I would like to m et him before the Conference
and asked ifhe had any objection to the release of the correspondence
I had carried with him from the Ahmednagar Fort Jail.
My health was very poor at this time. I had lost more than forty
pounds and could hardly cat. I was also suffering from all-round
general weakness and fclt completely exhausted. Doctors advised
me that I should ask th Viceroy to postpone the Conference for at
I ast two wer ks. This would give me an opportunity for treatment and
r cup ration. I did not however consider it proper that I should
ask for the postponement of such a momentous meeting on grounds
of personal health.
I asked Humayun Kabir, a leading member of the Bengal Legisla-
tive Council, to act as my Secretary during the Simla Conference.
Thus began an association which has continued to this day. I sent
him ahead to Bombay with a message for Jawaharlal. I asked
Jawaharlal that he and I should meet first and decide on our line of
action b('fore the formal m ting of the Working Committee. Jawa-
harlal agreed with my suggestion and said that this was the course of
cbon he himself had in mind.
I r ach d Bombay on 21 June. As usual I stay d with Bhulabhai
D sai. It was the same room from which r was arrested on the morn-
ing of 9 August 1942. When I sat on the verandah and talked to
friends I could hardly b lieve that thr e y an had pa ed. I felt as
ifit was only ye t rday that I was talking to friends and that the in-
Gid nts since 9 August had never taken pI ceo The familiar surround-
ings and old friends were the same. The same Arabian Sea stretched
before me to the far horizon.
andhiji was taying in Birla House according to his usual custom
ad th meeting of the Working Committee was held there. I report-
d to the ommittee the invitation I had received to attend the
Simla onference. The Committee considered the letter and decid-
ed th t 1 hould be uthorized to repre ent the Congre at the Round
Tab! . Thi w conveyed to the Viceroy who made arrangements for
Great Welcome in Delhi
our journey from Bombay. He placed at my disposal an aeroplane
which flew me to Ambala. From there I drove up to Simla. I "'. Y
add that b fore I left Bombay, I receivrd from the Vic roy a reply
to my letter from Calcutta. He gladly agre d to meet me before
the Conference, but regarding the relea e of the correspond 'nc he
said that since I was coming to Simla he would like to di cu s th
matter with me when we met.
It was a very hot day and when I arriv d at Ddhi I was alre. dy
exhausted. The drive from Ambala to Kalka proved even mor
trying. All along the way I had to meet immense crowds. They
surrounded the car, got up on the running boards and ev n climb d
on the roof. It was with the greatest difficulty that we ould mov' at
all. It was as if the people had gone mad and tll'y made way for
the car only when we appealed again and ag in that they should not
delay us but let us go. Finally at about 10 p.m., I reached iml.
I drove to the Savoy Hotel where rooms had been reserved for m .
I did not however stay in the Savoy Hotel for long. Wh n Lord
Wavell saw the state of my health he felt that a hot '1 was n 1 the
proper place for me. He therefore plac d at my disposal one f the
houses attached to the Vicer gal Estate and arrang d that staff
from the Viceregal establishment should look after m. I w
touched by this courteous gesture and I may add that I alw y
found Lord Wavell a man of innate refinement and consideration
for others.
The next morning I met the Viceroy at ten o'clock. He received
me courteously and described briefly the prop sals he had brought
on behalf of the British Government. He said that no far-reaching
constitutional changes would be carried out for the duration of the
war, but the Viceroy's Executive Council would be compl tely
Indian and he would endeavour to set up a convention that th
Viceroy would always act on the advice of the CounciL He appealed
to me to trust the Government. It was his sincere desire that the
problem ofIndia must be solved after the war was over. He pointed
out that the war was approaching its end. It would ther fore to
India's advantage to accept the offer and co-operate with th Brit" b
in bringing the war to a victorious cIo e. He then referred to the
Muslim League and said that it was nece ry that the hould be
an understanding between the Congre and the League.
I told him clearly that an agreement with the League seemed v ry
doubtful. Those who were in control of the League se med to be
106 India Wins Freedom
under the impression that they had the support of the Government
and they would not therefore accept any reasonable terms.
The Viceroy emphatically said that there was no question of the
Government supporting the League. If the leaders of the Muslim
League had any such ideas, thcy w re completely in the wrong.
He assur d me that the Government was and would remain neutral.
I th n raised the question of my correspondence with him from
Ahm dnagar FortJail and expressed th hope that he would have no
obj ction to its publication.
Th Vic roy said that he would not object if I was really k en but
to him it s cmed that publication just now would be unfortunate.
He pointed out that we wCrc now meeting in an effort to solve the
Indian problem in a new spirit and d sired that people should
forget tbe bitterness of the past. If old memori es were revived at
such a tim, the atmosph re would change and instead of an attitude
offriendship and amity, th re would be a spirit of distrust and ang r.
He app 'al d to me that I should not press for the publication of the
correspondence and said that he would appreciate it very much if
I accept d his sugg stion.
I saw that the Viceroy was sincere and genuinely desired a change
in the atmosphere. I told him that I shared his desire that we should
create a n w atmosphere and discuss our problem in a new spirit of
friendship. I would do nothing which would prejudice such a deve-
lopment and therefor agre d to his sugg stion.
The Viceroy repeated twice that he was grateful to me for this
ge tur .
The Vic roy then de crib d to me the details of his proposal.
My first rea tion was that it was not di~ rent in substance from
the ripps offer. There was however one material diffi renee in the
ir urn tanc . The rjpp offer was made when the British were
in dir n cd of Indian co-op ration. Today the war was 0 er in
Europ and the Allies had triumphed ov r Hitler. In spite of this,
the Briti h Go rnment h d repeat d th ir earlier offer in an attempt
to create a new political auno ph re in India.
I lold th ie roy th t the Indian National ongress had autho-
riz: d me to ct on jts behalfbut all the arne I would like to consult
my colle gu before I ga e a definite reply. I had therefore
called the Working Committee to meet in hula to consider the
propo 1. I would in this way be able to place the decision of the
ongr(' before th nti rence. I ur d Lord WavcU that my
Interview with Lord Wavell 10 7
endeavour would be to find a solution and not create difficulties.
I was impressed by the frankness and sincerity of the Viceroy a
he described the proposals to me. I saw that his attitude was not
that of a politician but of a soldier. He spoke frankly and dire tly
and came to the point without any attempt at b 'a ting ab ut the
bush. It struck me that hi approach was very different from that of
Sir tafford Cripps. Cripps had tried to present his proposals in as
favourable a light as possible. He highlight d the strong point
and tried to slur over the difficulties. Lord 'Vavcll mad no attempt
at embellishment and he certainly was not trying to mak(' an impres-
sion. He put it quite bluntly that the war wa sti ll on and thatJapan
was a formidable enemy. In such a situation til British Government
were not prepared to tak any far-reaching step~. Such dev lopment
must wait till the end of the war, but h felt that the foundation for far-
reaching changes could now be laid. The Executive ouncil would
be exclusively Indian. The top administration of th country would
thus come into Indian hands. Once this happ ned, a complet 'Iy
n w situation would develop and furth r progres after th . war would
be assured.
My interview with Lord Wavell created a new atmo phere in
Simla. He was giving a State Banquet that night and I heard that
during the dinner he spoke about me in high terms. H e also said th t
whatever their political opinion or their differences with the Govern-
ment, Congr ss leaders were gentlemen. This remark of the Vic r y
spread all over Simla and created a stir in both official and non-
official circles. Many who till then had been cold to the ong-
re s and hardly recognized my existence suddenly developed warm
feelings for us. Th y brought me many presents and tried to impre
on me that in thei r heart of hearts they had always admired the
Congress and ided wi th it.
On the 24th afternoon, the Working Committee me t in the hou
of Sardar Harnam Singh where Gaodhiji was staying. I gave a
brief report of my interview with the Viceroy and expres cd the
opinion that though this offer was not different from that of Cripps,
we houldacceptit.Insupportofmyposition.Ireferredtoth chang d
circumstances. The war in Europe was now over and ven J pan
could not last very long. Once the war was over, the British would
have no special reason to seek our co-operation. It was therefore not
desirable for us to reject Lord WaveU'soffi t. We should participate in
the Cow renee with a vi'ew to accept irthe terms we at all uitable.
lOS India Wins Freedom
Th re was a long discussion but in the end the Working Committee
decided that we should stress the following points at the Conference:
(1) We must have a clear statement about the relation of the Executive
Council to the Viceroy. If the Council arrived at a unanimous conclu-
sion, would its decision be binding on the Viceroy or would the Viceroy
have a veto even in such cases?
(2) The position of the army must be defined. There was at the time a
wall dividing the army and the people. This must be changed so that
Indian leaders had an opportunity of coming into touch with the army.
(3) The British Government had pushed India into the war without
consulting Indian opinion. The Congress had refused to accept this
position. If there was a s ttlement and a new Executive Council formed, it
must have thr right to refer the question of India's further participation in
the war to the Indian Legislative Assembly. India would participate in the
war against Japan not as a result of a British decision but by a vote of her
own representatives.

Gandhiji, whl!) was prescnt throughout the meeting of the Working

Committe, was a party to this d ecision. He did not on this occasion
bring up the point that participation in th war m ant that Congress
was giving up non-viol nc . In other words, he did not for a moment
raise the question ofvjolence or non-violence. Those memb rs of the
Working Committe ,who had arli r resigned on this issue, remained
qually silent.
In ac ordan with the Viceroy's declaration, the Conference
was atl nd d by til Pr sidents of the Indian National Congress
and th Muslim L agu as w 11 as r presentatives of the Scheduled
a t sand th Sikhs. Th leader of the Congress Party and the
D puty L ad r ofth Muslim L ague in the Central Assembly, the
I ader of the ongr 55 Party and th Mu lim League in the ouncil
of tat) and the 1 ad rs of th Nationalist Party and the Euro-
p an Gr up in th As mbly were a1 0 invited. The other partici-
pant were tho who then held offic as Pr miers in a Provincial
Gov rom nt or had r cently h ld that office. The Hindu Maha-
5 bh tri d to g t an in jtation but the Viceroy did not accept its
claim.
We were ask d to come a little before the actual time of the
ouf, r nc . Th Viceroy rei d us on the lawns of the iceregal
Ladg , h r w wer fonnally introduc d to him. I , as very weak
at the time and found it difficult to remain standing for more than a
rew minutes. I m ntioned this to ir E van J enkins, the Private
The Simla Conference 109
Secretary to the Viceroy, who took me to a corner where a sofa w
placed. After I had been sitting th re a few minutes, he am back
with a lady who was introduced to me as a profici nt Arabic chol r.
Perhaps he thought that I was sitting alon and should ha\' ompany.
And what better company could I have than an orientalist? I tri d
to speak to h r in Arabic but found that thc poor lady's knowJedg
of Arabic did not ext nd b yond Nam (Yes) and La (No). I then
asked h er in English why th e Private S(' retary thought her to b a
fluent Arabic speaker. She said that she had been in Baghdad for
some months and at th dinner party last night, she had t ld som of
the invitees that the Arab used the expression '1\jib, jib' wh('n('vcr h
was surprised. She laughingl y added that this had obviously impr '55-
ed the guests and given them the impression that she was an Ar. bic
scholar.
After a few minutes Lord Wavell came up and said that it was
time to go to the Conf< rence room. The scats wer arranged with til
Viceroy in the centre. The Congress as th prin ipal opposition
party sat to the left of the Viceroy. The Lraguc was on his right,
perhaps an unconscious admission that it was a support r of the
Government.
Lord Wavell made a brief opening speech after whi h I pIa cd
before the Conference the point of vi w of th ongr S5 Working
Committee. The Viceroy's reply on all the thr points rais d by me
was favourable. The discussion continu d the whole day with only
a break for lunch.
The Conference was private and th Pr ss was not invited. After
th first sitting, I told Lord WavelJ that th re would be wild specula.
tion about our discussions unless something was officially giv n to
the Press. It would therefore be desirable to issue a Press reI ase but
it must be something on which the parti s could agre . H said that
aft r every sitting, an official statement would be prepared and
approved by the Conference before r ] as . Accordingly I receiv d
a draft that evening and sent it back with one or two minor amend-
ments. These were incorporated before the statem nt was issued
to the Pc ss. The same procedure was followed throughout the
Conference.
Soon after the Conference began, the diffi rences b tw n th
Congre and the Muslim League came out into the op n. By tbe
cond day, the Conference had agre don c rtain main principJ I
like repre entation for minorities, whol h acted support for the w
IrO India Wins Freedom
effort and continuance of the reconstituted Executive Council under
the Government of India Act till the end of the war. Differences
however arose about the composition of the Executive Council.
Mr linnah's demand was that Congress could nominate all the Hindu
memb rs but all the Muslim members must be nominees of the
Leagu . I pointed out that Congress could never ace pt such a de-
mand. It had approached all political problems from a national
point of vi wand recognized no distinction between Hindus and
Mu lims on political issues. It could not in any circumstances agree
to be an organization of Hindus alone. I therefore insisted that the
Congress should have the freedom to nominate any Indian it liked
r gardl ss of whether he was a Hindu, a Muslim, a Christian, a
Parse , or a Sikh. Congress should participate on the basis of Indian
nationhood or not participate at all. So far as the Muslim League
was con rned, it was for the League to decide who should be its
nominees.
The onference reassembled on the morning of 26 I une but
dispers d b for lunch so that the delegates could confer among
th ms lvcs. Mr linnah had expressed a wish to have an informal
discussion with the Congress. I nominated for the purpose Pandit
Govind Ballabh Pant, who, I thought, would be the right person to
n gotiate with Mr Jinnah. Their discussions continued for several
d ys but in. the nd prov d abortiv . Khizir Hayat Khan, who was
att nding the .on~ r nce as the Premier of the Punjab, met me several
tim s during this period. I was glad to find that he had taken up a
very r asonabl attitude on all questions and was h lpful and co-
operativ in solving problems as they arose.
Th Simla oni rence marks a breakwater in Indian political
history. This was the first time that negotiations failed, not on the basic
political i ue b ~., en India and Britain, but on the communal i ue
dividing difli rent Indian groups. A retro pect into the history of
the Mu lim L ague is necessary in order to understand this change.
Three phase can be cl arly distingui h ed in the attitude of the
Mu lim L ague toward politic 1 problems.
The Mu lim L agu was e tablished in 1906 in Dacca after the
e ion of th 1u lim Educational Conf1 rence during Chri tmas.
It 0, d its origin to the fl'orts of Nawab Mu htaq Husain. I was
p ent t th ion and remcmb r the two r a on advanced for the
t. bli hmentoftheLe gue. It was said that one would be to treQgth-
n nd d v lop a Ii cling of loyalty to the Briti h Governm nt
Origin and Aims of the Muslim uagtU III
among the Musalmans of India. The second was to adv nce the
claims of the Muslims against Hindus and other communities in
respect of service under the Crown, thus safeguarding Uuslim in-
terests and rights. The leaders of the League w re thrrdi re naturally
opposed to the demand for political indcpenden rai I'd by th
Congress. They felt that if the Muslims joinrd in any su h d mand,
the British would not support their claim for special trratment in
elective bodies and services. In fact they d scribed the ongrcss as a
disloyal organization of rebels and distrusted even moderate poli-
tical lead rs such as Gokhal or Sir Ferozesah Mehta. During thi
phase, the British Government always used the Muslim Leagu as a
counter to the demands of the Congrrss.
The Muslim League entered into the second phase of its a tivitic's
when it found that the Government wa ompelit"d to introduc
various reforms as a result of Congress pressure. It was somewhat
disturbed when it saw the Congress achieving its obj ct st p by 51 p.
The League still remained aloof from the political struggk, but as
soon as any advance was made it put in a claim on b('half of the
Muslim community. This programme of the Muslim Lcagu suited
Government well. In fact, there are r asons to think that th(> Lague
was acting according to the wish s of the British. During the Morley-
Minto R eforms as well as during the Montford Schem of Provincial
autonomy, this was the attitude adopted by th League.
Then came the third phase in the League's programm during
World War 1. Congress had gained immensely in pr stig and
strength. It was now clear that the British Governm nt would have to
recognize Indian freedom. Mr Jinnah had now become the leader
of the Muslim League and felt that he must tak. advantage of v ry
difference betw en the Congress and the Government. Whenev r
there w re di cussions betw en the Congress and the Governm nt
for the transfer of power, Mr Jinnah would begin by remaining
silent. If the negotiations failed, he issued a milk-and-water stalt"-
ment cond mning both parties and saying that since th re w no
settlement there was no ne d for the Muslim L ague to xpr s any
opinion on the Briti h offer. This is what he did during th August
ofi'erin 1940 and the Cripps propo als ofl 94-2. The Simla nference
present d him with a situation that he had never faced b fi r .
As I have said earlier, all discussions b tween the n and the
Government had till now failed on political is ues. The British w
not willing to transfer power and the ongr was not re dy to
112 India Wins Freem
accept any solution which did not ensure Indian freedom. Discussions
had therefor fail d on political issues and never reached the commu-
nal question. In the Simla Con~ renee, I was able to persuade the
Congr ss Working Committ e to accept Lord Wavell's offer.
Now that the political is ue betwe n India and Britain seemed on the
point of soluti n, th e Conference broke down over the question of
communal representation in the n w Executive Council.
I have already xplained that the Congress had taken a national
stand on this question while th Muslim League demanded that the
Congress should give up its national character and function as a
communal organization. Mr Jinnah took the strange stand that the
ongr 55 ould n minatc only Hindu m mbers of the Executive
ouncil. I asked the Con~'r nee what right MrJinnahor the Muslim
Leagu had to dictate whom th Congress should nominate. If the
Congress put forth the names of Muslims, Parsees, Sikhs or Christians,
this would r duc th number of Hindu representatives, but how
did this conc rn th Muslim League? I asked Lord Wavell to say
in categorical t rms whether the stand of the Muslim League could
b r gard d a r a onable.
Lord Wav 11 said in r ply that he could not accept the stand of the
Mu lim L agu a reasonable. At th same time he said that this
was a matter which should b decided between the Congress and the
Muslim Leagu and it would not b proper for either the Govern-
ment or for hims If an individual to force a decision on either
party.
This differ nee regarding the compo ition of the Council came
out into the open after agr ment had been reached on the political
i ue. When the g neral pattern had been accepted, the time came
for the partie to ugge t th nam s ofth ir representatives. Natural-
ly the fi t name in th ongr ss list w that of the Congr ss Presi-
dent. W includ d lathe names ofJawaharlal and Sardar Patel
R garding th oth r two nam ,there was a good deal of discussion
mong u b fore would com to an greernent. I was ke n to
includ on P rs and one Indian Chri cian.
pI nation is ne ary to why I pressed for the in-
clusion ofth r pr entaciv ofminoritie. When we were arrest1 d
in ugust 1942 the Briti h Gov mment h d tried hard to work up
me of th milloritie gainst the Congr . One of the minorities
ppr ch d w r th Pes. The are very small community
but c upy n imp rtant po ition in nation 1 life because of their
.. \'1'1-: III

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Nominees for Executive Council Jl3
education, wealth and ability. I felt that an inju tice had been done
to a member of this community when Nariman was pa cd over t
the time of the formation of the first Congres Ministry of Bomb .
The Parsecs had also be en affectcd by one f the decisions whi
Congress had taken in 1937. When prohibition was introduced in
Bombay, the law affi cted the Pars e businessmcn m re than men
of any other community. They had almost a m nopoly of the wine
trade and prohibition made them lose busine s worth crores. The
Government perhaps thought that the Parsccs would b against
the Congress b cause of these incident, but as a comrnunityth y re-
fused to play the British game. A statement igned by almo t all
important and r puted leaders of the community declared in atego-
rical terms that they were and would r main with the ongress on
the question of Indian fr edom.
When I read the stat ment in Ahmedllagar FortJail, I was gre tly
impressed and told my colleagu s that th e Parsecs had serv d India
well in issuing this statement. I also sugg sted that we must giv
proper recognition to this gestur . Though the Parse s w re a v ry
small community, I felt that they must find a place in the first fr e
Government oflndia. When therefore we w re dra wing up the list of
Congress nominees for the Executive Council I insist d that there
should be a Parsee name in the list submitted by the Congr ss.
Gandhiji liked my idea but ~ It that since the Congress could nomi-
nate only five persons, it would Dot be possible to include a Parsec.
It was however agreed that in a futur Gov mm nt, very effort
must be made to accommodate a Parsee. To this I could not agree.
I said that the future was uncertain. Now that w had an opportunity
to nominate persons of our own choice, we must include a Parsec in
our list. After two days' discussion, my vi w ultimately pr vailed.
I also insi ted on the inclusion of an Indian hrislian in th
Congress list. I knew that a repres ntative of th community could
not come from any other source. Sikhs and Scheduled ast s would
be represented in any case, but no Christian would find a place in
the Government unJ ss Congr 55 sponsored him. I aOO remembered
that the Indian Christian community had always stood by the Con-
gress and adopted a national approach on all our political problems.
The upshot was that the list submitted by thl' ngr contain d
only two Hindu names. This proved, jf proof were n ded, th t
Congress was a truly national organization. It could have been
aaMt that the Hindua, who constituted the majority community of
 India Wins Freedom
India, would object to such a proposal, but be it said to their credit
that th Hindus of India stood solidly behind the Congress and did
not waver even when they found that in the Congress list of five,
three men were drawn from Muslims, the Christians and the Parsecs.
Later, the Hindu Mahasabha tried to make political capital out of
this decision of the Congress, but everyone knows how miserably
the Mahasabha failed. It is a strange irony of fate that like the
Mahasabha, the Muslim L ague also opposed the inclusion by the
Congress ofa Muslim name in its list.
Looking back on events after a period of ten years, I cannot still
help fe ling surpris d at the strange situation which developed as
a r suIt of th attitud of the Muslim League. The provisional list
which Lord Wavell had hims 'lfprcpar d includf'd four names in ad-
dition to th five names each of the Congress and the Muslim League.
On ofthes was a r presentative of the Sikhs, two of the scheduled
ca tes and the fourth was Khizir Hayat Khan, then Premier of the
Punjab. Jinnah react d violently against the suggestion that th re
should be two Muslims in the Executive Council who were not his
nominees. Khizir Hayat Khan came to see me and I assured him
that the Congress would not object to his inclusion. I repeated this
to Lord Wavell. If, therefore, the Conference had not broken down
because of Jinnah's opposition, the result would have been that the
Mu lims, who constituted only about 25 per c nt of the total popula-
tion ofIndia, would have had seven T presentatives in a Council of
fourt en. This is videnc of the generosity of the Congr ss and also
throws a lurid light on the stupidity of the Muslim League. The
League was supposed to be the guardian of Muslim inter sts and
yet it was because of its opposition that the Musalmans of India
were denied a substantial share in the Govemm nt of undivided
India. The intransigent attitude of the Muslim League finally led
to the br akdown of the Conf r nee.
After th Confi renee was over, I i u d a statement and h ld a Press
confe)Cnce in which I explained the difficulti s in the way of Con-
gr particip tion in the Simla Conference. The proposals were
pr ent d to us suddenly. On 15 June 1945 my colleagues and I
were rele d and we had to take a decision straightaway on the
invitation. We re lized that vast changes had taken place in the
internation 1 phere and that these had undoubtedly had reper-
cussions on the Indian problem. The inevitable reault of these
ehanp was to brln( to the forefront the question oflndian freedom
Uncompromising Attitude oj Jillnah IIS
and that of the freedom of other Asian countries. In spite of all
these difficulties, the Working Committee had decid d to participate
in the Conference.
I told the Press that at all stages during the Cow rene I I had
emphasized the national character of the Congress. I had al 0 made
it plain to the Viceroy that the Congress Working Committee wished
to co-opera te in every reasonable way in helping to r solve the present
political deadlock.
I pointed out that if the Simla Conference had succeeded, the wnr
againstJapan would have become not only Britain's but India's war
against Japan. India was directly concerned with the qu stion of
liberating countries in South-East Asia. It would, therefore, be the
duty of the new Government of India to carry on the war against
Japan till all these countries were lib rated. The new Indian Govern-
ment could not, however, be a party to any proposal for restoring
the domination of former European imperialist powers. We would
not permit the use of a single Indian soldier or the exp nditure of
a single pie for restoring the pre-war colonial regimes in South-
East Asian countries.
I also told the Press that after the fundamental issu ofth transfer
ofpow~r to Indian hands had been settled, the Conti r nce b gao to
consider the strength and composition of the new Ex cutivc oun-
cil. The Conference was adjourned to enable privat and informal
talks to take place among the parties but th se onv rsation
led to no result. In the course of these informal talks the position
taken up by Mr Jinnah was that the Muslim L ague alone should
nominate Muslim members in the new Ex cutive Coun iI, and
that Congress would have no right to nominate any Muslim. The
Congress found that such a position would be inconsistent with its
basic national character. It was not mer ly a question of seats, but
one af< cting a fundamental principle. We w re prepar d toaccom-
modate th Muslim League to the farthest possible extent, but
Mr Jinnah took up an uncompromising attitude. He refused to
submit even a list of names unless his point of view was accepted.
The Viceroy had told me that he did his best, but fail d to persu de
Mr Jinnah, who insisted that the Muslim nomine 5 hould all be
nominated by the League Working Committee. The Viceroy w
unable to agree to this and felt that it was not profitable to proceed
with the proposal at present.
I may here quote from the statement I had then issued:
II6 India Wins Freedom
Two points arise out of the present situation. The first is that the atti-
tude of the Muslim League has been responsible for the failure of the Con-
ference. The second point which emerges from the refusal of the Muslim
League is that it is for Lord Wavell to decide whether to go forward or not.
His Excellency has decided not to proceed for the present. In this con-
nection T must repeat what J said at the Conference. The British Govern-
ment cannot absolve themselves of the responsibility for the communal
problem here. Whether it is today or tomorrow, they must take up a firm
stand on a just and fair basis. There is no other alternative but to do so.
And once a decision is taken, we must move forward. Those who are pre-
pared to go forward must be allowed to go forward and those who wish to
be left out should be left out. ' Vithout determination, nothing can be done.
Wavering minds and faltering steps will never carry us forward in the
path of progress. We must think before we take a step, but once we
decide, hesitation is not a virtue but a sign of definite weakness.
I told the representatives of the Press that I had no regrets what-
sover for the ongress stand in this cow renee. We had gone as far
as we could to meet the wishes of Mr Jinnah, but we could not
accept his claim that th e Muslim League was the sole representative
and authoritative organization of the Muslims of India. In the
provinces wh re Muslims were in a majority, there was no League
Ministry. There was a Congress Ministry in the Frontier Province.
In Bengal, there was Governor's rule, while in the Punjab it was a
Unionist Ministry. In Sind, Sir Ghulam Hussain depended on
Congr 55 upport and the ame po ition h ld in Assam. It could not,
th refor ,b claimed that the Muslim League repres nted aU the
Muslims. Th re was in fact a large bloc of Muslims who had nothing
to do with the League.
Before I conclude this chapt r, I would like to refer to one of the
consequences of the 'Quit India' Movement. During this period,
some nt. w personalities appear d on the Indian scene. They were
thrown up by the d mands of the new situation. Among them was
Mrs Asaf Ali. I have already mentioned that on the morning of
9 August 1942, she told me on the Bombay railway platform that
she would not remain idle. After our arrest, she toured all over the
country and ought to organize ~e istance to the Briti h war effort.
he w not worried bout the di tinction between violence and non-
violence but adopted oy method she found useful. After some time,
the Government began to take notice of her activities and attempts
were m de to arrest her. She however went underground and was
able to vade arrest. In this sbe was helped by a large number of
Mrs AsaJ Ali s Activt'ties
Indians many of whom were Governmmt officers or industriali ts
who were normally regarded as loyal supporters of the ovcrnm('nt.
Some businessmen of Bombay and Calcutta helped her. he rvell
stayed in the homes of officers of the Indian Civil Snvi e ann th
Indian Army. She was able to raise tht' funds she n('edl' d and
remained active throughout the whole period of our detention.
When I was released in 1915, she ame to re mt secretly in
alcutta. I spoke to Lord W avdl about her who said that h(' would
not arrest her for her past activitirs but what about th<' futurr ?
I told Lord Wavell that the political situation had hanged and
there was liltl likelihood of her continuing wilh subversive acti-
vities. Wh n I was satisfied that she would not be arrrstrd, I ask('d
her to com out and this she did in the latt<'r halfof 1945.
H r activities had become so w ll-known that the Viceroy cited
her case in a speech in which he questioned the bonajidts of the ong-
ress regarding non-violence. H e said that when Ih wife of a mem-
b r of the Working Committe was l'ngaged in viol'nt activities,
it was difficult for the Government to believe in ongr('ss <irc-
larations conceming non-violence. Wh n we Irarnt about th('se
developments in Ahmednagar Fort J ail, I found that Asaf Ali was
worrying not about his own imprisonment but about the dangers
which his wife was facing. I tried to reassure him by saying that h
should not worry, but b e proud that she was xhibiting sueh ourage
and initiative in a noble cause.
 GENERAL ELECTIONS
FT E R the Simla Conference th e doctors strongly advised me

A to go to Kashmir for a change. My h alth was still weak and

it was with difficulty that I could carryon even the normal
duties of the Congress President. Jawaharlal also needed a change
and h too decided to go to Kashmir. I spent th months ofJuly and
August in Gulmarg. It was while I wa5 there that I learnt that the
Labour Party had won an unprecedented victory in the British
G ncral Elections. I immediately scnt a telegram of congratulations
to Mr Attl 'e and Sir ~tafTord Cripps. I exprrssed the hope that
now that Labour had come to power, it would fulfil the pledges it
had always given to India during the years it was in opposition.
In his reply Attl e said that th Labour Party would do its brst to
arrive at a right solution of the Indian problem. Cripps cabled that
it was his hope that India would not be di appointed. I may add that
Gandhiji and Jawaharlal did not lik this exchange of t legrams . .
Th y were both sceptical about th Labour attitude to India. I
was, however, convinced that the Labour Party would approach the
Indian problem from a fr sh angle and I was optimistic about the
outcom .
Shortly aft r this, the Viceroy declared that General Elections
should be h Id in India in the coming winter. This made it neces-
sary to call a m ting of th Working Commitl e and the A.I.C.C.
It was n c ssary for the Congr ss to decide what attitude to adopt
a r ult of th failure of the Simla Confer nc . There were those
who were in f: vour of starting a new movement. Others h Id that
n if no movem nt was laUl!ch d, the Congr should boycott
the El ctions. I was of the view that there was no justification for
hher of th suggestions. If the Simla Conference had failed it
w s not the fault of the British. The cause of the failure was com-
munal, not political.
I w still at Gulmarg when there was a new and unprecedented
 A/om Bombs all Hiroshima and NagasaJd 119
development in world history. The Am ricans dropped atom bomb
on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Before th se bombs wn u cd, it w
the general cstimate that it would takc at kast two y rs to bre. It
down Japanese resistance. Aft er Hiroshima and Nagasaki the itu
tion was completely tran formed. The Japanese had no an wer to
this new and frightful weapon of destruction and wcr ompC'lkd
to ace pt unconditional surrcndl' r. Th war in Europ w. alre. dy
over. Within a few weeks the American army had landrd on
Japanese soil and occupied Tokyo. General MacArthur brc me
the virtual ruler of Japan.
I am still convinc 'd that thl'rC' was no justifiC4' tion for th u, of
atom bombs on Japan without pr vious warning. It wa a wcapon
which compl tely destroyed not only military forcrs but the civil
population and harm ed even unborn grn('rations. In fa t, it thr at-
en d the destruction of man. When in World War I, tht" G rmllns
had used poison gas against the Allies, world opinion ondrmn d
th m in unqualified terms. If th e Germans had th n be n guilty of
inhumanity, how could one absolve th e Amrricans of the same
charge? I ~ It that th usc of the atom bombs xcr dl' d th limit of
permi iblc destruction and did not r dound to th prestigr or her ism
ofth lIies. r also noted with n'gret that the Allies hailed this (' v nt
as a magnific nt victory and ther was hardly one word ofprotC'st.
My h a1th was still weak. July and August ar not th' prop r
season for Kashmir and I had not benefited much by my stay th re,
but S ptemb r brought a most pi asant change and I began to im
prove rapidly. Myappetit r turn d and I was nble to take exerci e.
If! could have stayed for another month, I ~ 1 sure that my h alth
would have been fully restored. Circumstances, however, d mand d
that I should leave Kashmir. The Working Comrnittre and the
.I.C.C. needed my presence. When I came down to the plains, the
t mporary improvement in my health disappeared.
There was at that time no air service to Ka broir. On had to go
by the long and circuitous motor route. The Am rica ,however,
w re flying large numbers of army officen to Kashmir for r t
and r creation. Every two we its a fresh batch was sent by aeropJ ne
to rinagar. Some of these officers came to meet m . Wbrn they
beard I had to return to D llii, they offer d to Oy m down in the
special plane of the Am rican Commander. On 10 Scplemb r, I
cbed D lhi by their plane and started for Poona. The Workjng
Committe met at POOllf' on 14 September and a r few d )'I
120 India Wins Freedom
adjourned to Bombay. Both in th e Working Committee and the
A.I.C.C., there were heated discussions about our new line of policy.
A majority, including Gandhiji, h Id that we must devote ourselves
to exclusively constructive work. They beli eved that there was not
much hope on the political plane.
J argued that th ere was a great change in Britain as the result of
the formation of the Labour Government. The Labour Party had
always bren friendly to India. In view of this, it was desirable that
w should give it an opportunity of proving its bona fides. My firm
conviction was that we should not start a new movement but parti-
cipate in the G ncral Elections. I also point d out that the Simla
Conference had been a serious attempt to solve the Indian problem.
Though it had failed, we must appreciate th e spirit displayed by
Lord Wavell and now that Labour was in power, await furth er
d cvrJopments. After a good deal of discussion, my vicws finally
pr vailcd.
I now thought it necessary to take up the qu estion of political
prisoners. The Gov rnmcnt of India had released the members of
th e Working Committee, but thousands of ordinary members of the
Congress were still in jail. At the time of the Simla Conference , it
was not cl ar to me what our next step should be. I did not, therefore,
raise th e question of a general amnesty for all political prisoners at
th Con~ r nce.
Aft rth Conference two events transformed the entire scene. The
first was th swe ping victory of Labour in Britain and the second
was th e dropping of the atom bomb and the end of the war. The
political picture, both national and international, had now become
mu h cl ar r. I was convinced that w should follow a dual policy.
On the on hand, w must keep the spirit of struggle alive among
the Incian p opl and on th other, we must r frain from any preci-
pitate step.
E nts develop d as I had anticipated. Some time after the end of
the war, Lord Wav 11 declared that General El ctions would be held
in Indi. soon as I heard this announcement, I knew that the time
h d come to raise the que tion of the release of the political prisoners.
Once Genera} E1 ctions have been announced, there could be no
ju ufi tion for k ping them in jail. I wrote to Lord Wavell from
Gulmarg and aid lh t I h d not raised the question of the political
prisoners in Simla as the time was not opportune. Now the situation
h d changed. Since the war was over and General Elections had been
 Genera I Amnesry Jor all Prisoners I2[
announced, there should be a general amnesty. This was n cess ry
in the inl rests both of th Indian peopl and of lh~ Gov rrunent.
So far as the prisoners themselves were concerned) they had bt n in
jail for years and would be prepared to stay th rC' for some more
months. Continued detention would not harm thrm but it would
reduce the prospc ts of a settlement. If the Govcrnmrnt d<'sir('d to
create a new political atmosphere', they would have to rden all
political prisoners.
Lord WaveJl replied by tdegram. He said that h agn'rd with my
views and was issuing orders for the release ofth<' political prisoners.
He did not, however, issue orders for a general amnesty. Th resuit
was tbat while the majority of Congress prisoners carne out, a sm 11
group of leftist workers of th Congress were still detainrd. They
included Jai Prakash Narain, Ramanandan Mishra and 5\'v('ral
others.
I was not satisfi d with this outcome of my intervemion. I Saw
no reason why a small group of leftists should be detained whl'n all
the others were being rclcas('d. The Government f India had sus-
picions against them, but there was no proof that they had behav d
difl'i rently from th . other Congr ss work rs who had taken part in
the 'Quit India' Movement. After the A.LC.C. m t at Bombay in
S ptember, I wrote a long and detailed letter to Lord Wav 11. I
sajd that the effect on the country would b very unfortunat if this
I handful of political prisoners was not r 1 ased. If Lord Way II
wanted to create a proper atmosphere in the country he should agree
to a general amnesty. Lord Wavell finally agreed and th y w re
all released.
The A.I.C.C. had decided tbat an election manif('slo should be
pre par d by the Working Committee and placed b for tile A.I.C.C.
for its consideration and adoption. It also autboriz d the Working
Committee to issue a preliminary manifesto on behalf of the C mral
Election Committee. It was not possible to hold another meting of
the ALC.C. to consider the fuller maniti ato in view of the immi-
ncnee of the General Elections. The Working Committee therefore
issued the following manifesto on its own authority:
For sixty years the National Congress has laboured for the fr darn of
India. D~g this long span of years its history hat been the hiatory of
the lndian people, straining at the leash that has held them in bondage,
ever trying to unloose themselves from it. From smaU beginnIng. it has
progressively grown and sp,tcad in this vast country, carrying the m S'c
 India Wins Freedom
of freedom to the masses of our people in the towns as well as the r motest
villages. From these masses it has gained power and strength and developed
into a mighty organization, the living and vibran t symbol of India's will to
freedom and independence. From gcn ration to generation it has dedi-
cat d itself to this sacred cause, and in its name and under its banner
innumerable countrymen and coumrywomen of ours have laid down their
lives and undergone sutTering in order to redeem the pledge they had
tak n. By service and sacrifice it has enshrined itself in the hearts of our
people; by its refusal to submit to any dishonour to our nation it has built
up a powerful movement of resist an e to foreign rule.
The career of the Congress has been one of both constructive effort for
the good of the people and of unceasing struggle to gain freedom. In this
struggle it has faced numerous crises and come r peatedly into direct
conflict with the armed might of a great Empire. Following peaceful
methods, it has not only survived these conflicts but has gained new
strength from th m. After the recent three years of an unprecedented mass
upheaval and its crucl and ruthless suppression, the Congress has risen
stronger than ever and more loved by the people by whom it has stood
through storm and stress.
The Congress has stood for 'qual rights and opportunities for every
citizen of J ndia, man or woman. It has stood for the unity of all communi-
ties and religious groups and for tolerance and goodwill between th m.
It has stood for full opportunities for th people as a whole to grow and
develop according to their own wishes and g nius; it has also stood for the
freedom of each group and territorial area within the nation to develop
its own life and culture within the larger framework, and for this purpose.
such terrilOrial areas or provinces should be constituted, as far as possible,
on a linguistic and cultural basis. It has stood for the rights of all those
who suffer from social tyranny and injustice and for the removal for them
of all barriers to equality.
The Congr S5 has envisaged a free, democratic State with the fun-
damental rights and civil liberties of all its citizens guaranteed in the
on5lilution. This constitution, in its view, should be a federal One with a
gre t deal of autonomy for it on tituent units and its legislative organs
elected under universal adult franchise.
A hundred od fIfty years and more of foreign rule have arrested the
growth of the country and produced oumerous vital problems that demand
immedi te $olution. Intensive exploitation of the country and the people
during this period h reduced the m es to the depths of misery and star-
v lion. The country h not only been politically kept under subjection
od humiliated, but has also suffered economic, social, cultural and spiri-
tual degradation. During the years of war, and even now, this process of
exploitation by irre poruible authority and complete ignoring of Indian
interests and iews has reached a new height, an incompetence in the
Wflrkillg Cflmmittee's ManifisUl 12 3
administration, leading to terrible Ii mine nd wide pre d mi ery among
our people. There is no way to solve any of these urgt"nt problems e ("Cpt
through fre dom and independence. The content (If politic \J fre dam
must be bmh economic and social.
The most vital and urgent of I ndin' problems i how to r move the curse
of pO\'erly and raise the standards of the m $r5. IL is tn the well-b ing .lnd
progress of these masses that the Congress has dirr tt'd i sp d. J nttenti n
and its const ructive activities. I t is by their \\cllbcillg and advance-
ment that it hasjudgedcveryproposal and every change alld it h ' cIcc) red
that anything tha t comes in the way oCthe good of the lIU"CS ofuur coun-
try must be remov d. Industry and agriculturr, the.: 5oc.:i.\1 ('rvi nd
public utilities must be encouraged, mod rni~l"d alld rapidly cxtc:-nclcd in
order to add to the wealth of the country and give it the .Ipacity for aelf-
growth, 'without dependence on others. But all this mllst be dune with lhc
primary obj Cl, and paramoul1 t dut y of ben fiting the lO.LSse$ of our 1)(" pie
and raising their economic, cultural and spiritual level, n'moving unem
ployment, and adding to the dignity of the individual. For this purp c
it will be necessary to plan and co-ordinate social < dvancc, in .11 ill m ny
fields, to prevent the concentration of wealth < nel power in the hanwof
individuals and groups, to prevent ves ted interest~ inimic Ito 0 icty from
growing and to have social control of the mineral rcsour 5, mcans of
transport and the principal methods of production and di Lribulion in
land, industry and in other departments of national activity,.o th I free
lodi may develop into a co-operalivc corrunonwcalth.
In intcrnational affairs, the Congress stanw for the establislun nt of a
world federation of free nations. Till such time such a federation t KCI
shape, India must develop friendly relations with aJl nation., and p rtieu-
larly with her neighbours on thc east and the west and north. In the F r
East, in South-East Asia and in Western Asia, India has had tr de and cul-
tural relations for thowanw of years and it is inevitable that with frc dom
she I hould renew and develop these relations. Reasons of securit y nd fut ure
trends of trade also demand these closer contacts with thClC regions. Jnelia.
which has conducted her own struggle for frecdom on a non-violent b iI.
will atw ys throw her weight on the .ide of world pe ee and co-oper Lion.
She will also champion the freedom of all other .ubjeet nations and
peoples. for only on the basia of this freedom and tbe elimination of
imperialiam everywbere can world peace be establiahed.
On 8 August 1942, the All-India Congress Committee passed resolu-
tion. since then famous in India's sLOry. By its demanw nd ch llenge tbe
Congress .tands today. It is on the basia of thia resolution and with ilJ
b ttle-cry that the Congress faces the electioN for the ntn.l nd
Provincial Aucmblies.
The Central Legislative Assembly is a body with nO power or uthority
and is practically an advisory body whose 'a dvice ~ been eO tantly
124 India Wins Freedom
flouted and ignored. It is completely out of date and is based on a very
restricted franchise. The electoral registers for it are full of errors and omis-
sions and no opportunities for correcting or adding to them have been given.
Large numbers of our countrymen are still in prison and many others who
have been released ar disqualified from standing for election. Obstructions
in the way of holding public meetings still continue in many places. Yet,
with all these and other handicaps and drawbacks, the Congress hasdecided
to contest the elections to show that the inevitable result of elections,
however restricted, must be to demonstrate the overwhelming solidarity
of the opinion of the voters on the issue of independence. Therefore, in this
election, petty issues do not count, nor do individuals, nOr sectarian cries-
only one thing coun ts; the freedom and independence of our Motherland,
from which al l other fre doms will flow to our people.
So the Congress appeals to the voters for the Central Assembly all over
th country to support the Congr ss candidates in every way at the forth-
coming elections, and to stand by thct Congress at this critical juncture,
wh ich is so pregnant with future possibilities. Many a time the people of
I ndia have taken the pledg of independence : that pledge has yet to be re-
deemed, and the well-beloved cause for which it stands and which has sum-
mon d us so often, still beckons to us. But th time is coming when we
shall r d 'em it in full, not by til election but by what comes after it.
Meanwhile, this election is a small test for us, a preparation for the greater
things to come. Let all those who eare and long for freedom and the inde-
penden e of J ndia me t this test with strength and confidence, and
mar h together to the free India of our dreams.
As was gen rallyexp cted, Congress achieved an absolute majority
in all the Provinces xcept Bengal, the Punjab and Sind. In these
thr e Provinces, the position was complex. In Bengal the Muslim
Leagu was the largest singl party and captured almost half the
s ats. In th Punjab, t11 Unionist party and th League were balanc-
din almo t equal numb rs. In Sind also, the Muslim League won a
larg numb r of seats but could not achj ve a majority. In these
thr provin<;es th MusHm population was in the majority and the
Mu lim L ague had carri d on propaganda to arouse religious fanati-
ci m and ommunal p ions. This clouded the political issues so
much that Muslims who stood on Congr s or any other ticket had
gr at difficulty in even securing ~ hearing from the people. In the
North-West Frontier Province, where the Muslim majority was the
large t, all the efforts of the League failed and the Congress was able
to form the Gov rnment.
It would be appropriate t thi stage to review once again the
political situation in India. Wh nth second World War broke out,
 New Spiri oj Patriotism in Armed Forces 12 5
th communists w rc at a loss because Hitler and latin h d nlered
into a non-aggre ion pact. Till thl' Nazi- oviet agr('cm nt th com-
munist had been in the forefront in attacking Hitkr ilnd ondemn-
ing the Nazi philosophy of life. Indi an communi ts knew in their
heart of hearts that talin had committed a great bJundn in ('nter-
ing into this pact, but like communi ts in other parts of lhe world,
they lacked the courage to say so. They therefore described the
understanding as an attempt to limi t the exttnt of the war \\ hi h
was described as an imperiali I war. Being almo I hdpk. tht~y
sought to justify their position by describing Hitlrr as the Irsst'r evil.
In view of this th )' could not offer any hdp to the British and in
fact strongly supported Indian neutrality betwcen the two camp.
'VIlen, howcver, HitJcr attacked Russia, tht' communist turned
omplete somersault. They dcclared the war to be a pc-oplc's w. r
and went all out in support of the British. In India they openly join-
rd lhe war propaganda and did everything to help the nriti~h w r
erort. Mr M. N. Roy acceptt'd funds from th' Governmml opcllly
and carried on propaganda in favour of thc war. Thc ommunut
also rectiv d Government assistance in various ways. Tht' ban on
the Communist Party was removed and members ofth party h Ip d
to carry on war propaganda.
Th Congress on the othrr hand had launched lh 'Quit Indi '
Movement. Congressmen had been arrest d in larg numbe while
the communists who had previously be n und r arr 5t or in hiding
could now work openly in favour of their party. Evc-n when ongr
men wer released after th Simla Conference, they were not clear
as to their line of action and waited for ad cision by the ongr ss.
A mo t r markable change had in the meantim come about in all
th public s rvices. During the war the Defence Forces had r cruil d
a large proportion of young men who came from differ nt provinces
and different social classes. The arlier British practice of r croiling
only from c rtain selected groups had been abandoned under the
pr ure of war needs. The young men who had now joined the
Armed Forces had accepted the British at th ir word that aft r the
war India would be free. This belief had moved them to make
great drorts during the period of hostilities. Now that hostilitie.
were over, they expected that India would become ti e.
AU the three branches of the Armed Force..-the 'avy, the Army
4

and the Air Force-were inspired by a new spirit'ofpatrioti m. They

were in fact so full of c.n thusiasm that they could not conceal th ir
1 !Z6 India Wins Freedom
fe elings whenever th ey saw any of the Congress leaders. Wherever I
went during this period, the young men of the Defence Forces came
out to welcome me and exp ress their sympathy and admiration with-
out any regard for the reaction of their European officers. When I
w nt to Karachi a group of naval officers came to sec me. Theyex-
press d their admiration for the Congress policy and assured me that
if Congr ss issl'ed the necessary orders, they would come over to us.
H there was a conflict between Congress and the Government, they
would side with the Congress and not with the Governm nt. Hun-
dreds of naval officers in Bombay expressed the same feelings.
Th se sentim nts w re widespread, not only among officers but
also among th e ranks. I flew to Lahore in connexion with the forma-
tion of the provincial Ministry. A Gurkha regiment which was
stationed in Lahore had its quarters near the aerodrome. When the
soidi rs heard that I was coming, they lined up in hundreds and said
that th y wanted to have my darshan. Even policemen exhibited the
same feelings. In the history of the Indian political struggle, the
polic had always been the staunchest supporters of the Government.
Th y had in fact little sympathy with political workers and often
acted harshly towa.rds them. They had also undergone a transform-
ation of sentiment and were not behind any other group in their
f ling of loyalty to th e Congress.
Once wh n I was passing along Lal Bazar in Calcutta, my car was
held up in a traffic jam. Some police constables recognized me and
r port d to th ir barracks which were nearby. In a few minutes a
large galh< ring of constabl s and head constables surrounded my
car. They saluted me and some touched my feet. They all expressed
th ir regard for Congress and said that they would act according to
our ord rs. I remember another incident clearly. The Governor of
Bengal had expressed a wish to meet me. When I went to Govern-
ment Hous , the constabl s on duty surrounded my car and as I came
out ach man came up individually and saluted me. Th y all assured
me that th y would act according to my orders. Sinee I had gone to
Government House at the invitation of the Governor, I did not think
it proper that there should be any slogans. How ver, the constables
would not ke p quiet, but shouted slogans in my honour. This was
clear evidence that their ympathies were with Congress and that
they were no longer afraid of pressing them openly. If the Govern-
ment wished to punish them for their sympathy with the Congress,
they wren ady for it.
Formation of Provincial Ministries
The (' d('vclopm nLS were naturally report('d to the uthoritie
Governmrnt r("ceived dctaikd reports and passed thcm on to the
Sec retary of State for India. The British rcalizrd that for the first
time in Indian history, the entir people was aflame- with the d sire
for indepcnd nce. Political freedom was no long r thr ohj( ti of
the Congress alone but of all se tions of the pcopk. ,till more impor-
tant was the fact that all ections of the Snvi ('s- 'ivi l and Military
-wrr moved by the sam impulses. Thcre was no l(lng(T anything
secn' t about this up urge for frecoom. Me'n and omens f tl\(' Dr-
fence Forc s declared openly that thc), had pOlln'o out the'ir blood in
the war on the assurance that India would be fn'c' aftn till' C( 'Hi n
of hostilities. Th y demanded that thi s assurance must now be
honoured,
Aft r the general elections wcrr OVlT, the qUI'slion 01 fomling til .
new Gov rnment arose in each province'. It be anl(' nrce .. ary for
me to visit the provincial capitals and supervise the formation of the
Ministries. The time at my disposal was very short but air tran sport
h lped to solve the problem, During the war, all air s rvices had
be'en brought under the control of the Government. Th y also con-
trolled the allotment of s ats. Lord Wavrll issued instructions that
I should be givrn every facility and this mad it possible for m to
visit all the provincial capitals.
When I came to Bihar for the formation of the Govrmmrnt, 1
found the situation complicat d by th rivalri s of dim'rrnt groups
within the Congress. To thes w r add d th e personal problnru of
important Congressmen. Ther was th e acute and long-. tanding
rivalry between Dr Srikrishna Sinha and Dr Anugraha Narayan
Sinha. Ther was also the question of Dr Syed Mahmud as some
Congressmen had turned against him aft r hu r I age from Ahmed
nagar Fort jail. In the end, aJl the three w re included in the
Cabinet and I was glad that this was done with the support of
every important Congress leader of Bihar, including Dr Raj ndra
Prasad.
I had made up my mind that we should adopt a generous attitude
towards the Muslim League in the matter of the formation of the
Mini tries. Wherever members were returned to th mbJy on
the League ticket, I sent for them and invited them to co-operate jn
the formation of the provincial miniJtries. I did this both in the
provinces where Congr ss had an absolute majority and in thOJC
where it was the lar~st ingle party. I knew that in many province ,
 India Wins Freedom
particularly in Bihar, Assam and the Punjab, members of the Muslim
League would have been glad to come in, but Mr Jinnah 's policy
was to preventth m from co-operating with the Congr 55.
Th e position was specially difficult in the Punj ab. It was a Muslim
majority province but no party ha~ a clear majority. The Muslim
members were divided between the Unionist Party and th e Muslim
League. I held discussions with both groups. As I have said, under
instructions from Mr Jinnah, the League d elined my invitation.
However, I was able to carry out negotiations in such a way as to
give th Unionist Party the opportunity of forming the Ministry with
the support of Congr 5S. The Governor was personally inclined
towards the Muslim League but he found that he had no option but
to invit Khizir Hayat Khan, the leader of the Unionist Party, to
form the Government.
This was th first time Congress had come into th Government
in th Punjab. This was a d evelopment which had till then b een
regarded as almost impossible. Political circles throughout the
country d elared that I had shown great skill and stat smanship in
th negotiations which had led to th e formation of the Punjab Minis-
try. Independent memb rs throughout the country congratulated
me in unqualifi d terms. Th e National Herald, which is th organ of
the U.P. Congress, congratulated me on the manner in which I had
solv d th complex and difficult problem of th Punjab and went
so far as to say that my handling of the situation was one of the
cl arcst xamplcs of statesmanship and skill in negotiation xhibited
by any Congr ss leader.
I was pl eased by this response in the country but th ere was one
dey lopmcnt, fortunately temporary, which saddened me. From the
very b ginning of my activities in the Congres ,Jawaharlal and I
have b een th b st of friends. W hav always se n eye to ye and
1 aned on on another for support. Th question of any rivalry or
j alousy b tw en us had nev r aris n and I thought would never
ari . In fact my friend hip with the family dated from the days of
Pandit Motiial Nehru. In the beginning I had looked onJawaharlal
a broth r's on nd he had regarded me as hi father's friend.
J waharlal is by nature warm-hearted and generous and personal
jealou i never enter his mind. However) there were some among his
r lations and friends who did not like his cordial relations with me
and sought to creat difficultie and jealousies between us. Jawaharlal
has a w akn s for lh or tical considerations and th y took advantage
Jawaharlal Opposes My Policy
of this to turn him against me. They spoke to him and said th t
the alliance of Congress with th Unionist Party was in prin irk
wrong. They argu d that the Muslim Leagu was a mas organiza-
tion and that the Congress should have formed a coalition with the
Mu slim League and not with th Unionists in th t" Punjab. Thi w.
the line which the Communists had adoptcd openly. J awaharlnl
was partially infiuenct"d by their views and may havl' thought that I
was sacrificing leftist principles in forming a coalition with the Union-
ist Party.
Those who wanted to create a divi sion between J a\ aharlal and
mys If also kept on telling him tha t th e praise showered on mt was
a reflection on all oth r Congress leade rs. They knew his gent"rou.
nature and therefore spoke more about th others than him, but
they insisted that ifhis ov.'Il paper, the National Hrrald, continued to
speak so highly of me, th e result would be that I should soon a hi v
an unrivalled position in the Congress organization and this would
not be good for democracy within th e Congress.
I do not think that personal consid rations had any efTect on Jawa-
harlal's mind, but he may have been influenc d by th e ideoJogi al
sophistries. In any case, during the m eting of th e Congr 55 Working
Committee at Bombay, I found that for the first time since we had
worked tog ther in the Congress, he opposed my line of action on
almost ev ry item. Jawaharlal took the line that the policy I had
adopt d in the Punjab was not corr ct. H v n said that I had
brought down the prestige of the Congress. I was both surpris d and
sorry to hear this. What I had done in the Punjab was to put on-
~ss into the Government despite the fact that th Gov rnor had
been working for the installation of a Muslim L ague Ministry.
Through my endeavours, the Muslim League had b n isolated and
Congress, though it was a minority, had become the d cisive factor in
Punjab affairs. Khizir Hayat Khan was the Chief Minister through
Congress upport and he had naturally come under its influence.
Jawaharlal held that the participation ofCongr in theGov m-
mc:nt without being the majority party was not right. This would
fore the Congre to compromise and perhaps make it r sile from iu
principles. I denied that there was any ri .k of the ongr I giving
up it! principles but at the same time made it clear that if the Work-
ing Committee did not approve of my decision in Lahore, it could
adopt any new policy it li.k d. Congre had not giv n any gu nt
of remaining in office and could come out whenever it chos .
130 India Wins Freedom
Gandhiji came out strongly in support of my views. He said that
though Congress was in a minority in the Punjab, it had s cured a
decisiv voice in the formation and working of the Ministry through
nrgotiation. He held that there could be no better solution from
the Congress point of view and he was against any change in the
d cision I had taken. When Gandhiji expressed hims Ifin catcgorical
terms, all other m mbers of the Working Committee supported me
and Jawaharlal had to acquiesce.
It is possi ble that Jawaharlal ~ It that the matter had gone too far
and had p rhaps hurt my feelings . As was my uSllal practice, I was
staying with Bhulabhai Desai. Jawaharlal came to me early
nrxt morning and with great affl'ction and sincerity assured
me that his criticism did not for a momcnt indicate any lack of
confidence in my leadership. H admitted frankly that his rcading
had been wrong and hc desired tha t we should forget the whole
episod', This was exactly what I had ('xpected of him. His nature is
such thatifh , is moved by an idea, hc expresses it wi thout any mental
reservation, but if he finds later that he has bee n wrong, he never
h sitaH's to admit his mistake. I was pleased by this frank talk. He
and I have always been the best of friends and it had hurt me that
th re should b any difference between us.
I hav' said rarlier that some officers ofth Indian Navy had met me
in Karachi . Among oth r thing th ey had complained about racial
discrimination and said that their protests and representations against
such discrimination had been of no avail. Their discont nt went on
mounting and one day in D elhi I suddenly r ad in th n wspapcrs
that th y had resorted to direct action. They had given notice to the
Gov rnment that unle s their demands wer met by a particular date,
they would resign in a body. This date had now passed and they h td
a mass m ctingin Bombay in pursuance ofthcirearlicrdecision. The
news electrifi d th country and a vast majority of the people at once
sid d with them. The Gov rnm nt was al 0 greatly disturbed. They
called out British troops and placed all hips of the Indian Navy in
charge of British officers and men.
It was clear to me that this W<l!> not an appropriate time for any
maSS m v m nt or dir ct action. We had now to watch the course of
vents and carry on negotiations with the Briti h Government. I
ther fore r; It that this move on th part of the offie rs of th Indian
Navy was wrong. If they sufii red from racial discrimination, this
was not an evil peculiar to them but one common to aU sections of the
Naval Offictrs' Grievanus
Army and the Air Force. They werc- ju tifit'd in prot('sting agniru t
the discrimination but recourse to direct action at the presc-nt timr
seem('d to me unwise.
Mrs Asaf Ali took up tht" caus of the naval officrrs ~lOd bc-t..me
their ardent supporter. She came to Delhi to win my up port.
I told hn that the officers had not acted wisdy and my .. dvi((' to them
was that they must go back to work unconditionally. Thr Bomb. y
Congress telt"phon("d to me for my advicr and I sent thl m. tel gram
to thr same dfnt. Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel was Ihm in Uomb. y
and he also consulted me. I told him that the step takl n hy tht' naval
officns W('fe wrong and th<'y should g bad.. to work . Sardar PaId
asked as to what they should do in case the Gm'e rnmr llt did not give
them the opportunity to return to their work. I rrplied that it was my
reading of the si tuation that the Government would agJl'(' to In thrm
r('turn. In case the Government raist' d any difficulty, we sh lIld t.tkC'
such action as might be proper.
I wa due to Irave for P eshawar the next day in connrxion with
the formation of the Ministry there . How('vcr I post ronI'd my visit
and asked for an immediate interview with the Commandelin-Chi f.
Lord Auchinlrck mt't me in Parli amrnt Hou r at 10 a.m. n('xl
morning. I put for his considerations two points:
( I ) Congress has not approved of th!" action of the naval offic r1
and has advis d th m to go back to work unconditionally. Gongrr
is however anxious that thnt' shculd be no victimization. If the
Government adopted any vindictivc m('asure, ongrctls would takr
up the cause of these officers.
(2) The racial discrimination and other grievancr ~ of tht naval
officers must be exami ned and removed.
Lord Auchinleck spoke in a mo t fri(,ndly spirit. In fact, his tone
was mor cordial than I had xpccted. He said that th r would
be no victimization if the offic(.'l"S return d to duty uncondition ny.
So far as discrimination was concerned, his ("nti re frort would be to
remove it completdy, His replies sati fi d me and I immediat Iy
issued a statement calling upon the officers to r turn to duty and
uring th m that there would b e no victimization.
The revolt of the naval officers in Bombay was f p!"cial igni-
ficance in the context of ,osting circumstane s. This waa the lint
time since 1857 that a 5 ction of th D Ii nee Fore . had op T.Jy
rebelled against the British on a political i u . The rc Ilion was
not an isolated event, f9r earlier there had been the fonnation of the
 India Wins Freedom
Indian National Army under Subhas Chandra Bose out of Indian
prisoners of war. This army had attacked India in 1944 and was
at one stage on the point of capturing Imphal. After the surr nder
of J apan, the British re-occupied Burma and many officers of the
Indian National Army were taken prison rs. They did not rep nt
of their action in having joined th Indian National Army and some
of them were now facing trial for treason. All these developments
convinc d the British that they could no longer rely on the Armed
Forces unless the political probl m orIndia was satisfactorily solved.
I first hard of the captur of the officers of the Indian National
Army wh n I was in Gulmarg after the Simla Confnence. Mr Pratap
Singh, a Judge of th Punjab High Court, came to me onC day in
great excitem nt and r ported that some Indian officers who had
fought th British under Subhas Chandra Bose had been arrested. I
think that on' of his relations was involved in th . affair and he was
greatly worried about the fate of these young men. His own mental-
ity was that of the traditional civil servant. He therefore felt that any
interference by the Congress would prejudi e the case of these
prisoners. H suggested that th Congress should take no interest in
the affairs of the Indian N tion.al Army, for he argued that this would
keep the trial out of politics. I told him that his views were entir ly
wrong. If the Congr ss took no int rest in the matt r, the Govern-
ment would punish th I.N .A. officers and, in some cases, mete out
the extr m penalty. Thes officers included some of our finest young
m nand th ir imprisonment or death would be a serious national
loss. I decided straightaway that Congress should undertake the
d ~ nc of the I.N .A. officers and imm diately i sued a statement to
this ff ct.
As I viewed th matter, I f It that the British Government could
not complain of the conduct of th se officers. A part of the Indian
Army had b n s nt to Burma and Singapore. When J apan occu-
pied th se r gions, the British Government left the Indian Army
to its fate. In fact, it was a British officer who handed over the
Indi n Army to the Japanese. If the Indians had remained supine,
as prisoners of war they would still have be n compelled to under-
take the onstruction of roads or oth r work in factories which
would h lp the Japane e war effort. They would thus have become
pi ythings in the hands of the Japane e and might well have been the
instruments for capturing India for Japan. They adopted a different
attitude and decided they would themselves fight for Indian freedom.
Trial of I. N. A. Ojfiurs
So long as they were pri oners in Japanese hands th~ Briti h Govern-
ment could not help them in any way. If they had iei d with the
Japanese under dun's ev('n such action ould havt" bt't"n ju tilkd.
In fact thcy did bnt< r. Th. ir action ill organizing a rpar. It" rmy
whi hmaintain(ditsidcntityast}1I LiblrationAlmyoflndia\\' lhe
b SI courst' of action in lhl' circum tanct' . In thi way thty n ured
that if the Briti h wcr driven out of India, the country would b
occupied, not by Japanese armies, but by an Indian National mil'.
I therefor saw no reason why membns of the LN.A. hould b
prosecuted.
The Congress hrld that if the Government proposrd to pr . e ut
lhr officers of the I.N.A., th trial should be publi and th .ongr<"
should make th necessary arrangements for Ih ir !rgal defcneC'. I
wrote to Lord W av 11 in this conn('xion and pr s d thaI h should
accept the Congress view. Lord Wavell agr eel and is.~ued or(krs
that a public trial of the officers should be held in the R d Fort.
The trials excited great public enthusiasm and continurd for seve-ral
months. In th end, all the officers were released, eithrr on the
orders of the ourt or as an act of clemency by the Viceroy.
There were a few officers wh o wCr not at first rekased or in who
cases th decision was withheld. This I d to gr at public res ntm nt
and d monstralions wer held in different parts of the country.
When I w nt to L ahore in conm'xion with the formation of the
Punjab Ministry, the students brought out a huge proc ssion. They
marched through the city and came to the house wh'r I was staying.
I had Ii It from the beginning that these demonstrations w re not
justified. I spoke strongly to the students and told them that the
d monstrations were compl tely out of place in vi w of the attitude
tbe Congre had adopted. W e had d cid d to d efend the prison 1'1
and s cure their r elease. All I gal and constitutional m thods w re
being utilized for the purpose and unauthorized d monstrations
instead of h lping harm d the cause. The whole poli tical futu of
India was under di cu .on. A new Governm nt had b en fanned in
Britain with an absolute majority of the Labour Party in ParHa-
m ot. They had promised to find out a solution for the lndi n
probl m and they rou t be given an opportunicy of taking the n
sary action. Congre had accordingly decid d that th ould be
no movement for the pre nt. The country should the fo wait
and ee what directives the Congre i ued.
I have said that the dmonstrations were held in different parts of
10
134 India Wins Freedom
India. In Calcutta, there was violence during some of these demons-
trations. In Delhi, the people tried to set fire to Government build-
ings and destroyed public property. When I returned to Delhi and
met Lord Wavell, he referred to these incidents and said that they
wer not consistent with the assurance of the Congr ss that the
political probl m of fndia would be solved in a p aceful atmosphere.
I ould not but admit that th complaint was justified. I sent for all
the Congre~s work rs in Delhi and told them that a grave crisis faced
the Congress. In all national movements, a stage is reached when
the lead 'rs have to decide wheth r they should lead or follow the
masses. It s ems that in India we had now reached that stag. If
Congr<'ss believed that the Indian problem can be solved only through
pea eful methods, Congressmen must be prepared to carry that
message to the people a nd act in accordance with it. I told them that
I for one was not prepared to follow th e line of least resistance and
acquiesce in whatc-ver the masses did . What had h appened in Delhi
was in my opinion wrong. I said I would try to guide and direct
publi opinion and not merely follow the wishes of the mob. If they
did not lik my attitude, then they would have to find someone else
to lead them.
Before I close this chapter I should like to comment on certain
dev 'Iopmcnts which Jed to th exclusion of Bhulabhai Desai from
the ncwly- lected Congress Party in th Central L gislature. M a ny
were surprised at th time that he was left out but few kn w all the
d tails of the ase. I am afraid that th inner history may remain
unknown unil'ss I place on record all the relevant facts.
Rhulabhai Desai was one of th most successful legal practitioners
in Bombay and in ourse of time b came known as one of the fore-
most lawyers of India. ]ole was not originally an active Congress
worker but when the Go ernment of India Act, 1935 was passed and
ongre s de idcd to ontest the elections, he was returned to the
.cottal embly all the ongress ticket. He was elected the leader
of the ongress Party in the Central mbly and carried out his
duties with grea t di tin tion. His ability and enthu ia m soon carned
bim pI c in the inner ranks of the ongress. He became a member
of the Workin ommitt e nd was counted among its first rank
Ie d n. This ho\ e er m de Ome of the older members of the Gong-
r jeal u of him and lh y f; It th t so much importance should
nOl be given to a man who w a comp ratively recent recruit.
Phul bhai D i did not njoy good health and I had Dot therefore
Bhulabhai's Discussions with Liaqat Ali 135
included him in my new Working Committee. He was not arrest d
in 1942 and was-one of the few top men in the Congress who r mained
outside. I have already referred to the developm nls which took
place after Gandhiji's release in 1944. He had earlier oppo d r odia's
participation in the war effort but aft r his r lease he had ocli r d
Indian co-operation in return for the recognition ofIndian fr>edom.
His efforts did not succeed and the stalemate continued .. om p ople
in Delhi thought that the deadlock might b broken if a s ttl ment
was negotiated, not between the Congress and th Muslim Leagu ,
but between the Congress Party and the L ague Party in the ntral
Assembly. Such an arrangement would obviously be ad Itoe and
temporary, but even if it could be made for th' duration of the war,
it might mak a permanent settlement between Congress and the
League easier to achieve after the end of hostiliti s.
Mutual friends approached Liaqat Ali, Deputy Leader of th
Muslim League Party and Bhulabhai Desai. Liaqat Ali agr d
that exploratory talks should take place and there was a meeting
bl'tween him and Bhulabhai Desai.
Bhulabhai Desai wa~ interest d in the proposal but made it cI ar
that he could not take any step without the approval of th Congress.
He insisted that the und rstanding must be not only between the
parties in the Legislature but between the two organizationIl. All
the Congress leaders were how ver in jail and it was not pos~ible to
consult them. He th n suggested that he would approach Gandhiji
and seek his advice.
Bhulabhai Desai met Gandhiji and reported to him his discllssions
with Liaqat Ali and other fri nds. Gandhiji us d to observe every
~onday as a day of silence and since Bhulabhai met him on a
Monday, Gandhiji wrote out a reply in Gujrati. The purport of his
advice was that Bhulabhai should go ahead and, after ascertaining
the details, report back to him.
Armed with Gandhiji's authority Bhulabhai continued the negotia-
tions and an agreement was reached that the Executive Council
should be reconstituted to include members of the Congr Party
and the League Party. The negotiators desired that as 1 ader of
the Congres Party, Bhulabhai should join the Executive Council
but if this was not possible, Abdul Qayyum Khan, who w then
the Deputy Leader of the ongr Party, hould enter the Council
Bhulabhai reported this development to Qandhiji but for various
~ru the negotiations faile~ and the matter was droppec:t.
 India Wins Freedom
When we all came out ofjail in 1945, these incidents were reported
to us and It'd to a good deal of discussion among Congressmen.
Unfortunately the discussions ignored the fact that whatever
Bhulabhai did was with Gandhiji's knowl dge and permission.
Sardar Patel took a special interest in the matter and somehow the
impression was cr at d that Bhulabhai had tried to enter into the
Executive Council behind the back of the Congress by reaching an
und l"Standing with Liaqat Ali. I have already said that many
Congressmen were jealous ofBhulabhai Desai's rapid advance in the
organization and they were now enraged by what they thought as his
lack ofloyalty. Bhulabhai's opponents wer also successful in turning
Gandhiji against him by making certain allegations against Bhula-
bhai's private life. Many of these charges were false, but th e pro-
paganda was sustain d for several months and did Bhulabhai perma-
nent damage.
Ther wer som people who sought to influence Gandhiji's judg-
ment by working upon his close associates. They used to report
various incirl<'nts to them in the exp ctation that these would
reach Gandhiji's ears. Gandhiji generally had the capacity to ignore
such insinuations and innuendo s but there w re times when his
judgment was aife-ct d if som thing was continually r peated to
him by those who b long d to his p rsonal circle. I rem mber an
occasion wh n Gandhiji's mind had b en poisoned in this way against
Motital Nehru. J awaharlal had also once b n the obj ct of such a
ampaign. But in both these cases when Gandhiji came to know
the- facts h was able to take a fair and objective view of the whole
matter. In the case of Bhulabhai this unfortunately did not happen
and andhiji was accordingly estranged from him.
1 have aIr ady m ntion d that it was UpOD Gandhiji'sdayofsilence
that Bhula hai ought hi permi ion to negotiate with the Muslim
Lc gu so that Gandhiji had given his reply in writing. Bhulabhai
h d pre TV d this note and howed it to Sardar Pat 1 and others.
H point d out th t he had carried out the negotiations with
andhiji's knowl dg nd cons nt nd could not therefore be
blam d.
Th re w in fact no r ply to Bhul bhai's deli nee. Unfortunately
hi prot w not heeded and r ports continu d to circulate that
h h doter d into an intrigu with the I.e gue. F cling against
him b came so strong that when the G neral Elections were held in
the wint r of 1945-6 he was not offered a Congress ticket.
Death oj Bhulabhai Desai 137
This shocked Bhulabhai and affected his h altho He had suiTer d
from heart attacks even before, but now the attacks bt'cam more
frequent. He felt that he had served the Congr ss faithfully and
suffered in its cause and his only reward was rejection and di grace.
I visited Bombay about this time and as usual stayed with Bhula.
bhai. He was in bed and when I ask d him how h f, It he was so
moved that he began to we p. His deeprst regrrt was that Gandhiji,
who kn w all the facts, had not d fended him against hi critics. 1
tried to offer him consolation but it was of no avail. I drscribed the
incident to Gandhiji but I found that by now he had hard so much
against Bhulabhai that his heart was turned against him. Soon
after this Bhulabhai died of heart failure. I cannot but fc '1 a d ' cp
regret whenever I remember the incident, for Bhulabhai had scrv d
the Congress well and was condemned without any justifi ation.
 THE BRITI H ABINET MIS ION
s I survey d the political situation in India in February 1946,

A it was clear to me that the country had undergone a complete

transformation. An absolutely new India had been born.
Th p opl , wheth 'r officials or non-officials, wer fired with a new
d sir for freedom. Ther wasalsoachang ofspiritonth British side.
As I had expe t d from th b ginning, the Labour Cabinet was study-
ing the Indian situa tion from tJI right angle. oon aft'r the assump-
tion of power, it sent a Parliamentary Dc) gation to India. This
D(']egation visited lhe ountry in th winter of 1945-6. I was satisfied
from my on\' rsalions with it members that they had sensed the
chang of t mper in the country. Th y w re onvinc d that Indian
fr dom could not b long delayed and their report to Government
must have str ngth ned th Labour abin t in its resolve to effect an
arly and friendly s ttl m nt
I was Ii tcning to th radio at 9.30 in th ev ning on 17 February
1 46 wll nIh ard th r port of the new British decision. Lord
P thi k Lawr ne had announced in Parliament that the British
ov rom nt would s nd a abinet Mission to India to discuss with
the r pr ntativ s of India the question of Indian freedom. This
w al 0 announ cd in the programme outlined in the Vicerois
sp ccli on the am date. Th 11ission was to consist of Lord P thick
wr nee, cr t ry of tate for India, ir talford Cripps, the
'd nt ofth Board of Trade and Mr A. V. Alexander, the First
rd of the Admiralty. \ ithin half an hour, a repr ntative of the
l'\,SliQCl'lat d Pr arrived and ask d me about my reactions.
1 told him th t I ~ gl d th t the Labour Go emment had taken
d .. ve tep. I w pIe d th t the . .on which was
coming in lud d ir tafford ripps who h d already carried on
n ti tion with u and was th fl re an old friend.
I dded that ne thing med ab ut y clear to me. The new
Briti ~\'ernment , not shirking the Indian problem but facing
it boldly. Thi very important change.
Aulee's Speech Oil Indian Situation 139
On 15 March 1946, Mr Attlee made a statem nt in the Hou
of Commons on the Indian situation. This stat m nt had no
precedent in the history of Indo-British r lation . H frankly
admitted that the situation had completely chang d and cl manded n
new approach. His declaration that any attempt to persi t with old
methods would lead not to a solution, but a cleadlo k, rent'd a
gr at impression in India .
. orne of the points which Mr Attlee made in his spe ch de erve
spe ial mention. He admitt d that there had been faults on both
sides and added that they should now look to the futur rather than
harp on the past. H explained that it was no good applying the for-
mulas of the past to the present situation, for the t mp r of 1946 was
not the temper of 1920, 1930 or even 1942. H went on to say that
he did not wish to stress the differences between Indians, for in spit
of all differences and divisions, Indians were united in th ir desire
for freedom. This was the und rJying d mand of all the Indian p ople
whether they were Hindus or Muslims, Sikhs or Mara lhas, politicians
or ivil servants. 1'.1r Altice frankly admitted that the one ption of
nationalism had continually grown strong r and it now perm at'd
even the soldiers who had rendered splendid service in the war. H
also said that if there were social and economic difficulties in India
these could b resolved only by Indians. He conclud d by announc-
ing that the Cabinet Mission was going out in a positive mood and
with the resolve to succeed.
The Cabinet Mission arrived in India on 23 March. Mr J. '.
Gupta a prominent Congressman of B ngal had acted as host to
Sir Stafford Cripps when he came to India on an earlier occasion.
He told me he was going to Delhi to meet ripps. I gave him a
letter for ir Stafford welcoming him back to India.
I reached Delhi on 2 April 1946. It seemed to m that th most
important subject for consideration at this stag was not the political
i ue between India and Britain but the communal question in India.
The imla Conference had convinced me that the political qu lion
had reached a stage of settlement. The communal differences w re
still unresolved. One thing nobody could deny. As a communitYt the
Mu lims were extremely anxious about their future. It is true that
they were in a clear majority in certain provinces. At the provinci 1
level they had therefore no fears in these areas. They were however a
minority in India as a whole and were troubled by the fear that their
position and status in independent India would not be secure.
 India Wins Freedom
I gave continuous and anxious thought to this subject. All over the
world, the tendency was for the decentralization of pow r. In a
country so vast as India and with people so diverse in languag , cus-
toms and g ographical conditions, a unitary government was obvious-
ly most unsuitable. Decentralization of power in a federal govern-
m nt would also help to allay the fears of the minorities. Ultimately
I came to the conclusion that the Constitution of India must, from
the natur' ofthc case, b federal. Furth r, it must bc so framed as to
nsur autonomy to th provinces in as many subjects as possible. We
had to reconcil the claims of provincial autonomy with national
unity. This ould b done by finding a satisfactory formula for the
distribution of powers and functions between the Central and the pro-
vin ial governments. Some powers and functions would be essentially
c ntral,oth rs e sentially provincial and some which could be either,
would be provincially or centrally exercised by consent. The first step
was to devise a formula by which a minimum number of subjects
should b d dar d a e5S ntially the responsibility of the Central
Governm(nt. Tht's must b long to th Union Government compul-
orily. In addition, there should be a list of subjects which could be
dealt with ntrally if th provinces so desired. This might be called
th optional list for th C ntral Go mment and any province which
o wish d ould d kgatc its pow rs in resp ct of all or any of these
subjects to th ntral Government.
It was lear to m that Def nce, Communications and Foreign
Affairs w r subjects which could b d alt with adequat ly only on an
all-Inrua basi. Anyatt mpt to d al with them on a provincial level
would d feat the purpos and d('stroy th very basi of a Ii deral
ovcrnm nt. C 'rtain other subjects would be qually obviously a
provinci 1 r .spon ibiIi ty, but ther hould b a third list of subj cts
wh the provincial I gislatur would d cid wh th r to retain th m
provinci 1 ubj t or d 1 gat th m to th entre.
The mor I thought about the matter, the cl arer it became to
me th t the Indi n probl m could not be olv d on any other lines.
If on titution w re to b fmm d which embodi d thi principle, it
would en ur that in the Mu lim majority provinces, all subj cts
xc pt thre could be dministered by th province itself. This
would liminat from the minds of th Muslims aU fears of domina-
tion by the Hindu . One< uch f, an walia d, it was likely that
th p inc s would find it an advantage to delegate some other
subjec w 11 to th C ntral Gov mmt'nt. I was also satisfied that,
Metting with Cabinet MissioTl
even apart from communal con id ration, this was the best political
solution for a country like India. India is a ast country with a large
population divided into more or less homogrncou units whi h li\'!!
in differt~ nt provine s. It ,,,,'as necessary to assure to the provinces th .
largest possible m a ure ofautonomy even on gcnrral c nsidrrations
of constitutional propriety and practical administration.
This picture had gradually fonnt'd in my mind and had be rom >

quite clear by the time the Cabinet Mission came to Indi a though
I had not so far discuss d it with my colleagul's. I thou ght that I
should state my position in clear and unambiguous t rm whl'n the
proper tim came.
I m t th Membrl of tht' abinet Mission for the first timl~ on
6 April 1946. The Mission had framed somr questions r; r
discussion. Thr first one dealt with the communal problem in India.
When the Mission asked me how I would tackle th communal situa-
tion, I indicatrd the solution I had alrrady framed. As soon as J
said that th Cen tre shou Id have a minimum list of compu lsory su bjeets
and an additional list of optional ones, Lord PC'lhick Lawr nce
said, 'You are in fact suggesting a new solution of the ommunal
problem.'
Sir Stafford Cripps took special int r st in my suggr'stion and
cross- xamined me at great I ogth. In the nd, he also s m d to
b satisfied with my approach.
The Working Committee met on 12 April when I r port d on
my discus ions with the abin t Mission. I described in somewhat
gr aterd tail th solution ofth communal probl m I had sugg Sled,
Thi was th first tim that Candhiji and my coli 'agu Shad an oppor-
tunityofdi cussing myschem . Th Working Committ e was initially
som what sc ptical about the solution and m mbel'S raised all kinds
of difficulti s and doubts. I was able to meet th ir obj ctions and
clarifi d doubtful points. Finally the Working Commitl e was con-
vinc d about the soundn 55 of the proposal and Gandhiji exprc ed
hia complete agr em nt with the solution.
Gandhiji in fact complimented me by saying that I h d found a
olution of a problem which had till then baffled v rybody. He
said that my solution should allay the fcar of even th m at com
munal among the Muslim Leaguers and at the same tim it w
inspir d by a national and not a s ctional outlook. Gandbiji w
mphatic that only a federal constitution could work in a country like
India. From this point of view also, he welcom d my solution and
142 India Wins Freedom
said that while it did not introduce any novel principle, it brought
out clearly the implications of federalism in the Indian context.
Sardar Patel asked me whether the Central Government would be
restricted to three subjects alone. He said that there were certain
subjects like currency and finance which must from the nature of the
cas b long to the Central sphere. He held that trade and industry
could be d vcloped only on an aU-India basis and the same thing
appli d to commercial policy.
I did not have to r ply to his objections. Gandhiji himself took up
my point of view and answ r d ardar Patel. He said that there was
no reason to assume that provincial governments would differ
from th Centr on qu stions like currency or customs. It would be in
their own interest to have a unified policy in these matters. It was
not therefore nec ssary to insist that currency or finance must be
included in th compulsory list of Central subjects.
Th Muslim Leagu had for the first tim spok n of a possible divi-
sion oflndia in its Lahore R solution. This lateron came to b known
as th Pakistan Resolution. The solution I suggested was intended to
meN th fears of th Muslim League. Now that I had discussed my
s hem wilh my colleagues and memb rs of the Cabinet Mission,
1 felt that th time had come to plac it b fore the country. Accord-
ingly on 15 April 19'~6, I issu d a statement dealing with the
d mands of Muslims and other minorities. Now that the division of
India is a fact and lcn years have passed, I again look at the statement
and find that everything I had then said has come about. As this
tat mcnt contains my onsidered views on the solution of the Indian
problem, If, 11 hould quot it. This is what I said then and would
till sny:
I have considered from very possible point of vjew the s heme of
Poki l.n f, rmul ted by the Muslim Leagu . As an Indian, I have
mined it implication fi r the future oflndia as a whole. As a Muslim
Ih v mined its Iikely effect upon th( fortun of luslims of I ndi .
nsid ring the cherne in all j t aspects I have come to the conclusion
t1 tit u I nnful not onl y for India whole but for Mu I ims in parti-
cuI r. And in f; Cl it cr te more problems than it olves.
1 must confi that the very term. Paki tan goes ag iost my grain. It
u g ta that some portion of the world rcpure while others arc impurt'.
uch divi ion ofterritorie into pure and impure is un-lsI mic and a
rcpudi lion r the '\i pint of Islam. Islam recogni no such division
nd the Proph t s .,. od h m de the whole" rId a mo que for me!
urthcr, it eems th t the sch me ofPak.iAtan is asymboJ of defeatism and
 Pakistan Harmful for Muslims
has been buil t up on the analogy of thc J wish d mand for a national
home. It is a confession that Indian Muslims cannot hold thdr own in
India as a wholc and would be content to withdraw to a corner p i lly
reserv d for them.
One can sympathisc wi th the aspiration of thc J ws for 511 h a national
home, as they are scattercd all over the world and cannot in any region
have any effcctiv{' voice in the admin i ~tration. Thc condition of J ndiun
Muslims is quite otherwisc. Over 90 millions in number they re in
quantity and quality a sufficiently important c1emrnt in Jndi, n life to
influence decisively all questions of administration and policy. Nature
has further helped them by con entrating them in cCl'tain area.
J n such context, th demand for Paki tan loscs all forre. As. 1u lim,
J for one am not prepared for a moment to give up my right to lreat the
whole of India as my domain and to share in th" ~hap inJ.{ of its political
and economic life. To me it seems a sur sign of cowardir tl) give up
what is my patrimony and coni nl mysclfwith a mer fragment 01 it.
As is well-known Mr Jinnah's Pakistan sch me is ba.~('d on his two-
nalion theory. His thesis is that India contains many nationalities bast-d
on religious differences. Of them the two major nations, thc Hindus and
Muslims, must as s parat nations have s 'paratc statc~. WI1(n Dr.
Edward Thompson oncc pointed out to ?-.lr. Jinnah that Hindus and
Muslims live side by side in thousands of I ndian towns, \'illag's and
hamlets, Mr. Jinnah rcplied that this in no way afT< ctcd their st~parat
nationality. Two nations according to Mr. Jinnah confront onc another in
every hamlet, village and town, and h , thcr fore, dcsires that th y
should be scparated into two states.
I am prepared to overlook all other a.'pects of the problem and judge
it from the point ofvicw of Muslim interests alone. I shall go still further
and say that if it can be shown that the scheme of Pakistc n can in any
way benefit Muslims 1 would be prepared to accept it myself and also to
work for its acceptance by others. But the truth is that evcn if I x mine
this scheme from the point of view of the communal interests f the Muslims
themselves, I am forced to the conclusion that it can in no way bmcflt
them or allay their legitimate fears.
Let u consider dispassionately the cons quences which will follow jf
we give effect to the Pakis tan scheme. India will be divid d into two stat ,

tate there will remain3.

one with a majority of Muslims and the other ofHindw. In the Hindustan
crores of iuslims.e tter d in small min riti
all over the land. With 17 per cent in U.P., 12 per cent in Bihar and 9 ptr
eml in Madr they will be weaker than they are today in th mndu
majority provinces. They have had their homelands in th r gion. for
almost a thousand years and built up weJl-known centres ofMwlim culture
and civilization there.
They will awaken overnight a!ld di cover that they have become
 India Wins Freedom
aliens and foreigners. Backward industrially, educationally and economi-
cally, they will be left to the mercies of what would then b come an
unadulterated Hindu raj.
n the oth.er hand, their position within the Pakistan State will be
vuln rable and weak. Nowh re in Pakistan will th ir majority be com-
parahle to th Hindu majority in the Hindustan State.
I n fact, their majority will b so slight that it will be offs t by the
economical, educational and political lead enjoyed by non-Muslims
in th s - areas. Even if thi ~ were not so and Pakistan were overwhelmingly
Muslim in population, it still could hardly solve the problem of Muslims
in Hindustan.
Two States confronting oue another offer no solution of tile problem of
one another's minorities, but only lead to retribution and reprisals by
introdu cing a sys tem of mutual hostages. The scheme of Pakistan therefore
solv s no problem for the Muslims. J t cannot safeguard their rights
wher th y arc in a min rity nor as citizens of Pakistan secure them a
posi tion in Indian or world affairs which they would enjoy as citizens
of a major Stat like the Indian Union.
It may be argu d that if Pakistan is so much against the interes t of the
Muslims themselves, why should such a large section of Muslims be swept
away by its lure? The answer is to be found in the attitude of certain
ommunal exlr mists among the Hindus. When the 1uslim L ague began
to spcnk of Pakistan, they read into the scheme a sinister Pan-Islamic
onspiracy and b gan to oppo e it out of fear that it foreshadowed a
combination of Indian Muslims with trans-Indian Muslim States.
The oppo ilion acted as an incentive to the adherents of the League.
With impl- though untenable logic they argued that if Hindus were so
oppo d to Pakistan, surely it must be of benefit to Muslims. An atmo -
phere of emotional frenzy was created which made reasonable appraise-
ment impo ibl and swept way especially the younger and more impres-
sion ble among the Mu linu. I hav~, however, no doubt that when the
pr nt frenzy h died down and the question can be considered dis-
p i n tely, th e who now support Pakistan will themselves repudiate
it harmful for Muslim interests.
The fi rmula which I h ve ucceeded in making the Congress accept
ums wb lever m fit the Pakistan scheme contains while all its defects
and drawb re voided. The b is of Pakistan is the fear of interference
by the Centre in Muslim m jority areas a& the Hindus will be in a majority
in the Centre. TIle Congress meets thi fear by granting full autonomy to
the provin 'al UN and vesting a11 residuary pow in the provinces, It
halo provided for two lists of Central ubjects, one oompulsory and one
pti n 0 that if any provincial unit 10 wan ,it can administer all IUb-
j it elf tept. minimum delegated to the Centre. The Congress
them therefore ensures that Muslim majority provinces are internally
Fedtralism 07Z?y Solution 145
free to develop as they will, but can at the same time influence th Centre
on all issues which affect India as a whol .
The situation in India is such that all a ttempts to establish a c ntrali cd
and unitary governmen t are bound to fail. Equally doomrd to f: ilure is
the attempt to divide India into two States. After considrring all aspects
of the question, I have come to the conclusion that the only solution an
be on the lines embodied in the Congress fonnula which allows ro III for
development both to the provinces and to India as Il. whole. The ongrr
formula meets the fear of the Muslim majority areas to allay which the
scheme of Pakistan was formed . On the other hand, it avoids the def1 ts
of the Pakistan 5ch me which would bring the Muslims whrrr they arc in
a minority under a purely Hindu government.
J am one of thClse who consider the pr sent chapter of communal bitter-
nr~s and differences as a transient phas in Indi"n life. I firmly hold thut
they will disappear when India assumes the responsibility of her own
destiny. I am reminded of a saying of ladstonc that th best cur for a
man's fear of the water is to throw him into it. imilarly India must
assume responsibility and administer her own affairs beli rc fcars ,nu
suspicions can be fully allayed.
lh n India attains her destiny, sll' will forget the prrscnt hapter of
communal suspicion and conflict and face the problems of m dern lif,
from a modem point of view. Differences will no doubt persist, but they
will be economic, not communal. Opposition among political parties
will ontinue, bu t they will be based, not on religion but on conomic and
political issues. Class and not community will be the basis of rutur align-
ments and policies will be shaped accordingly. If it be argued that this is
only a faith which events may not justify J would say that in ny case
the nine crores of Muslims constitute a factor wluch nobody n ignor
and whatever the circumstances, they are strong enough to safeguard
their own de tiny.

The League had mov d further along the path of s paratism

inc the Lahore Resolution. It did not however mak it clcar as to
what exactly was its d mand. The wording was vagu and capable
of more than one interpretation but the g neral purport was clear.
The Muslim League demanded that the Muslim majority provinces
hould have full autonomy. Sikandar Hay t Khan in his support 0
the Resolution had given the same interpretation but now the ague
1 aden gave their demand a much wider connotation. Th y talk d
100$ Iy of the partition of the country and the establi hut nt of n
ind pendent State for the Muslim majority are . The Cabin t
fusion was not pre par ~ to concede the demand. On th contrary,
 India Wins Freedom
the Mission was in favour of a solution more or less on the lines I
had suggested.
Till almost the end of April, the negotiations continued. There
w re meetings with the Mission and the Mission also held discussions
among th mselves. In the meantime, the Mission took a recess and
w nt 10 Kashmir. The summer had now set in and Delhi was getting
holter and hotler. I was anxious for a little rest and I had first
thought of going to Kashmir and had written to friends ther . When
I found that the Mission was going to Kashmir I changed my plan.
I thought that my stay in Kashmir might be interpreted to mean
that I wanted to be in contact with the Mission and influence its
judgm nt. I therefore went inst ad to MUS500rie.
I have already said that after the failure of the Cripps Mission,
5hri Rajagopalachari started a campaign that the Congress should
a cep1 th demands of the Muslim League. He even went to the
xl nt of saying that partition of th ountry should be accepteJ in
principle. This I d to his disso iation from the Working Committee
and h b came unpopular with the rank and file of Congressmen.
andhiji also did not approve of Rajaji's activities. He did not
th r for wish that Rajaji should meet the Cabinet Mission during
our n gotiations. He asked Rajaji to r main in Madras. Rajaji felt
this bitt rly but for som time he kept quiet. When I went to Mussoo-
rie during the re es , I received a letter from him and learnt for the
first time that he had been prevented from coming to Delhi by
Gnndhiji. I ~ It that Gandhiji was not ven now willing that Rajaji
should ome to D lhi. I did not therefore consult him but on my
own re pon ibility wrot to Rajaji that if he wish d, he could come.
Rajaji t ok me at my word and arrived. Gandhiji was a little dis-
pleased but 1 told him that Rajaji had come only after receiving my
letter. I al 0 explained to Gandhiji that I did not consider it proper
th t Raj ji houid be pr vented from coming to Delhi in this way.
The Mi ion returned to Delhi on 24 April and reviewed the
constitutional negotiations in conjunction with the Viceroy. After
several di u 'on, ir tafford Cripps called on me to have an infor-
m 1 . u ion on the issues which had been raised. On 27 April,
the Mi ion . ued a tatement that further informal discussions
, ere d . bl to find basis for ttlement by greement between
the main parti . The delegation therefore invited the Presidents of
the ong and the luslim gue to Domin te representatives of
tlle \\ orkin ommittee ofth 0 bodies to "leet the delCf'ltion and
Discussions with Cabinet Mission
carry on negotiations at Simla. The Working Committe authoriz d
me to appoint the r presentatives to confer with the Cabinet lis-
sion. Accordingly I nominated Jawaharlal and ardar Pat I as my
colleagues to represent Congress. Th Governm nt arranged for our
stay in imla. Gandhiji was not formally a member ofth negotiating
body, but the Mission invit d him to come up to :i01la so that h
would be available for consultations. H ac cded to th ir request
and stayed in Manor Villa. W held informal me ,tings of the \ ork-
ing Committee th re so that Gandhiji could attend.
Discussion started at Simla on 2 May and continu'd till 12
May. Apart from the formal conference we had many informal
discussions. I was staying at th Retreat and on several 0 casions
Members of the Mission came to mect m th re. I also w nt t
meet them either individually or colic tively as th ca. ion
demanded. Asar Ali or Humayun Kabir sometimes accompani cl
me during these visits.
After about two weeks we returned to Delhi. Th l\1emb rs of th
Cabinet Mission held further discussions among th ms Ivrs, and
framed their proposals. These w re announced by Mr Aulee in th
House of Commons on 16 May. A White Paper was :11 0 issu d
embodying the Plan and it was stated that the British Cabin t
Mission considered this to be the b st arrangem nt to ensur th
sp edy setting up of a new Constitution for India. I have included
the abinet Mission Plan in the Appendix and read rs who are
interested may compare it to the Schem I had formulated in my
statement of 15 April.
I was in favour of continuing our discussions over the abin t
Mi sion Plan in imla. I told Lord WavcU that it would be belt r to
conclude our deliberations in Simla as the climate in D Ihi was not
congenial for the cool and car ful consideration of the important
i ues involved. Lord Wavell said that the seat of ovemment w
in Delhi and work was likely to suffer if he stayed away too long.
:1y comment was that D 1hi pr nted no difficulty for him the
Viceregal Lodge was air-conditioned and he never mov d out of it.
It was however otherwise with the members of the Cabin t M' ion
and us. We would find it extremely difficult to work in th furnace
which Delhi had become. Lord WavelJ replied that it w a matt r
of only a few days.
In the end, it turned out that we p d .the rest of May nd the
Thu
bole ofJune in Delhi. year the weather w unusually hot The
 India Wins Freedom
m mbers of the Cabinet Mission felt it, and most of all Lord Pethick
Lawrence, who faint d one day b ecause of the heat. The Viceroy
had arranged an air-condition d room for me and this certainly
helped, but the weather was so trying that yerybody wanted to bring
the discussions to an early conclusion. Unfortunall')y, the diffiTences
betw en Congress and the L ague could not be resolved so easily
and discussions failed to indicate any solution.
We had enough headaches with th e Cabinet Mission and its Plan,
but a new one was added by development s in Kashmir. The N ational
Conference under th leadership ofSh('ikh Abdull ah had been fight-
ing for political rights for the peopl of Kashmir. When the Cabinet
Mission arriv d h ' thought h would usc this opportunity to press
his claims. H raised the slogan of ' Q)lil K ashmir' and placed his
cas befor th Cabin t Mission. His demand was that the Maharaja
of Kashmir should end autocracy and give se lf-government to the
p pI'. The Maharaja's Government replied by arr sting Sheikh
Abdullah and his coli agues. Som time back a representative of the
National Ollfi-rence had been taken into the overnment and it
had s med that a compromise might b achitved. The arrest of
Sheikh Abdullah and his associat s dashed the e hopes.
Jawaharlal had always taken a keen inter sl in Kashmir's struggle
for rcpr s ntative Government. When th se new development
took plac ,h felt that h ought to go to Kashmir. It was al 0 thought
n cs,ary that omcarr ng m ntsshould b mad forthelegal defence
fthe !rae! rs of the Na tional Confer nc . I asked Asar Ali to att nd
to this. Jawaharlal aid that he would accompany As f Ali and so the
two of them I ft. The Maharaja' Gov mmcnt was irritated by this
deci ion and is ued a ban against their ntry into Kashmir. When
they I ft Rawalpindi and approached th Kashmir frontier, they
w r stapp d at Uri. Th y r fu cd to ob y th ban and the Ka hmir
vernm nt arrc t d th m. This naturally Cr at d a gr at ensation
in the ountry.
I w. not" ry happy bout th e dev topm ts. While I re nted
lh ction f th Kashmir Go crn.ment, I thought that this was not
the pro r c 'on to t rt a ne, quruT I ov r hmir. I
oke to lh ic roy nd aid that the Gov rn.m nl of India should
rr. ng th. t I could peak ovel' the t lephon with Jawaharlal.
H h d b n d lain d in d k bungalow and I succe ded in getting
the conn xion only after some time. I told Jawaharlal that I of
the vi that he should return to Delhi as soon as possible. It would
The Cabinet Mission Plan
not be proper for him to insist on entering Kashmir at Ule present
stage. So far as the question of Kashmir was concerned r assured
him that as Congress President r would take up the matter my elf.
I would also work for the r lease of Shei kh Abdullah and his colleag-
ues, but Jawaharlal should immediately return.
At first Jawaharlal objected, but after some discussion and on my
assurance that I would mys If take up the cause of Kashmir he
agreed. I th n requested Lord Wavell to arrang for an aeroplane
to bring back Jawaharlal and Asaf Ali. It was about s v n in th
evening when I made ulis request but he sent an a roplane that v ry
night. It reached Srinagar at about 10 p.m. and return.ed to D Ihi
withJawaharial and Asaf Ali at two in the morning. Lord Wavell's
attitude over the whole matter was extremely friendly and 1 greatly
appreciated it.
I have already mention d that the Cabinet Mission published
its scheme on 16 May. Basically, it was the same as the one sk tch d
in my statement of 15 April. The Cabinet Mission Plan provid d
that only three subjects would belong compulsorily to th Central
Gov rnmcnt. These wer Defence, Foreign Affairs and Communi-
cations, which I had suggested in my scheme. Th Mission howev r
added a new element to the Plan. It divid d the country into
three zones, A, Band C, as the memb rs of the Mission felt that
this would give a greater sense of assurance to the minorities. Section
B would include the Punjab, Sind, the N.W.F.P. and British Balu-
chistan. This would corutitute a Muslim majority area. In Section C,
which included Bengal and Assam, the Muslims would have a small
majority over the rest. The Cabinet Mission thought that this
arrang ment would give complete assurance to the Muslim minority,
and satisfy all legitimate ~ ars of the L agu .
Th Mission had also accepted my view that the majori ly ofsubjects
would be treated at the provincial I v I. Muslims in the majority
provinces would thus exercise almost complete autonomy. Only
certain agreed subjects would be dealt with at the sectional level.
Here also, the Muslims were assured of a majority in ctions Band
C and would be able to sati fy all their legitimate hop s. So far the
entre was concerned, there were only thr e subject which fr; m the
natur of the case could not b provinciaJJy administer d. Since the
Cabinet Mi ion Plan was in spirit tlle same as mine and the only
addition was the irutitution of the three Sections, I felt that weshould
accept the proposal.
1
 India Wins Freedom
At first Mr Jinnah was completely opposed to the scheme. The
Muslim League had gone so far in its demand for a separate indepen-
d nt tate that it was difficult for it to retrace its steps. The Mission
had stated in clear and unambiguous terms that they could never
recommend the partition of the country and the formation of an inde-
pend nt tatc. Lord Pcthick Lawrence and Sir Stafford Cripps said
repeat dly that th y could not see how a state like the Pakistan
envisaged by the Muslim League could be viable and stable. They felt
that my formula, which gave the largest possible autonomy to the
provinces and reserved only three subjects for the Central Govern-
ment, o~ red the only solution. Lord P ethick Lawrence said more
than once that tIl acceptance of this formula would m an that in the
b ginning the Muslim majority provinces would delegate to the
Central Government only three subjects and thus ensure complete
autonomy for themselves. The Hindu majority provinces would on
th other hand voluntarily agre to transfer to th Central Governm nt
several more subj cts. The Cabinet Mission thought there was
nothing wrong in this. In a true Ii deration, the Ii derating units must
hav the freedom to decide on the number and nature of the subj cts
to b transfi rr d to the Central Government.
The Muslim League Council met for three days before it could
come to a decision. On the final day, Jinnah had to admit that
ther could be no fair r solution of the minority problem than that
pres nt d in the Cabinet Mission Plan. In any case he could not get
bett r terms. He told the Council that th scheme prcs ntcd by the
Cabinet Mi sian was the maximum that he could secure. As such. he
advis d the Muslim League to accept the scheme and the Council
vot d unanimously in its favour.
Whil I was still in Mussoorie, some members of the Muslim League
had met me nnd e..'(pressed their sense of bewilderment and surprise.
They aid candidly that if the League was prepared to accept the
.nbinet Mi ion Plan, why had it rai ed the cry of an independent
tate and led Mu lims a tray? I discussed the qu tion with them in
detail. In the end they were forced to admit that '\ hatevermight be
th iew of the Muslim L gue the Muslims of India could not
pt' t any term b tter than those offered in the bin t M. .on Plan.
In our discu ions in the Working Committo , I pointed out that
the C binet M on Plan basically the same as the cheme
11 h d ccept uch the Working Committee did not have
much diffi ulty in c pting the main political solution contained in
 Tribute to Members of Mission 15t

the Plan. There was however the question about India's r'lation to
the Commonwealth. I had asked the Mission to leave the d ision to
India. I believed that in this way alone ouId a right decision b
reached. I had also said that it was my opinion that if th qu tion
was left to India, it was not unlikely that India might decide in favour
of continuing in the Commonwealth. ir tafford rip!> assured m
that this would he so. In the Cabin t Mission Plan, the questi n was
left to the decision of independent India. This also made it casi r
for us to accept the Cabinet Mission Plan. After protracted nc-gotia-
tions, the Working Committee in its resolution of 26 June accc-pt d
the Cabinet Mission's Plan for the future, though it found its If
unable to accept the proposal for an int rim Covernm onto
I would here like to pay a tribute to the way in whi h th abin t
Mission conducted th negotiations. Sir tafford was an old friend
and I had already expressed my opinion about him. I had not met
Lord P thick Lawrence and Mr Alexander b -fore, but form d a
very favourable impression of both of them. I was spe ially impr s -
c-d by the spirit of sympathy and und rstanding display d by Lord
P thick Lawrence. He was an old man but he had the spirit of youth.
His transparent sincerity, his deep love for India and his accurate
assessment of our difficulties mad us pay the greatest attention to
whatever he said. Mr Alexander did not speak much, but when ver
he made a remark, it was characteriz d by great shrewdness and
I political insight.
The acceptance of the Cabinet Mission Plan by both ongr SS
and Muslim League was a glorious event in the history of the freedom
movement in India. It meant thatthedifficultquestionofIndianfr -
dom had been settled by negotiation and agre ment and not by
methods of violence and conflict. It also seemed that the communal
difficulties had b en finally left behind. Throughout the country
there was a sense ofjubilation and all the p ople were united in their
demand for freedom. We rejoiced but we did not then know that
our joy w~ premature and bitter disappointment awaited us,
 THE PRELUDE TO PARTITION
OW that the political problems seemed to be solved, a fresh

N subject d mand d my attention. I was elected President of

the ongrcss in 1939. According to the constitution of the
Congress, my office was for only one y ar. In normal circumstances,
an w Prcsid nt would have been elected in 1940. The war interven-
d and soon aft r individual satyagraha movement began. Normal
activities were suspend d and we w r arrested in 1940 and again
in 1942. ongress was also declared an illegal organization. There
could therefore be no question of the election ofa Pr sident to succ ed
me and I remain d President throughout this period.
The situation had now returned to normal. The question naturally
arose as to whether there should be fresh Congress elections and a
new Pr sid nt rhos n. As soon as this was mooted in the Press, there
was a g neral d mand that r should be re-elected Presid nt for
anoth or t rm. The main argument in favour of my re- lection was ,
that I had b en in charge of n gotiations with Cripps, with Lord
Wav 11 and at pr sent with the Cabin t Missiou. At the Simla Con-
fer nee, I had for the first time succ eded in arriving at a successful
solution of the political problem, even though the Confer nee finally
brok on the communal issue. There was a g n ral feeling in Con-
gres tbat sine I had conducted the n gotiations till now, I should be
ch. rg d with the task of bringing them to a successful clo e and
impl menting th m. Congr circles in B ngal, Bombay, Madras
Bihar and the U.P., openly exprc cd the opinion that I should be
ch rged with the responsibility of giving eHi ct to the propo aI! in
the C bin t Mission Plan.
1 ns dhow r that th r wa orne difference of opinion in the
inn r circ1 of th Congre High Command. I found that S mar
P t 1 nd hi fri nd wi h d th t he should be elect d Pr sident.
ltb m form v ryd lie tcqu tion ndlcouldnotatnrstm ke
up my mind to wh t to do. I thought the matter over carefully
 Jawaharlal Elected Congress President
and finally came to the conclusion that since r had been Presid nt
for seve n years from 1939 to 1946 I must now relir . 1 th reforc
decided that I should not permit my name to be proposed.
The next point which I had to decide was the choice of my succes-
sor. I was anxious that th next P sident should be one who agreed
with my point of vi wand would carry out the same poli y as I
had pursued. After weighing the pros and cons, I came to the on-
elusion that Jawaharlal should b the n w Pr sid nt. A cordingly
on 26 April 1946, I issued a statement proposing his l1am
for the Presid ntship and appealing to Congressmen that they
should elect Jawaharlal unanimously. Gandhiji was prrhaps sam
what inclined towards Sardar Patel , but once I had proposed
Jawaharlal's name, he gave no public indication of his views. Some
people did propose th nam s ofSardar Patel and Acharya Kripalani,
but in the nd Jawaharlal was accepted unanimollsly.
I acted according to my best judgm nl but th way things have
shaped since then has mad e me think that I may have been wrong
and those who wanted me to continue for at least another year w re
perhaps in the right.
My decision caused a commotion among Congr ssmen all over the
country. Several important leaders travelled from Calcutta, B mbay
and Madras to persuade me to withdraw my stat ment and allow
my name to be put up. Appeals in the Press also appeared to th
,same effect. But I had already taken a decision and did not fe I that
1 should change my view.
The Muslim League Council had accepted the Cabinet Mission
Plan. So had the Congress Working Committee. It howey r needed
the approval of the A.I.C.C. We thought this would b a fonnal
matter as the A.I.C.C. had always ratified the decision of the Work-
ing Committee. Accordingly, a meeting of the A.I.C.C. was called
at Bombay on 7 July 1946. Once this decision was taken th rc
was no n ed for me to stay on in Delhi. The heat w becoming
intolerable and I returned to Calcutta on 30 June. On 4 July I left
Calcutta for Bombay. Sarat Chandra Bose was travelling in the
same train. At almost every station men em.bLed in larg numben
and their slogan was that I should continue Congre Pre ident.
rat Babu came to my compartment at every large station and
kept on repeating, cSe e what the public want and yet what have
you done.'
The Working Committee met on 6 July and prepared
J 54 India Wins Freedom
draft resolutions for th consideration of the A.I.C.C. The first
r solution d all with th Cabinet Mission Plan . I was asked to move
it, as strenuous opposition was expccted from the leftist group in the
Congr ss.
Wh n th A.I.C.C. met, I invit d Jawaharlal to take over as
ongrcss President from me. Sardar Patel moved a vote of thanks
for my s rvices as Congress President during these critical years and
spoke in detail about the way many insuperable difficulties had been
over om . Then I moved the resolution on the abinet Mission
Plan and briefly spoke about its main featur s. The lrftists opposed
it with great veh m 'ne . The ,ongress So ialists took the leading
part in the opposition, for it had become a cheap device to assume
an ('xtrcmc position and attempt to win popularity. They adopted
an unreal and theatrical attitude. Yusuf M harally was then very
ill but they brought him on a stretcher to create greater sympathy
in the audien C. He also spoke against the abinet Mission
Plan.
In my reply I explain d in detail what were the implications of the
Plan and point d out that th Plan was in fact a great victory for
,ongress. I said that tl1is mark d the achiev ment of independence
without a violent and bloody uprising. The British acceptance of
India's national d mand a a r suIt of non-viol nt agitation and
neg tiation was unprec d nted in world history. A nation of forty
eror s was b coming indepcnd nt through discussion and settlement .,
a.n d not as a result of military action. From this point of view alone,
it would be she r lunacy to under stimate our victory. I further
point d out that th Cabin t Mission Plan had accept d in all essen-
tial th Congress point fview. The Congress had stood for the free-
dom and unity of India and opposed all fissiparous tendencies. It
p d my understanding how p ople like the Congress Socialists
auld r gard such a ictory as a defeat.
My spe ch had a decisive influence on the audience. When the
ot w taken the resolution was p ed with an overwhelming
m.jority. TIm th al of approval was put on the Working
ommiU{' resolution c pting the abin t }.:. ion Plan.
e Ii w days, I recei d tele rams of congratulation &om
L rd P thick L wrenc and ir tafi'ord ripp. They were happy
that th .1... h d cc pted my re lution and congratulated me
on my bl pr nt tion of the abinet . 'on Plan.
Now happened one of th unfortunate events which changed
Jawaharlal's Statement at Press Conference 155
the course of history. On 10 July, Jawaharlal held a Press onf, ren e
in Bombay in which he made a statement \vhich in normal circum-
stances might have passed almost unnoticed, but in the existing atmos-
phere of suspicion and hatred, set in train a m st unfortunat seri
of consequences. Some Press representatives asked him whether
with the passing of the Resolution by A.I.C.C., the Congress
had accepted the Plan in toto, including the composition of th
interim Government.
Jawaharlal stated in reply that Congress would cnter the onsti-
tuent Assembly 'completely unfetter d by agreements and fr e to
meet all si tuations as they arise.
I

Press representatives further ask d if this meant that the Cabinet

Mission Plan could be modified.
Jawaharlal replied emphatically that the ongress had agreed only
to participatc in thc onstitucnt Assembly and regard d itself fr
to change or modify the Cabinet Mission Plan as it thought best.
I must place on record that Jawaharlal's statem nt was wrong.
It was not correct to say that Congress was fr e to modify the Plan
as it pleased. We had in fact agreed that the 'entral overnment
would be federal. There would be the compulsory list of three
'entral subjects while all other subjects remain d in the provincial
sphere. We had further agreed that there would be the three Sections,
viz. A, Band C in which the provinces would b grouped. These
matters could not be changed unilaterally by Congres without th
consent of other parties to the agreement.
The Muslim League had accepted the Cabinet Mission Plan, as
this represented the utmost limit to which the British Government
would go. In his speech to the League Council, Mr Jinnah had
clearly stated that he recommended acceptance only because nothing
better could be obtained.
Mr Jinnah was thus not very happy about the outcome of the
negotiations, but he had reconciled himself as there was no alter-
native. Jawaharla}'s statement came to him as a bombshell. He
immediately issued a statement that this declaration by the ong-
r Pr 'dent demanded a review of the whole situation. He accord-
ingly asked Liaqat Ali Khan to call a meeting of the League
Council and issued a statement that the Muslim gue Council
had accepted the Cabinet Mission Plan in Delhi as it was ured
that the Congress had a~ accepted the scheme and that the Plan
would be the basis of the future constitution of India. Now that the
 India Wins Freedom
Congress Presid nt had declared that the Congress could change
the scheme through its majority in the Constitu nt Assembly, this
would mean that the minorities were placed at the mercy of the
majority. His view was that Jawaharlal's declaration meant that
the Congress had rejected the Cabin t Mission Plan and as such
the Viceroy should call upon th Muslim L ague, which had accepted
the Plan, to form the Government.
Th Muslim League Council met at Bombay on 27 July. In his
op ning sp ch Mr Jinnah reiterated the demand for Pakistan as
th only course left op n to th Muslim League. After three days'
discussion, the Council passed a resolution re:iecting the Cabinet
Mission Plan. It also decided to resort to dir ct action for the
achievement ofPaki tan.
I was xtr('mcJy perturbed by this n w development. I saw that
th s h<:m' for which I had work<:d so hard was being d<:stroyed
through our own action. I felt that a meeting of the Working Com-
mitt . must b held immediately to r vi w the situation. The Work-
ing ommitte a cordingly met on 8 August. I pointed out that
if we wanted to sav the situation, we must make it clear that the
vi w of th . Congress was expressed by the resolution passed by the
A.!. . . and that no individual, not even the Congress President,
ould hang it.
Th Working Committee f It that it fac d a dil rnma. On the one
sid ,th prestig of th Congr S5 Pr sid nt was at stake. On the oth r,
th selll m nt which we had so painfully achi v d was in danger.
To r pudiat' the Pr sid nt's statement would weak n the organiza-
tion but to giv up the Cabinet Mission Plan would ruin th country.
inally, w draft d a Resolution which made no reii renee to the
Pr Cow r nc but reaffirm d the decision of the A.I.C.C. in the

The Working mmitlee regret to note that the Council of the AlI-
Indi MusUm L gue, re ersing their previou decision, have decided not
to p rticipate in the On tituentlu embly. In this period of rapid transi-
liol1 from depend nce on a foreign power to full independence, when
t nd intricte political and economic problems h ve to be faced and
sol ed, the I rgest m ure of co-operati n among the people of India
and th ir representatives is Iled for, 0 that the ch nge-over hould be
smooth IlDd to the advantAge of all concerned. The Committee realise
th t there are differences in the outlook and objectives of the Congress
and the Iuslim League. evuthd ,in the larger interests of the
Working Committee's Resolution 157
country as a whole and of the freedom of the people of India. the Com-
mittee appeal for the co-operation of all those who seek the freedom and
good of the country. in the hope that co-operation in common t. ks m y
lead to the solution of many ofIndia's problems.
The Committee have noted that criticisms hav been advanced on behalf
of the Muslim League to the crect that the Congress acceptan e of the
proposals contained in the Statement of iay 16th was conditional. The
Committee wish to make it clear that whit they did not approv of all
the proposals contained in this Statement. they accepted the scheme in
its entirety. They interpreted it so as to resolve the inconsist ncies COn-
tained in it and fiJI the omissions in accordance with the principles laid
down in that Statement. They hold that provincial autonomy is a basic
provision and each province has the right to d cid wh th('r to join a
group or not. Questions of interpretation will be de ided by th pro-
cedure laid down in the Statement itself. and the Congr 55 will advis
its repres ntatives in the Constituent Assembly to functi n ac or-
dingly.
The Committee have emphasised the sovereign character of theConsti-
tuent Assembly, that is its right to function and draw up a constitution
for India without the interference of any external pow r or authority.
But the Ass mbly will naturally function within the internal limitations
which are inherent in its task, and will therefore seek the largest measure
of co-operation in drawing up a constitution of free India allowing the
greatest measure offre dom and protection for all just claims and interetts.
It was with this object and with the desire to function in the Constituent
Assembly and make it a success, that the Working Commitlee passed their
resolution on June 26, 1946 which was subsequently ratified by the All-
India Congress Committee on July 7, 1946. By that decision of the
A.I.C.C. they must stand. and they propose to proceed accordingly with
their work in the Constituent Assembly.
The Committee hope that the Muslim League and all others concerned,
in the wider interests of the nation as well as of their own, will join in this
great task.

We had hoped that this Resolution of the Working Committee

would save the situation. Now there was no long r any doubt that
the Congress had accepted the Cabinet Mission Plan in its entirety.
If the Muslim League accepted our Resolution, it could return to the
early position without any loss ofprcstige. Mr Jinnah did not how-
ever acc pt the position and held that J awaharlal's statement repre-
ented the real mind of Congre . He argued that if Congre could
change so many times, while the British were still in the country and
power had not come to ita'hands, what as urance could th minoritie
 India Wins Freedom
hav that once the British left, Congress would not again change and
go back to the position taken up in Jawaharlal's statement?
Th R solution of the Working Committee accepted the Cabinet
Mission Plan in its entirety. This meant both the long-term plan
amI th proposals for the interim Government. This unequivocal
ace ptanc of th Cabinet Mission Plan by the Working Committee
1 cl to an imm 'diate response from the Viceroy. On 12 August,
J awaharlal was invited by him to form an interim Government at
the Centre in the following t rms:
1 [is Excellency the Viceroy, with the approval of Hi s Majesty's
.. overnmcnt, has invit d the Prcsid nt of the Congress to make proposals
for the immediate formation of an interim Government and the President
of the Congress has accepted the invitation. Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru
will shortly visit New Delhi to discuss this proposal with His Excel len y
the i croy.
Mr Jinnah issued a stat ment the same day in which he said that
'the latest resolution of the Congre s Working Committee passed
at Wardha on 10 August do s not arry us anywhere because
it is only a r petition of the Congress stand taken by them
from th very beginning only put in a differ ot phraseology.' He
rcj ct d Jawaharlal's invitation to co-operate in the formation of an
int rim Gov rnment. Later, on 15 AugustJawaharlal met MrJinnah
at his house. Nothing however came out of their discussion and
th situation rapidly deteriorat d.
" h n the Lague oun il met at the end of July and decided to
r ort to dir ct action, it had also authorized Mr Jinnah to take any
action he liked in pursuance of the programme. Mr Jinnah declared
16 August as th 'Direct Action Day', but he did not make it clear
what the programme would be. It was generally thought that there
w uld b another meeting of the Muslim League Council to work
out the detail, but this did not take place. On the oth r hand
1 n tic d in a.l utta th t a strange situation was developing. In
the past politi 1 parties had observed special days by organizing
hartnl , taking out proc 'ODS and holding meetings. The League's
'Di ct etion Day seemed to be of a different type. In Calcutta,
1 found en al {; cling that on 16 ugust, the Muslim League
w uld tta k ongressmen and loot Congress property. Further
Ct t d wb n the Bengal Government decided to declare
u t public holiday. The Congress Party in the Bengal
bly prot t d against this decision, and when this proved
'Direct Action Day' 159
ineffective, walked out as a protest against the Govcrnm nt's poLi y
in giving effect to a party decision through the u of Gov rnment
machinery. Therc was a gen ral s nse of anxicty in alcutta whi h
was heightened by the fact that th Governm nt was und r th
control of the Muslim League and Mr H. ' . uhrawardy was th
Chicf Minister.
The Congress Working Committee had on 9 August app intl'c1 a
Parliamentary Sub-Committee consisting of 'ardar Vallabhhhai
Patel, Dr Rajendra Prasad and myself. On th 13th w held a
meeting 'to di cuss a proposal to be submitted to the \ ' j '('roy for the
formation of the int rim Gov rnment.' J awaharlal now all d a
meeting of the Parliamentary Committee for th . 17th. J ac rdingly
lcft for Delhi by planc on the 16th.
The 16th of August was a black day in thc history of India.
Unprecedented mob viol ncc plung d the great city of Calcutta into
an orgy of bloodshed, murder and t rror. Hundr ds of liv s were
lost. Thousands were injur d and prop 'rty worth r res of rup('es
was d stroyed. Processions were tak n out by th' Leagu whi h
began to loot and commit acts of arson. Soon thc whol . city was in
the grip of goondazs of both communiti '5.
arat Chandra Bos , thc leadcr of the B ngal ongr s , had gon
to the Governor and asked him to take imm diate action to bring
the situation under control. He also told the Gov rnor that hand
I wcre required to go to Delhi for a meeting of the Working om-
mittee. The Governor told him that he would 8 nd thc Military
to escort us to the airport. I waited for some time but nobody arriv d,
I then, started on my own. The streets were deserted and the city
had the appearance of death. As I was passing through Strand Road,
I found that a number of carters and darwans wer standing about
with staves in their hands. They attempted to attack my car. Even
when my driver shouted that this was the car of the ongr leader,
they paid little heed. However, with great difficulty I got to Dum
Dum just a few minutes before the plane was due to leave. I found
there a large military contingent waiting in trucks. When I ask< d
why they were not helping to r tore order, they r pli d that their
orders were to stand ready but not to take any action. hroughout
Calcutta) the Military and the Police w re tanding by but remained
inactive while innocent men and women were being kill d.
The 16th of August .1946 was a black day not only for lcutta
but for the whole ofIndia. The turn that events had taken m de it
160 India Wins Freedom
almost impossibl to expect a peaceful solution by agreement between
the Congress and the Muslim Leagu . This was one of the greatest
tragedi s ofIndian history and I have to say with the deepest regret
that it had follow d int"xorably from the opportunity given to the
Muslim Lcagu to reopen th whole question of political and commu-
nal selll ment. Mr Jinnah took full advantage of this mistake and
withdrew from the L ague's early acceptance of the Cabinet Mission
Plan.
Jawaharlal is one of my dearest friends and his contribution to
India's national life is s cond to none. He has worked and suffered
for Indian freedom, and since the attainment of independence, he
has b com' th symbol of our national unity and progress. I have
n('verthdcss to say with regret that he is at times apt to be carried
away by his f clings. Not only so, but sometimes he is so impressed
by theor tical consid rations that he is apt to underestimate the
realities of a situation.
His fondness for abstract theory was responsible for his statement
about the nstitucnt Assembly. The same theoretical bias led him
to commit a similar mistak in 1937, when the first lections were
held under th Govcrnrn nt of India Act, 1935. In these elections,
th Muslim League had suft r d a gr at setback throughout the
ountry xc pt in Bombay and th' U.P. In Bengal, the Governor
of the provine had practically mad up his mind to form a League
mment but th success of the Krishak Praja Party upset his
c lculations. In th other Muslim majority provinces like the
Punjab, Sind and the N.W.F.P., the League had suffered equal
setbacks. In Bombay th . L ague had won a number of seats but it
w in the U.P. that the League attained its great st success, mainly
on a count of the support given to the League by the Jamiat-ul-
Ultma-i-Hind. The Jamiat had supported the Muslim League under
the imp ssion that after the elections, the Muslim League would
work in co-operation with the Congress.
houdh ri Kh liquzzaman and Nawab Ismail Khan were then
the leaders of the Mu lim League in the U.P. When I came to
Lucknow to form the Go ernment, I poke to both of them. They
a ured me th t not only would they co-operate with the Congre ,
but uld fully support the Congress programme. They naturally
pee ted th t the 1uslim Le gue would have some share in the new
Go ernm nt. The local position was such that neither othem could
eoter the ernment alone. Either both would have to be taken
Jawaharlal's OjJer Unacceptable to U.P. Leagut 161

or n ither. I had ther fore held out hopes that both would be takrn
into the Government. If the Ministry consisted of s ven m mbers
only, two would be Muslim L aguers and the rest would all be
Congressmen. In a cabinet of nine, the Congress majority would b
still more marked. Aft r discussion with me, a note was prepared to
the ffect that the Muslim League party would work in co-operation
with the Congress and accept th e Congress programme. Both
Nawab Ismail Khan and Choudhari Khaliquzzaman signed this
document, and I left Lucknow for Patna as my presen r was
necessary for the formation of the Ministry in Bihar.
After some days, I returned to Allahabad and found t my gr at
regret that Jawaharlal had wrill n to Choudhari Khaliquzzam. n
and Nawab Ismail Khan that only one of them could b tak n
into the Ministry. He had said that the Muslim League party ould
decide who should be included, but in the light of what I have said
abov , neither was in a position to come in alone. Th y thtrefor
expressed their regrets and said that they were unabl to accept
Jawaharlal's offer.
This was a most unfortunate development. If the U .P. L agu "s
oft r of co-operation had be n accepted, the Muslim L agu party
would for all practical purposes hav merg d in th ongr s.
Jawaharlal's action gave the Muslim Leagu in the U.P. a n w
lease of life. All stud nts of Indian politics know that it was from
the U.P. that the League was re-organiz d. Mr Jinnah took full
advantage of the situation and start d an oft nsive which ultimately
led to Pakistan.
I found that Purshottamdas :randon had taken a leading part in
the whole affair and influenced Jawaharlal's judgm nt. I did not
have much respect for Tandon's views and I tri d to persuade
Jawaharlal to modify his stand. I told him that h had made a great
mi tak in not bringing the L ague into the Ministry. I also warn d
him that the re ult of his action would be to cr at new life in the
Muslim League and thus bring about n w djfIiculti in the way of
Indian fr dom. Jawaharlal did not agr with me and h Id that
his judgment was right. He argued that with a tr nglh of onJy
twenty-six the Muslim Leaguers could not claim mor than one
eat in the Cabinet. When I found that Jawaharlal ~ adamant,
I went to Wardha and sought Gandbiji's advice. Wh n I xplained
the hole situation to bi.m, be agr ed with me and 'd he would
advise Jawaharlal to modify his stand. When Jawaharlal put the
 India Wins Freedom
matter in a dift rent light, Gandhiji submitted to Jawaharlal and did
not pr 5S th matter as he should have done. The result was that
th r was no s ttlcment in the U.P. Mr Jinnah took full advantage
of this situation and turned the whole League against the Congress.
Aft r th el ctions, many of his supporters had been on the point of
leaving Mr Jinnah, but now he was able to win them back to his fold.
Jawaharlal's mistake in 1937 had been bad nough. The mistake
f1946 prov d v n more costly. One may perhaps say in Jawahar-
lal's d r. nce that he nevcr expected the Muslim League to resort to
dir ct a tion. Mr Jinnah had n vcr been a believer in mass move-
m nt. I have myself tried to understand what brought about this
chang' in Mr Jinnah. He had perhaps hoped that when the
Muslim Leagu r jec ted th e Cabinet Mission Plan, the British
Government would reopen the whole question and hold further dis-
cussion. He was a lawY'r and perhaps felt that if discussions were
held again h could gain some more advantage by pressing his
demands. His al ulations howev r prov d wrong. The British
OVl'rnrn('nt did not oblige Mr Jinnah by initiating fresh discussions.
ir , taft rd ripps had be n in corr spondence with me through-
out this p riod. I had written to him that the Cabinet Mission had
h ld discussion with the Congress and th Muslim League for over
two months and finally framed a plan which both the Congress and
the L agu had a fpt d. It was unfortunate that the League had
withdrawn from that position, but that r sponsioility for this rested
with th L ague. This must not how vcr lead to a reopening of the
whol qu stion. If this was done, it would mean that there could
n ver b any finality in our n gotiation with the British. It would
hav a most ad rse effect on public opinion and create fresh prob-
I ms. ir tafford Tipps T plied that he agreed with me and his
ie, wa that the Government would adopt the same attitude.
Events turn d out as I had exp cted. I have already mentioned
that on 12 August 1946 the Viceroy i ued a communique inviting
J waharl 1 to form the int rim Government.
, met in Delhi on 17 August under the shadow of the
disturban es \ hich were taking place in Calcutta and elsewhere.
MrJinn h, we knew, w not likely to acceptJawaharlal's invitation
to nt r the ovemrneot. In f1 ct his reply declining the invitation
b d been.re 'ved on the 16th. Jawaharlal repeated his offer of co-
operation and id th t the door would always be open for the Muslim
League, but by no things had moved toafar for a friendly settlement.
 THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT
HAVE said that Congress had entrusted the Parliamentary

I Committee with the task of forming the illterim Govnnmenl.

Accordingly Jawaharlal, Patel, R ajendra Prasad and I m t in
Delhi on the 17th. My colleagues pressed hard that I shollld join
the interim Government. Gandhiji was also of the same vi(w. It
was a delicate question for me but after careful consideration I cam
to the onc1usion that I should remain outside. I thn for advis d
that Asaf Ali should be taken into the 'abinet. Wh n Asaf Ali h<' ard
this, he also pressed that 1 should join, but J did not agree. Many
of my friends h Id then and still hold that my decision was wrong.
They felt that the interest oftb country and th crucial time through
which we were passing demanded my participation on the overn-
ml"nt. I have thought over the matter since th n and I am not slIre
today that I was right. It is possible that I might hav help d
I the country more if! had joined the Government and not remained
outside. I had tbought then I could render gr atcr servic from
outside, but I now recognize that at that time membership of the
Government offered greater seop .
At the time of the Simla Conference, I had pressed strongly for the
inclusion of a Parsee in the Cabinet. Now that the ongress was
forming the Government, I again pressed for the acceptance of my
view. After some discussion my colleagues agreed. Sine the Parsee
community was concentrated in Bombay, we thought that ardar
Patel would be in a better position to advise us on the choice of the
Parsee representative. We accordingly left the choice to him and
after some time he sugge ted the name of Mr . H. Bhabha. We
later on found out that Mr Bhabha Wa! a friend of ardar Pat )',
n and could not by any means be regarded a Jead r, or even a
true rep ntative of the Parsee community. Our selection prov d
wrong and after some time, he dropped out of the overnment.
We abo decided that tbe Government bowd include an experienced
 India Wins Freedom
economist as the first Indian Finane Member. We selected Dr John
Matthai, though he was not in any sense a Congressman. In fact
th r was no rigid insistence on the inclusion of party men at the time
of th formation of the int rim Government.
The Muslim League was not only disappointed but enraged. It
felt that it had been let down by the British. It attempted to stage a
trong demonstration in Delhi and elsewhere, but its attempts failed.
Neverthrless th re was bilt rn ss and trouble throughout the coun-
try and Lord Wavell f It that he must persuade the L ague to join
the Government. He sent for Mr Jinnah, who came to Delhi and
h ld sev ral m etings with him. Ultimately on 15 October the
Muslim League de id d to join the interim Government.
During this period, I met Lord Wavell several times. He told
me that unl S5 the League participated in the Government, the
programme for carrying out the Cabinet Mission Plan would b~
upset. He pointed out that communal troubles w re continuing and
w r likely to continue till th League join d the Governm nt. I told
him that ther had n vcr been any objection from the Congress side
to the parti ipation of the League. In fact, I had repeatedly urged
th Leagu to com into the Gov rnm nt. Jawaharlal, both before
and after h . join d the Gov rnrnent, had also issu d an appeal to Mr
Jinnah to o-op rate.
At this stag I I is u d a furth r stat m ot pointing out that the
abin t Mi sion proposal had met all the legitimate fears of the
Muslim L ague. It gave th Muslim Leagu compl te fr dom to
function in th Constitu nt Assembly and place its own point of
view. The L ague had ther fore no justification" hatever to boycott
the Con tituent Assembly. When I met Lord Wavell next, he told
m that h had greatly appreci. ted my tand and sent a copy of
my tatem Ilt to Li qat Ali with a requ st to show it to Mr Jinnah.
1 must offer ~ w remarks at this stage about the nomine s that
Mr Jnn,h sent to the Executi e ouneil. Apart from Liaqat Ali
the m t important and experienc d leaders of th Muslim League
K.bw j NazimuddinofB ngal and Naw b I mail Khan of the
.P. It w t en for gr nt d that ife r the League accept d office,
th e thr mt"D would b includ d among th L ague's nominees.
uring the Simi Conference, th e w re the n mes that we~
gain nd gain m ntioned. Now that th L ague had decided to
nler the Ex cutive Council, 'Mr Jinnah act d in a mo t peculiar
manner. Khw J uimuddin and awab Ism iI Khan had never
 Ltague Members of the Interim Government 165
taken an extreme position in the di put s between th Cong
and the League. This had obviou ly displ as 'd Jinnah . H thought
~ that they would r fuse to be 'yesmen' and he th'refor d id d 10
exclude them from his list. It would however have creat d a furore
in the League Council if this fact was pr maturely known. H th r -
fore induced the League 0 11 neil to pass a r olution d 'legati ng full
authority to him.
When he submitted his list to Lord Wav 11, the names h indud d
were those of Liaqat Ali, 1. 1. Chundrigar, Abdur Rub Nj hlar,
Ghaznafar Ali and Jogendra Nath Mandal. I shall have a word to
say about J. N, Mandai separately. The other thre nomin es of
the League were completely unknown . They wer dark horses about
whom even members of the League had little information. It is of
course true th at the League had never taken any part in th ' political
struggle and as such had few leaders of nalional importanc . N v r-
thcless, among its members there were xperienced admiuistrators
like Khwaja Nazim uddjn and Nawab Ismail Kh an. They wer all
discarded in favour of Mr Jinnah's three henchmen.
On 25 O ctober, the names of the MusLim League Mem b rs of
the Interim Government were announced. Khwaja Nazimuddin and
Nawab Ismail Kh an along with other Musli m League I ad rs were
waiting anxiously in the Imp rial Hotel [or th announc ment. Th y
w re absolutely sure about their own inclusion and so were th ir
supporters. Accordingly, a large number of Muslim L ague Mcm-
, bers had come with garlands and bouquets. When the names wer
announced and neither was included in the list, one can imagi ne
their disappointment and anger. Mr Jinnah had poured ice-cold
water on their hopes.
An even mor ridiculous thing the Muslim League did was to
include the name ofMr Jogendra Nath MandaI in its list. M r Jinn h
had done his best to make the Congress nominate only Hindus,
but in spite of his efforts, Congress had nominated Hindu,
riuslim, Sikh, Parsec, Scheduled Caste and Christian members on
the Executive ouncil. Mr Jinnah felt that he must show that the
League could also repr ent other communities and decided to in-
clude one non-Muslim among his nominees. Accordingly, he lee
r Jogendra Nath MandaI. It did not strike Mr Jinnah that his
crion was inconsistent with his earlier claim that Congr should
nominate only Hindus and the Muslim League only Mu.slinu. Besides,
the choice of his nominee caused both amusement and anger.
12
166 India Wins Freedom
When Mr Suhrawardy had formed a Muslim League Ministry in
B ngal, the only non-Muslim included in his Ministry was Mr
Jogendra Nath MandaI. He was then almost unknown in Bengal and
had no position what ever in all-India politics. Since he was a nominee
ofth Muslim League and had to b given a portfolio, h was appoint-
d Law M mbC'r. Most of the Secretaries to the Government of
India w I'e then British. Mr Mandai also had a British Secretary who
complained almost daily th at it was diffieult to work with a Member
lik Mr MandaI.
Now tllat the League had agreed to join the Government, the
ongress had to re consti tut e the Government and accommodat
th representativl's of the League. W had to decide who should
I a e Ih(' Government. It was felt that Mr Sarat Chandra Bose,
ir Shafat Ahm d Khan and Sy d Ali Zaheer should resign to make
room for the League nominees. Regarding the portfolios, Lord
Wav Jl had sugg st'd that one of the major portfolios should go to
a r presentative of the League. His own suggestion was that we
should give up the Home Department, but Sardar Patel, who was
then Home Member, v h mently opposed the suggestion. My
view was that the issue oflaw and order was essentially a provincial
subject. In the picture envisaged in the Cabinet Mission Plan, the
Centre would have very little to do in this field. As such, the Home
Ministry in th C ntr would not have much importance in the n w
set-up. I was ther forc for accepting Lord Wavell's suggestion, but
amar Pat J was adamant. He said that jf we insisted, he would
rather I a th Gov("rnm nt than give up th Home D partment.
We then onsid r d oth r alternativ s. Rafi Ahmed Kidwai
uggcstcd that w should offer the Finance portfolio to the Muslim
L gue. It was no doubt on of the most important departments,
but it w a highly t hnical ubj ct and th Leagu had no member
,ho ould handle it. Kidwai' view was that becaus of the technical
n tur of the ubj ct, the L ague would refuse the offer. If thi
happ ned, the ongr would 10 e nothing. If on the other hand
the gue nominee ccept d the Finance portfolio, he would
oon m k a fool ofhims If. He b lie ed that either way Congre
would tand to gain.
Sardar P t I jumped at the proposal and gave it hi strongest
upport. I tried to point out that Finance was the key to Govem-
m nt, nd w would hav to face major difficulties if Finance was
\lDd r the ntrol of the League. S"rdlU' Pate!colplter d br sa~
 Fi1la1lce Portfolio 10 Liaqat Ali 1 7
that the League would not be able to manag Finan (' and \\' uld
have to decline the offer. I did not feel happy at th decision, but
;> since all the oth rs agreed I submitted. The iceroy wa thert' fore
informed that th Congress would offer Finance to n nomin e of
the Muslim League.
When Lord Wave ll conveyed thi infonnation to l\(r jinnah,
he said that he would give his r ply the next day. It seems that, t
first Mr Jinnah was a lilll uncertain about the offer. He had
decided to nominate Liaqat Ali as the hid rt"presc'ntativ(' of the
L ague in the Cabinet, but he was doubtful if Liaqat ould ade-
quately handle Finane. Chaudhary Mohammed Ali ofth Finance
Department heard this news and he immcdiat ly conlact('d Mr
Jinnah. He told him that the offer of the> ongrcss wa~ a real winclf:dl
and marked a great victory for the League. H had n ver exp ct d
that Congress would agre to hand over Finan e to the Muslim
League. With the control ofth Department of Finance, th L. gue
would have a say in every Department of Gov mment. He assured
Mr Jinnah that he need have no fears, He would give every h Ip
to Mr Liaqat Ali and ensure that he discharged hi s duti s ffectively.
Mr Jinnah then accepted the proposal and accordingly Liaqat
Ali became the Memb r for Finance. Congress soon realized that
it had committ d a great blunder in handing over Finane t th
Muslim League.
In all countries, th Minister in charg of Finance plays a k y role
in the Governm nt. In India, his position was even more important,
for the Briti h Government had treated the Finance Memb r as th
custodian of its interests. This was a portfolio which had always
been h Id by an Englishman specially brought to India for the
purpose. The Finance Memb r could interfere in very D partment
and dictate policy. Wh n Liaqat Ali b came th Finance Member,
he obtained posses ion of the k y to Government. Every propos J
of every D partm nt was subject to crutiny by his D partment.
In addition he had the power of veto. Not a Chaprasi could
be appointed in any Department without the sanction of his
Department.
Sardar Patel had been very anxious about retaining th Home
Membenhjp. Now he realized that he had played into the hands
01 the League by offering it Finance. Whatever proposal he made
was either reject d or modified beyond recognition by Li qat Ali.
Ria pcni ent interference made it difficult for any Congress
168 India Wins Freedom
Memb r to function effectively. Internal dissensions broke out within
the Government and went on increasing.
The fact is that the Interim Government was born in an atmos-
phere of suspicion and distrust between Congress and the League.
Even b fore the League joined the Government, its distrust of the
Congr S5 had influenced the composition of the new Executive
Council. When the Council was first constituted in September 1946,
a question arose as to who should be in charge of Defence. It will be
r memb red that difli renee over the Defence portfolio was one
of the reasons for the fail ure of the Cripps Mission. Congress wished
that Defence should be held by one of its own trusted men, but
Lord Wavell pointed out that this was likely to create difficulties.
H want d D fenc to be kept completely outside politics. If a
Congress Member was in charge of Defence, this would give the
L ague a handle for making unfounded charges. At the same time
he mnd it clear that even if the League came into the Government,
he would not agree to place D fence in charge of a nominee of the
Muslim League. He suggest d that the Defence Member should
b n ither a Hindu nor a Muslim. Sardar Baldev ingh, a ikh,
was at that time a Minister ill the Punjab and on Lord Wavell's
suggestion we agreed that he should have charge of Defence.
I must mention h re another small incident to show how far
suspicion and distrust had develop d in the minds of the nominees
of the Muslim L ague. After the Interim Government was formed,
it had been agr cd that all the Members should meet informaUy
before the formal me tings of the Cabinet. It was felt that if the
Memb rs had informal discussion among themselves, it would help
to dev lop the convention that the Viceroy was only a constitutional
head. Th e informal me rings were held by turn. in the rooms of
diffi rent Members of the Council, but very often Jawaharlal asked
the other members to tea. Usually the invitations w re sent by
J.wallarlal's Pri ate ecr tary. After the Muslim League joined the
abin t, th usuo.llett r of invitation to all Members of the Council,
including the nominees of the Muslim L ague, was sent by the
Priv te cretary. Liaqat Ali took great exception to this and said
th the fi It hurnili ted that a Private ecretary to Jawaharlal should
n him to t . B .d J h did not agree that J awaharlal had any
right i -President of the Council to hold such informal meet-
hlgs. Though he denied the right to J waharlal, Liaqat Ali himself
st led holdi~ sirnijlU' meetings \ . th the nominees of the M usliIQ
 Jawaharlal's Mistimed Frontier . Tour I6g
League. This is a small incident, but it shows the I ngths to whi h
the Muslim League representatives were prepared to go in their
non-eo-operation with the Congress.
In the latter half of October, J awahadal took a step whi h w
unnecessary and which I oppos d. His nature is how' er su h that
he often acts on impul e. As a rul he is open to pcrsuasi n, but
sometimes he makes up his mind without taking all the facts into
consid ration. Once he has done so, he tends to go ahead regardl ss
of what the consequences may be.
The North West Frontier Province had an overwhelming
majority of Muslims; both in 1937 and since 1946, the Ministry there
was dominated by Congress. Khan Abdul GaITar Khan and his
Khudai Khidmatgars were mainly responsible for this happy state of
affairs. In fact, we had become accustomed to depend on Kh an Abdul
Gaffar Khan and his brother Dr Khan Saheb in all matlers cone rn-
ing the Frontier Province.
oon after the Interim Government was formed, orders w re
issu d for the stopping of the aerial bombardment of tribesmen in
south Waziristan. In the meantime, Jawaharlal was r cciving
official reports that a large section of the people in the Frontier were
against Congress and the Khan brothers. Local officers r peatedly
said that the Congress had largely lost local support and that the
people had transferred their loyalty from Congress to the League.
,Jawaharlal was of the view that these reports were not correct and
were fabricated by Bri tish officers who were against Congress.
Lord Wavell did not agree with Jawaharlal, though he did not either
accept the official reports, in toto. His view was that the Fronti r
was almo t equally di vided between the Khan brothen nd the
Muslim League. The impression in Congress circles was that the
overwhelming majority of the people were with the Khan brothers.
Jawabarlal said that he would tour the Frontier and CIS the
situation for himself.
When I heard this, I told Jawaharlalthat he should not take any
hasty action. It was difficult to know what the exact ituati n in
the Frontier was. There were factions in every province and there
was bound to be a group opposed to the Khan broth t'S. Cong
had just umed office in the entre and had not yet consolidated
i position. His tour of the Frontier at tlili stage would give the
" "dent elements an opportunity of organizing their opposition to
Congress. Since a majority of the officials were also against tbe
 India Wins Freedom
Congress, they would sympathize with, if not actively support,
these opposition elements. It would therefore be better if he post-
pon d his visit till a more appropriate time. Gandhiji supported
my view but J awaharlal insist d and said that whatever be the
onsequences, he would go.
The Khan brothers were c rtainly right in claiming that a large
s ction of the people in the Frontier supported them. They had
howev r, exaggerated the ext nt of their infiu nee. This was natural,
for one invariably ov restimates one's own strength. Perhaps they
also wished to impress on us that while th re wcr differences
in other provine s, the Frontier was solidly with Congr ss. In fact,
how v r, ther was quite a powerful group against the Khan brothers.
Dr Khan aheb's terms of offiee as Chief Minister had given addi-
tional str ngth to such opposi tion. He had the opportunity of winning
ov r the ntire province, but he had committed mistak s which had
add d to the strength of th opposition.
m of th mistak s were of a purely p rsonal and social nature.
Th Frontier Pathan is famous for his hospitality. He is willing to
har th last pi ce of his br ad with a guest and his table is open
10 v ryon . H xp ts similarhospitality from olh rs and especially
from thos who occupy any high position in soci ty. Nothing
ali nates a Pathan more than miserlin 5S and Jack of g nerosity.
nfi rtunat ly, this was the r sp t in which the Khan broth rs fi 11
ry short of th xp ctation of th ir followers.
The Khan broth rs were w ll-to-do, but unfortunately they were
not ho pitable by t mp rament. Th y hardly v r invited anybody
to th ir table ven aft r Dr Khan Sah b b came Chief Minist r.
lfpeopl am to th mat t a or dinner-tim, th y w re never asked
t stay for th m al. Their mi rline xtend d ven to public
funds p t under th 'ir dir ction. During the G n ral Elections,
pIn d I rgc amount t their di po aI, but the Khan
p nt as little as po ible out of th c funds. Many candi-
t in th Ie clons b cau e they did not r cci sufficient or
tim 1 hlp. L t r, when th y am to know that the fund ,ere
lying idl , th m D b came bitter Demi of the Khans.
Jawaharlal Impresses the Pathans
me that they had seen such biscuits in Dr Khan Saheb's house, but
he had never offered biscuits or even a cup of tea to any of them I
The actual position in 1946 was that th Khan brothrrs did not
r~oy as much support in the Frontier as w in Drlhi I.h ught.
When Jawaharlal reach ed Peshawar, this discovc-ry arne to him
with an unpleasant shock. Dr Khan ahcb wa then th hief
Minister of the province and th e Ministry was a Congr ' Ministry_
I have already said that the British officers wert' against 'ongr
and had aroused publicfecling against the Ministry. Wh cnJawah. rIal
landed at the airport, he found thousands of Pat hans maSS('d thn
carryi ng black flags and shouting anti-slogans. Dr Kh an .th 'b
and other Ministers who had com to re ei" Jawaharlal weT
themselves under police protection and proved compl 'tely im'ITt- tiv .
As Jawaharlal emerged, slogans were raised against him and som
people in the mob tried to attack his car. Dr Khan Sahcb was so
worried that he took out his revolver and threatened to hoot. nly
under this threat did the crowd give way. The ars had to proc('C'd
under police escort.
The next day Jawaharlal left Peshawar for a tour of th tribal
areas. He found everywhere a large section of the p oplc agairull
him. The Maliks ofWaziristan werc largely r sponsi ble for the de-
monstrations against him. In some places his car was stoned and
Jawaharlal was once hit on the foreh ad. Dr Khan ah b and his
colleagues seemed so completely helpless that J awaharlal took the
situation into his own hands. He exhibit d ncith r w akn s nor fear
but show d the great st courage. His intrepid conduct made a gr at
impression on the Pathans. Aft er his return, Lord Wav II expr sscd
hi regr t for the whole affair and want ed an >nquiry to b made
into the conduct of the officers, but Jawaharlal did not agree lh l
any action should be tak n against th m. This greatly impre cd
Lord Wavell and I also admired Jawaharlal's stand.
Both Congress and the Muslim League had originally accepted the
Cabinet Mission Plan, which meant that both had cepted the
Constituent Assembly. So far as Congre s was concerned, it w'
still in favour of the Cabinet Mi ion Plan. The only obj ction rai d
from the Congee side was by certain leaders from m, who
objected to the formation of the C group. They w r p by n
i. explicable fear ofBengal. They aid that if Bengal and m were
grouped together, the whol.e r gion would b dominaL d by Mu lims.
This objection had been rai cd by the e sam leaders imm diately
17 2 India Wins Freedom
after the Cabinet Mission had announced its Plan. Gandhiji had
initially accepted the Cabinet Mission Plan and declared that 'the
Cabinet Mission proposals contain the seed to convert this land of
sorrow into one without sorrow and suffering.' He went on to say
in the HariJan, 'After four days of searching examination of the
State pap r issued by the Cabinet Mission and the Viceroy on behalf
of th British Gov rnment, my conviction abides that it is the best
docum nt that the British Government could have produced in the
circumstances.'
Gopinath Bardoloi the Chief Minister of Assam however persisted
in his opposition and submitted a Memorandum to the Congress
Working Committee opposing the grouping of Assam and Bengal as
proposed in th abinct Mis ion statement. In the Working Com-
mitte , we felt that we should not reopen the question of grouping.
In ord r partly to me t the objection of our colleagues from Assam but
mainly on grounds of principle, we did however raise the question of
European participation in th I ction of the Constituent Assembly.
I wrot to the Viceroy that Congress might r ject the whole of the
abinet Mission proposals if the European M 'mbers of the Bengal
and Assam Legislatures participated in the elections to the Constituent
Ass mbly, either by voting or by standing as candidates. This objection
was m t as the Burop ans in th B ngal Assembly made a declara-
tion that th y would not s ek representation. In the meantime how-
ever Gandhiji's i ws changed and h gave his support to Bardoloi.
Jawaharlal agr d with me that the fears of the A sam leaders were
unjustifi d and tried hard to impress th m with his views. Unfortu-
nat Iy tb y did not listen ither to Jawaharlal or me, specially since
Gandhiji was now on th ir sid and was issuing stat ment.~ support-
ing their stand. Jawaharlal, howe~r, remain d steadfast and gave
me his full support.
1 have already said that th League's reje tion of the Cabinet Mission
Plan had caused u a gr at d al of anxiety. I have also mentioned
the t p which the '\: rorking Committ e took to meet the League's
obj tion. This w did by pa 'ng a r lution on 10 Augu t in which
it w clearly tated that in pite of our dissatisfaction with some of the
pro al ontain d in the abinet Mi ion Plan we ccepted the
em in i entirety. Thi did not how vcr tisfy Mr J innah.
Apnrt from th of hi arguments \ bich r have already mentioned,
be held th t the \ orking ommittee did not till state in cat gorical
terms that the provine would join the group envisaged in the
Attlee Invites Viceroy and Party Leaders 173
Cabinet Mission Plan. Both the British Government and Lord Wavell
agreed with the League on this particular point.
I was all the time trying to iron out the differences through discu -
sion and Lord Wavell fully supported my efforts in ulis dir ction.
This was one reason why he was anxious to bring th Muslim 1. ague
into the Government, and he therefor welcomed the statement I had
made in this behalf. He genuinely believed that ther could be no
better solution of the Indian problem than that outlin d in the
Cabinet Mission Plan. H repeat dly told me that even fr m the
point of view of the 1uslim League, no better solution was possible.
Since the Cabinet Mission Plan was largely based on the scheme I had
formulated in my statement of 15 April, I naturally agr d with him,
Mr AtUee was also taking a personal inter st in the Indian d velop-
ments. On 26 November 1946 he invited Lord Wavell and r presen-
tatives of the Congress and the League to meet in London in another
attempt to resolve the deadlock. At first the Congress was not willing
to accept this invitation. jawaharJal in fact told Lord Wavcll that
there would be no point' in going to London for furth r discussion.
All relevant issues had been thrashed out again and again and it
would do more harm than good to r open th m.
Lord Wavell did not agree with jawaharlal and discuss d the
matter in further detail with me. He said that if the present attitude
of the Muslim League continued, not only would the administration
suffer but a peaceful solution of the Indian problem would become
more and more difficult. He further argued that discussions in
London would have the advantage of allowing the I aden to take
more objective and dispassionate view. They would be fr e from
local pressure and the continual interference of their followers. Lord
Wavell also stressed the point that Mr Attlee had been a friend of
India and his participation in the discussions might prove helpful.
I recognized the force of Lord Wavell's arguments and persuaded
my colleagues to change their point of view. It was th n decided
that Jawaharlal should represent Congress. The League was re-
pr ented by Mr jinnah and Liaqat Ali whil Baldev Singh w ot on
behalf of the Sikhs. The discussions were held from the 3rd tiU the
6th of D cember, but yielded little or no result.
The mojor differences concerned the interpretation of the clauses
lating to grouping in the Cabinet M' ion Plan. Mr Jinnah h Id
that the Constituent ~mbly had no right to chang the structure
of the Plan. Grouping was an e ntial part of th Plan and oy
174 India Wins Freedom
change regarding grouping would alter the basis of the agreement.
The Plan had itself provided that after the groups had framed the
Constitution, a province could opt out. This Mr Jinnah said was
suffici nt protection for any province which did not wish to belong to
the group to whi h it was alloLled. Th Congress leaders of Assam
held on th e other hand that a provine cou ld stay out from th e begin-
ning. It n d not join the group at all and could frame its constitution
indep ndentl y. In other words, according to Mr Jinnah the provin-
e s must fi rst j in th group and could thereafter, if they wished,
separate. According to the Congress leaders of Assam, the provinces
could start as separate units and could th r after join the group jf
th y so wish d. Th Cabinet Mission had held that the interpretation
of th L ague on thi s point was correct. Mr Jinnah argued that it
was on the basis of the distribution of powers among the Centre, the
Provinces and th Groups that he had persuaded the League to
acc pt th Plan. A sam ongress I aders did not agree, and after
som h sitation, Gandhiji as I have already said, gave his support to
th int rpr'tation sugg sted by the leaders from Assam. In fairn ess,
I have to admit that th er was force in Mr Jinnah's contention.
n 6 D c mb r, the British Cabin t issued a statcm nt in which
it upheld the point of vi w of the Muslim League on grouping, but
this did not h I th br a h betw 0 oogr S5 and the Leagu .
The fir t me ting of the Constituent Assembly was held on 11
D mb r 1946. The question aro e as to who should be Presid nt
ofth cmbl),. BothJawaharlal and ardar Pat 1 were of the view
that some n not in th overnm nt should be Ie t d President.
Th y both press d m to ace pt th office but I did not Ii el inclined
to agr e. veral other nam s w re then discu ed but there was no
agr m nt. Finally Dr Raj endra Pr ad was lected though he was
a m mb r of the Government. Tilis prov d a v ry happy choice,
for he card d ut the duti s ofPr sident with great distinction and
oro d v lu bI sugg slions and advic on many critical issues.
I Ita rur ady s id th t wh n th Interim Government was form-
d in pt mber 194 Gandhiji and my colleagu s had pre cd me
to join. 1 h d ho\ ver felt that at I ast one enior Congre leader
hould r main outsid the ovemment. I h d thought that this
would p nnit me to judg the ituation objectiv Iy. I had therefore
put af Ii into th Go emm nt. er the League join d the
lnt rim ovemm nt, n w difficulties rose inside the Executi
ouncil. Thu gain ros with regard to my
Liaqat Ali Presents Budget
participation in the Government. Gandhiji pressed even more
strongly than before that I should join. He told me openly that
whatever might be my opinion or my personal feclings, it was m
duty, in the interests of the country, toj oi n th o\,tmment. Hr aid
that my remaining outside was proving harmful. Jawaharla l \\':1 of
the same view.
Gandhiji suggested that Education would b(' the most appropria tt'
subject for me and also in the tru e national interest. 11(' S4 id that th e-
pattern of futur ducation was a basic qu rsti on for fret' India.
Accordingly on 15 January 1947, I took over Education from, IIri
Rajagopalachari who had till th en b ~n the Edu alion Memb r.
The policy and programm in the fi ld ofEdu ation that I follow-
ed after I assumed charg wou ld form the subje t-matter ofa s parat
study. My views on some of our duca tional problrms have bcen 01-
lected and published s paratcJy. I do not therefore want to say any-
thing about them in this volume. I will here d al only with th
general political situation in the country. This was ('very day be om-
ing more and more diffi ult and deli atr, on a count of tht' dift'r-
ences between ongr ss and th League.
I have already d scrib d the way in which the Leagu Memb) ' of
the Executive Council w re thwarting us at very step. They w r'
in the Government and yet against it. In fact, they were in a p si-
tion to sabotage every move we took. The pow rs of th Finan
Member w re being stretched to the limit and a new sho k awaited us
when the Budget for the following year was pr s nl 'd by Liaqa t Ali.
I twas tbe declar d policy of ongress that economic in qualiti s
hould be removed and a capitalist soci ty gradually replae d by on
of a socialist patt rn. This was also the stand in the ongress -I ct-
ion manifesto. In addition, both ]awaharJaJ and I had issued slat -
ments regarding the profits arn d by businessmen and industrial'
during the war years. It was open knowledge that a large part ofthu
income had gone underground and scaped the in orne-tax. Tbi.
had m ant that large resources wcr deni d to th Governm nt and
we f, It that the Gov mment of India should take str ng lion Lo
reco r taxe which w r due but had r main d unpaid.
Liaqat Ali had fram d a budget which was 0 te ibly ba d on
Congress declaration, but that was in r. ct a clever d vic for
discrediting the Congress. H e did thi by giving a mo l unpracti I
tum to both the Congress demand. He proposed laxation measure
which would hav~ impov~ri hed all rich m n and don pcnnan nt
 India Wins Freedom
damage to Commerce and Industry. Simultaneously, he brought
forward a proposal for the appointment of a Commission to enquire
into all gations regarding unpaid taxes and their recovery from
businessmen and industrialists.
We wer all anxious that there should be increasing equalization
of wealth and that all tax-evaders should be brought to book. We
were therefore not against Liaqat Ali's proposal in principle. When
Liaqat Ali raised the matter in the Cabinet, he openly said that his
proposals were based on the declarations of responsible Congress
leaders. He admitted that but for the statements thatJawaharlal had
made, he might never have thought about the matter. He did not
howev r give details, so that on general grounds we agreed with him
in principle. Having secured assent in principle, he proceeded to
fram. specific measur s that were not only extreme, but calculated
to harm the national economy.
Liaqat Ali's proposals took some of our colleagues by complete
s1:Irpris . There wer some who were secretly in sympathy with the
industrialists. There were others who honestly felt that Liaqat Ali's
specific proposals were based on political and not on economic
onsid rations. ardar Patel and STi R ajagopalachari in particular
wer violently oppos d to his budget, for they felt that Liaqat Ali
was more concerned to harass industrialists and businessmen than
to serve the int rests of the country. They thought that his main
moti e was to harm the members of the business community, the
majority of whom were Hindus. Rajaji said openly in the Cabinet
that he was opposed to Liaqat Ali's proposals and hinted that they
were ba ed on communal considerations. I pointed out to my col-
I agu th t the proposals were in conformity with declared Congress
objectives. W could oot therefore oppose the principles but should
amio them on their merits and support them wherever they were
onsi t nt with our principl .
I ha e aid, the situation was difficult and delicate. The
Muslim League had at first accept d and then rejected the Cabinet
M ion Plan. The Constituent (..nbly was in session, but the
League h d boycotted it in spite or the fact that the whole country
w united in th demand for freedom. On the one hand, the people
, ere imp tient for the attainment of independence. On the other,
ther m d to be no solution of the communal problem. The
binet l\1ission Plan offered the only solution and yet we were not
ble to clinch the ue and so resolve our differences.
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Attlee Advises Fixed Date for British Wilhdrawal 177
The Labour Government in Britain fclt that they w r fac('d with
a dilemma. Should they allow the present state to ontinu' or should
they take a forward step on their own initiative? Mr Attlee was of
the view that a stage had been r ached wh r suspen e was most un-
desirable. It was necessary to take a clear-cut decision and h de id<.-d
that the British Government should fix a date for the withdr. w 1
of British power from India. Lord Wavell did not agre ' regarding
the announcement of a date. He wished to persist with the abinct
Mission Plan, for he held that it was the only possible solution of the
Indian problem. He further h ld that th British Government would
fail in its duty if it transferred political power belore the communal
question had b en solved. Passions had been roused to such a p ak
in India that even responsible people were carri d away. The with-
drawal of British power in such an atmosphere would in his view
lead to widespread riots and disturbances. He therefor advised that
the status quo should be maintained and that every att mpt should
be made to compose the difference betwe n the two major parties.
It was his firm conviction that it would b e dang rous and unworthy
if the British withdrew without a previous und erstanding btwecn
Congress and the League.
Mr AttIee did not agree. He held that once a date-line was fixed,
the responsibility would be transferred to Indian hands. Unless this
was done, there would never be any solution. Mr Attlce [I ar d that
if the status quo was continued, Indians would lose their faith in the
British Government. Conditions in India were such that the British
could not maintain their power without an effort which the British
people were not prepared to make. The only alternatives were to
rule with a firm hand and suppress all disturbances, or tranS(;'r
power to the Indians themselv s. The Government could continue
to govern, but this would require an effort which would interfere
with the reconstruction of Britain. The other alternative was to fix
a date for the transfer of power and thus place the responsibility
squarely on Indian shoulders.
Lord Wavell was not convinced. He still argu that if communal
difficulties led to violence, history would not forgive the Briilih. The
British had governed India for over hundred yean and they would
be responsible if unrest, violence and clisord r broke out as result
of their withdrawal When he found that he could not convince Mr
Attlee, Lord WavelI offer.ed his resignation.
Looking at the events after tell yean, r sometimes wonder who
 India Wins Freedom
was right. Th circumstances were so complicated and the situation
so d licat that it is difficult to give a clear judgment. Mr AttIee's
d cision was governed by his determination to h Ip India to attain
ind pendence. Anyone with the slightest imperialist tendencies
could asily have exploit d India's weakness. In fact, Hindu-Muslim
di~ r nc s had always been (,xploitcd by the British Government.
This had been their supreme d fence against the Indian d mand for
indep ndenc . Mr Attlee was r solv d that the-Labour Government
should not adopt any policy which would lay it open to such a charge.
W mustadmitthatifhismotiveshad notbe n pure and jfhe had
wished to xploit the diffi rences betw en Congress and the League
h ould asily hav done so. In spite of our opposition the British
could have governed this country for another decade. There would
of course hav been disturbances and clashes. Indian feelings had
be n arou ed to a level wh r British rule would have b en challenged
at ev ry st p. Neverthel ss they could have, if th y had so wish d,
continu d to rule for a few more years by exploi ting Indian differences.
We must not forget that the French continued in Indo-China for
almost t n y ars, even though France was much weaker than Britain.
We must ther fore give due credit to the motives of the Labour
Government. They did not wish to exploit Indian weakness for their
own advantag . History will honour them for this judgment and we
must also without any m ntal r servation acknowledge this fact.
n th other hand, on cannot ay for certain that Lord Wave II
was wrong. Th dang rs he for saw wcr real and lat r vents proved
that his r ading of th situation was not incorr ct. It is difficult to
say which of the alt rnativ -th one actually adopted by Mr Attlee
r the 00 suggest d by Lord Wavell-would have been better for
India. If Lord Wa U' advice had b en followed and the olution
of the Indian probl m de~ rr d for a y ar or two, it is possible that
theMuslimL agu wouldhav gottiredofitsopposition. Eveoifthe
L ague had not taken a more positive attitude, the Muslim masses
of Indi would probably ha e repudiated th negative attitude of
the Mu lim League. It is even po ible that the tragedy of Indian
partition might have been avoided. O ne cannot ay for certain,
but ye r or two is nothing in the hi tory ofa nation. Perhaps history
will decide that the wis r policy would have been to foUow Lord
Wavell's dviee.
When it bee m known th t Lord Wavell was 1 ving I issued
statement whi~ indicated what I thousht of him. I knew that
 Tribute to Lord Wauell 179
Jawaharlaland myother colleagues didnot. gr e with mc. They wcr
against Lord Wavell but I considered it my duty to place before the
public my appreciation of his contribution. Thi s is what I said:
Mr. Attlee's statement on J ndia has ('vokrd mixC'd feeling~ ill m y mind.
I am, On the one hand, gratifi d to find th at the rcatling of tIlt' si tuation
I adopted in June 1945 has been justified by ("VC'llts. At the s. me time 1
cannot help a feeling of regret that Lord \,\';\\'cll, who was the initiator
of a new chapter in the history of relations betwe("n 1ndia and England,
is retiring from the scene.
Th re was on all hanJs suspicion and distrust of British intentions at
the time of the Simla Conference. I confess that I was mysdf prcjudi cd
and the events of the las t three years had left in my mind a lep;acy of
bitterness. It was in that mood th a t I went to Simla to participat(" in the
proposed conference but when I met Lord Wavell, I expcrien t'd a sudd n
change of mind. I found him a rugged, straightforward soldi er void of
verbiage and direct both in approach and sta temen t. He was not devious
like the politician but came straight to the point and created in the mind
an impression of great sincerity which touched my heart. Therefore, J
felt it my duty to advise the country to adopt a constructive method for
achieving its poli tical objective. Since then in spite of a general atmosphere
of doubt and opposition, I have never devi.ated from that course. 1t iJ
common knowledge that since the first Simla Conference at lealt on four
different occasions there were attempts both from within and outJide the
Congress to precipitate a movement and force Congress to resort to direct
action btl t I was convinced that in view of the conciliatory attitude of the
, British Government such a course would be jll-advised.
I exerted all my influence to keep the Congress cOllrse at ady, and today
I feel satisfied that my reading of the situation was not wrong. Th imla
Conference failed, but soon after, thegeneral elections w re h Id in England
and the Labour Party came into power. They declared that they would
carry out in practice their former professions about India. EventJ have
since then proved that their declaration was sincere.
I do not know what communicatiON pas ed between Lord W veil
and H.M.G. in the last twO or three weeks. Obviously there were lOme
differences which led to his resignation. We may differ from hi~ appraiJe-
ment of the situation. But we cannot doubt his .inccrity or integrity of
purpose. Nor can I forget that the credit for the changed unosphere in
Indo-British relations today must be traced back to the step which be
o courageously took in June 1945. After the faiJure of the Crippt Minion
Churchill's Government had made up their mind to put the Indian qu -
tlon in cold storage for the duration of the war. Indian opinjon could
a40 find no way out and the eventJ after 1912 had further increased tbe
bit\erneas. To Lord Wl\vell n\ust belong the credit for opening the dOted
180 India Wins Freedol/~
door. In spite of initial opposition from the Coalition Government, he
was able to persuade them to agree to make a new offer to India. The
result was the Simla Conference. I t did not succeed but very thing that
has followed since then has been a logical development of the courageous
step which he took.
I am confident that India will never forget this service of Lord Wavell
and when the time comes for the historian of independent India to appraise
the relations of England and India, he will give Lord Wavell the credit
for opening a new chapter in these relations.
There was a dinner that evening in which Lord Wavell bade
farewell to M mbers of the Viceroy's Executive Council. He was
obviously touched by my statement and told to a friend, 'I am glad
to say that there is at least one man in India who has tried to under-
stand my stand.'
The day b fore he left, Lord Wavell presided over his last Cabinet
meeting. After the business was over, he made a brief statement
which made a d p impression On me. Lord Wavell said, 'I became
Viceroy at a very difficult and critical time. I have tried to discharge
my responsibility to the best of my ability. A situation however
d 've)oped which made me resigq, History will judge whether I acted
rightly in r signing on this issue. My appeal to you would however
be that you should take no hasty decision. I am grateful to all of you
for the co-operation I have received from you.'
After this sp ech, Lord Wavell collected his papers quickly and
walked away without giving any of us an opportunity to say any-
thing. The n t day he left,Delhi.
 Sf

THE MOUNTBATTEN MI I N

ORD MOUNTBA TTEN first became wcll known during

L the war years. He staycd for some months in India and then
transferred his headquart rs to Ceylon. Whcn the war cnd d,
he returned to Britain , but on Lord Wavell 's resignation hc was
appointed Viceroy and Governor-G eneral. Fully brie[! 'd by th
Labour Government before he left, he came with instructions from
Mr Attlce that power must be transferr d before 30 Jun e 191-8.
He reached Delhi on 22 March and was sworn in as Vi croy
and Governor-General of India on the 24th . Immediately after th
swearing-in ceremony, he made a short spe ch, in which he str sed
the need for reaching a solution within th next few months.
Soon after this, I had my first interview with Lord Mountbatten.
At the very first meeting he told me that th British Government
was fully determined to transfer power. Before this could happen,
a settlement of the communal problem was necessary and he d ired
that a final and decisive attempt must be made to solve the problem.
He agreed with me that the differences between the Congress and
the League had now beeD greatly narrowed down. The Cabinet
M' ion Plan had grouped A~sam and Bcngal together. The Con-
gress held that no province should be compelled to enter a group
and each province might vote whether to join the group or not.
The League said that it had accepted the Cabinet M ission Plan
on the basis that the group would vote as a whole and that a province
could opt out only after the group had framed the corutitution.
The League further argued that any change in the proposals of the
Plan would nullify the agreement and held that Congr~ action h d
in effect done so. On this basis, the League had rejected the Cabinet
Mi ion Plan.
obody can understand why the League placed 10 much empha-
is on the question of.Assam, when A,sam was .not aM ljm majority
province. If the League's 'own criterion was applied, there was no
13
 India Wins Freedom
valid reason for forcing Assam to join Bengal. Whatever be the
reason, the L ague was fonnally right, though morally and politi-
cally its case was weak. I discussed the question with Lord Mount-
batt n on s veral occasions. I f It that the difference between the
Congress and the L ague had reached a stage where agreement
could only be allained through the mediation of a third party.
My opinion was that we might leave the matter to Lord Mountbatten.
Let th Congress and th Lcagu agree to refer the question to him
and accept his arbitration. N ither Jawaharlal nor Sardar Patel
would howev r agr e to this suggestion. They did not like the idea
of arbitration and I did not press the point further.
In the meantime, the situation was deteriorating every day. The
Calcutta riots had been followed by risings in Noakhali and Bihar.
Th reafter thnc was trouble in Bombay. The Punjab, which had
b n quiet till now, also showed signs of strain and conflict. Malik
Khizir Hayat Khan had tendered his resignation as the Premier
of th Punjab on 2 March. Anti-Pakistan d monstrations, which
led to thirteen deaths and many injured, were held in Lahore on
4 Mar h. Communal disturbances spread to other parts of the
province and there were majQr disturbances in Amritsar, Taxila
and Rawalpindi.
On th one hand, communal passions w re mounting. On the
oth r, the administration was becoming lax. Europeans in the ser-
vic s no longrr had their hearts in the work. They were convinced
that within a short time, power would be transferred to Indian
hands. This being so, th y w r no longer interested in their work
and were only marking tim. They told people openly that they
wer no long r r(:'sponsible for the administration. This led to more
unrest and uncertainty among the people and created an all-
round los of confidence.
Th ituation was made worse by the d adlock b tw en the
ongrcss and th Mu lim League within the Executive Council.
Th ntra! Gov roment was paralyzed by the way in which the
M mb rs ofth ouneil pulled against one another. The League was
in ch g ofFinanc and h Id the k y to the admini tration. It wilJ
b rememb red that this had be n entirely due to Sardar Patel,
who in his anxi ty to retain the Home portfolio, had offered Finance
j

to the Muslim Lague. Th re were some very able and senior

Muslim officers in th Finance D partment who ga e e ery possible
belp to Liaq t Ali. With their advice Liaqat Ali was able to reject
 Lord Mountbatten Suggests Partition r83
or delay every proposal put up by th Congre m mbers of the
Executive Council. Sardar Patel discovered that though he w
Home Member he could not creat so much as the po t ofa hapr i
wihout Liaqat Ali's concurrenc . The ongr<'ss M mbcrs of the
Council were at a loss and did not know what to do.
A truly pathetic situation had devcJop<,d as a result of the ,on-
gress mistake in giving Finance to th Muslim L ague. This h. d
led to the deadlock which gave Lord Mountbattc:n th' opportunity
of slowly preparing the ground for the partition of India. he
began to give a new turn to th political problem he tried to impress
on Congress the inevitability ofpartition, and sowed th seeds of the
idea in the minds of the Congress Members of the Executive ouncil.
It must be plac d on record that the man in Illdia who first ~ 11 for
Lord Mountbatten's idea was Sardar Patel. Till p 'rhaps til v ry
end Pakistan was for Jinnah a bargaining count r, but in fighting
for Pakistan, he had overr ached himself. The situation within the
Executive Council had so annoyed and irritated Sardar Pat 1 that
he now became a b Ii vcr in partition. The Sardar's had be n the
responsibility for giving Finance to the Muslim L agu . H th r -
fore resented his h lplessness before Liaqat Ali more than anybody
else. When Lord Mountbatten suggested that partition might om r a
solution for the present difficulty, he found ready ace ptance of the
idea in Sardar Patel's mind. He was convinced that he could not
work with the Muslim Leagu . He openly said that h was prepared
to let the League have a part ofT ndia if only he could get rid of it.
Lord Mountbatten was xtremely intcllig m and could read the
minds of all his Indian colleagues. Th moment he found Patel
amenable to his id a, he put out aU the charm and power of his
personality to win over the Sardar. In his private talks, he often
referred to Patel as a walnut, a very hard crust outside but soft pulp
once the crust was cracked.
As soon as Sardar Patel had been convinced, Lord Mountbatten
tumed his attention to Jawaharlal. Jawaharlal was not at first
at all willing and reacted violently against the very idea of parti-
tiOD, but Lord Mountbatten persisted till step by step Jawaharl I'.
opposition was worn down. Within a month of Lord Mountbatten'.
arrival in India Jawaharlal, th e firm opponent of partition had
~come, ifnot a supporter, at least acquiescent towards the idea.
I have often wondered how Jawaharlal was won over by Lord
Mountbatten. Jawaharlal i. a man of principle, but be it abo
 India Wins Freedom
impulsive and amenable to personal influence. The arguments of
Sardar Patel must have had some effect, but could not have
be n decisive. Jawaharlal was also greatly impressed by Lord
Mountbatten, but perhaps even greater was the influence of Lady
Mountbatten. She is not only extremely intelligent, but had a most
attractive and friendly temperament. She admired her husband
greatly and in many cases tried to int rpret his thought to those who
would not at first agree with him.
Another person who probably influenced J awaharlal on this
question was Krishna M non. Krishna Menon professed great ad-
miration for Jawaharlal and I knew Jawaharlal often listened to his
advi e. I did not fecI very happy about this, as I felt that Krishna
M non oft n gave him wrong advice. Sardar Patel and I did not
always see eye to ye but we were agreed in our judgment about him.
However, this I will discuss at greater length when I write the thinl
volum of my autobiography.
Wh n I became aware that Lord Mountbatten was thinking in
terms of dividing India and had persuaded Jawaharlal and Patel,
I was d eply distressed. I realized that the country was moving
towards a great danger. The pll'rtition of India would be harmful
not only to Muslims but to th whole country. I was and am still
onvine d that the Cabinet Mission Plan was the best solution from
every point of vi w. It preserved the unity of India and gave every
community an opportunity to function with freedom and honour.
Even fr m th communal point of view, Muslims could expect
nothing better. They would have complete internal autonomy in
provinces in which they were in a majority. Even in the Centre they
would have mor than ad quate r presentation. So long as there
were ommunru jealousies and doubts, their position would be
adequat ly safeguard d. I was also convinced that if the Consti-
tution for fr e India was framed on this basis and worked honestly
for som time, communal doubts and misgivings would soon
di appear. Th rcal problems of the country were economic, not
ommunal. Th differences related to classes, not to communities.
Once the country became free, Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs would
all r we the r al nature of the problems that faced them and
communal differences would b re 01 cd.
I did my best to persuade my two colleagues not to take the
final step. I found th t 'Patel was so much in favour of partition
th t he was hardly pr pared even to listen to any other point of view.
Patel and Nehru on Partition
For over two hours I argued with him. I pointed out that if we
accepted partition we would create a p rmanent probl m for India.
Partition would not solve the communal problem but make it a
permanent feature of the country. Jinnah had raised the sl gan of
two nations. To accept partition was to accept that slogan. How
could Congress ever agree to divide the country on the basis of
Hindus and Muslims? Instead of removing communal fcars,
partition would perpetuate them by cr 'ating two Stats bas'd on
communal hatred. Once States based on hatred arne iuto exjst 'oc ,
nobody knew where the situation would lead.
I was surprised and pained wh 'n P atel in rl'ply said that whether
we liked it or not, there were two nations in India. He was n w
convinced that Muslims and Hindus could not be united into one
nation. There was no alternative except to recognize this fa t. In
this way alone could we end the quarr I between llindusand Muslims.
He further said that if two broth ' rs cannot stay together, tit y
divide. After separation with their r spective shar s they become
friends. If on the other hand they arc forced to stay together, they
t nd to fight every day. It was better to have one clean fight and
then separate than have bickerings every day.
I now turned to Jawaharlal. He did not speak in favour of parti-
tion in the way that Patel did. In fact, he admitted that partition
was by nature wrong. He had however lost all hopes of joint action
after his experience of the conduct of the League members of the
Executive Council. They could not see cy to eye on any qu . tion.
Every day they quarrelled. Jawaharl al asked me in despair what
other alternative there was to accepting partition.
Jawaharlal spoke to me in sorrow but left no doubt in my mind
as to how his mind was working. It was clear that in spite of his
repugnance to the idea of partition, h was coming to the conclu-
sion day by day that there was no alternative. H e fec goized that
partition was evil, but he held that circumstances were inevitably
leading in that direction.
After a few days J awaharlal came to see me again. lIe beg n
'with a long preamble in which he emphasized that \ e should not
indulge in wishful thinking, but face reality. Ultim tely he c m
to the point and asked me to give up my opposition to p rtition.
He said that it was inevitable and it would -be wisdom not to oppose
what was bound to hapPen. He also said that it w uld nol be w'
for me to oppose Lord Mountbatten on this i ue.
186 India Wins Freedom
I told J awaharlal that I could not possibly accept his views. I
saw quite clearly that we were taking one wrong decision after
another. Instead of retracing our steps we were now going deeper
into the morass. The Muslim League had accepted the Cabinet
Mission Plan and a satisfactory solution of the Indian problem
s em d in sight. Unfortunat Jy, the position changed and Mr Jinnah
got a chance of withdrawing from the League's earlier acc ptance
ofth plan.
I argu d that our second mistake had arisen when Lord Wavell
suggest d that th Home portfolio should be given to the Muslim
Leagu . This would have not caus d any insuperable difficulty,
but b caus Sardar Pat 1 insisted on retaining Home, we had our-
s Iv 's offer d Finance to the Muslim League. This was th cause of
our pr sent difficulties. I warned Jawaharlal that history would
n ver forgiv us if we agre d to partition. Th verdict would then
be that India was divid ed as much by th e Muslim L eague as by
ongress.
Now that Sardar Pat I and v nJawaharial had become support-
ers of partition, Gandhiji remain d my only hope . During this
p riod h was staying at Patna. He had arlier spent some months
in Noakhali, wh r h made a gr at impression on local Muslims
and cr at dan w atmosphcr of Hindu-Muslim unity. We ex-
p etcd that he would come to Delhi to m t Lord Mountbatten
and he actually arri ed on 31 March. I w nt to see him at once
and his v ry first r mark was, 'Partition has now b come a threat.
It S IDS Vallabhbhai and ven Jawaharlal ha e surrender d. What
will you do now? Will you stand by me or ha e you also changed ?'
I pJi d, 'I have b n and am against partition. Nev r has my
pp ition to partition b n so strong as today. I am how ver dis-
Ire d to find that ev nJawaharlal and Samar Patel have accepted
d ~ at and in your word, surr ndered th ir anns. My only hope
now is in you. If you tand against partition, we may yet save the
situ tion. If you how v r acqui sc , I am afraid India is lost.'
Gandhiji aid, 'What a qu stion to ask? If the Congress wishes
to ace pt p rtition, it will he over my d ad body. So long as I am
ali e, I will n r agr e to th partition of India. Nor will I, if! can
h Ip it, allow ongre to acc pt it.'
L t r th t d y andhiji m t Lord. {ountb tten. He saw him
gain the n xt day and still gain on 2 April. Sardar Patel
came to him soon after he return d from his first meeting with
 Patel Influences Gandhiji
Lord Mountbatten and was closeted with him for over two
hours. What happened during this me ting I do not know. But
when I met Gandhiji again, I received th e gr at st shock of my life,
for I found that he too had changed. He was till not op nly in
favour of partition but he no longer spoke so vchrmently against it.
What surprised and shocked me ven more was that h be-gan to
repeat the arguments which Sardar Patel had already us d. For
over two hours I plead d with him but could make no impre-ssion
on him.
In despondency I said at last, 'If even you havr now adopt d
these views, I sec no hope of saving India from catastrophe.'
Gandhiji did not reply to my comments 'Out said that h hacl
aIr ady made the suggestion that we should ask Mr Jinnah to form
th Government and choose the M mbers of the abinrt. He said
that he had mentioned this idea to Lord Mountbattcn ,nd h
was greatly impressed.
I knew this was so. When I m't Lord Mountbatt n th clay
after Gandhiji had talked to him, he told me that if ongr s
accepted Gandhiji'ssuggestion, partition could sti ll b avoided. Lord
Mountbatten agreed that such an offer on th e part of Congress
would convince the Muslim L ague and perhaps win the confid nee
of Mr Jinnah. Unfortunately, this move could make no progress a..
both Jawaharlal and Sardar Patel opposed it vehem(ntly. In fact
they forced Gandhiji to withdraw the sugg stion.
Gandhiji reminded me of this and said that the situation now WlU
such that partition appeared inevitable. The only question to
decide was what form it should tak . This was the question which
was now being debated day and night in Gandhiji's camp.
I thought deeply over the whole matH'r. How was it that Gandhiji
could change his opinion so quickly ? My reading is that this
was due to the influence of Sardar Palel. Pat 1 op oly said th t
there was no way out except partition. Experi nee had shown that
it was impossible to work with the Muslim Lcagu . Another con-
sid ration probably w ighed with Sardar Pat 1. Lord Mountb ltcn
had argued that Congress had agr ed to a w ak Centre only in
order to meet the objection of the Lague. Provin were therefo
given full provincial autonomy, but in a country so divid d by
language, community and cultur , a weak entre w s bound to
encourage fissiparous tendencies. If the Muslim League we not
there, we could plan for a strong Central Govemm nt and frame a
188 India Wins Freedom
constitution desirable from the point of view of Indian unity. Lord
Mountbatten advis d that it would be better to give up a few small
pieces in the north-west and the north-east and then build up a
strong and consolidated India. Sardar Patel was impressed by the
argum nt that co-operation with the Muslim League would jeopardize
Indian unity and strength. It seemed to me that these arguments
had influenced not only Sardar Patel but Jawaharlal. The same
arguments repeated by Sardar Patel and Lord Mountbatten had
also weakened Gandhiji's opposition to partition.
My !fort throughout had been to persuade Lord Mountbatten
to take a firm stand on the Cabinet Mission Plan. So long as Gandhiji
was of the same view, I had not lost hope. Now with the change in
Gandhiji's view, I knew that Lord Mountbatten would not agree to
my suggestion. It is also possible that Lord Mountbatten did not
Ii ,1 so strongly about the abinet M.ission Plan, as this was not the
hild of his brain. It is therefore not surprising that as soon as he
m t with strong opposition to the Cabinet M.ission Plan, he was
willing to substitute for it a plan of partition formulated according
to his own ideas.
Now that partition s ellled generally acc pted, the question of
Bengal and the Punjab assumed a new importance. Lord Mount-
batten said that since partition was on the basis of Muslim majority
areas and since both in B ngal and the Punjab there were areas where
the Muslims were in a clear majority, these provinces should also be
partition d. H how ver advised the Congress leaders not to raise
th question at this stage and assured us that he would himself raise
it at the appropriate time.
Before andhiji left for Patna, I made a last appeal to him. I
plead d with him that the present state of affairs might be allowed to
continue for two years. De facio power was already in Indian hands
and if the tU jure transfer was delay d for two or three years, this
might persuade the League to come to a settlement for reasons I
h v alr dy mentioned in the last chapter. Gandhiji himself had
sugg l d this a fi w months go nd I reminded him that two or
three years is not long p clod in a nation's history. If we waited
for two or thr e y rs, the Mu lim League would be forced to come
to terms. I realiz d that if a decision was taken now, partition was
inevitabl , but a N:tter solution might emerge after a year or two.
Gandbiji did not reject my suggestion but neither did he evince any
enthusiasm for it.
I Plead for Cabinet Mission Plan 18g
By this time Lord M.ountbattcn had fram~d his own propo al
for the partition of India. H e now decided to go to London for di -
cussions with the British Government and to secure their appro\' 1 to
his proposals. He also felt that he would be able to win the 011-
servatives' support for his plan. The Conservati es had oppos d the
Cabinet Mission proposal mainly on the grounds that it did not
satisfy the Muslim League demand for the partition of India. Now
that the Mountbatten proposal was based on the partition of the
country, it would be natural to expect Mr Churchill's supp rt.
After the Congress Working Commi ttee neluded its s sion
on 4 May, I went up to Simla. After a few days Lord Mount-
batten also came up. H e wanted to have a brief vacation beror his
departure for London. His plan was to r tu rn to Delhi on 15 May
and leave for London on the 18th. I thought I would m. ke a last
attempt to save the Cabinet Mission Plall and ac ordingly on the
night of 14 May, I met him at Viceregal Lodge.
We had discussions lasting for over an hour. I appealed to him
not to bury the Cabinet Mission proposal. 1 told lIim that we should
exercise patience, for there was still hope that the plan would succeed.
If we acted in haste and accepted partition, we should be doing
permanent injury to India. Once the country was divided, no one
could foresee the repercussions and there wou ld be no chan e of
retracing our steps.
I also told Lord Mountbatten that Mr Attlee and his coUeagues
were not likely to give up easily a plan which th y had them elves
formulated after so much labour. If Lord Mountbatl n also agre d
and emphasized the need for caution, the Cabinet was not likely to
raise any objection. Till now, it was the Congress which had been
insisting that India should be freed immediately. Now it was the
Congress which asked that the solution of the political problem
might be deferred for a year or two. urely no one couJd blame the
British if they conceded the Congress request. I also drew Lord
Mountbatten's attention to another aspect of the question. If the
British acted hastily now, independent and impartial observers
would naturally conclude that the British wanted to giv freedom
to India in conditions where Indians could not take full advantage
of this development. To press on and bring partition agairut Indian
desires would evoke a suspicion that British motives were not pure.
Lord Mountbatten assur d me that he would place a full and
true picture before the British Cabinet and that he would r port
190 India Wins Freedom
faithfully all that he had heard and seen during the last two months.
He would also tell the British Cabinet that there was an important
section of the Congress which wanted postpon ment of the settle-
ment by a year or two. He assured me that he would tell Mr
Attire and Sir Stafford Cripps what my views on the matter were.
The British Government would have all these materials before
them when they came to a final decision.
I also ask d Lord Mountbatten to take into consideration the
likely consequenc s of the partition of the country. Even without
partition, th re had be n riots in Calcutta, Noakhali, Bihar, Bombay
and th Punjab. Hindus had attacked Muslims and Muslims had
attacked Hindus. If the country was divided in such an atmosphere,
th 're would be rivers of blood flowing in different parts of the
ountry and the British would be responsible for the carnage.
Without a moment's h sitation Lord Mountbatten replied,
'At I ast on this on' qu stion I shall give you compl te assurance.
I shall sec to it that there is no bloodshed and riot. I am a soldi r,
not a civilian. Once partition is accepted in principle, I shall issue
ord I'S to se that th ere arc no communal disturbances anywhere in
th ountry. If there should be the slightest agitation) I shall adopt
the sternest measures to nip th trouble in the bud. I shall not
us ven th rm d polic . I will order the Army and the Air Force
to a t and I will usc tanks and aeroplanes to suppress anybody who
wants to cr ate troubl .'
Lord Mountbatten gave me the impression that he was not going
to London with a cl ar-cut pictur of partition, nor that he had
compl t ' Iy giv 11 up the Cabinet Mission Plan. Later events made
m chang my stimate of th situation . The way he acted after-
ward sugg ts that h had p ' rhaps already made up his mind and
wa going to London to p rsuad the Briti h Cabinet to accept his
plan of partition.
Th who 1 world knows what was the s quel to Lord Mount-
b It n' brave d 'claration. Wh n partition actually took place,
riv IS of blood flowed in large parts of the country. Innocent men,
worn n and childr n w r ma aCT d. The Indian Army was
divid d and nothing ffi eti c was done to stop the murder of inno-
c nt Hindu and Muslims. That i 'hy in th pr c ding chapter I
htl e aid th t p rh ps Lord Wa ell was right.
 THE END OF A DREAM
had a lingering ' hope that the Labour Cabinet would not

I asily accept the rejection of the ,abinet Mission Plan. It

was framed by three members of the Cabih(,t who wer al 0
important m rr.bers of the Labour mo"cment. It was tru that
Lord P ethick Lawrence had by this time 1 esiglwd from the offie of
Secretary of State for I ndia, but Sir Staft lrd ,ripps and Mr
Alexander were still m embers of the Briti~h Cabin t. It was thu
my hope that they would make a last effort to save their plan . It
was th refore with regret that I heard soon aflC"r Lord Mountbatten
reached London that the British Cabinet had a eepted th s h me
proposed by him.
The details of Lord Mountballl"n's Plan were not yet published,
but I gu ssed that it would entail the partition of India. lIe
returned to D elhi on 30 May and on 2 Jun e hrld di s USSiOlU
with the representatives of the Congress and th Muslim League.
On the 3rd of Jun a White P aper was i sued which gav allth
details of the Pl an. The Stattment of the British Covernm nt will b
found in the Appendix and I n d only say that my worst Ii 'an
w r r aliz d. Th e price for freedom was th partitioning ofIndia
into two States.
Th publication of this Statement m ant the nd of all hopes for
preserving the unity ofIndia. This was the first tim that the abin 1
Mission Plan was discard(d and partition accept d officially.
In trying to explain why the Labour Govemm nt changed its atti-
tude, I came to the painful conclusion that its action w gOY rn d
more by consideration of British than Indian inter ts. Th bour
Party had always sympathiz d with Congr 55 and itJ l ad and
had many times openly declar d that th Muslim L agu was
reactionary body. Its SUIT nder to the d mands of the Muslim
League was in my opinion due more to its anxiety to lali guard
British interests than to its desire to pI e the Mwlim gue. If
 India Wins Freedom
a united India had become free according to the Cabinet Mission
Plan, there was little chance that Britain could retain her position
in th economic and industrial life of India. The partition of India
in which the Muslim majority provinces formed a separate and in-
dependent Slate, would, on the other hand, give Britain a foothold
in India. A tate dominated by the Muslim League would offer a
permanent sphere of influence to the British. This was also bound to
influence the attitude of India. With a British base in Pakistan,
India would have to pay far greater attention to British interests
than sh might otherwise do.
lt had for long been an open question whether India would
remain in th Commonwealth after attaining her freedom. The
Cabinet Mission Plan left the choice to free India. I had told Sir
Stafford ripps at the time that free India might of her own free
will elect to remain in the Commonwealth. The partition of India
would materially alter the situation in favour of the British. A new
Stat form d a cording to the Muslim League demand was bound
to r main in the Commonw altho HPakistan did so, India would be
compelJcd to follow suit. All the)e factors must have weighed with
th Labour overnm nt. They had pledged their support for
Indian fr dom, but they could not forget that during the political
struggle, Congress had always opposed the British and the League
had always support d th m. When Lord Mountbatten proposed
the partition of India and the creation of a new State to satisfy the
Muslim L agu , the proposal found a sympathetic response from
many of th members of the Labour Cabinet.
My reading is that Lord Mountbatten must have stressed this
point when he met the onservative Party. Mr Churchill had
n r b n in favour of the Cabinet Mission Plan. He found the
M untbatten Plan much more to his taste and threw his weight in
favour of it. This fact may also have weighed with the Labour
o nment, as Conservative support would make the pas age of the
Indi n Ind p ndence Bill much e ier.
he ongr Working ornmittee met on 3 June and con-
side d the n w situation. One of the first points which came up
for eli u 'on w the future of the North West Frontier Pro-
inc. h Mountb It n PI n had created a strange situation for
the ronti r. Khan bdul Gaffar Khan and his party had always
upport d ngr and oppo ed the Muslim League. The League
r garded the K.h n brothers as mortal enemies. In spite of the
Gaffar Khan's Appeal to Working Committte 193
League opposition, the Khan brothers had bern abl to form 11
Congress Government in the Frontier and this Government was
still functioning. P artition would place the Khan brothcrs and the
Congress Party in a most awkward situation. In fact, it would throw
the Khan brothers and their party of Khud ai Khidmatgars on the
mercy of the League.
I have already said that Gandhiji's conv 'rsion \0 til :\{olll1lbattrl1
Plan has been a cause of surprise and regret to me. ] [e now spoke
in the Working Committee in favour of partition. As I had alrl'ady
had an inkling into his mind, this did not t. ke me by surprise, but
one can imagine the reaction of Khan Abdul GaITar Khan. He
was completely stunned and for several minutes hc could not uttt'r
a word. He then appealed to the \ Vorking Committee and rel11indtt.!
the Committee that he had always supportcd the Congress. If the
Congress now deserted him, the reaction on the Frontier would b
terrible. His en mies would laugh a t him and CVLn his friends
would say that so long as the Congress ne ded th Frontier, they
supported the Khudai Kbidmatgars. When howev r the Congress
wished to come to terms with the Muslim League, it gave up its
opposition to partition without even consulting the Frontier and
its leaders. Khan Abdul Gaffar Khan repeat dly said that the
Frontier would regard it as an act of treach ery if th Congr'55 now
threw the Khudai Khidmatgars to the wolves.
Gandhiji was moved by the appeal and said that h would raise
the matter with Lord Mountbatten. H e did so when he m t the
Viceroy and told him that he would not be able to support the
plan for partition till he was satisfied that the Muslim League would
deal fairly with the Khudai Khidmatgars. How could he desert
those who had always stood by the Congress in the days of diiTleulty
and stress?
Lord Mountbatten said that he would discuss the matter with
Mr Jinnah. As a result of his conversation, Mr Jinnah pr d
the wish to meet Khan Abdul Gaffar Khan. They met in Delhi
but the talks were inconclusive. This was not surprising. Once
Congress had accepted partition, what future could there be for
Khan Abdul Gaffar Khan and his party? The Mounlbatten
Plan was based on the principle that the Muslim majority provinces
should be separated and formed into a separate State. Mu linu
Were in an overwhelming majority in the Frontier. As such, it was
bound to be included in Pakistan. Geographically abo, the ron tier
194 India Wins Freedom
was within the proposed territories of Pakistan. In fact it would
have no point of contact with India.
Lord Mountbatten had said that the provinces would be given a
chance to opt. He declared that the Frontier would also be given
the opportunity to decide its fate on the basis of self-determination.
Accordingly, h . sugg sted that a referendum might be held to decide
whether the Frontier would join Pakistan or India. Dr Khan
Sah b, who was still the Chief Minister of the Frontier, joined the
meeting of the Working Committee at this stage. Lord Mount-
batten had told him about his plan to hold a plebiscite and asked
Dr Khan Saheb jf he had any obj ction. Dr Khan Sah b was
the Chief Minister as he claimed to have the support of the majority.
As such he could not object to the proposal for a plebiscite. He had
however raised a new issue. He said that if th re was to be a plebis-
cite, the Pathans of the Frontier should have also the right to opt for
Pakhtoonistan, a State of their own.
The fact was that the Khan brothers were not as strong in the
Frontier as Congress had thought. Their influence had waned
after the beginning of the agitation for partition. Now that Pakistan
was in sight and the Muslim majority provinces had been promised
the opportunity of forming an independent State, an e}notional
uph aval sw pt through the Fronti r. The movement for Pakistan
was further str ngthened by the activity of the British officers, who
openly supported Pakistan and p rsuaded the majority of the tribal
chiefs in the Frontier to side with the Muslim League. Dr Khan
Sah b saw that his only chance of retaining the leadership of the
Frontier was' to raise the d mand for Pakhtoonistan. Many Pathans
would pr Ii r a small State of their own as they fi ared the domination
of the Punj b. Lord Mountbatten was not how vcr prepared to
listen to any new d mand. He wanted to push through his scheme
as fast as po ibl and the qu stion of a free Pakhtoonistan was not
yen discu cd in detail.
ince this was the last occasion on which the Khan brothers took
part in di cussions with the Congre ) I may at this stage briefly
r cord" h t happened to them immediately before and aft r parti-
tion. When they found that the Congress was now committed to
partition th y did not know what to do. They could not possibly refuse
the pI b' cit . It would be an ndmi ion that they did not enjoy the
supp ott of their people. They returned to Peshawar and after consulting
their friend) they raised the slogan ofindependence for the Frontier.
Pathans Demand Pakhtoonistan J 5
The Congress Working Committee had endorsed the drcj ion of
the Frontier Congress authorizing Khan Abdul affar Khan to
take whatever action he thought necessary to dral with th si tuation
in the province. The Frontit'r Congrtss now demanded th Iration
of a free Pathan State with a constitution framed on tht, basis I)f
the I slamic conception of democracy, equality and .ocial justic('.
Expl aining his stand, Khan Abdul Gaffar Khan said that tit
Frontier Pathans had their own distin t h i~tory and culture, and
these could not be preserved unless thc)' had full frndom t maintain
and develop their own institutions. They thereforr claimed that the
plebiscite should not be on the basis of a choicr LrtW('l n P.lkist. n
and India, but that there should br the third altrmatiVl' of an
independent Pakhtoonistan. This alone would make the pkbiscit(
fair and truly representative of the peopl('s' will. 1f this was not
done, th plebiscite would becomr me aningl rss, as the Polkhtoon
would be submerged by the other dements in Pakistan. Thne ;tn'
reasons to think that if the plcbisci tC had incl udrc) tht' is.~lIr of frn'
Pakhtoonistan, a large numb r of th Frontirrmm might hav('
votcd for it. They were afraid of being swallowed up by th
Punjab and this fact alone might have swayed th m to vot against
Pakistan.
Neither Mr Jinnah nor Lord Mountbatt n was hOW('ver pr
pared to accept this d emand. Lord Mountbattcn mad it Iral that
the Frontier could not form a separate and ind prnd t nt Statr, but
must be included ithcr in India or Pakistan. The Khan broth rs
then d elared that their party could take no part in the pJcbis itc
and called on the Pathans to boycott it. But their opposition was
of no avail. The plebiscite was held and a Iargr propollion of the
p ople voted in favour of Pakistan. If the Khan brothers had not
boycotted the pI biscite and their support rs had work d am suy,
it would have be n known what proportion of the Pathans w re
against Pakistan. However, the r sult went in favour of the Muslim
League and the British Government imm diately accepted it.
After partition actual1y took place, the Khan brothers modi6 d
their attitude in conformity with the demands of the situation. They
declared that their demand for a fr e Pakhtooni tan did not m an
the creation of a separate State but th r cognition of full autonomy
for the Frontier as a unit of Pakistan. They explain d that what
they stood for was a constitution of Pakistan which would be trUly
federal, which would guarantee full provincial autonomy to ill
196 India Wins Freedom
units and would thus secure the social and cultural life of the
Pathans. Without such constitutional safeguards, the Punjabis
would dominate the whole ofPakislan and might deny the legitimate
rights of Pathans and other minorities.
One must admit that this demand of the Khan brothers was
eminently reasonable. It was also in conformity with the resolution
which the Muslim League itself had passed in Lahore and which it
had never modified. Mr Jinnah had therefore no justification
when he accused the Kh an brothers of wanting to break away
from Pakistan. In fact, Khan Abdul GaITar Khan had several
interviews with him at K arachi and at one stage it seemed that an
understanding would be reached. Some observers in Pakistan said
that Mr Jinn ah was impressed by Khan Abdul Gaffar Khan's
sincerity and planned to go to Peshawar to meet him and his fellow
workers. This however did not materialize and very soon the politi-
cal enemies of the Khan brothers poisoned Mr Jinnah's mind against
th em. Khan Abdul Q ayyum Khan, who had formed the Ministry
in the Frontier, was naturally opposed to any reconciliation between
Mr Jinnah and the Khan brothers. He therefore behaved in a way
which made any understanding impossible. In fact his Government
act d withou t any sense of decency or justice and harassed th e Khudai
Khidmatgars by adopting all kinds of illegal and unfair measures.
D emocracy was crush d and force became the order of the day. Khan
Abdul Gaffar Khan, Dr Khan aheb and all other leaders of the
Khudai Khidmatgars were sent to j ail where they languished for
almost six years without any legal chage or trial. Khan Abdul Qayyum
Khan's v nd tla be arne so bitter that ven a section of the Muslim
League wa di gust d and said that either the Khan brothers should
be pros~eu ted or relea cd. All such forts were however of no avail.
Lawless oppr ion was perpetrated in the name of the law.
The A.I.C.C. met on 14 June, 1947. I have attended many
meetings of the A.I.C.C. but this was one of the strangest that
it was my misfortune to attend. Congress, which had always
fought for the unity and indep ndence of India, was now considering
an offici 1 r olution for the division of the country. Pandit Govind
Ballabh Pant moved the resolution and after Sardar Patel and
Jawah rlal had both poken on it, Gandhiji himself had to intervene.
It was impossible for me to tolerate this abject surrender on the
part of the Congress. In my speech I said clearly that the decision
which the Working Committee had reached was the result ora most
Congress Debates Partition '97
unfortunate development. Partition \Va a tragt'dy f1 r Indin and
the only thing that could be said in its favour was that W' had don
our best to avoid division, bu t we had failed. W e must not how' l'
forget that the nation is ol1e and its cultural life is and will rcm.t.in
. one. P olitically we had fail d and were thereforr di"idingthc country.
"Ve should accept our defeat but we should at the sam' time try 1.0
ensu re that our ultur ' was not divided. I fw(' put a stick in tht W<ltt' r.
it may I\ppear that the water has been divided but the walrr f('rnain
the sam and the moment the stick is n ' movcd, yen the app nrallcc
of division disap pears.
Sardar Patel did not like my spe('ch_ HI' spent almost the ,.. hole
of his speech ill trying to refutl.' what I had sai d. He argurd that ttl
resolution of til(' division of tile country did not uri' out ofweakn('s
or compulsion but that it was lht: only true so lution in the exisling
circumstanc s in India.
There were ckmrnts of comc-dy even in the midst of this grt'at
tragedy_ There have always been jn Congr(' ~s some men who hay
posed as nationalists but who arc in fact uttcrl)' commun I in outlook.
Th ey have always a rgu(,d that India has no unified culture and have
held that whatever Congress may say, the social life of the Hindus
and the Muslims was entirely diflhrnt. It was surprising to find that
members with th ese views had suddmly appeared on the platform a~
the gr atest upholders ofIndian unity.
They opposed the resolution vehemently and th .. gr unds they
gave were that the cultural and national Ijfe of Indi a could not be
divided. I agreed with what they were saying, and had no doubt
that what they now said was true. I could not however fotg t th. t
they had all their lives opposed such a vi w. It wall strange th t
now at dlis eleventh hour they should b the persons to raise the cry
for an undivided India.
After the first day's debate, there was a very strong feo ling against
t.h e Working Committt>e's resolution.. ith r Pandit Pant', per-
suasiv n ss nor Sardar Patel's eloquence had been able to pc uade
the people to accept lhis r solution. How could they, \vh n it wall
in a sensc the complete denial of all that Congrc had ,aid inee its
very inception? It therefore became necc ry for Gandhiji to inter-
vene in the debate. He appealed to the lemben to support the
Congre Working Committee. Readd d that he had always opposed
partition and no one could deny this fact.' He felt however th t a
situation had DOW been created where tb re was no alternative.
Ig8 India Wins Freedom
Political realism demanded the acceptance of the Mountbatten
Plan and he would appeal to the members to accept the resolution
moved by Pandit Pant.
When the resolution was put to the vote, 29 voted for it and 15
against. Even Gandhiji's appeal could not persuade more members
to vote for the partition of the country!
The resolution was no doubt pass d, but what was the condition
of the p oplc's mind? All hearts were heavy at the idea of partition.
Hardly anyone could accept the resolution without mental reserva-
tions. Even those who acc pted parti don had all their feelings against
it. This was bad enough. What was worse was the kind of insidious
communal propaganda which was gaining ground. It was being
openly said in certain eirel s that the Hindus in Pakistan need
have no fear as th re would be 45 millions of Muslims in India and
if th re was any oppression of Hindus in Pakistan, the Muslim.; in
India would have to bear the consequences.
In the meeting of the A.I.C.C., the members from Sind opposed
the resolution vehemently. They were given all kinds of assurances.
Though not on the public platform, in private discussion they were
ev n told by some p ople tha-t if they suffered any disability or
indignity in Pakistan, India would retaliate on the Muslims in India.
When I first b came aware of such suggestions, I was shocked.
I imm diat ly saw that this was a dangerous sentiment and could
have most unfortunate and far-r aching rep rcussions. It implied that
partition was b jng acc pted on the basis that in both India and
Pakistan, the minority would be looked upon as hostages in order to
safeguard the security of th minority in the other State. The idea
of retaliation as a m thod of assuring the rights of minorities seemed
to me barbarous. Later events proved how justified my apprehensions
were. The rivers of blood which flowed after partition on both
sid s of the new frontier grew out of this sentiment of hostages and
retaliation.
Some members of the Congr realized how dangerous such the-
ories were. I r m mber in particular Kiran Shankar Roy, one of the
Congre 1 ad rs of Bengal, who first brought this to my notice. He
also spoke to Acharya Kripal ni who was then the President or Con-
gre and point d out that it was a most dangerous theory. Once such
a feeling wallowed to grow, it would lead to the oppression and
murder of Hindus in Pakistan and of Muslims in India. Nobody
bowever pllid ILDY att~ntion to Kiran Shankar Roy. In fact, many
 Partition &shed Through 199
ridiculed him for his fears. They also told him that once Indi
was divided, we must acc pt the thc-ory of ho tage . The rgu 'd
. that it was only in this way that the Hindus of Pili t. n could be
protected. !Gran Shankar Roy was not com'in ed and he came to me
almost in tears. He never accepted th(' as urane which om of the
Congress leaders had held out and he livt"d to Sl'e th fulfilm('nt fhi
worst f} ars.
The British Govcrnm('nt had originally fixed a p riod of fift en
months for the completion of the arrangements fi r th tran fn of
pow r. Mr AtticI' had in fact (,xplicitly stated on 20 F 'bru ry 1947
that it was the definite intention ofth British Govemmrnt to t'ffect
the transfer of pow r to responsible Indian hands by a date not 1 tn
than June 1948. A gr at dcal had happened betwe n 20 F('bruary
and 3 Jun. Now that the plan for partition was accept d, Lord
Mountbatten declared that the scheme should b brought into dfeet
as quickly as possible. His motives wcrc perhaps mix 'd. On the
one hand, he wished that lhe British should transfer tht" responsibility
to Indian hands as early as possible. On the oth r, h prob bly h d
apprehensions that d lay might bring up n w imp dim nts to the
new plan. The fate of the Cabin t Mission Plan had shown that the
delay in its impl m ntation had given rise to second thoughts and
had ultimately I d to th rejection of the Plan.
Lord Mountbatten st't for hims If a period of three months during
which to carry out the task of partitioning India. It was not an y
task and I openly expressed my doubts about the possibility of
carrying out so complicated a plan in such a short time. I must
pay a tribute to Lord Mountbatt n for the efficiency and ability
with which he presided over his task. He had such a m tery of
detail and such quick grasp that in Ie than thr e months 11 the
problems were solved and on 14 August 1947, India w divided
into two States.
I will give one or two examples of the expedition and assurance
with which Lord Mountbauen hand1ed the various in tricat problems
that arose in connexion with the creation of two State.. soon as it
became known that India was going to be partitioned, the {indus
and the Muslims b~gan to put up inflated claims. There weT radic
,disturbances throughout the country. The great lcutta killinp
in 1946 had been followed by trouble in NoakhaJi and Bihar.
Riots had started in the Punjab in reb. Originally confined to
Lahore, the di.sturbance. 'Pread and lOOn large areas in and around
200 India Wins Freedom
Rawalpindi were torn with strife. Lahore in fact became the battle-
ground for which communalists among Hindus and Muslims fought.
R eprcs ntativ s of Hindus and Sikhs tri d hard to persuade Congress -
that Lahore must be retained in India. They pointed out that the
political and economic life of the Punj ab was centred in Lahore and
jf it went to Pakistan, the Punjab would be permanently crippled.
Many th r fore pressed that Congress should make anissue of Lahore.
Congress did not agree to th ir suggestion and held that the question
should b d cid d in accordance with the wishes of the population.
Some s('ctions among the Muslims and the Hindus as well as the
Sikhs thought that the issu ofLahor could be decided by resorting
to violence. Generally sp aking, the Hindus were the property-own-
ing classes in and around Lahore. Some Muslims thought that they
could hurt th Hindus most by destroying their prop >rty and attack-
ing them on the economic front. They ther fore burnt factories and
houses and loottd the property of non-Muslims indiscriminately.
Som s etions of the Hindus in Lahore retaliated by killing Muslims.
They had wealth and felt that such attacks might drive Muslims
away from Lahore and assure th m a Hindu majority. It was openly
said that in this confiict- -in wilich one side attacked property and
the oth r life-important lead rs of the communal parties were
dir ctly or indir ctly involved. Thus it was widely reported and
g n rally b liev d that I ad rs of the Muslim League, both Central
and Provincial, w r organizing attacks on Hindus. Similarly, the
Hindu Mahasabha leaders were accus d of inciting the Hindus'
against the Muslims.
An almost parall 1 situation had developed in Calcutta. The
supporters of the Muslim L ague insist d that Calcutta should go
to Pakistan, while all those against the League were anxious that
Calcutta hould remain with India.
It was in this situation that thequ stionofthepartition of the Punjab
and B ngaJ wa taken up by Lord Mountbatten. It had been decided
that there would b a ate in the Provincial Assembly to decide whe-
ther the provine s should b pi,l.rtition d at all or as a whole join
India or Pili tan. Both th B ngal and the Punjab Assemblies voted
for partition and it became nec ary to decide what would be the
bound ry of the two new provine s. Lord Mountbatten appointed
a Boundary ommi ion to go into this question and asked Mr Rad-
cljfJ"to undertake th task. Mr Radcliffwas then in Simla. He accept-
ed the appointment, but suggested that he would start his survey in
Lord Mountbatten's Abiliry and Drive :lOI
early July. He pointed out that it would be an almo t impo ible
.task to undertake a field survey in the Punjab in Ihe hent of June
andinanycaseJulymeantaddayofonlYlhret or Ii urw ck. Lord
Mountbatten told him that he was not pn'parrd for v n one day's
delay and any suggestion of three or four wee~' p tponemrnt WM
simply out of question. His orders wcrc carried out. Thi offers n
example of the xpedition and d spalch with whi h Lord Mount-
batten worked.
A second problem which faced Lord Mountbatten wa tll p rti-
tion of the Secretariat and the ass t f th Government of Indi .
There were difficulti s even about the pro\'inc('s which went wholly
to one State or the other. Records dcaliJlg 'with tht provin es whjch
went to Pakistan had to be separatcd and sent to Pakistan. In the
case of provinces which were divided thc tas k was ('ven mor dim ult.
Lord Mountbattcn personally supervised most of the arrangements
and the Committee which he appointed for the purpose sellkd v ry
qu slion as soon as it arose.
Even more difficult wcre the problems of dividing the finances of
the country and partiti oning the Army but no obstacle proved lOO
great for Lord Mountbatt n's ingenuity and drive. Th rno t om-
plicated issues in finance were decided within the allotted d t .
Regarding th e Army, it was decided that Pakistan should have one-
fourth of the Army and India thrc -fourths. The qu slion arose
.whether the Army should be divided imm diat Jy, or should serve
under a unified command for two or thr c years. The Army om-
manders advised that the general stafl'should r m in common during
this period. I was impressed by their argum nlS and support d them.
I had my own reasons, apart from those advanc d by Lord Mount-
batten. I was afraid that parlition would be followed by disturbance.
and riots. I felt that in such a context, a unified army could ICfVe
India well. I was clear in my mind that we should not bring commu-
nal divisions within th e Army if the situation was to be ved. Till
now there had never b en any communal feelings within the Army.
If the Army was kept outside politics, their di ciplin and n utrnJity
could be ured. I therefore pre d or a unified command nd I
wish to bring on record that Lord {ountb tL'n fully upportrd the
land. I am convinced that if the Army had r maincd unified we
would have avoided the rivers of blood which flow d immediately
after independence.
I regret to say that my coJteagues did not gr e with me and
 India Wins Freedom
opposed me. What surprised me most was the opposition of Dr
Rajendra Prasad. He was a pacifist and wedded to non-violence. He .
now took the lead in insisting on a division of the Army. He said
that iflndia was divided into two States, a unified army should not
and indeed could not continue for a day.
I think it was a dangerous decision. It divided the Army on the
basis of communities. The Muslim units mostly went to Pakistan
and th e Hindu and Sikh units remained wholly in India. This in-
jccted communal poison into an army which till then had bcen free
from it. When, after 15 August, the blood of innocent men and
worn n flowed on both sides of the fronti er, the Army remained
passive spectators. v'lhat is worsc, in some cas s military men cven
joined in th striC .
Lord Mountbatten said to me more in sorrow than in anger that
Indian members of the Army wanted to take part in killing Muslims
in East Pu[\j ab but th e British officers restrained them with great
difficulty. This was Lord Mountbatten's r port and I am not quite
ure how far this statement about the British offic rs is correct. This
how vcr I know from personal knowledge that some members of the
form r undivided Indian Anny killed Hindus and Sikhs in Pakistan
and Muslims in India. The wonderful tradition of the Indian Army
was disturb d and a slur was cast on what till then had been a
proud r cord.
Regarding th s rvices, I suggested that they should not be divided '
on a communal basis. PoHtical necessity had comp lied us to accept
partition ofth country, but th re was no reason why officials should
be uproot 'd from th eir own areas. I i It that all service men should
b retain d in th ir own provinces. Thus officials from W st Pun-
jab, ind or Ea t Bengal, whatever their community, should remain
in Paki tan. Similarly s rvice men who belonged to the Indian
provin should serve India r gardless of whether they were Hindus
or Muslims. My idea was that if we could keep communal passions
out orat 1 ast the ecvi s, a better atmo phere could be maintained in
both Stat s. Administration would thus be free of communal poison
and the minoritj s in each State would Ii el a greater ense ofsecurity.
I rcgr llo ay that my pleadings proved vain. It was decided that
nil rvie men would be gi en the right to opt for India or Pakistan.
The r sult was that almost without xception Hindus and Sikhs
opted for India and Mu lims for Pakistan.
I discu d this question with Lord Mountbatten in great detail.
The League Makes Another MistaJu
I pointed out how dang rous I t was to divide the Army and the
services on a communal basis. Lord Mountbatt n agre d with m
and did his best to support my stand. So far a th e Armywas concern-
ed he had no success at all. With rrgard to the civilians the only ult
of his efforts was that officials wer given thr righlto opt perm. nenlly
or provisionally. Ther would be no question about tho who opt d
permanently. Those who exercised th ir option provisionally were
giv n the right to revise their decision within a p riod of six months.
Both the States gave a guarantee of taking ba k thos who r vi d
their option in this manner. I have tosay with great regr t thauhougb
the solemn assurance was given, the unforlunat individuals who
xercis d th ir option provisionally did not generally receiv i ir
treatment from ither tat.
I also regret to say that the Muslim League acted foolishly and
blindly even in the rna tt r of the exerei (' of option. It in it d (11
Muslim officials to opt for Pakistan and I av India. At that time,
larg number of key positions in the 'cntral St ret rial w r h Id
by Muslims. The Muslim League prrssed all of them to leav Indi .
Those who did not r adilyagre wer fright n d by all.k.inds ofre-
ports as to what their fatc would be once Congr ss came into un-
disputed power. As such rumours were causing a crt. in am unt of
nervousness among Muslim mploy cs, I press d th Gov rnm nt
of India to issue a circular clarifying its stand. Lord Mountb II n
and Jawaharlal upported me fully and a circularwas actuallyi ued
rea suring servic men from Muslim and other minority communities
that if they remained to serve in Indi a, not only would they b given
their rights but they would b tr at d generou Iy.
The result of this circular was that a numb r of Mu lim officers in
the Central Secretariat r gained their confid nc and decided to stay
on in India. When the Muslim L ague I aders came to know thia,
th y started to canv s th officen who wi hed to r main. Th
Muslim officen were already nervous about what the futur may hold
in tore for them. They were now threatened tbatifthey r main din
India, the Mu lim League nd the Pakistan Gov rn .nt w uld
gard them as enemies and ha them in every ibJe way.
Many of these officers came from provinces which were 0
parts ofPaki tan. When they found that the MUIlim I.e gue ulh
rilies propos d to r taliatc against th ir property nd th ir lali os
in Pakistan, most of th,:se officers came highly eli lur d. 10 my
own Ministry, there were several M uslim officershoteling high positiona
 India Wins Freedom
Th y had opted for India on th e strength of my assurances, but when
the Muslim League h Id out threats against their fami lies and their
prop Tty, som ofth m came to me in tars and said, 'We had decided
to stay in India but now aft er the thr at held out by the Muslim
League it is impossible to do so . OUf famili es a re in West Punjab and
we cannot allow them to suffer. We are th erefore compelled to opt
for Pakistan.'
The action of the Muslim Leagu in driving almost all th e Muslim
offLc rs out of India was not only foolish but harmful. In fact it
was more harmful to the Muslims than to India as a whole. Now
that partition had b en accepted and Pakistan was being established,
it was clear that th e Muslims would get every advantage in the new
Sta te. If, in addition, some Muslims could have served in India,
this would nol only have bee n of personal advan tage to th em but
would have bet'n a great gain for the community as a whol e. The
pr sence of Muslims in some r sponsiblc positions would have given
assurance to th e community and allayed many unreasonable fears.
I have already said how foolishly the L ague had acted in insisting
on partition. The Lcagu 's attit~de towards Muslim officers was
another example of the same foolishness.
It was d ecided that th ' Indian Dominion would come into existence
on 15 Au gust 1947. Th Muslim L 'ague decided that Pakistan should
b constitut d a day arli r on 14 August. Ther was an unpleasant
indd nt ven with r egard to th e birth of the two Dominions. ,The
onv ntion had grown in th British ommonwealth tha t a Domi-
nion could choose its own Gov rnor-Gen ral and some Dominions
had appoint d th ir own nationals to this post. India was therefore
fr e to hoose all Indian to b the first constitutional Goyernor-
Gen ralofIndia. W how y T d dded that it would be better not to
mak a sudd nchang and fel t that th appointment of Lord Mount-
batt n would gi continuity of policy and administration. It was
al 0 thought that in the initial stag s there would be one Go rnor-
en ral for th two Dominions and any change ould be carried out
Int r. It was g n rally thought that Paki tan would be influenced
by th sam. consider tions.
W a ordingly announced that Lord Mountbatten was our choice
for th GOY mor-G n ral. We exp cted the L ague to select him,
but t the la t mom nt the Leagu cau d a surprise by proposing
that Mr Jinnah hould be appoint d the flTSt Governor-General of
Pakistan. A soon as Lord Mauntbatt n h ard this news, he told w
We Select Lord Mountbatten
that this changed the whol situation. H sugg sted that we hould
reconsider our decision and appoi'll an Indian. W howey r s. w no
reason to change our choice and reiterated that Lord Mountbatt n
would be the first Governor-Gennal of the Indian Dominion.
 DIVIDED INDIA
H AVE now reach d the fin al chapter of the story I want to

I t 11 in this volume. On 14 August 1947 Lord Mountbatten went

to Karachi to inaugurate the Dominion of Pakistan. He returned
th e n xt day and at 12 midnight on 15 August 1947, the Indian
Dominion was born.
Th country was free, but before the people could fully enjoy
th s ns of liberation and victory, they woke up to find that a
great tragedy had accompanied freedom. We also realized that
we would have to face a long and difficult journey b efore we ('ould
r lax and njoy th fruits ofliberty. _
ongrcss as well as the Muslim League had accepted partition.
Since the ongr 58 repr 'sent d the entire nation and the Muslim
L ague had considerable support among the Muslims, this would
normally have m ant that the whole country had accepted partition.
The r al po ition wa howev r complet Jy differ nt. When we looked
at th country imm diately b efore and aft r partition, we found
that th ace ptance was only in a resolution of the All-India Con-
gr 58 Commi it of th Congr S8 and on the register of the Muslim
L agu . Th p ople of India had not accepted partition. In fact,
their heart and souls r b 11 d against the very idea. I have said
that th Muslim Lague njoyed the support of many Indian
Muslims, but th re was a large ction in the community who had
alway oppo ed the League. They had naturally been deeply cut
by the d ci ion to divide th country. As for the Hindus and the
Sikhs. they w re to a man oppo ed. to partition. In spite of Con-
gr acceptance of the Plan th ir opposition had not abated in the
least. Now, when partition had b come a r ality, e n the Muslims
who w re the follow rs of the Muslim Lague w re horrified by
the r ult and b gan to ay openly that this was not what they had
m ant by partition.
In revi wing the situation after ten years, I find that events have
Sorrow Over Partition 207
confirmed what I said at that time. It was even then clear to me
that the Congress I aders had not accepted partition with free and
open minds. Some had accepted it out of sheer anger and r Dt-
ment and others out of a sense ofd spair. M n when th y re
swayed by indignation or fear cannot judg objectiv Iy. How uld
the advocates of partition who act d und r the str 55 of p
the implications of what th ey were doing?
. Among Congressmen the greatest supportcr of partition w.
Sardar Patel, but even he did not be Ii ve that partition w the
best solution of the Indian probl m. H threw his weight in favour
of partition out of irritation and injurrd vanity. Jl found himself
frustrated at every step by the v to put on his proposal by Li. q. t
Ali Khan as Finance Minister. It was thrnfor in shr r ang r
that he decided that if ther was no othrr alt rnativ(', p. rtition
should be accepted. H e was also convinced that tIl n w tate of
Pakistan was not viable and could not last. H thought that the
acceptance of Pakistan would teach the Muslim L agu a bitter
lesson. Pakistan would collaps in a short tim and the provine s
which had seced d from India would hav to fac untold difficulty
and hardship.
The real test of the p ople's attitude towards th partition of th
country came on 14 August 1947 when independ nt Pakistan waa
formed. If the people of India had willingly accept d partition,
surely the Hindus and Sikhs of the Punjab, th rontier, ind and
B ngal would have r joic d in th same way :u the Muslims of
tho e regions. Reports which we r ceived from all these provine I
show d how hollow was the claim that the ongr acceptane of
partition meant its acceptance by the Indian people.
The 14thof August was for the Muslims ofPakiJtan a dayofrejoic-
ing. For the Hindus and th e Sikhs, it was a day ofmouming. ThiJ
was the fe ~ not only ofmo t people, but ev n ofimportant 1 aden
ofCongr ss. Acharya Kripalani was then President of the ngre.
He is a man of Sind. On 14 August 1947, he j u d a ltat'm nl that
it was a day of sorrow and destruction for India. This feeling
expr d op nly by Hindus and Sikh throughout P k.. n. It
surely a strange situation. Our national organiz lion bad taken
decision in favour of partition but the entire people gri v ov r jt.
One question naturally arises here. If partilio evok d au
feelings of anger and sorrow in the htarts 0 all lndians, why did
the Indian people accept it'1 Wby was there nol greater opposition
208 Inda Wins Freedom
to it? Why was there such a hurry to take a decision which almost
everybody r garded as wrong? If the right solution of the Indian
problem could not be found by 15 August, why take a wrong
decision and then grieve ov r it ? I had again and again said that
it was bett r to wait till a correct solution was found. I had done
my b st, but my friends and colleagues unfortunately did not sup-
port me. The only explanation I can find of their strange blindness
to facts is that anger or despair had clouded their vision. Perhaps
also the fixation of a datc- 15 August- acted like a charm and
hypnotized them into accepting whatever Lord Mountbatten said.
The situation was one in which tragedy and comedy were in-
xtricably mixed. After partition, the most ridiculous position was
that of the Muslim League leaders who r mained in India. Jinnah
left for Karachi with a message to his followers that now that the
country was divided they should be loyal citizens of India. This
parting messag cr at d in them a strange sense of weakness and dis-
illusion. Many of th s leaders came to see me after 14 August. Their
plight was pathetic. Every one of them said with deep r gret and
ang r thatJinnah had deceived them and left th m in the lurch.
1 could not at first understand what they meant by saying that
Jinnah had deceived them. He had openly demanded partition of
the country on the basis of Muslim majority provinces. Partition
was now a reality and both in the W st and in the East Muslim
majority areas formed parts of Pakistan. Why then should these
spok sm n of the Muslim League say that they had been deceived ?
As I talk d to them I realized that thes men had formed a picture
of partition which had no reI vance to the real situation. Theyhad
failed to rt'alize th' r a1 implications of Pakistan. If the Muslim
majority provinces formed a separate State, it was clear that the
provine s in which the Muslims were in a minority would form
part ofIndia. The Muslims of the U.P. and Bihar were a minority
and would r main so ev n after partition. It is strange, but the
fact is that these Muslim Leaguers had been foolishly persuaded
that once Pakistan was formed, Muslims, whether they came from
a m jority or a minority province, would be regarded as a separate:
nation and would njoy the right of determining their own future.
No\!, when the Mu lim majority pro inces , nt out of India
and en B ng 1 and the Punjab wer divided and Mr Jinnah left
for K rachi, th y t last realized that they had gained nothing
but in fa t lost e erything by the partition of India. Jinnah's
15 August 1947
parting message came as the last straw on the camd's b ck. It w.
now clear to them that the only result of partition was that th ir
position as a minority was much weaker than before'. In addition,
they had through th eir foolish action creat d anger and resentment
in the minds of the Hindus.
These membe rs of the Mu lim League k pt on repeating that th y
were now at the mercy of the Hindu majority. It wa slI ch an
obvious thing that their grief over lhcse d vcJopment yoked
hardly any pity for them. I reminded them of wh. t I h. d s. id
during th Cabin t Mission Plan. In my statem nt of 15 April 194 ,
I had warned. the Indi an Muslims in unambiguous words. I h. d
then said that ifpartition ver became a reality, they'~ uld on day
wake up to find that after the majority of Mu lims had g n away
to Pakistan, they would still remain in Illdia but as a small and in-
significan t minori ty.
A special programme for marking th dawn f Ind('pc'nd nc
had b een arranged for 15 August. The Consti tu 'nt embly mct
at midnight and declared that Indi a was now fr and n indcp n-
dent State. Next day the Asse mbly met again at 9 a.m. and L I'd
Mountbatten d livered the inaugural sp echo The whole city w;
in a state of tumultuous joy. Even the pangs of partition we're (l r
the moment forgotten. Millions from the ity and the surrounding
countryside assembled to hailth adv nt offreedom. The flag offr c
India was to be hoisted at 4- p.m. In spit of th burning Augu.t
sun, millions gath red and in fact had been waiting in th gru Hing
heat for hollI'S. The crowd was so great that Lord Mountb II n
could not get out of his car at all and had to make hi. Ipe eh
from it.
The joy was almost delirious but lasted hardly forty-eight hou
The very next day news of communal troubl s b gan to t de p
gloom in the capital. It was the news of murder, death and cru hy.
It was learnt that in the East Punjab, Hindu and Sikh mobs had
alt cked Muslim villages. They werc burning hou es and killi g
innocent men, worn n and children. Exactly the .ame r ports m
from the West Punjab. Muslims there were killing indo iminat Iy
men, women and children of the Hindu and the ikh communiu .
The whole of the Punjab, East and We t, was b coming grav.
yard of destruction and death. Events followed in quick .uce .00.
One East Punjab Mi,n.iJter after anotheT carne rushing up to Delhi.
They were followed by local Congre leaders who were ou de the
210 India Wins Freedom
Government. All of them were horrified by the developments that
were taking place. They were also stunned by the magnitude of
th carnage and said in despair that perhaps nothing could stop it.
We asked th m why they had not called upon the military. In
despair they said that the troops stationed in the Punjab were no
longer r liable and not much help could be expected from them.
They d manded that military help should immediately be sent to the
Punjab from D lhi.
Th re were no disturbances in D lhi in the beginning, but with the
country all round aflame with such a murderous upheaval, it was
not possible to deplete th small military reserve held in Delhi. We
decided to s nd for troops from outside but before they could arrive,
trouble reached the capital. As news of murders in the Punjab
was follow d by the trickle of refugees who were coming away
from the West Punjab, violence broke out in Delhi. Murder stalked
th town. Trouble was not confined to the refugees or even to the
g neral public. Even the areas where only Government servants
lived were involved. When the r ports of massacres in the West
Punjab reached Delhi, Muslims in the city were attacked by mobs of
unruly men. Som Sikhs took a leading part in organizing these
murderous attacks in Delhi.
I have aIr ady said how much I had been disturbed by loose talk
of the dang rou doctrine of reprisals and hostages. In Delhi we
now had a gruesome application of that doctrine. If the Muslims of
the West Punjab were guilty of the murd r of Hindus and Sikhs, why
should t11 re be r taliation on innocent Muslims in Delhi ? This
theory ofhostag sand r prisals is so atrocious that no sane or decent
human bing can say a word in its defence.
The attitude of the Army now b came a critical issue. Before
partition, the Army had b en free from communal hatred. When
the country was divided on a communal basis, the communal virus
ent r d the Army. The majority of troops in Delhi were Hindus
and Sikhs. In a few days it became clear that it might prove too
gre t a strain on them if strong action was to be taken for he
restoration of Jaw nd order in -the city. We therefore took
measures to bring more soldiers from the South. They had not been
affected by the partition of the country and retained their sense of
soldierly discipline. The soldiers of the South played a great part
in bringing the situation under control and restoring order in the
capital.
Trouble in Delhi 211
Apart from the city proper, th re were suburbs such as Karolbngh,
Lodhi Colony, Subzi Mandi and Sadar Bazar, which d a hlrg
Muslim population. In all these areas, li~ and property wcr<: no
longer safe. Nor was it possible in the existing cir umstan to
provide them with complete military protection. At on st gc, th
situation in these areas became so bad that no Muslim houscholder
could go to sleep at night with the confidence that h would b'
alive next morning.
During these days of arson, murd er and rioting, I toured diCli r nt
parts of Delhi in the company of army officers. I found th Muslims
completely demoralized and suffering from a sense of utt r hdpl
ness. Many asked for shelter in my housc. Rich and well-known
families of the city came to m e compl t Jy destitute and with n
earthly possessions Jeft except the clothes th ey were wearing. me
did not dare to come by daylight and w re brought und r military
protection at midnight or in the early hours of the morning. My
house was soon full and I put up t nts in my compound. Men and
women of all kinds and conditions- rich and poor, young nd oJd-
huddled together in sheer ~ ar of death.
It soon became clear that it would take some time b fore law and
order could be restored. It was not possible to protect isol ted
houses in different parts of the city. If we arrang d for guards in
one area, the attack started lsewher. We ther for decid d that
Muslims should be Qrought togeth r and placed in protect d camps.
One such camp was establish d at th Purana Qila or the old Fort.
It has no building left but only the bastions. These were soon full.
A large number of Muslims were assembled in the ort and liv d
in these bastions duoughout almost the whole of the winler.
Several Special Magistrates were appointed during the diJ.
turbanccs to maintain law and order and restor pace. r r gret to
say that the selections were not always very happy and that 10m
of these Magistrates failed in th ir duty. I r member distinctly
the case of one Magistrate to whom a Hindu mem r of the ngre
came for help. He reported that th re was danger of attack on a
Muslim locality and ome Muslim families w r living in 14 ar of
death. This Magistrate, instead of taking necessary action, d
the Congressman for what he called hiJ 1 ck of fe ling. H e 'd h
was surprised that a Hindu should come out to help Mustil1ll.
ThiJ incident iJ revealing of the way differ nt people r ted to
the criais. Some of the SpeciaJ MagiltratCl and a few Congr men
212 India Wins Freedom
fail d but the majority of Congressmen in Delhi rose to great heights
during these difficult times . Hindu as well as Sikh members of the
Congress stood steadfast and r m ained true to the principles of
nationalism in spite of the taunts and insults of thei r communal-
mind d co-religionists.
I have criticized Lord Mountbatten for the way in which he helped
to bring about partition. I must now pay him a tribute for the
mann r in which he handl d th e crisis which faced us. I have
already referred to th energy and vigour with which he carried
out the intricate and difficult task of partitioning India. He now
act d with v n gr at r vigour and energy to restore law and
order in the country. His military training now stood us in very
good stead. Without his I adership and experience of military
tactics, it is doubtful if we could have got over the difficulties with
such expedition and efficiency. H e said that it was a war situation
and must be tr ated as such. During war, War Councils work
round the clock. We must also set up a Council of Action which
would take decisions on the spot and sec that the decisions were carried
out. An Emerg ncy Board was s~t up, consisting of some members
of th Cabinet and some high civil and military officers. The Board
m t daily at 9.30 a.m. in th Cabinet Room of the Government.
Lord Mountbatten pr sided. We reviewed the orders giv n during
th last lw nty-four hours and th action taken. This Board worked
without a break till peace was fully restored. The reports which
came to the Board evcry morning gave us an insight into the dan-
g rs of the situation.
One of the first signs of a true administrator is that he can rise
above p rsonal likes and dislik sand guarant e security of life and
property to all. During th terrible days of 1946 and 1947,Jawahar-
lal display d in a signal manner thes qualities of a true administra-
tor. From the first day that he joined Gov mment, he realized
that the State must not discriminate belw en citiz ns and that it
mu t treat Hindus and Muslims, Sikhs and Christians, Parsecs
and Buddhists qually. Who vcr was an Indian citizen had equal
claims in the eyc of the law.
The first vidence of his quality as an administrator was seen
in 1946. The Calcutta killings had b en followed by riots in Noakhali,
where Hindu had sufT< r d gr atly. The Hindus of Bihar then
attack d local Muslims in rctaliation for the Noakhali riots and
wide pr d disturbanc s broke out throughout the province. The
 Jawaharlal a True Administrator 21 3

P rovincial Government found it difficult to cope with the

situation and the Government of India had to take strong ction.
I was tileD staying in Patnn fo r almost two weeks and w. s impr ed
by the firmness and strenglh with which Jawaharl.I ought t check
the e attacks on life and property. All of us were working to the
same end, but there can be no denying that the mo t effective part
in this ta k was played by Jawaharlal Nehru.
During the whole of this period, andhiji was living in t rribl
mental anguish. H(' strained every nerve to r store good feelillg
between the communities and to secure the life and property of
Muslims. It caused him great distress and suffering to find thllt his
efforts did not meet with th expected succ '55. Onen he sent for
Jawaharlal, Sardar Patel and me and asked us to describe lhe
situation in the city. It added to his distress when he found th t
there were differen ces among us even regarding what wa, actually
happening.
The truth is that there was a difference of attitude between ard r
Patel on the one hand and Jawaharlal and me on the other. This
was affecting local administration and it was becoming clear that
the officers were divided into two groups. The larger group looked
up to Sa.r dar Palel as Home Minister and act d in a way wbich
they thought would please him, A smaller group looked toJawahar-
lal and me and tried to carry out JawaharLal 's orders. The Chief
. Commissioner of Delhi was a Muslim officer, Khurshed Ahmed,
son of Sahebzada Aftab Ahmed. H e wa~ not a strong officer. In
addition, be was afraid that if he took strong' action he m.ighl be
regarded as favouring the Muslitru. The result was that he w
only the nominal head of the administration aod all action wa
being taken by the Deputy CommiMioner on his own initiativ ,
This was an officer who was a ikh but did not follow many of th
Sikh customs and conventions. H e had haved off his bea' d nd
cut hi hair and many Sikhs regarded him as almost a her tic.
He had been Deputy Comm' ioner in D Ihi even before p rliti n,
and some time before 15 ugust there was a BUgg tion that since
he had served hi. term he might be returned to the Punjab. nr
Jeading citizens of Delhi, 'pecially a large ICCtion of Mwfu:ns, re-
p~ted strongly against this proposal. They said th t he w
fair-minded and strong officer, and that dur:ing th difficult day. it
would be bard to find uitable replacement.
The Deputy Com_ooer w accordingly retained, but jl
15
 India Wins Freedom
seems that under the stress of the communal tension which was
swe ping through the Punjab he could not maintain his former
attitude. I received many reports that he was not taking sufficiently
strong or eEf, ctive action against the miscreants. The very Muslims
who a year ago had pleaded for his retention now came and said
that he was not giving the necessary protection to the Muslim
citizens of D lhi. This was reported to Sardar Patel but he paid
hardly any attention to such complaints.
Sardar Pat I was the Home Minist r, and as such the Delhi admi-
nistration was directly under him. As the lists of murder and arson
grew longer, Gandhiji sent for Patel and asked him what he was
doing to stop the carnage. Sardar Patel tried to reassure him by
saying that the reports which he was receiving were grossly exag-
g rated. In fact PatcJ went to the extent of saying that the Muslims
had no cause for complaint or fear. I distinctly remember one
occasion wh n the three of us were sitting with Gandhiji. Jawaharlal
said with d ep sorrow that h e could not tol erate the situation in
D lhi, wh r Muslim citizens w re being killed like cats and dogs.
He felt humiliat d that he was helpless and could not save them.
His con sci nc would 110t let him rest, for what answer could he
giv wh n peopl complain d of these terrible happenings? Jawa-
harlal rep at d s veral tim s that he found the situation intolerable
and that his conscience would not let him rest.
W were compl te1y taken aback by Sardar Patel's reaction.
At a tim wh n Muslims were b ing murdered in Delhi in open
daylight, h calmly told Gandhiji thatJawaharlal's complaints were
completely incomprehensibl . Th re may have been some isolated
incidents, but Gov mment was doing v rything possible to protect
the li~ and prop rty of Muslims and nothing more could be done.
In fact h ga v nt to his di satisfaction that Jawaharlal as the
Prime Minist r hould express disapproval of what his Government
wa doing.
Jawaharlal r mained peechless for some moments and then tum-
d to Gandhiji in d spair. He aid that if these were Sardar Patel's
views, he had no comm nts to make.
Another incid nt which occurred about this time revealed
cle rly ho, aroar P tel s mind was working. He may have felt
that ome explanation wa nec ssary for the attacks on Muslims
which re taking place every day. Accordingly he put out the
th ory that deadly weapons had been recovered from the MU$lim
Gandhiji Decides To Fast
quarters of the city. His sugg stion was that thC" Musl ims of D lhi
had collected arms in ord r to attack the Hindus and the ikhs, nd
if the Hindus and the SikllS had not taken th first offcnsivc j the
Muslims would have destroyed them. Th police did r ov r
some arms from Karolbagh and Subzi Mandi. By Sardar P tel's
orders, these were brought to the Gov rnmcnt Hou e and k pl
for our inspection in the ant -chamber of th abinct Room.
When we assembled for our daily meeting, Samar Pat I sa.id lhut
we should first go to th ante-chamber and inspect th , plured
arms. On our arrival we found on th table d zen of kit hen
knives that wtTe rusted, pockct-kni,,{'s and pen-kniv('s. with or
without handles and iron spikes which had been recovC'red from
the fences of old hOllses and some cast-iron water pipes. Ac oreting
to Sardar Pat I, thrse were the weapons which the Muslims ofDdhi
had collected in order to exterminate the Hindus and th Sikhs.
Lord Mountbatten took up one or two of the knives and s, id with a
smile that those who h ad collect d this materia.l s m('d to hav a
wonderful idea of mjUtary tactics if they thought that the ity of
Delhi could be captured with th m.
I have already said that the larg' majority of Muslims of the
city had been collecled in the Purana Qila. WintC'T was now ap-
proaching. Thousands who lived under th op n sky su ro red terribly
from the cold. Th re were no proper arrang menu for food Or
drinking water. What was worse, the conservancy arrang menta
w re either non-exist nt or thoroughly inadequat.e. On moming,
Dr Zakir Husain gave vidence before the Emergency Board and
described the terrible conditions in the old art. He aid that these
poor men and women had been rescued from sudden death to be
buried in a living grave. Th e Board asked me to imp ct the arrang
menu and suggest necessary measures. At its n xt me ting, the
Board decided that immediate arrangements should be made for
drinking water and sanitation. The Army w also asked to Ie
as many tents as po 'bIe, so that the people could at I t live und t
canvas.
Gandhijj's di tre was increasing ery day. arm rly. the
whole nation had respond d to his tight It wish. Now it seemed
that his most fi rvent appeall w re falling on deaf can. At last he
could no longer tolerate this state of affain and nt for me to lay
that he had no weap~n Jeft but to fast till peac w r tored in
Delhi. When it became known that Gand.h.iji would Cast until
216 India Wins Freedom
p ace and order were restored in Delhi, many who had till then
remained inactive were shamed into action. They felt that at his
age and his state of health, he must be prevented from undergoing
the fast. They appealed to him to give up the idea but he remained
adamant.
One thing which weighed heavily on Gandhiji's mind was the
attitude of Sardar Patel. Sardar Patel belonged to Gandhiji's inner
circle, and was very dear to him. In fact, Sardar Patel owed his
entire political existence to Gandhiji. Among thc important leaders
of the Congress, many had had a political life even before Gandhiji
appeared on the sc ne. There were however two, Sardar Patel and
Dr Rajendra Prasad, who were en tirely the creation of Gandhiji.
Before the Non-co-op raLion Movement, Sarda r Patel was one of
the many lawyers of Guj rat with hardly any interest or place in
the public life of the country. When Gandhiji settled in Ahmedabad,
he picked out Patel and st p by step built him up. Patel became his
whole-heart d supporter and I have already mentioned how, on
many occasions, he merely echoed Gandhiji's wishes. It was Gandhiji
who made him a member oLthe Congress Working Committee.
Again, it was b cause of Gaodhiji that he became President of the
Congress in 1931. I t hurt Gandbiji deeply that Patel should now be
following a policy which was quite contrary to everything for which
he himself stood.
Gandhiji said that he saw Muslims of Delhi b iog killed before
his very eyes. This was being done while his own Vallabhbhai
was the Home Member of the Government of India and was res-
ponsible for maintaining law and order in the capital. Patel had
not only failed to give protection to Muslims, but he lightheartedly
dismiss d any complaint made on this account. Gandhiji said that
h had now no option but to use his last weapon, nam ly to fast
until the situation changed. Accordingly, he b gan his fast on 12
January 1948. In a s ns , the fast was directed against the attitude
of Snrdar Patel and Patel knew that this was so.
We had done our best to eli suade Gandhiji from undertaking
his fast. On the evening of the first day's fast Jawahnrlal, Sardar
Patel and I were sitting by Gandhiji s side. Sardar Patel was leaving
for Bombay the n t morning. He poke to Gandhiji in a formal
manner and complained that Gandhiji was fasting without any
justification. He also complained that there was no real reason
for su h fa t. Ip fact his fl\ t would lead to cilarges against th~
Effect of Gandhiji's Fast
Government and particularly against Sardar Patel. He said in
some bitterness that Gandhiji was acting ;u if ardar Pat 1 ,
responsible for the murder of the Mu slims.
Gandhiji replied in his usual calm manner, 'I am not in .hin
now but in Delhi. Nor have I lost my eyes and ars. If you
ask me to disbelievc the testimony of my own yc nd ears. nnd
tell me that Mu lims have no cause for complaint, r surely c unol
convince you nor can you convince m . Hindus and Sikhs arc
my brothers. They ar' flesh of my fif'sh and if th<'y arc now blind
with rage, I will nut hlame them. I must howt'vcr expatiate through
my own sufJ'ering and I hope that my fallt will Opt'n their cy to
r eal facts.'
Sardar P atel got up without a word :md made as if h would go
away. I stopped him and said that he should can (>1 his pr gramme
and stay on in Delhi. Nobod)' could say what tUI'll vcnlll might
take and he should not leave whil Gandhiji was fasting.
P atel almost shouted back, 'What is the use of my staying?
Gandhiji is not prepared to listen to me. He se'ms determined to
blacken the names of the Hindus before the whol' world. If thia i.
his attitude, I have no use for him. I can't chang my programme
and J must go to Bombay.'
Sardar Patel's tone even more than hi word deeply grieved me.
What, I thought, would be th('ir effect on andhiji. We felt that it
was us less saying anything more and Patel kfl.
ardar Patel had hardened his heart against Gandhiji, but not
SO the people of Delhi. The moment it wa~ known that he had
started his fast, not only the city but the whole of India was deeply
stirred. In Delhi the eIfe t was leelrie. Groups which had till re-
cently openly opposed Gandhiji came forward and said th t they
would be prepared to do anything in order to save andhiji'l
precious life,
Different people came and told Gandhiji that they w uld work
to bring peace back to D elh.i, but Gandhiji was not influenced by
their words. Two days ofli verish activity p d, On the third day,
a public meeting \ as called to consider tbe situation and to .
measures so that Gaudhiji could be persuaded to give up his fast.
I went to Gandbiji on my way to the meeting. 1 'd that he
should lay down conditions for breaking hi_s fat. We would then
place them before the people and say tha,t provided be: w . fled
on thCJe point". he would give up his fast.
218 India Wins Freedom
Gandhiji said, 'This is talking business. My first condition is that
all Muslims who have been compelled to leave Delhi because of these
attacks by Hindus and Sikhs would be invited to come back and they
must be r ese ttl ed in th eir own homes.'
This was a fine and noble gesture, but I knew it was not a prac-
tical proposition. Mter partition, life in both the Punjabs had been
disrupted. Millions of r fugees had come to India from West
Punjab and millions h ad left East Punjab for Pakistan. Thousands
had Jeft Delhi and many of th e refugees from West Punjab had
occupied the hous s which were left vacant by Muslims. If it had
been a matt r of a few hundr ds, p rhaps Gandhiji's wishes could
have been carri d out. When the m n and wom'n involved ran
into t ns of thousands, any att mpt to carry out Gandhiji's wishes
would only have cr ated fr sh prQblems. Hindus and Sikhs who
had come away from W st Punjab had been uprooted once but
th y had now found some kind of home in Delhi. If they were asked
to vacate th ir present houses, wh re would they go? B sides, the
Muslims who had left D lhi for Pakistan were probably scattered
in differ nt places. How could they be brought back? Muslims
could not be brought back nor could Hindus and Sikhs be asked
to Icav the hous s they were occupying. To try for such a settlement
would in fact m an that in place of the first eviction which had driven
out Muslims, we would now have a s cond to drive out Hindus and
Sikhs.
I caught hold of Gandhiji's hands and pleaded with him that he
should giv up this point. It would be neither practical nor perhaps
morally justifiable to ask Hindus and Sikhs who had now found a
hom in Delhi to become wanderers once again. I appeal d to him
not to insist on this point but to lay down as his first condition that
murder and arson should immediately cease. He could also insist
that Muslims who w re still in India should be able to live in honour
and p ace and that friendly relations should be restored among all
the communities. At first Gandhiji would not agree and kept insist-
ing on his own conditions. FinaUy, however, he r 1 nted and said
that if the conditions I had suggested satisfied me, he also would
ace pt them. I thanked him for his consideration for my views and
b gged him to accept my sugge tions.
Gandhiji then sugg sled that Muslim shrines and places of wor-
ship which had b en broken or violated should be restored and
repaired. The occupation of such places by non-Muslims was a cause
Gandhiji's Conditions for Giving up Fast 21 9
of grief and terror for Muslims. Gandhiji wanted an urnncc th t
there would be no r currence of any attack on such pI ces cred LO
any community.
Gandhiji then dictated his conditions for giving up th f. t. 1 hey
were as follows:
1. Hindus and Sikhs must forthwith stop all attacks g inst fwlims
and must reassure Muslims that thcy would livc together' brothers.
2. Hindus and Sikhs would make every effort to ensure that not one
Muslim should leave India because of insecurity of life and property.
3. Attacks which were taking place on lu)lirns in moving tJ' ins mu t
forthwith stop and Hindus and ikhs who were taking part in such It cks
must be pre cmed from doing so.
4. Muslims who lived near the shrines nd Uargah like Nizolmuddin
Aulia, Khwaja Qutubuddin Bakhtiar K aki and NasirucJdin Chir. gh
Dehlvi had lef. their homes in distress. They must be brought ba k to
their own locality and re-settled.
5. The Dargah Qutubuddin Bakhtiar had bc('n dolmolg d. Govenlm nl
could of course restore and repair the shrine but thill would not lisfy
Gandhiji. He insisted that the restoration and r('pair IIlllst be done by
Hindus and Sikhs as an act of atonement.
6. Most important of all was the need for a chang of he rt. Fulfilment
of the other conditions was not so importillJt as this. Leaders of the Hmdu
and the Sikh communi lies must rcaJlsurc Gandhiji on this point 10 th t
he would not have to fast again on such an iuue.
'Let this be my last fast,' he said.
I assured Gandhiji that th ese points could be mct. I me to the
meeting at 2 p.m. and placed til conditions b for ' lh audience.
I told them that we had met to rcas ure andhiji and to request
him to give up his fast. Mere r solutions would nOl move him, but
if the people of Delhi wanted to save his life, the onditi lU be had
laid down must be fulfilled. I had come to find out if lhe p opl 0
D lhi would givc him that surnnce.
There were bout 50,000 men and women pre nt at the m ting.
With one oice they shoutcd, 'We shall carry out andhiji'. with
to the letter. We shall pI dge our ljfe and heart and sh II not giv
him any cause for distre .'
I was still speaking when vario people copied out the
and began to secure signatur from the udie ceo 0
meeting was over, thousandJ had signed the docum nt. The puty
Commissioner of Delhi collected group of Hindu and Sikh lcade
and left for the shrine. of Khwaja ~tubuddin to repair the d ge.
220 India Wins Freedom
Simultaneously, several societies working in Delhi took a public
pledge that they would work in their own circles for the fulfilment
of Gandhiji's conditions. In fact, they declared that they would
take the responsibility for the conditions bei ng carried out. By
the vening, I had received deputations from all parties and groups
and from every quarter of Delhi a~suring me that they accepted
Gandhiji's conditions and urging me to request Gandhiji to give up
his fast.
Nex t morning, I called a mccting of representative leaders of
Delhi. We came to the decision that they should all go to Birla
House and give their personal assurance to Gandhiji. I reached
Birla House a t about ten and told Gandhiji that I was now fully
satisfied that his object had b en fulfill ed. His fast had changed
th hearts of thousands and brought back (0 them the sense of justice
and hum ani ty. Thousands had now pledged themselves to regard
the maint nancc of good relations among the communities as their
first task. I appealed to Gandhiji to accept the as urance and give up
his fast.
Gandhiji was obviously pleased but he did not yet accede to our
request. The day passed in discussion and persuasion. He had lost
str ngth and weight and was unable to sit up. H e was lying flat in
his b d but he listened to every d putation which came and tried to
ass ss how far there was a genuine change of heart. Finally he said
that he would give his reply the next morning.
We all as mbl<-d in his room next day at ten o'clock. Jawabarlal
was aIr ady th reo Among others who came was Zahid Husain, the
High ommissioner of Pakistan, who had asked for permission
to shim. Gandhiji sent for him and he joined the gathering,
which included the whole Cabinet except ardar Patel. Gandhiji
mad a sign to indicate that those who wanted to repeat their
pl dge to him should do so. About 25 leaders of Delhi, including
all schools of political thought among Hindus and Sikhs came up
one by one and vow d that th y would faithfully carry out the
conditions laid down by Gandhiji. He then made a sign and the
men and women of his circle started to sing the Ramdlwn. His grand-
daught r brought a glass of orange juice and he made a sign that she
hould hand the glass to me. I held the glass to hjs lips and Gandhiji
broke hi f: t.
After Gandhiji began his fast, Mr Arthur Moore, formerly Editor
of the taltsman, also began to fast in the Imperial Hotel. The
Communalists Attack Gandhiji 221
Hindu-Muslim riots had moved him dcc-ply. He told me th. t if the
troubles did not end, h had also decided to fast unto death. He had
been in India many years and adopted it as hi country. As an
Indian, he regarded it as his duty to put a stop to th human misery
and d gradation which was taking place. Dc-aul he' sRid, was prdi r-
able 10 the terrible tragedy which had overtaken Ind ia. 1 now cot
him a message that Gandhiji had brokC'n his fast and that he llhould
do the same.
Even after Gandhiji broke his fast, it took sevC"ral days bt'for h
slowly regain(.'d his strength. ~ard.lr PaId feturned from Bombay
and went to sec him. I was also present. andhiji'8 greatn'ss nt'v r
shone more ekarly than on such occasions. 11 rcc._,.ived Putel with
great affection and kindness. There was not a trac(' of re...entmcDt or
anger in his miell. Patd was obviously uncomfortable and hill
behaviour was still dry and formal. He was not plcasrd with ,andhi-
ji and did not approvc of what Gandhiji had done in order to restore
a sense of security among the Muslims.
Sardar Patel was not alon in lhis attitude towards G.Uldhiji'.
fast. In fact a group of Hindus had been bitt r against Gandhiji
ever since he had started his peace mov . Their resentment increas d
day by day. They openly condemned him for giving away wh llbey
raJled the legitimate interests of Hindus. This wa.~ no II cret and
was widely known throughout the country. A section of Hindus
under the leadership of the Ma hasabha and the R' htriya Svay m
evak Sangh went about saying openly that Gandhiji was helping
Muslims against Hindus. They organiz d oppo itioD even to hi.
prayer meetings, where, under Gandhiji's instruction!, verses from
the Quran and the Bible were r ad along with the Hindu scriptUI'Cl.
orne of the men organized an agitation against his prayer m t-
ings and said that they would not allow the recitation of veneJ from
the Quean or the Bible. Pamphlets and handbills were distribut d to
this effect. People wcrc also incited against andhiji by propaganda
that described him as the enemy of the HindUl. ne pampblet
went so far as to say that if Gandhiji did not cb nge his waY',
should be taken to neutralize him.
Gandhiji's fast had further exasperated this gToup. They now
decided to take action against bim. Soon after he umcd hi p yer
meetings) a bomb was thrown at him. Fortunately nobody was burt,
but people aU over India were shoe d that anybody should raise
his hand against Gandhiji, Police started their investis lions and it
222 India Wins Freedom
seemed very strange that they could not find out who planted the
bomb and how they had succeeded in entering the garden ofBirla
House. It was also strange that adequate steps were not taken even
after this incident to protect his life. The attack made it clear that
however small in number, there was a determined group that was
trying to kill GandhUi. It was therefore natural to expect that the
police and the C.LD. of Delhi should take special measures for
Gandhiji's protection. To our eternal shame and sorrow I have to
say that the most elementary precautionary measures were not taken
even aft r this warning.
A few more days passed. As Gandhiji slowly regained his strength,
he again started addressing the gathering after the prayers were over.
Thousands us d to attend these prayers and he felt that it was one of
th most efli ctive ways of carrying his message to the people.
On 30 January 1948, I went to Gandhiji at 2.30 p.m. There were
several important things I had to discuss and I sat with him for over
an hour. I then returned home but at about 5.30 I suddenly re-
membered that there were some important points on which I had
not taken his advice. I went back to Birla House and to my surprise
found that the gates were closeer. Thousands were standing on the
lawn and the crowd had overflowed into the street. I could not
und rstand what was the matter, but they all made way when they
saw my car. I got down near the gate and walked up to the house.
The doors of the house were also bolted. An inmate saw me through
th glass pane and came out to take me in. As I was entering, some-
one said in tears, 'Gandhiji has been shot and is lying senseless.'
The news was so shocking and unexpected that I could hardly
compr hend the meaning of the words. I had a dazed feeling and
walked up to Gandhiji's room. He was lying on the floor. His face
w s pale and his eyes w re closed. His two grandsons held his feet
nd were w eping. I heard as ifin a dream, 'Gandhiji is dead!
 EPIL G E
AN D H IJ I' S assas ination mark d tht' tn of an cr. 1

G cannot to this day forgrt how misrrably w had frult-d in

prote"ting th life of the grcatt'st on of m rn Indi . Aft r
the incident ofth bomb, it was natural to xp t that th p li t. nd
th C.I.D. of Delhi should take special pr cautions for hi prot tion.
I[ an attempt is mad' on th . life of e en a common man, lh police
take special care. Thi is done v n wh n thrrat rung I tl'1'S or
pamphlets are rccciv d. In Gandhiji's ase th r w r n t nly
I tters, pamphlets and publi threat, but a mb had a tu.lly b en
thrown. It was the question of the life of the gr at 51 p non thy of
contemporary India and y t no .ff, ctive m asur s wer t k n. It
was not that such measur s were dim ull. Th pr. y r m tin"
were not held in an op n fi Jd, but on the lawns ofBirla Hou. ThiJ
was a place surrounded on all sid s by walls. Nobody could ent r
it except through the gate. It was th easiest thing for the police to
ch ck p ople as they came in or went out.
After the tragedy it was cl ar from th evid nc from the sp ctat TI
that the murderer had nter d in a most suspicious w y. Hil eli
and words were such that the .I.D. could nd should have k pt
him under ob rvation. If the police had t k n any aClion, he . uld
have been discovered and di nned. He me with a r voJv r with.
out any check. Wh n Gandhiji had reach d the pray r me lin ,h
got up and accost d Gandhiji, s ying 'You r lat today.' dhiji
replied, 'Y .' Before he could say another word, the th 0
were fir d, hich put n nd to hi precio liti.
Th re was naturally a wave of anger once the (fa cdy h d
place. Some p opJe openly d rd r l I f i
Jaiprakash Narayan .how d co i r blc cou g in r ..
j e. In the meeting which w: heJd in D !hi t XPl1 our
of horror and sorrow at Gandhiji'. d ath, he 'd c1 arly th t th
Home iinistcr of the Govcmm nt of Indj could D t pc the
 India Wins Freedom
responsibility for this assassination. He demanded an explanation
from Sardar Patel as to why no special measures had been taken
where th ere was open propaganda inciting people to murder Gandhi-
ji and a bomb had actually been thrown at him.
Mr PrafulJa Chandra Ghosh of Calcutta raised the same issue.
He also condemned the Government of India for its failure to save
andhiji's life. He pointed out that Sardar Patel was reputed to be
a strong and efficient Home Minister. Huw co uld he then explain
why no effort had been made for the savi ng of Gandhiji's life?
Sardar Pat 1 met these charges in his own characteristic way. He
was no doubt deeply shocked, but he also resented the way in which
people were openly acc usi ng him. Wh en the Congress Parliamentary
Party m t, he said that enemies of the Congress were trying to divide
th e organization by bringing these charges against him. He reiter-
at d his loyalty to Gandhiji and said that the party should not bc
affe t d by these charg s but should stand firm and undivided in the
dang rous situation which had been created by Gandhiji's death.
His appeal was not without ITect. Many members of the Congress
Party assured him that they would stand by him.
I solated incidents in va rious parts of the country showed how widely
the poison of comm unalism had spr ad in recent times. The country as
a whole was ovclwh lmingly moved by the assassination, but in a few
towns people di tributed sweets and held celebrations as a mark ofjoy.
This was said specially of the towns of Gwalior and Ujjain. I was
sho k d wh 11 I heard that in both these towns, sweets were openly
distribut d and that some p ople had the impudence to rejoice pub-
Ii ly. Th ir joy was how ver short-lived. The nation as a whole was
ov rwhelm d with gri f and the wrath of the people turned against
all who wer supposed to be Gandhiji's enemies. For two or three
weeks aft r th trag dy, the leaders of the Hindu Mahasabha or the
R.S. . could not ome out and face the public. Dr Shyama Prasad
Mookerj wa then Pre ident of the Hindu Mahasabha and aMinis-
t r in the Union Government. He dar d not come out of his house and
aft r orne time re igned from the Mahasabha. lowly however the
situation improv d and after some time the people settled down.
od ,the murderer, was pro cuted but it took a long time to
build up the case against him. The police took s vera! months to
mak cnquiri s as it appeared that there had been a far-flung cons-
piracy to murder Gandhiji. The public reaction to Godse's arrest
offered an indication of how some Indians had been affected by the
Freedom at Cost of Unity
communal poison. The vast majority o[ Indians condemned d c
and compared him to Judas but some women from re~pccla.ble
families scnt him a sweat\.' r they had knitted for him. There was also
a movement for his release. His supporters did not openly defend
his action. They said that since Candhiji was a believer in non-
violence, his murderer should not be ex<,cuted. T('kgram w re
sent to Jawaharlal and me that the {'xecution of Godse would
against Gandhiji's principles. The law, however, took iL~ own cou e
and the High Court confirmed his sentence.
Hardly two months had passed since C~andhiji's death when
Sardar Patel had a heart attack. My own retlding is that this was
the result of the shock he had recciv d. So long as Gandhiji WilS
alive, Patel's anger against him remained. When J:lnc1hUi w.
murdered and people openly accused Sard.tr P,ltt'i of J1(gh t or in-
efficiency, he felt deep shock and humiliation. Besides, h could not
forget that he owed everything to Gandhiji. Gandhiji's unfailing
affection and consideration for Patel must have also mad the situa-
tion more painful to him. All these worked 011 his mind and lroubl d
him till he was attacked with thrombosis. He lived for some thr e
more years, but ncvcr regained hi s health.
Thus India gained her freedom bu lo,l her unity. 1\ new Slale
I

called Pakistan was called into being. Pakistan was the creatiC)n of
the Muslim League. Naturally the Muslim L ague party became the
dominant powe r in this new State. I have air ady described how the
Muslim League was originally founded to oppose the Congress The
League tberefore had hardly any members who had fought [or the
independence of the country. They had neither made any sacrifice
nor gone through the discipline of a struggle. Th y were either r -
tir d officials, or men who had been brought into public life under
British patronage. The result was that when the new Slate w form
ed, power came into the hands of p ople who had no record of rvice
or sacrifice. Many of the rulers of the new Stat were selfi h people
who had come into public life only for the sake of personal inter t.
A majority of the leaders of the new State came from the U.P.,
Bihar and Bombay. In most case, they could no ev n ak th
language of the areas which now fanned P kiJtan. There w th
a gulf between the rulers and the ruled in the new late. Th
self-jmposed leaders feared that jf free electio were held, m t f
them had very little. chance of yen being returned. h'r aim
therefore was to postpone the elections long a ible ad to
 India Wins Freedom
build up their fortunes and their power in the country. Ten years
have passed and it is only recently that a Constitution has been
fram d. Even this does not see m final , for every now and then there
arc proposals for further changes in it. Nobody yet knows ifand when
the first elections under the new Constitution will be held.
The only r suIt of the creation of Pakistan was to weaken the
position of th e Muslims in th e sub-continent of India. The 45
million Muslims who have remained in India have been weakened.
On the other hand, there is as yet no indication that a strong and
efficient Government can be establish ed in Pakistan. If one judges
the question only from the point of view of the Muslim community,
can anybody deny today that Pakistan has been for them a very un-
fortunate and unhappy development? In fact, the more I think
about it the more I am convinced that the creation of Pakistan has
solved no probl m. One may argue that the relations between
Hindus and Muslims had become so estranged in India that there was
no alternative to partition. This view was h eld by most of the sup-
porters of the Muslim League and after partition many of the Con-
gress lead rs have held a similar view. Whenever I discussed the
question withJawaharlal or Sardar Pat I after partition, this was the
argument they gave in support ofth ir decision. Ifhowever we think
th matt r over coolly, we shall find that their analysis is not correct.
I am convinc d that the scheme I framed on the occasion of the
Cabinet Mission and which the Mission largely accepted, was a far
better solution from every point of view. If we had remained stead-
fast and refused to accept partition, I am confident that a safer and
more glorious future would have awaited us.
Can anyone deny that the creation of Pakistan has not solved the
communal problem, but made it more intense and harmful? The
basis of partition was nmity b tween Hindus and Muslims. The
creation of Pakistan gave it a permanent ,constitutional form and
made it much more difficult of solution. The most regrettable feature
of this situation is that the sub-continent ofIndia is divided into two
States, which look at one another with hatr d and fear. Pakistan
believes that India will not allow her to rest in peace and will destroy
h r whenever she has an opportunity. Similarly India thinks that
whenev r Pakistan g ts an opportunity, she will move against India
and attack her. This has led both the States to increase their defence
exp nditure. After the War, undivided India spent only about a
hundred croTtS for defence. Lord WaveD himselfheld that a hundred
Final Thoughts
crores should suffice for the three ... ings of the D eli nce forcC' .
came partition. One-fourth of the undividrd army w nt to P ki tan.
In spite of this India has to sp nd over 200 crorC's for the mint n nee
of her defence forces. Of the r venues of the Go emmrnt ofIndiu,
about a third goes to m et the expensC's of def<"nce. Paki tan' p i-
tion is if anything wors . In spite of the fact that she h. only on-
fourth of th e territories and armies of India. she i spending tIc t
100 crores from h er own revenues besid s the. id he ge from the
United States. If we pause to think. we shall realize- what a gr t
national wastage all this involves. If this fund could b u d for
economic dev lopment. th progress of th ountry would be gee tly
accelerated.
Mr Jinnah and his follow rs did not e m to r alizt' that g ography
was against thl'm. Muslims in undivided I ndia w re di tribul din
way which mad it impossibl to form a s paratr t. t in a c n oli-
dated area. The Mu lim majority areas wer on the north-w t nd
the north-east. These two regions have no point of physi al cont ct.
People in these two areas arc compl tely differ nt from on anoth r
in every resp ct. xcept only in religion. I t is one of lhe gr t It
frauds on the people to sugg st that religious affinity can unit r .
which are geographi ally. economically, linguistically and culturally
different. It is true that Islam sought to establish a s i ty which
transcends racial. linguistic. economic and political frontiers. History
h as however proved that aft r the first few drcad I, or at most aft r
the first century, I slam was not able to unit all th Mu lim counlri ,
into one Slate on th basis of I lam alone.
~his was the position in the past and this is th position tod y.
N o one can hope that E ast and W est Pakistan will comp 11 th it
differences and form one nation. Even within Welt Pab lan, the
thr e provinces of Sind, the Punjab and the Fronti r, bav int mal
incompatibility and are working for separate ai and in tere.ta.
N everthele the die i cast. The new Stat of P kist.an i, a t.
It is to the interest ofIndia and Pakistan that they hould d v lop
friendly relations and act in co-op ration with one noLb r. Any
other course of action can lead only to gr aler trouble, ,um
ring nd
misfortune. Some people hold th t what happ ned in 't-
able. Othen equally strongly U e that what 1 h P n
wrong and could have been avoid d. We cannot y tod Y wlUch
reading is correct. History alone wiJI decide wheth r we hav ctcd
wisely and OOJTectly ir.i accepting partition.
 APPENDIX
Sir Stafford Cripps issued the following Draft D eclaration on behalf
of the British Government:
His Majesty's Govcrnment having considered the anxieties expressed
in this coun try and in India as to thc fulfilment ofpromiscs made in regard
to the future of India, have decided to lay down in precise and clear
terms the steps which they propose shal I }w taken for the earliest possible
realization of self-government in India. The object is the creat.ion of a
new Indian Union which shall const itute a Dominion associated with the
United Kingdom and other D omin ions by a common all egian ce to the
Crown but equal to them in every rcspect, in no way subordin ate in any
aspect of its domesti c and external affairs .
His Majesty's Governm nt therefore make the following declaration:
(a) Immediately upon cessation of hostilities, steps shall be taken to
set up in India in manner described hereafter an elected body charged
with the task of framing a new Constitution for India.
(b) Provision shall be made, as set out below for participation ofIndian
tates in the constitution-making body .
(c) His Majesty's Government undertake to accept and implement
forthwith the constitution so framed subject only to (i) The right of any
province of Bri tish India that is not prepared to a ccepl the new constJtu-
tion t(l retain its present constitutional position provision being made for
its subsequent accession if it so decides.
With such non-acceding provinces, should they so desire, His Majesty's
Government will be prep:ucd to agree upon a new constitution giving
them the same full status as the Indian Union and arrived at by a proce-
dure analogous to that here laid down.
(Ii) The igning of a treaty .:which shall be negotiated between His
Majesty's Government and the constitution-making body. This treaty
will cover aU nccc sary matters arising out of the complete transfer of
te$pon ibility from British to Indian hands; it will make provision, in
ac ordance with undertakings given by His Majesty's Government for
the protection of racial and religious minorities; but will not impose any
restriction on the power of the Indian Union to decide in future iu rela-
tionship to other member States of the British Common\\ealth.
Appendix
Whether or not an Indian. tate elects to adhere to the con titution it
will be necessary to negotiate a revision of its trc.a ty rrangcmcnts so flU'
as this may be required in the new situation,
(d) The constitution-making body sha ll b' composC'd as follow unl
the leaders of Indian opinion in the principal cOlllmunili ugrec upon
some other form before the end of hostil ities,
Immediately upon the resu lt being known of pro"illrial cit- lions whi h
will be necessary at the end of hos tilili("s, the en tire membership 01 the
Lower H ouses of Provincial l egi~ J atures sha.1I as n ~illgl(' c1("ctoral collcgt"
proceed to th e eJection of the constitution-making body hy the system
of proportional representa tion, This n w body shall he in numher abou t
I {10th of tht' number of the electoral collC'ge.
Indian State~ sha ll I invilrd to appoint rcprest'fltnt i\' 5 in the' ame
proportion as to their t tal population <IS in the case of rcprC"5(tlllltiv :5 of
British India as a whole and with the ~ame powers ;u British Jllcii.1n
members .
(e) During the cri tical pC"riod which now fac(,s India and until the new
constitution can be framed Hi s Maje~t)"s Go\'crnJnrnt !tIllst il1('vit,.lIJly
bear the 1C'.sponsibility for and retain lhe control and elirr tion of thr
Df."fence of India as part of their w(lrld war eITOrL hut thr task of organ
izing to the fult the military, moral and matl"rial r('sources nf India m\lst
be the responsibility of the Government of Jndia with the co-operation
of the peoples of J ndin. His !>.'l njes ty's Gnvernment dcsirt' and inviw thl"
immediate and effective participation of the h'adcrs of th~ principal
section of the Indian people in the counsels of their country, of the 'om-
monweallh and of the United Nations. Thus they wil J hr nabled to give
their active and constructive hel p in th discharge of a task which is vit:\J
and essential for the future freedom of India.

CORRBSPONDE CE WITH. IR STAF RD RIPPS

BItla Park
ew Deihl, April 10, I

Dear ir Stafford,
On the 2nd priJ I scot you the resolutjon of the Working Commiuce
of the Congress containing their views on the ( nt tive propotal. put
forward by you on behalf of the British Govtmment. In thi. f'CIQluti n
we expressed our dis ent from several important and rar~re-ach.ing pro-
po.sals for the future. Further consideration of these p po hal only
strengthened ,u s in our conviction in regard to them, and we 'bauld ilk
to rq>eat that we cannot accept them as Jug CIted. Th Working Com
mittee', resolution gives expression to our conclusions reJating t.O them
which we suehed after 4\c mo.t earn t consideration.
16
 Appendix
That resolution, however, emphasized the gravity of the present situa-
tion and stated that the ultimate decision that we might take would be
governed by the changes made in the present. The over-riding problem
before all of us, and mOre especially before all Indians, is the defence of
the country from aggression and invasion . The future, important as it is,
will depend on what happens in the next few months and years. We were
therefore pr pared to do without any assurances for this uncertain future,
hoping that through our sacrifices in the defence of our country we would
lay the solid and enduring foundations for a free and independent India.
We concentrated, therefore, on the present.
Your original proposals in regard to the present, as contained in clause
(e) of the proposed declaration were vague and incomplete, except in so
far as it was made clear that 'His Majesty's Government must inevitably
bear the full r sponsibility for the defence of India.' These proposals,
in effect, asked for parti cipation in the tasks of today with a view to
ensure the 'future freedom of India ' . Freedom was for an uncertain
future, not for the present; and nO indication was given in claus('" (e) of
what arrangem nts or governmental and other changes would be made
in the present. When this vagueness was pointed out, you said that this
was deliberate, so as to give you freedom to determine these changes in
consul tation with others. In our talks you gave us to understand that you
envisaged a National Governmerrt which would deal with all matt rs
except Defence.
Defence at any time, and more parti.c ularly in wartime, is of essential
importance and without it a National Government functions in a very
limited field. Apart from this consideration it was obvious that the whole
purpose of your proposals and our talks centred round the urgency of the
problems created by the threat of the invasion of Iodia. The chief func-
tions of a National Government must necessarily be to organize Defence
both intensiv ly and on the widest popular basis and to create a mass
psychology of r sistance to an invader. Only a National Government on
whom this responsibility was laid could do that. Popular resistance must
have a national background and both the soldier and the civilian must feel
that they are fighting for their country's freedom undernationalleadership.
The question became one not of just satisfying our national aspiration
but of effective prosecution of the war and fighting to the last any invader
who set foot on the soil ofIndia. On general principles a National Govern-
ment would control def, nce through a Defence Minister, and the Com-
mander-in-Chief would control the armed forces and would have full
1 titude in the carrying out of operations connected with the war. An
Indian National Government should have normally functioned in this
way. We made it clear that the Commander-in-Chief in India would have
control of the I\rJIlecl forces and the conduct of operations ancl other ~Uell
Appendix
connected therewith. With a view to arriving at a settlement, we were
prepared to accept certain limitations on the normal powers of the Defence
Minister. We had no desire to upset in the middle of the war the present
military organization or arrangements. We accepted also that the higher
strategy of the war should be controlled by the War Cabinet in London
which would have an Indian member. The immediate object before us
was to make the defence oflndia more effective, to strengthen it, to broad-
base it on the popular will, an d to reduce all r d tape, delay and ineffi-
ciency from it. There was no question of our interfering with the technical
and operational sides. One thing of course, was of paramount importance
to us; India's safety and defen ce. Subje t to this primary onsideration
there was no reason why there should be any difficulty in finding a way
out of the prcs("at impasse in accordance with th unanimous desire of the
Indian people, for in this matter there are no differences amongst us.
The emphasis on Defence led you to reconsid r th matter and y u
wrote to me on the 7th April suggesting a formula for Defence.
In this letter you said: 'As the Working Committee have understood,
it is impossible to make any change in the existing constitution during the
period of hostilities.' TIle Working Committee's attitude in the matter
has been completely misunderstood and J should like to clear this up,
although we are not immediately concerned with it. The Committee do
not think that there is any inherent difficulty in the way of constitutional
changes during the war. Everything that helps in the war not only can be
but must be done, and done with speed. That is the only way to carry
on and win a war. No complicated enactments are necessary. A recogni-
tion of India's freedom and right to self-determination could easily be
made, if it were so wished, together with certain other consequential but
important changes. The rest can be left to future arrangements and ad-
justments. I might remind you that the British Prime Minister actually
proposed a union of France and England on the eve of the fall of France.
No greater or more fundamental change could be imagined, and this was
suggested at a period of grave crisis and p Til. War accelerates change;
it does not fit in with static conceptions.
The formula for Defence that you sent us was considered by us together
with its annexure which gave a list of subjects or departments which were
to be transferred to the Defence Department. This list was a revealing
one as it proved that the Defence Minister would deal with relatively
unimportant matters. We were unable to accept this and we informed
you accordingly.
Subsequently, a new formula for Defence was suggested to us, but with-
out any list of subjects. This formula seemed to uS to be based on a more
healthy approach and we suggested certain changes pointing out that our
ultimate decision would necessarily depend on the alocation of subjects.
 Appendix
A revised formula was then sent back to us together with an indication of
the functions of the War Department.
This was so widely and comprehensively framed that it was difficult
for us to know what the actual allocation of subjects and departments, as
between the Defence Department and the War Department, would be.
A request was made on our behalf that illustrative lists of these subjects
might be supplied to enable us to consider the matter. No such lists were
supplied to us.
In the interview we had with you yesterday we discussed the new for-
mula and expressed our view-point in regard to it. I need not repeat what
I said then. The wording of the formula is after all a minor matter and
we should not allow that to come in our way, unless some important
prin iple is at stake. But behind that wording lay certain ideas and we
were surprised to find that during the past few days we had been proceed-
ing On wrong assumptions.
When we asked you for ill ustrative lists of suhjects for the tv. 0 depart-
ments, you re~ rred us to the old Ji st for the Defence Departm nt which
you had previously ent us and which we had been unable to accept. You
added that certain residuary suhj e ts might be added to this but, in effect,
there was not likely to be any such subject as the allocation was complete.
Thus, you said, that substantially there was no change between the old
I ist and any n w one that might be prepared. If this was so, and we were
to go back ultimately to the place w started from, then what was thc
purpose of our searching for a new formula? A new set of words meaning
the same thing made no difference. In the course of our talks many other
matters ,."ere also c1car d up, unfortunately to our disadvantage. You
had referred both privat Iy and in the course of public statements to a
National Government and a 'Cabinet' consisting of 'ministers'. These
words have a certain significance and we had imagined that the new
Government would funct ion with full powers as a cabinet, with the Viceroy
acting as a constitutional head . But the new picture that you placed
b fore m was really not very different from the old, the difference being
one of d grec and not of kind. The new Government could neither be
called except vaguely and inaccurately, nor could it function as a National
Government. It would just be the jeeroy and his Executive Council
with the Viceroy having all his old powers. We did not ask for any legal
changes but we did ask for definite assurances and conventions which
would indicate that the new Government would function as a free govern-
ment the members of which act as members of a cabinet in a constitutional
Government. In regard to the conduct of the war and connected activities
the Commander-in-Ch.iefwould have freedom, and he would act as War
Minister.
We were infOrIl\e<l that nothin~ can be s~d at this sta~el even vaguely
 Appendix 233
and generally, about the conventions that should govern the Government
and the Viceroy. Ultimately there was always the possibility of the
members of the Executive Council resigning or threatening to resign if
they disagreed with the Viceroy. That sanction or remedy is of course
always open, but it is curious that we should base our approach to a new
government on the probabil i ty of conlEct and resignation at the very outset.
The picture therefore placed before us is not essentially different from
the old one. The whole object which w , and I believe you have in view-
that is, to create a new psychological approach to the people, to make
them feci that their own national government had come, that they w re
defencing their newly-won freedom - w uld be compl tely frustrated
when they saw this old picture again, with even th old labels on. The
continuation of the India Office which has b en a symbol of evil to us,
would confirm this picture. It has almost been taken for granted for
some time past that the India Office would soon disappear as it was an
anachronism. But now we are told that even this und sirable relic of a
past age is going to continue.
The picture of the government, which was so I ike the old in all essential
features, is such that we cannot fit into it. Normally we would hav had
little difficulty in disposing of this matter for it is so far r moved from
all that we have striven for, but in the circumstances of today we were
prepared to give full consideration to every proposal which might lead to
an effective organization of the defence of J ndia. The peril that faces
India affects us more than it can possibly affect any foreigner, and we are
anxious and eager to do our utmost to face it and overcome it. But we
cannot undertake responsibilities when we are not given the freedom
and power to shoulder them effectively and when an old environment
continues which hampers the national effort.
While we cannot accept the proposals you have made, w want to
inform you that we are yet prepared to assume responsibility provided a
truly national government is formed. We are prepared to put asjde for
the present all questions about the future, though as we have indjcated,
we hold definite views about it. But in the present, the National Govern-
ment must be a cabinet government with full power and must not merely
be a continuation of the Viceroy's Executive Council. In regard to
defence we have already stated what, in our opinion, the position should
be at present. We feel that such an arrangement is the very minimum
that is essentjal for the functioning of a National Government and for
making the popular appeal which is urgently needed.
I We would point out to you that the suggestions we have put forward
are not ours only but may be considered to bethe unanimous demand of
the Indian people. On tliese matters there is no difference of opinion
among the various groups and parties, and the differ nee is as between the
234 Appendix
Indian people as a whole and the British Government. Such differences
as exist in India relate to constitutional changes in the future. We are
agreeable to the postponement of this issue so that the largest possible
measure of unity might be achieved in the present crisis for the defence of
India. I t would be a tragedy that even when there is this unanimity of
opinion in India, the British Government should pr vent a free National
Government from functioning and from serving the cause oflndia as well
as the Jarger causes for which millions are suffering and dying today.

Yours sincerely,
Sd!- Abul Kalam Azad
The Rt. Hon . Sir Stafford Cripps,
3, Queen Victoria Road,
New Delhi

On the 11 Ih of April Cripps replied to me in the following terms:

3, Queen Victoria Road

New Delhi, 1) th April, 1942.
My Dear Maulana Sahib,
I was extrem ly sorry to receive from you your letter of April 10th
expressing the rej ection by the Congress Working Committee of His
Majesty's Government's draft declaration.
I will not deal with those points which are covered by the original
resolution of your Committee which you sent me, as they were clearly
not the reason for your decision.
Nor need J go into the question of the division of duties bet'hccn the
Defence Minister and the Commander-in-Chicf as War Member with
which you deal at length. This division allotted to the Defence Minister
all functions outside those actually connected with the General Head-
quarters, Navy Headquart rs and Air Headquarters which are under
the Commander-in-Chief as h.ead of the fighting forces in India.
In ddition to the e functions in the narrow field of 'Defence' it was
suggested that all other portfolios relating to that subject'such as:
Home D partment- Intern I order, police, refugees etc.
Finance Departm nt-All war finance in India.
Communications Department- Railways, roads, transport etc.
Supply Department- Supplies for all forces and munitions.
Information and Broadcasting Department-propaganda, publicity etc.
Civil Defence Department-A.R.P. and all forms of civilian defence.
Legislative Department-Regulations and orden.
Labour Department-Mao Power.
Appendi:& ~35
Defence Department-Administration and Indian personnel etc.
should be put in the hands of representative Indians as members of the
Executive Council.
Nothing further could have been done by way of giving responsibility
for Defence services to representative Indian members without jeopar-
dising the immediate defence of India under the Commander-in-Chief.
This defence is, as you know, a paramount duty and responsibility ofI-iis
Majesty's Government, while unity of Command is essential in the interest
of the Allied help to India.
The real substance of your refusal to take part in a National Govern-
ment is that the form of Government suggested is not such as would
enable you to rally the Indian people as you desire.
You make two suggestions. First that the constitution might now be
changed. In this respect I would point out that you made this suggestion
for the first time last night, nearly three weeks after you had rec ived the
proposals, and I would further remark that every other repr sentative
with whom I have discussed this view has accepted the practical impossi-
bility of any such legislative change in the middle of a war and at such
a moment as the present.
Second you suggest 'a truly National Government' be formed, which
must be a 'cabinet Government with full power'.
Without .constitutional changes of a most complicated character and
on a very large scale this would not be possible, as you realize.
Were such a system to be introduced by convention under the existing
circumstances, the nominated cabinet (nominated presumably by the
major political organizations) would be responsible to no one but itself,
could not be removed and would in fact constitute an absolute dictator-
ship of the majority.
This suggestion would be rejected by all minorities in India, since it
would subject all of them to a permanent and autocratic majority in the
Cabinet. Nor would it be consistent with the pledges already given by
His Majesty's Government to protect the rights of those minorities.
In a country such as India where communal divisions are still so deep
an irresponsible majority Government of this kind is not possible.
Apart from this, however, until such time as the Indian people frame
tlteir new constitution, His Majesty's Government must continue to carry
out its duties to those large sections of the Indian people to whom it has
given its pledges.
The proposals of His Majesty's Government went as far as possible
short of a complete change in the constitution which is generally acknow-
ledged as impracticable in the circumstances .of today.
While therefore both I and His Majesty'S Government recognjze the
keen desire of your Working Committee to carry on the war againat the
 Appendix
enemy by every means in their power, they regret that your Working
Committee has not seen its way to join in the war effort upon the condi-
tions sincerely offered as the only conditions which could have brought
together all the different communities and sections of the Indian people.
Yours sincerely,
Sd!- Stafford Cripps

1 propose to publish this answer.

Maulana Abu! Ka!am Azad,

Birhl House,
New D 'lhi

T wrot back to him on the same day:

Birla House
Albuquerque Road
New Delhi
April 11, 194-2

Dear Sir Stafl'ord,

1 have just receiv d your letter of April 10th and 1 must ~onfess tbat
my 11 agues and I were considerably surprised to read it. I am sending
you this r ply immediately and can only deal bri fly here with some of
the points you have raised.
Th points rove red by our original resolution are important and re-
pre ent my C mmittee's w II-considered views on th British proposal
as n whol . But we pointed out to you that so far as the proposals relate
to the future they might be set aside, as we were anxious to assume res-
ponsibility for India' government and d fence in this hour of danger.
This r > p nsibility could onl b und rtaken, however, if it \ as real
respon ibilit and power.
As regards the division of functions between the Defence Minister and
the War fini ter you did not give illustrative lists, as requested by us,
and referred u to the previous list of the Defence Minister's function
wh:ch, < you kno\ , we had been wholly unable to accept. In your letter
under reply you mention certain subjects, directly or indirectly related
to the war, which will be admini tered by other departments. So far as
the Defence Mini ter i concern d, it is clear that his functions will be
limited by the first li t that you s nt.
None h sugg ted any restrictions on the normal powers of the
ommander-in-Chief. Indeed we went beyond this and were prepared
to agree to furth r powers being given to him as War Minister. But it is
Appendix 237
clear that the British Government's conception and ours in regard to
defence differ greatly. For us it means giving it a national character and
calling upon every man and woman in India to participate in it. It means
trusting our own people and seeking their full co-operation in this gr at
effort. The British Government's view seems to be based on an utt rIa k
of confidence in the Ind~an people and in withholding r al pow r from
them. You refer to the paramount duty and responsibility ofI-lis 1ajesty's
Government in regard to defence. That duty and responsibility cannot
be discharged effectively unless the Indian peopl are made to have and
feel their responsibility, and the recent past stands witness to this. The
Government of India do not seem to realize that the war can ouly be
fought on a popular basis.
Your statement that we have for the first time after three weeks sugg 'sl-
cd a change in the constitution is hardly correct. J n th course of our talks
reference was made to it, but it is true that we did not lay stress on it as
we did not want to introduce new issues. But wh n you stat d explicitly
in your letter that we had agreed that no constitutional chang s could be
made during the war, we had to deny this and correct your impression.
It is the last part of your Ietter that has especiaJl y surprised and pain d
us. It seems that there ha.s been a progressive deterioration in th.e British
Government's attitude as our negotiations pro ceded. What we were told
in our very first talk with you is now denied or explained away. You told
me then that there would be a National Government which would func-
tion as a Cabmet and that the position of the Viceroy should be analogous
to that of the King in England vis a-vis his Cabinet. In regard to the
India Office, you told me, that you were surprised that no One had so far
mentioned this important matter, and that the practical cour e was to
have this attached or incorporated with the Dominion's Office.
The whole of this picture which you sketched before us has now bren
completely shattered by what you told us during our lost interview.
You have put forward an argument in your lctter which at no time
during our talks was mentioned by you. You refer to the 'absolute dictator-
ship of the majority'. It is astonishing that such a statement should be
made in this connection and at this stage. This difficulty is inherent in any
scheme of a mixed cabinet formed to meet an emergency, but there are
many ways in which it can be provided for. Had you rais d this question
we would have discussed it and found a satisfactory solution. The whole
approach to thi question has been that a mixed cabinet should be formed
and should co-operate together. We accepted this. We are not interested
in the Congress as such gaining power, but we are interested in the Indian
people as a whole having freedom and power. How the Cabinet should
be formed and should function was a question which might have been
considered after the main question was decided; that is, the extent
 Appendix
of power which the British Government would give up to the Indian
people. Because of this we never discussed it with you or even referred
to it. Nevertheless you have raised this matter for the first time, in what
is presumably your last letter to us, and tried most unjustifiably to side-
track the real issue between us.
You will remember that in my very first talk with you, I pointed out
that the communal or like questions did not arise at this stage. As soon as
the British Government made up its mind to transfer real power and res-
ponsibility, the other questions could be tackled successfully by those con-
cerned. You gave me the impression that you agreed with this approach.
We are convinced that if the British Government did not pursue a policy
of en ouraging disruption, all of us, to whatever party or group we belong-
ed, would be able to come together and find a common line of action. But,
unhappily, even in this grave hour of peril, the British Government is
unable to give up its wrecking policy. We are driven to the conclusion
that it attaches more importance to holding on to its rule in India, as long
as it can, and promoting discord and disruption here with that end in
view, than to an effective defence of India against the aggression and in-
vasion that overhang us. To us, and to all Indians, the dominant consider-
ation is the defence and safety oflndia, and it is by that test that we judge.
You mention that you propose to publish your letter to me. I presume
that you have no objection now to our publishing our original resolution,
your letters to us, and our letters to you.
Yours sincerely,
Sd. Abul Kalam Azad
The Right Hon'ble Sir Stafford Cripps,
3, Queen Victoria Road,
New D>}hi

QUIT INDIA
The All-India Congress Committee has given the most careful considera-
tion to the re~ rence made to it by the Working Committee in their resolu-
tion d ted July) 4, 1942, and to subsequent events, including the develop-
ment of the war situ tion, the utterances of responsible spokesmen of the
British Government, and the comments and criticisms made in India and
broad. The onunittee approves of and endorses that resolution and is
of opinion that event subsequent Jo it have given it further justification,
and h ve m de it de r that the immediate ending of British rule in India
i an urgent neces ity, both for the sake ofIndia and for the success of the
cau e of the Unit d Nations. The continuation of that rule is degrading
and enfeebling lndi and making her progressivdy less capable of defend-
inS herself and of contributing to the cause of world freedom.
Appendix 239
The Committee has viewed with dismay the deterioration of the situation
on the Russian and Chinese fronts and conveys to the Russian and Chinese
peoples its high appreciation of their heroism in defence of their freedom.
This increasing peril makes it incumbent on all those who strive for freedom
and who sympathise with the victims of aggression, to examine the founda-
tions of the policy so far pursued by the Allicd Nations, which have led to
repeated and disastrous failure. It is not by adhering to such aims and
policies and methods that failure can be conv rted into su cess, for past
experience has shown that failure is inherent in them. 'Ihese policies have
been based not on freedom so much as on the domination of subject and
colonial countries, and the continuation of the imperialist tradition and
method. The possession of mpire, instead of adding to the strength of the
ruling Power, has become a burden and a curse. India, the classic land of
modern imperialism, has become the crux of the question, for by the free-
dom of India will Britain and the United Nations be judged, and the
peoples of Asia and Africa be ruled with hope and enthusiasm. The ending
of British rule in this country is thus a vital and immediate issue on which
depend the future of the war and thc success of freedom and d mocracy.
A free India will assure this success by throwing all her gr at resources in
the struggle for freedom and against the aggression of Nazism, Fascism
and Imperialism. This will nOt only affect materially the fortunes of the
war, but will bring all subject and oppressed humanity on the side of the
United Nations, and give these Nations, whose ally India would be, the
moral and spiritual leadership of the world. India in bondage will COn-
tinue to be the symbol of British imperialism and the taint of that imperial-
ism will affect the fortunes of all the United Nations.
The peril of today, therefore, necessitates the independence of India
and the ending of British domination. No future promise or guarantees
can affect the present situation or meet that peril. They cannot produce
needed psychological effect on the mind of the masses. Only the glow
of freedom now can release that energy and enthusiasm of millions of
people which will immediately transform the nature of the war.
The A.I.C.C. therefore repeats with all emphasis the demand for the
withdrawal of the British Power from India. On the declaration ofIndia',
independence, a Provisional Government will be formed and Free India
will become an alJy of the U oited Nations, sharing with them in the trials
and tribulations of the joint enterprise of the struggle for freedom. The
Provisional Government can only be formed by the co-operation of the
principal parties and groups in the country. It will thus be a composite
government, representative of all important sections of the people ofIndia.
Its primary functions must be to defend India and resist aggrdsion with all
the armed as weJl as the non-violent forces at its command, together with
iu Allied powers, to promote the well-being and progress of the workers in
 Appendix
the fi~lds and factories and elsewhere to whom essentially all power and
authority must belong. The Provisional Government will evolve a
scheme for a Constituent Assembly which will prepare a constitution for
the Government of India acceptable to all sections of the people. This
constitution, according to the Congress view should be a federal one, with
the largest measure of autonomy for the federating units, and with the
residuary powers vesting in these units. The future relations between
India and the Allied Nations will be adjusted by representatives of all
these free countries conferring together for their mutual advantage and
for th ir co-opt"ration in the common task of resisting aggression. Freedom
will enable India to resist aggression effectively with the people's united
will and strength b hind it.
The fre dom of India must be the symbol of and prel ude to the freedom
of all otherAsiatic nations under foreign domination. Burma, Malaya,
Indo-China, the Dutch Indies, Iran and Iraq must also attain their com-
plete freedom. It must be clearly understood that such of these countries
as are under the Japanese control now must not subsequently be placed
under the rule or control of any other colonial power.
While th A.I.e.C. must primarily be concerned with the indepen-
dence and det nee of India in this hour of danger, the Committee is of
opinion that the future peac , security and ordered progress of the world
demand a World Federation of fre nations, and on no other basis can the
prohl ms of the modern world be solved. Such a World Federation
would ensur freedom of its constituent nations the prevention of ag-
gres ion and exploitation by one nation of another, the protection of
national minorities, th advancement of all backward areas and peoples,
and th poling of the world's r sources for the common good of all. On
the establishment of such a World Federation, disannament would be
practicable in all countries, national armies, navies and air forces would
llO Inger b necessary, and a World Federal Defence Force would keep
the world p ace and prevent aggression.
An independent India would gladly join such a World Federation
nd c -op rat on an qual basis with other nations in the solution of
international problems.
uch F d ration hould be open to all nations who agree with its
fund ment I principlt"s. In view of the war, however, the Federation
mu tin vit bly, to begin with, be confined to the' United Nations. Such
a st p taken now will h v a most powerful effect On the \\ar, on the
peoples f the Axis countries, and On the peace to come.
The Committee regr~tfu1ly realizes, however, that despite the tragic and
o rwhelming Ie s ns of the war and the perils that overhang the world.
the gOY rnm nt of t w countrie are yet prepared to take this inevitable
step toward World Federation. The reactions of the British Government
Appendix
and the misguided criticisms of the foreign press also make it clear that ev n
the obvious demand for India's independence is resisted though this has
been made essentially to meet the present peril and to nable India to
defend herself and help China and Russia in their hour ofnced. Th om-
mittee is anxious not to embarrass in any way the defence of China or
Russia, whose freedom is precious and must be pr serv d or to jeopardisc
the defensivc capacity of the United Nations. But the peril grows both to
India and these nations, and inaction and submission to a foreign adminis-
tration at this stage is not only degrading India and reducing her capaci ty
to defend hers('lf and resist aggression, but is no answer to that growing
peril and is no service to the peoples of the Un ited Nations. The earnest
appeal of the Working Committe to Great Britain and the United Nations
has so far met with no response, and the criticisms made in many foreign
quarters have shown an ignorance of Indi a's and the world's n cd, and
sometim s even hostility to India's freedom, ""hich is significant of a men-
tality of domination and racial superiority which cannot h tolcratcd by a
proud people conscious of their strcngth and of th justice of their ase.
The A.I.C.C. would yct again, at thi s last moment, in th int rest of
world freedom, renew this appeal to Britain and the Uni ted Nations.
But the Committ e feels that it is no longer justifi d in holding th nation
back from endeavouring to assert its wi ll agains t an imperialist and
authoritarian govcrnment which dominates over it and prevents it from
functioning in its Own interest and in the intercst of humanity. Th Com-
mittee resolves, therefore, to sanction, for the vindication of India's
inalienable right to freedom and independence, the start ing of a mass
struggle On non-violent lines on the widest possible sca le, so that country
utilise all the non-violent strength it has gathered during the last twenty-
two) years of peaceful strugglc. Such a struggle must inevitably be under
the leadership of Gandhiji and the Committee request him to take the I ad
and to guide the nation in the steps to be taken.
The Committee appeals to the people of India to face the dangers and
hardships that will fall to their lot with courage and endurance, and in-
structions as disciplined soldiers ofIndian fre dom. They must rememb r
that non-violence is the basis of this movement. A time may come when it
may not be possible to issue instructions or for instructions to reach OUf p 0-
pIe, and when no Congress Committee can function. When this happens,
every man and woman, who is participating in this movement must func-
tion for himself or herself within the four corners of the general instructions
issued. Every Indian wbo desires freedom and strives for it must be hi own
guide urging bim on along the hard road where there is no resting place and
which leads ultimately to the independence and deliverance of India.
Lastly, whilst the A.I.C.C. has stated its own view of the future govern-
ment under free India the A.I.C.C. wishes to make it quite clear to all
 Appendix
concerned that by embarking on mass struggle it has no intention of gain-
ing power for the Congress. The power, when it comes, will belong to the
whole people of India.

BRITISH GOVERNMENT'S STATEMENT OF 3 JUNE

1. On February 20th, 1947, His Majesty's Government announced
their intention of transferring power in British India to Indian hands by
June 1948. His Majesty's Government had hoped that it would be possible
for the major parties to co-operate in the working out of the Cabinet
Mission's Plan of May 16th, 1946, and evolve for India a Constitution
acceptable to all concerned. This hope has not been fulfilled .
. 2. The majority of the representatives of the Provinces of Madras,
Bombay, the United Provinces, Bihar, Central Provinces and Berar,
Assam, Orissa and the North-West Frontier Provinces, and the represent-
atives of Delhi, Ajmer-Merwara and Coorg have already made progress
in the task of evolving a new Constitution. On the other hand, the Muslim
League Party, including in it a majority of the representatives of Bengal,
the Punjab and Sind as also the rcpres ntative of British Baluchistan, has
decided not to participate in the Constituent Assembly.
3. It has always been the desire of His Majesty's Government that
power should be transferred in accordance with the wishes of the Indian
people themselves. This task would have been greatly facilitated if there
had been agreement among the Indian political parties. In the absence of
such agr ement, the task of devising a method by which the wishes of the
Indian people can be ascertained has devolved upon His Majesty's
Governm nt. Mter full consultation with political leaders in India, His
Majesty's Government have decid d to adopt for this purpose the plan set
out below. His Majesty's Government wish to make it clear that they have
no intention of attempting to frame any ultimate Constitution for India;
this is a matt r for the Indians themselves nor is there anything in this plan
to preclude negotiations between communities for a united India.
4. It is not the intention ofNis Majesty's Government to interrupt the
work of the existing Constituent Assembly. Now that provision is made
for cert in provinces specified below, His Majesly'sGovernment trust that,
a consequence of this announcement, the Muslim League represent-
atives of those provinces, a majority of whose representatives are already
participating in it, will now t ke their due share in its labour. At the same
time it is clear that any constitution framed by this Assembly cannot apply
to those parts of the country which are unwilling to accept it. His Majesty's
Government are satisfied that the procedure outlined below embodies the
best m thod of ascertaining the wishes of the people of such areas on the
iuue whether their Constitution ia to be framed:
Appendix 243
(a) in the existing Constituent Assembly; or
(b) in a new and separate Constituent Assembly consisting of the re-
presentatives of those areas which decide not to particip:lte in the existing
Constituent Assembly.
When this has been done, it will be possible to determine the authority
or authorities to whom power should be transferr d.
5. The Provincial Legislative Assemblies of Bengal and the Punjab
(excluding the European members) will, therefore, ach br asked to
meet in two parts one representing the Muslim majority dislri ts and the
other the rest of the province. For the purpose of determining th popu-
lation of districts the 1941 census figures will be taken as authoritativ .
The Muslim majority districts in these two provinces are set out in the
Appendix to this announcement.
6. The members of the two parts of each Legislative Assembly sitting
separately will be empowered to vote whether or not the province should be
partitioned. If a simple majority of either part decides in favour of parti-
tion, division will take place and arrangement will be made accordingly.
7. Before the question as to partition is de ided, it is desirable that the
representative of each part should know in advance which Constituent
Assembly the province as a whole would join in the event of the two parts
subsequently deciding to remain united. Therefore, if any members of
either Legislative Assembly so demands, there shall be held a meeting of
all members of the Legislative Assembly (other than Europeans) at which
a decision will be taken on the issue as to which Constituent Aasembly
the province as a whole would join if it were decided by the two parts to
remain united.
8. In the event of partition being d cided upon, each part of the
Legislative Assembly will, On behalf of the areas they represent, decide
which of the alternatives in paragraph 4 above to adopt.
9. For the immediate purpose of deciding on the issue of partition, the
members of the legislative assemblies of Bengal and the Punjab will sit in
two parts according to Muslim majority districts (as laid down in the Appen-
dix) and non-Muslim majority districts. This is only a preliminary step of a
purely temporary nature as it is evident that for the purposes of final parti-
tion of these provinces a detailed investigation of boundary questions will
be needed; and as soon as a decision involving partition has been taken
for either province a boundary commission will be set up by the Governor-
General, the membership and terms of reference of which will be settled
in consultation with those concerned. It will be instructed to demarcate
the boundaries of the two parts of the Punjab On the basis of ascertaining
the contiguous majority areas ofMusJims and non-Muslims. It will also be
inJtructed to take into account other factors. Similar instructions will
be given to the Bengal lklundary Commission. Until the report of a
 Appendix
boundary commission has been put into effect, the provisional boundaries
indicated in the Appendix will be used.
10. The Legislative Assembly of Sind (excluding the European mem-
bers) will at a special meeting also take its own decision on the alternatives
in paragraph 4 above.
11. The position of the North-West Frontier Province is exceptional.
Two of the three representatives of this province are already participating
in the existing Constitu nt Assembly. But it is clear, in view of its geo-
graphical situation and other considerations, that if the whole or any part
of the Punj ab decided not to join the ('xisting Constituent Assembly, it
will be necessary to give the North-West Frontier Province an opportunity
to reconsider its positi on. Accordingly, in such an even t a referendum
will be made to the electors of the present Legislative Assembly in the
North-West Frontier Province to choose which of the alternatives men-
tioned in paragraph 4 above they wish to adopt. The re~ rendum will be
held under the aeg is of the Governor-G eneral and in consultation with
the provincial Government.
12. British Balu histan has el cted a member, but he has not taken hi~
scat in th existing Constituent Assembly. In view of its geographical
situation, this provin ce wi JI also be given an opportunity to reconsider its
position and to choose which of the alternatives in paragraph 4 above to
adopt. His Excellency th Governor-G eneral is examining how this ean
most appropriat 1y be done.
13. Though Assam is predominantly a non-Muslim province, the dis-
trict of Sylh ~ t which is contiguous to Bengal is predominantly Muslim.
Th re has b en a oemand that, in the event of the partition of Bengal,
ylh t should be amalgamated with the MusJim part of Bengal. Accord-
ingly if it is decided that Bengal should be partitioned, a referendum will
b held in Sylh t District under the aegis of the Governor-General and
in consultati n with the Assam Provincial Government to decide whether
the district of Sylhet should continue to form part of Assam Province or
should be amalgamated with the new province of East rn Bengal, a
boundary commis ion with terms of r ~ renee similar to those for the
Punjab and B ng ) will be 5('t up to demarcate the Muslim majority areas
of ylilet District and contiguous Muslim majority areas of adjoining
districts, which will th n be transferred to East Bengal. The rest of Assam
Province will in any case continue to participate in the proceedings of the
xi ting Constituent A sembly.
14. If it i decided that BengaLand the Punjab should be partitioned,
it will be nco ary to hold fresh elections to choose their representatives
on Ule cale of one for every million of population according to the principle
contained in the Cabinet Mission's Plan of May 16, J946. Similar election
will also have to 1><- held for Sylhet in the event of it being decided that
Appendix 245
this district should form part of East Bengal. The number of repr scnta-
tives to which each arca would be entitled is as follows:-

Province Gmeral Mu.riims Sikhs Total

Sylhet District 1 2 nil 3
West Bengal 15 4 nil 19
East Bengal 12 29 nil 41
West Punjab 3 12 2 17
East Punjab 6 4 2 12

15. In accordance with the mandates given to them, the representa-

tives of the various areas will either join the existing Constituent A~scmbly
or form the new Constituent Assembly.
16. Negotiations will have to be initiated as soon as poss Ible on the
administrative consequences of any partition that may have b en decided
upon:-
(a) Between the representatives and the respective successor authorities
about all subjects now dealt with by the Central Government including
defence, finance and communications.
(b) Between different successor authorities and His Majesty's Govern-
ment for treaties in regard to matters arising out of the transfer of power.
(c) In the case of provinces that may be partitioned, as to the administra-
tion of all provincial subjects, such as the division of assets and lia biliti s,
the police and other services, the high courts, provin cial institutions etc.
17. Agreemen ts with tribes of the North-West Frontier of India will
have to be negotiated by the appropriate successor authority .
18. His Majesty'S Government wish to make it clear that the decisions
announced above relate only to British India and that their policy towards
Indian States contained in the Cabinet Mission's memorandum of 12th
May, 1946 remains unchanged.
19. In order that the successor authorities may have time to prepare
themselves to take over power, it is important that all th above processes
should be completed as quickly as possible. To avoid dalay, the different
provinces or parts of provinces will proceed ind pendently as far as prac-
ticable with the conditions of this plan. The existing Constituent Assembly
and the new Constituent Assembly (if formed) will proceed to frame
constitutions for their respective territories; they will, of course, be frt'e to
frame their own rules.
20. The major political parties have repeatedly emphasized their desire
that there should be the earliest possible transfer of power in India. With
this desire His Majesty's Government are in full sympathy and they are
willing to anticipate the date of June 1948, for the handing over of power
17
 Appendix
by the setting up of an Independent Indian Government or Governments
at an even earlier date. Accordingly, as the most expeditious, and indeed
the on ly practicable way of meeting this desire, His Majesty's Government
propose to introduce legislation during the current session for the transfer
of power this year on a Dominion Status basis to one or two successor
authorities according to the decisions taken as a result of this announce-
ment. This will he without prejudice to the right of the Indian Constituent
Assemblies to decide in due course whether or not the part of India in
respect of which they have authority will remain within the British
Commonwealth.
His Excellency the Governor-General will from time to time make
such further announcements as may be necessary in regard to procedure
or any other matters for carrying out the above arrangements.
The Muslim majority districts of the Punjab and Bengal according to
the 1941 (census):-

I. THE PUN] AB
Lahore Division- Gujranwa1a, Gurdaspur, Lahore, Sheikhupura, Sialkot.
Rawalpindi Division-Attock, Gujrat, Jhelum, Mianwali, Rawalpindi
Shahpur.
Multan Division-Dera Ghazi Khan, Jhang, Lyallpur, Montgomery,
Multan, Muzaffargarh.

2. BENGAL
Chittagong Division-Chittagong, Noakhali, Tipperah.
Dacca Division-Bakerganj, Dacca, Faridpur, Mymensingh.
Presidency Division-]cssore, Murshidabad, Nadia.
Rajshahi Division-Bogra, Dinajpur, MaIda, Pabna Rajshahi, Rangpur.
 INDEX
Abdul, Sheikh Moh ammed, 6 36; arrestcd at Allahabad, 37; in Naini
Abdullah, Sheikh, 148-9 jail , 38; discussions with Cripps, 46, 48-9,
Abru Begum, 92 51, 53; on Cripps offer, 56; meeting with
Abyssinia, 27, 29 Wavell, 57; two leiters to Cripps, 60;
Aga Khan Palace, 86, 91 press conference, 63,114- 15; difference
Ahmad, Khurshed, 2i3 with Gandhiji, 76; 'Quit India' Move-
Ahmed, Sahebzad? Aftab, 213 ment, 813; wife's illness and death, 91-2;
Ahmed, Sir Syed, 7 Simla Conference, 104; interview with
Ahmedabad, 216 Wavell, 106-7 ; release of political
Ahmednagar Fort Jail , 83, 87-8, 96-7,104, prisoners, 120- 1 ; at Karachi and Lahore.
106, 113, 117 126; lTl!"eting with Bengal Governor.
al Azhar, 6 126; on Provi ncial Ministries, 127; rei -
01 Balogh, 8 ti ons with Nehru, 128-9; suppor t of
01 Hilol, 7-9 Gandhiji. 130; meeting with Auchinleck.
Alexander, A. V., 151 , 191 13 1; taking up I. N. A.'s case, 132-3;
Ali, Choudhary Mohammad, 167 sol utions of communal problems. 141;
Ali, Ghaznafar, 165 on division of India, 143-5, 184-6; nomi-
Ali, Asaf, 33, 42, 84, 88-9, 95, 97, J9, 117, nation of representative. to confer with
147-9, 163 Cabin ... t M.ission, 147; on JOlfendra Nath
Ali, Mrs Asaf, 85, 131; activities of, 116-17 Mandai, 166 ; on Europeans In Con.ti tu-
Ali, Mohammed, 9-10 ent AssemIJly, 172; Interim Government,
Ali, Shaukat, 9-10 174-5; on Wavcll. 178-80; interview with
Aligarh party, 7 M ountbatten, 181 ; all partition of Army,
Allahabad, 98,161; last line of resistance, 72 201-3; on Gandhiji's f:ut, 219
Amery, L. S., 103
Amritsar, riots, 182 Bajaj, Seth Jamnalal, 33
Andamans, 38, 90 I3ankura, 98
Ansari, Dr, II Dari, Maulvi Abdul , 9
Army, 125. 132. 201-2 Bardoli. Gopinath, 172
Asansol . 72. 97 Batala Jail . 97, 99
Assam. 116. 128. 149; Japancse advance Bengal, 20,72-3,82,97,124,149,152,160,
towards. 74; British war crrort in, 82; 207; partition of, 4, 188,200; in freedom
grouping of. 172, 181-2 struggle, 90; Governor', rule in, 116;
Atom bomb. 119-20 grouping of, 172, 181-2
Attlce, Clement, 118. 189; statemcnt of, Bhabha, C. H., 163
139, 179, 190; White Paper on Cabinet Bhave, Vinoba, 37
Mission Plan. 147; on Bntish withdraw- Bihar, 82, 128, 152, 225; movement, 90;
al, 177; on transfer of power. 181. 199 rivalries amongst Congrcssmen in. 127;
Auchinleck, Lord, 131 rioll, 182, 190, 199, 212
Azad, Maulana Abu) Kalam, forefathers of, Birla House, 104, 220, 223; bomb Ihrown
1; birth and education of. 2-3; adopts pen at Gandhiji in, 222
name 'Azad'. 4; join. political group,4-5; Bombay. 82. 83, 86, 152-3, 160, 163;
travel abroad, 6; political activitJes of, arrcst of Congrcs.leaden at, 84; struggle
7-8; meeting with Gandhiji and Tilak, against Government, 90; prohibition in,
8; arrest of, 10,84; President ofCongres 113: maJ. meeting of Navy officers in,
II,SI;jailed, 11.12; on election, 14; on 130; riot., 182, 190,225
acceptance of office, 15; on C.R. D:u. 16; Bose, aral Chandra, 153, 159, 166
in Alipore jail, 17; Delhi Congres. Pre- Bo e, Subh:u Chandra, 33. 4:0; arrest of,
sident, 19; Parliamentary Board, 22; on 10: in Germany, 41; formation of
war effort, 25; refuses Viceroy'. offer, I. N. A., 132
 Index
Boundary Commission, 200 Constituent Assembly, 78, 160, 164;
Durma, 78; occupied by J apan , 38,74, 102; Nehru's statement on, 14. 15; Jinnah's
BriUlh wi thdrawal from, 83; British re- view on, 173; boycotted by Muslim
occupation of, 132 League, 176; Independent India de-
Bux, Khan Babadur Allah, 48, 54 claration, 209
Constitulion of India, 147
Cauinet Missiun, 139, 11 1, 145, 148-50, Cripps Mission, 41, 48-9, 54, 101, 146,
15~, 156, 164, 173-4, 177, 186, 188-90, 179, IB4; reasons for failure of, 168
22G; on India's fr eedum, 138; Azau's Cripps, Sir Stafford, 46,48, 51 -2, 54-5,
discu~lion with, 142; dis ussions among 59, 61, 634, 66, 701, 77, 107,139,
th emselv('s, 147; pllLn of, 14-7, 150; Con- 150, 152, 154, 190, 191; non-official
gress and Muslim L~ague I,CCCpt plan visit to Russia, 47; talks wi th Gandhij i,
of. I',); firsl UongrcssrcsoluLion on, 154; 50; solution of communal problems,
Muslilll Lt'aguc rejects plan 01, 162; 58; Azad's congratula tions to, J18;
grouping of Assam and lkngal, I BI ; wilh Cabin('t Mission, 138; special
p lall discardt'd, 191; on India's r('main- interest in Azad's sugges ti on, 14 1; on
ing in Commonweal th, 192 Intlia's remaining in Commonweal th,
,alcutla, 45, &5-6, 71, 82 3, 97, 126, 192
162; U<>rpo"i\( 'Ofl, 21; press conference Curzon, Lord, 4-
at, 39 ;J apan("se threat to, 12-3; Ameri-
can army cen Lrc, 102; dcmollstra tions, Dacca, 110
13}; communal disturbances, 159, 182, Daily X'IVS, 40
190, 199,200,212 Dar al-UlulIl, 6
Ccntr~1 Pro\'inces, 82 Da~, . R., 10, 16, 18-21
'('ylon, 181 Defence f()rces, 125-7; 131
Clwkra\'arly, Shyam Sunder, 4 Delhi, 130, 146, 163, 186,213,217,220;
Cha.mbrrlain, Neville, 2'1 demonstration in, 164; prepares for
Chand Hihi, U9 'Quit India' Movement, 82; disturbance
Chinnl( Kai-shek, Generali ssimo, '12, 43-5, in, 134; riots in. 2 10-1, 2116; home of
56, (>S-6 refugees, 218 ; C.LD. of, 222-3
China, 29, 30, 42-3, 65-6, 78; national Deo, Shankar Rao, 34; mcmber of
mO\'('nlC'nt in, 43; re(Lction aga inst Congress Working Committee, 33; arrest
British in, lUI of, 86; broughl to Ahmoooagar, 88; rc-
Chouri houra incident, 18 fuses inoculation against cholera, 96;
Chunu,igar, 1. I., 165 taken to Poona ja.il, 97
hut' hill, Winst n, 39,47,56,70. 101-02, Desai, Bhulauhai, 33,55,83-4, 104, 130,
189, 192 135; facu about, 134; propaganda
Commonwealth, 151; lndia', remaining against 136; dcath of, 137
in, 192 Desai, Dhirubhai, 84
Communists, 83, J 29; activities of, 125 D esai, Mahadev, 6, 80-1
Congress, 50, IB2 3, IB9, 197, 206; Direct Action Day, 158-9
8p('cial session, 10; Nngpur se.lion, 10; Dominion Status, 44
Garno session, 10, 19; division of, 9-IOj DuHa, Mrs Labanya Prabha, 100
'I ndependent' resolution, II; Working
Committee, II; in offie-e, 13-14; form s Executive Council, SII Indian Executive
Minislric~, IS, 22; Rightists and Leftists, Council
22-3; Tripura session, 24; Wardb reso-
lution,26-30; R amgarh sess ion, 31; Fascism, 65
Ramgl\rh rf'solution S I ; rift in Working Fatch, 100
Committee, 34; Poonn resolution, 34; France, 27; and Indo-China, 178
resolulion on GripPI ofTer, 61-3 ; FronliCf Pathans, 194, 196; hospitality of,
tion I demand Te olution, 77-9; 170; prelervation of history and culture
poinu for imlll confCfence, 108; of, 195
elc:ction mnniJi Sto, 121-4; defence of Fuller, Barnfield, 4-
r.N.A ., 132-3; formula of resolution,
144 ; ceptance of C binet lo.uuion - Gandhi-Invin Pact, J 1
PIan, 151 -4; resolution at Mwlim Gandhiji, 34,36-7, 39-40, +5. 64, 72, 7+,
L rague'. non-acceptance of Cabinet 75-7, 81-3, 93-5, 104, 107-8 113, 118,
Missi n P1nn, 156-7; on partition of 120,142, 147,161,163,170,174; appears
Indi , 185-6, 191; n Gandhiji', sug- in politics, 8; non-cooperation pro-
gestiun, 187; po.tpon ment of settlement gramme of, 9-10; imprisonment of, 18;
\ lUlled by, J90. on N. W. F. P., J94; releaseof, 20, J35; on India', nOll-parti-
resolution on partition of India, 196 cipation in War, 25, 31; advice to British
Index 249
not to fight Hitler, 33; on Allied victory, Japan, 39, 41, 65-6,71-5,77-8,82,90,102,
41; talk with Cripps, 50; on Cripps offer, 107,115,119,133; attacks Pearl Har-
56; on Cripps communal settlement, 58; bour, 38, 101; propagand against
on 'Quit India' movement, 73, 80; arrest British 40; surrender of, 132
of, 84-6; fast of, 90-1; release of, 92; J enkins, Sir Evan, 108
support to Azad, 130; day of silence of, Jinnah, M . A., 22, 93-4, 112, 114, 116,
135; on Bhulabhai, 136; on Azad's solut- 128, 158, 160, 162, 167, 172, 174, 183,
ionof communal problems, 141 ; disappro- 187, 196; leaves Congress, 10 ; demand
val of Rajaj i's activities, 146; submits of, 110 ; leader of Muslim League, III;
to J awaharlal, 162; on Cabirlct Mission uncompromising a tt itude of, 115;
Plan, 172; on Education portfolio, 175; Pakistan scheme of, 143, 156; oppose.
on partition of India, 186-8, 193, 196, Cabinet Mission scheme, 150; n cept-
198; on formation of Government by !lnce of Cabinet Mission Plall, 155;
Jinnah , 187; supports partition reso- meeting with WavcJl, 164; nomination
lution, 197; ou riots, 213-14; fasting of Cabinet members, 165; invited to
of, 215-21; murder of, 222-4 London, 17 3; two-nation theory, 185;
General Election, British, 118; India, 118, meeting wi th Khan Abdul Gn1Tar Khan,
120, 136 ; funds for N.W.F.P., 170 193; non-accep tance of Pakbtoonistall
Germany, 65, 119; attack on Soviet Rus sia, proposal, 195; Governor-General of
38, 47; Subhas Chandra Bose in, 40; Pakistan, 204; leaves for Karachi, 208
blunder of, 95
Ghosh, ProfuJla Chandra, 94, 96; member Kabir, Humayun, 104, 147
of Congress Working Committee, 33; K alyan, 86, 97
brought to Ahmednagar, 88 Kamal ]';:15ha, M.uslafa, 6
Ghosh, Arabindo, 4 Karachi, 126, 130, 206
Godse, 224-5 Karmayogill,4
Gokhale, III Kashmir, 118-9, 119; Cabinet Minion'.
Government of India Act, 1935, 12 visit to, 146 ; arrest of J awnharlal and
Gulmarg, 120, 132; Azad's stay in, 118 Asa( Ali in, 148
Gupta,J. C., 139 Kashmir, Maharaja of, 59
Gwalior, 224 Katju, Dr K. N., 38
Khairuddin, MauJana, I
Hadi , Mohammad, Khaliquzzaman, Choudhari, 160-1
Horijan, 172 Khan, Abdul Qayyum, 135, 196
Hindu Mahasabha, 48,108,114,224; riots, Khan, Cheeta, 89, 90, 92, 95-7, 99
200; against Gandhiji, 221 Khan, Hakim Ajmal, 910, 19-20
Hiroshima, 119 Khan, Khan Abdul Galrar, 34, 169, 192,
Hitler, 33, 36, 95,102,106,125; break with 195; memher of Congress Working Com-
Stalin, 47 mittee, 33; reaction of, 193
Husain, Nawab Mushtaq, 110 Khan, Khizir Hayat, 110, 114,128-9; resig-
Husain, Zahid, 220 nation of, 182
Hussain, Sir Ghulam, 116 Khan Liaqat Ali, 135-6, 155, 164-5, 167-
8, 175-6, 182-3,207
Khan, Mohammad Ajmal, 84
India, partition of, 183-6, 189, 191; Khan, Nawab Iamail, 160-1, 164-5
Muslims in, 198 Khan Sahcb, Dr, 169-7 1, 194, 196
India office, 49, 52 Khan, Sir Shafat Ahmed, 106
Indian Dominion, birth of, 204 Khan, Sir Sikandnr Hayat, 58, 145
Indian Executive Council, 48-9, 51, 53, Khan, Sir Syed Ahmed, 3
56, 107, 113; power of, 57, 66; composi- Kher, B. G., 15
tion of, 110 Khilnfat, 8-9
Indian Independence Bill, 192 Khudai Khidmatgar. 169, 193, 196
Indian National Army, 132; trial of, 133 Khwaja Qutubuddin, 219
Indian States, 59, 62 Kidwai, RaG Ahmed, 166
Individual Satyagraha, 37, 72 Kripalani, J. B., 34, 75, 94, 96, 153, 1~8;
Indo-China, 178 General ccretary of Congres. Working
Indonesia, 102 Commitll".e, 33; brought 10 Ahmednagar,
Interim Government, 168-9 88; .tatcment of, 207
Irwin, Lord, II
Lahour Government, 120, 178, 181, 191-2
Jarri, Mohammed Yusuf, 3 Labour Party, 118, 120, 133, 179
J_itU-Id-UImuJ-j-HituJ, 160 Lahore, 126, 129; riot., 199-200; RCIOlu-
Jamahcdpur, 72 tion, "142, 145
25 Index
League of Nations, 27 Mussoorie, 146, 150
Liberation Army of India,I33
Linlithgow, Lord, 36 Nagasalti, 119
Nabr, Zubeida, 2
Naidu, Sarojini, 856; in Congress Work-
MacArthur, General, 119 ing Committee, 33
Madras, 152-3 Naini Jail, 38, 85, 91
Madras Congrcs. Legislature Party, 67 Nair, C. Sankaran, 18
Mahmud, Dr Syed, 89, 96, 127 ; in Con Narain, Jai Prakash, 121
grcsa Working Commil.lee, 33; arrest Nariman, Mr, 15,21,113
of, 84; brought to Ahmcdnagar, 88; re- National Conference, 148
lease of, 95 National Herald, 128-9
Majid, Sultan Abdul, 2 National Party, 108
Malaviya, Pandit Madan Mohan, 17 Nazimuddin, Khwaja, 164-5
Mandai, J ogcndra Nath, 165-6 Nehru, Jawah arlal, 15, 25, 34,38, 64-7,
Mattha i, John, 164 75-6, 131, 86, 89, 95-6, 103-4, 112, 136,
Mecca, 2 156-9, 161, 163, 168-70, 172, 176, 188,
Mcharally, Yusuf, 154 203,2 12, 220,225,226-7; Congress Presi-
Mehta, Asoka, 84 dent, 14, 153-4; in Congress Working
Mehta, Sir Ferozc:sah, III Committee, 33; volunteer for individual
Menon, Kri shna, 184 Sa t yagraha movement, 37; visit to
Mira Ben, 80-1, 82 China, 42: anxiety for democracies, 50;
Mishra, Ramanand an, 121 on Cripps offer, 56; meeting with
Montagu-Chrlm.ford Reforms, 16 Wavell, 57; arrest of, 84; brought to
Montford Scheme of Provincial Autonomy, Ahmcdnagar, 88; relations with Azad,
III 1:l8-9; arrest in K ashmir, 148; return to
Mookh rjce, Shyama Prasad, 224 Delhi,149;pressconference, 155 ; invited
Moore, Arthur, 220-1 to form interim Government, 158, 162;
Morley- Minto RelOrrrl.l, III mistake of, 162; visit to Peshawar and
Moscow, 47, 53 tribal areas, 171 : invited to London, 173;
Mountba ltc:n, Lady, 184 on President of Constituent Assembly,
Mountbatt en, Lord, 181-2; plan for 174; on inclusion of Azad in Cabinet,
partition of India, 183-7, 189, 191-2, 175; disagreement with Azad's state-
195, 199,2 01,208: advice of, 188: on ment on Wavell, 179; against arbitra-
communal riots, 190; on N.W.F.P. lion, 182: on partition of India, 183,185-
plcbi it<", 194; appoints Boundary 6, 196; in.fluenced by Lady MOUllt-
Commission, 2UO: on Army, 202-03: batten, 184; on Gandhiji's suggestion,
homes overnor-G 'neml of India, 187; on riots, 212-4
204: inauguration of Pakistan, 206: Nehru, Motilal, 19, 128, 136; formation
inaugural speech of, 209; restoration of of Swaraj Party by, 10, 20
law and order, 212, 215 Nehru, Rameshwari, 667
Munich Pact, 24 News Chronicle, 64, 66, 93
Muslim League, 20, 22, 48, 50, 67-8, 93, Nicobars, 38
99, 103, 105, 106, 108, 109, 114-16, Nisbtar, Abdur Rab, 165
124,127-9,135, 160-2,168, 173,178, 182, oalthali, 186; riots, 182, 190, 199,212
187-8, 192-4 19 , 203, 206, 225-6: pro- Non-co-operation 9-10
p ganda against Congre s, 21, 112, 169: North-West Frontier Province, 116, 124,
origin nd im of, 110-11: Bhulabhai's 160, 169, 192, 227
negoLi lion with. 136; division of India,
142, J89, 191; on Pakistan, 142, 144: Pak:htoooistan, 194-5
on provin ial autonomy, 145: Rajagopa- Pakistan, 142, 144, 150, 183, 195-6, 200-1,
I chari's campaign on demand of, 146: 203, 207, 225-6; birth of, 161, 21;
demand ~ r s p rate stale, 150; on Brili h base in, 192; .W.F.P. to
binet Mi sion PI n, 153, 155-6, be included in, 193-4; N.W.F.P.
171,176,186; direct action of, 158-9; plebiscite in favour of, 195; Hindus io,
dis ppointment oj: 164; Finan e port- 198-9
Ii lio 10, 1 -7, P lel', inability to Pal, Bipin Chandra, 10
work with, 183: N.W.F.P. plebiscite in Pant, GO\'inda BaJlabb, 88, 110; moves
Ii vour of, 195; on Khan brothers, 196; resolulion on partition of India, 196-8
riolS, 2 ; threau against families of Patel, Sardar allabbbhai, 34, 73, 75, 94,
:Ius im officen in India, 21 96,112,131,142,152-3, 159, 163, 167,
Mu lim.,education of, 2-3; rio" of, 3; 182, 213, 216, 220-1, 226; dislike for
polities of, 7; n tionllliSlS, 48 Me Nariman, 15: in Congres. Working
Index
Comm ittee, 33; on Gandhiji's letter, 76; Roy, M. .,31, 125
brought to Ahmednagar, 88; sent to
Poona jail, 97; on Bhulabhai's casc, 136; Sadar Bazar, 211
represents Congress in Cabinet Mssion alam, Miss Amtus, 93
Conference, 147; home member, 166 ; Salt Satyagraha, 11, 75
on election of President, 174; on Budget, Sasmal, Bircndra lath, 10
176; against arbitration, 182; on parti- Simla, 105, 107, 147
tion of Ind ia, 183-5, 187, 196-7, 207; - Conference, 10+, 109-10, 112, 115,
on Gandhiji's suggestion, 187; on Mount- 11 8, 120, 125, 139, 163, 179-80; failure
batten's advice, 188; on riolS, 214-5; on of, 114
Gandhiji,217 Simon Commission, 11
Patel, Sardar Vithalbhai, 19 Sind, 124, 149, 160, 227
Patna, 88, 18B, 213; Gandhiji's stay at, Singapore, 78, 83, 102, 132; 0 cupied uy
186 Japan, 36
Pearl Harbour, 38, 47, 101 Singb, Sardar Baldev, 168; invited to
Peahawar, 170, 194, 196; Nehru's visit to, London, 173
171 Singh, Sardar Harnam, 107
Pethick-Lawrence, Lord, 148, 150-1, 191; Singh, Pratap, 132
announcement of Cabinet Mission, Singh, Sampuran, 37
138 ; on Azad's solution of communal Sinha, Dr Anugraha Narayan, 127
problem, 141; congratulate~ Azad, Sinha, Dr rikrishna, 127
154 Silaramayya, Dr Pattabbi, 88, 95
Poona, 83, 86, 97, 119 Slade, Miss, see Mira Ben
Prasad, Dr Rajendra, 34, 75, 94, 127, 159, South Africa, 83
163, 216; against C. R. Das, 19; con- Srinagar, 119, 149
structive programme of, 20; in Congrcss Stalin, 102, 125
Working Committee, 33; elected Con Sialmnan, 220
gress President, 174; on partition of Suhrawardy, H. S., 159
Army, 202 waraj Party, formation of, 10-11,20
Provincial Autonomy, 16
Punjab, 124, 12B, 160, 188, 194-5, 227;
inclusion in B zone, 149; riots, 182, 190, Taher, Mohammed, 83
199,200,210,214; survey of, 201 Tandon, Purshottamdas, 161
Purana Qila, 211,215 Taxila, riou, 182
Thompson, Edward, 143
Ti1ak, Lokmanya, 8
'Quit India' Movement, 73, 80,121, 125; Times of India, 90
consequences of, 116 Times, The , 40
'Quit Kashmir', 148 T okyo, 119
Quran, 221
U.S.A., 38, 101; aid to PaldstM, 22 7
Radcliff, Mr, 200 Ujjain, 224
Rai, Lala Lajpat, 10 Unionist party, 124, 128-9
Rajagopalachari, C., 34, 51, 64, 67, 146, United ProvinCCl, 82, 90, 152, 160, 162,
174; opposes C. R. Das, 19; takes up 225
constructive programme, 20; in Con- Uri, 148
Teal Working Committee, 33; reaolution
m Madras Congress Legislature Pany, Venalllea, treaty of, 27
67; letter to Azad, 68-9; on Budget,
176
Ranchi, 72, 91 War Cabinet, 48, 52, 56, 61-3; proposals
Rashtriya Svayam Sevak Sangh, 221, of, 54
224- Wardha, 47, 70, 72-3, 80, 161; Cripp.
Rawalpindi, 148; rioll, 182, 200 at, 46; Azad at, 48
Red Fo ..t, 133 Wavell, Lord, 56, 63, 101 , 103, 105-6,
Roosevelt, Franklin D., 84, 95,101,102; on 109, 112, 114, 11 6-1 7, 120. 127, 134.
India, 38, 42; pressure on British 1~9, 152, 164, 179, 186, 226, expert
Government, 47 politician, 64, to London and back, 99;
Round Table Conference, 11, 17-18, 101, 0!l Con~retsleade", 197; reLeaac of poli-
104 tical pnaoneD, 121; tra1 ofl.N.A., 132;
Roy, Dr B. C., 91 portfolio diJtributioD, 166; on Defence
Roy, Kiran Shankar, 198-9 portfolio, 168; diaagreement with
25 2 Index
Nehru, 169; regret of, 171; target date World War I, 88, 95, 119
of British withdrawal, 177-8; services - II, 65, III, 124-
of,180
Waziristan 169; maliks of, 171 Zaheer, Syed Ali, 166
Willingdon, Lord, 12 Zaher, Sheikh Mohammed,
Wilson, Prelicient, 65 Zubeida, Begum, 2

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