Colonial 'Warfare 83

Enemies have come who would ruin our country

and change our religion .... With God's help 1will
get rid of them.
-From Emperor

<, Italian I r----"'-"" BJ.eri's

~
---+
batteries
~+I/I " ! +-- \position at
1"?900 hrs,

~O~~lt..~Jll/ ptROFf J
O n the evening
February 28, 1896,
of
1( ~ "" /oabormid~
advance
!.IT. BELAR ~Euena,s
r~e.rve
brigade
Menelik would then be
forced either to attack the
ltalian general Oreste '- Arimondi's advance .. Italians in the fortifications
........ and Baral:ieri'~r MT. BELLAH
Baratieri presented his four ~---r~ defense-1int "--~ /" / they would build there or to
brigade commanders with a >/ ) (Y withdraw al together from
Ethiopian a:- ~+--

;)~ /r/?
HILL
difficult choice. After rnarch- attack A1bertone's CHIDANE MERET the town. The first option
ing into northern Ethiopia, would certainly spell defeat
ACJf.~f,,~
Baratieri's force of 20,000 for the Ethiopians, while
had spent more than a month ~r" j ~I MT. SEMAJ)!TA
the second would show his
in the Tigrean Mountains ( ~ t~alia!1 ." Retreatin fractious tribesmen that
Askari 01
stymied by Menelik's army,
which was ensconced around
. ~lLL~FENDAJ
~/"CHIDANE
batterI~
r ~ ~
A1bertone
he had lost his nerve. In
either case, the Ethiopian
the town of Adowa. Like
wary boxers, the rwo armies
/AdOW~/ //t -, Emperor would be weak-
ened and with him the cause
had jabbed at each other, of Ethiopian independence.
each too respectful of the other's drawal. Baratieri, who had hoped that Using a sketch map of the sur-
strength to close. ow, though, pressed they would respond this way, proceeded rounding area, Baratieri indicated the
by his government and painfully aware to outline his plan. Under positions he wanted each brigade
that his rations were nearly depleted, cover of darkness, his to take. Giuseppe Arimondi's brigade
Baratieri knew that continued inaction four brigades would would occupy the center on Mount
was impossible. So he asked his subor- move up to the line Belah. Vittorio Dabormida's brigade
dinates-should the Italian army attack of hills rising would be on his right, with a third
or retreat? above Adowa. brigade in reserve
Unanimously, the brigade lead- 011 the backside

ers counseled attack. Even an unsuc- of Mount Belah.

cessful assault would serve Italian Baratieri then
honor better than ignominious with- moved his
finger across
the map to
Above: Local guides took Albertone's brigade indicate the
lo the hill of Enda Chirane Meret, which was position the left
mismarked on the Italian maps. and thereby flank should take-an in-
unhinged the entire Italian defense. Top: While conspicuous knob known as
many Western generals lost battles with Chidane Meret, which was to
native armies, General Oreste Baratieri was be defended by the Askaris, native
among the few.. to lose a war Right: An infantrymen under Brigadier General
engraving of Ethopia's Emperor Menelik. Matteo Albertone. With this, the
mounted on horseback and armed with a first link in the chain of disaster
modern repeating rifle. was formed.
 Around 9:00 P.M. on the moonless direct A1bertone to the correct loca- after another. But the rack)' valleys con-
night of February 29 (1896 was a leap tion, then turned his attention to the tinued to disgorge endJess streams of
year), the Italians moved out through remainder of his army. Meanwhile, warriors, Baratieri had assured his gener-
the t:wisting, narrow canyons. Local A1bertone was similarly confused. His als that the Ethiopian emperor had at
guides led each of the brigades to their native guides affirrned that his men most 30,000 tribesmen-estimates of
positions, where cursing hersaqlieri were digging in on Chidane Meret, but 60,000 were dismissed as wild fantasy, By
(the infamous Italian mountain his right-hand units could find no sign midmorning, the larger number no
infantry) and Askari began to dig in. of Arimondi's brigade, which should longer seemed so fantastic.
ews of the Italian advance reached the have been just off their flank. The truth was even worse than me
Ethiopian emperor as he kneeled in In fact, A1bertone was 3 miles most pessimistic Italian might have
morning prayer. Menelik at first disbe- (4.8km) forward of his assigned posi- imagined, for Menelik had rnustered
lieved the reports, but subseq ue nt- tion. The Italian sketch map had clase to 100,000 warriors around
Iy declared that God had delivered his Chidane Meret marked incorrectly, and Adowa. Almost half of these, whipped to
people. The Ethiopians, suffering even the locals guiding the Italian column, a frenzy by the Empress Taito, who
greater privations than the Italians, wh o did n o t use rnaps , brought brazenly exposed herself to enerny fire,
were already preparing to abandon A1bertone exactly where he had told were unleashed against A1bertone. With
Adowa, a move scheduled for the sec- them he wanted to go. As a result, Taito's encouragements ringing in their
ond day of March. Instead, Menelik A1bertone's Askaris were dangerously ears, 50,000 screaming warriors finally
now had the opportuniry to meet the exposed, while Baratieri's left flank overran the Askari entrenchments and
Italians away from their prepared posi- was wide open. poured down me valley toward Baratieri.
tions. He ordered his warriors to pre- The brigadier had little time to work
pare for battle. out what had happened, for he was soon
As the sun rase on March 1, under attack from three sides by
Baratieri puzzled over the location of
Above: The city oJ Adowa in 1896. Opposite:
Menelik's aroused warriors. Though par-
A European sketch of the Ethiopian army on
A1bertone's brigade. He could plainly tially armed with modern weapons, the
the march to Adowa. 1nsel: The Emperor
see the hill rnarked on his map as Ethiopians still fought in undisciplined
Menelik a few years after the battle. He not
Chidane Meret, but there was no sign masses, rushing forward piecemeal to
only defied the colonial powers oJ Europe.
of Albertone. Assuming that the clase with the enemy. Cooperation
berwecn c1ans was nonexistent, allowing
but also expanded the Bthiopian state at the
brigadier had moved slightly forward of
the hill, Baratieri dispatched runners to
expense of his neighbors.
A1bertone's men to repulse one attack
 General Baratieri, under the im- beat a hasty retreat, defeat would not February 1896. The next day, after a
pression for most of the morning that have turned into catastrophe. In an defeat that was largely the result of
Albertone was only slightly forward, agony of indecision, he did neither. faulty maps and navigational errors
had responded to the brigadier's pleas At about 10:30 A.M., refugees from (that is, losing their way), only 9,200
for reinforcements by sending up Albertone's shattered formation began shocked survivors, nearly 1,500 of
Dabormida's brigade. Dabormida was to appear in front of Baratieri, closely thern wounded, emerged from the bat-
told to make contact with Albertone followed by thousands of Ethiopians. tle. Although Menelik's army had also
and help him to pull back to his proper The wave crashed against Arimondi's suffered dearly, the Italians withdrew
position on the Italian left. Unfor- Alpine troops, who held on desperately permanently from Ethiopia, the only
tunately, the Italians again fell victim to for an hour, their artillery tearing gap- African nation to preserve its indepen-
their unfamiliarity with the area. Since ing wounds in the closely packed mass- dence up to the First World War.
one canyon looked much like another, es of tribesmen. But, o utnu mbe red
Dabormida turned the wrong way,
blundering off to the right. J ust about
ten to one, the Italian forces could
not resist for long, and once Baratieri

If one considers only this ltalian defeat
me time that Albertone's brigade was sounded the retreat the entire Italian and the other Western losses that pre-
going under, Dabormida stumbled line disintegrated in a rout. ceded it, it may seem that empire
upon the left wing of Menelik's army, The only bright spot for the Italians builders were the only blunderers
which he promptly waded into, con- was the conduct of Dabormida's of the colonial periodo Actually,
vinced that his beleaguered colleague brigade. As perplexed as any other Westerners held no monopoly on mili-
must be just ahead. Italian general on that day, Dabormida tary incompetence. At Little Big Horn,
Baratieri, meantime, was growing was not even aware he was surrounded Isandhlwana, and Adowa, native lead-
increasingly muddled. Two of his until two hours after the center had fall- ers displayed tactical finesse and a keen
brigades had seemingly disappeared en aparto The brigadier finally deter- appreciation for terrain; at Orndurman,
into thin air, though the sound of rifle mined to cut his way out of the trap, and where the Muslim Khalifa of Sudan
and cannon fire echoed through the led his men in a brilliant, though costly, tried to turn back an Anglo- Egyptian
hills. For an hour or more he failed to fighting retreat. They were the only invasion, non e of these qualities were in
take any real action, instead sending Italian units to emerge in good order evidence. The Khalifa and his generals,
orders or requests for information to from the battle, though their general did blunderers of the highest order, relied
Albertone--(who was dead) and to not sur vive to see it. Bis body was found on the zeal of their Dervishes to bring
Dabormida (who was by now cut off). rnonths later among his fallen men. victory, but they discovered that brav-
If he had gathered his remaining men Baratieri had led some 17,000 men ery was no match for the machine gun
and gone forward, or cut his losses and forward to Adowa on that last night of and the magazine-fed rifle.