Fiscal Decentralization to Rural Local Governments in

India: Selected Issues and Reform Options

M. Govinda Rao
T. R. Raghunandan
Manish Gupta
Polly Datta
Pratap Ranjan Jena
Amarnath H. K.

May 2011

National Institute of Public Finance and Policy

New Delhi
 Acknowledgements

The study on rural fiscal decentralisation was taken up at the request of the Ministry of
Panchayati Raj along with a companion study on Panchayats and development. We are grateful
to Mr. A. N. Sinha, Secretary, Ministry of Panchayati Raj for taking keen interest in the study.
We would also like to thank the officials of the Ministry for making available a lot of
information used in the study, particularly the information on Activity Mapping in different
States. The study team is grateful to Dr. J. M. Phatak, former Additional Secretary in the
Ministry (present Chairman and Managing Director, Rural Electrification Corporation) for useful
discussions on various aspects of fiscal decentralization to rural local governments. The
Ministry also wrote to the Secretaries in charge of Panchayati Raj department in each of the
States requesting them to provide information and data required for the study. The study team
would also like to express its gratitude to Mr. D. K. Jain, Joint Secretary in the Ministry of
Panchayati Raj. While all these persons have helped in shaping the study, they are not
responsible for any errors and shortcomings and the authors take full responsibility for the same.

ii
 Table of Contents

Acknowledgements

I. Decentralization to Rural Local Governments in India: A Summary and

the Starting Point 1 12
1. Introduction 1
2. The system 2
3. Intergovernmental transfers 6
4. Reforming rural fiscal decentralization in India 8

II. Theories of Fiscal Federalism and Decentralization: A Review 13 34

1. Introduction 13
2. Traditional theories of fiscal decentralization 14
3. Political economy approaches to fiscal federalism 19
4. Rationale for intergovernmental transfers 25
5. Lessons from theory 29

III. Functional Devolution to Rural Local Bodies: Progress in Activity Mapping 35 49

1. Background 35
2. Procedures to be followed while pursuing activity mapping 38
3. Progress made by the states in carrying out activity mapping 39
4. Pursuance of MoRD and MoPR in Undertaking Activity Mapping 42

IV. Status of Own Revenues of Panchayats 50 -65

1. Introduction 50
2. Background 51
3. Current state of revenues of PRIs 52
4. Own revenues of panchayats Survey results 59
5. Reasons for poor revenue efforts of panchayats 62
6. Measures to augment own revenues of PRIs 63

V. State Finance Commissions: An Overview 66 -99

1. Introduction 66
2. The Status of SFCs in India 67
3. Difficulties faced by the SFCs in sourcing data 79
4. Reasons for the lack of database 83
5. Measures taken by UFCs in developing database of local bodies 84
iii
 6. Reasons for low level of grant utilization earmarked for database
Improvement 85
7. Implementation of SFC Recommendations by the State Governments 86
8. Conclusion 98

VI. Concluding Remarks 100-104

References 105-112

Annexures 113-222

iv
 CHAPTER I

Decentralization to Rural Local Governments in India:

A Summary and the Starting Point

1. Introduction

There has been a world-wide trend towards decentralisation in recent years. Many
countries have experienced devolution of administrative, political and fiscal responsibilities to
lower levels of government. Dissatisfaction with the prevailing centralised systems of service
delivery, transition from centralised planning to market economy, deepening democratic
principles and increasing need to recognise social, economic and political diversities in different
regions within the countries are some of the important reasons cited for this phenomenon. This
trend towards decentralisation is seen in countries with federal as with unitary systems; it has
spanned across developing as well as developed countries. The trend was also seen in transitional
countries and even military dictatorships as in democratic countries (Litvack, Ahmad and Bird,
1998).

The world-wide trend towards decentralisation has been accompanied by animated

discussions about its gains and losses. Many analysts find inherent merit in decentralisation;
often it is considered to be a constituent of human well being and therefore, an end in itself. In
many countries, policy makers see decentralisation a panacea for many ills afflicting the society.
It is perceived as an important means to enable efficient allocation of resources, improve
governance, accelerate economic growth, reduce poverty, achieve greater gender equity and
empower weaker sections of society. In contrast, arguments against decentralisation have
focused on the weakening the capacity of the central governments to undertake macroeconomic
stabilisation, efficiency loss due to poor administrative capacity of local governments to
undertake the functions assigned to them and potential for increased corruption (Prudhomme,
1995; Tanzi, 1996, 2001). The empirical studies are yet to settle the issue of the impact of
decentralisation on efficiency, growth, poverty and governance.

1
 In keeping with the global pattern, in India too there has been a trend towards greater
devolution of powers to urban and rural local governments particularly during the since the
1990s. Of course, attempts to decentralise the administrative system and establishment of self
governing institutions has much longer history and there have been sporadic attempts at
devolving powers and rights to rural and urban local governments, particularly after
independence. However, the impetus gained momentum with the statutory recognition of local
bodies as institutions of rural and urban self-government after the 73rd and 74th Constitutional
amendments in 1992. Although this was done not as a component of structural reform, the
attempt to decentralise allocative decisions was in conformity with the change in the
development strategy towards a more open and market friendly economic regime.

2. The System

The 73rd Constitutional amendment envisages panchayats to be institutions of self-

government. The State legislature is required under Article 243 G of the Constitution to transfer
such powers, functions and responsibilities to village, block and district panchayats to enable them
to function as institutions of self-government. The 11th Schedule to the Constitution lists 29 broad
areas for the panchayats. In respect of these functions, the State governments, at their discretion are
required to devolve the functions to panchayats and the latter are required to undertake them
concurrently. The legislature is also required to appoint a State Finance Commission (SFC) to make
recommendations on the sharing and assignment of various taxes, duties, tolls, fees etc. and on the
grants-in-aid to be given to the panchayats from the consolidated fund of the State.

With the Constitutional amendment, recognition was given to the local level at village,
block and district levels, and in 2009 there were as many as 2,39,432 village panchayats
including village councils, 6,087 panchayat samities (i.e., block level panchayats), 543 district
level panchayats and 14 Autonomous District Councils (ADCs). Thus, altogether, there were
2,46,076 rural local governments at village, block and district levels in the country. Perhaps, this
constitutes one of the largest governmental systems in any democratic polity.

The fiscal decentralisation envisaged in the Constitutional amendments has the potential
to significantly improve the efficiency of public services delivery in the country. In principle, the
2
constitutional empowerment of the panchayats enables the panchayats to elicit the preferences of
people for public services and has the potential to provide public services according to the
preferences efficiently. However, in reality, the situation is different. Despite Constitutional
recognition, the design and implementation of rural decentralization do not enable the
panchayats to be the institutions of rural self government. The available information shows that
in terms of both the revenues raised and expenditures incurred, panchayats play a negligible role.

The Assignment System: Devolution of powers to the panchayats is done under Article 243 G of
the constitution which states, .the Legislature of a State may, by law, endow the Panchayats with
such powers and authority as may be necessary to enable them to function as institutions of self
government. (emphasis added). An important feature of this provision is the discretionary
nature of the devolution. The fact that a State may endow powers to the panchayats implies that the
devolution of functions is to be done at the discretion of the state governments.

Schedule XI to the Constitution specifies a list of 29 areas for the panchayats. The
important areas include agriculture, land improvement, minor irrigation, development of water
bodies and watershed development, education, healthcare, water supply and sanitation, rural
housing, poverty alleviation rural roads, women and development and social welfare. In respect of
these areas, the state legislature is required to devolve the functions, functionaries and assign
revenue bases or transfer funds to carry out these functions satisfactorily. The extent of devolution
of powers as stated above, however, is at the discretion of the state government and the latter
undertakes the functions in these areas concurrently with panchayats.

There is considerable difference between what is intended in law and how it is implemented.
By all accounts, the states have been reluctant to devolve powers to local governments. Most state
governments have devolved only a few of the 29 functions listed in the schedule and the powers
devolved even in respect of the devolved functions are not significant. In other words, none of the
state governments has devolved the functions after a proper examination of activities the local
governments can effectively implement. In fact, there are several functions outside the 29 functions
listed which can be undertaken meaningfully at local levels and in respect of the functions listed,
given that the functions have to carried out concurrently with the State governments or parastatals

3
and independent agencies created by the state governments, it is necessary to undertake a clear
activity mapping to achieve clarity in assignments.

The major considerations in transferring the functions are (i) the capacity of the rural local
governments to carry out these functions, and (ii) the strategy to deal with the employees who have
been undertaking these tasks at the State level. Many State governments transfer the functions to
the panchayats along with the employees and estimated finances to pay the salaries of the
employees and meet non-salary components of these functions. However, in order to make the
system implementable and ensure compliance of the employees to the new plan, the transfers have
been tied to several schemes that were originally implemented by these state government
employees. With State governments continuing to exercise the powers of transfers and promotions
of these employees, the accountability of the employees to the panchayats is totally lost.

Devolving functions in terms of schemes has robbed the advantages of fiscal

decentralisation altogether. The basic advantage of fiscal decentralisation is to enable the local
governments to provide public services according to the preferences of people. By devolving the
functions in terms of schemes, autonomy and flexibility required to implement expenditure
programs have been denied to the panchayats. The analysis of transfers given to various schemes in
Karnataka, for example, shows that in 2000-01, of the total amount transferred, rural local
governments had complete autonomy and flexibility in spending in respect of only about 3.2 per
cent of the funds. Of the total expenditure, 5.8 per cent was earmarked for salaries, 11.5 per cent
was meant for onward transfers to schools and other institutions, earmarked transfers to individuals
constituted 9.8 per cent and 15.6 per cent was meant for specified projects (Rao, Amar Nath and
Vani, 2003). Thus, fiscal decentralisation is basically a fiscal de-concentration in the Indian context
achieved through the top-down process.

A critical factor in improving fiscal autonomy of rural local bodies is to enhance their own
revenues. Improving own revenues is important also to strengthen the link between revenue and
expenditure decisions of the rural local bodies at the margin, which is extremely important to
promote both efficiency and accountability in the provision of services. At present, the rural local
bodies at district and block levels do not have worthwhile own revenue sources. They can raise

4
revenues, albeit meagre, from rents on the buildings let out by them. From the viewpoint of raising
revenues, village panchayat is the only meaningful tier of decentralization among rural local bodies.
The analysis shows that in 2002-03, the own revenues of panchayats constituted 0.07 per cent of
GDP or 0.36 per cent of total revenues raised in the country.

Major revenue raising powers assigned to the village panchayats comprise of (i) tax on land
and buildings not subject to agricultural assessment; (ii) taxes on entertainment other than
cinematograph shows; (iii) taxes on vehicles other than motor vehicles; (iv) taxes on advertisements
and hoarding; (v) pilgrim fees on persons attending jatras, festivals etc., where the village
panchayats make arrangement for water supply and sanitation; (vi) market fees; (vii) fees for
registration of cattle brought for sale to the market; (fees on buses and taxies and auto stands if the
panchayat provides facilities for travellers and (ix) fee for grazing cattle in the grazing lands. Of
these, only the tax on land and buildings other than agricultural land has some revenue significance.
Other taxes are not important either because, the tax base is negligible or the local bodies do not
have the capacity to administer them. In respect of taxes on land and buildings too, the village
panchayats can levy and collect this tax subject to the specified exemptions and ceiling rate
specified.

There are two important problems with respect to the assignment of tax powers to
panchayats. The first is that although in terms of numbers there are quite of few taxes, none of the
tax handles is significant from the viewpoint of generating revenues except the property tax. Thus,
any serious attempt to improve the fiscal autonomy of the panchayats should ensure greater tax
powers to them. It is only when the tax powers are assigned to the panchayats that they would be
able to improve the standards of public services, ensure greater efficiency and accountability the
provision as there would be greater correspondence between tax payments and benefit from public
services.

Equally important problem is the lack of capacity of rural local governments to administer
the levy. At present, even in the case of property tax, administration and enforcement of the tax has
left much to be desired. The panchayats have to levy the tax below the ceiling rate stipulated the
State governments and obsolete method of determining the base of the tax ensures significant

5
undervaluation and this has rendered effective rates even lower. Thus the demand for property tax
collections is much less than the potential. Furthermore, even the low level of tax demand is not
actually collected by the panchayats. Even the low effective rate has not helped have a high degree
of compliance. There is considerable scope for reforming the property tax system and build
capacity in the panchayats to implement it to ensure meaningful fiscal autonomy for the panchayats.

3. Intergovernmental transfers

According to the implementable rules of fiscal decentralization, finances should follow

functional assignments (Shah, 1994; Bahl, 2002). It should also be noted that a sound system of
fiscal decentralization should ensure a clear linkage between revenue and expenditure decisions.
This implies that decentralized levels of government should have powers to raise revenues to
enable them to finance public service levels preferred by their residents. Assigning revenue
powers and ensuring their effective use, therefore, is extremely important to ensure efficiency as
well as accountability in the provision of local services.

The next step in the design of the transfer system is to estimate the fiscal requirements
which can not be covered by their own sources of revenue. Indeed revenue bases assigned to the
local governments in all multilevel fiscal systems are inadequate to meet their expenditure
requirements because, local governments have comparative advantage in implementing
expenditures due to their lowest transaction costs but comparative disadvantage in raising
revenues for, all broad based, mobile and redistributive taxes can be effectively levied only by
the higher level governments. Besides, there are significant differences between different local
bodies in their capacity to raise revenues and costs of providing public services. These vertical
and horizontal fiscal imbalances have to be offset thorough a system of intergovernmental
transfers. Such transfers have to be unconditional but should not have disincentives for resource
mobilisation nor should it encourage fiscal profligacy.

In addition to these general purpose unconditional transfers given to enable the

panchayats to provide a normative standard of public services at stipulated revenue raising effort,
it is important to ensure prescribed standards of services in the local bodies in respect of some
basic services having a bearing on the life of people. These include interventions such as

6
poverty alleviation, provision of basic education, healthcare, housing, water supply and
sanitation and nutrition and child development. Many of these interventions are of national
concern, need to be achieved according to nationally set standards and would need to be
designed at the national level. Others may be of state wide importance and scope. However,
local bodies have comparative advantage in implementing all these services due to lower
transaction costs. To ensure that the prescribed minimum standards of services are provided in
the case of these interventions, specific purpose grants will have to be provided. However, it is
important that the design of such transfers should not constrain the capacity and initiate of the
local governments, should have sufficient flexibility to enable efficient provision of such
services.

Thus, a good transfer system requires designing of the unconditional transfers to offset
the general fiscal disabilities of panchayats. The provision for the appointment of the State
Finance Commission every five years is essentially to assess the expenditure requirements of
Panchayats for carrying out the functions devolved to them at all the three levels, assess their
capacity to raise revenues from the sources assigned to them and recommend grants to meet the
remaining requirements for the five years under their consideration. In addition to the state
transfers to the panchayats based on the recommendations of the SFCs, the central government
also gives grants based on the central Finance Commission. One of the terms of reference to the
Central Finance Commission is to make recommendation on the measures need to augment
the Consolidated Fund of a State to supplement the resources of the Panchayats in the State on
the basis of the recommendations made by the Finance Commission of the State.

The functioning of the SFCs, the nature and quality of recommendations made by them
and States attitude in implementation does not bring much cheer. In many of the states, SFCs
are not constituted regularly, in some states the Chairpersons and Members are not drawn from
among the experts, but from politicians and bureaucrats. Also, unlike in the case of the Union
Finance Commission where there is a healthy tradition of accepting the recommendations by the
Government, rarely do the states accept the recommendations and implement them. A part of the
reason for this has to be found in the poor quality of analysis and recommendations. Many of the
SFCs make their recommendations without much analysis of the capacities and needs of the
panchayats. In fact, most SFCs make their recommendations without collecting and analysing
7
even the basic data on the revenues and expenditures of panchayats at the three levels. There is
hardly any analysis on the revenue capacities and expenditure needs of the panchayats wither in
official or academic literature. Not surprisingly, clear activity mapping in the states is yet to be
done in the states and in the absence of this, estimating expenditure requirements in a scientific
manner could not be done. The consequence of this has been that a scientific system of transfers
from the States to Panchayats is yet to be developed. As regards the general purpose transfers
given on the recommendation of the Union Finance is concerned, it is at best, an exercise in
tokenism; the volume of transfers is negligible in relation to the expenditure requirements. Thus,
in most of the states, general purpose unconditional transfers are not very significant and where
they exist, they are given on the basis of a properly designed formula.

As mentioned earlier, the scheme based devolution of functions to panchayats in many

states has robbed autonomy and flexibility to Panchayats. In addition to the state schemes, there
are a number of central schemes which are passed on to the panchayats for implementation.
These include schemes on poverty alleviation, education and nutrition, health, water supply and
sanitation, women and child development, rural housing, rural roads and rural electrification.
The total expenditure on these schemes estimated in the 2009-10 budget is estimated at Rs.
crores. Funds for many of the schemes other are directly given to the panchayats/DRDA at the
district level. It is necessary to consolidate these multitudes of central and state schemes and
provide untied funds to the panchayats to carry out the functions assigned to them. The Report
of the Expert group on Planning at the Grassroots Level has made significant recommendations
in this regard (India, 2006).

4. Reforming Rural Fiscal Decentralisation in India

Unfortunately, decentralization to rural local governments, as it has been calibrated in India

has not had the desired effect of improving the standards of public services for a variety of reasons.
The preceding analysis brings out the shortcomings in policies, processes and institutions. The
analysis underlines weaknesses in both design and implementation. First, as mentioned earlier,
there were inherent problems with the design of decentralization. Devolving functions segmented
into various schemes and prioritising them has meant that the rural local bodies do not take any

8
decisions, but simply implement the schemes designed by the State/Central governments. Second,
rural local governments do not have the incentive to raise revenues. Overwhelming proportion of
the transfers is scheme based and the preoccupation is with implementing them - particularly those
involving contractors. There are serious problems of design and implementation of the tax systems
and in any case, the rural local governments perspective is that they are meant to merely implement
the schemes transferred to them by higher level governments and not take any fresh initiatives.
Besides, raising revenues in a local area with skewed power structure has not been easy and it is not
surprising that not only the property taxes are low, but even that is not collected properly. As the
state governments themselves faced increasingly constrained fiscal environment due to large
additional liability arising from increase in the pay scales on the one hand, and a steady decline in
central tax devolution on the other, the standards of services have actually declined. Thus, while the
schemes were transferred, commensurate funds to implement these schemes were not provided for
and this has only caused the standards of services to decline.

The rent-seeking behaviour on the part of the local politicians only exacerbated the problem.
In some states rotation of Sarpanch/Pradhan of the village panchayat was introduced and when in
office, the Sarpanch/Pradhan found it lucrative to initiate a number of works and award contracts.
Thus, too many projects are taken up with significant time and cost overruns, and the initial years of
each Sarpanch is spent not in planning but in seeing the semblance of completion of projects
undertaken under the previous regime. He in turn awards contracts, which will eventually be
completed by his successors, with significant efficiency cost.

In the literature, much has spoken about the gains from decentralization. However, these
gains accrue when the decentralization is designed according to the implementable rules and there
are institutions at the local government level to carry out the functions. However, the
decentralization that is attempted in India below the state level does not follow the implementable
rules1. Perhaps, this has to be expected, for, reforms are not implemented de novo. Any attempt at
achieving greater degree of decentralization starts from the given scenario and it may not be
possible to implement the benchmarked rules. In such an environment, it is possible to implement
only incremental changes.

1
For a detailed exposition of implementable rules of decentralization, see, Bahl (2002).
9
 To enable fiscal decentralization can play and important role in providing public services at
local level a number of reforms at the local government level should be carried out. These include
(i) clear activity mapping based on comparative advantage in implementing expenditures and
devolution of functions to the panchayats based thereon; (ii) providing appropriate revenue handles
to local bodies; (iii) guiding the local governments to undertake reforms in their tax systems,
particularly taxes on land and property; (iv) capacity building of local governments to enable them
to raise resources and provide public services efficiently; (v) unbundling the state sector schemes
and consolidating the central sector schemes to enable greater flexibility and autonomy to
panchayats in the implementation; (vi) Professionalisation of SFCs and reforms in the state transfers
to make them adequate, rule based, equitable and incentive compatible; (vii) all these are possible
only when there is an up to date information system comprising of fiscal, demographic,
geographical and economic data for the village, block and district panchayat jurisdictions.

Some of the suggested reform measures are explained in greater detail. Indeed, given the
vast diversity and differences in the capacity of panchayats and varying institutional realities and
power structure and asset distribution in rural areas, it would be misleading to suggest one design of
local government system to all states. Each state should evolve its decentralization system and
institutions the taking into account the institutional realities in the state, state of land distribution,
nature of power structure and the capacity of local institutions to design and implement fiscal
decisions. Nevertheless, there are important general reform issues applicable to all the states and
these are detailed in the following.

Keeping these issues in view, the Ministry of Panchayati Raj sponsored a comprehensive
study on the financial domain of the panchayats to be undertaken by the NIPFP with the
following terms of reference:
(1) A critical appraisal of the basic theories of fiscal decentralization and in the light of
the theoretical propositions, evaluation of the actual decentralization process in India
since the 73rd and 74 constitutional amendments. This should lead to
recommendations on the structure of decentralisation.
(2) Analysis of state-wise functional devolution to Panchayats and devolution of finances
to examine the correspondence of the one with the other.
(3) Critical review of the fiscal transfer system and formulae adopted by various states in
the devolution to the Panchayats. Analysis of the objective of State transfers to
Panchayats and evaluation of the extent to which the objectives have been achieved in
10
 the actual transfer systems in terms of achieving equity in adequacy to ensure the
required level of public service delivery.
(4) Examination of budgeting and accounting practices in States with regard to
Panchayats to understand how fiscal transfers to Panchayats are demarcated and
indicated. The analysis should bring out the inadequacies for demarcating allocations
and classifying them into budget heads.
(5) Analysis of various methods of physical transfer of funds and see its actual
functioning both through treasury and banks.
(6) Evaluation of the delegation of financial powers to the Panchayats to analyse how a
good fiscal transfer design can be stymied by poor delegation of financial approval
powers.
(7) Analysis of the status of own revenues of Panchayats across states with a view to
recommending measures to enhance revenue mobilization.
(8) Examination of the approach of the states towards the State Finance Commissions
recommendations and how far they have been accepted and implemented in various
states.
(9) Finally, suggestions for improvement in each area of reforms for effective
decentralization of function and finance and classification of the states based on the
effective decentralization.

Collection of important documents and material required for the study, particularly the
information relating to Activity Mapping in the States took considerable amount of time. With
the submission of the Report by the Thirteenth Finance Commission, the Ministry of Panchayati
Raj felt that it is not necessary to deal with all the terms of reference. The Ministry, therefore
suggested that the study may be discontinued and the report submitted on whatever aspects the
work was completed. As the work on various aspects of the terms of reference were in different
stages, we had to devote considerable amount of additional time to ensure that the completed
work provides some meaningful insights into the problems confronting rural fiscal
decentralisation in the country. Accordingly, the report has been prepared which broadly
addresses many of the issues referred to in the terms of reference. Nevertheless, it must be
mentioned that to comprehensively deal with the terms of reference, considerable additional time
and resources would be necessary and in that sense, the study is by no means complete.

In particular, the work on Activity Mapping has been carried out only in twelve states,
though the methodology to undertake the exercise has been elaborated in detail in the Annexure.
Nevertheless, it provides useful insights into the issue of ensuring clarity in functional
assignments by undertaking the exercise. We hope, similar exercises will be taken up based on

11
the methodology designed by so that the rural local governments are enabled within a clearly
defined functional space.

The next chapter makes a detailed review of the literature on fiscal federalism with a
view to bring pout the broad lessons. Chapter III makes a critical of the functional devolution to
panchayats. The status of activity mapping in different states is also analysed in chapter III. The
chapter also provides a framework for activity mapping of the functions in selected States.
Chapter IV analyses the reform issues relating to Panchayats own revenues. Chapter V discusses
the problems in the functioning of the State Finance Commissions. Chapter VI pulls together the
conclusions from various chapters.

12
 CHAPTER II

Theories of Fiscal Federalism and Decentralisation

1. Introduction

There has been a worldwide trend towards decentralisation in recent years. Many
countries have experienced increasing devolution of administrative, political and fiscal
responsibilities to lower levels of government. Dissatisfaction with the prevailing centralised
systems of service delivery, transition from centralized planning to market economy, deepening
democratic principles and increasing need to recognize social, economic and political diversities
in different regions within the countries are some of the important reasons cited for this
phenomenon. More importantly, it is important to note that inclusive growth is possible only
when there is inclusive governance and effective decentralisation is the only way to ensure the
latter.

The increasing trend towards fiscal decentralization noted above is an empirical fact
observed in many countries, but there are equally strong theoretical reasons for the phenomenon.
This paper reviews theoretical literature on fiscal federalism. At the outset, it must be stated that
there is no unified theory of fiscal federalism, but a series of propositions providing norms as to
how the multilevel fiscal systems should behave or making generalizations on how they actually
do. Much of the traditional theories or what is now referred to as the first generation theories
underline the welfare gains from decentralisation based on the assumption of a benevolent state.
In contrast, the second generation theories (SGT) of fiscal federalism expand the framework by
assuming that various agents of the government have their own objective functions rather than
the state maximizing the welfare of the people. This gives rise to application of industrial
organisation theories to the problems of decentralization and more particularly, the principal-
agent framework and developments in market promoting and competitive federalism literature.
While it is difficult to deal with the literature in detail, the important nuances and the
developments in the literature with important lessons for countries like India are discussed in the
following.

13
2. Traditional Theories of Fiscal decentralization

The traditional theoretical approach or what is now called the First Generation theories
(FGT) of fiscal federalism. This has two major shortcomings: First, much of the mainstream
literature takes a view that governments are benevolent and do everything to counter market
failures. Second, the normative framework in this body of literature has been developed in the
context of developed market economies. Uncritical application of the normative framework in
the context of developing and transitional economies with heavy emphasis on planning could be
misleading. In contrast, the second generation theories do not approach the subject assuming

Fiscal federalism is considered to be an optimal institutional framework for the provision

of public services. As observed by Alexis de Toqueville more than a century ago, The federal
system was created with the intention of combining the different advantages which result from
the magnitude and littleness of nations (1980, Vol. 1, p. 163). The basic issue, however, is that
of aligning responsibilities and appropriate fiscal instruments to carry them out to different levels
(Oates, 1999). The advantages from the magnitude and littleness can be realised only when the
functions of different levels of governments and various units within each of the levels are
clearly specified so that economies of scale in the provision of services reaped, advantage of a
large common market is realised while retaining the individual identities and public services
according to the diversified preferences of people across the nation are provided. This involves
mapping the public services to various governments and jurisdictions within each level of
government depending on their comparative advantage in terms of their capacity and willingness
(incentive) to respond to diverse preferences, reap scale economies, and minimize transaction
costs in the provision of public services.

An important implementable rule of fiscal decentralization is the clear assignment of

revenue handles to effectively implement the functional responsibilities (Bahl, 2002). Finances
should follow functions so that the subnational governments can vary the public services across
jurisdictions according to the preferences of the people by varying tax payments on them.
Assignment of revenue sources is necessary for, a strong link between the decision to spend and
the decision of raise revenues to finance the spending imparts greater efficiency and
accountability in public service provision. Thus, proper assignment of functions and sources of
14
finance, consequences arising from their overlap and the mechanism to match their functions and
finances both vertically among different levels of government and horizontally among different
governmental units constitutes the subject matter of fiscal federalism.

From this perspective, fiscal federalism is simply an efficient organisation of the

multilevel public sector. As Stated by Oates, the term federalism for the economist is not to
be understood in a narrow constitutional sense. In economic terms all governmental systems are
more or less federal: even in a formally unitary system (Italics in the original; Oates, 1977; p.
4).2 Similarly, Bird (2000, p. 135) states, in the traditional world of fiscal federalism in
principle everything boundaries, assignments of finances and functions, the level and nature of
transfers and so forth is malleable.3

The above formulation, however, blurs the difference between decentralisation and
federalism. According to Watts (1996), the structure can take the form of Decentralised
Unions which are basically unitary states in which subnational units have greater or lesser
degree of policy autonomy devolved to them by the Central government or formal federations
which combine a strong Central government with sub-central tiers having their own powers.
Indeed, there can be considerable divergence between formal and operational federation, but
nevertheless, as a rule there is considerable devolution of powers in formal federations.

Thus, formal federal systems, besides decentralisation, have additional pre-requisites.

Most importantly, the issue is not merely one of having an efficient assignment system; it is also
important to see how the assignments are made and are the assignments extinguishable.
Although it is difficult to get instances of classical federalism conceptualized by Wheare (1964)
in which, the participating governments are coordinate and independent, the assignment
system must be determined independently and should have a measure of permanence. There
should an effective system of checks and balances to ensure a measure of permanence. In
confederal systems, the assignments are done by lower level governments (States) whereas in

2
Not surprisingly as Breton (1981, p. 253) States, Political scientists who know better, have in their more generous
moments treated economists as poor souls with a model in hand in need of an application
3
Bird (2000) makes a distinction between fiscal federalism and federal finance. In his formulation, under fiscal
federalism everything - boundaries, assignments, and the transfers - is malleable, under federal finance these must be
taken to be fixed at some earlier (constitutional) stage and not open to further change under normal circumstances.
15
decentralized systems, powers are assigned by senior level governments. A federal system is the
one in which the entire set of powers legislative, fiscal and regulatory - are divided in the
Constitution or conventions between different levels of government. There is a measure of
permanency in the assignments and in particular, the powers given to lower level governments
can not be extinguished by higher level governments (Breton, 2000). Thus, checks and balances
to safeguard the system is an inherent part of the federal system whereas, decentralisation does
not necessarily entail that. In other words, all federal systems are decentralized whereas all
decentralized systems are not federal. The Constitution and other institutions set up to ensure
checks and balances and safeguard the domains of different levels of government are inherent
components of a federal system.

The political theories make out the case for federalism on the basis of freedom and
representation4, safeguarding group identities and ensuring security and stability through
bargains. On the other hand, economic theories of federalism focus on creating multilevel public
sector governance systems to improve efficiency. The traditional analysis or what has come to
be known as the first generation theories of economic federalism (Qian and Weinghast, 1997;
Oates, 2005) implicitly assume that governments are benevolent and as custodians of public
interest, they seek to maximize social welfare. They demonstrate the superiority of the
decentralized system over the centralized provision of public services. The new approaches to
fiscal federalism or the second generation theories consider the assumption of benevolent
governments unrealistic and take that agents within the governments (bureaucrats and
politicians) have their own objective functions operating within the constellation of incentives
and constraints depending on the given fiscal and political institutions (Oates, 2008). They
model the inter-governmental behaviour in terms of principal-agent relationship, underline the
importance of hard budget constraints and focus on the importance of competition both
vertically between different levels of government and horizontally among different units within
the same level to enhance efficiency in the delivery of public services.

The normative framework of fiscal federalism laid out by the traditional theory presents
the assignment of functions to different levels of government as well as appropriate fiscal

4
For a review of various political theories of federalism, see Rao and Singh (2005).
16
instruments to carry them out. Broadly, the theory states that redistributive and stabilization
functions belong to the realm of the Central government due to the innate constraints in carrying
them out by sub-national governments. In the case of the former, the constraints are posed by
the potential mobility of economic units and in the case of the latter, lower potency of the policy
instruments due to spillovers arising from the open nature of sub-national economies. However,
in carrying out the allocation function, subnational governments have a predominant role. The
theory also lays down the norms for the assignment of fiscal instruments to finance the assigned
functions. From the efficiency point of view, the decentralised governments should not only
refrain from levying non-benefit taxes on mobile economic units but they should actually levy
benefit taxation when these mobile units receive benefits from the services provided by them 5.
In addition, there is clearly a case for levying taxes on immobile factors.

A general contention is that decentralised system of governance enables greater

efficiency in service delivery. One of the earliest formulations of efficiency rationale for
decentralisation was by Tiebout (1956). When there are a large number of localities with
different public service tax mix, and people have footloose mobility, they vote on their feet
to move to the localities that provide the fiscal package best matching their preferences. In the
limiting case, this process can generate an efficient equilibrium outcome. Even when the
assumption of footloose mobility is relaxed, Oates (1969) shows the superiority of
decentralised solution as fiscal differentials are capitalized into property values.

Much of the focus of the first generation theories of fiscal federalism, however, is in
demonstrating the superiority of decentralised system over the centralised by exercising their
preferences through voice the voters influencing the decisions through the ballot and this is
characterized by the decentralization theorem. The theorem States, .... in the absence of
cost savings from the centralized provision of a (local public) good and of inter-jurisdictional
externalities, the level of welfare will always be at least as high (and typically higher) if Pareto-
efficient levels of consumption are provided in each jurisdiction than any single, uniform level of
consumption is maintained across all jurisdictions (italics added; Oates, 1972, p. 54). Notably,

5
This, in fact could result in loss of efficiency on another count. Levying benefit taxes on mobile manufacturing
activity could result in source-based as against residence-based taxation. See Oates (1999).
17
in this formulation, the lower efficiency is due to uniform provision of public services and not
due to centralization per se. Nevertheless, ability of the centralized system in meeting diverse
preferences is limited by informational and political constraints and hence, the superiority of
decentralized provision of public services (Oates, 1999).

The decentralisation theorem rests on two basic assumptions. First, the governments are
benevolent and maximize outputs of public goods so as to maximize the welfare of their
residents. Second, centralised provision necessarily results in uniform level of public outputs in
all jurisdictions. The support for this is taken from the fact that it is difficult for the Central
government to obtain the information needed to provide public services according to diverse
tastes and preferences. Second, it may be politically infeasible for the Central government to
vary the levels of public services across jurisdictions. These are discussed briefly below.

The classification of public sector according to Musgrave-Oates trilogy of

redistribution, stabilization and allocation results in the first two being predominantly carried out
by the Centre and the last the allocation function being mainly the responsibility of subnational
governments. The considerable information asymmetry in carrying out the allocation function at
the Centre places the decentralised governments at an advantage. In real world situations,
however, it is impossible to attribute divide the powers to the levels of government
corresponding to Musgrave-Oates triology. Even conceptually, efficiency of the decentralised
system in the allocation function presumes that there is an omniscient Central government or a
Central planner who has perfect information about the preferences of people, degree of spillovers
and magnitude of scale economies of different public services in order to be able to determine
the assignment system and a system of transfers6. In a setting of perfect information, it would be
possible for the benevolent central planner to provide different sets local public services that
maximizes the social welfare. As Breton (1995, p. 185) has noted, If Central governments
could perform the difficult task of estimating marginal spillover flows and designing the
appropriate grants program, a division of functions is not only unnecessary but wasteful.

6
Interestingly, Breton (1965) was the earliest to demonstrate the superiority of decentralization which was later
developed by Olson (1967) and Oates (1968) into what has come to be called the decentralization theorem.
18
However, informational and political constraints could prevent the Central planner from
generating an optimal pattern of local public services (Oates, 1999).

The issue is important because, potential welfare gains from decentralisation are large.
The gains depend on variations in demand and the gains are inversely related to the price
elasticity of demand for local services. Although there are no empirical studies on the demand
for .local services in India, the evidence from the US shows the price elasticity of demand for
local public services is low (Bradford and Oates, 1974; Rubinfeld, 1987). Indeed, technological
developments could lower the information cost and reduce information asymmetry and this may
favour increased centralization in respect of some services. It is also possible that often the case
that is made for decentralization is, in fact, a case for privatization rather than decentralisation.
Thus, the assignment system requires to be reviewed from time to time (Tanzi, 2002).

An extension of the traditional theory is the assumption that solutions to fiscal federalism
must be found in co-operative federalism. Implicit in this proposition is that the assignment
system should be unambiguous and powers given to sub-national governments can not be
extinguished so that the latter can exercise unfettered choice in their assigned domains. As
argued by Coase (1960), clear assignment works like the assignment of property rights. Efficient
provision of public services in their respective domains and internalizing externalities and
spillovers requires bargaining between different governmental units. Clarity in assignments
reduces transaction costs and enables Coasian bargains in which, the jurisdictions bargain with
one another for mutual gains and resolve many issues arising from spillover of costs and benefits
among them. This is the essence of co-operative federalism (Inman and Rubinfeld, 1997a,
1997b). However, co-operative federalism is possible only in cases where there is motivation
to enter into bargains for mutual gains, there is a measure of equality in the bargaining strength
and there is an effective referee and monitor to ensure efficient bargaining processes.

3. Political Economy Approaches to Fiscal federalism

This branch of literature on fiscal federalism draws heavily from the developments in
public choice and industrial organization (information) theories It does not assume an altruistic

19
government and motivation of public officials as common good in the Samuelson Musgrave
tradition. Instead, it assumes that participants in the political processes have their own objective
functions and seek to maximize their own gain rather than the welfare of the society (Oates,
2005). In other words, the new literature recognizes the importance of motivations of incentives
of the bureaucrats and politicians. According to the traditional theories, welfare gains accrue
from more efficient provision of public services due to better matching of preferences. Thus, the
trade off is between the efficiency gains from meeting diversified preferences and inability to
internalize the spillovers at the subnational level. The models employing the public choice
approach (the second generation theories or SGT), in contrast, bring out the trade off in terms of
better accountability of decentralized levels versus better coordination of policies to internalize
spillovers (Seabright, 1996). Thus, despite significant differences in the models employed under
the public choice approach, many of them produce a trade off between centralization and
decentralization which is fundamentally similar. As stated by Besley and Coate (2003, p. 2628),
the lay insight remains that heterogeneity and spillovers are correctly at the heart of the
debate about the gains from centralization.

There are three distinct set of theories under new approach to fiscal federalism or the
second generation theories. The first is the application of the developments in industrial
organization theory to fiscal federalism, particularly modeling the multilevel fiscal arrangements
in terms of the principal-agent framework. The second strand focuses on the problems arising
from the soft budget constraints and derives motivation from the fiscal crisis precipitated by
exploitation of fiscal commons leading to perverse behaviour of subnational governments,
particularly in Latin America. Finally, the third strand employs more formal political economy
approaches based on legislative structure and electoral process to analyse different kinds of fiscal
outcomes under centralised and decentralized politics. Among others, this strand examines the
outcomes from yardstick competition under the rubric of competitive federalism.

(i) Fiscal federalism in the principal-agent framework:

The application of industrial organization theory to fiscal federalism is mainly to model

the behavior of agents in terms of principal agent problem. There are two approaches adopted

20
in such models. In the first the Central government is treated as the principal and the States are
treated as agents (Levaggi, 2002). In this formulation which is akin to what Inman calls
Administrative federalism. In this model, States are treated simply as agencies that respond to
the directives of the Centre. In the second formulation, electorate is taken as the principal and
elected officials are taken as agents. In one such formulation Tommasi (2003), demonstrates that
decentralisation is preferable even in cases of perfect homogeneity of preferences. In this, the
case for decentralisation depends not only on differences in tastes, but also on the potential for
better local control or accountability. Similarly, Seabright (1996) considers elections as
incomplete contracts in his analysis concludes that while centralization allows for greater
coordination of fiscal decisions, decentralization promotes preference matching and greater
accountability. Thus, like in the case of traditional theories of fiscal federalism, heterogeneity
and spillovers are the critical factors determining gains from decentralisation (Besley and Coate,
2003). Thus, the basic trade off is between gains from coordination and providing public
services according to preferences and ensuring greater accountability in the public service
provision under decentralisation.

(ii) Fiscal federalism and soft budget constraints:

The second strand of literature in the new approaches to fiscal federalism deals with the
problems arising from the exploitation of fiscal commons by subnational governments and in
particular, the problem of soft budget constraints. Prudhomme, argues that decentralised levels
of government have strong incentives to raid the fiscal commons to create destabilising impact
on the economy. The perverse incentives and poor efficiency arising from them is brought out
by applying the concept of soft budget constraint advanced by Kornai (1979, 1980) which was
originally used to explain the behaviour of public enterprises in socialist economies, to analyse
the behaviour of decentralised governments. The perverse incentive arises from the existence of
soft budget constraints as the authorities in decentralised governments expect the higher level
governments to bail them out of their fiscal problems of continuing deficits and increasing stock
of debt. The approach adopts a sequential game-theoretic framework to explain the way in
which perverse expectations are formed. In the first stage, central government declares that it
will not bail out fiscally distressed decentralised governments. Of course, the latter do not take

21
this as credible because bankruptcy of a local government can have serious consequences and
this can spill over to other jurisdictions. Therefore, in stage two, the subnational governments
may continue to profligate and build up deficits and debt. Faced with this fiscal debacle at the
subnational level, in stage three, the Centre will have to take a call on whether or not to bail out
the decentralised government.

The literature identifies various political and economic factors that undermine fiscal
discipline at sub-national levels and identifies various sources of soft budget constraints.
Rodden, Eskelund, and Litvack (2003) analyse the experiences of various countries and identify
five important sources of soft budget constraints for subnational governments which are (i) ill
defined responsibilities to units and functionaries; (ii) federal transfers, (iii) borrowing by
subnational governments and bail outs by higher level of government; (iv) absence of a strong
system of private markets (land, capital), (v) history and precedents.

An important application of the soft budget constraint is the concept of Market

Preserving Federalism (MPF) which according to Weinghast (1993, 1995) is the ideal type of
federalism. He puts forth five preconditions for the MPF which are: (i) existence of a hierarchy
of governments clear delineation of function to each level; (ii) subnational autonomy to provide
public services and to regulate in areas assigned to them; (iii) the national government should
have policies to ensure a common market to allow for factor and product mobility; (iv) all
governments, particularly the subnational governments face hard budget constraints; and (v) the
political authority of different governments are institutionalized so that one level or a
governmental unit can not abridge, expand or extinguish the powers of the others.

The ideal type of federalism is the MPF in which the above five conditions are satisfied
the most. Effective intergovernmental competition requires clear assignments, product and
factor mobility across jurisdictional boundaries, hard budget constraint and institutional
authority. Hierarchical nature of governments helps to deal with externalities. Fiscal autonomy
in the assigned jurisdictions means that they cannot create money, access unlimited credit, or get
bailouts from higher-level governments in times of fiscal distress. Clarity in assignments is like
ensuring property rights; it is necessary both for accountability and incentives. Ensuring a

22
common market makes subnational governments de facto national governments and increase
penalties for protectionism and rent seeking. Internal trade barriers short-circuit inter-
jurisdictional competition.

Applying the concept of soft budget constraint which was introduced to describe the
behaviour of State owned enterprises in socialist economies, to the subnational governments
looking for fiscal relief from the Central government, Weinghast argues that perverse fiscal
behaviour is essentially built into the system. Therefore, the solution to the problem involves a
fundamental reform of political and fiscal institutions to alter the structure of incentives in
budgetary decisions. Credible commitment to avoid fiscal bailouts is critical to ensuring hard
budget constraints. This also requires politically strong Central government which is not
constrained by the States bargaining strength to bail them out in times of distress.

Weinghasts formulation of MPF goes a part of the way in removing the assumption of
selflessness in pursuing welfare gain7. However, the five preconditions required in this
formulation can not be found in the real world. Furthermore, actual conditions in a federal
system are governed by political decentralisation and given that fiscal federalism is a component
of federalism, it is not clear whether the objective function of individual agents is guided by self
motivation. Under the circumstances, it is doubtful whether the governments in general and
federal governments in particular can be appraised in terms of their commitment to preserving
markets. Assuming that any country can carry out non-market responsibilities such as differential
treatment of different groups (racial, linguistic, gender, regional) of population and undertake
other functions such as national unity, poverty, education, health, environment, culture and arts
in ways without constraining the market preservation would be unrealistic. Equally important,
the resolution to the difficult problem of assignment of powers under MPF is a matter of
definition. Again, by definition, vertical competition among various jurisdictional levels under
MPF cannot exist. It must also be noted that in the MPF as in the Tiebout (1956) model,
federations are conceived to be two-tier structures. In the latter, national structure is passive to
so that inter-jurisdictional competition can be precisely defined. However, in MPF, the national
tier is not passive, but not active either.

7
I am grateful to Albert Breton for drawing my attention to the various implicit assumptions of MPF formulation.
23
(ii) Competitive Federalism:

Another branch of literature under the SGT brings out the gains from intergovernmental
competition in a decentralised system. Brennan and Buchanan (1980) favour decentralisation as
the States compete with the Centre and among themselves to provide a check against the
government from becoming a Leviathan. In Market promoting Federalism (MPF), analysed
above, the subnational governments compete to provide enabling environment for businesses. In
terms of conceptual clarity, Bretons construct of competitive federalism, provides a more
comprehensive representation of the third strand of literature under the SGTs.

Breton (1995, 2006) and Salmon (1987, 2006) provide a more systematic work on
vertical and horizontal competition to conclude increase in efficiency under decentralisation.
Salmons analysis of horizontal competition shows that citizens of a jurisdiction can use
information about the public services provided elsewhere to evaluate the performance of their
own governments, in the manner of a rank order tournament8. Therefore, competition among
governments not only affects policies to attract or keep citizens happy, but it also interacts with
electoral incentives. Accordingly, [e]ach government has an incentive to do better than
governments in other jurisdictions in terms of levels and qualities of services, of levels of taxes
or of more general economic and social indicators. Empirically, whether this happens (and this
is a question that needs to be examined in the Indian context) depends on the possibility and
willingness of citizens to make assessments of comparative performance...and [on] the impact
these assessments have on the well-being of politicians (Salmon, 1987, p. 32). Breton (1995, p.
237) argues that the Salmon incentive mechanism is an essential pre-requisite for competitive
governments and is quite important in understanding the diffusion of policies and programs
among jurisdictions in federations.

There is considerable overlap between the MPF and Bretons concept of competitive
governments discussed above, with different relative emphases on government-market
boundaries. Indeed, there are differences in the way in which competition between subnational

8
In general incentive models, incentives are not perfect from the principals point of view because the performance
of the agent (here the government) is subject to noise. Hence performance is not a perfect indicator of effort.
Relative performance can help to reduce this noise in evaluating effort: see Milgrom and Roberts (1990), chapter 7.
24
governments is analysed and the incentive structures exist between different levels of
government. As mentioned earlier, the Weinghasts MPF implicitly assumes the existence of
two levels of government. Furthermore, Weinghasts concept of MPF misses an important point
that when there are extreme inequalities in economic power among subnational governments, the
efficient solution that is presumed to result from fiscal federalism due to unfettered
intergovernmental competition may not realise. This is however, captured in the competitive
equality of jurisdictions requirement in competitive federalism.

4. Rationale for Inter-governmental Transfers:

The assignment system in the normative framework necessarily results in vertical

imbalances. Assignment, according to comparative advantage implies that all broad based taxes
are assigned to the Centre and most expenditure functions are assigned to subnational levels.
Thus, redistribution and stabilization functions are considered to be mainly the functions of
Central government and therefore, all broad based and redistributive taxes, money supply
function and borrowing powers are predominantly assigned to the Centre. At the same time, in
order to cater to diversified preferences in the provision of public services, the allocation
function which involves spending is predominantly assigned to subnational governments. In
this scheme, vertical imbalance is unavoidable and the intergovernmental transfer system has to
resolve the imbalance. At the same time, it is important to match the revenue and expenditure
decisions at the margin for subnational governments for reasons of efficiency and accountability.
The efficient system of tax assignment envisages that tax powers should be assigned to
subnational levels up to the point where the marginal efficiency loss due to tax disharmony is
matched with marginal efficiency gain from fiscal autonomy. Even with such an assignment
system, vertical imbalance is a feature seen in all federation.

The rationale for horizontal transfers in this case is purely for equity reasons - to offset
the fiscal disabilities arising from lower than prescribed revenue capacity and higher unit cost of
providing public services. Differences in the capacity to raise revenues and unit cost of
providing public services among subnational jurisdictions create different fiscal residuum or
net fiscal benefits (Buchanan, 1950). The problem is exacerbated when there are origin based

25
taxes and similar other factors alter the net fiscal benefits in different subnational jurisdictions
(Boadway and Flatters, 1982). If there is perfect mobility of people across jurisdictions, fiscal
differentials will be equalized automatically as people migrate from places where the net fiscal
benefits are lower to those where they are higher. Even when there is no perfect mobility, if the
property market is reasonably well developed fiscal differentials will be capitalized into property
values (Oates, 1969). In developing countries, there is neither perfect mobility nor a developed
property market and the only way left is to offset these fiscal disabilities arising from low
revenue capacity and high unit cost of providing public services through intergovernmental
transfers. Such transfers have to be necessarily unconditional to enable every State to provide
a standard level of public service at a normative tax rate.

Efficiency consequence of equalizing transfers has been a matter of considerable debate

in the literature. The debate on the issue of whether the horizontal equalization transfers are
efficiency enhancing or involve efficiency cost is an issue that has remained unresolved. While
Buchanan (1950) and in the later formulation based on horizontal equity argument by Boadway
and Flatters (1982) argue that equalising transfers are growth enhancing. Similarly, the
competitive federalism literature recommend transfers to create a level playing field by enabling
poorer jurisdictions to compete effectively with fiscally stronger ones (Breton, 1987).
Buchanans claim is that equitable transfers are also efficiency enhancing because, as capital-
labour ratio in these regions is lower, the productivity of capital is high and transfer of capital to
poorer regions would lead to higher productivity and incomes.

The view that equitable transfers to poorer regions are growth enhancing is not shared by
many. The contrarian view is that there is a clear trade off between equalization and growth.
Scott (1950) argues that income levels in poorer regions are low mainly because of lower
productivity and transfer of capital to these reasons will entail lower productivity and incomes
and there is clearly a tradeoff between equity and efficiency. Despite a large volume of
literature, whether or not there is equity growth trade off in the case of equalising transfers
remains theoretically unresolved and remains an empirical issue. The transfers can help to
realise the growth potential of the locality by creating the necessary infrastructure or it may
actually be used to impart skills to labour, enhance productivity and accelerate mobility of labour

26
from regions having surpluses. In any case, the practice of giving equalising transfers is in the
realm of history, tradition and political economy and countries such as Australia, Canada, India
and Germany have been giving such transfers whereas, the United States does not.

There is a case for transfers also to ensure that people are provided with minimum
standards basic services with significant inter-jurisdictional externalities. The efficiency reason
for intergovernmental transfers arises from spillovers. The assignment system, however well
done, does not match with the geographical boundaries of the jurisdictions and spillovers have to
be resolved thorough the transfer system. There are also services which must be available at
minimum specified standards to all and these include minimum standards of education,
healthcare, water supply and sanitation. Martin Feldstein calls them categorical equity goods
(1975) as these services have nation-wide externalities and yet, sub-national governments have a
comparative advantage in providing them. In respect of all these services which overlap
jurisdictions and involve significant externalities, it is necessary to ensure minimum levels for
reasons of efficiency.

Ensuring minimum levels of public services for externality reasons is best done with a
system of open ended matching grants. The extent of matching by the higher level government
is supposed to reflect the degree of externality and open-endedness is necessary to provide
incentives of expansion of the service at the margin. In practice, however, the matching ratios
do not have any relationship with the extent of externality and in most cases, multiplicity of
shared cost programmes and the resource constraint at the Central level results in making such
programmes closed ended, but such programmes do not provide the incentive for expansion at
the margin. In many cases, both the matching ratios and the volume of transfers is determined
not on the basis of the externalities but simply for political reasons.

Using a collective choice framework, Bradford and Oates (1971) showed that lump-sum
grants to a group of persons would have identical allocative and distributional effects to a set of
transfers directly given to individuals in the group. In other words, the lump sum grants to a
group of persons would be simply a veil for a central tax cut to individuals in the group.
However, empirical analysis has not provided any support to this veil hypothesis. In contrast,

27
empirical analyses show that lump sum grants result in the expansion of public spending rather
than private incomes and this has come to be known as flypaper effect. There is a large body
of literature in the US that tries to explain this empirical fact (Gramlich, 1977). Indeed, in a
situation where subnational governments raise very little revenues through taxes like in the case
of local governments in India, the possibility of substituting own taxes to transfers simply do not
exist and the hypothesis itself does not make much sense.

In the actual design of the transfer system, there are serious operational questions, which
can not be resolved easily. The first has to deal with the proper combination of conditional and
unconditional transfers. The second issue has to deal with the extent of horizontal and vertical
distribution. There is no unambiguous way to measure the degree of vertical imbalance and the
extent of violation of horizontal equity. As regards specific purpose transfers are concerned, it is
impossible to measure the degree of externalities to work out optimal cost sharing arrangements
or matching ratios. Ironically, the very argument for decentralisation is based on asymmetric
information or the inability of the Central government to estimate the correct degree of
spillovers, but designing specific purpose transfers requires that the matching ratios will have to
be determined according to the degree of externalities! Finally, even if some approximations on
fiscal disabilities and matching ratios made, there are many non-economic including political
objectives and the actual transfer system, differs from the ideal. Nevertheless, the attempt should
be to approach the ideal both in designing it and in its evaluations.

Are intergovernmental transfers a good idea? Despite the rationale for transfers detailed
above, the review of theoretical literature shows that transfers tend to soften the budget
constraint of subnational governments. It shows that intergovernmental grants promote fiscal
irresponsibility and macroeconomic instability (Prudhomme, 1995). It is also argued that
equalization may actually impede the development of backward regions by preventing the inter-
regional mobility of resources, particularly labour (both emigration and immigration) in response
to cost differentials (McKinnon, 1997). They create transfer dependency (Rodden et.al., 2003),
which undermines fiscal discipline. Even in the case of matching transfers, in which matching
ratios should be worked out according to the extent of spillover, Inmans (1988) study in the U.S
found that in actual practice, the matching ratios never correspond to the extent of spillovers and

28
the federal share is invariably much higher than the spillovers involved. Even more serious are
the objections raised on equalising transfers given in many federations (the notable exception
being the USA). It is argued that the transfers given to offset fiscal disadvantages can interfere
with the normal process of income convergence seen in the process of economic growth which
occurs due to migration of labour and capital from places with lower productivity to those with
higher productivity.

The above analysis casts serious doubts on the efficacy ion intergovernmental objectives
in serving the long term interests of a federation. Nevertheless, transfers are a part of every
federation because, perfect matching of revenue powers with expenditure responsibilities is not
possible. Nevertheless, the literature provides guidance on a number of issues relating to
transfers. First, the role of transfers should not be lo large as to create transfer dependency.
There has to be a matching of revenue and expenditure decisions at the margin so that decisions
on additional spending are matched by financing it through taxation (Bird and Vaillancourt,
1998). Second, the system of grants must be transparent and predictable and should not have
incentives to free-ride. Surely, designing and implementing the transfer system is the most
important issue in fiscal federalism.

5. Lessons from Theory

The preceding analysis helps us to identify the factors determining the success of a
federation in terms of achieving economic prosperity and reducing poverty while retaining
individual identities and receiving the public services closely matching the diversified
preferences. In other words, there are important preconditions to be met if a federation has to
benefit from its magnitude (largeness) and littleness as Alexis de Toquelle asserted over a
hundred years ago. Besides, these theoretical approaches provide a number of lessons.

It must be noted that the theories of fiscal federalism reviewed above do not distinguish
between different multilevel fiscal systems. The theories have been developed irrespective of the
number of level and the size of jurisdictions. Indeed, each public service would have its area of
benefit span and it is not possible to have as many tiers as the number of public services

29
provided. Therefore, aggregation of public services within the limited number of jurisdictions is
unavoidable and with this spillovers and efficiency concerns become a part of the fiscal
federalism problem. The type of problems faced in the provision of public services by different
tiers could be different, but the theoretical approaches do not distinguish between them. Thus, it
would be inappropriate to consider the challenges faced by the state governments to be similar to
those faced by the local governments, the types of public services provided, the method and the
nature and quality of institutions and their capacities are vastly different.

One of the most important preconditions for a successful fiscal federalism is clarity in the
assignment system. Not only that the assignment system should be clear as far as possible, but
when there is overlapping, there should be systems and institutions to deal with it. Clarity in
assignments does not only imply mere assignment of revenue and expenditure powers; it is also
necessary to ensure that the functions of different functionaries within a level are unambiguous.
In a democratic polity, it is necessary to make the elected representatives responsible for decision
making and bureaucrats to implement the decisions taken by the executive.

According to the theory, the functions should be assigned according to comparative

advantage and the financial powers should follow the functions specified. It is important to
ensure that the subnational governments are not constrained by transfer dependency. Ensuring a
strong Wicksellian link, - the linkage between revenue and expenditure decisions at the margin
requires that the subnational governments are given adequate revenue powers. Accountability
requires that subnational services should be paid for by the residents of the jurisdiction. The
analysis of appropriate revenue handles at subnational levels shows that user charges should
cover the cost of most private goods provided by them; the cost of public services benefiting the
jurisdiction should be collected by way of taxes on the residents; and those with spillovers
should be partly paid for by taxes on the residents (equivalent to the benefits received by them)
and partly through intergovernmental transfers. Analysis also shows that the subnational
governments can levy taxes on immobile bases and can levy taxes on mobile bases based on the

30
benefit principle. However, taxing mobile bases could prove to be ineffective in raising revenues
besides transferring the burden to non-residents9.

The transfer system should address the problem of imbalance between revenue and
expenditure powers. To enable every governmental unit to provide comparable levels of public
services at comparable tax rates, it is necessary that the equalising transfer system is designed to
offset fiscal disadvantages. At the same time, it is important to ensure that the subnational
governments are not provided with the incentive to raid the fiscal commons. Ensuring proper
incentive structure in the transfer system is critical to preventing the soft budget constraint. It is
necessary that the states are not enables to pass on the burden of their public services to non-
residents through the transfer system. In addition to equalization transfers, specific purpose
matching (open ended) transfer should be designed to compensate the public services provided
by the subnational governments the benefit of which spill over the jurisdictions and the matching
ratios should be equivalent to the extent of spillovers. However, measurement of spillovers is
not easy and therefore, these transfers are hardly designed to offset the spillovers. Besides, in
most cases, the transfers are never properly designed.

A major advantage of a multilevel fiscal system is the large common market, but the
benefit can accrue only when not only all impediments to trade in factors of production as well
as commodities are removed, but also mobility of commodities, capital and goods is facilitated.
Ensuring a common market is at the heart of creating dynamism in fiscal federalism. The
impediments can come in terms of policies restricting the movement of labour, capital and
commodities or various institutional factors such as linguistic barriers and lack of secure
environment. The literature on MPF shows that it is important to avoid soft budget constraint at
subnational levels to ensure efficient and market friendly policies. This requires an efficient
assignment system, policies to promote responsible fiscal behaviour and measures to strengthen
and deepen the markets, particularly the land and capital markets. Removal of impediments to
mobility and trade in factors and products include abolition of laws restricting the markets and
removal of institutional rigidities.

9
For a detailed analysis of appropriate tax handles see, Bird and Slack, 2007 and the analysis in the context of
Australian federation, Bird and Smart, (2009)
31
 There can be gains from intergovernmental competition. Competition can lead to
efficiency gains in public service provision; it can also motivate innovations and productivity
increases in public service delivery. However, to reap the gains, it is important to ensure that
there is a measure of competitive equality and predatory competition does not take place.
Unequal competition could be destabilizing and can, in the extreme, break up the federation.
This is particularly important in the context of globalization as the States with more developed
markets and infrastructure can reap higher benefits from access to domestic and international
markets and grow faster than those with less developed markets and infrastructure. To ensure a
measure of competitive equality of jurisdictions, it is necessary to ensure that the combined
impact of regional policies and intergovernmental transfers should ensure a defined standard of
physical and social infrastructure in each jurisdiction and the transfer system and the transfer
system is not subjective and discretionary.

The analysis brings out the need for strong systems and institutions to promote and
regulate efficient competition. One method to deal with the problems of predatory competition
is centralization, but that would tantamount to throwing the baby with the bath water. The
argument for decentralisation in the first instance is to create a system to take advantage of lower
information and transaction costs in public service delivery and, therefore, this can not be a
viable solution. The solution has to be found within the decentralised framework to create
institutions to bargain and resolve inter-State and Centre-State conflicts.

Some of the important features of strong institutions for creating hard budget constraints
emerge in a well developed market economy. Efficient credit markets and a mature banking
system and well developed debt market with developed credit rating institutions is an important
precondition for the Centre to keep itself away from bail outs. Similarly, well developed land
and property markets and efficient mobility of factors and products can prevent public decisions
that impede the development of markets. These will promote intergovernmental competition
and minimize incentives for bail outs. It is important to discourage protectionist policies at
subnational levels. Equally important is the need to have strong fiscal institutions. Effective
local system of taxation, to match revenue expenditure decisions at the margin, and the
efficient system of intergovernmental transfers which do not involve perverse incentives are

32
extremely important to ensure a hard budget constraint. Legislatively imposed constraints on
deficits and requirement to balance the current budgets, will place a limit on fiscal expansion and
ensure more productive public spending. Limitations placed on borrowings both internally can
also help to contain perverse incentives for fiscal expansion. It is also necessary to have a well
designed bankruptcy laws that specify the fiscal crisis and the way that needs to be handled is
another important institutional requirement. Indeed, the type of systems and institutional
developments to encourage efficient and regulate inefficient competition and to ensure hard
budget constraints will have to be found according to the requirements of each country.

Often arguments are made for centralization on the grounds that technological
improvements have reduced the information cost and asymmetry and it possible for the Centre to
design and implement the programmes according to diverse preferences. Indeed, it is important
to use the technology if it helps efficient provision of public services without sacrificing the
capacity to cater to preference diversity. Sometimes, the arguments for decentralisation is
actually for privatization and in such a case, simply decentralizing the supply may not yield the
desired results (Tanzi, 2002). It is therefore, important to examine the case for decentralisation
in each case and judge it based clearly on efficiency grounds.

From the above discussion, it is clear that much of the theoretical literature on fiscal
decentralization has been modeled on western democracies having mature market economies.
There are a variety of reasons to modify the mainstream fiscal federalism analysis before it is
applied to the multilevel fiscal systems in developing and transitional countries (Rao, 2007).
This is because developing countries have a predominant primary sector, coexistence of a large
traditional sector with low market penetration and a small modern sector which links itself with
the market. It has segmented labor markets, low level of savings and investment, large part of
the savings in physical rather than financial assets. There is imperfect mobility of labour,
competition with significant trade distortions and scarcity of foreign exchange. The adoption of
planned development strategy in them has further distorted the markets (Newbery, 1987).
Secondly, most of these economies have adopted centralised planning in a decentralised system.
In India, in addition to all these, the development strategy has adopted the mixed economy
framework. Even as most countries have chosen to make a transition from centralized planning

33
to market based resource allocation, the vestiges of planning continue to influence resource
allocation outcomes. Developmental planning adopted by developing countries in the past and
the vestiges of centralized planning in the economies making a transition from plan to market do
influence the fiscal federalism outcomes and therefore, need to be analyzed in greater detail. In
most such economies, several impediments to the movement of factors and products continue.
Similarly, as a part of planning system, controls and prices and outputs continue in many
countries in transition and this alters the allocation of resources and determines incomes in
different regions in unintended ways. As Stated by Oates (1999, p. 1145), While the existing
literature on fiscal federalism can provide some general guidance, my sense is that most of us
working in the field feel more than a little uneasy when proffering advice on many of the
decisions that must be made on vertical fiscal and political structure. We have much to learn.

34
 CHAPTER III

Functional Devolution to Rural Local Bodies: Progress in Activity Mapping

1. Background
Improvement of service delivery at the local level has become one of the most important
goals in recent time. In pursuance of inclusiveness in the growth process, the 11th Plan
recognizes the criticality of involving Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRIs) in planning,
implementing and supervising the delivery of services at the local level that would require
functional, fund and staff devolution to them. The government of India has committed to
accelerate the ongoing decentralization as one of the important means for successful
implementation of its flagship programmes like -Bharat Nirman, National Rural Employment
Guarantee Act (NREGA) and National Rural Health Mission (NRHM) and hence has articulated
important roles for PRIs in implementation of these schemes. Yet all would agree that simply
providing greater responsibility onto PRIs without systematic reform and capacity building is
unlikely to lead to dramatic improvements in service delivery.

Under Article 243G of the Constitution states that, states may by law endow Panchayats
with such functions that are required to enable them to function as institutions of self-
government. These powers and responsibilities are to include:
(a) The preparation of plans for economic development and social justice; and
(b) The implementation of schemes entrusted to Panchayats in relation to subjects, which
may include those listed in the 11th Schedule of the Constitution.

In order to make devolution functional, the matters listed in the 11th Schedule of the
Constitution need to be broken down into discreet activities because it may not be appropriate to
transfer all the activities within a broad function or a subject to the PRIs. Because a function
listed in the 11th Schedule of the Constitution may be devolved through the law but activities and
sub-activities within each function can only be devolved through Activity Mapping. Self
evidently, Activity Mapping does not mean that subjects or sectors are devolved wholesale rather

35
they need to be unbundled into activities or into smaller units of work and thereafter assigning
these units to different levels of government. For example, a sector viz. elementary education
may consist of several services. A particular service of this sector viz. setting up and running
primary schools is composed of several activities like procuring funds for meeting the cost of
free primary education, preparing curriculum, appointing teachers, construction and maintenance
of school buildings, management of individual schools etc. Thus without Activity Mapping of a
broad function or a subject it is not possible to devise a workable devolution scheme for the local
bodies.

In considering the distribution of responsibilities among governments at different levels

for the discharge of individual activities of a service, one has to follow the well known principle
of subsidiarity which means that any task that can be done at the lower level should not move to
a higher level which is also meant to ensure allocative efficiency. Besides, Activity Mapping
must be undertaken in accordance with an objective standard of planning, asset creation, setting
standards, operation and Monitoring & Evaluation. In doing so we need to apply following
public finance principles namely economies of scale, externalities, equity, heterogeneity of
demand and accountability principles. That apart, two other relevant matters namely community
participation and unit of an activity and the information needs should also be taken into account
that has been elaborated in detail as follows:

Economies of scale: If the unit cost of delivery of certain activities tends to be lower when the
responsibility for delivery is given to a government having larger jurisdiction, then it is judicious
to earmark those activities to the government at that level. For example, an activity like
supplying and buying school books, uniforms and other equipments for target group of student
should be entrusted with Zila Parishad for the unit cost of delivery of such activity will be lower
when those will be purchased in a large volume.

Externality: When certain activities produce externalities that spread beyond the geographic
jurisdiction of a government, then those activities should preferably remain in charge of that
government whose geographic jurisdiction is large enough to cope with the effects of such

36
externalities. For instance a higher level of government like state or district government should
have the responsibility of assessing storage requirements, selection of locations and
establishment of godowns/ ware houses for storing foods and food grains for Public Distribution
System.

Equity: Where the delivery of certain services concerns the issue of equity, framing of policies
on the same should remain at the hands of the higher level government. For example, the central
government has to take initiative in deciding on issues involving universalization of primary
education or eradication of poverty.

Heterogeneity of demand: Where correspondence between local conditions/preferences and the

activities undertaken by the government is a necessary condition for improved service delivery,
such activities should ideally be the responsibility of the local government. For example, the
activity like providing mid-day meal to primary school kids should be entrusted with local
government because it is better informed regarding varying food habits of different region across
the country.

Unit of an activity and the information needs: Where an activity consists of a large number of
functions (for example, monitoring attendance of teachers of all the primary schools of a large
area), but the size of an individual unit of the function is small (for example, monitoring
attendance of teachers of one primary school), local governments of the size of Gram Panchayats
(GPs) are in a better position in performing such activities. For, being called upon to monitor a
few schools located within their jurisdiction, it is easier for the GPs to access the information
needed for executing the task of monitoring the attendance of teachers.

Community participation: Where the success of an activity depends much upon community
participation (say universal immunization), it is the government at the lowest level that should
play a major role in discharging that activity.

37
Accountability: Most important aspect in accountability relationship is the question of enforcing
accountability, which means rewarding good performance and punishing bad performance. It is
reasonable to argue that where the unit of operations of an activity is small (for example
vaccinating a child, the activity being vaccination of children), the local government is in a better
position to enforce accountability of the actual service providers (for example, the vaccinator).
For, the capacity of the local government to obtain information on the performance of such
operations is much more than that of the government at the higher level. However, there is a
rider. The local government can be made answerable for the discharge of a task only if it is given
responsibility for such task and is endowed with administrative authority over the service
providers and such financial resources as are necessary for performing the task. Thus the
accountability issue is linked up with the issue of devolution of functions, finance and
functionaries.

2. Procedures to be followed while pursuing Activity Mapping

Since different governments will have some responsibility in respect of a sector or

services within the sector, the exercise of fixing out autonomous functional jurisdiction for each
level of governance would necessitate breaking down of sectors into services and then
unbundling of services into activities. Thus the first step in the exercise of Activity Mapping is
identification of individual sectors. The next step is to disaggregate an individual sector into a
number of services. Each service is composed of several activities. Hence the third step would be
to unbundle each service into activities. The fourth and the last step in the exercise of distribution
of functions is to allot the activities to the different levels of governance. Which activity will go
to which level is to be determined on the basis of the criteria developed earlier. It may be
stressed that the responsibility must accompany authority. Hence when a government is made
responsible (or accountable) for certain activities, it must have commensurate authority over the
administrative and financial resources (See Box2.1).

38
 Box 2.1: Procedures to be followed while pursuing Activity Mapping

Step 1: Identification of individual sector

Primary Health Care
Step 2: Disaggregate an individual sector into a number of service(s)
Immunization
Step 3: Unbundle each service into activities
Procuring vaccine,
Establishing cold chain,
Appointing and training vaccinators,
Setting up immunization centers,
Monitoring vaccination activities,
Educating parents on immunization of children
Step 4: Distribution of the activities to the different levels of governance
Establishing cold chain and setting up immunization centers can be entrusted with
Zila Parishad
Procuring vaccine can be entrusted with Panchayat Samiti
Monitoring vaccination activities, educating parents on immunization of children can
be entrusted with Gram Panchayat

3. Progress made by the states in carrying out Activity Mapping

Most of the states said to have assigned a majority of the important subjects to the
Panchayats. Some of the states have gone even to the extent of devolving all the 29 subjects
through the State Conformity Act (CA) itself. The Task Force on Devolution on Powers and
Functions upon Panchayati Raj Institutions (MoRD, 2001) felt that by and large most states have
incorporated all 29 subjects in the their CA. but a glance at the devolution reveals that these
aforesaid 29 subjects are a combination of sectors, sub-sectors, broad activities in a sub-sector
and sub-activities /specific responsibilities in a broad activity which are haphazardly distributed
among different levels of PRIs. Thus even if necessary statutes are enacted by the states for

39
devolution of functions to PRIs but in most cases they have failed to alter the functional domain
of local government and hence do not significantly add to the existing functional domain of the
PRIs.

It is quite disheartening to note that in several states the Conformity Acts just reiterated
the functions listed in the 11th Schedule of the Constitution without having much thought of
which of them have relevance to the concerned state. The states before enacting Conformity Acts
should have reviewed the adequacy and relevance of the existing provisions with a view to
exploring the desirability of enlarging the functional domain of local government. Moreover, in
practice such transfers have remained by and large incomplete for the total functional devolution
was done vaguely without having any role clarity. There has been hardly any rational thinking as
to which of the disaggregated activities based on the considerations like economies of scale,
externality, equity, heterogeneity of demand and accountability along with other important
aspects like efficiency, capacity, enforcibility and proximity ought to be devolved to which level
of government. This has led to overlapping jurisdiction of different tiers of government.

There has been also non-standardization in the reporting of the devolution of functions to
Ministry of Rural Development (MoRD) and Ministry of Panchayati Raj (MoPR). Thus some
states tend to report a high range of devolution, by counting individual activities assigned under
law separately as subjects devolved. Others tend to devolve departments. It is important, both
from a point of view of conceptual clarity as also to permit comparisons between States, to
maintain the distinction between activities, subjects and departments when analyzing
functional devolution. Problems as regards to current status of functional devolution to PRIs
undertaken by states can be summarized as follows:

Incomplete devolution of function: On paper many state governments have chosen to devolve
subjects to PRIs wholesale-without unbundling them into specific activities and sub-activities.
Thus the functions assigned to them are more of subjects rather than in terms of activities or sub-
activities.

40
AD-HOC devolution: There has been little consideration on the basis of principles of public
finances and accountability of which services to devolve to which tiers. As a result, the higher
tiers of governments tend to have responsibility for most services.

Overlapping roles: The most difficult step in Activity Mapping is to identify the roles and
responsibilities of the each tier of local government in sufficient detail. Functionaries and funds
can then be allocated on the basis of this mapping. State governments are supposed to transfer 29
subjects listed in the 11th Schedule of the Constitution. The lack of clarity in functional allocation
and absence of dis-aggregation into detailed activities has led to considerable overlapping and
duality of control in most cases. This situation seriously undermines accountability.

Lack of role clarity: In most of the states, the PRIs are not very clear about the role that they are
expected to play in rural development. This is mostly due to the absence of role clarity with
regard to the statutory functions assigned to them.

Follow-up measures are not taken: It would be difficult to assess the degree of devolution of
the basis of legal provisions of functional devolution to PRIs itself. Because follow up action in
terms of appropriate administrative measures and formulating relevant rules or guidelines to
operationalize the intent legislature is very tardy. It is a common experience that legislative
devolution by states often remains on paper and are not followed up with executive orders. Such
orders not only mandate the devolution of functions but also devolves requisite finances and
place functionaries with the Panchayats for effective performance of the devolved functions.

Significant dominance of line departments: In several states many functions are still being
planned and implemented by the line departments of the state government and line departments
of some states still exercise the powers of supervision and control over the schemes of subjects
transferred to the Panchayats. In some cases mere administrative approval of the relevant
standing committee of the District or Intermediate Panchayats is obtained by the line
departments before implementing the schemes. Moreover, in many cases, while states assign
responsibilities to local governments, they leave the performance of key activities and sub-

41
activities necessary to deliver such devolved services with state line agencies. Besides, because
of no changes being made in long established codes prescribing technical standards and approval
processes (such as the PWD code), circulars, OMs, transfer orders etc, implementation might
still de-facto continue to vest with line departments concerned.

Staff and funds were not transferred: Most states after devolving several responsibilities upon
the PRIs have not transferred the requisite staff needed by the Panchayats to carry out
responsibilities. The 11th Plan Document also recognizes that devolution of functions to PRIs
through legislation or executive orders has not been matched by a concomitant transfers of funds.
Furthermore, many government officials at the district and sub-district levels do not want to
work under the administrative control of the elected PRIs.

4. Pursuance of MoRD and MoPR in Undertaking Activity Mapping

Following the 73rd and 74th Amendment Act to the Constitution, Ministry of Rural
Development (MoRD) and later Ministry of Panchayati Raj (MoPR) have been relentlessly
pursuing the issue of effective functional devolution to PRIs. Consequently an initial attempt in
the regard was to circulate a booklet among the states entitled Devolution of Powers and
Functions to PRIs. in 1995 describing suggested framework for functional devolution. The Task
Force on Devolution on Powers and Functions upon Panchayati Raj Institutions (MoRD, 2001)
noticed that the states by and large had not adopted the guidelines of the booklet provided by
MoRD. Later a conference of the State Ministers of Panchayati Raj was held on 11th July 2001,
New Delhi to discuss the measures to be taken to devolve functions and powers in accordance
with the provisions of the Constitution. The conference resolved that a Task Force comprising
senior officers of the Ministry of Rural Development and of the State Governments should be set
up to suggest measures for administrative decentralization of funds, functions and functionaries
with regard to the maters listed in the 11th Schedule. Accordingly a Task Force on Devolution on
Powers and Functions upon Panchayati Raj Institutions was constituted on 16th July, 2001. The
Task Force was asked to analyze all the 29 subjects and to identify specific activities under the
subjects and specify the inter-se division of activities among the three tiers of PRIs.

42
 While recommending broader guidelines and norms, the Task Force (2001) noted the
varying sizes of Panchayats in the states which ranges from a population of as low as 300 to as
high as 25000 for Gram Panchayats. Similarly intermediate Panchayats have different size of and
areas of jurisdictions. The Task Force (2001) is, therefore, of the view that sizes of Panchayat
have to be kept in view while exercising the devolution of funds, functions and functionaries.

The Task Force also emphasized that there should be no rigid guidelines in this respect
due to the existence of over lapping functional domain of different level of governments. The 29
subjects mentioned in the 11th Schedule of the Constitution covers some overlapping areas and in
the operation of Activity Mapping also there are activities which fall under the jurisdiction and
responsibilities of more than one agency. A rigid classification would therefore not be feasible.
Consequently, the Task Force (2001) would like to emphasize that states would have freedom
and flexibility to make suitable modifications within the broad framework of the
recommendations made by them. However, the Task Force opined that while there will be some
freedom and flexibility of states in carrying out the exercise of Activity Mapping, it needs to be
ensured that this exercise should have clear time schedule and time limit. Therefore, devolution
of functionaries and funds along with disaggregated activities among different level of
governments should be completed by a specified time limit. The Task Force submitted their
report in August 2001 and a deadline of 31st March 2002 for states to complete the Activity
Mapping was set.

Successive committees and commissions took an attempt to review the actual progress of
Activity Mapping being undertaken nationwide. Most of them, however, did not provide us
optimistic views. The Standing Committee on Urban and Rural Development, 2004 noted that
although more than nine years had passed since the 73rd Amendment Act was enacted, very few
states seem to be serious about the implementation of the said provision of Part IX. The
commission was also unhappy to note that very few states have linked the very important
devolution of function to the means of actualizing such devolution through the devolution of
functionaries and funds for all 29 subjects enlisted in the 11th Schedule (Quoted in SARC, Sixth
Report, 2007:46-47).

Later a Standing Committee on Rural Development May (2006) have reviewed the whole
process of current status of Activity Mapping. The Committee stressed that MoPR took several
43
initiatives in accelerating the process of Activity Mapping. But despite of holding as many as 7
Round Table Conference and 150 action points along with following actions namely providing
technical assistance, visits of the Ministers to states, reviewing interactions with state
governments, introduction of the award scheme and the Panchayat empowerment incentive
scheme by the Ministry the way the whole Activity Mapping was making progress was very
unsatisfactory. Next deadline for states to complete the Activity Mapping exercise was set for
31st March 2005 and later it was extended to 30th June 2005.

The Committee also noted that there was hardly any considerable improvement in the
status of devolution of subjects. Whereas a definite improvement was noted in the number of
subjects devolved in the states of Gujarat and Maharastra but there was also a reversal of
devolution by some states such as Haryana where number of functions assigned to PRIs had
decreased from 25 to 23. However, as reported to the Committee, MoPR attributed the slow
progress of Activity Mapping to the fact that it is being state matter for that reason they can not
be forced in undertaking Activity Mapping. Following this argument, the Committee opined that
union government can not bypass the responsibility of successful implementation of Activity
Mapping on the pretext that it is being a state matter since implementation of Part IX of the
Constitution is the responsibility of the Union Government where the aim of the Part IX of the
Constitution is to endow the Panchayats with such powers and responsibilities as may be
necessary to enable them to function successfully as institutions of self government.

In order to institute a standardized model for the collection of data on Activity Mapping,
MoPR prepared an elaborate fact sheet and conveyed this to states just before and during the first
meeting of the Council of State Ministers of Panchayati Raj at Kochi held on 5 th-6th August,
2005. This fact sheet was designed to be filed up separately for each subject matter in the 11th
Schedule and contained three parts, namely, description of the devolution of functions, financial
devolution and devolution of functionaries. This fact sheet was designed to ensure that all states
report in a standardized format the progress and Activity Mapping. Individual fact sheets were to
be prepared in respect of each matter listed in the 11th Schedule. Therefore, each state was to fill
up 29 fact sheets.

Despite these attempts undertaken by MoPR, Second Administrative Reform

Commission (SARC) (Sixth Report, 2007) expressed its concern over the fact that the
44
 implementation space of local government has become limited due to half-hearted way of
implementing the whole Activity Mapping exercise. The view of the SARC is summarized as
follows:

Functional devolution has been done by reproducing all 29 subjects in which maters are
just repeated in the states Conformity Act
Progress in delineation of functions across the states are very slow
Due to persistent effort of MoPR, there has been Activity Mapping in some states.
However, the exercise continues to be partial and prolonged. The draft Activity Mapping
list have not been approved by the state governments in some cases
Even where Activity Mapping has been approved, parallel action has not been taken.

The SARC noticed that almost all states have chosen to assign function to the PRIs not
through statute but by delegated legislation in the form of rules or executive orders. It is in this
context, SARC recommended Amendment to the Article 243G and 243W to make it mandatory
for state government to vest power and authority to local government. And clear delineation of
function for each tier of local government and passing of framework law to formalize the
relationship between the state and local government was also emphasized by them.

Table 2.1 Latest Position of State wise-Status of Activity Mapping

State Transfer of Subjects Latest Position
Subjects Covered
through under Activity
Legislation Mapping
Andhra Pardesh 17 9 A Task Force constituted under the Special Chief Secretary for
Activity Mapping has prepared detailed formulations. Draft
Government Orders incorporating Activity Mapping in accordance
with the recommendations of the Committee are under
consideration of a Group of Ministers for finalization. After the
completion of these discussions, the departments have been
directed to finalize the Government Orders for issue.

45
State Transfer of Subjects Latest Position
Subjects Covered
through under Activity
Legislation Mapping
Assam 29 29 Assam claims that it has done Activity Mapping more than three
years back. However, individual departments have not
opertionalized this order through executive orders transferring
funds and functionaries. However, after the recent visit of the
Minister Panchayati Raj to Assam, the state has renewed its efforts
at Activity Mapping. It has now set out a road map for undertaking
Activity Mapping in the current year and matching it with fiscal
devolution by the time of the supplementary estimates to the
States budget for 2007-08.
Arunachal -- 3 The state government has engaged one of its officers to carry out
Pradesh Activity Mapping with assistance from NGO, PRIA. This officer
has submitted his report on Activity Mapping to the state
government in May 2006. It has now promised that work on
Activity Mapping will be expedited. Currently only section of
beneficiaries in respect of Rural Development, Agriculture and
Horticulture programmes has been devolved to the Panchayats.
Bihar 25 25 Bihar had earlier taken Activity Mapping in 2001. However, these
orders were not operationalized. Therefore the state again
undertaken a detailed exercise in Activity Mapping with the
assistance from NGO, PRIA. Currently a Committee chaired by
the Commissioner and Principal Secretary, Rural Development and
Panchayati Raj is undertaking a detailed exercise on Activity
Mapping. The exercise will also include devolution of finances and
functionaries. In respect of finances, separate Committee headed
by the Finance Commissioner has been constituted to address the
modalities on creation of a Panchayat Sector Window in the
budget.
Chattisgarh 27 27 Although Activity Mapping has been completed for 27 subjects,
the requisite executive orders have not been issued so far
Goa 6 18 18 functions have been devolved to village Panchayat and 6 to ZP.
Goa needs to follow up with fiscal devolution
Gujarat 15 14 Activity Mapping has been done for 14 subjects. 5 subjects have
been partially devolved. Activities are yet to be devolved with
respect to 10 functions. A matrix for Activity Mapping has been
prepared by the State.
Haryana 29 10 Activity Mapping in respect of 10 subjects was released on 17.2.06
in the joint presence of the Chief Minister, Haryana and the Union
Minister for Panchayati Raj
Himachal 26 -- 15 departments had issued orders delegating powers to Panchayat.
Pradesh But no Activity Mapping has been attempted in the formal model
matrix as suggested by MoPR.
Karnataka 29 29 Activity Mapping has been completed in respect of all 29 items in
August 2003, followed by devolution of funds through the State
Budget in October 2004
Kerala 26 26 Activity Mapping was completed in the form of a responsibility
mapping by preparing a new Activity Mapping matrix that also
covers Municipalities. Untied funds are also being devolved to
Panchayats for the devolved functions

46
State Transfer of Subjects Latest Position
Subjects Covered
through under Activity
Legislation Mapping
Madhya Pradesh 23 23 Activity Mapping for undertaken in two stages-first 7 subjects
were covered with assistance from NGO, Samarthan. This NGO
has now completed Activity Maps for remaining 16 more matters
that have been devolved. These are under discussion with the line
departments concerned
Maharastra 18 -- There has not been much progress on Activity Mapping in the
state. The state recently decided to review the progress in this
regard.
Manipur 22 22 Earlier Activity Mapping of 22 subjects were said to have been
completed. However, since these were not operationalised, the
state has reviewed matters once again and issued a notification for
Activity Mapping for 16 subjects in January 2006. This is now
being operationalised.
Orrisa 25 7 Activity Mapping in progress in respect of 9 subjects has been
issued in the joint presence of the Union Minister for Panchauyati
Raj and the Chief Minister. The state is now undertaking fiscal
devolution to the Panchayats and aims to complete the same by the
next financial year
Punjab 7 -- Draft Activity Mapping has been prepared for all departments in a
detailed fashion . Significant work is being undertaken in certain
sectors such as Health and Education. The matrix has been
discussed with the Ministry of Panchayati Raj and is ready for
notification
Rajasthan 29 12 The Activity Mapping exercise was stated for 18 departments and
has now been completed for 12. A Cabinet sub-committee was
constituted in August 2004 to recommend measures to strengthen
PRIs. Its eports recommends full devolution by 2007, when the
Eleventh Plan starts.
Sikkim 28 -- Activity Mapping has started and is expected to be announced in
October 2006
Tamil Nadu 29 -- Tamil Nadu claims to have issued instructions for devolving all
subjects relating to Panchayati Raj but these remain on paper.
Subjects relating to rural roads, water supply, sanitation and rural
housing schemes are now being taken up for discussion in respect
of Activity Mapping
Tripura 29 21 In 1994 orders were issued for devolving 21 subjects. With respect
to 8 subjects, orders are awaited because of operational problems
related to the 6th Schedule. The Activity Mapping exercise is
underway
Uttar Pradesh 12 -- Activity Mapping was completed in respect of 32 departments as
part of the recommendations of a committee (Bholanath Tiwari
report) However, this report has not been implemented
Uttaranchal 14 9 Activity Mapping is respect of 9 departments has been completed
and is under consideration of the government
West Bengal 29 15 Activity Mapping ha been completed and orders issued in respect
of 15 subjects on 7.11.05
Source: Report of the Working Group on Democratic Decentralization and PRIs, MoPR, November 2006, pp. 34-36

47
 It is evident from the above table that as many as four states namely Assam, Karnataka,
Kerala and West Bengal seem to have completed Activity Mapping satisfactorily as provided in
the Report of the Working Group on Democratic Decentralization and PRIs (2006). However,
the study carried out by Ghosh and Sirkar (undated) concluded that the Activity Mapping
exercises undertaken so far by some state governments, including West Bengal Government,
have been largely unsatisfactory. Most of them have approached the issue from the angle of
transferring various on-going schemes sponsored by the governments at the centre or the states.
This is an erroneous approach, because the objective of Activity Mapping is not to transfer
schemes, but to transfer certain functional responsibilities from one level of government to
another. In fact, after a specific activity is transferred, a Panchayat should have the right to
determine whether an on-going scheme of the higher level government attached to the devolved
activity should be continued or not.

Another type of error was committed in preparing the activity map for West Bengals
Panchayats. There was no attempt to prioritize the 11th Schedule services to choose the most
deserving candidates for decentralization. The attempt to touch all the 11th Schedule items at one
go make the whole business about Activity Mapping somewhat ritualistic an exercise that does
not need to be translated into practice. If the intention was to improve the delivery system, then
the first task should have been to identify those services where the need for decentralization was
being felt most at present (ibid).

A detailed analysis of functional, funds and functionaries devolution in Gujarat has been
undertaken in this study by describing the respective provisions of The Gujarat Panchayati Raj
Act, 1993. An attempt has also been made to ascertain and list out the extent of functional
devolution in respect of each matter listed in the 11th Schedule of the Constitution through State
legislation to the three levels of Panchayats. Using the details of the legislative assignment of
activities as a base, the existing regime in respect of Activity Mapping could be analyzed and
presented in juxtaposition with the relevant provisions of the State legislation which would also
provide us the quality of the Activity Mapping undertaken, mainly with a view to ascertain
whether the exercise amounts to substantive devolution or is merely lip service to Panchayati Raj
(See Annexure 2.1).

48
 The present study also endeavored to provide a birds-eye-view as regards to the current
status of Activity Mapping of twelve states namely Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh Sikkim,
Assam, Haryana, Karnataka, Orissa, Tamil Nadu, Bihar, Himachal Pardesh, Rajasthan and West
Bengal. This section is mainly based on the information provided by MoPR (See Annexures 2.2
to 2.13).

49
 CHAPTER IV

Status of Own Revenues of the Panchayats

1. Introduction

Provision of services responding to local needs and preferences in a decentralized

government system depends to a large extent upon the willingness and the ability of local
governments to raise revenue from their own sources. The constitutional amendment in India
assigned the state governments with exclusive legislative authority to empower the PRIs to levy
taxes. The major objective of devolving revenue raising powers to the PRIs is to enable them to
function as effective institutions of self-government at local level by improving their autonomy
in planning and decision making.

While recent studies on Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRIs) in India have focused on
issues relating to the role of panchayats in poverty alleviation and employment generation
programmes, resource allocation favouring disadvantaged groups and improved participation of
women in decision making process, the own revenue effort of panchayats has received little
attention10. There is no standing national data base on panchayat finances in India, which limits
any meaningful analysis of revenue effort of panchayats. Reports of the Central Finance
Commissions serve as the only source of information. Central Finance Commissions collect data
on own revenue of panchayats from the state governments. The Eleventh Finance Commission
(FC-XI) Report provides data on own revenue of the PRIs for the period 1990-91 to 1997-98,
which was further extended by the Twelfth Finance Commission (FC-XII) Report up to 2002-03.
However, the data reported by the successive Central Finance Commissions are not comparable
and reliable. It is for this reason that the Thirteenth Finance Commission (FC-XIII) which
collected data on own revenues of panchayats have not utilized it.11

10
The recent studies which deal with own revenues of PRIs is Rao and Rao (2008), and Jena and Gupta (2008).
11
FC-XIII has collected data on own revenues of PRIs for the period 2002-03 to 2007-08. They have not used this
data in their analysis of local bodies and hence have not reported this data in their report but have placed it on their
website (http://www.fincomindia.nic.in).
50
 The present chapter analyses the status of revenues raised by the Panchayati Raj
Institutions (PRIs). It reviews the statutes (i.e, the Panchayati Raj Acts) of different states in
order to study the assignment of revenue raising rights - both tax and non-tax to the three tiers of
panchayats and examines the extent to which the PRIs have exploited their statutorily designated
revenue rights based on a survey conducted in the four states of Chhattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh,
Orissa and Rajasthan for the fiscal year 2005-06. The chapter looks into the sources of own
revenues of the PRIs comprising of own tax and own non-tax sources as provided by the Central
Finance Commissions and finds them to be inadequate (a fact also supported by the survey of
PRIs in the four states) thereby underlying the need for undertaking reforms to empower the
panchayats to augment revenues for them to play a meaningful role in the development of the
country. Finally, it suggests measures to augment the own revenues of the panchayats.

2. Background

In the three-tier PRI structure it is the lower-most tier or the gram panchayat which is
largely endowed with the revenue-raising tax and non-tax powers, while the intermediate and the
district tiers by and large have very limited or no revenue raising powers assigned to them.
Review of the statutes of twenty three Indian states12 reveal that in most of the states it is only
the gram panchayats which are assigned with tax rights. While in some states in addition to gram
panchayats, the block panchayats are empowered to levy a few taxes, in very few states (six
states) apart from the lower two tiers, the zila panchayats or the district panchayats are also
empowered to levy taxes but the number of taxes which they can levy is very limited.

Some of the taxes assigned to the PRIs are designated as obligatory taxes while in others
all taxes are optional. In three states namely, Madhya Pradesh, Chhattisgarh and Uttar Pradesh
the statute designate some of the taxes as obligatory or mandatory. The assignment of tax rights
to the three tiers of panchayats in the twenty-three states is shown in annexure 3.1 tables A3.1,
A3.3 and A3.4. Both in case of obligatory and optional taxes the tax rate and the base is decided
by the state governments while in case of optional taxes the statutes stipulate that these can only
be levied with the prior permission of the state governments. The relevant state statute or the

12
Panchayati Raj Acts of 5 states were not available. These states are Andhra Pradesh, Manipur, Mizoram,
Meghalaya, and Nagaland.
51
executive orders issued by the state government lay down the tax rates, tax base and exemptions
for the taxes assigned to PRIs. The statute also prescribes the maximum rate at which the
panchayats can levy the tax.

The house and building tax, which is the core element in the PRI fiscal domain, is
assigned to panchayats in most states, but not in Orissa despite recommendation by successive
State Finance Commissions. Even in states where this tax is assigned to panchayats it may either
be (i) a specific absolute levy not linked to floor area, or (ii) may have different slabs depending
upon the floor area. In many states the revenue from the house tax is virtually stagnant because,
the rates of house tax are not revised periodically in accordance with the market values.
Furthermore, the values imputed for floor area is not done according to any scientific principle.

In addition to the tax sources, the PRIs are also empowered to collect non-tax revenues in
the form of fees, fines, and user charges. The panchayats are vested with public properties like
irrigation sources, ferry ghats, waste lands and communal lands, orchards, tanks, markets and
fairs. Income from these vested properties form part of their non-tax revenues, although where
these are still owned and controlled by the line departments of the state governments the non-tax
revenues accrue to the state. The properties built by the panchayats such as sewerage, drains,
public roads, and buildings are also panchayat properties and some of these do generate non-tax
revenues. The assignment of non-tax rights to the three tiers of panchayats in the twenty three
states is shown in annexure 3.1 tables A3.2, A3.3 and A3.4.

3. Current state of revenues of PRIs

A major handicap in analyzing panchayat revenues is the paucity of information and data
on the panchayat finances. As mentioned earlier there is no standing national database on
panchayat finances in India and the reports of the Central Finance Commissions serve as the only
source of information. As stated by FC-XIII in its report The data provided varied in quality
across State Governments. While some State Governments furnished good quality data, most of
them provided data which was sparse, and frequently inconsistent with the data furnished to
earlier Finance Commissions. They also noted that significant problems remain with the quality
of data on local bodies made available to it by the State Governments. The report further states
that there are significant discontinuities in data relating to revenue and expenditure of local
52
bodies submitted by State Governments to FC-XI, FC-XII, and to this Commission. These
discrepancies detract from the credibility of the data. Hence, the Commission did not utilise the
data on local bodies as provided by the states in its report but has placed in its website.

Despite a grant of Rs. 200 crores given to the states by FC-XI for creation of database at
the local body level no state has taken necessary steps to compile data on PRIs and only 93
crores (i.e., 30 percent) of the allocated Rs. 200 crores were utilized by the states. Most states do
not have accurate information on panchayat finances a point also reiterated by FC-XIII. The FC-
XIII pointed out that Ten years have elapsed since FC-XI underlined the need for maintaining a
data base as well as up-to-date accounts and made a provision for supporting State Governments
in addressing these shortcomings. Five years have elapsed since FC-XII highlighted similar
inadequacies and made similar recommendations. Much has been said by the earlier Finance
Commissions on this important subject. Despite this, little improvement has been noted in the
situation. In its view an alternative approach may need to be adopted to address these issues
beyond funding these initiatives.

In order to collect information on the own revenues of the PRIs letters (dated 2 March
2010) were sent from the Ministry of Panchayati Raj addressed to the Secretaries in-charge of
the Panchayati Raj Department of all states/UTs (except Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland and
Delhi) requesting them to furnish necessary information. The format in which data had to be
provided was also enclosed with the letter (see annexure 3.2 for the letter and the enclosed
format). We did not receive any response from any of the states/UTs or from the Ministry of
Panchayati Raj.

In the absence of any other information available, we were left with no other option but
to use the own revenue data provided by FC-XIII in its website (http://fincomindia.nic.in). Given
the doubts about the reliability of data as pointed out by Finance Commission in their report and
by several other studies (see Rao and Rao, 2008; Jena and Gupta, 2008), the analysis should be
taken with some measure of caution. Table 4.1 presents information on own revenues (both tax
and non-tax) collected by the three tier panchayats taken together as percent of their state
domestic product from agriculture and allied activities. We have used state domestic product

53
from agriculture and allied activities as it broadly represent the rural incomes which is the
relevant indicator.13

Table 4.1: Own revenues of PRIs (as percent of agricultural GSDP)

Own Revenue (as per cent of Agricultural GSDP)
States
2003-04 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08
1 Andhra Pradesh 0.56 0.61 0.60 0.59 0.61
2 Assam 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.08
3 Bihar 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.03
4 Chhattisgarh 0.24 0.30 0.23 0.22 0.18
5 Goa 1.14 0.97 0.87 1.20 1.13
6 Gujarat 0.23 0.45 0.24 0.25 0.27
7 Haryana 0.53 0.94 1.18 1.00 0.82
8 Himachal Pradesh 0.10 0.11 0.09 0.10 0.09
9 Jharkhand 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01
10 Karnataka 0.50 0.28 0.35 0.49 0.76
11 Kerala 1.31 1.39 1.43 1.32 1.07
12 Madhya Pradesh 0.17 0.20 0.20 0.13 0.15
13 Maharashtra 1.45 1.25 0.97 0.87 0.78
14 Manipur 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02
15 Meghalaya 2.84 3.21 4.13 3.46 3.54
16 Orissa 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04
17 Punjab 0.38 0.49 0.45 0.46 0.10
18 Rajasthan 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.03
19 Tamil Nadu 0.95 0.90 0.79 0.73 0.63
20 Tripura 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.06
21 Uttar Pradesh 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.10
22 Uttarakhand 0.15 0.15 0.18 0.18 0.00
23 West Bengal 0.10 0.14 0.13 0.17 0.00
All State 0.40 0.42 0.40 0.39 0.35
Std Dev 0.676 0.725 0.886 0.759 0.766
Mean 0.477 0.509 0.530 0.501 0.457
COV 1.417 1.424 1.673 1.514 1.676
Note: The data for Arunachal Pradesh, Jammu & Kashmir, Mizoram, Nagaland and Sikkim not reported as
these state have not provided the information to FC-XIII.
Source: 1) Based on data provided by the Thirteenth Finance Commission (http://fincomindia.nic.in)
2) CSO, Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation, Government of India.

From the table we see that the revenue mobilization by the panchayats is extremely low
and there are significant interstate variations. Among the general category states the own revenue
to agriculture GSDP varies from 0 percent in case of Bihar and Jharkhand to 1.45 percent for
Maharashtra. If we include special category states this variation is even larger. For all states

13
In the chapter the term both agriculture GSDP and agriculture and allied activities GSDP implies state domestic
product from agriculture and allied activities.
54
taken together this percent age varies between 0.35 - 0.42. From the table it is also evident that
this inter-state variation is not only very high but has also shown a steady increase over the years.
The coefficient of variation of revenue as percent of agriculture GSDP has increased from 1.417
in 2003-04 to 1.676 in 2007-08. Over the years the own revenue mobilization has shown a
decline. The all state own revenues as percent of all state agriculture GSDP which was 0.40 in
2003-04 declined to 0.35 in 2007-08 after registering an increase to 0.42 in 2004.05. All this only
reiterates the point that revenue mobilization by the panchayats is abysmal and efforts should be
made by the panchayats to mobilize own revenues.
Table 4.2: Total revenues of PRIs (as percent of agricultural GSDP)
Total Revenue (as per cent of Agricultural GSDP)
States
2003-04 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08
1 Andhra Pradesh 2.83 2.96 3.21 2.85 3.13
2 Assam 8.34 8.86 12.10 16.34 9.89
3 Bihar 0.63 -- 1.49 1.17 1.26
4 Chhattisgarh 6.66 9.75 10.92 14.62 17.64
5 Goa 3.71 4.00 3.61 4.73 1.62
6 Gujarat 14.85 18.09 16.17 16.32 13.50
7 Haryana 1.11 1.57 2.78 2.40 2.82
8 Himachal Pradesh 2.54 2.89 3.11 3.57 3.47
9 Jharkhand 0.26 0.24 1.65 2.42 0.40
10 Karnataka 21.17 17.26 20.97 26.95 27.16
11 Kerala 11.07 11.79 11.91 11.60 12.12
12 Madhya Pradesh 0.79 2.75 3.89 7.90 10.09
13 Maharashtra 18.67 19.97 19.98 17.93 16.02
14 Manipur 4.92 4.27 4.34 4.93 4.74
15 Meghalaya 4.28 4.80 4.43 4.30 4.25
16 Orissa 5.12 5.03 5.30 7.97 7.04
17 Punjab 1.10 1.44 1.92 2.95 0.51
18 Rajasthan 0.66 1.12 1.23 0.95 0.72
19 Tamil Nadu 12.40 11.46 9.50 9.11 10.37
20 Tripura 5.24 8.19 9.43 8.56 14.92
21 Uttar Pradesh 2.59 2.78 3.60 2.40 2.61
22 Uttarakhand 1.40 1.51 2.55 3.33 3.31
23 West Bengal 1.83 2.30 3.61 3.46 4.54
All State 6.02 6.53 7.48 7.79 7.70
Std Dev 5.987 5.929 5.921 6.710 6.873
Mean 5.747 6.220 6.856 7.685 7.483
COV 1.042 0.953 0.864 0.873 0.919
Notes: 1)Total revenues of PRIs consists of own revenues and all funds received by three tier panchayats
from Central & State governments (including Central & State Finance Commission funds)
2)The data for Arunachal Pradesh, Jammu & Kashmir, Mizoram, Nagaland and Sikkim not
reported as these state have not provided the information to FC-XIII.
Source: As in Table 1.
55
 However, total revenues of panchayats comprising of assigned taxes, shared taxes and
grants-in-aid from both central and state governments as a percent of agricultural GSDP is
considerably higher than the own revenues (see table 4.2). The all state total revenue as percent
of agriculture GSDP increased from 6.02 in 2003-04 to 7.70 in 2007-08, but there are
considerable inter-state variations. The total revenue to agriculture GSDP percentage varied from
0.24 percent in Jharkhand to 27.16 percent in case of Karnataka. The coefficient of variation of
total revenue accruals though high at 1.042 in 2003-04 is still lower than that of own revenues
and has over the years registered a steady decline. It declined from 1.042 in 2003-04 to 0.919 in
2007-08. This variation in total revenues to agriculture GSDP percentages across states is
indicative of variation which exists in the expenditure levels of panchayats.
Table 4.3: Per capita revenues of PRIs (Rs.)

Per capita Own Revenue Per capita Total Revenue

States 2003- 2004- 2005- 2006- 2007- 2003- 2004- 2005- 2006- 2007-
04 05 06 07 08 04 05 06 07 08
1 Andhra Pradesh 50.00 57.41 62.41 65.72 83.41 253.76 281.05 335.23 320.47 429.85
2 Assam 3.69 3.76 3.81 5.26 6.66 461.30 520.59 796.74 1153.99 778.46
3 Bihar 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.81 1.17 17.45 0.89 40.87 40.83 43.02
4 Chhattisgarh 13.04 13.53 14.04 14.58 15.59 359.07 441.17 662.52 964.98 1496.06
5 Goa 150.00 134.62 170.34 201.46 202.01 488.77 556.76 703.82 792.87 289.66
6 Gujarat 20.89 37.53 25.67 31.46 41.61 1344.42 1512.12 1724.35 2015.48 2063.54
7 Haryana 70.47 127.20 163.05 173.81 165.62 145.99 213.00 383.43 418.12 566.24
8 Himachal Pradesh 8.86 10.87 10.22 10.50 10.80 231.13 290.18 336.54 371.00 410.44
9 Jharkhand 0.14 0.16 0.18 0.18 0.22 8.12 8.41 45.17 73.87 12.37
10 Karnataka 32.55 23.46 34.80 44.38 83.76 1384.77 1449.47 2094.63 2442.49 2988.25
11 Kerala 92.14 103.81 121.54 126.41 105.84 778.49 882.61 1014.99 1108.63 1202.47
12 Madhya Pradesh 11.42 12.10 13.71 9.71 11.25 52.72 168.37 265.75 595.78 753.10
13 Maharashtra 123.94 105.11 92.00 98.41 107.45 1593.99 1682.43 1891.70 2031.56 2211.54
14 Manipur 1.52 2.15 1.95 1.92 1.95 351.67 336.32 348.01 403.28 396.10
15 Meghalaya 166.32 190.58 259.67 267.77 292.78 250.65 284.82 278.87 332.78 351.99
16 Orissa 2.97 3.00 3.02 3.08 3.15 288.13 281.57 313.05 540.93 544.09
17 Punjab 69.16 92.76 91.78 107.22 27.87 198.97 271.37 393.04 684.75 137.85
18 Rajasthan 3.17 3.28 3.16 3.38 2.96 48.80 75.89 82.52 75.88 66.87
19 Tamil Nadu 56.20 67.80 73.06 83.16 80.18 732.69 859.07 879.99 1040.53 1325.20
20 Tripura 2.19 2.79 3.68 5.19 5.01 358.70 587.85 741.84 718.79 1286.67
21 Uttar Pradesh 4.96 5.24 6.09 5.53 6.50 136.97 151.32 209.15 148.75 174.44
22 Uttarakhand 10.66 12.34 14.18 16.02 0.41 102.25 120.64 202.60 298.94 301.78
23 West Bengal 8.71 11.33 12.10 16.29 0.00 152.01 192.61 328.18 337.96 508.10
All State 27.40 29.64 30.96 33.55 34.07 409.56 456.15 573.56 665.59 745.52
Source: Based on data provided by the Thirteenth Finance Commission (http://fincomindia.nic.in)
56
 Table 4.4: Own revenue as percent of total revenue
Own revenue as per cent of total revenue
States
2003-04 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08
1 Andhra Pradesh 19.70 20.43 18.62 20.51 19.41
2 Assam 0.80 0.72 0.48 0.46 0.86
3 Bihar 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.99 2.71
4 Chhattisgarh 3.63 3.07 2.12 1.51 1.04
5 Goa 30.69 24.18 24.20 25.41 69.74
6 Gujarat 1.55 2.48 1.49 1.56 2.02
7 Haryana 48.27 59.71 42.53 41.57 29.25
8 Himachal Pradesh 3.83 3.75 3.04 2.83 2.63
9 Jharkhand 1.69 1.88 0.39 0.25 1.75
10 Karnataka 2.35 1.62 1.66 1.82 2.80
11 Kerala 11.84 11.76 11.97 11.40 8.80
12 Madhya Pradesh 21.66 7.19 5.16 1.63 1.49
13 Maharashtra 7.78 6.25 4.86 4.84 4.86
14 Manipur 0.43 0.64 0.56 0.48 0.49
15 Meghalaya 66.36 66.91 93.12 80.47 83.18
16 Orissa 1.03 1.06 0.96 0.57 0.58
17 Punjab 34.76 34.18 23.35 15.66 20.22
18 Rajasthan 6.50 4.32 3.83 4.45 4.43
19 Tamil Nadu 7.67 7.89 8.30 7.99 6.05
20 Tripura 0.61 0.47 0.50 0.72 0.39
21 Uttar Pradesh 3.62 3.46 2.91 3.71 3.72
22 Uttarakhand 10.42 10.23 7.00 5.36 0.14
23 West Bengal 5.73 5.88 3.69 4.82 0.00
All State 6.69 6.50 5.40 5.04 4.57
Source: As in Table 3

level of service delivery in panchayats depends on the per capita revenues raised and per
capita revenues accruing (i.e., total revenues) to them. Table 4.3 shows the state-wise per capita
own revenues and total revenues at current prices for the period 2003-04 to 2007-08. These per
capita estimates of own revenue and total revenues for each state has been derived by dividing
respectively the own revenue and total revenues of panchayats with the rural population of the
concerned state. From the table we see that during this period both per capita own revenue and
per capita total revenue have registered and increase. All state per capita own revenue increased
from Rs. 24.70 in 2003-04 to Rs. 34.07 in 2007-08 while per capita total revenue registered an
increase from Rs. 409.56 to Rs. 745.52 during this period. Own revenues of PRIs constitute a
very small portion of their total revenues and has over the years declined as can be seen in table
57
4.4. All state own revenues as a percent of all state total revenue was 6.69 in 2003-04. It declined
to 4.57 in 2007-08. The generation of own revenues by the PRIs has been extremely low and
they are more dependent on fund transfers from higher levels of government for their
functioning. Such dependence on funds from higher levels on governments considerably reduces
the autonomy of the panchayats thereby reducing their role to merely performance of agency
functions of both the Central and State governments.

Analysis on own revenues of panchayats also suggest that per capita own revenues are
higher in states which have higher per capita agriculture and allied activities GSDP as can be
seen from figure 4.1. The correlation coefficient of per capita own revenues and per capita
agriculture and allied activities GSDP being 0.524. Thus, while the revenue mobilisation by
panchayats in general is low, the states with higher per capita agriculture sector GSDP mobilized
larger revenues.

Fig 4.1: Relationship between own revenues of PRIs & per capita agriculture & allied activities GSDP
300
200
100
0

5000 10000 15000 20000 25000

Per capita agriculture and allied activities GSDP (Rs.)

58
4. Own revenues of panchayats - Survey Results

In this section we analyse the own revenue effort of PRIs based on a survey conducted in the
four states of Chhattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa and Rajasthan for the fiscal year 2005-06.
14
The survey was conducted in 2006-07 by NIPFP under a project funded by UNDP in which
780 gram panchayats, 78 block panchayats and 17 district panchayats were surveyed across four
states of Chhattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa and Rajasthan. Assessment of own revenues of
PRIs was one of the many objectives of the project. We present below findings of the survey.

Table 4.5 shows the matrix of GPs by number and type of own taxes. From the table we
see that a large percentage of GPs (74.36 percent) in the four states have not collected any tax
revenue from the sources assigned to them. The remaining, around 20 percent of the GPs have
exploited only one source. That leaves very few GPs collecting from more than one source of tax
revenue (5.51 percent of the surveyed GPs). Among the taxes collected by the GPs house tax,
water tax and animal taxes are most usually levied. The water tax was collected by a large
number of GPs in Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh. Profession tax was not levied by the GPs in
these two states even though it is an obligatory tax.

Table 4.5: Matrix of GPs by Number and Type of Own Taxes

House Lighting Animal Water Other Total no. of
Percent
tax tax tax tax misc. GPs by source

0 source 0 0 0 0 0 580 74.36

1 source 35 4 31 27 60 157 20.13
More than 1 Source 21 18 15 26 21 43 5.51
Total 56 22 46 53 81 780 100.00
(7.18) (2.82) (5.90) (6.79) (10.38)
Source: Authors calculations based on survey data from the NIPFP study (2006-07)
Notes: 1. Figures in parenthesis refer to percent of GPs to total number of GPs.
2. Percentages in the bottom row do not add up to 100. Taxes from miscellaneous sources such as markets
and fairs, commercial property, and water charges that vary considerably across the states are included in
the other misc. category.

The spread of GPs collecting non-tax revenue is large as compared to those collecting
taxes both in terms of total number of GPs and number of sources. Table 4.6 shows that around
27 percent of GPs in the surveyed district in the four states do not raise any non-tax revenues.

14
Refer to Rajaraman (2007) for the details of the project.
59
 Income from physical properties vested with the panchayats are the major source of non-tax
revenue for GPs with 41.41 percent reported having received income from these sources. This
category includes renting out panchayat properties, auctioning of ferry ghats, orchards, trees and
leasing out properties for public use. A large number, 38.72 percent also receive interest receipts
from the bank deposits of funds received by them under various central and state schemes.
However, this source of income depends upon the amount of unspent funds under different
schemes remaining with the banks and is not based on any revenue effort of the GPs. Royalty
from minor minerals and income from forest products accrue to relatively fewer GPs, depending
upon the endowment of such properties. Other sources mainly include fees for issuing various
certificates and for use of shops and buildings in markets and fairs, user charges on services
provided by the GPs, sale of scrap, and fines.
Table 4.6: Matrix of GPs by Number and Type of Own Non-Tax Revenues
Property Royalty Income
Total no.
rental & Interest from from
Others of GPs by Percent
lease receipt minor forest
source
income minerals products
0 source 0 0 0 0 0 211 27.05
1 source 81 98 5 1 78 263 33.72
2 source 130 105 15 3 127 190 24.36
More than 2 Source 112 99 25 34 112 116 14.87
Total 323 302 45 38 317 780 100.00
(41.41) (38.72) (5.77) (4.87) (40.64)
Source: Authors calculations based on survey data from the NIPFP study (2006-07)
Notes: Figures in parenthesis refer to percent of GPs to total number of GPs. Percentages in the bottom row do not add
up to 100.

The mapping between assigned tax sources and the survey results is shown in table 3.7.
The table merely shows the taxes that have been collected by at least one of the surveyed GPs
and not the number of GPs collecting such taxes. For example, if in Chhattisgarh only one GP
collects animal tax then the table would show that animal tax is being collected by the GPs in the
state. In Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh the assigned tax rights seems to have been exploited,
where the GPs are collecting a number of taxes. However, this should be interpreted in
conjunction with the survey findings that few GPs collect any taxes. Conservancy tax and
profession tax, although designated as obligatory in Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh, are not
levied by the GPs. In Rajasthan only house tax, water rates and fees on markets are exploited.

60
 The education cess imposed by the JPs in Rajasthan piggy backs on the state taxes and in no way
reflects their revenue effort. However, in Orissa with the exception of market fees none of the
assigned taxes are collected.
Table 4.7: Taxes assigned and collected by the PRIs
Chhattisgarh Madhya Pradesh Orissa Rajasthan
Taxes
Assigned Collected Assigned Collected Assigned Collected Assigned Collected
Gram Panchayats
House tax (O) (O)
Vehicle tax
Latrine/conservancy tax (O) (O)
Water rate
Lighting rate (O) (O)
Drainage tax
Tax on works of public

utility
Market fees (O) (O)
Fee on registration of
(O) (O)
cattle
Profession tax (O) (O)
Animal tax
Pilgrim tax
Tax on commercial

crops
Others (Ferry service

tax)
Block Panchayat
Tax on theatrical
(O) (O)
performances
Development tax on
agri. land
Profession tax
Tax on use of agri. land
Education cess
Tax on fairs
District Panchayat
License fee for fairs
Water rates
Surcharge on stamp

duty
Source: Jena and Gupta (2008)
Note: 1) O refers to obligatory tax and rest of the taxes are as optional
2) House tax includes property tax on lands and/or buildings
3) The latrine tax includes tax for construction or maintenance of public latrine and scavenging and tax on
private latrines if cleaned by the GP. Tax on private latrine is obligatory in Chhattisgarh & Madhya Pradesh
4) Lighting rates and water rates are charged if such services are provided by the GP

61
 Revenue effort of the surveyed GPs is presented in table 4.8. The average per capita own
tax and own tax revenue of the four states was Rs. 1.39 and Rs. 4.37 respectively but there was
variations across states. The average per capita own revenue was Rs. 5.76. The share of own
revenues of PRIs, both from tax and non-tax revenue, in total receipts comprising centrally-
sponsored schemes funds (CSS), central finance commission funds, state scheme funds and
funds from the state finance commissions is very low. It was less than 2 percent of the total
revenue received by the GPs in these surveyed districts.

Table 4.8: Revenue Effort of Gram Panchayats (survey results) 2005-06

Per capita revenues of GPs (Rs.) Own revenue
Sample
State Own Tax Own Non Own Total as per cent of
size
revenue Tax revenue Revenue Revenue total revenue
Orissa 138 0.33 5.14 5.47 223.31 2.45
(22) (132)
Chhattisgarh 201 1.56 4.66 6.22 321.54 1.93
(53) (143)
Madhya Pradesh 262 2.62 5.43 8.05 317.55 2.54
(66) (179)
Rajasthan 179 0.22 1.91 2.13 223.95 0.95
(59) (115)
4 states 780 1.39 4.37 5.76 280.42 2.05
(200) (569)
Note: 1) Figures in parenthesis refers to the number of surveyed GPs collecting any tax or non taxes.
2) Own revenues of a GP consist of its own tax and own non tax revenues.
3) Total revenue of a GP consists of own revenues and all funds received from Central and State
governments (including Central and State Finance Commission funds)
Source: Authors calculation based on the survey data from the NIPFP study (2006-07)

Thus, from the above analysis, based on data provided by the Finance Commission and
also on the survey of PRIs in the four states of Chhattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa and
Rajasthan we see the own revenue efforts of the panchayats have been extremely poor.

5. Reasons for poor revenue efforts of panchayats

The poor performance of panchayats in generating own revenues can be attributed to a number
of factors. Excessive state control over panchayat tax domain has limited the autonomy of the
PRIs. The recommendations of State Finance Commissions to expand the tax domain of

62
panchayats have not been heeded by the state governments. The tax rates are specific and are not
periodically reviewed and revised. For instance in Orissa the vehicle tax rates prescribed in 1975
continue to exist. For many taxes there is absence of floor rate as only an upper limit is
prescribed. This adversely affects revenue mobilization. However, in some cases the statute
prescribes a range i.e., minimum and maximum rates. For example in Chhattisgarh and Madhya
Pradesh the statute prescribes a range for tax on land and buildings, profession tax, and
entertainment tax.

Within their limited tax domain failure of the PRIs can also be attributed to factors like
reluctance to levy taxes, poor administrative capacity, and electoral politics. The non-collection
of even obligatory taxes by large number of GPs in Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh can be
attributed to lack of willingness and poor administrative capacity. It is important to build the
capacity of the panchayats to administer and enforce the taxes assigned to them. The basic
requirement in building their capacity is to create a reliable data and information system. Unless
attempt is made to build the basic information system, and update it from time to time, it will be
impossible to create the capacity to levy administer and enforce any tax. The GPs by and large
are provided with one secretary who acts as record keeper and looks after their administrative
matters. However, all the record keepers are not GP appointees. State appointed record keepers
in many places manage more than one GP and panchayats have less control over them. With
greater emphasis on PRIs as preferred implementing agency for various central and state
development schemes, the administrative capacity of the panchayats is overstretched. As a result
the panchayat administration is more geared towards implementation of these schemes and owns
revenue collection effort takes a back seat. The political factors like proximity to voters also act
as disincentive to levy taxes. The elected representatives are many a time handicapped by the
lack of clarity as regards their functional responsibilities and powers to levy taxes.

6. Measures to augment own revenues of PRIs

On the basis of the information received from 10 states Rao and Rao (2008) found property tax
to be the most important source of revenues of gram panchayats in all states. However, there are
other important sources like octroi (Gujarat, Maharashtra and Rajasthan), professional tax
63
(Assam, Bihar, Himachal Pradesh, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh and Punjab), and entertainment tax
(Assam, Gujarat, Kerala, Punjab, Uttar Pradesh and Tamil Nadu). They pointed out that barring
these taxes there is no separate information on the revenue realised by the gram panchayats on
the other tax handles that are listed in respective acts.

Although in terms of numbers there are quite a few taxes and fees assigned to the
panchayats, very few sources have been exploited. This could be due to problems with respect to
the assignment of tax powers to panchayats or these sources may not be significant from the
viewpoint of generating revenues. Efforts should be made to augment own revenues of the
panchayats. Some of the measures could be in terms of improving the administrative capacity of
the panchayats while other could be in terms of providing additional revenue handles to them.
Some of these measures are:15

1) It is essential to build the capacity of the panchayats to administer and enforce the taxes
assigned to them. The basic requirement in building their capacity is to create a reliable
database and information system. Unless attempt is made to build the basic information
system, and update it from time to time, it will be impossible to create the capacity to levy
administer and enforce any tax. The information system should be developed in such a
manner that it is useful for planning and should be subject to norms of accountability.
2) In order to augment the revenue powers of the panchayats it is necessary to take a re-look at
the tax powers assigned to them and examine the possibility of assigning additional
productive revenue handles. This issue merits careful consideration. With the introduction of
full-fledged VAT at the state level, some of the revenue handles such as entertainment tax
will be merged with the VAT and some such as octroi will be abolished for reasons of
efficiency and competitiveness (Rao and Rao, 2008). Therefore, new tax handles will
become necessary even to maintain the revenues at the prevailing level.
3) The poor administrative and enforcement capacity of the village panchayats has more to do
with the power structure in the villages rather than the ability of the tax collectors. The way
to enforce the tax, therefore, will have to mandate complimentary benefits for payment of
taxes and penalties for its non-payment. Some specific measures can be suggested in this
regards like: (a) If it is feasible, a law should be enacted to disqualify those families

15
This section is largely based on Rao and Rao (2008)
64
defaulting on the taxes from voting and contesting in elections. (b) The defaulters could be
made ineligible to receive cooperative credit, supplies from the public distribution system. (c)
There could be a one-time settlement of arrears to begin with without any penalty. (d)
Panchayats collecting revenues above 80 per cent of the demand could be given a bonus at
specified pre-announced rates. Alternatively, matching element could be introduced to the
grants to be given from the state governments. (e) In addition to these it is important that
there should be trained tax collectors in each of the villages. If one collector for each village
panchayat is not viable, a tax collector can be assigned to multiple villages with appropriate
specification of responsibility. The training should equip the tax collectors to determine the
tax demand for each of the properties.

65
 Chapter V

State Finance Commissions - An Overview

1. Introduction

Local governments of India were provided constitutional status through the 73rd and 74th
Constitution Amendment Act (CAA), 1992 where three pillars of decentralization i.e.,
devolution of financial and functional power coupled with provision of adequate functionaries
were ensured. Of these three provisions, financial power is considered to be the most important
element of all. Article 243 H and 243 X of the Constitutional Amendment Act authorizes states
to pass legislation aimed at increasing the financial resources available to local bodies by
augmenting the latters statutory taxation powers and providing for grants-in-aid from state
governments. To assist states in this process, Article 243I (1) and 243Y (1) of the CAA mandate
the constitution of a State Finance Commission (SFC) every five years. Under this provision, the
SFC was entrusted with advising state governments on the principles to be applied in
determining the allocation of funds to local bodies and the range of taxes and non-taxes to be
devolved to local bodies.

It is about more than one and half decade since the Constitutional Amendment was
enacted. Experience thus far suggests that one may be optimistic about the overall functioning of
SFCs. All states except three (Mizoram, Mehgalaya and Nagaland have been excluded from the
operation as per Article 243 M) constituted their first generation of SFC and as many as 21 states
except Arunachal Pradesh, Chattisgarh, Jammu & Kashmir and Jharkhand constituted their
second SFC and except for Arunachal Pradesh, Chattisgarh, Gujarat and Uttarakhand all states
constituted or under process of being constituted their third generation of SFC as per the
information provided by the 13th Union Finance Commission (UFC) (GOI, Report of the 13th FC,
2009: 416-423). This phenomenon is likely to have positive impact on the financial power of
local government including their share of own revenues-one of the most important indicators of
financial decentralization. The macro level data which has so far been available shows that the
share of own revenues of the Panchayats (all tiers) that enable them to enjoy discretionary
decision making authority and budgetary autonomy was only 4.17 per cent for the period 1990-
66
91 to 1997-98 and was increased to 6.40 per cent over the period of 1998-99 to 2002-03. That is
a definite improvement from a low base though it is still low (GOI, Report of the 12th FC, 2004:
147; Rao M G, Amar Nath and Vani, 2004).

However, such a low level of share of own revenues of Panchayati Raj Institutions
(PRIs), despite the existence of SFCs for more than one and half decades forces us to question
whether there are inherent weaknesses in their operation and functioning. This paper attempts to
unearth major issues and problems relating to this matter. Section I one of this study aims at
describing the processes involved in setting up of SFC and factors that are responsible for
causing delay in submission of SFC reports which is evident in almost all SFCs across the states.
Section II analyses difficulties faced by the SFCs in sourcing data. By and large all SFC reports
that have so far been available in the public domain expressed their concern over the virtual
absence of necessary database at local government level which consequently compel them to
make recommendations in an ad-hoc and half hearted manner. Section III of this paper describes
the extent to which States have so far shown their seriousness regarding the recommendations of
SFCs by tabling Action Taken Report (ATR) before the State Legislature timely and pursuing
follow up actions on the recommendations of the SFCs consistently.

2. The Status of SFCs in India

Before entering the discussion of problem of functioning of SFCs, one should examine
the Constitutional provision of the formation of SFC as laid under the Constitutional (73rd
Amendment) Amendment Act (CAA). Article 243 I (1) of CAA states The Governor of a state
shall, as soon as may be within one year from the commencement of the Constitution (Seventy-
third Amendment) Act, 1992, and thereafter at the expiration of every fifth year, constitute a
Finance Commission to review the financial position of the Panchayats and to make
recommendations to the Governor..

By and large all states have merely reproduced the wordings of the Constitutional
mandate relating to functioning of SFCs in their respective Conformity Acts and hence, at least
on paper, they broadly complied with the provision of the CAA with few exceptions. However,
although Conformity Act of some states pertaining to few provisions failed to comply with the

67
relevant section of CAA, yet in practice these states complied with the Constitutional mandate
indicating casual approach of the states in dealing with this matter16.

Extent of deviation from states Conformity Acts as well as from CAA seems to be quite
severe in case of periodicity of SFCs. Almost all states have made provision for constituting their
first SFCs within the prescribed date mandated in the CAA (except for a few States like West
Bengal, Bihar and Goa) and successive SFCs at the expiration of every fifth year. The reality,
however, belies the statutory provision laid under the respective Conformity Acts of the states.
Except for Bihar, Goa, Himachal Pardesh, Kerala, Maharastra, Mainipur, Punjab, Rajasthan,
Tamil Nadu and Tripura all other States did not comply with the stipulation of constituting their
first SFCs within one year of the commencement of CAA i.e., 24.4.1993. However, Bihar,
Gujarat, Madhya Pardesh, Orissa, Sikim and Manipur reconstituted their first SFCs twice and
Goa thrice. Even then, Bihar failed to submit the report of its first SFC. And Goa managed to
submit the report of its first SFC after five years and Gujarat after four years and Manipur after
two and half years from the date of the initial constitution of their respective first SFCs (GOI,
Report of the 11th FC, 2000: 226).

Although as many as ten states constituted their first generation of SFCs by the
prescribed deadline, thereafter, however, the record of individual states has varied significantly.
It was expected that states who could not constitute their first batch of SFC within a
constitutionally mandated time period will eventually take initiative to constitute their successive
SFCs regularly i.e., at the expiration of the every fifth year as committed by them in their
Conformity Acts. However, none of these states eventually follow the cycle of constituting their
successive SFCs on time i.e., at the expiration of the every fifth year as committed by them in
their Conformity Acts. As regards the formation of their second SFCs, the extent of delay varies
from one month in case of Himachal Pradesh to five years in case of Goa. Even if we consider

16
For example, The Assam Panchayat Act, 1994 prescribes that the State Government instead of the Governor of the
state, as laid under the CAA, will constitute a SFC. But in practice, all three SFCs, that have so far been available in
the public domain, were constituted by the order of the Governor. However, The West Bengal Panchayt
(Amendment) Act, 1994 prescribes that first SFC of the state will be constituted as soon as may be after the
commencement of the West Bengal Panchayat (Amendment) Act, 1994 instead of constituting the first SFC within
one year of the commencement of CAA i.e., 24.4.1993. Thus the states Conformity Act neither complied with the
provision as laid under the CAA regarding the time period within which the first SFC has to be constituted nor the
state followed it in reality because constitution of the first SFC of the state came much later than the constitutionally
mandated date i.e., on 30.5.1994.

68
the final date of the reconstitution of their first SFCs for states like Goa, Manipur, the extent of
delay in constituting second SFCs may be less but delay is still there. Regarding the constitution
of third SFCs, here too, except for Himachal Pradesh none of these states constituted their third
SFC on time i.e., at the expiration of the every fifth year of the constitution of second SFC. It is
worth mentioning that few states have even constituted their second and third SFCs earlier than
the constitutionally mandated time period violating both their Conformity Acts as well as the
provisions laid under CAA (GOI, Report of the 13th FC, 2009: 416-423).

By and large Conformity Acts of the states tend to fail to specify issues pertaining to
efficient functioning of SFCs mentioned below.

a) No clear guidance is provided in the states Conformity Act regarding the time span for
constitution of SFCs and period of coverage
b) Absence of time allowed to SFCs for submission of their report in the states Conformity
Act.
c) Absence of maximum time limit and specific reasons under which extension of life span of
SFC could be granted.
d) Absence of timeframe for tabling ATR before the state Legislature in the states Conformity
Act
e) No relevant statute either in the Conformity Act or in the states legislature regarding the
eligibility required of the persons to be appointed as members of SFCs except for few states.

(1) No clear guidance is provided in the states Conformity Act regarding the time span for
constitution of SFCs and period of coverage

Almost all states reproduced the wordings of CAA regarding the time cycle of setting up
of SFCs i.e., at the expiration of every fifth year without specifying whether it will be constituted
every fifth year from the date of Notification order of constitution of previous SFC or otherwise.
That apart, the lack of a statutory mechanism for ensuring continuity of setting up of SFCs is an
added problem. Article 243 I (1) that provides for the constitution of the SFC at the expiration
of every fifth year , in effect disallows the constitution of a new SFC before the completion of
five year period. Under some circumstances such earlier constitution of SFC might be effective
in maintaining timely cycle of constitution of SFCs so that no time period is left uncovered by
SFCs. For example, a state might like to constitute its SFC well before the expiration of the fifth
year of the constitution of its previous SFCs in order to give the concerned SFC enough time to
69
submit their report in anticipation of some potential disruption (viz. forthcoming election) that
might take place during the tenure of the concerned SFC17.

However, it is worth mentioning that, lack of a statutory mechanism of constituting SFC

earlier does not deter some states from doing so. A number of states constituted their second and
third SFCs earlier than the constitutionally mandated time period without citing any reasons.
Second Administrative Reform Commission (SARC) is of the view that the Article 243 I (1)
should be amended to include the phrase as such earlier time after the words every fifth year
to enable a state to set up a SFC at the expiration of every fifth year or earlier akin to the
provision that already exists under Article 280 for constituting the Union Finance Commission
(UFC) (GOI, SARC, 2007: 65-66). Thirteenth UFC agrees with the recommendation made by
SARC. Necessity of such amendment, however, felt more in respect of ensuring synchronicity
between the SFCs and UFC with an objective to enable UFC to fulfill the constitutional mandate
of measuring the financial requirements of local bodies on the basis of the recommendations
made by SFCs.

Another problem is regarding the lack of a specific mention of a period of coverage of a

SFC either in the Conformity Acts or in the CAA. This lack of specification gives the states the
leverage to change the coverage period frequently at their discretion and convenience leading to
a chaotic situation. Although period of coverage of SFCs is normally for five years in most states
following the norms set by UFCs, yet it is different in the case of number of SFCs. Probably with
the objective of maintaining the continuity of the cycle of setting up of SFCs that gets often
disrupted consequent upon delay in tabling ATR and submission of report of SFCs, significant
number of states tend to frequently change the period of coverage of their SFCs resulting in the
situation where the period of coverage of different SFCs not only varies across the states but also
it is quite different from one SFC to another within a single state18. The lack of uniformity

17
For instance during the tenure of the Second SFC of Orissa (2005-06 to 2009-10) the general election to the 14th
Parliamentary and to the 13th Legislative Assembly elections of the state were held. These elections prevented the
Commission from gathering information from local bodies and government offices and hence caused delay in
submission of the SFC report (Report of the Second SFC, Orissa, 2004: 5). Likewise, submission of the report of the
third SFC of Himachal Pradesh (2007-08-2011-12) was partly delayed due to the delayed response from local bodies
on account of elections to the local government institutions (Report of the Third SFC, Himachal Pradesh: 9).
18
The period covered by the recommendations of SFC1 of Andhra Pradesh is only for three years (1997-98 to
1999-00) while both for SFC2 (2000-01 to 2004-05) and SFC 3 (2005-06 to 2009-10) it is for five years. For
Haryana, period covered by the recommendations of SFC1 is only for four years (1997-98 to 2000-01) while for
70
regarding the period of coverage of SFCs across the states as well as for different SFCs within a
single state makes it difficult for inter-state comparison and intra-state comparison.

(2) Absence of time allowed to SFCs for submission of their report in the states Conformity Act.

Almost no states except very few like West Bengal specify maximum time limit for the
submission of the reports of SFCs in their respective Conformity Acts. Relevant section of the
Conformity Act of West Bengal clearly specifies that the Chairman and other members of the
State Finance Commission shall hold the office for one year. However, even though there is no
mention of the maximum time limit for submission of SFC report in the Conformity Acts of the
states yet by and large all states specify certain time limit for the submission of the reports of
SFCs in their respective Terms of Reference (ToR) provided to SFC at the time of constitution.
If we consider the maximum time limit for submission of SFC reports as mandated in the
respective ToR (including the time limit granted for extensions) with the time period actually
needed to submit the SFC reports in different states, it will be evident that in few cases even it
was not strictly followed (Subrahmanyam, 2004: page numbers are not mentioned).

There is hardly any uniformity in submission of SFC reports. The time varies
considerably across the states. Unlike the UFC which has to give their recommendations well
before the date from which they have to be given effect to, there is no such compulsions for the
SFCs. As per the information provided by the 11th UFC, time span allowed by the respective
states in the ToR for submission of reports of first SFCs varies from 36 months (Andhra Pradesh)
to 3 months (Bihar, Goa). And as many as five states (Gujarat, Himachal Pradesh, Kerala, Sikim
and West Bengal) did not provide any time limit for SFC report submission in their ToR
provided to the first SFCs (GOI, 11th FC, 2000: 226). As per the information provided by the 13th
UFC, time taken for submission of SFC reports varies considerably across the states. For first

SFC2 (2001-02 to 2005-06) it is for five years and for SFC 3 (2006 to 2009) it is for three years. For Maharastra,
period covered by the recommendations of SFC1 (1994-95 to 1996-97) and SFC2 (1999-00 to 2001-02) is only for
three years while for SFC 3 (2006-07 to 2010-11) it is for five years. For Orissa, period covered by the
recommendations of SFC1 is for seven years (1997-98 to 2000-01) while both for SFC2 (2005-06 to 2009-10) and
SFC3 (2010-11 to 2014-15) it is for five years For Tripura, period covered by the recommendations of SFC1 is for
more than five years which started from January 1997 and continues till date as reported by the 13 th FC (13th UFC:
418) while for SFC2 (2003-04 to 2007-08) it is for five years. And finally for Uttar Pradesh, period covered by the
recommendations of SFC1 is for four years (1997-98 to 2000-01) while both for SFC2 (2001-02 to 2005-06) and
SFC 3 (2006-07 to 2010-11) it is for five years.
71
SFCs, it varies from one year (Sikkim) to five years (Arunachal Pradesh) and in case of second
SFCs it varies from four and half years (Bihar) to one year one month (Uttarakhand). Respective
variation in case of third SFCs is from four years (Andhra Pradesh) to one year one month
(Kerala) (GOI, Report of the 13th FC, 2009: 416-423).

However, it is worth mentioning that as many as seven states namely Bihar, Goa, Gujarat,
Madhya Pradesh, Manipur, Orissa and Sikkim reconstituted their SFC more than once. The
information provided by the 13th UFC did not have any uniformity relating to provision of the
dates of constitution of first SFCs of these state. As evident in the report, in case of Bihar,
Manipur and Gujarat dates of first/initial constitution of first SFCs were mentioned but in case of
Goa, Madhya Pradesh and Sikkim dates of last constitution were mentioned. And in case of
Orissa, two dates were provided by the report of the 13th UFC i.e., both initial date of
constitution and final date of reconstitution. For the sake of convenience, foregoing analysis is
based on the dates of initial constitution (as provided by the 11th UFC, p. 226) of SFCs of the
states which constituted their SFCs more than once.

3. Absence of maximum time limit and specific reasons under which extension of life span of SFC
could be granted.
None of the states Conformity Acts prescribes the maximum time limit for the extension of the
life span of SFCs and the specific reasons under which such extension could be granted.
However, few states specify the maximum time limit for the extension of the lifespan of SFCs in
their respective ToR but as usual in most cases these are not strictly followed as mentioned
before.

4. Absence of timeframe for placing ATR before the state Legislature in the states Conformity
Act
Almost no states except for few like West Bengal specify a maximum timeframe for placing
ATR before the state Legislature in the states Conformity Act. However, for West Bengal,
although Conformity Act of the state fails to specify exact time limit for placing ATR before the
state Legislature, yet the pertaining provision emphasizes that ATR should be laid before the
state Legislature as soon as possible after such recommendations are received and should be laid
before the state Legislature not less than 14 days and the state Legislature will accept the
72
recommendation with few modifications during the session in which they were laid. Despite such
legal provision, the state took eight months to table ATR on the recommendations made by the
first SFC and for the second SFC the state took more than three years to table the respective
ATR.

5. Absence of relevant statute either in the Conformity Act or in the states legislature regarding
the eligibility required of the persons to be appointed as members of SFCs except for few states.

In case of the UFC, Article 280 of the Constitution provides that Parliament may, by law,
determine the qualification for the members. Accordingly, Parliament enacted the Finance
Commission (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1951 which prescribed the qualification for a
person to be appointed as the chairman or a member. In case of SFCs, Article 243 I (2) makes
similar requirement for the state Legislatures. Eleventh UFC recommended that states should by
legislation ensure that the chairperson and members of the SFCs may be drawn from amongst
expert in specific discipline (GOI, Report of the 11th FC, 2000:74) and 12th UFC urged that it is
necessary that states constitute SFCs with people of eminence and competence instead of
perceiving the formation of SFC as a mere constitutional formality (GOI, Report of the12th FC,
2004:150). Likewise, 13th UFC noted that the views of 11th and 12th UFC is valid and merit
attention and consequently went further by introducing performance grant where one of the pre-
requisites for attaining performance grant awarded by the 13th UFC during the period between
2011-12 and 2014-15 is that state governments must prescribe through an Act the qualifications
of persons eligible for appointment as members of the SFC consistent with the Article 243 I (2)
of the Constitution in order to improve the quality of the SFC reports (GOI, Report of the 13th
FC, 2009: 179).

The study undertaken by Subrahmanyam (2004) indicates that the qualifications required
of the chairman and members of the SFCs are specified in the Conformity Acts in the states of
Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Gujarat, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, Pondicherry, Rajasthan,
Sikkim and West Bengal whereas they are governed by separate Acts or prescribed by the state
government through executive Notifications/rules in Bihar, Goa, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh,
Tripura and Uttar Pradesh.

73
 However, regardless of these statutory provisions in practice composition of different
SFCs across the states indicates that majority of the members and Chairpersons of SFCs are
serving/retired senior level bureaucrats both for different SFCs within a single state and for a
particular SFC across the states. For example Assam prescribed the qualification required for
appointment of members of SFCs by introducing a statute-The Assam Finance Commission
(Miscellaneous Provision) Act, 1995. Yet out of five members/chairpersons of second SFC of
Assam, four are serving/retired bureaucrats and for the third SFC of the state out of six
members/chairpersons five members are serving bureaucrats and one is a retired bureaucrat. On
the other hand a state like Tamil Nadu which is yet to make similar statute also practicing the
same. If we look at the composition of Second and third SFCs of the state, it is evident that out of
five all four are serving/bureaucrats and one is a political party member. Therefore, it remains to
be seen the extent to which performance grant to be provided by the 13th UFC will be able to
countercheck the situation as described above.

Needless to say, the usual trend of composition of SFCs across the states not only puts
limitation on the ability of the SFC to act as an autonomous body to make recommendations in a
free and an independent manner as has envisioned in the Constitution but also makes it difficult
for SFCs to submit their report in a timely manner. Because given their normal duties and
responsibilities, the serving bureaucrats can hardly spare much time for their work for SFC.

It is worth noting that careful examination of the provision laid under either in the
Conformity Acts of the states or separate statute regarding specific mentioning of qualifications
required of the Chairman and members of the SFCs, indicates that these relevant provisions
neither rule out the possibility of appointing serving/retired senior level bureaucrats nor rule out
the possibility of ruling party members from being Chairperson or members of SFC (see Box
5.1). In this respect we can mention the relevant clause of The Rajasthan Panchayat Act, 1994.
Article 118 (ii) of the Act clearly says that a person who have had wide experience in financial
matters and in administration is eligible for being member of SFC. The West Bengal Panchayat
(Amendment) Act 1994, prescribed the same in the relevant statute. Therefore, with a view to
check frequent reconstitution of SFCs and/or constitution in phases consequent upon frequent
transfer of these serving bureaucrats and ensuring neutrality/objectivity in the recommendations
made by SFC, it is not only necessary to introduce relevant statute, as suggested by the different
74
UFCs, but also there must be some provision along with the relevant statute clearly specifying
person who will be disqualified from being appointed as or being a member and/or Chairperson
of SFC. In addition, states that have already made the statute regarding qualifications required of
the chairman and members of the SFCs could also consider introducing a clause in the main
body of the relevant statute whereby it will be clearly specified that serving bureaucrats and
ruling political party members should not consist of more than a certain percentage of total
members of SFC in order to check the usual trend of overwhelming majority of these persons in
the composition of SFC. And states who have not made the statute yet may consider enacting
the relevant legislation while including these clauses, as suggested above, in order to introduce
certain built-in-efficiency in the functioning of SFCs.

Box 5.1

The West Bengal Panchayat (Amendment) Act 1994 states: The SFC should consist of not more than
five members including the Chairman, selected from amongst the jurists, economists, administrators
and social and political workers of eminence

The Gujarat Panchayats Act, 1993 states: The Commission shall consist of such number of members
not exceeding five including the Chairman as may be determined by the State Government:
The Chairman of the Commission shall be selected from amongst persons who have had experience in
public affairs and the other members shall be selected from among persons who-
(a) are, or have been or are qualified to be appointed as judges of a High Court; or
(b) have special knowledge of the finances and accounts of Government and local authorities; or
(c) have had wide experience in financial matters and in administration: or
(d) have special knowledge of economics

The Kerala Panchayat Act, 1994 states: The Commission shall consist of such number of members
not exceeding three including the chairman as may be determined by the Government:.
Persons who are to be appointed as member of the Commission shall be-
(a) One shall be a person having special knowledge and experience in financial matters and
economics; and
(b) The other two shall be persons having experience in public administration or local
administration or having special knowledge in financial matters and accounts of the
Government and local bodies

The Rajasthan Panchayat Act, 1994 states: The SFC shall consist of the following members-
(a) A Chairperson from amongst persons who have had experience in public affairs; and
(b) Such number of the other members not exceeding four from amongst persons who-
(c) have special knowledge of the finance and accounts of the Government; or
(d) have had wide experience in financial matters and in administration; or
(e) have special knowledge of functioning of the Panchayati Raj institutions and Municipal
Bodies; or
(f) have been closely associated with preparation and/or implementation of rural and urban
development programmes
75
 Apart from the structural lacunae in functioning of SFCs, there has been some major
drawbacks in implementation dealing with SFCs across the states which leads to delay in
submission of reports of SFC.
1. Frequent reconstitution of SFCs: As many as seven out of twenty five States (Meghalaya,
Mizoram and Nagaland are exempted under Article 243M), reconstituted their first SFCs. It
is heartening to note that number of reconstitution was nil in case of the second SFC as well
as third SFCs as reported by the 12th and 13th UFC. But careful examination of reports and
Notification order tell us a different story. Assam third SFC was first constituted on 6th
February 2006. Due to certain procedural inadequacies of the original Notifications, the
Commission had to be reconstituted. A fresh Notification order was issued on 3rd July 2006.
2. Frequent changes in the composition of SFCs: There has been frequent changes in the
composition of SFCs across the SFCs of the states on account of the fact that majority of the
members of SFCs consist of serving bureaucrats and one was appointed in place of others on
account of the latters inability to spare time due to increase in his/her work-load or they are
sent on deputation for serving other departments under different designation by the respective
state government19.
3. Constitution of SFCs in phases: Appointment of all SFC members does not come along
with the date of issuance of Notification order of SFC i.e., there is a time lag between
issuance of Notification order of constitution of SFC and appointment of SFC members and
chairperson. Again SFC members are not appointed simultaneously rather they are appointed
and hold office in phases due mainly to the fact, as concluded from the SFC reports, that
heavy responsibilities of serving bureaucrats prevent them from taking charge of the office
promptly.

19
Few examples could be cited in this respect. Rajasthan second SFC had experienced frequent change of Member
Secretary. The commission had five bureaucrats as Member Secretaries from time to time varying for a period of
one month to nine months. As admitted by the Commission, this partly accounts for the delay in submission of final
report by the Commission (Report of the Second SFC, Rajasthan, 2001: Preface). Likewise, second SFC of
Himachal Pradesh had as many as six Chairman. It is, therefore, suggested that the entire commission should be
constituted at one go to curtail delay in submission of report which is one of the most serious handicaps in the
functioning of the SFCs. Second SFC of Haryana feels that the state should ensure that the composition of SFC is
not disturbed till the completion of the task entrusted to it while frequent changes resulting in discontinuity and
cohesiveness of thoughts and methodology (Second SFC, Haryana, 2000:13).
76
4. Time lag between issuance of ToR of the Commission and Notification order of
constituting SFC: In several instances, ToR came much later than Notification order of the
constitution of SFC and even some cases ToR is not at all provided to several SFCs.
5. Non-provision of office space immediately after the constitution of SFC: Number of SFC
reports complained that there has been a significant delay in providing office space to them
after constitution of SFC that eventually makes it difficult for them to submit their reports
within a prescribed time period20.
6. Absence of permanent SFC cell: Such absence actually leads to maximum time being spent
on collecting basic data and other relevant information required by SFC that could have been
collected in a routine manner by the permanent cell for the use of SFC

There seems to be no well thought out planning or co-ordination between submission of

reports of SFCs and tabling ATR before the respective state Legislatures. As discussed earlier,
some structural drawbacks in the functioning of SFCs have been causing inordinate delay in
submitting reports of SFC but it is completely inexplicable why the same delay is present in
tabling ATR. Is it due to the fact that states are looking for excuses to bypass and to delay
implementing recommendations of SFCs? The apprehension seems to be valid in the light of the
fact that with regard to implementation of the SFC recommendations which were accepted, by
and large most states not only failed to take follow up action in terms of
legislative/administrative measures but also did not honor their commitment for the release of
additional funds (GOI, 12th FC, 2004: 143-144). This aspect will be discussed in detail in the
subsequent section of this study.

20
As experienced by the first SFC of UP, filling up the posts at the office of SFC and arrangement for suitable
accommodation for the chairman, members and staff and computers was completed and made fully functional only
in August 1995 though the Commission was constituted on 22 nd October 1994. Thus greater part of the tenure of the
Commission remained very less effective due to the problems of staff, offices and accommodation (First SFC, Uttar
Pradesh, 1996: 12). Experience of the third SFC of Himachal Pradesh could also be worth mentioning in this
respect. The Commission was constituted on 26th May 2005 and it was required to submit its report by 31 st July
2006. However, its Member Secretary assumed charge on 27th May, 2005 and Chairman assumed charge on 3 rd
June 2005 but the officers and staff could not be appointed in time due to various official formalities. Despite best
efforts, the secretariat staff of the Commission could only be appointed in December 2005. As mentioned above, the
Commission was constituted on 27th May 2005 was required to make its report available by 31 st July 2006 but it
actually became functional only in December 2005 thus leaving hardly 6-7 months time according to the original
notification to complete its job which was impossible given the prevailing circumstances (Report of the third SFC,
Himachal Pradesh, 2007:8-9).
77
 Moreover, delayed submission of SFC reports combined with delayed tabling of ATR
before the state Legislature compounded the problem of maintenance of timely cycle of SFC in a
greater extent. The date of submission of first SFC along with tabling ATR was so delayed that
most part of its award period of first SFCs across the states was covered. Therefore, very little
time was left for consideration of the recommendations made by the first SFCs. Of 25 states,
period covered by the recommendations of first SFCs were five years only in case of Assam.
However, we have excluded Orissa and Tripura in this respect since period of coverage of their
first SFCs are more than five years hence not comparable with other states mentioned above. In
case of second SFC, submission of SFC reports along with tabling of respective ATRs were so
delayed that no state has five years coverage period and for third SFC only Kerala has five years
period to be covered by the recommendations of third SFCs (GOI, Report of the 13th FC, 2009:
416-423).

It is worth mentioning that foregoing conclusion was based on the information provided
by the 13th UFC regarding the constitution of SFCs, submission of SFC reports, tabling of ATR
and period covered by SFCs. Careful examination of different SFC reports might lead us to
slightly different conclusion than that of the previous one. The 13th UFC report seemed to have
failed to take into account the fact that few SFCs produced interim reports with a view to enable
the respective state governments to consider the recommendations of the concerned SFCs. In the
anticipation of the delay in submission of SFC reports few SFCs like third SFC of Rajasthan
whose mandated coverage period was from 2005-06 to 2009-10 was asked by the government to
produce an interim report in order to enable the state government to reflect the recommendations
of the Commission in the Revised Estimates 2005-06 and Budget Estimates 2006-07 (Report of
the Third SFC, Rajasthan, 2008:7). Likewise, the second SFC of Rajasthan whose mandated
coverage period was from 2000-01 to 2005-06 was also asked to produce an interim report in
order to enable the state government to reflect the recommendations of the Commission in the
Revised Estimates 2000-01 and Budget Estimates 2001-02 (Report of the Second SFC,
Rajasthan, 2001:3).

In conclusion, it can be said that in case of most SFCs across the states combination of
different factors like delayed issuance of ToR, frequent changes in the composition of SFCs,
significant delay in providing office space and considerable period of time being taken in
78
completing final composition of SFC led to a situation where greater part of the mandated life
span of SFCs remained ineffective and hence non-functional. Therefore it is not only necessary
to fix a time span of SFC for report submission but the casual approach shown by the state
governments in dealing with SFCs should also be checked.

3. Difficulties Faced by the SFCs in Sourcing Data

Reports of SFC should contain an estimation and analysis of the finances of the state as
well as the local bodies at the pre and post transfer stages along with a quantification of the
revenues that could be generated additionally by the local bodies by adopting the measures
recommended therein. The gap that still remains would then constitute the basis for the measure
to be recommended by the UFC. For undertaking this task, SFCs should be equipped with
credible and up to date data base of local bodies. But the existing condition regarding
maintenance of database of local bodies across different states barring only few is as follows:

There is no comprehensive system of collecting, compiling and monitoring the status of

Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRI) finances regularly
Compilation of disaggregated data in the formats suggested by Comptroller of Auditor
General (CAG) in a time series which would enable SFCs to assess the income and
expenditure of the local bodies is grossly absent
Lack of information on the initiatives taken by PRIs of the respective states towards data
base building for which funds were earmarked by Eleventh and Twelfth Union Finance
Commission.
Absence of permanent SFC cell in the Finance Department of each state where raw data
could be furnished regularly.

The main source of data pertaining to local bodies used by different UFCs and SFCs is
data provided by the state governments. Unfortunately, states are providing inconsistent poor
quality data to SFCs as well as to UFC as noted by the 11th, 12th and 13th UFCs along with
different SFCs. Thirteenth UFC regretted that ten years had elapsed since the 11th UFC
underlined the need for maintaining a data base as well as up to date accounts and five years had

79
elapsed since the 12th UFC made similar recommendation. Despite this, little improvement has
been noted in the situation. Data provided to the 13th UFC by the states are sparse, inconsistent
with the data provided to other UFCs. Moreover, there are also significant discontinuities in the
data provided to the 13th UFC by the states relating to finances of local bodies (GOI, Report of
the 13th FC, 2009:165).

Consequent upon such gross absence of database, different UFCs observed that each SFC
devised its own format for the collection of the data and preparation of the report and hence the
SFC reports had wide variance in the content and the data presented making absolutely difficult
for the UFCs to get a clear picture of the state of the finances of the Panchayats and
municipalities from these reports. Self evidently, the existing situation has been preventing UFCs
from fulfilling their constitutional mandate relating to quantification of the required
augmentation of the consolidated fund on the basis of the SFC recommendations. Thus the data
supplied by the states as well as the reports of the SFCs did not provide a sound basis to quantify
uniformly across all states the supplementation required to the resources of their respective rural
and urban local bodies. In other words, the absence of data necessary for rational determination
of the gap between the cost of service delivery and the capacity to raise resources makes the task
of recommending measures for achieving equalization of services among local bodies almost
impossible.

The 11th and 12th UFCs, therefore, took initiative to collect data on the finances of the
Panchayat and municipalities here too they had to depend on the states for receiving the
database. The states tend to be quite casual in furnishing data to UFCs as evidenced from several
instances. Urban Local Body (ULB)-data supplied by the Government of West Bengal to the 12th
UFC was without that of the Kolkata Corporation which commands about a third of ULBs
budget of the state. Again Maharashtra and Rajasthan data combined both revenue and capital
items. Thus, as opined by NIPFP (2010) study, data on ULBs and Rural Local Body (RLBs)
presented by the 12th UFC is suspect and should be treated as indicative and not used for decision
making (NIPFP, 2010: 25).

80
Against this backdrop of virtual absence of database at local level it remains to be seen how
many SFCs admitted lack of database and recommended measures to remedy the situation? And
how did they develop their methodologies of estimating resource requirements of local bodies in
the absence of database and fulfilled their constitutional mandate of recommending measures of
horizontal and vertical devolution of resources to PRIs? Different studies indicate that no state
has any data base on RLBs this is also true for the ULBs except Tamil Nadu, Kerala and to some
extent Gujarat. A study by NIPFP (2010), shows that the data base on which the SFCs based
their reports was absent in West Bengal and poor in most states except in Kerala. Furthermore,
SFC report of Uttaranchal was not based on processed data and meaningful budget classification
of the local bodies (NIPFP, 2010: 15 and 26).

It is surprising to note that successive finance commissions of all states unanimously

expressed their concern over lack of data base and almost all of them felt the need of an agency
who can collect and provide comprehensive and up to date data and information relating to the
finances of local bodies centrally at the state level but very few of them recommended specific
measures relating to this issue (e.g., First, Second and Third SFC of Assam, First SFC of
Rajasthan and Second SFC of Orissa). And even among these few SFCs, only small number of
SFCs attempted to go deep into the issue of unearthing the causes of lack of database and actual
status of utilization of database improvement grants provided both by Eleventh (2000-2005) and
Twelfth UFC (2005-2010) particularly those of second and third batch of SFCs across the states.
The actual state-wise status of utilization of grants provided by these two Union Finance
Commissions earmarked for database improvement is not yet known. But complaint made by
successive SFCs regarding lack of data base and their perpetual recourse to time consuming
method of collection of primary data through circulating questionnaire to concerned government
offices, Urban and Rural Local Bodies, holding discussions with different stake holders and
inviting views and suggestions from the same combined with collection of secondary data from
government documents makes it clear that grant earmarked for database improvement by some
SFCs and UFCs did not produce the desired result. Moreover, the data collected through
questionnaires are hardly satisfactory because due to time constraint, data has to be collected on
sample basis and even then responses are very poor. And even among such poor responses,
considerable number of questionnaire are being rejected on account of serious inconsistencies

81
and discrepancies in their information particularly in terms of classificatory nature where it was
difficult to determine what constituted their own revenue receipts and what conspired the object
specific grant from the higher level of governments.

Apart from that the collection of data by applying this methodology takes long time
particularly for gathering information from different quarters and analyzing them and preparing
the report. Data collected through questionnaires had to be reclassified, harmonized, segregated
and frequently cross checked for turning it into useable form leading to substantial delay in
submission of reports as acknowledged by different SFCs.

The above mentioned methodology applied by different SFCs for collection of necessary
data by SFCs can at best work as a supplementary information but can not be substituted for
proper database. Thus in the absence of any budgetary format and reliable figures of receipt and
expenditure particularly at PRIs level any attempt of making financial projection for the future in
respect of PRIs would tend to be a purely theoretical exercises and hence can affect the quality of
SFC reports and recommendations therein.

The SFC should have been primarily concerned with horizontal resource gap of the local
bodies with a view to redressing intra-regional inequality. But the existing database does not
enable the SFC to undertake the task satisfactorily. Even the primary task of SFC can not be
performed due to the absence of database. The study undertaken by Mishra (2003) highlights that
due to gross lack of database most SFCs have not even made estimates of the magnitude of
resources which local bodies need for improving and maintaining their basic services. Of the 20
SFCs under the purview of the study undertaken by Mishra (2003), 13 have made efforts in the
direction of quantification of the requirements of local bodies while others have not quantified
their demands for funds. Even those which have quantified have not specifically indicated as to
how much funds they need from the UFC and how much would be met by additional resource
mobilization through own sources and how much by devolution from the respective state
governments. That apart, the estimates made by the SFC may not be reliable because of
questionable assumptions on which they have based their estimates. Moreover, there has been no
uniformity in the norms adopted in the approach and methodology deployed for arriving at these
estimates and with few exceptions the SFCs have not indicated the requirements for funds

82
separately for the Operation & Maintenance of different individual basic services (Mishra, 2003:
31-33).

Gravity of the existing problem of inconsistent analytical methodologies applied by SFC

reports could be understood from the study undertaken by Mathur and Peterson (2006) where
they mentioned that the different SFCs have adopted widely varying and often ad hoc,
definitions of resource gap. Successive SFCs in the same state often used different and
contradictory definitions of resource gap. Even within a single SFC report, the conceptual
definitions of resource gap are frequently followed by a short-cut quantification procedure that is
inconsistent with the definition set out (Mathur and Peterson, 2006: 8).

4. Reasons for the lack of database

Absence of budget window for local bodies in the states budget coupled with antiquated
accounting practices and the tendency of keeping accounts and audit pending for years seem to
be the main reasons for non-availability of credible data on financial performance of local bodies
i.e., income and expenditure of local bodies. Accurate data on the financial performance of local
bodies are best obtained from accounts of the local bodies themselves apart from the budget
documents of the state governments and the respective Finance Accounts. This requires that all
state governments make distinct budget provisions for local bodies, the expenditure relating to
which are reported in the Finance Accounts. Such an approach has been recommended by 11th,
12th and 13th UFC as well as the SARC.

A number of states do maintain distinct budgetary provision for amounts transferred by

them to each tier of PRIs and each category of ULBs. They provide object head wise details in
the budget documents. It is desirable that this best practice be followed by all states. 13th UFC
recommends that a supplement to the budget documents be prepared by the state governments.
The supplement should show the details of plan and non-plan wise classification of transfers for
all categories of ULBs and all tiers of PRIs from major head to object head, which have been
depicted in the main budget under the minor heads this supplement could also incorporate details
of funds transferred directly to the local bodies outside the state government budget (GOI,
Report of the 13th FC, 2009:168).

83
5. Measures taken by UFCs in developing database of local bodies

Eleventh UFC recommended ad hoc annual grant of Rs. 1600 crore for Panchayats and
Rs. 400 crore for municipalities and mandated certain activities such as maintenance of accounts,
development of database and audit to be first charge on this grant. Amount remaining thereafter
was to be utilized by the local bodies for maintenance of core civic services. Like 11th UFC, 12th
UFC also noted the importance of building database and maintenance of accounts by local bodies
and urged that the part of their support be earmarked by the state government for this purpose.
As noticed by the 13th UFC, while a few states have set up an excellent set of accounts, the
majority of states have not done so. As a result financial and operational performance by local
bodies continues to be of poor quality and the data remains cross sectionally unreliable for the
determination of local body grant amongst states. In response to this critical situation, 13th UFC
opted for a stronger incentive system. The Commission noticed that conditioanlities imposed by
the previous commissions in utilizing grants have met with limited success and the Commission
feels that incentivebased approach may yield better results than an exhortation based one in
matters relating to maintaining a comprehensive database as well an upto-date accounting system
(GOI, Report of the 13th FC, 2009:167). However, NIPFP (2010) study feels that 11th and 12th
UFC started from the wrong side. It is required to earmark at least 20 per cent under the service
up-gradation grant to be monitored by the State Statistical Bureau for building the data base of
local bodies (NIPFP, 2010:28).

Thirteenth UFC recommended that grants to be devolved to local bodies should have two
components a basic component and a performance based component. All states will have access
to this grant for all the five years as per the criteria and weights mentioned by them. The states
will be eligible to draw down its share of the general performance grant which will be effective
from 2011-12 and till 2014-15 only if it complies with the nine conditions. These conditions
must be met by the end of a fiscal year for the state to be eligible to draw down its performance
grant for the succeeding fiscal year. Of these nine conditions, two can be mentioned in this
context.

1. Budget Window for Local Bodies in the State Budget: The state government should put in
place a supplement to the budget documents for local bodies (separately for PRIs and ULBs)
furnishing the details of plan and non-plan wise classification of transfers separately for all
84
 categories of ULBs and all tiers of PRIs from major head to object head which have been
depicted in the main budget under the minor heads.
2. Account and Audit of all Local Bodies be Entrusted with CAG: The CAG must be given
Technical Guidance and Supervision (TGS) over the audit of all the local bodies in a state at
every tier/category. And its Annual Technical Inspection Report as well as the Annual Report
of the Director of Local Fund Audit must be placed before the State Legislature (GOI, Report
of the 13th FC, 2009: 178-179).

6. Reasons for low level of grant utilization earmarked for database improvement

Out of the total grant provided by the 11th UFC, Rs. 200 crore was earmarked for creation
of database and Rs. 483 crore for maintenance of accounts by local bodies. As per the
information received from the Ministry of Finance, only Rs. 93 crore and Rs. 113 crore was
utilized for creation of database and for maintenance of accounts respectively by local bodies.
The total utilization has thus been hardly 30 percent of the total allocation (GOI, Report of the
12th FC, 2004: 153-154).

The reasons for such gross under utilization are far from clear. However, in pursuance of
the detailed examination of gross lack of utilization of total grants released by the UFC, 12 th
UFC realized that conditionalities imposed for release of funds to local bodies ultimately
handicapped the very local bodies for which they were meant. As noticed by the Commission,
the central government imposes condition on the disbursement of such grant. The 12th UFC
recommended that no additional conditionality be imposed over and above the conditions
suggested by them (GOI, Report of the 12th FC, 2004: 158). But despite such liberal approach
some states have not been able to draw down even the 12th UFC grant. As viewed by the 13th
UFC, this is primarily due to non-submission of Utilization Certificates by the state
governments. It appears that part of this handicap is attributable to lack of maintenance of
accounts by the local bodies and their slack attitude towards getting accounts audited. This
clearly reinforces the need for all local bodies to create and maintain a database encompassing
their resources, operations and financial performances indicators (GOI, Report of the 13th FC,
2009: 152).

85
 Detailed study regarding state-wise break up of lack of utilization of grants earmarked for
data improvement of local bodies provided by both the 11th and 12th UFC could have thrown
some light on the fact why it has been unable to yield the desired result. However, some SFC
reports helped us to understand the problem better. Third SFC reports of Assam noticed that
Government of Assam (GoA) could avail hardly about 50 percent of the recommended 11th UFC
grant earmarked for improvement of database of local bodies of the state and the Rural
Development Department of the state spent the major portion of it for up-gradation of database at
the Head Quarter. This was not the intention of the 11th UFC. Moreover, what came as rude
shock was that the failure of the Head Quarter to immediately provide the data required by the
third SFC of the state. Meanwhile the grants recommended by the 12th UFC started flowing in.
But no amount till the financial year 2006-07, as noticed by the Commission, was allowed to
percolate down to the grass root level except that SMC computers have been centrally purchased
and sent to PRIs. These computers are yet to be used and in many places even the cartons have
not been opened. Moreover, there is no computer operator in the Gram Panchayats of the state as
observed by the Commission (Report of the Third SFC, Assam, 2008:7-8). NIPFP (2010) study
feels that absence of monitoring and supervisory agency at the state level causes such low level
of grant utilization earmarked for creation of database by 11th UFC and 12th UFC (NIPFP, 2010:
27).

7. SFC Recommendations and its Implementation by State Governments

Articles 243 I(1) and 243 Y(1) of the 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendment Act
provides for the mandatory constitution of a finance commission at the state level at specified
intervals. For most states, the Third State Finance Commissions have either submitted their
reports or are in the process of doing so. In case of some states even the report of the Fourth
State Finance Commissions are now available. Table 5.1 provides information on the
constitution and submission of the most recent SFCs for which reports are available and the
devolution recommended by them. In other words, if, for a state, the Third SFC has submitted its
report but the same is not available in the public domain we have in table 5.1 reported
information pertaining to the states second SFC only.

86
 Table 5.1 summarises the status of the most recent SFCs in different states and the action
initiated in regard to them. It may be seen from the table that in respect of most of the states,
Action Taken Reports on the SFCs are not available. Therefore, we are not in a position to
undertake a serious analysis of the implementation of these SFC recommendations. However,
for the states for which ATRs are available for the latest SFC reports, we have reported the
action taken by these state governments in column 7 of table 5.1.

For earlier SFC reports for which Action taken reports are available the overall
observations relating to SFC recommendations are contained later in this section.

87
 Table 5.1 Constitution and submission of Latest SFC Reports and Recommended Devolution
Date of
Date of Date of
Sl. State submission Period
Constitution submission Devolution Recommended
No (latest SFC)* of SFC covered
of SFC of ATR
report
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
The total devolution by way of assignments and grants recommended by the
commission for both rural and urban local bodies is Rs. 1793.94 cr (Rs.
Andhra 31.3.2003
2000-01 to 1167.33 cr for rural bodies and Rs. 626.61 cr for urban bodies). It works out
1 Pradesh 8.12.1998 19.08.2002 (ATR not
2004-05 to 10.385% (6.76% to rural bodies and 3.63% for urban bodies) of the total
(2nd SFC) available)
tax and non-tax revenues of the state including the share of central taxes for
the year 2000-01
Recommended an overall devolution package of at least 50% of the total
state revenues to the PRIs.
Arunachal After keeping in view the requirement of resources of the PRIs and financial
2 Pradesh 22.09.2005 April 2008 N.A. N.A. position of the state government the commission recommended that 20% of
(1st SFC) the states share in central taxes may be assigned to PRIs and 30% of the
staff position of the concerned line departments may be put to strengthen
the workforce of PRIs
a) No devolution for 2006-07; b) 10 % of Non Loan Gross Own Tax Revenue
Receipt, minus actual collection expenditure of Govt of Assam for the year
25.09.2009
Assam 2006-07 to 2007-08; c) 25 % of Non Loan Gross Own Tax Revenue Receipt, minus
3 06.02.2006 27.03.2008 (ATR not
(3rd SFC) 2010-11 collection expenditure of Govt of Assam should form the Divisible pool out of
available)
which allocations should be made to PRIs and ULBs during the three financial
years 2008-11
Bihar 2010-11 to 7.5% in state's own tax revenue, net of collection costs should be devolved to
4 22.06.2007 26.06.2010 N.A. Local Bodies
(4th SFC) 2014-15
Recommended that 8.287 % of States net own tax revenue to be devolved
to local bodies (6.628 % to RLBs and 1.659 % to ULBs based on 2001 popln).
Chhattisgarh 2005-06 to
5 22.8.2003 15.05.2007 30.07.2009 The state government through it ATR awarded 6% States net own tax
(1st SFC) 2009-10
revenue from 2007-08 onwards to local bodies (4.79% to RLBs and 1.21
% to ULBs)

88
 Date of
Date of Date of
Sl. State submission Period
Constitution submission Devolution Recommended
No (latest SFC)* of SFC covered
of SFC of ATR
report
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Goa 2007-08 to 2 % of State's own revenue to PRIs out of which 25 % to ZPs and the rest to
6 16.08.2005 31.12.2007 N.A.
(2nd SFC) 2011-12 GPs and PSs
RLBs- Additional taxation of worth Rs.293.09 crores per annum; Profession tax;
Gujarat 13.7.1998; 1996-97 to 50%; Entertainment tax: 75%: other Grants
7 15.9.1994 28.08.2001
(1st SFC) ULBs 2000-01
Oct.,1998
Recommended global sharing of state taxes @ 4 % of the total own tax
revenue of the state excluding Excise duty, Local area development tax
(LADT) to local bodies after retaining 1.25 % as collection charges of the
Haryana 2006-07 to government. (The state government through its ATR accepted the following:
8 22-12-2005 31.12.2008 01.09.2010 (i) For 2006-07 and 2007-08: sharing of state taxes @ 2 % of the total own
(3rd SFC) 2010-11
tax revenue of the state excluding Excise duty, Local area development tax
(LADT) to local bodies after retaining 1.25 % as collection charges of the
government; (ii) 3 % for 2008-09 and 2009-10; and (iii) 2% for 2010-11)
Recommended devolution equivalent to 2.75 per cent of the aggregate
Himachal 04.06.2008
2007-08 to States own tax and non-tax revenues to the local government institutions
9 Pradesh 26-05-2005 2.11.2007 (ATR not
2011-12 starting with the year 2008-09. This percentage may be kept fixed for the
(3rd SFC) available)
forecast period upto 2011-12.
Jammu &
10 Kashmir 15.1.2008 N.A. N.A. 2009-10 Report Not Submitted
(1st SFC)
Jharkhand Not
11 28.01.2004 N.A. N.A.
(1st SFC) specified
Karnataka 2010-11 to 1.33% of states own revenue receipts to be devolved to PRIs and ULBs in
12 28.08.2006 31.12.2008 N.A. the ratio of 70:30.
(2nd SFC) 2014-15

89
 Date of
Date of Date of
Sl. State submission Period
Constitution submission Devolution Recommended
No (latest SFC)* of SFC covered
of SFC of ATR
report
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Recommended a vertical transfer system comprising of the following
components: (1) General purpose funds: Local governments be given 3.5% of
States own tax revenue (SORT) using the t-2 method i.e., devolution in a
particular year is determined based on the tax collection figures of two years
back; (2) Support for the fiscally weak LGs: Recommended gap funding to
such GPs and set apart a lumpsum of Rs.25 crore from General Purpose Fund
Kerala 2011-12 to (GPF) from the share of GPs; (3) Maintenance funds: 4.5% of SOTR (t-2) in
13 19.09.2009 18.01.2011 N.A. 2011-12; 5% od SOTR (t-2) in 2012-13 and 5.5% of SOTR (t-2) in 2013-16; (4)
(4th SFC) 2015-16
Development funds: Commission recommends an allocation of 25% of the
proposed plan size in 2011-12; 27.5% in 2012-13; 28.5% in 2013-14; 29.5% in
2014-15; and 30% in 2015-16; and (5) Special grants for deprived Gram
Panchayats: Recommend a special grant of Rs. 25 lakh to each of the 16 very
vulnerable GPs and a grant of Rs. 15 lakh to each of the vulnerable 58 GPs as
identified by the commission
5 % of the States total own tax revenue of the previous year net of 10% as
Madhya collection charges and net of assigned taxes to the local bodies. 80 % of the 5
2006-07 to
14 Pradesh 12.07.2005 01.11.2008 05.02.2010 % (i.e., 4%) to be allocated to PRIs and the remaining 1 % to ULBs.
2010-11
(3rd SFC) State government accepted this recommendation in its AT)

29.03.2006 State should devolve 40 % of its share of taxes, duties, tolls and fees leviable
Maharashtra 1999-2000 to the panchayats and the municipalities
15 22.06.199 27.03.2002 (ATR not
(2nd SFC) to 2001-02
available)
2001-02 to 10% of tax and non-tax and state's share in central taxes of State; PRIs:
2005-06 34.38% and 20.60% to ULBs.
Manipur
16 03.01.2003 Nov 2004 02.12.2005 award
(2nd SFC)
period
extended to

90
 Date of
Date of Date of
Sl. State submission Period
Constitution submission Devolution Recommended
No (latest SFC)* of SFC covered
of SFC of ATR
report
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
31.3.2010
17 Meghalaya Exempt under Article 243 (M)

18 Mizoram Exempt under Article 243 (M)

Under Exempt under Article 243 (M). SFC constituted under State Act.
19 Nagaland 01.08.2008 22.10.2009 considerati 2010-15 No specific devolution has been recommended for local bodies
on
15% of the average gross tax revenue of the State for the years 2005-06
Orissa February, 2010-11 to to2007-08 @ Rs 896.17 crore per annum( 4480.85 crore for the 5 year period
20 10.09.2008 27.01.2010
(3rd SFC) 2011 2014-15 2010-11 to 2014-15)
State government accepted this recommendation in its ATR
22.05.2007 SFC recommend that the state Government devolve 4% of its net tax
Punjab 2006-07 to collection (minus compensation for abolished octroi) to meet their operating
21 17.09.2004 28.12.2006 (ATR not
(3rd SFC) 2010-11 expenses
available)
The Commission recommended devolution of 3.50% of the net proceeds of
States own tax revenue to PRIs and ULBs. Out of this, 0.50% share will be
17.03.2008 earmarked for incentives to these local bodies for mobilizing revenue from
Rajasthan 2005-06 their own sources. (i.e., it recommended 3% of net proceeds of States own
22 15.09.2005 27.02.2008 (ATR not
(3rd SFC) to2009-10 tax revenue for devolution to local bodies and 0.5% as incentive for revenue
available)
mobilization by the PRIs and the ULBs; Entertainment tax:100%; Royalty on
minerals: 1%.
Recommended transfer of 2% of the proceeds of state's own revenue (from
Land revenue, stamps & registration, tax on sale & trade etc., animal
Sikkim (ATR not 2010-11 to husbandry, forest and wildlife, minor irrigation, village & small industries and
23 04.03.2009 27.02.2010
(3rd SFC) available) 2014-15 Tourism) net of collection costs in 2010-11; 2.14% in 2011-12; 2.28% in
2012-13; 2.43% in 2013-14; and 2.58% in 2014-15

91
 Date of
Date of Date of
Sl. State submission Period
Constitution submission Devolution Recommended
No (latest SFC)* of SFC covered
of SFC of ATR
report
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
States Own Tax Revenue as arrived at by adopting Compounded Annual Rate
10.05.2007 of Growth for major State Taxes viz. Sales Tax, Motor Vehicle Tax, Stamp
Tamil Nadu 2007-08 to
24 02.12.2004 30.09.2006 (ATR not Duty & State Excise and for other taxes and expenses at MTFP projections,
(3rd SFC) 2011-12
available) the devolution transfer to local bodies shall be 10% for each year during the
entire award period of 3rd SFC;
Tripura 2001-02 to 5% of the divisible pool to PRIs;
25 29.10.1999 10.04.2003 30.04.2004
(2nd SFC) 2005-06 7.5% of states net proceeds of tax revenue to ULBs.
Uttar
2006-07 to
26 Pradesh 23.12.2004 29.08.2008 N.A. 6% of net tax proceeds to PRIs and 9% to ULBs.
2010-11
(3rd SFC)
Recommended that 10 per cent of state's own revenues (both tax and non-
05.10.2006
Uttaranchal 2006-07 to tax excluding interest receipts, dividend, profits, royalties from minerals and
27 30.04.2005 06.06.2006 (ATR not
(2nd SFC) 2010-11 sale proceeds from forest produce etc.) should devolve on the local bodies in
available)
each of the five years of its award period (2006-07 to 2010-11
The Commission recommended an untied fund allocation to the tune of
16.07.2009 Rs.800 crore constituting around 5% of the States own net tax revenue for
West Bengal 2008-09-
28 22.02.2006 31.10.2008 (ATR not the year 2008-09. It also recommended a progressive increase of the untied
(3rd SFC) 2012-13
available) fund allocation at the minimum rate of 12% p.a. on a cumulative basis for the
subsequent 4 financial yrs.
Notes:
1) * Here the latest SFC means the latest SFC for which the report is available.
rd
2) For Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Maharashtra and Tripura the reports of the 3 SFC is not vailable as they are either not submitted or still under
nd nd
consideration. For these states we have provided information for 2 SFC in the table. Similarly for Gujarat as the report of the 2 SFC is not available
st
we provided information for 1 SFC of the state.
Source: Panchayati Raj Department of different state Governments; and Report of the Thirteenth Finance Commission.

92
 Though the 73rd and 74th Amendment Act requires the mandatory constitution of a
finance commission at the state level at specified intervals under Article 243 I (1) and 243 Y (1),
the state governments enjoy the discretion to accept or reject the recommendations of SFCs.
Unlike in the case of the Union Finance Commission recommendations which have a convention
be being accepted by the Union Government, there is no such convention in the case of SFC
recommendations. Not surprisingly, the recommendations of the SFCs are not taken seriously by
the state governments. Successive UFCs particularly the Twelfth Finance Commission (GOI,
12th FC, 2004:149) and Second Administrative Reforms Commission (SARC) (GOI, SARC,
2007:64-65) suggested that states should follow the norms set by the central government by
accepting the recommendations made by the respective SFCs. However, the question remains the
extent to which the reports of SFCs could be accepted if these reports lack necessary quality on
account of inconsistent analytical methodologies applied by them coupled with lack of proper
estimation of the magnitude of resources required by the local bodies for improving and
maintaining their basic services. It is worth mentioning that 12th UFC went so far as to conclude
that failure to implement SFC recommendations defeats the very purpose of the constituting the
SFCs. The above conclusion made by the 12th UFC, as stated by Mathur and Peterson (2006),
..appears paradoxical, in light of the Twelfth Central Finance Commissions assessment about
the poor quality of the State Finance Commission reports and the lack of adequate analysis to
justify SFC recommendations (Mathur and Peterson, 2006:8-9).

Detailed recommendations of State Finance Commissions are given in table 5.1. Though
only a few states have brought out action taken reports (ATR) with modified acceptance, it is not
clear from other states whether these recommendations have been accepted or not as the ATRs
are not available. Irrespective of whether or not the recommendations of the most recent SFCs
are either accepted, we have attempted to analyse in actual devolution from the State to rural
local bodies based on the information collected from the Finance Accounts for some of the states
(5.2). From the table we see that excepting in the states of Tamil Nadu, Madhya Pradesh and
Chhattisgarh, the devolution in all other states have been much lower than those recommended
by the SFCs. In Madhya Pradesh it is around 15 per cent of the states own revenues for the
years 2006-07 and 2007-08. Here the Grants-in-aid recommended by the SFC is also included in

93
the devolution. The other state Tamil Nadu, devolved 11.12 per cent of its own tax revenues to
local bodies in 2007-08 as against the SFC recommended devolution of 10 per cent.

Table 5.2: Recommendation of State Finance Commissions and Devolution

to Local Bodies in Selected States
State Finance Actual Disbursement Remarks
Commission
Recommendations
Andhra Pradesh 10.385 % of Own 2002-03 2004-05 2005-06
Revenues for Local 6.52 6.20 7.06
Bodies
6.76 for RLB 3.56 3.61 3.44
3.63 for ULB 2.96 2.60 3.62
Assam 10% of Gross Own 2007-08
Tax Revenue for 6.73% of As % of own tax revenue and is
2007-08, Own Tax Grants in Aid and not Assignment
No devolution for Revenue
2006-07
Chhattisgarh Total 6% of Own 13.77 Data is for 2007-08
Tax
RLBs 4.79% 3.93
ULBs 1.21 for the 9.85
year 2007-08
Goa 2% of Own 0.25% of Data is for 2007-08
revenues of the Own
State for the year revenue
2007-08 for 2007-
08
Madhya Pradesh 5% of States own 2006-07 2007-08
tax revenue of the 14.90 15.06
previous year
Punjab 4% of Net tax 2006-07 2007-08 data pertains only to
collection 0.64 0.24 ULBs and no
assignments are
reported from RLBs in
the 13 FC report
Rajasthan 3.5 % of own tax 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08
revenues 1.85 1.60 1.69
Tamil Nadu 10% of own tax 11.12 % of Own tax revenue for 2007-08
revenues for 2007-
08
Uttaranchal 10 % of States 2006-07 2007-08
Own revenues 0.36 0.43 Of own tax revenue and
not of own revenues
net of interest receipts
Source: Panchayati Raj Department of different state Governments and Finance Accounts
94
 Andhra Pradesh has devolved only a half of what the SFC recommended for rural local
bodies during the period 2003-04, 2004-05 and 2005-06. Even in case of ULBs, it devolved
lower than what was recommended by the SFC. However, for 2005-06, its devolution to ULBs
was similar to that recommended by SFC. Goa, Punjab and Uttaranchal have devolved
insignificant portion of their own revenues in comparison to the recommendation of the SFCs.

Thus, our analysis shows that, by and large, the states have not followed SFC
recommendations in making transfers to rural local bodies. Although it is true that the states are
not legally bound to accept the recommendations of SFCs, completely neglecting them makes
the Institution irrelevant. We find that even when the states proclaim that they accept the
recommendation of the SFCs in their ATRs, in most cases we find that they do not actually
implement them. Another issue here is the confusion between Grants in aid and devolution. The
states are not making clear-cut distinction between these two in maintaining the information.

According to Article 243 I (4) and 243 Y (2) the recommendations not being accepted
have also to be presented before the state Legislature along with the reason thereof. This has not
strictly followed by the most states as evident from different Action Taken Reports (ATR).
Moreover, as mentioned before, the absence of any time limits for placing ATR before the state
Legislature in the Conformity Act as well as in the 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendment Act
provides opportunity to the states to delay in taking action on recommendations made by SFCs.
The Twelfth Finance Commission suggested that SFC should be constituted for a lifespan of
eighteen months and a time limit for six months be prescribed for a state government to act on
the SFC recommendations (GOI, 12th FC, 2004: 142). However, there is hardly any uniformity in
time taken for tabling ATR before the state Legislatures. The time taken for tabling ATR on first
batch of SFCs across the states ranging from one month (Assam) to three and half years
(Haryana). For Second SFCs it ranges from four months in case of Uttarakhand to five years two
months for Tripura and for third SFC, though most are reported as under consideration as
provided by 13th UFC report but available information shows that it ranged from half month
(Rajasthan) to one and half years (Assam) (GOI, 13th FC, 2009: 416-423).

An attempt has been made to measure the quality of ATR placed before the respective
state Legislatures in terms of following criteria. It is disheartening to note that most states fail to
attain these basic qualities because;
95
 Current status of implementation of SFC recommendations is not provided in the respective
ATRs
Reasons for partial acceptance and non-acceptance of recommendations of SFCs is not given
in the ATR
The number of recommendations provided in ATR does not tally with those provided in the
SFC reports
Previous commissions recommendations categorized under for further consideration or
under active consideration have never been considered. Although states are constituting
their next SFC, several recommendations of the previous SFC are still continued to be under
examination. In other words states hardly take timely action on such recommendations
There is an absolute lack of clarification in ATR regarding the provisions like accepted with
modifications and accepted in principle often used by the state governments against some
recommendations made by SFCs
In some ATRs only numbers of accepted recommendations are mentioned, in this number
game sometime the most crucial recommendations are found rejected surreptitiously.

So far as existing situation regarding the status of implementation of the accepted

recommendations are concerned it is noticed that allocation in the budget for additional resources
to the Panchayats are made following the recommendations of SFCs but funds are released by
the state governments to line departments/parasatals which operate independent of PRIs. Follow
up actions needed to implement the recommendations that are already accepted are very tardy
particularly regarding administrative and legislative measures (see Box 5.2).Formally accepted
recommendations of SFCs pertaining to financial measures are half-heartedly followed by the
states. There are four types of situations:
Accepted the recommendations of SFCs in totality i.e., in budgetary allocation and actual
transfer made to PRIs
Accepted the recommendations of SFCs fully in the respective ATR but neither it was
reflected in budgetary allocation nor in actual transaction
Accepted the recommendations of SFC partially in ATR but even such partial acceptance is
neither reflected in their budgetary allocation nor in the actual transfer.

96
 Accepted the recommendations of SFCs partially but the figure shown in budgetary
allocation is less than the accepted amount committed in ATR and actual transfer is even less
than the budgetary allocation21.

Box 5.2

Even though most of the recommendations of the Second SFC of Tamil Nadu were accepted by the
State government yet there was laxity in implementing the recommendations by the administrative
department of the Secretariat. In fact on the recommendations relating to the improving of resource
base casual approach is noticeable. For example, second SFC has recommended change in property
tax reforms and it is related to urban local body. This recommendation was accepted by the state but
no orders are placed yet and no initiative was taken regarding the Amendment of the Tamil Nadu
District Municipalities Act 1920 and Municipal Corporation Acts, which is required in this respect
(Report of the Third SFC, Tamil Nadu, 2006: 14).

Regarding the status of the implementation of the First SFC of Tamil Nadu, it is noticed that in case of
PRIs the implementation only centred around devolution and its related package. On civic services no
specific orders have been passed either relating the norms recommended by the First SFC or
modifying them except for fixing norms for water supply. Even the government introduced some
modifications in few recommendations which the First SFC had not suggested. That apart, Tamil Nadu
government in their ATR accepted the recommendation of the First SFC for direct remittance to the
Village Panchayat account on the local body share of minerals and also share from the black granite
but subsequently Rural Development Department of the Secretariat have rejected this
recommendations (Report of the Second SFC, Tamil Nadu, 2001: 12-13).

Second SFC report of the Uttar Pradesh government noticed that administrative department have
shown a lackadaisical approach towards implementing some of the recommendations of the First SFC
and noticed following status of the accepted recommendations of the first SFC by the Uttar Pradesh
government:
Administrative department is yet to examine the issues relating to recommendations made by the
First SFC
Accepted by the government in ATR but the implementing department did not find it practical
Referred to the concerned department but follow up action is yet to be taken

21
In AP the 1st SFC recommended Rs. 818.84 crore to PRIs per year, state accepted Rs. 363.95 crore. But the actual
transfer was only Rs. 265.95 crore that too only during 1998-99 and 1999-00. In Maharashtra 1st SFC recommended
an additional resource flow of Rs. 364.32 crore per year to panchayats for 1999-00 to 2001-02. The state accepted a
financial commitment of Rs. 160.82 crore. However in practice the state released only Rs. 78.25 crore against a
budget provision of Rs. 317.91 crore (Subrahmanyam, 2004).
97
 Concerned department did not know whether a decision has been taken or not
Orders are yet to be issued on recommendations of the First SFC (Report of the Second SFC, Uttar
Pradesh, Vol. I, 2002:7-11).

Against this backdrop, different SFC reports suggested that there is an evident need for
prescribing specific time limits for completing follow-up action in respect of SFC
recommendation. And the follow up action on ATR needs to be monitored on quarterly basis by
the High Level Committee constituted for this purpose.

8. Conclusion

The creation of State Finance Commissions as mandated in the 73rd and 74th
Constitutional Amendment Act initiated a landmark in the evolution of the state-local body fiscal
relationship in the country. However, after more than 15 years of operation and functioning of
successive SFCs, one can not be highly optimistic about the expected outcome regarding the
augmentation of financial power of local bodies.

Generally SFCs across the states are constrained by two main inadequacies: conceptual
and functional. The experience so far has shown that SFCs are perceived more as a constitutional
formality than as an effective institution of restructuring state-local financial relations with a
view to augmenting the financial power of the latter. Such conceptual limitation leads to an acute
functional inadequacy where states in general have been showing lackadaisical approach towards
constitution of SFCs, provision and maintenance of updated database for the use of SFCs and
implementing and following-up recommendations of SFCs.

Needless to say, consequent upon the lack of database of finances of local bodies, SFCs
are compelled to follow inconsistent analytical methodologies, that prevent UFCs from fulfilling
their constitutional mandate relating to the quantification of the required augmentation of the
consolidated fund on the basis of the SFC recommendations, and also put severe constraint on
most SFCs in estimating the magnitude of resources which local bodies need for improving and
maintaining their basic services.

Almost all SFC reports criticized the fact that most state governments are quite casual
about taking the necessary actions regarding recommendations made by SFCs. The number of
98
recommendations provided in ATR quite often do not tally with those provided in the SFC
reports, and although states are constituting their next SFC, several recommendations of the
previous SFC are still continued to be under examination. In other words states rarely take
timely action on such recommendations. Moreover, even the status of implementation and
acceptance of the recommendations made by SFCs are very unsatisfactory across the states.
Against this backdrop, SFC reports along with 12th UFC and SARC stressed the fact that failure
to implement SFC recommendations defeats the very purpose of constituting the SFCs.
However, concerned academia argues that the above conclusion .appears to be paradoxical
particularly in light of the unanimous consensus regarding the poor quality of the SFC reports
and the lack of adequate analysis to justify SFC recommendations.

Nevertheless, it can be expected that over time necessary remedial measures will be taken
with the objective of creating efficient operating and functioning SFCs that would in turn enable
them to go a long way in putting the finances of local bodies on a relatively more systematic,
regular and predictable footing. It is also expected that future SFCs will be able to build up the
edifice of local finances on the foundation laid by the first generation of SFCs.

99
 CHAPTER 6

Concluding Remarks

Functional Devolution to Rural Local Bodies

Article 243G of the Constitution prescribes that, states may by law endow Panchayats with such
functions that are required to enable them to function as institutions of self-government.
However, functions listed in the 11th Schedule of the Constitution may be devolved through the
law but activities and sub-activities within each function can only be devolved through Activity
Mapping. Instead of devolving 29 subjects listed in the 11th Schedule of the Constitution on a
wholesale basis, functional Activity Mapping suggests that these major subjects need to be
unbundled into activities and sub-activities and assigned to appropriate level of local
governments following the principle of subsidiarity. Activity Mapping must also be undertaken
in accordance with an objective basis viz. setting standards, planning, asset creation, operation
and monitoring & evaluation. In doing so we need to apply public finance principles namely
economies of scale, externalities, equity, heterogeneity of demand and accountability principles.

Most of the states said to have assigned a majority of the important subjects to the Panchayats
through the State Conformity Act but in most cases they have failed to add to the existing
functional domain of local government due to the fact that devolution of functions are done
without unbundling each function into activities and sub-activities. In addition, total functional
devolution was done vaguely without having any role clarity. There has been hardly any rational
thinking as to which of the disaggregated activities based on the considerations like economies of
scale, externality, equity, heterogeneity of demand and accountability along with other important
aspects like efficiency, capacity, enforceability and proximity ought to be devolved to which
level of government. This lack of clarity in functional allocation coupled with absence of
disaggregation into detailed activities has led to considerable overlapping and duality of control
in most cases. This situation seriously undermines accountability. Moreover, in several states
many functions that have already been statutorily devolved to the PRIs are still being planned
and implemented by the line departments of the respective state governments. What is worse is

100
the fact that follow-up action in terms of appropriate administrative measures and formulating
relevant rules or guidelines to operationalise the intent legislature pertaining to devolution of
disaggregated activities to the appropriate level of government is very tardy.

The actual progress in pursuing comprehensive Activity Mapping could only be measured in
terms of the fact that whether devolution of functions to PRIs through legislation or executive
orders has been matched by concomitant transfers of funds and functionaries. Most states after
devolving several responsibilities upon the PRIs have neither transferred the requisite staffs nor
necessary funds needed by the Panchayats to carry out responsibilities.

The progress of Activity Mapping being undertaken by the State Governments has been slow as
perceived by the successive committees and commissions who attempted to review the actual
progress in this context. Some concerned academia have pointed out that some state governments
have approached the whole issue from the angle of transferring various on-going schemes
sponsored by the Central and State governments. Activity Mapping, according to them, is not to
transfer schemes, but to transfer certain functional responsibilities from one level of government
to another. Ministry of Panchayati Raj (MoPR) attributed the slow progress of Activity Mapping
to its inability to force the states to carry out activity mapping since it is a state matter. Following
this argument, the Standing Committee on Rural Development May (2006) opined that union
government cannot bypass the responsibility of successful implementation of Activity Mapping
on the pretext that it is being a state matter since implementation of Part IX of the Constitution is
the responsibility of the union government. The Report of the Working Group on Democratic
Decentralization and PRIs (2006), which examined 23 states, has however, indicated that some
states, namely, Assam, Karnataka, Kerala and West Bengal have made good progress.

Own Revenues of Panchayats

A major handicap in analyzing panchayat revenues is the paucity of data on panchayat finances.
There is no standing national data base on panchayat finances in India and the reports of the
Central Finance Commissions serve as the only source of information. This data is also not

101
reliable and subjected to lot of inconsistencies. Over the years not much has been done to
improve the panchayat database.

Analysis of the data provided by FC-XIII shows that the revenue mobilisation by panchayats has
been abysmally low and they are more dependent on fund transfers from higher levels of
government for their functioning, a fact also supported by the survey of PRIs in the four states.
Such dependence on funds from higher levels on governments reduces their autonomy thereby
reducing their role to being agents of higher levels of governments performing their functions.
The analysis also suggest that per capita own revenues are higher in states which have higher per
capita agriculture and allied activities GSDP Thus, while the revenue mobilisation by panchayats
in general is low, the states with higher per capita agriculture sector GSDP mobilized larger
revenues.

The poor performance of panchayats in generating own revenues can be attributed to a number
of factors. Excessive state control over panchayat tax domain has limited the autonomy of the
PRIs. The state control of tax domain of panchayats through statutory provisions regarding rates,
base and exemptions limits their revenue raising capacity. The absence of a floor rate has the
potential of adversely affecting the revenue mobilization as the panchayats may fix the tax rate at
a very low level. In addition, the state statutes have not changed much for long period of time to
address the ground realities. The tax structure needs to be revised with respect to rates and base.
Infusing flexibility to the system is required and innovations at local level should be encouraged.
The recommendations of State Finance Commissions to expand the tax domain of the PRIs
should be calibrated and considered on merit. The non-assignment of house and building tax
despite recommendations of successive State Finance Commissions in Orissa is an evidence of
rigidity that has crept into the system.. Within their limited tax domain failure of the PRIs can
also be attributed to factors like reluctance to levy taxes, poor administrative capacity, and
electoral politics. The elected representatives of the PRIs and the supporting staffs need to be
made aware of the various statutory provisions regarding tax rights through proper training.

102
The chapter also suggests measures to augment revenues of panchayats. These include
incentivising tax effort of the PRIs, improving their administrative capacity, providing additional
tax handles to the local bodies, etc.

Issues in State Finance Commissions

The creation of State Finance Commissions as mandated in the 73rd and 74th Constitutional
Amendment Act initiated a landmark in the evolution of the state-local body fiscal relationship in
the country. However, after more than 15 years of operation and functioning of successive SFCs,
one cannot be highly optimistic about the expected outcome regarding the augmentation of
financial power of local bodies.

Generally SFCs across the states are constrained by two main inadequacies: conceptual and
functional. The experience so far has shown that SFCs are perceived more as a constitutional
formality than as an effective institution of restructuring state-local financial relations with a
view to augmenting the financial power of the latter. Such conceptual limitation leads to an acute
functional inadequacy where states in general have been showing lackadaisical approach towards
constitution of SFCs, provision and maintenance of updated database for the use of SFCs and
implementing and following-up recommendations of SFCs.

Needless to say, consequent upon the lack of database of finances of local bodies, SFCs are
compelled to follow inconsistent analytical methodologies, that prevent UFCs from fulfilling
their constitutional mandate relating to the quantification of the required augmentation of the
consolidated fund on the basis of the SFC recommendations, and also put severe constraint on
most SFCs in estimating the magnitude of resources which local bodies need for improving and
maintaining their basic services.

It has been observed that most state governments are quite casual about taking the necessary
actions regarding recommendations made by SFCs. The number of recommendations provided in
ATR quite often do not tally with those provided in the SFC reports, and although states are
constituting their next SFC, several recommendations of the previous SFC are still continued to

103
be under examination. In other words states rarely take timely action on such
recommendations. Moreover, even the implementational status of accepted recommendations
made by SFCs is very unsatisfactory across the states. Against this backdrop, SFC reports along
with UFCs and Second Administrative Reform Commission stressed the fact that failure to
implement SFC recommendations defeats the very purpose of constituting the SFCs. However, it
appears to be paradoxical particularly in the light of the unanimous consensus regarding the poor
quality of the SFC reports and the lack of adequate analysis to justify SFC recommendations.

Nevertheless, it can be expected that over time necessary remedial measures will be taken with
the objective of creating efficient operating and functioning SFCs that would in turn enable them
to go a long way in putting the finances of local bodies on a relatively more systematic, regular
and predictable footing. It is also expected that future SFCs will be able to build up the edifice of
local finances on the foundation laid by the first generation of SFCs.

104
References

Bahl, Roy W (2002), Implementation Rules for Fiscal Decentralisation in M. Govinda Rao
(Ed), Development, Poverty and Fiscal Policy: Decentralisation of Institutions, Oxford
University Press, New Delhi.
Bandyopadhyay, D (2008), Guiding Role of Central Finance Commission Regarding State
Counterparts, EPW, Vol. 43, No.22.
Besley, T and S. Coate (2003), Centralized versus Decentralized Provision of Public Goods: A
Political Economy Approach, Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 87. pp. 2611-2637.
Bhatt, M.P and M. S. Ramesh, (2000), Gujarat State Finance Commission Implication of
Recommendations, EPW, Vol.35, No.24
Bird, Richard M. (2000) Fiscal Decentralization and Competitive Governments in Galeotti,
Gianluigi, Pierre Salmon and Ronald Wintrobe (Eds), Competition and Structure: The
Political Economy of Collective Decisions, (Essays in Honor of Albert Breton).
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: U. K.
Bird, Richard M. (1986), On Measuring Fiscal centralization and Fiscal Balance in Federal
States, Government and Policy, Vol. 4. PP. 384-404.
Bird, Richard and Robert Ebel (Eds.). (2007), Fiscal Fragmentation in Decentralized Countries:
Subsidiarity, Solidarity and Asymmetry Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK.
Bird, Richard M, Robert D. Ebel and Christine I. Wallich (Eds), (1995), Decentralization of the
Socialist State, World Bank, Washington DC.
Bird, Richard and Enid Slack (2007), An Approach to Metropolitan Governance and Finance.
Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy, Vol. 29. pp. 729-755.
Bird, Ricjhard and Michael Smart (2009), Assigning State Taxes in a Federal Country: The
Case of Australia, (Processed).
Boadway, R.W. and Frank Flatters (1982), Equalization in a Federal State: An Economic
Analysis, Economic Council of Canada, Ottawa: Canadian Government Publishing
Centre.
Bradford, David, F. and Wallace E. Oates (1974), Suburban Exploitation of Central Cities and
Government Structure, in Harold Hochman and George Peterson (Eds) Redistribution
Through Public Choice, Columbia University Press, New York.
Brennan, Geoffrey and James Buchanan (1980), The Power to Tax: Analytical Foundations of a
Fiscal Constitution, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.
Breton, Albert (1965), A Theory of Government Grants, Canadian Journal of Economics and
Political Science, Vol. 31; No. 2, pp. 175-87.
105
Breton, Albert (1981), Federalism versus Centralism in Regional Growth, in Public Finance
and Economic Growth: proceedings of the 37th Congress of the International Institute of
Public Finance, Tokyo, Wayne State University Press, Detroit, Michigan. Pp. 252-263.
Breton, Albert (1987), Towards a Theory of Competitive Federalism, European Journal of
Political Economy, Vol. 2. Nos. 1-2; PP. 263-329.
Breton, Albert, (1996), Competitive Governments, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, U.
K.
Breton, Albert (2000), Federalism and Decentralization: Ownership Rights and the Superiority
of Federalism, Publius: The Journal of Federalism, Vol. 30. No. 2 pp. 1-15.
Breton, Albert (2002), An Introduction to decentralization Failure in Ehtisham Ahamd and
Georgio Brosio (Eds), Managing Fiscal Decentralization, Routledge, New York and
London. PP. 31-45.
Breton, Albert (2006), Modeling Vertical Competition, in Ehtisham Ahmad and Georgio
Brosio (Eds), Handbook in Fiscal Federalism, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK. Pp. 86-
105.
Buchanan, J.M. (1950), Federalism and Fiscal Equity, American Economic Review, Vol. 40, No.
4 (September), pp. 421-32.
Chaudhuri, S (2007), What Difference Does a Constitutional Amendment Make? The 1994
Panchayati Raj Act and the Attempt to Revitalize Rural Local Government in India in
Bardhan, P & Mookerji, D (Ed.), Decentralization and Local Governance in Developing
Countries A Comparative Perspective, OUP, New Delhi
Coase, Ronald (1960), The Problem of Social Cost, Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 3. pp.
1-44.
Datta, A (2005), The National Finance Commission and Fiscal Devolution to Local Bodies, in
Rao, P.S.N & Srivastava, G.C (Ed.), Municipal Finance in India Role of Twelfth Finance
Commission, IIPA in association with Kanishka Publishers, New Delhi
Datta, P (2009), Democratic Decentralization through Panchyati Raj in Contemporary India:
The Changes and Challenges, Working Paper No. 49, South Asian Institute, Depart of
Political Science, Heidelberg University.
Feldstein, Martin, S. (1975), Wealth Neutrality and Local Choice in Public Education,
American Economic Review, Vol. 65, pp. 75-89.
Ghosh, B and A.K Sirkar, A note on functional devolution to the Panchayats (Unpublished and
Undated)
Government of India, (2000), Report of the Eleventh Finance Commission for 2000-05, New
Delhi.
106
Government of India, (2005), Report of the Twelfth Finance Commission for 2005-10, New
Delhi.
Government of India, (2010), Report of the Thirteenth Finance Commission for 2010-15, New
Delhi.
India (2006), Report of the Expert Group on Decentralised Planning, Ministry of Panchayati
Raj, Government of India.
Gramlich, Edward (1977), Intergovernmental Grants: A Review of Empirical Literature, in
Wallace E. Oates, The Political Economy of Fiscal Federalism, Lexington Books: Heath
Lexington. PP. 219-39.
Inman, Robert P and Daniel Rubinfeld (1997), Rethinking Federalism, Journal of Economic
Perspectives, Vol. 11, pp. 43-64.
Inman, Robert, P. and Rubinfeld (1997b), Political Economy of Federalism in Dennis Mueller
(Ed), Perspectives in Public Choice: A Handbook, Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, U.K.
Jena, P.R. and M. Gupta, (2008), Revenue Efforts of Panchayats: Evidence from Four States,
Economic and Political Weekly, pp.125-130, July.
Joshi, R (2005), Decentralization and Local Finance Issues-The Working of State Finance
Commissions in India, State Government Budget Constraints and Social Services Policy
Research Networking to strengthen Policy reforms, Papers Commissioned by
Administrative Staff College of India, Hyderabad and NIPFP, New Delhi
Joshi, R (2006), The Working of State Finance Commissions, INRM Policy Brief No. 9, Asian
Development Bank, New Delhi.
Kornai, Janos (1986), The Soft Budget Constraint, Kyklos, Vol. 39. No. 1 PP. 3-30.
Levaggi, R (200@), Decentralized Budgeting Procedures for Public Expenditures, Public
Finance Review Vol. 30, PP. 273-295.
Mathur, Om Prakash and G Peterson, (2006), State Finance Commission and Urban Fiscal
Decentralization in India, India Urban Initiative, The Urban Institute, Washington.
McKinnon, Ronald, L. (1997), Market Preserving Fiscal federalism in the American Monetary
Union in Mario Blejer and Teresa Ter-Minassian (Eds), Macroeconomic Dimensions of
Public Finance: Essays in Honor of Vito Tanzi, Routledge, London and New York, PP.
73-93.
Milgrom and Roberts (1988), An economic Approach to Influence Activities in
Organizations, American Journal of Sociology, Supplement S 154- S 179.

107
Minocha, A.C (2008), Strengthening Link Between Central and State Finance Commissions,
EPW, Vol. 43, No.22
Mishra, C.S (2003), A Study of the Measures Needed to Augment the Consolidated Fund of the
States for Supplementing the Resources of Local Bodies, Unpublished Report,
Submitted to Twelfth Finance Commission
Ministry of Panchayati Raj (2006), Report of the Working Group on Democratic
Decentralization and PRIs (November 2006), Planning Commission, Ministry of
Panchayati Raj, Government of India
Ministry of Panchayati Raj (2006), Standing Committee on Rural Development, (Fourteenth Lok
Sabha), 21st Report, Lok Sabha Secretariat, Ministry of Panchayati Raj, Government of
India
Ministry of Panchayati Raj (2009), Guidelines for Devolution of Functions, Funds and
Functionaries (3Fs) to the Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRIs) through Activity Mapping,
Ministry of Panchayati Raj, Government of India
Ministry of Rural Development (2001), Report of the Task Force on Devolution of Powers and
Function upon Panchayati Raj Institutions, Ministry of Rural Development, Government
of India
Ministry of Rural Development (2001), Report of the Working Group on Decentralized Planning
and Panchayati Raj Institutions for the Tenth Five Year Plan, Ministry of Rural
Development, Government of India
National Institute of Public Finance and Policy (J010), State Finance Commissions and Urban
Local Bodies, National Institute of Public Finance and Policy, New Delhi
National Institute of Urban Affairs (2005), State Finance Commissions Recommendations and
Follow-up Actions Thereon, Vol.1 & Vol. II, Final Report, National Institute of Urban
Affairs, New Delhi.
Oates, W. E (1968), The Theory of Public Finance in Federal System, Canadian Journal of
Economics, Vol. 1. No. 1 pp. 37-54.
Oates, W. E. (1969), Effect of Property Taxes and Local Public Spending on Property Value:
An Empirical Study of Tax capitalization and Tiebout Hypothesis, Journal of Political
Economy, Vol. 77 pp. 957-971.
Oates, W. E (1972), Fiscal Federalism, Harcourt, Brace and Jovanovich, New York.
Oates, W. E (1977), An Economists Perspective on Fiscal Federalism, in W. Pates (es), The
Political Economy of Fiscal Federalism , Lexington, Massachusetts, pp. 3-20.
Oates, W. E (1999), An Essay on Fiscal Federalism, Journal of Economic Literature, Vol.
XXXVII. (September); Pp. 1120-1149.
108
Oates, W. E. (2005), Toward a Second generation Theory of Fiscal federalism, International
Tax and Public Finance, Vol. 12, pp. 349-373.
Olson, Mancur (1991), Autocracy, Democracy and Prosperity, in Richard Zeckhauser (Ed),
Strategy and Choice, Cambridge University Press, pp. 131-157.
Oommen, M.A (2005), Twelfth Finance Commission and Local Bodies, EPW, Vol.40, No.20
Oommen, M.A (2006), Fiscal Decentralization to the Sub-State Level Governments, EPW,
Vol. 41, No.10.
Prudhomme, Rmy. (1996), The Dangers of Decentralization, World Bank Research Observer,
Vol. 10. PP. 201-20.
Qian, Yingyi and Barry Weinghast (1997), Federalism as a Commitment to Preserving Market
Incentives, Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 11, pp. 83-92.
Rajaraman, I and D. Sinha, (2007), Tracking functional devolution by states to Panchayat,
Working Paper No. 48, National Institute of Public Finance and Policy, New Delhi
Rajaraman, Indira (2007), Rural Decentralisation and Participatory Planning for Poverty
Reduction: Overall Report on Four States, National Institute of Public Finance and
Policy, New Delhi.
Rani, P. Geeta (1999), State Finance Commissions and Rural Local Bodies Devolution of
Resources, EPW, Vol. No. 34, No.14-26.
Rao, M. Govinda (1997), Invisible Transfers in Indian Federalism, Public Finance/ Finaces
Publiques, Vol. 52 (3-4), pp. 429-448.
Rao, M. Govinda and Nirvikar Singh (2005), Political Economy and Federalism in India, Oxford
University Press, New Delhi:
Rao, M. Govinda and Raja J. Chelliah (1996), Fiscal Federalism in India, Research in
Economics Monograph 8. Indian Council of Social Science Research, New Delhi.
Rao M Govinda, Amar Nath H K, and B P Vani (2004), Fiscal Decentralisation in Karnataka
A study of Rural Local Bodies, in Geetha Sethi ed. Fiscal Decentralisation in India,
Oxford in University Press and World Bank, New Delhi
Rao, M.G. and U.A.V. Rao, (2008), Expending the Resource Base Panchayats: Augmenting
Own Revenues, Economic and Political Weekly, pp.54-61, January
Riker, W., (1964), Federalism: Origins, Operation, Significance; Little, Brown; Boston.
Rubinfeld, David (1987), The Economics of the Local Public Sector in Alan Auerbach and
Martin Feldstein (Eds), Handbook of Public Economics, North Holland, Amsterdam.
SARC (2007), Second Administrative Reforms Commission, Sixth Report, Local Governance
An Inspiring Journey into the Future, Government of India, New Delhi
109
Salmon, Pierre (2006), Horizontal Competition Among Governments, in Ehtisham Ahmad and
Georgio Brosio (Eds) Handbook of Fiscal federalism, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK.
Pp. 61-85.
Seabright, P (1996), Accountability and Decentralization in Government: An Incomplete
Contracts Model, European Economic Review, Vol. 40. PP. 61-89.
Shah, Anwar (1994), The Reform of Intergovernmental Fiscal relations in Developing and
Emerging Market Economies, Policy and Research Series No. 23, Washington D. C.,
The World Bank,
Scott, A. (1950), A Note On grants in Federal Countries, Economica, Vol. 17. PP. 416-22.
Scott, A. (1964), Economic Goals of Federal Finance, Public Finance/Finances Publiques, Vol.
13. No. 3 pp. 241-288.
Shah, S (May 2008), Making service work for poor people in India: can decentralization do it?
paper prepared for the Seminar on Issue Before the Thirteenth Finance Commission,
National Institute of Public Finance and Policy, New Delhi
Subrahmanyam, K. Siva (2004), Performance of SFCs, Impact of their Recommendations &
Suggested Framework for the Twelfth Finance Commission, Sponsored by Twelfth
Finance Commission, Govt. of India, National Institute of Rural Development,
Hyderabad.
Tanzi, Vito (1996), Fiscal Federalism and Decentralisation: A Review of Some Efficiency and
Macroeconomic Aspects" in Michael Bruno and Boris Pleskovic, (eds) Annual World
Bank Conference on Development Economics. Washington DC.
Tanzi, Vito (2002), Pitfalls on the Road to Fiscal Decentralization,, in Ehtisham Ahmad and
Vito Tanzi (Eds), Managing Fiscal Decentralization, Routledge, London and New York.
PP. 17-30.
Tommasi, M (2003), Centralization versus Decentralization: A Principal Agent Analysis,
unpublished paper.
Tiebout, Charles M. (1956), A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, Journal of Political
Economy, Vol. 64. pp. 416-24.
Tocqueville, Alexis de (1945), Democracy in America, Ne York: Vintage Books Random House:
first published 1838.
Watts, Ronald (1996), Comparing Federal Systems in the 1990s, Institute of Intergovernmental
Relations, Queens University, Kingston.
Weingast, Barry, R. (1995), The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market Preserving
Federalism and Economic Development, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization,
Vol. Vol. 11. PP. 1-31.
110
Weingast, Barry R. (2009), Second Generation Fiscal Federalism: The Implications of Fiscal
Incentives, Journal of Urban Economics, Vol. 65. PP. 279-293.
World Bank (2006), India Inclusive Growth and Service Delivery: Building on Indias
Success, Development Policy Review

Panchayat Act of States

Government of Assam, The Assam Panchayat Act, 1994
Government of Bihar, The Bihar Panchayat Raj (Amendment) Act, 2006
Government of Goa, The Goa Panchayat Raj Act, 1994
Government of Gujarat, The Gujarat Panchayats Act, 1993
Government of Himachal Pradesh, The Himachal Pradesh Panchayati Raj Act, 1994
Government of Kerala, The Kerala Panchayat Raj Act, 1994
Government of Rajasthan The Rajasthan Panchayat Act, 1994,
Government of Tamil Nadu, The Tamil Nadu Panchayats Act, 1994
Government of Uttar Pradesh, The Uttar Pradesh Panchayat Act, 1947 (Amendment included
upto 2007)
Government of West Bengal, The West Bengal Panchayat (Amendment) Act, 1994

Report of the State Finance Commissions

Government of Assam (29th February 1996), Report of the Assam Finance Commission, Assam
Government of Assam (August 2003), Report of the Second Assam State Finance Commission,
Assam
Government of Assam (March 2008), Report of the Third Assam Finance Commission, Vol. I &
Vol. II, Assam
Government of Haryana (2004), Second State Finance Commission, Haryana
Government of Himachal Pradesh (24th October 2002), Report of the Himachal Pradesh Second
State Finance Commission, Himachal Pradesh
Government of Himachal Pradesh (2nd November 2007), Report of the Himachal Pradesh Third
State Finance Commission, Himachal Pradesh
Government of Himachal Pradesh (November 1996), Report of the Himachal Pradesh State
Finance Commission, Himachal Pradesh
Government of Kerala (23rd November 2005), Third State Finance Commission, Kerala
111
Government of Kerala (February 1996), State Finance Commission, Kerala
Government of Kerala (January 2001), Second State Finance Commission, Kerala
Government of Madhya Pradesh (July 2003), Second State Finance Commission, Madhya
Pradesh
Government of Orissa (29th September 2004), Report of the Second State Finance Commission,
Orissa
Government of Punjab (December 2006), The Third Punjab Finance Commission, Punjab
Government of Rajasthan (August 2001), Report of the Second State Finance Commission,
Rajasthan
Government of Rajasthan (December 1995), Report of the First State Finance Commission,
Rajasthan
Government of Rajasthan (February 2008), Report of the Third State Finance Commission,
Rajasthan
Government of Tamil Nadu (1996), Report of the Tamil Nadu Finance Commission, Tamil Nadu
Government of Tamil Nadu (May 2001), Report and Recommendations of Second State Finance
Commission, Tamil Nadu
Government of Tamil Nadu (September 2006), Report and Recommendations of Third State
Finance Commission, Tamil Nadu
Government of Uttar Pradesh (August 2008), Report of the Third State Finance Commission
(Panchayati Raj & Urban Local Bodies), Vol. I & II, & III, Uttar Pradesh
Government of Uttar Pradesh (December 1996), State Finance Commission (Panchayati Raj &
Urban Local Bodies), Vol. I & II, & III, Uttar Pradesh
Government of Uttar Pradesh (June 2002), State Finance Commission, (Panchayati Raj & Urban
Local Bodies), Vol. I & II, Uttar Pradesh
Government of West Bengal (2002), Report of the Second State Finance Commission, West
Bengal
Government of West Bengal (2008), Report of the Third State Finance Commission, West
Bengal
Government of West Bengal (November1995), Recommendations of the State Finance
Commission, West Bengal.

112
 ANNEXURES

ANNEXURES TO CHAPTER II

Annexure 2.1: Gujarat

1. Legislative devolution of functions in Gujarat - General features:

Gujarat has a long history of three-tier Panchayati Raj System which has been functioning since
1963. Till the amendment of 73rd Constitutional Amendment Act, 44 Amendments to Gujarat
Panchayati Act (GPA), 1961 had been effected to strengthen local governance.

The functions, functionaries and funds to PRIs are devolved under the provisions of section 175
of the Gujarat Panchayats Act 1993. Panchayat Act of Gujarat came into force on April 15, 1994
and it was further amended in year 1999, 2000 and 2004.

1.1 Functions Assigned to the District Panchayat

It is worth mentioning that the legislative pattern of functional devolution to three tiers of PRIs in
Gujarat was made both through schedules appended to the Gujarat Panchayat Act, 1993 and
through few provisions described in the main body of the Act. Therefore certain provisions for
functional devolution to the District Panchayat is available both at different clauses spread over
the Gujarat Panchayat Act, 1993 and in the schedule 111 of the Act.

Section 175 (1) of the Gujarat Panchayat Act, 1993 states that the State Government may
transfer to a district Panchayat any such powers, functions and duties relating to any matter that
are exercised or performed by the State Government and allot to the district Panchayat such fund
and personnel as may be necessary to enable the district Panchayat to exercise the powers and
discharge the functions and duties so transferred.

Section 175 (2) of the Gujarat Panchayat Act, 1993 states that the State Government, may
transfer to the district Panchayat such powers, functions and duties as are exercised or performed
by the following departments of the State namely
113
 1. Agriculture
2. Animal Husbandry
3. Public Health & Medical Relief
4. Public Works Department activities in the district
5. Social Welfare
6. Land Department
7. Prohibition Department so far as prohibition propaganda is concerned
8. Co-operative Department
9. Cottage Industries and Small scale Industries
10. District Statistical Officer

Section 175 (3) of the Gujarat Panchayat Act, 1993 also states that on the transfer of any
powers functions and duties under sub-section (1) and (2) the District Panchayat shall if the
State Government so directs and with the previous approval of the State Government may
delegate to any Panchayat subordinate to it any of the function, power and duties so transferred
and allot to such Panchayat such fund and staff as may be necessary to enable the Panchayat to
exercise the powers and discharge the functions and duties so delegated

Section 180 (2) of the Act states that the State government may entrust to a district Panchayat
schemes for economic development and social justice in relation to the matters listed in the 11th
schedule.

Section 155 (1) of the Act states: A District Panchayat may with the previous sanction of the
State government incur expenditure on education or medical relief outside its jurisdiction, if its
finances permit. Sub section of (2) of the Act states: A district Panchayat may also make
provision for carrying out in the area within the limits of its jurisdiction any other work or
measure which is likely to promote;
(i) the health safety, comfort or convenience and
(ii) social, economic or cultural well being of the inhabitants of the areas

114
Section 155 (6) of the Act states: A District Panchayat shall perform such other duties and
functions as are entrusted to it by or under any other law for the time being in force.
Section 155 (7) of the Act states: It shall be lawful for the District Panchayat to render financial
or other assistance to any person for carrying on in the district any activity which is related to
any of the matters specified in Schedule III of the Act.

Section 154 of the Gujarat Panchayat Act, 1993 states that subject to the provision of this Act,
it shall be the duty of each District Panchayat to make in the area within its jurisdiction and so
far as the fund at its disposal will allow reasonable provision, in regard to all or any of the matter
specified in Schedule 111 of the Act that are described as follows:

Table 1: Functional Devolution to District Panchayat

Details of Item in the 11th
Appended Detailed provisions on devolution of powers Schedule to which this
Section of the Act provision pertains
Schedule III Item undertaking intensive pioneering schemes relating to paddy, wheat Agriculture, including
No. 6 (a) bajari, juwar, ground-nuts and cotton agricultural extension
Schedule III Item construction and maintenance of building for seeds distribution
No. 6 (b) centres
Schedule III Item implementation of schemes of manure
No. 6 (c)
Schedule III Item promoting the planting of coconut palm
No. 6 (d)
Schedule III Item arranging for purchase and sale of necessary equipment for the
No. 6 (e) protection of plants
Schedule III Item arranging for the purchase and sale of insecticides
No. 6 (f)
Schedule III Item establishment and maintenance of model agricultural farms
No. 6 (g)
Schedule III Item procuring and distributing improved seeds
No. 6 (h)
Schedule III Item implementing schemes relating to agricultural production and
No. 6 (i) agricultural development
Schedule III Item arranging exhibitions as competitions and other programmes in
No. 6 (j) connection with agricultural development and cattle breeding
Schedule III Item provision for irrigation by canals tanks and bunds Minor irrigation, water
No. 11 (a) management and
Schedule III Item the implementation of the schemes of tube-wells water-shed
No. 11 (b) development
Schedule III Item digging new wells and repairing old wells for irrigation
No. 11 (c)
Schedule III Item giving assistance for purchase of pumping sets and machinery
No. 11 (d)

115
Details of Item in the 11th
Appended Detailed provisions on devolution of powers Schedule to which this
Section of the Act provision pertains
Schedule III Item provision and propaganda for improved Kosi
No. 11 (e)
Schedule III Item providing detonators and boring equipment for wells
No. 11 (f)
Schedule III Item encouraging and assisting irrigation schemes on a co-operating basis
No. 11 (g)
Schedule III Item establishment and maintaining supply centres for cattle breeding Animal husbandry,
No. 7 (a) dairy and poultry
Schedule III Item giving encouragement and assistance to cattle breeding centres run
No. 7 (b) by recognized institutions
Schedule III Item the implementation of schemes of key villages
No. 7 (c)
Schedule III Item the implementing of the schemes of Goshala development
No. 7(d)
Schedule III Item provision for the rearing of stud calves
No. 7 (e)
Schedule III Item the development of grass-lands
No. 7 (f)
Schedule III Item encouraging and assisting schemes for the storage of grass
No. 7(g)
Schedule III Item implementing schemes of poultry farming
No. 7 (h)
Schedule III Item the implementation of the schemes of cattle breeding
No. 7 (i)
Schedule III Item establishment and maintaining veterinary hospitals and dispensaries
No. 7 (j)

Schedule III Item examining the possibilities of village industries and small scale Small scale industries
No. 8 (a) industries in the district preparation and execution of plans for their including food
revival, organization and development processing industries
Schedule III Item providing for necessary assistance and encouragement of technical
No. 8 (b) training to village workers in village industries and small scale
industries relating to their crafts
Schedule III Item undertaking all educational activities entrusted to it Education including
No. 3 (a) primary and secondary
Schedule III Item planning of education in the district within the framework of the schools
No. 3 (b) national policy and the national plan
Schedule III Item survey and evaluation of educational activities
No. 3 (c)
Schedule III Item distribution of Government aid in regard to primary education
No. 3 (d) between the Taluka Panchayats
Schedule III Item recognizing private educational institutions within its area
No. 3 (e)
Schedule III Item recommending the courses of study
No. 3 (f)
Schedule III Item selection of text-books
No. 3 (g)
Schedule III Item implementation of any programme in regard to secondary education
No. 3 (h) that may be entrusted to it by the State Government

116
Details of Item in the 11th
Appended Detailed provisions on devolution of powers Schedule to which this
Section of the Act provision pertains
Schedule III Item inspection of primary schools managed by the Taluka Panchayats
No. 3 (i) and conduct of their examination
Schedule III Item Accepting and managing educational funds
No. 3 (j)
Schedule III Item Assisting, encouraging and guiding all educational activities in the
No. 3 (k) district
Schedule III Item organizing camps, conferences and gatherings of members of
No. 3 (l) Village Panchayats, Talluka Panchayat and District Panchayat in the
district (related to this area)
Schedule III Item arranging fairs and festivals other than fairs and festivals arranged Cultural activities
No. 9 (c) by the state government
Schedule III Item establishing maintaining expanding and aiding secondary, technical Technical training and
No. 8 (c) and industrial schools vocational education
Schedule III Item establishment and maintenance of dispensaries Health and sanitation
No. 1 (a) including hospitals
Schedule III Item taking necessary action or steps for improvement in public health primary health centres
No. 1 (c) and public amenities and dispensaries
Schedule III Item establishment and maintenance of primary health centres
No. 1 (d)
Schedule III Item giving protection against diphtheria, whooping cough and tetanus
No. 1 (h)
Schedule III Item establishment and maintenance of ayurvedic and homeopathic
No. 1 (i) dispensaries
Schedule III Item provision of medical relief through ayurvedic and homeopathic
No. 1 (j) centres
Schedule III Item assisting recognized medical relief-centres
No. 1 (k)
Schedule III Item providing for training of nurses
No. 1 (l)
Schedule III Item assisting family planning Family welfare
No. 1 (e)
Schedule III Item supply of milk of children and nursing mothers in families in the Women and child
No. 1 (f) low income group development
Schedule III Item providing for training to mid-wives
No. 1 (g)
Schedule III Item providing necessary assistance and encouragement to the work of Social welfare including
No. 9 (a) institutions of social service welfare of the
Schedule III Item conducting necessary social welfare activities in the district handicapped and
No. 9 (b) mentally retarded
Schedule III Item Establishment and management of relief centres in times of natural
No. 10 calamities such as famine and scarcity, floods, fire and earthquake
Schedule III Item provision and maintenance of drinking water supply Drinking water
No. 1 (b)
Schedule III Item construction and maintenance of roads Roads, culverts bridges,
No. 2 (a) ferries, waterways and
Schedule III Item the planting and rearing of trees on both sides of the roads other means of
No. 2 (b) communication
Schedule III Item execution of works (related to this subject) entrusted to it by the
No. 2 (c) State Government

117
Details of Item in the 11th
Appended Detailed provisions on devolution of powers Schedule to which this
Section of the Act provision pertains
Schedule III Item supervision repairs and preservation of building vested in the Maintenance of
No. 2 (d) District Panchayat community assets
Schedule III Item construction and maintenance of buildings required for the activities
No. 2 (e) of the District Panchayat

In addition, to the above mentioned functional devolution, The Gujarat Panchayat Act, 1993 also
devolves other functions to District Panchayat as listed below:

Table: 1a
Details of Appended Functions (In the sphere of administration)
Section of the Act
(Section 154)

Schedule III Item No. collection of necessary stores and materials

4 (a)
Schedule III Item No. publication of statistical and other information relating to activities of Panchayats
4 (b)
Schedule III Item No. co-ordination and the use of statistics and other information required for the activities of the
4 (c) village Panchayat, Taluka and district Panchayat
Schedule III Item No. periodical supervision and evaluation of the projects and programme entrusted to the
4 (d) different Panchayats in the district
Schedule III Item No. accepting donations in the furtherance of the purposes for which fund might have been raised
4 (e)

Table: 1b
Details of Appended Functions (In the sphere of Community Development)
Section of the Act
(Section 154)
Schedule III Item No. co-ordination and integration of development schemes of all Talukas in the district and
5 (a) preparing a plan therefore for the whole district
Schedule III Item No. preparation of projects plans and schemes concerning two or more Talukas in the district
5 (b)
Schedule III Item No. promoting the establishment and development of Panchayats
5 (c) (i)
Schedule III Item No. inspection, regulation and control of the Taluka Panchayats in the district
5 (c) (ii)
Schedule III Item No. performance of all such functions as are assigned to it under any law or as may be assigned by
5 (c) (iii) the State Government from time to time
Schedule III Item No. Implementation of any development programme that may be entrusted by the State
5 (d) government
Schedule III Item No. Distribution and co-ordination of work among village, Taluka and District Panchayats
5 (e)

118
The Gujarat Panchayat Act, 1993 also entrusted District Panchayat to exercise control over The
Education Committee. Section 145 (1) (iii) of the Gujarat Panchayat Act, 1993 states that an
Education Committee will perform the functions and duties pertaining to education and such
other literacy and cultural activities as the Panchayat may assign to it.

Hence Part 11 of Schedule 111 of the Act depicts that it shall be the duty of The Education
Committee of a District Panchayat;
(i) to undertake all educational activities
(ii) to undertake the planning of education in the district within the framework of the national
policy and the national plan
(iii) to survey and evaluate educational activities
(iv) to act as a channel for the State Government in regard to primary education to reach
Panchayat
(v) to make suggestions as to the selection of text-books by the State Government
(vi) to make suggestions as to courses of study for being determined by the State Government
(vii) to implement any programme in regard to secondary education entrusted to the District
Panchayat by the State Government
(viii) to arrange for inspection of primary schools managed by the Taluka Panchayat and to
conduct their examinations
(ix) to supervise the working of all primary schools and of such other educational institutions
under the control of the District Panchayat as that Panchayat may decide from time to
time
(x) to supervise the activities of Village Panchayats within the jurisdiction of the District
Panchayat to ensure that each such Panchayat pays its contribution to the school funds, if
any, and to bring cases of default to the notice of the Educational Inspector of the District
and generally to guide them to maintain and improve primary school or school in their
charge
(xi) to accept and manage educational funds
(xii) to assist, encourage and guide all educational activities in the district

119
(xiii) to discharge the following duties if the District Panchayat makes provision for secondary
and other education
(xiv) to conduct secondary school providing for diversified courses in rural areas where private
enterprise is not available and to introduce a Number of High School Scholarships for
poor and deserving in rural area
(xv) to conduct hostels for High School as well as for pupils in Standard V to VII
(xvi) to provide for part-time education of children who leave school at about the age of 11 and
of the children whose age is between 11 and 14 years and who are absolutely illiterate
(xvii) to make arrangement for vocational education in rural areas
(xviii) to push the scheme of social education classes, village libraries and pre-primary
education
(xix) to recognize and aid gymnasia and to organize recreational centres and holiday and
school cams

1.2 Functional Devolution to Taluka Panchayat

Likewise, certain provisions for functional devolution to the Taluka Panchayat is available both
at different clauses spread over The Gujarat Panchayat Act, 1993 and in the schedule 11 of the
Act. That apart, Section 180 (3) of the Act also provides that the District Panchayat shall if the
State Government so directs and may with previous approval of the State Government, entrust to
a Taluka Panchayat subordinate to it any scheme entrusted to it under section (1) and (2) and
allot to such Panchayat such fund and personnel as may be necessary to enable the Panchyat to
implement the scheme so entrusted.
Section 131 (1) of the Gujarat Panchayat Act, 1993 states: A Taluka Panchayat may, with the
previous sanction of the District Panchayat incur expenditure on education or medical relief
outside its jurisdiction, if its finances permit.
Section 131 (3) of the Gujarat Panchayat Act, 1993 states: A Taluka Panchayat may also make
provision or carrying out in the Taluka any other work, measure, scheme or project which is
likely to promote:
(a) the health safety, comfort or convenience
(b) social, economic or cultural well being and

120
 (c) education including secondary education of the inhabitants of the Taluka or part thereof

Section 130 of the Gujarat Panchayat Act, 1993 states: Subject to the provision of this Act, it
shall be the duty of each Taluka Panchayat to make in the area within its jurisdiction and so far
as the fund at its disposal will allow reasonable provision, in regard to all or any of the matter
specified in Schedule 11. Thus Part 1 of Schedule 11 of the Act stated matters in respect of the
duty of Taluka Panchayat to make provision as listed below:

Table 2: Functional Devolution to Taluka Panchayat

Details of Detailed provisions on devolution of powers Item in the 11th Schedule
Appended to which this provision
Section of the pertains
Act (Section130)
Schedule II Item planning for agricultural improvement in the Taluka Agriculture, including
No. 6 (a) agricultural extension
Schedule II Item use of land and water resources and preparation of improved
No. 6 (b) agricultural methods according to the latest researches
Schedule II Item maintenance of seed multiplication farms, assisting registered seed
No. 6 (e) produces and distribution of seeds in the Taluka
Schedule II Item raising the production of fruits and vegetables
No. 6 (f)
Schedule II Item promoting the use of improved agricultural implements and arranging
No. 6 (h) to make them easily available
Schedule II Item the protection of crops fruit trees and plants against diseases
No. 6 (i)
Schedule II Item establishment and management of model agricultural farms
No. 6 (j)
Schedule II Item reclamation and conservation of agricultural land in the Taluka Land Improvement,
No. 6 (d) implementation of land
Schedule II Item conservation of manorial resources, preparing compost manure, reforms, land
No. 6 (g) organic manure and mixture and to arrange for making them easily consolidation and soil
available conservation
Schedule II Item construction and maintenance of irrigation works in the Taluka Minor irrigation, water
No. 6 (c) management and water-
Schedule II Item providing credit and other facilities for irrigation and agricultural shed development
No. 6 (k) development
Schedule II Item increasing the area of land under irrigation by construction and repairs
No. 6 (l) of wells, digging and repairs of private ponds by undertaking minor
irrigation works and by supervision of field channels
Schedule II Item increasing the use of sub soil water by boring wells and giving
No. 6 (m) assistance in regard to such wells
Schedule II Item providing for the timely and equitable distribution and full use of
No. 6 (n) water available under irrigation scheme
Schedule II Item improving cattle breed by introduction of stud bulls by castration of Animal husbandry, dairy
No. 7 (a) stray bullocks and establishment and maintaining artificial and poultry
insemination centres

121
Details of Detailed provisions on devolution of powers Item in the 11th Schedule
Appended to which this provision
Section of the pertains
Act (Section130)
Schedule II Item introducing improved breeds of cattle sheep poultry etc giving grants
No. 7(b) therefore and maintenance of small breeding centres
Schedule II Item controlling and checking infectious diseases
No. 7 (c)
Schedule II Item introducing improved grass and cattle feeds and providing for their
No. 7 (d) storage
Schedule II Item starting and maintaining first-aid centres and veterinary dispensaries
No. 7 (e)
Schedule II Item providing for milk supply
No. 7 (f)
Schedule II Item solving the problem o stray cattle
No. 7 (g)
Schedule II Item to promote cottage village and small scale industries with a view to Small scale industries
No. 8 providing increased employment and raising people standard of living including food processing
and especially- industries
Schedule II Item to establish and maintain production and training centres
No. 8 (a)
Schedule II Item to improve the skills of artisans
No. 8 (b)
Schedule II Item to popularize improved implements
No. 8 (c)
Schedule II Item to establish industrial township at the Taluka level
No. 8 (e)
Schedule II Item To develop wool industry
No. 8 (f)
Schedule II Item to ensure the implementation of scheme for Cottage, Village and Khadi, village and
No. 8 (d) Small Scale Industries run by the Khadi and Village Industries Board cottage industries
and All India Association
Schedule II Item establishment and maintenance of primary schools Education including
No. 3 (a) primary and secondary
Schedule II Item preparing and implementing the programme of constructing buildings schools
No. 3 (b) for primary schools
Schedule II Item assisting educational activities of a Village Panchayat
No. 3 (c)
Schedule II Item enforcing in the Taluka the law relating to compulsory primary
No. 3 (d) education
Schedule II Item assisting the propagation of pre-primary education
No. 3 (f)
Schedule II Item conducting and encouraging libraries reading rooms and other cultural Libraries
No. 3 (e) activities
Schedule II Item encouraging physical and cultural activities Cultural activities
No. 4 (d)
Schedule II Item controlling small pox and other epidemics and expansion and Health and sanitation
No. 4 (d) maintenance of health services including hospitals
Schedule II Item maintenance and supervision of stores of drugs dispensaries, primary health centres
No. 1 (d) pharmacies, maternity homes and primary health centres and dispensaries
Schedule II Item cultivating public opinion on following methods for the preservation
No. 1 (e) of health and sanitation

122
Details of Detailed provisions on devolution of powers Item in the 11th Schedule
Appended to which this provision
Section of the pertains
Act (Section130)
Schedule II Item nourishment
No. 1 (e) (ii)
Schedule II Item control and eradication of contagious diseases
No. 1 (e) (iii)
Schedule II Item providing for help and protection to the people against epidemics
No. 1 (f)
Schedule II Item establishing voluntary health associations
No. 4 (e)
Schedule II Item family planning Family welfare
No. 1 (b)
Schedule II Item Promoting the development of village jungles and pastures Social forest and farm
No. 15 forestry
Schedule II Item maternity and child welfare Women and child
No. 1 (e) (ii) development
Schedule II Item promoting children activities
No. 4 (h)
Schedule II Item training gram-laxmis and gram sevikas and utilizing their services
No. 4 (g)
Schedule II Item Implementing of schemes for women and childrens welfare and
No. 10 maintaining womens and childrens welfare centres , education
centres craft centres and tailoring centres
Schedule II Item establishing and maintaining information centre community Social welfare including
No. 4 (a) educational centres and recreation centres welfare of the
handicapped and
Schedule II Item establishing institutions for rendering social service such as youth mentally retarded
No. 4 (b) clubs womens club and farmers association and encouraging any
such institutions if already established
Schedule II Item establishing a village defense crops
No. 4 (c)
Schedule II Item planning for increased employment and production as well as for co-
No. 5 (a) ordination of village institutions
Schedule II Item training in self-help and self-sufficiency among the village
No. 5 (b) community on the principles of mutual co-operation
Schedule II Item training gram sevikas and utilizing their services
No. 4 (f)
Schedule II Item utilizing the surplus energy resources and time of the village for
No. 5 (c) benefit of the community
Schedule II Item providing for the implementation of development programmes
No. 5 (d) entrusted to it by the State Government
Schedule II Item to establish and promote the development of multi-purpose co-
No. 4 (g) operative societies for credit sale, industry, irrigation and agriculture
Schedule II Item promoting savings through thrift small savings and insurance schemes
No. 4 (h)
Schedule II Item sponsoring voluntary institutions of social welfare and coordinating
No. 11 (d) and assisting their activities
Schedule II Item propaganda for publication and against drug addictions
No. 11 (e)
Schedule II Item Providing immediate relief in cases of floods fires epidemics and
No. 12 other natural calamities on a small or large scale

123
Details of Detailed provisions on devolution of powers Item in the 11th Schedule
Appended to which this provision
Section of the pertains
Act (Section130)
Schedule II Item community radio listening programme
No. 17 (a)
Schedule II Item arranging exhibitions
No. 17 (b)
Schedule II Item publications
No. 17 (c)
Schedule II Item planning for increased employment and production as well as for co-
No. 4 (h) ordination of village institutions
Schedule II Item training in self-help and self-sufficiency among the village
No. 5 (a) community on the principles of mutual co-operation
Schedule II Item providing facilities for pure drinking water Drinking water
No. 5 (b)
Schedule II Item implementing schemes of rural housing Rural housing
No. 11 (b)
Schedule II Item Development of village sites with the co-operation of the village
No. 16 population and planning of rural housing
Schedule II Item construction and maintenance of village link roads Roads, culverts bridges,
No. 2 (a) ferries, waterways and
Schedule II Item providing necessary assistance for construction and maintenance of other means of
No. 2 (b) village approach roads communication
Schedule II Item provision of hostels for students of backward class and scheduled Welfare of the weaker
No. 11 (a) castes and scheduled tribes sections and in particular
Schedule II Item maintaining decrepit beggars of the Scheduled Castes
No. 11 (c) and Scheduled Tribes

In addition, to the above mentioned functional devolution, The Gujarat Panchayat Act, 1993 also
devolves other functions to Taluka Panchayat as listed below:

Table: 2a
Details of Functions
Appended
Section of the
Act (Section130)
(In the sphere of co-operation)
Schedule II Item to promote the idea of co-operation in different field of life and to organize and encourage co-
No. 9 operative institutions in the economic and social fields and especially-
Schedule II Item to establish and promote the development of multi-purpose co-operative societies for credit sale,
No. 9 (a) industry, irrigation and agriculture
Schedule II Item promoting savings through thrift small savings and insurance schemes
No. 9 (b)
In the sphere of collection of statistics
Schedule II Item Collecting and coordinating statistics as may be required by the village Panchayat Taluka
No. 13 Panchayat or District Panchayat or by the State Government
In the sphere of collection of trusts
Schedule II Item Managing trusts in furtherance of the objects of any programme that may be carried out with the
No. 14 Taluka Fund

124
Section 130 of The Gujarat Panchayat Act, 1993 also entrusted Taluka Panchayat to undertake
following functions pertaining to education under their jurisdiction. Hence Part 11 of Schedule
11 of the Act depicts that it shall be the duty of a Taluka Panchayat;
a) to assist in conducting and revising educational surveys and in preparing and implementing
Five year Plan for the development of primary educational and all other educational activities
entrusted to it.
b) to provide adequate accommodation and equipment for primary schools
c) to open with the sanction of the district Panchayat new primary school in places where they
are needed
d) to determine the exact location of primary schools
e) to supervise the working of all primary schools and of such other educational institutions
under the control of the district Panchayat as that Panchayat may decide from time to time
f) to exercise such powers over the staff employed in primary schools and other educational
institutions under the control of the district Panchayat as may be delegated to it from time to
time
g) to supervise the activities of the village Panchayat within the jurisdiction of the Taluka
Panchayat to ensure that each such Panchayat pays its contribution to the school funds. If any
and bring cases of default to the notice of the Educational Inspector of the district and
generally to guide them to maintain and improve the primary school or schools in their
charge
h) to be responsible for the enforcement of compulsory primary education and without prejudice
to the generality of the foregoing provisions
(i) to determine on the recommendation of the competent officer of the district
Panchayat the distance measured according to the nearest road between an approved
school and the residence of the child for the purposes of the Bombay Primary
Education Act 1947
(ii) to grant on the recommendation of the aforesaid competent officer exemption from
attending an approved school to a child who is receiving instruction otherwise in an
approved school

125
i) to grant sanction to the changes in the dates of birth an the names of pupils attending primary
schools
j) to construct new buildings for primary schools and to carry out special repairs
k) to sanction grants-in-aid to Gram Panchayats for their standing committee for education
l) to inform and if necessary to advise the district Panchayat generally on all matters connected
with primary education and educational activities undertaken by the district Panchayat in the
Taluka
m) to carry on propaganda in the Taluka for the expansion and improvement of education in
general and primary education in particular and
n) to exercise such other powers and to perform such other duties as may be delegated to it by
the district Panchayat from time to time
o) to hire building for primary schools with sanction of the Taluka Panchayat on reasonable rent
which shall be certified by the competent authority
p) the supervision of individual primary schools
q) to secure the enforcement of the Bombay Primary Education Act 1947, and the rules or
orders made there under

1.3 Functional Devolution to Village Panchayat

Likewise, certain provisions for functional devolution to the Village Panchayat is available both
at different clauses spread over the Gujarat Panchayat Act, 1993 and in the schedule 1 of the Act.
Section 100 (1) of the Gujarat Panchayat Act, 1993 states: A Panchayat may with the
previous sanction of the district Panchayat incur expenditure on education or medical relief
outside its jurisdiction if its finances permit.
Section 100 (2) of the Gujarat Panchayat Act, 1993 states: A Panchayat may also make
provision for carrying out in the areas within the limits of its jurisdiction any other work or
measure which is likely to promote
(i) the health, safety, comfort or convenience
(ii) social, economic or cultural well being and
(iii)education including secondary education of the inhabitants of the areas

126
Section 100 (6) of the Gujarat Panchayat Act, 1993 states: A Panchayat shall perform such
other duties and functions as are entrusted to it by or under any other law for the time being in
force
Section 100 (7) of the Gujarat Panchayat Act, 1993 states: It shall be lawful for a Panchayat
to render financial or other assistance to any person for carrying on in the Village Panchayat any
activity which is related to any of the matters specified in Schedule 1
Section 103 of the Gujarat Panchayat Act, 1993 states: In case of any institution managed by
a Taluka Panchayat or district Panchayat or any work to be done out of the fund of a Taluka
Panchayat or district Panchayat, the Taluka Panchayat, as the case may be, the district Panchayat
amy, if the village Panchayat so agrees entrust to the village Panchayat the management of such
institutions or the execution of such work.
Section 99 of the Gujarat Panchayat Act, 1993 states: Subject to the provision of this Act, it
shall be the duty of each Village Panchayat to make in the area within its jurisdiction and so far
as the fund at its disposal will allow reasonable provision, in regard to all or any of the matters
specified in Schedule 1.
Schedule 1 of the Act stated matters in respect of the duty of Village Panchayat to make
provision as listed below

Table 3: Village Panchayat

Details of Detailed provisions on devolution of powers Item in the 11th Schedule
Appended to which this provision
Section of the pertains
Act (Section 99)
Schedule 1 planned improvement of agriculture Agriculture, including
Item No. 7(a) agricultural extension
Schedule 1 securing minimum standards or cultivation in the gram with a view
Item No. 7(b) to increasing agricultural production
Schedule 1 establishment and management of model agricultural farm
Item No. 7(c)
Schedule 1 the establishment and maintenance of granaries
Item No. 7(d)
Schedule 1 bringing under cultivation waste and fallow lands vested by the State
Item No. 7(e) Government in the Panchayat
Schedule 1 ensuring conservation of manurial resources preparing composts and
Item No. 7(f) sale of manure
Schedule 1 production of improved seeds, the establishing of nurseries of
Item No. 7(g) improved seeds and promoting the use of improved seeds
Schedule 1 promoting the use of improved agricultural implements and making
Item No. 7(h) such implements easily available

127
Details of Detailed provisions on devolution of powers Item in the 11th Schedule
Appended to which this provision
Section of the pertains
Act (Section 99)
Schedule 1 the promotion of co-operative farming
Item No. 7(i)
Schedule 1 crop-protection and crop-experiments
Item No. 7 (j)
Schedule 1 taking steps against harmful animals with a view to protection of
Item No. 7(m) crops
Schedule 1 assisting the implementation of soil improvement projects of the Land improvement,
Item No. 5 (b) state government implementation of land
reforms, land
consolidation and soil
conservation
Schedule 1 minor irrigation, construction and maintenance of filled channels and Minor irrigation, water
Item No. 7(k) distribution of water management and water-
shed development
Schedule 1 improvement of cattle and cattle breeding Animal husbandry, dairy
Item No. 8(a) and poultry
Schedule 1 the general care of livestock
Item No. 8 (b)
Schedule 1 providing and maintaining stud bills for purposes of cattle breeding
Item No. 8 (c)
Schedule 1 promotion of dairy farming
Item No. 8(d)
Schedule 2 establishment, control and management of cattle ponds
Item No. 2(m)
Schedule 1 regulating the keeping of cattle and taking necessary steps against
Item No. 1 (o) stray cattle and dogs
Schedule 1 raising preservation and improvement or village forest pastures and Social forestry and farm
Item No. 7(l) orchards forestry
Schedule 1 surveying and harnessing industrial and employment potential of the Small scale industries
Item No. 9 (a) gram including food processing
industries
Schedule 1 promoting hand spinning, hand weaving, dying, printing, Khadi, village and
Item No. 9 (b) embroidery, sewing, oild pressing industry, leather industry pottery cottage industries
carpentry, smithy, industries, processing, agricultural raw materials
into finished product, other cottage industries and special arts or
craft of the village if any and protecting encouraging and assisting
these with a view to improving and develop them
Schedule 1 providing necessary raw materials for cottage industries and arts and
Item No. 9 (c) crafts
Schedule 1 making efforts for the production by the village craftsmen of modern
Item No. 9 (d) and improved tools for cottage industries and making such tools
easily available to them
Schedule 1 encouraging and assisting artisans for training in cottage industries
Item No. 9 (e) and handicraft
Schedule 1 providing for the organization management and development of
Item No. 9 (f) cottage industries on a co-operative basis
Schedule 1 supply of water for domestic use and for cattle Drinking water
Item No. 1 (a)

128
Details of Detailed provisions on devolution of powers Item in the 11th Schedule
Appended to which this provision
Section of the pertains
Act (Section 99)
Schedule 1 construction, maintenance and repair of public roads, drains bunds Roads, culverts, bridges,
Item No. 2 (b) and bridges provided that if the roads drains bunds and bridges vest ferries, waterways and
in other public authority such works shall not be undertaken without other means of
the consent of that authority communication
Schedule 1 lighting of the village Rural electrification
Item No. 2 (d) including distribution of
Schedule 1 generation distribution and supply of electrical energy and other electricity
Item No. 2 ( r) matter matters connected therewith
Schedule 1 establishment and maintenance of works for the provision of Poverty alleviation
Item No. 2(c) employment particularly in times of scarcity programme
Schedule 1 economic survey of the gram accompanied by the provision of
Item No. 5 (n) employment to the unemployed or under-employed residents thereof
Schedule 1 spread of education Education including
Item No. 3 (a) primary and secondary
Schedule 1 assisting the introduction of compulsory primary education as schools
Item No. 3 (f) planned by the state
Schedule 1 provision of school buildings and of necessary equipment for
Item No. 3 (g) education
Schedule 1 repairs and maintenance of school buildings
Item No. 3 (i)
Schedule 1 maintenance of school funds
Item No. 3 (j)
Schedule 1 establishment, construction and maintenance of secondary schools
Item No. 3 (o)
Schedule 1 provision for light meals for school children if possible
Item No. 3 (n)
Schedule 1 establishment and maintenance of libraries and reading rooms Libraries
Item No. 3 (d)
Schedule 1 establishment and maintenance of theaters for promotion of art and Cultural activities
Item No. 3 (c) culture
Schedule 1 celebration of school functions and festivals
Item No. 3 (l)
Schedule 1 arranging cultural programmes for the purpose of popular education
Item No. 3 (m)
Schedule 1 establishment, maintenance and regulation of fairs pilgrimages and
Item No. 5 (i) festivals
Schedule 1 establishment and maintenance of akhada parks, clubs and other
Item No. 3 (b) places of recreation for the welfare of women and youth
Schedule 1 establishment and maintenance of markets Market and fairs
Item No. 2 (j)
Schedule 1 construction and maintenance of buildings for warehouse, shops
Item No. 2 (p) purchasing centres and such others
Schedule 1 sanitation, conservancy, the prevention and abatement of nuisance Health and sanitation
Item No. 1 (c) including hospitals
Schedule 1 preservation and improvement of public health establishing and primary health centres
Item No. 1 (d) maintaining public hospitals and dispensaries providing public relief and dispensaries
Schedule 1 ensuring systematic disposal of carcasses, provision of definite place
Item No. 1 (g) for the purpose and other means for disposal of unclaimed corpses
and carcasses

129
Details of Detailed provisions on devolution of powers Item in the 11th Schedule
Appended to which this provision
Section of the pertains
Act (Section 99)
Schedule 1 taking measures to prevent the outbreak, spread and recurrence of
Item No. 1 (i) any infectious disease
Schedule 1 removal of rubbish heaps jungle, prickly pear the filling in of
Item No. 1 (k) disused wells, insanitary ponds, pools, ditches pits or hollows the
prevention of water-logging in irrigated areas and other
improvements of sanitary conditions
Schedule 1 the encouragement of human and animal vaccination
Item No. 1 (m)
Schedule 1 the provision and maintenance of compost pits
Item No. 1 (n)
Schedule 1 cleaning public streets places and sewers and all spaces not being
Item No. 1 (r) private property which are open to the enjoyment of the public
whether such places are vested in the Panchayat or not, removing the
noxious vegetation and abating all public nuisances
Schedule 1 propagation of family planning Family welfare
Item No. 6 (d)
Schedule 1 pre-primary education and child welfare activities Women and child
Item No. 3 (h) development
Schedule 1 maternity and child welfare
Item No. 1 (l)
Schedule 1 offering financial assistance to needy student Social welfare including
Item No. 3 (k) welfare of the
Schedule 1 relief of the crippled, destitute and the sick handicapped and
Item No. 6 (a) mentally retarded
Schedule 1 assistance to the residents when any natural calamity occurs
Item No. 6 (b)
Schedule 1 organizing encouraging and assisting co-operative activities in the
Item No. 6 (c) economic and social fields
Schedule 1 Giving relief and establishing and maintaining relief works in time
Item No. 1 (z) of famine or scarcity to or the destitute persons within the limits of
the Panchayat
Schedule 1 organizing voluntary labour for community works and works for the
Item No. 6 (e) up-liftment of the village
Schedule 1 watch and ward of the village and of crops therein and raising
Item No. 4 (a) volunteer organization or organizations of any other kind
encouraging and assisting such organizations
Schedule 1 providing for training facilities to the youth of the gram for the
Item No. 4 (b) purpose of self-defense and village defense and assisting such
training that may be organized by the Government
Schedule 1 preventing of fires, rendering assistance in extinguishing fires and
Item No. 4 (c) protecting life and property when fire occurs
Schedule 1 promotion of social and moral welfare of the village including Welfare of the weaker
Item No. 3 (e) prohibition propaganda removal or untouchability amelioration of sections, and in
the condition f the backward classes the eradication of corruption particular of the
and the discouragement of gambling and other antisocial activities Scheduled caste and
Tribe
Schedule 1 opening fair price shops Public distribution
Item No. 6 (f) system

130
Details of Detailed provisions on devolution of powers Item in the 11th Schedule
Appended to which this provision
Section of the pertains
Act (Section 99)
Schedule 1 construction and cleaning of public roads, drains, pond, tanks and Maintenance of
Item No. 1 (b) wells other than tanks and wells used for irrigation purposes and community assets
other public places
Schedule 1 regulation by licensing or otherwise of tea coffee and milk shops
Item No. 1 (e)
Schedule 1 provision, maintenance and regulation of burning and burial ground
Item No. 1 (f)
Schedule 1 construction and maintenance of public latrines
Item No. 1 (h)
Schedule 1 reclaiming of unhealthy localities
Item No. 1 (j)
Schedule 1 watering public streets and places
Item No. 1 (q)
Schedule 1 removing obstruction and projection in public streets or places and
Item No. 1 (t) in spaces not being private property which are open to the enjoyment
of the public whether such spaces are vested in the Panchayat or
belong to Government
Schedule 1 securing or removing dangerous buildings or places
Item No. 1 (u)
Schedule 1 constructing alerting and maintaining public streets culverts
Item No. 1 (v) Panchayat boundary marks markets slaughter houses latrines privies
urinals drains sewers drainage works, sewage works baths washing
places drinking fountains tanks wells dams and the like
Schedule 1 paying the salary and contingent expenditure on account of such
Item No. 1 (x) police or guards as may be required by the Panchayats for the
purpose of the Act or for the protection of any Panchayat property
Schedule 1 constructing and maintaining residential quarters for the conservancy
Item No. 1 (y) staff of the Panchayat
Schedule 1 maintenance and regulation of the use of building handed over to the
Item No. 2 (c) Panchayat or of government buildings under the control of the
Panchayat grazing lands, forests land including lands assigned under
section 28 of the Indian Forest Act 1927, and tanks and wells (other
than tanks and wells or irrigation)
Schedule 1 control of fairs, bazaars, tonga stand and cart stands
Item No. 2 (e)
Schedule 1 construction and maintenance or control of slaughter houses
Item No. 2 (f)
Schedule 1 planting of trees in market places and other public places and their
Item No. 2 (g) maintenance and preservation
Schedule 1 construction and maintenance of Dharamsalas
Item No. 2 (h)
Schedule 1 management and control of bathing and washing ghats which are
Item No. 2 (i) managed by any authority
Schedule 1 construction and maintenance of houses for conservancy staff and
Item No. 2 (k) village functionaries of the Panchayat
Schedule 1 provision and maintenance of camping grounds
Item No. 2 (l)
Schedule 1 construction and maintenance of buildings for common use and of
Item No. 2 (q) buildings necessary for development activities

131
 Details of Detailed provisions on devolution of powers Item in the 11th Schedule
Appended to which this provision
Section of the pertains
Act (Section 99)
Schedule 1 control of cattle stands, thrashing floors, grazing grounds and
Item No. 5 (h) community lands
Schedule 1 regulating checking and abating of offensive or dangerous trade or
Item No. 1 (p) practices
Schedule 1 extinguishing fires and protecting life and property when fires occur
Item No. 1 (s)
Schedule 1 obtaining a supply of an additional supply f water, proper and
Item No. 1 (w) sufficient for preventing danger to the health of inhabitants from the
in sufficiency or unwholesomeness of the existing supply when such
supply or additional supply can be obtained at a reasonable cost
Schedule 1 extension of village sites and the regulation of buildings and housing
Item No. 2 (0) schemes in accordance with such principles as may be prescribed
Schedule 1 establishment and maintenance of akhada parks, clubs and other
Item No. 3 (b) places of recreation for the welfare of women and youth

In addition, to the above mentioned functional devolution, The Gujarat Panchayat Act, 1993 also
devolves other functions to Village Panchayat as listed below:

Table: 3a
Details of Appended Functions
Section of the Act
Section99
In the sphere of Planning and Administartion
Schedule I Item No. 5 the preparation of plans for the development of the village
(a)
Schedule I Item No. 5 preparation of budget collection and maintenance of accounts custody and utilization of funds
(d) assessment and collection of taxes and maintenance of an Account Code
Schedule I Item No. 5 use of assistance given by the central and state government for and purpose of the village
(e)
Schedule I Item No. 5 making independent surveys of the gram or assisting such surveys undertaken by the central or
(f) state government
Schedule I Item No. 5 recruitment training and management of staff to be employed by Panchayat
(g)
Schedule I Item No. 5 reporting to proper authorities complaints which are not removable by the Panchayat
(j)
Schedule I Item No. 5 preparation maintenance and up-keep of the Panchayat records
(k)
Schedule I Item No. 5 registration of births deaths and marriages in such manner and in such form as may be laid down
(l) by the State Government by general or special order in this behalf
Schedule I Item No. 5 numbering of premises
(m)
In the sphere of collection of land revenue
Schedule I Item No. collection of land revenue when so empowered by the State government under section 168
10 (a)
Schedule I Item No. maintenance of records relating to land revenue in such manner and in such form as may be
10 (b) prescribed from time to time by or under any law relating to land revenue
132
The analysis of the legislation as above may be summarized in the table below:
Table: 4
Village Taluka District
Item in the Eleventh Schedule
Panchayat Panchayat Panchayat
Agriculture, including agricultural extension
Land improvement, implementation of land reforms, land consolidation X

and soil conservation
Minor irrigation, water management and watershed development

Animal husbandry, dairying and poultry

Social forestry and farm forestry X

Small scale industries, including food processing industries

Khadi, village and cottage industries X

Rural housing X X
Drinking water
Roads, culverts, bridges, ferries, waterways and other means of

communication
Rural electrification, including distribution of electricity X X

Poverty alleviation programme X X

Education, including primary and secondary schools
Technical training and vocational education X X
Libraries X
Cultural activities
Markets and Fairs X X
Health and sanitation, including hospitals, Primary health centres and

dispensaries
Family Welfare
Women and Child Development
Social Welfare, including welfare of the handicapped and mentally
retarded
Welfare of the weaker sections, and in particular of the Scheduled Castes X
and the Scheduled Tribes
Public distribution system X X
Maintenance of community assets X

In total, activities relating 22 matters are devolved to the Village Panchayats and 18 matters to
the Taluka Panchayats and 14 matters to the District Panchayats.

133
2. Financial Devolution to PRIs
2.1 Devolution of Property and Fund and Taxation Power to Village Panchayat

Property
Section 108 (1) of the Act states: For the purpose of this Act, the State Government may subject
to such conditions and restrictions as it may think fit to impose vest in a Panchayat open sites,
waste, vacant or grazing lands or public road, streets, bridges, ditches, dikes and fences, wells,
river-beds, tanks, streams, lakes nallas, canals, water-courses, trees or any other property in the
village vesting in the Government.
(More Clarifications)
Section 109 (1) of the Act states: A Taluka Panchayat or the District Panchayat may from time
to time direct that any property vesting in it shall vest in a Village Panchayat and thereupon
notwithstanding anything contained in the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 or the Indian
Registration Act, 1908. Such property shall vest in the Village Panchayat.
Section 109 (2) of the Act states: Every work constructed by a Panchayat out of its fund or
with Government assistance or peoples participation shall vest in the Panchayat
Section 110 (1) of the Act states: Subject to the provision of the subsection (2) no lease, sale or
other transfer of any immovable property vesting in or acquired by a Panchayat shall be valid
unless such lease, sale or other transfer has been made with the previous sanction of the
competent authority-
Section 110 (2) of the Act states: In the case of a lease of immovable property other than the
property vesting in the Panchayat under section 108 no such previous sanction shall be necessary
if the period of lease does not exceed three years.

Village Fund
Section 111 (1) of the Act states: There shall be in each village a fund to be called the Village
Fund.
Section 111 (2) of the Act states: The following shall be paid into and form part of the fund
namely:
a) the proceeds of any tax or fee imposed by or assigned to the Panchayat under this Act

134
b) all sums ordered by a court to be paid as compensations
c) all other sums ordered by a court to be placed at the credit of the village fund
d) the sale proceeds of all dust, dirt, dung, refuse or carcasses of animals, except in so far as any
person is entitled to the whole or portion thereof
e) sums contributed to the fund by the State Government or the Taluka Panchayat or the district
Panchayat
f) all sums received by way of loans from State government or Taluka Panchayat or the district
Panchayat or out of the District Development Fund or otherwise
g) all sums received by the Panchayat by way of gift or contribution
h) the income or proceeds of any property vesting in the Panchayat
i) the net proceeds (after deducting the expenses of assessment and collection) of the cess
authorized by section 203
j) all sums realized by way of rent or penalty otherwise than as the amount of any fine in a
criminal case
k) all sums realized as pound fees after deducting the expenses

Taxes, Fees and Rates

Section 200 (1) of the Gujarat Panchayat Act states: Subject to any general or special order
(including an order fixing the minimum and maximum rates of a tax or fee) which the State
Government may make in this behalf it shall be competent to a Village Panchayat to levy all or
any of the following taxes and fee at such rates as may be decided by it and in such manner and
subject to such exemptions as may be prescribed namely:-
(i) a tax on buildings (whether subject to payment of agricultural assessment or not) and
lands (which are not subject to payment of agricultural assessment) within the limits of
the village
(ii) octroi on animals or goods or both brought within the village for consumption use or sale
therein
(iii) a pilgrim tax
(iv) a tax on fairs, festivals and other entertainments not being a tax on payments for
admission to any entertainments

135
(v) a tax on vehicles, boats or animals used for riding, draught or burden, kept for use within
the village, whether they are actually kept within or outside the village
(vi) a toll on vehicles and animals used as aforesaid entering the village but not liable to
taxation under clause (v) of this section
(vii) a tax on dogs kept within the village
(viii) a general sanitary cess for the construction or maintenance of public latrines and for the
removal and disposal of refuse
(ix) a general water rate which may be imposed in the form of a rate assessed on buildings
and lands or in any other form as may be best adapted to the circumstances of any class
of cases
(x) any other prescribed tax ( not being a toll on motor vehicles or trailers, save as provided
by section 20 of the Bombay Motor Vehicles Tax Act, 1958 or tax on professions, trades
callings and employments or a tax on payments for admission to any entertainment)
which the State Legislature has under the Constitution powers to impose in the State
(xi) a fee on market and weekly bazaars
(xii) a fee on cart-stands and tonga-stands
(xiii) a special water rate for water supplied by the Panchayat through pipes which may be
imposed in any form including that of charges for such water supplied fixed in such
mode or modes as shall be best adapted in the circumstances of any class of cases
(xiv) a fee for the supply of water from wells and tanks vesting in it for purposes other than
domestic use and for cattle
(xv) fee for temporary erection on or putting up projections over or temporary occupation of
any public street or place
(xvi) a special sanitary cess upon private latrines, premises or compounds cleaned by the
Panchayat agency
(xvii) a drainage tax
(xviii) a lighting tax
(xix) a fee for cleansing a cess pool constructed on land whether belonging to Panchayat or
not
(xx) A fee for gazing cattle on gazing lands vesting in a Panchayat

136
(xxi) In lieu of any two or more separate taxes specified in clauses (i), (viii), (ix), and (xviii), a
consolidated tax on buildings or lands or both situated the limits of the village

Other Financial Powers

Section 201 (1) of the Act states: Subject to any rules that may be made under this Act and
regard being had to the fact that a factory itself provides in the factory area all or any of the
amenities which such Panchayat provides, village any factory with the sanction of the State
Government top receive a lump-sum contribution in lieu of all or any of the taxes levied by the
Panchayat.
Section 203 (1) of the Act states: A Village Panchayat may by resolution passed by its meeting
apply to levy a cess at the rate not exceeding 25 paise according to its needs and capacity on
every rupee of every sum payable to the State Government land revenue and on which a cess is
leviable under clause (a), (b) and (c) of sub-section (1) of section 191 and thereupon the state
government shall in addition to any cess leviable under section 191) levy and collect such cess in
the area within the jurisdiction of such Panchayat.
Section 204 (1) of the Act states: power of Taluka Panchayat to increase taxation of Panchayat
Section 205 of the Act states: If under clause (a) of item 4 of Schedule 1, a Village Panchayat
incurs any expenditures on watch and ward of the village and of the crops therein the cost of
such watch and ward shall be levied and recovered by the Panchayat from such persons and in
such manner (including the levying of a fee) as may be prescribed

2.2 Devolution of Property and Fund and Taxation Power to Taluka Panchayat

Property
Section 133 (1) of the Act states: In addition to the movable or immovable property acquired by
a Taluka Panchayat the following shall vest in the Taluka Panchayat namely:
(i) every road building or other works constructed by a Taluka Panchayat out of the Taluka fund
with or without the Government assistance or peoples participation
(ii) any land or property vesting in the State Government when transferred to a Taluka
Panchayat by the State Government for local public purposes

137
(iii)any land or property which vesting in any other Panchayat when vested in the Taluka
Panchayat by that Panchayat for the purpose of this Act. Provided that any land or property
transferred to a Taluka Panchayat under clause (b) shall not unless otherwise expressly
provided in the instrument of transfer belong by right of ownership to the Panchayat but shall
vest in it subject to the terms and conditions of the transfer and in the circumstances specified
in such terms or conditions, the land or property with all things, if any, attached thereto
including all fixtures and structures thereon shall revest in the State Government and it shall
be lawful for the State Government to resume possession thereof

Section 133 (2) of the Act states: Notwithstanding that any immovable property vest in Taluka
Panchayat, no lease, sale or other transfer thereof shall be valid unless it has been made with the
previous sanction of the competent authority-Provided that in the case of a lease of immovable
property other than the property referred to in clause (b) of subsection (1), on such previous
sanction shall be necessary if the period of lease does not exceed three years

Taluka Fund
Section 134 (1) of the Act states: There shall be in each Taluka fund which shall be called a
Taluka Fund. And Section 134 (2) of the Act states: The following shall be paid into form part
of the Taluka fund namely:
(i) the proceeds of any tax or fee imposed by or assigned to the Panchayat under this Act
(ii) the sale proceeds of all dust, dirt, dung, refuse or carcasses of animals except in so far as
any person is entitled to the whole or portion thereof
(iii) sums contributed to the Taluka fund by the State Government or the district Panchayat
(iv) all sums received by way of gift or contributions by the Taluka Panchayat
(v) the income or proceeds of any property vesting in the Taluka Panchayat
(vi) the net proceeds (after deducting the expenses of assessment and collection) of the
stamp duty authorized by section 207
(vii) all sums realized by way of rent or penalty otherwise than as the amount of any fine in a
criminal case

138
Other Financial Power
Section 193 of the Act states: The State Government may levy a cess not exceeding twenty
paise on every rupee of water rate leviable under the provisions of the Bombay Irrigation Act,
1879
Section 197 of the Act states: The local cess leviable on water rate under section 193 in respect
of lands shall be paid by the State Government to the Taluka Panchayat within the jurisdiction of
which the land are situated, after deducting such portion thereof as cost of collection as the State
Government may prescribe by rules
Section 206 (1) of the Act states: Subject to any general special orders which the State
Government may make in this behalf, every Taluka Panchayat may after observing the
preliminary procedure required by section 212 impose an education cess and any of taxes and
fees which a leviable by a village Panchayat under section 200.
Provided that the rate of tax or fee leviable by a Taluka Panchayat in respect of any matter within
the limits of any village shall not exceed 15per cent of the rate of the tax or fee actually levied by
the village Panchayat in respect of the same matter and where no such tax or fee has been levied
by the village Panchayat shall not exceed 15per cent of the prescribed maximum rate of tax or
fee in respect of the same matter.
Section 207 (1) of the Act states: A Taluka Panchayat may by resolution passed at its meeting
apply to the State Government for increasing the rate of stamp duty leviable under the
Bombay Stamp Act, 1958 on instruments of sale mortgage, lease or any other kind of transfer
on immovable property situated within the limits of the Taluka to such extent exceed 15per cent
of the rate duty so leviable and specified in the resolution
The State Government shall every year after due appreciation made by law in this behalf pay to
the Taluka Panchayat from the Consolidated Fund of the State a grant-in-aid approximately
equal to the extra duty realized under subsection (1) in respect of properties situated within the
jurisdiction of the Taluka Panchayat

139
2.3 Devolution of Property, Fund and Taxation Power to District Panchayat

Property
Section 157 (1) of the Act states: In addition to the movable or immovable property acquired by
a district Panchayat the following shall vest in the district Panchayat namely:
(i) every road building or other works constructed by a district Panchayat out of the district
fund with or without the Government assistance or peoples participation
(ii) any land or property vesting in the State Government when transferred to a district
Panchayat by the State Government for local public purposes
(iii)any land or other property which vesting in any other Panchayat, when vested in the district
Panchayat by that Panchayat for the purposes of this Act. Provided that any land or property
transferred to a district Panchayat under clause (b) shall not unless otherwise expressly
provided in the instrument of transfer, belong by right of ownership to the Panchayat but
shall vest in it subject to the terms and conditions of the transfer and in the circumstances
specified in such terms and conditions, the land or property with all things, if any, attached
thereto including all fixtures and structures thereon shall revest in the State Government and
it shall be lawful for the State Government to resume possession thereof
Section 157 (2) of the Act states: Notwithstanding that any immovable property vest in a district
Panchayat, no lease, sale or other transfer thereof shall be valid unless it has been made with the
previous sanction of the competent authority-Provided that in the case of a lease of immovable
property other than the property referred to in clause (b) of subsection (1), no such previous
sanction shall be necessary, if the period of lease does not exceed three years.

District Fund
Section 158 (1) of the Act states: There shall be in each district a fund which shall be called a
District Fund. And Section 158 (2) of the Act states: The following shall be paid into and form
part of the district fund namely:
(i) the proceeds of any tax or fee imposed under this Act
(ii) the sale proceeds of all dust, dirt, dung, refuse or carcasses of animals except in so far as any
person is entitled to the whole or portion thereof

140
(iii) sums contributed to the district fund by the State Government or otherwise
(iv) all sums received by way of gift or contributions by the district Panchayat
(v) the income or proceeds of any property vesting in the district Panchayat
(vi) the net proceeds (after deducting the expenses of assessment and collection) of the cess
authorized by section 191
(vii) all sums realized by way of rent or penalty otherwise than as the amount of any fine in a
criminal case

Application of District Fund

Section 159 (1) of the Act states: All property vested in a district Panchayat under this Act, and
all funds received by it in accordance with the provisions of this Act, and all sums accruing to it
under the provisions of any law for the time being in force, shall be applied subject to the
provisions of any law for the time being in force, shall be applied subject to the provisions and
for the purposes of this Act and all such sums and funds shall be kept in such custody as may be
prescribed. Provided that out of the net proceeds of the cess referred to it in clause (g) of sub
section (2) of section 158, a portion calculated at the rate of 8 paise on every rupee of very sum
on which the cess is levied under section 191, shall be applied by a district Panchayat for the
purpose of primary education in the district

Section 159 (2) of the Act states: any surplus funds in the hands of a Panchayat which may not
be required for current charges may be invested in such manner as may be prescribed
Section 159 (3) of the Act states: in the case of any loan by a Panchayat, the payment of the
principal or installment, thereof and the payment of interest thereon shall be a first charge on its
fund

District Welfare Fund

Section 160 (1) of the Act states: Notwithstanding anything contained in section 158 and 159
in each district, there shall be established by the district Panchayat a fund to be called the
District Welfare Fund which shall consist of-
(i) all the sums received by way of gifts or contribution from the State Government or the
Central government or any person for the purpose of the family welfare programme
(ii) the proceeds of entertainment programme arranged by the Panchayat
(iii)the same proceeds of family welfare seals

141
 Application of District Welfare Fund
Section 160 (2) of the Act states: The Fund shall be applied by the Panchayat for the purpose of
family welfare programme in the district.

Section 160 (3) of the Act states: Any sum in the fund which may not be required for the
current expenditure may be invested in such manner as may be prescribed

Other Financial power

Section 191 (1) of the Act provided that the State Government can levy of fifty paise cess on
every rupee of land revenue. Section 191 (3) (a) of the Act states: If it appears to a district
Panchayat that for the purposes of its functions under schedule 111 and additional provision of
funds is necessary, it may be a resolution passed at its district, the rate of cess levied under sub-
section (1) to such extent and for such period as may be prescribed in the resolution. Provided
that by such increase the rate of cess shall not exceed three hundred paise on every rupee on
which such cess is leviable under sub-section (1) of the section 191 of the Act.
Section 191 (3) (b) of the Act states: on receipt of an application under clause (a) State
Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette increase the rate of cess as proposed by
the district Panchayat and thereupon subsection (1) shall have effect as if for the rate specified
therein the rate as so increased has been substituted
Section 198 of the Act states: The local cess leviable on lands under section 191 shall be paid
by the State Government to the District Panchayat within the jurisdiction of which lands are
situated after deducting such portion thereof as cost of collection, as the State Government may
prescribe by rules.
Section 199 of the Act states: The State Government may on the application of the District
Panchayat to which the cess is payable, suspend or remit the collection of cess or any portion
thereof in any year in any area, subject to the jurisdiction of such District Panchayat
Section 115 of the Act states: Every Village Panchayat shall contribute every year to the
District Development Fund constituted under section 223 a sum equal to such percentage not
exceeding ten percent of its income from such sources as may be prescribed-provided that where
any Village Panchayat fails in any year to make a contribution under this section it shall be
lawful for the State Government to deduct such amount from the grant payable to the Panchayat

142
under section 219 in the next Deseeding year as may be sufficient to make the contribution and
credit the same to the District Development Fund on behalf of the Village Panchayat
Section 208 of the Act states: Subject to any general or special order which the State
Government may make in this behalf every District Panchayat may after observing the
preliminary procedure require 1 by section 212 impose any of the taxes and fees which are
leviable by a Village Panchayat under section 200.
Provided that the rate of tax or fee leviable by a district Panchayat in respect of any matter within
the limits of any village shall not exceed 10per cent of the rate of the tax or fee actually levied by
the Village Panchayat in respect of the same matter and where no such tax or fee has been levied
by the village Panchayat shall not exceed 10per cent of the prescribed maximum rate of tax or
fee in respect of the same matter.
Section 209 (1) of the Act states: A District Panchayat may by resolution passed at its meeting
apply to the state government for increasing the rate of stamp duty leviable under the Bombay
Stamp Act, 1958 in instruments of sale mortgage, lease or any other kind of transfer on
immovable property situated within the limits of the district to such extent exceed 20per cent of
the rate duty so leviable and specified in the resolution
The State Government shall every year after due appreciation made by law in this behalf pay to
the District Panchayat from the Consolidated Fund of the State a grant-in-aid approximately
equal to the extra duty realized under subsection (1) in respect of properties situated within the
jurisdiction of the District Panchayat
Section 210 of the Act states that tax on profession etc. levied by District Panchayat to be
collected by village Panchayat

Financial Assistance to Panchayat by the State Government

Section 218 of the Act states: The State Government shall having regard to the
recommendations, if any, of the Finance Commission, in each year after due appropriation made
by the State Legislature by law in this behalf make provision for making grants to the Panchayats
in accordance with this chapter

143
Section 219 (1) of the Act states: For the purpose of section 218, the State Government shall in
each year determines a sum which shall be equal to the average of the land revenue collected or
recovered during the three preceding revenue years in the State.
Section 219 (2) states: Out of the sum determined under subsection (1) an amount equal to (a)
such percentage of the sum as may be prescribed shall be set apart for meeting the expenditure
on the salaries of the secretaries of village Panchayat and of the village accountants in the State
and on their training; (b) five percent of the sum shall be paid into the State Equalization Fund
established under Section 220.
Out of the balance remaining after making the provisions in accordance with sub-section (2)
(i) an equal to (a) 50per cent of the balance shall be distributed among the village
Panchayats (b), 25per cent of the balance shall be distributed among the Taluka
Panchayat and (c) 10 per cent of the balance shall be distributed among the district
Panchayats in proportion to the average collection and recovery of land revenue from the
respective village, Taluka or as the case may be district Panchayat in the three revenue
years immediately preceding;
(ii) an equal to (a) 7.5per cent of the balance shall be paid into District equalization Fund
established under section 221 (b) 7.5per cent of the balance shall be paid into District
Gram Panchayat Encouragement Fund under section 222

Section 220 (1) of the Act provides the establishment of State Equalization Fund by the State
Government to be utilized for making special grants to backward districts so as to minimize
the social and economic inequalities between the districts of the State
Section 221 (1) of the Act provides the establishment of District Equalization Fund by the
District Panchayat to be utilized by the district Panchayat for making special grants to
backward Panchayats subordinate to it so as to minimize the social and economic inequalities
between the Panchayats in the district
Section 222 of the Act states: In each District there shall be established by the district
Panchayat a fund to be called District Village Encouragement Fund to be utilized by the
district Panchayat for making incentive grants to village Panchayat to encourage them to
raise their income by levying taxes and fees leviable by them under this Act.

144
Section 223 states:
Section 223 (1) of the Act states: In each district there shall be established a fund to be called
the District Development Fund which shall consist of the contributions made by the village
Panchayats under section 115 to be utilized for granting loans to village Panchayats in
accordance with the rules and for payment of interest on contributions made by the said
Panchayats.
Section 224 of the Act states: The State Government shall after due appropriation made by the
State Legislature by law in this behalf pay to every district Panchayat an equal amount to two
percent of the forest revenue collected in the revenue year immediately preceding within the
limits of the district
Section 225 of the Act states: Where any village is situate in a forest area and is not assessed
under the Land revenue Code then the State Government shall in lieu of a grant of land
revenue under section 219 pay to the village Panchayat of the village, in each year such
amount out of the forest revenue of the village collected in the revenue year immediately
preceding as it may fix but the amount so fixed shall not be:
(i) less tan Rs. 500 and
(ii) more than an amount calculated on the basis of the population of the village at such per
capita rate as is equal to the per capita rate arrived at in respect of grants made under
section 219

3. Staff under PRIs of Gujarat

3.1 Staff under Village Panchayat

Section 114 (1) of the Act states: Subject to the provision of this Act and the rules there
under
(a) there shall be a Secretary for every village Panchayat who shall be appointed in
accordance with the rules
(b) a village Panchayat shall have other servants as may be determined under section 227.
Such servant shall be appointed by such authority and their conditions of services shall be
such as may be prescribed-

145
 Provided that the State Government having regard to the population of a village and income
of the Panchayat thereof may direct in respect of a group of village Panchayats that such
group shall have one Secretary and thereupon there shall be one Secretary for that group.
Section 114 (2) of the Act states: A secretary of the a village Panchayat shall subject to the
control of the Sarpanch
(a) keep in his custody the records and registers of the Panchayat
(b) issue receipts under his signature for sums of money received by him on behalf of the
Panchayat
(c) prepare all statements and reports required under this Act and
(d) perform such other functions and duties under this Act as may be prescribed

3.2 Staff under Taluka Panchayat

Section 136 (1) of the Act states: Subject to the provisions of this Act and the rules made
there under-
(i) there shall be a Secretary for every Taluka Panchayat
(ii) The Taluka Development Officer who shall be an officer belonging to the State service
and posted under the Panchatyat shall be the ex-officio Secretary of the Panchayat
(iii) A Taluka Panchayat shall have such other officers and servants as may be determined
under section 227
Section 136 (2) of the Act states: The officers and servants referred to it in clause(c ) of
subsection (1) shall be appointed by such authority and their conditions of service shall be such
as may be prescribed.
Section 136 (3) of the Act states: The officers and servants appointed under sub-section (2) shall
in the discharge of their functions and duties exercise such powers as may be conferred on them
by the Panchayat subject to rules if any, made in this behalf

3.3 Staff under District Panchayat

Section 180 (1) (b) of the Act states: Where the State Government entrusts a scheme under
clause (a) to a district Panchayat, it shall allot to the district Panchayat such fund and personnel
as may be necessary to enable the district Panchayat to implement the scheme.

146
Section 161 (1) of the Act states: Subject to the provisions of this Act and the rules made
thereunder
a) there shall be a secretary for every district Panchayat
b) a District Development Officer posted under the Panchayat shall be Ex-Officio Secretary
of the Panchayat
c) a district Panchayat shall have such other officers and servants as may be determined
under section 227

Section 161 (2) of the Act states: The officers and servants referred to in clause of sub
section (1) of section 161 shall be appointed by such authority and their conditions of service
shall be as may be prescribed
Section 161 (3) of the Act states: The officers and servants appointed under sub-section (2)
shall in the discharge of their functions and duties, exercise such powers as may be conferred on
them by the Panchayat subject to rules if any made in this behalf
Section 114 (3) of the Act states: The other servants of the Panchayat shall perform such
functions and duties and exercise such powers under this Act as may be imposed or conferred on
them by the Panchayat, subject to rules, if any, made in this behalf

Appended Information
Section 176 of the Act states that transfer of rights and liabilities in respect of property transferred
to Panchayat.
Section 177 of the Act states that obligation of liability of servants transferred under section 175
not affected.
Section 178 of the Act states withdrawal of powers and functions etc from district Panchayat.
Section 180 (1) (b) of the Act states: Where the State Government entrust a scheme under
clause (a) to a district Panchayat such fund and personnel as may be necessary to enable the
district Panchayat to implement the scheme

147
 Annexure 2.2: Analysis of Activity Mapping in Andhra Pradesh
The State Government constituted a Task Force Committee under the Chairmanship of Special
Chief Secretary to the Government along with other 3 Secretaries in G.O. Rt. No. 1469, PR&RD
Department dated 24.09.2004 to work out and make suggestive measures on devolution of power
to PRIs on each subject. The draft activity maps firmed up in workshops convened, which were
attended by the Panchayat members and were placed before the Task Force Committee for
further consideration. The meetings of Task Force Committee were held between 2004 and 2006.
The Committee prepared the draft Activity Mapping for 27 matters (except Housing and
Libraries). Based on this exercise, the Government has issued 9 Government Orders (GO)
between January and March 2008, which pertains to different departments and covers 12 matters
listed in 11th Schedule of the Constitution for all 3 tiers of Panchayats at Andhra Pradesh. An
analysis of all three tiers of Panchayat indicates the following range of activities devolved to
Panchayats:
Gram Panchayat
Sl.No in Functions
11th Matters in 11th Schedule Funds Functionaries
Schedule Planning Implementation Supervision Promotion
Minor irrigation, water
3 management & watershed
development
Animal Husbandry, dairying
4
and poultry
5 Fisheries
11 Drinking Water
12 Fuel and Fodder
Education including primary
17
and secondary schools
Health and sanitation
23 including hospitals primary
health centers and dispensaries
24 Family welfare
25 Women & child development
Social welfare including
26 welfare of the handicapped
and mentally retarded
Welfare of the weaker sections
27 and scheduled castes and
scheduled tribes
28 Public distribution system
Total 10 8 10 4 8 10

148
 Mandal Parishad
Sl.No in Matters in 11th Schedule Functions Funds Functionaries
11th Planning Implementation Supervision Promotion
Schedule
2 Land Improvement
,implementation of land reforms,
land consolidation
3 Minor irrigation, water
management and watershed
development
4 Animal Husbandry, dairying and

poultry
5 Fisheries
11 Drinking Water
12 Fuel and Fodder
23 Health and sanitation including
hospitals primary health centers
and dispensaries
24 Family welfare
25 Women and child development

26 Social welfare including welfare
of the handicapped and mentally
retarded
Total 5 9 7 7 7 10

Zilla Parishad
Sl.No in Matters in 11th Schedule Functions Funds Functionaries
11th Planning Implementation Supervision Promotion
Schedule
2 Land Improvement,
implementation of land reforms,
land consolidation
3 Minor irrigation, water
management and watershed
development
4 Animal Husbandry, dairying and

poultry
5 Fisheries
11 Drinking Water
12 Fuel and Fodder
17 Education including primary and

secondary schools
23 Health and sanitation including
hospitals primary health centers
and dispensaries
24 Family welfare
25 Women and child development

149
26 Social welfare including welfare
of the handicapped and mentally
retarded
27 Welfare of the weaker sections
and scheduled castes and
scheduled tribes
Total 5 8 11 2 10 11

The analysis indicates that the devolved functions through Activity Mapping, mainly pertain to
planning, implementation, supervision and promotion. Of the 29 matters listed in the 11th
Schedule, functions have been devolved for 12 matters whereas funds and functionaries have
been devolved for 8 and 10 matters respectively at Gram Panchayat level. In the case of Mandal
Parishad, functions have been devolved for 10 matters whereas funds and functionaries have
been devolved for 7 and 10 matters respectively. At Zila Parishad level, functions have been
devolved for 12 matters whereas funds and functionaries have been devolved for 10 and 11
matters respectively. Since ZPs depend upon the Activity Mapping orders for the actual
devolution of sector-specific powers to them, the Activity mapping is a step forward for them.

150
Annexure 2.3: Activity Mapping in Madhya Pradesh:
In the current circumstances where the devolution of powers under the law to the Panchayats is
conflicting, imprecise and conditional, the onus is upon the government to bring in role clarity
through Activity Mapping. In this respect, it appears from the documentation that Madhya
Pradesh has undertaken reasonably good work by issuing executive orders (between 1996 and
1997) regarding the devolution of functions, funds and functionaries. A compendium on
department wise devolution of functions, funds and functionaries was released in 1998 by
Panchayat and Rural Development Department, Government of Madhya Pradesh. According to
the compendium, out of the 29 matters listed in the Eleventh Schedule, executive orders
containing the Activity Mapping in respect of 25 matters have been issued. These executive
orders pertain to 22 departments. Details are given in the table below:

Functions
Plannin Functio
Sl Matters in 11th Schedule Executive Orders Supe Funds
g & Promoti naries
No rvisi
Implem on
on
entation
B-1-6/96/14-2
Agriculture including (30.10.1996)
1
agriculture extension B-1-5/93/14-2
(2.5.1998)
Land improvement, B-1-6/96/14-2
implementation of land (30.10.1996)
2
reforms, lands consolidation B-1-5/93/14-2
and soil conservation (2.5.1998)
B-1-6/96/14-2
Minor irrigation, water
(30.10.1996)
3 management and watershed
B-1-5/93/14-2
development
(2.5.1998)
Animal Husbandry, dairying 189-F-2/96/35/93
4
and poultry (12.12.1996)
2886/96/36
(31.10.1996)
5 Fisheries
E-23/11/94/36/P
(09.05.1997)
Social Forestry & Farm F 3/77/94/10/2
6
Forestry (29.10.1996)
Not Not
Not Not Not
7 Minor Forest Produce Not covered cover covere
covered covered covered
ed d

151
 FA-1-41/52/96
Small scale industries
(30.010.1996)
8 including food processing
3-104-52-97
industries
(22.10.1997)
FA-1-41/52/96
Khadi, village and cottage (30.010.1996)
9
industries 3-104-52-97
(22.10.1997)
18036/22/V-
7/JRY/96
(30.10.1996)
10 Rural Housing 18224/22/V-6/97
(20.11.1997)
6094/22/V-7/JRY/96
(02.04.1997)
F8-16/34-2/96/6062
(29.10.1996)
11 Drinking water
F-8/16/96/2/34
(24.10.1997)
189-F-2/96/35/93
12 Fuel & Fodder
(12.12.1996)
207 (20.04.1996)
Roads, culverts, bridges,
13 ferries, waterways and other
F.3-2-94-XVI-
means of communication
A(17.04.1996)
Rural electrification including
14 Not available
distribution of electricity
Non Conventional energy
15 Not available
resources
18067/V-2/96
Poverty alleviation (30.10.1996)
16
programmes 18224/22/V-6/97
(20.11.1997)
F.44-65/85/B-2/20
(30.10.1996)
Education including primary F-44-65-85-B-2-20
17
and secondary schools (25.03.1998)
F-44-65-85-B-2-20
(27.06.1997)
Not Not
Technical training and Not Not Not
18 Not covered cover covere
vocational education covered covered covered
ed d
F.44-65/85/B-2/20
(30.10.1996)
Adult and non-formal F-44-65-85-B-2-20
19
education (25.03.1998)
F-44-65-85-B-2-20
(27.06.1997)
F-8/3/94/26-2
(28.11.1996)
20 Libraries
F/2/5/95/26-2
(21.11.1996)
152
 F/6/35/94/9
(05.11.1996)
21 Cultural activities
F/6/35/94/9
(09.12.1997)
Not Not
Not Not Not
22 Markets and fairs Not covered cover covere
covered covered covered
ed d
F.3-10/9517-Medi-1
(1.8.1995)
(6.9.1995)
(15.9.1995)
Health and sanitation
(6.10.1995)
23 including hospitals primary
F 1-27/96/17/Medi -
health centres and dispensaries
1 (30.10.1996)
F-3-7-
(1)/98/17/Medi-1
(16.07.1998)
F.3-10/9517-Medi-1
(1.8.1995)
(6.9.1995)
(15.9.1995)
(6.10.1995)
24 Family welfare
F 1-27/96/17/Medi -
1 (30.10.1996)
F-3-7-
(1)/98/17/Medi-1
(16.07.1998)
F-8-3/95/50-2
(29.10.1996)
F 8-21/93/50-2
(29.10.1996)
Women and child F 1- (A)/99/95/50-1
25
development (18.11.1997)
F 3/83/96/50-2
(30.03.1997)
F 8/21/93/50-2
(17.12.1996)
F-8/3/94/26-2
Social welfare including
(28.11.1996)
26 welfare of the handicapped
F-1-13-B-96-26-2-
and mentally retarded
216 (2.2.1998)
F-4-226/96/1/25
Welfare of the weaker sections (29.10.1996)
and in particular of the F-4-245/96/1/25
27
scheduled castes and (30.10.1996)
scheduled tribes F 4/1/98/1/25
(3.1.1998)
F 7-8-92-29-I
28 Public distribution system
(24.12.1994)
Not Not
Maintenance of community Not Not Not
29 Not covered cover covere
assets covered covered covered
ed d

153
The above analysis indicates that of 29 matters listed in the 11th Schedule, functions have been
devolved for 25 matters, whereas funds and functionaries have been devolved for 19 matters.
The matters that are left out are Minor Forest Produce, Technical training and vocational
education, Markets and fairs and maintenance of community assets. However, while the Activity
Mapping for social forestry does not cover minor forest produce as a separate item, there are
elaborate provisions of the law inserted through PESA that vest MFP in Gram Sabhas and GPs in
fifth schedule areas. Though Activity Mapping does not explicitly cover the maintenance of
community assets as a separate item, in some of the activity maps relating to education, health
etc., assets such as schools PHCs, Anganwadis, etc have been vested in the Panchayats.
Therefore, one can safely conclude that this aspect has been partly covered in the Activity
Mapping undertaken. Madhya Pradesh has undertaken to revisit the Activity Mapping. However,
matters are proceeding very slowly. The task of preparing an improved Activity Mapping was
assigned to an NGO named Samarthan, Bhopal by the Government.

154
Annexure 2.4: Activity Mapping in Sikkim:
On 15th April, 2006 a Task Force was constituted to make recommendations on the activities
which may be transferred to the PRIs. The final report of the Committee was jointly released by
the Chief Minister and the Union Minister of Panchayati Raj on 25th October, 2006 in Gangtok.
Activities of 14 Departments: Agriculture and Food Security, Horticulture and Cash Crops,
Animal Husbandry, Livestock, Veterinary Services, Education, Health and Family Welfare,
Forests, Environment and Wild Life, Commerce and Industries, Disaster Management,
Irrigation, Cultural Activities, Rural Water Supply, Rural Bridges, Rural Sanitation,
Cooperatives are devolved. In addition there is a Miscellaneous sector and sector of all centrally
sponsored schemes. Under the Miscellaneous head, several activities are covered pertaining to
subjects related to maintenance of community assets, child and women development, non-
conventional energy sources and tourism. However, under the heading Centrally Sponsored
Scheme nothing specific is mentioned, except stating that these are to be as per guidelines
given by the GOI.
An analysis of the Activity Mapping indicates the following range of activities devolved to
Panchayats:
Gram Panchayat:
Sl.No in Matters in 11th Functions Funds* Functionaries
th
11 Schedule Planning Implementati Supervision Promotion
Schedul on
e
1 Agriculture including
agriculture extension
2 Land improvement,
implementation of land
reforms, land
consolidation and soil
conservation
3 Minor irrigation, water
management and
watershed development
4 Animal Husbandry,
dairying and poultry
5 Fisheries Not covered
6 Social Forestry
7 Minor Forest Produce Not covered

8 Small Scale Industries

9 Khadi, village and

155
 Cottage Industries.
10 Rural Housing Not covered
11 Drinking Water
12 Fuel and fodder
13 Roads, culverts, bridges,
ferries, waterways and
other means of
communication
14 Rural Electrification Not covered
including distribution of
electricity.
15 Non Conventional
energy resources
16 Poverty alleviation Not covered
programmes
17 Education including
primary and secondary
schools
18 Technical training and Not covered
vocational education
19 Adult and non-formal Not covered
education
20 Libraries
21 Cultural activities
22 Markets and fairs
23 Health and sanitation
including hospitals
primary health centers
and dispensaries
24 Family welfare
25 Women and child
development
26 Social welfare including Not covered
welfare of the
handicapped and
mentally retarded
27 Welfare of the weaker Not covered
sections and scheduled
castes and scheduled
tribes
28 Public distribution Not covered
system
29 Maintenance of
community assets.

156
 Zilla Parishad:
Sl.No in Matters in 11th Schedule Functions Funds* Functionarie
11th s
Schedule Planning Implementation Supervision Promotion
1 Agriculture including
agriculture extension
2 Land improvement, Not covered
implementation of land reforms,
land consolidation and soil
conservation
3 Minor irrigation, water
management and watershed
development
4 Animal Husbandry, dairying
and poultry
5 Fisheries
6 Social Forestry
7 Minor Forest Produce Not covered

8 Small Scale Industries

9 Khadi, village and Cottage
Industries.
10 Rural Housing Not covered
11 Drinking Water
12 Fuel and fodder
13 Roads, culverts, bridges, ferries,
waterways and other means of
communication
14 Rural Electrification including Not covered
distribution of electricity.
15 Non Conventional energy
resources
16 Poverty alleviation programmes Not covered
17 Education including primary
and secondary schools
18 Technical training and Not covered
vocational education
19 Adult and non-formal education Not covered
20 Libraries Not covered
21 Cultural activities
22 Markets and fairs
23 Health and sanitation including
hospitals primary health centers
and dispensaries
24 Family welfare
25 Women and child development Not covered

157
26 Social welfare including
welfare of the handicapped and
mentally retarded
27 Welfare of the weaker sections
and scheduled castes and
scheduled tribes
28 Public distribution system Not covered
29 Maintenance of community
assets.

The above table would show that the scope of the functional devolution contained in the Activity
Mapping is quite detailed and include planning and implementation responsibilities.

There has been a special emphasis on the devolution of powers and responsibilities relating to
sports activities to Panchayats. Since 2004-05, the State has provided funds for conducting sports
and games with the intention of promoting rural sports, identification of talent and providing
basic equipment in the villages. During 2005-06 each GP was provided Rs 50,000.00 and Rs 1
lakh to each Zilla Panchayat . Apart from devolution of funds, functionaries are also devolved to
the Sports and Youth Affairs Department. At ZP level Deputy Directors are posted and at GP
level Physical Education Teachers and Physical Training Instructors are posted.

158
 Annexure: 2.5: Activity mapping in Assam:
Assam had committed in its Statement of Conclusions that it would undertake a comprehensive
Activity Mapping exercise. Following detailed consultations at the highest level in the
Government, the State undertook an Activity Mapping exercise dated 25th June 2007. The format
used by the State for the Activity Mapping was the same that the Ministry had provided as the
fact sheet therefore the Activity mapping was intended to be comprehensive and covered the
devolution of funds and functionaries too. The Activity Mapping undertaken by Assam has been
analyzed separately in detail for each level of Panchayat.

Gram Panchayats
Item in the Eleventh Schedule Functions
Fun Functionari
Sl. Plan Impleme Super Promot ds es
Matter
No ning ntation vision ion

1 Agriculture, including agricultural extension X

Land improvement, Implementation of land

2 reforms, land consolidation and soil X
conservation
Minor irrigation, water management and
3 X X
watershed development.
4 Animal husbandry, Dairying and poultry X
5 Fisheries. X X
6 Social forestry X X
7 Minor Forest Produce X
Small Scale industry including food
8 X X X X
processing industry
9 Khadi, village and Cottage Industries. X
11 Drinking water
12 Fuel and Fodder X X X
Roads, culverts, Bridges, Ferries, waterways
13 X X X
& other means of communication.
Rural electrification including distribution of
14 X X X
electricity
16 Poverty alleviation programme.
Education including primary and secondary
17 X
schools
19 Adult and non-formal education. X

159
 Health and sanitation, including hospitals,
23 X X
primary health centers and dispensaries.
24 Family Welfare X X X
25 Women and Child development X X
Social welfare including welfare of the
26 X X
handicapped and mentally retarded.
28 Public distribution system. X

[The executive order in respect of all matters excluding Fuel and fodder is reported to be in force since
25-06-2007. In the case of fuel and fodder, the relevant order came into force on 15-02-2007.]

Anchalik Panchayats
Item in the Eleventh Schedule Functions
Fun Functionari
Sl. Plan Impleme Super Promot
Matter ds es
No ning ntation vision ion
1 Agriculture, including agricultural X
extension
2 Land improvement, Implementation of land X
reforms, land consolidation and soil
conservation
3 Minor irrigation, water management and X
watershed development.
4 Animal husbandry, Dairying and poultry X
5 Fisheries. X X
6 Social forestry X X
7 Minor Forest Produce X X X
8 Small Scale industry including food X X
processing industry
9 Khadi, village and Cottage Industries. X
11 Drinking water X
12 Fuel and Fodder X X X X
13 Roads, culverts, Bridges, Ferries, waterway X X
& other means of communication.
14 Rural electrification including distribution X X X X
of electricity
16 Poverty alleviation programme. X
17 Education including primary and secondary X
schools
19 Adult and non-formal education. X X
23 Health and sanitation, including hospitals, X X
primary health centers and dispensaries.
24 Family Welfare X X
25 Women and Child development X X
26 Social welfare including welfare of the X
handicapped and mentally retarded.
28 Public distribution system. X X
[The executive order in respect of all matters is reported to be in force since 25-06-2007.]

160
Zila Paridhad
Item in the Eleventh Schedule Functions Fun Functionari
Sl. Plan Impleme Super Promot ds es
Matter
No ning ntation vision ion
1 Agriculture, including agricultural X
extension
2 Land improvement, Implementation of land X X
reforms, land consolidation and soil
conservation
3 Minor irrigation, water management and X
watershed development.
4 Animal husbandry, Dairying and poultry
5 Fisheries. X
6 Social forestry X X
7 Minor Forest Produce X
8 Small Scale industry including food X X
processing industry
9 Khadi, village and Cottage Industries. X X
11 Drinking water X
12 Fuel and Fodder X X X
13 Roads, culverts, Bridges, Ferries, waterway X X
& other means of communication.
14 Rural electrification including distribution X X X X
of electricity
16 Poverty alleviation programme. X
17 Education including primary and secondary X
schools
19 Adult and non-formal education. X X
23 Health and sanitation, including hospitals, X
primary health centers and dispensaries
24 Family Welfare X
25 Women and Child development X
26 Social welfare including welfare of the X
handicapped and mentally retarded.
28 Public distribution system. X
[The executive order in respect of all matters is reported to be in force since 25-06-2007.]

Salient features of the range of activities devolved:

The extent of Activity Mapping matrix is given in Table below:
(in terms of number of matters listed in 11th Schedule)
Nature of Functio Plannin Implementati Supervision Promotion Fund Functionary
Devolution nal g on function Function devolved devolved
devoluti function Function devolved devolved
Level on in devolve devolved
of PRI one way d
or other
GP 21 19 17 11 17 4 20
AP 21 15 18 15 16 3 21
ZP 21 19 19 17 16 3 21

161
The salient features of the Activity Mapping are as follows:

(a) Though legislative devolution of functions has been done for 28 matters at one or more level
of PRIs, Activity Mapping has been undertaken only for 21 out of 29 matters listed in the 11 th
Schedule of the Constitution. Sports and Youth affair is an additional matter where Activity
Mapping has been carried out. The 8 matters listed in the Eleventh Schedule, which are not
covered under Activity Mapping are as follows:
welfare of the non conventional technical training and maintenance of
weaker sections energy vocational education community assets
cultural activities market and fairs rural housing, libraries

(b) At all three level of PRI, the nature of the functions devolved covers planning,
implementation and promotion. This indicates that the Activity Mapping is indeed a serious and
substantive exercise, as far as functional devolution in concerned.

(c) The strength of the Activity Mapping carried out by Assam is further fortified by the fact
that the Activity Mapping clearly covers supervision of the functionaries for almost all the
functions devolved. The functionaries are deputed with the PRIs by the State government and
their salary is placed with the Panchayats. The Activity Mapping is detailed and covers the
writing of CRs and leave sanction authority of the functionaries, which is also vested with the
Panchayats. The disciplinary authority of the Panchayats is limited to minor penalties and the
major penalty is to be taken by the State against the functionaries devolved.

(d) However, the Activity Mapping falls short of being a really comprehensive one when the
range of fiscal devolution covered by it is considered. The Activity Mapping covers the
devolution of funds only for 4 matters, namely, animal husbandry, drinking water, poverty
alleviation programmes and education including primary and secondary education at the GP
level and only for 3 matters, namely, animal husbandry, drinking water and poverty alleviation
programmes, in respect of Anchalik Panchayats and Zilla Parishads.

162
Annexure 2.6: Analysis of Activity Mapping in Haryana:
According to information dated 4-5-2007 the State Government reports that it has undertaken
Activity Mapping of detailed legislative assignment of functions in different phases. In February
2006, an Activity Mapping was released by the Chief Minister in the presence of the Union
Minister for Panchayati Raj through which activities of 10 departments cover ten matters listed
in the Eleventh Schedule namely, Irrigation, Food and Supplies, Education, Public Health
Department, Women and Child Development, Social Justice and Empowerment, Health
Department, Animal husbandry, Agriculture, and Forest department were assigned. It is reported
that for the ten devolved matters, funds have been devolved in respect of nine (except PDS) and
functionaries for eight matters (except Primary and Secondary Education and PDS). The letter
also mentions an instance of reversal of functions vide notification dated 10-8-2005, functional
control of all Government primary Schools in rural areas, which was handed over to the ZPs has
reverted to the Education Department of Haryana.
An analysis of the Activity Mapping indicates the following range of activities devolved to
Panchayats:
Sl. Subject Planning & Funds & Promotion / Assista Supervision/
No. Implementation Functionaries Development nce Maintenance
transferred
1 Agriculture including
Agricultural extension
3 Minor irrigation, water
management and
watershed development
4 Animal husbandry,
dairying and poultry
6 Social forestry and farm
forestry
11 Drinking water
23 Health and sanitation,
including hospitals,
primary health centres and
dispensaries
24 Family welfare
25 Women and Child
Development
26 Social Welfare, including
welfare of handicapped
and mentally retarded
17 Primary education
28 Public distribution system

163
The above table would show that the scope of the functional devolution contained in the Activity
Mapping of 12-02-2006 is quite detailed and include planning and implementation responsibilities.
Therefore, on the face of it, the Activity Mapping contained in the circular issued in 2006 is relatively
much better as compared to other States. This would mean that the focus in Haryana ought to be much
more on ensuring whether financial assignments have followed the functional assignments contained in
the Activity Mapping.

Meantime a well known NGO, PRIA has conducted a study to track the progress made in disseminating
the information at the grassroots on devolution of power. The study involved a survey in 46 villages
across 5 districts of Ambala, Mahendragarh, Sonipat, Fatehabad and Sirsa and a FGD with Panchayat
Samiti members. Some of the findings are as follows:

S.No Matters in the 11th Response

Schedule
1 Agriculture, including 52per cent of the respondents were not aware that the activities of agricultural
agricultural extension. development officers will be monitored by the Panchayats.
2 Minor irrigation, water 82per cent of the respondents were not aware that scheme of minor irrigation
management and is available to Panchayats.
watershed development
3 Animal husbandry, In respect of Veterinary services 39per cent of the respondents did not know
dairying, poultry and that the Gram Panchayats are empowered to supervise veterinary services
veterinary services centers upto hospitals levels.
4 Education, including It was told that no action has been taken yet.
primary and secondary
schools
5 Women and Child 11per cent of the respondents were not aware that anganwadi workers
Development supervision, recruitment and identification of beneficiaries are assigned to
PRIs.
6 Social Welfare, including 100per cent of the respondents were aware that old age pension is disbursed
welfare of the through the GP.
handicapped, mentally Power has been devolved to all the three tiers of PRIs, but there has been no
retarded and old age action taken yet on the delegation of functionaries.
pension.
7 Social forestry 52per cent of the respondents said that they do not know that village and
social forestry schemes are to be supervised by the GPs.

The PRIA report indicates that there is widespread lack of knowledge about Activity Mapping
among the PRI members. It appears from the PRIAs study that Haryana has not taken any
concrete steps following the release of Activity Mapping in February, 2006. Therefore it is likely
that the Activity Mapping of February 2006 remains a dead letter and is limited to paper.

164
Annexure 2.7: Activity Mapping in Karnataka:
Karnataka was the first State to undertake Activity Mapping after consideration of the report of
the Task Force constituted by the Union Ministry of Rural Development dated August 2001.
First, the Working Group on decentralization, constituted by the State Government in June 2001
examined the Activity mapping matrix and made detailed recommendations in its report
submitted in February 2002. After its recommendations were considered by the Cabinet, the
Activity Mapping Framework was issued as a Government Order in August 2003. Broadly, the
Activity Mapping positions the Zilla and Taluk Panchayat as planners, facilitators and owners of
common executive machinery, Gram Panchayats as the cutting edge of local service provision
and Gram and Ward Sabhas as instruments of downward accountability.

Activity Mapping of Karnataka has been done through a process of compromise, so there is some
level of concurrency in devolution of functions. However, there is a conscious effort to
operationalise it as also give wide publicity to Activity Mapping. Fiscal devolution on the basis
of Activity Mapping is described more fully under the appropriate heading, in this study. The
Activity Mapping undertaken by Karnataka has been analyzed separately for each level of
Panchayat in the table below:
Gram Panchayat:
Sl.No in Functions
11th Matters in 11th Schedule Planning & Funds* Functionaries**
Schedule Supervision Promotion
Implementation
Agriculture including agriculture
1
extension
land improvement,
Covered under
implementation of land reforms,
2 agriculture including
land consolidation and soil
extension services
conservation
Minor irrigation, water
3 management and watershed
development
Animal Husbandry, dairying and
4
poultry
5 Fisheries
6 Social Forestry
7 Minor Forest Produce
8 Small Scale Industries
Khadi, village and Cottage
9
Industries.
165
 Covered under
10 Rural Housing
poverty alleviation
Covered under PRED
11 Drinking Water
Engineering division.
12 Fuel and fodder
Roads, culverts, bridges, ferries,
13 waterways and other means of
communication
Rural Electrification including
14
distribution of electricity.
Non Conventional energy
15
resources
16 Poverty alleviation programmes
Education including primary and
17
secondary schools
Technical training and vocational
18
education
19 Adult and non-formal education
20 Libraries
21 Cultural activities
22 Markets and fairs
Health and sanitation including
23 hospitals primary health centers
and dispensaries
24 Family welfare
25 Women and child development
Social welfare including welfare Covered under
26 of the handicapped and mentally Welfare of weaker
retarded sections & SCs & STs
Welfare of the weaker sections
27 and scheduled castes and
scheduled tribes
28 Public distribution system
Maintenance of community
29
assets.

Taluk Panchayat:
Sl.No in Functions
11th Matters in 11th Schedule Planning & Funds Functionaries
Schedule Supervision Promotion
Implementation
Agriculture including agriculture
1
extension
land improvement,
implementation of land reforms, Covered under
2
land consolidation and soil Minor irrigation
conservation

166
 Minor irrigation, water
3 management and watershed
development
Animal Husbandry, dairying and
4
poultry
5 Fisheries
6 Social Forestry
7 Minor Forest Produce
8 Small Scale Industries
Khadi, village and Cottage
9
Industries.
Covered under
10 Rural Housing
poverty alleviation
Covered under the
11 Drinking Water
PRED Engineering
Covered under the
12 Fuel and fodder
Animal husbandry
Roads, culverts, bridges, ferries,
13 waterways and other means of
communication
Rural Electrification including
14
dIstribution of electricity.
Non Conventional energy
15
resources
16 Poverty alleviation programmes
Education including primary and
17
secondary schools
Technical training and vocational
18
education
19 Adult and non-formal education
20 Libraries
21 Cultural activities
22 Markets and fairs
Health and sanitation including
23 hospitals primary health centers
and dispensaries
24 Family welfare
25 Women and child development
Social welfare including welfare Covered under
26 of the handicapped and mentally welfare of weaker
retarded sections, SC & ST
Welfare of the weaker sections
27 and scheduled castes and
scheduled tribes
28 Public distribution system
29 Maintenance of community assets.

167
 Zilla Parishad:
Sl.No in Functions
11th Matters in 11th Schedule Planning & Funds Functionaries
Schedule Supervision Promotion
Implementation
Agriculture including agriculture
1
extension
land improvement,
implementation of land reforms, Covered under
2
land consolidation and soil Minor irrigation
conservation
Minor irrigation, water
3 management and watershed
development
Animal Husbandry, dairying and
4
poultry
5 Fisheries
6 Social Forestry
7 Minor Forest Produce
8 Small Scale Industries
Khadi, village and Cottage
9
Industries.
10 Rural Housing
Coverd under
11 Drinking Water
PRED Engineering
Covered
under the Covered under the
12 Fuel and fodder
Animal Animal husbandry
husbandry
Roads, culverts, bridges, ferries,
13 waterways and other means of
communication
Rural Electrification including
14
distribution of electricity.
Non Conventional energy
15
resources
16 Poverty alleviation programmes
Education including primary and
17
secondary schools
Technical training and vocational
18
education
19 Adult and non-formal education
20 Libraries
21 Cultural activities
22 Markets and fairs
Health and sanitation including
23 hospitals primary health centers
and dispensaries
24 Family welfare
168
25 Women and child development
Social welfare including welfare Covered under
26 of the handicapped and mentally Welfare of weaker
retarded sections,SC & ST
Welfare of the weaker sections
27 and scheduled castes and
scheduled tribes
28 Public distribution system
Maintenance of community
29
assets.

Salient features of the range of activities covered in Activity Mapping are as follows:
Activity Mapping for GPs:
An analysis of the Activity Mapping in respect of GPs further strengthens the powers given
under the Panchayati Raj Act of the state to GPs. Thus, wherever the Act in Schedule I has
indicated that promotional responsibilities are with the Grama Panchayats, the Activity Mapping
has gone ahead and entrusted the actual implementation, planning and supervision functions.
Examples in this regard are in respect of rural sanitation, housing, minor irrigation tanks and
fisheries. Activity Mapping for Grama Panchayats in Karnataka is an example of where Activity
Mapping has carried forward the evolutionary process of Panchayati Raj and increased the
responsibilities at the GP level by further decentralization. In respect of public distribution
system though this was not covered under the Activity Mapping, separate orders were issued in
2005 devolving responsibilities concerning the public distribution system to the Gram
Panchayats.

Activity Mapping for Taluk Panchayats:

Activity Mapping in respect of Taluk Panchayats indicates that it has been given major
responsibilities in minor irrigation and watershed development, animal husbandry, dairying and
poultry, fisheries development, social forestry, khadi and village industries, drinking water,
roads, education, health care and health centres, women & child welfare and social welfare.
These activities cover activities of planning, implementation and maintenance of facilities and
services delivered under these departments. However, it is interesting to note that Activity
Mapping for Taluk Panchayats has not covered welfare of the weaker sections and the aspect of

169
public distribution system. This goes contrary to the actual ground position where it is the Taluk
Panchayats that are constructing and maintaining SC/ST hostels in Karnataka.

Activity Mapping for Zilla Parishads:

Activity Mapping for Zilla Parishads reflects the strong commitment to Zilla Centric Panchayati
Raj in Karnataka, which has come right from 1987 onwards. Therefore, it is the Zilla Parishad
that has been given the planning and consolidation of rural plan responsibilities in almost all
matters in the 11th Plan Schedule. The areas of Activity Mapping has been undertaken for ZPs in
respect of education, training and vocational education and the public distribution system.

170
 Annexure 2.8: Analysis of Activity Mapping in Orissa:
A detailed note on Activity Mapping, devolution of functions, finances and functionaries in
Orissa, which was submitted by the Government of Orissa before the second meeting of the
Council of State Ministers of PR held in Bhubaneswar in June, 2006. It may be recalled that an
Activity Mapping order was issued by the Government of Orissa during the visit of MoPR to
Orissa in October, 2005. It may be noticed that the Activity Mapping undertaken only covers 18
matters listed in the 11th Schedule, whereas in other occasion, the Activity Mapping indicates
that 21 matters have been covered. Abstract details of the Activity Mapping undertaken are given
in the tables below, separately for each level of Panchayat.
Gram Panchayat
SL in 11th Matters in Executive Functions Funds Functionari
Schedule 11th Schedule Orders Planning & Supervi Promoti es
Implementation sion on
a)No.1-PS- Not
1/05(Pt.ii) Given
Agriculture 8430(8)/PR,
including Bhubneswar, the
1
agriculture 25th October
extension ,2005.
b) No.i.PS-2/20036886/PS
dated 4/07/03
a) No.1-PS- Not
Minor 1/05(Pt.ii) Given
irrigation, 8430(8)/PR,
water Bhubneswar, the
3
management 25th October,
and watershed 2005.
development b) No.i.PS-2/20036886/PS
dated 4/07/03
a) No.1-PS- Not
1/05(Pt.ii) Given
Animal 8430(8)/PR,
Husbandry, Bhubneswar, the
4
dairying and 25th October
poultry ,2005.
b) No.i.PS-2/20036886/PS
dated 4/07/03
a) No.1-PS-1/05(Pt.ii) Not
8430(8)/PR, Bhubneswar, Given
5 Fisheries the 25th October, 2005.
b) No.i.PS-2/20036886/PS
dated 4/07/03
a) No.1-PS-1/05(Pt.ii) Not
8430(8)/PR, Bhubneswar, Given
Minor Forest the 25th October, 2005.
7
Produce b) No.i.PS-2/20036886/PS
dated 4/07/03
171
 a) No.1-PS- *
1/05(Pt.ii)
8430(8)/PR,
Bhubneswar, the
10 Rural Housing
25th October,
2005.
b) No.i.PS-2/20036886/PS
dated 4/07/03
a) No.1-PS- *
Roads,
1/05(Pt.ii)
culverts,
8430(8)/PR,
bridges,
Bhubneswar, the
13 ferries,
25th October,
waterways and
2005.
other means of
b) No.i.PS-2/20036886/PS
communication
dated 4/07/03
a) No.1-PS- Not
1/05(Pt.ii) Given
Non 8430(8)/PR,
Conventional Bhubneswar, the
15
energy 25th October,
resources 2005.
b) No.i.PS-2/20036886/PS
dated 4/07/03
a) No.1-PS-1/05(Pt.ii) *
8430(8)/PR, Bhubneswar,
Poverty
the 25th October, b) No.i.PS-
16 alleviation
2/20036886/PS
programmes
dated
4/07/032005.
a) No.1-PS-1/05(Pt.ii)
Education
8430(8)/PR, Bhubneswar,
including
the 25th October, b) No.i.PS-
17 primary and
2/20036886/PS
secondary
dated
schools
4/07/032005.
a) No.1-PS- Not
1/05(Pt.ii) Given
8430(8)/PR,
Adult and non- Bhubneswar, the
19 formal 25th October,
education 2005.
b) No.i.PS-2/20036886/PS
dated
4/07/032005
a) No.1-PS- Not
1/05(Pt.ii) Given
8430(8)/PR,
Bhubneswar, the
Markets and
22 25th October,
fairs
2005.
b) No.i.PS-2/20036886/PS
dated
4/07/032005

172
 a) No.1-PS- Not
Health and 1/05(Pt.ii) Given
sanitation 8430(8)/PR,
including Bhubneswar, the
23 hospitals 25th October,
primary health 2005
centres and b) No.i.PS-2/20036886/PS
dispensaries dated
4/07/032005
a) No.1-PS- Not
1/05(Pt.ii) Given
8430(8)/PR,
Bhubneswar, the
24 Family welfare 25th October,
2005.
b) No.i.PS-2/20036886/PS
dated
4/07/032005
a) No.1-PS- Not
1/05(Pt.ii) Given
8430(8)/PR,
Women and Bhubneswar, the
25 child 25th October
development ,2005
b) No.i.PS-2/20036886/PS
dated
4/07/032005
Social welfare a) No.1-PS-1/05(Pt.ii) Not
including 8430(8)/PR, Bhubneswar, Given
welfare of the the 25th October ,2005
26
handicapped b) No.i.PS-2/20036886/PS
and mentally dated
retarded 4/07/032005
a) No.1-PS- Not
Welfare of the
1/05(Pt.ii) Given
weaker
8430(8)/PR,
sections and in
Bhubneswar, the
particular of
27 25th October
the scheduled
,2005
castes and
b) No.i.PS-2/20036886/PS
scheduled
dated
tribes
4/07/032005
a) No.1-PS- Not
1/05(Pt.ii) Given
8430(8)/PR,
Public Bhubneswar, the
28 distribution 25th October
system ,2005
b) No.i.PS-2/20036886/PS
dated
4/07/032005

173
 Panchayat Samiti
SN in Matters in 11th Executive Orders Functions Fund Functiona
11th Schedule Planning & Super Promot s ries
Schedule Implementation vision ion
a) No.1-PS-1/05(Pt.ii) Not
Agriculture 8430(8)/PR, Bhubneswar, Given
1
including the 25th October ,2005.
agriculture b) No.i.PS-2/20036886/PS
extension dated 4/07/03

Minor irrigation, a) No.1-PS-1/05(Pt.ii) Not

water 8430(8)/PR, Bhubneswar, Given
3 management the 25th October, 2005.
and watershed b) No.i.PS-2/20036886/PS
development dated 4/07/03
a) No.1-PS-1/05(Pt.ii) Not
Animal
8430(8)/PR, Bhubneswar, Given
Husbandry,
4 the 25th October ,2005.
dairying and
b) No.i.PS-2/20036886/PS
poultry
dated 4/07/03
a) No.1-PS-1/05(Pt.ii) 8430(8)/PR, Not
Bhubneswar, the 25th October, Given
5 Fisheries 2005.
b) No.i.PS-2/20036886/PS
dated 4/07/03
a) No.1-PS-1/05(Pt.ii) 8430(8)/PR, Not
Bhubneswar, the 25th October, Given
Minor Forest 2005.
7
Produce b) No.i.PS-2/20036886/PS
dated 4/07/03
a) No.1-PS-1/05(Pt.ii) *
8430(8)/PR, Bhubneswar,
10 Rural Housing the 25th October, 2005.
b) No.i.PS-2/20036886/PS
dated 4/07/03
Roads, culverts, a) No.1-PS-1/05(Pt.ii) *
bridges, ferries, 8430(8)/PR, Bhubneswar,
13 waterways and the 25th October, 2005.
other means of b) No.i.PS-2/20036886/PS
communication dated 4/07/03
a) No.1-PS-1/05(Pt.ii) Not
Non 8430(8)/PR, Bhubneswar, Given
15 Conventional the 25th October, 2005.
energy resources b) No.i.PS-2/20036886/PS
dated 4/07/03
a) No.1-PS-1/05(Pt.ii) 8430(8)/PR, *
Poverty
Bhubneswar, the 25th October, b)
16 alleviation
No.i.PS-2/20036886/PS
programmes
dated 4/07/032005.
Education a) No.1-PS-1/05(Pt.ii) 8430(8)/PR,
including Bhubneswar, the 25th October, b)
17 primary and No.i.PS-2/20036886/PS
secondary dated 4/07/032005.
schools
174
 a) No.1-PS-1/05(Pt.ii) Not
8430(8)/PR, Bhubneswar, Given
Adult and non-
19 the 25th October, 2005.
formal education
b) No.i.PS-2/20036886/PS
dated 4/07/032005
a) No.1-PS-1/05(Pt.ii) Not
8430(8)/PR, Bhubneswar, Given
22 Markets and fairs the 25th October, 2005.
b) No.i.PS-2/20036886/PS
dated 4/07/032005
Health & a) No.1-PS-1/05(Pt.ii) Not
sanitation 8430(8)/PR, Bhubneswar, Given
including the 25th October, 2005
23
hospitals primary b) No.i.PS-2/20036886/PS
health centre & dated 4/07/032005
dispensaries
a) No.1-PS-1/05(Pt.ii) Not
8430(8)/PR, Bhubneswar, Given
24 Family welfare the 25th October, 2005.
b) No.i.PS-2/20036886/PS
dated 4/07/032005
a) No.1-PS-1/05(Pt.ii) Not
Women and 8430(8)/PR, Bhubneswar, Given
25 child the 25th October ,2005
development b) No.i.PS-2/20036886/PS
dated 4/07/032005
Social welfare a) No.1-PS-1/05(Pt.ii) 8430(8)/PR, Not
including Bhubneswar, the 25th October ,2005 Given
welfare of b) No.i.PS-2/20036886/PS
26
handicapped & dated 4/07/032005
mentally
retarded
a) No.1-PS-1/05(Pt.ii) Not
Welfare of the
8430(8)/PR, Bhubneswar, Given
weaker sections
27 the 25th October ,2005
and in particular
b) No.i.PS-2/20036886/PS
of SCs and STs
dated 4/07/032005
a) No.1-PS-1/05(Pt.ii) Not
Public 8430(8)/PR, Bhubneswar, Given
28 distribution the 25th October ,2005
system b) No.i.PS-2/20036886/PS
dated 4/07/032005

175
 Zilla Parishad
Sl.No in Matters in 11th Executive Orders Functions Fund Functiona
11th Schedule Planning & Super Promot s ries
Schedule Implementation vision ion
a) No.1-PS-1/05(Pt.ii) Not
Agriculture
8430(8)/PR, Bhubneswar, Given
including
1 the 25th October ,2005.
agriculture
b) No.i.PS-2/20036886/PS
extension
dated 4/07/03
Minor irrigation, a) No.1-PS-1/05(Pt.ii) Not
water 8430(8)/PR, Bhubneswar, Given
3 management the 25th October, 2005.
and watershed b) No.i.PS-2/20036886/PS
development dated 4/07/03
a) No.1-PS-1/05(Pt.ii) Not
Animal
8430(8)/PR, Bhubneswar, Given
Husbandry,
4 the 25th October ,2005.
dairying and
b) No.i.PS-2/20036886/PS
poultry
dated 4/07/03
a) No.1-PS-1/05(Pt.ii) 8430(8)/PR, Not
Bhubneswar, the 25th October, 2005. Given
5 Fisheries
b) No.i.PS-2/20036886/PS
dated 4/07/03
a) No.1-PS-1/05(Pt.ii) 8430(8)/PR, Not
Minor Forest Bhubneswar, the 25th October, 2005. Given
7
Produce b) No.i.PS-2/20036886/PS
dated 4/07/03
a) No.1-PS-1/05(Pt.ii) *
8430(8)/PR, Bhubneswar,
10 Rural Housing the 25th October, 2005.
b) No.i.PS-2/20036886/PS
dated 4/07/03
Roads, culverts, a) No.1-PS-1/05(Pt.ii) *
bridges, ferries, 8430(8)/PR, Bhubneswar,
13 waterways and the 25th October, 2005.
other means of b) No.i.PS-2/20036886/PS
communication dated 4/07/03
a) No.1-PS-1/05(Pt.ii) Not
Non 8430(8)/PR, Bhubneswar, Given
15 Conventional the 25th October, 2005.
energy resources b) No.i.PS-2/20036886/PS
dated 4/07/03
a) No.1-PS-1/05(Pt.ii) 8430(8)/PR, *
Poverty
Bhubneswar, the 25th October, b)
16 alleviation
No.i.PS-2/20036886/PS
programmes
dated 4/07/032005.
Education a) No.1-PS-1/05(Pt.ii) 8430(8)/PR,
including Bhubneswar, the 25th October, b)
17 primary & No.i.PS-2/20036886/PS
secondary dated 4/07/032005.
schools
a) No.1-PS-1/05(Pt.ii) Not
Adult and non-
19 8430(8)/PR, Bhubneswar, Given
formal education
the 25th October, 2005.
176
 b) No.i.PS-2/20036886/PS
dated 4/07/032005
a) No.1-PS-1/05(Pt.ii) Not
8430(8)/PR, Bhubneswar, Given
22 Markets and fairs the 25th October, 2005.
b) No.i.PS-2/20036886/PS
dated 4/07/032005
Health and a) No.1-PS-1/05(Pt.ii) Not
sanitation 8430(8)/PR, Bhubneswar, Given
including the 25th October, 2005
23
hospitals primary b) No.i.PS-2/20036886/PS
health centres dated 4/07/032005
and dispensaries
a) No.1-PS-1/05(Pt.ii) Not
8430(8)/PR, Bhubneswar, Given
24 Family welfare the 25th October, 2005.
b) No.i.PS-2/20036886/PS
dated 4/07/032005
a) No.1-PS-1/05(Pt.ii) Not
Women and 8430(8)/PR, Bhubneswar, Given
25 child the 25th October ,2005
development b) No.i.PS-2/20036886/PS
dated 4/07/032005
Social welfare a) No.1-PS-1/05(Pt.ii) 8430(8)/PR, Not
including welfare Bhubneswar, the 25th October ,2005 Given
26 of handicapped b) No.i.PS-2/20036886/PS
& mentally dated 4/07/032005
retarded
a) No.1-PS-1/05(Pt.ii) Not
Welfare of the
8430(8)/PR, Bhubneswar, Given
weaker sections
27 the 25th October ,2005
and in particular
b) No.i.PS-2/20036886/PS
of SCs & STs
dated 4/07/032005
a) No.1-PS-1/05(Pt.ii) Not
Public 8430(8)/PR, Bhubneswar, Given
28 distribution the 25th October ,2005
system b) No.i.PS-2/20036886/PS
dated 4/07/032005

Salient features of the range of activities covered in Activity Mapping are as follows:

The matters of Drinking Water, Welfare of the weaker sections and Maintenance of community
assets which are reported to be covered but are not contained in the Activity Mapping that was
undertaken in October 2005. In respect of maintenance of community assets, elements of this
aspect are contained in the departmental Activity Mapping undertaken. However, more needs to
be done as section 49 of the Act directly vests community assets in the GP. There are conflicting
reports regarding the devolution of functions in respect of drinking water and this matter requires

177
further investigation. The Grama Panchayat Act is very clear about the responsibilities of GPs
over drinking water, laying down elaborate provisions in this regard in Sections 50 to 54.
However, it is given to understand that drinking water assets are still operated by line
departments, which are even claiming that 12th Finance Commission grants that Panchayats are
to get as an entitlement, should go to the departments instead. In respect of SC/STs and Tribal
development, in Scheduled areas, development activities in Orissa are primarily undertaken by
separate ITDAs, which give nominal membership to Panchayat representatives, but function
independently of the Panchayats.
A perusal of the notification would show that much of the functions given to ZPs and PSs are
promotional in nature they just do not go far enough. For instance, though the Panchayat law
gives clear powers to the Panchayat Samitis in respect of control and management of Primary
education, substantive activities relating to education, such as appointment and placement of
teachers, construction and management of school building, supply of school equipment etc. are
not covered under Activity Mapping. Similarly, much of the Activity Mapping in respect of
primary sector matters, such as Agriculture etc is set out in very broad terms.

178
Annexure 2.9: Analysis of Activity Mapping in Tamil Nadu:
In 1996, soon after the conclusion of the first post constitutional amendment elections to the
three levels of Panchayats, the Government of Tamil Nadu constituted a Committee under the
Chairmanship of Dr. L.C. Jain, the then full-time Member of the State Planning Commission to
give recommendations on the entrustment of powers to the three tiers of Panchayats. The
Committee submitted its report to the Government in April, 1997. Following the submission of
this report, Government Orders for devolution of functions in respect of Rural Development
Department, Agriculture, Animal Husbandry, Forests, Social Welfare, Revenue, Khadi and
Village Industries, Education, Health and Family Welfare, Adi-Dravidar Welfare, Co-operation,
Food and Consumer Protection, were issued assigning certain powers and functions to the three
levels of Panchayats as given below:

Gram Panchayat
Sl.No in Functions
11th Matters in 11th Schedule Funds Functionaries
Schedule Planning Implementation Supervision Promotion
Agriculture including
1 * *
agriculture extension
Land Improvement,
implementation
2
of land reforms, land
consolidation
Minor irrigation, water
3 management and
watershed development
Animal Husbandry,
4
dairying and poultry
5 Fisheries
Social Forestry and farm
6
forestry
7 Minor Forest Produce
Small Scale industries
8 including food processing
industry
Khadi, village and cottage
9
industry
10 Rural Housing
11 Drinking Water
12 Fuel and Fodder

179
 Roads, culverts, bridges,
ferries, waterways and
13
other means of
communication
Rural Electrification
14 including distribution of
electricity
Non Conventional energy
15
resources
Poverty alleviation
16
programmes
Education including
17 primary and secondary
schools
Technical training and
18
vocational education
Adult and non-formal
19
education
20 Libraries
21 Cultural Activities
22 Markets and fairs
Health and sanitation
including hospitals primary
23 -
health centers and
dispensaries
24 Family welfare
Women and child
25
development
Social welfare including
26 welfare of handicapped
and mentally retarded
Welfare of the weaker
27
sections and SCs & STs
28 Public distribution system
Maintenance of
29
Community Assets

Panchayat Union Council

Sl.No in Matters in 11th Schedule Functions Funds Functionaries
11th Planning Implementation Supervision Promotion
Schedule
1 Agriculture including

agriculture extension
2 Land Improvement
,implementation of land
reforms, land consolidation
3 Minor irrigation, water
management & watershed
;development

180
4 Animal Husbandry,

dairying and poultry
5 Fisheries
6 Social Forestry and farm

forestry
7 Minor Forest Produce
8 Small Scale industries
including food processing
industry
9 Khadi, village and cottage

industry
10 Rural Housing
11 Drinking Water
12 Fuel and Fodder
13 Roads, culverts, bridges,
ferries, waterways & other
means of communication
14 Rural Electrification
including distribution of
electricity
15 Non Conventional energy

resources
16 Poverty alleviation

programmes
17 Education including
primary & secondary
schools
18 Technical training and

vocational education
19 Adult and non-formal

education
20 Libraries
21 Cultural Activities
22 Markets and fairs
23 Health & sanitation
including hospitals primary

health centers &
dispensaries
24 Family welfare
25 Women and child

development
26 Social welfare including
welfare of handicapped
and mentally retarded
27 Welfare of the weaker

sections and SCs & STs
28 Public distribution system
29 Maintenance of

Community Assets
181
 District Panchayat
th
Sl.No in Matters in 11 Schedule Functions Funds Functionaries
11th Planning Implementation Supervision Promotion
Schedule
1 Agriculture including
* *
agriculture extension
3 Minor irrigation, water
management and
watershed development
4 Animal Husbandry,

dairying and poultry
5 Fisheries
6 Social Forestry and farm

forestry
7 Minor Forest Produce
8 Small Scale industries
including food processing
industry
9 Khadi, village and cottage

industry
10 Rural Housing
11 Drinking Water
12 Fuel and Fodder
13 Roads, culverts, bridges,
ferries, waterways and

other means of
communication
14 Rural Electrification
including distribution of
electricity
15 Non Conventional energy

resources
16 Poverty alleviation

programmes
17 Education including
primary and secondary
schools
18 Technical training and

vocational education
19 Adult and non-formal

education
20 Libraries
21 Cultural Activities
22 Markets and fairs
23 Health and sanitation
including hospitals

primary health centers and
dispensaries
24 Family welfare
182
 25 Women and child

development
26 Social welfare including
welfare of handicapped
and mentally retarded
27 Welfare of the weaker

sections and SCs & STs
28 Public distribution system
29 Maintenance of

Community Assets

Though an analysis of the activity mapping would indicate that they are quite detailed, the actual
devolution of substantive functions is limited. The above table would show that the scope of the
functional devolution contained in the Activity Mapping is largely limited to planning and
promotional responsibilities. It is only in a few instances that the Panchayats have been given the
responsibility of implementation.
The abstract of number of matters contained in the 11th Schedule that have been devolved
directly through provisions in the law, or through executive orders, is given below. As can be
seen in the abstract, out of 29 matters in the11th Schedule, concrete and definite powers and
responsibilities have been devolved in respect of 2 matters to DPs, in 15 matters to PCs and in 13
matters to GPs, through the Tamil Nadu Panchayati Raj Act. These are as follows:

Sl Village Panchayats Intermediate Panchayats District Panchayats

Land improvement, Agriculture, including agricultural Roads culvert Bridges Ferries, waterways
1
implementation of land extension & other means of communication
Minor irrigation, water
Land improvement,
2 management and watershed Market & Fairs
implementation of land
development
Roads, culvert, bridges, ferries, Minor irrigation, water
3 waterways and other means of management and watershed
communication development
Small Scale Industries food
4 Social Forestry
processing industry
5 Rural Housing Rural Housing
6 Drinking Water Drinking Water
Roads culvert Bridges Ferries,
Rural electrification, including
7 waterways and other means of
distribution of electricity
communication
8 Adult and nonformal education Rural Electrification
Education including primary and
9 Libraries
secondary schools
Technical training and vocational
10 Cultural Activities
training

183
 Sl Village Panchayats Intermediate Panchayats District Panchayats
11 Market & Fairs Adult and non formal education
Health and Sanitation, including
12 hospitals, primary health centers Market and fairs
and dispensaries
Health and sanitation including
Maintenance of community
13 hospitals, primary health centers
assets
and dispenasries
Welfare of the weakers sections,
14 and in particular of the Scheduled
caste and tribes
15 Maintenance of community assets

In respect of the remaining matters, certain powers, largely of planning, supervision and promotion have
been given to the Panchayats, through executive orders issued in furtherance of Section 257 read along
with Schedule IV of the Act. Details are listed in the Table below:
Sl Village Panchayats Intermediate Panchayats District Panchayats
Agriculture, including Animal Husbandry dairy and Agriculture, including agricultural
1
agricultural extension poultry extension
Animal Husbandry dairy and Land improvement, implementation of
2 Fisheries
poultry land
Minor irrigation, water management and
3 Fisheries Social Forestry
watershed development
4 Minor Forest Produce Minor Forest Produce Animal Husbandry dairy and poultry
Small Scale Industries food Khadi, village and cottage
5 Fisheries
processing industry industry
Khadi, village and cottage
6 Fuel and Fodder Social Forestry
industry
Non Conventional Energy
7 Fuel and Fodder Minor Forest Produce
Resources
Small Scale Industries food processing
8 Family Welfare Poverty Alleviation Programme
industry
Non Conventional Energy
9 Libraries Khadi, village and cottage industry
Resources
10 Poverty Alleviation Programme Cultural Activities Rural Housing
Education including primary &
11 Family Welfare Drinking Water
secondary schools
Technical training and vocation
12 Women and Child Development Fuel and Fodder
education
Social Welfare, including
Women and Child
13 hospitals, primary health centers Rural Electrification
Development
and dispensaries
Social Welfare, including
14 hospitals, primary health Public Distribution System Non Conventional Energy Resources
centers and dispensaries
Welfare of the weakers sections
15 ,and in particular of the SC & Poverty Alleviation Programme
the ST.
Education including primary & secondary
16 Public distribution System
schools
17 Adult and nonformal education
184
Sl Village Panchayats Intermediate Panchayats District Panchayats
Technical training and vocational
18
education
19 Libraries
20 Cultural Activities
21 Family Welfare
Health and Sanitation, including
22 hospitals, primary health centers and
dispensaries
23 Women and Child Development
Social Welfare of the including welfare of
24
the handicapped and mentally retarded
Welfare of the weaker sections, and in
25
particular, of the SC and ST
26 Public distribution System
27 Maintenance of community assets

Comments on the pattern of functional devolution through the Tamil Nadu Panchayati Raj
legislation and executive orders:
(a) Apart from Section 257, the rest of the Panchayati Raj law is quite precise in its
enunciation of the powers given to the Panchayats. The provisions are most detailed in respect of
Village Panchayats. The powers of the Panchayats are laid out elaborately and cover mostly civic
functions. An important feature of the Tamil Nadu Panchayati Raj Act is that Section 110 and
111 of the Act gives power to the Village Panchayat in respect of roads, culverts, bridges,
waterways and other means of communication, rural electrification, health & sanitation, water
management, market and fairs.
(b) There is a similar detailed approach to the assignment of functions and powers to the
Panchayat Council under the Act. In fact, the Panchayat Council has a wider range of functions
as compared with the Village Panchayats.
(c) The powers given in respect of Village Panchayats and Panchayat Council are common
under Sections 133, 125(1), 127(2-a,b,c), 128(1,2), 130(c,d), 131(1-c,d,f), 155(1,2,3,4,5) and
188. These pertain to roads, markets and public health matters. In the case of roads and markets,
the law provides for a clear assignment of certain of these to Village Panchayats and to
Panchayat Unions. Therefore, in respect of these assets, there is a clear framework for asset
transfer and Activity Mapping in respect of these assets, as between village Panchayats and
Union Councils.

185
(d) District Panchayat has only been given advisory functions under Section 163,164,165 and
166. In respect of very few matters listed in the Eleventh Schedule, namely, Markets & Fairs,
Roads, culvert, bridges, ferries, waterways and other means of communications. The act is one of
the weakest in the country when it comes to giving powers and responsibilities to the District
Panchayats. Under Section 163, the DP can advise the government on the functioning of Union
Councils and Village Panchayats. Though one can generously say that the law gives powers and
responsibilities to the District Panchayats in respect of roads and markets, even here, the powers
are merely to tender advice on classification. Section 164 merely states out the general powers of
the District Panchayat, namely, (a) undertake such measure as it deems necessary, (b)collect such
data as it deems necessary, (c) publish statistics or other information relating to various aspects
of the regulation or development of the activities of Panchayat union councils and Village
Panchayat in the District Panchayat, (d) require any Panchayat union council or Village
Panchayat to furnish such information as may be required by it in relation to the measures
undertaken by that Panchayat union council or Village Panchayat for the regulation or
development of its activities and other matters as may be prescribed. The Activity Mapping
undertaken for District Panchayats has not improved the situation in any way. It merely gives
powers to plan, supervise and promote, but not to implement. In fact the only concrete power of
implementation given to the Zilla Parishad is under Cultural Activities the power to
establish district galleries and music schools!

In conclusion, while it might be said that the Tamil Nadu legislation is a detailed one, certain
provisions in it reveal a disquietingly conditional approach to Panchayati Raj. While there seems
to be intent on the face of it, to comply with the Panchayati Raj constitutional amendment, at the
same time there is an anxiety against making such devolution unequivocal. Section 257 is a
manifestation of this dichotomy in approach. Apart from this section, the rest of the legislation is
crisp and clear in respect of the functions given to Village Panchayats. However, the law makes
it very clear that the District Panchayats have very little to do except advise. Overall, legislative
functions on devolution mainly pertain to civic functions and a few public health functions, but
give very little scope for Panchayats to do anything else. While it might be concluded that the
law has been further enlarged through the enactment of executive orders taking devolution

186
forward, these orders, since they largely give only planning, supervision and promotional
functions (particularly to the District Panchayats) and leave out implementation from the scope
of Panchayats (particularly District Panchayats) it needs to be considered whether Tamil Nadus
claim that it has devolved all 29 matters holds any merit.

187
Annexure 2.10: Analysis of Activity Mapping in Bihar
Government of Bihar has undertaken reasonably good work by issuing executive orders (2001)
regarding the devolution of functions, funds and functionaries. A compendium on department
wise devolution of functions, funds and functionaries was released in October 2001 by Rural
Development Department, Government of Bihar. According to the compendium, out of the 29
matters listed in the Eleventh Schedule, 27 executive orders have been issued in respect of GP,
24 Executive orders have been issued in respect of PS and 23 Executive orders have been issued
in respect of ZP. Details of the nature of the activities devolved upon the Panchayats are given
in Tables below:
Gram Panchayat
Functions
S Matters in 11th Fund Functio
Executive Orders Plann Impleme Super Promot
N Schedule s naries
ing ntation vision ion
Letter4/file/meeting-
Agriculture including 12/2001/3301
1
agriculture extension (Secretary)/ agriculture,
dated 25-9-2001
Land improvement,
implementation of
Letter 8/land deve-
2 land reforms, lands
panchayat-22/2001-632
consolidation and soil
conservation
Minor irrigation water B-1-6/96/14-2
management and (30.10.1996)
3
watershed B-1-5/93/14-2
development (2.5.1998)
189-F-2/96/35/93

Animal Husbandry, (12.12.1996)
4
dairying and poultry
5M(1)304/2001/PP/5697
5M(1)304/2001/PP/569
5 Fisheries
7, Dated 25-9-2001
Social Forestry & MS/10/2001-3087,
6
Farm Forestry Dated 26-9-2001
MS/10/2001-3087,
7 Minor Forest Produce
Dated 26-9-2001
Small scale industries
Letter No. 3529, Dated
8 including food
24-9-2001
processing industries
Khadi, village and Letter No. 3529, Dated
9
cottage industries 24-9-2001
Letter 8/land deve-
10 Rural Housing
panchayat-22/2001-632
6/V1-102/2001-1169,
11 Drinking water
Dated 24-9-2001

188
 MS/10/2001-3087,
12 Fuel and fodder
Dated 26-9-2001
Roads, culverts,
bridges, ferries,
Letter 8/land deve-
13 waterways and other
panchayat-22/2001-632
means of
communication
Rural electrification
Letter No. 3073, Dated
14 including distribution
25-9-2001.
of electricity
Non conventional Letter No. 3073, Dated
15
energy sources 25-9-2001.
Poverty alleviation Gra. V3-1/2001/7197,
16
programme Dated 30-7-2001
Education including
No.8/B3-431/95/1662,
17 primary and secondary
Dated 24-9-2001
schools
Technical training and
18
vocational Education
Letter No.-13/S1-
Adult and Non formal
19 1/2001/2383, Dated 26-
education
9-2001
Letter11/V54/2001/986
20 Libraries
/S, Dated 25-9-2001
No.19/B2-11/200/669,
21 Cultural activities
Dated 25-9-2001
22 Markets and Fairs
Health and sanitation
including hospitals, No.45(18), dated 26-9-
23
primary health centers 2001
and dispensaries
No.45(18), dated 26-9-
24 Family welfare
2001
No.19/B2-11/200/669,

Dated 25-9-2001
Women and child
25 Letter No.9/ICDS-
development
12/2001, dated 25-9-
2001
Social welfare
Letter No.9/ICDS-
including welfare of
26 12/2001, dated 25-9-
the handicapped and
2001
mentally retarded
Letter No 1/AJ-
Welfare of the weaker
101/2001/3721, Dated
sections and in
27 24-9-2001
particular of the Scand
Letter No 5/SCA-
ST
46/2001/3722
Public Distribution No.P-6/77/2001/4124,
28
System Dated 26-9-2001
Maintenance of Letter 8/land deve-
29
Community Assets panchayat-22/2001-632

189
Panchayat Samit
Functions
Matters in 11th Fund Functio
Sl Executive Orders Plann Impleme Super Promot
Schedule s naries
N ing ntation vision ion
Letter-4/file/meeting-
Agriculture including 12/2001/3301
1
agriculture extension (Secretary)/ agriculture,
dated 25-9-2001
Land improvement,
implementation of
Letter 8/land deve-
2 land reforms, lands
panchayat-22/2001-632
consolidation and soil
conservation
Minor irrigation, water
management and Letter 8/land deve-
3
watershed panchayat-22/2001-632
development
Animal Husbandry, 5M(1)304/2001/PP/569
4
dairying and poultry 7, Dated 25-9-2001
5 Fisheries
Social Forestry & MS/10/2001-3087,
6
Farm Forestry Dated 26-9-2001
MS/10/2001-3087,
7 Minor Forest Produce
Dated 26-9-2001
Small scale industries
Letter No. 3529, Dated
8 including food
24-9-2001
processing industries
Khadi, village and Letter No. 3529, Dated
9
cottage industries 24-9-2001
10 Rural Housing
6/V1-102/2001-1169,
11 Drinking water
Dated 24-9-2001
MS/10/2001-3087,
12 Fuel and fodder
Dated 26-9-2001
Roads, culverts,
bridges, ferries,
13 waterways & other
means of
communication
Rural electrification
Letter No. 3073, Dated
14 including distribution
25-9-2001.
of electricity
Non conventional Letter No. 3073, Dated
15
energy sources 25-9-2001.
Poverty alleviation Gra. V3-1/2001/7197,
16
programme Dated 30-7-2001
Letter11/V-
Education including 54/2001/986/S, Dated
17 primary and secondary 25-9-2001
schools No.8/B3-431/95/1662,

Dated 24-9-2001
Technical training and
18
vocational Education

190
 Letter No.-13/S1-
Adult and Non formal
19 1/2001/2383, Dated 26-
education
9-2001
Letter11/V-
20 Libraries 54/2001/986/S, Dated
25-9-2001
No.19/B2-11/200/669,
21 Cultural activities
Dated 25-9-2001
No.45(18), dated 26-9-
22 Markets and Fairs
2001
Health and sanitation
including hospitals, No.45(18), dated 26-9-
23
primary health centers 2001
and dispensaries
No.45(18), dated 26-9-
24 Family welfare
2001
No.19/B2-11/200/669,

Women and child Dated 25-9-2001
25
development No.9/ICDS-12/2001,

dated 25-9-2001
Social welfare
Letter No 1/AJ-
including welfare of
26 101/2001/3721, Dated
the handicapped and
24-9-2001
mentally retarded
Letter No 1/AJ-
Welfare of the weaker
101/2001/3721, Dated
sections and in
27 24-9-2001
particular of the SC
Letter No 5/SCA-
and the ST
46/2001/3722
Public Distribution No.P-6/77/2001/4124,
28
System Dated 26-9-2001
Maintenance of
29
Community Assets

Zila Parishad
Functions
Sl Matters in 11th Fund Functio
Executive Orders Plann Impleme Super Promot
N Schedule s naries
ing ntation vision ion
Letter-4/file/meeting-
Agriculture including 12/2001/3301
1
agriculture extension (Secretary)/ agriculture,
dated 25-9-2001
Land improvement
implementation of
2 land reforms, lands
consolidation and soil
conservation
Minor irrigation, water
management and Letter 8/land deve-
3
watershed panchayat-22/2001-632
development
Animal Husbandry, 5M(1)304/2001/PP/569
4
dairying and poultry 7, Dated 25-9-2001

191
 5M(1)304/2001/PP/569
5 Fisheries
7, Dated 25-9-2001
Social Forestry & MS/10/2001-3087,
6
Farm Forestry Dated 26-9-2001
MS/10/2001-3087,
7 Minor Forest Produce
Dated 26-9-2001
Small scale industries
Letter No. 3529, Dated
8 including food
24-9-2001
processing industries
Khadi, village and Letter No. 3529, Dated
9
cottage industries 24-9-2001
10 Rural Housing
6/V1-102/2001-1169,
11 Drinking water
Dated 24-9-2001
MS/10/2001-3087,
12 Fuel and fodder
Dated 26-9-2001
Roads, culverts,
bridges, ferries,
13 waterways and other
means of
communication
Rural electrification
Letter No. 3073, Dated
14 including distribution
25-9-2001.
of electricity
Non conventional Letter No. 3073, Dated
15
energy sources 25-9-2001.
Poverty alleviation Gra. V3-1/2001/7197,
16
programme Dated 30-7-2001
Letter11/V-
Education including 54/2001/986/S, Dated
17 primary and secondary 25-9-2001
schools No.8/B3-431/95/1662,

Dated 24-9-2001
Technical training and
18
vocational Education
Letter No.-13/S1-
Adult and Non formal
19 1/2001/2383, Dated 26-
education
9-2001
Letter11/V-
20 Libraries 54/2001/986/S, Dated
25-9-2001
No.19/B2-11/200/669,
21 Cultural activities
Dated 25-9-2001
22 Markets and Fairs
Health and sanitation
including hospitals, No.45(18), dated 26-9-
23
primary health centers 2001
and dispensaries
No.45(18), dated 26-9-
24 Family welfare
2001
No.19/B2-11/200/669,

Women and child Dated 25-9-2001
25
development No.9/ICDS-12/2001,

dated 25-9-2001
192
 Social welfare
Letter No 1/AJ-
including welfare of
26 101/2001/3721, Dated
the handicapped and
24-9-2001
mentally retarded
Welfare of the weaker
Letter No 1/AJ-
sections and in
27 101/2001/3721, Dated
particular of the SC
24-9-2001
and the ST
Public Distribution No.P-6/77/2001/4124,
28
System Dated 26-9-2001
Maintenance of
29
Community Assets

Salient features of the range of activities devolved through Executive Orders:

The extent of devolution of functions to the Panchayats through the executive orders that
together comprise the Activity Mapping undertaken, is given in the Table below:
(in terms of number of matters listed in 11th Schedule)
Nature of Functional Planning Implementation Supervision Promotion Fund Functionary
Devolu devolution function Function function Function devolved devolved
tion in one way devolved devolved devolved devolved
or other
Level
of PRI
GP 27 17 15 14 20 7 14
PS 24 13 9 16 23 8 17
ZP 23 12 12 15 22 5 19

The matters that are not devolved to the Panchayats by the Executive Orders at the respective levels are
listed in the Table below:
Gram Panchayat Panchayat Samiti Zilla Panchayat
Technical training and vocational Technical training and vocational Technical training and vocational
education. education. education.
Markets and Fairs. Markets and Fairs.
Fisheries
Rural Housing Rural Housing
Roads, culverts, bridges, ferries, Roads, culverts, bridges, ferries,
waterways & other means of waterways and other means of
communication. communication.
Maintenance of community assets Maintenance of community assets
Land improvement, implementation
of land reforms, land consolidation
and soil conservation
The above analysis shows that Executive orders have been issued in respect of 28 matters, except
Technical training and vocational education. It also shows that the devolution through the Act has been
complemented by Executive Orders, which comprises the Activity Mapping that is in force. The State has
been informing that it is undertaking a process of revising the Activity Mapping. However, no further
information on whether this process has been completed has so far been received.

193
Annexure 2.11: Analysis of Activity Mapping in Himachal Pradesh:
The State has reported that (dated 31.7.1996) it has undertaken devolution of functions and
responsibilities pertaining to 26 matters listed in Eleventh Schedule of the Constitution. These
activities relate to 15 departments, namely, Agriculture, Animal Husbandry, Ayurveda,
Education, Food & Supplies, Forest, Health and Family Welfare, Horticulture, Industries,
Irrigation & Public Health, Public Works, Revenue, Rural Development and Social & Women
Welfare. The main features of the Activity Mapping undertaken are as follows:
(a) Activity Mapping does not cover the devolution of funds and functionaries. The State has
informed that transfer of funds and functionaries would be done after the finalization of a fresh
Activity Mapping exercise.
(b) The activities devolved through Activity Mapping mainly pertain to planning,
implementation, supervision and promotion. An analysis of all three tiers of Panchayat indicates
the following range of activities devolved to Panchayats:
Gram Panchayat:
Sl Functions
No. Fund Functio
Matters in 11th Schedule Plannin Impleme Super Promo s naries
g ntation vision tion
Agriculture including agriculture
1
extension
Land improvement, implementation of
2 land reforms, lands consolidation and
soil conservation
Minor irrigation, water management and
3
watershed development
4 Animal Husbandry, dairying and poultry
5 Fisheries
6 Social Forestry & Farm Forestry
7 Minor Forest Produce
Small scale industries including food
8
processing industries
9 Khadi, village and cottage industries
10 Rural Housing
11 Drinking water
12 Fuel & Fodder Not covered
Roads, culverts, bridges, ferries,
13 waterways & other means of
communication
Rural electrification including
14 Not Covered
distribution of electricity

194
 15 Non Conventional energy resources
16 Poverty alleviation programmes
Education including primary and
17
secondary schools
Technical training and vocational
18
education
19 Adult and non-formal education Not Covered
20 Libraries Not Covered
21 Cultural activities Not Covered
22 Markets and fairs
Health and sanitation including hospitals
23
primary health centres and dispensaries
24 Family welfare
25 Women and child development
Social welfare including welfare of the
26
handicapped and mentally retarded
Welfare of the weaker sections and in
27 particular of the scheduled castes and
scheduled tribes
28 Public distribution system
29 Maintenance of community assets

Panchayat Samiti:
Sl Functions
Fund Functionari
No. Matters in 11th Schedule Implement Supervis Promotio
Planning s es
ation ion n
Agriculture including agriculture
1
extension
Land improvement,
implementation of land reforms,
2
lands consolidation and soil
conservation
Minor irrigation, water
3 management and watershed
development
Animal Husbandry, dairying and
4
poultry
5 Fisheries
6 Social Forestry & Farm Forestry
7 Minor Forest Produce
Small scale industries including
8
food processing industries
Khadi, village and cottage
9
industries
10 Rural Housing
11 Drinking water
12 Fuel & Fodder Not covered

195
 Roads, culverts, bridges, ferries,
13 waterways and other means of
communication
Rural electrification including
14 Not Covered
distribution of electricity
Non Conventional energy
15
resources
16 Poverty alleviation programmes
Education including primary and
17
secondary schools
Technical training and vocational
18 Not Covered
education
19 Adult and non-formal education Not Covered
20 Libraries Not Covered
21 Cultural activities Not Covered
22 Markets and fairs
Health and sanitation including
23 hospitals primary health centres
and dispensaries
24 Family welfare
25 Women and child development
Social welfare including welfare
26 of the handicapped and mentally
retarded
Welfare of the weaker sections
27
and in particular of SCs & STs
28 Public distribution system
29 Maintenance of community assets

Zila Parishad:
Sl Matters in 11 th Functions
No. Funds Functionaries
Schedule Planning Implementation Supervision Promotion
Agriculture including
1
agriculture extension
Land improvement,
implementation of land
2 reforms, lands
consolidation and soil
conservation
Minor irrigation, water
3 management and
watershed development
Animal Husbandry,
4
dairying and poultry
5 Fisheries
Social Forestry & Farm
6
Forestry
7 Minor Forest Produce

196
 Small scale industries
8 including food
processing industries
Khadi, village and
9
cottage industries
10 Rural Housing Not Covered
11 Drinking water
12 Fuel & Fodder
Roads, culverts,
bridges, ferries,
13 waterways and other
means of
communication
Rural electrification
14 including distribution Not Covered
of electricity
Non Conventional
15
energy resources
Poverty alleviation
16
programmes
Education including
17 primary and secondary
schools
Technical training and
18 Not Covered
vocational education
Adult and non-formal
19 Not Covered
education
20 Libraries Not Covered
21 Cultural activities No Details provided
22 Markets and fairs Not Covered
Health and sanitation
including hospitals
23
primary health centre
& dispensaries
24 Family welfare
Women and child
25
development
Social welfare
including welfare of
26
the handicapped and
mentally retarded
Welfare of the weaker
sections and in
27
particular of the SCs &
STs
Public distribution
28
system
Maintenance of
29
community assets
197
The above analysis indicates that of 29 matters listed in the 11th Schedule, functions have been
devolved through Activity Mapping for 26 matters. There is some variance between the matters
devolved under the law and the Activity Mapping undertaken, as follows:
In the case of the following 6 items, Activity Mapping has been undertaken even though the
matter has not been devolved to Panchayats under the Act:
(a) Minor Irrigation,
(b) Water management and Watershed development
(c) Minor Forest produce
(d) Non conventional energy sources
(e) Technical Training and Vocational Education
(f) Public Distribution System
In respect of the following 2 items, even though the matter has been devolved under the Act,
Activity Mapping has not been undertaken:
(a) Rural electrification
(b) Adult and non-formal education

In respect of Libraries, neither is the matter covered under the Act nor has Activity Mapping
been undertaken.
The Activity Mapping of Himachal Pradesh needs to be revisited, in the light of contemporary
experience. While the State has undertaken to revisit its Activity Mapping, matters are
proceeding very slowly. The State will also need to re-work its approach to devolution of funds
and functionaries in the process of finalizing its Activity Mapping. The state also should start
undertaking budgetary analysis of the line items in the budget that are to be transferred to the
Panchayats in consonance with the provisions of the State Legislation and the Activity Mapping
undertaken.

198
Annexure 2.12: Analysis of Activity Mapping in Rajasthan:
According to information furnished by the State Government reports that it has undertaken
Activity Mapping of the above detailed legislative assignment of functions through executive
orders as detailed below:

Sl. Subject Executive Order

No.
1. Agriculture, Including C.S. Order F.4 (66) PR/PC/2002/565 dated 19-6-03 & Deptt. Order F.14
Agricultural Extension (27)AGr-I/96 Part- III Dated 30.6.2003
2. Land Improvement, C.S. Order F.4(66) PR/PC/2002/565 dated 19-6-03 & Deptt. Order F.14
implementation of land reforms (27)Agr-I/96 Part- III Dated 30.6.2003
3. Minor irrigation, water C.S. Order F.4(66) PR/PC/2002/565 dated 19-6-03 & Deptt. Order F.5
management and watershed (8)Irri/2002 Dated 30.6.2003
development
4. Animal Husbandry dairy and Deptt. Order F.7(1)AH/2002 Dated 7.4.2001
poultry
5. Fisheries C.S. Order F.4(66) PR/PC/2002/565 dated 19-6-03 & Deptt. Order F.7 (21)
AH/ 2001 dated 27.6.2003
6. Social Forestry and Farm C.S. Order F.4(66) PR/PC/2002/565 dated 19-6-03 & Deptt. Order F.15
Forestry (35) Forest /97 dated 17.7.2003 & F. 7 (39) Forest /9 dated 20.6.2000 (Reg.
S. No. 5 of GP)
7. Minor Forest Produce C.S. Order F.4(66) PR/PC/2002/565 dated 19-6-03 & Deptt. Order F.15
(35) Forest /97 dated 17.7.2003
8. Small Scale industries, C.S. Order F.4(66) PR/PC/2002/565 dated 19-6-03 & Deptt. Order F. 21
including food processing inds (6) Industries/1/2003 dated 5.7.2003
9. Khadi ,Village and cottage Deptt. Order dated 7.2.2001
Industry
10. Rural Housing Since 1974 (indicated in the fact sheet)
11. Drinking water C.S. Order F.4(66) PR/PC/2002/565 dated 19-6-03 & Deptt. Order
PHED/Engg/Secty/2K/56 dated 5.6.2000 &
F.1(7)PHED/AA/Moni/PR2002-03/ 455 dated 26.6.2003
12. Fuel and fodder C.S. Order F.4(66) PR/PC/2002/565 dated 19-6-03 & Deptt. Order
F.15(35) Forest/97 dated 17.7.2003
13. Roads ,culvert ,bridges, ferries, C.S. Order F.4(66) PR/PC/2002/565 dated 19-6-03 & Deptt. Order
waterways and other means of F.88/P&M/-II/VR/03/D-1895 dated 26.6.2003
communication F.88/P&M/-II/VR/03/D-1894 dated 26.6.2003
F.88/P&M/-II/VR/03/D-1896 dated 26.6.2003 (Kept in Abeyance, as
reported in the fact sheet.)
14. Rural electrification, including C.S. Order F.4(66) PR/PC/2002/565 dated 19-6-03 & Deptt. Order F.(20)
distribution of electricity Energy/2001 dated 26.6.2003
15. Non Conventional Sources C.S. Order F.4(66) PR/PC/2002/565 dated 19-6-03 & Deptt. Order F.(20)
Energy/2001 dated 26.6.2003
16. Poverty Alleviation Programme Already with PRIs
17. Primary Education C.S. Order F.4(66) PR/PC/2002/565 dated 19-6-03 & Deptt. Order F. 2(5)
Education-1/trg2003 dated 30.6.2003
18. Technical training and C.S. Order F.4(66) PR/PC/2002/565 dated 19-6-03 & Deptt. Order F.1 (18)
vocational education Technical Edu/2002 dated 28.6.2003
19. Adult and Non formal Not operational
Education
20. Libraries C.S. Order F.4(66) PR/PC/2002/565 dated 19-6-03 & Deptt. Order
199
 F.139/Legal/PR/Library/2003/1261 dated 27.6.2003
21. Cultural Activities C.S. Order F.4(66) PR/PC/2002/565 dated 19-6-03 & Deptt. Order F. 14
(1) Tourism/2003 dated 5.7.2003
22. Markets and Fairs C.S. Order F.4(66) PR/PC/2002/565 dated 19-6-03 & Deptt. Order
F.14(7)Ka-2/2003 dated 12.7.2003
23. Health and sanitation, including Deptt. Order F.16 (08) M&H/ dated 1.5.2000
hospitals, primary health
centers and dispensaries
24. Family Welfare C.S. Order F.4(66) PR/PC/2002/565 dated 19-6-03 & Deptt. Order
F.2(107)SCP/SWD/99/1-8 and 17-24 dated 3.1.2000
25. Women and Child C.S. Order F.4(66) PR/PC/2002/565 dated 19-6-03 & Deptt. Order
Development F.11(3)33/W&C/2000/76297 dated 30.6.2003
26. Social Welfare, including C.S. Order F.4(66) PR/PC/2002/565 dated 19-6-03 & Deptt. Order
welfare of the handicapped and F.1/Estt./SWD/03/47128 dated 28.6.2003
mentally retarded
27. Welfare of the weaker sections, C.S. Order F.4(66) PR/PC/2002/565 dated 19-6-03 & Deptt. Order
in particular ,of the SCs & STs F.1/Estt./SWD/03/47128 dated 28.6.2003
28. Maintenance of Community Already with PRIs.
assets

The features of the executive order through which Activity Mapping is supposed to have been
undertaken are as follows:
(a) Executive Orders for Activity Mapping touches all matters except Adult and non-formal
education. In respect of Rural Housing, Poverty alleviation and Maintenance of community
assets, it is reported that these activities are already vested in the Panchayats.
(b) It may be noted that the State Government has also kept the executive order on Activity
Mapping in respect of Roads, culverts, bridges, ferries, waterways and other means of
communication in abeyance. This is an example of the State using its powers to diminish the
devolution of functions to Panchayats through executive orders.

An analysis of the Activity Mapping executive orders indicates the following range of activities
devolved to Panchayats:
Sl. Subject Planning & Funds & Promotion / Assistance Supervision/
No. Implement Functionaries Development Maintenance
ation transferred
1 Agriculture including
Agricultural extension
2 Land improvement,
implementation of land
reforms, land consolidation
and soil conservation.
3 Minor irrigation, water
management and watershed
development
200
4 Animal husbandry, dairying
and poultry
5 Fisheries
6 Social forestry and farm
forestry
7 Minor forest produce
8 Small scale industries
9 Khadi, Village and cottage
industries
10 Rural Housing
11 Drinking water
12 Fuel and fodder
13 Roads, culverts, bridges,
ferries, waterways and other
means of communication
14 Rural electrification
(select
villages for
electrificati
on as per
number
decided at
state level)
15 Non conventional energy
16 Poverty alleviation
17 Primary education
18 Technical training and
vocational education
19 Adult non formal education
20 Libraries
(Given in
broad terms)
21 Cultural Activities
22 Markets and fairs
23 Health and sanitation,
including hospitals, primary
health centres & dispensaries
24 Family welfare
25 Women and Child
Development
26 Social Welfare, including
welfare of the handicapped
and mentally retarded
27 Welfare of the weaker
sections and in particular, of
the SCs and STs.
28 Public distribution system
29 Maintenance of community
assets

201
The above table would show that the scope of the functional devolution contained in the Activity
Mapping executive orders is quite detailed. Most of these powers have been given to the ZPs and
Panchayat Samitis. In respect of a few items, such as Libraries, family welfare etc, it may be
noted that the functions given to GPs, PSs and ZPs are stated out in very broad terms and are
open ended. No clear cut demarcation of activities assigned to Panchayats has been specified.

Therefore, on the face of it, the Activity Mapping contained in the circulars issued in 2003 is
relatively much better as compared to other States. This would mean that the focus in Rajasthan
ought to be much more on ensuring whether financial assignments have followed the functional
assignments contained in these executive orders. There is however, one matter of concern. It has
been reported by NGOs and Panchayat representatives from Rajasthan that that several of the
Activity Mapping orders issued by the Government above have been withdrawn in 2004. For
instance, it is reported that the government has withdrawn the powers devolved to Panchayats in
respect of education. However, these matters have not yet been reported by the Government
through the fact sheet except in the case of Roads and culverts, where it is reported that the
executive orders on Activity Mapping have been kept in abeyance.
The next steps would be as follows:
(a) To ascertain the latest position in respect of the clearance by Rajasthan of the new
Activity Mapping that has been suggested by a Cabinet sub-Committee in the State.
(b) Pending the above, to follow up to find out greater details of how these activities that
were assigned in 2003 are being implemented today by the Panchayats,
(c) To expedite the budgetary analysis so as to provide us greater details on fiscal
devolution.

Based on the above analysis, it can be suggested that Govt. of Rajasthan must go beyond giving
Panchayats nominal powers and actually engage them in the management of functions entrusted
to them and exercise full responsibility for the entrusted activities. Moreover, the state should
start undertaking budgetary analysis of the line items in the budget that are to be transferred to
the Panchayats in consonance with the provisions of the State Legislation and the Activity
Mapping undertaken.

202
Annexure 2.13: Analysis of Activity Mapping in West Bengal:
The West Bengal Government issued an Official Memorandum No. 1415/P/2M-6/99 dated 24th
May, 1999 signed by the Chief Secretary in which all 29 subjects were devolved to GP, PS and
ZP level. However, it does not seem as if specific executive orders were issued by each
department following this order.
West Bengal issued its first Activity Mapping order in November 2005. The salient features of
this exercise are as follows:
(a) This exercise covers 15 items. However, these items are not the same as the terms used
in the Eleventh Schedule and probably refer to the departments that handle these matters.
(b) An analysis of the content of the Activity Mapping reveals that the activities concerning
the following 18 matters listed in the 11th Schedule have been touched upon in some way
or the other, through it:
a. Agriculture, including agricultural extension.
b. Animal husbandry, dairying and poultry.
c. Khadi, village and cottage industries
d. Small scale industries, including food processing industries.
e. Health and sanitation, including hospitals. Primary health centres and dispensaries
f. Family Welfare
g. Social forestry and farm forestry.
h. Women and Child Development
i. Social Welfare, including welfare of the handicapped and mentally retarded
j. Fisheries.
k. Public distribution system
l. Adult and non-formal education.
m. Libraries
n. Cultural activities
o. Education, including primary and secondary schools
p. Drinking water
q. Minor irrigation, water management and watershed development.

203
 r. Land improvement, implementation of land reforms, land consolidation and soil
conservation.
(c) The activity mapping at first sight, leaves out the following 11 matters contained in the
Eleventh Schedule:
a. Minor forest produce
b. Rural housing.
c. Fuel and fodder
d. Roads, culverts, bridges, ferries, waterways and other means of communication.
e. Rural electrification, including distribution of electricity.
f. Non-conventional energy sources.
g. Poverty alleviation programme
h. Technical training and vocational education.
i. Markets and Fairs
j. Welfare of the weaker sections, and in particular of the Scheduled Castes and the
Scheduled Tribes
k. Maintenance of community assets

Some of these omissions are interesting. For instance, while social forestry is covered under
Activity Mapping, minor forest produce is not. Similarly, Activity Mapping does not explicitly
cover the maintenance of community assets as a separate item, but one can safely conclude that
this aspect has been adequately covered in the Activity Mapping undertaken for 15 items.
The pattern of Activity Mapping is interesting. The Activity Mapping matrix does not contain
vertical columns for each level of Panchayat, but lists out the activities as responsibilities of the
Standing Committees of the three-tier PRIs. Therefore, the Activity Mapping is more in terms of
the delegation of departmental functions directly to the Standing Committees of the Panchayats,
This is surely a unique approach. While this is understandable in the context of the Gram
Panchayats being larger units in West Bengal and that the Standing Committee system is
powerful in the State, this pattern of Activity Mapping does not make the inter-se relationship
between the three levels of Panchayats clear, particularly as the same activities are devolved to

204
the Standing Committees concerned at each level of Panchayat. Several features of Activity
Mapping of West Bengal are as follows:
The content of the Activity Mapping indicates a strong hierarchical relationship between the
three levels of Panchayat.
Most activities given to the Panchayats are substantive, such as beneficiary selection,
implementation, policy framing etc. There is a related extent of reporting and monitoring
responsibilities given. However, the level of detail is good enough to promote clarity. There
seems to be a conscious avoidance of giving Panchayats merely promotional or advertising
roles.
While the Activity Mapping does not cover the devolution of functionaries, a very good
feature of the Activity Mapping is that a link officer has been identified for each Standing
Committee. This is a good practice that we can suggest for other States also, although it pales
in comparison with the more meticulous approach adopted by Assam and Sikkim.
An excellent feature of the Activity Mapping is that in respect of all departments covered,
planning and budgeting responsibilities are universally devolved to the Standing Committee
concerned.

In conclusion, it might be stated that West Bengals approach to Activity Mapping has been
unique because of its emphasis on Activity Mapping of Standing Committees. Some features,
such as the naming of link officers for each Standing Committee are worthy of emulation. West
Bengal therefore is an interesting case study of a State that has shown a consistent commitment
to strong Panchayats, moved in the direction of gradually strengthening devolution through both
the law and executive orders, but is unable to match this devolution to Panchayats with adequate
funds as it is has been operating large fiscal deficits and shows low tax performance.
The next steps would be to undertake similar exercises for other departments and cover the
remaining matters in the Eleventh Schedule and the concentrate on fiscal decentralization to
match the functional devolution undertaken through the Act and the Activity Mapping.

205
 ANNEXURES TO CHAPTER III

Annexure 3.1

Table A3.1: Assigned Taxes to Gram Panchayats

ArP Ass Bih Chh Goa Guj Har HP J&K Jha Kar
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11

1 Property tax on land and/or buildings (House tax) (O)

2 Taxes on Profession, Trades and callings (O)
3 Toll on persons, vehicles & animals
4 Tax on sale of firewood, tatch conservance and slaughterhouse
5 Tax on Private haat and private fisheries
6 Tax on Shops, pharmacies, workshops etc.
7 Tax on cultivable land lying fallow for more than 2 years
8 Cess or fee on registration of cattle sold
9 Cess or fee on license for starting tea stall, hotels and restaurants
Tax/Cess on cycles, carts, boats, rickshaw, vehicle drawn by
10
animals
11 Tax on entertainment other than cinematograph shows
12 Tax on advertisement and hoardings
13 Lighting tax/rate (O)
14 Drainage Tax
15 Octroi (other than on petroleum products)
16 Garbage disposal tax
17 Pilgrim tax
18 Octroi on animals, goods
19 Tax on fairs, festivals and other entertainment
20 Tax on vehicles, boats, animals
21 Toll on animals and vehicles

206
 ArP Ass Bih Chh Goa Guj Har HP J&K Jha Kar
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11

22 Tax on dogs kept

23 General/special sanitary cess

24 Tax on works of public utility (i.e. on adult male members of

sabha area for construction of public work of general utility)
25 Tax on cinemas & theatre
26 Tax on gharats, rice husking mills, brick kiln, oil mills
27 Tax on hawkers, pheriwalas
28 Water tax
29 Conservancy tax (O)
30 Tax on vehicles other than motor vehicles
31 Entertainment tax/duty
32 Service tax for sanitation, water supply, scavenging, street
lighting & drainage
33 Land conversion cess
34 Additional Stamp duty
35 Duty on Transfer of Property
36 Tax on agricultural land for specific purpose
37 Toll on persons, animals, Vehicles on toll bar established by GP
and or on roads (other than kutcha), bridges under GP
38 Toll on ferry established or run by GP
39 tax on person exposing goods for sale in markets, hats, or melas
40 Tax on commercial crops

207
Table A3.1: Assigned Taxes to Gram Panchayats [Contd. ..]
Ker MP Mah Ori Pun Raj Sik TN Tri UP Utt WB
12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23

1 Property tax on land and/or buildings (House tax) (O) (O)

2 Taxes on Profession, Trades and callings (O)
3 Toll on persons, vehicles & animals
4 Tax on sale of firewood, tatch conservance and slaughterhouse
5 Tax on Private haat and private fisheries
6 Tax on Shops, pharmacies, workshops etc.
7 Tax on cultivable land lying fallow for more than 2 years
8 Cess or fee on registration of cattle sold
9 Cess or fee on license for starting tea stall, hotels and restaurants
Tax/Cess on cycles, carts, boats, rickshaw, vehicles drawn by
10
animals
11 Tax on entertainment other than cinematograph shows
12 Tax on advertisement and hoardings
13 Lighting tax/rate (O)
14 Drainage Tax
15 Octroi (other than on petroleum products)
16 Garbage disposal tax
17 Pilgrim tax
18 Octroi on animals, goods
19 Tax on fairs, festivals and other entertainment
20 Tax on vehicles, boats, animals
21 Toll on animals and vehicles
22 Tax on dogs kept
23 General/special sanitary cess

24 Tax on works of public utility (i.e. on adult male members of

sabha area for construction of public work of general utility)

208
 Ker MP Mah Ori Pun Raj Sik TN Tri UP Utt WB
12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23

25 Tax on cinemas & theatre

26 Tax on gharats, rice husking mills, brick kiln, oil mills
27 Tax on hawkers, pheriwalas
28 Water tax/rate
29 Conservancy tax (O)
30 Tax on vehicles other than motor vehicles
31 Entertainment tax/duty

32 Service tax for sanitation, water supply, scavenging, street

lighting & drainage
33 Land conversion cess
34 Additional Stamp duty
35 Duty on Transfer of Property
36 Tax on agricultural land for specific purpose

37 Toll on persons, animals, Vehicles on toll bar established by GP

and or on roads (other than kutcha), bridges under GP
38 Toll on ferry established or run by GP
39 tax on person exposing goods for sale in markets, hats, or melas
40 Tax on commercial crops
Source: Relevant State Panchayati Raj Acts
Note: 1) O refers to obligatory tax and rest of the taxes are as optional
2) House tax includes property tax on lands and/or buildings
3) Panchayati Raj Acts of 5 states were not available. These are Andhra Pradesh, Manipur, Mizoram, Meghalaya, and Nagaland

209
Table A3.2: Assigned Non-Taxes to Gram Panchayats
ArP Ass Bih Chh Goa Guj Har HP J&K Jha Kar
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11

1 Fee for providing sanitary arrangement in places of worship, fairs & melas
2 Water rate for supply of water for drinking, irrigation etc.
3 Lighting rate/fees
4 Conservancy rate/fees
5 Fees on license on running trade
6 Fee on registration of vehicles (those not registered under any other law)
7 Pilgrimage fee
8 Market fee
9 Fee on registration of cattle/animals sold
10 Fees on buses and taxis, auto stand, car stand
11 Fees on grazing cattle on grazing lands
12 Fee on sale of goods in fails, markets, festivals
13 Fee on cart stand, tonga stand
14 Fee for temporary erection or putting a projection on public street or land
15 Fee for the use of slaughter house, encamping grounds
16 Fee for temporary occupation of village sites, roads & other public places
17 Fee on tongas
18 Adda fee
19 Fee on cattle pounds
20 Fee for application of creation or re-creation of buildings
21 Service charges for toilet facilities, parking facilities etc
22 Fee for Dharamshalas, camping ground
23 Fee for drainage
fees on plaints, petitions & other processes in suits and cases instituted
24
before the Nyaya Panchayat
25 fees on registration for running trade, wholesale or retail
26 Fees on license on dogs, birds & other domestic pet
27 Drainage rate
28 Fees for use of burning ghat
29 fees on registration for tube-wells fitted with motor-driven pump sets

210
Table A3.2: Assigned Non-Taxes to Gram Panchayats [Contd. ..]
Ker MP Mah Ori Pun Raj Sik TN Tri UP Utt WB
12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23

1 Fee for providing sanitary arrangement in places of worship, fairs & melas
2 Water rate/fee for supply of water for drinking, irrigation etc.
3 Lighting rate/fees
4 Conservancy rate/fees
5 Fees on license on running trade
6 Fee on registration of vehicles (those not registered under any other law)
7 Pilgrimage fee
8 Market fee; fee on market and weekly bazaars
9 Fee on registration of cattle/animals sold
10 Fees on buses and taxis, auto stand
11 Fees on grazing cattle on grazing lands
12 Fee on sale of goods in fails, markets, festivals
13 Fee on cart stand, tonga stand, car stands
14 Fee for temporary erection or putting a projection on public street or land
15 Fee for the use of slaughter house, encamping grounds
16 Fee for temporary occupation of village sites, roads & other public places
17 Fee on tongas
18 Adda fee
19 Fee on cattle pounds
20 Fee for application of creation or re-creation of buildings
21 Service charges for toilet facilities, parking facilities etc
22 Fee for Dharamshalas, camping ground
23 Fee for drainage
fees on plaints, petitions & other processes in suits and cases instituted
24
before the Nyaya Panchayat
25 fees on registration for running trade, wholesale or retail
26 Fees on license on dogs, birds & other domestic pet
27 Drainage rate
28 Fees for use of burning ghat
29 fees on registration for tube-wells fitted with motor-driven pump sets
Source: Relevant State Panchayati Raj Acts
Note: Panchayati Raj Acts of 5 states were not available. These are Andhra Pradesh, Manipur, Mizoram, Meghalaya, and Nagaland

211
Table A3.3: Taxes and Non-Taxes Assigned to Block Panchayats
ArP Ass Bih Chh Goa Guj Har HP J&K Jha Kar
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
A Assigned Taxes **
Toll on persons, animals, Vehicles on toll bar established by GP & or on
1
roads (other than kutcha), bridges under GP
2 Toll on ferry established or run by GP
3 Surcharge on land revenue
4 Cess on water rate
5 Tax on supplying Water and electricity
6 Tax on Profession, trades and callings
7 Water Tax
8 Tax on Theatrical performance (O)
9 Tax on use of agricultural land
10 Tax on fairs
B Assigned Non-Taxes **
Fee on cinema halls, brick kilns, saw mills, timber depots, private
1
fisheries, vegetable gardens for commercial purpose etc.
2 Fee on regitration of vehicles (those not registered under any other law)
Fee for providing sanitary arrangements in places of worship,
3
pilgrimage, fairs and melas
4 Fee for license for a haat or market
5 Water rate for supply of water for drinking, irrigation etc.
6 Lighting rate/fees
Fee on public hospitals, dispensaries , schools, sarais, markets, rest
7
houses & other public institutions
8 Fee on supply, storage and preservation of water for drinking, bathing etc
Fee for preservation and reclamation of soil and drainage and
9
reclamation of swamps
10 Fees fairs, agricultural shows and industrial exhibitions
11 Fee for any other license

212
Table A3.3: Taxes and Non-Taxes Assigned to Block Panchayats [Contd. ..]
Ker MP Mah Ori Pun Raj Sik TN Tri UP Utt WB
12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23
A Assigned Taxes
Toll on persons, animals, Vehicles on toll bar established by GP & or on
1
roads (other than kutcha), bridges under GP
2 Toll on ferry established or run by GP
3 Surcharge on land revenue
4 Cess on water rate
5 Tax on supplying Water and electricity
6 Tax on Profession, trades and callings
7 Water Tax
8 Tax on Theatrical performance (O)

9 Tax on use of agricultural land

10 Tax on fairs
B Assigned Non-Taxes
Fee on cinema halls, brick kilns, saw mills, timber depots, private
1
fisheries, vegitable gardens for commercial purpose etc.
2 Fee on registration of vehicles (those not registered under any other law)
Fee for providing sanitary arrangements in places of worship, pilgrimage,
3
fairs and melas
4 Fee for license for a haat or market
5 Water rate for supply of water for drinking, irrigation etc.
6 Lighting rate/fees
Fee on public hospitals, dispensaries , schools, sarais, markets, rest houses
7
& other public institutions
8 Fee on supply, storage and preservation of water for drinking, bathing etc
Fee for preservation and reclamation of soil and drainage and reclamation
9
of swamps
10 Fees fairs, agricultural shows and industrial exhibitions
11 Fee for any other license
Source: Relevant State Panchayati Raj Acts
Note: 1) O refers to obligatory tax and rest of the taxes are as optional.
2) Panchayati Raj Acts of 5 states were not available. These are Andhra Pradesh, Manipur, Mizoram, Meghalaya, and Nagaland
213
Table A3.4: Taxes and Non-Taxes Assigned to District Panchayats
ArP Ass Bih Chh Goa Guj Har HP J&K Jha Kar
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
A Assigned Taxes ** &&
Toll on persons, animals, Vehicles on toll bar established by GP & or on roads
1
(other than kutcha), bridges under GP
2 Toll on ferry established or run by GP
3 Water Tax
4 Tax on fairs, melas and other entertainments
5 Sanitation tax
6 Pilgrim Tax
7 Special tax on lands and buildings
8 Tax on land benefited by irrigation or developmental works
B Assigned Non-Taxes **
1 Fees on registration of boats
2 Fees on registration of Vehicles
Fee for providing sanitary arrangements in places of worship, pilgrimage, fairs
3
and melas
4 Fees on license for mela or fairs
5 Lighting rate/fees
6 Water rate
Fee on public hospitals, dispensaries , schools, sarais, markets, rest houses &
7
other public institutions
8 Fee on supply, storage and preservation of water for drinking, bathing etc
9 Fee for preservation & reclamation of soil & drainage & reclamation of swamp
10 Fees fairs, agricultural shows and industrial exhibitions
11 Fee for temporary erection or putting a projection on public street or land
12 Conservancy fee
13 Fee on the registration of animals sold in
14 Market fee on persons exposing goods for sale in any market
15 Fee for use of dharamsalas, rest houses, slaughter house & encamping ground
16 Fee for drainage
License fee on brokers, commission agent, weighmen or measures practicing
17
their callings

214
Table A3.4: Taxes and Non-Taxes Assigned to District Panchayats [Contd. ..]
Ker MP Mah Ori Pun Raj Sik TN Tri UP Utt WB
12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23
A Assigned Taxes
Toll on persons, animals, Vehicles on toll bar established by GP & or on roads
1
(other than kutcha), bridges under GP
2 Toll on ferry established or run by GP
3 Water Tax
4 Tax on fairs, melas and other entertainments
5 Sanitation tax
6 Pilgrim Tax
7 Special tax on lands and buildings
8 Tax on land benefited by irrigation or developmental works
B Assigned Non-Taxes
1 Fees on registration of boats
2 Fees on registration of Vehicles
Fee for providing sanitary arrangements in places of worship, pilgrimage, fairs
3
and melas
4 Fees on license for mela or fairs
5 Lighting rate/fees
6 Water rate
Fee on public hospitals, dispensaries , schools, sarais, markets, rest houses &
7
other public institutions
8 Fee on supply, storage and preservation of water for drinking, bathing etc
9 Fee for preservation & reclamation of soil & drainage & reclamation of swamp
10 Fees fairs, agricultural shows and industrial exhibitions
11 Fee for temporary erection or putting a projection on public street or land
12 Conservancy fee
13 Fee on the registration of animals sold
14 Market fee on persons exposing goods for sale in any market
15 Fee for use of dharamsalas, rest houses, slaughter house & encamping ground
16 Fee for drainage
License fee on brokers, commission agent, weighmen or measures practicing
17
their callings
Source: Relevant State Panchayati Raj Acts
Note: Panchayati Raj Acts of 5 states were not available. These are Andhra Pradesh, Manipur, Mizoram, Meghalaya, and Nagaland

215
Annexure 3.2

216
217
 ANNEXURES TO CHAPTER IV

Annexure 4.1

Local Bodies: Summary of Recommendations made by FC-XIII

The Finance Commissions are required to make recommendations on the measures needed to
augment the Consolidated Fund of a State to supplement the resources of the Panchayats and
Municipalities in the State on the basis of recommendations made by the Finance Commission of
the State. The recommendations of FC-XIII relating to local bodies can be broadly classified
under the following heads:

1. Augmenting own revenues of panchayats:

State Governments should incentivize revenue collection by local bodies: FC-XIII is of the
view that there is no substitute for local bodies raising their own tax and non-tax revenues
and for State Governments augmenting their tax assignment and transfers to them. Local
bodies must be encouraged to fully exploit those taxation powers which have been assigned
to them by their respective State Governments. They should be in a position, not only to fully
exploit sources like property tax and profession tax, but also to recover at least maintenance
costs for services like water supply, solid waste management and sewerage. Local bodies
should be incentivised for such efforts. Own revenue collections can be incentivised through
a number of ways like mandating some or all local taxes as obligatory at non-zero rates of
levy; by deducting deemed own revenue collection from transfer entitlements of local bodies,
or through a system of matching grants etc.
The All local bodies should be fully enabled to levy property tax (including tax for all types
of residential and commercial properties) and any hindrances in this regard must be removed.
State Governments must put in place a state level Property Tax Board, which will assist all
municipalities and municipal corporations in the state to put in place an independent and
transparent procedure for assessing property tax.
In order to strengthen the local bodies FC-XIII recommended that both the Central and State
Governments should issue executive instructions that all their respective departments pay
appropriate service charges to local bodies: FC-XIII recommended that all government
218
 properties of the Centre as well as the states should be subject to levy of user charges which
should be regulated by suitable legislations. This was recommended by FC-XI in its report.

2. Strengthening the accounting and auditing system of local bodies:

The Commission observed that the data on financial and operational performance of all local
bodies continues to be of poor quality despite substantial progress by local bodies in a few
states on this account. As per the present system any assistance given by the State
Governments to PRIs is booked as a lump sum under the minor heads 196, 197 & 198 which
appear both in the budget documents as well as in the finance accounts of the State
Governments. However, neither of these two documents depict the details relating to the
expenditure incurred by the PRIs by detailed heads and object heads. Further, it is not
possible to determine the corresponding expenditure incurred by the PRIs as they do not
maintain similar accounts that could capture these details. Accurate data on the financial
performance of local bodies can at best be obtained from accounts of the local bodies
themselves, apart from the budget documents of the State Governments and the respective
finance accounts. This requires that all State Governments make distinct budget provisions
for local bodies, the expenditures relating to which are reported in the finance accounts. A
number of states do maintain distinct budgetary provisions for amounts transferred by them
to each tier of PRIs and each category of ULBs. They provide object head-wise details in
the budget documents. Object heads like salary, wages and office expenses are captured
under the relevant detailed heads.
The Commission recommended that a supplement to the budget documents be prepared by
the State Governments showing details of plan- and non-plan-wise classification of transfers
separately for all categories of ULBs and all tiers of PRIs, from major head to object head,
which have been depicted in the main budget under the minor heads 191, 192 and 193; and
196, 197 and 198 respectively. This supplement could also incorporate details of funds
transferred directly to the local bodies outside the State Governments budget. The
supplement should aim to provide details of spatial distribution of transfers at least up to
district level. Similarly the finance accounts should also reflect such a distinction and a
separate statement needs to be included in the finance accounts showing the detailed plan-

219
 and non-plan-wise classification of transfers separately for all categories of ULBs and all
tiers of PRIs, from major head to object head, which have been depicted in the finance
accounts under the minor heads 191, 192 and 193; and 196, 197 and 198 respectively. FC-
XIII recommended that these changes be brought into effect from 31 March 2012.
State Governments should appropriately strengthen their local fund audit departments
through capacity building as well as personnel augmentation: FC-XIII recommended that in
view of the substantial increase in the volume of transfers to local bodies all State
Governments should strengthen their audit framework. It is of the view that while the C&AG
will provide technical guidance and supervision, the major portion of the work will have to
be undertaken by the local fund audit department. Annual Technical Inspection Report of
G&AG as well as the Annual Report of the Director of Local Fund Audit must be placed
before the state legislature. Thus they recommend that State Governments should strengthen
their local fund audit departments both in terms of capacity building as well as augmentation
of personnel.
FC-XIII recommended that State Governments must put in place a system to electronically
transfer local body grants provided by this Commission to the respective local bodies within
five days of their receipt from the Central Government. Wherever this is not possible due to
lack of easily accessible banking infrastructure, the State Governments must put in place
alternative channels of transmission such that funds are transferred within ten days of their
receipt.

3. State Finance Commissions:

Major issues relating to the functioning of Finance Commissions include
Synchronicity with Central Finance Commissions: FC-XIII recommended like the previous
two FCs that the SFCs be appointed on time and the period covered by the SFCs is
synchronous with the period covered by the National Finance Commission.
FC-XIII recommended that Article 243-I of the Constitution should be amended to include
the phrase or earlier after the words every fifth year: As the timing of the National
Finance Commissions constitution as well as the period for which it makes
recommendations is known the State Governments should be empowered to constitute and

220
 direct their respective SFCs to give their report well before the National Finance Commission
finalises its recommendation. Therefore, they endorsed the recommendation of the SARC
that Article 243-I (1) of the Constitution should be amended to include the phrase or earlier
after the words every fifth year.
Quality of SFC Reports: The quality of SFC reports continues to be patchy. Though FC-XII
had recommended that SFCs collect data in the formats suggested by it, this advice has not
been uniformly followed. Further, the recommendations of the SFCs do not follow a uniform
pattern, thus detracting from their usability. In order to address this problem FC-XIII had
constituted a task force to prepare a template for SFC reports. It recommends that SFCs could
consider adopting the template suggested at by the task force as the basis for their reports.
State Governments should ensure that the recommendations of SFCs are implemented
without delay and that the Action Taken Report is promptly placed before the legislature:
The experience of SFCs has not been found to be successful for a number of reasons. SFCs
themselves are hampered by lack of data, limited capacity and poor ownership by State
Governments. There is little incentive for them to produce a comprehensive report. Further,
or because of these reasons, states are not overly keen either to accept their recommendations
or to place the ATR before the state legislature in a timely manner. This situation provides a
further disincentive for SFCs to produce good quality reports. There is, thus, a need for State
Governments to ensure that the recommendations of SFCs are implemented without delay
and that the ATR is placed promptly before the legislature.
Qualification of Members of SFCs: Important issues legal, economic, financial and
administrative, as well as those relating to decentralization, need to be examined and SFC
members should be well equipped to meet these challenges. It is desirable that all states
legislate requisite qualifications of SFC members (consistent with Article 243I (2) of the
Constitution) as the working of SFCs is also hampered by the lack of such criteria.

4. Sharing of state revenues with local bodies

Given the increasing income of State Governments from royalties, FC-XIII recommended
that the states should share a portion of this income with those local bodies in whose
jurisdiction such income arises.

221
5. Improving Service Delivery
State Governments must gradually put in place standards for delivery of all essential services
provided by local bodies: Lack of resources often results in local bodies diluting the quality
of services provided by them. State Governments must gradually put in place standards for
delivery of all essential services provided by local bodies. To begin with State Governments
must notify or cause all the municipal corporations and municipalities to notify by the end of
a fiscal year (31 March) the service standards for four service sectors-water supply,
sewerage, storm water drainage, and solid waste management proposed to be achieved by
them by the end of the succeeding fiscal year.
A portion of the grants provided by us to urban local bodies may be used to revamp the fire
services within their jurisdiction:. All municipal corporations with a population of more than
1 million (2001 census) must put in place a fire hazard response and mitigation plan for their
respective jurisdictions. Publication of these plans in the respective State Government
gazettes will demonstrate compliance with this condition.

6. Other Recommendations
FC-XIII recommended setting up of bodies similar to the SFC in states which are not covered
by Part IX of the Constitution: This is based on the recommendations of the Expert
Committee on Planning for the Sixth Schedule Areas set up by the Ministry of Panchayati
Raj to look into this matter.
The State Government must put in place a system of independent local body ombudsmen:
FC-XIII recommended that states put in place a system of independent local body
ombudsman to look into complaints of corruption and maladministration against the
functionaries of local bodies, both elected members and officials, and recommend suitable
action. According to FC-XIII such a system should be made applicable to all elected
functionaries and officials in all municipal corporations, municipalities and zilla parishads at
least.

222