Knowlton V Richland County Et Al - Opinion and Order Re Summary Judgment

Case: 1:15-cv-00210-DAP Doc #: 39 Filed: 04/05/17 1 of 30.
PageID #: 1233
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
SARA KNOWLTON, as Administrator ) CASE NO. 1:15-cv-00210-DAP

of the estate of Brian Garber, )
)
Plaintiff, ) JUDGE DAN AARON POLSTER
)
vs. ) OPINION AND ORDER
)
RICHLAND COUNTY, OHIO, et al., )
)
Defendants. )
I. Background
On March 16, 2014, Brian Garber was shot and killed by three deputies of the Richland
County Sheriffs Office. Am. Compl. 1, Doc #: 3. Plaintiff Sara Knowlton, as the administrator
of Brian Garbers estate, filed the above-captioned civil rights suit against Richland County,
Ohio; Richland County Board of Commissioners; Richland County Sheriffs Office; Steve
Sheldon, sheriff, in his individual and official capacities; Raymond Frazier, in his individual and
official capacities; Andrew Knee, in his individual and official capacities; James Nicholson, in
his individual and official capacities; and Donald Zehner, in his individual and official capacities
(collectively, Defendants). Am. Compl. 613. Therein, Knowlton alleges ten claims:
Case: 1:15-cv-00210-DAP Doc #: 39 Filed: 04/05/17 2 of 30. PageID #: 1234
1. Excessive force, brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983, against all Defendants;

2. Ohio state law assault and battery, against Frazier, Knee, and Nicholson;
3. Ohio state law wrongful death, against all Defendants;
4. Excessive force, brought pursuant to 1983 and Monell v. Dept of Soc. Servs. of City of
N.Y., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), on the basis of custom, against Richland County;
5. Excessive force, brought pursuant to 1983, on the basis of failure to supervise, against
Sheldon and Zehner;
6. Ohio state law negligent supervision, against Sheldon;
7. Ohio state law negligent hiring and retention, against Richland County, Richland County
Board of Commissioners, Richland County Sheriffs Office, and Steve Sheldon;
8. Excessive force, brought pursuant to 1983, on the basis of ratification, against Richland
County, Richland County Board of Commissioners, Richland County Sheriffs Office,
and Sheldon;
9. Survivorship action, against all Defendants; and
10. Willful, wanton, and reckless conduct, brought pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 2744.01 et
seq., against all Defendants.
Am. Compl. 5990.
On January 16, 2017, Defendants moved for summary judgment. Doc #: 31. The matter is
fully briefed.1 On March 17, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Strike Defendants Arguments That The
Report of Expert Melvin Tucker Is Inadmissible At Summary Judgment. Doc #: 37.
II. Summary Judgment Framework
Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); accord Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). On the other
hand, if a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party, summary judgment for
the moving party is inappropriate. Baynes v. Cleland, 799 F.3d 600, 606 (6th Cir. 2015) (citing
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The movant bears the initial burden
1
The Court notes that the briefing would have been more beneficial to the Court had each
side used less hyperbole.
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of showing that there is no material issue in dispute. Id. at 607 (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)). A fact is deemed material only if it might affect the outcome of the
lawsuit under the governing substantive law. Id. (citing Wiley v. United States, 20 F.3d 222, 224
(6th Cir. 1994)). In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the court must view the facts and
any inferences reasonably drawn from them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
Id. (citing Kalamazoo Acquisitions, LLC v. Westfield Ins. Co., 395 F.3d 338, 342 (6th Cir.
2005)).
III. Factual Background
For purposes of this motion, disputes of fact are resolved, and reasonable inferences
made, in favor of the non-moving party.
A. Medical and Behavior Backgrounds
1. Brian Garber
Brian Garber, the deceased, had some history of mental health issues. He was diagnosed
with ADHD at around age five or six, was later diagnosed with depression, anxiety, and bipolar
disorder, and had been prescribed medication. In February 2012, Brian Garber had been suicidal
following the loss of his daughter to SIDS. It is unclear what medication he may have taken on
the day of the incident at issue.
2. Raymond Frazier
Deputy Frazier had been diagnosed with mild depression and anxiety and had been
prescribed medication for this at the time of the incident. His anxiety and use of medication was
known commonly throughout the Sheriffs Office.
In 2007, Frazier had been involved in a lawsuit related to his use of deadly force against
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Gilbert Rush. Frazier also had two, maybe three complaints for use of force. Frazier Dep.
97:913. In an August 2013 incident, which resulting in an internal and a criminal investigation,
Frazier was accused of throwing an individual to the ground and handcuffing that individual to a
chair. Frazier received either an instruction in caution or an unsatisfactory work performance
related to that incident. Frazier Dep. 99:112, 108109. According to a Voluntary Statement in
Fraziers personnel file given by an individual in September 2013, Frazier allegedly arrived at an
individuals house, pointed his gun at the individual, and threatened to kill him if he did not open
the door. He then allegedly kicked the door open, put his gun to the individuals head, and then
punched him a few times.
In May 2013, Frazier became upset when his canine partner was taken away from him,
and had an outburst involving kicking chairs and speaking angrily at other officers. Frazier then
elected to take a sick day for the rest of the day. Frazier was put on administrative leave pending
a psychological examination:
Reason for Referral

Deputy Raymond J. Frazier was referred for Psychological Evaluation by
Major Dale Fortney of Richland County Sheriffs Office. The referral reads
Please advise if Deputy Frazier is fully capable, psychologically and
emotionally, of fulfilling all the duties of a Deputy Sheriff. This referral
came about after Deputy Frazier responded by kicking chairs, making angry
(but not threatening) statements and became emotionally distraught and
tearful following the removal of his canine from his possession for some
retraining. In addition, there was a recent complaint from a mechanic service
used by the Sheriffs Office stating that Deputy Frazier had threatened to
arrest someone if his car was not fixed.
Fitness for Duty Evaluation 1. The psychologist concluded,
1. Results of this Psychological Fitness for Duty Evaluation provide no

evidence that Raymond Frazier meets criteria for mental health diagnosis. He
does currently take antidepressant medication for treatment of some
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symptoms which appear to be controlled at this time.

2. In regard to the referral question as to whether Deputy Frazier is capable
of psychologically and emotionally fulfilling duties of Deputy Sheriff,
conclusion of this evaluation is that he could be returned to full duty
immediately.
3. However, Mr. Frazier openly admits that he has low frustration tolerance
and sometimes responds to stressors in a maladaptive manner. Therefore, it
is strongly recommended that he seek mental health intervention to learn
some more appropriate coping, interpersonal, self-control, and patience skills.
Id. at 6. Frazier was disciplined with an Instruction of Caution for Unsatisfactory Work
Performance and Failing to Maintain a Required Standard of Performance. Inter-Office
Communication from Captain Bosko to Sheriff Sheldon 2.
B. Prior to the Incident
March 16, 2014, at approximately 7:10 p.m., Deputy Knee and Lieutenant Zehner
responded to a domestic violence call at Brian Garbers residence, 3425 Mill Run Road. Brian
Garber had pushed his wife, Sara Knowlton, down, holding her onto the bed at her collarbone
and shoulder area near her neck, and had pushed his mother, Connie Garber, when she tried to
stop him. Sara Knowlton was scared for herself and her children and contacted law enforcement.
When Knee and Zehner arrived, Brian Garber had already left the house. Richland County
Sheriffs Office and Lexington Police Department officers searched for Brian Garber, but were
unable to locate him. Sara Knowlton and Connie Garber eventually, albeit reluctantly, signed
domestic violence packets. They expressed to the deputies that they wanted to get help for Brian
Garber.
Subsequently, Matthew Garber (Brian Garbers father) and Connie Garber returned to
their home (Brian Garbers childhood home) at 3400 Mill Run Road, which was across the street
and up the hill from 3425 Mill Run Road. Matthew and Connie Garber found Brian Garber
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upstairs in his his childhood bedroom. Brian Garber strongly implied that he had a gun and did
not deny it when his mother asked whether he had a gun. In her deposition, Connie Garber said,
[Brian Garber] didnt say he had a gun, he just said, you wont like whats
under my shirt. He had his hand under his shirt, and Im the one that said
really, Brian, now youre trying to tell us you have a gun? And he goes like
this (indicating). Yeah. And I knew he was -- I just knew it, I knew he was
just saying that because he wanted to be left alone. Hes never handled a gun
in his life.
C. Garber Dep. 42:613. Matthew and Connie Garber went downstairs, whereupon they
discussed the matter.
I [Connie Garber] said, you know he doesnt have a gun, He [Matthew

Garber] goes, well, probably not but what if. I go, where would he get it? He
said, you never know, but what if and he might harm himself. Then that
shook me up and I thought, okay, what if. Because I knew he would never
hurt us or anyone, I knew he wouldnt.
Id. 42:2243:5. Brian Garber also sent text messages to Sara Knowlton indicating, among other
things, that he had a gun. Connie Garber also communicated to Sara Knowlton that Brian Garber
had a gun. Sara Knowlton called 911:
Sara states, Hi, I just called about my husband and the police were here. My
husband is now up at my in-laws where my kids are and he has a gun.
The dispatcher asks, Where are you at now, where is your husband with the
gun?
Sara replies, Hes up at 3400 Mill Run. My mother-in-law took the kids in
the car and left, but my father-in-law is up there and he has a gun. (Begins
to cry)
The dispatcher gains further information and informs Sara that officers are in
the area and they are responding.
Sara states, (crying) Oh my god, okay Im going to put something in front
of this door that he broke.
The dispatcher informs Sara to stay on the line and Sara responds, Oh my
god (crying) hes crazy, I cant move this washing machine. (Panting trying
to push machine)
The dispatcher asks, Can you see the residence from the house?
Sara responds, Yes, theyre up there, um, they uh live up the hill across the
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street from us. Oh my god where did he get a gun? (crying) Okay well I cant
put anything in front of this door.
Dispatcher asks, Okay, how do you know that he has a gun?
Sara responds, He just text and said he had one, and then he went up there
and showed his parents, so my mother-in-law took our kids, put them in the
car and ran.
Dispatcher asks, How do you know he showed it to the parents?
Sara responds, My mother-in-law just came down here, knocked on the
door, and said hes got a gun and Ive got the kids.
Dispatcher states, Okay.
Sara states, Im gonna barricade this door he broke in. Im not leaving, Im
not going outside.
Sara informs the dispatcher that Connie took her kids and they all got in a car
and ran off. The dispatcher then asks, Okay, where is your mother-in-law
and kids at?
Sara states, Shes in the house right now, the kids are locked in the car, shes
going out in the car with them right now. We dont know if hes lying or
not.
Dispatcher asks, Your mother-in-law never saw the gun?
Sara responds, He said he showed it to them and now shes saying she
doesnt know if he really does. So I dont know.
Sara then informs the dispatcher that she had told Connie to take her kids
somewhere because, they dont need to see this or be here.
Sara then informs the dispatcher that she is receiving text messages from
Brian. Sara states, Hes texting me now Im going to put you on speaker so
I can know what hes saying. Oh god, those pussy cops can throw me in jail
put me in prison it doesnt matter what they do because once I am out youre
dead.
The dispatcher asks, Is he there now or who you talking to?
Sara responds, No hes texting me, Im telling you he just said. When he
gets out of jail, and believe me Im not afraid of prison, I wouldnt mind
finding some poor young victim to anally rape.
A short time later the dispatcher informs Sara that deputies are in the area and
advises her to stay in her house. Sara informs the dispatcher that she still has
something in front of the door that was kicked in by Brian earlier.
Later the dispatcher is heard in the background saying, 911 responding
inaudible-dispatch they need down at Mill Run Road ASAP shots fired.
The dispatcher informs Sara that deputies will be down to speak with her.
911 Call For Report Number 14-1097, Ohio Attorney Generals Office Bureau of Criminal
Investigation 13, Investigative Report 4/3/2014, Doc #: 32-11. Contemporaneously, at about
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8:14 p.m., Richland County dispatch radioed its deputies that Brian Garber had returned and was
in possession of a firearm.
C. The Incident
After arriving at 3400 Mill Run Road, Richland County Sergeant Nicholson, Deputy
Knee, Lieutenant Zehner, and Deputy Frazier entered the house. Lexington city officers Weaver
and Beasley also entered the house. Nicholson, Knee, and Frazier were equipped with, among
other things, firearms with magazines, pepper spray, Tasers, and handcuffs. Nicholson was the
supervisor in charge of the operation.
Matthew Garber indicated Brian Garber was on the second floor at the second door to the
left. Nicholson entered the hallway on the second story first, Knee was second, and Frazier was
third. Zehner stopped about mid-way up the stairs. At some point after when Nicholson, Knee,
and Frazier made initial contact with Brian Garber, Weaver took a position at the bottom of the
stairs, behind Zehner, and Beasley was behind Weaver.
As Nicholson, Knee, and Frazier reached the bedroom occupied by Brian Garber, Brian
Garber announced he had a gun. Brian Garber was seated in a bed and was facing, roughly, the
door. Nicholson took a position at the right of the door. Knee took a position at the left.
Nicholson ordered Brian Garber to show his hands, to which Garber said No. Nicholson
attempted to verbally de-escalate the situation.
During this exchange, Nicholson turned on the light in the bedroom. Frazier moved
between Knee and Nicholson and entered the bedroom. The deputies were roughly five or six
feet away from the bed in which Brian Garber sat. The deputies gave orders, such as directing
Brian Garber to show his hands, with which he did not comply. Nicholson indicated they could
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help Brian Garber, but Brian Garber said You cant help me. Nicholson Dep. 56:1121. While
Brian Garber appeared agitated, he did not verbally threaten the deputies. Brian Garber told the
deputies shoot me, and Nicholson responded, Thats not going to happen tonight. Were
going to get you some help. Id. 63:1922.
Nicholsons attempts to de-escalate were unsuccessful; the deputies testified that Brian
Garber refused help and said the deputies would have to shoot him. Less than a minute after
making contact with Brian Garber, the three deputies each heard a pop that sounded like a
gunshot and fired upon Brian Garber sixteen times, killing him. The individual deputies
testimony related to what he saw, heard, and did at the time of the gunshots is broken out
separately.
1. Knee
Knee testified that Frazier entered the room between himself and Nicholson and took a
position directly in front of Brian Garber. Knee Dep. 49:1625. Knee could see Brian Garbers
left hand but not his right hand, as that was concealed under his shirt.
Knee could see that Brian Garber had a very distinct rectangular-shaped impression
underneath his shirt in the center area of his chest. Id. 54:2224. He believed it looked like the
front end of the barrel of a gun. Knee did not observe the rectangular object move. Knee testified
that he was in fear he might be shot, but that he did not decide to shoot based on seeing the
rectangular object under Brian Garbers shirt. Id. 56.
Knee testified that while Frazier and Nicholson were giving Brian Garber commands, he
heard a sound:
I heard a very loud, distinctive bang go off from [Brian Garbers] area.
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Q. Okay. And what did that bang sound like to you?

A. I thought he fired a shot.
Id. 57:14. Knee, however, did not see the gun flash, the burst of fire from the end of the
barrel which all guns emit when fired. Id. 5758. Knee testified that he fired his weapon
because he heard what he thought was a gunshot coming from Brian Garber, that he was trained
to use deadly force as a last resort, and that prior to the sound of the gunshot from Brian Garber
he had not needed to use deadly force. Id. 6263.
Knee did not see Brian Garber move when he heard the sound and never saw Brian
Garbers hand come out of the shirt. Knee fired within a second of hearing the sound. Knee
believed Frazier fired before he did but was unsure when Nicholson fired.
2. Nicholson
After Nicholson and Knee took positions at opposite sides of the door, Frazier entered the
room between Nicholson and Knee, although Nicholson had not asked him to do so, and in fact
did not want him to do so. Nicholson Dep. 5455.
Nicholson saw a protrusion under Brian Garbers shirt, and described the protrusion as
being fully extended in the shirt to where it looked almost like a teepee. Id. 58:2359:6. He
perceived it to be a firearm 100 percent. It wasnt like a finger or a sharp object or a pencil. Id.
62:913. Nicholson did not feel the need to use his weapon while he was communicating with
Brian Garber and trying to de-escalate the situation.
Nicholson saw the object under Brian Garbers shirt slightly move. Nicholson heard a
pop that sounded like a gunshot. Id. 59, 6667. At the time of the pop, Nicholson saw Brian
Garber jerk the object under his shirt. Nicholson was confident the sound was a gunshot, and
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believed it was coming from the direction of Brian Garber. Nicholson did not see a flash. Once
Nicholson heard the sound he believed to be a gunshot from Brian Garber, he raised his weapon
and fired. Nicholson testified that he fired his weapon because he heard the shot from Brian
Garber. Id. 77:1022. Nicholson believed that both Frazier and Knee fired before he did but after
Brian Garber had fired.
3. Frazier
In evidence are three statements made by Frazier: an unsworn written statement dated
November 6, 2014; his November 14, 2014, grand jury testimony; and his December 16, 2015,
deposition.
Frazier said Brian Garbers left hand was between his legs holding a can, and his right
hand was holding something under his shirt. Frazier described the object as appearing to be the
front end of a Glock-style firearm, a squared front end firearm. Frazier Statement 5; accord
Frazier Test. 2122; Frazier Dep. 5151.
According to Fraziers unsworn statement, [Brian Garber] lifted his shirt up slightly with
the fingers of his left hand and with his right hand he pulled out what appeared to be a firearm
from under his shirt. As he started to extend his right and out toward me, I heard a loud popping
sound. . . . When Garber brought what I thought was a weapon from underneath his shirt and the
pop went off, I honestly thought I was going to die. Frazier Statement 67. According to his
Grand Jury Testimony, Brian Garber all at once moves his shirt up and he raises his hand and
theres a pop. . . . He was bringing his hand out of his shirt and moving it forward. Frazier Test.
2324. Frazier, however, testified that it was not possible that either he nor his fellow deputies
could have fired in response to Brian Garbers movement. Id. 27. At deposition, Fraziers version
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of the facts changed. Frazier testified that Brian Garbers hand did not come out from under his
shirt, that Brian Garber did not extend his arm, and that he did not lift his shirt and present a
firearm. Frazier Dep. 5556. Frazier also discounted some of his unsworn statements. Id. 5963.
Frazier saw Brian Garber flinch first, then heard the pop which he identified as a gunshot.
Frazier stated unequivocally that the pop he heard could not have come from his fellow deputies,
that it came from Brain Garber. Frazier Test. 2526. Frazier did not see a flash. Until he heard
the pop, Frazier did not see the need to use deadly force; the pop was the reason [he] fired [his]
weapon. Frazier Dep. 65:48.
D. After the Incident
After the shooting, Knee entered the bedroom to check Frazier, because there was
concern Frazier may have been shot. Nobody checked to see if Brian Garber had a gun. Neither
Knee, Nicholson, nor Frazier saw a dark object, remote control, or anything that could have
looked like a gun on the bed. Knee Dep. 66, 7071; Nicholson Dep. 74, 7677, 7983, 85. The
deputies did see a beer can between Brian Garbers legs. Nicholson Dep. 74; Frazier Test. 4142.
At Nicholsons direction, Knee retrieved a camera from a police car. Zehner entered the room
and took the pictures of the scene.
Several minutes after the incident, Knee, Nicholson, and Frazier went downstairs to the
kitchen and waited together for approximately one hour. There, the deputies discussed Frazier
possibly being hit and checked Fraziers shirt and vest. The deputies discussed that the object
Brian Garber had appeared to look like a Glock. They also discussed that Knee had handled
himself professionally. The deputies had been instructed not to discuss their observations with
each other, and Knee acknowledged in his deposition that the discussion about the Glock
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violated that instruction. Knee Dep. 7576. Later that night, the deputies participated together in
a critical incident debriefing counseling session, where they talked further about the incident.
No gun was ever found in the bedroom. Bureau of Criminal Investigations (BCI) agent
Cory Momchilov testified that investigators were unable to identify another source that could
have created the gunshot pop sound Knee, Nicholson, and Frazier described. Momchilov Dep.
6770, 88.
E. Investigation
Sheriff Sheldon is the highest policy-maker for the Sheriffs Office. Major Joseph Masi is
Sheldons chief deputy. Masi recommended to Sheldon that BCI handle the crime scene and
investigation. Sheldon felt an independent agency should do an investigation. Sheldon Dep. 31.
Masi conducted an administrative investigation, and Sheldon did not have hands-on involvement
with the investigation.
BCI Agent Momchilov served as lead investigator for the criminal investigation.
Momchilov investigated the scene the night (early A.M.) of the incident. At various times over
the course of the investigation, he interviewed the officers involved as well as Mathew Garber,
Connie Garber, and Sara Knowlton. Momchilovs investigation included reviewing the relevant
911 calls, radio traffic, crime scene logs, the autopsy report, and cell phone records. Momchilov
also reviewed photographs of the scene, which showed a remote control located in the bed next
to Brian Garber, but he was unaware of when the photographs were taken. At the request of the
prosecutor, the remote was tested for prints and DNA; no latent prints were suitable for
comparison and the DNA swab collected was not sufficient for inclusion regarding Brian Garber.
Momchilov Dep. 4042. Momchilov was aware that some witnesses had no recollection of
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seeing the remote control on the bed.
Momchilov prepared an investigative report and presented that report to the prosecutors.
The prosecutors presented the case to a grand jury and it was no-billed. At that point the BCI case
was closed.
Masi also conducted an internal investigation after which the Richland County Sheriffs
Offices Use of Force/Firearms Review Board ultimately concluded the use of force was
reasonable.
IV. Discussion
We all can agree that what happened on March 16, 2014, was a tragedy. The undisputed
facts are that Brian Garber, a mentally disturbed man, went out of control. After assaulting his
wife, he retreated to an upstairs bedroom in his parents home. Members of his family believed
he was armed, communicated such to the 911 dispatcher who in turn communicated it to the law
enforcement officers in the field, and when three sheriffs deputies arrived in response to the
domestic violence complaint, Brian Garber told them he had a gun. He menacingly pointed what
appeared to be a gun from under his shirt. The deputies tried to calm Brian Garber down and get
him to surrender, but he refused to raise his hands and said they would have to shoot him. While
all three deputies justifiably feared for their safety, all testified they did not see the need to use
force so long as Garber was conversing with them.
All three deputies ultimately shot Brian Garber at close range, killing him. All three
deputies testified that they shot in response to a shot they believed came from Garber. They were
adamant that the shot they heard did not come from one of their fellow officers. They were all
wrong; Garber did not have a gun, and the only shots were fired by the three sheriffs deputies.
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The question for the Court is whether the deputies and other officers are entitled to qualified
immunity. Since the question of whether the deputies made a tragic mistake or intentionally used
excessive force is ultimately one of credibility that the jury must decide, the Court denies the
three deputies motion for summary judgment. The jury must ultimately decide why three
sheriffs deputies insist upon a version of the facts which they know is not correct. As there is no
evidence that the deputies actions stemmed from an official policy, custom, or practice, the
Court grants the Countys motion.
A. Richland County Sheriffs Office
Defendants argue that the Richland County Sheriffs Office is not an entity subject to
being sued under 1983. Knowlton does not argue to the contrary, and Defendants position is
supported by case law. Barrett v. Wallace, 107 F. Supp. 2d 949, 954 (S.D. Ohio 2000)
(Plaintiffs case against Defendant Sheriffs Office must be dismissed because the Sheriffs
Office is not a proper legal entity, and, therefore, is not subject to suit or liability under 42 U.S.C.
1983.). Accordingly, Richland County Sheriffs Office is dismissed.
B. Federal Claims
Knowlton asserts claims for excessive force on the bases of individual liability and
several theories of municipal liability.
1. Individual Defendants
a. Legal Standard
Government officials, including police officers, are immune from civil liability unless,
in the course of performing their discretionary functions, they violate the plaintiffs clearly
established constitutional rights. Stated differently, a defendant enjoys qualified immunity on
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summary judgment unless the facts alleged and evidence produced, when viewed in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff, would permit a reasonable juror to find that: (1) the defendant
violated a constitutional right; and (2) the right was clearly established. Jefferson v. Lewis, 594
F.3d 454, 459 (6th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). In Saucier v. Katz, the Supreme Court held
that, in addressing the issue of qualified immunity, a court must first determine whether there is a
violation of a constitutional right before addressing the issue of whether the right was clearly
established. 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). The Supreme Court modified this approach in Pearson v.
Callahan, allowing district and circuit courts the freedom to determine which prong of the
immunity analysis to address first. 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009).
All claims that law enforcement officers have used excessive forcedeadly or not . . .
should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its reasonableness standard. We apply
the objective reasonableness standard, which depends on the facts and circumstances of each
case viewed from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene and not with 20/20
hindsight. Jefferson, 594 F.3d at 46061 (citation omitted). The reasonableness of an officers
use of deadly force depends in large part on the severity of the crime at issue and whether the
victim was armed or posed a danger to the officer or others. It is unreasonable for an officer to
seize an unarmed, non-dangerous suspect by using deadly force. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S.
1, 11, 105 S.Ct. 1694, 85 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985). [O]nly in rare instances may an officer seize a
suspect by use of deadly force. Sample v. Bailey, 409 F.3d 689, 697 (6th Cir.2005) (quoting
Whitlow v. City of Louisville, 39 Fed.Appx. 297 (6th Cir.2002)).
b. Frazier, Nicholson, and Knee in their Individual Capacities
For the purposes of this motion, it is undisputed that Frazier, Nicholson, and Knee
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believed Brian Garber to be armed when they arrived at the house and for the duration of
incident. Brian Garber was not committing a crime and was not attempting to flee. Brian Garber
did, however, claim to have a weapon and appeared to be wielding something under his shirt
when the deputies confronted him in his bed.
The essential undisputed facts and reasonable inferences are few. First, Knee, Nicholson,
and Frazier each claim to have fired in response to a gunshot pop sound. The three deputies
testimonies are highly consistent in this regard: Knee testified that he shot in response to hearing
a gunshot from Brian Garber, Nicholson testified that he shot in response to hearing a gunshot
from Brian Garber, and Frazier testified that he shot in response to hearing a gunshot from Brian
Garber. Frazier, in particular, was adamant that the shot he heard, which prompted him to fire at
Brian Garber, did not come from either Nicholson or Knee; Frazier also stated that it was not
possible that any of them could have fired in response to Brian Garbers movement.2 Frazier
Test. 27. However, Brian Garber was unarmed and was not the source of any gunshot sound. No
other source for such a sound has been identified, and it is reasonable to infer that trained and
experienced law enforcement officers would know a gunshot sound at close range when they
hear one. Fraziers grand jury testimony sums up this apparent paradox succinctly:
[Prosecutor] Mr. Meyer: There was never a gun found. Correct?

Deputy Frazier: Correct.
Mr. Meyer: So can you explain to us what that pop was?
Deputy Frazier: Thats what wed all like to know.
Frazier Test. 26.
2
While Fraziers testimony about what he may have seen is somewhat inconsistent
between his deposition and earlier statements, any inconsistency is essentially irrelevant because
Frazier, like Knee and Nicholson, claims to have fired in response to the sound of Brian Garbers
gunshot, not his hand motions.
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These facts put the Court in the unusual situation where the testimony of all three
deputies involved in the deadly shooting contradicts the objective facts of that event. See
Jefferson, 594 F.3d at 462 (Though we are hesitant to doubt Officer Lewiss testimony that he
saw a flash, the court may not simply accept what may be a self-serving account by the police
officer. It must look at the circumstantial evidence that, if believed, would tend to discredit the
police officers story.).
Because Brian Garber was unarmed and produced no pop, the Court can only conclude
that one of the deputies fired the first shot and that none of the deputies fired in response to any
gunshot sound from Brian Garber. Thus, each of the deputies is either mistaken or lying about
shooting in response to a gunshot sound from Brian Garber or otherwise. This is not a question of
law for the Court, but a question of fact and credibility for a jury to decide.
While it is of course possible that two of the deputies made an objectively reasonable
mistake in believing that the first shot came from Garber, none of them offered this explanation.3
Neither did any of them state that they fired in response to what they perceived to be a
threatening gesture or movement by Brian Garber with the object they believed to be a gun. Each
of the deputies testified that he felt threatened during the confrontation, but went on to explicitly
say that he did not feel the need to use deadly force until he heard Brian Garber shoot first and
that the sound of Brian Garbers gunshot was the cause of his returning fire. In fact, Frazier
maintained this position throughout his grand jury testimony with the knowledge that Brian
Garber was unarmed and despite the prosecutors attempts to get Frazier to offer alternative
3
Though BCI agent Momchilovs opinion does not influence the Courts conclusions, the
Court observes that Momchilov believed it possible that a gunshot from one of the deputies
precipitating the shooting. Momchilov Dep. 88:1425.
-18-
explanations for his use of his weapon.4
In Cerbelli v. City of N.Y., a district court faced a similar dilemma,
As mentioned above, Valdes insists that he shot Cerbelli when Cerbelli

lunged toward and threatened Consalvo, while Ehmer maintains that Ehmer
fired at Cerbelli only after Cerbelli charged toward him and Valdes. Because
prior to the outbreak of gunfire Cerbelli stood in the middle of the precinct
lobby, with Consalvo on one side of him and Ehmer and Valdes on the other,
Cerbelli could not reasonably have posed a threat to Consalvo, Ehmer, and
Valdes at the same time. Thus, if Valdes and Ehmer started shooting at the
same time, as Ehmer insists, Valdes could not have fired to protect Consalvo
just as Ehmer fired to protect Valdes and himself; one of their accounts
necessarily would be false.
No. 99-CV-6846 ARR RML, 2008 WL 4449634, at at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 1, 2008). Noting that
given the difficult problem posed by a suit for the use of deadly force, in which the witness most
likely to contradict [the police officers] storythe person shot deadis unable to testify[,] . . . .
the court may not simply accept what may be a self-serving account by the police officer. The
court must also consider circumstantial evidence that, if believed, would tend to discredit the
police officers story, and consider whether this evidence could convince a rational factfinder that
the officer acted unreasonably, id. at *5 (alterations in original) (internal citations omitted), the
court concluded it cannot resolve this factual dispute without a jury and consequently cannot
determine satisfactorily the reasonableness of Ehmers decision to open fire at this time.
If a jury concludes that one (or more) of the deputies made an honest mistake about
4
The issue of the deputies discussing the shooting prior to giving their statements may be
considered by a jury as part of its credibility evaluation. It is possible a jury will find that the
three deputies intentionally corroborated their stories as Knowlton hypothesizes, it is possible
that the jury will find that the deputies may have merely accidentally confused some of their
memories through discussion, and it is also entirely possible that a jury will believe that the
deputies recollections are honest and reliable, as the Defendants hypothesize. This is not a
determination for the Court to make.
-19-
hearing a pop from Brian Garbers gun, it is likely the jury will find the deputy or deputies to
have acted reasonably under the circumstances. But see Jefferson, 594 F.3d at 462 (affirming
denial of summary judgment for a police officer because of disputed facts, noting, [t]he fact that
most strongly cuts against the reasonableness of Officer Lewiss decision to return fire is that,
even accepting Officer Lewiss testimony [that he saw a flash] on its face, Officer Lewis only
saw a flash; he heard no corresponding gunshot before he returned fire.). On the other hand, if
the jury concludes that one (or more) of the deputies was dishonest about his reason for shooting,
the jury may well conclude that the deputy (or deputies) used unconstitutional excessive force.
Since the ultimate decision on qualified immunity and the constitutionality of the use of deadly
force hinges on the credibility of the officers, the jury must decide this case. See generally Sova
v. City of Mt. Pleasant, 142 F.3d 898 (6th Cir. 1998) (reversing summary judgment granted in
favor of a pair of officers where it was not possible to identify which officer(s) has shot the
victim). Accordingly, qualified immunity cannot be granted at this stage, and Count 1 for
Excessive Force may proceed against Knee, Nicholson, and Frazier.
c. Zehner and Sheldon in their Individual Capacities
The undisputed facts indicated that neither Zehner nor Sheldon shot Brian Garber, was in
the room when Brian Garber was shot, or otherwise had any direct, personal responsibility for the
shooting of Brian Garber.
i. Failure to Prevent
Plaintiffs suggest that Zehner and Sheldon may be found liable on the basis of failing to
prevent the use of force. Generally speaking, a police officer who fails to act to prevent the use
of excessive force may be held liable when (1) the officer observed or had reason to know that
-20-
excessive force would be or was being used, and (2) the officer had both the opportunity and the
means to prevent the harm from occurring. Turner v. Scott, 119 F.3d 425, 429 (6th Cir. 1997).
Clearly, Sheldon was not at the scene and thus had neither the requisite knowledge or
opportunity. With regard to Zehner, the evidence shows that he took a position on the stairs,
roughly twenty feet from the door into Brian Garbers bedroom, while the other deputies, under
the supervision of Sergeant Nicholson, were the ones who encountered Brian Garber. Zehner
testified that his attention was divided between looking down the hall toward Brian Garbers
room and down the stairs to watch for anyone approaching from behind. Zehner also testified that
he did not see Frazier enter the bedroom. Up until the moment of the shooting, the three deputies
were engaged in audible conversation with Brian Garber, which included the officers trying to
de-escalate the situation.
Thus, while Zehner plausibly may have anticipated that his officers would potentially
employ some force in dealing with an armed domestic violence suspect, there is simply no
evidence from which to infer that Zehner would have had reason to know that excessive force
would be used or that he could have done anything to prevent the shooting.
Thus, there is no basis to impute liability to Zehner or Sheldon.
ii. Supervisory Liability
Finally, Knowlton also asserts supervisory liability.
[S]imple negligence is insufficient to support liability of [supervisory

officials] for inadequate training, supervision, and control of individual
officers. A supervisory official may not be held liable under 1983 for the
misconduct of those the official supervises unless the plaintiff demonstrates
that the supervisor encouraged the specific incident of misconduct or in
some other way directly participated in it. At a minimum a plaintiff must
show that the official at least implicitly authorized, approved, or knowingly
-21-
acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct of the offending officers.

Supervisory liability under 1983 cannot be based upon a mere failure to act
but must be based upon active unconstitutional behavior.
Combs v. Wilkinson, 315 F.3d 548, 558 (6th Cir. 2002) (alterations in original) (citations
omitted).
Here, Sheldons chief deputy, Masi, completed an internal investigation which ultimately
concluded with the board finding that the shooting was lawful. Furthermore, Sheldon and Masi
referred the matter to BCI for an independent criminal investigation. Prosecutors presented the
matter to a grand jury which ultimately did not return an indictment.5 These
investigationsparticularly the immediate referral to an outside agency for criminal
investigationare not consistent with authorization or approval of potentially unconstitutional
conduct.
Accordingly, there is no basis for a jury to find individual liability for excessive force on
the part of either Zehner or Sheldon. These claims must be dismissed.
2. Municipal Entity Liability
In relevant part, Knowlton has named Richland County and Richland County Board of
Commissioners as well as Steve Sheldon, Raymond Frazier, Andrew Knee, James Nicholson,
and Donald Zehner, in their official capacities, as defendants. Official-capacity suits . . .
generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer
is an agent. As long as the government entity receives notice and an opportunity to respond, an
official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity.
5
Any concerns about the effectiveness of the BCI investigation or the prosecutors
investigation is immaterial, as neither BCI nor the prosecutor is a party.
-22-
Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985) (citations omitted). Thus, here, each of the
defendants named in his official capacity is simply another way of naming Richland County as a
defendant.
On the merits, to establish personal liability in a 1983 action, it is enough to show that
the official, acting under color of state law, caused the deprivation of a federal right. More is
required in an official-capacity action, however, for a governmental entity is liable under 1983
only when the entity itself is a moving force behind the deprivation; thus, in an official-capacity
suit the entitys policy or custom must have played a part in the violation of federal law. Id. at
166 (citations omitted). A plaintiff can make a showing of an illegal policy or custom by
demonstrating one of the following: (1) the existence of an illegal official policy or legislative
enactment; (2) that an official with final decision making authority ratified illegal actions; (3) the
existence of a policy of inadequate training or supervision; or (4) the existence of a custom of
tolerance or acquiescence of federal rights violations. A municipality may not be sued under
1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents. Burgess, 735 F.3d at 478
(citations omitted). Here, Knowlton argues for municipal liability on the basis of custom and
ratification.
There is an absence of evidence establishing an inappropriate custom. First, Richland
County Sheriffs Office does have official written policies related to the use of force and use of
deadly force. Masi Dep. Exs. at 1122, Doc #: 32-8. There is no serious argument that these
written policies are inappropriate. Second, (as discussed more in the next paragraph addressing
ratification) the evidence does not demonstrate toleration of excessive force in this case.
However, even if there were evidence of toleration of excessive force in this case, Knowlton, in
-23-
attempting to argue a custom of tolerating unconstitutional conduct, provides no other examples
of Richland Countys toleration of unconstitutional actions. This incident alone is insufficient to
demonstrate such a custom. See, e.g., Jackson v. Wilkins, 517 F. Appx 311, 322 (6th Cir. 2013)
(One example of the Citys failure to discipline, however, does not prove that the City had a
policy of failing to discipline.). There is no evidence of an unconstitutional custom that may
have caused the current incident.
Nor is there evidence of ratification. The Sixth Circuit has held that official toleration, .
. . concealment . . . [and] a complete failure to initiate and conduct any meaningful investigation,
into complaints of constitutional violations may establish municipal liability. Ragsdale v. Sidoti,
No. 5:12 CV 2484, 2015 WL 10986350, at *5 (N.D. Ohio June 5, 2015), quoting Marchese v.
Lucas, 758 F.2d 181, 18788 (6th Cir. 1985). The evidence demonstrates that Richland County
conducted an internal investigation of the shooting and that BCI conducted a separate, criminal
investigation of the shooting. While not perfect, the underlying BCI investigation particularly
appears reasonably thorough and meaningful. The Sheriffs Offices Use of Force Investigative
Team/Firearms Review Board reviewed the internal investigation and BCIs independent
investigation BCIs investigation and concluded the use of force was reasonable and no laws had
been violated. Masi Dep. Exs. at 10. Separately, the grand jury decided not to indict. First, the
Court again notes that the quality of the BCI investigation is outside the scope of the instant
lawsuit, as BCI is not named as a defendant here, and any errors or suboptimal practices in that
investigation are not the responsibility of the Sheriffs Office or County. Second, there is no
evidence that the BCI investigation was made impotent by Sheriffs Office mismanagement, as
Knowlton argues. Opp. 28, Doc #: 34-1. That Fraziers grand jury and deposition testimonies are
-24-
somewhat different on the matter of whether he saw motion or not is immaterial, as he made
clear in both testimonies that the impetus for taking his first shot was the pop sound, not the
movement. Frazier also testified to the grand jury that he had not seen that remote control laying
out there in plain sight, and that hed thought that Brian Garbers gun would have fallen to the
right. Frazier Test. 42:743:23. The investigators and grand jury would thus have been capable of
meaningfully evaluating Fraziers credibility and his claims about the facts of the case and about
how he acted. Finally, to the extent the BCIs investigation was negatively impacted by the
deputies handling of the scene prior to the BCI investigation, there is no evidence that the
Sheriffs Office was aware of any effect on BCIs investigation such that they choose to
discipline or counsel (or not) those individuals involvedan official cannot ratify if the official
is not aware.
Finally, Knowlton does mention prior disciplinary issues in Fraziers employment record.
However, in her Amended Complaint, Knowlton does not allege inadequate training or
supervision as a basis for municipal liability. Moreover, because there is no evidence that any
prior disciplinary matter rose to the level of a constitutional violation, Fraziers employment
record also fails to demonstrate custom or ratification of unconstitutional, excessive force.
In closing this discussion, it is worth returning briefly to the high standard applicable with
regard to Monell liability: that the entity itself is a moving force behind the deprivation of a
persons constitutional right. In addition to showing that the [the government entity] as an entity
caused the constitutional violation, plaintiff must also show a direct causal link between the
custom and the constitutional deprivation; that is, she must show that the particular injury was
incurred because of the execution of that policy. This requirement is necessary to avoid de facto
-25-
respondeat superior liability explicitly prohibited by Monell. Doe v. Claiborne Cty., Tenn. By &
Through Claiborne Cty. Bd. of Educ., 103 F.3d 495, 508 (6th Cir. 1996) (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted). Here, there is no evidence of an unconstitutional policy or that such
a policy might have been the moving force behind a deprivation of Brian Garbers rights.
Accordingly, all municipal liability claimsincluding those against the County, Board, and the
various official capacity Defendantsare dismissed.
C. State Law Claims
1. Individual Torts
Knowltons state law claims for assault and battery, wrongful death, survivorship, and
willful, wanton, and reckless conduct against Knee, Nicholson, and Frazier in their individual
capacities survive summary judgement.
Employees of an Ohio political subdivision are immune from suit for negligent torts.
Burgess v. Fischer, 735 F.3d 462, 479 (6th Cir. 2013). However, they are not immune from suit
for actions committed with malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner.
Id. (quoting Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 2744.03(A)(6)(b)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Malice is the willful and intentional design to do injury or the intention or desire to harm
another, usually seriously, through conduct which is unlawful or unjustified. Id. (quoting Cook
v. City of Cincinnati, 658 N.E.2d 814, 821 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995) (internal quotations omitted).
Bad faith is present when a Defendant acted with a dishonest purpose, or conscious
wrongdoing, or he breached a known duty through some ulterior motive or ill will. Id. at
47980 (quoting Cook, 658 N.E.2d at 821). Wanton misconduct is the failure to exercise any
care toward those to whom a duty of care is owed in circumstances in which there is great
-26-
probability that harm will result. Id. at 480 (quoting Anderson v. City of Massilon, 983 N.E.2d
266, 273 (Ohio 2012)) (internal quotations omitted). Finally, reckless conduct involves the
conscious disregard of or indifference to a known or obvious risk of harm . . . that is
unreasonable under the circumstances and is substantially greater than negligent conduct. Id.
(quoting Anderson, 983 N.E.2d at 273) (internal quotations omitted). When there is a material
factual dispute about whether police conduct was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, there
is also a dispute as to whether the conduct was reckless for purposes of Ohio tort immunity.
Burgess, 735 F.3d at 480 ([B]ecause we find that there is a question as to whether [the officers]
conduct was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, we also find that upon viewing the facts
in a light most favorable to Plaintiffs there is a question as to whether the conduct was reckless
under 2744.03(A)(6)(b).).
As stated above, there is a dispute of material fact as to whether the actions of Defendants
Knee, Nicholson, and Frazier were reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Therefore, there is
also a dispute of material fact as to whether the actions of those same Defendants were reckless
for the purposes of Ohio tort immunity, and the state law claims must also survive summary
judgement. However, there is no reasonable dispute about whether any other Defendants acted
with malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner. To the extent these
state law claims are asserted against other Defendants, they are dismissed on the basis of
immunity.
2. Negligent Supervision and Negligent Hiring and Retention
The Complaint asserts claims for negligent supervision against Sheldon and negligent
hiring and retention against Sheldon and the municipal Defendants.
-27-
The elements of an action for negligent hiring and retention are (1) the existence of an
employment relationship, (2) the employees incompetence, (3) the employers actual or
constructive knowledge of such incompetence, (4) the employees act or omission causing
plaintiffs injuries, and (5) the employers negligence in hiring or retaining the employee as the
proximate cause of plaintiffs injury. Linder v. Am. Natl. Ins. Co., 798 N.E.2d 1190, 1197 (Ohio
Ct. App. 2003). The elements of a negligent supervision claim are the same as those for
negligent hiring or retention. Browning v. Ohio State Hwy. Patrol, 786 N.E.2d 94, 104 (Ohio
Ct. App. 2003). For proximate cause, the conduct must be foreseeable. Id.; Staten v. Ohio
Exterminating Co., 704 N.E.2d 621, 623 (Ohio Ct. App 1997). Foreseeability is based upon
whether a reasonably prudent person would have anticipated that an injury was likely to result
from the performance or nonperformance of the act. Staten, 704 N.E.2d at 624. Conduct is
foreseeable to an employer only if it knew, or should have known, of the employees propensity
to engage in similar criminal, tortuous, or dangerous conduct. Browning, 786 N.E.2d at 103.
Here, Knowlton describes in some detail Fraziers disciplinary history, but does not
provide evidence related to Knees or Nicholsons disciplinary histories, nor does Knowlton
allege in her Opposition negligence as to any officer but Frazier. Opp. 29. Also, the evidence
only relates to Fraziers ongoing employment, not his hiring. Accordingly, the Court will only
discuss Frazier and his supervision and retention.
The available evidence from Fraziers employment history includes a handful of
disciplinary issues including several use of force complaints. The two complaints from August
and September of 2013, however, neither resulted in a conviction nor internal discipline related
to the use of force (the one resulting disciplinary action was apparently related to failing to file
-28-
proper paperwork). On the other hand, in May 2013, Frazier was suspended and referred for
psychological evaluation. As Knowlton observed, the psychologist noted Frazier has low
frustration tolerance and sometimes responds to stressors in a maladaptive manner. Fitness for
Duty Evaluation 6. After the evaluation, Frazier received discipline for Unsatisfactory Work
Performance and Failing to Maintain a Required Standard of Performance and returned to duty.
This psychological evaluation reveals three important things. First, when faced with
troubling behavior on the part of its deputy, Frazier, the department responded by suspending
him and requiring a psychological evaluation. When Frazier was returned to duty, he received an
instruction in caution. This evidence demonstrates the Sheriffs Office was actively managing
rather than neglecting potential personnel performance issues. Second, the psychologist identified
issues such as frustration tolerance and coping skills and noted Frazier was somewhat
intolerant of difference or change. Id. at 5. These issues, while likely requiring awareness and
management, are of a different nature than what transpired in Brian Garbers bedroom. There is
no evidence that suggests Frazier became frustrated with or intolerant of Brian Garber or
otherwise fired in anger. Thus, Fraziers history does not make the type of excessive force at
issue a foreseeable, likely result of continuing to employ Frazier as a deputy. Third, the
psychological examiner concluded, [Frazier] could be returned to full duty immediately. Id. at
6. Thus, while Knowlton suggests Frazier was known to be incompetent, there is no evidence to
support this. Assuming, arguendo, that Frazier was actually incompetent, the evidence does not
indicate that the Sheriffs Office had actual or constructive knowledge of such incompetence.
In sum, the available evidence demonstrates that when the Sheriffs Office believed there
might be an issue with Fraziers ability to perform his duties, it acted to manage the situation. In
-29-
doing so, the Sheriffs Office received a professional psychological evaluation clearing Frazier
for duty. There is no evidence upon which a jury could find that the Sheriffs Office acted
unreasonably in employing Frazier or that it knew, or should have known, of a likelihood to
engage in similar criminal, tortuous, or dangerous conduct. Browning, 786 N.E.2d at 103. The
evidence does not support a finding of negligence.
These counts must be dismissed.
V. Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, Motion for Summary Judgement, Doc #: 31, is
GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Count 1 for excessive force, Count 2 for assault
and battery, Count 3 for wrongful death, Count 9 for survivorship, and Count 10 for willful,
wanton, and reckless conduct may proceed against Defendants Knee, Nicholson, and Frazier in
their individual capacities only. All other claims and defendants are dismissed.
Motion to Strike, Doc #: 37, is DENIED as moot.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dan A. Polster Apr. 5, 2017

DAN AARON POLSTER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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Knowlton V Richland County Et Al - Opinion and Order Re Summary Judgment

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What claims were brought against the defendants?

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What did the psychological evaluation of Deputy Frazier reveal?

What did the psychological evaluation of Deputy Frazier reveal?

Case: 1:15-cv-00210-DAP Doc #: 39 Filed: 04/05/17 1 of 30.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SARA KNOWLTON, as Administrator ) CASE NO. 1:15-cv-00210-DAP

1. Excessive force, brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983, against all Defendants;

Am. Compl. 5990.

Report of Expert Melvin Tucker Is Inadmissible At Summary Judgment. Doc #: 37.

II. Summary Judgment Framework

Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, depositions, answers to

III. Factual Background

made, in favor of the non-moving party.

A. Medical and Behavior Backgrounds

the day of the incident at issue.

known commonly throughout the Sheriffs Office.

chair. Frazier received either an instruction in caution or an unsatisfactory work performance

punched him a few times.

Reason for Referral

Fitness for Duty Evaluation 1. The psychologist concluded,

1. Results of this Psychological Fitness for Duty Evaluation provide no

symptoms which appear to be controlled at this time.

Performance and Failing to Maintain a Required Standard of Performance. Inter-Office

Communication from Captain Bosko to Sheriff Sheldon 2.

B. Prior to the Incident

discussed the matter.

I [Connie Garber] said, you know he doesnt have a gun, He [Matthew

had a gun. Sara Knowlton called 911:

Investigation 13, Investigative Report 4/3/2014, Doc #: 32-11. Contemporaneously, at about

supervisor in charge of the operation.

stairs, behind Zehner, and Beasley was behind Weaver.

attempted to verbally de-escalate the situation.

going to get you some help. Id. 63:1922.

rectangular object under Brian Garbers shirt. Id. 56.

Q. Okay. And what did that bang sound like to you?

he had not needed to use deadly force. Id. 6263.

did not want him to do so. Nicholson Dep. 5455.

Brian Garber and trying to de-escalate the situation.

Brian Garber had fired.

Frazier Test. 2122; Frazier Dep. 5151.

weapon. Frazier Dep. 65:48.

D. After the Incident

and took the pictures of the scene.

with the investigation.

seeing the remote control on the bed.

force so long as Garber was conversing with them.

Court grants the Countys motion.

A. Richland County Sheriffs Office

1983.). Accordingly, Richland County Sheriffs Office is dismissed.

several theories of municipal liability.

established constitutional rights. Stated differently, a defendant enjoys qualified immunity on

immunity analysis to address first. 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009).

Whitlow v. City of Louisville, 39 Fed.Appx. 297 (6th Cir.2002)).

b. Frazier, Nicholson, and Knee in their Individual Capacities

when the deputies confronted him in his bed.

[Prosecutor] Mr. Meyer: There was never a gun found. Correct?

Frazier Test. 26.