1963

VICTORIA

REPORT
OF

ROYAL COMMISSION
INTO THE

FAILURE OF KINGS BRIDGE

PRESENTED TO BOTH HOUSES OF PARLIAMENT BY HIS EXCELLENCY'S COMMAND

By Authority:
A. C. BROOKS, GOVERNMENT PRINTER, MELBOURNE.
No. 1.-6352/63
 ROYAL COMMISSION OF ENQUIRY
INTO THE FAILURE OF KINGS BRIDGE
Report of the Hoyal Commission to His Excellency. Major-General Sir Rohan
Delacombe, Knight of the British Empire, Companion of the Bath, Companion of the
Distinguished Service Order, Governor of the State of Victoria and its dependencies in the
Corrunonwealth of Australia.

YouR ExcELLENCY,
In pursuance and execution of Letters Patent dated the Twenty-eighth day of August,
1!)62 under the Seal of the State of Victoria, whereby His Excellency, the Honourable
Lieutenant-General Sir Edmund Francis Herring, K.C.M.G., K.B.E., D.S.O., M.C., E.D.,
Lieutenant-Governor of the State of Victoria issued to us
His Honour Edward Hamilton Esler Barber, a Judge of the County Court;
Dr. James Adam Louis Matheson, M.B.E., M.Sc., Ph.D., M.I.E.Aust., Vice-
Chancellor o(the Monash University;
and
Professor John Neill Greenwood, D.Sc., M.Met.E., Dean of the Faculty of
Applied Science of the University of Melbourne ;
a Commission authorizing and appointing us to enquire into and report to Your Excellency
upon the following matters, namely, the cause or causes of the failure of the bridge known
as Kings Bridge, constructed pursuant to the King-street Bridge Act 1957 and in addition
and without derogating from the generality of the foregoing, the following matters:-
(I.) The terms, conditions, specifications and drawings in accordance with which
tenders for design and construction of the bridge were invited by the
Country Roads Board, and whether the same were adequate and reasonable
for the purpose ;
(II.) The tenders received, the action taken to investigate the same, the
circumstances surrounding the acceptance of the tender submitted by
Utah Australia Limited, and whether the acceptance thereof was
reasonable and proper and justified in the circumstances;
(III.) The design submitted and adopted for the bridge, and whether the same
was adequate and suitable or was in any and what respects defective or
inappropriate or deficient;
(IV.) The materials and processes and workmanship used in the construction
and erection of the bridge, the standard and suitability thereof for the
purposes for which they were used, whether they were in accordance with
the eontract specifieations and whether they were in any and what
respects defective or inadequate ;
(V.) The nature, extent and standard of supervision exercised over the
construction and erection of the bridge, and whether the same was
reasonable and adequate or was in any and what respects inadequate
or defective ;
(VI.) "Whether any and what negligent, culpable or improper aet or omission
directly or indireetly caused or contributed to the failure of the bridge,
and if so the party or parties responsible therefor ;
(VII.) \Vhether the construction and erection of the bridge in accordance with
the tender submitted by Utah Australia Limited was reasonable having
regard to the kno,vn state of engineering and scientific knowledge and
experience subsisting at the time the tender was accepted;
and His Excellency directed and appointed that His Honour, Judge Edward Hamilton Esler
Barber should be Chairman of the said Commission.
 We, the undersigned, Chairman and Members of the Commission having duly
enquired into the several matters aforesaid, now have the honour to report to Your
Excellency as follows :-

1. PUBLICATION OF NOTIFICATION OF SITTINGS OF THE COMMISSION.

Pursuant to our direction Notices of the date of Sitting of the Commission were
published in the "Herald" newspaper on the 1st day of September and in the "Age"
and "Sun" newspapers on the 2nd day of September, 1962.

2. SITTINGS OF THE COMMISSION.

The Commission held a Preliminary Hearing on the 6th September, 1962 and
thereafter between the 1st October, 1962 and the 28th March, 1963 sittings upon 71 days. The
Commission heard evidence vi>va voce of forty-five witnesses, a list of whom is contained
in Appendix 1 of this Repor1;. Two hundred and thirty-seven exhibits were received
in evidence (Appendix 2).

The persons who gave evidence before the Commission did so on Oath and were
subject to examination and cross-examination by Counsel. The evidence given was reported
verbatim and embodied in a transcript of evidence which is respectfully presented with
this Report.

3. REPRESENTATION OF PARTIES BY COUNSEL.

Mr. S. T. FROST, Q.C. with Mr. G. JUST appeared to assist the Commission.

The following Counsel were granted leave to appear :-

Mr. J. STARKE, Q.O., "ith Mr. S. E. K. HuLME and Mr. S. P. CHARLES,
instructed by Malleson Stewart and Co., on behalf of Utah Australia Ltd.
Mr. B. L. MuRRAY, Q.C., with Mr. X. CoN~OR, Q.C., and Mr. J. WIN~EKE,
instructed by the Crown Solicitor, on behalf of the Country Roads Board.
Mr. 0. J. Gn.,LARD, Q.C. and Mr. D. DAwsoN, instructed by ~Weigall and
Crowther, on behalf of King-street Bridge Design Ltd. (Mr. Gillard
withdrew on the third day of October, 1962).
Mr. N. E. BuRBANK, Q.C. with Mr. H. BALL and Mr. G. S. H. BucKNER,
instructed by Hussell Kennedy and Cook, on behalf of Johns and Waygood
Ltd.
Mr. N. E. BURBANK, Q.C. with Mr. H. BALL, instructed by Russell, Kennedy
and Cook, on behalf of Murex Australasia Ltd.
Mr. J. McL You~G, Q.C. with Mr. N. M. STEPHEN, instructed by D. J. Nairn
on behalf of Broken Hill Proprietary Company Ltd. and Australian Iron
and Steel Pty.. Ltd.
Mr. L. VouMARD, Q.C. with Mr. W. FAZIO, instructed by the Commonwealth
Crown Solicitor for the Commonwealth of Australia.
 CONTENTS
PART 1. -INTRODUCTION.

1 . l. Introductory Narrative
1 .1.1. Brief history of project
I .1 . 2. The parties
1.1. 3. Description of the bridge structure
1. 2. Collapse of bridge on lOth July, l!ltl2
1.3. Immediate cam;e of collapse

PART 2. ~THE CONSTRUCTION.

2. 1. Nature of the Contract
2 . 2. The Tenders
2 . 2 .1. The tenders received
2 . 2 . 2. The tender accepted

2. 3. Setting up the Organization

2 . 3 .1. Arra1~gemen ts for design
2 .3.2. Utah contract with J. & W.
2. 3. 3. Approval of J. & W. as sub-contractor
2. 3 3 .1. Appointment of Scarlett to act on behalf of Utah
2.3.4. J. & W. contract with B.H.P.
2. 3 .4 .1. Failure to order steel to the specification
2. 3.4. 2. Responsibility of Utah for J. & W. order
2.3.4.3. Responsibility of C.R.B.
2. 3. 5. C.R.B. organization to control the contract

2 .4. Competence and Experience of the Parties to Undertake the Project

2. 4 .1. Relationship between the partiel'l
2.4.2. :\ir. T. J. Ferris
2.4.3. C.R.B.
2.'1 .4. Utah
2 . 4. 5. K.S.B.D. Ltd.
2.4.6. J. & w.
2.4.7. B.H.P.
2 .4. 8. Murex
2. 4. 9. Conclusion on t}Ie competence and experience of the parties

2. 5. The Specifications
2. 5 .1. General description
2. 5. 2. 'l'he design specification
2.5.3. High-ten~:~ile steel
2.5.4. Welding
2. 5. 5. General comments on the specifications

2.6. Design
2. 6 .1. General suitability
2. 6. 2. Design of the tension flanges of the girders
2. 6. 2 .I. Residual stresses resulting from previous welds
2. 6. 2. 2. Residual stresses resulting from the completion of a single weld
2. 6. 2. 3. Stresses at the ends of the cover caused mainly by superimposed loads on
the bridge
2. 6. 2 .4. Intensification of stresses by the ,;hape of the weld
2. 6. 2. 5. Tri-axial stresses
2. 6. 2. 6. Connection between the dangers of fatigue and of brittle fracture
2. 6. 2. 7. Consideration of residual stresses by designers
2. 6. 2. 8. Shape of the cover plate ends
2. 6. 3. The responsibility of the designer for specifying welding detailH

2. 7. Steel
2. 7 .1. The steel specified
2. 7 .1 .1. The justification for including B.S. 968 : 1H41
2. 7 .I. 2. Reasons for modifying B.S. 968 : 1941
2. 7. 2. The steel actually supplied
2. 7. 2 .1. Did the steel ompplied by B. H. P. meet the B.S. H68 : 1941 specification 1
2. 7. 2. 2. Submitted heats
2. 7. 2 .3. Did the steel meet the C.R.B. specifications ?
2. 7. 3. The steel as found in the failed ~irderr;

2. 8. Electrodes
 CONTENTS-continued.

2. 9. Welding
2. 9. 1. The characteristics of a weld
2. \:l. 2. Influence of compositiou athl rate of cooling on the heat affected zone
2. H. 3. The coneept of thermal ;;everity
2. H.4. Standard recommendations for welding B.S. 968: 1941
2. 9. 5. Non-destructi \'C examination of welds
2.9.5.1. The penei,rant dye method
2. 9. 5. 2. The magnetic powder method
2. 9. 5. 3. Radiation examination
2. H.5 .4. Ultrasonic wave method
2. 9. 5. 5. Use of non-dest,ructi ve testing m the girder fabrication
2.9.6. Welding on the Kings Bridge project
2. 9. 6 .1. Weld sequence
2. 9. 6. 2. \Yeld defects in fabrication
2.9.6.3. Survey of cracks at cover plate ends
2. 9. 6. 4. Association of cover plate end cracking with heats of steel
2. 9. 6 .5. Association of cover plate end cracking with date of fabrication
2. 9. 6. 6. Association of cover plate end cracking with sequence
2.9.6.7. Cracks which have developed beyond the toe crack
2. \:l. 6. 8. Other cracks in the bridge
2. 9. 7. of views relating to welding

2 .10. The Fabrication of the Girders

2.10 .1. Preparation and check:mg of design and shop drawings
2.10.2. Ordering the steel
2.10.3. The supply of steel
2 .10. 3 .1. Matters of general policy
2 . 10. 3 2. Steel plant pdicy and practice
2 .10 .4. Inspection of the steel
2.10.5. Fabrication and welding procedures
2.10. 6. Inspection of the welding and fabrication

PART 3. -THE COLLAPSE OF THE W.14 SPAN OF THE BRIDGE.

3 .1. Characteristics of the failed gird;)f W.l4/2
3.2. The condition of the W.14. Rpan just prior to the eollap~e
3. 3. What is to be learned from the fractures ?
3. 3 .1. The significance of the toe crackR at the transverse weldR
3.3.2. The cause of the primary or partial brittle fractures
3.3.3. The presence of paint ir1 the fractures
3.4. The chemical composition and physical properties of the Kteel in the W.14 girders
3 A .I. The chemical composition
3. 4. 2. The presence of trace elements in the steel
3.4.3. Notch ductility of the steel
3. 4. 4. Strain ageing tests
3 .5. Summary of the metallurgical causes of failure

PAR'I' 4.~SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS.

4 .1. General observations
4. 2. pursuant to terms of reference
4 . 3. Condition of the superstructure

APPENDICES.
1. Alphabetical List of Witnesses
2. List of Exhibits
3. Relevant Extract from Report of Committee of
4. Extracts from Paper " How to Uee High Tensile Steel Effectively " by A. L. Elliott
5. Results of Tests on Samples from \V.l4 Girders, Extracted from D.S.L. Report, Exhibit 194
6. Photographs, Plans, Graphs, &c.

There are frequent references throughout the Report to rlauses 1Jf the C.R.B. specification and to
sections of the Report it~elf. To di:[Preutiate between the two sets of references the following scheme has
been followed :-
References to the C.R.B. specification are in the form
Clause x-y-z. e.g. 2-3-16.
References to the Report are in the form : -
Section x.y.z. e.g 2.3.[..
 7

In the course of this Report it has been necessary to mention with great
frequency a number of corporate bodies and individuals. In order to save space and avoid
tedious repetition we have referred to such corporations using their full name where first
mentioned, and thereafter have used initials or short form of the name.

The abbreviations used for corporate bodies are as follows:-

Australian Iron and Steel Pty. Ltd. A.I.S.
Broken Hill Proprietary Company Ltd. B.H.P.
Country Roads Board C.R.B.
Defence Standards Laboratories D.S.L.
Engineering Testing and Research Services Pty. Ltd. E.T.R.S.
Johns and Waygood Ltd. J. & w.
King Street Bridge Design Ltd. K.S.B.D.
Murex (A/asia) Pty. Ltd. Murex
Utah Australia Ltd. Utah

The following is a list of individuals who are frequently mentioned throughout this
Report. As this list sets out the initials and other relevant information, we have in general
used surnames only in the body of the Report.
BoNWICK, J. E. B.C.E., Office Engineer for Utah on the Project 1937-1958; Project
Engineer for Utah on Kings Bridge Project 1958-1960.
BuTLER, L. T. B.A. (Eng.) (Oxon.), B.Sc. (Eng.), C.E., M.I.E. Aust., C.R.B. Supervising
Engineer for King-street Bridge throughout the Project.
CAMPBELL, R. Welding inspector employed by J. & W., concerned with supervision and
inspection of welding on Project.
CLARKE, N. V. Resident Inspector for C.R.B. at J. & W.'s shop on Project from early 1959.
DARWI~, D. V. M.M., M.C.E., M.I.E. Aust., Chairman of C.R.B., 1949-1962.
EASTICK, R. F. M.B.E., C.E., A.M.I.E. Aust., Senior Constructional Engineer (Bridges) of
C.R.B. throughout the Project.
FARRAR, w. C. B.C.E., A.M.I.E. Aust., an Executive Director and the Manager of the
Structural Department of .T. & W. throughout the Project.
FERRIS, I. J. B.Met.E., A.R.A.C.I. Principal Scientific Officer, Defence Standards
Laboratories
FINK, G. w. Project Manager for Utah on the Project from August, 1957, until February,
1961.
FRANCIS, PROFESSOR A. J. l\f.Sc. (Birm.), Ph.D. (Birm.), M.I.C.E., M.I.Struct.E., Head ofthe Department
of Civil Engineering, University of Melbourne.
HARDCASTLE, B. T. A. B.C.E., A.M.I.E. Aust., Managing Director of K.S.B.D. since 1957.
HuDsoN, R. F. B.Met.E., Manager and Metallurgist for E.T.R.S. since 1957.
HYLAND, SIR HERBERT Member of Legislative Assembly, Victoria and the Leader State Parliamentary
Country Party.
JACKSON, F. 0 0 A.M.I.E. Aust., C.R.B. Assistant Engineer on the Project.
LoNGo, L. N. A Utah executive in charge of the preparation of tenders for the Project.
MASTERTON, C. A. M.C.E., A.M.I.E. Aust. During the Project was in turn C.R.B. Assistant
Engineer for Bridges and Engineer for Bridges.
MATHIESON, J. M.C.E., M.I.E. Aust., C.R.B. Chief Engineer throughout the Project.
MILLER, V. 0 0 A Utah civil engineer engaged on design aspects of the Project.
RALSTON, 0. B. Service Officer of B.H.P. attached to its Melbourne office throughout the
Project.
REEDY, L. Chief Engineer of Caterpillar of Australasia Pty. Ltd. 1959-1963.
RoDERICK, PRoFESSoR J. W. M.A., Ph.D., M.I.C.E., M.I.E. Aust., F.A.A., Head of the Department of
Civil Engineering, University of Sydney.
ScARLETT, K. F. A. An executive of .T. & W. engaged on the Project, 1958-1960.
STOCKER, w. R. B.Sc. (Engineering) (Glasgow), M.I.M.E. London, Assistant to the Managing
Director of .T. & W. since 1949.
THOMPSON, J. W. Executive Officer, Administration, at Port Kembla Steelworks of A.I.S.
WARD, F. A. Now Assistant Australasian Sales Manager of Murex. Was in turn the
Senior Technical Representative and the Assistant Branch Manager of
Murex during the Project.
WILSON, C. A. B.C.E., A.M.I.E. Aust., Senior Design Engineer in the Bridge Division of
C.R.B. since 1950.
 8

PART 1.-INTRODUCTION.
1.1. Introductory NarrativE~.
1.1.1. Brief history of the project.
In November, 1954, the Parliamentary Public Works Committee recommended the
construction of a fixed bridge to cross the Yarra River at King-street and referred the
proposal to the Country Ro:tds Board for investigation and report.

In 1955, the C.R.B. recommended that the crossing should form part of a route with
freeway conditions for traffic bound for the centre of the City of Melbourne and originating
south of the Hanna-street-City-road intersection in South Melbourne. In April, 1956,
the Public Works Committee adopted the Board's proposal and made a further
recommendation for a structure generally on the lines of that ultimately erected. The
C.R.B. was recommended as the constructing authority with power to call tenders on a
world -wide basis.

During 1955 and 1956 the C.R.B. surveyed the site, investigated the foundation
conditions and prepared an outline scheme for the project which was to comprise two
low-level crossings of the Yarra River ; a high-level crossing continuing as an elevated
roadway for approximately one-third of a mile to the south; and an overpass to carry
Flinders-street traffic over King-street close to the northern ends of the river crossings.

The C.R.B. decided to invite tenders for the design and the construction of the
structures and, to this end, prepared an outline drawing showing the grades, clearances and
other limiting conditions within which the contractor was required to work. A specification
was prepared which laid down in some detail the design requirements (loading, permissible
working stresses, &c.) and also the standards required in materials and workmanship. In
particular the contractor was permitted to offer a superstructure in reinforced concrete,
pre-stressed concrete, mild steel, high-tensile steel or light alloy.

In September, 1956, tenders closing on the 29th January, 1957 were invited in
Australia, United Kingdom and U.S.A. Tenders were received from seven tenderers who
between them submitted fourteen different designs. After a full investigation of these
tenders, the C.R.B. decided to recommend acceptance of the tender from Utah Australia
Ltd. for the sum of 2,374,3130 16s., and on the 27th May, 1957, formal advice to this
effect was sent to the Minister--and was accepted by Cabinet. On 13th August, 1957, the
contract between Utah and the C.R.B. was executed.

Work on the bridge commenced on the 19th September, 1957. On the 18th December,
1957, the King-street Bridge Act was passed~appointing the C.R.B. as constructing
authority, conferring the necessary powers on the Board to construct the bridge for the
Government of Victoria, and validating such steps as had already been taken by the Board.

The work of construction was completed in various stages, the high-level bridge and
elevated roadway being opened to traffic on 12th April, 1961.

Pursuant to the King-street Bridge Act, certificates of completion were published

in the Government Gazette as to each stage, the final certificate being published on the 18th
October, 1961. Upon publication, each part of the structure became a metropolitan
bridge or highway, and the Melbourne and Metropolitan Board of Works became the
maintenance authority for the bridge and roadway.

1.1.2. The parties.

The design which formed the basis of Utah's tender had been prepared by King-street
Bridge Design Limited, a company formed by a number of engineers specifically for the
purpose of creating a design for this bridge. Utah Australia Limited having signed the
contract with the C.R.B. for the construction of the bridge, engaged a sub-contractor~
Johns & Waygood Limited for the fabrication, erection and painting of the steel work for
the superstructure. J. & W. in turn ordered the necessary steel from Broken Hill Proprietary
Company Limited. The electrodes used for welding were supplied by Murex (Australasia)
Proprietary Limited.
 9

1.1.3. Description of the bridge structure.

As authorized by the King-street Bridge Act, and as finally erected, the whole Kings
Bridge structure comprises the Flinders-street overpass, the low-level bridges and the
high-level bridge and roadway mentioned above. The latter crosses the Port 'Melbourne
Railway and the St. Kilda Railway, \Vniteman-street, Queen's Bridge-street and City-road
and runs into Hanna-street near Grant-street, South 'Melbourne.

The matters concerned in this Enquiry, however, relate to the high-level bridge
roadway only, and the expression "the bridge" as used hereafter may be taken to refer
only to this portion of the above structure.

The bridge consists of two parallel structures forming eastern and western carriage-
ways. Each structure is constructed with four lines of main girders, supported by piers, and
with a reinforced concrete deck. In most spans the design was for four suspended girders
carried by cantilever girders, extending from supporting piers. Every girder consisted of
two flange plates, welded to a web plate and strengthened at intervals by vertical steel
stiffeners. It was necessary for the designers to overcome the problem arising from the
fact that the bending moments sustained by the suspended girders are at a maximum at
mid-span. One possible solution would have been to have used tension (lower) flanges vary-
ing in thickness so that the thickest portion was in the centre of the girder's length. The
alternative design, which was actually chosen, was to attach a cover plate on to the bottom
of the lower flange of the suspended girder terminating some 16 feet from each end of the
girder. The cover plates were tapered at each end from their maximum width to a square
end detail 3 inches wide. The cover plates were completely welded to the flange by fillet
welds running the entire length of each side of the cover plates, continuing along the side of
the taper and terminating in a transverse weld across the 3-in. end of the cover plate.

All steel in the structure relevant to the present Enquiry had been fabricated by
J. & W. from a high-tensile steel supplied by B.H.P. to B.S.968 : 1941. It is to be noted,
however, that the C.R.B. specifications required high-tensile steel, if used, to satisfy some of
the clauses of B.S.968 : 1941 and certain additional clauses notably one relating to the impact
strength of the steel.

1.2. Collapse of the Bridge on the lOth July, 1962.

On the lOth July, 1962, shortly after 11 a.m. a low loader and trailer weighing unloaded
about 17 tons-carrying a load of approximately 28 tons, drove on to the western carriage-
way of the bridge from the South Melbourne side. \Vhen it reached a span, W.14,
close to the southern end of the western -half section of the bridge, that span suddenly
collapsed-sagging a distance of approximately 1 foot, being kept from further subsidence
by the concrete deck and the vertical concrete wall slabs which enclosed the space under
the bridge. The girders which collapsed were designated W.l~1, 2, 3 and 4. Subsequent
examination disclosed that all four of the suspended girders at this point, which were
approximately 100 feet in length, had fractures approximately 16 feet from the southern
end. Three of them had fractures at a similar position 16 feet from the northern end.

The bridge was closed to traffic and very shortly after the lOth July, a Committee of
Investigation was set up to enquire into and report upon the causes of failure and measures
to be taken for the repair of the bridge. A copy of the portions of this Committee's report
relevant to this Enquiry appears in Appendix 3.

1.3. Immediate Cause of Collapse.

Upon examination by the expert Committee, subsequently eonfirmed by our own
observations, it was found that fractures had occurred at the south end of all four girders
W.l~1, 2, 3 and 4 and at the north end of girders \V.14-2, 3 and 4-there being no fracture
at the north end of girder W.l~l. The fractures were all at points approximately 16
feet from the end of the girders and were all found to start from the welds at the ends of the
cover plate. In every ease fracture had initiated at the toe of the transverse weld at the end
detail of the cover plate and extended completely through the lower flange up the web,
and in some cases through the upper flange.
 10
All fractures were typical of failure by "brittle fracture" originating from toe cracks
in the parent metal of the flanges at the transverse fillet welds. As will appear from the
later detailed examination of these fractures, they all exhibited signs which established
beyond doubt that the ultimate dramatic collapse was but the last stage in a "cascade"
pattern of fractures-which had taken many months to reaeh the point where final collapse
occurred.
The evidence establishes that the ends of these cover plates >vere an manually >velded
as the last operation in the fabrication of the girder, after the flanges had been welded to
the web and the cover plate to the lower flange.
The complex process which led to the coJlapse of the W.l4 girders is divisible into
four distinct stages :-
1. In at least seven of the eight transverse welds at the end of the cover plates,
toe cracks oceurred immediately after welding the end detail-each crack
starting in the heat affected zone of the second weld bead and continuing
into the parent metal of the lower flanges. These cracks, therefore, were
running transverse to the length of the flange, at a position of stress
concentration associated with the sudden change of thickness.
2. Very soon after welding--and before painting~ some of the toe cracks extended
by brittle fra(;ture through the lower flange and in some cases into the
web plate. The positions so affected were \V.14-1(S), W.14-2(N),
W.14-2(S), W.14--3(S) and w.14-4(S).
3. At some time after the final coat of paint had been applied in January, 1961
two of the primary brittle fractures propagated up the web plates. In
girder "\V.14-2 at the south end the fracture continued 44 inches up the web
and completely severed the bottom flange at this point. This girder,
therefore, carried no part of the dead load or traffic load.
4. By the time the low loader was driven across the span on lOth July, the cracks
in girders 2 and 3 were so extensive as to render these girders incapable
of bearing any of the load of traffic and consequently the passage of the
heavy vehicle caused a final failure in all seven fracture sites through
the entire web plate and bottom flange plates in each position and
through the upper flange plates of W.14-1, 2 and 3 at the South end.
It is considered that stages 1 and 2 were the critical stages---and that once these
had eventuated, stages 3 and 4, were inevitable. Although a good deal heavier than the
average user of the bridge, the low loader was well within the load limits which the bridge
was designed to take without danger.
When the low loader arrived two of the four girders were virtually useless, and the
other two seriously weakened--sooner or later a load of sufficient magnitude to fracture
the span must have been imposed. The collapse could well have oecurred at a time of peak
traffic and have resulted in a serious injury and loss of life.
When a bridge fails, one immediately thinks of the possibility of subsidence or other
failure of the foundations. It should, however, be stated at once that no scintilla of evidence
came before us which would raise any doubt as to the soundness of the foundations or that
the difficult problems confronting the contractor as to the foundations were quite
satisfactorily solved.
Perhaps the main releYance of the existence of difficult conditions for sound
foundations, is that we are left with a suspicion that a pre-occupation with these problems
led to some lack of concentration on other problems associated "\\''.ith the superstructure.
Although the immediate cause of the failure of the W.14 spans was fairly readily
ascertainable the reasons for the girders having reached such a dangerous condition, and
without discovery by inspection, were found to be highly complex and such as to necessitate
an investigation going back to the genesis of the Kings Bridge project.
It was found necessary not only to examine in some detail, such matters as the relevant
sections of the bridge design, the quality of materials and the standard of workmanship,
supervision and inspection, but in order to fix the relative responsibilities of the various
parties engaged in the construetion of the bridge, enquiry had to be made into a number
of issues arising out of the relationships of the personnel representing the constructing
authority, the contractors and the several sub-contractors involved.
 11

PART 2.-THE CONSTRUCTION.

2.1. Nature of the Contract.
Before inviting tenders on a world-wide basis, officers of the O.R.B. gave careful
consideration to the most suitable t:y-pe of contract. They inve;;;tigated three possible ways
of handling the undertaking, which were:-
(a) The Board's own staff might have prepared a detailed design and bill of
quantities and called for tenders thereon.
(b) The Board might have employed a firm of consulting engineers to carry
out the detailed design for the purpose of calling for tenders.
(c) Tenders might have been invited on a ''design and construet" basis, with
the Board supplying its data of investigation and limiting outline
dimensions of the structures, together with specifications both for the
design and for construction.

The reasons which influenced the Board in decision to choose the third method
are set out in detail in a paper by Darwin included in a collection of papers entitled " Kings
Bridge", published by the Institution of Engineers Australia, (Exhibit 22), and were
further discussed in his evidence.

The first method was rejected because it was said to entail a year longer for preparing
plans and specifications, the second because it similarly involved loss of time, and also
that there were no local experienced bridge design staffs of the necessary numbers outside
the Board's own staff.

This latter objection is a curious one, as the design ultimately accepted waR produced
by local designers, a number of whom had combined for the purpose.

The contract as finally executed between the Board and Utah was not in the sense in
which that description is usually understood, a "design and construct" contract, although
it was so described and referred to throughout the Enquiry. Usually the constructing
authority sets out the nature and extent of the required structure in wide general terms, and
leaves it to the contractor to create a detailed design. Doubtless, because of the desire
to have competitive tenders for construction as well as for design the Board found it
necessary to prepare quite detailed design and specifications. A " design and construct .,
contract as usually understood is very suitable in eases where it is desired to employ the
special expertise of some particmlar contractor, as for example where the contractor has some
patented method of construction unobtainable elsewhere. On the other hand, when used
in conjunction with competitive tendering, the true " design and constmct " form is
inappropriate, and must be modified, as in this case, to the extent where its advantages
may be lost.

Darwin advanced four main arguments in support of the form of contract adopted-
L That this system attracted the ideas of different designers.
2. That "with the contractor basically responsible for his own design
there should he especially good harmony in supervision ".
3. That a " similar procedure had been very successfully followed in the
invitation of tenders for Sydney Harbour Bridge ".
4. That if an overseas firm secured the contract some of the design work would
be done overseas thus " affording relief to hard-pressed local offices ".

None of these reasons, when examined, is really compelling. The first is tme only
up to a point. As a result of the Board's plans and specifications being drawn in considerable
detail, the field in which the tenderers were able to exercise their ideas of design was
comparatively lin1ited. To give one example, from many others, the specifications were
so drawn as to limit the thickness of flanges in welded constmctions to 1 inch, a factor
which proved restricting to designers. The second argm:nent has a theoretical attractiveness,
but in practice the hoped-for harmony soon gave way to discord.
 12
As to the third argument, while the builders of the Sydney Harbour Bridge achieved
a notably satisfactory result, this may well have been rather in spite of than because of the
form of contract adopted, which was the suhjeet of serious criticism by eminent members
of the engineering profession (See Minutes of Proceedings of the Institution of Civil
Engineers, Volume 238, 1935).

The fourth argument again exhibits a pre-occupation \Vith the time element and the
supposed inadequacy of local design staff.

In practice the form of contract adopted proved to be most unsatisfactory.

The most serious disadvantage was undoubtedly the absence of a design engineer
responsible not only for mattem of design in the first place but for general supervision and
control of the various aspects of the work in progress. Had a consulting engineer been
employed directly by the C.R.B. in the first instance to design the bridge and act in a
supervisory capacity he would have been responsible directly to the C.R.B. and would
have exercised supervisory functions for it,. 'fhis is in marked contrast to the position under
the system adopted, as the designers were responsible only to the main contractor and not
to the Board. Moreover, they could not be called upon to supervise the sub-contractors for
the Board. The contract ber;ween Utah and K.S.B.D. specifically provided that the
designers would be available for consultation hut would not be required to undertake any
job supervision. (Exhibit 39, Cl. 4 (e) ). In the result there was a complete separation
of the fTmctions of design and supervision.

This situation is well illustrated by the evidence of Hardeastle, one of the designers,
to the effect that had he become aware that .T. & W. was encountering a great, deal of
" cracking " during welding, he would have reconsidered the design, with a view to
eliminating any features which might have given rise to undesirable stresses. Under the
system adopted, the designers had no right to such information and no corresponding duty
to undertake any revision of design.

It is very difficult to determine how much of the breakdown in organization

occurring during t,he construction is traceable to the form of the contract and how much
to the attitude of the various parties to it.

There existed a very noticeable gap between the constructing authority and the
sub-contractors. This gap might have been filled to some degree by the main contractor,
Utah, had the responsible offtcers of that company seen fit to undertake some aetive
participation in the work of supervision and inspection, or had tney felt it desirable to have
arranged conferences between the various parties including K.S.B.D. to resolve difficulties
as necessity arose, from time to time. It is fair to say that a]] of the parties relied on their
legal contractual rights and so meticulously avoided stepping outside their proper contractual
sphere, that a grave lack of liaison and eo-operation between them resulted. To a
considerable extent, this may be blamed on the parties themselves, but we feel that the
disastrous effect of it, would have been at least mitigated had the C.R.B. used a form of
contract which provided for a consulting engineer responsible for over-all supervision and
control.

It is true that witnesses from all part,ies when asked for their views on the suitability
or otherwise of the form of contract adopted, were in accord that it was a good arrangement,
which worked well. However, an over-all consideration of the evidence compels us to an
opposite conclusion.

It is our considered opinion that the C.R.B., while doubtless acting with the best
intentions, made what turned out to be a crucial error of judgment in deciding upon the
form of contract, which shaped the pattern of contractual relationships between the parties
and failed to provide the necessary over-all supervision. These factors contributed to the
troubles and difficulties encountered during construction and may have had a direct bearing
on the failure of the bridge.
 18
2.2. The Tenders.
2.2 .1. The tenders received.
On the due date for the lodging of tenders, the 29th of January, 1957 the C.H.B.
received fourteen tenders and one offer (not a legal tender) from seven different companies.

It was quite apparent that the Board and the Government expected that from the
wide area in which the invitations to tender we1e published, there would be available a
very large number of tenderers, some of whom would be corporations of world reputation
in bridge building. Doubtless, there was disappointment that no tenderer which could
fairly be classed as of top-rank bridge-building reputation saw fit to seek the contract for
this important structure. Nevertheless, the actual number of tenderers was reasonable,
and amongst them were a number of companies of solid reputation and wide experience,
including Utah, whose reputation in general construction work stood very high.

The specifications (Clause 1~1-10) stated that the Board's officers in assessing these
various tenders, would take into consideration the following factors :--
(a) Total cost;
(b) Time to complete contract;
(c) Adequacy of design;
(d) Appearance ;
(e) Ease and cost of maintenance;
(f) The ability of tenderer to finance the contract.

Tenderers were required to submit particulars showing their competence, personnel

to be engaged upon the project, and a time schedule for various stages of design and
construction.

In a letter to the Premier dated 12th March, 1957 (Ex. 10) Sir Herbert Hyland suggested
that " two good outside consultants should be employed to sit in with C.RB. officers when
they were considering the tenders". This suggestion was rejected, on the Board's advice
that such assistance was unnecessary, and the matter was pmsued no further. At this
date it is impossible to say what effect, if any, the assistance of such consultants \vould have
had, or even if there were available locally at the time any suitable persons not already
associated with one or other of the tenderers. The Board's reluctance to accept such outside
assistance is understandable. All that can be said now is that the presence of such
independent advisors lnight have changed the picture, particularly in relation to the use of
high-tensile steel. In any event, this might well have afforded some protection to the
C.R.B. against subsequent criticism. No positive finding is possible, and we do not feel
disposed to make any comment adverse to the C.H.B. on this matter.

The system adopted for the selection of the successful tenderer was designed to ensure
a proper examination of all tenders. Wilson described the process as follows :-
He and Niasterton were handed--not the actual tenders-but the preliminary
drawings and calculations and were unaware of the names of the tenderers or the amounts.
The two officers then checked the dra\Vi.ngs and calculations for any obvious contraventions
of the specifications or major errors in the design. At a later stage, the amounts of the
tenders were given to the examining officers and a full report made to the Chief Engineer
and the Board. rrhe tender received from Utah (2,374,360) was the third lowest valid
tender received. In fact, the actual amount paid to Utah including extras was
2,770,794 16s. Always leaving aside the question of the use of high-tensile steel we are
satisfied that there was no factor of superiority in any of the higher tenders, by comparison
with that of Utah, which should have required the C.R.B. to reject the latter in favour of
any of the higher tenders, or justified it in doing so.

The lowest tender, which was sublnitted by .John Holland and Co. Pty. Ltd. in the
sum of 1,793,658 was subjected to a critical examination. In his memorandun1 of the 27th
May, 1957 (Ex. 11) Darwin set out the reasons for rejection which were as follows
(a) The foundations were not designed in accordance with the specification.
This matter is discussed in Section 2.5.2.
(b) The appearance was said to be unsatisfactory.
 14

(c) The financial strength of the company was subject to some criticism, mainly
because it sought certain concessions as to method and time of progress
payments and reduction in the amount of retention money which were
thought to indicate " apprehension on the part of the company itself as
to its ability i;o successfully finance a project of this magnitude".
(d) The tenderer's experience was mainly in the field of industrial building and the
staff and the e:r1gineers proposed to be employed was considered inadequate.
The amount of 45,000 allowed for design was low as compared with the
amount allowed by other tenderers.
(e) The tender figure was thought to be too low and indicated that the company
would be unable to carry out the project at this figure.
(j) Interference with traffic would have occurred over a longer period than
was the case with the proposals of other tenderers.
(g) There was said to be considerable risk of general public dissatisfaction due
to delay or even stoppages occasioned by deficiencies of this tenderer.

During the hearing a good deal of evidence was directed to show that the steel flanges
in this design were of greater thickness than the specified 1 inch and that, therefore, the
t'3nder was also outside the specification in this regard. (See Section 2.5.2.) Curiously,
this was not one of the grounds relied upon in 1957 for rejecting this tender.

r-rhe next tender, that of E. G. Olementson (Vie.) Pty. Ltd. (2,118,037) was rejected
for very similar reasons:-
(a) Financial structure of the company was not regarded as impressive.
(b) The disabilities regarding piles mentioned in relation to the John Holland
tender applied equally to this tender.
(c) A nominated sub-contractor had attached special conditions as to payments
which were in conflict with the specifications and unsatisfactory to the
Board.

In this case also it was said that taking the piles down to the mud-stone would involve
so much extra cost as to bring the total price above that of Utah.

2.2.2. The tender accepted.

The Utah tender by contrast was considered to be free from any of the objections
raised to the lower tenders and to display a number of satisfactory features which may be
summarized as follows :-
The design was adequate, particularly as to the foundations which consist of
5-ft. diameter " Benoto" cylinders carried well down into mud-stone at a level which is
an average 33 feet below the level provided by John Holland.
The time schedules were satisfactory, providing a minimum interference with traffic.
The appearance was pleasing and the design of supporting piers gives good traffic
clearance and allowed useable space under the structure.
The maintenance aspect was satisfactory.
The tender price was reaJistic and reasonable.
The previous history of the company in Victoria and elsewhere was impressive and
its financial position sound. It was associated with a number of eminent Victorian
consulting engineers. (In passing it is observed that the idea of some of the design work being
done overseas with consequent "relief of the hard-pressed local offices" seems to have
disappeared from sight).
There were two outstanding features of the Utah tender which required earnest
consideration by the O.R.B. officers. Firstly, the use in the superstructure of high-tensile
steel, a material that was new and untried for welded bridge construction in Australia. This
matter is fully discussed in other sections of this Report, from which it will be found that
we were compelled to the conclusion that the C.R.B. should not have accepted high-tensile
steel for use in the bridge, unless and until it had become satisfied, by the clearest
demonstration, of the competence and ability of the tenderer, and its steelmaker and
sub-contractor, to supply and fabricate the steel to a satisfactory standard. From this it
follows that the Utah tender, in which this material was proposed for the whole of the
 15
superstructure, should not have been accepted without far more enquiry and investigation
on this basis. It is quite plain that insufficient critical attention was given to this matter
at the stage of considering tenders. None of those involved appear to have had any
realization of the extent to which they were venturing into unknown territory in using
this material.
Secondly, concerning the design of the sub-structure; the C.R.B. officers were very
properly concerned to ensure absolutely sound foundations, which the Utah design was
thought to provide, and in the result, appears to have achieved. However, as we point out
in Section 2.5.2, the foundations in the Utah tender involved a much greater cost than those
of John Holland.

It is true that the foundations designed by John Holland were outside the
specification, and it is evident that C.R.B. officers doubted their adequacy for the purpose
and rightly regarded the safety of the foundations as of paramount importance.
Nevertheless, we feel that this aspect of the John Holland tender perhaps merited a
more thorough investigation than it received.

The whole of the evidence, including the contemporary documents, suggests to us

that from the beginning the C.R.B. officers were very greatly impressed by the reputation
of Utah, which they regarded as a highly-efficient organization likely to make a success of
the bridge project. While this may have been a perfectly proper attitude, we are left with
the impression that it perhaps induced some zeal to find reasons in favour of accepting
the Utah tender.

The Board having made its choice of tender, the recommendation (Ex. 11) was
sent to the Minister.

The letter of advice to the Minister made no reference to what we have referred to
as one of the two outstanding features of the Utah tender, namely the fact that high-
tensile steel was to be used for the first time in Australia in a welded bridge. The Board's
then Engineer for Bridges, Masterton, had informed representatives of Utah at a meeting
before the acceptance of the tender that he doubted their ability to satisfactorily weld steel
of Australian origin, but was told that B.H.P. had given an assurance that the steel was
weldable. At the time the specifications were prepared he had no doubt that high-tensile
steel complying with the Board's specifications and supplied from the United Kingdom
could be welded, provided satisfactory welding procedures were used. The Premier expected
that the Board's report upon the tenders and its recommendations would deal with all
aspects of the project in a most satisfactory manner. We feel that the Board should have
advised the Minister that the Utah tender involved the use of high-tensile steel of
Australian origin for the first time in a welded bridge and that its own Engineer for
Bridges entertained doubts about the use of such steel.

At this point the Minister directed that the tender documents and other material
should be examined by Mr. V. G. Swanson, at that time Chief Engineer, Ports and
Harbours in the Public Works Department, so that he could " appraise " the tenders.
Swanson reported to the Minister by a memorandum dated 20th June, 1957 (Ex. 12). It
is a little difficult to understand precisely the object of this appraisal. Swanson's own
evidence suggests that he was mainly concerned to ensure that the tender accepted was
within the specifications. He did not advert in a critical way to such matters as the use
of high-tensile steel. Indeed, he disclaimed any competence to advise on this matter.
However, on the aspect of the business propriety of accepting the Utah tender, the
Board is entitled to rely on the Swanson memorandum as constituting contemporaneous
independent advice supporting its decision.

Two aspects of the Board's decision to accept the Utah tender must be kept
separate.

We criticize the Board for its too ready acceptance of the proposal to use high-
tensile steel in the bridge, and for its agreement to the award of the sub-contract for
fabrication to J. & W. without ensuring its competence to weld this unfamiliar steel. In
these matters of judgment we feel the Board was in error. On the other hand, setting
these matters aside, we are satisfied that the decision to accept the Utah tender was
honestly made.
 16
Early in this Enquiry we became aware that rumours were current, the nature of which
led us to expect that some evidence would he forthcoming suggesting or alleging impropriety
relation to the tenders received and to the Board's action in dealing with them. No
witness prepared to give such evidence came forward, and none was discovered by those
assisting the Commission. \Ve have not found any evidence or any suspicious circumstances
suggesting impropriety on the part of any C.R.B. officer, tenderer or other person in this
regard. Any criticism made by us, on the matter of the assessment of tenders, is criticism
of judgment merely and is not intended to sugge::,;t impropriety or to impugn the integrity
of any of those persons involved.
2.3. Setting Up the Organization.
2.3.1. Arrangements for design.
Soon after the announcement of the decision to build Kings Bridge, the Melbourne
Division of the Institution of Engineers, Australia, became interested in the matter.
Because the project afforded a unique opportunity to the independent profession in
Melbourne, it was decided by the structural sub-panel of the Consulting Engineers Panel of
the Institution that a group consulting engineers be formed to prepare a design, and to
interest Victorian contractors in such design.
Messrs. Hardcastle and Richards, a firm of eonsulting engineers, paid the fee of
100 and obtained the Board's specifications. Subsequently, they were approached by
Utah with a view to assisting with the preparation of a tender. .Messrs. Hardcastle and
Richards informed that company of the existence of the Design Group and members of the
Design Group were then consulted. It v;as finally agreed between Utah and the Design Group
that the Design Group would prepare designs and drawings in sufficient detail to enable
Utah to submit a tender for the project.
The Design Group was incorporated on the 6th March, 1957 under the provisions
of the Companies Act, as "King-street Bridge Design Limited" a company limited by
guarantee. Hardcastle was appointed Managing Director. On the 25th March, 1957 a
letter was received from Utah setting out the terms and conditions upon which the company
was authorized to proeeed with the preparation of tender designs, drawings and
supplementary specifications for the King-street Bridge. Actually the. fonnal agreement
between the companies was not executed until the 19th January, 195\) but was deemed
to have commenced on 16th January, 1957. (See Exhibit 39).
It is clear under the comraet that the duties of K.S.B.D. were limited to preparation
of design and consultation on "Matters arising during construction which involve the
]'inal Drawings". Specifically it was not obliged to out job supervision or preparation
of schedules or material lists.
The designers prepared designs in both mild steel and high-tensile steel. Before
the final decision was made on the choice of these two materials, a conference was held on
the 28th November, 1956 between Mr. Farrar of J. & W., Mr. Longo of Utah and
Hardcastle. During this conference, Farrar telephoned Mr. Frankenberg, sales manager
of B.H.P. in the presence of the other parties and repeated to them his conversation.
There can be no doubt that at this point all parties understood that ample supplies of steel
to B.S. ~)68: 1941 would be available from B.H.P. and further that this steel was weldable
if proper \velding procedures were adopted and executed with skill. The effect of their
understanding is summarized in letters passing between J. & W. and Utah dated 1st
December, 1956 and 7th December, 1956. On the basis of this understanding and for
economic reasons discussed elsewhere in this Heport (Section 2.7.1.1.), the decision was
made to proceed with the final design in high-tensile steel.
2.3.2. Utah contract with. J. & W.
Unlike the contracts executed between C.H.B. and Utah, and Utah and K.S.B.D.,
Utah's contract with J. & \V. was never reduced into a formal document, but is to be f01md
in a series of letters. (See Ex. 15). By the 4th September, 1957 these letters had
resulted in the contract for the fabrication of the steel work. (Tr. 1209).
On the 11th August, 191)8 a contract was made for the erection of the steel and for
the field paint work.
In its tender to Utah, J. & \V. did not include any particular item for the cost of
testing material.
 17
2.3.3. Approval of J. & W. as sub-contractor.
By a letter dated 8th November, 1957, Utah, as required by clause 1.2.14 of the
specification, submitted to C.R.B. names of several proposed sub-contractors, including
J. & W. as fabricator of structural steel and the C.R.B. replied on the 11th November,
1957, accepting these sub-contractors. Subsequently, by letters dated the 12th and 15th
May, 1958, J. & \V. was submitted and accepted as sub-contractor for the erection of the
steeL The high reputation of J. & W. as a fabricator of mild steel was of course well
known to the C.R.B. However, the comment is made elsewhere that it was readily
aecepted as a fabricator in high-tensile steel without adequate enquiry as to its experience
of this material or competence to make the necessary adjustment of its fabrication
methods. (See 2.7.1.1 and 2.4.0).

2.3.3.1. Appointment of Scarlett to act on behalf of Utah.

On the 15th August, 1958 Utah wrote to C.R.B. in the following terms:-
.. Please be advised that 1\Ir. K. A. Hearlett of Jolms and \Vaygood l;td. is
authorized to act on our behalf in matters pertaining to the testing and inspection
procedures required for acceptance of structural steel products for the King-street
Bridge project.
Such authorization is subject to our prior approval of any matters affecting
changes in construt:tion procedures, scheduling or variations to the contract ".
And on the 22nd Heptember, 1\)58, C.R.B. replied as follows:-
., We can only agree to dealing direct with Mr. Scarlett instead of with Mr. Fink,
if it is understood that any statement made, or opinion expressed by Scarlett, is taken
as being made on your behalf''.

Thereafter, apparently, Scarlett acted as Utah's representative in discussions arising

in relation to testing and inspection.

2.3.4. J. & W. contract with B.H.P.

2.3.4.1. Failure to order steel to specification.
One of the critical events in the whole story of the bridge occurred when on the
20th May, 1958, J. & W. placed its first orders with B.H.P. for the manufacture of steel in
accordance with B.S. 968: 1941. The order (See Ex. 17), omitted any reference to the
additional tests prescribed by the C.R.B. specifications. (Clauses 2-3--6 to 2-3~16 and 2-5-1).
In the result J. & \V. found itself bound to accept steel from B.H.P. without additional
tests, and bound under its contract with Utah to supply girders fabricated from steel which
complied with these additional tests. The elucidation of the mystery of how this
extraordinary situation came about, caused us considerable difficulty, and the evidence
of the J. & W. witnesses did nothing to reduce the confusion.

A factor which eonditioned the whole of the early negotiations was that nobody
in J. & W. comprehended the real significance of these tests. They just did not realize
that these tests were specified to ensure the production of something differing in quality
from steel manufactured to B.S. 968 simpliciter, as a safeguard against brittle fracture.
Farmr's evidence was to the effect that, in the tender to Utah for the fabrication of steel,
J. & W. failed to include any allowance for these tests by "an oversight". ~o doubt,
however, thi.s " oversight ., occurred because of the mental attitude of J. & \V. arising from
previous experience that " the production of B.H.P. certificates usually satisfied the
clients ". \Ve interpret this as meaning that tests such as those specified by the C.RB. were
not always insisted upon by the customers who were usually content to accept fabricated
mild steel which had been certified by the steelmakers.

Between the time of tendering to Utah, (25th January, 1957), and the time when
orders for steel were placed with B.H.P., (20th May, 1958), the ,J. & W. management had
a number of conversations with B.lLP. officers and as a result were convinced of two
matters-firstly, that B.H.P. was adamant in its refusal to supply steel with additional
tests, and secondly, that B.H.P's attitude to Izod tests was that they were of little or no
use.
o:J52/u3-2
 18
The evidence of the B.H.P. witnesses, Ralston and Thompson shows that in fact,
neither of these two conceptions was completely accurate. If B.H.P. had been pressed with
sufficient determination, it is probable that it could have been persuaded to accept orders
for steel in full accordance with the C.R.B. specifications~though, no doubt, at a higher
price. Further, the B.H.P. attitude to lzod tests was less unequivocally condemnatory
than J. & W. understood it to be. It is probable that at this stage, the J. & \V. officers
did appreciate their responsibility to Utah and the C.R.B. to ensure that the tests would
be carried out, but felt confident that they could arrange for the tests to be done by testing
authorities in Melbourne. Also, they doubtless realized that if B.H.P. had agreed to supply
the steel in accordance with specifications, the cost would have been so much greater, that
in a competitive tender it would have been prohibitive. They, therefore, took a
" commercial risk " hoping that most of the heats of steel would comply with the C.R.B.
tests and that such as did not, would be useable for other purposes. They were comforted
also by the opinion which they then held, but which turned out to be misleading, that the
C.R.B. would not insist on the tests being carried out to anything like the extent provided
for in the specifications. In all these cireumstanees it now seems highly probable that
whatever may have been the situation at the time of the tender to Utah, the orders to
B.H.P. were given without the additional tests as a deliberate act and not as any sort of
oversight.
The importance of this matter cannot be overemphasized. When J. & W. became
convinced that B.H.P. would not supply steel in aceordance with the C.R.B. specifications,
its plain duty was to have informed Utah and through Utah the C.R.B. The whole matter
could then have been brought into the open before any orders were lodged. No one can
now say what would have been the result of such disclosure, or even if the other parties
would in fact have treated the matter with sufficient seriousness. If they had done so,
however, the whole story could have changed-even to the extent that the use of the
specified steel might have been abandoned in favour of some other material, with
consequent alterations to design.
At the Enquiry it was urged against J. & "\V. that its failure to order in strict
accordance with the specifications and the terms of its contract with Utah eonstituted a
serious breach of its eontraetuaJ obligations. The answer made was that the speeifieations
required J. & \V. to fabrieate in steel manufactured to B.S. 968 which would be submitted
to, and pass, the Izod and other tests, but that nothing in the speeifieations required these
tests to be carried out by the steelmaker, and that J. & W. was perfeetly entitled to order
as it did, and at its own expense, have the tests earried out by other suitable testing
authorities.
We are unable to aecept this argument, although it appears to have been at least
tacitly accepted by the other parties at the time. A perusal of the speeifications, section
2~3, and in particular dause 2-3-16 (h) shows plainly that the obligation of Utah, and
therefore of J. & W., was to arrange for the weldability test specimens to be prepared by
the steelmaker and tested at its works or at an approved testing laboratory at its cost.
The subsequent history of the matter discloses that J. & "\V. did not carry out the
procedure with strict regard to the onerous obligation undertaken, which was to ensure the
proper testing of all steel, and the setting aside without demur of any steel which did not pass
the tests on the strictest basis. In fact, there was a failure to carry out all the tests to the
full extent of the specification requirement, and J. & W. is found resisting testing by every
available means, constantly urging reduction in testing, and finally ever-persuading C.R.B.
to relax the testing. In this respect we feel that J. & \V. was clearly at fault.

2.3.4.2. Responsibility of Utah for the ]. & W. orders.

The failure of J. & W. to order the steel strictly in accordance with the C.R.B.
speei:fications was a matter not disclosed to Utah by J. & W. at the time. Indeed, on
5th September, 1958, J. & W. wrote to Utah a letter containing the phrase "The enclosed
copies of test certificates for all material received at our works to date are for the C.R.B.
files. You will note the fzod figures are not given on these certificates, but as requested
by Mr. Eastick, it is agreed that the B.H.P. company will provide impact tests for all
future heats ".
This unfortunate piece of misinformation was explained by Stocker and Scarlett
as an error by the latter. It was claimed to have been corrected verbally.
 19

The question then arises was Utah to blame for not overseeing the orders given by
J. & W. to B.H.P. ? Utah had made clear to J. & W. that the sub-contract must be
carried out within the terms of the main contract and had arranged for C.R.B. specifications
to be made available. Utah, no doubt, assumed that a company which had been
purchasing steel for 100 years was capable of giving a relatively simple order. Moreover,
even if it had occurred to Utah to request a sight of the orders for the purpose of
checking them before they were placed by J. & W., this would have been greatly resented
by J. & W., as being out of accord with usual practice. In the light of the misleading letter
of 5th September, 1958, it would be scarcely fair to say that Utah should have discovered
the situation sooner, although this might well have been ascertained by a careful perusual by
Utah of the J. & W. tender which made no mention of the additional tests. When the
situation was discovered, the C.R.B. as well as Utah, accepted the position. We, therefore,
feel that no adverse finding should be made by us against Utah on this matter whatever
ultimate vicarious liability may be found to exist in law.

2.3.4.3. Responsibility of C.R.B.

It is by no means easy to decide when the C.R.B. first knew of the form of order
given to B.H.P. by J. & W.

A perusal of the correspondence-without any other information-would lead to

the conclusion that it did not know until after 18th February, 1959, because in a letter of that
date, complaint was made to Utah that Izod test certificates were not coming forward, and
in a further letter of 26th February, 1959, the following paragraph occurs-
" It has been suggested that, when steel was ordered, an Izod test was not
specified, and if this were so, it would seem possible that some of the steel, already
supplied, could be unsatisfactory and would need to be rejected. Should it be
found that material, as ordered on a limited specification, has been supplied, B.H.P.
cannot very well be held responsible for any delay in completion of the contract
due to non-compliance with the contract specification. If material is supplied
by B.H.P. and does not comply with your order and there is a delay in advising
B.H.P. accordingly, B.H.P. cannot very well be held responsible for that delay."

At this stage there was correspondence between Utah and J. & W. on the matter,
and at the request of C.R.B., J. & W. wrote to B.H.P. on lOth March, 1959, asking for a
reconsideration of its attitude, which was refused in a letter of 7th April, 1959.

On the other hand, the evidence of Eastick makes it quite clear that he knew as the
result of conversations with Thompson early in 1957, that B.H.P. was unwilling to
undertake these additional tests, and it is equally clear that he was quite unconcerned about
this. He was interested only in seeing that efficient arrangements would be made for
testing in Melbourne.

Whether Eastick ever passed this information on to his superiors at that time
(1957) is uncertain. However, Eastick claimed that at a conference on 21st March, 1958,
at which Butler and Eastick represented C.R.B. and Miller and Fink, Utah, he made the
position clear to all present, and the notes of the conference (Part of Ex. 51) bear this out.
In any event, Eastick was the Board's Officer in charge of testing, among other things,
and his knowledge must be taken as that of the Board. It is abundantly plain that Eastick
and probably other C.R.B. officers except Wilson, shared with J. & W. the lack of
understanding of the significance of the impact tests.

As late as 14th December, 1959, at a conference between Eastick, Bonwick, Scarlett

and Ferris (See Ex. 75) it was possible for the question to be asked of Ferris, " Why are
Izod tests required when B.S. 968 does not specify same?". Even Ferris's forthright reply
that he would "have nothing to do with the use of B.S. 968 if adequate assurance of its
resistance to brittle fracture was not available" seems to have passed over the heads of
his enquirers. At the hearing, Eastick's evidence left us with the impression that even
then he had not grasped the significance of the Izod tests.

Whatever be the time at which the C.R.B. had knowledge of the form of order placed
by J. & W., there is no doubt that it accepted the situation with very little protest. Apart
from urging J. & W. to make a belated appeal to B.H.P. for reconsideration, in March, 1959,
no other action was taken. Perhaps at that stage nothing else could have been done.
 20

The real criticism of the C.R.B. arises from its subsequent actions. Because of the failure
to appreciate the importance of the impact tests, they were never carried out to the full
extent of the specifications, and the least onerous of the extra tests were relaxed to a
" random " basis.

While inspection in general was being maintained with such rigorous insistence on
detail as to seriously irritate the J. & W. personnel, the impact tests were allowed to be
greatly reduced. An even mo:re serious error was to permit, or at least to acquiesce in, the
practice of J. & W. of proceeding to fabricate girders from steel which had not been tested,
subject to a satisfactory result being ultimately obtained. This was, we feel, very bad
practice which the Board should have refused to accept. A further criticism must be added,
of breakdown in communication within the Board's own establishment. Wilson, the
man mainly responsible for the specifications, who had added these additional tests in
order to protect the bridge from brittle fracture, was the one witness from the Board's
staff whom we consider to have understood the significance of these tests. He was never
informed, much less consulted, about these matters. Had this been done, we feel that a very
different course would have been followed.

2.3.5. C.R.B. organization to control the contract.

After he had finished his work on the specification Wilson apparently spent most of
his time in connection with the bridge foundations. The knowledge which he had gained
from Ferris and elsewhere about brittle fracture and related matters does not seem to have
spread from him to other officers of the C.R.B. and we must enquire why this should have
been so.

The organization of the C.R.B. during the relevant period, in so far as it directly
concerned Kings Bridge, was as follows :-
Chief Engineer J. Mathieson
Engineer for Bridges I. J. O'Donnell (when speci-
fications were being prepared)
C. A. Masterton
Senior Design Engineer C. A. \Vilson
Supervising Engineer, King-street Bridge L. T. Butler
Senior Constructional Engineer (Bridges) R. F. Eastick
Assistant Engineer F. Jackson
Welding Inspector N. V. Clarke (with two assiS-
tants)

A great deal of the information that we obtained about the conduct of the job came
from the evidence of Wilson, Eastick and Clarke although Mathieson, Masterton, and Butler
also appeared briefly at the Enquiry. A paper by Masterton (Exhibit 22) presented to the
Institution of Engineers, Australia, gives what must be presumed to be the official account
of the construction procedure and contains a number of statements that are worthy of
comment. It should perhaps be mentioned that we do not know for certain how much of
the paper was written by Masterton of his own knowledge and how much was based on
information supplied to him by his subordinates.

At any rate the early part of the paper indicates that Masterton, possibly advised
by Wilson, had a very lively appreciation of the inherent difficulties of welding, of the sort
of failures of welded structures that had taken place previously, and of residual stresses
and their implications. The introduction of the additional clauses into the specification, to
try to cover the danger and difficulties, are then described and are followed by an account
of Jackson's experiments, described in Section 2.4.3, to improve the knowledge of the C.R.B.
officers in welding this material.

During the construction of the bridge the regular inspection of the welding was carried
out by Clarke and his assistants working under the immediate supervision of J ackson :
Eastick was the officer in general charge of the fabrication of the girders from the C.R.B.
point of view while Butler was in charge of the project as a whole.
 21
f t is difficult to believe, in view of their actions, that Butler, Rastick and .T ackson
really appreciated the situation properly or that the knowledge that Wilson and Masterton
possessed was effective at the time the contract was awarded. For example we read in
Masterton's paper, under the heading " Welding High Tensile Steel'', the following:-
" 1t was not known if steel made to specification B.S. 968 had previously been
fabricated by welding for girder construction. ft had not been so used to any appreciable
extent in Australia.

From experimental results in the U.K. it was ascertained that an effective welding
procedure had to be established, maintained and constantly checked to ensure trouble-free
welding.

Tn these circumstances it was, therefore, necessary for the Board to satisfy itself:--
(i) that high-tensile steel of Australian manufacture could be satisfaetorily
welded manual1y;
(ii) that welding procedure and controls were developed suitable for mass
production under workshop conditions;
(iii) that a procedure was established suitable for the fabrication work being
performed by automatic and semi-automatic processes; and
(iv) that the non-destructive testing of this welding could be satisfactorily
arranged.

\Ve can only comment that the Board allowed itself to be all too easily satisfied.

There are several other passages in the paper which describe what might have
happened rather than what actually did happen. For example :-
" 'fhe contractor supplied test certificates from the manufacturer which gave the
physical properties and the chemical composition of each plate for each heat.'" This was
never done, as Masterton admitted in evidence. " The test certificates and the check
analysis, together with the Izod and weldahility test results, were entered in the record
hook, and if they fulfilled the requirements specified then the contractor would he officially
informed of the approval to the plates covered by the Board's stamped number."

It may appear to be a small point hut we think it significant that there was no proper
record hook. There was a chart (Exhibits 71 and 72) hut we found that many plates were
approved that did not conform to the C.R.B. specifications. Nor were weldahility Izod
tests ever carried out at the lower temperature, although it would appear from Appendix I.
of the paper that 1\'Iasterton thought they had been. On the other hand Appendix TIT.
describes Jackson's experiments and makes it clear that testing was not carried out at the
lower temperature.

From Masterton's paper and from the evidence we heard we conclude that there was
a failure of communication within the C.R.B. organization. On the one hand important
background information did not reach the officers on the job ; on the other the aetions of
these officers were not always fully realized at appropriate levels in the C.R.B. In
particular, Wilson did not know until the ]~nquiry that the weldability Izods had not been
carried out at :32]'. and waH manifestly shocked by the information.

In this eonnection we find a gap in our knowledge. \Ve know that Wilson and
.Masterton visited England and the Continent of Europe in 1956 partly to answer enquiries
from possible tenderers-and also, perhaps, to stimulate such enquiries, and partly to make
a general survey of eurrent bridge-building practice. 'Ve do not know whether a full report
of this visit was ever made to the Board as there was no evidence on this point. If no such
report was made a great opportunity was missed, for Masterton's diaries contain a great deal
of excellent information, some of it highly relevant to the subject of our Enquiry.

The value of such a report would have been two-fold. In the first place Wilson and
1\'Iasterton themselves would have benefited by the act of reducing to an orderly sequence
the heterogeneous notes and impressions of hurried visits to many offices and works. And,
secondly, the circulation of their report could not have failed to improve the understandina
of all concemed with Kings Bridge. e
 22
2.4. Competence and Experience of the Parties to Undertake the Project.
2.4.1. Relationship betWE!en the parties.
Throughout the Enquiry it has been evident that there was a complex interplay
in the relationship between the various parties concerned. \Ve address ourselves, therefore,
to a consideration of the competence and experience of the parties on the one hand and
of their responsibilities on the other. \Ve are acutely aware of the difficulties besetting
any definition of moral standards in this connection and will, therefore, so far as possible,
confine our attention to the responsibilities as defined in the several contracts or stated
in the C.R.B. specifications. At the same time we recognize that many companies
assume responsibilities, of a professional character, that transcend their contractural
obligations. It is good that this should be so.

In order to get a clear picture of the organization eoncerned in the construction of

the bridge, this is set out diagrammatically as follows :~--

C .R. B.-COXSTR DOTING AUTHORITY.

Wrote the specifications governing the whole project. Retained final
:<uthority for approving all materials and fabrication procedure~.
inclurling inspection of completed girders.
I
UrAH AusTRALIA L'rn.---Cos:rRACTOR.
Awarded the contract for the design and constTuetion of the complete
structure but acc,uallv itself onh constructed the foundations.
substructure, and deck. The wh~le de:-;ign aiHl the supply and
erection of the steel work were sub-contracted.
I
SuB-CONTRACTORs.

King-street Bridge Design Ltd. Jokns & Way,qood Ltd.

Responsible for rlesign, both of foumlations Responsible for fabrication, painting, and erection
and superstructure. of steel work in the superstructure. This included
the detail shop (lrawings and we!aing procedure,;.
I ~-~

I
Broken Hill Proprietary Jfurex (Ajusla)
Company Ltd. Pty. Ltd.
Hteel plates and bars. ElectrodeH ancl Huxes.

It is clear from this that the contractor came between the constructing authority
and the sub-eontractors. This does not appear to have restrained direct discussion of
design aspects between C.R.B. and K.S.RD., as is evidenced by the numerous design
conferences held. On the other hand, official contact was maintained between C.R.B.
and J. & W. only through l7tah. It will be realized from the above diagram that B.H.P.
and Murex had official contaet only with J. & W.

Although C.R.B. was the final authority for aceepting steel, there was no discussion
with B.H.P. at any stage of the contract regarding the quality of the steel supplied or
difficulties associated with its fabrication, apart fron1 some informal discussions between
Eastick (C.R.B.) and Ralston (B.H.P.) in the early stages. Whether this was an inevitable
eonsequence of the type of co:r.traet, or not, there is no doubt that discussions between
C.R.B. and B.H.P. at the appropriate level, could have had important and beneficial
consequences.
In setting out our views on the competence and experience of the parties it must
be realized that our sole concern is to establish whether, in the eircumstanccs related to
the initiation and fulfilment of the contract, the parties were familiar with the low-alloy
steel selected for fabrication of the superstructure. Thit> matter relates to all the
parties mentioned except Murex.

2.4.2. Mr. I. J. Ferris.

Ferris is the Principal Scientific Officer in charge of the welding and physical
metallurgy group for the Defence Standards Laboratories of the Commonwealth of
Australia. He is a well-qualified metallurgist with many years' experience that was highly
relevant to the use of welded high-tensile steel in the Kings Bridge.
 23

At the Enquiry it soon became evident that he had played an informal but important
role before and during the construction of the bridge ; he participated in the work of the
committee of investigation immediately after the failure; he subsequently carried out
a detailed study of the failed girders (Ex. 194) ; and finally he assisted the Commission
by giving very valuable evidence.

At the time the specifications were being written he gave much advice to Wilson
on the steel specifications generally, and on B.S. 968 in particular. He confirmed the
desirability of introducing Izod tests and of limiting the thickness of the steel to 1 inch.

He gave advice which led to the introduction of the welding procedure described
in the B.W.R.A. booklet; advised the C.R.B. to employ an independent organization for
the inspection and testing of the welding; gave Jackson (C.R.B.) some training in welding
techniques so that he might undertake inspection; gave advice on radiographic inspection
and the interpretation of radiographs; and finally, advised "\Vilson to recommend that
the bridge should be closed after the failure of span W.14.

During the fabrication period there seem to have been several occasions on which
he was consulted by one or other of the parties who turned to him for advice.

Apart from a payment by C.R.B. to D.S.L. for the training of Jackson, there was
no payment made either to D.S.L. or Ferris by any of the parties.

In the early stages of our proceedings the impression could have been gained that
he was the man on whom the main responsibility for the failure must rest, for it seemed
that many decisions of importance were only taken after visiting, or telephoning him.
As the evidence unfolded, however, it became abundantly clear that he at least was one
man who really knew what he was talking about. With the one exception that the Izod
value (of 20 ft.jlb. at 32 F.) he suggested should have been higher (and he explained the
authoritative basis of his figure) his advice was absolutely sound. We were finally left
with the opinion that, far from being held responsible for the failure, he must be given
full credit for trying to get the various parties working on the right lines.

~While we are more than satisfied that Ferris gave excellent advice we are not sure
that he was always wise to give it especially to people who might not fully understand
the significance of what he was saying. Nor can he always have been certain that he was
being asked the right questions. We do not blame him for his ready willingness to help
but we very much blame those who put him in such a difficult position.

In particular we blame the C.R.B. which leaned most heavily on him and which
should have had a competent metallurgist on its own staff. No doubt there would still
have been problems where Ferris's great experience would have been of value but the
questions would then have been asked, and the replies received, with understanding.

If the bridge had been built of mild steel it is quite possible that no great difficulties
would have arisen with this familiar material; in that case no exception could be taken
to the occasional use of Ferris to help with special problems. With the high-tensile steel
that was actually used it was essential to have experts fully involved in, and in daily
contact with, the problems of fabrication. In spite of all his knowledge and experience,
Ferris just could not do what was required as a part-time consultant at the far end of a
telephone line.

2.4.3. The Country Roads Board.

The C.R.B. selected B.S. 968 : 1941 after consultation with Ferris of D.S.L.
However, the C.R.B. engineers had no experience with this steel, nor had they anybody
on the C.R.B. staff who had the necessary metallurgical knowledge, not only to advise
them of the difficulties but to aid them in the over-all control of the welding contract. As
constructing authority assuming the right of approval of materials and procedures it
needed the full-time services of a competent metallurgist. The welding experience of its
offtcers was with mild steel. Whether they knew it or not, they were taking a bold step
in specifying low-aJloy steel-if this should prove te be the material selected by the
Flllccessful tenderer,
 24
We appreciate the view put by Darwin that no progress is made in engineering
practice unless you are prepared to try something new. We think, however, that the caution
normally exercised by engineers in such cases should have led him to cause a thorough
investigation of the properties of this, to them, new material. Darwin and his staff take
refuge behind the authority of a British Standard Specification. We think nobody on
the C.R.B. staff understood all the implications of the nmv material. It was, at first
glance, too like mild steel for them to realize its considerable differences. It is well known
that the introduction of alloying elements into steel makes it more sensitive to cooling rate
and to weld cracking. To overcome these difficulties on a routine basis it is essential to
reorganize the fabrication shop. They did not appreciate this sufficiently to be able to
assess the ability of J. & W. to undertake the necessary reorganization for this purpose.

The only effort the C.RB. appears to have made to become acquainted with the
material it was decided to adopt, is described in the paper by }Vfasterton (Exhibit 22). In
this he states inter alia " It was not known if steel made to specification B.S. ~)68 had
previously been fabricated by welding for girder construction ., . This statement refers
to the state of knm.vledge of the C.R.B. at the time of writing the specification. In view
of this, our opinion is that the C.R.B. did an absolute minimum of testing on the properties
and weldability of the steel. From the experiments done, however, there could have been
extracted the following pieces of information which should have warned of diffieulties
ahead:~-

(a) This steel sometimes does not show a yield point. This feature should have
been discw;sed with K.S.B.D.
(b) The composition of the samples of Australian steel used was variable and
sometimes above the maximum limits specified in B.S. 968. This should
have alerted C.R.B. to require J. & W. to have checks made on the
steel delivered and to have had direct discussion with B.H.P.
(c) In an experiment to determine the magnitude of residual stresses in the
flange-web welding, although appreciable stresses were indicated the
matter was not followed through. '!;he experiment was made on thinner
plate than w.as subsequently used in flanges and there was no evidence
that consideration was given to the use of pre-heating or of vmiability
of welding sequence on residual stresses.

Considering the importance placed by Wilson on the need for notch ductility in the
steel, one of the most remarkable aspects of the preliminary testing programme is the
omission of a survey of this property on the samples investigated. ln 1\Iasterton's paper
only two plate Izod tests are mentioned and these were carried out at room temperature.
Even at this early stage the significance of variation of notch ductility with temperature
appears to have been overlooked. To be able to assess this property it was essential to have
a series of Izod speeimens over a range of temperatures from 0 F. to at least 120 F., from a
series of thicknesses of plate covering the range to be used in fgbrication of the girders.
By comparison, this procedure was followed by l\1ott, Hay and Anderson, consulting
engineers for the Runcorn-Widnes Bridge being fabrieated in England from similar steel
at about the same period. Without this knowledge obtained from several heats there
was no certainty regarding the possible notch brittle behaviour of this steel.

In view of the fact that the C.R.B. had retained authority to approve the steel and
all fabrication procedures, we eonsider that with the staff available it was not competent
to carry out these functions.

Another matter is the ability of C.R.B. officers to undertake the inspection during
fabrication of the girders. Admitting that they were working with a new material, they
took the view that it would be better to avoid using inspectors who were familiar with the
inspection of mild-steel welding, and preferred to train a new group.

The first step was to send Jackson, Eastick's assistant, to D.S.L. for a few weeks
(See Exhibit 21) to acquaint himself with the characteristics of B.S. 968 steel and with
the techniques of welding it. ]'erris felt confident that Jackson understood what he was
taught but that when he left D.S.L. he did not have sufficient knowledge to supervise
 25

adequately the fabrication of the bridge. (Tr. 263B). Nevertheless, he did produce hvo
reports (Exs. 53 and 54), on the welding of B.R. 968 steel, which are competent pieces of
work as far as they went.

Incredible as it may now seem, this was the only direc.t experience that any C.R.B.
officer had of welding B.S. 968 steel before they began the \York of inspection.

J ackson 's knowledge doubtless grew on the job but it is to be questioned whether he
was really capable of training the inspector:,; even though they were competent welders of mild
steel. He did, however, produce a sensible instruction sheet (Ex. 59) for the inspectors.

Jackson was abroad at the time of the Enquiry and was not available to give evidence.
From what others said of him, and from the exhibits mentioned above, we formed the opinion
that he was capable and conscientious, but whether he had enough experience to do what
was expected of him, or whether he was adequately supervised himself, are very different
matters.

We believe, therefore, that the C.R.B., in spite of its long experience in bridge
building, was not competent to undertake the supervisory role it had assigned to itself in the
specifications ; it did not fully realize the implications of the change to high-tensile steel
and the steps it took to prepare itself for the job were inadequate.

In view of the opinions expressed above we think it worth '.Yhile to inelude an account
of the careful and considered steps by which, over a period of several years, the California
Division of Highways moved into the field of welded high-tensile steel bridges. Appendix
4, therefore, consists of extracts from a paper by the Bridge Engineer in Planning of that
authority.

The paper itself was included by Bonwick in his report to Utah (Ex. 24) following
his visit overseas in early 1960.

2.4.4. Utah Australia Ltd.

There seems to be no doubt that the C.R.B. regarded Utah as the most impressive
of the contractors whose tenders were low enough to merit serious consideration. There
were good reasons for this attitude. The American principal of Utah was known
to be a major contractor of wide experience with a long history of successful work.
The Australian subsidiary, although not very long established, had earried out work at
Eildon and in the Snowy Mountains which had demonstrated its capacity to bring to
Australia much of the skill and drive that characterize the American eonstruction industry.
By employing senior staff from America, supplemented by Australian assistants and
workmen, and by maintaining an adequate liaison with the parent company it had built
up a good reputation, especially in the field of earth-moving and similar work.

Although Utah had had no experience of bridge building its proposal to construct
the foundations itself, and to sub-contract the design and the fabrication and erection of
the steel work, while maintaining over-all responsibility for the job, seemed to make
the best of both worlds.

The only weakness of this plan proved, in the event, to be a fatal one: neither Utah
nor the C.R.B. nor, for that matter, J. & W. itself realized that J. & W. was not competent
to handle the problems inherent in the use of high-tensile steeL It is unfortunate that the
American company, to which the designs and, presumably, the arrangements as a whole were
submitted, did not ask some pertinent questions on this point.

As the general contractor, responsible for the job as a whole, Utah had a clear duty,
first to satisfy itself that its sub-contractors were suitable and, when experience showed
that they were running into difficulties, to do something about it.

It is obvious that the Utah personnel in Australia knew nothing about high-tensile
steel and, like almost evervone else, took B.S. ~)68 on its face value. When Hardcastle's
investigations in 1956 show~d that it would save weight there does not seem to have been anv
t};ought that a full study should be made of the possibility of using it on a big scale i.iJ.
Australia. Enquiries in California-and the Executive Headquarters of the Utah
 26

Construction Company are in San Francisco~would have shown that the successful and
extensive use there of welded mild. and high-tensile steel for bridges has involved. what amounts
to a transformation of the steel construction industry. Radiographic inspection of welds,
which was so much resented by J. & \V., is recognized as essential not only to check the
work produced but to develop techniques and train welders. Beaton writes of " shops ...
being subject to the discipline of radiography" and the papers that Bonwick included in the
report of his visit to U.S.A. and U.K. in 1960 (Ex. 24) reveal a technical awareness that was
pathetically lacking on the Kings Bridge.

At the Enquiry, Counsel for Utah was at pains to show that the responsibility for
ensuring the competence of the sub-contractors rested exclusively on the shoulders of the
C.R.B. "The authority at least is satisfied, and that was all that any reasonable contractor,
in our submission, would be required to do ". (Tr. p. 190). We do not accept this view.
One ofthe purposes that the C.ltB. had in mind, in advertising the contract on a world-wide
basis, was that a contractor 1night emerge who would bring to Victoria expertise that was not
locally available. C.R.B. thought it had such a contractor in Utah but was disappointed
in the event. We do not exonerate the C.R.B. from a share of the blame but we do not
think that Utah did all that could reasonably have been expected ofit. The resources that
were readily available to Utah from its American principals were not brought to bear on the
fabrication of the steeL

2.4.5. King-street BridgE~ Design Ltd.

The consultants who formed themselves into the above-named company presumably
did so because no one of them felt that he had sufficient experience, or a big enough office,
or both, to tackle a job of this magnitude unaided.

In the event four engineer;:;, each from one of the constituent firms but none experienced
in the use of high-tensile steel, were mainly concerned and of these Hardcastle seems to have
played an important, if not the leading, part; at any rate, he came forward at the Enquiry
as the spokesman for the group.

By 1957, Hardcastle had. had some eight years in practice as a structural designer
and had won for himself a good reputation in this field. He had not previously designed a
bridge, however, and it is therefore necessary to ask whether he should have taken on, or
been entrusted with, a bridge project of this magnitude; to the layman it might appear not.
But the principles of structural design are very much the same whether a bridge is being
designed, or a crane, or the framework of a building. \Ve can find no evidence whatever
that Hardcastle himself, or the team of which he was apparently the leader, should not have
been entrusted with this work. We discuss, in Section 2.6.2., the only two features of the
design that were open to criticism. It is now only necessary to point out that although
Hardcastle said (Tr. 480) that the final decision to use high-tensile steel was made by Utah
and K.S.B.D. jointly, and, although K.S.B.D. had reported, on the strength of a trial design,
that B.S. 968 appeared to offer the most economical solution, the ultimate responsibility is
that of Utah. It must be realized that the position of the designers in this contract was a
subordinate one. 1'hey were employed by, and were responsible to Utah, whose engineers,
Miller and Longo, who were regularly in contact with Hardcastle and who, after considering
the matter and consulting J. & W., finally made up their minds to submit a tender based
on B.S. 968 steel. \Ve think that within the limits of the responsibility assigned to it,
K.S.B.D. was competent to carry out the work for which it was engaged.

\Ve retain our preference for a different arrangement, as discussed in Section 2.1.,
under which C.R.B. would have engaged a consulting engineer to design a bridge for the
construction of which contracto:rs would have been invited to tender. It would then have
been his duty to have investigat~~d the suitability of B.S. 968. As it was, as far as we know,
Utah never called upon K.S.B.D. to make any real investigation or to give any technical
advice on this matter at all.

\Ve also think it important to comment, at this point, on the influence that the
competitive situation, in which the designers were working, had on the deeision to use high-
tensile steel. It was necessary for them to produce not only a satisfactory design but also
one which would be acceptable on price. Hardcastle's trial design showed a saving in weight
and the very sketchy investigation, which was all that was practicable at the tender stage,
suggested that it would also show a Raving in cost. \Ve cannot, naturally, know what
 27
Hardcastle would have done if he had been retained as a consultant by C.R.B. to design
the bridge, but he would at least not have been under pressure to produce a competitive design
and could have had a full investigation of B.S. 968 made before choosing it.
1'his consideration underlines the objections to this form of contract which we have
described in Section 2.1.

2.4.6. Johns & Waygood Ltd.

This company which was established more than a century ago, has acquired a good
reputation as a fabricator of structural steel work. In recent years it has built a fine shop
at Sandringham where a large tonnage of welded mild-steel work is produced annually. The
equipment and facilities of this shop appear to be at least equal to those in comparable shops
abroad working in a similar class of work to J. & W. but we must enquire whether they were
adequate for the higher class of work required if B.S. 968 was to be satisfactorily fabricated.
11 he manager of the structural department was 1VIr. \V. C. Farrar, whose extensive
experience of design and construction began in 1929. He was generally responsible for all
phases of the J. & W. contract and, in particular, was closely involved in the preparation of
the tender to Utah. In this context Farrar said : ":VIy knowledge of welding is such that
I am able to prepare estimates committing our organization to firm bids on competitive
tenders and if suceessful to organize the execution of them ". As neither he nor anyone
else in .J. & W. were personally familiar with fabricating B.S. 968 steel he relied on the
assurance of B.H.P. that thousands of tons of similar material had been supplied by it to the
Naval Dockyards and had been satisfactorily welded.
In preparing his tender Farrar considered and made some (but, as it turned out,
insufficient) allowance for pre-heating, testing of the steel, and radiography of the welds.
Regarding the latter he said: "Had the Board stated that field radiography inspection would
be imposed if B.S. 968 steel was used but not if mild steel was adopted, the use of B.S. 968
steel would not have been considered for a moment ".
We have a good deal of sympathy for Farrar. He was preparing a tender, under
some pressure of time, for a job in an unfamiliar material ; he tried to extrapolate from
his extensive knowledge of handling mild steel to a new situation and relied on advice which
was literally true but actually misleading. He was working to a specification the implications
of which neither he nor, at that time, the C.R.B. fully understood. In consequence his
expectations of the extent to which J. & W. would have to reorganize to deal with the contract,
were quite inadequate.
Theofficersimmediatelyinchargeofthefabricationand welding were Mr. \V. R. Stocker,
and Mr. K. F. A. Scarlett, both of whom were very experienced in working with mild steel
but lacking in experience of high-tensile steel and its properties.
J. & W. does not employ a metallurgist in its organization "because there would not
be sufficient duties to keep him fully occupied and our policy has always been to seek advice
from an outside expert for metallurgical queries. For example, regarding quality and
supplies of steel we discuss our problems with B.H.P. who have their highly-qualified technical
officers and well-equipped laboratories at their service. For electrodes and welding
techniques we have ready access to, and in fact are encouraged to use, the competent
technical experts of the various companies supplying electrodes and welding equipment
to us and for any special investigations we would engage the services of an expert consu1tant
or analyst depending on the nature of the advice required.''

Although it is not our function to offer advice to the parties concerned in this project
we feel that an opportunity for preventing similar mishaps in the future will be missed unless
we draw attention to organizational defieieneies which eontributed to the bridge failure.
Whilst it is evidently possible for a fabricator in mild steel to work without a
metallurgist it is not possible with a1loy steel. Had J. & w. been used to examining
welds rnetallurgically, and been aware of all the technical pitfalls which beset the fabrieator
in alloy steel, the whole character of the organization eould have been changed. A
metallurgist would have aided the training of welders ; checked the chemical analysis of the
plates so that the inevitable variations in composition could be assessed; carried out the
lzod tests; helped with the assessment and control of pre-haat; and supervised the use of
 2R

non-destructive weld tests by radiography and other means. This involvement of a

fully-trained applied scientist in its work would have raised the whole tone of the J. & W.
establishment. It would have been well worth while even for this c>ontraet alone and of
lasting benefit to J. & W. as a leading fabricator.
As it was there was no one at .J. & \Y. who understood, or had any interest in, the
testing programme. The proper care and drying of electrodes, the calculation and
measurement of pre-heat, which added to the technical difficulties and expense, the orderly
determination of welding sequences and the dissemination of unambiguous instructions to
the welders, and the keeping of adequate records were foreign to their normal practice.
It did not become a member of the British Welding Research Association until June, 1960,
and we have no evidence that its officers were abreast of the technical literature of their
subject. All these things are indicative of their unscientific attitude.
These remarks must be read in the context of the high standard of technical
competence required to handle alloy steel. So far as mild steel is concerned the equipment
was entirely suitable, the welders skilful and the management experienced.
But in 1957 the company's organization, particularly in technical control, was not
adequate to undertake the fabrication of girders in low-alloy steel.
By contrast, we heard from Mr. Reedy how Caterpillar of Australia Pty. Ltd., had
organized itself to use large quantities of B.S. 968 plate in the manufacture of its
earth-moving plant. While there is an obvious differen9e of scale between Caterpillar's
work and J. & W.'s, this was a most impressive account of intelligent technical control which
had enabled a local fabricator to know for itself, by analyses conducted by its own staff,
within what limits of chemical composition this steel could be satisfactorily welded, and
to lay down appropriate procedure. It was also evident that this mastery of the job was
not l~ghtly won but was the result of long, arduous and expensive investigation and
expenence.

2.4.7. Broken Hill Proprietary Co. Ltd.

While B.H.P. is generally regarded as a single organization, the fact is that the
steel-making plants at NewcaBtle and Port Kembla enjoy a certain measure of technical
autonomy. The Port Kembla branch, operating under the name of Australian Iron and
Steel Pty. Ltd., is the one with which we are directly concerned since practically all of the
steel used on the bridge was made there.
The sales organization in Melbourne apparently serves the whole company and
Mr. 0. B. Ralston, the service officer who conducted correspondence and had discussions with
J. & W. about the contract, also represents both plants and works from the l\felbourne
office.
Mr. J. vV. Thompson, who is a metallurgist by training, was the Assistant Bxecutive
Officer, Administration, at Port Kembla and was in charge of the chemical and metallurgical
laboratories, research and inspection there during the period when the steel was being
manufactured for this contract.
The company as a whole manufactures a wide range of steel and steel products ;
steel to B.S. 968 for Caterpillar and other customers, and the very similar D. \V. plate for
the Navy, had been made for some time prior to the bridge contract. On the basis of
this experience, B.H.P. had no hesitation in agreeing to supply steel for the bridge and in
assuring .J. & W. that it would be weldable. \Ve discuss elsewhere (Section 2.3.4) the
attitude of the company to the additional tests specified by the C.R.B.

On the face of it, therefore, one would suppose that B.H.P. would have been well
able to play its part adequately in the Kings Bridge contract. It had enough qualified
staff and laboratory and plant resources to do all that was required. Yet we find that the
production of some 2,000 tons of steel involved the diversion to other uses of far more steel
than was sent to the b1idge, while of that which was sent, several heats could, with
advantage, also have been diverted. The reasons for this are not clear either to us, or, we
feel, to B.H.P. itself. We understand that the two plants used different techniques for
producing this material and we wonder whether there was any collaboration or discussion
between them on the metallurgical aspects of the problem.
 29
Although much good steel was delivered to the bridge the steel as a whole must be
regarded as unsatisfactory for three reasons
(a) lt \vas too variable in quality.
(b) Much of it wa::> found to be difficult to weld because of the high carbon,
manganese and chromium content.
(c) Some of it. notably heats 35 and 56, was notch brittle.

Brittle fracture is a problem that has caused anxiety in recent years to the designers
of large plate structures, such as ships, storage tanks and bridge girders, especially when they
are welded. It is a problem that is still not completely solved but a good deal of progress
has been made ; the influence of stress raisers and low temperatures is recognized, suitable
acceptance tests are being devised and so on. But, in the last resort, it is to the steelmaker
that we must look to produce steel that is notch tough.

In other countries much progress has been made in this direction and, to this end,
extensive experimental and steel production programmes have been carried through. Such
work as was done in B.H.P. laboratorieg was on a much smaller scale and would be classed
as " testing '' rather than " investigation ". The apparent lack of interest in a topic that is
of sufficient importance to justify a place in forefront of the research programme is
disappointing, particularly as there have been several brittle fracture failures in Australia,
in recent years, in some of which B.H.P. steel must have been involved. \Ve have full details
of only mie of these failures which is described in Report of the Proceedings of the Fourth
Conference of Professional Officers, representing the Controlling Authorities of the Water
Supply and Sewerage Services of the Capital cities and of the States of Australia. rrhe
conference was held in October, 1949 and one paper describes the :33 brittle fractures that had
occurred up to that time during the fabrication of some 6 miles (out of 2:3 miles total) of
69-in. diameter pipes. Some of the remarks made during the discussion of that paper might
almost have been made at out own Enquiry and are worth quoting :--
" B.H.P. had been approached in the matter but unfortunately they had not
been very helpful. Their attitude seemed to be that is our standard grade of
If you dmd huy it there are plenty of other customers who are willing t.o
take it._.,
.... if it could get a steel corresponding to B.K ~)68 difficulties would
he overcome. B.H.P. were prepared to make such steel if sufficient orders were
forthcoming,._ 'One thing they (B.H.P.) did ask and that was that the British
Rtandard should be relaxed somewhat in the tolerances .

We quote these remarks because they indicate an attitude that apparently still
prevails in B.H.P. To be fair, 1948 was a time when steelmakers were hard-pressed to meet
the demand for steel, and B.H.P. has since made a great deal of B.S. n68 steel, as we know ;
moreover, B.S. 968 : 1941 has not been as successful a specification as had been hoped and
has since been replaced by B.S. 968 : 1!)62. On the other hand, B.H.P."s attitude to its
customers and to tolerances has scarcely changed and it still has much to learn about brittle
fracture.

lt may perhap:s be argued that if research on this topic is being actively pursued in
various places elsewhere, there would be no point in B.H.P. duplicating it. This may he so,
but we think that there is a need for a strong technical group directing continuing
investigations on basic problems associated with the steel-making, pit practice and mill
practice of quality steels. Such a group might have resolved that, in view of work
proceeding elsewhere, its own efforts should be concentrated on other problems, but there
would at least have been people in the company reading current scientific literature with
comprehension, and ensuring that up-to-date knowledge permeated the whole organization.

We recognize, of course, that B.H.P. hai:i a research department at X eweastlc, and

technical laboratories at Kewcastle and Port Kembla, but these laboratories do not appear
to have been working in a concerted manner on the kind of problems with which we have
been confronted in this Enquiry.
 30
B.H.P. ha:; a wonderful r:lcord and has played an incomparable part in the development
of Australia. It has certainly not been slow to introduce all sorts of innovations in the
field of steel production, to take but one example, but we consider that the events with
which we have been concerned have shown up a weakness in its policy and outlook which
made it, at the time of the contract, not fully competent to produce steel of the appropriate
quality.

We describe elsewhere some incidents, among several that came to our notice, which
suggest that there was room for an improvement also in the flow of information between the
plant and the service department. Problems of communication of this kind are inevitable
in a big organization and, unfortunately, they are seldom brought to notice except when
something goes wrong. The system of internal communications operating at that time
in B.H.P. should have been adequate, we think, and the incidents referred to were more the
results of errors by the officers who used it than of the system itself. This matter is discussed
again later, but for the present, we simply remark that it would have been better if more of
what went on between Ralston and J. & W. had been recorded in memoranda and circulated
'\\.-jthin the company so that a project of this importance might have received closer attention
by all concerned, especially in the early stages.

2.4.8. Murex {Australasi~a.) Pty. Ltd.

The headquarters of Murex Welding Processes Ltd. are in England ; the head office
and works of Murex (Australasia) Pty. Ltd., are in Hobart, where a research laboratory
is maintained, while an office for handlin.g sales is located in Melbourne.

The company is a we1l-known one in the welding industry as a manufacturer of

electrodes, fluxes and electric welding equipment.

In June, 1958, the Melbourne office of Murex was asked to recommend an electrode
for the manual welding of B.S. 968 steel and, after certain investigational work at Hobart,
a " low-hydrogen " electrode, Fortrex 35, was recommended. This electrode consists
of a central wire coated '\\.-jth a flux which is specially designed so that the amount of
hydrogen liberated during welding is kept to a minimum ; this makes it particularly suitable
for use with low-alloy steel of the B.S. 968 type.

Electrode acceptability tests were carried out to the C.R.B. specifications by Murex
under C.R.B. supervision ; the welded plates were examined by Royal Melbourne Technical
College and, as a result, Fortrex 35 electrodes were approved and used throughout the
project for manual welding. "Murawire" and " Muraflux" were later approved by the
C.H.B. for automatic welding.

When J. & W. started t.he fabrication of the girders it ran into trouble because it
was quite unprepared to weld B.S. 968 steel to the required standard. An arrangement
was then made under which Mr. F. A. Ward of Murex was seconded to J. & W. to instruct
welders in the use of welding techniques necessary to obtain good X-ray results when using
low-hydrogen electrodes.

It is apparent that \Yard set about the task of transforming the J. & W. shop so as to
make it capable of producing work of adequate standard and he certainly improved the
standard of welding. Ward i8 an experienced and intelligent man who holds a number
of certificates which testify to his competence and had spent some thirteen years as a
part-time welding instructor at Royal Melbourne Technical College. As well as relying on
his own experience he was constantly in touch, through the Melbourne office, with the research
department in Hobart.

The correspondence to and fro (Exs. 151 and 180) gives a very clear and convincing
picture of a well-organized company with experienced metallurgists at the centre, constantly
providing their technical representatives in the field with valuable advice and information.
We have no doubt that l\Iurex was well able to do what was required of it and, indeed,
it was asked to undertake, and achieved, far more than one would have expected in the
circumstances. The reorganization that Ward brought about at .J. & W. went some way
to bringing it to the standard required for this class of work.
 31
2.4.9. Conclusion on the competence and experience of the parties.
We discuss in Section 2.7.1.1 the question whether C.RB. was justified in including
B.S. 968 in the bpecifications but, in any event, in the light of our discussion of the
competence and experience of the parties, it is evident that C.R.B. should have taken
eertain additional steps which were not taken.

Clausb' 1-1-10, Assessment of Tenders, lists the factors which the C.R.B. announced
that it would take into account in assessing the tenders. Among these is :~
(f) Ability of tenderer to finance contract.
There should, in addition have been a clause-
" (g) Ability of tenderer to carry out the contract."

'l'he C.R.B. had, in fact, made provision for obtaining the information on which
(g) might be assessed for, among the documents which the tenderer was required to
complete, was Form G, which included :-
(l) List of Major Bridge and other Civil Engineering Works designed and
constructed by Tenderer.
(a) Design (four columtL''l with headings, Description, Constructing Authority,
Amount, Design Time).
(b) Construction (four similar cohunns).

]<"'urther parts of the form enquired about the major items of plant used, the number
of design engineers and draughtsmen or workmen employed per week at peak of design or
construction, and the technical literature in which projects are described.

Utah's answer to all the questions was "See accompanying brochure labelled ' Utah
Construction Company '." This brochure (Ex. 19) is an impressive accmmt of the
achievements of this great company in the construction of many important projects,
including several that are of world renown. Its inclusion as part of Utah (Australia)
Limited's tender clearly implied that the full resources of the American principal were to
be thrown behind the Kings Bridge contract, and the C.R.B. appears to have left the
matter there.

The specified tender docun1ents did not require, and the actual tender did not
supply, any details of the competence of the sub-contractors although clause 1-2-14 states
that " The contractor shall not without the prior written consent of the Board (which
may be given upon such conditions as the Board deems fit and which shall not relieve the
contractor from liability under this contract)-
(a) sub-let any portion of the works; or
(b) enter into any sub-contract for the execution of any portion of the works ".

It is clear, therefore, that the C.R.B. relied on the general competence of Utah
and, later, of J. & W., and did not pursuP any adequate enquiries on their specific
competence to weld low-alloy steeL

Moreover, the C.R.B. did not take adequate steps to fit itself for its task as
J~ngineer"as described in the specifications. (See Section 2.3.5.)

These initial mistakes on the part of the C.H.B. had serious consequences for they
led to a series of assumptions that had, in actual fact, little or no basis.

Thus : C.RB. believed that B.S. 968 steel, if capable of passing the additional
. . J. & W.
tm;ts, could and would be satisfactorilv \Velded by

K.S.B.D. believed that C.R.B. would not have included B.S. 968 as a permissible
material unless satisfied that it was suitable.

Utah was assmed by J. & W. that it could do the job and, not being required by
the ;,pecifieation to submit evidence of J. & W.'s experience and not itself realizing the
full in1plication of working with high-tensile steel, aecepted these assurances without
making adequate enquiries.
 32

J. & W.'s officers were told by B.H.P. that the steel was weldable ; did not realize
that for " weldable " they should have read " weldable by firms that have reorganized
themselves to a new level of technical competence''; thought that C.R.B. would not have
included B.S. 968 without due consideration; and finally, knew that C.R.B. would be
inspecting the fabrication procedure and the finished work and expected that this would
suffice to ensure a satisfactory job.

All these parties must share the blame for embarking on a project for which they
were not fully competent. Only Ferris and Murex played their parts properly.

We believe that C.RB. rather expected that the successful tenderer would have
been an overseas contractor, experienced in the design and construction of the particular
type of bridge offered, and, in that event, C.R.B.'s own limited experience might have
been of less significance.

The first welded high-tensile steel bridge built of Australian steel by a Victorian
firm should have been a much smaller structure on which all concerned could have served
an apprenticeship in a new craft.

2.5. The Specifications.

2.5.1. General description.
The specifications fall into four main divisions, as follows :-
Division !-Conditions of tendering and conditions of contract.
Division 2-Materials.
Division 3-Design.
Division 4-Construction.

The conditions prescribE:d in Division 1 requued each tenderer to prepare a design

conforming generally to the leading dimensions which had been fixed by the C.R.B., and
to submit a Schedule of Rates giving the unit cost quoted for each item of work. The
product of the estimated quantity of each item and the unit cost gave the estimated cost
of each item and hence, bv summation, the estimated cost of the whole work. The actual
cost of the work was similarly obtained from the product of the actual quantity of each
item and the unit cost quoted in the Schedule of Rates.

Division 2 specified in considerable detail the properties of the materials which

might be used in the bridge and the tests which samples of those materials had to pass
before being accepted. As is usual in such documents, much use was m<:tde of standard
specifications issued by such bodies as the Standards Association of Australi11, the
British Standards Institution and the American Society of Testing Materials.

According to clause 3-1-5. (a), the superstructure might be constructed of reinforced

concrete. pre-stressed concrete, riveted or welded steel, structural aluminium alloy or
combinations of any of these. Division 2 accordingly provided specifications for most
of the materials likely to be :required for structures of the above types although, as it
turned out, the specifications for the high-tensile steel which was eventually used were
mixed up with those for mild steel. We are concerned throughout this Report with events
which may have stemmed from this unfortunate lark of precision.

It may be remarked th2ct no ~:;pecification at all was provided for aluminium alloy.
The O.R.B. explained that had the successful contractor offered this material, a supplementary
specification would have been issued in accordance with clam>e 1-:3-9.

Division 3 of the specification dealt with design and in it were laid down the loads
which the bridge was to be capable of carrying, the permissible working stresses in the
various materials, the permitted limiting dimensions of various components and, generally,
the great many conditions to whieb the designB had to conform. The total effect of all
these elauses was to leave the designer very little freedom of manceuvre for the exercise of
his own judgment. Clauses l-i:l~4 to 1--3-8 inclusive laid down the arrangements by which
the C.R.B. were to check the drawings and computations; in practice these arrangements
were supplemented by design conferences at which the C.R.B. indicated the corrections
that were to be made to the drawings. Exhibit 157 is the fiJc of the minutes of these
conferences, 119 in number, and it is clear that, while it may be going too far to describe
the C.R.B. as "the real designers of the bridge'', the C.R.B. certainly approved every
ealculation, drawing and detail, and required to be changed anything of which it did not
approve, or which did not conform to the specifications.

Division 4 contained the specification clauses which regulated wOTkmanship and

construction procedure ; in particular, elauses 4-6-53 to 4-6-67 covered welding and
inspection. Some of these clauses, notably 4-6 55 (Control of distortion and shrinkage
stresses), 4-6-56 (Pro-heating), 4-6-60 (Quality of welds), 4-6-61 (Corrections), and 4-6--63
(fnspection, general) became the subject of much disputation between J. & W. and the
C.R.B. They are discussed in Section 2.:i4. below.

There wore in the specifications a number of clauses the existenee of which seem to
have been overlooked or ignored by the parties, or compliance with which was waived.
Some examples are:
Clause 2-l-l. (Particularly as it defines the word "' purchases ").
Clause 2-3-9. (Drillings for analysis).
Clause 2-3-24. (Despatch of material).

2.5 .2. The design specifications.

Division 3 of the specifications prescribed the way in which the designer was to set
about his task and the limitations within which he had to work. It is necessary to enquire
whether this specification was so rm;trictive t.hat designers were unduly circumscribed and
a.lso vd10ther any of the clauseH were actually harmful in any way.

As to the former, Hardca::;tle stated in evidence that he did not feel himself restricted
by the specification but he also stated t.l1at it was much more detailed than other tmch
specifications to which he had v;orked and that it " certainly controlled our approach to
design".

On the other hand, there were two respects in which Professor A. J. Francis, who
assisted John Holland and Co. with their design, disagreed \vith the terms of the specification.
The first of these is of sufficient interest to merit a brief discussion. Clause 3-4-10 stated
that " in designing piles to resist lateral loading, and for design as a column, no lateral
support from surrounding materials shall be taken iuto account where these materials are,
filling, silt, or elay ". It would be not unfair to describe this clause as being completely
safe hut somewhat conservative even in view of the very poor foundation material adjacent
to the Yarra River.

Francis, relying on experimental and other evidence that need not concern us,
attempted to take advantage of clause 3-1~~10, which stated that" a rational analysis based
on a theory acceptable to the Board ... will he considered as compliance with the
specifications ", and designed a piled foundation \vhicl1 took some accmmt of l::tteral support
from the silt and clay of the river bed.

Utah, on the other hand, made enquiries from the C.R.B. as to how tenders which
departed from the specifications would he received, and was told, in substance, that they
would not be entertained. Accordingly, it was decided as n matter of policy to adhere
strictly to the specifications and to submit a design including Benoto cylinders for the
foundations. The tender letter of 29th January, 1957, however, includes these \vords :-
" If the C.R.B. ean furnish further information concerning lateral support
to the piles and also aetailed properties of the silt, it8 locat-ion and extent at each
of the pier locations, then based on such further information, on the assumption
that lateral support of piles f'an he assumed above the gravel layer it is believed
that a foundation using piles could he designed, which, if acceptable to the
C.ILB., could result in a substantial money saving".

The C.RB. did not pursue this suggestion but accepted the tender based on Benoto
eylinders which were eventually snccessfulJy used. Lta.h and the designers were, therefore,
more accurate than John Holland and Co. in its assessment of the C.R.B.'s views on piles ;
by tendering on the basis of Benoto cylinders, and content.ing themselves wit.h merely
drawing attention to the economic a.dvantages of piles, they went. a long way to securing the
6352/63-3
 34

contract without doing violence to their engineering eonscience ; while the intended use
of piles was one of the reasons given for the rejection of John Holland's tender t:>pite
of its lower price.
We do not blame the C.H.B. for its attitude. As a public authority, responsible
for public safety, it was perfectly entitled to take this decision. We simply point out
that other responsible and experienced engineers held a different view. Such a eonflict
of judgment is inevitable in any engineering project.
The second matter in which Francis held different views from the C.R.B. was in
relation to the thickness of flanges briefly discussed previously in Section 1.1.3. Although
there is a rather unfortunate confusion with clauses 3-4-13 and 3-6-14 of the specification,
elause 3-10-6, where one reads that " no plates greater than 1 inch in thickness shall be
used in welded construction ", is 1mambiguous. 'rhis elause led straight to the use of
cover plates.
Here again we are involved in a question of judgment. The necessary thickness
of the flange plates in the cent:re of the span can be achieved either by having a single plate
of, say, 1-!-in. thickness, or by welding a cover plate on to the main flange plate. In this
case the combined thickness would be somewhat less than 1! inches because the thinner
plates in B.S. 968 can be used at a somewhat higher working stress than the thicker.
Both methods have their advantages and disadvantages. The O.R.B., relying on
Ferris's advice, reasoned as follows :~" The thicker the plate the greater is the risk of
brittle fracture because of the inherent properties of steel. It is therefore better to use two
or three thiimer plates welded together and to rely on our tests to ensure good steel and
sound welding. Cover plates are well recognized and widely used devices and, if carried far
enough towards the end of the girder to guard against fatigue, provide the best solution ".
The opposite view can be stated thus :-" Thick plates in the centre of the girder
"VY'ili be joined to thinner plates towards the ends by butt welds which are inherently better
than fillet welds because they are more easily X-rayed, and are not so liable to residual
stresses arising from the welding process nor to stress concentrations under applied loads.
Provided we take care to avoid notches and other discontinuities which will produce local stress
concentrations we can reduce 11he risk of brittle fracture to a reasonable leveL Moreover,
we will eliminate long runs of fillet welding and, in particular, avoid the termination of
the cover plate which, although often used, is not a good design feature ".
Expert opinion is divided on which is the better view to adopt and the O.R.B. cannot
be blamed for preferring one to the other. We simply point out that Francis disagreed, but
we must not fall into the error of saying that the bridge would still be standing if it had
been built to his design rather than to Hardcastle's; we have no means of knowing how
the thicker steel would have tmned out in actual practice nor how it would have fared in
the hands of the fabricators.
It must be pointed out, though, that the specification both required satisfactory
Izod results as a guarantee of adequate notch-toughness and also limited the thickness
of the steel for the same pmpose. This left the designer with no scope to apply his own
mind to the risk of brittle fractme and the best means of avoiding it.
In conclusion, we think it can be said that opinion is swinging away from eover
plates towards the use of thicker plates and especially towards the use of special steels
and techniques in critical regions. Thus Messrs. Mott, Hay and Anderson, when designing
the Huncorn-\Vidnes Bridge (See Ex. 93) in 1956, used plates in B.S. 9681! inches thick with
butt welds, but arranged for the completed girders to be subjected to a stress-relieving heat
treatment. They seem to have got the best of both worlds for their bridge is still standing,
at the time of writing, after one of the most severe winters on record.

2.5.3. High-tensile steel.

The clarity of the specification for the steel left a great deal to be desired. 'fhus
clause 2-5-1, high-tensile strudmal steel of weldable quality, provided that the steel should
conform to the requirements of B.S. 968: 1941, that the steel should be made by the
basic open-hearth method, and that the War Emergency Hevision of 1943 should be deleted.
Testing was to be carried out in accordance with clauses 2-3-6 to 2-3-16.
 35
Reference to these clauses vvhich, incidentally, are under the heading " Mild Steel ",
shO\vs that several tests not contemplated by B.S. 968 were called for. The most
important of these were the Izod and weldability tests which were intended to protect the
bridge from brittle fracture.

In the Izod test a specimen of the steel to be examined is machined so that its
cross-section is a square of side 10 n1.1n. A groove or notch of specified dimensions is cut
in one side of the specimen which is then mounted in the anvil of a pendulum impact
machine. The pendulum \veight is swung so as to hit the specimen which breaks at the
notch ; the energy absorbed by the steel in fracturing is measured by the subsequent height
of the swing of the pendulum. It is generally considered that this test gives a good
indication of the notch toughness of the steel and is thus a fair guide to its liability to
brittle fracture.

An alternative test of a 1-limilar kind is the Charpy test in which the specimen
rests as a beam between two supports instead of projecting as a cantilever from a single
anvil as in the Izod test. The Charpy test is replacing the Izod mainly because the
temperature of the specimen can be more easily maintained at the desired value.

In clause 2-3-7 the required Izod values are given as 32 ft.jlb. at 70 F. and
20 ft./lb. at 32 F.

The weldability tests were quite elaborate and required two plates to be butt-welded
together in a certain manner and then cut up into slices, by machine cuts at right angles
to the weld, so as to provide a number of specimens each containing a central weld. Four
of these specim.ens had to withstand being bent round a former without cracking ; two
were subjected to tensile tests and four were prepared for Izod testing by machining
notches ; in two of the Izod specimens the notch was located in the centre of the weld and
in the other tvvo in the heat-affected zone (H.A.Z.) of the plate adjacent to the weld.

The Izod specimens were to be tested aecording to the requirements of clause

2-3-B (b) in which two temperatures, 32 F. and 70 F. were mentioned. For reasons
that vrere never satisfactorily explained, the tests at the lower temperature were never
carried out.

The specification leaves much to be desired at this point. Only four Izod specimens
were called for, two with a notch in the weld and two with a notch in the H.A.Z. Thus
if tests had been conducted at two temperatures there would have been but a single test
under each condition. This is not good practice ; \vhenever possible three tests should be
made. It is unfortunate, too, that the lower temperature was the one to have been discarded
for this was the more critical from the point of view of brittle fracture.

It can well he argued that if the reason for including these tests had been
unequivocally stated in the specification the C.R.B. inspectors, at least, would have been
able to approach this task \vith more understanding.

Some ingenuity is required to discover the results that were to be attained in all these
tests for the clauses just referred to were under the general heading of "Mild Steel" and
the values quoted presumably referred to tha,t material. However, B.S. 968 gives values
of the ultimate tensile stress and yield stress for plates and sections of various
thicknesses ; no values for the Izod tests are given, of course, since these tests are not part
of that specification.

The final result of all this was to produce a steel specification with many clauses in
addition to those of B.S. \")68. The intention oft,he C.R.B. in so doing was naturally, to secure
a steel with appropriate qualities, espeeially in respect of notch toughness, but the confused
way in which the speeification was actually written and the ambiguous use of the term
B.S. 968 undoubtedly contributed to the unfortunate series of misunderstandings, or whatever
they were, that surrounded the supply of steel for the bridge.

It is not unusual for the writers of specifications to add clauses to standard

specifications and, in some instances, standard specifications include optional elauses that
may or may not he insisted upon. We are convinced that the train of events would have
 36

been quite different if the C.R.B. specifications had made no mention of B.S. 968 but had
included a full specification, ab initio, for the steel that was desired. This could have forced
Utah and .J. & W. to have negotiated a contraet with B.H.P. for the supply of a special
steel and many lamentable ineidents, whieh oceupy much spaee in this Report, might not
have taken place.

The following table summarizes the mam differences between the C.R.B. steel
specifications and B.S. 968 :--

CH Jl Vlalli!e Title' ...

Jl S Clause Diffcl'ence

-~---

2-3-7 .. Im.pnct properties .. '' .. Not in B.S. 968

2-3-8 .. W eldability .. .. . . Not in B.S. 968, but similar tests are given
m B.S. 2549: 1954 as a test of the
electrode
2-3 ~; .. Chemical analysis .. .. 9 Clause 2-3-9 more detailed than elau<>e 9
2-3-12 .. Tensile tests .. .. 4 Speed of testing specified Jn elause 2-3-12
2-3-14 .. Imp a et tests .. .. .. Not in B.S. ~168
23-15 .. Number of tests .. .. 5 and 7 Quite different requirements
2-3-16 .. \V eldability tests .. .. .. Based on B.S. 2549 but signifieant differences

2.5.4. Welding.
The elauses dealing with welding were carefully dmwn with the intention of producing
a high standard of workmanship. The difficulties that were actually encountered arose,
in the main, from the following :-
(a) At the time of writing this specification, \.Vilson was not fully aware of the
complications of welding B.S. 968 steel, and it therefore became necessary
to issue supplementary specifications.
(b) The nature of the welding process and the defects that <-an occur are such
that the production of an unambiguous document describing what
is, and what is not, aeeeptable is inherently difficult.
(c) J. & W. did not expect that the very high standard of welding described in
the specification would be insisted on by the C.R.B.

The clauses that gave rise to special diffieulty are now briefly discussed.

Clause 4-6-63 includes the following

" The welding of structural sections will be inspeeted by the engineer (i.e.,
the C.RB.) during and after fabrication. Methods of inspection which may be
used include the following :-
Visual inspeetion (including the use of penetrant dyes, acid etehing and
photography).
lVIagnetic particle inspection.
Radiographie inspection."

J. & \V. maintained that previous experience of C.RB. contracts had led to the
expectation that radiographic ins:pection, if used at all, would be used to a small extent only,
and that the amount insisted upon required the welding to be of " pressure vessel
standard ".

The C.R.B. maintained that the elause meant exaetly what it said and it proceeded
to set up a team of inspeetors whose duty was to inspect every inch of welding using
whatever method was thought appropriate. Penetrant dyes were used extensively on
fillet welds and radiography mainly on butt welds.

Clause 4-6-60 (a) reads: "\Veld metal shall be solid throughout except that any small
gas poekets and smal1 inclusions of oxide or slag may he over looked if well dispersed and if
none exeeeds -k inch in greatest dimension, and if the sum of the greatest dimensions of
all sueh defects in any square inch of weld met-al does not exceed i inch ''. The
 37

interpretation of this elause, and the insistence by the C.R.B. on what was regarded
by J. & W. as being a standard higher than \Vas implied in the phrase " equal to the best
general practice in modern bridge shops " (Clause 4~6~7), led to continual friction.
Eventually, a new radiographie standard (Ex. 58) was adopted based on the work of
Beaton of the California Division of Highways. Objection was taken to this new standard
on the grounds that, as Beaton's work had not been published at the time when the
contract was signed, the contractor could not possibly have expected it to be used.
Nevertheless, it was used apparently for the remainder of the construction period.

Clause 4-6-61 prescribed the procedures to be used to eorrect any defects found as a
result of the inspection procedure just described. There is no doubt that a large amount
of repair work was in fact carried out (See Ex. 103 and 222) and subsequently passed by the
C.R.B. The evidence supports the contention of J. & vV. that, in spite of the difficulties
which were admittedly encountered in welding, every repair demanded by the C.R.B.
was carried out to the satisfaction of the C.R.B.

Clause 4-6-56 required care to be " exercised to prevent weld cracking ". " If
required by the engineer" the parts to be joined were to be "pro-heated to a temperature
of at least 130 F " Tables 1 and 2 and Appendix D of B.S. 2642 give the
relationship between the pre-heat temperature and the welding conditions for rutile and
low-hydrogen electrodes. This specification was itself superseded, on the instmctions of
the C.R.B., by a booklet (Ex. 23) written by B. J. Bradstreet and published by the
British \Velding Research Association entitled "Arc-Welding Lo\v-Alloys Steels" which
described a fairly elaborate procedure for determining the degree of pre-heat and resulted
in different temperatures being required from those given by either clause 4-6-56 or B.S.
2642. This topic is discussed further in Section 2.9.4.

The pre-heat temperatures actually used were the subject of argument throughout
the hearings of the Commission. In clause 4-6-55 instructions are to be found on the welding
proeedures to be used to minimize distortion and shrinkage stresses, while clause 4~6~12 (a)
states that " completed work shall be of the correct dimensions, square and free from
twists, bends, and open joints. No member at any time during fabrication shall depart
from the straight or from the specified profile by more than i inch in any length of 10
feet". These requirements were apparently later replaced by those in clause 507 of the
American ~Welding Society's Standard Specification for ~Welded Highways and Railway
Bridges, which are somewhat less severe.

While the J. & \V. and C.R.B. witnesses were all unanimous that at least the pre-heat
specified by the C.R.B. was always used, it was admitted by the senior officers of J. & W.
that they were reluctant to use the full pre-heat required by the B.,V.R.A. booklet referred
to above. One reason for this was undoubtedly the fact that the greater the preheat the
greater the difficulty of controlling distortion. It was never satisfactorily established
that the permissible deviations of the finished girders from t,he nominal dimensions were
compatible with the pre-he.at required.

2.5.5. General comments on the specifications.

Specification writing is an art whose subtleties are seldom illuminated by the light
of day let alone by the blinding searchlight of a prolonged public enquiry.

The writer is, or should be, concerned to describe the materials and workmanship
in such terms as will ensure adequate, serviceable quality but not such perfection as
would be unduly expensive. It must be confessed that specifications usually err on the side
of perfection and call for work of such flawless virtue as no contraetor could achieve without
going bankrupt. It is then left to resident engineers, clerks of works, and inspectors
to temper the written word with the wisdom and experience of long practice.

A good specification, on the other hand, substitutes objective tests of quality,

wherever possible, for pious demands for the unattainable so that inspectors have impartial
rods with whieh to measure the work it is their duty to judge.

By this criterion the C.R.B. speeifieations were, in general, good but the clauses
covering steel were scattered about in an unfort1mate manner and were not as clear as
could have been desired. We have criticized some of these elauses because they were
 38

not free from ambiguities and especially heeause the ambiguity over the nomenclature
of the steel had such unfortunate COih'>equences. However, the C.R.B., while admihing
these criticisms, claimed that no reasonable person could really have been misled; any
deficiencies in the speeification provided a useful excuse for--hut could not possibly have
caused~-the events that led to the failure of the bridge.

Our only criticism of the substance of the steel clauses, at~ distinct from their form,
relates to the Izod value required and the lower temperature specified; these were taken
by Ferris from B.S. 1500 : 194'9 for unfired pressure vessels. We now think that the
value of 20 ft.jlb. was too low and that the temperature of i32o F. was too high ; the
lowest temperature recorded in Melbourne is 27c F. (See Sections 2.7.1.2. and 3.4.3.)

Nevertheless we desire to commend very strongly the inclusion of such a clause.

There remains only the question of whether the form of the specification was
suitable for this type of contraet. \Ve make no firm deeision on this point hut content
ourselves -vvith the remark that the full advantage of a design and construct contract may
not be realized unless a petjorrnanoe speeifieation is written. We think that such a course
would allow the contractor more scope to offer an ingenious solution and wm1ld force him
to bring his designer more closely into partnership \vitb his construction team. But we
concede that the writing of such a 8peciflcation would pose many problemR for the
construction authority especially in devising suitable acceptance tests.

With the important re8crvatim1s mentioned, therefore, we conclude that the

C.R.B. specifications \Vere satisfactory.

2.6. Design.
2.6.1. General suitability.
\Ve are agreed that, 1:1peaking generally, the dm;ign was a good one. It employed
a large number of plate girders, which are very commonly used in steel bridge eonstruction,
arranged alternatively in cantilever and suspended spans. The details were arranged in
such a way as to make the progressive erection of the completed girders a straightforward
and systematic process. The girder::-; themselves had clean and simple lines, ea.sy to
maintain and attractive in appearance.

The structure as a whole was an elegant addition to the Melbourne scene; it

cert,ainly greatly improved the flow of traffic in that part of the city.

Criticism of the design must, therefore, be confined to the u~:~e of high-tensile steel
and to the details of the design of the tension flangm; of the girders. The latter are
discussed below. In proceeding as they did on both those features the designers, who
were represented at the Enquiry by Hardcastle, were supported by the confirmatory
opinions of many other engineer,s and they certainly cannot be held solely, or even mainly,
responsible for what went wrong.

2.6.2. Design of the tension flanges, of the girders.

It has already been indicated (Section 2.5.2.) that the method of securing the
necessary thickness of the flang(~ in the eentre of a girder by adding one or more cover
plates is very common practice. This is a feature which has been carried over into
welded-bridge practice from long experienee with riveting but the continuity between the
adjacent plates, which is an inherent and, from some points of view, an advantageou8
feature of welding introduces ('Omplications that do not oceur with riveting.

It is customary, for reasons of economy, for the cover plates to extend only over
such regions of the flanges as need to be strengthened. rrhe points of termination have
to be settled and, in this case, clause 3-10~2~ (d) and Table 2 of Division 3 of the
specifications laid dovvn the procedure. The object of this procedure was, very properly,
to ensure that the ends of the eover plates were located in regions where the general stress
level was low enough for the danger of fatigue to be discounted.
 39

We understand, however, that the formulae given in Table 2 were modified after
it had been decided to use high-tensile steel. This would imply that the fatigue strength
of this steel is higher than that of mild steel in the same proportion as the ultimate tensile
strength is higher. We do not think that this is so and, in our opinion, it would have
been \viser to uEte the same fatigue formulae for high tensile as for mild steel. The result
of this would l1ave been that the cover plates would have been longer and their termination
nearer the ends of the girders; \Ve do not think, however, that this change, although
beneficial, would have significantly altered the subsequent train of events.
The shape of the cover plate end had also to be deeided and here a detail was used
that has been successfully used in thousands of instances. It is shown in Fig. 11. In its
report (Ex. 1) the Committee of Investigation criticized this detail, saying : " This is
known to produce high local concentration of stress and is considered an undesirable
feature". The Committee can hardly have been unanimous on thi8 matter, for Exhibit
36 (U.S. Bureau of Public Roads drawing SB--2~53 slwwing standard Composite I-beam
Bridges) shows a cover plate detail almost identical with that used in Kings Bridge and
is signed by J\:Ir. E. L. Erickson, a member of the Committee.
The stress situation in the main flange plate adjacent to the end of the cover plate
is very complicated and is affected by several cireumstances. These are discussed below
in some detail, but it should first be pointed out that the attention of investigators in the
past has mainly been concentrated on the magnitude and significance of the stresses
induced by the superimposed loads on the structure. The residual stresses left in the
structure by tl1e processes of manufa.cture have not received anything like the same
attention, partly because they are far more difficult to investigate satisfactorily, but also
because they are usually considered to be of less importance. This view can only be
justified if it is certain that tlw steel is sufficiently duetih~ to allow high local stresses to
be dispersed into surrounding regions by local yielding. The various sources of stress are
now discussed.

2.6.2.1. Residual stresses resulting from previous welds.

When two pieces of metal are welded together it is inevitable that, on cooling, tensile
stresses will be " locked up " in the weldment at some points and compressive stresses at
others.
If a single plate is uniformly heated and allowed to cool the thermal expansion and
contraction can t,ake place freely and there are no residual stresses. But if, while it is hot
the plate is firmly attached by welding to another plate, the shrinking which would otherwise
occur on cooling is prevented to some extent and a state of stress is produced. In a weldment
the weld metal itself is also involved for, as soon as it solidifies, it attempts to shrink but,
being firmly attached to the adjacent plates, it too has stresses induced in it. The details
of what happens depend very much on the temperature distribution throughout the joint
and the rate at which it loses heat particularly as it approaches normal temperature.
The above remarks apply both to mild and to high-tensile steel. Internal stresses
are also caused by the volumetric expansion, which has to be aceommodated by the cooling
mass, associated with the carbon in the steel; at high temperatures the iron and carbon
are combined in such a way as to form austt>nite which changes, at lm'>'er temperatures and
with an increase of volume, to ferrite plus pearlite.
The higher the carbon and manganese content the lower is the temperature of
this change and the harder is the resulting product.
It follows from the above that as one weld succeeds another, during the fabrication
of a structure, complex patterns of residual stress are superimposed.
The main runs of welding in Kings Bridge were the fillet welds coiUJecting the webs to
the flanges and the cover plates to the flanges. It is to be expected that the final stress
situation after fabrication depends on the order in which these main welds and, naturally,
all the other welds, were perfornwd. We therefore attempted to find out whether the cracks
at the ends of the cover plates \vere associated with the order in which the various welds
were perfonned and, while the evidence is not conclusive, it would seem that the worst results
were obta.ined when the cover plate ends were welded hst, as was the case with the four
girders of the failed span. (See also Sees. 2.9.6.1. and 2,9.6.7.)
 40

2.6.2.2. Residual stresses resulting from the progressive completion of a single weld.
It will be apparent from the foregoing that the final state of stress is liable to be
affected by the way in which a single weld is bnilt up. The Interim Code for Manual Metallic
Arc welding in Building Construction, published by the Standards Association of Australia
as S.A.A. Int. 352, has this to say : "The di1ection of the general progression in welding
on a member shall be from points where the parts are relatively fixed in position with respect
to each other, toward points where they have a greater relative freedom of movement."

In attaching the cover plates to the flanges the long fillet welds were automatically
welded first and the welds along the tapers and across the transverse ends were then done
manually. This operation was some times carried out as the last step in attaching the cover
plate to the flange but before the web to flange fil1ets were made, and sometimes as a final
operation after the web and flanges had been welded together.

So far as the order of making the taper and transverse manual welds was concerned,
much time was spent at the Enquiry in trying to establish what actually happened and in
discussing what should have happened. rraking the evidence as a whole we conclude that
some welders did one thing and some another and that the records now available do not
enable us to say whether there is any correlation between the mder of procedure and the
subsequent appearance of craeks.

There was no evidence that the transverse end weld was ever completed before the
welds clown the tapers were beglm but experiments by A.I.S. (Ex. 184, Section 7) suggest that
this might have been the best way to proceed.

2.6.2.3. Stresses at the ends of the cover plates caused mainly by superimposed loads.
It is to be expected that at the cover plate end there were residual stresses produced,
in the manner described above, both by the welding of the cover plate to the flange and
also by more remote welding operations.

We now come to the main stresses for which the bridge \vas designed-those caused
by the dead load of the girders and deek and those caused by the incidence of traffic. In
addition, mention must be made of the attachment of the concrete deck to the upper flanges
of the girders by means of shear connectors. The shrinkage of the concrete, as it hardened
and matured, would impose a compressive stress on the upper flange and a corresponding
tensile stress on the lower flange. Professor Francis' estimate of the increased tensile stress
in the lower flange from this cause was 2,HJO lb.jsq. in. (Ex. 30).

The stresses caused in the tension flanges by the load effective at any moment can
be estimated by conventional bending theory, but this does not take into account the
concentration of stress at the ends of the cover plate caused by the sudden change of stiffness
of a flange to wbich a partial length cover plate is attached.
The first report of the Steel Structures Research Committee (ILM.S.O. 1931) contains
theoretical and experimental evidence about the stresses in welded joints which, if extended
to the cover plate problem, indicates clearly that the stresses in the welds connecting the
cover plate to the flange will be different from those given by conventional theory. In
particular it is to be expected that the elastic force transmitted by unit length of the end
welds will be intensified.

2.6.2.4. Intensification of slresses by the shape of the weld.

The three previous sections have described briefly three sources of stress at the ends of
the cover plates. It remains to point out that the actual stress experienced at a particular
location depends not only on the general stress level to be e21..'Peeted for one reason or another
but also on the exact shape of the weld at the point. Thus a smooth and gradual transition
is much to be preferred to one in which there are re-entrallt angles which produce an
intensification of the stresses. In particular any sharp angle at the toe of the weld, or
undercutting or overlapping of the weld or, worst of all, an actual crack will result in a local
region of higher stress intensity than the average in the locality.
All these effects can be cumulative and, when this happens in the tensile sense, the
local stress at a critical point can rise to a much higher value than the designer's calculations,
which generally deal with average stTesses only, would lead him to expect.
 41

2.6.2.5. Triaxial stresses.

It will be appreciated that, within the tl1irkness of the steel in a weldment, the various
effects described above can result :in stresses having components in mutually perpendicular
directions. Specifically, at the toe of the weld at the end of the cover plate there can be
stresses acting parallel to the length of the girder; stresses perpendicular to the length of
the girder and parallel to the plane of the flange; and stresses perpendicular to the length
of the girder and parallel to the plane of the web.

It is known that the behaviour of steel is greatly affected by the magnitude and sense
(i.e., tension or compression) of these stresses and that, in particular, the existence of
component tensile stresses that are nearly equal in magnitude is conducive to brittle fracture.
While the subject is far from being fully explored it now seems certain that a steel which
is quite ductile under a tmiaxial stress can become brittle if sufficiently large perpendicular
stresses are also present. It is also thought that all steels will fail in a brittle manner under
sufficiently high triaxial stresses, i.e., when the three perpendicular components are equal.

It also appears that the transition temperature, at which a change from ductile to
brittle behaviour takes place, is raised by the action of component tensile stresses perpendicular
to the direction of the main stress. This may account for the fact that the transition
temperature obtained from Izod or Charpy tests is not always the same as experience of the
same material in an actual structure '"ould indicate.

An interesting discussion of these matters is given by Bijlaard in the book "Residual

Stresses in Metals and lVIetal Construction" edited by Osgood (Reinhold, 1954 p. 127).

The phenomena just described make it particularly dangerous to weld across the
tension flange of a girder for residual stresses can be set up in three perpendicular directions.
Since the main stress (longitudinal) is tensile the tendency to brittle fracture is increased
and the transition temperature raised at points where the other component residual stresses
are tensile.

A further consideration is that, if a crack should appear, it is likely to be across the

flange and so across the line of the main longitudinal tensile stress. A erack of this nature
may, in some circumstances, propagate by brittle fracture; in others the resistance of the
beam to fatigue failure will be reduced. It should also be noted that the risk of a crack
propagating by brittle fracture is greatly affected by its location. If it is in such a position
that it can extend without hindrance right through the structure it is much more dangerous
than if extension does not lead to a large release of energy. It will thus be seen that a
crack on the outside of a tension flange is more serious, for example, than a crack in the web
some distance from the flange.

For these reasons, and also because any undiscovered weld defect in this position
is a special source of weakness, some designers prohibit the use of transverse fillet welds
at any point on a tension flange ; others permit them only towards the ends of the girder
where the bending stress is low. The specifications for Kings Bridge were based on the
latter view.

We find it difficult to say whether, at the time of writing the specifications, the C.R.B.
should have decided differently but we are of opinion that, on the basis of lmowledge now
available, transverse fillet welds should be prohibited on tension flanges.

2.6.2.6. Connection between the dangers of fatigue and of brittle fracture.

The phenomenon known as the fatigue of metals may be briefly described as the
tendency of a metal to fracture under a. fluctuating or reversing stress. Its danger arises
from the fact that a metal will fail under a smaller load, applied thousands or millions of
times, than would be required to make it fail in a single application.

This danger is naturally more acute in machines with reciprocating or rotating parts
than in bridges where only the live load, due to traffic, fluctuates ; the dead load, due to
the self-weight of the structure, is constant. The extent of the fluctuation of total load
depends on the ratio of live to dead load and is usually greater in railway than in road bridges.
 42
At any point in a structure the likelihood of fatigue failure depends on the maximum
stress and on the range of stress experienced there ; on the number of fluctuations likely
to be experienced during the life of the structure ; and on the inherent resistanee of the
material to the phenomenon of fatigue. The eonneetion between fatigue aild brittle fracture
is that both are most likely to occur at points of high stress especially if the inherent stress
is intensified by stress raisers such as unfavourable geometry, poorly shaped or defective
welds, surface and other defeet8 produced in the steel-making process or notches or cracks.
Residual stresses, especially when tensile and in perpendicular directions, seem to add to the
risk of both types of failure.

The Kings Bridge specifications took account of the possibility of brittle fracture. They
also gave recognition to the susceptibility of the cover plate end to fatigue failure by fixing its
position in a region of low bending stress. It was argued at the Enquiry that, because of the
above connection between fatigue and brittle fracture, the designer should have been alerted
to the danger of the latter occurring at the same point. This may well be so but the C.R.B.,
whose officers compiled the specifications should have been even more alert. However,
Eastick's evidence suggests thar he did not realize that the Izod tests had been included
to try to guard against brittle fracture.

2.6.2.7. Consideration of residual stresses by designers.

Although the exact role played by residual stresses in promoting brittle fracture is
still not fully understood there is no doubt tbat it is a significant one. The question
therefore arises whether the dm;igner should take them into account in some way in the
course of making his calculations.

It will perhaps be apparent from what has already been said that the precise
estimation of the magnitude of residual stresses is really a hopeless task; the most that
can be said is that they will certainly be present in a welded structure and that they may
well approaeh or reach the yield point of the material. On the other hand they are usually,
but not always, local in character. Fina1ly it must be said that their effeet becomes more
serious as the size of the strucilure increases.

With these facts in mind, therefore, and in the present state of knowledge, the
designer proeeeds qualitatively rather than quantitatively. He can do his best, by eareful
detailing, to ensure that the inevitable concentrations of stress are kept to as low a level
as possible ; he should ensure that the fabricator adopts satisfaetory procedures during
welding; in order that loeal yielding may disperse high stresses by redistribution, he must
ensure that only steels of adequate ductility and notch toughness are used; and finally
he may deeide to resort to a stress-relieving heat treatment.

One of the features of the Kings Bridge project that most disturbed us was that
the designer was not in elose eontact with, nor responsible for, the actual fabrication.
Hardcastle told us, for example, that he was not aware that some of the steel used did not
exhibit a clear yield point. We have no means of knowing ho>v he would have reacted to
this knowledge if it had reached him at the time but it is certain that this information would
have had more significance for him, whose knowledge of the anatomy of the structure
was so intimate, than for anyone else.

In the foregoing we have been mainly eoncerned with residual stresses from the
point of view of their local effcet at special points. There remains the question of any
effects that are greater in scale:; one such matter did receive very dose attention during
the construction of the bridge.

It was known that welding the stiffeners to the web plate would have the effect of
shortening the web and it was therefore intended that the operation of attaching the
stiffeners to the web should be completed before the web to flange welds were made.
However, it would not then have been possible to use an automatic welding process for
the long web to flange fillets.

Experiments were therefo:re undertaken to find the magnitude of the web-shortening

resulting from the attachment of the stiffeners so that an estimate could be made of the
residual stresses likely to be indueed if these stiffeners were welded to the girder after the
flanges were in position. The results of these experiments were submitted to Professor
 43

Roderick, of Sydney, whose view was that the arrangement would he satisfactory provided
that the possibility of buckling could be eliminated from consideration. Aecordingly,
Hardcastle made some calculations which showed that the danger of buckling was remote
and the arrangement was approved and used throughout the fabrication.

It is evident from a perusal of Roderick's report, and of the reeords of the eonferenee
with him, that he mainly considered the possibility of a reduction of the so-ealled plastic
moment of resistance of the girder by the residual stresses. In so doing he implicitly relied
on the capacity of the girder to develop a full plastic moment by yielding, as he was
entitled to do because of the specification of the steel. He 'vas not asked for an opinion
on the possibility of brittle fracture intervening before yielding could take place and did
not himself advert to this possibility.

2.6.2.8. Shape of the cover plate ends.

Because of their possible influence on the failure of the bridge, the shape of the cover
plate ends was much discussed at the Enquiry. There has been much research on this
problem, mostly directed to comparing the resistance to fatigue of different arrangements
of the cover plate ends; because of the influence of local stress situations on both fatigue
and brittle fracture it can he assumed that a design which is favourable from one point of
view will also be favourable from the other.

The results of these investigations are somewhat conflicting; thus the Welding
Handbook, 4th Edition, Volume 1, says that " No practical arrangement or detail has been
found which is quite as good as simply cutting the end of the cover plate square without
any taper". On the other hand Munse and Stallmeyer (British \Velding Journal, March,
1960), came to exactly the opposite conclusion and found that a design similar to that used
in Kings Bridge, but with the transverse weld omitted, was the hest under some conditions.
However the difference between these designs was not very marked and no detail using cover
plates was as satisfactory as the alternative approach of butt-welding the thinner plate to the
thicker one and tapering the latter, in v>idth or thickness or both, to match the former at
the weld.

It is not to he assumed from this that this last design, by itself, is sufficient to guard
against failure. The Duplessis Bridge, in Canada, (Highway Research Abstracts, June,
1951) and an unnamed bridge described by Campus (Osgood: loc. cit. p. 8) both
suffered brittle fractures initiating at butt welds connecting tension flange plates of different
thicknesses. The steel used in the first of these bridges was, however, of poor quality
while weld defects were found in the second case.

Nevertheless, while it seems that designers are now tending to avoid cover plates it
cannot be said that the practice is tmiversal nor that the designers of Kings Bridge can
he blamed for using them in 1957. As has been said, they have been successfully used in
thousands of instances.

2.6.3. The responsibility of the designer for specifi.ying welding details.

It is not usual for the general structural drawings to show details of the welding
procedure which are normally left to the fabricator to work out for himself. In practice the
latter prepares from the designer's drawings a series of shop dra,vings giving the detailed
dimensions from which the plates are cut and other information required by the workmen
but, again, the nun1ber of weld runs, whether downhand or overhead, the gauge and
type of electrode and so on, are often left to the welding supervisor to settle on the shop
floor.

No doubt this procedure is quite satisfactory on routine jobs in mild steel hut it
seems to us to he inadequate in some circumstances. It is not difficult to think of structures,
even in mild steel, where the order in which the welds are made is important from the
designer's point of view. When more difficult materials are being welded the development
of satisfactory teehniques and the assessment of their significance in the final structure
seem to us to require considerations of a somewhat sophisticated nature on which the
designer's mind should he brought to hear.
 An important advantage of the design and construct type of contract is that there
need be no obstacle to full collaboration bet1veen the fabricator and the designer in such
matters ; the latter can hardly be expected to have a close, detailed knowledge of the
metallurgical and other implications of welding techniques but he can well be expected
to realize how the final results of those techniques may effect his structure.

\Ve are therefore astonished that it should have been agreed, a;.; ;.;tated by Wilson,
that "the welding procedureE . would be determined by the fabricators and there
would be no reference on the drawings in that regard." This is to throw away one of the
advantages mentioned by Da:rwin for this ty7e of contract. (Section 2.1.).

We believe that the Kings Bridge project shows that if designers do not take some
responsibility for welding procedures then they are taking 8erious ri8ks. The extent to
which ~his is necessary on a particular job, and the way in which responsibility is best to be
exercised are outside the scope of this Heport but they merit careful consideration by the
engineering profession.

2.7. Steel.
2. 7 .1. The steel specified.
2.7 .1.1. The justification of including B .S. 968 : 1941.
Steel to B.S. 968 : 1941 mcluded by the C.R.B. as one of the options for use in
the superstructure of the bridge, is knowll as a low-alloy steel and it is designated as
" high-tensile (fusion welding quality) structured steel for bridges, &c.". It was a war
emergency specification. The C.H.B. specifications clearly implied that if welded girders
were to be included in the construction they could be fabricated either in mild steel or in
high-tensile steeL The main advantage in the use of the latter was that higher design
stresses could be used becau:ge this steel was stronger than mild steeL Consequently,
the girders would be lighter, thus reducing the load on the foundations. As the foundations
were the cause of much anxiety in the early considemtions of the C.RB., any feature
reducing the dead load of the superstructure could from that point of view be considered
desirable. Nevertheless, in assessing the economy of high-tensile steel it is necessary to
look beyond the mere saving of weight. This material costs more than mild steel per ton
and it is more difficult to fabricate. For these reasons we were surprised at Bonwick's
statement that its use resulted in a saving of 175,000.

Since all conditions for the 8atisfaetory welding of low-alloy steel were well known
and since economies in the dead load on the foundations could be produced thereby it was
reasonable for the C.RB. when drawing the specifications to include B.S. 968 : 1941
steel as an optional material.

However, there are certain implications which follow from this. It was known to
the C.RB. that no major welded structure had been constructed in this material in
Australia (See 1\lasterton's article on " Kings Bridge ", Ex. 22). It was not sufficient to
know that other fabricators including the Hoyal Australian Navy had used this steel. If
the girders were to be fabricated in Australia it was necessary to know that there was a
fabricator with the organizational and technical ability to make the change from mild steel
to low-alloy steel construction, and that the steel as made in Australia would have the
necessary properties-for it is well kno1vn that many manufacturing features enter into
the production of a satisfaetory steel.

In this connection it must be borne in mind that :-

(a) At the stage when the specifications were drawn the C.RB. did not know
that the steel would either he made or fabricated in Australia and as
this was a British Standard Specification they not unreasonably assumed
its authenticity as a steel suitable for the fabrication of bridges by welding
construction.
(b) If, on the othe:r hand, as turned out to be the ease, the steel production
and the fabrication were to be done in Australia, there is no doubt the
B.H.P. would have assured C.RB. that it eould make satisfactory steel,
and there is equally no doubt there were fabricators in Australia, who,
 45
whilst perhaps not having experience with thit> particular steel, were
organized for work under the exacting standards used for pressure
vessel fabrication.

Wc conclude that the C.RB. was justified in including steel to B.::). 968 ; 1941 as an
optional material for constructing the superstructure, provided the specifications ensured
that it would be fabricated by a firm having adequate experience with its characteristics.
For this purpose there should have been inserted in the specifications a clause providing
that where a tenderer proposed the use of B.8. H68 : 1941 or for that rnatter pre-stressed
concrete or aluminium alloy, he should be required to demonstrate his ability and
competence to handle such material.

It follows that before accepting a tender based on B.S. !J68 : 1941 the C.RB. should
have been satisfied that the above condition relating to the fabricator and the steel supplier
could be fulfilled. The C.R.B. neither adequately investigated the properties of B.S. 968
steel as made by B.H.P., nor the ability of the sub-contractor to reorganize along the
necessary lines.

In the absence from the specifications of a special clause as suggested, clause 1-2-14,
which pro'hibited the contractor from sub-contracting any part of the work without the
prior written consent of the C.H.B., could have been invoked in relation to J. & W. It
appears that J. & W. and B.H.P. were accepted as sub-contractors and steelmakers,
respectively, on the strength of their general reputation without any special enquiry about
their experience in fabricating or manufacturing B.S. 968. The C.R.B. should have
required this competence to have been adequately demonstrated.

We arrive, therefore, at one of those many curious situations which have been a
feature of this Enquiry. While the C.RB. was justified in permitting steel to B.S. 968 : 1941
as an option, it was not justified in accepting without further enquiry the tender of Utah
including B.S. 968 : 1941.

We are eonvinced that the C.RB. failed to make the necessary experiments and
enquiries because (with the, exception of Wilson) no officer of the Board realized their
importance. They accepted the title of the British Standard Specifieation as implying
that the steel could be welded satisfactorily by an established fabricator irrespective of
whether he had had experience with low-alloy fabrication or not.

2.7.1.2. Reasons for modifying B.S. 968: 1941.

(a) Notehed Bar Impact Tests.-Wilson appears to have been the only man in the
C.R.B. to have been thoroughly convinced that failme by brittle fracture was a possibility,
and in this he was advised and supported by Ferris of D.S.L. 'l'o this end he \\'"Tote into
the original design specifications some safeguards to cover the possibility of failme of the
bridge by brittle fracture, appl;.ring these features of the specifications with equal force
to both mild steel and B.S. 968, if welding construction was to be used.

To eover this possibility he introduced into his speeification two features :-

(i) The thickness of plates or sections was limited to a maximum of l inch.
(ii) An Izod notched bar impact test to be carried out at two temperatures,
namely, 32 F. and 70 F.

It was said that the temperature of 32o F. was chosen because it was the lowest
operating temperatme to which the steel work of the superstructure would be exposed
under Melbourne climatic conditions. However, enquiry at the ~Ieteorologieal Bureau
would have elicited the information that the n:Unimurn temperature ever recorded in
Melbourne was 2T ]f. and engineering eaution would have reduced this to 22o F. Indeed
at another part of the specifitation this was done: Clause 3-6-46 requires that the
provision for expansion and contraction of the girders should cover the range of temperature
20 F. to 120 F. It is obvious that 32 F. was ehosen because it is easily reproduced,
being the melting point of ice. To understand the significance of this requirement needs
a brief deseription of the phenomenon of brittle fracture. It should be understood that,
as mentioned above, this phenomenon is associated with mild steel as with low-alloy steel,
so that in what follows no distinction is made.
 46
when steel is subjected to load it deforms : at low stresses the amount of deformation
is small and, if the load is removed, the deformation disappears. At higher stresses the
deformation is more marked and is permanent in the sense that a high proportion of it
remains even after the load is removed. The transition from one stage to the other takes
place gradually in some steels while in others it is characterized by " yielding " when a
comparatively large amount of deformation takes place under nearly constant stress.
Steels in which a large amount of deformation takes place before fracture are ductile.

The presence of notches creates an entirely different situation, and in this connection
a notch may be merely a sudden change of section associated with a design feature, a defect
in the plate resulting from steel works practice, a crack resulting from defective welding
practice or from flame cutting a plate to dimensions, an under cut in a weld, a nick caused by
a sharp blow in handling and any similar sharp change of contour on the surface, or even
a sudden change in physical properties sueh as occurs in the immediate vicinity of a weld.

In such cases, under tensile stress, a fracture is liable to start at the apex of the notch,
and once started it may be either arrested or propagated according to the properties of the
steel. The property of arresting the development of a crack is kno\\'11. as notch ductility.
A notch ductile steel will arrest a crack already started ; a notch brittle steel will allow
the crack to propagate with substantially no deformation at low stress and the steel
fractures as though it were a piece of pottery.

Notch ductility depends on many features associated with the chemical composition
and manufacturing conditions of the steel, the sharpness of the notch, the speed with which
load is applied and the temperature of the steel when the stress is applied.

It will be seen therefore that to ensure notch ductility in any plate of steel it is
essential to test it to check ii1s behaviour to stress in the presence of a notch, and to do
this at different temperatures. It is found that Rteels of the t)'}Je considered change
regularly from a notch brittle state at low temperatures to a notch ductile state at higher
temperatures. This is known as the transition range and this determines, in so far as it can
be determined, the response to stress of steel containing notches of the type described. For
any given quality of steel such as mild steel or low-alloy steel the transition range may vary
according to the steel manufacturing conditions, so that it by no means follows that steel
of a given chemical composition, will have a defined degree of notch ductility at a given
temperature. For this reason, it is essential to apply a test and the one most favoured is
a Charpy or an Izod test which has already been described.

The result,s obtained are a valuable guide to the suitability of the steel, but its
actual transition charaeteristics in a given structure may not be identical with those shown
lmder the simple conditions of the test.

In order to determine 1;he transition characteristics of a steel a number of notched

bar test pieces is required. 'I'hese are then brought individually to a given temperature in
the range to be investigated from the lo\vest at which the steel is to be used up to about
220 F. The specimens are broken in the Charpy or Izod machine at the temperature to
which they have been brought, and the energy absorbed in fracturing is noted.

The C.R.B. should have ,,;peeified and insisted upon the carrying out of a complete series
of tests of the kind described until it became familiar with the properties of the steel,
instead of specifying two temperatures only, 32 ],. and 70 F.

All low-carbon steels are i-mbjected to this phenomenon of changing with temperature
from a ductile to a brittle state.

There is, however, another source of embrittlement of low-carbon steels. This is

the phenomenon of strain ageing. It is associated with the presence of nitrogen, and is a
eharacteristic of a given heat of steel and independent of the ambient temperature. This
brittleness is generated when susceptible steel is subjected to a slight deformation
followed by heating to a low temperature (around 250 C.). Since all flange plates were
straightened by rolling through staggered rolls, and were heated prior to welding and during
 47
welding, a susceptible steel might develop strain embrittlement and be ;,;usccptible to
brittle fracture irrespective of the ambient temperature. It follows that the notch ductility
of the steel as supplied by the steelmaker may deteriorate during fabrication and there is
nothing a fabricator can do to prevent this change. It is inherent in certain heats of steel.

This kind of embrittlement was not envisaged by the C.R.B. and no test to cover
t,his feature was written into the specification. Apparently also the steelmaker did not
advert to this possibility, for it is possible to " fix " residual nitrogen by small additions to
the steel in the ladle. It does not then cause strain ageing.

(b) The Weldability Test.-A further materials test included in the CUtE.
specification was a weldability test intended to ensure that the properties of the steel as
supplied were maintained during the welding operation, and also to test the properties of
the weld metal deposited from the electrode. Again, this test was to be applied whatever
the steel used, i.e., it was not restricted to B.S. 968. It was a complicated test involving
a lot of machining, and it was probably this feature which gave rise to the impression that
exce:-:;sive testing was involved in the contract, an impression which ultimately led to a
relaxation of testing about the middle of 195n.

This series of weldability tests included Izod tests (a) on the weld metitl, and (b) on
the heat-affected zone of the weld. Two tests 'vere to be made on each, and at p. 83, book 1
of the specification it is stated (by implication) that t,hey should be made at 32 F. and 70 F.
However, in fact, both were tested at "ambient., temperature, and none at 32 F.

SU:YIMARY.
1n view of the unknown behaviour of B.S. 968: 1941, steel in conditions leading
to brittle fracture :-
(a) It was reasonable and right to specify a notched bar test. at. the lowet':lt
temperature to which the bridge would he subjected.
The question as to whether the value chosen for the lzod impact
value 'vas the right one is discussed elsewhere (Section 3.4.3. ).
(b) As the weldability tests were designed to test both the weld metal and the
heat-affected zone of the parent plate these tests also were reasonable and
should have been carried out on each individual heat of steeL
(c) In view of the very limited experin1ental work which had been done on the
properties of this steel by either C.R.B. or J. & W. before fabrication
commenced, it would have been advisable for the preparation of the test
weld to have been done by one of J. & W.'s own welders. This would
have given them a better kno,vledge of the welding characteristics of the
steel. Instead, the preparation of the test welds was given to the most
expert welders of Murex, which \vas quite permissible 1mder the C.R.B.
specifications but J. & W. learned nothing from these regarding weldinu
~~~. D

(d) In view of the ultimate failure of the bridge by brittle fracture there can be
no doubt that, in the light of present knowledge, the additional tests
imposed by the specification were justified, though in certain respects
inadequate.
(e) lt must be realized that even the best specification is useless unless its
conditions are complied with. This necessarily involves carrying out the
procedures specified and subjecting the results to intelligent scrutiny.
This was not done.

2.7.2. The steel actually supplied .

. .In Section 2.3.4.1., we discussed fully the matter of J. & \V. having ordered steel
from B:H.P..to comply with B.S. 968: 1941, simply, while having contracted through Utah
to fabncate m steel complying with the extra clauses of the C.R.B. specifications.

It is sufficient to say here, that because of the two different standards created, it is
necessary to consider the steel vis-d-vis the two specifications.
 48

2.7.2.1. Did the steel supplied by B.H.P. meet the B.S. 968: 1941 specification?
The evidence on which this ean be answered is partly in Exhibit 72, a. compilation
of acceptance tests by the C.B.B.
\Vithout going into detail it can be said that, from a eommereial point of view the
steel supplied was in our view largely in accordance with B.S. 968 : 1941 in so far as tests
were carried out.
This statement must be qualified in several ways :-"-
(a) The speeifications call for extra tensile tests when more than one thickness
is rolled from a heat. This was not always done.
(b) Similarly, the number of bend tests, and the type, whether longitudinal or
transverse was not always as specifted.
(c) On the original B.H.P. eertificate showing heat analysis no mention was
made, in general, of the chromium content. The B.S. 968 speciftcation
limits manganese to 1 8 per cent. and the combined manganese and
chromium content to 2 0 per cent. As the manganese was frequently
near the upper limit, this feature of the specification eould not be checked
from the certificate unless the chromium content was guaranteed less
than 0 2 per cent.
So long as the steel was made by the open-hearth process, the only chromium present
was about 005 per cent.--a residual from the steel-making conditions. However, Balston
claimed that B.H.P. was justified in leaving up to 0 35 per cent. ehromium as residual.
If this were so then it was definitely necessary to report chromium on the certificate in order
to check against the specification. In actual fact, when in February, 1959, B.H.P. (Port
Kembla) switehed production from open hearth to electric furnace, it deliberately added
0 25 per cent. chromium and still did not report this on the test certificate.
Even, however, with this addition, the chemical analysis taken from the ladle test
ingot which purports to give as nearly as possible the average composition of the heat was,
by and large, within the specified limits, though frequently at the maximum permissible
limit.
It must be borne in mind that the fabricator has to deal with steel as it is, and not
as it might be or as it purports to be on an analysis certificate. In other words either he
should be able to accept the certificate as giving the true composition of the steel plates
he receives, or he should do some systematic checking. In many cases \Vhen plates were
checked (Table 3, Section 2.9.6.4.) the results were found to differ from the ladle analysis.
There are well-known reasons why a difference may occur between the "ladle
analysis " and the "plate ::malysis ". These are all controllable metallurgically.
Steelmakers vary in their attention to detailed practice, and this constitutes part of the " art "
of steel-making.
Briefly there are three sources of variation of composition throughout a given mass
of steel. The first relates to the size of charge. Open-hearth heats may be several hundred
tons. Towards the end of the process finishing additions of various alloys are made to adjust
the carbon and manganese. There is a. sheer physieal difficulty in getting such a mass of
steel uniform.
At Port Kembla the open-hearth charges were of about 250 tons and this was tapped
into two ladles of 125 tons. The electric furnace heats, however, \vere only 17 tons and did
not, or should not, present the same difficulty, i.e., they would be expected to be more uniform
on tapping.
The second source of variation is concerned with the ladle. Sometimes final additions
of alloys are made and the churning action of the molten metal is relied on to mix the whole
uniformly.
A.l.S. is in accord with these views for in Exhibit 184, section 1, it is stated " the
electric furnace at 17 tons presented a much simpler operation and the advantage of being
able to remove slag and re-form slag of controlled composition and conditions, made
specification control more regular ".
 49
The third source of variable composition is the natural phenomenon of ingot
segregation. The molten steel is teemed from the ladle into ingot moulds. The ingots
solidify from the outside and the concentration of such elements as carbon, manganese,
sulphur and phosphorus increases towards the centre and top of the ingot. By suitable
practice this segregation can be localized and can be removed by cropping in the rolling
mill. In this way ingot segregation differs from ladle and furnace segregation. It is
regular and can be removed in normal mill practice. The other two would give steel which
varies from ingot to ingot and the chance of the test ingot of about 2 lb. being representative
of the many tons of metal is remote if the charge is not uniform.

Heats 55 and 56 have been the subject of exhaustive checking during this li1nquiry
and it has been shown definitely by all the laboratories concerned (D.S.L., McPherson's,
and A.I.S.) that there were differences between the ladle analysis and the plate analysis
taken from the failed girders. ']'his is not the place for a detailed consideration of this
problem. Sufficient to say that the following order of variation has been found by D.S.L.
& McPherson' s :-

Analyses.
Ladle ! Plate (max.) Difference
I i
Heat No. Type I I
I e. Mu. c. Mn. c. Mn.

~---------~----~----~--------~-
I
38 .. .. .. O.H. 22 156 25 167 03 11

40 .. .. .. , 23 175 26 203 03 28

55 .. .. .. E. F. 21 170 28 180 07 10
56 .. .. .. 23 158 27 175 04 17
"
I I

It will be noticed that the difference between ladle and plate analysis, as far as carbon
is concerned, is rather greater with the two electric furnace heats than with the two open-
hearth heats. The differences are not great except with heat 55 and would not have been
serious if the ladle analysis had not already been at the maximum permissible limits of the
specification. The regularity with which high carbon and manganese have been found in
heats 55 and 56 suggests ladle segregation rather than ingot segregation.

The significance of the chemical composition is that it controls the mechanical

properties (yield stress, maximum stress, ductility as measmed by elongation in the tensile
test and notch ductility) and the weldability. In general, the higher the content of carbon,
manganese and chromium the stronger and the less ductile is the steel ; the higher the carbon
the less notch ductile and the less easily weldable is the steel.

2.7.2.2. Submitted heats.

There was a great deal of discussion during the Enquiry relating to a group of six
electric furnace and two open-hearth furnace heats (a1l fully killed) which were said to be
slightly high in tensile strength. These J1eats were referred to as "submitted heats" and
are further discussed in Sections 2.7.2.3, 2.10.3.2 and 3.4.1. It was disclosed at the
Enquiry that these heats, including the first heats made in the electric furnace, had been
made with the deliberate addition of 0 25 per cent. chromium. This was not disclosed on
the analvsis certificates. AJter careful consideration of all the evidence we have reached
the conclusion that this addition was not, per se, a factor causing the failure of the W.l4
span, but in conjunction with high carbon and manganese added to the difficulties of
fabrication.

However, two of the heats (Nos. 55 and 56) were incorporated in the tension flanges
of the group of girders which collapsed on July lOth, 1962.

Before following this matter further, it is necessary to look at the steel supplied from
the point of view of the C.R.B. specifications.
6352/63--4
 50
2.7.2.3. Did the steel meet the C.R.B. specifications?
As has been pointed out, the C.R.B. design engineer, Wilson, wrote some additional
clauses into the specifications covering Jzod impact tests and weldability tests thereby
modifying the B.S. 968 : 1941. The Izod tests were included to protect the bridge from
brittle fracture.
One of the factors which affects notch duetility is the thickness of the plates.
Consequently, the specifications called for Izod tests at two temperatures on each thickness
of plate from each heat of steel. The reeords, however, disclose that when there was more
than one thickness of plate in a given heat only one thickness was subjected to Izod tests
and there is nothing to indicate to which thickness the actual tests were applied.
It was a term of the C.R.B. contract with Utah (See Clause 2~3~24) that material
should not be despatched from the maker's works or from stock until Utah had certified that
it complied with the requirements of the C.R.B. specification. In fact, during the Enquiry,
no party has adverted to this dause and it must be pre~:mmed that no attempt was made
by the C.RB. to enforce it. J. & \V. looked upon C.RB. as the authority to give the final
approval, but did not hesitate to fabricate steel before this approval had been given. Utah
took no part in the assessment of tests, but merely passed on the certificate from J. & \V.
to C.R.B.
Of the 58 open-hearth heats supplied, 54 were tested, not in accordance with the
strict requirements of the C.H.B. specifications, but to the extent of the actual require-
ments of the C.RB. They all passed the Izod test at 32 F., most of them easily
complying. Curiously some of them (Heats 4, 9, 20, 25, 26, 30 and 31) failed at 70 F.,
but on retesting (not strictly according to the specifications) were passed. Most of the
heats passed the weldability tests at first attempt and all on retesting.
It has been very evident during the Enquiry that those concerned with the Izod testing
programme did not understand its significance and went through the motions merely to
comply with the specifications. This particularly applies to Scarlett (J. & W. and Utah),
Bastick and Jackson (C.R.B.). This attitude was engendered by a defect in internal
communication in the C.R.B., for apparently \Vilson ceased to be associated with this
aspect once fabrication started, and was never aware that the conditions of the specifications
had not been completely fulfilh!d. He does not appear to have passed on his enthusiasm
for the additional tests to those subsequently responsible for carrying them out. The
controlling personnel of J. & W. had no interest in testing of any kind, and B.H.P. had
persuaded them that in any case the lzod tests were futile. Utah personnel simply had
no interest in the quality of material being fabricated for the contract. " vvny "' they
said in effect, " do something \vhich C.R.B. is sure to do ? "
When it became kno>vn to Eastick and Jackson that the remainder of the steel
would be supplied from relatively small electric furnace heats of 17 tons instead of from
125-ton open-hearth heats, they decided to test heats selected at random.
In actual fact, there was little change in the position from this aspect, for from the
58 open--hParth heats only 1,200 tons was delivered to J. & W. This is an average of
approximately 20 tons per heat and is not much larger than the average of 15 tons per heat
from the electric furnaces.
The total number of heats actually supplied was, however, far greater than had been
originally anticipated by J. & W. \vnen the order was being discussed with B.H.P.,
J. & vV. understood that it would have to accept quantities from the one heat of not less
than 150 tons at a time, and J. & W. placed its orders, with insignifieant exceptions,
accordingly. If the steel had been supplied in 150-ton lots there would only have been
fifteen or so heats involved instead of the llO or so actually used in the bridge. The
testing programme was correspondingly enlarged. In addition the amolmt of retesting
requi1ed, especially in the electric furnace heats, turned what would have been a quite
reasonable testing programme---even if it had been carried out completely in accordance
with the C.R.B. specifications~--into a very extensive one.
By contrast with the steel from open-hearth heats the over-all picture of the steel
from the electric furnace heats is not good. Because of the changed attitude of the C.R.B.
to testing they were not tested as thoroughly as the open-hearth heats. Weldability tests
 51

were carried out on 29 heats and of these 26 failed in one respect or another, but most of
them passed on a first retest. This was a much higher proportion of failure than had
occurred in the weldability tests on the open-hearth heats, namely 18 out of 58.

This is an indication that the electric furnace steel produced was inferior to the open-
hearth steel. One of the reasons given for changing to electric furnace steel-but which we are
by no means convinced was the compelling reason-was that the fully-killed steel produced
in the electric furnace would be of better quality and would aid J. & W. to meet the more
exacting specifications of C.R.B.

From the time that random testing was adopted the story of acceptance testing
is a sorry one, and we feel no good purpose would be served by analysing the reported tests
in detail. Several of the heats failed in the weldability Izod test and were never retested
(Heats 49, 50, 51, 79 and 80). Several failed, were retested and failed again. In fact, it
was admitted by Scarlett that testing was continued until satisfactory values were
obtained (See heats 54, 55, 70, 74 in Ex. 72).

The climax of the testing story comes with the group of 8 "submitted heats" (See
Sections 2.7.2.2 and 3.4.1). The results of the first tests on these heats were so bad that
J. & W. and C.R.B. should have been not only alerted but alarmed. Regrettably, these heats
were treated as part of the general run. No plate Izods were carried out, and the
weldability tests were first made four months after the submission. Of the 8 heats, 5 failed
in the tests, 4 of them badly. Heats 52, 53, 54 and 55 failed on the first retest but were
again retested,

Heat 55 still failed, so was tested a fourth time. Almost a year elapsed before
these tests were completed, but although in September, 1959, these four heats were still
showing "fail" on retest, and should in fact have been rejected, J. & W. wrote to B.H.P.
requesting delivery.

A more callous disregard of the value of acceptance tests it would be difficult to

imagine, and the responsibility for this must rest equally with J. & ,V., Utah, and C.R.B.,
for officers of all these organizations were in control of material inspection (Scarlett for
J. & W. and Utah, Eastick and Jackson for C.R.B.).

There is, however, an interesting fact to which we attach some signifieance. The
flange in girder W.14-2 which first fractured (some months before the final failure) was
made from heat 56 (if the records are reliable), which passed the weldability tests at the
first attempt. It was not subjected to plate Izod tests at the time, but in tests since the
failure has given quite variable results.

2.7.3. The steel as found in the failed girders.

Since the collapse of the W.14 span of the west elevated carriageway, many samples
have been taken for chemical analysis, and for various physical tests including Izod tests.
These are set out in some detail in Sections 3.4.1. and 3.4.2. and only brief mention will
be made at this stage.

The records show that the tension flanges (bottom) of all four girders at the
location of the fracture were constructed from steel from heats 55 and 56 (electric
furnace-" submitted heats "). The webs of the girders at the same location were
recorded as being made from heat 40 (open hearth) though there is internal evidence that
in fact the web of girder W.14-1 was made from heat 38 (open hearth).

Chemical analyses have shown that the carbon and manganese contents of much
of the steel from heats 40, 55, and 56 were outside specification-ranging as high as 028
per cent. carbon and (heat 40) 2.0 per cent. manganese (See Exs. 155, 184, and 194). The
maximum allowed by specification is 0 23 per cent. carbon and 1 8 manganese. The
manganese plus chromium figure is, however, close to or above the maximum permissible
in heats 55 and 56 because of the presence of 025 per cent. chromium (intentionally
added), (See Ex. 170).
 52

Much has been made by B.H.P. of a table of toleranceti sponsored by the American
Iron and Steel Institute. From this it is claimed that for steel of this quality tolerances
over the maximum specified carbon of 04 per cent. and of manganese of 05 per cent.
were permissible, and acceptable as grounds for rejection. There is no mention of any such
tolerance in B.S. 968 : 1941.

vVe are of the opinion that a competent fabricator should have carried out check
analyses on at least some of the heats received, and amongst these would surely have
been included the " submitted heats "-
(a) because attention had been drawn to them by the supplier, and
(b) because of the high incidence of failure under the specified tests.

Undoubtedly, some of this steel, including heats 55 and 56, was out of specification
with regard to chemical composition, and should have been rejected. There was ample
time to attend to this as the W.l4 girders were not fabricated for more than a year after
the steel was received.

The Izod tests made on the failed girders have revealed an interesting patteru. In
general, heat 55 shows very low value though occasionally, as happened when it was tested
to exhaustion fOT acceptance, it turns up with a good record. Such a case is found at the
southern fracture in girder W.l4--4. These values (31 ft.jlb. at 32 F. and 40 ft./lb. at
70o F.) are so surprising in view of the testing history of this heat that it is suspected a
plate from some other heat ha,g been wrongly marked.

The samples of heat 5{) from the girders show mixed Izod values, sometimes
conforming with the C.R.B. specification and sometimes not.

It could not have been rejected on the acceptance tests which were made, and it
is futile to guess whether, had Izod tests been made on the plate, the low values or the
high values would have been found. We are certain, however, that under the procedure
of testing till satisfactory results were obtained, this heat would have been accepted.

In fact, no single heat was rejected throughout the contract. We are faced with
the situation that a specification written by 'Vilson of C.R.B. in a form well ahead of its
time, was made futile by the failure to apply it critically. The value of a specification is
determined by the rigour of the inspection system used to implement it.

We are of the opinion t,hat heat 55, along with several others of the submitted
heats should have been rejected. We cannot, on the evidence, say that heat 56 should
have been rejected. On the tests made it was justifiable to include it but whether this
could be said if the full tests had been applied we have no means of knowing.

2.8. Electrodes.
Three welding processes were used, manual, automatic, and semi-automatic. All the
welding at the cover plate ends, both the taper welds and the transverse weld was manual.
The electrode used was Fortrex 35 made by Murex. This electrode is of the low-hydrogen
type recommended for use with low-alloy steel.

There has been no evidence that the electrodes per se were other than entirely
satisfactory. However, the flux surrounding the metal core is Jiable, as with all fluxes,
to absorb moisture from the atmosphere. This moisture is decomposed in the arc at the
melting temperature of the steel, releasing hydrogen which is absorbed by the weld. It
is weH established that such hydrogen is a main cause of cold cracking in the heat-affected
zone of the weld. Because of the nature of the flux covering, the low-hydrogen type of
electrode contains a minimum of inherent hydrogen and any absorbed water can be
entirely eliminated by drying. This involves the use of hot boxes in which the electrodes
are placed prior to being used by the welders. (See Section 2.9.1.)

This procedure was new to J. & W. and, just as it never appreciated. the
metallurgical difficulties associat,ed V\'-ith low-alloy steel, so it never really understood the
need for meticulous care in the drying of electrodes. It was another example of the
organization failing to rise to the occasion.
 53

The packets in which the electrodes are delivered carry instructions for use
including a recommended drying temperature of 150 C. to he maintainetl for lmlf an hour.
It is interesting to note that in experiments conducted by A.J.R. (Ex. 184) it was found
that 350 C. was necessary to ensure that all water was driven off. Although the hot
boxes used by the welders were thermostatically controlled, there was no evidence of any
instruction given to anybody regarding the length of time the electrodes should be in the
box before being used. Since adequate drying of the electrodes is essential for avoiding
cracking in welds, any failure in this respect could have been an important contributory
cause of the failure. If the electrodes used for the welding of the cover plate ends were not
effectively dried, and used whilst in tlle dry condition, they could have been a cause of
the toe cracking which developed at the transverse weld at the end of the cover plates.
The vV.14 girders were fabricated towards the end of the contract, i.e., October, 1960, by
which time, it might be thought, all the essential technical controls would have been
established. However, about this time Clarke mentions in his diary a number of occasions
when he found it necessary to request J. & vV. supervisors to collect odd electrodes lying
around and return them to the hot box. The fact that he made a note of this is an
indication that J. & W. personnel were not seized of the necesRity for attending
scrupulously to this matter.

As against the record in Clarke's diary the evidence of all the J. & W. witnesses,
and Ward (Murex), was to the effect that electrodes were properly treated. However,
Ward left J. & \V. about April, 1960, and we strongly suspect that after his departure,
by the time Clarke made the notes referred to above, the treatment of electrodes had
become somewhat lax.

We are compelled to the opinion, therefore, that laxity in shop organization in the
treatment of electrodes may have contributed to the failure of the bridge.

In so far as the weldability tests were carried out, the quality of the weld metal was
invariably satisfactory, and we are quite satisfied that the electrodes per se played no part
in the failure of the bridge.

2.9. Welding.
2.9 .1. The characteristics of a weld.
vVhen two pieces of steel A and B are to be welded together, this can be done either
by a butt weld or a fillet weld. This latter type, shown at C in Fig. 1, will be used to
illustrate the characteristics of welds as it was this kind which was concerned in the failure.
The weld shown is a three-bead weld. No. 1 bead is the root run. It is run first and
subsequently is covered by and partially incorporated in the two subsequent runs. In
a similar way the second nm is partially incorporated in the third run. It is an essential
feature of a satisfactory weld of this kind that the first run shall fuse into the two plates
and that the subsequent runs shall fuse into the first run and into one or other of the two
plates. In this way there is formed a continuous metallic union between A and B. Each
run or bead is laid down by striking an arc between an electrode and the work being welded.
The steel electrode melts and provides the metal of the weld. In general, it is of a different
composition from the plates being joined.

\Ve thus get two plates A and B, knO\vn as the parent metal and C, the weld metal.
Although A and B difl'er in chemical composition from C, the physical properties should be
very similar, so that there is a "bridge., between A and B which will behave under stress
as though the whole was continuous.

There are, however, some physical differences between the parent and the weld
metal. It is for this reason that the composition of the weld metal is different. Since the
latter is placed in position in the molten state it has the characteristics of a casting-in
particular the grain size is very coarse. The two plates, which in the ingot stage were in
a similar condition, have been hot rolled. This has had two major effects: (a) the crystal
size was considerably reduced and (b) the plate acquired a laminated structure due to the
elongation of segregates. This kind of structure is highly developed in low-alloy steels
of the B.S. 968 type. In effect, the molten electrode is "cast " into a cavity made in the
parent metal by the high temperature developed in the electric arc, and the heat developed
is sufficiently intense to melt also part of the parent metaL
 54

From this brief description it will be evident that in the immediate vicinity of a weld
there is a sharp temperature gradient. The molten steel produced has a temperature of
about 1,700 C., whilst the parent metal may be at ordinary temperatures, or if it has been
"pre-heated" it may be, say, 200 C. Over a short distance there is a fall of about 1,500 C.

Steel is a very complex alloy because at ordinary temperatures it can be in different

states according to the rate of eooling from above a red heat. If cooled sufficiently rapidly
it is hardened-if cooled slowly it is soft, and there are intermediate stages.

The making of a weld involves the establishment of a temperature gradient from

1,700 C. to say 200 C. As a result there will be a zone in the parent metal around the
weld which has not been molten, but which has been heated sufficiently to bring about the
above-mentioned change. As soon as the weld has been completed and the source of heat
is cut off, there will be a sudden cooling due to the conduction of heat into the cold regions.
of the parent metal. That part of the latter which has been above 800 C. will be in a
hardenable condition, and give rise to a zone of steel {about i inch thick in the case we are
considering) which will be the harder the more rapidly it has cooled.

This is the heat affected zone (H.A.Z.) of the weld indicated by shading in Fig. 1.
The kind of difference in hardness which can be expected with B.S. 968 is a follows (hardness
expressed on Vickers Diamond Pyramid scale) :-
Parent JJ!Ietal Heat Affected Zone Weld Metal
180/200 300/500 200/250

There is another effect of the temperature gradient. When heated, steel expands,
and if this expansion is resisted by reason of the fact that the hot zone is surrounded by
steel at a lower temperature, a eompressive stress will arise which will deform the hot zone.
On cooling, this same zone '"'ill try to return to its previous dimensions. The return will
also be resisted and this will cause a complex stress pattern in the neighbourhood of the
weld. (See Sections 2.6.2.1. and 2.6.2.2.).

The heat-affected zone, being harder than its surroundings, is more brittle and is,
therefore, not so amenable to sbress relief by yielding as is the surr01mding metal.

To this situation a third element is added if the welding is done under conditions
where hydrogen can be generated in the arc. This condition is found when the flux
covering contains hydrogen or when the flux covering is not dry. Thus, for this project,
a "low-hydrogen electrode" was used, i.e., one containing little combined hydrogen in
the flux. It \vas, however, essential to dry the electrodes immediately before using.

If hydrogen is liberated in the arc, it is absorbed by the molten metal and some of
it remains dissolved in the solid. As the weld metal cools, the solubility of hydrogen in
the solid steel decreases, and some of it diffuses into the H.A.Z. which thereby becomes
saturated. As cooling proceed!'! this zone reaches a temperature range (4000 C. to 200 C.)
in which it transforms to the low-temperature condition. During this transformation
hydrogen is expelled from solution since it is less soluble in the low-temperature state.
It is this expulsion of hydrogen which sets up very localized internal stress, causing cracking
in the relatively hard and brittle heat-affected zone. It is considered that a hardness of
350 (V.D.P.) is the maximum permissible to avoid H.A.Z. cracking.

2.9.2. Influence ol composition and rate ol cooling on the heat-affected zone.

From what has been said it is evident that the H.A.Z. of a weld is a very critical
region. The question arises as to how it is affected by the welding procedure. The
important factors are the composition of the steel, its rate of cooling, and the presence of
hydrogen. So far as the composition is concerned, the important alloying constituents
are carbon, manganese, and chromium, but for the present purpose the two latter can be
taken together. Carbon is the element which converts iron into steel, and it is by far
the most important element in connection with the welding of steel. Pure iron has a
hardness of about 80. The addition of 023 per cent. carbon makes possible, with a
sufficiently high rate of cooling, a hardness of 450/500.
 55
The less time there is for the steel to change from the high to the low temperature
condition the harder it is. Consequently, as we have seen above, the slowly cooled plate
of B.S. 968 steel has a hardness of 180/200, whereas the more rapidly cooled H.A.Z. has a
hardness of 300/500. A small change in the carbon content can make a big change in the
hardness.
The effect of manganese and chromium is to slow dow11 the rate of change from the
high to the low-temperature condition. The higher the content of these two elements the
more readily is the hard state of the steel retained.
Consequently, to avoid undue hardness in the H.A.Z., the carbon and manganese
should be kept away from the maximum limits set by the specification. However, welding
is only a procedure for fabricating a structure-in this case a girder~and the girder is
designed on the assurance that it will have certain specified properties. The corresponding
property to hardness is the ultimate tensile strength (and yield stress). To obtain the
specified properties the steelmaker must adjust the composition, taking into consideration
the rate of cooling of the plates as they come from the rolling milL From this is seen that
the steelmaker may want to keep near the maximum limits of the specification as regards
carbon and manganese particularly with thicker plates which cool more slowly whilst the
fabricator would find his task easier if the steelmaker kept below them.
It is this dichotomy of interest which leads to the kind of difficulty with which we
were confronted in this Enquiry, and it points to the necessity ofthe closest collaboration
between the steelmaker and the fabricator concerning the composition of the steeL

2.9.3. The concept of thermal severity.

The rate of cooling of a weld has been shown to be a factor in controlling the
hardness of the H.A.Z. and the hardness is one factor in controlling the liability to cracking.
The various factors which in turn control the rate of coiling of a weld are :-
(a) The geometry of the weld.
(b) The temperature of the weld before welding commences.
(c) The heat input during welding which is controlled by the gauge of electrode
used, the rate of melting (burn off) of the electrode per inch run of weld,
and the welding current.
The first of these items governs the thermal severity of the weld and is associated with
the conduction of heat away from the molten pool of metal (C. in Fig. 1). The thicker
the plates, and the greater the number of paths along which heat can be conducted, the greater
is the thermal severity of the joint. The unit used to define this is the heat flow through
one thickness of !-in. plate. For example, a butt weld of two !-in. plates would have a
thermal severity of two, whilst that for two -~-in. plates would be four, and that of a T-weld
in t-in. plate would be six. Thus the thermal severity of a joint is expressed by a number
(T.S.N.) which is simply four times the total thickness of the plates through which heat can
flow away from the joint. It follows that the greater the T.S.N. of the joint, the greater
will be the cooling rate under any given set of welding conditions.
As mentioned earlier, the temperature of the molten pool of steel under the arc is
about 1,700 C. The transfer of heat from this pool is more rapid the greater the
temperature difference between the weld and the surroundjng steel which is conducting
the heat away. That is, with a joint of given T.S.N. the cooling rate of the weld is greater
the lower the temperature of the weldment at the completion of welding. It follows
that the cooling rate can be reduced by pre-heating the weldment. This pre-heating can
be done by gas flames being played around the location of the joint, making sure that all
conducting paths are raised in temperature. It is generally conceded that the zone heated
should be at least 3 inches wide in every direction.
There is, however, another way of introducing heat into the weldment so as to
reduce the cooling rate. This is by increasing the rate of deposit of the molten metal
from the electrode. It will be evident that the energy input during welding is controlled by
the welding current. With heavier gauge electrodes heavier currents can be used, and it
is possible to melt and deposit the weld metal at a greater rate. In this way the temperature
of the steel in the immediate neighbourhood at the completion of the weld is higher the
greater the rate of melting. This is an alternative or supplementary way of reducing the
temperature gradient and so of reducing the rate of cooling.
 56
2.9.4. Standard recommendations for welding B.S. 968: 1941.
As a guide to fabricators the British Standards Institution has written B.S. 2642 :
1955, "General requirements for the metal arc welding of medium tensile weldable
structural steel to B.S. 968 types".

This was at fir:::~t adopted by C.R.B. It control:::; the quality of electrode:::~ to be used
by cross-reference to B.S. 2549: 1954, and abo lays down details relating to butt and fillet
welding.

In clause 25 of B.S. ~1642 attention is drawn to the conditions of storage of

electrodes and the need for these to be kept dry. This is in connection with the possibility
of introducing hydrogen to the weld from moisture in the electrode flux covering. The
matters considered in section 2.9.3 are governed by clause 26 which sets out the items to be
taken into account in determining the weld procedure. In this it acts as a guide only,
directing the fabricator to those items to which he must give attention for the production
of satisfactory welds in B.S. 9138. The items are:-
(a) Classification, type and size of electrodes.
(b) Current and minimum open circuit voltage, and, for automatic welding,
are voltage.
(c) Length of run per electrode or (for automatic welding) :::~peed of travel.
(d) Number and arrangement of runs in multi-run welds.
(e) Welding positions.
(f) Welding sequence.
(g) Pre-heating.

In an Appendix (c) details are given relating to the various factors which prescribe
the welding conditions using low-hydrogen electrodes to produce crack-free welds. Charts
show the relationship between gauge of electrode, run length per electrode (butt weld)
t~ize of fillet, thermal t~everity of the joint and the neces8ary pre-heating temperature.

Earlv in 1959. i.e., before fabrication had commented. C.R.B .. J. & \V. and Utah
agreed to sl'Ibstitute for B.S. 26,12, a brochure produced by B.\V.R.A. ~ntitled " Arc welding
low-alloy steel ". This was, threfore, used as the welding control guide throughout the
project.

This booklet " is for welding engineers, shop and site supervisors and those
responsible for drafting specifications, and summarizes the practical results of a considerable
volume of research work done by B.W.R.A." It is mueh more descriptive and discursive
than B.S. 2642 and could well have been adopted as a textbook to supplement the training
of welders for this type of steeL

It highlights the features of the H.A.Z. of welds and draws attention to those factors
which affect the formation of cracks. These are listed as :--
Cooling rate of the heat-affected zone-size of weld run, size of joint, temperature
of joint.
Composition of the steel.
Type of electrode.
Stress in the heat-afl~cted zone.

Two methods are then described for determining the " weldability " of any piece
of steel, i.e., the ease of fabrication of a given steel under the imposed conditions available
to the fabricator. One method., and the one recommended, is an experimental one in
which welds are made in a stand:ud way using the actual steel to be employed on the project.
This is called the controlled the:cmal severity (C.T.S.) test. The objective is to determine
those welding conditions which will avoid heat-affected zone cracking, without unduly
restricting the fabricator. The complete test needs three test assemblies using three plate
thicknesses-! inch, t inch, and 1 inch giving joints with thermal severity numbers of 2 to 12,
and the same electrode is to be used as will be used on the project. As a result of this
test a "weldability index" can be allotted to a given heat of steel, and this index, denoting
a characteristic of the steel, can then be used to determine the pre-heat required, using a
 57
given size of a given type of electrode. The great advantage of this experimental
approach is that the fabricator learns a lot about the particular features required for tlw
successful welding of this steel. The weldability index is in seven grades designated A to G
with the difficulty of welding without cracks increasing in that order.

Weldability in this sense is largely governed by the composition of the ::;teel and
particularly by the carbon, manganese and chromium contents in B.S. 968. By
experience it has been found that the weldability index can be estimated by using a formula
which takes into account the kno-w'"ll facts that crack-free welding is more difficult the
higher the carbon content and that manganese and chromium can be allotted a "carbon
equivalent " since they act in the same direction but are less potent. The total percentage
carbon plus this carbon equivalent is spoken of briefly as the "carbon equivalent" of the
steel. A relationship has been found between the weldability index as determined from
the C.T.S. test and the carbon equivalent as expressed by the formula. The weldability
of a given steel must be associated \vith a given t,ype of electrode. Since hydrogen is a potent
cause of H.A.Z. cracking the low-hydrogen class of electrodes can tolerate a higher carbon
equivalent than other classes. The correlation between the two methods for determining
the weldability index, using low-hydrogen electrodes is~
Wr:hlability Index Ca.rbon Equivolenl
Percenta{}e
A Up to 025
B 026 to 030
c 031 to 035
D 036 to 040

The booklet points out that the weldability index can be calculated with a fair
degree of accuracy, usually within one index letter, by using the formula. Obviously to
have even this degree of accuracy it is necessary to 1.'1!ow the composition of the actual
plates to be welded. As pointed out (2.7.2.1) there may be an appreciable difference between
the plate analysis and that shown on the analysis certificate from the steelmaker. This
difference could be sufficient to change the weldability by one index letter. The booklet
states that when only the steel specification is available, it must be assmned that the steel
eomposition is at the high end of the permissible composition range. For B.S. 968 this
would mean 023 per cent. carbon, 18 per cent. manganese, and 02 per cent. chromium,
giving, from the established formula a carbon equivalent of 0 34 per cent., near the top
end of the range for weldability index C. The necessity for the fabricator to check the
actual plate analyses for himself is shown in Section 3.4.2 in which it is revealed that
some steel for the Kings Bridge project had a carbon content 0 26 to 0 28 per cent.

Having decided the index, the booklet then describes how to determine the pre-heat
temperature which for a joint of given thermal severity and using a given size run-length
combination of a given type of electrode will give crack-free welds.

It was an admirable, concise, effective description of how to do what the fabricator

had undertaken to do. At the Enquiry we learned how few people, even supervisors at
J. & vV. had in fact even seen a copy.

Clarke (C.R.B.) had made some abstracts from it in his notebook and this appears
to have been the only source of information relating to the B.W.R.A. booklet which J.
& vV. personnel saw.

2.9 .5. Non-destructive examination of welds.

Welding is a skilful art even when it is done by automatic machines. It is still more
of an art when done manually. It will be evident from what has been said that successful
high-class welding needs~
(a) good fit of the sections of the joint;
(b) good fusion and penetration of the parent metal so that an effective nnion
is assured;
(c) a correct contour of the external surface ;
(d) freedom from under-cutting and overlap;
(e) absence of cracks whether internal or coming to the surface.
 58

It follows that careful inspection of all welds on which the strength of a structure
depends is an essential feature of welding construction.

Broadly, inspection methods divide into destructive and non-destructive. The

former can only be used to determine the weldability factors on the one hand or the
suitability of the production welding procedures on the other. In other words they are
used to test the materials and procedures.

It is, however, essential that the final structure shall be examined, and for this,
non-destructive methods must be used.

The most obvious method is a simple visual examination of the whole weld, with
perhaps a magnifying glass as a visual aid. This constitutes a first rapid survey and
serves to detect categories of defects under (c) and (d) above, and also some of those
under (e).

It is, however, the hidden flaws covered by (a), (b), and (e) that give rise to the
need for more sophisticated methods of inspection. We need " eyes " which will see what
is below the surface or even what is at the surface though not readily visible. Four main
methods are in use.

2.9.5.1. The penetrant dye method.

The weld surface is cleaned and a light penetrant oil is brushed or sprayed on. The
oil seeps into any cavity or crack open to the surface and after a few minutes the excess
oil is washed off. Mter drytng either naturally or by a warm air blast, a liquid
"developer" is sprayed on to the surface to be examined. This contains a fine white
powder and on drying this remains as a film. The oil which had penetrated the defect is
drawn back into this film and produces a dark stain. A crack will show as a dark line
on a white background. Extensive lengths of weld can readily be covered and cracks
wil1 be found which were not readily visible directly.

2.9.5.2. The magnetic powder method.

This is applicable to steels because wherever there is a discontinuity, an applied
magnetic field is distorted. It is useful in detecting similar defects to those observable
by penetrant dye, but will also detect defects close to, but not penetrating, the surface.
There are several variants of the method. In one the weld is first sprayed with a white
powder film like the one used with the penetrant dye. This forms a background. The
weld is then subjected to a strong magnetic field and a fine magnetic pmvder is blown
gently on to the surface to be examined. \Vherever there is a discontinuity, such as a
crack, the finely-divided magnetic powder (black on the white background) accumulates.
The nature of the defect is then indicated. This method also is readily applied to
extensive lengths of weld, provided they are accessible to the application of the magnetizing
field.

2.9.5.3. Radiation examination.

X-rays and gamma rays (from radioactive materials) can penetrate metals just as
light can penetrate glass. Any discontinuities in the metal can be recorded on
photographic film. Thus a cavity, or a crack if lying in the right direction, will show on
an exposed film as a dark spot or line. The interpretation of the film requires experience
and skill. It is possible to examine long lengths of accessible welds, such as butt welds,
making individual "exposures" equal to the length of film used. It is not very suitable
for examining fillet welds owing to the complex geometry, and the difficulties in inclining
the beam and film so as to utilize effectively the differences in absorption between the
sound metal and the defect. This applies particularly to T-joint welds such as the
web-flange weld in the girders.

2.9.5.4. Ultrasonic wave method.

This depends on the generation of extremely short-length waves of the same nature
as sound waves. They are so short (i.e., of such high frequency) that they are inaudible
to the human ear. Metals are "transparent" to such waves which are unable to pass
through gases. Consequently, if such a beam :meets a crack or any other discontinuity
in the metal which contains a gas, the beam is reflected. The equipment consists of a
 59
generator to produce the short waves, and a detector usually an oscillograph to pick up
the "echo" reflected from the defect. The echo shows as a sharp peak on the oscillograph
trace.
As with X-radiography, the interpretation of the indications requires experience
and skill particularly with eomplex joints.

2.9.5.5. Use o/ non-destructive testing in the girder fabrication.

The C.R.B. inspectors used visual examination and the penetrant dye method
extensively for their fillet weld survey. They used X-radiography extensively for butt-
weld examination.

The cover plate end weld was a difficult one for instrumental examination, though
possibly the ultrasonic method could have been developed for this purpose. The type
of defect which in our opinion led to the failure, namely, the toe crack in the flange at the
transverse weld, was amenable to detection by the penetrant dye method.

Our views on whether this was used or not are expressed elsewhere. (See 3.3.3.).

2.9.6. Welding on the Kings Bridge project.

It has been pointed out elsewhere that, at the beginning of the contract to fabricate
the superstructure of Kings Bridge, J. & W. was inexperienced in the welding of low-alloy
steel. It was essential, at this stage, for a small group of experienced welders to be given
theoretical and practical instruction in the welding procedures ultimately to be used in
fabrication.

But nobody at J. & W. recognized that there was an educational problem involved
in the contract, and so nothing was done in this direction.

The J. & W. inspector and supervisor, Campbell, who gave instructions to the
welders, admitted that he himself had never read the B.W.R.A. booklet and had onlv
copied a table from it out of Clarke's notebook. "

It is therefore understandable that the evidence of supervisors, charge hands and

welders contained many contradictions. The impression is gained that the clear, concise
and authoritative information contained in the B.,V.R.A. booklet-which had been adopted
by all parties concerned-was simply not made available to those most in need of it.
There was no period when J. & vV. really set out to determine for itself and for the
education of its supervisors, charge hands and welders the weldability characteristics of
B.S. 968 steeL

During 1959, when construction techniques were being evolved, automatic

welding procedures were developed. Ultimately these produced results which, after many
defects were repaired by manual welding, were accepted by C.R.B. inspectors as satisfactory.
The automatic machine was used for butt welding both flange plates and web plates and
for fillet welds of cover plate to flange and flange to web. At first the stiffeners were
manually welded into position but later this was done by a " squirt gun ", a semi-
automatic machine. For automatic welding " 1\Im:awire " and " 1\Im:aflux " were used.

Because of the design of the cover plate it was not possible to complete the welding
to the flange automatically. At each end there was a tapered part which reduced the width
of the cover plate from 14 inches to 3 inches (See Fig 11). These tapered sides and the
bransverse 3-in. end were welded manually generally using three runs. For this work the
Fortrex 35 low-hydrogen type electrode made by Murex was used.

2.9.6.1. Weld sequence.

We have already considered (See 2.6.2.2) the influence of sequence on residual
stresses. There was no pre-determined sequence for the laying of the three cover plate
end welds. The general impression gained from the evidence was that the two taper welds
were made before the transverse weld. If this is so, this critical weld was made at a
location of maximum restraint.
 60
Experimental assemblies of this cover plate end made dming the extensive
investigations in A.I.S. laboratories since the failure (Ex. 184), have indicated clearly that
the sequence of welding round the end of the cover plate is an important faetor in the
production of toe cracks at the transverse weld.

There was no evidence at the Enquiry that J. & W. made any experimental replicas
to determine the thermal severity of this joint. There was, however, evidence that the
end weld was made sometimes before and sometimes after the web was welded to the flange
and further that this important sequence was determined by shop organization expediency
rather than as a result of pre-determined principles. The importance of the web/flange
sequence so far as the cover plate end weld is concerned is two-fold.
(a) The presence of the web weld increased the thermal severity of the
joint in a peculiar way in that an extra heat-conduction path was located
only across the centre of the transverse weld. This increased the
complexity of the internal stress condition. There is evidence of the
increased thermal severity at this location in the A.I.S. investigations
where it is shown that the hardness of the H.A.Z. of the transverse weld
is greater under the web weld than elsewhere-indicating a higher cooling
rate.
(b) The weld, already restrained laterally by the two taper welds, was restrained
in thickness as well if the web was already in position.

2.9.6.2. Weld defects in fabrication.

During the Enquiry at1jention wag concentrated almost wholly on the transverse
weld at the end of the cover plates. This was natural as this was the location of the
fraetures which caused the \V.14 span of the bridge to collapse. It was revealed in
evidenee that no craek in this loeation had been detected during the fabrication period.
"\Ve express our views elsewhere on the reason for this. (See 3.3.3.). Although the only
part of the bridge which has failed is the W.l4 span, it is necessary to consider the general
position relating to cracking during fabrication, and the possibility of cracks being present
in the remaining spans of the bridge. Our reason for doing this is to issue a warning that
cracks in the structure which are transverse to tensile stresses, may develop into fatigue
cracks under the repeated loadings imposed by traffic. The Enquiry has revealed that
the craeks whieh eaused the collapse of the W.14 span were assoeiated with the fabrieation
teehniques used, and the quality of the steel supplied, and are therefore not neeessarily
confined to a given ty-pe of weld or a single span.

The main information relating to cracking during the fabrication lies in two
sources :---
(a) The C.R.B. statistical analysis of details of inspection of the defects in the
main g:i:rders (Ex. 222) ; and
(b) the various reports (chiefly by Murex and A.I.S.) relating to diffieulties
whieh developed during the progress of the contract.

The C.R.B. survey relates to both visual and radiographie examination of the main
fillet welds and butt welds-both automatic and manual.

From this survey we conclude that in the fillet welds there are possibly fifteen
serious undetected transverse cracks and in the butt welds of tension members (flange and
cover plates) there are possibly ten serious undetected transverse eracks. The difference
between deteeted and repaired cracks, and undetected cracks is that the latter are still in
the bridge.

The important question remains, as to whether all cracks were present at the time
of inspection. It is the view of several witnesses (Ferris and Professor H. Muir ineluded)
that weld cracking can occur up to three days after the weld has been made. This time
is determined partly by the welding conditions, partly by the ambient temperature and
partly by the stresses applied to the girder during handling. There is no evidence to
indieate that the C.R.B. inspectors knew of this delayed cracking. It is possible therefore
that cracks formed in some of these welds after they were examined, and these (if any) will
also still be in the bridge.
 61

2.9.6.3. Survey of cracks at cover plate ends.

Since the collapse of W.l4, M.lVLB.\V. as part of its reconstruction programme, has
examined many cover plate ends on the tension flanges in the remaining spans of the
bridge. As it had been established by E.T.R.S. (Exs. 48 and 4H) using non-destructive
methods of examination, that many of these welds were probably cracked in much the
same way as those in the W.14 span, lVI.M.B.\V. decided to remove these ends by a milling
operation. Wnilst doing this, in order to aid the Commission in its ]Jnquiry, a log was kept
of the location, length and depth of any cracks revealed (FJx. 218). Wnen such cracks were
found the milling was continued lmtil the crack was cleared. The depth of milling required
to clear the cracks varied from 1~ -inch to !-inch but there were several cases where the
crack passed completely through the flange. These latter are considered separately.

Attention is drawn to the fact that these eracks were not deteeted by the C.R.B.
inspectors, although 35 of them were at the toe of the transverse weld (the remainder were
mostly at the toe of the root weld and so were not detectable by the penetrant dye method).
The M.lVI.B.W. observation raised the previously stated possibility regarding undetected
cracks in fillet and butt welds to the level of strong probability.

We have made an analysis of the data provided by this operation of M.lVI.B.W. in

order to help us to assess-(a) whether the cracking was associated with any particular
heats of steel (b) whether the cracking was associated with any particular period during
the contract (c) whether the cracking was associated with sequence of welding.

2.9.6.4. Association of cover plate end cracking with heats of steel.

Table 2 shows the heat number and type of steel and number of cracked ends
revealed by the lVI.M.B.W. milling operation, plus the eight ends of the \V.14 girders.

TABLE 2.

Heat No. Type Number of enrls Heat No. Number of ends

showing cra.cks showing 0racks

2 I O.H.S.K . . . .. I E.F. 4

Hi 15 O.H.F.K . . .

'E.F.
2tl 1
I " ! "

2\l .. f
15 .. I ., l
:
2

.. I

E.F. fj
I
50 .. I , .. I .,
.. I , I .. 3
!

Total86

O.H.S.K.-Ope11-hea.rtb, semi-killed. O.H.l'.K .-Open-hearth, fully-killed. Kl'.--Eled.rie furnare, fully-killed.

Altogether the lVLM.B.W. has given us results from the examination of 160 cover plate
ends from the suspension girders. We thus have :-
Total ends examined 168. Cracked 86. Not cracked 82, or approximately
50 per cent. are cracked.

The ends containing cracks were made from seven semi-killed open-hearth heats,
one fully-killed open-hearth heat and twelve fully-killed electric furnace heats, and the
composition shown in the related heat certificate is as given in Table 3.
 62

TABLE 3.
Analyses of Heats Concerned with Cover Plate End Cracks.
These analyses have been taken from the A.I.S. test certificates (Ex. 20). The
figures in brackets refer to plate analyses made either before or after the steel was delivered
to J. & W. and represent the maximum values reported during the Enquiry.
I I
Heat Type c. i
Mn. Cr. Heat Type c. Mn.
I Cr.
----- .i

2 .. .. O.H. 19 166 13 56 . . . . E.F. 23 158 24

(. 24) (180) ( 27) (1 71) ( 29)
16 .. .. "
21 170 10 58 . . .. O.H. 22 169 25
( 24) (1 92) ( 08) ( 23) (1 75) 1
22 .. .. 21 155 12 70 .. .. E.F. 19 164 ?
" ( 28) (191) ( 38)
28 .. ..
"
22 175 27 71 .. .. , 21 166 ?
29 .. ..
"
23 156 30 72 .. .. 22 163 ?
30 .. .. 22 156 30 73 .. .. " 20 161 ?
39 .. .. ", 19 161 16 79 .. .. " 21 165 ?
48 .. .. E.F. 21 172 24 80 .. .. " 22 169 ?
50 .. .. 22 165 21 81 .. .. " 23 161 ?
55 .. .. " 21 170 23 84 .. .. " 19 160 ?
" "
( 28) (180) ( 25)
-~---------

NoTE.-The heat analyses show carbon to be in the range from 19 per cent. to 23 per cent. and
manganese from 15 per cent. to 17 pHr cent. If these were a reliable indication of the composition of the steel
supplied it would be an indication thab steel composition could be discounted as a source of welding difficulty.
It will be noticed, however, that wherever the plates as delivered have been analysed there is invariably an
appreciably higher content of carbon and manganese than shown on the test certificate. It would seem therefore
that where composition is critical the analysis should always be checked.

The semi-killed steel hea1is account for 43 of the cracked ends, i.e., 50 per cent. It
will be noticed that three of these heats-Nos. 16, 22 and 29 account for 38 of the 43 cracked
ends, i.e., 88 per cent. This suggests that the steel of these three heats was defective or of
low weldability. It is on record that heats 16 and 22 had given trouble during fabrication
and had been the subject of metallurgical investigation.

However, there is anotheJ: factor to be taken into accmmt. Of the 93 tension flange
plates associated with cover plate ends in suspended girders (Ex. 143) which were made from
open-hearth steel, 77 were from the 3 heats mentioned. If we eliminate these 77 from the
total of 168 we get 91 cover plate ends of which 48 were cracked. We thus have:-
Approximate perceniiage of all ends examined which show cracks .. 50
Approximate percentage of all ends examined which show cracks
other than from heats 16, 22 and 29 .. 52
so that it is evident that the inelusion of the three heats reduces rather than increases the
percentage of cracked ends. \Ve conclude that so far as weldability was concerned the
three heats concerned were nei1;her better nor worse than the others.

Accepting that 50 per cent. of all cover plate ends show cracks of one kind or another,
there is no reason why similar defects should not be found in other than the suspended
girders.
From Ex. 143 we find that there are 187 tension flanges (top) in the cantilever girders.
It is possible therefore that about 100 of these show cracks. rrhey are under the concrete
deck, but we understand that of those examined several have been found to be cracked.

We point out, however, that whilst all cracks in tension members are dangerous,
some are worse than others. From the M.M.B.vV. records we believe that 41 cracks in the
suspension girders were serious toe cracks before they were removed and possibly 50 similar
ones }'emain in the cantilever tension members.

An examination of Table 3 strongly indicates that the welding difficulties causing

these cracks came from the high carbon and manganese contents of these heats, to which
J. & '\V. did not react. It is of interest to note that information concerning out of specification
 63

analyses came to light as a result of J. & W. taking action itself. It had plate checks made
early in March, 1960-presumably because of welding difficulties in December, 1959 to
February, 1960. Having got the results, J. & W. was not alerted to the source of the
troubles, in spite of similar reports from Murex about the same time (See letter 5th March,
1960, Murex to J. & W.) showing the analysis of a cracked plate:-
Carbon lli anganese Chromi,um
28 19 38
and from heat 22 . . 24 .. 18 .. 56

Murex warned J. & W. that particular care would be needed with pre-heating
temperatures in order to avoid cracking with material of this type.

2.9.6.5. Association of cover plate end cracking with date of fabrication.

\Ve have analysed these results further in order to find whether girders vv:ith cover plate
end cracks were fabricated in any particular period. For this purpose we have used Ex. 218
(with additional information from M.M.D.vV.) and 88 (dates of completion of girders).

The information we have relates to girders fabricated in the thirteen months from
December, 1959, to December, 1960. The cracks are found to be fairly regularly
distributed in girders fabricated throughout the year as follows :-
Cracked Welds
December, 1959-March, 1960 25
April-June 22
July-September .. 19
October-December 20

We find also that the three heats 16, 22, and 29 were used throughout the year.

We conclude that there was no stage of fabrication particularly associated vvith

the production of cracked welds.

2.9.6.6. Association of cover plate end cracking with web4lange welding sequence.
It has been mentioned that the transverse weld at the cover plate end, although
only 3 inches long and an easy weld to lay, either by down-hand or vertical-up procedure,
can be difficult to weld without cracking, unless precautions are taken with respect to
pre-heat and sequence. Two sequences were involved-
(a) whether it was laid before the web was welded to the flange, and
(b) whether it was welded before or after the taper welds. Whenever the
questions regarding these sequences was asked in the Enquiry, whether
of K.S.B.D., the C.R.B., or J. & W., we got the same amrwer: "Nobody
gave it a thought, and it \Vas done just when it was most convenient
for shop practice."

Regarding the major sequence web-flange end of cover plate we have some data
in Ex. 89 from C.R.B. records, but the information is not suflicient for us to make a clear
analysis in conjunction with Exhibit 218. 'Ve only know defmitely that on certain girder&
the cover plate end was the last weld to be made. Regarding the minor sequence it seems
that the transverse weld was probably always done after the two taper welds. J.1~rancis
considered that this \vas the worst sequence to use.

Assembling the available data from the M.M.B.W. operation we get the following
result:-
(a) Of the cover plate ends completed with the transverse weld the last to be
made on the girder, approximately 65 per cent. showed cracks.
(b) Of the remaining 67 cover plate ends, for which we have no record of the
web/flange cover plate end sequence, 37 (55 per cent.) showed cracks
and 30 (45 per cent.) were free.

Since about 75 girders had been made before the period covered by this survey,
it is possible that most of the second group above were fabricated by the same sequence
as the first group. In this case we reach the conclusion that the chances in favour of
producing a cracked weld if the transverse weld is the last made was about 3 to 2.
 64

2.9.6.7. Cracks which have developed beyond the toe crack stage.
In analysing above the data from Exhibit 218 (plus the additional information which
has come to light since that was tendered) we have not distinguished cracks which have
remained as toe cracks and those which have developed into partial brittle fractures. It
is not possible to do this without making an assumption regarding the average depth of
toe cracks.

In order to examine the question of the general liability of the steel to brittle
fracture we now assume arbitrarily that a crack which is deeper than! inch has propagated
from an initial weld crack. Ex:amples are shown in Table 4.
TABLE 4.
Girder End Heat Depth Location

in eh.
E.3S3 .. .. . . North .. .. .. 29 Ji.
11 Toe

EJ4S2 .. .. .. , .. .. .. 50 i Toe and root

E.14S3 .. .. .. , .. .. .. 50 fs Between toe and root

E.14S4 .. .. .. , .. .. .. 50 ,
" "
E.lS4 .. .. .. "
.. .. .. 80 Through ! Toe

E.3Sl .. .. .. South .. .. .. 29 -~ Toe

W.l2Sl .. .. .. , .. .. .. 58 -& Between toe and root

E.6S2 .. .. .. North .. .. .. I 22 I Through ! I ?

Combining this with Section 2.7.6.4 it will be seen that 13 of the 86 welds showing
cracks, have developed into partial brittle fractures. Most of these were from toe
cracks or cracks closely associated with the toe. Seven different heats of steel (including
heats 55 and 56) are involved compared with 23 heats (three of which showed no cracks)
in the cover plate end survey. Another way of expressing this is to say that of 86 transverse
cracks, 73 have not developed into brittle fractures, and as these are distributed through
eighteen heats it is an indication that the general run of steel was sufficiently notch-ductile
to resist propagation of brittle fractures under the conditions to which it had been subjected.

2.9.6.8. Other cracks in the bridge.

The Commission requested E.T.R.S. to examine a "sample" of the girders to
determine whether the attention which had been focussed on the cover plate ends might
have led us to the mistaken idea that the remainder of the bridge would be found
satisfactory. Sufficient has been revealed in the analysis in this section of our Report to
show that no complacency can be maintained in this matter.

E.T.R.S. undertook to examine cover plate to bottom flange fillet welds of the E.l4
span, and also the manual fillet. welds at the taper ends of these cover plates. The survey
could only be done on a sampling basis as far as the longitudinal welds were concerned.
Four lengths of l foot each were selected on each of the eight welds, and the sixteen taper
welds were also examined. No cracks were detected by the magnetic particle method,
which reveals cracks reaching the surface. The ultrasonic method was then applied
(Ex. 232) and cracks from 4 inches to 15 inches long were indicated in five of the eight
taper welds at the north end, of the girders. The ultrasonic method used was then
checked jointly with D.S.L. on the taper welds of W.l4. As a result (Ex. 237) Hudson
"has little doubt . . that the ultrasonic indications found in the northern end
taper welds of the E.14 series of girders are in fact indications of cracking in the
flange. It is concluded, therefore, that quite extensive timer run toe (or possibly
root) cracking is present in the E.l4 girder flanges under some of the taper welds".

Ferris in a supplementary report (Ex. 231) gives conclusions relating to an

examination of taper welds and manual fillet welds around the end plates of the W.l4
girders. In both locations craeks were found.
 65

From these examinations and our analysis of the welding defects survey, we
conclude that the cracking at the cover plate ends which we have so carefully examined
throughout our Enquiry, is characteristic of the whole of the welding of this detail in
the bridge and is not a unique feature associated with these particular welds in the W.l4
girders which dramatized the effects resulting from steel quality and welding procedures
because all factors were operating at_ once.

2.9.7. Summary of views relating to welding.

From the foregoing sections relating to the welding on the Kings Bridge project, we
reach the following conclusions :-
1. J. & W. did not adequately prepare its staff and workmen for welding low-
alloy steel.
2. No pre-determined sequence was set down for laying the cover plate end weld,
the importance of which was not realized.
3. The tension flanges of the suspended spans in the bridge possibly still
contain about fifteen serious undetected transverse cracks in the main
fillet welds and ten serious transverse cracks in the flange and cover plate
butt welds.
4. Other cracks may have formed since the welds were inspected during
fabrication.
5. Of 160 cover plate ends (tension flanges of suspended girders) removed by
M.1Vl.B. W. in its reconstruction programme, just over half were found
to be cracked.
6. It is probable that a similar proportion of cracked welds is still in the bridge
in the top flanges of the cantilever spans.
7. The high carbon and manganese content of some heats increased the difficulty
of producing crack-free welds. However, the cracking found is so
general that we consider the fabrication techniques to be largely
responsible for them.
8. Cracking at the cover plate ends is general throughout the bridge. The
collapse of the W.l4 span focussed attention on the cover plate ends,
but we think that several causes operated simultaneously to determine
this location of the failure.

2.10. The Fabrication of the Girders.

In order to make a point or to justify a conelusion, for example as to the competence
of one of the parties to 1mdertake the project, some incidents have already been mentioned,
in previous sections, which might with equal logic have been included in this one.

In the present section, the attempt is to paint a picture of what went on during the
progress of the project. In so doing, we have found it necessary to indulge in a certain
amount of recapitulation-not so much, we hope, as to be tedious-but sufficient to convey
an accurate impression of the scene.

Even so, this does not pu.rport to be a complete account of all the matters that
emerged during the hearing but it does, we believe, bring together the most important
matters with which we are concerned.

2.10.1. Preparation and checking of design and shop drawings.

After the award of the contract to Gtah, K.S.RD. set to work to expand the tender
drawings into a complete set of design drawings supplemented by the calculation sheets on
which they were based. The drawings and calculations were checked in meticulous detail
by C.R.R and it is for this reason that we say, that whatever responsibility K.S.B.D.
carries for adopting cover plates and the detail of their termination, must be shared by the
C.R.B. (See Sects. 2.5.1. and 2.5.2.).

The design drawings give only the main dimensions and so it was necessary for
,T. & W. to prepare from them a series of shop drawings carrying every dimension necessary
for the fabrication of the girders. These drawings were also checked by the C.R.B.
6352/63-5
 66
It is at this point that we see the need for someone who, for want of a better term,
we call a " welding engineer ". We visualize him as a man, skilled both in the technique of
welding and in the art and science of structural design, whose duty it would be to ensure
both that what was being asked. for by the designer could, in fact, be satisfactorily fabricated,
and also that the proposed fabrication procedures would fulfil, or at least not frustrate, the
designer's intentions. We think that the shop drawings should carry a schedule showing
the welding procedures to be .::tdopted at each joint, the order of laying down the welds,
the requ.lxed pre-heat, any special points to be noted by the inspectors and, indeed, all the
details required to carry out i;he work.

Whether or not this be the best way of filling the gap between the designer and the
fabricator, the fact remains that in this case nothing of the sort was attempted with the
results described below.

2.10.2. Ordering the stetd.

In Section 2.3.4.2. there is a full description of the series of events that resulted n1
J. & W. ordering steel to B.S. 968 without stipulating the additional O.R.B. tests. There
is, therefore, no need. to go over the story again except to say that we still cannot conceive
how B.H.P. could accept this order from an old and valued customer--
(a) if they knew about the additional tests;
(b) if they realized the significance of additional tests from the point of VIew
of brittle fraeture.

The evidence of Ralston and Thompson led us to think that the decision not to accept
an order including the extra requ.lxements of the C.R.B. specification (i.e., additions to
B.S. 968: 1941) had been made at too low a level in the organization. However, after
seeing a letter of 25th August, 1959 from the General Manager, Newcastle Steel works, to
the Managing Director, B.H.P.J and other communications in Exhibit. 204, we realize that
the policy of not accepting additions to specifications had been discussed at higher levels.
\Ve also conclude from these internal communications that the full requirements of the
O.R.B., in this connection, were quite well known and appreciated, though the witnesses
we heard gave the impression that the full specification had never been received by B.H.P.

This was not a minor matter : what was involved was a specification for an important
metropolitan highway bridge in a capital city with difficult traffic problems, and the
designers of a public authority had decided that it was necessary to protect the bridge from
possible failure by brittle fracture.

Brittle fracture had been before the public eye in connection with welded ship and
other failures and the views of the O.R.B. engineers merited discussion rather than categorical
rejection. This situation is not; unconnected with the type of contract which was drawn
up for this project. It is evident that, as the C.R.B. reserved to itself the final approval
of the steel, there should have been a much closer association between O.R.B. and B.H.P.
in these matters.
It is quite clear to us that J. & \V. had unlimited faith in B.H.P.'s ability to supply
satisfactory steel for the project. To tell such a fabricator, knowing that it had no
metallurgical department to use as a check, that Izod testing of this steel was, to all intents
and purposes, wasting time, was to play on its faith, and to confirm it in an attitude to
testing in general which we now know to be characteristic of J. & W. The issues were
much larger than could be dismissed in this way, although we appreciate that J. & W. was
told in good time (i.e., before tendering) that the steel could not be guaranteed to pass the
stipulated Izod test. However,, we also appreciate that having ordered to one specification
and contracted to another more stringent one, J. & \V. could have been left to sort out
material which would pass the O.R.B. specifications from among what was received.

Before leaving this matter of policy on notched bar testing we must point out that
U.K. steehnakers had given a great deal of attention to the brittle fracture problem in the
early 1950's; much research effort was directed to the theoretical and manufacturing
aspects of the problem. One firm made a statistical analysis of 60 heats of steel, relating
the rolling conditions to the notch ductility by applying the Charpy test to determine the
ductile/brittle transition range for several thicknesses of bar.
 67

This was in marked contrast to the attitude of A.I.S. metallmgists in dismissing

the test as " completely useless and illogical from a metallmgical point of view ", (letter
25th March, 1959 from Chief Metallmgist, A.I.S., Port Kembla). They appear to have
made no study of the notch ductility properties of this steel as produced in their own
plant, and if they were aware of the results of impact testing carried out in the B.H.P.
organization the full significance of these was not appreciated.

Om views on the lack of this type of technical research are based on the opinions
and attitude of witnesses for B.H.P., not one of whom suggested that such work had been
done or had ever been contemplated, and who were rather on the defensive to prove that
the B.H.P. attitude had been a correct one.

2.10.3. The supply of steel.

Apart from two basic open-hearth heats made at the Newcastle plant of B.H.P.
the steel for tllis contract was made by A.I.S. at Port Kembla. Approximately half was
from basic open-hearth semi-killed heats and the remainder from fully-killed electric
fmnace heats. (An open-hearth heat, in this sense, is the product teemed from a 125-ton
ladle).

In spite of modern scientific aids steel-making is still something of an art ; it is

not necessarily the case that steel made at one plant will be the same as that made to the
same specification at another plant.

We will endeavour, therefore, to sort out those aspects of the steel supply which
relate to general company policy (B.H.P.) from those which relate to the particular plant
where the steel was produced. (A.I.S., Port Kembla).

2.1 0.3.1. Matters of general policy.

The first major matter of general policy was that the steel would be made at the
Port Kembla plant.

We assume that this decision was related to technical considerations associated with
the characteristics of the two plants and this matter is of no concern to the Commission.
We do not know whether the steel would have been better if it had been made at Newcastle
and we simply observe, as has been mentioned before, that the practice of the two plants
was not the same.

The second general matter~that the company would not undertake to produce
steel to the full C.R.B. specifications-has already been discussed in Section 2.10.2.

Finally we come to some questions of B.H.P.'s relations with its customer which
we presume to be company matters and not specific to the plant producing the steeL

On several occasions during the project J. & vV. were in difficulties of several kinds
relating to defects which developed in welding. Port Kembla officers on such occasions
made helpful investigations and suggestions. At one stage, they even offered to send
expert welders to J. & W. to demonstrate what they considered to be proper techniques.
J. & W. did not accept the proffered help, apparently because in the meantime Ward
(Murex) had been seconded to it for this purpose.

There was one matter which was apparently decided at too low a level. This
related to C.R.B. heat 22, which was first mentioned in correspondence from J. & vV. to
B.H.P. early in 1959; this was an open-hearth heat to which chromium had been added.
In the investigation report of 12th March, 1959 no mention was made of chromium but it
was suggested that material from some other heat might have been inadvertently delivered
with heat 22. However, in the report which went to J. & vV. (16th March, 1959) this
information was not passed on. The same heat gave welding trouble during 1959 and on
18th }larch, 1960 there was a further report from Port Kembla in which it was revealed
again that some other heat had been mixed with heat 22. Chromium was now mentioned
as it had been found by the consulting chemists, Sharp and Howell, to whom J. & W. had
submitted samples for analysis. The cryptic comment is made in this report : " To
completely eliminate the (mixed) material it would be necessary to sample each bar
marked 267607 (C.R.B. 22) and analyse for chromium content".
 68

. Again the evidence is that this information was not passed on to J. & W. We are
therefore faced with an established fact that wrong material, which was not covered by
the test certificate, had been sent to the fabricator. This possibility of mixing is well known
in any steel mill. When it is discovered, every effort should be made to trace the wrong
material, particularly in an important project like Kings Bridge. It was the plain duty
of B.H.P. to check every plate of this heat for J. & W., but it did not do this.

~We point out (Ex. 143) that there are 35 girders in the bridge in which heat 22 ha8
been used for tension flanges at locations involving cover plate terminations.

Another matter of general policy relates to the unilateral introduction of a set of

composition tolerances culled from an American source (American Iron and Steel
Institute, Steel Products Manual) (Ex. 170). B.H.P. claims that according to this, the
carbon maximum, which in B.S. 968 is placed at 023 per cent., could be 027 per cent.;
there is nothing in B.S. 968 which suggests this. No doubt a steelmaker, who recognizes
the natural phenomenon of ingot segregation and the technical difficulties of obtaining
a uniform composition throughout a large mass of steel in the furnace and ladle, naturally
assumes tolerances of this kind. This has been referred to in Section 2.7.2.1. But when
a specification categorically fixes a maximum, presumably in this case to cover the
weldability as well as the mechanical properties, we think a fabricator is entitled to
expect the steel supplied to be within the composition limits set.

On several occasions du.ring the Enquiry attention was drawn to clause 20 of

B.S. 968: 1941, which gives the customer the option of rejecting material which during
fabrication is fou.nd to be out of specification. We have interpreted this clause as relating
strictly to the maximum values set out for chemical composition in clause 9 of B.S.
968: 1941. B.H.P. witnesses and Cou.nsel strongly resisted this viewpoint and claimed
the tolerances mentioned above. In view of this attitude the following extracts from
internal B.H.P. correspondence are of interest:-
Ralston to A.LS., Port Kembla, 11th April, 1958.
" The question jtlOW arises-what reasonable variation outside the specified
limits of chemistry and mechanical properties should be expected ? And, also,
if any heats test on the limits of the specification, would we be prepared to make
additional tests to ensure that plates supplied from these heats are in reasonable
agreement with the specification ? "

Chief Metallurgist, Port Kembla, to Sales Department, Melbourne, 29th April,

1958.
" We wish to distinguish between variations outside the specified limits
and variations from the pit analysis if the latter is within the specification. We
should not enter into discussions on variations from the pit analysis and the
customer and the C.R.B. should be informed that with semi-killed steel such
variations are quite possible.
The provisions outlined above we believe should be accepted by the
customer rather than his insisting on strict adherence to the specification as stated
in clause 20 of B.S. 9f)8 : 1941.
For use on work which is highly stressed or on which design factors are not
clearly defined we can only suggest that individual plates or bars be tested as for
example in the boiler specifications which provide for testing each pattern.
Penstock Boiler Quality for the H.E.C. Tasmania costing 5 10s. per ton over the
standard rate for B.S. 2762 : 1956, is tested in this manner."
From the second paragra.ph we conclude that our interpretation of clause 20 was
also accepted by the Chief Metallurgist of A.LS. in 1958.
We also conclude that aB B.H.P. was advocating strict adherence to B.S. 968 : 1941,
it could hardly claim that the chemical composition, as set out in clause 9, should be
subject to the American tolerances.
In view of the big quantities of this steel being diverted to less important uses, it
is not difficult to understand this claim for analysis tolerances beyond the B.S. 968 limits,
 69

but it is not satisfactorv for B.H.P. to say that, "We told J. & W. of these tolerances".
J. & W. was known not"to have a metalhirgical department and was therefore not likely
to--and, in the event, did not--establisL a. set of check tests on the plate as received.
We think, in fact that the practice of B.H.P. in providing metallurgical service
for its customers, may have had the effect of causing fabricators such as J. & W. to rely
too much on them. In the long run B.H.P. can give better service by encouraging its
customers to set up their own service departments. If this were done the valuable
information given by B.H.P. would fall on more receptive ears and better informed
minds.
This concludes our survey of those aspects of general B.H.P. policy which would
apparently have applied equally to both the Newcastle and Port Kembla steel plants.
However, we would point out that like many other matters at our Enquiry these matters
do not fall into neat classifications. For example, whilst there was a policy relating to
composition tolerances, the individual plant personnel determined what influence this should
have on their practice and what limits they would adopt to obtain the specified physical
properties.

2.1 0.3.2. Steel plant policy and practice.

The first matter to which we draw attention relates to the certificates of analysis
supplied with the steel from each individual heat. We realize that this is the conventional
way of presenting what should be the average composition of the steel, but we think that
it should show all the features required to check compliance with a specification. Since
it was steel works policy to work to the maximum permissible chemical limits of the
specification, in order to obtain the required strength of the steel, it was necessary to know
the chromium content to check the total of manganese and chromium. It is conventional
with mild steel to report no more than five elements (three of which in semi-killed steel
could normally be considered "residual"). This matter has already been referred to in
Section 2.7.2.

Certificates from Newcastle that we have seen carry a printed column in which the
chromium content can be entered; we were told that this was because Newcastle regularly
manufactures alloy steels.

The only exoneration we can find for the steelmaker m this respect Is that it
followed an established convention.

Another feature of the steel supply, which has been mentioned earlier and which has
given the Commission considerable trouble to understand relates to the decision of A.I.S.,
early in 1959, to change from semi-killed open-hearth steel to fully-killed electric furnace
steel. This was represented to us by Ralston and Thompson as an attempt by A.I.S. to help
,J. & W. out of their contractual difficulties with respect to the C.R.B. specification. This
view was confirmed in a letter of 8th February, 1961, from General "!\1anager, Port Kembla,
to Managing Director, B.H.P. which reads as follows:-
"Because of the severity of the C.R.B.'s requirements, accepted by J. & W.
but not ourselves, it was decided, in an effort to assist J. & ~W. to meet the C.R.B.
demands, to produce the steel in the electric furnace. \Ve have since produced
B.S. 968 heats in the open hearth to the satisfaction of various customers but
would no doubt encounter similar difficulties again if requirements additional to
B.S. 968 were imposed.
We would emphasize that J. & W. were told quite definitely that we were
not prepared to accept requirements over and above the B.S. 968 specification.
However, J. & W. encountered some difficulty in fabrication through failure to
observe eorrect welding practice for this grade and this did not assist them in the
over-all problem of dealing with the C.R.B.
It would be true to say that our reason for manufacturing this material in
the electric furnace was attributable to the severity of the Board's requirements
and our desire to assist J. & W. as far as possible in meeting those requirements.
 70
The failure and rejection of a full open-hearth heat on the basis of the
C.R.B.'s tests would have disrupted deliveries far more than the failure of a single
electric furnace heat. We were also forced to narrow our specification range
and this was more practical in the electric furnace.
We also refer you to the other reasons quoted to you in our letter dated
15th January, 1960."

If these were the main reasons for the change, they represented a belated change of
view on the part of the Port Kembla staff, and an admission that they were under some
obligation to help J. & W. to meet the C.R.B. requirements. It was, however, a curious
decision. The change to fully-killed steel was likely to result in improved notch ductility,
but up to this time no difficulty had been found in this respect with the semi-killed open-
hearth steel being supplied. What was really needed by the fabricator was an improvement
in weldability and this required a lowering of the carbon and managanese contents.
However, two of the " submitted heats " (55 and 56) were on ladle analysis at the maximum
for carbon and two others (58 and 59) only 01 per cent. below it. In addition 0 25 per cent.
chromium had been added. Several of the heats examined since the failure have shown
carbon contents between 025 per cent. and 028 per cent. In fact there was a marked
deterioration in the properties of the steel (See Section 2.7.2.3.), both as regards notch
ductility (in some heats) and weldability in general.

We believe, however, from a consideration of internal communications and from a

perusal of section 11 of Exhibit 184 that the reasons for the change were largely internal and
that A.I.S. had considerable difficulty in producing B.S. 968 for this contract. We were
told that to supply the first 1,000 tons, "thousands of tons", had to be diverted to other
uses. This was apparently because such material did not meet the mechanical test
requirements of B.S. 968 and beoause it was unsatisfactory for other reasons such as piping,
laminations and surface defects. The latter were certainly a cause for concern by C.R.B.
inspectors, even in material wh::ch was delivered, and this may have played some part in
the decision to change to electric furnace production; the result, however, was a poorer
quality of steel.

The first intimation that any change had taken place appeared in a letter of
27th February, 1959, from A.I.S. relating to the "submitted heats" (See Section 3.4.1.),
in which it was stated that " tesi; failure occurred in a number of fully-killed electric furnace
and open-hearth heats".

It is noteworthy that up to that time:

(a) all the semi-killed open-hearth steel had passed such of the C.R.B. tests as had
been applied (See Section 2.7); and
(b) J. & W. had not completed the fabrication of a single girder (The first
girders were not completed until September, 1959).

As the change took J. & W., Utah, and C.R.B. by surprise it is evident that A.I.S.
took this decision entirely independently, although neither the C.R.B. specifications nor
B.S. 968: 1941, mention electric furnace steel. When J. & W. referred these "submitted
heats" to the C.R.B., the latter consulted Ferris and Hudson who both considered that the
change should result in an improved steel whieh could be accepted if it fulfilled all other
requirements. We now know that, far from ensuring that the requirements were fulfilled,
the C.R.B. relaxed testing at this time.

The change to smaller heats led to Eastick and the C.R.B. deciding to resort to
"random" testing of heats. (Bee also Section 2.7.2.3.). . Eastick felt justified in this
because of the verbal assurances from Ralston that fully-killed steel would be more ''notch
tough", and up to this stage, the heats of open-hearth steel had passed the applied tests in this
respect. The still better performances that he had been led to expect seemed to Eastick
to be good grounds for relaxing the frequency of testing.
 71

In view of all the circumstances we conclude that the decision to change from open-
hearth semi-killed steel to electric furnace fully-killed steel was largely determined by
internal considerations at Port Kembla. In particular, it was to reduce the amount of
diversion of steel which did not comply with the requirements of B.S. 968: 1941 and had
little to do with the extra tests required by the C.R.B. specifications.

We consider that the change in steel making practice early in 1959 was detrimental
to the quality of the steel supplied, and was a direct cause of the failure in that the tension
flange plates in the failed girders were made from steel in heats 55 and 56 which were both
made in the electric furnace.

2.10.4. Inspection of the steel.

The tests to which the steel was to be subjected comprised a chemical analysis,
inspection of the surface of the plates for blemishes and defects, tests of the physical
properties such as the tensile strength and yield point, the impact strength (Izod), and
tests to determine the weldability of the steel. These tests are described in Specification
Clauses 2-3-l. to 2-3-25.

Several of these tests have already been discussed but there remain a number of general
matters which require consideration.
The question of whether the steel should have been inspected before it left Port
Kembla was discussed before us at some length. It transpired that Ferris advised Wilson
to get Lloyd's Register of Shipping, Land Division, to inspect the steel at the steel works
and that Wilson discussed the matter with Butler who, in turn, asked for the Board's
direction. Butler's letter (Ex. 32) includes the sentence "It would appear doubtful whether
the Board would benefit by 10s. per ton" (a reference to the cost of Lloyd's inspeetion)
and carried the following handwritten note signed by Wilson : " This was considered
verbally by the Chief Engineer and/or the then Chairman and not agreed to. There is no
official written record". However, the C.R.B. apparently did >vrite in 1960 to suggest
the use of Lloyd's inspectors but J. & \V. refused and the matter was not pressed.
\Ve are quite clear that it would have been far better if the steel had been
unambiguously identified, tested, and cleared for despatch by an independent inspector at
Port Kembla works. As it was, the steel was only inspected and tested after delivery and
the first requirement of a testing programme, proper identification of the specimens, was
not satisfied. This not is an easy requirement to fulfil ; one piece of steel looks very like another
and it is, therefore, important to have very systematic arrangements for stamping heat
numbers on specimens and for recording the results. It must be realized that it was
intended that " two tension, two cold bend, and two impact tests shall be made from each
size of section or plates rolled from any one heat of steel or identifiable batch from stock "
(Clause 2-3-15.); and that four bend tests, two tensile butt-weld tests, four impact tests,
and a macrographic test were required for weldability (Clause 2-3-16 (f)). This was a
formidable programme to organize and carry out. It was never fully implemented and
was ultimately relaxed.
In practice, the specimens were machined by J. & W. and tested by E.T.R.S. or at
Royal Melbourne Technical College in the presence of Scarlett and J ackson. A curious
feature of the testing was the procedure adopted for retesting failed samples. The
specification is tmambiguous : Clause 2-3-15. states that "should any of the test specimens
first selected not fulfil the test requirements for the material being tested, two additional
specimens of the type which did not fulfil the test requirements shall be taken, and should
either of these fail to fulfil such tests, all the material so represented shall be rejected."
It is perhaps not surprising that J. & W., having accepted the material from B.H.P. before
the tests were made, took the view that what did not pass the first time would pass if it
was tested a sufficient number of times; but it is indeed very surprising that the C.R.B.
concurred.

On the other hand, tests are not prescribed without reason. Quite apart from their
discriminatory value-to reject faulty material-they can be an invaluable guide to
production. B.H.P. knew this and in actual fact carried out, for its own purposes, many
more tests than it reported (See Ex. 186) ; but J. & \V. did not realize that the weldability
tests, if intelligently used, could have helped to determine fabrication procedures. Instead
of this it was constantly pressing the C.R.B. to relax the testing programme.
 72
'While we do not regard the matter as of crucial importance we think it is
symptomatic that many of t:h.e Izod tests at the higher temperatures were tested at
"ambient temperature" and not at 70 F. as specified. With this steel the Izod value
changes rapidly with temperature and so a few degrees up or down can make the difference
between success or failure.

In some heats (e.g., 1, 4, 9; see Sec. 2.7.2.3.) the Izod value at 32 P. was higher than
that at the upper temperature ; this can only be explained if the samples were wrongly
identified or the tests improperly conducted or recorded, or if the steel was very variable.

The specifications are not absolutely clear on the point although it certainly seems
that the intention was that the steel should have been inspected before it left the maker's
works (See Clauses 2-3-16 (h) and 2-3-25.). Further it was not to be despatched from the
maker's works or stock until U1iah had certified that it complied with C.R.B. specifications.
The C.R.B. also had ample powers to ensure that the steel was fully tested and approved
before it was used (Clause 2-1-l.). In spite of all this, J. & W. insisted that it was nothing
more than a "commercial risk" to use steel before it had been tested and Eastick apparently
did not insist.

'Ve have most difficulty of all in understanding the decision to change to "random"
testing. The average tmmage of steel per heat was not greatly reduced (See Section
2.7.2.3.) by the change to electric furnace production although everyone expected the new
process to give better control of steel-making. But if it was essential to reduce the number
of tests, selective tests on samples shown by the certificates to be high in carbon and
manganese should have been chosen, and the "submitted heats" should have been
thoroughly tested.

All the matters mentioned above illustrate the advantages that could have been gained
from the presence of a competent metallurgist in J. & W.'s works. In particular, we
again draw attention to the reckless way in which the "submitted heats" were accepted;
the importance and significance of this matter could not have escaped a metallurgist.

We summarize our views on the inspection and testing of the steel as follows :-
J. & W.---
(a) having failed to order the steel to C.R.B. specifications failed to inspect
it properly prior to fabrication ;
(b) was under press1rre from Utah to complete the fabrication and erection
of the girders on time and, in turn, constantly pressed C.R.B. to relax
testing;
(c) did not understand, and had no respect for, the importance of a sound
and comprehensive testing programme.
C.R.B.-
(a) did relax the i:utensity of testing without proper thought;
(b) did approve steel which did not come within its specification;
(c) did not apply its full rights as to testing.

As a result of all this, several heats of steel were accepted that should have been
rejected.

2.10.5. Fabrication and w.e(ding procedures.

Welding high-tensile steel is a more complicated business than welding mild steel and
requires careful attention to detail if it is to be successfully carried out. J. & ,V. had had no
previous experience of B.S. 968 steel and much of their difficulty can be traced to having
to learn as it went along on a big contract with a tight delivery schedule.

It soon became apparent to J. & ,V. that without outside help it would never succeed
and so Ward of l\iurex was installed " to put their house in order ". It was not at all easy
to obtain, train and examine enough welders to keep the work rmming smoothly but we
think that this difficulty was eventually overcome. We formed the impression that the
welders who came before us could, with proper direction, have done a first-class job.
 73

We do not think that instructions were given to the men in a satisfactory manner;
indeed we never really found out what, if any, was the system in use. It appears that the
calculation of the neeessary pre-heat was a very haphazard business, to say the least, and
the pre-heat temperature eventually reached the men by word of mouth. This in itself is
not necessarily reprehensible but proper records should have been kept so that the reason
for any faults subsequently detected might have been traced.

The following extract from " Memorandum on Faults in Arc Welds in Mild and Low
Alloy Steels", published by the B.W.R.A. in 1950, is of interest in this connection:-
" Full information as regards weld sizes and details, plate preparation,
assembly and fit-up, welding procedure, sequence and so on should be given on
the drawings, or by separate charts or other suitable means, to ensure that the
works staff is fully conversant with the requirements of the drawing office, and
of the planning or production departments.
During fabrication, all welding should be carried out under coiL.<>tant
supervision, by welding operators trained and tested to weld 1mder conditions
and on the type of welds appropriate to the class of work on which they are employed.
It is advisable that identification and record systems be used by which
responsibility for the execution and supervision of welding can be established
at any tinw during or following completion of the work ''.

On the other hand the excellent records kept by C.R.B. have been of great value to
U8. They have enabled us to learn the heats of steel incorporated in every girder of the
bridge, and the welding sequence used in most cases. Unfortunately, on the transfer of
C.R.B. to new headquarters, records relating to the work of individual welders were destroyed.
Had these records been available we would ha.ve known which \Velders had made the welds
which failed and some of the doubts we have on procedures used could have been resolved.
'rhe fabricators kept no such records.

In Section 2.9.3. we have dealt with the question of pre-heat. We were told that
J. & W. would have preferred to use bigger electrodes and heavier currents but this matter
was never properly explored with the C.RB.

Metallurgical opinion is unanimous on the importance of heat in-put but, on the other
hand, we have evidence that some experienced fabricators like to keep the initial temperatures
as low as possible consistent with the prevention of weld cracking. This is not just a matter
of expense although the cost of pre-heating is not negligible ; nor is it that a good rate of
production may be maintained. The aim is rather to reduce both distortion and the
production of high residual stresses. 'Ve do not presume to adjudicate on a matter that is
doubtless only to be resolved by careful compromise. But we whole-heartedly agree with
Eastick's view that if J. & ,V. had spent the period between the award of the contract and the
beginning of fabrication in systematically investigating these matters and preparing
themselves for the job the whole history of Kings Bridge would have been different.

Experiments conducted during the Enquiry have cmrvinced us that the determination
of the proper welding procedure for the various girder joints in this steel is not at all easy
and merits n:mch more careful study than was possible once fabrication was under way. The
method used by J. & W. was just not good enough, especially when the steel delivered was
as high in carbon as eventually turned out to be the case. The culminating point was
reached when, towards the end of the contract (September, 1960), for reasons that are not
clear, the "weldability index" was lowered for a few weeks. This meant that the pre-heat
temperature would be lowered. It was apparently during this period that theW. 14 girders,
which eventually failed, were fabricated. As we now know, the carbon content of these plates
was exceptionally high so that the pre-heat temperature should have been raised rather
than lowered. We consider that the resulting inadequate pre-heat was one of the causes
of the toe cracks at the cover plate end weld8 in the failed girders.

Two further illustrations will suffice to demonstrate .J. & W.'s tmpreparedness to
undertake the contract : if pre-heat is to be used properly the temperature of the steel must
be checked but J. & W. welders had no means of doing so. It was only when Clarke told
 74
them about temperature-sensitive thermocrayons that they were able to check pre-heat
temperatures at alL Finally, in this context, we refer again to the fact that it was only
on Ward's advice that J. & W. installed hot boxes in which to store and dry the electrodes
before use.

We now turn to the incident of the 500-ton press, which occupied more time at the
Enquiry than it deserved, but which does illustrate rather vividly the attitude of some of
the parties. It came to light only because of the rather underhand activities of Fisher
who had been installed by Utah in the J. & W. works as an observer. We do not think
very highly of Utah for this manamvre, even though Fisher apparently went beyond his brief
in his enthusiasm to detect and. report any misdemeanours on the part of J. & W., and we
commend Bonwick for putting the arrangement on a proper basis.

It seems that J. & W. was having difficulty in ensuring that the camber of the completed
girders was in accordance with the drawings. It occurred to Stocker that if he were to
subject them to a suitable force in a big press he eould bend them into the correct shape.
C.R.B. was asked for its approval but, before this was received (complete with a number of
precautions that were to be observed), Stocker conceived the idea of a private trial by night.
The idea was, no doubt, that if it succeeded C.R.B. would accept the procedure as having
been justified by the result. No measurements of the strain were made, nor any thought
given to the consequences of cold work on steel of this kind, but apparently the attempt
was abandoned before it went very far.

So far as ,J. & W. is concerned we conclude as follows:-

(a) The J. & W. organization, particularly at senior level, was not adequate
to undertake the construction of these girders in B.S. H68 steel.
(b) Under the strict control of C.H.B. inspectors and with the help of Murex
most of the technical difficulties were subsequently solved.
(c) Inherently, however, it never became a competent fabricator of low-alloy
steel because of the failure to appreciate that the troubles encountered
were largely metallurgical in origin.
(d) Within its competence, and working under adverse conditions created
by C.R.B. im:pection and Utah production pressure, it did its best.
(e) These adverse conditions arose from lack of knowledge of the steel being
fabricated, but they were not helped in their adversity by the similar
lack of knowledge of the C.R.B. officers who were in effect their task
masters.
(j) Had it not been for the close C.R.B. inspection the bridge would have been
much worse than it was.

The question of the inspection of the girders by C.R.B. is discussed in Section 2.10.6
below and we now turn to the attitude of Utah to the difficulties encountered by their
sub-contractor. "\:Ve are not concerned here with the question of legal liability, but simply
with whether Utah should have intervened or could have done so to good effect.

In actual fact they did practically nothing beyond transmitting letters from C.R.B.
to J. & W. and vice versa. They did take action, on occasions, to try to iron out differences
but they were deliberately careful not to become closely involved themselves. Having
awarded the sub-contract to J. & W. who were, so far as anyone knew at the time, competent
and experienced fabricators they left them to get on with it.

The Utah engineers concerned were :Fink and Bonwick, whose work in this context
was described as follows : " The most important thing as far as we were concerned was
to administer the sub-contract in respect of payment, measurement of work, timing of
when girders were going to arrive, scheduling, programming, and so on, and give them
any technical assistance we coU:ld give them if they asked for it ".
 75

It is convenient at this stage to list a number of significant dates:-

13.8.57 Contract signed between C.R.B. and Utah for bridge construction.
4.9.57 J. & \V. given contract for fabrication by Utah.
19.9.57 Work began.
11.11.57 J. & W. approved by C.R.B. as sub-contractors for fabrication.
20.5.58 First steel ordered by J. & W. from B.H.P.
.8.58 First steel delivered at J. & W. (earliest test certificate is dated
9th July, 1958).
15.8.58 Scarlett nominated as Utah's representative at J. & \V.
5.9.58 Letter J. & vV. to Utah saying (erroneously) that B.H.P. would
do the Izod tests in future.
2.3.59 1Jnsuccessful demonstration of automatic welding.
10.3.59 Letter J. & W. to Utah undertaking to do Izod tests.
24.3.59 Acrimonious conference at J. & \V.
14.4.59 Conference between Utah and J. & W. Difficulties reviewed
and action agreed.
7.8.59 Letter 1Jtah to J. & W. saying that sub-structu:re was ready for
105 girders but that none had been delivered.
7.9.59 First girder erected.
29.11.59 Letter J. & W. to Gtah asking for 334,000 extra in view of
high standard of work and excessive inspection required by
C.R.B.
30.11.59 Letter Utah to J. & W. rejecting claim for extra payment.
A perusal of the correspondence makes it abundantly clear that throughout 1959
J. & W. were in great difficulties to get the job going. By about July, 1959, Stocker was
advising J. & W. to stop the contract but the principals of the firm honourably decided
that having set its hand to the contract, it would see the matter through.
The pathetic aspect of this correspondence is that J. & W. were continually saying
that all would be well if only the C.R.B. would relax their control over welding procedures
and the severity of their inspection; it never seems to have occurred to J. & W. that
this control and inspection was essential to the satisfactory execution of the job.
It will be clear from the above dates that long before the first girder was completed
Utah was very well aware that its sub-contractor was in very serious trouble.
It transpired at the Enquiry that in April, 1959, Fink wrote to a friend of his, l\tlr.
C. C. Winter, of the California Department of Public Works, to ask about welding high-
tensile steel ; he received the following suggestions :--
1. Set up rigid tolerances and procedures and follow them.
2. Moisture is critical.
3. Surges in power are critical.
4. Rigid inspection.
As a further suggestion: "Have someone from your company visit and talk to
the American Bridge Company or the U.S. Steel Company ". This was indeed good
advice but neither C.R.B. nor J. & \V., to whom it was shown, nor Utah themselves did
anything about it and it was not until the end of January, 1960, that Bonwick was sent
to the U.S.A. and the U.K. to "obtain answers to the following three main questions:-
(a) \Vhat methods are used for the fabrication of welded low-alloy steel plate
girder bridges ?
(b) What are typical costs and man-hour production rates for this type of work?
(c) vv11at standards of inspection are adopted by the different authorities for
this work ? "
By the time he got back in early March about 90 girders out of a total of 277 had
been erected so that the valuable information he obtained was really too late to be
effective.
Utah representatives at the Enquiry more than once said that in view of the close
supervision of the work by C.R.B. and the fact that J. & \V., whatever their deficiencies,
knew more about welding than they did, any intervention by Utah would have confused
an already difficult situation. We agree; the only effective action Utah could have taken
 76
would have been to bring over from America, early in 1959, a thoroughly experienced
welding engineer who had been used to working to the requirements of the California
Division of Highways or some other similar State authority. This man would have had
to be put in charge of the whole operations at J. & W.
We do not know whether action of this kind was considered by Vtah at the time
although Fink said in evidence that he did not think it a good idea; he did say, however,
that Utah had power under the contract to intervene and supervise .T. & W.'s work.
We are convinced that nothing less would have sufficed to bring J. & W. up to the
required standard in time. As it was, by the time Bonwick got back from abroad the
combined efforts of Ward, the C.R.B., and J. & \V. themselves seemed to have been
successful and completed girders were moving steadily out of the shop.
There was, however, one occasion when Utah could possibly have obtained some
useful information and failed to do so. In July, 1959, it came to their notice that a
bridge had been constructed of B.S. 968 steel at Glen Quoich in Scotland and on the 14th
a cable was sent to Sir \Vm. Halcrow & Partners of London asking for information. The
reply referred Utah to Sir \Vm. Arrol & Co. of Glasgow, who designed and constructed
the bridge, but no further action was taken.
Our conclusions about Utah are, therefore, as follows:-
(a) They did not come up to the expectations of the C.R.B. by bringing
American experience to bear on the fabrication of the steel work.
(b) They did not realize that J. & \V. were too inexperienced in this class of
work to be given the sub-contract. (Their appointment of Scarlett as
their representative is clear evidence of this.)
(c) They could only have improved the performance of J. & \V. by virtually
taking over eontrol of the J. & W. shop by importing expert staff.
(d) Their attitude to the whole question of fabrication was disappointing.

2.10.6. Inspection of the welding and fabrication.

The correspondence referred to in the previous section makes it abundantly clear
that C.R.B. not only inspected the finished work but also insisted on their right to approve
every detail of the fabrication and welding procedure. They were certainly entitled to do
so but they were no more competent than J. & W. in the special problems of handling
B.S. 968 steel because their only prior contact with it was when Jackson went to D.S.L.
for training (Section 2.4.3).
One can readily imagine, therefore, the state of mind engendered in the J. & W.
personnel when these C.R.B. men, themselves without appreciable knowledge or experience
of the steel, set themselves up as the final arbiters in all welding proceduxes.
The inspectors were, we believe, expert welders but they had had no experience of
inspection; nevertheless they had the final authority even though, like J. & \V., they were
learning on the project.
To add to J. & \V.'s difficulties, Utah was continually pressing for delivery of the
girders, but not otherwise contributing to the progress of the project. The fabricator's
staff must have been a frustrated group of men; they were trying to handle a steel which
was variable and not always in conformity with the steel-works certificates; the
controlling authority was applying very high standards; and the contractor was wanting
his girders. This was not a congenial atmosphere for a great experiment in a new
material.
Inspection is an art which involves knowledge, skill, and personality. There is
nothing more calculated to rouse hostility amongst workmen than an inspector who is so
unsuxe of his own knowledge 1;hat he interprets his instructions literally.
From the evidence it would seem that the C.R.B. staff virtually took over the
details of girder fabrication in J. & W. shops. They themselves had no knowledge of the
fabrication difficulties with this steel and they seem to have "stood over" J. & W.
personnel, demanding the submission of every detail of procedure, A typical case arose
in connection with the use of automatic welding. This was considered by C.R.B. personnel
to be a departure from standard practice, which to them meant manual welding. Certainly,
 77
early efforts to produce a sati::>factory automatic weld were not successful but C.RB.
officers appear to have been critical rather than helpful. When it seemed that success vms
in sight, Eastick adopted the attitude of a disciplinarian regarding stops and starts of the
welding machine.
From an early stage in the contract C.R.B. officers appear to have doubted the
technical competence of J. & W. to construct girders in this steel and, having no knowledge
of their own, they adopted the unhelpful attitude of criticism. This naturally created a
feeJing of resentment in the J. & W. organization and the mutually uncooperative
attitude seems to have been a feature throughout the contract.
For instance, there was a suggestion that J. & W. introduced night work at short
notice in order to get on with t;ome welding when the inspectors were not present. We
think that the exigencies of the production schedule probably demanded night work, or
at least overtime, quite often but the fact that such action could be interpreted as an
attempt to outvrit the inspectors is evidence of an unsatisfactory relationship.
C.R.B. seems to have lost sight of the possibility of brittle fracture at an early stage.
In fact there is no evidence that anybody in the C.R.B. organization gave this a second
thought. Consequently, even C.R.B. officers went through the motions of Izod testing
quite mechanically and with no thought that it was of critical importance. In this they
were at one with J. & W.
We now consider in turn several specific issues : the firl"t is the question of the
weldability tests. The specification for these was based on B.S. 2549 : 1954, which deaL'>
with electrodes for welding steel to B.S. 968 : 19,!1. In this specification the method of
preparing test pieces described requires the temperature of the parent plate to be between
50 F. and 85 F. when the test welds are started.
For reasons that we were not told but which, for all we know to the contrary, may
have been entirely sound, the tests of B.S. 2549 were used by the C.R.B. to examine, not
the electrodes but the steel. Unfortunately, there was no prescription of the initial
temperature of the parent plate and, in consequence, this became a matter of dispute
between C.R.B. and J. & W. The weldability test specimens were prepared by J. & W.,
welded by Murex and finally tested by E.T.R.S. or the Melbourne Technical College ; on
24th November, 1958 the Melbourne office of Murex wrote to the research department
at Hobart as follows
" In most cases the tests were very satisfactory, but you will notice that
the Jzod values are low on some of the tests, so therefore we have to carry out
a retest on this particular plate." The reply from Hobart included the following :
" . it would appear that the trouble is confined to the Izod specimens
when the notch is located in the heat-affected zone. As we have pointed out
before, this is entirely a thermal effeet and ean be expeeted with the heavier section
plate material.
We understand that pre-heating is not allowed by the C.R.B. inspectors.
There is little else than can be done to slow down cooling right in the heat-affected
zone . "
We never did discover with any precision what was done about pre-heating the
weldability test specimens although Scarlett, in ev,-jdence, implied that the C.R.B.
inspector present at the welding fixed the pre-heat. We are, however, satisfied that it
occurred neither to C.R.B. nor to J. & W. that these tests might have been used to help
to determine the welding procedure.
There is, however, plenty of evidence that Clarke, and the inspectors under him,
gave a great deal of attention to such matters as the use of thermocrayons and the general
" housekeeping" at J. & W. and they eertainly looked for, and found, large numbers of
weld defects which were subsequently repaired, re-inspected and passed. This is the basis
of J. & W.'s elaim that every defect that was found was repaired to the satisfaction of the
C.R.B.
The records of work of the inspectors are contained in the three volumes of Ex. 103
(Fillet weld survey sheets), in Ex. 98 (File of official memoranda from Clarke) and are
summarized in Ex. 222. This eTidence certainly gives the impression, at first glance, of
a very strict and meticulous in:speetion. However, the fact remains that a number of
things got past the inspectors that have subsequently come to light.
 78
The design specifications prohibited transverse welds in tension flanges except in
regions where the stress was at a sufficiently low value. Accordingly the gusset plates to
which the cross-bracing was attached were shown on the dra.wings to be welded to the
flanges by longitudinal welds only. Nevertheless it was found later that transverse welds
had also been used on the western girders over City-road, and Hudson, in his examination
of the bridge after the collapse of span W.l4, found that a number of these welds gave
indications of cracks. He also found indications of cracking at various locations on the
85 girder ends that he examined.

The incidence of cracks at the cover plate ends is described in Section 2.9.6.1 et seq.
but the question of whether this location, which is now known to have been of critical
importance, should have been the subject of a special examination remains to be discussed.

The O.RB. inspectors clearly had no instructions to give it particular attention

and regarded it in the same way as any other fillet weld. The butt welds on the tension
flanges were very properly given a very close examination and it is surprising that similar
reasoning was not applied to 1'he cover plate end weld$.

We think that they should have been picked out for special examination by the
C.RB. when the intensity of inspection to be imposed was being settled.

We have commented, in Section 2.6.3, on the designer's role in specifying welding

details and we believe that similar arguments apply to the interest he should take in
inspection.

The counter argument iH that defects, sometimes resulting in serious consequences,

are not infrequently found in comparatively unimportant details, the attachment of lugs
for supporting pressure vessels, for instance, and tack welds have been mentioned to us
as features which are sometimes. too lightly regarded because of their seeming unimportance.
From this standpoint the C.R..B. attitude of regarding all welds as of equal significance
was correct.

We do not agree with this view. Any .system of inspection that is not 100 per cent.
complete involves selection and among the criteria for selection must surely be the possible
consequences of a crack remaining undetected. As soon as this has been said it becomes
obvious that transverse cracks in tension flanges must be sought with special care and
eliminated.

The final inspection apparently often took place with workmen swarming over
the girder putting the finishing touches to the work. It seems that J. & W. insisted that
production should not be delayed because inspection and testing were incomplete and
maintained that any defects in the girders would eventually be corrected; they regarded
it as merely a commercial risk that this might involve removing completed girders from
the bridge. As a consequence the final inspection was carried out in very unsatisfactory
circumstances and it is quite likely that the cracks which eventually caused the bridge
to fail were missed for this reason.

We hardly know whom to blame the more, J. & W. for its cavalier attitude or C.R.B.
for putting up with it.

Our conclusions about the inspection of the welding are as follows :-

(a) C.R.B. inspectors were inexperienced in the inspection of this class of
welding and therefore adopted what they regarded as safe criteria.
(b) J. & ,V. did not realize that, with this material, meticulous inspection was
essential.
(c) In consequence there was continual bickering about the standards of
inspection.
(d) The C.R.B. inspectors missed a great many cracks that have since been
found.
(e) :Many cracks were found and repaired.
(f) The standard of inspection was high but not high enough.
 79

PART 3.-THE COLLAPSE OF THE W.14 SPAN OF THE BRIDGE.

In the preceding narrative we have attempted to present a picture of the
relationships between the parties concerned and in particular of the conditions prevailing
in the fabricator's organization and workshops.

We now propose to consider in detail the nature of the failure, using the information
acquired during the Enquiry, including the results of the former Committee of Investigation
and the investigations which have been made for us by the Defence Standards Laboratories
and the various parties concerned.

3.1. Characteristics of the Failed Girder W.14-2.

This was the second girder from the west side of the elevated carriageway and its
general characteristics can be seen in the accompanying photograph, Fig. 2, which is taken
looking south. The cover plate end is therefore not seen. To complete the picture and
to show the relationship with the cover plate, reference is made to Fig. 3 which is a photograph
of the southern end fracture (looking north) of girder W.l4--l, and to photograph Fig. 4 of
girder W.l4~4 (north). These two show typical cover plate endings and the association
of the fracture with them. These three photographs are typical of all the fractures in a
general way. They differ in detail.

Fig. 2 shows the following characteristics:-

(a) A brittle (i.e., non ductile) fracture of the lower flange and the web.
(b) A dark area (A.) in the centre of the flange, in the neighbourhood of the
web/flange fillet welds at the toe of the cover plate end weld.
(c) A dark area (B.) in the web near the top ot the photograph. This is a
fatigue fracture which serves to establish the condition of this girder prior
to the final collapse on lOth July, 1962.

Fig. 3 shows a typical cover plate end transverse weld. It can be seen that the
fracture in the flange starts at the toe of this transverse weld, of which two of the three weld
beads can be seen. The root bead is of course covered.

Figure 4 shows the longitudinal weld of the cover plate to the flange and the welding
at the end of the cover plate. It can be seen that the taper weld started after gouging
back 3 or 4 inches into the longitudinal weld. Two weld beads are evident.

Figure 5 shows in more detail the nature of the fracture in W.l4-2 at the south end.
From the bottom is seen-
(a) the cover plate and two of the transverse weld beads.
(b) a dark area which in effect is composite. First the toe crack about l inch
deep, then a primary brittle fracture, rusted, and terminating at the
two web/flange fillet welds showing that these welds arrested the first
fracture.
(c) The web/flange welds.
(d) The web and flange secondary brittle fracture (rusted).
We consider this girder fractured through the flange to point B. (i.e., 44 inches up
the web) in Fig. 2, months before the final collapse, because it was the only fracture which
was rusted.

In trying to fix the time for this fracture we have several significant features :-
(a) There is no indication of the final coat of paint which was applied during
January, 1961. This coat, having an aluminimum base was readily
distinguishable, and was in fact found in at least one fracture (W.l4.-3
south end). There is little doubt also that the fracture would have been
so obvious that the painter would have noticed it. Nobody has
mentioned this to us.
(b) The surface of the fracture is rusty. It is considered that this would
have required several months to reach the condition noted at the time.
 80
(c) The fatigue fracture at B. {Fig. 2) indicates a response to traffic loads because
of the presence of characteristic markings showing the progress of fatigue.
{d) The temperature at the time of the failure (11 a.m. lOth July, 1962) was
about 45 F. following a minimum of 36 F. during the previous night.
The only lower temperature to which the bridge was subjected was in
1961, when a minimum of 33 F. was recorded in July.

The only definite limits for the time of fracture of W.l4-2 are therefore January,
1961, and July, 1962, with a possibility, judging by the rust and the low temperature that
it occurred in July, 1961. It is possible, therefore, that this fracture was present on
18th October, 1961, when the bridge was taken over by M. & M.B.W. If there had been
an inspection this fracture, if present, would have been noticed.

\Vnen the actual fractme is examined it is evident that the progre~:>s of the fracture
up the web took place in several stages.

3.2. The Condition of the W.l4 Span just prior to the Collapse.
Before considering the failure in detail, and trying to trace the ultimate causes, it is
appropriate to describe the condition of the failed span, and in fact of the whole bridge as we
now know it to be. This is illustrated by reference to Fig. 6. 'he following features are
noted:-
(a) At all seven cover plate transverse welds where the main fractures were
found there was a toe crack about ! inch deep x 3 inches long.
(b) Red primer paint had penetrated six of these toe cracks.
(c) In the following positions the toe cracks had developed into primary brittle
fractures which had passed through the flange plate: W.14-1 (south),
W.14~2 (nor1;h), W.14-3 (south), whilst at W.l4-2 {south), a similar
fractme had developed but had been arrested by the fillet welds at the web.
(d) Red primer paint had penetrated three of these brittle fractures from the
top side of the flanges: W.l4-l (south), w.l4-2 (north) and W.l4-3
(south).
(e) The final coat of nluminimum paint penetrated also the primary brittle fracture
in W.l4~3 (south) from the top side of the flange, showing that this fracture
had broken through the primer coat, and the second coat of paint which
was applied after the girder had been erected. This means that this
fracture was opening up under traffic loads before January, 1961.
(f) Sometime after ~fanua.xy, 1961, i.e., after the final coat of paint was applied,
the primary brittle fracture at the south end of W.l4~2 passed through
the two fillet welds which had first arrested it and stopped 44 inches up
the web, leaving only a few inches of the web intact. The primary
brittle fracture at the south end of W.l4-3 about the same time spread
4 inches up the web. It is suggested that these extensions occurred
during the winter of 1961.
(g) During the succr~eding year the south ends of W.l4--2 and W.14-3 were
flexing under traffic loads to an extent which resulted in fatigue fracture
developing for about t inch further up the web in each case.

In addition the north end of \V.l4-2 had a fracture 1 inch up the web as seen in
Fig. 7.

It can be seen, therefore, that during the twelve months from about July, 1961, to
July, 1962, these two girders (W.l4--2 and W.l4--3) were carrying no appreciable part of the
traffic load.

'fhe ultimate collapse of this span was therefore inevitable for the condition was
getting continually worse due to the presence of fatigue fractures in these two girders.

At this stage it is appropriate to comment on the situation in the remainder of the

bridge as it has been disclosed during the Enquiry.
 81
There are at least two other locations where the :flange plates are fractured through
at the transverse weld, though as yet these are partial fractures similar to those already
described (See (c) above). These locations are span E. lljS4 over City-road and E. 6jS2
over "'lliteman-street.
In the course of reconstruction many cover plate ends have been milled away and
the locations examined for cracks similar to those which caused the failure. Without going
into detail it can be said that toe cracks at this weld were frequently found and a few of
them had evidently developed into partial brittle fractures which were i inch to i inch deep
in the flange plate which was only ! inch thick.

These points are mentioned, not because they had any direct connection with the
failure, but in order to indicate that the condition which caused .span W.14 to collapse is
not by any means unique in the structure a.s a whole.

3.3. What is to Be Learned from the Fractures.

3.3.1. The significance of the toe cracks at the transverse welds.
It is known in welding circles that this kind of crack is more liable to occur in low-
alloy steel than in mild steeL This is one of the features included in the term " weldability ",
and means that to avoid defects of thir; kind it is necessary to take certain precautions when
welding low-alloy steeL The higher the carbon, manganese and chromium in any given
plate of steel the more careful mu15t the welder be.

The factors a competent fabricator would take into account are :-

(a) The use of the correct temperature for pre-heating the location of the weld,
taking into account the gauge of electrode to be used, the composition
of the steel and the geometry of the joint.
{b) The type of electrode to be used, including its composition and the composition
of the flux covering.
(c) The drying of the electrode immediately prior to lL.'>e.
(d) The fit of the two plates to be welded, any gap between the two being
detrimentaL
(e) The restraint placed on the weld during cooling, this being largely determined
by the geometry of the particular joint and the welding sequence used.

It will therefore be seen that a complex set of circumstances was involved and we
have no means of sorting out the part played by these factors other than by trying to interpret
the evidence.

We have reason to think that at the time these W.14 girders were fabricated there
had been a reduction of pre-heating temperatures. J. & \V. was never impressed with the
need for pre-heating and at the end of September, 1960, it issued instructions for the weldability
index to be lowered. This meant a lower pre-heating temperature. As previously mentioned
(Sec. 2.7.3.) the .steel u.sed for these girder :flanges was out of specification-being high in
carbon. The pre-heat temperature .should therefore have been raised, rather than lowered.

The electrode used for the manual welding of the end of the cover plate was a low-
hydrogen electrode Fortrex 35 designed for welding low-alloy steel. It has been established
that the welds were actually made from such electrodes. The maker, however,
recommended that such electrodes be " stored in a warm place and re-dried at 150 C. for
30 minutes immediately before use". The object of this wa::; to remove any mo:h<;ture which
may have been absorbed from the atmosphere.

There is evidence that about the time the W.14 girders were fabricated there was
some slackness regarding the shop practices relating to electrodes. This is one of the
features of low-alloy steel welding which J. & \V. had to take into account for good fabrication.
It had not been used to this refinement but it was introduced by \Vard of Murex in 1959.
Our reasons for thinking that this may have had a bearing on the failure are as follows:-
(a) Clarke (C.R.B.) in his diary mentioned several occasions in September and
October, 1960, when he issued warnings about electrodes not being tidied
up and welders using cold electrodes.
6352/63-6
 82
(b) At no time during the Enquiry ha::> J. & W. mentioned for how long the
electrodes were heated. \Ve presume therefore that this feature of the
welding was left to the judgment of individual welder~>.
(c) With a view to assisting the Commission, A.l.S. carried out some experiment::>
in which it was indicated that all moisture was not driven off from the
electrodes until a temperature of 350 C. was used.

The importance of this drying is that moisture from any source decompo::>es in the
welding arc and releases hydrogen which is absorbed by the weld metal. This is one of
the most important causes of the type of cracking fOlmd at the toes of the transverse weld.s.

It is in this connection also that the " fit " of the plates being welded is of importanee.
The gas used for the pre-heating burners wa~:> either aeetylene or propane. Each of these
produees water which at first condenses on the cold metal, hut evaporates as the temperature
rises. If there is a had fit, water can condense between the two plates. This could be
a source of hydrogen. We considered this as a possible cause of the failure, hut finally
rejected it for the following reasons :-
(a) This source of hydrogen could only affect the root weld head whereas the
toe cracks ea using the fractures occur at the second head run, i.e., after
all access to any cavity between the plates had been closed.
(b) The fit of the pla.tes at W.l4-2 (south end), where the first failure occurred,
was particularly close.

Cracks are caused by loeal stresses acting on material which is too brittle to yield,
or which is restrained from yielding because stresses are acting in several different directions.
These stresses are due to the eontraetion during cooling after welding and are said to be
"internal stres~>es" because they develop inside the weldment without any external load
being a pp lied.

These W.14 girders were fabricated in such a way that there was a maximum of
re~:>trai:nt
on this transverse weld. It was, in fact, the final weld done on the girders. It
was restrained by the two tapeT welds at the end of the cover plate and by previous weld~>
rUlllling at right angles to it on t;he opposite side of the flange plate, i.e., the web/flange welds.
No record is available for many of the girders, particularly those eonstructed in the early
stages of the eontract, hut at least half were welded in the manner of the vV.l4 girders.
Clarke said this was done hecauJ:le manual welders were not available at the time when the
automatie cover plate flange longitudinal welds were eompleted. In other words there
was no rational or pre-determined sequence for this weld~to which nobody attached any
special importanee-it was jus1; a matter of shop expediency.

Ji'rom these considerations we eondude that the following factors were eoncerned in
causing the toe eracks which, being stress raisers, set off the train of events whieh led to
the failure of span "\V.l4 :-
(a) The pre-heating of the weld loeation wa~>insuftieient beeause the carbon content
of the steel was higher than was known at the time, and the pre-heat had
been lowered by decision.
(b) The electrodes may have been insufficiently dry due to slackness in shop
praetice.
(c) The restraint on bhe transverse weld caused by the sequence of welding used.

We cannot, however, say whether one of these factors was more important than the
others.

3.3 .2. The cause of the primary or partial brittle fractures.

Any sharp re-entrant angle in the steel causes a sharp concentration of stress at the
leading edge whether the stress is of internal or external origin. The toe cracks mentioned
constitute a defect of this type. The ability of steel to resist such stress eoncentration
is known as "notch ductility" or "noteh toughness" (See Sec. 2.7.1.2.). It is an intrinsie
property of a given piece of steel, and involves considerations of micro-structure, hardness
 83

and chemical composition, including nitrogen and hydrogen content. The precise degree
of notch ductility revealed is, however, also a function of the geometry of the part in the
neighbourhood of the notch, of the size of the weldment and of the rate of application of
the external load. The essential characteristic is the pre8ence of a notch--in this case
the toe cracks.

In our thinking on this feature of the failure we have been influenced by the
appearance of the partial brittle fractures in the failed girders. They are always discoloured
and generally rusty. This discolomation we think was caused by the phosphoric acid used
for cleaning the weld prior to painting and if this is so the fractures must have been present
at this stage. These W.l4 girders were painted in the fabrication bay (Hardcastle
Tr. 2070) and from the description we have had of this operation it is evident that little time
would elapse between the finish of manual welding at the end of the cover plate and the
application of acid for cleaning. This latter was left on for about half an hour.

These partial brittle fractures occurred therefore almost certainly within two hours
of the welds being made. There is evidence also that internal cracks were formed in the
fillet welds connecting the tapered part of the cover plate end to the flange as well as the
transverse weld itself. 'fhe former eracks have not propagated by brittle fracture so far
as we know and this inclines us to the view that local internal stresses, probably aided by
handling stresses as the girders were turned over for painting, were most severe at the
transverse end and caused the cracks there to develop. Scarlett (Tr. 1480) said there was
much flexing of girders during handling.

We have asked ourselves the question, " vVhy did these partial brittle fractures
occur at five of the eight welds and not at the other three ~ " No satisfactory answer has
been found. Four of them, including three of the worst fractures at this stage, involved
heat 55 which had a bad record for notch ductility when tested. The fourth occurred in
heat 56 which has given mixed notehed bar results on the whole, but never so bad as those
from heat 55. It is possible that these erratic results in heat 56 are due to strain ageing
but we are not satisfied that this is the answer. We note that heats 55 and 56 were
rather higher in nitrogen ('008 per cent. to 011 per cent.) than is fixed as an upper limit in
the 1962 amendment of B.S. 968. We earuwt rule out the possibility that some mixing
of these two heats has occurred during fabrication.

We have also considered the possibility of hydrogen embrittlement arising from the
pickling process to which all plates were subjected. We are aware that some authorities
consider that there is a permanent effect resulting from the absorption of hydrogen. We
have, however, rejected this possibility because the condition would be found in all plates,
and because at the location of the fractures the steel had been heated by the welding
operation. Hydrogen in this sense must be distinguished from hydrogen introduced by
the use of undried electrodes. This latter hydrogen is confined very locally to the heat-
affected zone of the weld and may be partially responsible for the toe cracks.

We conclude that the primary brittle fractures in these girders were due to the
brittle nature of the steel. They were "triggered" by the cracks present at the toes of the
transverse weld at the cover plate end. The stress needed to cause the brittle fractures was
partly internal (resulting from the close restraint of this weld) and partly external due to the
handling of the girders for painting. This latter feature was probably the variable which
decided whether partial brittle fractures occurred or not, coupled with the notch ductility
of individual plates of steel.

'Vhilst we cannot satisfy ourselves that it had any part in the failure we would draw
attention to what we consider a bad practice, and one fraught with danger. This is, the
method used for cleaning welds prior to painting, by swabbing with either 15 per cent.
hydrochloric acid or 15 per cent. phosphoric acid. The practice was to leave this acid in
contact for half an hour or so. Under such circumstances the acid would penetrate into
any cracks which had remained undetected and would generate hydrogen which would be
absorbed by the steel in the immediate neighbourhood. Thus the cracks would be
surrounded by embrittled steel, and this might lead to brittle fracture due to handling
stresses. Another bad feature, particularly if hydrochloric acid is used, is that the
~orrosion products formed would be a continuing source of corrosion even under the paint.
 84

3.3.3. The presence of paint in the fractures.

At the time of the collapse there were rumours that some of the fractures had been
filled in with red lead which had then been painted over. The implication was that
cracks had been found in the finished girders by the fabricator and there had been an
attempt to conceal them. Examination of the fractures shows that nothing of the kind
could have happened. We hwe no evidence that anyone noticed these cracks which must
have been present before painting. They were sufficiently wide for the priming coat of paint
to penetrate into some of the toe cracks and partial brittle fractures. They could not
have escaped detection if the penetrant dye method of inspection had been used. As
shown elsewhere, the painters were usually on the heels of the inspectors and any
final inspection was done under very adverse conditions.

The W.14-3 south fraciiure is particularly interesting. It is shown in Fig. 8. The

priming coat of paint penetrated from the upper surface of the flange, indicating that at this
stage a brittle fracture had developed completely through the flange and fillet welds
(web/flange) and was in fact wider than the 3-in. transverse weld. This fracture was,
at this stage, more advanced than that in girder vV.14-2 (south) which ultimately was the
first to fail completely.

The W.14-3 south fracture also contains the final coat of aluminium paint which
penetrated from both sides of the flange. This means that owing to the flexing which
occurred during transportation and erection this crack had opened again through the
priming paint and was visible. It must also have been flexing under traffic loads between
November, 1960 and January, 1961, because the second coat of paint applied after
erection must also have cracked through.

The evidence of Clarke {Tr. 957-8) was that if these end welds were done last it was
not the general practice to examine them for cracks by the penetrant dye method. Such
an inspection should have been made. We have been told by witnesses from K.S.B.D.,
C.R.B. and J. & W. that nobody gave a second thought to this weld as being of any
special importance. We cannot agree with that view-(a) because a sharp change of
section in a flange creates a position of stress concentration, and (b) because it is a transverse
fillet weld on a tension flange. We think, therefore, that special attention should have
been drawn to it.

We conclude that the transverse welds of the \V.14 girders were not adequately
inspected for cracks and that this omission is a direct cause of the failure of the W.14 span
of the bridge. vVe find that failure to inspect these welds was due to a combination of
circumstances :-
(a) No particular attention had been dra\\'11 to the importance of these
cover plate end welds.
(b) The inspection of final details on the girders was carried out in such an
atmosphere of hurry and bustle that no inspectors could be expected to
do this important work satisfactorily.
(c) ll'or the same reason, that is, speeding to complete the painting operation,
a sufficient period was not allowed for cracks to develop. It is accepted
that cracks of the kind found in the failed girders can occur up to two
or three day:~ after the welding operation. We consider therefore that
painting should not have started until this lapse of time had occurred.
The fact thai;, in the circumstances, the cracking of these welds occurred
within an hour or two of the end of welding is not relevant to this
argument.
In our opinion the parties responsible for the lack of inspection which should have
discovered these cracks are-
(a) K.S.B.D. for no~ realizing and drawing attention to the importance of this
weld.
(b) J. & W. for creating the circumstances which made adequate inspection
impossible.
(c) The C.H.B. for not insisting on adequate time elapsing between the final
weld and the painting operation, and on adequate facilities for final
inspection be:ing provided by the fabricator.
 85
3.4. The Chemical Composition and Physical Properties of the Steel in the W.14
Girders.
Since the collapse numerous sampler; have been taken from the failed girders in
order to find any anomalies which would help to decide the cause of the failure. To clarify
the situation at this stage we repeat that the immediate caul)e of the collapse was---(a) the
presence of toe cracks at the transverse weld at the end of the cover plates; (b) the
development from these of partial brittle fractures. It is our opinion that the toe cracks
should not have been there if suitable welding practices had been employed, and should
not have developed into brittle fracture if suita.ble steel had been used. In other word.s
we agree with the opinion expressed in American \Velding Hesearch Council Bulletin
No, 16, of November, 1953 (p. 41) :-"The arresting of a crack is primarily the responsibility
of the material ; the prevention of crack initiation on the other hand depends on a
combination of geometry, fabrication and material".

It will be noticed that the steel enters into both aspects. This is because the
chemical composition of the steel determines the welding characteristics and response to
stress is determined by the physical characterit;tics.

We now proceed to examine the material of the failed girders from these points of
VIeW.

3.4.1. The chemical composition.

As previously explained the steelmaker defines the chemical composition of a heat
by the analysis of a test ingot poured part way through the teeming of the steel into ingot
moulds. To simplify the consideration and in our opinion without in any way detracting
from the treatment of the evidence, we will confine our attention to the material of which
the lower (tension) flanges of the collapsed span were fabricated. We make this 8tatement
because, in our view, once these flanges had fractured througl1, the ultimate collapse was
inevitable.

Only two heats of steel are concerned in the ten,'>ion flanges of the four girders.
These are the fully-killed electric furnace heats 7890 (C.R.B. No. 55) and 7892 (C.R.B.
No. 56) made at the Port Kembla plant of A.LS. For convenience these will be designated
by the C.R.B. Nos. 55 and 56.

The cast analyses of these two heats are as follows:--

!
Heat Carbon
(C.)
Phosphorus
(P.)
Manganese
()in.)
Silicon
(Si,)
i
Sulphur
(S.)
I Chromium
(Cr.)

55 . . -. -. 21 025 170 30 022 23

56 .. .. .. 23 CH7 158 19 026 2<!

From the point of view of weldability the significant elements are earbon, manganese
and chromium. Attention will be paid later to some more detailed analyses which we
had made to help solve some of the problems. The B.S. 968 specification defines the
composition of this steel as follows
Carbon (C.) 23 per cent. maxnnum
Manganese (:1\'In.) 18 ,
Chromium (Cr.) 10
" "
" " "
Manganese +
Chromium 20
" " "
From this it i.s seen that on the cast or ladle analysis heats 55 and 56 fall within the
specification. Heat 55 is on the upper limit of manganese plus chromium and heat 56 on the
upper limit of carbon. For reasons already discussed (Section 2.7.2.1) analysis of the plates
delivered to the fabricator may vary appreciably from that of the ladle sample shown
on the analysis certificate. The reasons for this are well known. Some depend on
 86

the skill of the steelmaker, others are just natural phenomena to be coped with. It is,
however, essential for the fabricator to understand these matters and for the steelmaker
by his skill to minimize the difference between what he purports to supply and what he
actually does supply.

Since we have to deal with the facts of the ease analvses have been made on material
taken from various parts of the failed girders. The re~ults of these investigations arc
summarized in Tables 5 and 6 and in A.ppendix 5.

It will be recalled that heats 55 and 56 were two of the " submitted heats " about
which B.H.P. wrote to J. & W. on the 27th February, 1959 {Ex. 76), as follows:-

D.l6j8-B.S.S. 968 QUALITY STEEL.

" In the latest rolling of B.S.S. 968 girder plate for your good selves,
test failures occurred in a number of fully-killed electric furnace and open-hearth
heats.

Our metallurgical investigation of the heats in question indicated that

the steel quality is good as regards soundness and freedom from banding and
lamination, also, despite the high tensile, the steel would be weldable.

In the ease of heat 243241, the meehanieal tests were satisfactory for
}-in. girder plate, bu1; due to the reduction in tensile strength from 35j4( t.s.i.
to 33/39 t.s.i. in the heavier sections, the 1-in. girder plate failed to meet the
specification.

In view of the foregoing, we are submitting in the attached sheets, details

of the heats for your approval.

\Ve have asked our works to forward samples from each heat involved
as we understand it will he necesl'\ary to conduct weld tests on this material
before any decision can be reached.

If you are involved in any additional tests for submission to the

Country Roads Board, we would be prepared to meet rea.sona ble costs.

Assuring you of our best attention."

The letter implied that a complete metallurgical investigation had been made to
determine why these heats were high in tensile. From Ex. 186 (check tests) it appears
that no cheek analyses were made on plates of some of these heats prior to despatch. It
is difficult to understand, therefore, the basis of the confidence expressed in the letter that
"despite the high tensile, the steel would be weldable". At this stage, it was essential
that A.I.S. should have made check analyses of plates. Since the failure, many such
analyses have been made on heats 55 and 56, and these are summarized in Tables 5 and 6.
From these we see that the average of sixteen analyses of heat 55 is carbon 25 per cent.
and manganese plus chromium 2 0 per cent. and of fifteen analyses of heat 56 is carbon
26 per cent. and manganese plus chromium 2.0 per cent.

It is evident, therefore, that in these two cases, the pit sample was not representative
of the heat, and had A.I.S. made the thorough investigation necessary it would have been
disclosed that these heats were out of specification as regards composition.

This featme was of much greater importance than the slightly high-tensile strength
to which attention was drawn. It raised the weldability index (as calculated from the
composition) to D and, therefore, made the task of the fabricator still more difficult. It
reduced the notch ductility and thereby weakened the second line of defence against brittle
fractme.
 87
ThiB is not the case which is confused by the claim of the steelmaker to a tolerance
on a ladle analysis. In our opinion the ladle analyses were not representative of heats 55
and 56 and the bulk of the steel of t.hese heats was clearly out, of specification.

TABLE 5.-CHEMIOAL ANALYSES 01<' STEEL .FROM FAILED GIRDERS

Composition
Uirdcr No.
W.l4/S ].oration
Cr.

HeM 55~-D.S.L. Analyses

1 North end of centre plate I C.RB./40 24 1 77 24 2U
South end of C.R.B./41 24 176 I 24 20
" plate
North end of south " C.R.B.j42 . 2fi 178 24 20
South end of south fracture C.R.B.j43 26 180 25 20 012
North of south fracture Sl/F 25 1713 25 20
2 North end C.RB./14 2.5 178 24 20
At end of north weld "" N2/F 27 1. 77 25 20 011
3 North end of centre plate I C.R.B./45
28 180 25 20
Sout11 of south fract.me C.R.B./46 26 180 ! 25 20 011
I
4 North end of centre plate C.R.B./i7 22 1 73 24 20
North of soutl1 fractun I 84/F . " 22 l . 7:3 24 20 OOS
I
South of I C.R.R./48 2:3 177 24 20
"
Heal 55-A.l.S. Analyses
] Nol'th of south fracture W.14/1S 24 l 73 27 20
2 North of north fracture 2N 25 I 172 29 20 OOR
3 North of south fracture S3/l 26 167 25 19
4 North of , \V.14j4S 23 172 26 20
D.S.L. mean .. " 25 177 24 20 UlO
A.I.S. mean 25 171 27 20 008
A.LS. certificnt.e 21 170 23 19

TABLE 6.-CHEMIOAL ANALYSES OF STEEL FROM FAILED GIRDERS

Composition
Girder No. I,oeation ~ample No.
W.!4/S

----- -----~ .. ---~--- -~--- \---~-~-~- -~--

0.
: ----
Mn. Or. .Mn . .; Or. I X.

I
Heat 56-~D.S.L. Ana.lyse8
1 Near north end C.R.B./50 25 173 24 20 010
N.I.F. 26 170 25 20
" end" south of fracture
North C.R.B./51 26 175 24 20
2 Centre plate north end O.R.B./52 26 172 24 20
Centre plate south end C.R.B./.53 27 172 25 20
North end of south phtn C.R.B./54 26 173 24 20
Near south fracture C.R.B./55 25 172 24 20 009
3 Nnar north end C.R.B./56 25 173 2J 20
South of north fracture N3/F 26 173 23 20 008
Near north end C.R.B./57 2.5 17;3 24 20
North of north fracture C.R.13.j58 26 174 24 20 009

Heat 56--A.l.S. Analyses

1 .. North of north fracture .. IN .. 27 171 I 29 20 008
2 .. North of south fracture .. 82/2 .. 26 I 16S 21 19 ..
3 .. North of north fracture 3X .. 25 164 26 19 ..
4 .. North of .. .. 1N .. 26 164 26 19 008
D.S.L. mea.n" .. " . . .. .. 26 173 24 20 009
A.I.S. mean . . .. .. .. 26 167 26 19 008
A.I.S. certificat~ .. .. .. 23 158 24 18 ..
 88

3.4.2. The presence of trace elements in the steel.

In view of the unexpected brittleness of some of the steel used in the bridge project
we had exhaustive tests made to see whether there was any detrimental impurity present
in trace amounts.

Samples of steel from the failed girders and from a U.K. source have been analysed
spectrographically in three laboratories namely :-~-D.S.L., B.\V.R.A. and A.I.S. The
results are given in Table 7 for heats 55 and 56 which showed no differences.

TABLE 7.--SPECTROGRAPHIC ANALYSIS OF GIRDER FLANGE PLATE

I I

Element D.S.L. B.W.:&.A. B.W.IL\..

A.I.tl. Aust. U.K.
i---
0/
!0 % % I %
Aluminium .. .. 01-02 Less than 005 Less than 005 ND
Arsenic .. .. N8 003 ND I
Antimony .. .. N8 003 NS
Copper .. .. Less than 05 030/045 112 1/2
Cobalt .. NB 005 ND ND
Lead .. .. .. NB Less than 002 About 01 Less than 01
Molybdenum .. ND 01 01/02 About 01
Nickel .. ' . Less than 05 030/045 About 1 About 2
Niobium .. .. NS Less than ()()5 ND ND
Nitrogen .. .. 008/012 OOt\ NS NS
Tin ' . '. . ' ND 00.5 ND ND
Titanium .. . ' ND Less than . ()()5 ND ND
Vanadium '. .. ND T~ess than 005 ND Less than 01
Zirconium '. .. ND Les~ than 005 ND ND
I

ND: Not detected. NS: Not sought. Not identified by heat number but probably heat 55.

rrhe only trace element found in significant concentration is nitrogen, which will be
considered in the section on strain ageing. (3.4.4).

From this enquiry it can be stated that no element has been discovered to be present
in the Australian steel which is n.ot also present in the sample of steel made in lJ.K. This
result, with the exception of the nitrogen value, is completely negative in helping us to solve
the problem of the brittleness of heats 55 and 56.

3.4.3. Notch ductility of the steel.

As previously explained, this property is measured by either the Charpy or the Izod
test. rro be useful, the results must show a series of values of energy absorbed in breaking
the notched bar at different temperatures. It is well known that there is no clearly defined
relationship between the values obtained on the two machines. \Ve have therefore, wherever
possible, collected values which would help us to correlate the two tests. The Charpy
test has become accepted internationally, but it was the Izod test which was specified by
the C.R.B. \Ve have also thought it advisable to try to establish whether the Izod values
adopted by the C.R.B. were adequate for the protection of the bridge from failure by brittle
fracture, in the light of the most recent knowledge. Unfortunately, the results are so
variable from individual pieces of steel that no satisfactory solution has been found. Tables
8 and 9 show the Charpy and Izod values obtained on heats 55 and 56 at D.S.L. and A.I.S.
during the course of this Enquiry. The variability of the steel is indicated by the following
results taken from Exhibit 46 (D.S.L. report).-
Ft.jlb. (Oharpy)

Heat 55 Sample S4/F 00. 6, 7, 8, 9, 9, 10

, 210. 17, 21, 28
" " "
Heat 56 Sample 14/2 00, 5, 8
, u 210. 13, 31, 34
" "
 89

The accepted standard for protection from brittle fracture in the case of mild steel
ship plates is 15ft.;'lb. Charpy at the lowest operating temperature. whether we accept
32 F. (0 C.) as proposed by the C.R.B. or 22 F. (~5o C.) as more realistically based on
meteorological observation in Melbourne it is evident that neither of the two heats concerned
approaches the required Charpy values. Based on the Izod test and using the C.R.B.
criterion, heat 55 still shows poor results and although on the average heat 56 just fails, it will
be seen from Table 9 that four of the six samples fail to reach the specified value, one of them
failing badly. In reverting again to the variability of results obtained in these investigations
it should be pointed out that B.H.P., during the Enquiry, maintained that the evidence
of this variability as shown by the acceptance tests was dubious because of lack of knowledge
of the preparation of the test pieces. We accept that criticism but this can not apply to
the values quoted in Table 9, the preparation of the specimens in this case being done under
laboratory control for the purposes of this Enquiry.

We conclude that the steel in the flanges of the failed girders was of low and variable
notch ductility and that as a result the steel was not able to resist the propagation of brittle
fracture from the toe cracks at the transverse weld at the end of the cover plates.

We have plotted all the results available to us relating to Charpy and Izod values
taken for comparison from the same plates of steel to B.S. 968 of~ inch and! inch thickness
supplied to this contract. There is a wide scatter as has been indicated, and only
twenty observations. Assmning that zero energy is the same point for both machines, the
best relationship is
Izod = 2 Charpy
but the values scatter between Izod = 4 Charpy and Izod 4/3 Charpy. The range of
values included was 5 to 55 Izod and 4 to 30 Charpy.

If we accept the above relationship we conclude that the 20 ft./lb. Izod specified
by the C.R.B. was approximately equivalent to 10 ft./lb. Charpy, and was therefore not
equivalent to the value accepted as protecting mild steel, ship plate, i.e., 15 ft./lb. Charpy.
This would be equivalent to 30 ft./lb. Izod. If we look at Table 9 it is seen that this value
was recorded in only one case, at 8.2/1 (heat 56). This was the location of the first major
brittle fracture.

Although the evidence is slender, we conclude that a value higher than 30 ft./lb.
Izod (15 Charpy) was necessary with this steel to protect the bridge from brittle fracture,
and tentatively suggest that 40 ft./lb. Izod (20 ft./lb. Charpy) would have been necessary,
though this can only be an informed guess. However the information on which this view
is based was not available when the C.R.B. specifications were written.

The question then arises whether in 1956, steelmakers would have accepted such a
value in a specification, using B.S. 968 as a basis. We have seen the reaction of B.H.P.
to the value of 20 ft.jlb. at 32 F. Yet, when we look at the plate acceptance tests which
were carried out on 61 heats of steel to this contract we find that 40 of them would have
satisfied the 40 ft.jlb. Izod criterion. Of these, 34 were semi-killed basic open-hearth steel
and six fully-killed electric furnace steel.

We have for comparison some results from bridge steel made in U.K. at about the
same time (1956~57) as the C.R.B. specifications were being written (Ex. 93). For the
four thicknesses of steel below 1 inch the values at 0 C. are all above 20 ft.jlb. Charpy.
Since this is the one valid comparison between B.S. 968 made contemporaneously in U.K.
and Australia respectively we have reproduced the results in Figs. 9 and 10. It is at once
evident that the transition temperature of the U.K. steel is appreciably lower than that of
Port Kembla steel, and the liability to brittle fracture is correspondingly less.

It would appear therefore that the 20 ft./lb. Charpy criterion at 0 C. is not an

impossible one to attain.
 90
TABLE 8.--CHARPY VALUES ON HEATS 55 AND 56.
!-in. Plate.
Ft.jlb. at Temperatme 0. 0

Heat I,abora.tory Sample ~() () 10 20 30 40 50 60 80

------~-~-----------------------

55 D.S.L. S.4F 8 22 43 57

A.I.S. 2N 5 10 13 22

A.I.S. S.3/1 4 4 10 10
--- --------------~---~ --------------------
Average 6 14
------ -----~---------------------

56 D.S.L. 14/2 4 8 25 42 68 72
A.T.S. IN 16 27 30 41

A.I.S. 3N 8 19 30 35

A.I.S. 4N 13 17 38 47

A.I.S. S.2/l 6 8 2(i 44

A.I.S. S.2/2 5 8 28 28

------- ---------------------------
Average 6 24

TABLE 9.--IzoD VALUES ON HEATS 55 AND 56.

!-in. Plate.
0
Ft./lb. at Temperatme 0.

Heat Laboratory Sample -20 0 10 20 30 40 60 60

------------------------ ----------------

55 D.S.L. S.4F .. 12 25 36 53

A.I.S. 2N .. 8 23

A.I.S. S.3/l 4 8

----~-- -------- ----~--------

Average 12 22
-------- ---------------

56 D.S.L. 14j2 .. 17 41 55 65

A.I.S. IN . . 25 33

A.I.S. 3N . . 10 14

A.I.S. 4N . . 17 39

A.I.S. S.2/l 30 33

A.I.S. S.2/2 16 17

- - _A_v_e_r_a__g_e_ _ _ _ --~---~---.-.- -.-.-19--..--.-. -30~---. ---_-_---.-.---.-.-

 91

3.4.4. Strain ageing tests.

It has already been mentioned (Sedion 2.7.1.2) that the notch ductility may change
during the fabricating process. \Vhen certain heats of steel are strained slightly so that
permanent deformation occurs, and this is followed by heating to about 250 C., the notch
ductility decreases because of the phenomenon of strain ageing. Straining for straightening
and heating for and by welding are inherent in the fabrication processes. Strain ageing
is associated with the presence of nitrogen in the steel. This element forms a nitride which
can dissolve in the ferrite (the relatively pure iron part of the steel structure). Whilst it
is in solution it is relatively harmless but when such steels are plastically deformed by stress
the nitride will precipitate from the solid solution on heating. There is an intermediate
stage just prior to precipitation at which the nitrogen atoms form dusters and this appears
to be the condition which produces pronounced notch brittleness. It is in this respect
that the nitrogen content of the steel is important. Heats 55 and 56 contained 012 per
cent. and 009 per cent. nitrogen respectively and this is rather above the normally accepted
limit. The electric furnace heats showed almost double the nitrogen content of the open-
hearth heats (Ex. 184-Section 2).

Steel supplied for the contract was tested for strain ageing characteristics both by
D.S.L. and A.I.S. laboratories. A synopsis of the results is given.

D.S.L. confined their experiments to a flange plate from heat 55. The treatment
and the results are shown below. (Ex. 194, App. 9).

D.S.L. strain ageing tests on heat 55.

Average of Three Test.~
(Ambient temp.)

As received 7 5 ft.jlb. Cbarpy

Heated to 250 C. 30 minute air-cooled 55 ,
"
1 per cent. plastic strain/heated 250 c. 30 minute
air-cooled 40
" "
5 per cent. plastic strain/heated 250 c. 30 minute
air-cooled 35
""
This was brittle material as received but the ageing treatment increased the brittleness.

Another sample was taken from within 2 feet of the last ones and was subjected
to a normalizing treatment with the following result :-
Average of 'l'hree Tests

As received .. 13 ft./lb. Charpy

Normalized by heat 900 C. and furnace cooling 32 ,
"
This result suggests that the material as received from the girder was already in a
strain-hardened condition-possibly from fabrication effects. There was a large amount
of pulling and pushing during the fabrication of a girder. This may account for some of the
variability which characterises these tests, for example the differences between the two
" as received " samples above taken from plates 2 feet apart. It would not account for
the variability in samples from one plate such as those mentioned in Section 3.4.2.

The A.I.S. results on strain ageing were made on material from J. & W. stock and are
reeorded in Table 10.

The results are not sufficiently extensive to draw firm conclusions but it would seem
that strain ageing is a general eharaeteristic of A.I.S. steel made to B.S. 968.

Other steels investigated at the same time show that imported B.S. 968 and other
heats made by A.I.S. are liable to the same eharacteristic.

vVe eonclude that the steelmaker should give special consideration to this problem
particularly as the addition of "scavenger" elements in the ladle would probably reduce
its incidence.
 92

TABLE 10.-STRAIN AGEING RESULTS ON B.S. 968, KINGS BRIDGE CONTRACT.

(EXHIBIT 184, SECTION 4).

lzod ft./lb.

Heat No. rype rested o c. Tested 20 C.

!
A Received ~train Aged A;; Received Strain Aged
1-

4 .. .. .. .. O.H. 9 (23) .. 25 (19) 6

4 .. .. .. .. 6 8 7
.. .. " .. 12
4 .. . .
"
11 Hi
20 .. . . .. .. "
50 (27) 25 52 (30) 41
20 .. .. .. .. 43 19 GO 26
"
27 .. .. .. .. 48 (42) 15 55 (51) 41
47 .. .. .. .. "
E.F. HJ VI 27 22
53 .. .. .. .. 11 .. 26 10
"
6'c) .. .. .. .. "
36 34 46 45
81 .. .. .. .. "
43 22 47 58
84 .. .. .. .. 41 14 46 26
84 .. .. .. .. " 34 16 4H 29
105
109
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
" 27
43
9
36
41
67
Hi
38
"
The va]U\8 in brackets refer to acceptance t<lsts as shown in l~xhlbit 72.

3.5. Summary of the Metallurgical Causes of the Failure.

In this section we elirttinate the human element in so far as it relates to matters of
opinion and decision with regard to the conduct of the project, and confine ourselves to
the facts a/3 they have been e~:tablished ~:~ince the failure. In this selll3e we confine our
opinions to the properties of the steel supplied and the properties of the welds made. vVe
further restrict ourselves to heats 55 and 56 as these were the two heats of steel
immediately associated with the failure.
1. The heats were out of specification regarding earbon and on the maximum
limit with res1>ect to manganese pluJ'> chromium.
2. The steel was su~.ceptible to strain }1geing, probably due to its high nitrogen
content.
3. The steel was of low notch ductility.
4. The pre-heat used in making the transverse weld was probably too low,
though there is no direct evidenee relating to this.
5. The electrodes may not have been dried sufficiently immediately prior to
welding thereby introducing hydrogen into the welds.
6. The thermal severity characteristics of this weld had been underestimated.
7. Acid had been used to clean the welds prior to painting.
8. Because of (1), (4), (5) and (6) cracks developed at the toes of the tralll3verse
welds and these were the primary cause of the failure.
9. There was a high degree of restraint on the transverse weld due to the fact
that it was the last weld made on the girder. The restraint was due to the
two taper welds and the web/flange fillet welds. The result of this
restraint was a. high-longitudinal tensile stress operating at right angles
to the transverse weld.
10. It is possible also that during the handling of the girders, after the final
welding and before painting, tensile stresses were set up which would tend
to open up the cracks. vVe have no means of estimating these stresses.
11. Because of (2), (3), (7) and (8) the welds developed partial brittle fractures
from the extremities of the toe cracks. These brittle fractures reduced
the strength of the flanges in W.l4-2 and vV.l4-3 so much as to eliminate
them as load-bearing features. vV.14-1 was similarly weakened at the
south end.
 93
PART 4.-SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS.
4.1. General Observations.
Before presenting our final assessment of the responsibility for the failure of the
bridge, it is desirable to make some general observations.

The basic fact of the whole Enquiry i.s that a large and important public structure,
which cost the community overall .some 4,000,000 failed dramatically and embarrassingly
within fifteen months of its coming into service, and failed moreover, by reason of inherent
defect, and not from the action of some natural force of unforseen magnitude, or other
external factor.

Such a failure should not have occurred. It cried out for explanation, and for the
a,'lses.sment of responsibility among those whose duty it was to create a safe and patisfactory
structure, and we reject the theory, .somewhat diffidently suggested to us at one stage, that
the failure was due to .sheer misfortune occurring in such circumstances that no blame can
be attached to any of those associated with the project.

We accept the argument addressed to us by Counsel, that our task, .so far as it
relates to fixing blame and responsibility, is to do so as a matter of fact simply, and not
to concern ourselves with legal liability, direct or vicarious. We have made every endeavour
to avoid any findings out.side our proper sphere, particularly having in mind the existence
of litigation currently proceeding between some of the parties, and the possibility of
future litigation.

We refer to some minor matters of controversy which arose during the sittings of the
Enquiry, and which are to be found scattered over the 4,000 pages of transcript. These
matters were relevant, and at the time appeared important, but are not vital to our findings,
and reference to them is omitted in the interest of avoiding intolerable length in this Report.

We have also asked ourselves whether we have been judging these incidents by
standards that are too high for ordinary mortals to reach and whether we are demanding
higher standards of competence from engineers than we would from doctors, lawyers or other
professional men. It is, of course, undeniable that a doctor or lawyer who makes a mistake
which causes his client to lose life or liberty normally escape~:> public censure although he
may have to aMWer a charge of negligence in the courts. But engineers generally-and in
thi.s case certainly~-do not work as individuals in a con.sultan~client relationship, they
work as a team. This certainly brings with it problems of communication and organization
but it also means that individual engineers are supported by others who can help and check
their work.

From this standpoint we do not think that we have been too har~:>h on individuals.
It is the various organizations within which they were working that we regard as being
collectively responsible for the unhappy state of affairs that we have been investigating.

4.2. Findings Pursuant to Terms of Reference.

We now present, in summary form, our major conclusions and findings arising
directly under the terms of reference. It will be appreciated that throughout the body
of this Report we have made a great many findings of fact and expressed a number of
opinions which we have not attempted to summarize, but which we, nevertheless, consider
important. In the following pages will be found only the fundamental and essential
findings.

1. The major causes of failure were as follows :-

(a) Cracks were present at the toe of the welds terminating the cover plates on the
tension (lower) flanges of the W.l4 span which collapsed.
(b) The cracks were caused by the unfamiliarity of the fabricator, Johns and Waygood
Limited, with the problems of welding low-alloy steel, and the quality of the
steel supplied by Broken Hill Proprietary Company Limited much of which
was so high in carbon, and so unexpectedly variable, that even an experienced
fabricator would have had difficulty in welding it.
 94

(c) The cracks remained in the girders because they were not discovered either by
Johns and Waygood Limited or by the Country Roads Board inspectors.
(d) The steel supplied by the Broken Hill Proprietary Company Limited for the
tension flange pla1:es on the span concerned, accepted by the Country Roads
Board, and used. by Johns and Waygood Limited without adequate
examination, was low in notch ductility and was thus unable to resist the
propagation of bnttle fractures from the toe cracks.

2. Under the specific terms of reference we find as follows :--

Term I.~The terms, conditions, specifications, and drawings in accordance with which
tenders for design and,c:onstruction of the bridge were invited by the Country Roads
Board, and whether the same were adequate and reasonable for the purpose.
(a) The form of contract which was entered into, as required by the terms,
conditions, and specifications, called a "design and construct " contract
was in fact a modification of the contract usually so described. It was
unsuitable in that it failed to provide the necessary over-all supervision
of the variom aspects of the work and was to some degree responsible
for the absence of a proper co-ordination of the project.
(b) The terms and conditions in accordance with which tenders were invited
were inadequate in that the clause dealing with the assessment of tenders
should have provided that one of the factors to be considered was "the
ability and competence of the tenderer to perform the contract and, in
any case in which it is proposed to sub-contract a substantial part of the
work, the abiEty and competence of the sub-contractor."
(c) l'he specifwations and drawings were in general satisfactory and reasonable,
but were unsuitable to the following extent:-
(1) In the sections relating to the manufacture, testing, and inspection
of steel, the speeifications lacked precision and contained
ambiguities.
(2) A number of important problems only arose because the
specifications included B.S. 968 : 1941 steel with added clauses.
It would have been much better if the C.R.B. had set out
fully the specification of the steel required without using the
B.S. B68 label at all.

Term 11.-The tenders received, the action taken to investigate the same, the
circumstances surrounding the acceptance of the tender submitted by Utah
Australia Limited, and whether the acceptance thereof was reasonable and
proper and justified in the circumstances.
The number of the tenders received was reasonable, but we feel that
the C.H.B. must have been disappointed that the names of some bridge builders
of world reputation were conspicuous by their absence.
The aetion taken to investigate the tenders was reasonable and proper
from the point of view of business propriety. \Ve, however, make some
criticism of the C.R.B. in Section 2.2. of our Report : in particular we feel that
the use of high-tensile steel in the Utah tender should have been specifieally
drawn to the attention of the Government before the decision to use this
material was finally made.
The acceptance of the Utah tender was reasonable from the point of
view of business propriety. However, it should not have been aceepted without
far more enquiry and investigation, because the material to be used in the
superstructure was one of which neither the C.RB. nor Utah had any experienee.
We found no evidem~n or any circumstances giving rise to any suspicion of
impropriety in relation to these matters.
 95

Term Ill.--The design submitted and adopted for the bridge, and whether the same
was adequate and suitable or was in any and what respects defective or inappropriate
or deficient.
(a) The general design wa~ adequate and suitable. We are of the opinion,
however, that the choice by Utah of high-tensile steel as specified was
unfortunate for the reasons stated hereafter.
(b) The use of cover plates, and the design of the end detail of cover plates was
criticized in the report of the Committee of Investigation (Appendix :3)
and a great deal of evidence and discussion was directed to this matter.
We are not prepared to find that, in 1957 this feature was undesirable,
but on the basis of knowledge now available, we are satisfied that any
feature involving transverse fillet welds in tension flanges is undesirable.

Term IV .--The materials and processes and workmanship used in the construction
and erection of the bridge, the standard and suitability thereof for the purposes
for which they were used, whether they were in accordance with the contract
specifications and whether they were in any and what respects defective or
inadequate.
(1) M ateTials.
Steel.
(a) At the stage at which the specifications were drawn we are agreed that
on balance the C.R.B. was justified in including high-tensile steel as an
optional material for the superstructure. However, we are quite satisfied
that this material should not have been used for the whole of the super-
structure in a project of such magnitude, in the circumstances existing in
1957, where neither Utah, J. & W., nor the C.R.B. itself, had any
experience in the use of the material for welded bridge building.
(b) Some of the steel used in the bridge and particularly in the girders of the
W.14 span did not comply with the C.R.B. specifications as regards
composition and notch ductility and should have been rejected by
J. & \V. and the C.R.B.
(c) J. & W. while bound to supply steel to the specifications (B.S. 968 with
additional clauses) ordered the steel from B.H.P. as B.S. 968: 1941
simply without the additional tests. J. & W. with the knowledge of the
C.R.B. failed to carry out sufficient tests to ensure the notch ductility
of some of the steel wmd, and failed to make check analyses of the steel
supplied to ensure its correct chemical composition.
(d) J. & W. and the C.R.B. accepted delivery of certain "submitted heats"
to which their attention had been drawn by B.H.P. No proper
consideration was given to these heats before acceptance, and some of
them should have been rejected, in particular heat 55, which was used in
the failed girders.
(e) All these parties failed to hold sufficient discussion on the subject of the
quality of the steeL
Electrodes.
The electrodes used--Fortrex 35 for manual welding and Murawire and
Mnraflux for automatic welding-supplied by Murex were suitable, in accordance
with specifications, and in no way defective or inadequate.

(2) Processes and WoTkmanship.

There was no evidence to suggest any defect or departure from proper
standard in any of the processes or workmanship involved except in the matter
of welding.
In relation to welding we reach the following conclusions:-
(a) J. & W. did not adequately prepare its staff and workmen for
welding low~alloy steel.
(b) No pre-determined sequenee was set down for laying the cover plate
end weld, the importance of which was not realized.
 96
(c) At the time when the W.l4 girders were fabricated, adequate
pre- heat was not used and it is possible that the electrodes
were not properly dried.
(d) Whilst the high carbon and manganese content of some heats
increased the difficulty of producing crack-free welds, the
cracking found is so general, irrespective of the heat of steel
or the time of fabrication, that we consider the welding techniques
are also responsible for it.
(e) \Ve condemn the practice of using acid for the final cleaning of
welds for if there is any undetected crack the presence of acid
will create a brittle condition in the surrounding steeL
(f) Insufficient time was allowed between the last welding operation
and the final inspection and the conditions during that inspection
were such as made adequate inspection difficult. '

Term V.-The nature, extent, and standard of supervision exercised over the construction
and erection of the bridge, and whether the same was reasonable and adequate or
was in any and what respects inadequate or defective.
Utah.
Utah, the head contractor, which might have been expected to undertake
considerable supervision of the work of J. & W., deliberately refrained, as a
matter of policy, from any such supervision or inspection, on the basis that doing
so would only duplicate and interfere with the work of C.RB. inspectors.
Utah did appoint Scarlett of J. & W. as its representative on matters of
testing and inspection or acceptance of steel, but did little else. vVe do not
make any adverse comment on this attitude, as it was accepted by C.RB.
O.R.B.
The system of acceptance testing of the steel was deficient in several
respects and whilst never utilizing its full right of testing, C.R.B. ultimately
gave way to pressure exerted by J. & W. and Utah and relaxed its testing
requirements without adequate consideration. The C.R.B. also set up an
inspection system designed to effect a satisfactorily high standard of
workmanship. However, it was carried out by people who lacked any
experience in the technique of inspection or in the welding problems associated
-with the steel being fabricated. As a result, the control was in some regards
too rigorous, so that the personnel at J. & W. were made resentful at what
they regarded as " pin pricking ". On the other hand, while many defects were
discovered and remedied, the system failed lamentably to uncover some crucial
defects including the cracks associated with the vV.l4 girders which failed.
For reasons given in Section 2.10.6, these defects should have been discovered.
J. & w.
The fabricator never understood the need for meticulous inspection of
welding when the material being fabricated was high-tensile steel. This
attitude, combined with the suspicion that the inspectors knew no more than
they did, engendered a strong feeling of resentment, which led to constant
arguments over standards of workmanship. Harassed by the inspectors on
the one hand, and on the other pressed by Utah for production on schedule,
the J. & W. management continually sought some relaxation of inspection.
All this militated against the efficiency of the system. It is fair to say,
therefore, that J. & \V.'s attitude contributed to the failure by the C.R.B.
to discover important defects which passed into the bridge structure.

Term VI.-Whether any and what negligent, culpable, or improper act or omission
directly or indirectly caused or contributed to the failure of the bridge, and if so
the party or parties responsible therefor.
The determination of the questions arising under the first head of this
term of reference, required us to undertake the difficult task of fixing some
standard of negligence which can fairly be applied to the matters which we
have found necessary to criticize in the conduct of many of those associated
 97
with the Kings Bridge project. We accept the argument that not every act
or omission should be held to be " negligent " within the meaning of that word
in this context, even though they might be negligent from the standpoint of
legal liability. For the purpose of this term of reference we have, therefore,
adopted the standard that any course of action, resulting from a considered
judgment exercised after proper enquiry, is not negligent even though in the
event it proved to be wrong. Nor do we class as negligent some instances
of lack of competence arising simply from inexperience, under circumstances
in which the party concerned has acted to the best of its skill and ability. On
the other hand, we treat as negligent such instances of error as we are satisfied
occurred because those responsible entirely failed to give reasonable consideration
to the particular decision.
Applying this somewhat restricted test we are of the opinion that the
following matters of importance do constitute negligence :-
1. The failure by J. & W. to carry out its clear obligation to test and
select, from the material supplied by B.H.P., steel which
would have come within the full requirements of the C.R.B.
specification.
2. The decision by C.H.B. to abandon the full programme of acceptance
testing and to carry out testing on a random basis.
3. The acceptance by the C.RB. and J. & W. of the "submitted
heats" which B.H.P. had given them the opportunity to reject
or accept.
4. The offer by B.H.P. to J. & W. of the "submitted heats" by
means of a letter (Ex. 76) which declared that " our metallurgical
investigation . . . indicated that the steel quality is good
. . . also . . . the steel would be weldable ". A proper
investigation could not have supported such a statement
(See Sec. 3.4.1.).

We fou11d no evidence of any act or omission which we are prepared to

find was either culpable or improper. Specifically we refer to one suggestion
of gross impropriety which was given some publicity shortly before the Enquiry
started. This allegation was to the effect that someone, presumably in the
employ of J. & W., had intentionally concealed known cracks in the girders by
filling them with red lead and painting over them. We are satisfied that there is
no truth in this suggestion. It is true that the inspection methods failed to
reveal certain cracks which should have been found and that paint was found
to have penetrated into some of them, which was a significant matter from
several points of view. However, the suggestion of deliberate concealment is
unfounded.

Term VII.-Whether the construction and erection of the bridge in accordance with
the tender submitted by Utah Australia Limited was reasonable having regard
to the known state of engineering and scientific knowledge and experience subsisting
at the time the tender was accepted.
The general knowledge in the engineering profession of the quality and
behaviour of B.S. 968 : 1941 steel has greatly increased since January, 1957.
Nevertheless, there was ample information in the literature generally available
at that date, and in the minds of metallurgical engineers like Ferris, to have
provided the parties involved in the bridge project with a clear warning that
this steel required very special care and skill in manufacture and fabrication.
All the parties except Ferris and Murex failed to realize that in essaying
the construction of a large and important welded structure in this material,
they were taking a very long step from the familiar processes of mild -steel
construction into an unfamiliar situation where more elaborate techniques were
required. Because of this lack of appreciation, the proper programme of test
and experiment which alone would have justified the use of this steel was not
undertaken.
6352/63-7
 98
4.3. Condition of the Superstructure.
Although it is not within our terms of reference, we cannot conclude our Report
without recording our very grave concern about the future of the steel work of the bridge.
We know that it contained a great many cracks that have been found and removed but
from all we have learnt, we are certain that there must be many more. Some of these may
be in critical and highly-stressed regions. Such cracks must be a continuing source of
danger, either of brittle fracture or fatigue, unless some means is found to reduce the
tensile stress concentrations to negligible amounts. We wish to point out that we do not
know of any determination of the fatigue properties of this steel even at this late stage.

\Ve desire to record our thanks to those who have rendered us very great assistance
during the course of this Enquiry.

Counsel assisting the Commission, Mr. S. T. Frost, Q.C., and Mr. Gordon Just,
displayed great industry and capacity.

Their skill in presenting the evidence, and in advising us on procedural and other
matters, was of the greatest possible assistance.

We also wish to thank the other Counsel appearing at the Enquiry, who, while
never losing sight of their paramount duty to advance and protect their clients' interests,
so conducted their cases as to greatly assist our investigation.

Many of the organizations directly and indirectly concerned with the Enquiry
provided us with valuable information, and some of them devoted much time and expense
to scientific experiment and the compilation of extensive records.

In particular, we thank the Defence Standards Laboratories, and the Melbourne and
Metropolitan Board of \Vorks. Two organizations directly concerned with the Enquiry-
the Country Roads Board and the Broken Hill Proprietary Company Ltd.-each provided
us with much material of great importance beyond that which was necessary for their
own purposes.

Engineering, Testing, and Research Services Pty. Ltd. carried out certain tests and
investigations for our information, and its Manager and Metallurgist, Mr. Hudson, rendered
us extremely valuable assistance.

Finally, we thank Mr. C. A. Mitchell, the Secretary to the Commission, who

discharged his duties with unf::1iling good will, and whose long experience of Enquiries of
this nature was most useful to us.

E. H. E. BARBER, Chairman.

J. NEILL GREEN\VOOD, Member.

J. A. L. MATHESON, Member.

Melbourne,
3rd June, 1963.
 99

APPENDICES.

Appendix 1 Alphabetical List of Witnesses.

2 List of Exhibits.

3 Relevant l~xtract from Report of Committee of Investigation.

Extracts from the Paper "How to Use High Strength St{>el Effectively", by
A. L. Elliott.

5 Results of Tests on Samples from W.l4 Girders, extracted from D.S.L. Report,
Exhibit 194.

6 Photographs, Plans, Graphs, &c.

 100
APPENDIX 1.
ALPHABETICAL LIST OF WITNESSES.

Name of Witne88 Pages of Transcript

BAKER, Geo:ffrey William 3351-3356A
1063-1204
BoNWICK, John Edwin
{ 3321-3326A
BooTH, Reuben Joseph 1649A--1651
Box, George Radburn 3307-3320
BuLL, Professor l!'rank Bertram 2802-2879
BUTLER, Leicester Travers 1849-1856
1573-1628
CAMPBELL, Richard .. { 3159-3163
943-1003
r 1030--1063

l
CLARKE, Norman Victor

3159-3160
DARWIN, Donald Victor 170-225
{ 555942
EASTICK, Robert Frank
In Camera, 1-7
2881-2908
l!'ARRAR, William Crisp
{ 3062--3141
2616-2776

FERRIS, Irwin Jamcs

FINK, Gcorge William

{ 3348-3350

3622-3
1216-1257
FISHER, Eugene Peter 2343-2373
Fox, Edward William 1651-1683
FRANCIS, Professor Arthur James 1881-2008
2073-2085
GARDEN, Kenneth Alexander ..
{ 2146-2147
GRAHAM, David Gordon 1683-1703
HARDCASTLE, Phillip Alfred 2053-2073
423-509
HARDCASTLE, Roy Thomas Andrew
{ 2012-2037
HoFFMANN, Siegfried .. 1628-1649
515--55]
HUDSON, Robert Frederick
{ 3218-3230
2777-2787

HUNTER, Joseph
{ 2791-2801

3039-3058
3212-3217
J AEGER, Ernest
{ 3243-3251
"MAIN, Allen Bennie 1780-1844
~!ASTERTON, Cli:fford Alexander 2085-2130
MATHIESON, John 1845-1849
MOLL, Victor Raymond 551-555
{ 3252-3259
MoRRIS, David Owen
In Camera, 8-42
 101
APPENlliX 1-contimted.

Name of Witnus Pages of Transeripl

Mum, Professor Hugh 2911-3037
NoBLE, Raymond 255-259
2133-2253
RALSTON, Owen Bruce
{ 3142--3158
REEDY, Lorne 3199-3211
RoBB, George 3338-3344
1472-1572
ScAl~LETT, Kenneth Frederick Alexander
{ 3265-3299
1012-1023
SxmmoTTOM, William Logan
{ 2333-~2342

SLATTI<JRY, Francis James .. 3164-3174

1004-1012
SLAVIN, Benjamin
{ 2325-2333
1205-1214
STOCKER, William Reginal<l
{ 1257-1456
SwANSON, Victor George 225-229
( 2255-2324
THOMPSON, John Ward

WARD, Frank Alexander

WILLIAMs, Frederick Vincent ..
t 2,173-2603

3175-3194
1705-1780
3327-3337
WrLUAMS, Ronald Trethewey .. 2373-2400
229--254
WILSON, Cecil Alexander
{ 259-423
1857--1881
 102
APPENDIX 2.

LIST OF EXHIBITS.

Exhibit Number Descriptiou Page at which

Tendered

1 Report of Committee of Investigation 47A

2 Photographs numbered ] to 1fi (being the phntogmph~ refened to in 49
Ex. 1)
3 Plans numbered R23, 00120 and R23, 00116 49
4 Colour slides of fractures (Nos. 1 and 2, showing failure of girder W.14 (2), 53
Kos. 3 and 4, showing failure of girder W.14 (3), Nos. 5 and 6, showing
failure of girder W.14 (1) and Nos. 7 and 8, showing failure of girder
W.14 (4). Each of the failures shown is at. the southern end of the
girders)
5 Two photograph:> of craek on girder E.ll 55
6 Specification~five books 97
7 Contract (being contract between C.R.B. and Utah, including annexures 97
except for specification and drawings)
8 Book of Drawings (made by tenderer and forming part of tender and 97
ultimately of the Contract)
9 Schedule of tenderers (annexed to Exhibit 11) 98
10 Letter dated 12th March, 1957, from Sir Herbert Hyland to the Premier, 103-4
and the Premier's reply dated the 27th March, 1957
11 Letter dated 27th May, 19[)7, from Mr. Darwin to the Minister for Public 103-4
Works
12 Memorandum dated 20th June, 1957, from Mr. Swanson to the Minister Ill
for Public Works
13 "Answers to Minister':; Questions" in a document dated 27th July, 1962, 117
from 3:Ir. Roberts, the Chairman ofthe C.R.B. to the 'Minist-er for Public
Works
14 Book of drawings .. 125
15 Correspondence passing hetween .T. & \V. and Utah (the contract between 131
these parties is contained herein)
16 Bundle of letters by various people concerning quality of steel (this 135
exhibit was later absorbed in Ex. 51)
17 Copy of Order from .J. & W. to B.H.P. dated 20th May, 1958 (the first 138
order herein)
18 A.I.S. acceptance of order (the acceptance of the order refened to in 139
Exhibit 17)
19 Utah Construction Co. brochure (submitted by Utah with its tender) .. 14<1
20 List of heat numbers and chemical compositions (showing the C.R.B. 147
numbers applied to B.H.P. heat numbers and the ladle analysi:o; of
each heat; this document compiled by C.R.B.)
21 Undated letter (about February, 1958) from Dr. };'ox to C.R.B. 149
22 Paper "Development of Project " by 1\h. D. V. Darwin, and paper 153
"Development of Electric Welding", by Mr. 0. A. Masterton
23 Book "Arc Welding of Low Alloy Steels" (usually referred to m the 154A
hearing as " Bradstreet " or as " B:W.RA. Booklet ")
24 Report on overseas plate girder practice by Mr . .J. E. Bonwick 157
25 Report by Dr. W eck 169A
26 Surface treatment of Rt,elwork~Supplementary specification, clause 4-8-5 169A
27 Summary of tests specified in specifications for high-tensile steel 235
28 Document re Bailey bridges 248
29 Article "The Selection of Steels for Welded Structures", by Hugh 1\'Iuir 320
and .J. S. Hoggart
30 Report by Professor Francis 355
31 British Standard 2642 : 1955 394
32 1Iemorandum dated 2Hth November, 1957, by Mr. Butler to C.R.B. (as 394
to inspection of steel in the mill)
33 Schedule of bridges b1:ilt in welded medium and high-tensile steel and 402 and 419
photographs of somE, of these bridges
34 Summary of steel specification requirements (refers to U.K., France, 403
Germany, and U.S.A.)
35 Extraet from "Publie Roads", Volume 30, No. 'i, October, 1958, 403
'' Current Structural Bridge Steels : A Survey of Usage and Economy ",
by Nathan W. Morgan
36 Standard Composite I-Beam Bridges, spans 50 feet to 100 feet (U.S. 405
Department of Commerce, Bureau of Public Roads, May, 1953)
37 Let-ters and enclosures 408
1. Dated 12th November, 1957, O.R.B. to Utah
2. Dated 6th December, 1957, Utah to C.R.B.
3. Dated 14th F'ebruary, 1958, C.R.B. to Utah
 103
APPENDIX 2-continued.
LrsT OF ExHIBITS-~ontinued.

Description Page at which

Exhibit Number Tendered

38 Letters and enclosures 412~413

1. Dated 18th February, HJ58, T.:;tah to C.R.B.
2. Dated 13th }'[arch, 1958, C.RB. to Utah
3. Dated 25th :\larch, 1958, Utah to C.R.B.
39 Letter dated 25th Mareh, ] 957, Utah to K.S.B.D., and agrePment dated 426
19th ,January, Hl59, betwepn Utah and K.S.B.D. Ltd.
40 Computations of girders W.l4, 1-4 together \Vith transmittal notices .. 435A
41 Approved drawings of girders which failed .. 437-438
42 Report dated lOth March, 1ntiO, from Department, of Civil Engineering 461
of the University of Melbourne on eight pieces of steel (sent to it by
C.R.B. for testing) together with diagrams (the vieces of steel are
further described at page 1657 of the transcript)
43 Sheet of Civil Engineering lecture noHlR for ] ~)(jJ of the Uninwsitv of 4tl8
Melbourne (identified by Professor Fmneis at page 1889 of" the
transcript)
44 Paper "Transfer of Stresses in Welded Cover Plates". by A. :XI. Ozell 502
and A. L. Conyers, published in Welding Rm;e11rch Council (U.S.A.),
Bulletin No. 63, August., 1960
45 Paper "Fatigue in Welded Beams and Girders", by W. H. Munse and 504
.T. E. Stallmeyer, published in Highway Research Board, Bulletin No.
315, 'March, 1962
46 Report dated 3rd August, HJU2 (with mmexures) by Mr. Ferris 511
47 Picee of cover plate from girder E.14--3 at the north end 531
48 Kings Bridge steel girders, hy drawings (being a plan presented by Mr. 532
Hudson showing the result;; of the examination nf the tmns\ersf; weld"
at the ends of the cover plates)
49 Photostat copy of Mr. Hudson's fincling11 534
50 Drawing No. JW746A (a shop drawing used for fabricating; it refers to 555
girder W.1lSl and gusset plates)
51 C.R.B. and Ut{th correspondence, &c. (This includes the letters referred 557~558
to by Mr. Eastick in his evidence in chief)
52 Comparative table showing pre-heating requirements (compiled by n.Tr. 572
Eastick)
53 Report by Mr. Jackson "I1weshgatiou into the Heat-affected Zone 577
Cracking of B.S. 968 Steel Using the Controlled Thermal SeYerity Test"
54 Report by Mr. Jnckson "Tnvestigat.ion into Weldability n.nd Phybieal 578
Properties of B.S. 968 Steel Plate "
55 Part I.-Typed copy of rekwant. extracts from ::\Tr. '\Vilson's diary 578
Part 2.-~Jr. Wilson's diary 688
56 Pamphlet describing National ARsociation of Testing Authorities 595
57 Paper "Radiographic Inspection of Welded Highway Bridges", by .Tohn 5!J7
L. Beaton, presented at the 37th Annual ~feeting of the Highwny
Rese~>rch Board, Washington D.C., 6th to lOth January, 1H58
58 Sheet showing modified radiographic standard 59!)
59 Circular dated 20th August, 1\)58, prepared by }fr. Jackson, being 602
" Inspection Procedure List for Welding SupervisorK l~ngngrd on the
King-street Bridge Project "
60 Pro forma procedure sheet 607
61 Pro forma visual inspection results .. 607
62 Typicnl trace of radiographic exmnin:ttion 607
63 Three files of test eert,ificates produced by Utah (the files include certifieates 644
of physical tests on the ::;t.eel supplied given by the steelmaker by
E.T.R.S. and by Roynl Melbourne Technical College, and certificates
of analysis given by the steelmaker and also letters to 1111d from Utah
transmitting to nnd from C.R.B. and J. & W. the certificates and
approvals t.hereof)
64 Procedure qu:tlification fillet weld test, automatic and semi-automatic. 688
(an extract from "Inspection nnd Tests of Welding of Highway
Bridges", by John L. Be.<'1ton, December, 1958)
65 Letter dated 8th October, 1962. from Mr. Wilson to Colvilles Ud. and 703
reply dated 18th October, IH62, thereto
66 List showing dates of erection of girders, King-street Bridge project 704
(prepared by Utah)
67 Certificates of mechanical tests with diagram and photograph referring 710
to letter of 22nd July, 1958 (the certifieates were given by Murex)
68 The comparison of bending stresses enclosed with letter of 22nd April, 710
1958 (the comparison being made by K.S.B.D.)
69 Utah file on induced stresses 731
70 File in support of J. & W. claim for extra payment 737
71 Part L-Oopy of wall charts supplied to C.R.B. by J. & W. 738
Part 2.-0riginal of t.he 11aid wall chart.a 931
 104
APPENDIX 2-continued.
J,IST OF ExHIBITS-continued.

Exhibit Number Description Page at whleh

Tendered

72 Chart compiled from C.R.B. records relating to heats (amendments to it 740

are in transcript pages 740-741)
73 Details of heat numbers of steel in main girders 742
74 Correspondence tendered by Utah 743
75 Copy of 1\Ir. Scarlett's notes of conferences 23rd June, 1959; 25th 797A and 1658
November, 1959 , 14th December, 1959; 16th December, 1959;
and 17th December, 1959
76 Letter dated 27th FE,bruarv, 1959, with enclosures from B.H.P. to J. & W. 825
77 Exmnples of completed c~pies of pro forma as in Exhibit 60 .. 828A
78 British Standard Speciftcation No. 2549 of 19M 848-849
79 Copies of all orders for steel placed by J. & W. with B.H.P. 881
80 Table of acceptanceg of orders from J. & W. by B.H.P. 882
81 Copies of analysis and physical test eertificates. in order of date (an 883
analysi8 certifieate and a physical test certificate were delivered with
each heat of steel) and a list of physical test certificates which are
not now available
82 Tabulation of heats from which steel was supplied to J. & W. (a summary 884
of Exhibit 81)
83 List of heats supplied to J. & W. of which chromium analysis was made 885
84 Table of analyses of the two heats produced from Newcastle (heats shown H87
as B.H.P. numbers B6342 and 22417 and also known by C.R.B. heat
numbers 32 and ~:0 respectively)
85 Tahle of deliveries of steel to J. & W. 888A
86 Photostat of joh cards (as kept by the C.R.B. in relation to each t,rirder) 903
87 Schedule of examinations of welders 904
88 List of girders showing date of fabrication and erect.ion (compiled by 905
J. & W.)
89 List of girders whose cover plate ends were welded after assembly of web 906
and flange (compiled hy C.R.B. Note that at the time it was tendered
it was explained that the fact that a girder was not, mentioned on this
list did not mean that its cover plate ends were welded before assembly
of web and flange, hut only that there was no record in relation to such
a girder aH to when its cover plate ends were welded)
90 Copy letter d.'tted 2Eith July, 1962, and memorandum of the same date 942
from Mr. Hoggart, Senior Lecturer in "Mechanical Metallurgy, University
of l\:Ielbourne to the Secretarv, C.R.B.
91 Document (produced by J. & W.) "B.S. 968 Steel Available at Works of 942
J. & W. at Sandringham as at 2nd November, 1962"
92 BritiKh Standard 96g: 1941 and British Standard 968: 1962 96-4
93 Letter dated 19th October, 1962, from the Secretary to the Royal 965
Commission to MeBsrs. Mott, Hay, and Anderson and reply dated 31st
October, Hl62, thereto with appendices and drawings
94 Welding charts (being some charts displayed at J. & W.'s shop) 984
95 Three electrodes (one Fortrex 35, one Vodex, and one Fastex F.5) .. 994
96 Certificate dated 7th January, 1958, issued by the Defence Standards 1005
J,aboratories in reBpect of the Izod Impact Testing Machine at the
Royal Melbourne Technical College and covering letter
97 Certificate dat.ed 27th .July, 1959, issued by the D.S.L. in respect of the 1006
lzod Impact Testing Machine at the Royal Melbourne Technical College
and covering letter
98 Copy of official memoranda given by Mr. Clarke to J. & W. 1057
99 Rough notes taken by Mr. Clarke at conference 1059
100 Photograph~ of workshops of J. & W. taken at the time work was 1062
proceeding on Kings Bridge project
101 Journal "Australian Mechanical Engineering" of 5th January, 1961 1063
102 First page of "Memorandum on Faults in Arc Welds in Mild and Low 1063
Alloy Steels" (a publication by B.W.R.A. which was first issued to
its members in October, 1949)
103 Three books of fillet weld survey sheets 1068
104 Letter dated 24th Oc;ober, 1962, from the Secretary to the Royal Com- 1101
mission to Sir William Arrol and Co. J,td. and reply dated 6th November,
1962 thereto
105 Extract from" Calculated Pre-heat Temperatures to Prevent Hard-zone 1118
Cracking in Low-alloy steels", by C. L. M. Cottrell and B. J. Bradstreet
(page 3 in British Welding Journal, July, 1955), showing weldability
indices of steels that have been tested
106 J,etter dated 7th August, 1959, from Utah to J. & W. 1122
107 Concreting and painting sequences of spans W.l3, W.14, and W.l5 1193
108 Letter dated 15th April, 1959, from \Department of Public Works, 12.04
California to Mr. Fink
 105
APPENDIX 2~--eontinued.
LIST OF ExHIBITS--continued.

Page at which
Exhibit Number Description Tendered
---~i---------------~-----------------------1----~------

109 Letter dated 20th January, 1960, A.LS. to J. & W. 1209A

110 Reports dated 8th July, 1960, and 9th September, 1960, from Mr. Peter 1212
Johns to J. & W.
111 Paper by Mr. Gilbert Roberts "The Welded Maidenhead Bridge", 1212
published in "British Welding Journal", June, 1961, and paper by Mr.
J. S. Alien ''New Thames Bridge", published in "Welding and Metal
Fabrication", May, 1961
112 Letter dated 29th October, 1958, from Royal Melbourne Technical College 1265
to J. & W.
113 Schedule of welders tested for work on King-street Bridge (compiled by 1268
J. & W.)
114 Passage at page 42 of "The Welder", April- June, Hl57, commencing 1269
" In order that the welding should be in line " and ending " more than
200 were tested ''
115 Schedule of delivery of heat certificates, B.II.P. to J. & W... 1271
116 Document with figures showing loss of camber 1275
117 Copies of the four articles referred to at page 20 of B.W.R.A. handbook 1278
(Ex. 23)
118 Letter dat~d lst October, 1962, from J. & W. to B.W.R.A. and reply 1279
dated 16th October, 1962, thereto
119 Piece of steel from heat 22, showing lamination 1282
120 Certificates !L'lted 4th March, 1960, 9th March, 1960, and lOth June, 1960, 1283
given by Sharp and Howells of tests on heat 22
121 Murex technical report to Johns and Waygood dated 22nd April, 1960 1286
(refers inter alia to analysis of heat 22)
122 Report on approximately 18th March, 1960, by A.I.S. on examination 1290 and 2143
of girder-plate samples ex J. & W. and photographs
123 Certific.'lte dated 14th October, 1959, given by Sharp and Howells of tests 1292
on heat 53
124 Reports numbered 38316, 38317, and 38318 by McPhersons Ltd. of tests 1294
on heats 55 and 56
125 Letter dated lOth February, 1960, from British Iron and Steel Corporation 1311
Ltd. to Norman W. Hutehinson and Sons Pty. Ltd., with sketch
drawings and letter dated 16th February, 1960, from the latter to
J ohns and Waygood
126 Report dated 5th August, Hl58, from A.I.S. upon B.S. 968 plates ex 1311
J. & w.
127 Bundle of certificates relating to tests on plate ex S.S. lYlara as referred 1312-0
to on page 1258 of the transcript {the certificates relate to steel senj; to
J. & W. by B.H.P in February, 1958, for testing)
128 Welding chart dated 25th August, 1958, prepared by J. & W. (setting 13Hl
out inter alia principal gauges and pre-heats)
129 i Certificate of analysis AC 4034 dated 31st March, 1958, given by 1384
Australian Iron and Steel Ltd.
]30 Letter dated 29th November, 1959, from J. & W. to Utah, and reply dated 1438
30th November, 1959, thereto
131 . Individual report to Committee on Investigation by 1\'Ir. Eric L. Erickson 1456
132 1

Report of Professor Frank Bertram Bull and a letter written by Professor 1462 and 1470
Bull
133 Letter dated 16th November, 1962, from Dr. Week to the Commission 1464
134 I Letter dated 8th November, 1962, from Freeman Fox and Partners to
1 1465
the Commission
135 Certificates of additional tests produced by J. & W. {including weldability 1472
test certificates given by E.T.R.S., weldability test certificates given by
Royal Melbourne Technical College and miscellaneous certificates and
reports given by B.H.P., E.l\LF. Electric Co. Pty. Ltd., the University
of Melbourne and Sharp and Howells)
136 Summary of plate weldability tests carried out by E.T.R.S. for J. & W. 1484
137 File relating to heat 5.5 certificates (compiled by C.R.B.) 1.532
138 List of plates in which suspected laminations occur .. 1536
139 Photographs of cover plate of girder E6S3, over \Vlliteman-street 1583
14-0 Reproduction by Mr. Campbell of pre-heat chart 1589
141 Reproduction by Mr. Campbell of notebook entry 1593
142 A box of thermal crayons 1599-1600
143 Ust of location of heats in flanges at points of termination of cover plates 1657
144 Copy of Mr. Norman Clarke's diary from 23rd April, 1959, to lOth 1658
February, 1961, and the original thereof
145 Sketch by witness Edward William Fox as to order of welding of 1675
cover plate end
146 Minutes of meeting held on 1st December, 1962, at J. & W.'s Sandringham 1729
premises re weld tests
 106
APPENDIX 2-continued.
LisT OF ExHmrrs-continued.
-------;-------------~----~-----~-----~--

Exhibit Number Descrlpt,ion

--------------------------~------------------------------------------1~-------

147 Extract from Engineering News Record of 18th October, 1962, "Crystals 1730
cause failures ? ", being a letter from Douglas 8. Laidlaw to the editor
148 Report No. I.R. 551 dated 4th November, 1959, by :Jiurex Research 1733-4
Department, Hobart, to the Melbourne Branch of :Jlurex
149 M:emomndum dated 12th October, 1959, from the M:urex Research 173fi
Department, Hobart
150 Memorandum dated 7th October, 1960, from .:\ielbourne Branch of Murex 1735
to :Jlurex Research Department, Hobart, and reply thereto da.ted
14th October, 1960
151 Murex file, including Exhibits 148, 149, and 150 l738
152 Memorandum dated :lrd December, 1962, from Mr. R. T. A. Hardcastle, 1916
being his comment~ on Professor Francis's report
153 Report dated 18th May, 1960, by Mr. C. A. Wilson, "Effect of Weld 1918
Defects on Strengt:n of Girders "
154 Report on type of welds at cover plattJ ends 1918
155 Results of tests conducted on behalf of C.R.B. by D.S.L. ou sections of 1978
failed girders
156 Graph of Charpy Impl>ct Tests appended to Exhibit 93 Hl94
157 Minutes of 119 design CQnferences held between 21st August, 1957, and 2011
12th May, 1960
158 Copies of Acier Stahl Steel, January, 1961, and April, 1961 .. 2034
159 Report to J. & W. hy Professor Bull 2045
160 Report by Professor H. W. Worner 2045
161 Letter dated 28th November, 1962, from Dr. Week to the Commission 2045
162 Photographs (taken off Ex. 4) which, according to the witness P. A. 2058
Hardcastle, show red lead paint
163 Two samples of B.S. 968 steel showing welding using different gauges of 2088
electrodes and varying runs
164 File of correspondence produced by the witness 0. E. Ralston and report 2133 and 213\l
from Port Kembla with attached photographs
165 Schedule showing deta.ils of supply of steel to B.S. 968: 1941 by B.H.P. 2145
to Australian users
166 List. of heats supplied to J. & W. together with a table showing customers 2148
other than .J. & W. supplied with steel from these heat.s
167 Record showing t.ot~l deliveries of steel by B.H.P. to S. & W. to 25th 2148
June, 1959
168 Notes of conference held on 26th :May, l9fi8, at J. & W. between B.H.P.
and .J. & W. and original notes of t,his conference, containing red ink 2190 and 3106
additions
169 Letter dated 6th January, 1961, from J. & W. re B.H.P. and reply 2217
thereto dated 14th February, 1961
170 American Iron and Steel Institute, Steel Products Manual, pages 18 and 2221
following
171 Murex report dated 11th December, 1962, showing analyses, &e., of :Nlurex 2241
welding materials
172 1957 Edition "B.H.P.-A.L & S. Steels" .. 2247
173 1962 Edition "B.H.P.~A.I. & 8. Steels" .. 2247
174 Drawing showing suggested weld sequence for termination of cover plates 2300
175 Photograph showing lzod testing machine with vice blocks, &c. 2:33()
176 File containing reports of witness E. P. Fisher to Utah 2343
177 Report on automatic welding of steel to B.S. 968, by E. P. Fisher 2347
178 l\llemo of German publications on strength of steel 2368
179 Experience record of E. P. Fisher .. 2373
180 Second Murex file 2379
181 I.etter dated 26th November, 1962, from Dr. 1\-iatheson to Dr. Week, and 2401
reply thereto dated 4th December, 1962
182 Table from the A.I.S.L Steel Products Manual 2401
183 Seven samples of British B.S. 968 st.eel 2405
184 A.I.S. experimental re port on B.S. 968 2410, 3365, and
3563
185 Two copy letters dated 6th December, 1962, and 12th December, 1962, 2433
to B.H.P. covering supply of imported British B.S. 968 steel
186 B.H.P. file on chemical, mechanical, and metallurgical checks on B.S. 9()8 247l
steel supplied for the bridge
187 Mr. Farrar's notebook on conference on 19th May, 1959, at Sandringham 2528
188 Pamphlets from Murex, E.M.F. and Lincoln re handling and care of 2535-6
electrodes
189 Optical and electron micrographs t.aken of welds in heat 55 .. 2540
190 Data on edges of plates and sections as supplied to J. & W. by B.H.P. 2550
191 Letter dated 21st November, 1962, from the Department of the Navy 2570
to C.R.B. with enclosures re D.W. steel
 107
APPENDIX 2-----.continued
LIST oF ExHIBITS ~continued.

Description Page at which

Exhibit Number Tendered
~--~--1------~--------~-~---~-~-~----~-1-~~------

192 Photo of special girder showing "U" shaped cover plate end 2582
193 Note of additional clauses to Standard Specifications 2595
1!H Report dated 23rd .January, HH\:3, by lVIr. Ferris, on metallurgical 2fi03
investigations into the failure of four welded low-alloy steel girders
(being the W.l4 girders) referred to nR D.S.L. report
195 Report issued 21st December, 1962, by B.W.R.A. "An Investigation of 21\03
the Weldahility of a Steel PIMe Removed from a Failed Girder in the
Kings Bridge "
196 Summary showing incidence of cracks in transverse weld discovered up 2695
to 25th January, 1963
197 I,etter dated 30th Januarv, 19fl3, from C.R.B. tn the Commission re 2724
Mr. F. E . .Jackson
198 Second statement by Professor Bull 2803
199 Summary of test results carried out at Adelaide University 2804
200 Two samples of steel being off'cuts from steel supplied for t,he bridge, 2810
marked R1 and 7
201 Two pieces of mild steel marked MS2 and MS6 2810
202 Piece of steel, sample marked 8 (flame-cut edge) 2811
203 Boyd diagram produced by Professor Bull (relating to the bridge steel) 2833
21H Internal correspondence of B.H.P. 2879
205 Extracts from Exhibit 187 2894
206 Notes on testing from 1\'Ir. Farrar 2908
207 }feteorological information 2909
208 Method of sampling bridge material for chemical analysis (produced by 2~l29
lVlr. Ferris)
210 Paper "Thermal Gradients during Welding of Sin1ulated Kings Bridge 2972
Girders", by H. C. Coo and G. G. Brown of B.H.P., Research Division
211 Questions for. consideration by B.H.P. 3037
212 Table showing Navy pre-heats 3040
213 Plate mill specification sheet (issued by B.H.P. to it.s service oftieers) 3142
214 Statement, with annexnres, of Anna Miconiatis (of J. & W.) 3Hi2
215 Mr. Clarke's notebook, containing pre-heat tables 3160
216 Sample of steel supplied by Mr. Thompson .. 3194
217 Mr. Wilson's private notes on steel thickness 3196
218 Charts relating to 1\I.l\Jl.B.W. milling operation on cover plate ends of 3196 nnd 3432
Kings Bridge
219 Correspondence between the Secretary to the Commission and Caterpillar 3201
of Australia Pty. Ltd.
220 Sheet showing typical example of welding procedure, issued by Caterpillar 3203
of Australia Pty. Ltd. to its welders.
221 Izod impact test pieces from E.T.R.S. 3229
222 Statist,ical analyses of the details of inspection of main girders (compiled 3231
by C.R.B.)
223 Report of witness D. 0. Morris (received "in camera") In Camera, 8
224 Letter dated 26th February, 1963, from Norman W. Hutchinson and 3260 and 3430
Sons Pty. Ltd. t.o Mr. Peter Johns enclosing cast analyses of B.S. 968
in Forth-Road Bridge
225 Drawings by Mr. Williams of the transverse weld nt the end of the 3336
cover plate on W482, north end
226 Letter dated 7th February, 1963, from Professor Bull to Dr. Matheson .. 3357
227 American Welding Society's Standard Specifieations for Welded Highway 3357
and Railway Bridges, 1950
228 Pages 4 and 5 from a paper by Hatfield "The Work of the Heterogeneity 3358
of Steel Ingots Committee "
229 B.H.P. sales enquiry report and reply 3359
230 Correspondence between C.R.B. and the British Ministry of Transport 3364
231 D.S.L. supplementary report. dated 8th March, 1963, on examination of 3428
failed girders
232 E.T.R.S. report dated 7th March, 1963, on tapered welds in girder E.14 3429
233 Memorandum dated 5th March, 1963, from Mr. Ferris re incidence of 3429
cracking
234 Further reports from Testing nnd Rest>.'l.rch Department of lVIePherson's 3429
Ltd.
235 Statistics compiled by M.M.B.W. of cracking after 111 ends of cover plates 3432
had been milled
236 Signed report of Professor Roderiek 3439
237 Report dated 14th March, 1963, by E.T.R.S., supplementary to Ex. 232 3552
 108
APPENDIX 3.

RELEVANT EXTRACT FROM REPORT OF COMMITTEE OF INVESTIGATION.

The Failure.
On lOth July, 1962, at a time between 11 a.m. and 11.30 a.m. one span close to the southern end of the
western half-section of the High Level Bridge collapsed suddenly under a load carried by a semi-trailer vehicle
having a total length of about 49 feet. The total weight was approximately 47 tons. The stresses in the
bridge as designed due to this load were within permissible limits.
The span concerned has four (4) suspended girders 100 feet long carried by cantilevers extending from
adjoining spans. Each of the four girders was fractured at a point approximately 16 feet from the southern
end, and three at points approximately 16 feet from the northern end. The structure sagged a maximum
distance of about 1 foot but did not completely collapse, the fractured girders being supported by the
concrete deck and to some degree by vertical concrete wall slabs enclosing the space beneath the bridge.
Each girder consists of steel flange plates welded to a stk!el web plate. The forces sustained by the
flanges in girders of this type vary from a minimum at the ends to a maximum at the centre and the thickness
of the flange is commonly proportioned accordingly. In these girders the variation was obtained by constructing
the flange of two plates, the lower of which was welded to the upper but did not extend over the whole
length. The lower plate is described as the cover plate.
In the four girders there are thus eight (8) points of termination of the cover plates and the seven (7)
fractures occurred at these points.
As a precautionary measure, all parts of the bridge were closed to traffic later in the same day.
There was no evidence of settlemen;l; or other movement of the foundation sub-structure or the supporting
piers and the investigation has been directed to the superstructure.

The Investigation.
The matters examined by the Committee are related to the known or probable factors concerned.
Responsibilities have not been considered by the Committee.
The items of the investigation were :~
1. The cause of the failure.
2. Tests and examinations to ascertain, as far as possible, the presence of any other points or potential
points of weakness.
3. The degree of risk in re-opening parts of the bridge to traffic and restrictions desirable.
4.. Remedial measures.

1. The Cause.
Examination and inspection of the fractures show that the failure was of a type known as " brittle
fracture " in the steel. This is a condition brought about by the combination of several principal factors,
namely:-
(a) The nature of the steel ;
(b) low temperatures;
(c) the process of fabrication, in this case, welding ;
(d) design details.

Brittle fracture is a mode of failure which may occur in any steel if a critical combination of condition
exists. These are principally :-
(1) The presence of a notch or indentation, crack, or other flaw;
(2) temperature in the range critical for the particular steel concerned ;
(3) a stress sufficient to cause a crack or flaw to extend.

Under the most unfavourable combination of these factors, a collapse may occur whilst the structure has
no load on it other than that due to its own weight.
The critical temperature in the steel used in the construction of this bridge is relatively high and
brittle fracture could, therefore, occur at temperatures commonly experienced in Melbourne, particularly in the
winter. Minimum night temperatures a.t the time of the failure were in the order of 35 F. to 40 F. and this
is considered to have been a factor contributing to the failure.
The steel used in these girders was of a kind commonly known as high-tensile steeL The specification
required that it should conform to British Standard No. 968: 1941, and contained additional conditional
conditions relating to impact properties.
 109
APPENDIX 3---continued

It is known that steel of this description presents certain difficulties in welding and that this was
understood at the time of the preparation of the specification. Extensive precautions were taken to ensure a
satisfactory structure; however, it is the opinion of the Committee that the nature of the steel used,
although so far as is known at present, conforming in general to the specification, was such that even these
precautions proved inadequate.

Careful and extensive recorcls were kept by the Country Roads Board of certificates supplied by the
sub-contractors fabricating the girders certifying the quality of mueh of the steel.

'rhere are gaps, however, in the information relating to some of the "heats'' or batches of steel
included in the girders which failed.

The fractures occurred in each case at the short tranver8e weld at the end of the cover plates and the
examinations and tests made show that an excessively hardened zone was created in the flange plate at this
weld so that "locked-up " stresses caused cracks to oecur in these zones. In the girders which failed, it is
clear that the cracks led to the fractures and failure.

Four of the seven fractures have been examined closely by the removal of parts of the girders and there
is little doubt that at least one girder was fractured over a considerable portion of its depth not lesH than
three months and possibly much longer, prior to the failure. Two other fractures show that some craeking
existed before the failure. These fractures also show traces of red lead paint indicating that some cracking
was present either before the girders left the fabrication shop or before a second coat of similar paint was applied
after erection.

The failures aTe associated with a specific design feature, namely the stopping of cover plates. This is
known to produce high local concentration of stress and is considered an undesirable feature.

Whilst the Committee ha;; not been able to ascertain whether the fabrication procedures actually employed
weTe in accordance with those laid down in the specification, the existence of heat-affected zone cracks
suggests that these may have been insufficient. It may have been that no pro-heat was used in making the
end welds of the cover plates or that there may have been excess hydrogen present either from a pickling
process or electrode coatings; further that the rate of heat input to the joint in making the manual welds
was insufficient.

ln general, automatic or semi-automatic welding methods were used but at certain points, including
the ends of cover plates, manual welding was employed.

2. Tests and Examination.

The character of the observed fractures indicated that similar flaws might exist elsewhere in the
bridge. A programme of examination and testing has been carried out and a considerable number of flaws
have been detected.

The following methods were used : -

1. Visual inspection. This has detected two cracks.
2. Magnetic particle inspection.
3. Ultrasonic inspection.
4. Radiography.

Any one of these tests may not be reliable but a positive indication by two can be taken as being
of fair order of reliability.

Visual inspection has been made throughout the bridge but instrument examination has been confined
to sections where a high degree of public risk existed or as necessary elsewhere to obtain information.

The coverage of tests and the information gained has been sufficient to justify the conclusion that defects
probably exist in all girders.
 110
APPENDIX 4.

'l'he following extracts are taken from the paper ''How to use high-strength steel effectively" by A. L.
Elliott, Bridge Engineer in Planning, Bridge Department of the California Division of Highways, which appeared
in the "Engineering News Record" for 18th February, 1960.

It was included in Bonwick's report to Utah (Ex. 24) :-

" Progress in use of high-strength steels has accompanied advances in connecting methods. But
recently, metallurgists have pushed ahead with still stronger steels; progress in applying them to
structures awaits development of suitable welding techniques. Strength is not the only consideration in
selecting a steel for structural application. Other physical characteristics, such as toughness, ductility
and weldability, are equally important, and these as well as strength are influenced by addition of
small amounts of alloying eiements to steel.

Adding carbon to steel, for example, increases strength, but as m.ore and m.ore carbon is added,
the steel becomes hard and brittle. Soon a point is reached where the steel is virtually useless for
structural applications.

'l'his carbon limit is rather low. Exceeding it may lead to disaster: steel might crack in cold
weather or be shattered by vibration.

'l'o be weldable without brittleness, steel must have a carbon content less than 0 25 per cent.
Manganese also is critical and should be below 1 25 per cent.

Adoption of welding caused some nmjor changes in steel use in California. Before 1951, use of
rolled beams had been increasing steadily. For long spans, cover plates were riveted on, and sometimes
the webs were split and plats inserted to increase the depth of the beams. But these were expensive
solutions to the long-span problem.. After a short period of working with welded beams, California
began to utilize welding to the fullest extent in 1954. Since then, use of rolled beams has tapered off
to a mere 21 tons in 1958.

!.1eanwhile, use of welded beams has been increasing ::;teadily (18,500 tons in 1958). With this
background of experience in \velding, California was well prepared to make effective use of the high-
strength steels when they became available.

When alloy structmal ,steels were introduced about 20 years ago, California started to use them in
bridges. In 1939, two large truss bridges were designed with over 2,200 tons of high-strength steel. Two
years later, this new steel wa.3 covered by an AS'l'M tentative specification, A242 for alloy steel. After
that, California used it extensively.

Well over 100,000 ton;' of A242 steel have been used in the past ten years in welded California
highway bridges alone. 'l'his experience prepared the State's engineers for the next step to a higher
stress grade.

When the early designs for the second Carquinez Straits Bridge were beginning to take shape
about 19.53, the new HO,OOO lb./sq. in. yield-point steel had not yet been used in large quantity in any
structure. Since engineers are traditionally conservative, the normal procedure would have been to
wait ten or fifteen years until the new steel was well tested before specifying it for a bridge. But the
potential economies, the saving in weight and the reduction in size of members that this higher-strength
steel could effect, were too attractive to permit its adoption to be postponed.

So California engineers undertook a thorough investigation of this Rteel, which the maker, U.S.
Steel Corp., called T-1. After testing more than 3,000 lb. of it, they decided to use it in a substantial
portion of the Carquinez b1-idge. During fabrication of the trusses, some defects in welding were
discovered, ~md during erection, some transverse cracks were found in longitudinal welds (E.N.R. Sept.,
4, 1958, p. 42). 'l'he cracks frequently were close together, but in widely spaced groups.

All welds were rechecked and those that had cracks were removed and repaired. Less than 60
members were found to lli'tve cracks.

Since then, much time and money has been spent to duplicate the cracks deliberately and discover
the cause. But duplication has not been possible. 'l'he cause can be deduced only from circumstantial
evidence.

Part of the trouble seems to be attributable t.o the difficulty of getting welding rods that match the
strength of the alloy steel. If this is true, special care should be taken to insure quality. A tack
weld should be treated as meticulously as a major weld.

Use, care, and handling of low-hydrogen rods and proper selection of combinations of wire and
flux become very important with higher-strength steels. So does general house-keeping in the shop;
dirt and moisture must be excluded. Welding high-strength steel is a precision operation, not to be
undertaken casually or haphazardly. With proper care and attention to detail, successful welds are
assured".
 111

APPENDIX 5.

Results of Tests on Sampfegfrom W.l4 Girder.,, Extmctedjiom D.S.L. Report, Ex. 194.

SUMMARY OF HARDNESS SURVEYS OF WELD HEAT-AJ;'J;'ECTED ZONES.

These surveys were made using an adaption of the B.W.R.A. method with a 5 kg. indenting load. A
number of traverses from parent plate to weld pool were made through the H.A.Z. of representative welds. Peak
hardness values of each traverse were noted and from these aYerage peak Hv. for each weld was determined.
The maximum Hv. obtained in each H.A.Z. is also quoted.

Hardnes
Girder Sample Zone
Av. 11!ax.
Parent Weld
Peak Plate Deposit

W.l4~S1~ Automatic Weld Web to Flange H.A.Z. (Western 370 385 205 210
North end Flange Side)

I Web H.A.Z. (Western Side) 300 300 .. 210

! Flange H.A.Z. (Eastern 310 315 200 205

Side)
I
Manual Transverse Weld Flange H.A.Z. (2nd Fillet) 345 360 .. ..
i
Cover Plate to Flange
(Central Section) Cover Plate II.A.Z. (3rd 340 340 .. I ..
Fillet)
I I i
!
Manual Taper Weld Cover Flange H.A.Z. (3rd Fillet) 445 460 200 I 240
Plate to Flange (Eastern 1 I
Side) Cover Plate H.A.Z. .. 325 190 ..
Manual Taper Weld Cover
1

Flange H.A.Z. (3rd Fillet) ~ 420 435 195 220

Plate to Flange (Western
Side) Cover Plate H.A.Z. (2nd 320 320 180 ..
Fillet)

W.14-S3- Automatic Weld Co,er Flange H.A.Z. .. .. 410 425 195 235
North end Plate t.o Flange
Cover Plate H.A.Z. .. .. 400 205 235
1-
Manual Transverse Weld Flange H.A.Z. (2nd Fillet) .. 370 ]95 230
Cover }>]ate to Flange
I
Cover Plate H.A.Z. (3rd 365 385 205 230
Fillet) i I
i-

Manual Taper Weld Cover Flange H.A.Z. (3rd Fillet) 475 485 180 230
Plate to Flange (Eastern i
Side) Cover Plate H.A.Z. (2nd .. 325 205 230
Fillet)

Manual Taper Weld Cover Flange H.A.Z. (3nl Fillet) 470 485 HlO 235
i
Plate to Flange (Western
Side) Cover Plate H.A.Z. (2nd .. 345 205 235
Fillet)
W.14-S2~ Manual Transverse Weld Flange H.A.Z. (2nd Fillet) .. 390 185 235
South end Cover Plate to Flange
Cover Plate H.A.Z. (3rd .. 350 181'> 240
l!'illet)

Manual Taper Weld Cover Flange H.A.Z. (3rd Fillet) .. 435 210 240
Plate to Flange (Eastern
Side) Cover Plate H.A.Z. (2nd .. 255 190 240
Fillet)
I
 112
APPENDIX 5-continued.

KINGS BRIDGE~SUM~fARY OF CHJ<J.VITCAL ANAI;YSES.

Heat No. C01nposition

"'Girder Location in Girder Sample
(l<'rom ~orth End) No.
B.H.P. U.R.ll. c. Jl1n. Cr. Si. s. P. N.
i
Web .. 243,237 40 ti.I t ! Near splice with N.IW 2I I68 I5 03 022 037 005
Heat 38, N. end
Adjacent I<'raeture, W.14-i:U, 22 I 67 I5
S. end S. Fracture
1 N. Surface

S.2 Near splice with G.R.B./I6 .. 26 203 04

Heat 38, S. end
Near splice with O.R.B./I7 .. 26 20I 04
Heat 38, S. end
Near splice with G.R.B.j18 .. 25 201 04
Heat 38, S. end

8.3 NEar splice with C.R.B./25 .. 24 195 04

Heat 38, S. end
NEar splice with C.R.B./26 .. 24 194 04
Heat 38, S. end
NEar splice with C.R.B./27 .. 2f> I I 97 04
Heat 38, S. end
1---
S.4 Near splice with C.R.B./34 .. 25 I 1!16 04
Heat 38, S. end
Nar splice with C.R.B./35 .. 25 1!)5 04
I
Heat 38, S. end
[ Near splice with C.It.B.j36 .. 25 196 04
Heat 38, S. end

D.S.L. Mean (Neglecting Girder 8.1) .. .. .. .. 25 197 04

I
B.H.P. Certificate .. .. .. .. .. .. 23 175 050* 06 021 015 ..
Analysed for Chromium but not reported in Test Certificate.
t This Is almost certainly Heat 38, not Heat 40.--Commissloners.

Hea.t No. Composition

Girder Girder Location iu Girder Sample
Component W.14- (from N. end) No.
B.H.P. C.R.B. c Jl1n Cr Si s p N

Flange 7,890 55 s 1 Plate 2, North end .. CRB/40 24 177 24 ..

(Bottom)
" "
South end .. CRB/41 24 176 24
I ..
Plate 3, North end .. CRB/42 25 178 24 ..
. "
South of S. Fracture CRB/43 26 180 25 012

" "
North of S. ll'mcture S1F .. 2!} 176 25 34 o:n 020 ..
1~-
-1 -
s 2 Plate 1, Xorth end '' CRB/44 2.~ 178 24
Plate 1, above Xorth end of N2F 27 177 25 33 034 021 011
Cover
I j~-
I
s 3 Plate 2, North end .. CRB/45 I 28 180 25 !

Plate 3, South end .. CRB/46 26 180 25 I 32 Oll

I

s 4 Plate 2, North end .. ORB/47 22 I73 24

Plate 3, Xorth ofS. Fracture S4F 22 172 24 30 027 OI8 008
South of S. Fracture ORB/48 23 177 24
" "
'

D.S.L. Mean 25 177 24 32 030 020 Oll

B.H.P. Certificate 21 170 I 23*1 30 022 025

Alllllysed for Chromium but not reported In Test Certificate

 113

1
Cinlel' <Hrd1r Loeatio11 in (;jnltt' ~amvk
rompntunt . \\'.I+ (from :X. ewl) So.
!
F'lan.g<' ;)(} Plate I. near Xort.h end <'H 8. ;;u
(Bottonl)
.. Jl('<ll' Xorth cnd XIF

I'H8/til

:-; }
Plate I Xorth I'H.B/:i:!
"'"'
.. So nth l~:w I . <~H 8;.-,;~ ~7 l i~ 2'i

Plait- :3. :\orlh und CHB;:>+ -~6 I 73 -~~

~011th nfS, Fra.-ture I'H B, : .-, ~.) I 7:! :!.J 2:!

:-.; !l Pi at< I. !H':tl' Xorth end ('j{B, ;)H . :! ;""~ . 7:~ :!4

Konlh oi'X. l:'rntt !ll'P x:w :!f\ I I 7:~ . :.!:> ::!~ O:H 018 0(18

s .j ]'(;\(( 1. ll('Hl' K<rth ('lld t'HlL.>I . ~.) 1 la :!4

Xorth ofX. FraetJJr'e t'H Bi.!S :?f\

D.H.L. :\lean :!fi

B.H.P. ( 'ertiti<-ate . ~-1-*i . l !);) 0:!1\ (ll7

I kat \o. ('l)lflpo..;ititm

tankr ( ~ inlc1 iH
( 'ollllJOIU'llt
B.ll.J'. : ( .H.H. i
W.l+ X.
,.
:H:!.:;oa J>h,te H.
I SW
Plate .j
('on::l'
" .j !{, So11th end {near
Fmdnre)
:.'+

B.ll. P. Certifieate :!1 I I:.' 1170*' 071l i II:!H 0+:!

I
1--

(Jorcw PJatr ~.t)7 ,:tl) 1\i H I PlatP l, North end :\"f{' OI!l
I

B.H.I'. Cerlilieatt :!1 I 70 Ill* 14ii O:ll 010

Cnn-r I' late i,87X ;-i:! :-.; )

Plat<' l. Xorth end :\:!I. 1!1 l SI i . ~.-, 31

Certiti('nte :20 I i'i . ;!.)* 30

('on:r l'lat!' 7 .kSll .>:~ ,..; .. l'lat!' I. Xorth end x:w

B.H.P. ( 'ertili.eate IH* :21'\ O:_!.j ! 0:?4

CCt\-er Pial<' ~.J:U41 :)8 . s !'In t (' :~. South PJld {neur H. Hit' I !12 OH tH 021 01:! '(l(kj
Fractur<> l

B.ILP. f'crtili.('ate .. ).)

* Amllysed for l 'lmnniurn lmt not rc>pnl'tfd in Test f'Prtifkate

 114

:\L\XGAXEi"lE PLUS CHROMlUM TOTALS, C:\LCl'LA.TED C...\.RBOX -r;Ql~l L\Ll<~XTS (C. E.)*
AND DF~RI\'J<JD WELDABI1Xl'Y lXDICEf:l (W.T.)*

::\In. \1'.1.

X.l\V 183 0309 c

W.l4 L S.Fr., N. Smfae<> .. I 182 031H c
C.R.B./Hi 207 0. :}()tj ])
C.R.B.jli 2 (If) 0365 IJ
C.R.B./lR 205 0. 3[1fi ))
C.R.B./2!'J I llH 0342 c
C.R.B./2fi 198 0:341 r
C.R.lL2i 201 0353 c
C.R.B./3+ 200 0-:')52 c
C.R.B./35 , I 1!!9 0:352 c
C.R.B./3(i 200 0352 c
C.R.B./40 201 () :3f):3 c
C.R.B./41 200 0::.152 c
C.R.B./42 202 0 ::.16:3 !)
C.R.B./4:'5 2 Of) 0375 D
S.IF 201 03ti3 ])
C.R.B./44 202 036:'! D
N.2F .. 202 0:384 f)
C.R.B./45 20fi (). 3\l[) l>
C.R.B. Mi 205 03Tl f)
C.R.B./47 .. I I !17 (). 331 e
S.4F .. I 9(i o a;3o c
C.R.B./48 :;H)] 034:3 c
C. R.B./50 I !H 0 3fil J)
~.lF .. 1. !)fl 0:370 n
C.R.B./fil .. I 1 9!) 0372 D
C.R.B.i52 197 0:371 })
C.R.B./53 1 97 0381 D
C.R.B./54 1!17 0:371 n
C.R.B./5fl l!lfi 0.:360 n
C.R.B./5ti I 97 U3fil J)
N.3J1' .. I !lfi () 370 n
C.R.B./t11 1 !17 0361 ])
C.R.B./58 IHI'l 0:371 J)
S.4C l \)() 0.:338 c
N.lC .. lG 1\)5 0:350 0
N.2C 52 2ll 0 ;30D c
N.3C 53 l% 0 3!if) ])
S.IC .' i 58 lDt\ 0:312 c
:Non:: * "Weldahility lmlnx dPriy('d from l'arboll rquivalent r.a.Iculat<'d from
itir1nnl& gh'H in B.\Y,ILA. booklt't '' _\.t-c-\''ehling of l.ow Aliuy StN;ls'"
hy ll. J, llrallstrent .for Cla'" () (low hydrogen) ehetrn<lcs.
 J17:i

.\ PPEXI HX fi.

FWL:RE::\ H.EFEHRE]J TO !:\ THE TEXT OF THE REPORT.

Fig. I. C'i'OiiS-~Pcti< lll thmngh a l)'Jii(al li!let WPld and 1hot.ogra J>li,.;,

Fig. 2. Fractnn lll gird('!' \\'.14-2. ;mut.Jwrn Pnd, looking ,.;outl1.

:), Fnwl11re Ill girder W.14 L ~out-hPrn nd. looking llOJ't,lJ.

Fig. 4. FraetJJr!' of ginhr W.14 4, nort lwrn I'll< [, Nhowing {'0\'Pl' plah nrl.

;l, -Fract-urn of girdN \\'.14 2. southPrn ew I, lonkin~.; north

li. FPature~ of t.]l(e ~("\.Pll fmdnrf'> Ill thP fai I!'Cl \\'.14 SJI1tll.

i, Fmet-un ,,f girder \\'.14 -2, nort hrn !'JH[, lookinu,., sont.]J.

Fig. S Fraeture of girder \\'.1-1 ;), wntlwm PJHl. looking wutli.

Hrd priming paint. White-- -final alnmi11imn paint.

H. Jluctility tmn~ition Clll'\'!':< for B.~. !~tiS: 1!l+ I ;;tppj lWM[e m tlw l'nitt.!l Kingdom l !l:\ti I.

l<'ig. W. nnetilitr tran"ition ('11I'YP~ for B.N. !HiS: I !t11 stPel ~ll ppli<'<l for Kings Bridge.

Fig. 11. Diagm111 ~hOWlll!.( lWtlll J('atUJ'P;,i of t lw fai letl

12. Diagram ;;howing tlu~ lll<tlll fPa.tmps nf K Hridg;',

 +IE:AT .\F~E C TEP ZONE
I
UNIII.FFECiE.D PARENT META.L
I
I

~ 6"0
WE\..0

UNAFFEG\ED P-AR..E NT ME "TA.L

Fig. 1.
 TYPICAL WELD STRUCTURES

Automatic longitudina l we ld- cover plate to flange .

(Girder W . I4-S. 4, south en d.)
X 2

Manua l taper w eld-cover plate to flange .

Th e ga p between cover plate and fl a nge was grea t e r in t h is
sect ion th a n in any of th e others examined to date .
(G irder W . I 4- S. I, nort h en d.)
X 2

Manual transverse w e ld- cove r p late to flange .

(G irder W . I 4- S.I , north e nd .)
X 2
Fig. 1- (continued}.
 TYPICAL WELD STRUCTURES

Automatic longitudinal weld-web to flange.

(Girder W . I4- S.I, north e nd .)
X 2

Web to fl ange w e ld, repai r ed by manu al w e lding .

(Gird er W . I4-S.3 , nort h en d . )
X 2

Fig. 1 - (continued} .
 Fig. 2.
Fract ure in gird er W.l4- 2, so uth ern end, look ing south.
 Fig. 3.
Fracture in girder W . l4- l , southern end, looking north .
 Fig. 4.
Fracture of girder W.l4-4, northern end, showing cover plate end.
 Fig . 6.-" Features of t he seven fractures in the fai Ied W . /4 span "
The legend app licable thereto is : -
Black .. Toe crack.
Red .. . . Priming paint.
Brown .. Pr imary brittle fracture.
Green Extens ion of primary brittle fracture pr ior to lOth Ju ly, 1962.
Yellow .. Fatigue fracture.
Blue .. Final fracture associ ated with the collapse .

STAC 2. -
FLA.NctE COMPo51T10N AND
'/ 1Z.oD'/ VALUES NEA.~ ~EA\ N'?55 !ZoD.~.\b.~j t1EAT N9 5G !ZOO J"t '~sf HEAl' NC? S~ IZOD . /_t. l\.~ .;
10t~2oF C. o 25/., 70f:~2. f= C. 0 2Gj. 70f:'.~7'F
T+-1 E .f='RA C. TUR E s . C . o-2Sf.. - -
Mrv. I?B/. 12.- 4 Mn.-. I 731 0
D. S.L-. 3 1 13 M~. 1 74% D.S.L. 37 1...<0
+-1 E-A.'T N 9 5 G . rzoojt.l k f c .... o'24-j.. c.-..
o24-f: 0
C.R-.B - Cif', 0 2A-1o C . R.. . B . oS '2-0
C, 02Gi., 700F. 32F: N. OOII% N. oooez N. ooo9%
M""-. 170% D .S .L
Cr- . 0 25/.. C ."D.,.'B . 44 2>0
N. ooio%
W\4:'1 Ul'{e.R.oi.<:.Et-1 NORI~ -r-I"D .

~EAT W ? 55 l l=o_.ll.lbsf "EAT N 5G I \=o.ft_1bsj HEAT N<'55 1 1ZOO.,It.llo,; "EA> N'? 55 1 \ZOO.,ilo. 1\.s .j.
G 0-25~ 70F.32F C. 025% 70~32F c. 02<0% 70.F.3'2f C . 0<2'2% J0F. 32F
M~.

Cr. 0 .2S%
N 0 12_%
J. 7Gj 0
0

le""
D.SL .

1'2.. 7 .
M... I 72 ;.
Cr. o 24-J.
N. o.oo9%
I OSl.-.
eR s.
'27
44 :2..4-
14 Mw. IBO f.
c..
N.
o 2 5%
ooll%,
I DSL

CP.e . 24
- -

B
Mw.
Cw.
N
\72/
024%
oooez
0
I DSL.
CP.B. 40
~7 26
'0\

'N'\41 S. f'P..S. SVP.F,._, CE. ~\4-2: S .F P...S.'SVA.~A.CE. W\4--3. S FR--S.SVP.FACE ''-'/14 4: 5 -f'R .sSuP.F,.._C
 Fig. 5

Fig. 7

Fig. 8

Wl4-3 S.Fracture; South Surface

Red = Priming Paint. White = Final Aluminium Paint.
 A

Bo B

T-tilCKNESS
---\-
--A 41'1
o--o B 5
Y.---')(, c . 7"
.a.-- e. tz'
c---c F \4!'
0 L-----------~----------------------------
0
-10. -20"' OCENT. +20" +eo +so"'
Temperature

Fig. 9.

HEA.T N9 T+-t!CKNE.SS

- 4 ~~~--
7j,t:il>ll

-
0--0 38
5~ s;s''
80
)(---')( 'o/4.

l-Et()
u..
I
>-
a..
0:::
<(40
I
u

Fig. 10.
 fl-IO Cl
~ J::Ul)f\'1
~
~
1'1 )> )> (Jl
Cl n n :f Gi
m z
"m o z
""
-=
rr1
I
0 ~ \:l::, Cl
~"
11
F /anse P(ale 14
~~~ r- 1- -t-Sitf/eners 6'.f/@ 1-~1" c,_ .10
~h
, z 11
V Ni!6, 59 K 1/6 V

., .i! I
m ,Plate 16 K ~
I I
r
I
;s o"
A L 1----.:::f A.
12' o: } / :Y
1
10~0
11
Cover f'lal<?, Ou/s;'c/., CtiderJ W;4-1&4 ... ,.. tS! 0 V __.________. J
l- 17! 6' I 4 !J( f,~
1
J( 6.!'! 0" ,, , Ins/d.. (f J1. .:1 1- ;7.'6' ~
~I I

lOO '-0" Ctrs B,js

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CROSS SECTION AA CROSS SECTION 88 CROSS SEC'TION CC

{T~;::>k:r:,/ a ~ns- IGC-IC. 175-/.5, 17C-2C, /15 -2S c::>n/5()

GENERAl NOTES DESIGNED I I FILE NO~

M.M.B.W. PLANNING AND HIGHWAYS BRANCH SCALE: Not ld Sco/~.
E
DRAWN $.$.S, J/tJ/i!iZ JOB NO' SHEET OF
D I I KINGS BRIDGE- INVESTIGATION
c NGINEER MET~OPOI..ITAN HIGHWAY

CHECKED I I
DRAWING NO
1
B I I eoo'PL_AN~N~o'~-------1
KEY PLAN R23 00 120
A
INDIIEX DATE REVISION APPb. CHIEF PlANNER I I SUPERVISING ENGINEER
FJ!!t t...B.