Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-50553 February 19, 1991

NAZARIO VITA, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
SOLEDAD MONTANANO, ESTANISLAO JOVELLANO and ESTEBANA
JOVELLANO, defendants-appellants.
JOSE, ELENA AND ALODIA, ALL SURNAMED MONTANO, intervenors-appellants.

MEDIALDEA, J.:

In a resolution dated March 16, 1979, the Court of Appeals certified this case to Us because it
involves pure questions of law (pp. 70-80, Rollo).

The pertinent facts are as follows:

A complaint was filed before the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Laguna by
plaintiff-appellant Nazario Vita, in his capacity as judicial administrator of the estate of deceased
Edilberto Vita, seeking to recover from defendants-appellants Soledad Montanano, Estanislao
Jovellano and Estebana Jovellano the possession of three (3) parcels of land located in Barrio
Talangan, Nagcarlan, Laguna and their annual yield since January, 1962 in the amount of P1,100.00
a year. Plaintiff-appellant claims that during the lifetime of Edilberto Vita, he was the owner and
possessor of these three (3) parcels of land covered by: Tax Declaration No. 1252 (73, old) with an
area of 3,640 square meters, Tax Declaration No. 1231 (72, old) with an area of 1,000 square
meters, and Tax Declaration No. 1253 (4, old) with an area of 640 square meters; and he was
enjoying the fruits therefrom. When he died on January 23, 1962, defendants-appellants, through
stealth and strategy, took possession of the above-stated parcels of land and gathered the fruits
therefrom. Notwithstanding demands from plaintiff-appellant, defendants-appellants refused to
surrender the possession of these parcels of land. Plaintiff-appellant further claims reimbursement in
the sum of P2,000.00 as attorney's fees and P1,000.00 as actual or compensatory damages.

In their answer dated December 1, 1964, defendants-appellants deny that the three (3) parcels of
land belong to the estate of Edilberto Vita. Instead, they claim that the two parcels of land covered
by Tax Declaration No. 1252 and Tax Declaration No. 1231 belong to Soledad Montanano as these
were conveyed to her by Isidra Montanano (her aunt and wife of Edilberto Vita) and Edilberto Vita in
a document signed and executed by them on November 22, 1938 and ratified by one Mr. Matienzo,
a Notary Public from Nagcarlan, Laguna. However, all copies of said document were lost during the
last war. The parcel of land covered by Tax Declaration No. 1253 is owned in common by Soledad
Montanano, her brother Jose and sisters Elena and Alodia. It originally belonged to Francisca Asilo,
deceased sister of their grandmother, Micaela Asilo. Its ownership was transferred to them under the
arrangement sanctioned by Edilberto Vita himself wherein all the proceeds from the yearly harvests
therefrom shall be spent for the yearly masses to be held for the souls of Francisca Asilo and Isidra
Montanano. This being the case, plaintiff-appellant is now estopped from instituting this action.
Defendants-appellants claim also that Edilberto Vita could not have inherited these parcels of land
from Isidra Montanano as the latter's estate has never been the subject of a judicial or extra-judicial
proceeding. The erroneous inclusion of these parcels of land in the inventory of the estate of
Edilberto Vita in Special Proceedings No. SC-136 of the Court of First Instance of Laguna does not
make them actually a part of his estate. There is no fixed income from these parcels of land because
since 1962, plaintiff-appellant, with unknown persons, has been gathering whatever crops that may
be taken therefrom. And, by reason of the malicious filing of this complaint, they seek reimbursement
of the amount of P1,000.00 representing attorney's fees and other litigation expenses.

Replying to defendants-appellants' answer, plaintiff-appellant claims that Isidra Montanano and

Edilberto Vita never executed any document on November 22, 1938 and if they had, it was
thereafter repudiated, canceled and destroyed, for which reason, the three (3) parcels of land
remained in the possession of Isidra Montanano and Edilberto Vita; that upon the death on
September 25, 1957 of Isidra Montanano, who left neither descendants nor ascendants, her
surviving spouse Edilberto Vita succeeded her and took immediate possession of her estate; and
that from the time defendants-appellants took possession of these parcels of land, they have
continuously gathered the fruits therefrom.

In a petition dated August 20, 1966, Jose, Elena and Alodia Montanano sought leave of court to
intervene in this case. In the order of the trial court dated April 12, 1967, the amended answer dated
September 10, 1966, which intervenors-appellants filed jointly with Soledad Montanano, was
admitted as their answer-in-intervention. Incorporated therein is a counterclaim that Soledad, Jose,
Elena and Alodia Montanano are the co-owners of (pp. 43-44, Record on Appeal):

(a) A parcel of coconut land situated in Bo. Bangbang, Nagcarlan, Laguna, containing an
area of 2,450 square meters, more or less, covered by Tax Declaration No. 8953;

(b) A parcel of coconut and secano land situated in Bo. Buboy, Nagcarlan, Laguna with an
area of 15,096 square meters, more or less, and covered by Tax Declaration No. 10228;

(c) A parcel of coconut land, with its improvements, situated in Bo. Yucos, Nagcarlan,
Laguna, with an area of 2,500 square meters, more or less, and covered by Tax Declaration
No. 7999;

(d) A parcel of coconut land, with its improvements, situated in Bo. Talangan, Nagcarlan,
Laguna, with an area of 12,865 square meters, more or less, and covered by Tax Declaration
No. 1233 (sic) (third parcel of land in the complaint); and

(e) A parcel of residential land, with its improvements, situated in Gen. Luna, Nagcarlan,
Laguna, with an area of 167.50 square meters, more or less, and covered by Tax Declaration
No. 102;

that Jose Montanano is the sole owner of (p. 44, ibid):

(a) A parcel of coconut land, with improvements thereon, situated in Bo. Bangbang,
Nagcarlan, Laguna, with an area of 10,000 square meters, more or less, and covered by Tax
Declaration No. 6493; and
 (b) A parcel of coconut land, with improvements thereon, situated in Bo. Banago, Nagcarlan,
Laguna, with an area of 9,604 square meters, more or less, and covered by Tax Declaration
No. 8304;

that Soledad Montanano is the sole owner of (p. 44, ibid):

(a) A parcel of coconut land, with improvements thereon, situated in Bo. Talangan,
Nagcarlan, Laguna, with an area of 4,165 square meters more or less, and covered by Tax
Declaration No. 123 (sic) (the second parcel of land in the complaint); and

(b) A parcel of coconut land, with improvements thereon, situated in Bo. Talangan,
Nagcarlan, Laguna, containing an area of 10,434 square meters, more or less; and covered
by Tax Declaration No. 1252 (the first parcel of land in the complaint);

that Alodia Montanano is the sole owner of (p. 44, Ibid):

(a) A parcel of coconut land and irrigated riceland, with improvements thereon, situated in
Bo. Buboy, Nagcarlan, Laguna, containing an area of 24,153 square meters, more or less
and covered by Tax Declaration No. 10268; and

(b) A parcel of coconut land, with improvements thereon, situated in Bo. Buboy, Nagcarlan,
Laguna, containing an area of 1,619 square meters, more or less, and covered by Tax
Declaration No. 8510;

that Elena Montanano is the sole owner of (p. 44, Ibid):

(a) A parcel of coconut land, with improvements thereon, situated in Bo. Buboy, Nagcarlan,
Laguna, containing an area of 6,242 square meters, more or less, and covered by Tax
Declaration No. 8511; and

(b) A portion of a parcel of riceland situated at C. Lirio St., Nagcarlan, Laguna, containing an
area of 9,691 square meters, more or less and covered by Tax Declaration No. 1184.

They alleged therein that they acquired ownership of the three (3) parcels of land mentioned in the
complaint, which are in the possession of Soledad Montanano, and the other parcels of land
mentioned in their counterclaim, which are in the possession of plaintiff-appellant, by virtue of a
donation mortis causa executed by Isidra Montanano on November 22, 1938 or by a donation
executed by her on December 20, 1940 which was confirmed by Edilberto Vita. They pray that these
parcels of land be adjudicated to them in the manner set forth in their counterclaim; that plaintiff-
appellant be ordered to account for the harvests from these parcels of land from the time he took
possession; and that they be awarded damages corresponding to their litigation expenses.

In his reply dated July 4, 1967, plaintiff-appellant denied all the allegations contained in the answer-
in-intervention and reiterated that there was no such donation executed by Isidra Montanano. If such
donation were really executed, she was forced to do so at a time when she was not mentally in a
position to execute and sign freely said document.

On September 15, 1973, the trial court rendered judgment adverse to all parties, the dispositive
portion of which reads (p. 52, Record on Appeal):
 Considering that the plaintiff has not shown by preponderating evidence that the three (3)
parcels of land covered in the complaint belong to the estate of Edilberto Vita and it
appearing likewise that the defendants and intervenors have not shown that the parcels of
land covered in the counterclaim were validly donated to them and that they have legally
accepted the donation made by Isidra Montanano, the complaint filed by the plaintiff and the
counterclaim filed by the intervenors are hereby DISMISSED. This is without prejudice to the
filing of a separate proceedings (sic) in Court for the proper disposition of the estate of the
deceased Isidra Montanano, including that of her share in the fruits of the properties donated
to her during her marriage with Edilberto Vita which is considered part of their conjugal
properties. No assessment is hereby made with respect to the damages sustained by the
parties as they offset each other, if any.

Without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

All parties appealed to the Court of Appeals. The case is now before Us raising mainly the following
legal issues:

1) whether or not the three (3) parcels of land mentioned in the complaint are included in the estate
of Edilberto Vita (as regards the appeal of plaintiff-appellant); and

2) whether or not acceptance is necessary in a donation mortis causa; and whether the donation
dated December 20, 1940 is mortis causa or inter vivos (with respect to the appeal of defendants-
appellants and intervenors-appellants).

Plaintiff-appellant avers that the trial court failed to consider that Edilberto Vita's right to the conjugal
half in the first two parcels as surviving spouse had ceased to be inchoate upon the death of Isidra in
1957, and that such right had been vested upon him by operation of law. With respect to the
conjugal half pertaining to Isidra in said two parcels, and the entirety of the third parcel as her
paraphernal property, they were likewise vested upon him by operation of law, subject only to the
right of her nephew and nieces, pursuant to Articles 995 and 1001 of the New Civil Code.

In other words, plaintiff-appellant is again claiming that the parcels of land covered by Tax
Declaration No. 1252 (73, old) and Tax Declaration No. 1231 (72, old) are conjugal properties of
Isidra Montanano and Edilberto Vita whereas the parcel of land covered by Tax Declaration No. 1253
(4, old) is the paraphernal property of Isidra Montanano. We are in conformity with the finding of the
trial court that the three (3) parcels of land mentioned in the complaint were paraphernal properties
of Isidra Montanano, being supported by documentary and testimonial evidence (p. 48, Record on
Appeal):

. . . plaintiff claims that in accordance with the inventory prepared by Edilberto Vita of his
properties before his death (Exhs. "O", "O-1", "O-1-A", "O-1-B", and "O-1-C"), the parcel of
land covered by Tax Declaration No. 4 (old) was a paraphernal property of his wife Isidra
Montanano while the parcels of land covered by Tax Declaration Nos. 72 (old) and 73 were
conjugal properties of the spouses Edilberto Vita and Isidra Montanano as they were
donated to the latter by Francisca Asilo during their marriage. It is the contention of the
plaintiff that upon the death of Isidra Montanano, her husband Edilberto Vita acquired
ownership of these properties.

This contention of the plaintiff in effect corroborates the claim of the defendants and
intervenors that an the three (3) parcels of land, subject-matter of the complaint, including all
 the parcels of land being claimed by them in the intervenor's counterclaim, were all
paraphernal properties of Isidra Montanano. The two (2) parcels of land supposedly received
as donation by Isidra Montanano during her marriage with Edilberto Vita should be classified
as her paraphernal properties, it being acquired by her through lucrative title (Art. 148, Civil
Code). On the other hand, plaintiffs testimony that the third parcel of land covered in the
complaint was inherited by Edilberto Vita from Isidra Montanano is an admission that the
said property was the paraphernal property of the latter.

The defendants and intervenors claim that the above-stated three (3) parcels of land and the
properties covered in their counterclaim were donated to them by Isidra Montanano by virtue
of two (2) deeds of donation she executed on November 22, 1938 and December 20, 1940.
They presented testimonial and documentary evidence to prove that Isidra Montanano
acquired all these parcels of land, either by inheritance or donation, from her father Domingo
Montanano, her aunt Francisca Asilo and her uncle Juan Asilo. Aside from this, the tax
declarations covering the properties involved in the complaint and counterclaim are mostly in
the name of Isidra Montanano, except one each in the name of her father Domingo
Montanano, her aunt Francisca Asilo and her nephew Jose Samonte. The court is
convinced, therefore, that all the properties involved in t litigation were the paraphernal
properties of the deceased Isidra Montanano.

Whatever merit there may be in plaintiff-appellant's claim that upon the death of Isidra Montanano,
the ownership of these parcels of land (except with respect to the parcel of land covered by Tax
Declaration No. 1253 (4, old) which was validly donated to defendants-appellants and intervenors-
appellants by Isidra Montanano, as We shall discuss later) are vested upon Edilberto Vita by
operation of law, subject only to the right of her nephew and nieces, liquidation of the conjugal
partnership of Isidra Montanano and Edilberto Vita must be undertaken prior to the adjudication of
properties to the heirs (Vicente J. Francisco, The Revised Rules of Court in the Philippines, 1970
Edition, p. 619). In this connection, contrary to the trial court's ruling, it is not necessary to file a
separate proceeding in court for the proper disposition of the estate of Isidra Montanano. Under Rule
73, Section 2 of the Rules of Court, if both spouses have died, the conjugal partnership shall be
liquidated in the testate or intestate proceedings of either. In the present case, therefore, the
conjugal partnership of Isidra Montanano and Edilberto Vita should be liquidated in the testate
proceedings of the latter.

Defendants-appellants and intervenors-appellants allege the following: 1) that a donation mortis

causa (as in the case of the November 22, 1938 donation), being in the nature of a legacy, need not
be accepted; their acceptance of that donation is superfluous and 2) that the December 20, 1940
donation is a donation inter vivos because: a) there is no stipulation or provision therein that the
donation is essentially revocable; b) there was an acceptance of the donation; c) the donation was
not simply made in consideration of the death of the donor but of her affection for the donees.

It is explicit in Article 725 * of the Civil Code that acceptance is necessary in a donation. This applies
to all kinds of donation because the law does not make any distinction. The rationale behind the
requirement of acceptance is that nobody is obliged to receive a benefit against his will (Arturo M.
Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines, Volume II, 1972
Edition, p. 521). We uphold the trial court that (p. 50, Record on Appeal):

. . . notwithstanding the fact that from the secondary evidence presented, the said deed of
donation mortis causa of November 22, 1938 seems to have been legally and validly
executed, it cannot be given force and effect as the acceptance thereof by the donees is void
and illegal in as much (sic) as they were made at the time of the execution of the document,
not after the death of the donor Isidra Montanano. A donation mortis causa takes effect only
 after the death of the donor, consequently it is only after the latter's death that its acceptance
maybe made.

xxx xxx xxx

However, We adopt a view contrary to that of the trial court regarding the second allegation of
defendants-appellants and intervenors-appellants. According to the trial court (p. 50, Record on
Appeal):

The defendants and intervenors further claim that all the properties covered by that
counterclaim were donated to them by Isidra Montanano pursuant to a second deed of
donation executed by the latter on December 20, 1940 (Exh. "3"). A careful study of the said
document, however, shows that it is another deed of donation mortis causa, considering the
following provisions appearing therein with respect to its effectivity:

Na bagaman at sa kasulatang ito ay lubusan ng ibinibigay at ipinagkakaloob sa

bawat isa ng pag-aaring dito'y itinungod sa kani-kanila, matangi ang ganang
napaukol sa kay Dr. Vicente C. Chipongian at kay Maria Osuna, na iyon ay patuluyan
nang ngayo'y iginagawad sa kanila ng walang pasubali, na magagawa na nila ang
buong karapatan ngayon bilang tunay na may-ari, gayon man, ay kami pa ring mag-
asawa ang mananatili sa pag-mamayari, pakikinabang at pamomosision sa kani-
kaniyang pag-aaring ditoy ipinagkakaloob, sa buong panahon na ang bawat isa sa
amin mag-asawa'y nabubuhay, at kung kailan bawian kami ng hiram na buhay, ay
saka at saka pa lamang maaring matamo nila ang ganap na pagmamayari at
pakikinabang sa mga pag-aaring iyan na dito'y inihayag nila ang pagtangap.

From this provision of the document, it clearly appears that the donors shall continue to be
the owner and possessors of the properties involved in the donation and shall continue to
enjoy the fruits of said properties while they are still living and it is only upon their death that
ownership will transfer to the donees. It was the evident intent of the donors in this case to
give the donation after their death. In the meantime, they retain full or naked ownership and
control of the properties while they are still living and title will pass to the donees only after
their death. This is donation mortis causa (Heirs of Bonsato v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-
6600, July 30, 1954, 50 O.G. 3568; Howard v. Padilla, G.R. L-7064, 7098, April 22, 1955).

The quoted provision in the second deed of donation should be understood in its entirety. Thus,1wphi1

based on the first part of the paragraph which states " '[n]a bagaman at sa kasulatang ito ay lubusan
ng ibinibigay at ipinagkakaloobsa bawat isa . . . na iyon ay patuluyan nang ngayo'y iginagawad sa
kanila ng walang pasubali, na magagawa na nila ang buong karapatan ngayon bilang tunay na may-
ari . . . " (Emphasis supplied), supra, it was obviously the intention of Isidra Montanano to grant a
donation inter vivos to defendants-appellants and intervenors-appellants. Although the rest of the
paragraph states "'gayon man, ay kami pa ring mag-asawa ang mananatili sa pag-mamayari,
pakikinabang at pamomosision, na kani-kaniyang pag-aaring dito'y ipinagkakaloob, sa buong
panahon na ang bawat isa sa amin mag-asawa'y nabubuhay, at kung kailan bawian kami ng hiram
na buhay, ay saka at saka pa lamang maaring matamo nila ang ganap na pagmamayari at
pakikinabang sa mga pag-aaring iyan . . . supra," We have adjudged in the case of Heirs of Juan
Bonsato, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al., 95 Phil. 481, 488:

It is true that the last paragraph in each donation contains the phrase "that after the death of
the donor the aforesaid donation shall become effective." . . . However, said expression must
be construed together with the rest of the paragraph, and thus taken, its meaning clearly
appears to be that after the donor's death, the donation will take effect so as to make the
 donees the absolute owners of the donated property, free from all liens and encumbrances;
for it must be remembered that the donor reserved for himself a share of the fruits of the land
donated. Such reservation constituted a charge or encumbrance that would disappear upon
the donor's death, when full title would become vested in the donees.

It was also Our observation therein that (ibid, at p. 487):

. . . The donor only reserved for Himself, during his lifetime, the owner's share of the fruits or
produce . . . a reservation that would be unnecessary if the ownership of the donated
property remained with the donor. Most significant is the absence of stipulation that the
donor could revoke the donations . . .

Furthermore, mention must be made of the fact that the consideration of the second deed of
donation is love and services rendered by defendants-appellants and intervenors-appellants to Isidra
Montanano, as revealed by the third and fourth paragraphs therein (Exhibit "3," for the defendants):

Na sapagkat ang banal kong nais ay kung bawian man ako ng aking hiram na buhay ay
matumbasan man lamang sa pamamag-itan ng isinasagawa kong pagkakaloob sa
hinaharap na kasulatan yuong manga pagdamay, pagmamahal at paghahasikaso na
tinanggap ko at tunay na ipinakita sa akin ng mga ditoy itinangi ko,

Kaya't dahil diya'y buong puso kong ibinibigay, isinusulit at ganap na IPINAGKAKALOOB,
ang mga natitira ko pang mga pag-aari, na wala pang kinatutunguran o napagbibigyan, sa
kaparaanang dito'y itinatagubilen ko, sa manga taong gaya nitong mga sumusunod:

xxx xxx xxx

As We have ruled in Concepcion, et al. v. Concepcion, 91 Phil. 823, 830:

. . . even if he (donor) says it (the donation) is to take effect after his death, when from the
body of the instrument or donation it is to be gathered that the main consideration of the
donation is not the death of the donor but rather services rendered to him by the donee or
his affection for the latter, then the donation should be considered as inter vivos, . . . and the
condition that the donation is to take effect only after the death of the donor should be
interpreted as meaning that the possession and enjoyment of the its of the property donated
should take place only after donor's death.

Along the same line of ratiocination is Our holding in Balaqui, et al. v. Dongso, et al., 53 Phil. 673,
677:

. . . that as the donor guaranteed the right which she conferred on the donee by virtue of the
deed of gift, wherein, in recompense of the latter's good services to the former, she donates
to her the two parcels of land with their improvements, said gift is inter vivos and irrevocable,
and not mortis causa, notwithstanding the fact that the donor stated in said deed that she did
not transfer the ownership of the two parcels of land donated, save upon her death, for such
a statement can mean nothing else than that she only reserved to herself the possession
and usufruct of said property, and because the donor could not very well guarantee the
aforesaid right after her death.

ACCORDINGLY, the appeal of plaintiff-appellant is hereby DENIED whereas the appeal of

defendants-appellants is hereby PARTLY GRANTED. The decision of the Court of First Instance of
Laguna dated September 15, 1973 is MODIFIED as follows: 1) the dismissal of the complaint of
plaintiff-appellant is AFFIRMED; 2) the dismissal of the counterclaim of defendants-appellants and
intervenors-appellants is SET ASIDE; and 3) plaintiff-appellant is ordered: a) to deliver the
possession of the properties donated to defendants-appellants and intervenors-appellants by virtue
of the deed of donation dated December 20, 1940, and b) to render an accounting of the products
harvested therefrom from January 23, 1962 up to the present.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, Cruz, Gancayco and Grio-Aquino, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

* Article 725 of the Civil Code provides:

ART. 725. Donation is an act of liberality whereby a person disposes gratuitously of a

thing or right in favor of another, who accepts it.

(see also Articles 734, 745 and 746 of the same Code).