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ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE
THE MACMILLAN COMPANY
MEW YORK BOSTON CHICAGO DALLAS

ATLANTA SAD FRANCISCO

'
MACMILLAN & CO., Limited

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MELBOURNE
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TORONTO
ARGUMENTATION AND
DEBATE
BY
JAMES MILTON O'NEILL
PHOFESSOB OF RHETORIC AND ORATORY IN THE
UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN
CRAVEN LAYCOCK
DEAN OF THE FACULTY OF DARTMOUTH COLLEGE
AND
ROBERT LEIGHTON SCALES

SOMETIME INSTRUCTOR IN ENGLISH IN DARTMOUTH COLLEGE
Nsm fnrk
1917
All rights reserved

Copyright, 1917
By the MACMILLAN COMPANY
Set up and electrotyped. Published July, 1917.
TO
CHARLES FRANCIS RICHARDSON
TEACHER, COLLEAQtTE
AND
FRIEND.
{'{
Cornell University
Library
The original of tliis book is in
tlie Cornell University Library.
There are no known copyright restrictions in

the United States on the use of the text.
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WISDOM
Viscount Morley, Chancellor of Victoria University, at the recent opening
of the John Morley Chemical Laboratory given to that institution by
Mr. Carnegie, said that he sometimes thought he would Uke to set an ex-
amination on the subject, "What is an Educated Person?" For himself, he
said, he would "put at the very top the qualification that any educated
man or woman should know what is evidence, should know when a thing is
proved and when it is not proved." Moreover, added the eminent English
literary and political critic, "The educated person should know how many
interpretations the same verbal proposition would what weight
fairly bear,
was to be attached to rival authorities." This is an extremely interesting

dictum, one that will especially interest the scientist with his loyalty to the
scientific and inductive method, and the lawyer with his traditions of care-
ful weighing of evidence.
Editorial, The Boston Herald.
PREFACE
This volume is the result of a complete re-writing of
Argumentation and Debate as published by Laycock and
Scales in 1904. seemed to me that the original text
It has
contained the and most orderly explanation of the
clearest
subject ever published. It was felt, however, that this text,
in common with all other texts in argumentation, was not
sufficiently thorough for college and university classes. A
text which would go more deeply into the methods and pre-
cepts which argumentation has borrowed from logic, law,
rhetoric, and oratory, has been greatly needed for some time.
This volume ie the result of an attempt to meet that need.
How well this purpose has been accomplished you who read
and use this book must judge.
This book has been prepared in the hope that it will serve
as a text to be carefully studied, considered, and discussed
by college and university classes in academic courses in
argumentation and debate. Within this field the aim has
been the broadest possible one. The purpose of the particu-
lar classes for which it has been written should be thorough-
going intelligence in regard to argumentation and debate, not
merely platform efficiency in this field. Platform efficiency
is not to be decried, but it should come after and be based
upon thoroughgoing intelligence, and should not, in academic

class rooms, be made an independent end to the exclusion
of this broader and more fundamental educational aim.
Such being its purpose, this volume, is, of course, submitted
as equally useful in classes working either in oral or in written
argumentation or in both. The fundamental principles of
argumentation are identical in both forms. Certain special
adaptations for oral presentation are particularly considered
in Part II, Debate.
X PREFACE
In regard to the content and method of certain chapters,

a word of explanation may be due. In the first place it was
decided that considerable material showing the relation of
argumentation to other fields, particularly to those of law
and logic, should be included in this volume. I have long
desired that my classes should have more complete and more
authoritative explanations of our relations with these fields
than I have been able to find in previous text-books on argu-
mentation, and I know that I am not alone in this. Most
teachers of argumentation and debate probably desire that
their students shall have backgrounds and foundations in
the subjects comparable to those furnished students in other
departments of the curriculum. Such backgrounds and
foundations will make it possible for the student of argu-
mentation to relate this work intelligently to his work in
logic, law, English composition, etc. And particularly they
will enable him to take the results of this work with him to
his work in all other coursesand into his thinking and acting
in everyday life. Having decided to include material of this
sort (such as is particularly found in the chapters dealing
with Evidence, Kinds of Arguments, and Fallacies), the
question arose as to the manner in which such material should
be introduced. It was decided that the use of many direct
quotations from recognized authorities in these several fields
would be the most frank, most accurate, most authoritative,
and on the whole most satisfactory method. It is for this
reason that the readers will find an unusual, though under
the circumstances I trust not an undue, amount of direct
quotation from other writers, in this text.
Throughout the text an effort has been made to systematize
and organize the material to be presented in such a manner
that from the table of contents to the individual paragraphs
of each and every chapter, the relation of one part to every
other part would be made clear. It is recognized that the
difference in conditions under which instruction in argumen-
tation is given in different institutions, will probably make
PREFACE xi
it necessary for some teachers to omit some portions of this

text. If particular classes wish to skip certain sections (such
as a part or the whole of the chapters on the Kinds of Argu-
ments, or Fallacies) this may very easily be done. A brief
summary of the section omitted, and a statement of its rela-
tion to the other parts of the book may very easily be made
by the teacher. It has been felt desirable that as far as the
limits of a single volume permitted, a complete statement of
the doctrines and principles that may be included within
the field of argumentation should be given, but given in such
a manner that individual teachers may make such adapta-
tions as the time allowed or the previous preparation of the
students may seem to make advisable.
A glance at the pages of this book will make it evident
that I am indebted to a great many writers in the various
fields with which argumentation is concerned. I have tried
to give accurate credit and documentation in every instance
in which I have consciously drawn from the work of those
who have gone before me. A complete bibliography of the
publications to which reference is made in this text is pub-
lished in the appendix, and here I wish to express my thanks
and obligations to all the writers whose works are listed in
that place.
In addition I wish to express my appreciation of the help-
ful suggestions and criticism which I have received while
preparing this manuscript from Professors J. A. Winans of
Cornell University, J. S. Gaylord of Winona Normal School,
W. C. Shaw of Dartmouth College, C. H. Woolbert, formerly
of the University of Illinois, Dean H. W. Ballantine of the
University of Illinois Law School, and Dr. H. M. Kallen of
the Department of Philosophy of the University of Wis-
consin.
J. M. O'N.
The University of Wisconsin,
May, 1917.
PREFACE
{To the original hook by Laycock and Scales)
The growing recognition of the importance of Argumenta-

tion as a separate subject of study in American colleges, and
the increasing emphasis which isput upon the necessity for
a proper method of presenting it, are probably due to the
appreciation of two facts.' In the first place, it is coming
to be acknowledged that Argumentation is a peculiar art,
distinct from all others. Many of its principles are derived
from the fundamental elements of other arts and sciences.
Formal logic, rhetoric, oratory, and the rules of court pro-
cedure all contribute to it of their precepts; but though it is
thus composite in nature, it is essentially a unified art, de-
manding investigation for its own sake. Furthermore, it is
realized that argumentative skill does not belong exclusively
to any one profession or class of men. To know how to argue
is necessary not alone for the lawyer or the publicist, but
equally for the preacher, the scientist, the business man, or,
indeed, for any one who may wish to influence the opinions
or actions of his fellows; it is a power which every educated
man should have an opportunity to acquire. With these
requisites in mind, the authors have made it their purpose,
taking these component elements from their various sources,
to develop from them a body of principles, by the study and
practice of which the student may gain, so far as possible, the
ability to create or control the beliefs of others.
Any one seeking by argumentation to influence the
thoughts or acts of another must employ either the written
symbol or the spoken word. In this day of the newspaper,
the magazine, and the essay much of the most potent argu-
mentation comes from the pen or the public press, so that
:
xiv PREFACE
the needs of the hour call for training in the written form.
On the other hand, there is a large class of students, who are
in search of training for the court room, the deliberative
assembly, or the platform. Consequently, the requisites of
both these kinds of presentation must be recognized in any
treatment of the art as a whole. Accordingly, with a view
to these requirements, the following plan has been adopted
in presenting the subject. The work is divided into two parts
the first contains a discussion of the general principles of
argumentation, applicable alike to written and to spoken
discourse; the second part is devoted to the setting forth
of certain additional precepts peculiar to oral debate. Finally,
realizing that a thorough mastery of the subject can come
only from continued practice, the authors have given, in the
Appendix, a brief outline of the methods of instruction which
they have found to be most serviceable, and have ventured a
few suggestions which may prove helpful in supplementing
the study of the text.
C. L.
R. L. S.
Hanover, N. H.,
May 30, 1904.
'
CONTENTS
PART I. INTRODUCTORY
PAGE
^ 1. Definitions and Relation8 1
PART II. ARGUMENTATION

A. INVENTION
^ 2. The Proposition IS
i/^S. The Burden of Proof 33
(y" 4. The Issues 42
B. SELECTION
"^ 5. Gathering Material 68
t^6. Evidence 80
i/7. Kinds of Arguments 114
/8. Fallacies 170
C. ARRANGEMENT
9. General Principles of Arrangement 197
j/ 10. Brief Drawing and Outlining 208
D, PRESENTATION
11. Persuasion 249
12. The Introduction 298
13. The Discussion 322
14. The Conclusion 334
15. Reputation 344
PART III. DEBATE

16. The Nature op Debate 367
17. The Main Speeches 392
18. Rebuttal Speeches 420
19. Delivery 430
XV
xvi CONTENTS
APPENDIX
A. Bibliography 445
B. Pleading 449
C. Judges' Ballot with Instkuctions 452
D. Rules for Legal Brief Drawing 454
E. 1. Material for a Short Brief 457
2. Material for a Long Brief 459
PART I. INTRODUCTORY
CHAPTER 1
DEFINITIONS AND RELATIONS
OUTLINE
A. Argumentation defined.
B. Fundamental importance.
C. Universal and indispensable.
D. Twofold nature.
E. Conviction alone.
F. Persuasion alone.
G. Four processes:
1. Invention.
2. Selection.
3. Arrangement.
4. Presentation.
H. No distinct dividing line.
I. Debate defined.
J. Argumentation and logic.
K. Argumentation and the forms of composition.
L. Sources of argumentation:
1. Law.
2. Logic.
3. Rhetoric.
4. Oratory.
A. Argumentation defined. Argumentation is the art of

influencing others, through the medium of reasoned dis-
course, to believe or act as we wish them to believe or act.
B. Fundamental importance. Belief is an element which
is most truly fundamental in the ability of man to grow
1
2 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE
and in his power to create. It is the beliefs of the individual
about religion, about politics, and about society, which de-
termine his attitude toward men and events, and which
govern his Actions in the affairs of life. Moreover, a man's
behef is rarely, if ever, entirely original. His creed is wrought
out of the ideas of priests and prophets; his political prin-
ciples aremade up of materials taken from economists and
statesmen; his social tendencies are influenced by the theories
of philosophers and reformers; and in all his conceptions,
far more than he can realize, he is influenced by the opinions
of his daily companions. So that the revelation of truth
and the establishment of justice in human affairs, must de-
pend largely upon the power of those who stand at any time
for what is true and just, to control the convictions of their
fellows and so to make them see the best and seek after it.
What, then, of the art whose work it is to influence others to
believe or to act? Must it not be respected and cultivated
as the embodiment of much that is worthiest in human
thought and action?
C. Universal and indispensable. But argumentation is
worthy of respect and study, not simply because of its funda-
mental importance, but also because it is so nearly universal
and indispensable. We find ij,s uses made manifest in almost
every branch of affairs. In the legislative assembly the strug-
and policies of government are
gles of parties are settled
worked out by argument; inUie courtroom it is argument
which advances the conflicting claims of individuals, pro-
tects their rights and privileges, and guides the regulation
of the duties of the citizen to the State; in facility meetings,
fraternity meetings, mass meetings, men must argue in order
to weigh one course of action against another; in the meeting
room of the directors of a corporation, it is by argument that
its members come to decisions as to what is honorable and
what is expedient; and, wherever in the home or on the

street men differ about their private concerns, they argue
to adjust their differences and to find the truth. Indeed,

DEFINITIONS AND RELATIONS 3
wherever active-minded men with opinions meet, there is

sure to be argumentation.
D. Twofold nature. It has long been the custom of
writers on argumentation to speak of its twofold nature
its relation to reason on the one hand and to emotion on the
other. The subject has been divided into considerations of

principles that have to do with reason principles of convic-
tion, and those that have to do with emotion
principles of
persuasion. Conviction has been defined as an appeal to
the intellect and persuasion as an appeal to the will.
Now modern psychologists are telling us that this old divi-

sion is not an essential or fundamental one, that in ultimate
psychological analysis conviction and persuasion are the
same, that these terms represent properly only a difference
of emphasis inmethods of approach to the whole personality,
that the real appeal to the person as a whole, and that
is
psychologically there no difference between winning assent

is
to a thesis dealing with an unemotional matter of fact, and

winning assent to a proposition dealing with contentious
policies and deep prejudices.
These developments of modern psychology give rise to the
question, "Shall students of argumentation now drop this old
division and pay no further attention to long recognized
principles of conviction and persuasion?" The answer is,
"No"; and in this answer the psychologists concur.
For practical purposes it is well to use this old distinction
to differentiate the types of cases or types of approach in cases
which have to do, first, mainly with gaining the assent of the
whole personality to such a proposition as, "A straight line is
the shortest distance between two points," and, second,
mainly with such propositions as, "Resolved: that National
Prohibition by Federal Amendment is desirable." We have
to deal in argumentation with all sorts of propositions rang-
ing from those to be carried, if at all, by clear and sound

reason based on facts mere questions of fact in which human
likes and dislikes are not enlisted, to propositions of policy
:

which touch the prejudices and passions ^'e^y deeply. Be-
tween these two extremes we find all grades of mixture.
It is thought worth while for practical purposes to continue
to call work on the former a work of conviction, and work on
the latter a work of persuasion, to label an appeal to the
"whole personality" which calls principally for a considera-
tion of the weight of evidence and the strength of inference as
an appeal to the intellect or "conviction," and to label an ap-
peal to the "whole personality" which calls for a considera-
tion of personal likes and dislikes, desires and prejudices of
the duties, virtues, or happiness of oneself or others to label
this sort of approach an appeal to emotions or "persua-
sion." And when we speak of argumentation which is aimed

at belief we mean mere acceptance intellectual agreement.
When we speak of argumentation which aims at action we
mean gross action, behavior, conduct not simply mental
action which is, of course, present in the acceptance of behef
or intellectual assent.
Successful argumentation practically always deals with
both aspects. Almost
important propositions on which
all
men diflfer and emotional con-

are such that both intellectual
siderations have to be met. Beliefs are used as a basis for
action.
Winans' discusses the distinction between conviction and
persuasion in the following excellent paragraphs
"It is convenient to use the word 'persuasion when we come
to treat of influencing conduct. The word
not without
is
diflSculties, since usage varies; yet there seems to be no good

substitute. A review of the authorities justifies us in accept-
ing tentatively Whateley's ^ definition of the word: 'Persua-
sion, properly so called, i. e., the art of influencing the will.'
Ttp influence the will is identical with influencing the conduct,
and includes inducing or checking single acts or affecting a
prolonged course of conduct; but, as we shall use the term
persuasion, it is not limited to inducing physical acts, but
' Winans, pp. 249-250. 2 Page 128.
"
includes changing the mental attitude by removing preju-

dice, bringing about a fair-minded attitude toward a person,
a willingness to consider a proposition, or a desire to accept
it. The term is broad enough to include conviction, but we
shall for convenience use the latter term to designate the
process of 'Bringing any one to recognize the truth of what
^
he has not before accepted. . .
.
'
"Those to whom the term persuasion means inducing to

believe usually distinguish it from conviction by saying that
to persuade is to secure belief by rather emotional methods,
while to convince is to use logic and reasoning. So The Stand-
ard Dictionary says persuade means 'to induce to believe
willingly.' Here we have, probably, a hint of why the words
convince and persuade have been confused. To induce a man
to believe it is often necessary to make him willing to consider
the proposition at all, to remove prejudice and induce a will-
ingness to believe. Now this is a matter of emotional atti-
tude, and changing emotional attitude is included in the

proper work of persuasion. In this position I have the sup-
port of Baker's Principles of Argumentation, in which it is
said (p. 7) Conviction aims only to produce agreement be-
:
'
tween writer and reader; persuasion aims to prepare the way

for the process of conviction and to produce action as the
result of conviction.'
E. Conviction alone. By the force of reasoning, by the
use of simple fact and logic, a man may make others see that
this or that statement is justified, that this or that argument
is even that the whole idea he is contending for is
logical, or
true; but it does not follow that he has made them accept as
guides of conduct the propositions he advances. In order
to make them fully accept his views of the matter or agree
to act as he wishes, the arguer must also make them desire
to carry out his thesis by affecting their emotions.
"Nothing would seem to be a plainer lesson of experience
than that we mortals often leave undone those things we
New English Dictionary.
'
know we ought to do, and do those things we know we ought
not to do; yet this truth is by speakers,
constantly ignored
and with bad results. This truth is proverbial: 'The spirit is
willing, but the flesh is weak; Video meliora proboque; deter-
'
iora sequor. Certain knowledge that lack of exercise is ruining

one's health does not necessarily drive one out of doors; yet
one does not for a moment believe that one's work or pleasure
is worth the cost. There must be, then, more than intel-
lectual acceptance of truth to secure action.
"It may seem absurd to insist upon such a truism as that
men do not always act in accordance with judgment; but I
write out of memory of class-room struggles. When regard-
ing a cold, barren, tactless speech I have asked, 'What ele-
ments of persuasion does this contain?' I have received the
answer, 'Does it not prove my claim? What more is
needed?' Apparently I have appeared a shocking cynic
when I have suggested that men are not always governed
by pure reason."^
The weakness of any argumentative effort which consists
only of conviction, i. e., an appeal to the reason, is this: that,
though the person addressed may understand, he may not
really be in any way affected because the impulses which give
force to his inmost convictions, and which stimulate him to
action, may not have been reached. Of course, in those cases
in which there is no persuasion, which are in nature cases for
pure conviction, as demonstrations in geometry, we must
not look for anything else. What has been said refers to
the weakness of relying on pure conviction in cases that have
persuasive possibilities that seek to affect human conduct.
F. Persuasion alone. The results of an almost wholly
emotional appeal are usually no more satisfactory than those
of a simple intellectual demonstration. It is seldom an ad-
vantage for a speaker to stimulate the moving impulses of his
audience unless he can hold them in control; for he may find
he has set free a force that is as likely to act?to his detriment
' Winans, p. 251.
as to his benefit. Then, too, he will probably find .that the

effect of his appeal is but fleeting and unreliable; he will find
his hearers are stirred only to shallow and passing excitement,
and that calm deliberation will reveal the unsubstantial
nature of the argument and so leave their permanent behefs
unaffected. The proportion of emphasis on conviction and
persuasion as these terms are here used, will, in any par-
ticular case, depend, of course, upon the circumstances;
in a college debate very often little persuasion is sufficient;
the campaign orator uses a great deal. Both, however, are
necessary in all effective argumentation which aims at in-
fluencing human behavior.
G. Four processes.Whatever the relative importance
of conviction and persuasion, there are, in every piece of
argumentative work four indispensable processes: (1) to
find out just what you want to establish; (2) to gather
the materials needed for the proofs; (3) to arrange these
materials; (4) to present them in good rhetorical or oratori-
cal form. For convenience we may name these four proc-
esses (covered in Part II of this book) respectively (1) In-
vention, (2) Selection, (3) Arrangement, and (4) Presentation.
1. Invention consists in determining upon those ideas
in the truth of which the speaker or writer wishes to make
his hearers or readers believe. No man can hope to infiuence
the beliefs of others, unless he first Has in his own mind (a)
an exact idea of the beliefs he wishes to inculcate, (b) a clear
conception of the points of fact he must establish to convince
his readers or hearers. Under this head we study proposi-^
tions, burden of proof, and issues.
2. Selection consists in choosing from all the sources of
human knowledge those facts and inferences that will serve
to establish the ideas determined upon. Of all the evidence
and arguments that may be found on any question, the ar-
guer can use and wishes to use a comparatively small amount.
He must sort Wiis small amount out of the mass of available
material with the utmost care. His success must depend in
great degree upon his tact and good judgment in choosing
those materials that will appeal strongly to the minds and
hearts of those he seeks to influence. Here we take up
gathering material, evidence, kinds of arguments, and fallacies.
3. Arrangement consists in organizing these selected
materials in such a way as to secure the maximum effect upon
the beliefs or actions of the persons addressed. However
valuable the facts or appeals chosen for use may be, their
efficiency will depend largely upon the plan in accordance
with which they are utilized. They cannot be presented
clearly or forcibly unless they are brought into proper rela-
tions with each other and with the whole proof. Under ar-
rangement we consider general principles of arrangement and
briefing and outlining.
4. Presentation consists in putting the materials into
good rhetorical or oratorical form, in effectively communi-
cating their force to others by means of a good use of thought
and language. To convey to another the ideas invented,
selected, and arranged,xdemands a many-sided skill. In
written argument it calls for the application of the principles
of rhetoric; in spoken argument it calls for speaking ability
and skill in persuasion; in debate it calls for the peculiar pow-
ers of resource and adaptability which the circumstances of
this form of controversy demand. Here we study persuasion,
the introduction, the discussion, the conclusion, and refuta-
tion.
H. No Of course there are no dis-

distinct dividing line.
tinct lines of demarcation between these various processes:
in any piece of argumentation the progress is continuous,
from the first conception of the ideas to be considered to the
final presentation. Any separation of it into parts must be
more or less arbitrary. It is attempted in this book only
because it may help in presenting some of the fundamental
principles with greater clearness.
I. Debate defined. Debate is a direct oral argumenta-
tive contest between two opposing sides, on a definite ques-
tion, at is a specialized form of argumen-

a definite time. It
tation and requires knowledge and skill not required
special
in other forms of argument. A good argumentative essayist
is not necessarily a good debater. A man who can write and
memorize and deliver a good argumentative address is not
necessarily a good debater. The latter must have all the skill
of the former, and in addition he must know how to conduct
his case on the platform. He must know the rules of the
game, and must be able to meet the many situations in offense
and defense as they arise in the contest. In Part III of this
volume, which is devoted to debate, we consider the nature
of debate, the main speeches, the rebuttal speeches, and delivery.
Before undertaking a detailed study of Argumentation it
will be well to have clearly in mind the relation of argumenta-

tion, not only to debate, but also to other subjects, especially
logic, and the forms of composition.
J. Argumentation and logic. Argumentation has been

defined as the art of influencing others, through the medium
of reasoned discourse, to believe or to act as we wish them to
believe or act. "Logic may be defined as the science of
thought, or as the science which investigates the process of
thinking." ^ "Logic is sufficiently defined for our purposes
if we say that it is the science of proof or evidence." ^ "Logic
may be most briefly defined as the Science of Reasoning. It
is more commonly defined, however, as the Science of the
Laws of Thought, and some logicians think it is the Science
'
of the Formal, or of the Necessary Laws of Thought."
"Much discussion of a somewhat trifling character has arisen
upon the question whether Logic should be considered a
science only, an art only, or both at the same time but . . .
it seems substantially correct and sufficiient to say, that logic
is a science in so far as it merely investigates the necessary
principles and forms of thought, and thus teaches us to un-

derstand in what correct thinking consists; but that it be-
comes an art when it is occupied in framing rules to assist
' Creighton, p. 1. ^ Bode, p. 4. ' Jevons, p. 1.
persons in detecting false reasoning. A science teaches us
to know and an art to do, and all the more perfect sciences
lead to the creation of corresponding useful arts." ^ There
is then a distinct difference between argumentation and logic
as the latter is It is near the truth to say
usually defined.
that logic which argumentation is the corre-
is the science of
sponding art. Logic teaches us to know, argumentation to do.

Logic helps us to understand the laws of thought, argumenta-
tion helps us to make other people agree with what we think.
K. Argumentation and the forms of composition. Argu-
mentation is usually classified as one of the four forms of

composition narration, description, exposition, argumen-
tation. It is probably useful from the standpoint of the
teaching of English composition to have this label for a
composition that seeks to prove a definite proposition, but
it is not accurate to conceive of argumentation as simply one
of the four forms of composition. The art of argumentation,

of influencing the beliefs and actions of others by reasoned
discourse, rests upon much beside the principles of composi-
tion. Of the four processes treated in this book two only are
concerned with these principles, and these two are con-
cerned with much else. The man who would do satisfactory
work in argumentation must be skilled in description, narra-
tion, and exposition; and he must have in addition a knowl-
edge of logic, skill in gathering and testing evidence, arid in
brief drawing, a knowledge of various methods of procedure
(for the most part borrowed from the law), along with skill
in using them, and, in most cases, ability in public speaking.
It is probably true, moreover, that most descriptive, narra-
tive,and expository writing is designed for the eye and is to
be read, and not heard by the ear. The opposite is true in
regard to argumentation. Practically all great arguments
are speeches, and even when argumentation is designed for
print rather than oral delivery, as in controversial articles,
editorials, etc., the best effect is gained by writing as if for
1 Jevons, p. 5.

an audience with the hearer and the opponent always in mind.

What might be called a "speech style" or "oral style" is al-
ways preferable in argumentation and is practically always
used in good argumentation. So the worker in argumenta-
tion, whether oral or written, should be well versed in all that
goes to make effective speaking. In the words of Professor
Alden, "Xbesgi^thenâre the problems we hayejto consider:
the use of the universal laws of reasoning, the development of
the habit of analysis and of unprejudiced methods of investi-
gation, the secret of clear and rapid expression of intellectual
processes, and the art of adapting one's material to his hearers
so as to win their favor and affect their conduct. Clearly
the art that involves all this is of no mean order." ^ Clearly,
also, an art that involves all this is more than a subdivision
of the art of composition.
L. Sources of argumentation. The following table
shows approximately the sources of the rules, principles,
doctrines, methods, devices, etc., which taken together make
up the subject-matter of a thorough course in argumenta-
tion. Notice that some of the topics may be traced back to
more than one of the four great ancestors of argumentation:
Law, Logic, Rhetoric or English Composition, and Oratory
or Public Speaking.
1. Law
'
PART II. ARGUMENTATION
SECTION A. INVENTION
CHAPTER 2
THE PROPOSITION
OUTLINE
I. The Theory of Propositions
A. Subjects must be propositions.

B. Definition.
C. Necessity of having a proposition in all sorts of situations.
1. Club.
2. Court of law.
3. Assembly.
4. Public discussions.
D. Advantage to hearer and speaker.
E. Not always expressed.
F. Classification.
1. Fact.
2. Policy.
II. Formulating the Proposition
A. The problem of formulating the proposition.

B. The process of formulating the proposition.
1. Finding the real question.
a. Study origin.
b. Analyze ideas.
2. Formulating the tentative proposition.
3. Testing this proposition.
a-. Definitions.
b. Summary of definition.
4.Comparing and adjusting.
C. These steps not to be taken mechanically.
13
III. Characteristics of Good Propositions for Debate
A. A list of desirable characteristics:

1. Assertion.
2. Single.
3. Unambiguous.
4. Unprejudiced.
5. As concrete and specific as possible.
6. Burden of proof on affirmative.
7. As brief and simple as possible.
8. Debatable.
9. Interesting.
I. The Theory of Propositions

A. Subjects for argumentation must be propositions.
In this important particular, argumentation differs, in addi-
tion to the things mentioned in the last chapter, from any of
the other kinds of rhetorical composition. In any of the three
other forms, we may have for our subject a simple word or
phrase, denoting merely some general concept existing in
the mind, which we wish to portray for our reader. If we
wish to write a narrative, we may choose some such subject
as "The Battle of Manila," or "An Ascent of the Jungfrau."
For an exposition we might well select such a topic as "The
New York Clearing House," or "Forest Fires; Their Cause
and Their Prevention," these phrases would make excellent
titles for compositions of this nature; but in argumentation
such terms would be wholly valueless.
To take an example : suppose a student desiring to write
an expository discourse should determine on the title, "The
Tariff Bill of 1913." This would be a worthy subject; he
could in his composition, treat briefly of the history of tariff
legislation, explain the economic principles involved, give
the particulars in which this bill differs from earlier bills,
immediate predecessor, tell what its advocates

especially its
and opponents claimed as to its probable effect, and perhaps
discuss the method of its administration, thus making of
THE PROPOSITION 15
the whole an exposition of the nature and workings of this

bill. But as the subject of an argumentative eSort this term
would be useless, for it does not suggest anything definite to
be proved or disproved; it does not state any belief which the
writer wishes his reader to accept. In an argument on this
subject the author might discuss any one of a dozen ideas or
beliefs; he might argue for or against this particular bill;
that a high protective tariff would be a .benefit to the people
of the United States; that tariff for revenue only is unwise.
If his argument is to be effective, he must determine in ad-
vance what idea or belief he is to uphold or attack.'' The sub-
ject of his argument will be a statement of the particular
idea or belief with which he is concerned. But a belief or an
opinion cannot be accurately expressed in a word or a phrase.
It demands a complete statement, a full sentence. To use
more technical language, we cannot argue a term; we must
have a proposition.
B. Definitions. "A term is so called because it forms
one end (Latin terminus) of a proposition, and strictly speak-
ing it is a term only so long as it stands in the proposition.
But we commonly speak of a term or a name meaning any
noun, substantive or adjective, or any combination of words
denoting an object of thought, whether that be .... an in-
dividual thing, a group of things, a quality of things, or a
group of qualities." ^ "Any word or group of words which
serves to point out any imaginable subject of discourse is
looked upon as a name or term." ^ "A complete assertion or
statement consists of two terms and a copula, and when then
expressed it forms a proposition." ^ "A proposition is the
expression in words of an act of judgment." * "A judgment
isa mental assertion of some thing as true or untrue, while
a proposition is the expression of a judgment in words. A
proposition therefore is a sentence." ^
' Jevons, p. 17. ' Jevons, p. 16.

2 Bode, p. 7. * Creighton, p. 78.
6 Bode, p. 52.
To "The Single Tax," "Co-education," "Mt.
illustrate:
Washington," "The Relation of Church and State," are all
terms. These expressions might well serve as the subjects of
No one of them could
narrations, descriptions, or expositions.
serve as the basis of an argument.' Before we can argue we
must have a judgment, an opinon, a belief, expressed in words
that is a proposition. "Co-education should be abolished at
X (or adopted at Y)," "The Single Tax is preferable to the

general property tax," are propositions.
C. The necessity of having a proposition in all sorts of
situations in which people argue should be kept carefully
in mind.
In a club there was once assigned as the. topic of an
1.
evening's debate, "William Pitt's Place in English History."

A few of the disputants spoke of his parliamentaxj^ abilities,
of his power as an orator and gave
political leader; others
their attention to a consideration of his s'tatesmanship,com-
mending his foreign policy or criticising his selfishness and
unscrupulousness; others commented on his personality and
his private life; and so, each speaker looked at the subject
from his own point of view, and no one endeavored to prove
or disprove any particular proposition. The discussion was
in many ways interesting, but as a debate the evening's work
was a failure; no one had been induced to accept any definite
belief about the subject, and no conclusion had been estab-
lished.In order to turn the discussion into a debate, the sub-
ject shouldhave taken some such form as: Resolved, that
William Pitt was the greatest parliamentary leader of the
eighteenth century; or, William -Pitt's conduct of Irish
affairs was detrimental to the interests of the Irish people.
The disputants made the mistake of trying to argue a
term.
2. In a court of law we find a system in sharp contrast to
' Of course we can argue ahont the meaning of a term. We can express our
belief as to what the term "The Single Tax" means, and argue that prop-
osition.
TEE PROPOSITION 17
the method of this historical club. Here it is necessary that

the deliberations accomplish definite results. There must
be no waste of time or energy, and the end of it all must be
a settlement of the question presented for consideration.
With these purposes in mind, the court of law demands that
whenever a question is brought before it, "pleadings" be
made and that these pleadings "shall set forth with certainty
and with truth the matters of fact or of law, the truth or
falsity of which must be decided to decide the case." In
other words, the court demands that any man who would
argue before it must, before he begins his demonstration,
make a clear and unmistakable proposition, stating the things
that he intends to prove true or false.
3. In a deliberative assembly, such as the house of repre-
sentatives, the proposition would be found expressed in the
form of some bill or resolution. In board meetings, faculty
meetings, society meetings, mass meetings, etc., the proposi-
tion usually exists in the form a motion from the floor.
of
The presiding ofiicer should see to it that a complete motion
covering the question in hand be phrased and presented to
the assembly, and that all discussion be confined to the
particular proposition before the house.
4. In general public discussions a speaker should always
have a definite proposition for each and every speech that he
makes. This is well brought out by Professor Foster in the
following paragraph:
"Every political campaign shows the need of definite
propositions for debate. In Maine, in the fall of 1906, some
of the speakers had no definite proposition, but launched
with vehemence upon the topic of the Prohibitory Law.
Stripped of all the confusing verbiage, invective, and humor,
some of the speeches of the Democrats could be reduced to
the contention, 'Prohibition does not prohibit'; and some of
the speeches of the Republicans could be reduced to the
contention, 'Temperance is a great virtue.' As these
speeches were not concerned with debatable issues, there
was no debate. Argumentation demands a complete prop-
osition." \
D. Advantage to hearer and speaker. The making of a

proposition is of great advantage to the reader or hearer in
enabling him to understand the discussion and get some real

fruit from it. But it is no less an advantage to the writer or
speaker. In the first place, if he does not know the exact

proposition at issue, he is almost sure to waste time and effort,
and to confuse his audience, in arguing about matters that

are wholly outside the real question, and in proving things
that are "beside the point." Then again, he must know the
propositiqp in order to understand the position taken by his
opponent, and so be able to refuse him. The proposition is
simply a statement of the position which the writer or
speaker must establish or overthrow, and he cannot expect
to be successful, either in positive proof or in refutation,
unless he understands just what is the work necessary for
him to do.
E. Propositions are not always expressed. While the
proposition should always he phrased by the writer or speaker
before he prepares his argument, it may be expressed or not
as the circumstances seem to require. Sometimes it may be
advisable not to state the proposition at the outset. This is
often true when one
preparing to address a "hostile" au-
is
dience or to write for a circle of readers whose present preju-

dices and beliefs are known to be opposed to the writer's po-
sition. In such a case well to use as a
title a term (State
it is
wide prohibition) or the question form (" Is state wide prohi-

bition advisable?") and disclose your position only after you
have carefully prepared the way. For an oral debate the
proposition should always be expressed, and in the form of a
resolution: "Resolved: that state wide prohibition should be
adopted in Wisconsin."
F. Classifications of propositions may be drawn up in
many ways. Hyslop ^ gives six main divisions and nineteen
' Foster, p. 3. 2 Page 121.
THE PROPOSITION 19
subdivisions. But a consideration of the classifications made

in the science of logic would not have great practical value to
a student of the art of argumentationi Some writers ^ in the
latter field have, however, classified propositions as (1) prop-
ositions of fact and (2) propositions of policy. A proposi-
tion of poUcy deals with the question, "Ought this to be
done?" A proposition of fact deals with the question,
"Is this true? " A proposition of fact aims at belief, a propo-
sition of policy aims at action. Therefore unmixed ques-
tions of fact, as propositions in geometry, are settled largely
by impersonal convictions; questions of policy tend more and
more to be matters for persuasion mainly as we get further
from fact towards matter of mere personal likes and dislikes. ,
In argumentation we may try to influence others to belief

ox act. Usually we try to do both. Most actions are based
on beliefs and most beliefs influence actions. By establishing
a certain fact or certain facts to the satisfaction of a given
audience (that is by both convincing and persuading) we
influence them to act as we desire. But since most argu-
ments of policy rest upon questions of fact, since many ques-
tions can be so phrased as to fit either type without altering
materially the nature of the case, and since the work to be
done in finding, phrasing, supporting, or attacking, is prac-
tically the same for both kinds of propositions, it is hardly
worth while to try to make much of this classification. It is
wise, however, to decide, among other things, whether we
are arguing facts (as such) or policies, before planning our
argument. A student should, moreover, consider this in
connection with choosing propositions for contest debating;^
and in the affairs of real life we should avoid trying to settle
by discussion questions of fact that should be investigated
rather than argued.
1 See Pattee, pp. 20-22, and Gardiner, pp. 12-26.

^ See post, characteristics of good propositions (debatable), p. 30.
II. Formulating the Proposition

So far we have been considering the nature of propositions
in general and the necessity of having a proposition in order
to have an argument. We now turn to the practical consider-
ation of how to formulate the particular proposition we need
from the mass of ideas to be found in any general field.
A. The problem of formulating the proposition when one
is not definitely formulated for us, is an exceedingly important
and often very difficult task. Stephen on Pleading ^ opens

with this significant sentence: "In the course of administer-
ing justice between litigating parties, there are two succes-
sive objects,
to ascertain the subject for decision, and to
decide." In practicing general argumentation under any and
all circumstances we should keep in mind these "two succes-
sive objects." We should agree on what is to be decided

before we proceed to decide it. We should follow the instruc-
tive example of the courts in fixing on the proposition to be
decided, before we get confused by, and confuse, the evidence
and argument available in the general field of the discussion.
This is as true in arguments on politics, literature, and re-
ligion around the fire or at the dinner table, as of other dis-
cussions in legislature or courtroom. Let us .first analyze
our differences as a distinct step, before advancing to attack
or defend. If this is done much argument will be saved.
Agreements will come with understanding. It is not always
easy to determine just what is the question really in issue,
but it is easier before the argument starts than after. It
may be obscured by the words of the discussion; it may be-
come confused with other kindred but different questions it ;
may be separated with difficulty from tjhe general problem

that embraces it. Then again it is often difficult to put the
question into words after it is found. Looseness in expres-
sion, ambiguity, the failure to know
the true acceptations of
the words in the proposition, are mistakes fruitful in possibil-
' Williston's edition, p. 1.
'
THE PROPOSITION 21
ities The writer must know how to find out

of serious error.
what he wants to prove and how to express himself in
it is
such a way that there can be no question as to his exact'

meaning.
B. The process of formulating the proposition naturally
divides itself into four steps: (1) Finding out what is the
reed question, i. e., the facts and ideas, the truth or falsity of
which must be decided to decide the question. (2) Formulat-
ing the question in words. After the facts in issue have been
determined, they must be tentatively expressed in the form
of a complete statement. (3) Testing this statement by a
terms to find out just what it means as it
definition of its
stands. (4) Comparing the meaning of the statement so
expressed with the meaning of the real question. If the state-
ment thus formulated does not express jut what is intended,
it must be modified until it does. Whatever the circum-
stances, these four steps, though they are usually so inter-
mingled as not to seem always be
like separate operations, will
helpful in finding or testing the true proposition.
1. Finding the real question. The student starting out
in his search after the proposition will usually find that it
exists originally in his mind in the shape of some problem
of a general nature. This problem, probably, is of too vague
and a character to be a fit topic for an argumenta-
indefinite
tive effort.In order to develop from it a suitable proposition,
it must be narrowed down and restricted within the bounds
of some concrete and particular proposition. The work,

then, of determining on the exact question to be discussed is
largely the work a broad and general field

of selecting out of
some single, concrete, and limited phase of the whole prob-
lem. In performing the work of this first step there is no
exact rule or method for all cases. Sometimes it may be neces-
sary for the disputant-to-be to examine the contents of his
own mind. More often it becomes desirable to do a consider-
able amount of preliminary reading and investigation in
connection with the search. But, whatever the circum-
stances, the "narrowing down" process is essentially the
same, and there are certain steps that are always serviceable.
In the first place, it is generally helpful (a) to consider the
conditions under which the question arose. If the writer will
understand just how he came to be interested in the problem
he has in his mind, he wUl be able to see more clearly just
what is the phase of it with which he is most concerned and
which he desires to discuss; or, if he is investigating the prob-
lem by the reading of books or current magazines, the mat-
ters really in issue will take more definite form in proportion
as he understands the circumstances that generated them and
brought them into discussion. In the second place, after gain-
ing a comprehension of the origin of the question, it remains
for him (b) to analyze the ideas embraced within the general
problem as it exists in his own mind or in the minds of others.
Then he is ready to select the parts he wishes to consider and
classify them in such a manner that the result shall be a
single, distinct, and definite proposition.
To take an example: Let us suppose that a student in
want of a debatable proposition finds himself interested in
"The labor problem." He cannot argue "the labor prob-
lem"; it is merely a term, and is too vague and indefinite an
idea. He must "narrow it down." To do this, he first con-
siders the origin of the,question (or the origin of his interest
in the question). He finds perhaps, that his interest has
been aroused by some magazine article discussing compulsory
arbitration as a cure for strikes, or by some comment among
his friends on the incorporation of labor unions. Having
gone thus far, it remains for him to analyze his ideas and so
reduce the question still farther. Is it in the United States
that he thinks labor unions should be incorporated? Further,
does he believe they ought to be incorporated under State
laws or under Federal laws? Does he want to consider only
the incorporation of the unions, or does he wish to discuss
the kindred question of the desirability of a compulsory arbi-
tration law? And so he goes on, interrogating his own mind,
THE PROPOSITION 23
untilhe hits upon the exact phase of the labor problem that
he wishes to discuss. He has discovered the "real question."
2. Formulating the tentative proposition. Having found
the real question he formulates a proposition, perhaps as
follows, " Resolved: that in the United States labor unions
should be compelled to incorporate under Federal laws." But
this is only a part of the task; the question still remains:
Is this the proposition? Does it contain the ideas the student
has in mind? The statement thus made must be tested to see
if it expresses just what the writer intends.
3. Testing this proposition as first formulated is very
important. A carelessly constructed sentence may result
in the making of a proposition which is very far from the
embodiment of the writer's ideas. And this carelessness
may have very serious results. A false grammatical con-
struction or the choice of a wrong word may mean the differ-
ence between victory and defeat, between having one's
ideas accepted and having them rejected. To avoid these
dangers, care must be taken that each word of the statement,
and the statement as a whole, shall represent one's ideas as
accurately as possible. Failure to understand the exact
meaning of a given proposition is often shown in the class
room.
For examplie, take a discussion of the question: "Re-
solved that labor unions in the United States are detrimental
:
to the industrial interests of the country." In a debate on

this proposition, the afiirmativeadmitted that the principle of
the organization of labor was right, and that labor unions
ought to exist in some form; "but," they said, "labor unions
to-day are detrimental because they inflict certain injuries
on the consumer and the employer, by such means as strikes,
the limitation of output, the uniform wage scale," etc. The
negative said, in substance, "We admit that labor unions
declare strikes, and that strikes are bad; we admit that the
unions sometimes limit output; but we contend that on the
whole the unions are not detrimental, because the industrial
conditions would become worse if they did not exist at all."
Clearly the two sides did not meet at all in the discussion.
They were arguing two different questions. The aflSrmative

was arguing whether or not the policies and principles of the
unions at that time were such as to do greater injury than
good to industry; the negative was arguing the question
whether or not labor ought to be organized at all. The confu-
sion arose from a failure to find out what the proposition really
meant. It meant either the one thing or the other, but, in the
same debate, it should not mean both. The discussion could
not bring about any result till it had been settled what was
the true interpretation of the question. The disputants had
found a proposition, but not the proposition. Each word that
may be at all ambiguous must be examined and its true
meaning discovered. The grammatical structure of the sen-
tence and the relation of the words to each other must be
investigated, in order to be sure of the rightful interpretation
to be put upon the statement as a whole.
a. Definition. This work of testing the meaning of the
proposition may be called definition. The word "definition"
suggests a simple and easy task. "Look in Webster or the
Standard Dictionary, and work is done." But this is a mis-
take. Sometimes the statement is so simple that very little
effort is necessary to be sure of its meaning. But often the
'
proper testing of a proposition is a long and complicated

process. To take an example: Suppose a student is trying
to prepare for an intercollegiate debate a question having
to do with the preservation of the "independence" of some
nation. He word "independence."
starts out to define the
He first consults Webster's Dictionary, and he finds there
this definition: "Exemption from reliance on others or con-
trol by them." This definition seems to fit his idea; but if
he is wise he will not accept it. The definition is valueless.
The dictionary merely gives the acceptation of the word in
its general usage. This question of the independence of a
nation is a question of international relations, and the term
THE PROPOSITION 25
" independence" is a technical term in tte code of the law of
nations. "Independence," then, must have the special mean-

ing given it in international law.
The student must seek this special meaning. He may
look in some larger dictionary, which will explain the term
in its technical, interpretation. Probably he will directly
consult the international law authorities themselves. In
Lawrence's Principles of International Law, p. Ill, he
would find the following: "Independence may be defined as
the right of a state to manage all its affairs, whether external
or internal, without interference from other states, as long
as it respects the corresponding right possessed by each fully
sovereign member of the family of nations."
This would surely seem to be a final definition. But if the
student should go into a debate with that as his understand-
ing of the word, he would probably meet with an unpleasant
surprise. If he should carry his investigation further, he
would find that there are exceptions to the rule laid down in
the definition, exceptions that are really a part of the rule of
law. He will find that one nation or a group of nations may
directly interfere in the external or internal affairs of another
nation without violating that nation's rights of independence,
provided the intervening nations are interfering in order to
protect their own rights of sovereignty. He would find fur-
ther that the theory of independence permits a nation, even
when its own sovereign rights are not endangered, to interfere
in the affairs of another nation and restrict the exercise of
some of its natural rights of sovereignty, provided the re-
imposed are of a certain limited nature as to their
strictions
extent and duration. These exceptions are as important
as the so-called "definition" itself. In fact, the debate, if
well argued, would probably turn on the truth of these ex-

ceptions and their application to the question.
An understanding of the true meaning of this word "in-
dependence" could only be found by this painstaking in-
vestigation. No less careful or less thorough definition could
,

have disclosed the import of the word; and this accurate
knowledge was indispensable in order to make the proposi-
tion of any real value.
b. Summary of steps in definition. In the case of nearly
every such definition, the same method has to be pursued.
First, find its ordinary acceptation. Second, determine
whether it may have any meaning that is technical or in any
way peculiar. If it does have such a peculiar meaning, the
definition must be sought in the exposition of some writer
who will explain this special interpretation. term
If it is a
in science, go to the specialist in that science; if a political
phrase, go to the statesman or historian; a legal term, go to if
the jurist. Third, even after the definition is obtained from a

good authority, consider the questions Are the terms of this :
definition that I have found exact Are there any exceptions

.>*
to the general statement? The exceptions sometimes de-

stroy the rule.
4. Comparing and adjusting results of other steps. For
the fourth and last step remains simply to compare and
it
adjust the results of the first three steps. If the work of

definition shows the statement as originally formulated to be
inaccurate or ambiguous, if it is found that the tentative prop-
osition does not express the ideas that the author intended
it to express, then the statement must be changed till it finally
does put the real question into words, clearly and accurately.
C. These steps are not to be taken mechanically. It
must not be supposed that they are mutually exclusive, set
oflE by hard and fast lines, and always to be followed rigidly
one after the other in the order given. They represent rather
an analysis of the process one should follow in framing a
proposition under the most difficult circumstances. They
show the maximum of work to be done. In ordinary practice
they run together, and we phrase propositions usually per-
haps without taking all of theae steps. This process is of-
fered here as a guide for the most difficult cases, and as a
testing and checking device in all cases. As much of this
THE PROPOSITION 27
process should be followed in each instance as is needed to

insure the correct statement of the proposition.
III. Characteristics of Good Propositions for Debate
A. A list of desirable characteristics ^ or qualities of good

propositions for debate will help us to test ready made
resolutions for debate. We
do not formulate from a general
field all of the propositions on which we have to work either
in courses in argumentation or in our business and political
activities. Many of them are given to us by others. More-
over, many of the subjects on which we do formulate proposi-
tions are of such a nature that the processes we have been
discussing do not have to be worked out in detail. It is
therefore worth while to have such a list in order that we may
have a simple series of tests by which to judge all proposi-
tions, our own and those of other people. Such tests are
particularly needed for propositions for formal debate.
1. Assertion. A proposition for debate should be phrased
in the form of an assertion, not a question. This is necessary

in order to get a clean-cut statement of the position of the
aflirmative. It prevents ambiguity and makes possible an
accurate placing of the burden of proof. "Resolved: that
the city of X
should install a water system using the water
of Lake A." Not, "Should the city of use the water of X
Lake A?"
2. Single. A proposition should be single, not double.
The must be avoided of combining two separate ideas in
error
one proposition; two questions, closely akin to one another
but really distinct from each other, may easily become con-
fused and be carelessly joined together in a single statement.
For example, students sometimes devise such propositions
as, "Resolved: that a high protective tariff is hostile to the
economic interests of the United States, and reciprocal trade
relations should be established with the Dominion of Can-
' For similar lists see Foster, p. 12, Ketcham, pp. 13 and 20.
ada;" or, "Resolved: that labor unions are detrimental to
industry, and they should be compelled to incorporate."
Now in each of these propositions there are two problems
presented; these problems are similar in the nature of the
ideas contained in them, but the issues to be determined are
very different. The proofs necessary to establish the fact
that labor unions are detrimental to industry are not at all
the same proofs required to show that they should be com-
pelled to incorporate; so that the attempt to combine in one
demonstration what are really two distinct proofs must
result in confusion. We may handle each of these qiiestions
separately, but we cannot hope to treat both successfully
in one debate. Consequently, in formulating our statements
for debate, we must be sure not only to have a proposition,
but to have a single proposition.
3. UnambiguoVis. A proposition should be unambiguous.
Avoid ambiguous, general terms capable of a number of
different meanings
Civilization, church, progress, conser-
vatism. specific, most definite, most limited
Use the most
term possible in each case. For example, in the proposition:
"Resolved: that the judiciary should be (or should not be)
independent of the will of the people," what is meant by
"judiciary," "independent," "the will of the people"?
Until definite meanings have been agreed upon for all of
these terms (and preferably substituted for the original am-
biguous terms in the proposition) there can be no discussion
worth while.
4. Unprejudiced. A proposition should be unprejudiced.
The question must not be begged by a phraseology that as-
sumes the point to be proved. "Resolved: that the undesir-
able .Japanese should be excluded." "Resolved: that the in-
efficient lecture system should be abolished." "Resolved:
that the barbarous conduct of the Bulgarian troops should be
condemned." The italicised words are all question begging
epithets which practically cover the point at issue. Avoid all
descriptive expressions of praise or blame.
j
Colorless ex-
THE PROPOSITION 29
pressions which serve simply to identify or define should be

used exclusively in phrasing propositions.
5. Concrete and specific. The proposition for debate
should be as concrete and specific as possible. This rule is
qualified somewhat because one cannot accurately say that
all propositions for debate should be concrete and specific.
If the case presents for discussion an abstract or general

is no reason why such discussion should
proposition, there
not be had, but every proposition for debate should be as
concrete and specific as the circumstances of the discussion
permit.
6. Burden of proof on affirmative. The burden of proof
should be on the affirmative. This general principle which is
universally true, should replace the rules of thumb contain-
ing half truths in regard to the negative statements and the
word "not." It makes no difference whether the proposition
is worded negatively or contains the forbidden word "not,"
so long as the affirmative of the proposition as worded has

the burden of proof. ^ The burden of proof actually rests
upon the a change, or opposing the existing
side advocating
order. The presumption is with "things as they are" where-
ever there is well-ordered discussion. Wherever there is
debating which pays proper attention to logical sequence and
economy of time and attention, the attack of the one op-
posing the present and advocating the new, is always ad-
vanced before the defense of th#established order (or a
counter proposition or remedy) is brought forward. So that
in phrasing a proposition for debate, in order not to go astray
on. this point, the only thing that is necessary is to inquire
which side is advocating the new, and opposing the existing
situation; then so word our proposition that that side will
have the affirmative. Often changing situations require dif-
ferent wordings of propositions due to the fact that the ac-
tual presumption may change from side to side with changing
conditions. For instance, a few years ago the proposition
' See ch. 3 on "Burden of Proof."
"Resolved: that United States Senators should be elected by
popular vote," was well worded. Now this proposition is
badly worded because the burden of proof actually lies upon
the negative, and the presumption is with the affirmative.
Therefore, to-day the proposition should read, "Resolved:
that United States Senators should be elected by the Legis-
latures of the several states," or some other wording which
places the burden of proof upon the affirmative, and requires
the affirmative to advocate a change from the existing order.
7. Brief and simple. A proposition for debate should be
as brief and simple as possible. This rule is also qualified be-
cause brevity and simplicity should always be sacrificed to
accuracy. It sometimes happens that we are debating a
proposition which deals with a situation so complex that a
long and complex proposition is needed to set forth with
accuracy our opinion in regard to this situation. All we can
do is to strike out every superfluous word, and to have as
brief and simple a statement as will allow us to say accurately
what we wish to say.
8. Debatable. A proposition for debate should be de-
batable. By that we mean that
it should be two-sided.
To speak more accurately, a proposition is debatable when

it is such that it permits an intelligent difference of opinion,
after the important facts which underlie it have been set

forth. We must avoid propositions which should be settled
by definite tests, or me#surements, or investigation, rather
than by discussion. For instance, do not debate the ques-
tion of a horse's weight; weigh the horse. Do not debate
whether or not the price of a certain commodity has risen
25% in the last decade; refer to trustworthy reports and find
out whether or not this is true. This^ means practically, Do
not debate pure questions of fact when it is possible by investi-
gation to determine the truth so accurately that intelligent men
cannot differ after the results of the investigation become knoum.
Important questions of policy are practically always good
questions for debate. Certain questions which are questions
THE PROPOSITION 31
of fact, but which cannot be settled accurately by simple

investigation, such as questions concerning the origin of the
earth, the origin of life, the descent of man, etc., may also
be excellent questions for debate. Useless, of course, for

the purpose of debate are all propositions stating mere per-
sonal taste or opinion which is based upon elements that are
hard to weigh and measure, or which involve comparisons
that must rest either upon such elements or upon simple
definition. For instance " Resolved that Lake Y is the most
: :
beautiful lake in America." " Resolved: that law is a nobler

profession than medicine." "Resolved: that James Whit-
comb Riley was a great poet."
9. Interesting. Propositions for debate should be inter-
esting. This applies of course more particularly to public
contest debates. The affairs of actual life require us often to
debate whatever propositions come up for discussion regard-
less of whether or not we are interested in them; and we do
not propose to say that committees, courts, and legislatures
should refrain from taking up any but interesting questions.
But for contest debating and practice debating, particularly if
the debaters want the advantage of a live audience, we should
give some attention to choosing propositions that will be
generally interesting to the debaters and to the audience
that we wish to attract.
EXERCISE. CHAPTER 2
THE PROPOSITION
Properly phrase six propositions of fact and six proposi-

tions of policy.
Phrase good propositions on some phase of each of the
following subjects (these terms need not necessarily be
used in the proposition): Woodrow Wilson; Theodore
Roosevelt; Co-education; College Entrance Require-
ments; Minimum Wage; Mexico; Foreign Trade; Liquor
Regulation; English Composition; Inter-collegiate Ath-
letics.
3. Bring to class three argumentative newspaper editorials,

clipped from the recent press, preferably from the col-
lege paper, with a properly phrased proposition of your
own for each, which embodies as accurately as possible
the thesis of each editorial.
4. Hand in a list of ten poorly worded propositions for debate,
taken from lists of propositions in text-books, pamphlets,
bibliographies, etc., indicating the defects in each, and
giving the proper re-wording.
5. Hand in a well- worded proposition on some important
subject of interest to you, on which you will work during
the whole semester, and which will be referred to here-
after as the subject for your "original iorensic."
Note: Lists of propositions ready worded for debate are omitted from this
book because it is felt that each class can better work out its own proposi-
tions according to the suggestions of this chapter. Subjects for propositions
can easily be obtained by reading the editorials of the daily press, or looking
through recent or current numbers of such periodicals as: Current Opinion,
The Review of Reviews, North American Review, The Forum, The IMerary
Digest, The New Republic, Colliers, The Nation, etc.
CHAPTER 3
THE BURDEN OF PROOF
OUTLINE
A. The problem of the burden of proof.
B. In legal procedure.
C. The shifting of the burden of proof.
D. Counter propositions.
E. Two propositions at once.
F. The burden of rebuttal.
G. Summary.
1. Burden of proof always on the actual affirmative, never
shifts.
2. Actual affirmative is the one who wants a change.

3. Actual affirmative and nominal affirmative must coincide.
4. Affirmative prima facie case creates for negative a burden
of rebuttal.
5. Burden of rebuttal may shift from side to side during the
debate.
H. Presumptions.
1. Of law.
a. Conclusive.
b. Disputable.
2. Of fact.
A. The problem of the btirden of proof,' in common with

many other specific problems of general argumentation, can
best be studied by investigating
its treatment in legal proce-
dure; for law that practical reasoning has received

it is in the
most attention and reached its highest development. It
' For an exhaustive and authoritative discussion of this whole subject,
see Thayer's Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at the Common Law, Chap-
ter IX. Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1898.
33
seems to us wise to give a separate chapter to this problem,
and to try to present a clear and complete statement of the
. burden of proof in law and in -general argumentation. If
close attention were paid in argumentation outside the court-
room as well as in legal trials to such matters as burden of
proof, burden of rebuttal, prima fade case, types of negative
cases, etc., much confusion^ disorganized bickering, and fu-
tile These doctrines are sim-
disputing would be avoided.
ple to understand, easy to apply, and should be adhered
to in all argumentation which has any serious purpose
whatever.
B. In legal procedure. The expression "burden of
proof" in law is used in two different and distinct meanings,
and is also used by some people in a confused way to repre-
sent both meanings without discrimination. First. It is
used to represent the "risk of the proposition," the burden
upon that party to the controversy who will lose if nothing is
done. It is the burden of making good his claim which rests
upon the one who starts an action, who demands a change
from the existing situation. This is the true meaning of
"burden of proof," and is the only proper meaning of that
term outside of law courts. Second. In law, however, a
different meaning is also recognized. The term "burden of
proof" is sometimes used to mean the duty of " going forward
with evidence or argument" at any given time. Thus, if the
plaintiff who has the burden of proof in the first instance,
makes out a prima facie case, the defendant must bestir
himself in opposition to the affirmative, or accept defeat.
In these circumstances, he is said to have a duty to go for-
ward with either evidence or argument. If he accomplishes
this successfully,then the duty of going forward is once again
upon the affirjpative or plaintiff.This duty or burden is
clearly quite diînct from the original risk of the proposition,
of making good his claim, which is upon every man who goes
into a court ^yith a claim of any kind. Third. There is, as
we have saidj, a confused and undiscriminating use of the
"
THE BURDEN OF PROOF 35
expression "burden of proof" to cover either or both of these

concepts.
C. The shifting of the burden of proof has long been a
vexed question in argumentation. It is clear from what we
have said above that the burden of proof in its first and most
legitimate meaning, that of the "risk of the proposition"
which is carried by the party to the controversy who demands
a change, can never shift. Since this is the only meaning that
the expression "burden of proof" should have in general
argumentation, proper to say that the burden of proof
it is
never shifts. The duty

of going forward with evidence or
argument at any given time, of course, may shift from time
to time in the course of the trial or discussion. But the
proper term to apply to this shifting burden is neither "bur-
den of proof" nor "duty of going forward," but "burden of
rebuttal." This " burden of rebuttal " may shift. For example,
the burden of proof rests with the plaintiff or the affirmative
who comes into court (or into a legislature, before a mass
meeting, a board of directors, or other assembly, or con-
ference) demanding or recommending a change in the exist-
ing situation. He necessarily takes the responsibility of
showing that such a change ought to be made. Before any-
one can be required to show why such a change should not
be made, the plaintiff or the affirmative must make out a
prima fade case. A prima facie case is one of sufficient
strength to win if it is not refuted. Suppose the affirmative
makes out such a case. Then the negative has a "burden
of rebuttal." He has not a burden of proof. His essential
responsibility is only to counteract the influence of the
prima facie case of the affirmative.If he does this the burden
of rebuttal may be said to shift to the affirmative, and if the
affirmative successfully answers the negative, the burden of
rebuttal is once again upon the negative and the prima facie
case stands still unanswered. If we will keep in mind these
two expressions, " burden of proof " and " burden of rebuttal
and use them always as here defined, there will be no more
confusion in regard to burden of proof. These terms will
be used in this way throughout this book.
D. Counter propositions. Whenever the answer of the
negative takes the form of a counter proposition^ (in law an
"affirmative defense") the negative, of course, becomes es-
sentially an affirmative, and has the burden of proof on the
new proposition. For example, if in a first degree murder
case the answer of the defense is not that the accused did not
kill the deceased, but that the accused was insane at the time,
this constitutes a counter proposition. For the time being the
question at issue is not, "Resolved: that A is guilty of mur-
der in the first degree," but, "Resolved: that A is (or was at

the time in question) insane." On this proposition the origi-
nal defense becomes the affirmative. The accused is pre-
sumed to be sane until the contrary is established. The
original prosecution becomes the negative, and seeks to
prevent the establishment of the fact of insanity. Here,
clearly, there is no shifting of the burden of proof. There is
a new proposition with a burden of proof of its own, and this
burden is on the new affirmative, and never shifts.
E. Two propositions at once. There is one type of dis-
cussion in which there are really two affirmatives, two nega-
tives, and two burdens of proof; really two propositions to be
decided in the same case. Such is the situation when we have
a case of direct comparison between two claims neither of
which has any presumption in its favor. This is the case when
it has been decided that a certain thing shall be done but the
choice between two plans lias not yet been made. Suppose
it is decided that a canal shall be built between A and B. The
only question is whether the canal will be built on the X
route or the Y route. A commission is appointed to decide,
and the advocates of thetwo routes appear before the com-
mission to debate. Here there is really no affirmative, no
negative, no burden of proof as regards the big igsue. It is
a question, and cannot be stated as a resolution placing a bur-
' See Types of Negative Cases, ch. 16.
den on one unless we frame a counter proposition placing the

burden on the other. But if the X route ha,s been adopted,
then the presumption is in its favor and the advocates of the
Y route have the burden of proof to show that the Y route
is better than the X route.
F. The burden of rebuttal. This term was invented by

Dean H. W. Ballantine. It is to be hoped that its use will
become universal. Its general acceptance will lend accuracy
and clearness to what has heretofore been a confused and
troublesome situation both in law and general argumenta-
tion and debate. Says Dean Ballantine,
"Professor James Bradley Thayer was the first to demon-
strate clearly the inaccuracy of the common expression that
the burden of proof 'shifts,' and to elaborate the distinction
between the burden of proof in the sense of 'duty to estab-
lish,' which never shifts, and what is awkwardly termed
'the duty of going forward with the evidence,' which does

have the characteristic referred to as 'shifting.' It is sug-
gested that what is referred to as the burden of proof in this
second sense, or the so-called 'duty of going forward with
the evidence,' which is in fact not a duty at all, ought to be
christened by the new but exact name of burden of rebuttal.'
'
When the plaintiff makes out a complete prima facie case,

whether with the aid of a presumption or by reasonable and
credible evidence, the burden of proof is said to shift to the
defendant. This use of the phrase is very inaccurate and
confusing. What is meant is that the plaintiff, having es-
tablished a preponderance in favor of his contentions, has
created a burden 0/ rebuttal, or the necessity for this opponent
to meet and repel his prima fade case by evidence of equal
weight. This may be accomplished either by counter proof
and refutation of one or more of the essential propositions of
the plaintiff's case, or by the defendant assuming the laboring
oar and making affirmative proof of new propositions of his
own in confession and avoidance.^ The burden of proof is
'
See Pleading, Appendix B.


thus sometimes assumed by the defendant, but the need for
this arises only after the plaintiff has made out by evidence,
presumptions, or admissions, his case in chief. The defendant
may have the choice either to hear the burden of rebuttal which
has been created by the -plaintiff, or to assume the burden of
proof of an affirmative defense, &s where the defendant, in-
stead of denying the due execution, shows a material altera-
tion in the note sued on, and then the plaintiff in turn has
either to deny or rebut such showing, or confess and avoid
it by proof of circumstances rendering the alteration lawful
or excusable. The plaintiff must always at his peril maintain
the proof of his own contentions at the required height and
keep them good. As to these the burden never shifts from
him although he may satisfy it from time to time. But the
burden of rebuttal may be created for the plaintiff to reply to the
affirmative propositions of the defendant, in addition to the
necessity of restoring his own contentions. Thus the center
of gravity, or the preponderance of the evidence, may shift
from the plaintiff to the defendant or back again, but the
burden of establishing the proposition of claim or defense is
always with the same party. The negative is safe with an
even balance or equilibrium and he need merely rebut or
neutralize his adversary's proof; he need not establish a
^
rebuttal by a preponderance of evidence."
G. Summary: 1. The burden of proof, then, always
rests upon the actual affirmative. 2. The affirmative is the
party who will lose if no evidence or argument is offered
if nothing is done. The affirmative is the dissatisfied party,
the one who wants a change, the attacking party. 3. Care
must be taken that propositions be so phrased that the actual
affirmative and nominal affirmative coincide, that the af-
firmative of the proposition is actually taken by the one up-
holding the burden of the controversy. "The obligation of
proving any fact lies upon the party who substantially as-
1 H. W. Ballantine, The Apportionment of Proof and the Burden of Rebuttal.
Law Notes, Dec, 1912, p. 168
serts the affirmative of the issue." ^ For example in the

question: "Resolved: that in the United States private own-
ership of railroads is preferable to national ownership," the
negative advocates a radical change. The negative "sub-
stantially asserts the affirmative of the issue."So the neg-
ative has the burden of proof, and
under obligation to is
present evidence or argument before the affirmative can

properly be called on. If nothing is done the affirmative
wins. This of course is all wrong. The error is in the word-
ing of the proposition. It must be changed so that the real
burden of proof will rest on the affirmative side. This can
be done by transposing the words "private" and "national."
Then the affirmative is the attacking party, the dissatisfied
party, the one who loses if nothing is done. 4. When the af-
firmative has carried its burden of proof sufficiently to establish
a prima facie case, it has created for the negative a burden of
rebuttal. 5. The burden of rebuttal (a more accurate term
than 'the duty of gping forward with argument or evidence')

may shift from side to side during the conduct of the debate.
H. Presumptions of one kind or another are so often
mentioned in connection with the burden of proof that it is
well to state briefly the common usage of this term in law;
in order that we may know accurately what we are doing
when, in general argumentation, we attempt to use this term
in a way analogous to its legal usage. In order to set forth
with accuracy and authority the statement of the theory
of presumptions in English law, we quote the following
from an article in the English Law Magazine, volume 6, p. 348,
October, 1831. This article Professor Thayer quotes ^ and
characterizes ^ as "The best consideration of the subject of
presumption known to me."
"Presumptions are commonly divided by writers on Eng-
hsh law, into two classes, namely, presumptions of law, and
presumptions of fact.
' Greenleaf, p. 93. ' Prel. Treatise, pp. 539ff. Appendix.

^ Thayer, pp. 313, footnote.
"1. Presumptions of law are of two kinds, a. First,
concMsive or imperative presumptions, that is, legal rules not

to be overcome by any evidence that the fact is otherwise.
Thus by the statute of limitations, a simple contract debt,
not kept up in certain specified manners, is extinguished after
a lapse of six years, nor can it be recovered by proving that
the sum due has never been paid Again, a sane man
ispresumed to contemplate the probable consequences of his
own acts; and this presumption is conclusive, nor may he
rebut it by showing that in fact he did not foresee them. . . .
b. Second, 'disputable or rebuttable presumptions are def-

initions of the quantity of evidence, or the state of facts,
sufficient to make out a prima facie case; in other words, of
the circumstances under which the burden of proof [burden of
rebuttal] lies on the opposite party. Of this very extensive
class of presumptions a few examples will suffice. Thus, a
man is presumed innocent until he is proved guilty; that is, if
a man is charged with a crime, he is not bound to prove that
he did not, but his accuser is bound to prove that he did com-
mit it. (In cases of homicide, however, if it merely appears
that one man has killed another, he is presumed to be guilty
of murder, unless such evidence is produced as will either re-
duce the offense to manslaughter, or entirely remove its crim-
inality, by justifying or excusing it.)
'
"2. Presumption of fact has a totally different meaning

from presumption of law; and refers not to propositions, but

to arguments not to assuming, but inferring. When evi-
dence is offered which can only be brought to bear on the
matter at issue by a process of reasoning, the inference is
termed a presumption of fact. The statement on which this
inference is founded is termed presumptive evidence.^ . . .
If the witness or documents attest, not the fact to be proved,

but something from which that fact may be inferred, the evi-
dence is said to be presumptive or indirect. [The distinction
' Footnote by Thayer, p. 541.
^ See Circumstantial Eiridence, ch. 6.
between positive and presumptive evidence is most correctly

stated by Mr. Bentham. 'Evidence (says he) is direct,
positive, immediate, when it is of such a nature, that (ad-
mitting its accuracy) it brings with
it a belief of the thing to
be proved. Evidence is indirect, or circumstantial, when it

is of such a nature that (admitting, its accuracy) it leads
to a belief of the thing to be proved only by way of induc-

tion (i. e., deduction), reasoning, inference.'
Treatise on
Evidence by Dumont, 186n.] ' A presumption, therefore,
in this sense, or a presumption of fact, can only mean an
argument or inference; and presumptive evidence is not
evidence taken by itself, but only because, joined to some
other general proposition, it tends to prove a certain con-
clusion. Thus, when it is said that, where a person was found
standing over a wounded man with a bloody sword in his
hand, there is a presumption (or it may be probably inferred)
that the one stabbed the other; the fact that the man was
found with a bloody sword has, in itself, apart from its
consequence, no weight; but it tends to determine the ques-
tion at issue, who stabbed the wounded man. So, if the date
of a man's birth be at issue, and it is proved that he died
in a certain year at a certain age, his age and the time of his
death are in themselves indifferent; but they are data to
determine the year of his birth. . . .
"Natural presumptions, or presumptions of fact, are not

properly opposed to legal or artificial presumptions; but are
arguments founded on presumptive or circumstantial evi-
dence, which is opposed to direct or positive evidence. Pre-
sumptive evidence being that which tends to prove the fact
at issue, or from which the fact at issue may be inferred;
while direct evidence establishes the fact at issue itself
without any process of reasoning."

' Footnote by Thayer, p. 547.
CHAPTER 4
THE ISSUES
OUTLINE
I. Theory of Issues
A. Issues defined.
B. Examples.
1. In law.
2. In general discussion.
C. Terminology.
1. In law.
2. In general argumentation.
a. Potential.
b. Admitted.
D. Necessity of knowing.
E. Issues and proposition.
F. Issues and burden of proof.
1. Affirmative and negative.
2. Counter proposition.
3. Winning or losing.
G. Issues and conviction and persuasion.
H. Number and form of issues.
I. Issues and partition.
J. "Stock issues."
II. Finding the Issue
A. Think.
B. Study.
1. History.
a. Origin.
b. Present status.
2. All phases.
3. Both sides.
42
THE ISSUES 43
C. Exclude.
1. Mutually admitted matter.
2. Irrelevant matter.
3. Unimportant matter.
4. Indirect matter.
D. Select.
1. Points which meet tests of C.
2. Vital points.
I. The Theory of the Issues ^

A. Issues defined. The issues are the inherently vital
by the affirma-
points, elements, or sub-propositions, affirmed
tiveand denied by the negative, upon the establishment of
which depends the establishment of the main proposition.
They are the ultimate, irreducible, essential matters of fact
or of principle (law) upon which the conclusion of the ques-
tion hinges. They are not simply "important main points"
or "points on which there is They are
a clash of opinion."
the smallest possible divisions of crucial points, each one of
which the affirmative must establish in order to establish the
proposition.
B. Examples. Before explaining further let us illustrate
this by concrete examples from law and general argument.
1. In law. First let us say for example that A is accused
of the crime of burglary at common law. Now this crime
has five essential elements, (1) breaking, and (2) entering
(3) a dwelling (4)at night, (5) with felonious intent. There
are in the first place five issues here. The State (affirmative)
must prove all five. They are all vital. If the defense
(negative) prevents the affirmative from establishing any-
single point beyond any reasonable doubt, the case of the
affirmative fails.Then the defendant is not guilty of bur-
glary. He may be guilty of a number of other things, but
that is another story. The defendant may admit that he
broke and entered a dwelling at night, but deny that it was

done with felonious intent say he did it to put out a fire.
The affirmative has estabhshed (or gained an admission of)
four of the five necessary points, but the whole case falls.
No affirmative case can stand after the loss of a single issue.

Any point which the affirmative can fail on, and still estab-
lish the case cannot he an issue, though it may
be very impor-
tant. Importance is not enough an issue is vital in the
strictest sense of that word.
2. In general discussion. Let us take an example in a
general field of discussion in which the issues are not deter-
mined for us by Suppose a propo-
technical legal definition.
sition advocating the adoption of a "single tax" system in
some city, state, or nation. The issues are the specific prop-
ositions that the affirmative would have to prove to the
satisfaction of a competent board of judges in order to show
that the particular single tax system they advocate ought
to be adopted. Suppose there are three such sub-questions
that the affirmative must answer satisfactorily, in order to
establish the proposition, for instance, (1) Is the present
system unsatisfactory .'*
(2) Will the new system raise suffi-
cient revenue.'' (3) Will it ,do this with substantial justice
(i. e., without evils those complained of, or others as bad).''
If careful investigation should show that these are the issues
of the particular proposition under discussion, the affirmative
must prove all of them in order to establish its case. If the
negative shows that the claims of the affirmative on any one
of the three points are unfounded, the case fails, the negative
wins. If the present system is satisfactory no abuses no

shortcomings ^no evils is it possible to win a case for a
new system? If a tax system (old or new) will not raise suffi-
cient revenue, it is no good. What will be sufficient will, of
course, vary in different circumstances but this question,
of the results to be obtained is always vital in such a question,

always an issue if the negative fights on it. And if the new

system will not remove present evils or will introduce others
just as bad or worse
then it is no good. So if the negative
blocks the affirmative on a single issue the affirmative loses.
THE ISSUES 45 '
C. Terminology. Since there is considerable confusion

ia tegard to issues in argumentation, and since various kinds
of issues are sometimes mentioned in either law or general
argument, it may be well to consider the uses of the word
with its appropriate modifiers in each field.
1. In law. Our theory of issues in general discussion is
borrowed from legal procedure.* We shall, therefore, start

with a lawyer's statement of the theory of issues in law.
Professor W. C. Robinson gives the following statement in
his Forensic Oratory:^
"Every cause, civil or criminal, consists of one or more
propositions, either of fact or law, affirmed by one side and
denied upon the other. If but a single proposition is affirmed,
the issue is a simple one, and the denial is as comprehensive
as the affirmation. Where two more propositions are
or
affirmed, the denial may extend to resulting in a complex
all,
issue, or it may be confined to one, and constitute a simple

issue. In trespass quare clausum, for example, the plaintiff
must affirm possession in himself, and an unlawful entry by
the defendant. The defendant may deny the entry or the
possession, thus tendering a single issue, or by a general de-
nial he may raise and put the plaintiff upon
a complex issue,
proof of both. Again, in burglary the commonwealth affirms
that the defendant broke and entered, in the night season,
with felonious intent, into the dwelling of another. A gen-
eral denial creates a complex issue, ... on each of which
the commonwealth must establish its position beyond a
reasonable doubt. Or the defendant may in fact, if not in
form, rest his defense upon a single issue and success- . . .
fully maintaining this, attain the same result as if . . .
[all] had been decided in his favor.
"Each of these primary issues may in its ttim contain

other [subordinate] issues, either simple or complex, whose
determination is essential to the decision of the issue which
includes them; and under these still lesser issues may be
1 See Pleading, Appendix B. ^ Pages 62, 63.
found, until the whole cause may be made to rest upon
some single indivisible fact, or on some simple dictum of the
law. This single fact or dictum then becomes the actual
issue in the cause, the only matter in dispute, the final test
of legal obligation. Thus, in the charge of burglary, the
defendant may deny the breaking, on the ground that the
door by which he entered was ajar, and on this fact alone the
question of his guilt or innocence depends. Or in a trespass,
if the defendant justifies his entry for that he was an ofiicer
duly serving civil process, and this be met with an allegation

that his entry was upon the Sabbath before the setting of the
sun, the entire cause may be reduced to the question as to
the moment when defendant entered on the plaintiff's land.
"Whenever the issue can be thus simplified and con-
centrated in one single proposition, the labor both of the
advocate and of his auditors is rendered short and easy.
Confusion and obscurity, as far as is ever possible, are thereby
excluded. The relevancy of the proof is and the
clearly seen
idea of legal obligation is easily developed and applied. Jus-
both parties, therefore, re-
tice as well as the true interest of
quires that the cause should be presented to its arbiters with
issues as few and as well defined as the nature of the contro-

versy will permit. The discovery of this last, decisive issue
is the first duty of the advocate.This constitutes the cause.

This is the only proper subject-matter of the oration. The
ideas which lead his hearers to decide it in his favor are all
with which he need concern himself. If he can induce them
to agree with him on this, his cause is won; if not, his cause
is lost."
In general argumentation. These primary and sec-
2.
ondary issues are found in all argumentation. The use of
them in the law courts differs slightly from their use in
argumentation elsewhere in this: in a court the primary
issues are declared and set forth in the pleadings, before the
real argument begins; whereas in ordinary argumentation the
finding and explaining of these primary issues may -be part
THE ISSUES 47
of the debate itself. But under all circumstances these issues

and the method of finding them are essentially the same.
The primary issues in both cases must be sought first. The
primary issue in law is close to the potential issue in general
argumentation, but in the latter whenever we can break up a
primary issue into say three points, each of which is still
vital, then we have three potential issues and will have to
establish all of them as actual issues if the negative fights on
them. The outcome of the argument may depend almost
entirely on the establishment of some one or more of the sub-
ordinate issues; as, for instance, the question of whether a
door was slightly ajar, or the time of day at which a thing
was done, or the trustworthiness of a witness. But the signif-
icance of any such subordinate issue is derived from the fact
that it afiSrms or denies one of the primary issues, so that its
bearing and importance cannot be understood until one

knows the primary issue which it serves to establish. The
primary issues, then, must be found first. If in general ar-
gumentation we keep a clear distinction between "issues of
fact" and "issues of principle" paralleling the law's distinc-
tions between issues of fact and of law, we will save consider-
able time and avoid much confusion.In general argument
the term "issues" is usually employed instead of "complex
issue."
For the purposes of general argumentation it seems better
not to use the term "subordinate issue." In this freer field
in which we are not bound by the legal systems of procedure
and rules of evidence, the problem is to find the (primary)
issues or issue, and then proceed to attack and defend with
whatever witnesses, evidence, and arguments are available
under the circumstances of the particular case. The broader
term "partition" better suited to general argumentation
renders the use of the term "subordinate issues" unnecessary
and undesirable. In this book, then, the term "the issues"
will be used to designate the actual issues
the smallest divi-
sion of points that, from the very nature of the problem, the
affirmative must establish to establish the proposition, and
which the negative refuse to admit.
a. " Potential issues." The potential issues are always
the same in the same question; they exist independently of
the wills of the disputants; they are to be discovered, not
invented or chosen. They are the points that are so vital
that they must be established or admitted in order to estab-
lish the proposition. The "potential" issues the points
that will have to be proved by the affirmative unless admitted
by the negative exist in the very nature of the proposition,
and are always the same same proposition. They
in the
are always the same and negative, always the
for affirmative
same for every affirmative and every negative, on a given
proposition. Their discovery results from a thorough analy-
sis of the proposition.
Of course, if any way, the potential
propositions vary in
issues may "Resolved: that the commission form of
vary.
government should be adopted in Chicago," is not necessarily
the same proposition as, "Resolved: that the commission
form of government should be adopted in Dayton, Ohio." In
these cases the potential issues may or may not be the same.
But if on a certain evening twenty debates are held in the city
of Chicago on the first resolution, the potential issues will be
the same for all debates and for both teams in each debate.
b. "Admitted issues." Any "potential issues" which
the negative will admit may for convenience be called "ad-
mitted issues." These, of course, drop out of the contro-
versy. Admitted matter obviously cannot be an actual
issue. The issues are the inherently vital points that are
controverted by the negative. In general argumentation
what might be an issue if it were denied, falls back into the
class of "admitted matter" when it is admitted, and ceases
to be of importance in the discussion.
For instance: If in a given action possession in A and entry
by B are the points on which the proposition must rest, and
one is admitted, then the other constitutes the sole issue in
THE ISSUES 49
that contest. So if the basic vital points in a proposal for the

adoption of a certain scheme of taxation are (a) the elimina-
tion of present evils, (b) the raising of sufficient revenue, and
(c) the working of justice to all classes, (that is, not bringing
in new evils) if these are the foundations and the negative
admits (a), then the issues are (b) and (c). If the negative
admits (a) and (b) then the issue is (c).
D. The necessity of knowing the issues cannot be over-
estimated. Without an understanding of them the proposi-
tion is nothing more than a name. Argument on any ques-
tion implies some means that there
difference of opinion; it
are certain ideas affirmed by one side and denied by the
other. The proposition is merely an expression of this clash
of opinion, and an understanding of its meaning depends
entirely upon a comprehension of the points of conflict.
If the writer would prove his proposition, he must prove these
critical points. Moreover, the value of his materials depends
upon their relation to these points; any evidence that gives
a direct and substantial support to these vital facts is valua-
ble; whatever does not bear directly on these facts is, at
best, of secondary importance, if a disputant makes a mis-
take in finding these critical points on which the discussion
must be based, he may well waste his time in proving some
fact that will not help him after it is proved, or he may be
surprised in debate by attack on some vital point which he
is not ready to defend. This danger is realized and guarded
against in the courts of law. They demand that the issues
shall be clearly stated in the beginning, and that every
piece of evidence, whether of fact or of law, shall have a di-
rect and evident bearing on some one of these issues, anything
that cannot conform to this test being declared irrelevant
and being excluded from consideration. Then again, a
speaker or writer who does not know the issues will probably
confuse his readers or hearers by giving them a false, distorted
view of his case. If a disputant does not comprehend just

what are the few vital points of his case, around which all the
50 ARGUMENTATION AffD DEBATE
lesser facts must be grouped, his proof will almost certainly
lack the unity and coherence that are indispensable for
clearness and force in presentation.
E. Proposition and issues. We have seen in the pre-
ceding chapter that in order to have intelligent argumenta-
tion, we must first have a proposition. The proper formulat-
ing of the proposition insures that we have one single question
that can be argued directly and so brought to a definite
conclusion. This proposition thus makes clear the general
position which the disputant must argue for or against. But
he is not yet ready to select the evidence or the arguments
with which to support his contention. He has merely found
the field of battle. Before he can open the fight, or even ar-
range his forces, he must examine the ground he has chosen,
and find out its points of vantage and of weakness. The
proposition discloses the task that must in the end be ac-
complished, but it does not show what are the steps neces-
sary in the accomphshment, or just what method may be
most effective. The proposition gives a single question for
discussion; but even in any such single question there are in-
numerable arguments, points, masses of evidence, that may
be brought forward. All these arguments and all this evi-
dence cannot be used; it is not all of equal value; some of it
will. have such a direct and obvious bearing on the question
that it must have great weight; but much of it will have such
an indefinite and remote bearing that to use it at all would
be a waste of time. Clearly, then, the next thing for the dis-
putant to do is to get some standards by reference to which he
can determine the value of these materials. There are always
certain points or propositions that are critical, that are so
vital that the whole question must hinge on them. A cen-
tury and a half ago, John Ward, in his Systems of Oratory,
said: "But in all disputes it is of the greatest consequence to
observe where the stress of the controversy lies. For, without
attending tothis, persons may cavil about different matters,
without understanding each other or deciding anything."

THE ISSUES 51
In any discussion the "stress of the controversy" inevitably

falls upon the proving or disproving of a few points, which
are the center and soul of the question only as those

: who have
the burden of proof win in the struggle over these points
can they win the whole contest. In order, therefore, to know
what proofs to use, the disputant on either side, must first
find out just what are the points that the affirmative must
establish by the proofs in order to establish the proposition.
These points are the issues.
F. Issues and burden of proof. It is well to consider
the relation of the theory of issues to various aspects of the
theory of burden of proof, in order that their complete har-
mony may be clear and all misunderstanding avoided.
1. The issues, and the affirmative and negative. The af-
firmative has no choice in regard to issues^ every "potential
issue" which the negative chooses to fight on,must be estab-
lished. The on the other hand, may choose among
negative,
the potential issues what ones to admit and what to fight on.
In law this choice must be made known to the affirmative in
the course of the pleading, so that a suit never starts without
all parties issues and agreeing as to what the
knowing the
issues are.In general discussion this situation should be
approximated as closely as possible. Before a debate starts,
or early in the debate, a direct clash should be brought about
on vital points that are left after all admissions have been
made. The affirmative, of course, has the burden of proof on
each issue. Establishing usually means "beyond a reason-
able doubt" or by "preponderating evidence," so the nega-
tive in trying to block a case seeks to raise reasonable doubts
on as many issues as possible, and usually does not risk every-
thing on fewer issues than are absolutely necessary. One
man may doubt on one issue and one on another, so it is well
to fight on as many as offer a good chance, unless one can be
absolutely sure of winning on fewer.
2. Issues and counter proposition. Sometimes the
negative sets up a substitute or counter plan or proposition.
When this is the case the negative of course has the burden
of proof as to its plan. The issues of the ease are not changed
by this plan of defense. If the substitute does not offer an
obstacle to the establishing of the affirmative side of the is-
sues a waste of time to talk about it. If the substitute

it is
can be so presented as to block one or more of the vital points

of the affirmative, the case fails the negative wins. But
the substitute may not have won.
For example, suppose in the burglary case already referred
to instead of confining case to proving unfounded one or
its
more of the five accusations, the defense simply denies them

all and offers evidence that proves conclusively that B com-
mitted the crime in question. When they accuse B they nec-

essarily take the burden of proving B did these things. But
their only purpose isto show thereby that A is innocent.
And note that B is not declared guilty as the result of this
trial. The proposition is that A is guilty. The aflSrmative
have failed to establish their case either by having been
blocked on one or more of the issues, or by the negative offer-
ing a substitute. Biit the substitute did not mnnot in this
trial. It is advanced only enough to show that the claims of
the aflBrmative are unfounded.
Again in the single tax illustration already given, suppose
that the negative after discovering the issues, finding out
what their opponents must do to win, decide on offering a
counter proposition instead of simply attacking these issues.
The negative claims that the single tax system should not be
adopted because the "classified property tax" would better
meet the present situation. Now, this counter proposition
is legitimate, worth while, and effective only if it meets the
issues of the case being discussed. Otherwise it is simply

arguing beside the point, evading the issue rather than meet-
ing it. If the negative can show by comparison with the
classified property tax system wherein the single tax system
is not the proper method by which to eliminate the evils,
yield sufficient revenue, or work substantial justice, then the

THE ISSUES 53
negative use of this substitute is allowable and wise. But if

it does not meet the issues in the original proposition, its
use is neither justifiable nor expedient.
3. The issues and winning or losing. In what we have
just said concerning issues, burden or proof, and winning and
losing, we have had in mind actual cases in real life, not con-
test debates before judges who are to say who won the debate.
All that ha.s been said, however, applies in these contest
debates exactly as it does in a law court or political campaign,
except the remarks on winning or losing. In a law court, in
a campaign, in business, in science, it is the case
political
that is being passed on. The decision is on the "merits of the
question," not on the way in which certain advocates handle
the case. But in an intercollegiate debate, for instance, the
decision should go always on the skill of the debaters,^ never
on the strength of the case (except in so far as this is indica-
tive of the skill of the debaters). The decision to mean any-
thing at all must be based on the skill shown in debating
not on the strength of the evidence or the merits of the case.
A debate should, of course, be worked out and presented as
though the decision were to be made by the audience or jury
or judge on the merits of the case. For only in this way can
the contestants show their real ability as debaters, but the
judges should know enough about debating to render a de-
cision on ability alone.
G. The issues and conviction and persuasion. The
issues are the points that will have to be established by
the aflSrmative in order to convince competent judges that
their plan should be adopted. The issues have to do p rL^
marily w ith co nvicti o n rather than persuasjon. They are
the basis of the appeal to the intellect. The work of persua-
sion may be done in connection with proving the issues.
In selecting evidence, illustration, phraseology, the emotional
side of each audience (sentiments, taste, prejudices) should
always be kept in mind as one of the guides in all that we do.
'
See "Types of Decisions," ch. 16. "The Nature of Debate.''
But in discovering the issues in any case, we must consider

only the intellectual side of our case the facts and the jus-
tifiable inferences from the facts. The analysis of the prop-

osition to find the issues should be impersonal not done
with particular audiences or judges in mind. After the im-
personal case is discovered then the adjusting of it to any
particular tribunal should be carefully undertaken. This,
of course, means paying a good deal of attention to persua-
sion.
H. Number and form of issues. The number of issues
varies necessarily in different propositions.. There are not
usually more than three or four, unless in some technical
or legal proposition in which there may be a large number.
In a great many propositions there is but one issue. The is-
sues are to be discovered. Careful analysis will reveal them.
We cannot decide in advance to "pick out" three or four
issues. We may find three or four and we may find but one.
When we have found the number of points that may be is-,
sues from the nature of the case, our next step is to find out
if any of them are admitted. If so we place them in the in-
troduction as admitted matter. The others are our issues
for this controversy.
When found the issues should be expressed in such qiiestion.
form that the affirmative will answer "Yes," and the nega-
tive "No." They should be always so stated in a brief, and
usually so stated in a speech or written argument. Do not
say "The issue is, that this plan will be financially advan-
tageous." Do not say " The issue is, What will be the finan-
'
cial effect?'" The proper form is: "The issue is, 'Will this
plan be financially advantageous?'" This represents the

clean-cut question that must be answered the exact point
which the affirmative affirms and the negative denies.
I. Issues and partition. The partition consists of a state-
ment of the main points to be taken up in the discussion. It
is an enumeration of the steps to be taken in presenting the
case. It is a plan of campaign determined on (and usually
THE ISSUES 55
announced) in advance. The partition must not be confused

with the issues. They may,
it is true, be substantially identi-
cal, but they may differ widely. There may be one issue and

four points in partition or three points which cover the
three issues. The issues must all be vital points. The points
in partition must all be important but not necessarily vital.
If a single issue is lost the case faUs. One or more points in
partition may be lost without losing the case.
Suppose a table is hanging suspended from the ceiling by a
chain of three links. If one link is destroyed the table falls.
The table represents "the case," the contention of the affirm-

ative; the links of chain represent the issues. Suppose the
table is standing on five legs. One, two, or three legs may
be removed and still the table be might be
left standing. It
that four legs could be removed, and if the fifth were big
enough, and placed directly in the center of the table, it might
hold up the table, especially if the attack on it were very
weak. Here the table again represents "the case," and the
legs represent the points in partition. Or suppose two armies
are contending for the possession of a given territory, the
control of which both understand must depend upon the oc-
cupation of two particular points (the issues), a pass and a
certain height of ground. Now there are various positions
which the two opposing forces may seize and hold, and vari-
ous lines of attack which they may adopt, depending upon the
peculiar habits and methods of the respective generals; but
these positions and this strategy (the partition) are valuable
only as they serve to give the command of these two critical
points. In a like manner, let us suppose two disputants are

arguing the questions: "Resolved: that the army canteen
should be reestablished." Now the settlement of this ques-
tion may well depend upon the decision of two issues namely, ;
(1) whether the canteen is beneficial to the individual soldier,

and (2) whether it is beneficial to the army as a whole. A
speaker on the affirmative might in his argument state his
intention of proving three points as follows: (1) that the
army officers are favorable to the canteen;
opinions of reliable
(2) number of arrests for drunkenness increased
that the
when the canteen was abolished; (3) that the canteen is
beneficial in other countries.
These three points may be well chosen, but their impor-
tance must be derived from their efficiency in establishing the
affirmative side of the two issues mentioned above. A par-
tition, then, isa statement of the points the arguer intends
to prove; the issues are the points the affirmative must 'prove
in order to prove his case. If the points of the partition are
well chosen, they will usually correspond closely with the
issues; but they may be entirely different, and they are not
ia any case necessarily identical.
J.
" Stock issues." There has been some discussion
recently^ in regard to formulas for issues or "stock issues"
that can be applied to all questions. It seems obviously
impossible to get stock issues that will apply to all different
kinds of questions. This follows from the very nature of is-

sues. But in regard to a large class of propositions much
used in contest debate a certain formula may be used as a
start in analysis. We refer to propositions of policy having
to do with changes in necessarily continuing systems, as
taxation, education, railways, water, light and power utili-
ties, sanitation, Here are problems that cannot be
etc.
dropped. Here are enterprises that are to he kept going on
some basis or other. In such questions we may well start
an analysis on the basis of two "stock issues." The phrase-

ology may differ the points are essentially the same. Va-
rious wordings of each are given:
1. Are there evils in the
Is the present unsatisfactory?
existing situation? a cause for action? Is there a
Is there
disease? Do we need a change? etc.
2. Is the proposed action an improvement? Will it
1 See The Special Issues, by J. R. Pelsma, and Formulas for the Special
Issue, by H. B'. Gough, The Public Speaking Review, Vol.' Ill, No. 3 (Nov.,
1913), pp. 1-8.
THE ISSUES 57
cure the evils? Is this the action we should take? Is this

the proper remedy? Is the proposed change the right one?
New systems will not be adopted while the present is
satisfactory, nor unless the proposed scheme looks like a

satisfactory remedy or improvement. So the man with a
new scheme for doing something that is to continue to be
done on some scheme, must always show somehow or other
(or get it admitted) that there is something wrong and his
scheme will make it right.
Why then are these not really the exact issues in all such
cases? For two reasons it is unsafe to accept them as such.
First, because analysis may show a more specific and concrete
wording for these general questions, and this will aid in many
ways. Second, and principally, because on accurate analysis
it may be found that one of these questions, especially num-
ber two, will break up into say three questions, each of which
must be proved by the affirmative. So each is an issue,
and we have a case of four issues instead of two. For exam-
ple,suppose the proposition deals with a new city water sys-
tem. We take the first stock issue and find out how specifi-
cally we can It results in one question, perhaps,
express this.
(1) Is the present water supply insufficient? Then analysis
of the situation may show three questions each of which must
be affirmatively answered or the whole scheme fails These
three for instance, (1) Is the proposed supply sufficient?
(2) Is it pure? (3) Can we aflFord to get it? So in this case
we find four actual issues, instead of two. If the negative
block one of the four the affirmative loses.
Notice, however, that it is not sufficient to be able to break
up a big question into three or four small ones; each small
one must be absolutely vital, or it is no issue. For instance,
suppose a big question hit upon under some question, to be:
Is this proposed method financially advantageous? Later
it isfound that this is to be settled by answering these: (a)
Will it increase the sales? (b) Will it permit cheaper raw
material? (c) Will it lower the cost of advertising? Are
these the issues? is not necessarily
Clearly not, because each
vital. The aflSrmative could lose one (any one) and win, if
the total left were enough. It is the total result of these
three factors taken together that is the issue. These might
well be main points, points in partition, and might all be bit-
terly fought, but they are not issues. The big question of
financial advantage which these go to prove is the issue.
II. Finding the Issues
So much for the nature of the issues. We now have to

consider the problem of finding them. (While we usually
refer to the issues rather than to the issue it must be re-
membered that often we have but one issue.) This prob-

lem varies in difliculty under different propositions. In
many propositions the issues are obvious. All we need to
know to discover them is the nature of issues. They are there
in sight; we have only to recognize them. In other prop-
ositions the problem of analysis is a long and difficult one.
For such cases it is well to have in mind specific methods or
plans of action. But it must be admitted, and always re-
membered, that there is no one method that should always be
applied in all its details to any case that is to be analyzed.
The steps suggested in the following pages should be taken
in any case as far as is necessary to discover the issues. And
tentative issues that we have discovered, or points claimed
by our opponents as issues may be tested by the processes
here enumerated. If one has to analyze a question about
which he knows practically nothing, following all of these
steps in the order presented, will discover the issues. But
such cases occur rarely. The right thing is to understand the
whole system and use whatever part of it seems useful in any
particular case.
A. Think. The first thing to do in any case is to think.
This must always be done. Careful thinking will disclose
the issues in many cases. Think the proposition over from

THE ISSUES 59
all angles. Ask yourself all sorts of questions about it. Who
wants this? Why?, Whose business is it? Who will pay for
it? Who will suffer by it? Who will profit by it? What
kind of question is it? What interests are at stAke? Eco-
nomic? Moral? Êsthetic? Social? Political? Commercial?
Industrial? Spiritual? Educational? Religious? Literary?
Artistic? Which one of these terms, some of which are over-
lapping or practically synonymous, best characterizes this
question? What standards within this field must we be
guided by? What do the terms used mean? How many
interpretations could possibly be put on this proposition?
Which one best fits the particular circumstances?
B. Study. 1. History. The next step, and one that
your thinking will naturally lead you to, is study. If we do
not already know we must study the meanings that may be
attributed to the terms and to the proposition as a whole.
As issues may differ with different propositions, in order to
find our particular issues we must learn what interpretation
to take and what its vital points are by studying (1) the his-
tory of the question with special attention to (a) its origin
and (b) the occasion for the present discussion. The nature
of any controversy must depend largely upon the circum-
stances of its birth or the causes of its present importance.
The an excellent illustration of finding the
following is
issues, taken from the argument by Daniel Webster before

the Supreme Court in the case of Luther vs. Borden. The
events that gave rise to this case occurred in Rhode Island
in 1841-42 and were what was popularly known as the
Dorr Rebellion. Mr. Webster began:
"It is known that in the years 1841 and 1842 political agita-
well
Rhode Island. Some of the citizens of that State
tion existed in
undertook to form a new constitution of government, beginning
their proceedingstoward that end by meetings of the people, held
without authority of law, and conducting those proceedings through
such forms as led them, in 1842, to say that they had established
a new constitution and form of government, and placed Mr. Thomas
W. Dorr at its head. ... All will remember that the state of
things approached not actual conflict between men in arms, at
if
least the 'perilous edge of battle.' In June, 1842, this agitation

subsided. The new government, as it called itself, disappeared
from the scene of action. The former government, the Charter
government, as it was sometimes styled, resumed undisputed control,
went on in its ordinary course, and the peace of the State was
restored.
"But the past had been too serious to be forgotten. The legis-
lature of the State had, at an early stage of the troubles, found it

necessary to enact special laws for the punishment of the persons
concerned in these proceedings. It defined the crime of treason,
as well as smaller offences, and authorized the declaration of martial
law. . . This having been done, and the ephemeral government
.
of Mr. Dorr having disappeared, the grand juries of the State found
indictments against several persons for having disturbed the peace
of the State, and one against Dorr himself for treason. This in-
dictment came on in the Supreme Court of Rhode Island in 1844,
before a tribunal admitted on all hands to be the legal judicature
of the State. He was tried by a jury of Rhode Island, above all
objection, and after all challenge. By that jury, under the instruc-
tions of the court, he was convicted of treason, and sentenced to
imprisonment for life.
"Now that an action is brought in the courts of the United States,
and before your honors, by appeal, it is alleged that Mr. Dorr,
. . .
instead of being a traitor or an insurrectionist, was the real gov-

ernor of the State at the time; that the force used by him was
exercised in defence of the constitution and laws, and not against
them; that he who opposed the constituted authorities was not
Mr. Dorr but Governor King; and that it was he who should
have been indicted, and tried, and sentenced." '
2. All phases. But a study

of the origin and history of
the question may
not reveal the issues. In many proposi-
tions and complicated problems viê must go further and study
(2) all phases of the present situation. Very often issues
cannot be found without a complete understanding of the
proposition in all its phases. The phase that is, on hasty
' The Works of Daniel Webster, Vol. VI, pp. 217-219.
THE ISSUES 61
judgment, passed over as seemingly insignificant often de-

velops with careful scrutiny into some new line of thought
and discloses a new and vital issue. We must not consider
the economic phase of the question to the exclusion of the
ethical or aesthetic phases. If a question has a moral phase
and physical phase, an educational phase and a political
phase, we must study them all. Nothing that is relevant
can safely be ignored, however much it may seem a matter
of detail. The question must be thoroughly understood in
all its phases before any attempt is made to state the
issues.
3. Both sides. Akin to this study of all the phases and
points of view is the necessity of studying (3) both sides of
the question.With a knowledge of only his own side, a dis-
putant may invent some points that he decides he will prove;
but he cannot know the real issues. The issues are always
the points on which there a conflict of opinion. To deter-
is
mine where he must obviously know what his

this conflict is,
opponents maintain, what they are willing to admit, and what

they deny. Consequently there is nothing that will help
more to reveal the critical points in any discussion than to
compare the arguments advanced by the conflicting sides.
C. Exclude (1) Admitted matter. When we have gained
the proper knowledge of all the facts, the process is then a
process of exclusion and selection. The next step to take
then is to exclude (1) admitted matter. Clearly, if both
sides admit the truth of a certain idea, that idea cannot be a
critical point. The clash of opinion cannot arise from such
a point. By excluding such facts as these, we can narrow the
material down to the significant facts, which only are valua-
ble.
This is a method often used by great lawyers and delibera-
tive orators. Mr. William Wirt, in the case of Gibbons vs.
Ogden, finds the issues of the case by first excluding the
matters that may be admitted by either side. The legislature
of New York had granted to Robert Fulton and others cer-


on the waters of the State.
tain exclusive rights of navigation
Mr. Wirt, in his speech, was endeavoring to prove the grant
to be unconstitutional. He began :
"In discussing this question, the general principles assumed as

postulates on the other side may be, for the most part, admitted.
Thus it may be admitted, that by force of the Declaration of Inde-
pendence each State became sovereign; that they were, then, inde-
pendent of each other; that by virtue of their separate sovereignty
they had each full power to levy war, to make peace, to establish
and regulate commerce, to encourage the arts, and generally to
perform all other acts of sovereignty. I shall also concede that the
government of the United States is one of delegated powers, and
that it is one of enumerated powers, as contended for by the counsel
for the correspondent. . . .
"The peculiar rule of construction demanded for those powers

may also be conceded. But the express powers are to be strictly
construed; the implied powers are to be construed liberally. By
this it is understood to be meant, that Congress can do no more
than they are expressly authorized to do; though the means of doing
itare left to their discretion, under no other limit than that they
shall be necessary and proper to the end." '
It is often a help when we cannot know the minds of our

opponents to ask this very question: Can the other side
afford to admit this fact? It was in this way that Webster,
in the famous White murder trial, established one of his is-
sues in the face of the contradictions of the opposing counsel.
"The counsel say that they might safely admit that Richard
Crowninshield, Jr., of this murder. But how
was the perpetrator
could they safely admit that? were admitted, everything
If that
else would follow. For why should Richard Crowninshield, Jr.,
kill Mr. White? He was not his heir, nor his devisee; nor was he
his enemy. What could be his motive? If Richard Crowninshield,
Jr., killed Mr. White, he did it at some one's procurement who
himself had a motive. And who, having a motive, is shown to have

had any intercourse with Richard Crowninshield, Jr., but Joseph
> 9 Wheaton, 160.
THE ISSUES 63
Knapp, and this principally through the agency of the prisoner

at the bar? . . . He who
on this evidence, that Richard
believes,
Crowninshield, was the immediate murderer cannot doubt that
Jr.,
both the Knapps were conspirators in that murder. The ad- . . .
mission of so important and so connected a fact would render it

impossible to contend further against the proof of the entire con-
spiracy as we state it."
(2) Irrelevant and (3) unimportant matter. We must ex-

clude from the material in which we will find the issues (though
not necessarily from any use) not only admitted matter, but
also (2) irrelevant, and (3) unimportant matter. There are
many ideas and facts that*are commonly associated with
the proposition which do not really have any logical bear-
ing on it.These should be carefully put aside at the out-
set. Then many other facts which are prop-
again, there are
erly embraced within the meaning of the question which
may be very valuable as evidence to prove other facts, but
which manifestly are not important in themselves. For
instance, in a civil suit for damages in a court of law the
honesty or the intelligence of a witness might, under some
circumstances, become very significant, the establishment
of some vital point depending upon his reliability. Yet the
character of this witness would not be mentioned in the
pleadings as one of the issues, for his credibility is not im-
portant in itself, but only because of its effect upon some other
and larger point in the case. In seeking the issues, the first
step should be to exclude such facts as these, which are mani-
festly of only secondary importance.
The from Mr. Jeremiah S. Black's speech
following, taken
"In Defence Right of Trial by Jury," illustrates the
of the
.
effective use of this method. Here the speaker found his

issues by the exclusion of irrelevant matter.
"The you presents but a single point and that an

case before
exceedingly plain one. It is not encumbered with any of those
vexed questions that might be expected to arise out of a great war.
You are not called upon to decide what kind of rule a military
commander may impose upon the inhabitants of a hostile country
which he occupies as a conqueror, or what punishment he may in-
flict upon the soldiers of his own army or the followers of his camp;
or yet how he may deal with civilians in a beleaguered city or other

place in a state of actual siege which he is required to defend against
a public enemy. The contest covers no such ground as that. The
men whose acts we complain of erected themselves into a tribunal
for the trial and punishment of citizens who were connected in no
way whatever with the army or navy. And this they did in the
midst of a community whose social and legal organization had
never been disturbed by any war or insurrection, where the courts
were wide open, where judicial process was executed every day
without 'interruption, and where all the civil authorities, both
State and National, were in the full exercise of their func-
tions. . . .
"Keeping the character of the charges in mind, let us come at

once to the simple question upon which the court below divided in
opinion: Had the commissioners jurisdiction, were they invested
with legal authority to try the relators and put them to death for
the offence of which they were accused?" '
4. Indirect. Furthermore we must exclude from our

issue material, regardless of its general relevancy or great
importance, all (4) indirect matter including important
subordinate issues. Every important and relevant fact that
is denied or that cannot safely be admitted is not necessarily
one of the issues. It may be a subordinate point, important
only indirectly because the proof of it establishes or helps to
establish some larger fact. In that case the larger fact, that
the subordinate fact serves to prove, is one of the issues.
Usually this discrimination between the issues and the sub-

ordinate points is not difficult. The issues are the points the
proving of which directly proves the proposition itself; the
proving of the subordinate points, on the other hand, helps

to prove some larger fact, which larger fact in turn serves to
prove the proposition. The issues are related directly to the
' Great Speeches by Oreat Lawyers, pp. 484, 485.
THE ISSUES 65
proposition; the " subordinate issues," indirectly. For an ex-

ample, take the question: "Resolved: that labor unions
should be compelled to incorporate." In the consideration of
this question the fact would be emphasized that labor unions
had very rarely broken their contracts with their employers
in the past. This would clearly be only a subordinate point.
It would not serve to establish the proposition directly; it
would be significant only because it would help to establish
the larger fact, that there was no occasion (no cause for ac-
tion) for compelling the unions to incorporate. This last-
mentioned point, on the other hand, would be one of the
issues; it would be a vital fact not admitted by the opposing
side, on which there was a clash of opinion, and it would
stand in direct and immediate connection with the prop-
osition.
D. Select. While this exclusion has been going on we
have probably been selecting at the same time, saving out the
opposites of the classes of points we have excluded. Our
work, then, summed up positively, has been to select (1)
points which meet the test of C: (a) points on which there
is a direct clash of opinion (points that are not admitted

that our opponents probably will not admit), (b) relevant
points, (c) important points, (d) direct (not indirect or sub-
ordinate) points. Our work is about done. These points are
necessarily few and may constitute the issues just as they
stand. There is one test which will determine this. Are all
of these points vital to the establishment of the affirmative
side of the proposition? We must select only vital points,
from this small group. Can the affirmative side be estab-
lished without establishing all of these points? If so, they
are not all issues. If the affirmative can lose a point and still
prove its case, that point is not an issue. When we reach this
step in our analysis and find that the points we have selected
will not pass this final test the difficulty is usually that the
test for subordinate points and indirectness has not been
strictly applied, and that we have three or four points under
a proposition in which there are only one or two issues.
What we need is a point or two that will group these
three or four and connect them to the proposition in a
vital way.
Suppose the resolution proposes a new method or process
in manufacture, in which there is no question of ethics,
politics, social justice, or any such phase to complicate the
issues, and suppose you have narrowed the points down to
three the new process will lessen the cost of raw material,
will make unnecessary the paying of certain royalties now
being paid, and will produce a valuable by-product. These
points have passed your tests of importance, relevance, etc.,
and are all emphatically denied by your opponents. Are

they issues? No; they are points in partition. There is
not an issue among them, because no one of them is really
vital. Suppose the negative shows that you will not lessen

the cost of raw material that this will remain unchanged.
But you succeed in proving the saving on royalties and the
gaining of a new by-product. Of course you have estab-
lished your case
that the process should be adopted. Or
suppose the negative wins on two of them and shows no
change in regard to them, while you show a gain on one.
Your case is established. These cannot then be issues. Each
issue is so vital that if the affirmative fails to establish one of
them the case fails. The difficulty here is that you are trying
to get three issues where there is only one, viz., would this
process bring a financial advantage. This is the issue. To
establish the fact that this process should beadopted the
affirmative must show financial advantage, and this may be
shown in any possible way. There is only one issue. The
difficulty arose from not applying the test for directness
strictly enough.
Summary of method of finding the issues:
A. Think: On the proposition, its possible meaning, all its
elements, and aspects, to the limits of your present
knowledge.
.
THE ISSUES 67
B. Study: 1. History of question, with especial attention to

a. Its origin,
b. Present occasion for discussion.
2. All phases of question.
3. Both sides
C. Exclude:
1. Mutually admitted matter.
2. Irrelevant matter.
3. Unimportant matter.
4. Indirect matter.
D. Select:
1. Points which meet the test of C.
2. Vital points.
EXERCISE. CHAPTER 4
THE ISSUES
1. Give the potential issues on each of three propositions

on subjects used in Exercise 1, of Chapter 2.
2. Indicate under each of the propositions mentioned above
which "potential issues" you would admit if you were
in charge of the negative case.
3. Phrase propositions and under each give the most accurate
phraseology possible for the "stock issues" on each
of the following subjects: Military Preparedness; the
Commission Form of Government for city;
State Universities.
4. Give accurately all the steps in analysis leading to the
final statement of issues in the proposition for your

original forensic.
SECTION B. SELECTION
'"''
"'IX^-c^ p-'O-'^-- '- '
CHAPTER 5
GATHERING MATERIAL
OUTLINE
A. Invention and selection.
B. Importance of preliminary reading.
C. Necessity of method.
D. A note-taking system.
E. Note-book or card system.
F. The card form.
G. Accuracy in documentation.
H. Wliat to look for.
1. Both sides.
2. Arguments and evidence.
I. Where to look.
J. What plan to follow.
1. Newspaper reading.
2. The effective method.
a. General conditions.
b. Questions in dispute.
c. Details of evidence.
K. What to do : assimilate.
L, The way to assimilate material.
M. Personality.
N. Conscious practice.
A. Invention and selection. In the discussion of the

chapters under the head of Invention we have seen how a
question must be analyzed in order (1) to understand what is
the real proposition to be established, (2) and to understand
how to handle the burden of proof in regard to it, and (3) to
find out the issues, the vital ideas or matters of fact which
must be established to establish this proposition. We next
68
GATHERING MATERIAL 69
come to a consideration of the means and methods to be

employed in the work of advancing or opposing the establish-
ment of these vital points, or issues, which have been dis-
covered. As we shall see later, much depends on the methods
by which we arrange our material and present it to the reader
or hearer. But before we can arrange our proofs or present
them, we must, obviously, take the various steps in the proc-
ess of Selection, and so get the exact material to be used.
This getting of material naturally divides itself into two
parts: first, the gathering of material by preliminary reading
or investigation; and second, the testing of the material we
find, and the selection of those parts that will best serve our
purpose in a given case. In the work of this second part we
will be aided by a knowledge of emdence, forms of arguments,

and fallacies ^the topics treated in the next three chapters.
Of course, in practice these steps in the process of selection
are not always mutually exclusive. Usually we test and se-
lect, using our knowledge of evidence, arguments, and fal-
lacies as we do our reading, and thus we choose or reject our

material as we find it while we are gathering our evidence
together.
B. Importance of preliminary reading. All argumen-
tation which involves preparation of any kind involves a
considerable amount of preliminary reading. The amount
varies; but in most serious argumentative work the time thus
spent is probably greater than that spent in all the other
work of preparation taken together. The lawyer spends by
far the greater part of his time in examining witnesses, docu-
ments, and authorities. The able senator or representative
preparing for debate works longest and hardest in the col-
lection of facts and figures. The intercollegiate debater
labors for weeks in libraries to gather the materials for a
twelve-minute speech. Surely a part of our work so funda-
mental and so arduous is worthy of the most careful consid-
eration. It is of sufficient importance to demand that we
adopt a clear and effective method of doing it.
C. Necessity of method. In the case of the beginner in
argumentation, must be admitted that a great deal of time
it
is wasted here. To a man who has had no practical experi-

ence, there does not seem to be any particular need of method
in reading. Newspapers, magazines, and encyclopaedias all
seem alike as long as he can find in them anything bearing
on the question. His method commonly is to start in any-
where and read as long as he can. Inevitably he wastes
many hours at the start on worthless material, and later,
to make up the time, he rushes along over the best authori-
ties with careless haste. Again, such a reader does not really
comprehend or assimilate what he reads. He reaps a harvest
of quotations from here and there, picks out a few points
from this writer and that, and he thinks his preparation is
complete. This inability to gather material intelligently
is a serious weakness. A rational method is necessary. There
must, of course, be individuality in all work of this kind;
personality should everywhere be cultivated rather than
repressed. But the principles given here have been engen-
dered by common experience and are so capable of universal
application that every man should follow them unless he is
in a position to set them aside deliberately in favor of other
specific principles that seem better fitted to his particular
needs. They must not be violated through ignorance or
carelessness.
D. A note-taking system must be used. It is a common
mistake for a student to trust to his memory the safe-keeping
of the ideas that he finds, with the almost inevitable result
that, when called for, the ideas are not available. They either
vanish and contribute nothing to the cause, or they must
be sought anew at some future time at the cost of redupli-
cated work. Often becomes necessary to verify some idea
it
that has been suggested by some magazine article, or to reen-

force it with some good authority, and the chances are
strongly against the probability that the original article
can be found again. It is an extraordinary memory that
can recall such a reference. Again, it is not always possible

to tell at the beginning just what evidence
will finally be val-
uable. Facts that seem trivial at the moment when we
read them may turn out in the end to be important. But if
no note is taken of them, they are almost surely lost. Against
these and many other evils there is but one safeguard. A
system of note-taking must always be used. Facts, ideas,
arguments, illustrations, must be noted down in substance,
or copied as full quotations, when they are discovered.
E. A note-book or a card system may be used. A note-
book is perhaps easier to carry around, offers better facilities
for copying long extracts and preserving clippings, etc., and
binds all the material together in a single compact volume.
But the card system offers great advantages in sorting,
testing, organizing, using, and filing the material gathered.
Unless there are specific reasons arising from the circumstancs
of a given case for using a note-book, the card system should
,be used. A few cards only need be available for each day's
reading. The accumulated material may be kept carefully
filed away in one place. When the time comes for drawing
the brief, or preparing the written argument, the speech, or
the debate, the cards can be easily sorted, and the best
material can be quickly selected and arranged in proper order
for use. All the material gathered on a given subject can be
properly indexed and away for use at any future
filed time.
F. The card form shown here is recommended. It pro-
vides for accurate recording of material, authority (writer
or speaker), and source where this material was found. The
advantages of having all the documentation at the top of the
card, rather than at the bottom, are many. This makes it
easier to refer to the cards in a filing case or card index, with-

out loss of time and without disturbing the whole file. This
also makes it easier to sort and handle them at a desk, and
they are much more convenient for use on the platform in

actual speaking or debate. It is easy to preserve permanently
in immediately usable condition all the material one gathers
on such cards and the store may grow at any point without
disturbing the material on any other point. Cards may be
removed or added on any sub-topic, as the material available
changes from time to time. On the face of the card, of course,
should be written (or pasted, if clippings are used) either
exact quotations, paraphrases of the substance, or simply
a characterization of the book, article, or speech referred
to at the top of the card. A card four by six inches is very
convenient; but a larger or smaller card will do about as well.
TOPIC
freely.But in the process of making up your case you should

make the thought of most of the quotations a part of your
thought, and so use few direct quotations in the presentation
of your argument, except where you think added advantage
comes from giving the exact words of some recognized au-

thority on the subject being treated as for instance the
quotations in this text from well-known writers on logic,
law, etc.
Having realized the necessity of making an investigation,
and having adopted a method of note-taking, the student
who has an argument to prepare may then well ask four
questions: What shall I look for? Where shall I look? What
plan of search shall I follow? What shall I do with the
material 1 gather?
H. What to look for. 1. Understanding both sides. The
broad general answer to this first question is that the investi-
gator must look for material that will enable him to under-
stand hoth sides of his question. To know both sides of the
question thoroughly is of great value in all stages of argu-
mentation. In the first place, without such knowledge a
disputant cannot have that understanding of his case as a
whole which must precede the intelligent use of evidence and
arguments. We have already seen that the first step in prepa-
ration, and one of the most important steps, is always the
finding of the issues. But these issues cannot be found, nor
the partition arranged, except by knowing both sides. The
issues are always the pointson which there is a direct clash of
opinion, and frequently these points can be found only by
comparing the assertions of the opposing parties and as-
certaining just where these assertions are contradictory.
The partition is a statement of the main points on which you
are to base your attack on your opponent's case, and your
defense of your own case against your opponent's attack.
A partition arranged without knowledge of your opponent's
case would obviously be quite useless. Again, a disputant
who knows only the arguments on his own side of the case
may find himself helpless when confronted with some unex-
pected argument of his opponent. This inability to meet and
repel an opponent is fatal to success in argumentation, and it
must be guarded against in preparation. Such arguments
are rarely to be answered by inspiration. Inspiration is not
always reliable. The necessary knowledge must be gained
before the actual crisis comes; and it can be gained only by
studying the other side of the question q.nd considering how
any attack may best be met.
2. Arguments and evidence. A more specific answer to
the first question mentioned above, is that the reader must
usually look for two classes of material, which might be
labeled arguments and evidence. First, the reader should
find the point of view, the opinion, which the writer of any
book or article takes of his subject as a whole, and also the
points which he seems to regard as the critical points in the
case, his reasons for his opinion, his arguments pro or con.
Second, the reader should look for evidence, facts stated,
incidents cited, statistics given, illustrations used, or any
quotable matter. These points and quotations should be
noted as they rise. It is a common experience of a beginner
that he passes over some idea or some apt quotation without
taking note of it, to find that later if he only had it at hand
it would be a valuable piece of evidence or a strong argument
from authority. New evidence is valuable wherever it is

found, and some note should always be taken of it. Opin-
ions, on the other hand, are usually valuable only as they
come from some writer who is a recognized authority on the
subject. And it should be borne in mind that as to who is
a recognized authority the audience is always the final judge.
No matter how great the knowledge of any writer, if he is
unknown to the audience or doubted by them, the quotation
ceases to have value as an "argument from authority."
But while reading the words of a writer of acknowledged
standing, the note-book should be freely used. The quota-
tion may be taken down in full, or some reference may be
noted to the place where it is found; but it must not be suf-

fered to escape entirely.
I. Where to look. The question "Where shall I look?"
will probably not bother many students in colleges and uni-
versities.Those who have a good library available will
turn at once to 'published bibliographies, card indexes, and
such monthly and annual indexes as The Readers Guide,
Poole's Index, and The Annual Library Index. Those who
cannot immediately command the facilities of a large library,
or who for any reason want more specific suggestions on
sources of material for argument, should write to University
Extension divisions, public libraries, etc.
J. What plan to follow. The question of a plan to be

followed in the use of various sources demands fuller consid-
eration. The undoubtedly to
correct principle to follow is
read from the general to the specific. A lawyer preparing his

case for court begins his examination of witnesses with the
examination of his client. With his story as a foundaôn
he then goes on to seek the lesser details that he needs to
"fill in" his case. He knows that to begin with the testi-
mony of his lesser witnesses would result in a confusion and
waste of time. He might find that the testimony he had
spent hours in seeking was more easily found elsewhere, or
that, after all, it was of no service to the cause of his
client.
1. Newspaper reading. The principle applies with equal
force in the search for evidence by preliminary reading in
general argumentation. For example, the American news-
paper is a valuable source of material. Few are the discus-
sions where it cannot be used with effect, if it is used properly.
But in most cases it should be handled as the lawyer would
handle the witness who testified that the defendant, on a
certainday and hour, came to a certain livery stable and
hired a certain horse and carriage. Such evidence might
hang a man; the whole question of the guilt of a murderer
might depend on the identification of that particular horse
and carriage. But that witness is not the first to be examined;
it might happen that his testimony had no bearing on the
case. The newspaper should be used in a similar way. It is

valuable as a means of corroboration; it may be valuable as
a source of facts for the support of some vital argument.
But it should rarely be read first. Various dangers arise
from such premature reading of the newspaper. In the first
place, it would often mean a waste of time. A writer of ac-
knowledged authority on a particular problem will put into
a few lines the substance of the whole of a popular newspaper
editorial. Again, the student who seeks such a lesser source
first will find that he has spent time in gathering arguments
and facts that better writers easily refute. More serious still,
an investigator will often get from such a doubtful source
falsp impressions that later reading cannot entirely efface.
The work of preliminary reading, in this respect, is an exact
analogy to the work of the architect or the contractor. What
kind of judgment would it be on his part to plan his roof and
windows before he knew the size of the house or the general
style of its architecture? The writer who goes in search of
newspaper facts before he knows the fundamental conditions
of the problerri in hand and the broad outlines of his .case
shows no better judgment.
2. The effective method is to begin the investigation
with the reading of (a) books and magazine articles that give
an understanding of the general conditions on which the
question is founded. The understanding so gained is a
touchstone by which all else may be tested. Next, take up
(b) magazine articles or pamphlets bearing on the particular
question in dispute. By this time the main ideas on which
the proof must be founded gradually appear, and the case
a.s a whole begins to assume a definite form. Finally, make
a discriminating use of (c) such sources as the newspaper, to
get details of evidence still needed in addition to that already
gathered to support all points you wish to prove. It is only
by following such a plan of reading as this that there can be
secured the three things most to be sought in the work of

reading preliminary to arrangement and final presentation,
viz.: (a)a grasp of the question as a whole; (b) an under-
standing of the vitally important points in the case; and (c)
the getting of evidence that is relevant and reliable.
K. What to do assimilate.
: Lastly in regard to the step
we are now considering, the thing to do with the material
gathered is to assimilate it. "Assimilation is the process
by which plants and animals convert food into the various
tissues of their own proper substance." When a man eats,
if the food he takes is properly assimilated, it ceases to exist
as food and becomes part of the man himself. So in argu-
mentation, assimilation is the process by which the student
converts the materials gathered from all sources into the
fibers of his own finished arguments. We have stated in the
preceding section that the first thing to be sought in the read-
ing of any book or article is the point or points which the
writer regards as vital in the case. Merely to seize upon these
ideas, however, and force them bodily into the proof without
change of form, would inevitably produce the same disastrous
effects that would ensue if a man should eat without digestion.
The proof would be weak and ill formed. It would be a mere
jumble of facts and figures. The varied and inharmonious
ideas of different men would be mixed together in confusion.
The force of evidence that might be made convincing would
be spent with no effect. To have strength and vitaUty in
proof, the ideas and arguments of other writers and thinkers
must be so fused with one another and with the ideas of the
student himself, that the final product bears httle if any re-
semblance to any one of the parts of which it is made; it is not
the idea of this book or that, nor the idea of the reader, but an
indivisible composite of all. Like the body, the proof is made
of many kinds of substances, but it must itself be new and a
distinctive unit.
L. The way to assimilate material. There is but one
way in which material can be so assimilated. It must be
done by and constant thought of the reader as he
the careful
progresses, step by When one starts out to read on any
step.
subject, he nearly always has ih. his own mind some original
conceptions of the question. In the first place, then, he
should understand just what these conceptions are. Then,
when in the course of his reading he finds some new idea,
some new argument, he should carefully compare it with the
contents of his own mind, and modify his own conceptions
accordingly. The ideas that result will not be those he has
read, nor will they be those he had originally: they will be
new. This process must be kept up unremittingly. The
material cannot be stored up for future assimilation any
more safely than a man could postpone the digestion of his
food. Each bit of material must be understood, compared,
and assimilated when it first is discovered. The evidence
gathered in this way ceases to exist in its various foreign
forms. The ideas no longer overlap or conflict with one an-
other. They fall into their proper places as parts of one
working body.
M. Personality. Such a method also gives to the proof
the invaluable quality of personality. Complete originality
in argumentation is very rare. The most effective speech or
essay often contains ideas and evidence that have become
time-honored by their frequent usage. But the ideas are so
altered by the personality of the author that they are made
new. They take on fresh forms and colors and gather an
original force. No quality is more valuable to charm or
interest an audience than and the
this quality of personality;
personality that is forceful in argumentation is always at-
tributable largely to the power of assimilation.
N. Conscious practice. This power is gained only by
practice. It may well grow into an unconscious habit of mind;
but the creation and development of it must always come
from conscious self-training. The ability to assimilate is,
of course, engendered and strengthened by other means than
preliminary reading in argumentation. But nowhere is the
application of the power more practical or more important;

and a student who is enterine unon the serious pursuit of
argumentation, however truly he may possess this quality
of mind in general, will do well to watch himself for a time,
lest he fall into other habits.
EXERCISE. CHAPTER 5
GATHERING MATERIAL
1. Hand in at least twelve cards of notes gathered for use

in your original forensic, carrying out accurately the
suggestions and directions for note-taking on cards given
in this chapter.
CHAPTER 6
EVIDENCE
OUTLINE
I. The Nature of Evidence
A. Persuasion and conviction in evidence.

B. Proof.
C. Evidence.
D. Argument.
E. Evidence in law.
F. Evidence in general argumentation.
G. Sources of evidence.
H. Prejudiced witnesses.
II. The Kinds of Evidence
A. Direct or circumstantial.
B. Written or unwritten.
C. Eeal or personal.
D. Original or unoriginal (hearsay).
E. Pre-appointed or casual.
F. Positive or negative.
G. Ordinary or expert.
1. "Argument from authority."
2. Documentation of sources not argument from authority,
III. The Tests of Evidence
A. Tests of the quality of the evidence itself.
1. Consistent with human nature?

2. Consistent with known facts?
3. Consistent with itself?
4. Can it pass the hearsay test?

a. In law courts.
b. In general argumentation.
80
EVIDENCE 81
(I) The nature of the evidence itseh'.
(U) The channel through which it comes.

5. Is it exceptionally valuable?
a. Admissions against interest.
b. Casual or undesigned.
c. Negative.
d. Real.
B. Tests of the sources of evidence.
1. Ordinary ("fact") witnesses.
a. Physically qualified?
b. Mentally qualified?
(I) Memory.
(II) Accuracy.
(A) Thoughtless exaggeration.
c. Morally qualified?
(I) "Unduly interested in case.
(II) General moral character.

d. Opportunity for getting the truth?
2. Expert ("Opinion") witnesses.
a. Opinion evidence needed?
b. Authority qualified?
c. Authority recognized?
I. The Nature of Evidence

A. Persuasion and conviction in evidence. We now
come to the consideration of the second of the two parts in
the process of Selection, viz., the choosing from whatever
materials we have been able to gather, of those facts, argu-
ments, or appeals that will best serve our purpose in the case
in hand. we must remember the dual
Here, as everywhere,
nature of argumentation: our materials must be judged
all
and chosen in accordance with the standards boJ;h of con-

viction and of persuasion. Persuasion requires that we
consider the character, intelligence, and personal interests
of our audience or readers, and the circumstances in which
we are arguing, so that we may make use of the ideas and
methods that will strike most directly and forcibly upon
the imagination and peculiar emotions of those we address.
While evidence must be chosen primarily on the basis of its
logical sufficiency, it is well always to consider also its per-
suasive possibilities. When a choice is possible between evi-
dential facts, witnesses, groups of evidence, or methods of
proof, that which will have the more persuasive effect should
be chosen. But persuasion is a secondary consideration here.
Nothing can be good evidence that does not qualify as a
sound basis for conviction. Conviction requires that we un-
derstand what it is that constitutes the inherent strength of
we may employ evidence
the various kinds of proofs, so that
and argument that will seem to the minds of others to be
logically strong and accurate. Leaving the standards of per-
suasion to be discussed at a later time, let us now turn to the
question : What are the inherent elements of strength and of
weakness in the various kinds of proof .''
B. Proof is the name used to designate "anything which

serves, either immediately or mediately to convince the mind
of the truth or falsity of any fact of proposition. . . .
'Proof isapphed to the conviction generated in the

also
mind by proof properly so called." ^ "The word proof
... is applied by the most accurate logicians, to the effect
of evidence, and not to the medium by which truth is es-
tablished." ^ There is then substantial authority for using
the word to designate that which convinces the mind or the
conviction generated the effect produced. The fact that
both of these meanings are in common use should be borne
in mind by all students of argumentation. It may save
misunderstanding in debate. But constructively it is of
little or no consequence which meaning we use. The "bur-
den means the same whichever definition is used;
of proof"
and work under either we must consider the same sub-
in our
divisions
(1) evidence, and (2) arguments.
C. Evidence. "The word evidence ... is applied to
that which tends to render evident or to generate proof.
' Best, p. 5. 2 Greenleaf, p. 3.

EVIDENCE 83
. . . Evidence, thus understood, has been well defined,

any matter of fact, the efiFect, tendency, or design of which is,
to produce iii the mind a persuasion, Affirmative or disaf-
firmative, of the existence of some other matter of fact. The
fact sought to be proved is termed the 'prin cipal fact':
^
the fact which tends to estabhsh it, 'the e videntiarv fact. '
If A. is the '
principal fact ' to be proved, and X the ': evi-
dentiary fact,' the evidence then the claim thatoiBFered, X
pr oves A is an argument. This distinction should be kept clear.
"When one offers 'evidence,' ... he offers, otherwise than
by reference to what is already known, to prove a matter
of fact which is to be used as a basis of inference to another
matter of fact. ..In giving evidence we are furnishing to
a tribunal a new basis for reasoning. The new element . . .
thus added is what we call evidence." ^ Evidence then con-

sists of all the matters of fact that may be used in the generat-
ing of proof. It is the raw material from which the finished
product, proof, is to be manufactured.
D. Argument, in its restricted meaning, is the name
used to designate the process by which, from knowing the
existence of one fact, or a certain number of facts, we infer
the existence of other facts. This meaning of the word "ar-
gument" must not be confused with other meanings. The
word may be used to refer to a finished discourse as a whole;
it may refer to an entire debate or discussion; or, as here,
it may mean simply a single process of reasoning. There is,
perhaps, no better definition of an argument, in this sense,

than Cardinal Newman's definition of reason, as "any proc-
ess or act of^the mind by which, from knowing one thing,
it advances on to know another!" To continue the analogy
of manufacturing, suggested in the last paragraph, argument
is the process by which the raw material, evidence, is turned
into the finished product, proof.

E. Evidence in law. Before discussing the classifica-
tion and tests of evidence in general argumentation, we should
' Best, p. 6. 2 Xha^yer, pp. 263, 264.
have clearly in mind what legal evidence means as distinct
from evidence as used in ordinary discussion outside of court
trials. We should know the fundamental precepts and pur-
poses of the law of evidence in order to understand, and to
be able properly to apply, whatever borrowings we may
make from this division of legal practice. A clear under-
standing of the law of evidence will show us why evidence
in argumentation outside of law courts should not be rigidly
subjected to the legal tests.
The law of evidence concerns itself with furnishing to
courts matters of fact for their use in arriving at judicial
decisions in regard to questions before them. In discharging
their proper functions the courts of law are not engaged in
academic discussions nor in the work of discovering and en-
forcing abstract truth or abstract justice. Their purpose is
to se ttle disp utes and award justice as fairly and accurately
as may be under the limits imposed upon them, such as time,
expense, etc., and by the use of such instrumentalities as are
available for their employment. The law of evidence has
developed to meet the requirements of this practical situa-
tion^ and is not a set of rules to be followed outside^Tthe
courtroom, by those working upon questions which are not
to be decided in courts of law.
The function of the law of evidence is set forth as follows
^
by Professor Thayer:
"(1) It prescribes the manner of presenting evidence; as
by requiring that it shall be given in open court by one who
personally knows the thing appearing in person, subject to
cross-examination, or by allowing it to be given by deposition,
taken in such and such a way; and the like. (2) It fixes the
qualifications and the privilege of witnesses, and the mode of
examining them. (3) And chiefly, it determines, as among
probative matters, matters in their nature evidential, what
classes of things shall not be received. This excluding func-
tion is the characteristic one in our law of evidence."
' Prel. Treat., p. 264.
EVIDENCE 85
The relevancy of a piece of evidence cannot be settled by

law. Matters are relevant or not according to the tests of
logic and general experience. T he law of evidenc e s imply
s ays that under ce rtain circumstances certain relevant evi-
dence shall not be admitte d. It consists of a set of excluding

rules which exclude certain classes of relevant evidence, and
consists further of certain exceptions to these rules, which
admits subdivisions of classes of evidence excluded by the
general rules. Strictly legal tests of evidence are not tests of
logical relevancy, but tests of legal admissibility. The
grounds upon which legal admissibility has been denied to
certain classes of evidence are various. Some kinds of evi-
dence are thought to be of too little importance, in some the
connection is too farfetched. Some kinds of evidence are
excluded because it is feared their effects upon the juries
would not be salutary; others are excluded on grounds of
general public policy, etc., etc. It is well for the student of
general argumentation to be as familiar as possible with the
law of evidence in order to understand what use may prop-
erly be made outside of the courtrooms of suggestions to be
drawn from rules which are rigidly enforced ia the courts
themselves.
F. Evidence in general argumentation. In brief then,
in generalargumentation we may have good evidence that
would not be admitted in law courts. Relevancy logical ,
sufficiency^ what we demand of evidence outside of courts.

is
But In law^ evidence must meet this test and then also meet
the requirements of the law of evidence. There is no "law of
evidence" as such outside of the courts. So the oft heard
statement that such and such evidence "would not be ad-
mitted in any court in the country" has really very little
force if the discussion is being carried on outside of a court.

The have to do mainly with admissi-
rules of legal evidence
bility, we have no
while in general argumentation, where
rules of admissibility, we are concerned mainly with rele-
vancy. However, while we do not exclude, it is probably well
p

to scrutinize very carefully in general argumentation evidence
that courts have thought it best to exclude entirely from the
consideration of juries. In order to be able to do this, on
the one hand, and to be ready, on the other, to thwart who-
ever (either in, ignorance or cunning) tries to apply in general
discussion the excluding rules of the law courts, it is well
to note carefully the references to the law of evidence, and
to legal procedure which are given in this book.
G. The sources of evidence. Evidence which seems
on its face to be credible, consistent, and convincing may be
rendered of no account by an exposure of weakness in the
source from whence it comes. The source s of evidence are
three erson s, d ocuments, and thing s. Persons are of
course the most important source. The testimony of persons
may of course be written as well as spoken. Not all written
evidence documentary. Books, magazine articles, etc.,
is
used in general argumentation should be used as the personal

testimony of their authors. When a writer states in a book
that a certain thing is true, this is personal testimony that
the thing is true and documentary evidence that he stated
that it was true. The person behind all personal testimony
should be tested alike in written and oral evidencfe. As the
term is used in this book "witness" covers both "speaker"
and "writer." It may be said, however, that written testi-
mony is less likely to contain such errors as are due to simple
thoughtlessness. But in all cases the sources of evidence
should be carefully examined. If it can be shown that the
statements, however plausible, are mere careless assertions
of unreliablgjiersjais, or that the, testimony wasgiven with
some dishonest_motive, its value is gone. So it is always
necessary in selecting one's own proof or in attacking the
proof of an opponent to know what kinds of witnesses give
good evidence, and what kinds bad evidence. Looked at
from the viewpoint of the sources from whence the evidence
is derived, there are two kinds of evidence: (a) o rdina ry_esi-
dence, and (b) expert evidence. There are certain tests

EVIDENCE 87
that may be applied to all witnesses; these are the tests of

the sources of ordinary evidence. Then the examination of
the class of witnesses known as "experts" demands the
application of certain additional tests.
H. Prejudiced witnesses. Before passing on to a con-
sideration of the kinds of evidence and the tests of evidence,
it maybe well to state what the function of the witness is,
to analyze his operations, and to give a warning concerning
a big question that is important in connection with the
testimony of all kinds of witnesses. A witness has to- gather
impressions, facts, information, and then 'present these to
others. He must learn the tnith and tell it A good witness
.
must he capable and desirous offinding out or receiving the truth,

and capable and desirous of reporting the truth. The big
question that we must ask in regard to each witness is "with
what prejudice, if any, does he look upon the matter concern-
ing which he is testifying?"
Prejudice, bias, self-interest, personal liking for one thing
and dislike for another affects the truth finding as well as the
truth telling of many men who are desirous of finding and tell-
ing nothing but the truth. It is to a great extent true that

men (all men and womennot simply the less intellectual)
believe what they want to believe. They are not capable
of finding the truth in regard to some things because they
look at these things through colored glasses. What many
honest men see, hear, and even taste, and smell, depends
to a certain extent upon their prejudices. The solution of the
difficulty thus presentednot to resolve not to use preju-
is
diced witnesses, but to use the least prejudiced witnesses

possible. To decline to receive or accept the testimony of
prejudiced witnesses is to decline all testimony on most of the
important questions of the day. Of course there are many
mere questions of -fact in which prejudices are of no account.
But in general argumentation, in politics, economics, sociol-
ogy, religion, literature, education, etc., most men who are
discussing questions, writing articles, and books, have def-
inite opinions, beliefs, interests,and prejudices. This does
not mean that we must disregard what they testify to, but
that we must weigh their testimony with reference to their
pre-conceived notions, and always listen to the testimony on
both sides. Read what both the advocates and opponents of
a certain measure find in the facts of a given event, and then
draw your own conclusions as to the truth. Do not try to
get the truth concerning something from those who are
naturally prejudiced against it, and do not accept without
comparison with the statements of opponents the testimony
concerning something of those who are naturally prejudiced
in its favor.
II. The Kinds of Evidence

Evidence may be classified in a number of ways. Some of
the divisions made are more or and there is
less arbitrary
slight disagreement among authorities, especially as to nomen-
clature. It is well worth whUe, however, to examine the com-
moner classifications and definitions at least to the extent
of learning what is meant by the terms used.
A. Direct or circumstantial. The most common classi-
fication of evidence is into (1) direct and (2) indirect or cir-
cumstantial. "Evidence is either direct or indirect; accord-
ing as the principal fact follows from the evidentiary the
factum probandum from the factum probans immediately
or by inference. In jurisprudence, however, direct evidence
is commonly used in a secondary sense; viz., as limited to
cases where the principal fact, or factum probandum, is at-
^
tested direct by witnesses, things, or documents."
'
In law, then, the term direct evidence is usually applied

to the testimony of persons who declare the existence of the
fact in issue, speaking from their own personal knowledge.
The important factor is that these persons testify directly
as to the existence of the fact in issue. The testimony is
required to be based on their own personal knowledge by

1 Best, pp. 15, 16.
EVIDENCE 89
the hearsay rule. The evidence would still be direct as

distinct from circumstantial if the information were second-
hand or "hearsay," but since as such it would normally be
inadmissible in a law court, direct evidence in law is defined
in terms which cover direct original evidence. "A witness
testifies that he saw A inflict a mortal wound on B, of which
he instantly died; this is a case of direct evidence." ^ If the

witness testified that C told him that he (C) saw A kill B,
the evidence would still be direct (i. e., not circumstantial)
but it would be inadmissible as hearsay in law. Outside of
law courts, however, we act on this kind of direct evidence
every day. Indirect or circumstantial evidence ^ is " evidence
of some other fact, or facts, from which, taken singly or
collectively, the existence or nonexistence of the particular
fact, or facts, in question, may be inferred as a necessary
or probable consequence." ^ It is obviously impossible to
classify evidence as direct or circumstantial until we know the
"fact in issue" to determine which this evidence is advanced.
If it immediately affirms or denies some fact from which an

inference is made to the "fact in issue," it is circumstantial.
" If a witness testifies that a deceased person was shot with
a pistol, and the wadding (used in this pistol) is found to be
part of a letter addressed to the prisoner, the residue of which
is discovered in his pocket," * that is indirect or circumstan-
tial evidence. the existence of these facts the jury may
From
"
infer the guilt of the prisoner. ' Circumstantial evidence is
either conclusive or presumptiv e: conclusive, where the con-

nection between the principal and evidentiary facts the
factum probandum and factum probans a necessary is
consequence of the laws of Nature; presumptive, where it

only rests on a greater or less degree of probabihty. In
practice this latter is termed 'presumptive evidence' ob-
viously a secondary sense of the word; for direct. evidence is
in truth only presumptive, seeing that it rests on a presump-

' Greenleaf, p. 17. ' Hughes, p. 1.
* See Presumptions of Fact, ch. 3. * Greenleaf, p. 17.
tion of the accuracy and veracity of witnesses, things, or
^
documents."
The most effective proof is gained by the use of these two
kinds of evidence in combination. Direct evidence may be
untrustworthy because of mistakes in the observation of the
witness or because of prejudice. Circumstantial evidence
may be inconclusive because of a possible ambiguity in the
inferences to be drawn from it. But when the two kinds are
used together, each confirming the other, the evidence be-
comes of the highest possible efficiency.
B. Written or unwritten. With respect to its form, we
may. classify evidence as: (1) written, and (2) unwritten.
In the court of law a considerable part of the evidence is un-
written. It consists of the spoken testimony of witnesses,
present before the judge or jury. In formal debate elsewhere,
however, the evidence is largely written.^ It is often akin
in its nature to the spoken testimony of the courts, in that
it expresses the beliefs of different persons as to the existence
of certain facts. But the persons themselves are rarely

present to express their beliefs orally. Their opinions are
gathered from books, magazines, newspapers, and docu-
ments.
C. Real or personal. "Again, evidence is either (1)
real or (2) personal.' By real evidence is meant evidence of
I
Best, p. 16.
' See p. 86. The Sources of Evidence, this chapter.
'
" Stephen's limitation of the term 'evidence' to (1) the statements of
witnesses and documents is too narrow. When, in a controversy be-
(2)
tween a and his customer, involving the fit of a coat, the customer
tailor
puts on the coat and wears it during the trial, as in Brown vs. Foster, 113
Mass. at p. 137, a basis of inference is supplied otherwise than by reasoning
or statements, whether oral or wiitten; and it seems impossible to deny to
this the name of 'evidence.'
"It is what Bentham calls "real evidence,' a phrase which imports a very
valuable discrfinination, when limited to that which is presented directly to
the senses of the tribunal. It is not, practically, of much importance when
divided further into 'reported real evidence,' etc. Best in his treatise, ha.s
confused the topic by following Bentham into this sort of refinement, over-
EVIDENCE 91
which any object belonging to theclass of things is the source,

persons also being included, in respect to such qualities as
belong to them in common with things." ^ Real evidence is
obtained when weapons or wounds are exhibited to the jury,
or fences or railroad crossings are examined by them, or a
person whose age or parentage is in issue appears before the
jury to be seen by them. Real evidence, of course, cannot
be hearsay. It is evidence presented directly to the senses
of those who are to judge, without any interpretation by a
person. The evidence speaks for itself There is no "thought
.
communication." It may of course be presented to any of

the senses, sight, hearing, taste, smell, etc.
Personal evidence is that which is afforded by a human
agent, either in the way of discourse, or by voluntary signs
(made for the purpose of communicating thoughts). Evi-
dence gained by observation (of the person of the witness) or
that afforded by involuntary changes of countenance and de-
portment comes under the head of real evidence.^ When-
ever a witness communicates thought to a judge or jury either
by spoken language or by signs, he is giving personal evidence;
while if he shows the jury a wound, or that he can raise his
arm by raising it for them to see, he is giving real evidence.
D. Original and unoriginal. A division of evidence that
is important because under it we get one of the terms (hear-
say) that we hear most about in discussions of evidence, is

the division into (1) original and (2) unoriginal evidence.
Original evidence is that "which has an independent proba-
tive force of its own; unoriginal, also called derivative,
transmitted, or secondhand evidence, is that which derives
its force from, through, or under some other." ^ Best
gives five forms of unoriginal evidence, but these minute
subdivisions are not of importance to the student of general
looking, probably, for the moment, the Bentham, milike himself,

fact that
was engaged in a philosophical discussion and was not writing a law book."
Footnote, Thayer, pp. 263, 261.
1 Best, p. 16. 2 See Ibid. ' Ibid., p. 17.
argumentation. For us it is substantially correct to say that
unoriginal evidence means hearsay evidence.
Hearsay evidence is defined by Greenleaf ^ as "that kind
of evidence which does not derive its value solely from the
credit to be given to the witness himself, but rests also in
part on the veracity and competency of some other person.
. . Its extrinsic weakness, its incompetency to satisfy the
.
mind as to the existence of the fact, and the frauds that may
be practised under its cover, combine to support the rule,
that hearsay evidence is totally inadmissible." Hearsay
evidence, in brief, is the evidence of persons who testify to
the existence of some fact, on the ground that they have
been informed of its existence by some other person. Hearsay
evidence, of course, is always "personal," never "real." For
the exceptions to the hearsay rule in law see Best, ch. IV.^
In general argumentation. What the courts exclude, ar-
gumentation elsewhere should treat with suspicion, but
should not necessarily rule out. Courts must have rules
that will apply to all alike. But we are not so bound in gen-
eral argumentation. 'Of course, the hearsay evidence of the
ignorant, the careless, the vicious, is worthless. But hearsay
evidence coming through accurate, trained minds may be of
such a character that it would be absurd to question it on
the ground that it is hearsay. Secondhand evidence, how-
ever, is usually less convincing than original evidence. The
testimony may be too many stages removed from the fact
itself. An audience will often suspect that the arguer cannot
or dare not produce the original authority. Again, it is too
easily overthrown. a reliable witness who has a first-hand
If
knowledge can be brought to testify to any fact of a con-
tradictory nature, the hearsay evidence is immediately
brought to the ground.
Care must be taken not to confuse direct and original
evidence. If A testifies that B said that he saw kill Y, X
this is direct but hearsay. If A testifies that he saw run- X
1 Pages 121, 122. Pp. 434-444.

EVIDENCE . 93
ning away from the scene of the murder of at Sbont the Y

time Y
must have been killed, this is original but circum-
stantial evidence that X murdered Y.
E. Pre-appointed or casual. Evidence may be divided
into (1) pre-appointed evidence and (2) casual evidence.
Wherever "the creation or preservation of an article of evi-
dence has been, either to public or private minds, an object
of solicitude, (viz. in the view of its serving to give
. . .
effect to a right, or enforce an obligation, on some future

contingent occasion), the evidence so created and preserved
^
comes under the notion of pre-appointed evidence."
Deeds, notes, written contracts, etc., are forms of written
pre-appointed evidence. When a man arranges to have
certain persons witness his words or actions in order that
they may testify to what he said or did, we have unwritten
pre-appointed evidence. Any evidence not coming under
the head of pre-appointed evidence is casual or undesigned
evidence. It is evidence that has been neither created nor
preserved for the purpose of using it as evidence of the fact
now being substantiated by it. This kind of evidence con-
sists of testimony given by persons who, when they gave it,
had no thought that it would ever be used as evidence in the

case in question. Speaking for another purpose a person
often lets fall a statement that is merely incidental. The
value of such evidence lies in its freedom from the suspicion
of any hidden motive. It is ingenuous and presumably hon-
est. But it has very serious weakness. The testimony may
well have been careless. The witness, thinking the assertion of
slight importance, may have been indifferent as to its accuracy.
Mr. Webster, in the following selection from his argument
in theWhite murder trial, enforced the value of some of his
evidence by showing that it was undesigned:
"Mr. Southwick swears all that a man can swear. He has the
bestmeans of judging that could be had at the time. He tells you
* Best, p. 18, quoted from 2 Bentham Jud. Ev., 435.


that he left his father's house at half-past ten o'clock, and as he
passed to his own house in Brown Street, he saw a man sitting on
the steps of the rope-walk; that he passed him three times, and
each time he held down his head, so that he did not see his face.
That the man had on a cloak, which was not wrapped around him,
and a glazed cap. That he took the man to be Frank Knapp at the
time; that, when he went into his house, he told his wife that he
thought it was Frank Knapp; that he knew him well, having known
him from a boy. And his wife swears that he did so tell her when
he came home. What could mislead this witness at the time? He
was not then suspecting Frank Knapp of anything. He could not
then be influenced by any prejudices. If you believe that the
witness saw Frank Knapp in this position at this time, it proves the
'
case."
F. Positive or negative. This classification is important

because of the peculiar nature and significance of what has
long been called (especially by rhetoricians) "negative evi-
dence." The term (1) positive evidence is rarely used. It is
needed simply to balance the negative. Positive evidence is

all actual evidence. (2) Negative evidence is the term applied
to a significant absence of evidence: as for instance, the ab-

sence of signs of campfires, as evidence that campers have not
preceded you along a certain trail; or the failure of a member
of a dinner party to mention, vs^hile discussing the dinner
later, that one of the guests died at the table of heart failure,
as evidence that this did not happen.
Such negative testimony, or the testimony of silence
"the failure of the witness to mention a fact so striking that
he must have noticed it had it occurred" ^has often been
mentioned by writers on argumentation as evidence of special
value.^ The legal writers on evidence make statements
that seem at first quite contradictory. "Ordinarily a witness
who testifies to an affirmation is entitled to credit in prefer-
ence to one who testifies to a negative, because the latter
1 TheWorks of Daniel Webster, Vol. VI, p. 90.

2 See Baker and Huntington, p. 131, and Genung, Prac. Rhet., p. 410.

EVIDENCE 95
may have forgottenwhat actually occurred, while it is im-

possible to remember what never existed." ^
"Our old lawyers lay down broadly, 'It is a maxim in
law that witnesses cannot testify a negative, but an affirm-
ative.' From these and similar expressions it has been
rashly inferred, and is frequently asserted, that 'a negative
is incapable of proof,' a position wholly indefensible if un-
derstood in an unqualified sense. Nothing more was meant
than to express the undoubted truth that, in the ordinary
course of things, the burden of proof is not to be cast on the
party who merely denies an assertion. The ground on which
this rests has been already explained; and another grave ob-
jection to requiring proof of a simple negative is its indefi-
niteness. A person asserts that a certain event took place,
not saying when, where, or under what circumstances; how
ani I to disprove that, and convince others that at no time, at
no place, and under no circumstances, has such a thing oc-
curred? The utmost that could possibly be done in most
instances would be to show the improbability of the supposed
event; and even this would usually require an enormous
mass of presumptive evidence. Hence the well-known rule
that affirmative evidence is in general better than negative evi-
dence. But when the negative ceases to be a simple one,

when it is qualified by time, place, or circumstance, much
of this objection is removed; and proof of a negative may
very reasonably be required when the qualifying circum-
stances are the direct matter in issue, or the aflBrmative is
either probable in itself, or supported by a presumption,

or peculiar means hands of the party
of proof are in the
asserting the negative." These statements are not incon-
^
sistent. The legal writers make these remarks usually in

connection with a discussion of the burden of proof. All
sound thinkers agree that the affirmative (the affirmative
on the substance of the proposition, regardless of form)
has the burden of proof. So the courts insist on affirmative
1 Greenleaf, note 1, p. 93. ^ Best, pp. 262, 263.
evidence, and do not require proof of a simple negative on
account of its indefiniteness. But when we have a simple,
definite, qualified denial, the case is quite different. And it
is only in regard to questions sufficiently qualified in time,

place, and circumstance that rhetoricians give special value
to negative evidence or the testimony of silence the ab-
sence of evidence where it would naturally be found if the
statement made were .true.
For instance, the absence of a man's name from the list of
students published in a college catalogue is negative evidence
that this man is not a student at this college. The failure
of the newspapers of a certain city for the month of May,
1888, to mention a sensational murder trial alleged to have
been held in that city during that month is negative evidence
that no such trial took place. If we fail to find in the stand-
ard biographies of a man any reference to his having been
elected to an important pubHc office, it is safe to conclude
that he never was so elected. The strength of this evidence
is similar to that of casual evidence. It lies in the difficulty
of "manufacturing" or manipulating it. The absence of
evidence to support a claim where we have a right to expect
it to be found if the claim is true, is in many cases more con-
vincing than positive assertions. The common expression

"If that were true, we would have heard about it" expresses
the universal faith in negative evidence.
G. Ordinary or expert. Evidence may be classified as
(1) ordinary and (2) expert. Most evidence is ordinary.
This term covers all not expert. Expert testimony
that is
strictly speaking is called in law "opinion evidence" and in

general argumentation "argument from authority." These
two terms cover practically parallel things, and we will gain
considerably in general argumentation if we understand the
legal doctrine of "opinion evidence" and follow it in dealing
with "argument from authority." In law the testimony of an
"ordinary" witness is not always limited strictly to matters
of ikct. There are at times circumstances under which an
EVIDENCE 97
ordinary witness is allowed to testify ia regard to matters

of opinion, such for instance as his opinion regarding the
"character" or the "sanity" of some other person. Also,
there arise at times in law trials circumstances under which
an "expert" witness testifies as to matters of fact rather than
to matters of opinion. For
an expert chemist
instance,
might very weU testify as to matters of fact in the realm of
chemistry, under which circumstances he could not be called
strictly an " opinion " witness. However, the expert is usually
asked to interpret facts which he or other witnesses estab-
lish, and this interpretation which is the expert's principal
function usually is, of course, opinion evidence in law, or

argument from authority in general argumentation.
Professor Thayer ^ has the following to say concerning ex-
pert witnesses:
"What is their function? It is just this, of judging facts
and interpreting them. They are called in because, being men
of skill, they can interpret phenomena which other men cannot,
or cannot safely, interpret.'^ They 'judge' the phenomena,
the appearances or facts which are presented to them, and
testify to that which in truth these signify or really are; they
estimate qualities and values. We say that they testify to
opinion. In truth, they are 'judging' something, and testi-
fying to their conclusion upon a matter of fact. It is perfectly
well settled, in our law, and, as it would seem, elsewhere,
that such opinions or judgments are merely those of a wit-
ness; they are simply to aid the final judges of fact, and not
to bind them."
The ordinary witness testifies that a certain alleged fact
is true because he actually observed it to be so; the expert
testifies that the same alleged fact is true because certain
other facts exist, and his peculiar and exceptional knowledge
him in inferring the existence of the fact in question.
justifies
The ordinary witness in a law court is not allowed to express
an opinion or even to use a word which shows his opinion.
' Page 196. ' Italics ours.
le must state what he saw, heard, etc., without character-
sing it in any way. Under certain circumstances "experts"
re called who are allowed to express opinions or give opin-
m evidence.
To take a simple illustration, the question is whether a
ertain man who was shot and killed wore a certain coat on
he day of the murder. The ordinary witness may testify
biat he saw the deceased near the place of the murder a short
ime before the deed, and that he was wearing the coat in
uestion. The expert finds certain stains on the coat and
dth the aid of his exceptional knowledge of chemistry, he
ifers that the stains are blood stains and freshly made,
opinion. He is allowed to give this opinion to the
'his is his
iry. An ordinary witness maiy tell the jury that he saw A

trike B in a certain manner. The expert can tell the jury
whether such a blow would be fatal to a man in B's condition,
'learly in these cases the value of the testimony of the expert
epeiids upon This is always the
his special technical skill.
rimary test of expert evidence: Is the witness possessed of
iich knowledge that he will draw the correct conclusions
om the facts presented to him? It is as a rule only when the

spert is dealing with questions on which the layman cannot
e expected to draw his own conclusions, that he is allowed to
ive opinion evidence; and until this point is reached he is
nly an ordinary witness, regardless of his position or repu-
ition.
"As to the former (opinion evidence) it is traceable easily
3 the same source as the hearsay rule. ... It was for the
iry to form opinions, and draw inferences and conclusions,
nd not for the witness. He was merely to bring in to the
iry, or the judge, the raw material of fact, on which their
linds were to work. The witness was not to say that
. . .
e 'thought' or 'believed' so and so: it was for the jury to

ly what they thought and believed. The witness must say
'hat he had 'seen and heard;' ... In a sense all testi-
lony to matter of fact is opinion evidence, i. e., it is a con-

EVIDENCE 99
elusion formed from phenomena and mental impressions.

Yet that is not the way we talk in courts or in common life.
Where shall the line be drawn? When does matter of fact

first A difficult question but some
become matter of opinion ? ;
things are clear. There are questions which require special

training and knowledge to answer them. On such . . .
questions, then, the ordinary jury may be assisted by skUled

witnesses, who give their opinions. There is ground for
. . .
saying that, in the main, any rule excluding opinion evidence

is limited to cases where, in the judgment of the court, it wiU
not be helpful to the jury. Whether accepted in terms or not,

this view largely governs the administration of the rule." ^
Opinion evidence, then, is admissible in the courtroom
when (a) a question for decision is such that to answer it
requires special training, skill, ability, or experience one
which the ordinary layman is unable to answer without the
help of someone who is specially prepared to understand such
a question, (b) an expert is available to assist the jury whom
(c) the court accepts as likely to be helpful to the jury in
arriving at the decision.

1.Argument from authority. In general argumentation
as we have said, this kind of evidence is what is knovm as
the "argument from authority." is a false name, for it
This
is not properly an argument,
a process of reasoning,
i. e.,
but evidence. It consists in establishing a fact by quoting

the opinion of some person whose knowledge is such as to
justify the acceptance of his inferences as truthful. Now the
legal procedure in this matter should be followed closely in
all argumentation. This will, among other things, do. away
with one of the most stupid and harmful of the bad practices
in contest debating that of quoting alleged "authorities"
on all sorts of questions, (a) The people quoted are usually
not authorities not expertsnot people specially qualified
to express opinions on the questions discussed, and (b) the
questions on which the authorities are cited- are not questions
' Thayer, p. 196.
which call for expert testimony. Very often they are plain,
ordinary, everyday propositions on which all citizens are sup-
posed to be qualified to pass judgment, (c) Moreover, author-
ities are rushed in without being so produced as to be accepted
by anyone as authorities whose opinions might be helpful.

It must be remembered that a distinguished man is not
necessarily an authority on any question on which he has
expressed an opinion.-' The fact that a man is a distinguished
scientist gives him no standing as a critic of literature. Suc-
cess in politics does not make a man an authority in educa-
tion. Dramatists are not per se entitled to the privileges
of opinion witnesses on questions of sociology; and the opin-
ions of famous clergymen in the field of economics should
usually be accorded the same good humored disregard that
ought to greet the pronouncements of learned economists
on questions of religion and theology. We are not saying that
a man should have no opinions except in his special field

of work ^but simply that the fact that a man is an authority
in one field does not make him an authority in other fields.
2. Documentation of sources ^ not argument from au-
thority. Care should be taken to avoid the common error of

treating all documentation of sources and identification of
witnesses as arguments from authority. When a great jurist
is quoted as saying that a certain law was passed in a certain
state on a given date, he is an ordinary witness to be tested

precisely as the farmer who testifies in regard to an accident
on the highway. When the judge is quoted, and the place
where his statement was found is given, the witness is identi-
fied, end the source of information documented, as should
usually be done; but there is no expert testimony offered, no

opinion evidence given, no comment from authority used. We
have the latter situation when we quote the judge as saying
that such and such a law would be unconstitutional.
The following is an example of argument from authorily
' See Argumentum ad verecundiam, p. 193.
' See Documentation of Sources, ch. 5.

EVIDENCE 101
from the speech by Patrick Henry on "The Right of a State

during the Revolution to Confiscate British Debts." In
seeking to prove that the confiscation of British debts is
warranted by necessity, he says :
"The necessity being great and dreadful, you are warranted to

lay hold of every atom of money within your reach, especially if it
be the money of your enemies. It is prudent and necessary to

strengthen yourselves and weaken your enemies. Vattel, Book 3d,
ch. 8, sec. 138, says: 'The business of a just war being to suppress
violence and injustice, it gives a right to compel by force him who
is deaf to the voice of justice. It gives a right of doing against the
enemy whatever is necessary for weakening him, for disabling him
from making any further resistance in support of his injustice, and
the most effectual, the most proper methods may be chosen, pro-
vided they have nothing odious, be not unlawful in themselves, or
exploded by the law of nature.' Here let me pause for a moment and
ask whether it be odious in itself or exploded by the law of nature
to seize those debts?" '
III. The Tests of Evidence

Very important for our purposes are the tests to be applied
to determine the value of evidence. To know whether a
piece of evidence is strong or weak is essential to the in-
telligent conduct of a case. We can use only a limited
amount of all that we gather. We must have the power to
discriminate. Then, too, we must know what is sti:ong
enough to be put in the forefront of the proof, and what is
so weak as to be valuable only for the purpose of "filling
in" and reinforcing the more important parts. For these
purposes we have two vital tests of evidence: (A), the test of
the quality of the evidence itself, and (B) the test of the sources
,
from whence it comes. For convenience in our discussion,

the sources of evidence will be referred to as "witnesses."
A. Tests of the quality of the evidence itself. 1. Is
the evidence consistent with human nature and human ex-
' Qreai Speeches by Great Lawyers, p. 13.

perience? Any man properly hesitates to accept as a fact
anything that runs contrary to his own past experience or the
experience of his fellow-men. To make him beheve in any
evidence that contradicts the beliefs of hisand his habits life
and substan-
of thinking requires explanation, enforcement,
tiation that soon become an argument in themselves, and
even then the unqualified acceptance of the proof may be
a matter of doubt. If the evidence is in this way contrary to
ordinary human experience, one must never neglect to main-
tain its truthfulness by explaining just why it is credible and
valuable. Campbell, in his Philosophy of Rhetoric ^ expresses
the situation, when he says: "From experience we learn to
confine our belief in human testimony within the proper
bounds. Hence we are taught to consider many attendant
circumstances which serve . . . to corroborate . . . its evi-
dence. The reputation of the attester, his manner of address,

the nature of the fact attested, the occasion of giving the testi-
mony, the possible or probable design in giving it and several

other circumstances have considerable influence in fixing the
degree of credibility." Evidence, then, should as far as pos-
sible be consistent with ordinary human experience and the
natural course of afliairs. If it is of any extraordinary nature,
its credibility must be shown before it will be of value or effect.
The weakness of evidence that is of an extraordinary na-

ture and contrary to common experience, is exposed in the
following selection from the speech by John Henry North in
the case of Rex vs. Forbes and others. Mr. North's client
was charged with committing criminal assault upon the Lord-
lieutenant of Ireland. Testimony was given by a certain
Dr. M'Namara, who said that he actually saw the defendant
hurl a bottle at the Lord-lieutenant in a public theatre.
Mr. North attacks testimony as follows:
"The Doctor in the middle gallery sees Handwich in the third

row of the upper one, though between them there were two benches
1 P. 77.
EVIDENCE 103
covered with people, and the boarded parapet in front of the upper
gallery besides! Through all these obstacles he sees him in that
dark corner of the gallery where he represents him to be placed;
sees him fling the bottle, and is now able, at this distance of time,
to identify his person. The saw in what he learnedly
bottle itself he
calls its transit. A
word or two on that same transit. I hold it
physically impossible that a bottle could have taken the course
described by Farrell and M'Namara, from the upper gallery to
the stage, without being observed by four or five hundred spec-
tators. Just think what the theatre is: a wide, illuminated area,
whose bounding surfaces are studded with eyes as numerous as
those of Argus. Not a square inch in that field of view which
was not painted on the retina of some one eye T)r other in that vast
assembly. Consider, too, the timethe interval between the play
and farce ^when the attention of the audience was not fixed upon
the stage, when people were all looking about them, recognizing
and greeting their friends and acquaintances. Was there no one
to mark this bottle but Farrell, M'Namara, and the young medical
student.? What, not one giggling girl in the boxes, glancing round
for admiration! not an operaglass pointed! no fortunate observer
of the transit but the astronomer from Ballinakill! Is all this
credible?
But this is not all voonders upon voonders, as the
Dutchman said when he got to London the greatest miracle is
to come. Down comes the bottle, thundex'ing from the upper
gaUery to the stage, and falls unbroken!"
2. Is the evidence consistent with known facts? The ne-

cessity is evident of avoiding contradiction between different
pieces of evidence presented in the proof, or between evidence
presented and other well-known facts. Its discovery by an
opponent or by the audience will ruin all confidence in the
guilty person. The mistake of adducing evidence that is
contradicted by the commonly known or easily proved facts
of the question is illustrated by the following examples.
A few years ago in a trial of a civil suit the defendant was
on the witness stand. He was seeking to establish an alibi.
In the course of his testimony he was asked to tell of all his
' Great Speeches by Great Lawyers, p. 659.

movements and doings on a particular day. He told of sev-
eral purchases he had made in the stores of the city, of his
visit to a barber's shop, and of various other incidents. When
this testimony was finished, the examining lawyer stated the
simple fact that the day in question had been the day of the
observance of President Wilhaih McKinley's burial. Everj-
shop and store had been closed. The testimony was not to
be reconciled with the facts well known to the judge and the
jury, and was discredited.
Webster used this test effectively in the White murder
trial to overthrow the testimony of one of the witnesses of
the defence:
"Balch says, that on the evening, whenever it was, he saw the

prisoner; the prisoner told him he was going out of town on horse-
back, for a distance of about twenty minutes' drive, and that he
was going to get a horse at Osborn's. This was about seven o'clock.
At about nine, Balch says he saw the prisoner again, and was then
told by him that he had had his ride, and had returned. Now it
appears by Osborn's books, that the prisoner had a saddle-horse
from his stable, not on Tuesday evening, the night of the murder,
but on the Saturday evening previous. This fixes the time about
which these young men testify, and is a complete answer and refuta-
tion of the attempted alibi on Tuesday evening." ^
3. Is the evidence consistent with itself? Evidence that

contradicts itself is of course the worst possible kind. Some
answer maybe made, some explanation given, to save the
situation when one's evidence is shown to be inconsistent
with human experience or known facts. Is human experience
correct and complete in regard to the matter in question?
Men are continually accepting beliefs that are inconsistent
with the experiences of their fathers. Are the known facts
really known or only supposed? Has there been a mistake?
Must we abandon some of the presumably established facts
in the light of new evidence? But when our evidence has an
' The Works of Daniel Webster, Vol. VI, p. 83.
EVIDENCE 105
inconsistency within itseK we cannot escape without suffer-

ing some disadvantage. We cannot go outside and show the
error is on the other side. There is something wrong with our
own e'îdence, and when this is exposed by our opponent
our cause has suffered more than would have been the case
had we failed to meet any other test. Inconsistency in the
disputant himself is unpardonable. So, when Oppius was
charged with defrauding the soldiers of their pensions,
Cicero refuted the charge by proving that the same persons
charged Oppius with a design to corrupt the army with his
extravagant gifts and So a man who in explaining
liberality.
a certain function, based
irregularity in regard to advertising
part of his case on the fact that a large crowd was neither
expected nor desired because the patronage was a fixed and
assured one, and based a second part of his case on the as-
sertion that he had to do what was done in order to catch the
public and get as large an attendance as was desired, lost
greatly in the minds of the judges when this inconsistency
was pointed out.
4. Can the evidence pass the " hearsay " test? a. In the
law courts, of course, hearsay evidence is ruled out unless it
comes under one of the recognized exceptions to the hearsay

rule. (See Best On Evidence.) ' But it is well to note that evi-
dence may be hearsay and therefore inadmissible if offered to
prove one thing, and original evidence and admissible if offered
to prove another. Evidence is inadmissible as hearsay only
when offered as evidence of the thing stated of the truth
of the remark made. For instance, W testifies, "I heard J
say to B 'the horse is sound.' " This is hearsay evidence if
offered to prove that the horse was sound. It is original evi-

dence if offered to prove that J warranted the horse.
b. In general argumentation, as a matter of fact, hearsay

evidence is often good. The question here is (1) whether the
evidence itself is of such a nature that it may be safely passed
from person to person with substantial accuracy, and (2)
' Pp. 431-444.
whether or not the channel through which the evidence
comes is satisfactory. The reasons for excluding hearsay at
all are: no chance for cross-examination of witness, witness
not under oath, the opportunity of someone in the chain not

saying what he meant, or someone not understanding cor-
rectly what was said. When by the mental and moral char-
acter of the persons forming the channel, an^ by the definite,
clean-cut nature of the evidence itself, these objections are
met, the fact that the evidence is hearsay amounts to very
little. For instance, we would give little credence to a village
story, vague "undocumented" rumor, or neighborhood
gossip, in regard to the behavior of newcomers to a neighbor-

ing estate ^people who would naturally be misunderstood and
mistrusted by many of the villagers. But if the dean of X
College announced in faculty meeting that the dean of Y
College had said that the president of Y had telephoned that
the governor had just vetoed a certain bill, the hearsay
evidence would be accepted and acted upon without question.
5. Is the evidence of a kind that is exceptionally valuable?
Under this head it is well to mention four kinds of evidence

that have special value. We should keep these in mind
when
testing evidence either our own or our opponents'.
a. Admissions and declarations against interest. These are
the terms given in the courts to the testimony of persons
contrary to what their own concern in the cause would sug-
gest. This testimony is there regarded as of such importance
and so free from doubt that secondhand evidence of such
statements is made admissible,^ contrary to the general
rule excluding all hearsay evidehce. When people make
deliberate statements to their own disadvantage the state-
ments are usually true, when people deliberately lie it is
because they think the lie is Sometimes

to their advantage.
the admission or declaration is made when the person is aware
of its damaging nature; sometimes, when unaware. Such
testimony is ordinarily reliable; but there are exceptions.
1 See Best, p. 440.

EVIDENCE 107
If the statement is made by a person unconscious of its

effect on his own interests, we must be sure that it was not
made under the influence of an intent to gain
carelessly, or
some other end. a deliberate admission or confession,
If it is
there may have been some hope of reward that led the wit-
ness to suffer a lesser evil for a greater gain; or the statement
may have been given under compulsion. In either case its
value is gone. But the presumption is always in favor of the
.
trustworthiness of this kind of evidence. To take an exam-

ple: a statement by any "protected" manufacturer that the
tariff duties were too high
if such a thing were possible
would be a worthy bit of evidence. But if it could be proved

that he was about to embark in some new enterprise where
the tariff could not help him, that his purpose was the de-
struction of some greater rival, or that he was in the hire of a
political manager, its force would be destroyed.
b. Casual or undesigned evidence. This kind of evidence,
whose character has already been discussed, is specially val-
uable because of its freedom from suspicion.
c. Negative evidence. Negative evidence has also been fully
explained. It is a third type that is generally considered
especially valuable because it cannot be easily manufactured
or "doctored." It is difficult to tamper with an absence of
evidence. Though sometimes, of course, the significant ab-
sence may be artificially brought about.
d. Real evidence. If the nature of the controversy is such
as to permit the use of real evidence this sort (already dis-
cussed) is of course much
better than personal evidence to
the same effect. When
one can exhibit the condition of a
wound, the ill fit of a coat, the dangerous condition of a bridge
or railroad crossing, such exhibition will be better than oral
descriptions of these things.
B. Tests of the sources of evidence. 1. Tests of ordi-
nary
" fact "witnesses.
a. Is the witness physically qualified? Most human
knowledge comes through the avenues of the five senses, and


it isfrom the information so received that we get evidence.
Clearly, then, the physical powers of a witness may have
great influence upon his reliability. If a witness is color-
blind, his testimony that green signal lights were displayed
at the time and place of a railroad accident must be ignored.
However, this test is not very common outside of the court-
room. The writers that furnish the materials of student
debate and of ordinary disputation everywhere are usually
beyond the reach of such examination, and their testimony
is not commonly of such a nature that it makes much dif-
ference whether they are blind, or deaf, or otherwise un-

fortunate physically. But whenever physical weakness may
have any possible effect on the testimony, the test should be
rigorously applied. It is one of the most effective of all
possible tests, for such a defect in a witness is conclusive
against his testimony.
witness mentally qualified? More important
b. Is the
for the purposes of general argumentation than the test of
physical endowment is the test of mental powers.
(I) Memory. The test of the memory of a witness is ap-
plicable everywhere. In the courts, it is a part of the "stock
in trade" of a cross-examiner. In ordinary argument it is
less significant. A defective memory is damaging, because
it a strong presumption of error in the statement of

raises
testimony. If the witness cannot remember things in general,
it is probable that he cannot clearly remember about the
particular fact in question. His impressions will probably

be vague and indistinct, and so his statements will be un-
reliable.
In the White murder trial, Webster used this test in
attacking a witness of the defence:
"Mr. Burchmore says, to the best of his belief, it was the evening
of the murder. Afterwards he attempts to speak positively, from
recollecting that he mentioned the circumstance to William Peirce
as he went to Mineral Spring on Fast-day. Last Monday morning
EVIDENCE 109
he told Colonel Putnam he could not fix the time. This witness
stands in a much worse plight than either of the others. It is diffi-
cult to reconcile all he has said with any belief in the accuracy of
'
his recollections."
Accuracy of statement. The accurate use of words

(II)
and phrases is not by any means universal. We shall treat
later of the different kinds of "liars"; but many mistakes of
verbal expression are wholly undesigned. Provincial phrases,
personal pecuUarities in speech, a tendency toward exaggera-
tion, may often lead a witness to say what he does not really
mean. In getting written evidence, to avoid the mistake of
misunderstanding the witness, the real import of the tes-
timony should be gathered from the evidence as a whole
rather than from the exact words of any particular sentences.
Witnesses who are habitually inaccurate must, of course, be
treated with suspicion. There are many writers whose prac-
tice it is to deal in generalities and bold over-statements.
If a man has a reputation for that style of writing, his tes-
timony is of little or no value; and, in any case his credibility
is liable to question.
(A) Thoughtless exaggeration. Accidental or thoughtless
exaggeration is very common in oral testimony, and arises
from habits of mind in the witness. Some men have an
irresistible impulse to "make things big," like Falstaff, with
his "eleven men in buckram." Intentional exaggeration is
simply one kind of deliberate lying. A witness who exag-

gerates can best be exposed by investigating his accuracy in
other instances. Collins ^ uses this test in his argument to
prove that Swift was not married to Esther Johnson, when,
in speaking of one of the witnesses, a certain Dr. Madden, he
says: "Of Madden it is sufficient to say that in temper and
in blood he was half French, half Irish; and that as a writer
he is chiefly known as the author of a work wilder and more
1 The Wmks of Daniel Webster, Vol. VI, p. 83.

2 Jonathan Swift, by J. C. Collins, ch. VI, pp. 146-157.


absurd than the wildest and most absurd of Whiston's
prophecies and Asgill's paradoxes." If a witness habitually
exaggerates, none of his statements can be accepted at their
face value.
C. Is the witness morally qualified? Deliberate perver-
sion of the truth implies some motive. With an expert the mo-
tive is most often that of pride. One expert is opposed to
another in some court trial or perhaps on some economic
question. Each feels that his reputation depends on the
overthrow of his rival. Consequently, though they may be-
gin with the most honest intentions, they yield to the de-
mands of the occasion, their testimony degenerates into a
spirited argument, and exaggeration and misrepresentation
are bred. With an ordinary witness the motive is some in-
terest in the question at issue. He feels some sympathy with
the parties most deeply involved in the outcome, or he him-
self has some interest in the question at issue.
A witness must be tested Avith these possible weaknesses in
view, in two respects: (I) 7s he unduly interested in the out-
come? and (II) What is his general moral character? This
second test is significant, because it tells us to what extent
the witness would permit unworthy motives to influence his
words. A reputation for low moral character in a witness
makes his testimony of little or no value.
This test one of the most common in the courts. Rufus
is
Choate gave a good illustration of its effectiveness in his

speech in the Dalton divorce case. While attacking one of
the leading witnesses of the plaintiff, he said:
"I begin, therefore, with the foundation witness in this case,

John H. Coburn, and I respectfully submit to you, that tried by
every test of credibility which the law recognizes, on your oaths
you are bound to disbelieve him. It is not that a laugh can be

raised against Coburn or his testimony that is nothing; it is that,
according to those tests which are founded on the longest and
widest experience the law deems satisfactory to show whether a
jury can safely believe or not, he is not to be believed. I submit.
EVIDENCE 111
then, that John H. Coburn is not an honest man, and is not, there-
fore, entitled tobe heard in so dehcate a work as bringing every
word my chent spoke on that evening to her husband; he is not an
honest man, and I put it on your solemn oath to you, that there
is not a man on that jury who, on the exhibition of John H. Coburn,
would intrust him to carry a bundle worth five dollars from this
courthouse to the depot." ^
D. Did the witness have an opportunity for getting the

truth? This is an obvious and important test. If the situa-
tion or experience of the witness has been such that he has not
had a chance to observe the existence of the facts to which
he testifies, and to observe them closely and carefully, his
statements are clearly untrustworthy. In the courts it is a
common method of impeaching testimony to show that a
witness was too far distant from the scene to see clearlj', that
he did not have time to observe cariefully, or that he did not
arrive in season.
This test is of first importance in all kinds of argumentation.
Innumerable are the writers who are ready to venture the
most positive statements on the foundation of a few weeks'
investigation, or who carelessly make bold assertions of some
general truth, when they have observed only a few phenom-
ena, and when those they have observed are as likely as not
to have been exceptional or sporadic in nature. It is not
uncommon that an author or a traveller visits such a coun-
try as Hussia for a few months or a year, and, on his return,
writes articles or abook on Russian society, Russia's political
methods, and her economic prospects. Now, such a man is
not to be criticised for writing in the magazines or publishing
a book; his narrative may well be interesting. But, as ev-
idence, his and prophecies generally amount to
statements
nothing; Russian society and politics cannot be analyzed in
a month. Again, how often we find newspaper writers and
pamphleteers giving the most emphatic testimony to defects
' Greed Speeches by Great Lawyers, p. 307.
:

in methods of colonial administration by their own govern-
ment, when they have never ventured beyond the borders of
their home states. Their earnestness may be good and their
patriotism commendable, but their testimony is worthless.
The opportunities for observation are insuflScient to make
good evidence.
2. The tests of the sources of expert evidence. This in
general argumentation is testing the authorities in "argu-
ments from authority." The "authority" used for the pur-
pose of such argument or such evidence as this must bear
three special tests
a. make the introduction of ojrinion
Is the case such as to
evidence arguments
from authority warrantable ? Do not
offend your audience by giving the opinions of alleged
authorities on questions on which the facts are available and
understandable to any intelligent man. Do not ask A to be-
lieve a thing because B believes it, when A's opinion is just
as good as B's. No authorities, no matter how good, should
be used in questions to settle which opinion evidence is not
needed.
b. Is the witness possessed of the knowledge and experience
necessary to justify his acceptance as an expert in the matter
in question?
c. 7s his authority recognized by the audience or reader?
However great the knowledge or skill of an expert, if his great-

ness is unknown to the hearer or reader, the effect of quoting
him will be a mere "flash in the pan." The audience or
reader will see in the pretended "authority" nothing more
than a meaningless name, and so will ignore his statement.
The disputant must always be sure that the worth of his
expert is accepted; and if there may be any doubt, his first
duty is to establish for him a satisfactory reputation.

EVIDENCE 113
EXERCISE. CHAPTER 6
EVIDENCE
1. Give an example of an item of evidence which shaU be

personal, circumstantial, and original.
2. Give an example of an item of evidence which shall be
negative, real, circumstantial, and ordinary.
direct, unwritten, hearsay, personal, and casual.
negative, real, casual, and circumstantial.
5. Hand in a clipping or copy of an argument from current
newspapers, magazines, lectures, or text-books, contain-
ing an argument from authority.
6. On evidence drawn from the sources mentioned in number
five, containing ordinary evidence, apply all of the tests
applicable to it, stating the results, and your final opin-
ion as to the value of the evidence.
CHAPTER 7
KINDS OP ARGUMENTS
OUTLINE
I. In Logic
A. Deduction.
B. Induction.
1. Real process of inference the same.
2. Object: necessary connection according to some general
principle.
3. Mutual dependence.
4. Kinds of induction:
a. Perfect.
b. Imperfect.
5. Methods of induction.
a. Agreement.
b. Difference.
c. Joint method.
d. Residues.
e. Concomitant variations.
C. The syllogism.
1. The special rules of the syllogism.
2. Definitions.
3. Sorites.
4. Inferences in quantitative relations.
5. Enthymemes.
6. The nature of syllogistic reasoning.
7. The weakness of the syllogism in general argumentation.
II. In Rhetoric
A. Antecedent probability.
1. Effect to cause not a part of a 'priori argument.
2. Methods of attack.
114
KINDS OF ARGUMENTS 115
a. Connection complete?
b. Cause adequate?
c. Other causes present?
d. Substitute argument?
B. Sign.
1. Effect to cause.
a. Methods of attack.
(I) Some other cause?
(II) Cause capable?
(III) Connection complete?
2. Effect to effect.
a. Methods of attack.
(I) Those already given
used in combination.
3. Association of phenomena in past.
a. Association of phenomena and generalization.
b. Methods of attack.
(I) Cases too few?
(II) Contrary cases?
(III) Inconsistent?
C. Example.
1. Generalization.
a. Illustrative and argumentative examples.
b. Methods of attack.
(I) Fair specimens?
(II) Large enough part of field?
2. Analogy.
a. Figurative analogy.
b. Literal analogy.
(I) Generalization from a single instance.
c. Summary.
d. Methods of attack.
(I) Those of generalization for literal.
(II) False analogy for figurative.
3. Cause and effect in example.
I. In logic. Forms of arguments are classified and

studied mainly from two points of view Logic and Rhetoric.
The difference already referred to between formal logic
and argumentation is strongly marked in the methods em-
ployed by each in the treatment of the kinds of arguments,
or, as the term is in logic, of "inferences." Logic explains
the different ways in which the mind may work in making
an inference or reasoning. purpose is to teach us to under-
Its
stand our own thought processes. In rhetoric or argumenta-
tion the purpose in discussing the methods of inference, or
"the kinds of arguments," is to make clear the rules that
must be followed in order to make arguments that wUl be
valuable for the purpose of convincing aiid persuading
others. It is not the mind of the speaker or writer that must
be satisfied in argumentation, but the mind of the hearer or
reader. For this purpose the necessity of knowing the
various kinds of arguments that may be used is twofold;
it isnecessary (1) in order to be able to select and use the
arguments that wUl be valuable in constructing one's own
proof, and (2) in order to be able to attack the proofs of an
opponent. In addition to these particular and practical ad-
vantages arising from a knowledge of the forms of argument,
logical and rhetorical, there seems to be a more general and
less definitely practical reason for studying all of the matters
discussed in this chapter. That is that anyone who is trained
in argumentation should he familiar vrith the vocabulary of
argument whether he ever makes practical use of it or not. One
who has had college or university training in argumentation
ought to be able to understand the logical terms and methods
here presented when they are used by others even if he
does not care to use them himself. With these purposes in
mind, let us see what the logicians^ can do to help us. Before
' In presenting material drawn from Logic in this chapter and in the
chapter on Fallacies, it has been thought much better for many reasons to
let the logicians speak for themselves. The following discussion is therefore
taken almost entirely from the standard text-books of recognized authorities
on logic (Jevons, Creighton, Bode, Hibben, Hyslop, Sidgwick). Great care
has been exercised in choosing material that will best serve the purposes of
students of argumentation. In all cases of quotations of any length, permis-
sion to use them has been obtained from the publishers, and has been ac-
knowledged elsewhere. Here again I express my thanks. J. M. O'N.
considering the kinds of arguments as usually given in rhet-

oric or argumentation we should understand what logic
has to say on the same subject under the heads of deduction,
induction, and the syllogism.
A. Deduction. "There are two directions in which
inference or reasoning may proceed. We may begin with
certain facts or principles which are already known, or are
assumed to be true, and proceed to show that some result
necessarily follows from them. Thus we might infer that if
the draughts of a stove are closed so that the supply of oxygen
is lessened, the fire will burn slowly; or from the relative
positions and revolutions of the planets, that an eclipse

of the sun will take place on a specified day and hour. This
method of reasoning is known as Deduction. It proceeds,
as we have from premises to conclusion. ... In
seen,
deductive reasoning the particular case is always brought
under some general law or principle, which is already known
or assumed as true. Socrates is known to be mortal, because
as a man he falls under the general law that all men are mortal,
the closing of the draughts is a case of lessened supply of
oxygen, and, therefore, in accordance with the general law,
a case of slow burning. A deductive inference shows what
are the results of the application of a general law to particular
facts or instances. It proceeds downwards, as it were, from
the general law to its consequences.
B. Induction. "In Induction, on the contrary, the
procedure is just the opposite of this. We begin with par-
ticular phenomena, and try to discover from them the law
or principle which unites them. Certain facts are observed
to happen together, and the problem is to find the ground or
explanation of this connection. Inductive inference is thus
a process of reading the general law out of the particular
facts. It is an insight into the nature of the whole or system,
based upon a careful examination of the parts. 'Yesterday
the smoke tended to fall to the ground, and it rained in the
afternoon.' These two facts may simply be observed a
number of times without any thought of their connection.
But intelligence asks: Why should they happen in conjunc-
tion? And to answer this question, we must begin by ana-
lyzing the facts in our possession. When the smoke falls to
the ground, the atmosphere must be lighter than usual; this
is the case when it contains a great deal of moisture; but when
the atmosphere is in this condition, it usually tends to dis-

charge its moisture in the form of rain; therefore we have
the general law which enables us to show that the behavior
of the smoke and the rain yesterday were not only accident-
ally conjoined, but essentially connected.
1. Real process of inference the same in deduction and
induction. "Deduction and Induction, then, are both

forms of inference, but the starting-point and mode of pro-
cedure of the one is difiFerent from that of the other. Conse-
quently, it is not unusual to speak of them as two kinds of
reasoning which are quite distinct and independent of each
other. It is, however, important to avoid this popular error,
and to remember that the real process of inference is in each
case the same. The essence of inference, as has been shown,
consists in the fact that it exhibits the manner in which par-
ticular facts are connected together into a system or whole} And
this end is achieved both by Deduction and Induction. In
the former case, the general law of connection ^what we
may call the nature of the system within which the partic-

ulars fall is known, and we argue from this as to the nature
and relations of the various parts which fall within it. We
have the common thread which unites the various facts in our
hand, and following it out are able to show its application
in determining the nature of events which have not yet
come within the range of our experience. Knowing the law
of gravity, for example, one could infer deductively what
momentum a ball weighing one pound must necessarily have
after falling one hundred feet. It would not be necessary
actually to measure the momentum of the falling body in
' Italics ours.
this particulai; case, but it could be shown to be the neces-

sary result of the general law. What the deductive inference
shows to us, is the way
which a general principle or law
in
of connection runs through a group of facts, and constitutes
them a real or organic whole. The sameînsight is reached
by inductive inference, although the starting-point is en-
tirely different. As we have already seen, induction begins
by observing that certain phenomena are frequently con-
joined, and attempts to discover some law or principle which
will make the fact of their connection intelligible.
2. Object: necessary connection of facts according to
some general principle. " It is usual to say that in induc-
tion we go from the particular facts to the general law. The
following, however, would be a more correct form of state-
ment: Before the inference, we observe that a number of
phenomena occur together, but do not know whether this
conjunction is necessary or not; or, if we assume that it is
necessary, we do not understand why it should be so. As a
result of the inductive inference, we gain an insight into the
necessary connection of the observed phenomena, and also
understand the principle according to which the latter are
united. What we really obtain through an inductive infer-
ence is not only a general law, but also a perception of its
concrete application to particular phenomena. This being
so, it is clear that Induction and Deduction are not two differ-
ent kinds of inference. Inference always implies an effort on
the part of the mind to see how phenomena are necessarily con-
nected according to some general principle.^ And, in carrying
out this purpose, the mind must begin with the knowledge
which it already possesses. When the general law of con-
nection is known, and the object is to discover the nature of
some particular fact, the method of procedure is deductive.
But, when the problem by which we are confronted is to read
out of the facts of sense-perception the general law of their
connection, the method of inference which must be employed
' Italics ours.
isthat of induction. But from whatever point we set out,
and whatever may be the immediate object of the inference,
/the result is always the same-'^îttLin^^tJnt-G-thfi-aiecessa^
^
('
connection of facts according to some general principle."
3. MutualB^êndence. " While considering the distinc-
tions between induction and deduction, we must not over-
look their mutual dependence. We cannot proceed in deduc-
tion irrespective of induction, because the universal upon
which the deductive process is based arises in the majority
of cases from a previous induction. It is true that the uni-
versal term may be in a proposition that is known a priori,
as the axioms of geometry and certain space and time postu-
lates; but a very small proportion of major premises can be
said to have such an origin, and their resulting conclusions
have very slight material significance. Deduction that
reaches other than purely abstract and formal conclusions
must rest upon induction for the material to form its prem-
ises. ... On the other hand, induction is dependent upon
deduction; for we cannot reason from particular instances to

a universal proposition, unless we assume as the basis of the
whole inductive process some postulate which has real uni-
versal significance. Otherwise, we reach only a high degree
of probability, but not necessity; a rude generalization, but
not universality. When we assert some such general state-
ment as this, that arsenic always acts as a poison, we have
based the universal character of the proposition upon an
underlying postulate that is understood even though it is not
expressed, such as the uniformity of nature, that under identi-
cal conditions we always look for identical effects. This is
referred to at this point merely to illustrate the deductive

^
basis of induction."
4. Kinds "There are three different ap-
of induction.
term 'Induction,' which are generally as-
plications of the
sumed to mean the same thing. To explain what they are
we have to produce the usual divisions of the subject, which
1 Creighton, pp. 329-333. ^ Hibben, pp. 172-173.
are the so-called kinds of induction. They are (a) 'Perfect

Induction' and (b) 'Imperfect Induction.' The first meaning
of the term applies to the first kind, and the other two are
modifications of what is implied in imperfect induction. We
would not suspect a diflFerence of meaning from this general
fact alone, but if we examine carefully the illustrations chosen
to describe the nature of the process as thus distinguished
into different kinds, we shall discern very clearly the great
differences of real meaning attaching to the term. Thus
'Perfect Induction' is simply an enumeration of the particulars
which form a class. It is the process which characterized
the method of Socrates in reaching his definitions, and which
Aristotle remarked was a new method compared with the ar-
gumentation of his predecessors. An example of perfect in-
duction is the following: 'Mercury revolves on its axis; so
do Venus, the Earth, Mars, Jupiter, Saturn, and Neptune.
But these are all the planets, and therefore all the planets
revolve on their axes." Although this is stated in the form
of reasoning, it is not reasoning at all. This fact is apparent
in the nature. of the conclusion, which is that "All the planets
revolve on their axis," not on the axis of Mercury, although
the same thing would be true if we had said " on the axis of
Mercury." But the special proof of its not being a case of
reasoning is in the fact that the so-called conclusion ismerely
a universal statement of what had been enumerated in detail
in the premises. We are supposed to have observed the in-
dividual fact that " Mercury revolves on its axis," and then
again that " Venus revolves on its axis," and so on through-
out the entire number of planets. Hence when we say, "AU
the planets revolve on their axes," we but universalize our
particular observations we use the terms "all planets" as
an economical device to avoid repeating the proper name of
each planet. But we do not infer anything, or reason from
one proposition to another. We do not establish any new
connections of thought by the process, as we do in syllogistic
reasoning, . but we only generalize what we had observed
. .
in detail. It is precisely the same with all enumerations of
individuals or particulars into a whole or class with a gen-
eral name denoting those enumerations only. They may be
called "Inductions" we choose so to name them; but they
if
are not reasoning. They are only generalizations as opposed

to or distinct from reasoning, while the term " Induction," as
now used by logicians, denotes a process of inference or reason-
ing of some kind. It is quite generally agreed since the time
of Bacon that the so-called " Perfect Induction" is not properly
called " Induction," because it is not a mode of reasoning.
It has been the name for the Socratic process of obtaining
universal conceptions and definitions. But the contingencies
of the growth of knowledge and the demand of a method
which would take the place of the Aristotelian Logic sug-
gested the term " Inductive " as opposed to " Deductive," and
the rejection of " Perfect Induction" on the ground that it was
not ratiocinative in its nature, implied that Induction must
be a process of reasoning' in order to compare it with Deduc-
tion.
"This second general meaning is the more important of
the two, and was called 'Imperfect Induction' because the
conclusion contained more than the premises. Thus if I had
inferred that 'AH the planets revolve about their axes,'
from the mere fact that one of them did so, I should have
drawn an inductive inference. I should not in this case have
merely generalized the particulars of my observation' or ex-
perience, but have conjectured or inferred that what was
true of one case would turn out to be true of all the objects
known upon other grounds to belong to the same class.
But this conclusion has no definite certainty such as the mind
desires, and hence to give this conjecture greater probability
I must vary my observation of facts in connection with the
several planets, and find whether they agree or disagree with
my supposition. If, for instance, I observed that certain of
them presented an absolutely invariable appearance, such
as a particular spot always in sight and in the same place.
the fact would be at least a presumption against the supposi-

tion of the planet's axial revolution. On the other hand, if
the spot presented certain regular changes of position and

periodical disappearance and reappearance, the fact would
be in favor of the hypothesis. This mode of repeating and
varying observations or experiments in the case of the ex-
perimental sciences, according to certain methods, which are
called the Method of Agreement,' the Method of Difference,'
' '
the Method of Concomitant Variations,' etc., has been called

'
the Inductive Method in general, as a mode of ascertaining

certain truths in a manner quite distinct from the ordinary
syllogistic and deductive reasoning. This is the third mean-
ing of the term, with which a theory of Induction has to
reckon.'"
5. Methods of induction. "We have now to consider
such methods as can be laid down for the purpose of guiding
us in the search for general truths or laws of nature among the
facts obtained by observation and experiment. Induction
consists in inferring from particulars to generals, or detecting
a general truth among its particular occurrences. But in
physical science the truths to be discovered generally relate
to the connection of cause and effect, and we usually call
them laws of causation or natural laws.
" By the Cause of an event we mean the circumstances which
must have preceded in order that the event should happen.
Nor is it generally possible to say that an event has one single
cause and no more. There are usually many different things,
conditions or circumstances necessary to the production of
an effect, and all of them must be considered causes or neces-
sary parts of the cause. . . .
"By an antecedent we mean any thing, condition, or cir-

cumstance which exists before or, it may be, at the same time
with an event or phenomenon. By a consequent we mean any
thing, or circumstance, event, or phenomenon, which is dif-
ferent from any of the antecedents and follows after their
' Hyslop, pp. 295-298.
conjunction or putting together. an
It does not follow that
antecedent is a cause, because the might have hap-
effect
pened without it. Thus the sun's light may be an antecedent
to the burning of a house, but not the cause, because the house
would burn equally well in the night. A necessary or indis-
pensable antecedent is however identical vnth a cause, being
that without which the effect would not take place.
"The word phenomenon will also be often used. It means
simply anything which appears, and is therefore observed
by the senses; the derivation of the word from the Greek
word 4>ai,v6nevov, that which appears, exactly corresponds to
its logical use.
' a. Method
of agreement. "The first method of induc-
/tion is that which Mr. Mill has aptly called the methoji of
agreement. It depends upon the rule that 'If two or more
instances of the phenomenon under investigation have only
one circumstance in common, the circumstance in which
alone all the instances agree, is the cause (or effect) of the
given phenomenon.' The meaning of this First Canon of
inductive inquiry might, I think, be more briefly expressed
by saying that the sole invariable antecedent of a phenomenon
is probably its cause.
"To apply this method we must collect as many instances
of the phenomenon as possible, and compare together their
antecedents. Among these the causes will lie, but if we notice
that certain antecedents are present or absent without ap-
we conclude that they cannot
pearing to affect the result,
be necessary antecedents. Hence it is the one antecedent
or group of antecedents always present, when the effect
follows, that we consider the cause. For example, bright
prismatic colours are seen on bubbles, on films of tar floating
upon water, on thin plates of mica, as also on cracks in glass,
or between two pieces of glass pressed together. On examin-
ing all such cases they seem to agree in nothing but the pres-
ence of a very thin layer or plate, and it appears to make no
appreciable difference of what kind of matter, solid, liquid
or gaseous, the plate Hence we conclude that such

is made.
colours are caused merely by the thinness of the plates, and
this conclusion is proved true by the theory of the inter-
ference of light. Sir David Brewster beautifuUy proved in a
similar way that the colours seen upon Mother-of-pearl are
not caused by the nature of the substance, but by the form
of the surface. He took impressions of the Mother-of-pearl
in wax, and found that although the substance was entirely
different the colours were exactly the same. And it was
afterwards found that if a plate of metal had a surface marked
by very fine close grooves, it would have iridescent colours
like those of Mother-of-pearl. Hence it is evident that the
form of the surface, which is the only invariable antecedent
or condition requisite for the production of the colours must
be their cause. '.
. .
b. Method of difference. "The second method of

induction which we will now consider is known as the
Method of Difference. It is stated m Mr. Mill's Second
Canon as follows:
"'If an instance in which the phenomenon imder investiga-
tion occurs, and an instance in which it does not occur, have
every circumstance in common save one, that one occurring
only in the former; the circumstance in which alone the two
instances differ, is the effect, or the cause, or an indispensable
part of the cause, of the phenomenon.'
"In other words, we may say that the antecedent which is
invariably present when the phenomenon follows, and in-
variably absent when it is absent, other circumstances re-
maining the same, is the cause of the phenomenon in those
circumstances.
"Thus we can clearly prove that friction is one cause of
heat, because when two sticks are rubbed together they be-
come heated; when not rubbed they do not become heated.
Sir Humphry Davy showed that even two pieces of ice when
rubbed together in a vacuum produced heat as shown by their
melting, and thus completely demonstrated that friction
isthe source and cause of the heat. We prove that air is the
cause of sound being communicated to our ears by striking
a bell in the receiver of an air-pump, as Hawksbee first did in
1705, and then observing that when the receiver is full of
air we hear the bell; when it contains little or no air we do
not hear the bell. We learn that sodium or any of its com-
pounds produces a spectrum having a bright yellow double
line by noticing that there is no such line in the spectrum of
light when sodium is not present, but that if the smallest
quantity of sodium be thrown into the flame or other source
of light, the bright yellow line instantly appears. Oxygen
is the cause of respiration and life, because an animal be
if
put into a jar full of atmospheric air, from which the oxygen
has been withdrawn, it soon becomes suffocated.
"This is essentially the great method of experiment and its
utility depends upon the precaution of only varying one
circumstance at a time, all other circumstances being maintained
just as they were. . . .
"Beautiful instances experiment according to this

of
method are John Herschel has pointed
to be found, as Sir
out, in the researches by which Dr. Wells discovered the cause
of the dew. If on a clear calm night a sheet or other covering
be stretched a foot or two above the earth, so as to screen the
ground below from the open sky, dew will be found on the
grass around the screen but not beneath it. As the tempera-
ture and moistness of the air, and other circumstances are
exactly the same, the open sky must be an indispensable an-
tecedent of dew. The same experiment is indeed tried for
us by nature, for if we make observations of dew during two
nights which differ in nothing but the absence of clouds in
one and their presence in the other, we shall find that the
clear open sky is requisite to the formation of dew.
c. Joint method. " It may often happen that we cannot
apply the method of difference perfectly by varying only one
circumstance at a time. Thus we cannot, generally speaking,
tiy the qualities of the same substance in the solid and liquid

condition without any other change of circumstances, be-

cause it is necessary to alter the temperature of the substance
in order to liquefy or. solidify it. The temperature might
thus be the cause of what we attribute to the liquid or solid
condition. Under such circumstances we have to resort to
what Mr. Mill calls the joint method of agreement and differ-
ence, which consists in a double application of the method of
agreement, first to a number of instances where an effect
is produced, and secondly, to a number of quite different
instances where the effect is not produced. It is clearly to

be understood, however, that the negative instances differ
in several circumstances from the positive ones; for if they
differed only in one circumstance we might apply the simple
method of difference. Iceland spar, for instance, has a curious
power of rendering things seen through it apparently double.
This phenomenon, called double refraction, also belongs to
many other crystals; and we might at once prove it to be due
to crystalline structure could we obtain any transparent
substance crystallized and uncrystallized, but subject to no
other alteration. We have, however, a pretty satisfactory
proof by observing that uniform transparent uncrystallized
substances agree in not possessing double refraction, and that
crystalline substances, on the other hand, with certain excep-
tions,which are easily explained, agree in possessing the power
in question. The principle of the joint method may be stated
in the following rule, which is Mr. Mill's Third Canon:
"
'If two or more instances in which the phenomenon occurs
have only one circumstance in common, while two or more
instances in which it does not occur have nothing in common
save the absence of that circumstance; the circumstance in
which alone the two sets of instances (always or invariably)
differ, is the effect, or the cause, or an indispensable part
of the cause, of thephenomenon.'"
"I have inserted the words in parenthesis, as without them
the canon seems to me to express exactly the opposite of
what Mr. Mill intends. . . .

d. Method of residues."We have now to consider a
method which must be employed when several
of Induction
causes act at once and their effects are all blended together,
producing a joint effect of the same kind as the separate
effects. If in one experiment friction, combustion, compres-
sion, and electric action are all going on at once, each of these
causes will produce quantities of heat which will be added
together, and it will be difficult or impossible to say how
much is due to each cause separately. We may call this a
case of the homogeneous intermixture of effects, the name
indicating that the joint effect is of the same kind as the
separate effects, where the joint effect is totally different in
kind from the separate effects. Thus if we bend a bow too
much it breaks instead of bending further; if we warm ice
itsoon ceases to rise in temperature and melts; it we warm
water it rises in temperature homogeneously for a time but
then suddenly ceases, and an effect of a totally different
kind, the production of vapour, or possibly an explosion,
follows.
"Now when the joint effect is of a heterogeneous kind the
method of difference is sufficient to ascertain the cause of its
occurrence. Whether a bow or a spring will break with a

given weight may easily be tried, and whether water will
boil at a given temperature in any given state of the barom-
eter may also be easily ascertained. But in the homogeneous
intermixture of effects we have a more complicated task.
There are several causes each producing a part of the effect,
and we want to know how much is due to each. In this case
we must employ a further Inductive Method, called by Mr.
Mill the Method of Residues, and thus stated ia his Fourth
Canon :
"'Subduct from any phenomenon such part as is known

by previous inductions to"be the effect of certain antecedents,
and the residue of the phenomenon is the effect of the remain-
ing antecedents.'"
" If we know that the joint effect a, b, c, is due to the causes
A, B, and C, and can prove that a is due to A and b to B,
it follows that C must be due to C.

There cannot be a simpler
case of this than ascertaining the exact weight of any commod-
ity in a cart by weighing the cart and load, and then sub-
tracting the tare or weight of the cart alone, which had been
previously ascertained. We can thus too ascertain how much
of the spring tides is due to the attraction of the sun, provided
we have previously determined the height of the tide due to
the moon, which will be about the average height of the tides
during the whole lunar month. Then subtracting the moon's
tide the remainder is the sun's tide.
"Newton employed this method in a beautiful experiment
to determine the elasticity of substances by allowing balls
made of the substances to swing against each other, and
then observing how far theyrebounded compared with their
original But the loss
fall. of motion is due partly to imper-
fect elasticity and partly to the resistance of the air. He
determined the amount of the latter effect in the simplest
manner by allowing the balls to swing without striking each
other, and observing how much each vibration was less than
the last. In this way he was enabled to calculate the quantity
that must be subtracted for the resistance of the air. . . .
e. Method of concomitant variations. "Every science

and every question in science, is first a matter of fact only,
then a matter of quantity, and by degrees becomes more and
more precisely quantitative. Thirty years ago most of the
phenomena of electricity and electro-magnetism were known
merely as facts; now they can be for the most part exactly
measured and calculated.
"As soon asphenomena can thus be measured we can ap-
ply a further Method of Induction of a very important char-
acter. It is the Method of Difference indeed applied under
far more favourable circumstances, where every degree and
quantity of a phenomenon gives us a new experiment and
proof of connection between cause and effect. It may be
called the Method of Concomitant Variations, and is thus
'
130 ARGUMENTATION AND DFBATE

stated by Mr. Mill, in what he entitled the Fiffh Can -a oi
Induction.
'"Whatever phenomenon varies in any manner whenever
another phenomenon varies in some particular manner, is
either a cause or an effect of that phenomenon, or is con-
nected with it through some fact of causation. . .
.
"The illustrations of this method are infinitely numerous.

Thus Mr. Joule, of Manchester, conclusively proved that
friction is a cause of heat by expending exact quantities of
force in rubbing one substance against another, and showed
that the heat produced was exactly greater or less in propor-
tion as the force was greater or less. We can apply the
method to many cases which had previously been treated
by the simple method of difference; thus instead of striking
a bell in a complete vacuum we can strike it with a very
little air in the receiver of the air-pump, and we then hear
a very faint sound, which increases or decreases every time

we increase or decrease the density of the air. This experi-
ment conclusively satisfies any person that air is the cause
of the transmission of sound. . .
"The most extraordinary case of variations, however,

consists in the connection which has of late years been shown
to exist between the Aurora Borealis, magnetic storms, and
the spots on the sun. It has only in the last thirty or forty
years become known that the magnetic compass needle is
subject at intervals to very slight but curious movements,

and that at the same time there are usually natural currents
of electricity produced in telegraph wires so as to interfere
with the transmission of messages. These disturbances are
known as magnetic storms, and are often observed to occur
when a fine display of the Northern or Southern Lights is
taking place in some part of the earth. Observations during
many years have shown that these storms come to their
worst at the end of every eleven years, the maximum taking
place about the present year 1870, and then diminish in
intensity until the next period of eleven years has passed.

Close observations of the sun during thirty or forty years

have shown that the and number of the dark spots, which
size
are gigantic storms going on upon the sun's surface, increase
and decrease exactly at the same periods of time as the mag-
netic storms upon the earth's surface. No one can doubt,
then, that these strange phenomena are connected together,
though the mode of the connection is quite unknown. It is
now believed that the planets Jupiter, Saturn, Venus-, and
Mars, are the real causes of the disturbances; for Balfour
Stewart and Warren de la Rue have shown that an exact
correspondence exists between the motions of these planets
and the periods of the sunspots. This is a most remarkable
and extensive case of concomitant variations." ^
C. The syllogism. "The name
Syllogism means the
joining together in thought of two propositions, and is de-
rived from the Greek words aw, with, and Xo'70?, thought or /
reason. It is thus exactly the equivalent of the word compu-

tation, which means thinking together (Latin con, together,
puto, to think), or reckoning. In a syllogism we so unite in
thought two premises, or propositions put forward, that
we are enabled to draw from them or infer, by means of the
middle term they contain, a third proposition called the con-
clusion. Syllogism may thus be defined as the act of thought
by which from two given propositions we proceed to a third
proposition, the truth of which necessarily follows from the
truth of these given propositions. When the argument is
fully expressed in language it is usual to call it concretely

a syllogism.
1. "The special rules of the syllogism . . . serve to in-
form us exactly under what circumstances one proposition
can be inferred from two other propositions, and are eight in
number, as follows :
a. Every syllogism has three and only three terms.

These terms are called the major term, the minor term,
and the middle term.
' Jevons, Lessons in Logic, pp. 239-253.
.

b. Every syllogism contains three, and only three propositions.
These propositions are called the major premise, the minor
premise, and the conclusion.
c. The middle term must be distributed once at least, and must
not be ambiguous.
d. No term must be distributed in the conclusion which was
not distributed in one of the premises.
e. From negative premises nothing can be inferred.
f If one premise be negative, the conclusion must be negative;
and vice versa, to prove a negative conclusion one of the premises
must be negative.
From the above rules may be deduced two subordinate
rules, which it will nevertheless be convenient to state at
once.
g. From two particular premises no conclusion can be drawn.
h. // qne premise be particular, the conclusion must be par-
ticular.
"All these rules are of such extreme importance that
it willbe desirable for the student not only to acquire a
perfect comprehension of their meaning and truth, but to
commit them to memory. . .
."
2. Definitions. "The middle term may always be

known by the fact that it does not occur in the conclusion.
The major term is always the predicate of the conclusion,
and the minor term the subject. ...
"Again, the syllogism necessarily consists of a premise
called themajor premise, in which the major and middle
terms are compared together; of a minor premise which
similarly compares the minor and middle terms; and of a
conclusion, which contains the major and minor terms only.
In a strictly correct syllogism the major premise always
stands before the minor premise, but in ordinary writing and
speaking this rule is seldom observed; and that premise
which contains the major term still continues to be the major
premise, whatever may be its position.
"The third rule is a very important one, because many

fallacies arise from its neglect. By the middle term being

distributed once at least, we mean that the whole of it must be
referred to universally in one premise, if not both. The two
propositions
All Frenchmen are Europeans,

All Russians are Europeans,
do not distribute the middle term at all, because they are

both aflSrmative propositions, which have undistributed
^
predicates."
3. " Sorites or chain of reasoning. A Sorites is a chain of
reasoning in which the two terms of the conclusion are united
through the mediation of more than one intervening or con-
necting term. It may assume either of the two following
forms:
AisB;
ceeding syllogism. From this point of view, the first of the
above inferences is equivalent to three complete syllogisms,
as follows:
:
conclusions are possible because they rest upon a true major

premise which does not appear in the argument. If A is
north of B, and B is north of C, we can infer the relation of

A and C, because we are familiar with the nature of space
relations. To state the law or the generalization which under-
lies the inference is a matter of some difficulty. According
to some writers the inference, in correct syllogistic form,
would read about like this
Whatever is north of that which is north of another is
north of that other;
A is something that is north of that which is north of C;
.A is north of C.
.
"It is true that we never formulate the major premise of this

inference, and that we usually do not even suspect its pres-
ence. But, as we shall see a little later, the suppression of one
of our premises is a frequent occurrence in everyday reason-
ing. This major premise is not formulated, just because the
relationship which it expresses is so simple and obvious.
This relationship is peculiar to the realm of quantity, and
so the recognition of this relationship enables us to make
inferences in this realm which have no precise parallel in
^
other fields."
5. Enthymemes. "When- one premise
of an argument
is lacking, the enthymeme is applied to it. When an
name of
argument is defective in this way, it must be remembered
that the missing proposition is to be regarded as in conscious-
ness, though not expressed. It is of great importance to
form the habit of making clear to oneself the premises by
which any conclusion claims to be supported. In this way
groundless assumptions are often brought to light, and the
weakness of an argument exposed." ^ "Indeed, it is but
seldom in ordinary reasoning that we arrange our arguments
in the strict syllogistic form. We hurry on from one fact to
another in our thinking without stopping to make all the
steps definite and explicit. We feel it to be a waste of time,
Bode, pp. 78-80.
' Creighton, p. .
and a trial to the patience, to express what is clearly obvious,
and so we press on to the conclusion which is, for the time
But the more rapid and
being, the central point of interest.
abbreviated the reasoning, the more necessary is it to keep
a clear head, and to understand what conclusion is aimed at,
and what premises are assumed in the argument. To bring
to light the hidden assumption upon which an argument is
based, is often the best means of refuting it. Enthymemes
are sometimes said to be of the first, second, or third order,
according as the riiajor premise, the minor premise, or the

conclusion is wanting. As a matter of fact, an enthymeme
of the third order is a rhetorical device used to call special
attention to a conclusion which is perfectly obvious, although

suppressed. Thus, for example, 'all boasters are cowards,
and we have had proofs that A is a boaster.' Here the con-
clusion is at once obvious, and is even more prominent than
if itwere actually expressed." ^
6. The nature of syllogistic reasoning. "The syllogism,
as we have already seen, presents a conclusion together with
the reasons by means of which it is supported. A single
proposition taken by itself is dogmatic: it merely asserts
without stating the grounds upon which it rests. The syl-
logism, on the other hand, justifies its conclusion by showing
the premises from which it has been derived. It thus appeals
to the reason of all men, and compels their assent. To do this,
it is of course necessary that the truth of the premises to
which appeal is made should be granted. If the premises are
disputed or doubtful, the argument pushed a step further
is
back, and it is first necessary to show the grounds upon which

these premises rest. The assumption of syllogistic reason-

ing ând, indeed, of all reasoning whatsoever is that it is
possible to reach propositions which every one will accept.
There are certain facts, we say, well known and established,
and these can always be appealed to in support of our con^
elusions. In syllogistic reasoning, then, we exhibit the inter-
> Creighton, pp. 126, 127.
dependence of propositions; i. e., we show how the truth of

some new proposition, or some proposition not regarded as
beyond question, follows necessarily from other propositions
whose truth every one will admit. " ^
7. Weakness of the syllogism in general argumentation.
But the man who wishes to be successful in general argumen-
tation needs to be armed with more than a knowledge of the
syllogism. While it is true that putting an argument into
"syllogistic form" for the purpose of testing it is one of the
easiest and most accurate ways of determining the strength
or weakness of our argument (and of exactly locating any
weakness), the warning in the following paragraph against
depending upon the syllogism as a constructive device should
be carefully heeded.
"For it tells us only what the soundness of inferences
depends upon when we assume that the words in which they
are expressed are free from ambiguity. In actual inferences
this assumption is never strictly in accordance with the facts,
and is least in accordance with them when the soundness of
the inference is most debatable. That is the chief reason why
an appeal to Syllogistic Logic is generally so unconvincing.
Now that the direct inquiry into Nature is open to almost
every one, almost every one has begun to learn that sharp-cut
words are traps for the unwary. A syllogism can always be
blocked by refusing to admit the truth of a premise, and in
these times no special study of the forms of Syllogism is
needed to show us in practice at any rate that the easiest
and most effective way to do this is to criticise the words in
which it is expressed. Where the conclusion is disputable
there is seldom any difficulty in finding some want of def-
initeness in the premises, so that they can only combine
to form a conclusion when one of them is interpreted in a
sense which makes it untrue. To raise this objection în

however untechnical language îs to tell the syllogistic
logician that his simple process is not yet available. The
1 Creighton, pp. 106, 106.
real difficulty of the question has first to be settled, and then
those who care to do so may put the reasoning into 'syllo-
^
gistic form.' "
'
II. Nearly all writers on the subject of
In rhetoric.
rhetoric have divided the kinds of arguments into three
classes, and have given to these classes the names, (A) an-
tecedent probability, (B) sign, and (C) example. The mean-
ings given to these titles and the divisions made under them
have been somewhat varied, so that there is no universally
accepted classification. Any division which shall be of
service in argumentation must have for its purpose the
establishment of standards by which we may determine
whether any particular arguments are good or bad, strong
or we9.k, as the materials of proof. Consequently, in order
to give a practical insight into the proper selection and use of
arguments in argumentation, and a practical power to detect
the most serious fallacies, the kinds of arguments should be
classified and explained in such a way as to make clear, as
far as possible, on what the strength of the various kinds of ar-
guments depends. The classification used here (the old tril-
ogy, systematized and classified, we trust, in its subdi-
visions) is retained as much more fundamental, accurate,
and serviceable than any of the modifications of it attempted
by recent writers.
The lines of division between the classes of arguments
cannot always be drawn with absolute distinctness. Many
arguments with slight changes in phrase pass from one class
to another. But thisjs not a serious matter. It is the under-
standing of the structure and substance of the arguments that
is essential. We have seen that an argument is a process by
which, from knowing the existence of a fact or a certain num-
ber of facts, we infer the existence of some other fact or facts.
In the first place, then, it should be stated that in nearly every
argument the validity of the inference depends upon a connec-
tion of cause and effect between the facts from which we infer and
1 Sidgwick, pp. 75, 76.
the facts to which we infer. This connection 15 not always

actually understood by the person making the argument,
and is often not stated. But this connection is, nevertheless,
in most cases, the source of strength or weakness in the reason-
ing. It must be understood in order to know the real force
of the argument and detect the fallacies of the opponents.
"Whether the given inference be right or wrong, whether
it be express and deliberate, or rapid and free, whether it
take the form of a cut-and-dried syllogism, an argument from

analogy, or from circumstantial evidence, in all cases equally
it is our belief about the way things hang together in nature
that provides alike the sole motive power of inference and the
sole foundation on which we rest our proofs." ^ However,
there are many valid arguments in which this causal connec-
tion is not evident, and in these cases it must also be deter-
mined what is the element of their strength.
A. Antecedent probability. The argument from antece-
dent probability is an argument from cause to effect.
It is sometimes said that the argument from antecedent
probability requires a preliminary assumption; that the
argument consists assuming the existence of some fact and
in
then producing evidence to show that the assumption is
justified. This is not true. Very often it is convenient in
presenting or explaining the argument to make such an as-
sumption. As, for instance, in a criminal trial a lawyer,
when he is arguing before the jury, may practically assume
for the time that A murdered B, and then go on to show that
A had a motive. Of course he must not assume that A com-
mitted the murder and then infer from this that he must have
had a motive. The assumption is purely a preliminary step.
The motive must be established independently. This having
been done, the lawyer argues from the known cause (the
motive) to the unknown effect (that A murdered B). This
is an argument from antecedent probability, and the assump-
tion made by the lawyer is not an essential part of the argu-

' Sidgwick, p. 46.
ment. Note that the unknown effect is not that B was mur-
dered, or that B was killed, or that B is dead. The unknown
effect to which we argue is the fact in issue concerning A.
For the sake of clearness he may first show that A's pistol
was found beside the body, and present various other kinds
of evidence, to create a presumption of guilt against A, be-
fore he discusses his motives. Such a method is obviously
more sensible than examining the possible motives of all the
persons who might possibly have committed the crime, es-
pecially since the lawyer is hired to prosecute this particular
man, A. Moreover, the effect on the jury is helped by the
corroboration of other kinds of arguments, the arguments
from sign in this case. But assumption is not essential.
this
The strength of the argument depends entirely upon the
itself
connection of cause and effect, between the motive and the

deed. The argument is conclusive if it can be shown that
these motives of A were the cause that would produce the
effect in question, viz., the murder of B by A, and its validity
will vary with the strength of this causal connection.
__^^riie^ argument from antecedent probabihtyj^ then, is an
inference from a known cause W
an unknown effect; it consists
in showing that a certain known fact or combination of facts
is of such a nature as to bring to pass the existence of another
fact, whose existence is in dispute. An argument from cause

to effect is often called an a priori argument.
An example is found in the famous White murder trial.
There Daniel Webster showed that the Knapps believed they
could get Captain White's fortune by murdering him and
stealing his last will, and then argued that this motive was the
cause that produced the effect in question, viz., their murder
of Captain White. Again, if one of the larger universities

of the country is known and acknowledged to have a very
strong foot-ball team, it an argument from antecedent
is
probability to infer that this team will defeat a team from

some small college of two or three hundred students. It
is inferred that the known cause the strength of the univer-

sity team
produce the effect of a victory over a weaker
will
rival. A good argument is found
illustration of this kind of
in the following selection from a speeph given at a National
Democratic Convention to account for hard times under a
Democratic administration:
"When the Democracy came into power in

1893 it inherited from
itsRepublican predecessor a tax system and currency, a system of
which the McKinley and Sherman laws were the culminating
atrocities. It came into power amidst a panic which followed upon
their enactment with strikes, lockouts, riots, civil commotions, while
scenes of peaceful industry in Pennsylvania had become military
camps. Besides its manifest features, the McKinley law had thrown
away revenue derived from sugar under a special
fifty millions of
plea of a free breakfast table, and substituted bounties to sugar

planters, thus increasing expenditure, thus burning the candle at
both ends and making the people pay at last for their alleged free
breakfast.
"From the
joint operation of the McKinley law and the Sherman
law, an adverse balance of trade was forced against us in 1893, a
surplus of $100,000,000 in the treasury was converted into a deficit
of $70,000,000 in 1894; and engraved bonds prepared by a Repub-
lican secretary to borrow money to support the Government were
ill omens of preorganized ruin that awaited the coming Democracy
and depleted treasury."
The orator argues that these acts of Republican malad-

ministration were the causes that produced the effect of
Republican responsibility for hard times.
1. Effect to cause not part of a priori argument. It may
be noticed that in many such instances the argument from
cause to effect is preceded by a sort of preliminary argument
from effect to cause. Before we argue that the strength of
the foot-ball team will be the cause of victory, we may prove
that the team is strong by showing that it has won victories
over other teams in the past. This is an inference from
effect the past victories
to cause the strength of the
team. But this is not part of the a priori argument.
The strength of the team
not really in question; it is in
is
this case generally admitted. If, however, the abilities of
the team are questioned and must first be proved by showing

past evidences of their achievements, the argument thus
becomes more truly an argument from certain known
a given cause to other effects of the same cause,
effects of
i. an argument from sign. As has already been re-
e.,
marked, the lines of division between the classes are not

definite.
2. Methods An argument from antecedent
of attack.
probability may
be attacked in several ways, but they are
all the same in that they are all directed toward the destruc-
tion of the connection between cause and effect. In order to

be effective, the argument must show that the known or
proved fact would probably act as a cause to produce
the effect; and it is here that the argument is best at-
tacked.
a. Is the connection of cause and effect complete? Is
there a broken or missing link in the chain?
The two facts, one of which is called the cause and the
other the effect, are rarely in immediate connection with
each other. There are almost always several in-
C termediate steps between the two. " Intermediate
B links in a chain of causation are so many opportu-
Q '
nities for counteraction, in the same way as the
S length of a piece of railway provides opportu-
any accident. They are intermediate
nities for
conditions. The pull on the trigger will fire the shot if, and
only if, the catch, the spring, the hammer, the cap, and so on,
all act in the expected manner., Therefore our forgetfulness
of intermediate links takes effect just in the same way as our
forgetfulness of conditions generally; it may give us a false
security." ^ It follows, then, that the closer the causal con-
nection, the surer is the argument, and that any argument
may be destroyed by showing that some of the necessary

1 Sidgwick, p. 153.
intennedlate links are lacking. It might be proved that A

was inspired with a most malevolent hatred of B, that he
would welcome any favorable opportunity of attacking him,
even that he had actually sought to do him injury; but in
order to connect this motive with the murder of B, it must
be shown that none of the necessary, intermediate steps were
lacking. It must be proved that A was present at the time,
that he had the necessary weapon, that he was physically
strong enough to do the deed. The destruction of one of
these links of the chain destroys the argument.
b. Is the cause adequate to produce the effect in question?
Could such a little cause have such a big effect?
It is not difficult to imagine any number of facts that might
possibly follow from the existence of some other fact. But
such connections are not always sufficient to make C- 'i
a valid argument. It is not sufficient that a fact
might have a general tendency to produce a certain
effect. It must be shown that the cause in question
is in itself adequate to account for the existence of
the efPect in question. Is it reasonable to argue that

such a little c could produce such a big E?
Ex-Governor Black of New York, in the trial of Roland B.
Molineux for the murder of Mrs. Adams, lised this test when,
in speaking of the motives assigned by the prosecution as the
cause of the murder, he said: "They have failed utterly to
supply a motive. It is absurd to suggest that out of a mere
quarrel such as Cornish and Molineux had, should grow a
hatred so profound as to inspire a man twelve months later
to commit murder." In 1893 the so-called "hard times"
from 1892 to 1896 were said by some people to have been
caused solely by the unexpected failure of a prominent Eng-
lish banking house. The failure in question might have been
a startling incident of the day, it might perhaps have precipi-
tated failures and misfortune elsewhere; but it was clearly
no adequate cause for such a widespread and prolonged mis-
fortune.
c. Did the operation of other causes in the case in ques-
tion prevent the action of the cause under discussion?
The normal progress between the cause and the efifeet is
often stopped or turned from its course by the intervention of

some other cause which destroys or turns aside the natural
If a man takes a dose of deadly
result of the first cause.
poison, the chances are that it will cause his death; but it
may be shown that this effect will not actually follow in this
case, by showing that the man took an anti-
dote. The antidote prevents the occurrence of
the natural One may argue that the
effect.
Chinese race are very numerous, that as a

people they are physically formidable, that
they are peculiarly fortunate in climate and in
economic resources, and, consequently, that there is great
danger of a commercial "Yellow Peril." This is a clear
inference from cause to effect. But this reasoning may be
attacked,by arguing that certain racial peculiarities of the
Chinese prevent them from being aggressive competitors,
and make them thus incapable of the powers of initiative
and self-advancement necessary for independent commercial
progress as a race. The operation of this second cause will
destroy the connection of cause and effect on which the argu-
ment depends.
d. Is there an entirely different argument from cause to
effect that should be substituted for the one advanced?
Very often the argument from antecedent probability is
used to account for the existence of some particular phe-
nomenon. It is human nature to wish to know a sufficient
cause for any fact presented. If you say
something is true, somebody immediately
wants to know why it is natural that it should
be true. To recur to the example of the H--i
criminal, if a lawyer tries to account for a
robbery, he must show that his explanation of it is natural
and reasonable. So he tries to show that the man he
is prosecuting had a motive for committing the crime. In

attempting to overthrow such an argument, it may not be
sufficient to show that the connection of cause and effect is
weak. A weak cause is better than no cause at all. Con-
sequently, it is necessary to substitute some other argument
from cause to effect for the argument that has been attacked.
The causal connection that seems the more reasonable will
be accepted to the exclusion of the other.
For instance, a man is murdered. This is a known fact.
We try to account for it by showing that A murdered him.
To prove this we show A's motive. In answer A shows that
B had a stronger motive. Here we substitute a complete new
argument that seems better to account for the big problem
we are trying to explain. Note that we are not substituting
a new c for the same E. We substitute B's motive for A's
motive and from this known cause argue to a new unknown
effect that B is the murderer. This being inconsistent with
the effect we from A's motive, we make the substi-
inferred
tution complete and drop the first argument.
Of two such arguments of unequal force the stronger, of
course, ought to displace the weaker. If one argues that A
committed a murder in order to inherit $1,000, this argument
is met (though perhaps not the whole case against A) by show-
ing that B knew that by the death of the deceased he would

get $1,000,000. Other things being equal the million dollar
motive outweighs the thousand dollar motive. In case two
equal a priori arguments are presented, each person will

accept the one that he prefers to believe the one that fits
his likes and dislikes best. This method was used in the
Molineux trial. The defence attacked the argument of the
prosecution to show that the defendant had a motive that
caused him to commit the murder in question, by producing
evidence to show that another man concerned in the case had
stronger motives and consequently that it was no more ra-
tional to accuse the defendant than it was to accuse this man.

In refuting arguments from antecedent probability the
rhetorical treatment may take various forms, but the analysis
of the argument is always the same; the attack is always

directed toward one point, the connection between cause
and effect.
_ B. Sign. The argument from sign is, in general, what the
name implies. It rests upon the assumption that the facts dealt
with will always or usually accompany each other, and that
consequently the presence of one will be a sign of the presence
of the other. As in the argument from antecedent probabil-
ity, most arguments from sign depend for their validity upon
a causal connection; but we shall also find that there is a class

of arguments from sign in which this causal connection is not
fully understood or expressed, or, at least, is hard to trace.
Arguments of this last-mentioned class depend for their
strength upon the fact of a more or less invarial)le association
in the past between the facts in question, and are therefore
closely akin to generalization. There are three kinds of
arguments from sign. 1. Arguments from, effect to cause.
2. Arguments from one effect to another effect of the same cause.
3. Arguments from the association of phenomena in the past.
1. The argument from effect to cause is the reverse of
the argument from antecedent probability. As that was an

argument based on facts antecedent to the fact in dispute,
so this is an argument based on facts coming after the fact
in dispute. As the former is called an o priori argument, so
the latter is called an a posteriori argument. From a known,
admitted fact we argue back to an unknown, disputed fact.
We say the latter exists or existed because the former is an
effect of it. If it can be shown that any alleged fact whose
existence we wish to prove is or was the cause of any known

fact, the proof of this alleged fact is indisputable. Wlien we
see ice, we safely conclude that the temperature has been
below a certain point; and the argument is beyond dispute,
because it is only a certain degree of coldness that will freeze
water.
William Seward argued from effect to cause in the follow-

ing part of his defence of William Freeman. Freeman was

on trial for murder, and Seward's defence was that of insanity
on the part of the prisoner:
"There is proof, gentlemen, stronger than all this. It is silent,
yet speaking., It is that idiotic smile which plays continually on

the face of the maniac. It took its seat there while he was in the
State prison. In his solitary cell, under the pressure of his severe
tasks and trials in the workshop, and during the solemnities of
public worship in the chapel, it appealed, although in vain, to his
task-masters and his teachers. It is a smile, never rising into
laughter without motive or causethe smile of vacuity. . . .
"That chaotic smile is the external derangement which signifies

that the strings of the harp are disordered and broken, the superficial
mark which God has set upon the tabernacle to signify that its
immortal tenant is disturbed by a divine and mysterious com-

mandment. If you cannot see it, take heed that the obstruction of
your vision be not produced by the mote in your own eye, which
you are commanded to remove before you consider the beam in
your brother's eye. If you are bent on rejecting the testimony of
those who know, by experience and by science, the deep aflHictions
of the prisoner, beware how you misinterpret the handwriting of
the Almighty." '
A number of years ago, in Yorkshire, England, a traveller,

having in his pocket certain marked coins, was attacked in
the early evening, murdered, and robbed. The following
day coins of this peculiar stamp were found on the person of a
certain manservant at an inn in the vicinity. This servant
was unable to account for his possession of the money, and
on this evidence he was tried, convicted, and hanged. This
was a clear argument from sign ^from effect to cause. It
was argued that his possession of the coins was the effect
of his taking them from the body of the murdered man on the
evening before. But several years after it was found that the
conviction was a mistake. The keeper of the inn confessed
that he himself committed the murder and, in order to trans-
1 Works of William H. Seward, Vol. I, p. 468.
fer the guilt, got his servant intoxicated and put the coins into
his pocket. The argument from sign was fallacious, because
the effect in question was the result of another cause than
that inferred.
a. Methods of attack. There are two ways of attacking
the argument from effect to cause, one from the alleged cause
as the basis showing that it could not have been the cause of
the effect, the second from some other cause as a basis show-
ing that this other cause more probably produced the effect.
(I) May not the known effect be due to some other cause
than the one alleged?
A mariner at night seeing lights ahead infers
C C that a ship or a lighthouse
*-' is at hand. But
f ^
\ "*? may be set or manipulated on shore with the

/
purpose to mislead him and profit by the
Vy/
^^' wreck of his ship. Again it is argued that
Shakespeare must have written the works
attributed to him, because he was credited with their au-
thorship all through his life. It is said that this effect must
have been due to the cause, that he did actually write
the works. But those who oppose this view attack the ar-
gument by showing that the popular belief may be attributed
to other good causes,to the comparative lack of interest
in the authorship at the time, or the desire of the real author
to conceal his identity, and so, that the reputation is no
sure sign of authorship.
(II) Is the alleged cause capable of being the real cause
of the effect in question?
We may also attack the argument directly, in C .i.p
much the same way that we would attack the

argument from antecedent probability, by showing
that the cause which it is alleged produced the
known effect was really not capable of producing it.
This is commonly done by showing that the cause
was not powerful enough, or that in some way the effect would
not be a reasonable and normal result of this cause. But it

must be observed tHat this alone is not always sufficient to de-
stroy the argument. Although this phenoiiienon might not
have been a sufficient cause, other causes might have
in itself
co'operated with it in producing the effect, and so the known
effect may still be a sign of this alleged cause. To make the
refutation complete in such a case, it must be shown that
these other causes, whose cooperation was necessary, did not
exist.
(ni) Is the cause and effect connection complete? This,
the same test already suggested for antecedent probability, is,
of course, just as effective here. When

a washout
carries away a section of a railroad, trains cannot
^
8 ^ go through in either direction. We can neither
8
'
go up or down the chain of causal connection if a
link is missing.
g
There are many other devices that may be in-
vented and employed in different cases, which are too numer-
ous or complicated to be explained here. The foregoing are
the most common and effective tests; and of the other tests
it may be remarked that they are all directed to destroy the
causal connection, and that they may be readily invented if

the nature of this inference from effect to cause is understood.
2. The argument from effect to effect. The second
class of the arguments from sign involves a process of in-
ference which is a combination of the argument from cause
to effect and the argument, from effect to cause. The argu-
ment from effect to effect is simply an inference from a
known effect of some cause to the existence of an unknown
effect of the same cause. A certain fact or combination of
facts is known to exist. From the existence of this known fact
the existence is inferred of another fact which is alleged to
be its cause ^the argument from effect to cause. Then a
second step is taken; it is inferred that this cause produces
another effect, this second unknown effect being the fact
which it is the aim of the argument to prove. Very often.
:

of course, a short cut is taken from one effect to the other
effect, paying Uttle or no attention to the common cause.
To illustrate by a diagram :
In full detail the process is as

follows
The effect A is known, i e.,
it is admitted or it has been

established by evidence. From
this known effect is inferred
T, by process number I (argument
^
Effect Effect
,
/ a
from eiiect ^ ,. \ ?u
to cause) the ex-
istence of X, which is alleged to be its cause. Then by
process number II (argument from cause to effect) is inferred
the existence of Y, which is alleged to be another effect of
the cause X. The argument seeks to prove Y as an inference
from A, and in doing so it passes through the connecting
cause X. The short cut consists of inferring immediately
that where there is A there is Y. This is sound when it is
true that that which causes A invariably causes Y also.
In the evening we observe a redness of the sky, and we
argue that there will be fair weather the next day. It is
^''an argument from effect to effect. The redness is due to

certain atmospheric conditions, and these conditions are
such that they will produce fair weather. We argue that
a certain man will succeed as the president of a corpora-
tion. We first point to his success in other enterprises re-
quiring executive skill and creative power; from them we
infer their cause, his abilities, and then reason that these
abilities will produce their effect, viz., success in his new
undertaking. We notice that the thermometer is low and
at once infer good skating.
The following illustration is taken from the speech of David
Paul Brown in defence of Alexander William Holmes (before
the Circuit Court in Philadelphia, in 1832). A vessel was
wrecked, and, in order to save as many as possible of the
passengers, orders were given to throw overboard a part

of them. The defendant obeyed the order and threw certain

men over the side of the ship into the water. He was tried
for murder, and Mr. Brown is here arguing to show that the
defendant acted in good faith and with right motives. He
said:
"I am strengthened in this position by the indisputable fact .that

Holmes, the prisoner, during the whole voyage, was upon the kindest
and most harmonious terms with all the passengers; that he pre-
served the same friendly relation to them after the loss of the ship;
that he had perilled his life more than once to preserve them; that
he had literally stripped himself of his apparel for their comfort; in
short, his desire to save them seemed to absorb all consideration of
mere personal or individual safety. In these circumstances, to
suppose anything cruel or wanton upon his part is to run counter
to everything that is possible or natural. I infer, therefore, that
he supposed the peril to be imminent and instantaneous, or he
never would have complied with the orders of the mate. ... I
maintain, therefore, that the most favorable construction is to be
placed upon his motives; and it is justly to be inferred that he
acted upon the impression that the danger was imminent, and that
death was inevitable to all, except by resorting to those means
which he actually adopted. But even taking all the statements
. .
of the witnesses for the prosecution, highly colored I will not say
discolored as they and torture them as you may, it is impos-
are,
sible for you to arrive at any other conclusion than that Holmes
was actuated by the kindest and most generous influences; and
certainly I need not say that kindness and generosity are opposed to
wantonness and barbarity." '
He argues that the former actions of Holmes were the

evidences of their cause, viz., his sincere interest for the wel-
fare of the passengers, and then argues that this cause pro-
duced the effect in question, his honesty of motive in this
particular instance.
In a great part of the arguments of this class it is notice-
able that more than one effect is usually adduced to prove
' Great Speeches by Great Laivyers, pp. 143, 144.
the existence of the cause, each effect giving added evidence
of the single cause alleged.
a. Methods of attack. The points of weakness in this
kind of argument are evident. It is a combination of the two
foregoing arguments, ^from sign and from antecedent prob-
ability; and if either one of these component inferences is de-
fective or can be successfully attacked, the whole argument
is destroyed. Referring to the diagram given above, the
argument can be attacked in either leg of the triangle. (I)
The tests are, therefore, the tests already given for the arguments
from cause to effect and from effect to cause.
For example, the argument of Mr. Brown might be at-
tacked at two points. It might be shown that the effects

he mentioned relations of Holmes with the passengers and
his apparent solicitude in their behalf, etc.
might not really
be due to the alleged cause, viz., his interest for their welfare,

but to another cause ^perhaps his desire to win favor or
pecuniary gain. Again it might be attacked (test number 3,
of arguments from antecedent probability) by granting the
sincerity of his motives in general, but showing that certain
circumstances peculiar to his particular case prevented the
natural operation of the cause. Perhaps the defendant was
so fearful for his own life that his usual honesty was put aside
and he acted selfishly or maliciously. Or in the other example,
the thermometer may be out of order, so the cold that we in-
ferred may not have been. Our cause was wrong. Or the
cause may have been right, but a high wind prevented the
formation of ice, so our second effect is lacking.
3. Association of phenomena in the past. The third
class of arguments from sign composed of arguments based
is
upon the past association of facts or phenomena. Two phe-

nomena have been observed to happen together so many
times in the past as to seem to justify the belief that they will
accompany one another in the future. So when one of the
facts or phenomena is observed to be present in any particular
case, it is inferreid that the other also is present. In such
arguments the causal relation is not readily understood or

explained, although it undoubtedly exists.
a. Association of phenomena and generalization. This
kind of argument is very closely .related to the argument by
generalization. In any given case a slight change in expres-
sion may shift the argument from one type to the other.
In so far as it is possible to draw a strict dividing line between
arguments from the association of phenomena in the past
and arguments by generalization, we classify according to
whether the underlying causal connections are expressed
or not. When the causal relations are not understood, or
are understood and taken for granted but not expressed, no
general rule formulated, the argument is strictly speaking
an argument from the association of phenomena in the past.
That is we accept one thing as the sign of something else
without expressing our mode of reasoning, without citing
a general rule with instances to prove it (generalization) and
without comparing two individual cases as to resemblances,
point by point, as a basis for inferring resemblance on a dis-
puted point (analogy). The argument from association
might be called simply an implied generalization. Its strength
depends upon the validity joi the underlying unexpressed
generalization.
We may infer that any ruminating animal has cloven
hoofs; conversely, we may infer that any animal with cloven
hoofs is a) ruminant. These inferences are reasonably safe
because in most cases the two characteristics have been
found to exist together, although scientists do not under-
stand the exact nature of the connection. The argument
about ruminant animals depends on the fact that the con-
currence of the two phenomena seldom fails. In some cases
the rule has been broken; the pig and the tapir, for illustra-
tion, have cloven hoofs, but are not ruminants: consequently,
the convincingness of the argument is weakened, and any
considerable number of exceptions would make it valueless.
The conclusion you draw that A is nearby when you see


his dog or horse or hat somewhere; many every day state-
ments about the weather or crops, or the habits of animals;
the immediate and almost universal import of a half-masted
flag, or crepe on a door; all these are examples of this type of
argument. What has been said earlier about the impossi-

bility of hard and fast dividing lines, should be kept in niind
in connection with this type of argument. It is possible to
list here arguments that might fit under either of the other
types of -sign, or under generalization, or even antecedent

probability. But it still seems well worth while to keep this
old label for that large class of "implied generalizations" in
which no general law is formulated or expressed, and many
times not understood. It should also be observed that ex-
amples of this type of argument are usually (not always)
found in fields where unchanging laws of nature are not in

control or are not understood to be in control ^but usually
are cases in which the human will plays an important part.
It is so possible that the two phenomena are not associated

this time that someone else has A's horse, or dog, or hat
that the fiag has been half-masted by mistake, or the crepe
put up as a joke. This argument is very weak in itself, but
is often important in corroborating other elements in a case.
b. Methods of attack. It is, then, clear where the argu-

ment may be open to attack. The habit of hasty, unreason-
ing (and often unrecognized) implied generalization is very
common. In many debates this very error is predominant.
A speaker or writer cites a few instances of the concurrence
of two facts in the past and argues that because they have
happened together in the past, they must happen together
in the present instance. Really, what he has established is,
that they may happen together; he has proved nothing, and
his attempt may be rendered null by (I) pointing out that
the cases are too few to establish a law of concurrence, which
is really necessaryi. e., exposing the weakness of the im-
plied generalization which fails to com^ up to the tests of a

real generalization which it must meet; or better, (II) by

producing contrary examples, definite cases where the one phe-

nomenon has occurred without the other; or (III) destroying
its corroborative function by showing itto be actually in-
consistent with facts in the ease already known. Arguments
of this kind arefrom their nature of doubtful value. The co-
existence of the two facts in past instances is not shown to be
anything more than mere accident, and chance is at best a
weak foundation on which to base an interference. The
argument gathers its force wholly from the frequency of the
past concurrence of the phenomena. In order to approach
conclusiveness we must have: (I) a very large number of cases
of the observed concurrence of the facts or phenomena, and
(II) substantial uniformity in the operation of the rule that
when one occurs the other accompanies it, and (III) har-
mony with accepted facts in the case.
C. Example. The third and last division of the kinds
of arguments is composed of those which depend for their
strength upon the resemblance between the case in question
and some other case or cases, which are adduced either as
analogous in nature to this particular case, or as establishing
some general law that is applicable to it. There are, there-
fore, two classes of arguments from example, which may be
called, respectively, (1) the argument by generalization, and
(2) the argument from analogy.

1. Generalization. In arguments of this kind we "con-
sider one or more known individual objects or instances of a
certain class as fair specimens, in respect of some point or
other, of that class; and consequently draw an inference
from them respecting either the whole class or other less
known individuals of it." ^ Our purpose is to establish a
general law which will apply to a particular case under dis-
cussion.
The following from Burke's Speech on Conciliation is
an illustration of an inference from individual instances to
a truth respecting the whole class to which they belong:
' Whately, p. 52.


"In power must be less vigorous
large bodies, the circulation of
at the extremities.Nature has said it. The Turk cannot govern
Egypt, and Arabia, and Curdistan, as he governs Thrace; nor has
he the same dominion in Crimea and Algiers, which he has at Brusa
and Smyrna. Despotism itself is obliged to truck and huckster.
The Sultan gets such obedience as he can. He governs with loose
rein, that he may govern at all; and the whole of the force and vigor
of his authority in his centre is derived from a prudent relaxation
in all his borders. Spain, in her provinces, is, perhaps, not so well
obeyed as you in yours. She complies too, she submits, she watches
times. This is the immutable condition, the eternal law, of ex-
tensive and detached empire." '
Chief Justice Marshall, in his opinion delivered in the ease

of McCulloch vs. Maryland,^ used the argument by generali-
zation as follows:
"The power though appertaining to

of creating a corporation,
sovereignty, is power of making war or levying taxes
not, like the
or of regulating commerce, a great substantive and independent
power, which cannot be implied as incidental to other powers, or
used as a means of executing them. It is never the end for which
other powers are exercised, but a means by which other objects
are accomplished. No contributions are made to charity for the
sake of an incorporation, but a corporation is created to administer
the charity; no seminary of learning is instituted in order to be
incorporated, but the corporate character is conferred to subserve
the purposes of education. No city was ever built with the sole
object of being incorporated, but is incorporated as affording the
best means of being well governed. The power of creating a cor-
poration is never used for its own sake, but for the purpose of
effecting something else."
In the following, Channing, arguing that the sufferings of

the slaves are evils and should be done away with, infers
'
from individual instances of a class to "another less known

individual of it:"
1 Cook's Edition, p. 26. 2 4 wheat. 316.

"Allow that the sufiFerings of the slave are less than those of the
free laborer. But the sufferings are Wrongs, and this changes their
nature. Pain as pain is nothing compared with pain when it is
wrong. A blow, given me by accident, may fell me to the earth;

but, after all, it is a trifle. A slight blow, inflicted in scorn or with
injurious intent, is an evil, which, without aid from my principles,
I could not bear. Let God's providence conflne me to my room by
disease, and I more than submit, for in his dispensations I see
parental goodness seeking my purity and peace. But let man im-
prison me, without inflicting disease, and how intolerable my nar-
row bounds. So if the elements take away our property, we resign
it without a murmur; but man rob us of our fortune, poverty
if a
weighs on us as a mountain. Anything can be borne but the will
and the power of the selfish, unrighteous man. . . .
"My hostility to the system does not rest primarily on the physical
agonies it inflicts, but on a deeper foundation: on its flagrant injus-
tice, and on the misery necessarily involved in a system of wrong." \
Headduces examples to prove the general truth that,

regardless of the pain it inflicts, injustice or wrong always
creates an evil, and then applies this general truth to the

instance of slavery so proving that slavery is an e\nl.
Under this head Hill ^ offers some good suggestions and

provides some excellent examples which we quote.
a. Illustrative and argumentative examples. "In argu-
ments important to distinguish between
of the first class, it is
examples which are merely illustrative and those which are

argumentative. A supposed case under a general principle
which is itself in dispute, though it may make the principle
more does not tend to prove its truth. Cicero's
intelligible,
proposition that nothing is expedient which is dishonorable
is explained, but not established, by the example he gives,
an example drawn from Themistocles's project of burning

the Spartan fleet. This plan Cicero, in opposition to Aris-
tides,maintains to be inexpedient because dishonorable;
but no one who had not already assented to the general
1 Channing's Worha. Vol. V. pp. 37, 39. ^ Hill, pp. 361, 363.


principle would be convinced of its soundness by this
example.
"An actual instance of the operation of a principle has,
on the other hand, the force of an argument. Such an ar-
gument is given in a criticism of Sir James Fitzjames Steph-
en's History of the Criminal Law
of England. In answer
to Sir James's proposition 'that unanimity of jurors is es-
sential to trial by jury: that if that is to be given up, the

institution itself should be abolished,' his critic refers to the
fa!ct that in Scotland, where a majority of jurors decide,
trial by jury succeeds as well as in England. Another ex-

ample is given in the following passage :
"The outcry of a suffering beast may be no measure of its dis-

tress. That outcry, like all else in nature, is of a strictly utilitarian
character. But it was not developed in the first place as an appeal
to the sympathy of man, and therefore man's senses and intuitive
judgment cannot be trusted to interpret it aright. The pig squeals
aloud when he is hurt, and advertises his woe over half the parish,
because, in the wild state, his comrades were sworn to rescue him
from a foe or die. Many a hunter who has been treed by a herd of
peccaries, after wounding one of them, has had convincing proof
of their magnificent esprit de corps. ^ The sheep is dumb before
her persecutors because, when wild, there was no hope of salvation
from the scared flock, fast fleeing to inaccessible hills as soon as the
wolf began his raid. The Virginian opossum, when playing that
part in the world's drama which he has made peculiarly his own,
will allow his limp carcase to be mauled to an incredible extent
without moving an eyelid. He acts his lie with Cretan facility, and
sticks to it with more than Spartan fortitude. Yet he is silent for
exactly the same reason that the pig is so shrilly vociferous, viz.,
because this has been proved the best way to preserve his precious

life."
"Still another example is the little essay by Charles Lamb^

'Louis Robinson, M. D., Every-day Cruelty. The Fortnightly Review,
July, 1894, p. 107.
^ Essays of Elia. Popular Fallacies, VII.
on the popular proverb that 'of two disputants the warmest

is generally in the wrong' :
"Our experience would lead us to quite an opposite conclusion.

Temper, indeed, is no test of truth; but warmth and earnestness
are a proof at least of a man's own conviction of the rectitude of
that which he maintains. Coolness is as often the result of an un-
principled indifference to truth or falsehood, as of a sober con-
fidence in a man's own side in a dispute. Nothing is more insulting
sometimes than the appearance of this philosophic temper. There
is little Titubus, the stammering law-stationer engaged in Lincoln's

Inn we have seldom known this shrewd little fellow engaged in an
argument where we were not convinced he had the best of it, if his
tongue would but fairly have seconded him. When he has been
spluttering excellent broken sense for an hour together, writhing
and labouring to be delivered of the point of dispute the very gist
of the controversy knocking at his teeth, which like some obstinate

iron-grating still obstructed its deliverance his puny frame con-
vulsed, and face reddening all over at an unfairness in the logic
which he wanted articulation to expose, it has moved our gall to see
a smooth portly fellow of an adversary, that cared not a button for
the merits of the question, by merely laying his hand upon the
head of the stationer, and desiring him to be calm (your tall dis-
putants have always the advantage), with a provoking sneer carry
the argument clean from him in the opinion of all the by-standers,
who have gone away clearly convinced that Titubus must have
been in the wrong, because he was in a passion; and the Mr; ,
meaning his opponent, is one of the fairest and at the same time
one of the most dispassionate arguers breathing!"
We have already mentioned a priori (antecedent probability

cause to effect) and a posteriori (sign, first type, effect to
cause). A third label, a fortiori, which is often used in con-
nection with these two, covers a certain use of the argument
from example. It may be used either in generalization, or
analogy. Genung ^ explains it briefly and gives some very
good illustrations.
1 Genung, Prac. RheU pp. 421, 422.


"A favorite use of the argument from example, especially
in oratory, is the argument technically called a fortiori,
which reasons that if a certain principle is true in a given case,
much more will it be true in a supposed case, wherein the
conditions are more favorable.
"Many of the assertions of Scripture are put in the form of
an argument a fortiori; for example: 'Wherefore, if God so
clothe the grass of the field, which today is, and tomorrow is
cast into the oven, shall he not much more O ye
clothe you,
of little faith?'
"The from Burke, advocates sympathy with
following,
the Irish Roman more natural and fitting, for
Catholics, as
the English, than the sympathy which was actually given to
the Americans in the time of the Revolution :
" 'I confess to you freely that the sufferings and distress of the
people of America in this cruel war have at times affected me more
deeply than I can express. I felt every gazette of triumph as a
blow upon my heart, which has an hundred times sunk and fainted
within me at all the mischiefs brought upon those who bear the
whole brunt of the war in the heart of their country. Yet the
Americans are utter strangers to me; a nation among whom I am
not sure that I have a single acquaintance. Was I to suffer my
mind to be so unaccountably warped, was I to keep such iniquitous
weights and measures of temper and of reason, as to sympathize
with those who are in open rebellion against an authority which I
respect, at war with a country which by every title ought to be,

and is, most dear to me, and yet to have no feeling at all for the
hardships and indignities suffered by men who by their very vicinity
are bound up in a nearer relation to us, who contribute their share,
and more than their share, to the common prosperity, who perform
the common offices of social life, and who obey the laws, to the
full as well as I do?'"
b. Methods of attack. In this argument as we have said

we present "one or more individual objects or instances, of
a certain class, as fair specimens, in respect of some point or
other, and draw an inference from them, respecting the whole
class or other less known objects of it." The italicised parts

of this definition indicate the two points for attack on this
argument. To test an argument by generalization apply two
questions to it:
(I) "Are the specimens fair in respect of the point in is-
sue? " The failure to meet this test is very common in dis-
honest and partisan controversy. The statement that "100
students were asked if they wanted thesystem intro-
duced, and only three said ' Yes," has no valid force whatever
'
if the 100 students were all unfair specimens of the general
student body of 5000 in regard to the particular point in issue.

Choosing unfair specimens and making out a plausible, but
dishonest and worthless generalization, is a favorite trick of
partisan investigators and advocates to make out
who have
a preconceived case regardless of the truth.
(II) " Has a large enough part of the class been observed
to justify an inference regarding the whole class or unob-

served parts of it? " To apply this test, as the first one, it is
necessary to know the exact nature of the question at issue.
In questions which concern the working out of natural laws,
as in chemistry, physics, biology, etc., a very small number of
specimens are needed to determine the rule. If a certain
treatment of a dozen rabits results in each case in the same
way, it is reasonably safe to formulate a rule for all the mil-
lions of rabbits, or for other animals as well. In chemistry or
physics one very carefully performed experiment may well
settle some question for all time. A rule can be formulated
and followed with confidence in every case. This is gen-
eralization from a single instance. It is allowable when
dealing with the working of natural laws on inanimate
materials, and sometimes on plants and animals. Of course,
in regard to many questions, as questions in chemistry, or
physics, plantsand animals, even human beings, are to be
tested in thesame manner as inanimate materials. It is as
we get further and further from this type of question, and
nearer to questions involving personal taste, ability, prej-
^

udice, opinion, belief, etc., that we must increasingly enlarge
the proportion of observed instances. The greater the possi-
ble variations in answer to our question, the wider must be
the field of observation, in order ,to justify a generalization.
And, of course, the very nature of many questions preclude
the possibility of getting a rule that will work without ex-
ceptions. In practically all questions affecting human con-
duct a high degree of probability is all we can hope to get for
any general rule.
2. Analogy. In taking up a consideration of the analogy

it is well to cite some well known and authoritative writers
in regard to different ideas as to whatan analogy.
constitutes
There are two quite which we shall label
different conceptions
for convenience "figurative analogy" and "literal analogy."
a. Figurative analogy. Says Whately:
"The word Analogy again is generally employed in the
case of Arguments in which the instance adduced is somewhat
more remote from that to which it is applied; e. g., a physi-
cian would be said to know bj"^ Experience the noxious effects
of a certain drug on the human constitution, if he had fre-
quently seen men poisoned by it; but if he thence conjectured
that it would be noxious to some other species of animal, he
would be said to reason from analogy; the only difference
being that the resemblance is less, between a man and a
brute, than between one man and another; and accordingly
it is found that many brutes are not acted upon by some
drugs which are pernicious to man.

"But more strictly speaking. Analogy ought to be distin-
guished from direct resemblance, with which it is often con-
founded, in the language, even of eminent writers (especially
on Chemistry and Natural History) in the present day.
Analogy being a 'resemblance of ratios,' that should strictly
be called an Argument from Analogy, in which the two things
(viz. the one from which, and the one to which we argue)
are not, necessarily, themselves alike, but stand in similar

' Elements of Rhetoric, pp. 72, 73.
relations to some other things; or in other words, that the

common genus which they both fall under, consists in a
relation. Thus an egg and a seed are not in themselves alike,
but bear a like relation, to the parent bird and to her future
nestling, on the one hand, and to the old and young plant
on the other, respectively; this relation being the genus which
both fall imder; and many arguments might be drawn from
this Analogy. Again, the fact that from birth difiFerent per-
sons have different bodily constitutions, in respect of com-
plexion, stature, strength, shape, liability to particular dis-
orders, &c., v^'hich constitutions, however, are capable of
being, to a certain extent, modified by regimen, medicine,
&c., affords an Analogy by which we may form a presumption,
that the like takes place in respect of mental qualities also;
though it is plain that there can be no direct resemblance
either between body and mind, or their respective attributes.
"In this kind of Argument, one error, which is very com-
mon, and which is to be sedulously avoided, is that of con-
cluding the things in question to be alike, because they are
Analogous; to resemble each other iu themselves, because
there is a resemblance in the relation they bear to certain
other things; which is manifestly a groundless inference.
"Sometimes the mistake is made of supposing this direct
resemblance to exist when it does not; sometimes, of suppos-
ing, or sophistically representing, that such resemblance is
asserted, when no such thing was intended. One may often

hear a person reproached with having compared such and
such a person or thing to this or that, and with having in
so doing introduced a most unjust, absurd, and indecorous
comparison; when, in truth, the object in question had not
been, properly speaking, compared' to any of these things;
an Analogy only having been asserted. And it is curious that
many persons are guilty of misrepresentation, who are, or
ought to be, familiar with the Scripture-Parables; in which
the words "compare" and "liken" are often introduced,
where it is evident that there could have been no thought of


any direct resemblance. A child of ten years old would
hardly be guilty of such a blunder as to suppose that members
of the church are literally 'like' plants of corn, sheep,
fish
caught in a net, and fruit trees.
" Another caution is applicable to the whole class of argu-
ments from Example; viz. not to consider the Resemblance

or Analogy to extend further (i. e., to more particulars than
it does). The resemblance of a picture to the object it rep-
resents, is direct; but it extends no further than the one sense,
of Seeing, is concerned. . . .
"Thus, because a just Analogy has been discTerned between

the metropolis of a country, and the heart of the animal body,
it has been sometimes contended that its increased, size is a
disease^
that it may impede some of its most important
functions, or even be the cause of its dissolution."
Here we have an excellent discussion of the strict old

analogy a comparison of things which are not alike in them-
selves,
^but are alike in the relations they bear to other
things. So we have analogies drawn between the circula-
tion of the blood and the circulation of money, the life of man
and the life of a nation, the spread of ideas and the spread of
disease. In all such analogies we are dealing simply with a
resemblance of relations.
b. Literal analogy. Another kind of analogy is explained
by Minto.^ "In a strict logical sense, however, as defined
by Mill, sanctioned by the previous usage of Butler and
Kant, analogy means more than a resemblance of relations.
It means a preponderating resemblance between two things
such as to warrant us in inferring that the resemblance ex-
tends further. This is a species of argument distinct from the
extension of an empirical law. In the extension of an empiri-
cal law (i. e., generalization), the ground of inference is a coin-
cidence frequently repeated within our experience,^ and the
inference is that it has occurred or will occur beyond that
experience; in the argument from analogy, the ground of in-
' Minto, book ii, ch. X. * Italics ours.
ference is the resemblance between two individual objects or

kinds of objects in a certain number of points, and the inference
is that they resemble one another in some other point,
known to belong to the one, but not known to belong to the

other. "Two things go together in many cases, therefore in
all, including this one," is the argument in extending a
generalization: 'Two things agree in many respects, there-
fore in this other,' is the argument from analogy.
"The example given by Reid in his Intellectual Powers
has become the standard illustration of the peculiai* argu-
ment from analogy.
" 'We may observe a very great similitude between this earth
which we inhabit, and the other planets, Saturn, Jupiter, Mars,
Venus, and Mercury, They all revolve around the sun, as the
earth does, although at different distances and in different periods.
They borrow all their light from the sun, as the earth does. Several
of them are known to revolve around their visible axis like the
earth, and by that means have like succession of day and night.
Some of them have moons, that serve to give them light in the ab-
sence of the sun, as our moon does to us. They are all, in their mo-
tions, subject to the same law of gravitation as the earth is. From
all this similitude it is not unreasonable to think that these planets
may, like our earth, be the habitations of various orders of living

creatures. There is some probability in this conclusion from
analogy.'"
The difference between these types of analogy may be

brought out by an illustration. Suppose you take an apple
and ascertain: (a) its shape, (b) its color, (c) its size, (d) its
weight, (e) scars and blemishes on it, (f) its softness, and then
(g) its taste. The next day you find another apple which
agrees in all the points (a) to (f) inclusive, and you infer that
this second apple will be like the They
first in taste also.
agree in so many you reason that they will agree
points that
in the point in question. Is this an analogy? It seems evi-
dent that Whately would say "No," and Minto would say
"Yes."
(I) Generalization from a single instance. According to
Whately's definition of the analogy this would have to fall

into the "generalization" class of argument from example.
It would then be a generalization from a single instance.
And that is precisely what this argument is; literal analogy
is simply another name for it. You have in effect estab-
lished a general rule that apples which fit the condi-
tions (a) to (f), inclusive, taste so and so, and you apply
this general rule to the first apple considered. You would,
of course, apply it whole barrel of apples.
similarly to a
This is a generalization based on a single specimen which
is considered a fair specimen, and is made in regard to things
that are so uniform in nature that such a generalization is

justified. The analogy quoted by Minto from Reid's In-
tellectual Powers is the same. Substantially a general law is
formed to the effect that all planets which are like the earth
in such and such respects are probably, inhabited.
c. In summary, then, we have in arguments from ex-
ample two types: First, generalization, the establishment of

a general law, based upon specimens examined. This may
range from instances dealing with phenomena affected by
the human will (generalizations regarding people and human
institutions) to instances dealing with phenomena affected
only by unchanging la'ws of nature (generalizations in chem-
istry, physics, biology, etc.) At the first end of the scale we
must examine a great number of instances in order to have a
sound generalization. The number diminishes until at the
last end of the scale we can generalize from a single instance.
Such generalization from a single instance, especially when
only one case for its application is in mind, is often called
analogy. This use is so widespread that we must accept this
as permissible and recognize this as one of the types of analogy
(literal analogy) . Such an analogy is of course often a strong
argument. It has real logical force. Second, in addition to
the use of this term to cover a generalization from a single
instance, literal analogy, as discussed above, we have the old-
fashioned analogy (figurative), based purely on a resem-

blance of relations
not a direct comparison of members of
the same class point for point. This type of analogj' is
usually only a figure of speech and has practically no logical

force. It is usually possible to answer it by saying that the
analogy is false, that the parallel is not close. Since the
things compared are not alike in themselves ^not members
of the same class, it is always easy to show wherein the
parallel breaks down.
d. Methods of attack. So the methods of attack of the
type of analogy are really those to be applied to gen-
(I) first
a fair specimen of the class? (B) Are

eralization: (A) Is it
you taking a large enough part of the class i. e., is this a
field in which one can generalize from a single instance?
(II) False analogy. The second type of analogy is met by
pointing out that the resemblances are not sufficiently par-
allel, by attacking it as a false analogy. Thus we often hear
it argued that men and nations are alike in certain particu-
lars, and that consequently nations must have youth, man-
hood, old age, and decay. The argument is not valid, be-
cause the resemblance is not a resemblance that has any
bearing on the argument. Men and nations are alike in
their moral responsibilities; for both, self-indulgence or mis-
judged action brings its punishment; for both, the same
intellectual qualities may bring success. But they are not
alike in the one essential point, viz., physical organization.
It is usually possible thus to waive aside any analogy of this
type. It has no probative force unless the parallel is admitted

to be sound and then probative force is not needed. But
while this analogy is of little use as an "argument," it is
very effective as a "figure of speech" to make meaning clear.
To explain the unknown by drawing an analogy to the known
is one of the best ways of getting clearness of showing
what you mean. It is very useful indeed in exposition. In
regard to resemblances, we must bear in mind that in order
to give grounds for any argument or illustration, it is impor-
tant not that the resemblances are many, but that they are
such as bear directly upon the argument. Horses and generals
are not alike in their relations, in many ways; but Lincoln's
argument derives its force from the fact that the two are
similar in the relation that important to the argument.
is
" Csesar had Cromwell, and George
his Brutus, Charles I his
III may profit by their example." Caesar was unlike Charles
I in most of his personal qualities; he ruled a different coun-
try, in a different age. George III was the very opposite of
the Roman temper and character; his people, his advisers,
in
his century, were not similar to those of either of the men
cited as "examples." But the three cases were similar in the
essential element: Csesar, Charles I, and George III all repre-
sented the pressure of tyranny upon a spirited, liberty-loving
people. In each case oppression was the cause of the effect,
rebellion; and whatever other differences there may be in the
circumstances, the causes were similar in nature. Such an
argument only emphasizes the fact that the causal (Connec-
tion is essential in this class of arguments, and that the simili-
tude between the instances is a similitude of causes and effects.
3. Cause and effect in argument from example. In ar-
guments from example the connection of cause and effect,
as in the other two classes of arguments, is, of course, present.
The difference is that in the other classes the inference is
directly from cause to effect, or effect to cause, whereas in

this class the inference depends upon a comparison of causes
and effects. In the argument from antecedent probability
we argue that certain known facts are of such kind that they
must from their very nature produce a certain effect. In the
argument from example we argue that certain known facts
wiU be the cause of a certain effect because they are similar
to the certain other facts which have been the cause of a sim-
the past. If the facts that we produce as "ex-
ilar effect in
amples" have happened to follow one another in the past
merely by accident, then no amount of comparison can prove
anything more than that similar facts may happen together in
the future by accident; the comparison cannot give valid

grounds for a behef that they certainly ivill follow one
another. The causal connection must be present in order
to make the argument sound. It is, then, sometimes possible
to attack arguments from example from this point of view by
showing weakness in the connection in the "examples," as
well as by showing that the resemblance between the "ex-
amples" and the instance in dispute may not be a true
resemblance. The test of the causal connections, have been
given in the treatment of the other classes of arguments.
EXERCISE. CHAPTER 7
KINDS OF ARGUMENTS
1. Write out original examples of inductive and deductive
reasoning.
2. Hand in three examples each of perfect and imperfect
induction.
3. Give an original example of each of the five methods of
induction.
4. Hand in one good example of each of the following: Syl-
logism; Sorites; Inference in quantitative relation; En-
thymeme.
5. Give one sound argument from antecedent probability
and one unsound argument from antecedent probability,
indicating which method of attack exposes the weakness
of the latter.
6. Give one sound original example of each of the three kinds
of argument from sign; and one unsoimd argument of
each kind, indicating the weakness of each of the latter
and the proper methods of attack to use against each.
7. Give two sound and two unsound examples of argument
by generalization, explaining the strength and weakness
of each.
8. Give two examples each of figurative and literal analogy,
explaining the strength and weakness of each for argu-
mentative purposes.
CHAPTER 8
FALLACIES
OUTLINE
I. Definition and classification.
II. Rhetorical fallacies (Errors in interpretation).
A. Incorrect ohversion.
B. Incorrect conversion.
C. Amphibology.
D. Accent.
III. Logical fallacies (Errors in reasoning).
A. Formal (Violations of rules of syllogism).
1. In categorical arguments.
a. Four terms.
b. Undistributed Middle (Illicit Middle).
c. Illicit Major.
d. Illicit Minor.
e. Negative premise.
f. Particular premise.
2. In Hypothetical arguments.
a. Denying the antecedent.
b. Affirming the consequent.

3. In disjunctive arguments.
a. Imperfect disjunction.
B. Material (not in the form but in the matter).

1. Equivocation (Ambiguity).
In quantity.
(I) Composition.
(II) Division.
w
2.
b.
^
In quality.

(I) Ambiguous Middle (Specific accident).
(II) Simple accident.

(III) Converse accident.
Presumption,
a. Begging the question (Petitio Principii).
170
FALLACIES 171
(I) Assumption of unproved premise (As-

sumptio non probata).
(II) Arguing in a circle (Circulus in pro-
bando).
b. IrrelevaTvt conclusion (Ignoring the question)
(Ignorantio Elenchi).
(I) Argumentum ad hominem.
(II) Argumentum ad populum.
(III) Argumentum ad ignorantiam.
(IV) Argumentum ad verecundiam.
(V) Argumentum ad judicium.
c. Complex question.
d. Non sequitur (False consequent).
(I) Simple.
(II) False Cause (Post hoc ergo propter
hoc).
I. Definition and classification. A fallacy is an error in
reasoning. In a strictly logical sense the term fallacy can be

applied to no other kind of error. It is usual, however, in
discussing fallacies, to consider certain definite errors in in-
terpretation as well as errors in reasoning. Indeed logicians
comments on these errors with the state-
usually preface their
ment that the proper place to deal with them is in a book on
rhetoric. They are variously classified as "errors in inter-
pretation," "hermeneutic fallacies," etc. We shall classify
them as rhetorical fallacies, to distinguish them from the
errors in reasoning, which we Con-
shall call logical fallacies.
siderable search has failed to discover any two writers who
use classifications of fallacies which are the same in all re-
spects. Nor does the classification given here follow in detail
any given elsewhere. It is, however, in the main identical
with those given by Hyslop^ and Creighton.^ The amount
of time that can be profitably spent in studying a rather
complete list of fallacies, wiU vary with different classes.
But the avoidance of fallacies in our own reasoning, and the
1 Page 227. 2 Page 154.
detection of them in the reasoning of others are of such vital
importance that it seems well to give the student of argu-
mentation at least an opportunity to learn the nature of
the most common dangers. The twelve fallacies printed
in italics in the above table should be carefully studied,
This classification is not put forward as all-inclusive, nor are
its divisions deemed to be mutually exclusive. A given
fallacy may be classified under different heads, according
to the standpoint from which it is viewed. It is thought,
however, that this classification is better than others hitherto
published with respect to completeness, terminology, and
logical division.
II. Rhetorical fallacies, or errors of interpretation, are
faults of understanding, not of reasoning. They are mistakes
in interpreting propositions. They "any
are not errors in
process or act of the mind by which, from knowing one thing,
it advances on to know another." ' There is no advance to-
ward a new thing. The inference (if inference at all) involved
here is immediate inference. No new truth is developed. No
steps in reasoning are taken. For instance, in getting the
proposition "Some quadrupeds are horses" from the proposi-
tion "All horses are quadrupeds," we are doing no reasoning,
inferring no new truth. The
statement is the result
first
of the interpretation of the second, not of reasoning from the

second as a basis.
A. Incorrect Obversion of a proposition
obversion.
means changing from affirmative to negative or from
it
negative to affirmative without changing its meaning. For

instance, "All of the campers were asleep"

"Not one of the
campers was awake." "Not one of the specimens was

perfect" "All of the specimens were imperfect." The
fallacy of illogical obversion arises when we fail to understand
the exact meaning of the first proposition or some of its
terms, and consequently get an obverse that does not mean
the same thing as the original. "All University men are
Newman (italics not in original).
'
FALLACIES 173
eligible" does not mean necessarily "No non-University men

are eligible," but "No University men are ineligible." To
avoid the fallacy of illogical obversion, we must change the
predicate only. The use of the negative of the original sub-
ject gives illogical obversion. To state the rule technically:
instead of affirming a predicate as true of a given subject,
we may deny its negative in regard to the same subject; in-
stead of denying a predicate of a given subject we may affirm
the negative of this predicate in regard to the same subject.
"All citizens vnll be admitted," logically ob verted gives us

"No citizens vnll be refused admission"; illogically ob verted
it results in "No aliens will be admitted."
B. Incorrect conversion. Conversion of a proposition
means transposing its subject and predicate without changing
its meaning. "No seniors are members of the club" "No
members of the club are seniors." The fallacy of illogical
conversion arises when we fail to grasp clearly the limitations
on the terms of the first proposition and give some term a
wider application in the second proposition than it had in
the first. Technically it is an error in distribution of terms.
If the second proposition distributes a term which was not
distributed in the first, the fallacy of illogical conversion is'
committed. The statement that "All brave men are gener-

ous" does not mean that "All generous men are brave."
From "All horses are animals" it does not follow that "All
animals are horses" but that "Some animals are horses."
"In the heat of debate, or when using propositions without
proper attention, there is a natural tendency to assume that
a proposition which makes a universal statement regarding
the subject, does the same with regard to the predicate. And,
although such errors are very obvious when pointed out, âs,
indeed, in the case with nearly all logical fallacies, they
may very easily impose on us when our minds are not fully
awake, that is, when attention is not active and consciously
^
on guard."
' Creighton, pp. 155, 156.
C. " The fallacy of amphibology consists in an ambiguous
grammatical structure of a sentence, which produces miscon-
ception. A celebrated instance occurs in the prophecy of the
Spirit in Shakespeare's Henry VI.: 'The Duke yet lives that
Henry shall depose,' which leaves it wholly doubtful whether
the Duke shall depose Henry, or Henry the Duke. This
prophecy is doubtless an imitation of those which the ancient
oracle of Delphi is reported to have uttered; and it seems that
this fallacy was a great resource to the oracles who were not
confident in their own powers of foresight. The Latin lan-
guage gives great scope to misconstructions, because it does
not require any fixed order for the words of a sentence,, and
when there are two accusative cases with an infinitive verb,
it maj' be difficult to teU, except from the context, which
comes in regard to sense before the verb. The double mean-

ing which may be given to 'twice two and three' arises from
amphibology; it may be 7 or 10, according as we add the 3
aftpr or before multiplying. In the careless construction of
sentences it is often impossible to tell to what part any
adverb or quahfying clause refers. Thus, if a person says,
'I accomplished my business and returned the day after,'
it may be that the business was accomplished on the day
after as well as the return; but it may equally have been

finished on the previous day. Any ambiguity of this kind
may generally be avoided by a simple change in the order
of the words; as, for instance, 'I accomplished my business,
and on the day after returned.' Amphibology may some-
times arise from confusing the subjects and' predicates in a
compound sentence, as if in the sentence, 'Platinum and iron
are very rare and useful metals,' I were to apply the predicate
useful to platinum and rare to iron, which is not intended.
The word 'respectively' is often used to show that the reader
^
is not at liberty to apply each predicate to each subject."
D. " The fallacy of accent consists in any ambiguity
arising from a misplaced accent or emphasis thrown upon
> JevoM, pp. 172, 173.
FALLACIES 175
some word of a sentence. A ludicrous instance is liable to

occur in reading Chapter XIII. of the First Book of Kings,
verse 27, where it is said of the prophet, 'And he spoke to
his sons, saying. Saddle me the ass, and they saddled him.'
The Italics indicate that the word him was supplied by the
translators of the authorized version, but it may suggest
a very different meaning. The Commandment, 'Thou shalt
not bear false witness against thy neighbor,' may be made by
a slight empha?is of the voice on the last word to imply that
we are at liberty to bear false witness against other persons.
Mr. De Morgan, who remarks this, also points out that the
erroneous quoting of an author, by unfairly separating a
word from its context, or italicising words which were
not intended to be italicised, gives rise to cases of this
fallacy.
"It is curious to observe how many and various may
be the meanings attributable to the same sentence according
as emphasis is thrown upon one word or another. Thus the
sentence, 'The study of Logic is not supposed to communicate
a knowledge of many useful facts,' may be made to imply
that the study of Logic does communicate such a knowledge
although it is not supposed to do so; or that it communi-
cates a knowledge of a few useful facts; or that it communi-
cates a knowledge of many useless facts. This ambiguity
may be explained by considering that if you deny a thing to
have the group of qualities A, B, C, D, the truth of your
statement will be satisfied by any one quality being absent,
and an accented pronunciation will often be used to indicate
that which the speaker believes to be absent. If you deny
that a particular fruit is ripe and sweet and well-flavored,
it may be unripe and sweet and well-flavored; or ripe and
sour and well-flavored; or ripe and sweet and ill-flavored;

or any two or even all three quaUties may be absent. But
if you deny it to be ripe and sweet and well-flavored, the denial
would be understood to refer to the last quality. Jeremy

Bentham was so much afraid of being misled by this fallacy
of accent thathe employed a person to read to him, as I
have heard, who had a pecuharly monotonous manner of
^
reading."
in. Logical fallacies are errors in reasoning or inference,
as distinct from errors in interpretation. There are two
classes of logical fallacies formal and material.
A. Formal fallacies arise from a violation of the rules
of the syllogism. To detect them it is necessary only to be
familiar with the formal laws of reasoning. Knowledge
of the subject-matter dealt with in the argument is not
essential. Formal fallacies consist in violations of the
rules of the syllogismwhich have been given in an earlier
chapter. In enumerating and illustrating here the fallacies
that are associated with these rules, it is probably well to
follow the subdivisions indicated in our classification: cate-
gorical, hypothetical, and disjunctive syllogisms.^
1. In categorical syllogisms. A categorical syllogism is
one iu which all the propositions are categorical propositions.
A categorical proposition is an absolute, declarative, positive
statement admitting no conditions or exceptions. "All men
are mortal. John is a man. John is mortal." These are
categorical statements. Six fallacies arise in categorical
syllogisms.
a. Four terms. "Every syllogism has three and only
three terms." A when a fourth term is used.
fallacy arises
It is so obvious when all four terms are quite distinct that
there is little danger of any one's being deceived by it.
As in:
Frenchmen are Europeans.
Germans are Caucasians.
Therefore Frenchmen are Caucasians.
But we commit the fallacy just the same when we have verb-
ally only three terms, if in reality we have four, by using one
term in two different senses. "The terms must be three,
' Jevons, pp. 174, 175.
^ See also "dilemma" in Chapter on Refutation.

FALLACIES 177
not only with regard to the letters and the words, but even
with regard to the meaning. For example:
"Mouse is a monosyllable;
"A mouse eats cheese;
"Therefore a monosyllable eats cheese.
Here we have apparently only three terms, viz., 'Mouse,'
'monosyllable,' and a 'creature that eats cheese'; but in
reality we have four terms, for the word 'mouse' means two
different things. In one case it means an animal, in the other
case it means a word. It is not true to say that the animal
'mouse' is a monosyllable, nor that the word 'mouse' eats
cheese." ^ The overlapping of the divisions in our classifica-
tion of fallacies is shown by the fact that this fallacy may also
be classed as the material fallacy of equivocation called am-
biguous middle.
b. Undistributed middle. "The middle term must he
distributed once at least." The fallacy arising from failure
to observe this rule is sometimes called illicit middle or illicit
process of the middle term. A teiin is distributed when the

whole of it is referred to universally.
Frenchmen are (some) Europeans;
(Some) Europeans are Teutonic;
Therefore Frenchmen are Teutonic.
The middle term, Europeans, is undistributed here. The
conclusion is therefore erroneous, in spite of the truth of the
premises.
Frenchmen are Europeans;
(AH) Europeans are Occidentals.
Therefore Frenchmen are Occidentals.
Here the middle term is distributed in the major premise.
The conclusion is correct.
c. Illicit major. "No term must he distributed in the
conclusion which was not distributed in one of the premises."
Violations of this rule are called the fallacies of illicit major
when the major term is so treated.
' Bodkin, p. 39.
Horses are animals;
Cows are not horses;
Therefore cows are not animals.
The major term, animals, is here used in the premise to de-
note some animals. Horses are a part of the animals of the

world. In the conclusion the term animals is used universally,
or covering all of the animals of the world.
d. Illicit The fallacy of illicit minor consists
minor.
in distributing the
minor term giving it a wider application
in the conclusion when it was not distributed in the minor
premise as in,
All Senators are at least thirty years old;

All Senators are voters;
Therefore all voters are at least thirty years old.
e. Negative premises. "From negative premises noth-
ing can be inferred." This "rule is evidently founded on the
principle that inference can proceed only where there is
agreement, and that two differences or disagreements allow
of no reasoning." A is not B, and C is not B, may both be
"^
true statements and A and C may or may not agree with

each other. "Democratic Senators did not vote for this bill;
Senator A did not vote for this bill; therefore Senator A is a
Democratic Senator." The fallacy is here very evident.
The major premise simply tells us that Democratic Senators
and those who voted for the bill are in separate classes. The
minor premise tells us that Senator A is not in the latter
class. But he may or may not be in the former class. Je-
vons ^ gives a warning that must never be lost sight of in
dealing with negative premises. "It must not be supposed
that the mere occurrence of a negative particle (not or no)
in a proposition renders it negative in the manner contem-
plated by this rule. Thus the argument:
'What is not a compound is an element;
'Gold is not a compound;
'Therefore gold is an element,'
' Jevons, p. 133. P. 134.
FALLACIES 179
contains negatives in both premises, but is nevertheless valid,

because the negative in both cases affects the middle term
which is really the negative term not-compound."
f. Particulax premises. "From two particular premises
no conclusions can be drawn." "If one premise is particular,
the conclusion mv^t be particular." Particular propositions are
those in which the predicate is affirmed of a part only of the
subject, those in which the subject is qualified by "some"
"a few," "the majority of," "most all of," etc. "The re-
maining rules of the syllogism, the 7th and the 8th, are by no
means of a self-evident character, and are, in fact, corrol-
laries of the first six rules; that is, consequences, which follow
from them. . We may call a breach of the 7th rule a
. .
fallacy of particular premises, and that of the 8th rule the

fallacy of a universal conclusion from a particular premise,
but these fallacies may really be resolved into those of Illicit
Process, or Undistributed Middle." ^ Since these fallacies,
when tested, always turn out to be due to illicit distribution
of terms, we shall not take space to treat them further under
this head.
In hjôthetical syllogisms. A hypothetical syllogism
2.
is one in which the major premise is a hypothetical proposi-
tion, and the minor premise a categorical proposition. A
hypothetical proposition asserts something not directly and
positively, but subject to some condition or limitation. Ex-
ample:
If A paid the hotel bill, B owes A $10.00.
A paid the hotel bill.
Therefore B owes A $10.00.
The part of the major premise expressing the condition or
supposition is the antecedent; the part stating the result is the
consequent. Sound reasoning is obtained in this form of
argument only when the minor premise either affirms the ante-
cedent or denies the consequent. Two fallacies are therefore to
be specially guarded against here.
' Jevons, p. 135.
a. Denying the antecedent. Whenever the minor prem-
ise of a hypothetical syllogism denies the antecedent the
reasoning is fallacious. For example:
If he has sold out, he will pay.
He has sold out. He has not sold out.
Therefore he will pay. Therefore he will not pay.
Notice that when we affirm the antecedent ("he has sold
out") it follows necessarily that "he will pay." But when we
deny the antecedent, "he has not sold out," it does not
follow necessarily that "he will not pay." The major premise
does not say that he will not pay unless he sells out. He may
pay any way. So in the following:
If he passed the examination, he is eligible.
He passed the examination. He did not pass the
examination.
He is ehgible.
.'. He is not eligible.
.'.
He may have had other ways of becoming eligibledaily aver-

age, outside reading, etc. Whenever the antecedent is denied
the conclusion does not necessarily follow the reasoning is
fallacious. The conclusion may or may not be a true statement.

b. Aflirming the consequent. Whenever the minor
premise of a hypothetical syllogism affirms the consequent
the reasoning is fallacious.
If he were well, he would write.
He has not written. He has written.
."
He is not well.
.
.'He is well.
.
Notice that when we deny the consequent, "he has not

written," it follows necessarily that "he is not well," but
when we affirm the consequent it does not follow that "he is
well." The major premise did not say that he would not
write unless he were well. He might write anyway. So in
the following:
If the winter has been severe, the birds will be dead.
The birds are not dead. The birds are dead.
.'. The winter has not been severe. .'. The winter has been
severe.

FALLACIES 181
If the major premise is true, finding the birds ahve proves the
winter has not been severe; but finding them dead proves
nothing about the severity of the winter. They may have
died from other causes. But notice that you cannot say
"they might have been kept alive by special causes," for this
isdenying the truth of your major premise.
3. In disjunctive syllogisms. A disjunctive syllogism
has a disjunctive proposition for a major premise, and a
categorical proposition for a minor premise. A disjunctive
proposition is one in which the predicate is made up of a
series of two or more words, phrases, or clauses expressing
opposition or separation, as in: A is either B or C or D.
"A one which implies or asserts
disjunctive proposition is
an alternative in the relation between the subject and predi-

cate; as, 'A is either B or C,' or 'Metals are either hard or
soft.' The symbols of the disjunctive proposition are either
'
and or."
a. Imperfect disjunction. In disjunctive arguments
the fallacy of imperfect disjunction arises whenever the dis-
junction expressed is not both exhaustive and mutually
exclusive.
Since "the affirmation of one of the alternatives, as the
disjunctive syllogism informs us, involves the denial of the rest;
and conversely, the denial of all the other alternatives is
^
equivalent to the affirmation of the one that remains,"
we commit the whenever we fail to mention possible
fallacy
alternatives, or when those mentioned overlap.
He is either slow-witted or lazy.
He is lazy.
He is not slow witted.
.'.
This is fallacious the alternatives are not mutually ex-

clusive k person may be both slow-witted and lazy.
All voters are either democrats or republicans.
He is not a democrat.
He
.'. is a republican.
' Hyslop, p. 119. ' Bode, p. 91. Italics ours.
Here the fallacy arises from the fact that the disjunction
does not exhaust the possibilities. He may be a socialist, a
prohibitionist, or a member of some other party, or of none.
The fallacy of imperfect disjunction, while usually listed
as a formal fallacy, might well be considered a material
fallacy of presumption. The fault lies in the matter the
false assumption in the major premise. Grant the truth of
these premises and the conclusions follow.
B. Material fallacies arise outside of the form of the
argument, and are involved in the matter dealt with. "The
formal laws may be conformed to, but owing to some am-
biguity of meaning or assumption of facts which are not
true the conclusion may be materially vitiated in spite of
the correctness of the formal reasoning. The material fal-
lacy can be detected only by those who are familiar with the
subject-matter of the discourse or argument." ^ Material
fallacies are divided into two groups
^fallacies of equivoca-
tion and fallacies of presumption.

1. Fallacies of equivocation are caused by the equivocal
or ambiguous use of terms. "I have divided them into two
classes, those of quality, or accident, and those of quantity.
Those of quality or accident are so called because the fallacy
arises from some confusion due to differences of meaning in
regard to the attributes denoted by a term in a proposition.
Thus, if I say "Iron is a metal," I affirm "metal" of it in
its proper form, as an aggregate of certain qualities or at-
tributes. Now, if I also say "Rust is iron," I use the term

"iron" in a slightly different sense, affirming that the sub-
stance, or generic, not the specific, qualities of it are identical
with "rust"; that is to say "rust"
is "iron" only in its sub-
stance, not in its form.This fact prevents me from drawing

the conclusion that "Rust is a metal." The fallacies of
quantity are so called because they are due to the different
senses in which a merely numerical aggregate of indimduals
can be taken. Thus, "All the trees" may be taken coUec-
Hyslop, 223.
FALLACIES 183
tively or distributively, and so give rise, as we shall see, to

an equivocation. We consider this form of fallacy first in
order, and it is perhaps the easier to detect. It is that of Com-
position and Division." ^
a. In quantity. (I)" The fallacy of composition arises
when we affirm something to be true of a whole, which holds
true only of one or more of its parts when taken separately
or distributively." ^ The difficulty comes from using the
.
middle term distributively in the major premise and col-

lectively in the minor premise. The following illustrate this
fallacy:
All the angles of a triangle are less than two right angles.
A, B, and C are all the angles of a triangle.
. A, B, and C are less than two right angles.
.
In the major premise we mean that each angle is less than two
right angles (the middle term is used distributively), in the
minor premise we mean all the angles taken together (the
middle term is used collectively). This fallacy is committed
when we argue that what is true of the various states in the
union is true of the United States as a nation, or that what is
true of members of a class or college, taken as individuals,
is true of the class as a class or of the college as an institution.
(n) Division is the opposite of composition. "It consists

in assuming that what is true of the whole is also true of
the parts taken separately." ' For instance:
All the angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles.
A is an angle of a triangle.
.
A is equal to two right angles.
' .
The difficulty comes from using the middle term collectively

in the major premise, and distributively in the minor premise.
Congress voted for X.
A is in Congress.
. . A
voted for X.
b. In quality, or accident. "It is important to keep
these distinct from the fallacies of Composition and Division.
1 Hyslop, p. 228. ^ Creighton, p. 160. ' Creighton, 162.
The have to do with numerical or mathematical ag-
latter
gregates and individuals, the former with logical or meta-
physical wholes which represent totals of attributes. Unless
we keep this in view we are liable to confuse them. But if
we remember that Composition and Division turn upon the
collective and distributive use of terms, and the fallacies of
Accident upon the confusion of essentia and accidentia, or
genus and species (conferentia and differentia), or of the ab-
stract and concrete, we shall have no difficulty in the judg-
ment of particular cases. We divide the fallacies of Accident
^
or Quality into three kinds."
(I) Ambiguous middle (specific accident). In this fallacy

we use the middle term ambiguously that is, give it a differ-
ent meaning in major premise and minor premise. Says
Jevons,^ "Equivocation consists in the same term being
used in two distinct senses; any of the three terms of the
syllogism may be subject to this fallacy, but it is usually the
middle term which is used in one sense in one premise and
in another sense in the other. In this case it is often called
ambiguous middle, and when we distinguish the
the fallacy of
two meanings by using other suitable modes of expression
it becomes apparent that the supposed syllogism contains
four terms. The fallacy of equivocation may accordingly

be considered a disguised fallacy of four terms. Thus if a
person were to argue that 'all criminal actions ought to be
punished by law; prosecutions for theft are criminal actions;
therefore prosecutions for theft ought to be punished by
law,' it is quite apparent that the term "criminal action'
means totally different things in the two premises, and that
there is no true middle term at all. Often, however, the am-
biguity is of a subtle and difficult character, so that dif-
ferent opinions may be held concerning it. Thus we might
argue:
"He who harms another should be punished. He who
communicates an infectious disease to another person harms
' Hyslop, p. 231. 2 Pages 171, 172.
FALLACIES 185
him. Therefore he who communicates an infectious disease

to another person should be punished.
"This may or may not be held to be a correct argument
according to the kinds of actions we should consider to come
under the term harm, according as we regard negligence or
malice recjuisite to constitute harm. Many difficult legal
questions are of this nature, as for instance:
"Nuisances are punishable by law:
"To keep a noisy dog is a nuisance;
" To keep a noisy dog is punishable by law.
" The question here would turn upon the degree of nuisance
which the law would interfere to prevent. Or again:
"Interference with another man's business is illegal;
"Underselling interferes with another man's business;
"Therefore underselling is illegal.
" Here the question turns upon the Mnd of interference, and
it is obvious that underselling is not the kind of interference
referred to in the major premise."

Such fallacies may rise in many ways. (A) We may confuse
the etymological meaning and the common meaning of a
word: as, for instance, the sophistical argument often founded
on the word "representative."
"Perhaps no example of this can be found that is more
extensively and mischievously employed than in the case
of the word 'representative.' Assuming that its right mean-
ing must correspond exactly with the strict and original sense
of the verb 'represent,' the sophist persuades the multitude
that a member of the House of Commons is bound to be
guided in all points by the opinion of his constituents; and,
in short, to be merely spokesman: whereas law and custom,
which may be considered as fixing the meaning
in this case
of the term, require no such thing, but enjoin the representa-
^
tive to act according to the best of his oitm responsibility."
(B) We may confuse two or more common meanings of the
same word, where the word has different meanings in different
' Mill, System
of Logic, p. 503.
circumstances. The word "democratic" in one connection
is the name of a political party; in another it designates a
body and social ideas and principles. So we
of political
argue falsely: all Americans should be democratic; conse-
quently vote the Democratic ticket. The word "church"
may mean the whole body of believers, or it may mean the
officers of this body, viz., the clergy; and many false argu-
ments may result from confusing these meanings.
There are many other sources of confusion from ambiguity
in terms. Their variety and frequency only emphasize the
necessity of careful definition. Definition is the weapon
before which ambiguity must fall.
all
"Nothing is more important than the subject of Definition,

and too much stress cannot be laid on it. It is the keystone
of all correct reasoning, and is most difficult. This . . .
fault of not knowing the precise meanings of words is the most

fruitful source of Fallacies. Nearly all the flaws in argument
that are difficult of detection take their rise from this. Too
much attention cannot be given to the matter of Definition.
^
It is the true panacea for all false reasoning."
(II) Simple accident consists in arguing from genus to
species, from essence to accident, from abstract to concrete.

To argue from genus to genus, from essence to essence is,
of course, always sound. "One of the oldest examples of

Simple Accident is the following:
" What you bought yesterday you eat to-day.
" You bought raw meat yesterday.
"Therefore you eat raw meat to-day.

De Morgan humorously remarks of this ancient illustration:
'This piece of meat has remained uncooked, as fresh as ever, a
prodigious time. It was raw when Reisch mentioned it in
the Margarita Philosophica in 1496; and Dr. Whately found
it in just the same state in 1826.' It is not so accurate an
illustration as is desirable according to the definition, because
the subject of the major premise is so indefinite, and is hardly
^ Bodkin, p. 145.
FALLACIES 187
a genus. But in the conclusion the predicate is asserted of

the subject, with the accidental quaHty of rawness added,
while in the major premise that predicate is asserted only
of the substance or essence ofwhat was bought, and hence
we mistakenly argue from meat in general, and without
qualification to meat in a particular form. Another and
perhaps better illustration is the following:
" Pine wood is good for lumber.
" Matches are pine wood.
" Therefore matches are good for lumber.
Here the predicate of the major premise is asserted of the
substance or essence of 'pine wood,' not of all forms of it,
while matches are pine wood not only in essence, but in a
particular form or accident. ... So also we cannot argue
from the fact that oxygen and hydrogen will burn, that
water will burn because it is oxygen and hydrogen. 'It
would be a case of the simple fallacy of Accident to argue
that a magistrate is justified in using his power to forward
his own religious views, because every man has a right to
inculcate hisown opinions. Evidently a magistrate as a man
has the rights of other men, but in his capacity of a magis-
trate he is distinguished from other men, and he must not
infer of his special powers in this respect what is true only
of his rights as a man.' All fallacies which attempt the sub-
stitution of a particular thing for the generic form belong
^
to this head."
(III) Converse accident arises when we argue from species
to genus, from accident to essence, from concrete to abstract.

"An illustration of the fallacy of Converse Accident is the
following:
" Intoxicating liquors act as a poison.
" Wine is an intoxicating liquor.
" Therefore wine acts as a poison.
In this case we are arguing from the excessive use to all
uses of wine, an inference that is fallacious. The major,

' Hyslop, 232-234.
premise is true only of a particular mode of using liquors,
or of the excessive use of them, while the conclusion, unless
interpreted with a similar qualification, asserts the same
thing of forms of using them. 'It is undoubtedly true
a/Z
that to give to beggars promotes mendicancy and causes

evil; but if we interpret this to mean that assistance is never
to be given to those who solicit it, we fall into the converse

fallacy of Accident, inferring of all who solicit alms what is
true only of those who stdicit alms as a profession.' Another
formulated instance appears in the following illustration:
"Loyalty to the government is the duty of all citizens.
"Loyalty to Charles I. was loyalty to the government.
"Therefore loyalty to Charles I. was the duty of all citizens.
We may look at this instance in more than one way. In the
first place, the major premise means that loyalty is a duty to
legitimate governments or to such as execute the law, while

the minor premise asserts the fact that loyalty to Charles I.
was loyalty to the government whatever its nature was, and
hence the conclusion asserts loyalty to Charles I. to be a duty
without qualification, and without distinguishing between
him as a magistrate and as a man. In the second place, loy-
alty to Charles I. may have been loyalty to him as a private
person, say by his servants, while all citizens could not be
loyal to him in this capacity, and so it is an error to argue
from this particular kind of loyalty to every form of it in-
'
cluding civil allegiance."
2. Presumption. Fallacies of presumption arise from
assuming or presuming something which nêds to be 'proved,
taking for granted something we have no right to take for
granted. Examples follow of its main divisions and sub-
divisions.
a. Begging the question (petitio principii). This fal-
lacy consists in assuming the truth of some proposition which
is the same as, or equivalent to, the conclusion to be proved,
and thence inferring the truth of the conclusion. It may

' Hyslop, 234.
:
FALLACIES 189
take any one of several forms. The most common are:

(I) assuming the truth of an unproved premise; (II) arguing
in a circle.
(I)Assumption of an unproved premise (assumptio non-
probata). It seems at first sight that no man would be so
foolish or so bold as to assume the truth of his conclusion as
one of the means of proving it. But names and phrases often
cloak the error, and in the course of the intervening discussion
the assumption may be forgotten before the conclusion is
reached; so it is not always an easy fallacy to run to earth.
Assuming the truth of some general proposition from which
the particular conclusion in question must follow, is but
another form of the same mistake. To take an example
^
cited by John Ward:
"So when the Clodian party contended that Milo ought to suffer
death for this reason, because he had confessed that he had killed
Clodius, that argument reduced to a syllogism would stand thus
"He who confesses he has hilled another ought not to he allowed to
see the light.
"But Milo confesses this.
" Therefore he ought not to live.
"Now the force of this argument lies in the major or first prop-
osition, which Cicero refutes by proving that the Roman people
had already determined contrary to what is there asserted: '/re
what City,' says he, 'do these men dispute after this weak manner?
In that wherein the first capital trial was in the case of the brave Hora-
tius, who, before the city enjoyed perfect freedom, was saved by the
suffrages of the Roman people, tho' he confessed that he killed his

sister with his own hand.'"
In this case the advocate who was prosecuting Milo as-

sumed the truth a general proposition, which included the
of
particular proposition he sought to establish. He assumed
that. every man who has killed another ought to die, when
it was admitted that Milo had killed Clodius. Cicero re-
1 Volume I, p. 159.
futed the argument by pointing out the fallacy and showing
that the general assumption was false, because the Roman peo-
ple in the past pardoned a man who had killed another.
had
Arguing in a circle (circulus in probando). More
(II)
common than the foregoing is the fallacy called "arguing

in a circle." It is one of the frequent errors of careless ar-
guers and a common trick for confusing a sluggish thinker.
The fallacy consists in taking two propositions and using

them each in turn to prove the other as in trying to prove
that a train is on time because it agrees with your watch, and
then proving that your watch is correct because it agrees
with the train.
The counsel for the plaintiff in the case of Ogden vs. Saund-
ers argued in a circle, and was exposed by Mr. Webster:
"The plaintiff in error argues in a complete circle. He supposes

the parties (in the making of a contract) to have had reference to it
(the statute law) because was a binding law, and yet he proves it
it
to be a binding law only upon the ground that such reference was
made to it.''
Sir James Fitzjames Stephen, in his Introduction to the

Indian Evidence Act, Ch. II, gives the following illustration:
"A ship is cast away under such circumstances that her loss
may be accounted for either by fraud or by accident. The captain
is tried for making away with her. A variety of circumstances
existwhich would indicate preparation and expectation on his part
if made away with, but which would justify no
the ship really was
suspicion at all if she was not. It is manifestly^ illogical, first, to
regard the antecedent circumstances as suspicious, because the
loss of the ship is assumed to be fraudulent, and, next, to infer
that the ship was fraudulently destroyed from the suspicious char-
acter of the antecedent circumstances."
b. Irrelevant conclusion, ignoring the question (ignor-

antio elenchi). This fallacy consists in mistaking the con-
clusion to be proved, or endeavoring to prove something
which has no important bearing on the point at issue. One
FALLACIES 191
isliable to fall into this fallacy either in positive proof in

proving the wrong point or in refutation in proving something
which is not the contradictory of the thing asserted by one's
opponent. In one's own proof one may waste efifort in the
attempt to establish what is not worth establishing, or one
may attempt to deceive by proving something so near like
the real conclusion that it seems the same. In refutation, this
error lies in mistaking the point to be answered, or in delib-
erately misrepresenting an opponent's position in order to
make reply easier.
Mill cities the example of the refutation made against
Malthus's theory of population:
"The attempts, for instance, to disprove the population doctrines

of Malthus have been mostly cases of ignoratio elenchi ignoring
the point. Malthus has been supposed to be refuted if it could be
shown that in some countries or ages population has been nearly
stationary; as if he had asserted that population always increases
in a given ratio, or had not expressly declared that it increases
only in so far as it is not restrained by prudence, or kept down by
poverty and disease. Or, perhaps, a great collection of facts is
produced to prove that in some one country the people are better
off with a dense population than they are in another country with a
thin one; or that the people have become more numerous and better
off at the same time. As if the assertion were that a dense popula-
tion could not possibly be well off: as if it were not part of the very
doctrine, and essential to it, that where there is a more abundant
capital there may be a greater population without any increase of

poverty, or even with a diminution of it." '
Webster, arguing for the prosecution in the White murder

trial, exposed in an opponent the fallacy of ignoring the point,
as follows:
"The prisoner's counsel catch at supposed flaws of evidence, or

bad character of witnesses without meeting the case. Do they
mean to deny conspiracy? Do they mean to deny that the two
1 Mm, p. 517.

Crowninshields and the two Knapps were conspirators? Why do
they rail against Palmer, while they do not disprove, and hardly
dispute, the truth of any fact sworn to by him? Instead of this,
it is made a mere matter Palmer had been

of sentimentality that
prevailed upon to betray his bosom companions and to violate the
sanctity of friendship. Again I ask, Why do they not meet the
case? If the fact is out, why not meetit? Do they mean to deny
that Captain White is dead? One would almost have supposed
even that, from some remarks that have been made. Do they
mean to deny the conspiracy? Or, admitting a conspiracy, do they
mean to deny only that Frank Knapp, the prisoner at the bar, was
abetting in the murder, being present, and so deny that he was a
principal? If a conspiracy is bears closely upon every
proved, it
subsequent subject of inquiry. Why do

they not come to the fact?
Here the defence is wholly indistinct. The counsel neither take
the ground nor abandon it. They neither fly nor light. They
hover. But they must come to a closer mode of contest. They
must meet the facts and either deny or admit them." '
There are five common subdivisions of the fallacy of

irrelevant conclusion. The mistake in each is the same
ignoring the real point in issue to argue about some other
point. These five types follow.
(I) Argumentum ad hominem is an appeal or attack
directed at the character, principles, beliefs, or statements
of some person, rather than at the subject-matter in con-
troversy. It is talking about a man when his character has
nothing to do with the case, attacking the past record of a
lawyer rather than the merits of his client's claim. Of course,
when a man's character is a legitimate part of the case it
should be discussed. An
attempt to show personal unfitness
of a candidate for the oflSce he is seeking is not an example of
this fallacy or of any other.
(II) Argumentum ad populum is an appeal to the passion
or prejudice of a people and so obscuring and avoiding the
real question as when national prejudice is aroused rather
' The Worlcs of Daniel Webster, Vol. VI, p. 59.
FALLACIES 193
than facts discussed in regard to national defence or inter-

national relations of any kind.
(III) Argumentum ad ignorantiam is practically a falla-
cious attempt to shift the burden of proof. It is saying,
"What I say is true, because you cannot prove thatnot it is
true." a confusion of positive proof and

It is essentially
refutation. To show that an opponent's case cannot be
established is a proper kind of attack in argumentation; but
it is only negative and destructive in nature. It proves
nothing positive, and the fallacy consists in maintaining that
the lackqf proof that a proposition is not true, establishes that
it is true. "Thus," says Creighton, ^ "we cannot prove
affirmatively that spirits do not revisit the earth or send
messages to former friends through mediums." But this
does not prove that spirits do walk the earth.
(IV) " Argumentum ad verecundiam is an appeal to the
reverence which most people feel for a great name. This
method of reasoning attempts to settle a question by referring
to the opinion of some alleged authority, without any
consideration of the arguments which are advanced for or
against the position. It is, of course, right to attach much
importance to the views of great men, but we must not
suppose that their opinion amounts to proof, or forbids us
to consider the matter for ourselves.
"There is, however, a more common, though still less jus-
tifiable, form of the argument from authority.^ A man who
is distinguished for his knowledge and attainments in some
particular field, is often quoted as an authority upon ques-
tions with which he has no special acquaintance. The pres-

tige of a great name is thus attached to it. Thus, for example,
a successful general is supposed to speak with authority upon
problems of state-craft, and the opinions of prominent clergy-
men are quoted regarding the latest scientific theories." '
(V) Argumentum ad judicium. This fallacy is com-
mitted when the real question is ignored and an attempt
1 P. 169. ' See pp. 99-100. Creighton, p. 170.
made to prove that men generally believe so and so. It is
answering the proposition that the earth is round by proying
that all men believe the earth is flat. If you put forward a
proposition that admittedly is contrary to the general belief,
it is no answer to you to prove what the general belief is.
The fallacy consists in assuming that general belief cannot
be wrong. Prevailing opinion creates a strong presumption
in its favor, and places a heavy burden of proof on him who
opposes it, but it does not settle all questions.
c. Complex question. This is a question founded on
an assumption. It cannot be answered by "yes" or "no"
without granting the truth of the assumption. "Are you
again on speaking terms with your wife.''" "Have you quit
drinking to excess?"
d. Non sequitur (false consequent). This consists sim-
ply in asserting a conclusion that does not follow from the
premises, because the conclusion has in it new matter that is
not covered by the premises.

(I) Simple non sequitur arises when the conclusion covers
new matter with no attempt made to show a cause and effect

connection. "Jones is a good husband and father, so he
ought to be elected mayor." "All men are rational. Socrates
is a man. Therefore Socrates is noble."
(II) False cause (post hoc, ergo propter hoc). This is
probably the most common and the most insidious form of
non sequitur. The fallacy consists in assuming that because
one occurrence precedes another in time, the one is the cause
of the other. Here time order is mistaken for cause and effect
connection. Many of the common superstitions of ancient
and of modern times illustrate this fallacy. For instance,
thirteen people sit at table together, and within a few months
one of the number is accidentally drowned; immediately
some one argues that the death is the effect of the thirteen
sitting at meat together.
Again, it has recently been argued that, because the num-
ber of crimes perpetrated by negroes in the Southern states
FALLACIES 196
has increased since educational opportunities were first offered

to the negro, therefore the growth of crime is directly due to
the growth of education. It certainly is not sufficient for the
arguer to base his contention simply on the fact that the one
thing has followed the other, and few thoughtful men will be
inclined to accept the conclusion thus drawn. Until some-
thing more is done to show a definite causal connection, we
may safely call this a post hoc fallacy.
The most common form of this fallacy, perhaps, is that
used by the political arguer. It runs something like this:
" Such and such a political party came into power at such a
time,and for a number of years thereafter the country suffered
from financial depression; therefore the policies and admin-
istration of this political party are the cause of the unfortu-
nate state of affairs."Now, the statement may or may not
be true, but the argument in the above form certainly con-
tains a fallacy. To show
that this fallacy does exist, and
that the conclusion not worthy of acceptance, it is neces-
is
sary only to point out the fact that any. one of a half dozen
other causes might, at least as readily, have produced the
same result.
An illustration will make clear the commonness of this
kind of fallacy, and will also suggest the care that is neces-
sary to guard against it. In Harper's Weekly for March 5,
1904, the editors noted the fact that various college presi-
dents had estimated that "the college graduate has one
chance in forty of 'succeeding in life,' whereas the man who
hasn't been to college has only one chance in ten thousand."
The inference naturally drawn from this statement is that
the mere fact that a man secures a college education multi-
plies many times his chances for success. To this inference
and to the possible fallacy that may lurk therein the editorial
in question addresses itself as follows:
"Not many persons doubt any longer that an American college

education is an advantage to most youths who can get it, but in
these attempts to estimate statistically what college education does
for men there is a good deal of confusing of post hoe and propter hoc.
Define success as you much larger proportion of American
will, a
college men win it than of men who don't go to college, but how
much college training does for those successful men is still debatable.
Remember they are a picked lot, the likeliest children of parents
whose ability or desire to send their children to college is evidence
of better fortune, or at least of higher aspirations than the average.
And because their parents are, as a rule, more or less prosperous
and well educated, they get and would get, whether they went to
college or not, a better than average start in life. In order to make
an estimate that would be really fair of what college does for boys, -
it would be necessary to compare the fortunes of two groups of
boys from something like the same rank of life and of something
like equal ability, one a college-taught group and the other not.
But that cannot well be done. The colleges get the likeliest boys.
If one boy out of a family of four goes to college it is the clever
one. The boys who might go to college and don't are commonly
the lazy ones who won't study. The colleges get nowadays a large
proportion of the best boys of the strongest families. The best
boys of the strongest families would win far more than their pro-
portionate share of success even if there were no colleges."
EXERCISE. CHAPTER 8
FALLACIES
1. Hand in two specimens of copied matter from current

newspapers, lectures, text-books, etc.,each containing a
fallacy, naming the fallacy, and writing an answer to
the reasoning given.
2. Hand in one original example each of undistributed mid-
major, and illicit minor.
dle, illicit
3. Hand intwo examples each of the fallacies denying the
antecedent and affirming the consequent.
4. Hand in one example each of ambiguous middle, begging
the question, irrelevant conclusion, and false cause.
SECTION C. ARRANGEMENT
CHAPTER 9
GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF ARRANGEMENT
OUTLINE
A. Function of arrangement.
B. Three great rhetorical principles.
1. Unity.
a. Introduction.
b. Conclusion.
c. Discussion.
2. Coherence.
a. Order.
(I) Subordination secondary materials.
(II) Elevation primary materials.
b. Connection.
c. Summary.
3. Emphasis.
a. Emphasis and coherence
b. Methods of emphasis.
(I) Emphatic places. ,
C. Special importance of these principles in argumentation.
A. Function of arrangement. Through the study of

propositions, issues,and burden of proof, we have learned
what must be done. Guided by an understanding of evidence,
forms of arguments, and fallacies, we have chosen the materials
with which to accomplish our task. We now come to the
problem of organizing these materials into the most effective
arrangement for the performance of this particular task.
We have chosen our recruits and gathered them together;
but that is all. Our army is only half made; it is but a con-
fused and straggling mob. To tempt the fortunes of battle
197


with such an array would mean defeat. The forces must be
organized into companies, regiments, divisions; they must be
officered with captains, colonels, and generals, and at their
head must be placed a commander, the master spirit of all;
they must be drilled and disciplined and taught to know their
rights and their duties. Organization is no more necessary
in an army than is arrangement in an argument: every master
of the art of war knows how to organize his forces; every
master of the art of debate knows how to arrange his proofs.
The results from lack of organization are the same in both,
confusion, wasted strength, and weakness. It is only by
careful arrangement that ideas and evidence can be kept
from self-contradiction and confusion, that their strength
can be saved and directed to accomplish anything.
B. Three great rhetorical principles. To secure an
effective arrangement of materials in argumentation, the old
rhetorical principles of unity, coherence, and emphasis must
be scrupulously observed. We shall consider first their special
importance in argumentation, and then discuss (ch. 10) the
rules of brief drawing and outlining the following of which
will insure the observances of these principles.
1. Unity. Itis essential to the success of any piece of
argumentation that the ultimate effect produced by it upon

the audience shall be a single impression, viz., the truth or
falsity, the wisdom or unwisdom of the proposition under
discussion. To achieve such a result our materials must be so
arranged as to be a single unit of force. Little facts and great
ideas must work together, each enforcing the other. Each
fact must corroborate its fellows, and inconsistency must
never appear. Everything must work for the single ulti-
mate purpose of proving, not this idea or that, but the propo-
sition. Proving a number of "main points" more or less
connected with the question in hand will not do. It is th.e
proposition that the affirmative must establish by proving
(or gaining admission of) all the issues contained in it. It is
the proposition that the negative must overthrow by prevent-

GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF ARRANGEMENT 199
ing the establishment of one or more of the issues on which

it rests. This is what is meant by unity in the whole compo-
sition.
a. Introduction. In any piece of argumentation the

most vital force is obviously the proof itseH, the evidence
and the arguments. It would, however, be a very defective
effort which contained nothing else besides the giving of
testimony and the manufacture of it into proof. These
materials must' be introduced in such a manner as will clear
the way before them and place them in the field advantage-
ously for action. This is the work of the divisions of the
speech called the introduction. The purpose of introduction
is make
to clear the real nature of the question in contro-
versy, why it is in dispute, how it is related to other prob-
lems, what the really significant facts are. Such an explana-
tion presents the question to the audience as a single complete
problem, distinguished from other problems; it fixes the proofs
that are to follow in their true relations to the proposition
and to each other by explaining what facts are vital in the
case, how these facts may be proved, and how the disputant
intends to create the proof. The word introduction as used
here embraces all of the old division of the first part of a
speech into introduction (or exordium), narration, and par-
tition. By whatever name we call it, some preparation is
needed before the work of the discussion can be well done.
The audience must know what the dispute is about, what are
the issues to be decided, and what are the points of fact that de-
cide them.
b. Conclusion. In argumentation our work is seldom
complete until we have gathered together the evidence and
argument at the end of the discussion, to show how we have
made good the promises and claims of the beginning; no long
or elaborate work of argumentation is finished without a
conclusion, or peroration. From the viewpoint of unity the
conclusion is as indispensable as the introduction. It is
practically impossible to bind together evidence, arguments.


and ideas of all kinds and degrees of importance, and make
them work in harmony, simply by means of logical internal
arrangement. There must be some other external force to
'
weld them together and establish them in their true relations

to one another and to the whole. The purpose of the con-
clusion is to do this final binding together of the many and
varied elements of the proof. However perfect the intro-
ductory precautions, as evidence and arguments are mar-
shalled in rapid succession, and as each fact and each idea
is emphasized in its importance, the reader or hearer may
lose his graspon the case as a whole. He may believe this
testimony or accept that idea and still his beliefs may be
vague or hesitating about the conclusiveness of the proof as
a whole. He is not yet brought to that place where he can
be trusted to rehder a decision or to carry out his decision
into action. It still remains to show that the proof of this
point and that, though insufficient in themselves, when added
together prove the proposition. The cumulative force of the
whole proof must be displayed; evidence and arguments
must be gathered together and finally delivered as one blow.
This is the work of the conclusion, and if it is well done, the

end is but a restatement though in very difPerent manner
of the beginning. The conclusion should usually be so re-
lated to the introduction that the proof seems in a way to
lead around in a circle, so that in the end we arrive ag&in at
the point from which we started, the proposition.
c. Discussion. In addition to the work of the intro-
duction and the conclusion, in giving unity to the composi-
tion, care must be taken in the choice of the material for the
body of the discussion itself. But here the problem is very
simple. If all the material bears on the proposition unity
will be observed. The problem of making this bearing clear
is Unity and coherence are closely
largely one of coherence.
related, and unity in the discussion might be said to be a
by-product of coherence. The proposition is the heart of the
whole composition; by relation to it all must be bound to-
gether in one. Consequently the materials should be so

chosen and so arranged that every element is connected
either direclly or indirectly with the proposition, and the
connection so clearly established that it will be understood
without effort. If a fact or an idea up as if for its own
is set
sake or is left ambiguous on the facts in issue,
in its bearing
it turns attention in the wrong direction, gives a mistaken
impression of the whole position taken by the arguer, and

destroys the cooperation between the parts, which is neces-
sary to unity. This whole problem of harmony within the
proof itself is, however, largely a matter of proper subordina-
tion of the parts, and may better be treated under the head-
ing of coherence.
2. Coherence. Closely akin to unity is the quality of
coherence. The purpose of all argumentation is to convey
ideas to others and make them believe or act as we want
them to; and, however well settled our own conceptions
may be, if we beget confusion in presenting them to others,
our efforts are in vain. However truly the principle of unity
is observed however truly our facts and our inferences
have a bearing on the proposition we uphold, this bearing
must be clear to those we seek to influence or our argumenta-
tion is a failure. The principle of coherence, then, demands
that all the materials of the proof be so (a) ordered and so (6)
connected as to make clear their relation to each other and to the
proposition.
a. Order. To have coherence we must first have order
among the elements used. First things must come first,
last things last. Big points must follow each other in proper
succession, each with its subordinate little points properly
grouped under it. The first thing to do to obtain order is to
attend to what may be called "subordination."
(I) Subordination of secondary elements. We have seen,
in the treatment of the finding of the issues, that in any
argumentative composition, the proof is made up of materials
of widely different values. There are some facts that are so
vital that,if we can make sure of them, they will establish
our whole case; and there are others that, while truly valu-
able in the proper connection, have no meaning or impor-
tance in themselves. These secondary facts find the excuse
for their introduction in that they serve to prove the exist-
ence of some other more important fact. It follows that to
put them into the proof without making clear just what is
their bearing on these other larger facts, and just what is
the part they are intended to perform, is to lose their only
value.
(II) Elevation of primary elements. In contrast with
these materials of a secondary nature are those facts and
ideas in the proof that are themselves of primarj' importance.
The nature of the human mind is such that, in reasoning,
there are always a few points that stand out boldly, while aU
else sinks into a background of support. Few readers or
hearers can carry in mind and thoroughly assimilate more
than a half dozen important ideas on any question in a single
debate; so that the greatest care must be taken to enforce
upon the attention and fix in the memory of auditors the
facts in the case that are really decisive. They may be per-
mitted to forget the details of evidence, but the existence of
these decisive facts they must be compelled to remember. If
a reader or hearer is really to comprehend the meaning of
any proofs, he must be made to understand what is large and
what is small, what is important and what trivial. There-
fore, in arranging our materials: (1) We must first find out
what are the critical points to be established. (2) Then these

points must be elevated made to stand out above all the
rest of the proofs. (3) Finally, all the secondary materials
must be subordinated and grouped about these centers of
proof.
b. Connection. Order alone will not give coherence.
The materials used must be properly connected or confusion
is likely to result. This principle of connection is observed
when the different elements are woven together properly.
Transitions must be arranged. Connections must be made.

Not only must the horse be before the cart, but he must be
hitched to the cart if the whole outfit is to be serviceable.
Rarely is any one fact sufficient to estabUsh another larger
fact; more rarely is any one single fact or idea sufficient to

establish the proposition. Usually the process is: many
prove each larger fact;
lesser bits of evidence are set forth to
then a number of these larger facts combine and cooperate
to prove the whole. Where the proofs are of such a nature,
the effectiveness of the coequal facts depends, in large de-
gree, upon the way in which they were made to work together.
Transitional phrases, sentences, and paragraphs must be
employed to ensure this cooperation. Much evidence, not
intelligible in itself, becomes full of meaning and force when
viewed in the light of other correlative evidence. In any part
of the proof, then, important that such facts be not set
it is
forth till after those from which they get their importance,
and that the vital connection between such facts be clearly
evident. For a fact misunderstood or neglected when it is
first given, "falls back dead" and is rarely called to mind
again; it must in most cases be appreciated when it is given,

or it is lost. Especially is treatment of the
this true of the
larger ideas in a composition. Often an audience listens
inattentively for many minutes to a speaker who is giving
his best energy to the establishment of some idea of the first
importance, because they are not possessed of those other
facts that they must know to realize the meaning of his proof,
c. Summary. For full coherence then it is necessary
to arrange all the ideas, primary and secondary, in the proper
order and to weave them all together with easy, natural
transitions. A reader or hearer should not feel that he is
being arbitrarily picked up, carried around, and dropped,

at the whim of the speaker or writer; he should rather have
the sensation of being led easily, yet firmly, along in the most
natural paths of reasoning. Readers or listeners are easily
confused by sudden breaks in the chain of reasoning, and
readily become lost if their mental scenes are shifted too
suddenly. Listeners should know "where they are" in the
case at all times. As the speaker proceeds, an audience should
see the way opening gradually before them, and feel that
each step is natural; so that when they have come to the end
they will believe they have reached a proper destination. In
arranging for the proper observance of this principle, then,
we need to consider two requisites: (1) Proofs must be pre-
sented in such a logical order that every fact is clear in its
full import at the time when it Each idea
is presented. (2)
must be verbally connected with the one preceding by such
a natural transition that a single chain of reasoning runs all
through the proof.
3. Emphasis. Well-directed emphasis is one of the
prime qualities of all successful composition, and nowhere
does it do a greater service than in argumentation. In the
first place, as we have already seen, there are some things
in our proof that are important and some that are trivial;
emphasis distinguishes between them, magnifying the ad-
vantages of the former and minimizing the disadvantages
of the latter. A disputant always has some points in his case
that are strong and can be relied on, while he has others that
are weak and vulnerable; emphasis gives prominence to his
strong points and covers up his weak points.
a. Emphasis and coherence. Many qualities of arrange-
ment that make for coherence are as truly matters of em-
phasis. In fact all three principles we are considering are
very closely related. There are no sharp dividing lines be-
tween their provinces. Particularly do emphasis and co-
herence cooperate in bringing out the strength and in con-
cealing the weakness of any case. The grouping of lesser
facts around the greater, which is so essential to coherence,
is equally important in emphasizing the important points
in the proof. But, in addition to this discrimination between
the lesser and the greater facts, it is also necessary to dis-
criminate between the various more important points of
GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF ARRANGEMEST 205
the proof. Some are more warmly contested than others, and
the proof on these critical points must be made to stand out
over everything else. Again, on some" issues, one contestant
or another has the weaker side for facts; available evidence
may be against him, and he must conceal his defects. So it
becomes necessary to know what are the ways of displaying
strength, and of hiding weakness.
b. Methods of emphasis. The common methods of em-
phasis, as far as the several principles of arrangement are
concerned, might be called the methods of flace and space.
The former means placing more important points in certain
more emphatic positions. The latter means simply that we
give more space in a manuscript, more time in a speech, to
the important things and less space to the unimportant
things. A combination of both place and space methods is'
of course better than either alone.
(I) Emphatic places. The emphatic parts of the proof
are the beginning and the end. At the beginning the audience
is expectant and critical, and the first impression is usually
enduring. The importance of the beginning depends some-

what on the circumstances; but it is rarely safe to make a
feeble beginning. The first impression must not be weak, for
it too often creates a prejudice that is an obstacle to later
progress. Sometimes the beginning is made exceptionally

important by the necessity for an immediate answer to some
argument advanced by an opponent. His arguments may
have been so strong and may have made such an effect that
the answer to them becomes a turning-point of the proof;
the refutation of them must be made emphatic. This ref-
utation may, if the answer is very strong, and if it concerns
the most vital point of the whole question, be reserved till
the end. But sometimes the arguments need to be answered
at once, in order to remove hostility on the part of the au-
dience, and in order to influence them favorably for the recep-
tion of the other proofs that are to come. In such cases
both emphasis and tact require that the refutation be placed
at the beginning. The most important point should usually
be placed at the end, for that is the position of maximum
emphasis. At the end comes "the last word," the part
which gives the final impulse to conviction and persuasion.
The parts between are most easily forgotten; so it is the mid-
dle of the proof that receives what is to be neglected or con-
cealed.
C. Special importance of these principles in argumenta-
tion. It may readily be seen from the preceding discussion
arrangement that unity, coherence,
of the general principles of
and emphasis argumentation imply more than in most
in
kinds of composition. The fusing of a multitude of thoughts
into one thought, the careful leading of a man's reason from
one point to another, the indispensable discrimination be-
tween great and small, the painstaking establishment of un-
mistakable relations between each small fact and the whole
question, the impressing of the few vital points on the atten-
tion and the memory, all these tasks are exaggerated and
made more critical than in any other kind of writing or speak-
ing. It follows that much more care must be taken here
than arrangement of our
in other kinds of composition, in the
materials, before we put them in rhetorical form for
finally
presentation. In description or narration, all the work of pre-
liminary arrangement that maybe desirable maybe embodied
in a short outline of a few headings. All that is needed may
be a few rough jottings to state the main- ideas and suggest
the general lines of their development; facts, rhetorical figures,
mental pictures may properly be left to the suggestion of the
moment. In argumentation the requisities are very different.
So much depends upon the exact relations of fact to fact and
point to point, in order to make our appeals to the reasoning
and effective, that we must give much more
faculties clear
time and consideration to the arrangement of our materials.
We must not only arrange our main ideas and indicate the
general trend of the development of these ideas, but also the
details of fact and of explanation must be accurately estab-
lished in their proper relations with each other. To meet

demand for attention to these principles in ar-
this special
gumentation, we have special devices, the brief and the out-
line based on the brief. These are accurate, definite schemes
which if followed will make evident the proper arrangement
for practically perfect unity, coherence, and emphasis in each
particular case.
CHAPTER 10
BRIEF DRAWING AND OUTLINING
OUTLINE
A. What a brief is.
B. Purposes of a brief.
C. Brief is impersonal.
D. Legal brief drawing.
E. Brief and outline.
F. Rules for brief drawing.
G. Parallel column brief.
H. Complete sample brief.
A. What a brief is. A brief is a full and finished arrange-

ment and argument on a given
in logical order of all the fact
side of a given case. It is not a preliminary outline on which
to build a speech or essay. Every detail of evidence in the
case is put into a properly drawn brief. The brief is a finished
article. It contains a full and complete statement of the
intellectual side of the case. Nothing need be added to it if
we want a decision simply on the weight of evidence and the

force of inference and have a tribunal ready to give a de-
cision on these things alone. So we might present briefs on a
disputed question to a board of judges for decision without
presenting any other manuscripts or making any speeches.
All the materials of proof appear in a good brief. It is complete
in the elements of conviction, and almost wholly lacking in
the elements of persuasion as such. Except as some of the
evidence may have a persuasive force, there is no persuasion
in a brief.
B. Purposes of a brief. A brief may serve many pur-

poses. Its most important use is that of presenting it to
208
BRIEF DRAWING AND OUTLINING 209
judges as the whole statement of the case without additional

comment of any kind. It may also be presented as the whole
statement of the intellectual side of a case preliminary to
arguing the question in full; or it may be presented as the
complete statement of fact in a case preliminary to arguing

general principles or points of law which should apply to such
a case.. For all these purposes in which the brief passes from
the hands of the one who prepares it to a judge who is to de-
cide the case, the brief should be complete and perfectly
drawn. But this statement holds good also even when the
case is to be presented by a speech or an argumentative
article, pamphlet, or book. Putting the whole intellectual
side of the case into the form of a perfect brief gives one the
best opportunity really to know his case, all the details of it,
its strength and weakness. A perfect brief exhibits the

relation of every bit of evidence to the proposition and to
every other bit of evidence in the whole case. It also shows
the value and importance of each piece of evidence. It
brings out the strong points, the points that are covered by
more evidence than is necessary, and the weak points, the
points thatmust be bolstered up with more evidence or
very carefully handled in the presentation. So the prepara-
tion of a perfect brief is a most important part of the prepara-
tion of any case even if the case is to be presented orally.
C. The brief is impersonal. and is deter-
It belongs to
mined by "the case." It is a true and unemotional arrange-
ment of all the facts and arguments in the case. It is not and
cannot be designed to a particular audience, without
fit
which distinguish it from an

losing its chief characteristics
outline. In fact we might say that a brief by its very nature
is not adapted to any audience. While perfect brief form is
probably the best method ever devised for presenting certain
types of cases on paper, it is usually a very poor method of
presenting any case orally. Getting ideas and impressions
through the eyes from a printed page is very different from
getting ideas and impressions through the ears from a living


voice. But granting all this, it still remains true that the
preparation of a perfect brief should be part of the prepara-
tion of any important work in argumentation however it is
to be finally presented.
D. Legal brief drawing. Legal briefs are drawn to be
submitted to courts either to serve as the basis for oral ar-
gument or to be the complete presentation of the case,
when decision is rendered without argument, merely on the
briefs presented. "A brief is a document,^ prepared by coun-
sel for the use of the court as a basis for oral argument 9f a
cause; it contains a statement of the manner in which the
questions in controversy arose, of the facts of the case so far
as they relate to the questions; it is an outline of the argu-
ment, consisting of the propositions of law or fact to be main-

tained, the reasons upon which they are based, and citations of
authorities in their support." ^ The rules of legal brief draw-
ing are for the most part like the rules given in this chapter.
One important exception, however, is that solid paragraphs
containing many statements are usually used in legal briefs.
So our rule No. 4 is not a rule of legal briefing. Many details
of legal briefing are prescribed by law in various states, and
while conventions as to form, etc., differ slightly in different
states, it is true that the main principles of brief drawing in

general argumentation are identical with the main principles
of legal brief drawing as practiced by the best lawyers,
through the country.
"In the typical legal 'brief on appeal' one looks for the
following well-defined stages, or subdivisions:
1. The Title.
2. The Preliminary Statement.
3. The Statement of the Case (sometimes termed 'The
Facts').
4. The Specification of Errors.
5. The Brief of the Argument.
' Professor Henry S. Redfield in The Brief on Appeal.
Quoted from Brief
Making (The West Publishing Co., p. 219) by Maxcy, The Brief, p. 3.

The general form of the argumentative brief, as it has been

developed in practice, follows closely after the legal model.
It contains
1. The Title.
2. The Preliminary Introduction.
3. The Main Introduction.
4. The Statement of Issues.
5. The Brief of the Argument.
6. The Conclusion." i
Notice that thefirst four of these parts are covered by an
and that the fifth and sixth correspond to our

introduction,
discussion and conclusion respectively. Some legal briefs
have "conclusions" in separate parts and some do not.
^
Dean Ballantine's twenty-one rules for legal briefing
show clearly how closely the rules for briefing in general ar-
gumentation follow those for the legal brief. Of course, the
argumentative brief is an offspring of the legal brief. Here
as in many other phases of argumentation we have general-
ized what the legal profession has worked out for its specific
needs.
E. Brief and After the impersonal brief is
outline.
finished an be drawn up for any speech that is
outline should
to be presented. In drawing up the outline the speaker
should always keep his particular audience in mind, and adapt
his speech carefully to the audience which he must meet.
In preparing an argumentative speech one may differ from
the order of the brief as much as is desirable. It is a mistake
to suppose that a brief is always a good outline for a speech.
As a matter of fact it is rarely if ever so. An outline of al-
most any great argument will not coincide with a brief of
the material in the argument. This is as it should be. The
speech must fit the audience. It must be planned with great
attention to considerations of persuasion. Men differ in
theirways of presenting cases to audiences, and the same
case must be presented to different audiences differently.
' Maxcy, pp. 6, 7. ' Appendix E.
In a speech we may wish to catch the attention and arouse
interest in the very beginning by presenting the most strik-
ing piece of evidence we have. In a brief we are not con-
fronted with the problem of getting the attention of the
judge. In a speech we may wish to reserve certain explana-
tory matter until we are ready to present certain arguments,
in a brief confusion would result if this were left out of the
introduction and put into the discussion. So the outline of
a speech should be made from a brief of the case, to meet the
requirements of a certain situation. Time, place, audience,
etc., should be carefully considered in the preparation of any

speech and should not be considered at all in the prepara-
tion of a brief. And the speech may differ from the brief as
much as seems desirable in any given case. Of course in
some cases the brief may be followed rather closely, and in
many cases the main lines of the brief are followed. We
should never so desert the brief that we fail to meet the re-
quirements of unity, coherence, and emphasis, in argumenta-
tion. In all cases the task of outlining the desired speech is
relatively simple after a good brief of the case is completed,
especially if the circumstances under which the speech is to
be given are fully understood. We should
go over thefirst
brief and select those parts of the case which we wish to
present to the particular audience which we have to meet.
We may select almost wholly different portions for use in
presenting the same case to different audiences. (A case on
the honor system, for instance, to be presented first to stu-
dents and later to faculty. One audience might grant with-
out any argument the very points that would have to be
argued at great length before the other audience.) Second,
we should arrange these selected parts in whatever order
seems most persuasive for the particular audience we have
in mind, practically regardless of the arrangement of these
parts in the brief. A knowledge of persuasion and of the
principles of speech composition are of course of great value
here. But as far as brief drawing is concerned the principle
to remember is this: The brief is determined by the nature of

the impersonal case which it is possible to build up on our side
of the proposition; the speech outline (or the speech) is determined
by the kind of presentation (both in substance and order) which it
ismost desirable to make to a particular audience or set of judges.
F. Rules for brief drawing. The following seventeen
rules cover the work of brief drawing. Each rule here should
be strictly observed. Students should memorize these rules as
stated and should be able to explain the reasons for each rule.
GENERAL RULES
1. The brief should be divided into three parts, marked
respectively, introduction, discussion, and conclusion.
2. The ideas in the brief should be arranged in the form of
headings and subheadings.
3. Each heading and subheading should be in the form of
a complete statement.
4. Each heading and subheading should contain but a single
statement. (Rare exceptions may be made to this in the case

of literal quotations covering more than a single statement.)
5. Every coordinate series of statements should be ar-
ranged in order of climax, unless this violates time order

in expository matter or logical order in argumentative matter.
6. The relation between the headings and subheadings
should be indicated by means of margins, and letters, num-
bers, or other symbols.
7. No heading or subheading should be marked with more
than one symbol.

8. All references and sources of information should be ac-
curately stated in the brief, on the same page on which the

information is given.
RULES FOR INTRODUCTION

9. The first part of the introduction should contain all
the information necessary for an understanding of the dis-

cussion history, definition, explanations, admissions, etc.
'

10. The last part of the introduction should contain a
statement of the issues and of the partition.
11. The introduction should contain only statements
the truth of which is admitted by both sides.
RULES FOK DISCUSSION
12. The discussion should contain all evidence and argu-

ment to be usedon the given side of the given proposition.
13. In the discussion, each main heading should read as a
reason for the truth or falsity of the proposition.
14. Each subheading, or series of .coordinate subheadings, t
should read as a reason for the truth of the heading above it.
15. Objections to be refuted should be dealt with as they

arise.
16. In phrasing refutation the heading should state clearly

the argument td be answered, and the character of the an-
swer to be made.
RULE FOR CONCLUSION

17. The conclusion should contain a summary of the
essential points of the proof.
Let us consider each of these rules in connection with work-
ing out a brief on the negative side of the proposition: Re-
solved that the contract system of employing convict labor
should be abolished.
Rule 1. TJie brief should be divided into three parts,

marked and conclusion.
respectively, introduction, discussion,
In the last chapter we saw that in any piece of argumenta-

tion the important part is the proof itself, and that in order
to secure unity it is necessary to subordinate the introduc-
tion and conclusion, making them simply a means to the more
eifective presentation of the points in the proof. In outline
(A) it is evident that a part is introductory in nature, a part
is a discussion of the proof, and part is merely a word of con-
elusion. The first step, then, is to separate the parts and show
their relationship.
Negative (A)
The convict labor problem.
Necessity of employment. Experiments with different systems.
Effect of contract system on reformation.
Control by prison officers, habits of industry (regulations of the
contract), and learning trades.
Competition with free labor under the different systems.
Competition under piece-price system.
Competition under contract system.
Public-account system.
Methods of removing evils of competition under contract system.
Contract system is the most profitable.
Examples.
On the whole the contract system is preferable to any other.
Taking this outline and separating the parts according

to Rule 1 we have:
(B)
Introduction

Discussion
Effect of contract system on reformation.

contract), and learning trades.
Methods of removing evils of competition under contract system.
Contract system is the most profitable.
Examples.
Conclusion
On the whole the contract system is preferable to any other.

Rule 2. The ideas in the brief should he arranged in the
form of headings and subheadings. To secure unity and co-
herence in a brief we found not only that it was necessary to
consider the introduction and conclusion ancillary to the
discussion itself, but also that it was necessary to arrange
the material so that it will make clear what is important and
what is subordinate. The most natural methods of securing
this result is to arrange the material of the brief in headings
and subheadings.
Take, for instance, this from (A):

Public-account system.
Although these points are made here as of equal value,

it isobvious after a moment's observation that they are of
unequal value. Take the first two headings: the second is
certainly subordinate to the first, and should be so arranged.
Evidently there is some central idea in this group of headings,
and we must find this idea and state it in such a way that the
minor points can all be grouped under it. What, then, is the
central idea? It involves a comparison of the contract system
and the other systems as regards its competition with free
labor, and it may be stated as follows:
(C)
Competition with free labor is less harmful under the contract

system than under the other systems.
Effects of competition under the piece-price system.
Effects of competition under the public-account system.
Ways of removing any evil effects under the contract system.
Rule 3. Each heading and subheading should he in the form

of a complete statement. In (B) the most obvious fault is the
lack of clearness. For the purpose of conveying the ideas
:
to any other person than the maker of the brief, the outline
is useless. Take, for illustration, the introduction to this
outline

Here no one of the statements carries a clear idea of What

was in the mind of the writer. "Necessity of employment."
What about it? Does the writer mean there is no necessity
of employment, or that there is a general necessity? Em-
ployment for what purpose? Under what conditions? These
questions and others may justly be asked, and the brief can-
not be said to be even tolerable, until the ideas are so stated
that they cannot be misunderstood. Evidently, the principal
difficulty lies in the fact that the writer has failed to make his
statements complete. A word, or even a number of words,
taken out of their connection may often have a number of
different meanings, and the way to guard against vagueness
and ambiguity is to make complete sentences. Let us then
expand these phrases into complete statements.
(D)
The problem of employment of the convict is one of the serious

problems of criminology.
It is admitted that the convict must be employed in some kind
of work. Several different systems of employment have been
tried in this country; the most important of which are: the
piece-price system, the public-account system, and the contract
system.
Rule 4. Each heading and subheading should contain

but a single statement, except in occasional cases of literal
quotations.
Another common fault of brief drawing, and one closely
akin to the one just considered, is that of crowding too much
into one heading. It is as important to have each heading
a single statement as have each heading a complete
it is to
statement. may be allowable to quote
Occasionally it
directly more than a single statement and have this stand as

one heading or subheading. But this must not be taken as
permission to insert whole blocks of undigested quotations.
Material taken from others should be boiled down to single
statements or to properly related series of single statements.
Clearness is greatly increased by living up to this rule veiy
carefully. Take, for instance, the first point from the dis-
cussion (B):
Effect of the contract system on reformation.

contract), and the learning of trades.
Expanding this into complete statements in accordance

with Rule 3 we have:
The contract system is effective in the work of reforming the crim-

inal. Under system criminals are under the direct and
this
, responsible control of the prison officers, and are taught habits
of industry, for the regulations of the contracts prescribe these
things. The criminals have an opportunity to learn practical
trades.
The subordinate heading here is an incoherent jumble,

or, as it may be a crowded heading. The results of a
called,
crowded heading are: a lack of evident connection between
the different subordinate headings, and a similar lack of con-
nection between the subordinate headings and the main
heading. For instance, the statement "for the regulations of
the contracts prescribe these things" evidently has no direct
connection with the main heading, "The contract system is
effective in the work of reforming the criminal," and to show

justification for its presence in the brief some change must
be. made. This change must be made by a separation of the
different ideas of this heading into headings each containing a

single statement. It would then read as follows:
(E)
The contract system is efiFective in the work of reforming the

criminal.
Convicts are under the direct and responsible control of the prison
officers.
The contract provides that the contractor shall have no control

over the discipline of the prison.
The convicts are taught habits of industry.
The contract provides that they shall be continually employed.
Convicts have an opportunity to learn a practical trade.
Rule 5. Every coordinate series of statements should be

arranged in order of climax, unless this violates time order in
expository matter or logical order in argumentative matter.
Suppose we have six coordinate statements, say of the third
degree, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, under B. If this situation occurs in
the introduction, when we are explaining the history of the
question, and deals with incidents having a time order, we
should follow the time order regardless of the climax or other
considerations. If in the discussion our six coordinate points
have to do with matter linked in a logical sequence, have
a cause and effect connection with each other ^we must
follow the logical order. In all other caseswe should arrange
them in climactic sequence, beginning with the weakest and
ending with the strongest.
Rule 6. The relation between the headings and subheadings

should be indicated by means of margins, and letters, numbers,
or other symbols. Thus far we have seen the importance of
so stating our headings that the main and the subordinate
parts shall stand clearly in their proper relations. It is nec-
essary to show the varying importance of the different
parts by the indentation of the margins and by the use of
symbols. In doing this some definite system ought to be
followed. In this book the system of marking will be as
follows:
I.
A.
1.
a.
(I).
(A).
(1).
II.
A. etc.
Great care must be taken to see that marginal indentations
are always the same for symbols of equal order. So all roman
numerals on a page should be in line, and the same for
capital letters, arable numerals, etc. The statements should
never run back to the left under the symbols. All margins
should be clear the lower the order of importance of the
statements, the shorter the lines used, so that the eye can
quickly grasp the relation of all the statements on a page.
Outline (E), then, when these directions are carried out
will read:
(F)
I. The contract system is effective in the work of reforming the

criminal.
A. Convicts are under the direct and responsible control of the
prison officers.
1. The contract provides that the contractor shall have no
control over the discipline of the prison.
B. The convicts are taught habits of industry.
1. The contracts provides that they shall be continually
employed.
C. Convicts have an opportunity to learn a practical trade.
Rule 7. No heading or subheading should be marked

with more than one symbol. In applying any system of letter-
ing there is a common fault which leads to confusion, namely.
using more than one symbol for marking a single heading.

For instance, in outline (F), the marking is done correctly;
but a beginner in argumentation might easily fall into the
mistake of marking it something as follows:
(G)
A. 1. Convicts are under the direct and responsible control of the
prison officers.
2. The convicts are taught habits of industry.
3. Convicts have an opportunity to learn a practical trade.
In the first heading of (G) the reason in the mind of the

writer for marking it A. 1 probably is the more or less vague
idea that the three headings, numbered
1, 2, 3, are to be
grouped together. He feels that these headings are more or

less connected in meaning, so he puts in the letter A to indi-
cate the connection. He allows A to stand for a grouping

or summarizing statement which he has carelessly neglected
to put into words. This can be his only excuse for putting
in the extra letter, for otherwise it has no meaning whatever.
However, the use of the extra letter does not serve the
purpose he has in mind. It does not make clear just how
the subheads 1, 2, and 3 are connected, but confuses the
reader by making him stop and guess what is the connection
between them. If any such headings are really associated,
the association can be made clear only by definitely stating
the connecting idea, in a separate heading. By reference to
outline (F) we see how the relation of the ideas is rightly ex-
pressed. The subheadings are clearly established in their
proper relations to one another- by stating in main heading I
the larger idea of which they are subordinate parts. So we
have the inviolable rule that no symbol should be put into
it marks a separate and distinct heading of its
the brief unless
own.
Rule 8. All references and sources of information should

be accurately stated in the brief on the same page on which the
information is given. Exact references (volume, number,
page, etc.) to all authorities and particular sources of informa-
tion should always be given on the page of the brief which has
the statement which they support.
The method of inserting references to authorities is a
matter of individual discretion rather than of rule or precept.
The method may be adopted which is used in the text of the
present volume, of putting numbers in the body of the text
(or brief) with the title and exact citation of the authority
appended at the foot of the page. Or, it is simpler, and just
as clear, merely to insert the reference in the margin of the
brief, opposite the heading in connection with which it is
quoted. Probably the best method, on the whole, and the
one to be recommended, is to add the reference at the end
of the quotation or statement which it supports.
Whatever the method, the exact citation for every author-
ity and particular source of information used should always
be given.
We have now a fairly distinct idea of the general rules for
arranging our ideas in the form of a brief. But there are
certain particular requisites that are peculiar to the three

divisions of the brief the introduction, the discussion, and
the conclusion. These three parts differ from one another
in many ways, and must have certain rules of their own, in
accordance with which they can best perform their respective
functions.
Introduction
Rule 9. The first part of the introduction should contain

all theinformation necessary for an understanding of the dis-

cussion history, definition, explanations, admissions, etc. The
force of this rule is obvious from the very nature of the intro-
duction. The introduction exists solely for the purpose of
preparing the way for the effective operation of the
actual proof; and it has obviously failed in purpose
its
if, when the evidence and arguments are presented to

: :
the reader or hearer, by reason of his lack of information

about the question, he is incapable of understanding the
proof.
For an example take outline (B) . We find, in the discussion
proper, references to "the contract system," "the public-
account system," "the piece-price system," terms which
are meaningless to any man who has not given particular
study to the question. Again, we find the most important
points of the proof to be concerned with "reformation,"
"competition with free labor," and "profitableness"; these,
words have meaning in themselves, but we cannot see the
force of the arguments brought forward concerning them,
because we do not understand why these points are impor-
tant or how they tend to prove anything about the proposi-
tion. The introduction in this case, in the first place, should
have explained the import of these words whose meaning is
not clear in the discussion, i. e., it should have explained the
piece-price system, the public-account system, and the
contract system.
This is the work that is necessary to the introduction, viz.
(1) a definition and explanation of the meaning of the words
of the proposition, and of all the important terms in the
question that need explanation in order to be perfectly clear
in the discussion; (2) a narration of the history of the problem
in dispute, if such a statement is necessary to make clear the
real nature of the question.
The explanation of the terms of the question we are using
might take form somewhat as follows
(H)
Introduction
I. The problem of the employment of the convict is one of the

serious questions of criminology.
A. It is admitted that convicts must be employed in some
kind of work.
B. Several different systems have been tried in this
country.
1. The principal systems are the piece-price system,
the public account-system, and the contract sys-
tem.
II. The three systems may be described as follows:
A. The characteristics of the piece-price system are three:
1. Contracts are made with persons, firms, or,corpora-
under which the prison is furnished with

tions,
raw material.
2. These raw materials are manufactured by the
convicts at agreed prices per piece.
3. The work is done wholly under the supervision- of
prison oflBcials.
B. The public-account system is as follows:

1. The prison buys its own raw materials.
2. The prison manufactures like a- private firm, and

sells in the best available market.
C. The contract system involves the following charac-
teristics :
1. Contracts are made with persons, firms, or corpora-

tions, under which convicts are employed at
certain agreed prices for their labor for fixed
periods of time.
2. The contractors are usually furnished by the prison
with power and machinery.
3. The convicts work under the immediate direction
of the contractor, but subject to the super-
vision of the pirison officials.
Rule 10. The last part of the introduction should con-
tain a statement of the issues and of The work
the partition.
of explaining the nature of the question, and stating the
points to be proved, is essentially the work that has been
treated in Chapter 4 on the Issues. By analyzing the ques-
tion, studying the history of its discussion, and picking out
the points that are vital to the establishment of the proposi-
:
tion we may find that the settlement of the question

depends
on the decision one vital issue, viz.: Is the continuance
of
of the contract system detrimental to the general welfare of
the State? And further that this question must be decided
by comparing the system with other possible systems (since
it is admitted that some system must be employed) on three
What system gives the best financial returns?

points, viz.:
What system is most effective in reforming the criminal?
What system has the most beneficial effect on the free labor
of the State?
If the contract system can be shown on the whole to have
the preponderance of virtue in these respects, it is the most
desirable and should not be abolished. If, judged by these

standards, it is inferior on the whole to some one of the other
systems, it should be abolished. The explanation of the
nature of the question and the statement of the issues might,
then, take form as follows:
(I)
III. The real question is whether the continuance of the

!i contract system is detrimental to the general welfare
of the State.
A. This question must be decided by comparing the sys-
tem with other possible systems (since it is ad-
mitted that some systems must be employed) on
three points, viz.
1. Are the financial returns unsatisfactory?
2. Is the contract system unsatisfactory in regard to
the reformation of the criminal?
3. Does the contract system entail unnecessary in-
jurious effects to the free labor of the State?
The amount a brief depends
of explanation required in
entirely upon the nature of the particular question. In out-
line (H) given above, j;he explanation of the nature of the ques-
tion is short and takes the form of exposition. In treating
any new or uncommon question, full and detailed explana-
tions would be required, in order to give the reader the in-
formation necessary to an understanding of the issue and
of the question as a whole. In such a generally known ques-
tion as that of the contract-labor system, little explanation
was necessary, and that simply of an expository nature.
But very often the explanation of the question takes the
form of a narration of facts or a history of the question. In
the court room it commonly consists of a narration of the
leading facts of the case to be presented. In a discussion of
the question, "Resolved, that United States senators should
be elected by a direct vote of the people," the explanation
would take a similar form. It would require a history of the
origin of the Senate and of the existing form of election, and a
narration of the events leading up to the agitation for popular
election.
Finally, it is desirable to state the points which the dis-
putant proposes to prove in order to establish his case. This
is the part of the introduction called the partition. Though
the points in the partition may well correspond quite closely
with the statement of the issues, they are not always identical.
With the addition of this statement of the points of the proof,
the completed introduction might read as follows:
(J)

serious questions for criminology.
A. It is admitted that convicts must be employed in some
kind of work.
B. Several different sj'stems have been tried in this coun-
try.
the public-account system, and the contract
system.
II. The three systems may be described as fîUows:
A. The characteristics of the piece-price system are three:
: :
1. Contracts are made with persons, firms, or cor-

porations, under which the prison is furnished
with raw material.
2. These raw materials are manufactured by the
convicts at agreed prices per piece.
3. The work is done wholly under the supervision of
prison oflBcials.

2. The prison manufactures like a private firm and

C. The contract system involves the following char-
acteristics :
1. Contracts are made with persons, firms, or cor-

porations, under which convicts are employed
at certain agreed prices for their labor, for fixed
periods of time.
of the contractor, but subject to the supervision
of the prison officials.
III. The real question is, whether the continuance of the
contract system is detrimental to the general welfare
of the State.
A. The value of the system must be judged by three tests
1. Are the financial returns unsatisfactory?
2. Is the contract system unsatisfactory in regard to
the reformation of the criminal.''
3. Does the contract system entail unnecessary in-
jurious effects to the free labor of the State?
IV. The negative intends to prove its case by establishing
four facts
A. The contract system brings the best financial returns.
B. The contract system is effective in the work of re-
forming the criminal.
C. Any defects of the system can be remedied without
destroying the system.
D. The contract system is the most desirable for its
effect on the free labor of the State.
This introduction, of course, is susceptible to many changes
and improvements leading up to the issues, perhaps if desired
a fuller statement of the analysis, but it fulfils with reasonable
accuracy the functions of a good introduction for this particu-
lar question. In addition to Rule 9, which is explanatory of
the general nature of this part of the brief, it should be borne
in mind that there are generally three things necessary in
the introduction, in order to make it conform to this general
rule: (1) a definition and explanation of all the terms of the
proposition and of any other important terms in the discus-
sion that need explanation; (2) an explanation of the nature
and real meaning of the question as found by analyzing its
essential parts, in such a way as to lead up to (3) (Rule 10)
a statement of the issues and of the points to be proved by
the disputant in establishing his case. These three elements
of the introduction are, however, variable in importance, and
their necessity is not in all cases so imperative as to make
them all properly part of our Rules for Brief-drawing. But
the statement of the issues and of the points to be proved in
the discussion is so important as to justify the incorporation
of it among the principles of good brief drawing. We have
seen how indispensable it is for the disputant himself to find
and understand the issue; it is also generally desirable that
the reader or hearer understand them. For him, as for the
writer himself, it is knowlege of the issue that helps him to
get a clear view of the real question in its entirety; it is the
issue that enables him to follow readily the subsequent de-
velopment of the proof; it is by an understanding of the is-
sues that he may be made to feel the force of the evidence
and the arguments, and their full effect upon the proposition.
The work of explaining the issues is like the work of the
mill-race. The waters of the river go rushing by with im-
pressive sound and force; but they do not make paper or spin
cotton till the raceway gathers in their power and directs it
straight at the turbine wheel. So evidence, arguments, and

proof of aU kinds may impress an audience mth their volume
and loud sound, but they do not actually convince anybody
imtU they are controlled and effectively directed straight at
the proposition. This is the true work of the issues. They
are the agency by which the proofs given in the discussion
are brought into connection with the proposition, in such a
way that every blow in the proof strikes the question fairly
and helps the disputant to win his cause. In a speech it is
sometimes desirable, as a matter of tact, to conceal the points
to be proved in the discussion; but such cases are exceptional,
and are under all circumstances provided for in the out-
lining of the presentation rather than in the drawing of the
brief.
" Clash of opinion " in the brief. If the proposition is ac-
curately analyzed, each side will arrive at the "potential
issues," the claims the affirmativemust advance unjess they
are admitted by the Wherever it is possible to get
negative.
the admissions of the negative these should be stated by the
affirmative to show the narrowing down to the actual fight-
ing issues. The negative brief, of course, should recite the
admissions after giving the potential issues, thus showing
clearly the issues on which the argument is to turn. But a
perfunctory statement of "the clash of opinion" for all briefs
(in most of which probably one side gives not only its opinions
but also those it supposes the opposition will hold) is super-
ficial and worthless. Stating what you are ready to prove and
what you expect the other side to admit, or what your oppo-
nent must prove and what you actually do admit, is quite a
dififerent thing. This is what should be given to show the ac-
tual issues rather than a carefully balanced "clash of opinion"
which is in part mere guess-work.
Rule 11. The introduction should contain only statements
the truth of which is admitted by both sides. To recur again
to the general principles of arrangement, the introduction
never exists for its own sake, and does not properly contain
the proof of the proposition. Particularly in brief drawing
is it the servant of the discussion and merely preparatory in
nature. If we put into it prejudiced statements, that an
opponent must deny and that we must consequently support
by proof, it is no longer an introduction, but merely one
part of the discussion. We have destroyed our real intro-
duction. This is a serious mistake, for with very few excep-
tions it is indispensable to success that the minds of judges
or readers of the brief be prepared for the reception of the
proofs before they are thrust upon them, and this work can-
not be well done if the writer is actually arguing, and fighting
an opponent all the way. There is nothing in the work of the
introduction to a brief to require any prejudice or controver-
sial attitude to make it effective. It is merely an explanation
of the matters that are to be reasoned about in the discussion,

and of the facts that must be known in order that the discus-
sion may be understood. The writings and speeches of the
masters of argumentative art aU show their appreciation of
the true functions of the introduction and of the desirability
of keeping it free from signs of prejudice even in oral pres-
entation. Although it may sometimes be helpful to put
argument and evidence in at the beginning of a speech, it
usually turns out in the end that it is just as well for us to
withhold our proof till the discussion proper is reached,
and use the introduction for its primary purpose only. In a
brief this should always be done. It is no less important in
the case of briefs prepared not for the use of others ia decid-
ing the case, but for the purpose of arranging, testing, and
relating aU the evidence and argument that might be used,
as a step in preparation for oral or written presentation of
the whole case to one or several different audiences. Here
it is important that the writer keep his case clear by arrang-
ing an unprejudiced introduction.

The Discussion
Rule 12. The discussion should contain all evidence
and argument to be used on the given side of the given proposi-
tion. This rule is rather obvious when we understand the
proper functions of a brief, and that arguing should not be
done in the introduction of a brief. Of course, space does not
permit us to illustrate this rule. It should be remarked here
that the specimen brief given here is to illustrate correct

form not full and accurate substance. It is undesirable to
insert into a text-book a full and complete brief on a big
question.
Rule 13. In the discussion, each main heading should
read as a reason for the truth or falsity of the proposition. The
main headings of the discussion are the points of the parti-
tion and should be taken up in the order given in the intro-
duction. They should be carefully phrased, so they may be
connected directly with the proposition by the word "be-
cause." For instance, we may say (the negative statement
of the proposition here, because we are working on a negative
brief): "The contract system of employing convict labor
should not be abolished, because
I. It brings the best financial returns.
II. It is effective in the work of reforming the criminal.
III. Any defects in it can be remedied without destroying
the system.
IV. It is most desirable for its effect on the free labor of the
State.
If there were an additional point of pure refutation it might
read as follows:
V. The contention of the affirmative that (such and such
a condition exists) is untenable.
Rule 14. Each subheading, or series of coordinate sub-
headings, should read as a reason for the truth of the heading
above it. By a series of coordinate sub-headings is meant a
coordinate series which taken together constitute a reason for
the heading above, as B is true because and 2 are true..
1
1 alone is not a reason for B. Neither isBut 1 and 2

2
taken together make a reason. The relation between 1 and
2 may not be best expressed by "and." This situation ob-
tains whenever we have subheadings that must be taken
together. "When coordinated statements in a brief stand in
contrast to one another, or in any suspended relation, the
several related propositions constitute, in reality, a single
compound argument, rather than a succession of equivalent
^
contentions."
Such a must read as a reason, rather than each part
series
comply with this rule. The symbols
of it so read, in order to
used to represent such a series should be not 1 and 2, but 1^
and V or AS A^ A', etc. As,
. because
A*^ and
A^
The discussion contains the real proofs of the composition.

These proofs are always of the nature of flights of stairs as-
cending from different directions toward the proposition.
There are the smallest details of evidence, which serve to
establish certain facts; these facts go toj)rove some larger
facts; and so on, till all meet and are made one in the propo-
sition itself.
Now there are two ways in which these proofs may be
arranged to make clear this relation to one another. By
one method we proceed from lesser to greater; the smallest
details are stated first, then follow the facts these details
are meant to prove, and finally the result of it all is stated
in the proposition. C is true, hence B is true; B is true,
hence A is true, and so on.
The other method is just the inverse of this. The fact
that is directly connected with the proposition is put first;
' Maxpy, p. 29.

:
BRIEF DRA WING AND OUTLINING 233
next come the facts that are the reasons for the truth of the
facts that were first alleged; then, following in series, are the
lesser and still lesser ideas, each statement reading as a reason
for the truth of the statement next above it. A is true be-,
cause B is true; B is true because C is true, etc.

The first methods may be illustrated briefly as follows
a. The convicts are generally employed within the walls
of the prison, and

b. The employed by the contractors are under
instructors
the control of the prison officers, and
c. The conditions of the employment of the convict are
specified in the contract or by legislation hence: :
1. The system gives opportunity for proper control of
the convicts, hence:

A. Deficiencies in reformatory methods and prison
discipline can be remedied by careful adminis-
tration, therefore:
III. Any defects in the contract system can be remedied
without destroying the system.
The second method would make this part of the brief read
as follows:
without destroying the system because,
A. Deficiencies in reformatory methods and prison dis-
cipline can be remedied by careful adminis-
tration, for,
1. The system gives opportunity for proper
control of the convicts, for,
a. The convicts are generally employed
within the walls of the prison.
b. The instructors employed by the con-
tractors are under the control of the
prison officers.
c. The conditions of the employment of the

convict are specified in the. contract or
by legislation.
For the purposes of drawing a brief, the second method,
using the connectives "for" or "because," is clearly far
better than the first, and should always be followed. In some
cases ^ it is wise in presenting proof to conceal till the end the
point that is being proved, but these cases are exceptional;
and even where such concealment is desirable, it should be
carried out in the final presentation, not in the making of the
brief. The which may perhaps
defects of the first method,
be called the "hence and therefore" method, are obvious.
When a brief or an argument founded upon such a brief is
presented, the reader or hearer does not understand what
the disputant is "driving at," till after long wanderings he
reaches the point to be proved; then the reader is forced to go
back over all the ground again, in order to estimate the real
force of what he has been reading, and an audience, who
cannot be given the privilege of hearing it explained
again, have irretrievably lost many of the good points of the
proof.
Again, the "hence and therefore" arrangement has the
disadvantage of presenting a deceptive appearance to the
eye. It puts the least important proof in the most prominent
places and makes it hard to appreciate, at a glance, the real
co-ordination of the points. Finally, it makes the work of
lettering and numbering diflScult.
Rule 15. Objections to be refuted should be dealt vdth OrS they

arise. This means that in the brief we should weave in with
our constructive work specific refutation of statements of our
opponents whenever we know of them and are able to do so.
In any part of the brief it is possible to introduce a point
in refutation, by making one of the regular reasons read as
an answer to a specific charge of the other side. For in-
stance:
1 Sec a, p. 308.
I because
A
B because
1
2 because
a
b
c The charge that ( )
is false, because
(I)
(II)
_
Such a piece of refutation as c in this diagram can obvi-

ously be inserted anywhere, in any series of reasons, in any
order of reasons, in any order of subordination. Of course,
if the refutation is of the first order, it will stand as a main
point in the discussion and so will be announced in the par-

tition as a regular main point.
Rule 16. In phrasing refutation the heading should state
clearly the argument to be ansioered, and the character of the
answer to he made. This precept is of great importance,
because it guards against a serious error. Refutation is the
name that is given to any attack directed against the proof
of an opponent. With the importance of refutation and the
methods of handling it, we are not now concerned; ^ but there
must always be more or less of it in any brief, and its effective-
ness depends very largely upon the way it is introduced.
The writer of a brief, knowing in his own mind what is the
position of his opponent which he desires to assail, very
naturally falls into the mistake of unconsciously attributing
a like knowledge to others, and so goes on to array his an-
swers, without making clear to his audience or readers just
what it is he is answering, and how he is answering it. This
carelessness often proves troublesome; for in order to make
refutation achieve its purposes, it is necessary that the at-
tention of an audience be first directed toward the exact point
' See chapter 15.
in controversy, in order that they may see the comparison of
the two sides and so feel the destructive force of the answer.
For example, it is urged by opponents of the contract
system, that the system enables the prison authorities and
the contractors to become rich at the expense of the prisoners.
In refuting this point, the student would be guilty of am-
biguity if he should say, "The contract system does not
allow the prison authorities and the contractors to become
rich at the expense of the prisoners." It might very naturally
be supposed from the statement that this is a point of posi-
tive proof rather than a point in refutation, that the writer
is upholding this as one of the virtues of the system. This
makes his proof weak, for he is "damning the system with
faint praise." Again, this statement of the point might be
interpreted to mean, that the writer was comparing the con-
tract system with other systems, and declaring it to be pref-
erable in this respect. As a matter of fact, what he means
is, that the arguments made by his opponent to prove this
objection to the contract system are false. To make his

position clear and to bring his own arguments into proper
contrast with those of his opponent, he should have stated
his refutation somewhat as follows: "The objection that
thissystem allows the prison authorities and the contractors
to become rich at the expense of the prisoners is groundless,
for, etc."
This is, in general, the desirable way to introduce refuta-
tion: (1) state briefly and clearly the argument to be answered;
and (2) tell the nature of the answer. Then give the answer.
As for instance, "The contention that free silver causgs pros-
perity is founded upon a false assumption, for," etc. "The
evidence of Madden that Swift was married to Stella John-
son is unreliable, for," etc. "The argument that the incor-
poration of labor unions will prevent strikes is weak, for,"
etc. Whatever the form of the statement, it should so pro-
claim the argument to be answered that the attention of a
reader or hearer cannot be misdirected.
The Conclusion
Rule 17. The conclusion shxmld contain a summary of
the essential points of theproofs The function of the conclu-
sion in the brief is obvious from the work itself. Its duty is
merely to sum up the essential points that have been estab-
lished by the proof, and to make clear their bearing as a
whole on the proposition. This work is best done by a
summary in brief form, lettered and numbered.
The summary should generally contain a statement of
all the main headings of the discussion, and of as many of the
subheadings as are necessary finally to present the proof as

a whole. An illustration of the form of such summary is
given in the conclusion of the brief printed at the end of this
chapter.
Q. Parallel column brief. Before closing this chapter
attention should be called to a new style of brief drawing
which arranges the discussion in three parallel columns of
inferences, facts, and sources. While this device seems to us
not well adapted for use as a final form for the finished brief,
it is an excellent scheme for enforcing and testing thorough-
going analysis. It brings out with great clearness the three

elements (arguments, evidence, and sources of information)
that must be found in any well-drawn brief, and might well
be used in preliminary exercises for training in accurate
analysis. As a means of demonstrating the difference between
bare assertions and substantial proof, it can be used to great
advantage. The following illustration and brief comment is
quoted from Professor F. B. Robinson's Effective Public
Speaking.^ The words "arguments" and "evidence" might
be preferred to "inferences" and "facts." In the first para-
graph quoted (p. 239) for "issues" the student should read
"points in partition."
Pages 280-284.
Inferences
Inferences
:

sufficient detail to enable others to get it readily and read
it in context.
"For faults in reasoning, carefully read the inference
column; to discover lack of facts, read the fact column;
and to check up authorities and sources, consult the last
column. This form of brief provides not only an or-

derly form-arrangement of material bi^t also a basis of
criticism."
H. Complete sample brief. The following brief while
not complete as to details of evidence is correct in form, and
ought to be a satisfactory model. It is not presented as
complete or perfect or as approaching perfection, but it il-
lustrates the principles that govern themaking of a brief,
effectively embodying the general laws of the arrangement
of materials.
Introduction

serious questions of criminology.
A. It admitted that convicts must be employed in
is
some kind
of work.
B. Several different systems have been tried in this
country.
the 'public-account system, and the contract
system.
II. These three systems may be described as follows
A. The characteristics of the piece-price systems are
three:
1. Contracts are made with persons, firms, or corpo-
rations under which the prison is furnished with
raw materials.
2. These raw materials are manufactured by the con-
victs at agreed prices per piece.
3. The work is done wholly under the supervision of
orison officials.

2. The prison manufactures like a private firm, and

C. The contract system involves the following charac-
teristics:
1. Contracts are made with persons, firms, or corpo-
rations, under which convicts are employed at
certain agreed prices for their labor, for fixed
periods of time.
of the contractor, but subject to the supervision
of the prison officials.
III. The real question is whether the continuance of the
contract system is detrimental to the general welfare
of the State.
A. This question must be decided by comparing the sys-
tem with other possible systems (since it is ad-
mitted that some system must be employed) on
three points, viz.:
1. Are the financial returns unsatisfactory.''
2. Does it fail to promote satisfactorily the reforma-
tion of the criminal.'
3. Does it entail unnecessary injurious effects on
the free labor of the State?
IV. The negative intends to prove its case by establishing
four facts:
A. The contract system brings the best financial returns.
B. Thecontract system is effective in the work of re-
forming the criminal.
C. Any defects of the system can be remedied without
destroying it.
D. The contract system is the most desirable for its
effect on the free labor of the State.

Discussion
I. The contract system brings the best financial returns,

because,
A. The system avoids expenses necessary in the other
systems, for,
1. It avoids the expense of machinery.
2. It avoids the necessity of supplying working cap-
ital.
3. It avoids the employment of high-priced officials
and salesmen.
4. It avoids the risks and losses of trade.
5. It diminishes opportunities for peculation, because,
a. Extravagance and peculation are common
under the other systems, for,
(I) The Commissioner of Labor of New
York declares, "The large outlay

under the public-account
of funds
system gave opportunity for whole-
sale extravagance and peculation."
B. The public-account sj'^stem is seriously defective from
a financial standpoint, for,
1. In Illinois in four years and five months the loss
to the State was $314,212.

2. In New York it was found that the expenses of
the sales department were such as to make the
system financially impracticable.
C According to the report of the United States Com-
mission of Labor, the income of this system is sixty-
five per cent of the running expenses of the prison.
D. The Commission, comparing this system with others,
declares these returns to be more satisfactory than
those from any other system, for,
1. This Commission says, "In a financial sense the
contract system 'is the most profitable of any to

the State, except the, so-called lease system."
II. The contract system is effective in the work of reforming

the criminal, because,
A. The convicts are under the direct and responsible
control of the State, for,
1. In every contract there is a clause providing that
the contractor shall have no control over, and
shall in no way interfere with, prison discipline.
2. Punishment cannot be inflicted on the complaint
of instructors without full investigation by the
wardens.
3. The penaltyany violation of the rules by a
for
is immediate dismissal.
contractor or instructor
B. The system teaches the prisoner a practical trade by
which he can earn an honest living after release,
because, '
1. The Labor Commissioners of New York say that

the convicts learn exactly the same trades and
specialize in the same way as in factories and
other places of work outside.
2. It proved effective in Pennsylvania in teaching
trades for practice after leaving the prison.
C. It teaches habits of industry, because,
1. Under it the convict must be constantly employed,
for,
a. The contractor engages to keep a certain num-

ber of men continually employed.
D. The contract system promotes the health of the con-
victs, because,
1. Mr. Pillsbury of New York says that the system
is very beneficial to the health of the convicts,
and that they leave the prison in better physi-
than when they came.
cal condition
without destroying the system, because ^
A. Deficiencies in reformatory methods and prison disci-

pline can be remedied by careful administration, for.
1. The system gives opportunity for proper control
of the convicts, for,
a. The convicts are generally employed within the
walls of the prison.
b. The instructors employed by the contractors
are under the control of the prison officers.
c. The conditions of the employment of the con-
vict are specified in the contract or by legis-
lation.
2. The work of reform depends largely upon the
character of the officers in charge.
3. The character of the officials can be improved by
legislation, for,
a. Making the offices non-partisan would remove
inefficiency due to politics.
b. Efficiency of the officers would be improved by

making the term of officepermanent during
good behavior,
B. Any possible evils of competition can be remedied by
legislation, because,
1. Competition can be prevented by limiting the
production of any article by convicts to one-
tenth of the total product in that State.
2. Competition could be lessened by providing for a
greater diversity of products by the convicts, for,
a.The Labor Commissioner of Massachusetts rec-
ommends this as a remedy.
3. Competition could be lessened by a law requiring
the public advertisement for proposals for con-
tracts, because,
a. This would tend to prevent injuriously low
prices in competition, for,
(I) The advertisement of the proposals would
raise the cost of production to the con-
tractor by stimulating competition in
bids for the labor.

IV. The contract system is the most desirable for its effect on
the free labor of the State, because,
A. The argument that the competition of convict labor
with free labor under the contract system is det-
rimental to the welfare of the State is weak, for,
1. The competition must exist under any system of
employment, because,
a. The products of the convict must be sold in the
market.
2. The competition is more serious under the public-
account system, for,

a. Goods can be sold below the market price in
competition, beqause,
(I) The State cannot be forced into bank-
ruptcy.
(II) The whole cost of production is the cost
of the material.
b. The tendency is to centralize manufactures on
a few lines of production, for,
(I) It is impossible to manage many different
lines of manufacturing.
c. The United States Industrial Commission says,
"It has been shown by numerous investiga-
tions that under the public-account system
there is greater competition with the prod-
ucts of free labor than under any other."
3. The competition is at least no less harmful under
the piece-price System, because,
a. The Industrial Commission in their report of
1900 say that the piece-price system does
not affect the competition with free labor.
b. The first biennial report of the Bureau of Labor
of California declares that under the piece-
price system the effects of competition were
no different from the effects under the con-
tract system.
c. The Prison Labor Reform Commission of New
York stated that, in practical operation, the
piece-price system was shown to be more
oppressive to competitive free labor than the
contract system.
d. In New Jersey this system was found to be
worse in its competitive effects than the con-
tract system.
B. It is conductive to the effective administration of the
prison, for,
1. The officers of the prison are chosen solely for
their efficiency as prison keepers, for,
a. They are not required to act as business man-
agers, because
(I) The manufacturing is done under the di-
rection of outside contractors.

2. The contract system restricts prisons to the use
for which they are intended, for,
a. It relieves the management of the prison from

the necessity of managing large manufactur-
ing establishments, as under the other sys-
tems.
Conclusion
I. The negative has proved the following:
A. The contract system brings the best financial returns,
*
because,
1. It avoids expenses necessary in the other systems.
2. The public-account system is seriously defective
financially.
3. The income from the contract system is sixty-five
per cent of the running expenses.
4. Students of the subject declare that the returns are
largest from the contract system.
B. The contract system is effective in the work of reform-
ing the criminal, for
1. The convicts are under the direct control of the

State.
2. The system furnishes a trade to the convict, and
thus furnishes a means of honest livelihood on his
release.
3. The convict is taught habits of industry.
4. The contract system promotes the health of the
convicts.
C. Any defects in the contract system can be remedied
without destroying the system, for,
1. Disciplinary and reformatory deficiencies can be
remedied by careful administration.
2. Any possible evils of competition can be remedied
by legislation.
D. The contract system is the most desirable for its effect
on the general welfare of the State, for,
1. The argument that it introduces undesirable com-
petition with free labor is weak.

2. It gives effective prison administration.
II. We therefore maintain that the contract system of em-
ploying convict labor should not be abolished.
EXERCISE. CHAPTER 10
BRIEF DRAWING AND OUTLINING
1. Write the introduction to a brief on some "campus

topic."
2. Write the discussion of the brief mentioned in 1.
3. Hand in a complete brief of the material contained in
Appendix G, 1.
4. Write a complete brief of material contained in Appendix
G, 2.
5. Hand in, in the form of a parallel column brief, all of your

material on one main point in the discussion of the brief
of your original forensic.
6. Hand in a complete brief of the subject chosen for your
original forensic.
7. Hand showing the adaptation
in three different outlines,
of the material in the briefon the campus topic to three

different audiences as for instance, the Freshman Class,
the Faculty, the Board of Regents, or Trustees.
8. Hand in a complete outline of your original forensic,
adapting the outline carefully to a particular audience
and occasion, the characteristics of each of which shall
be definitely set forth.
SECTION D. PRESENTATION
CHAPTER 11
PERSUASION
OUTLINE
I. Conviction and Persuasion in Presentation
A. The brief and presentation.

B. Conviction and persuasion.
C. Selecting parts of case for particular audience.
II. The Nature of Persuasion
A. Persuasion defined.
B. Persuasion in almost all argumentation.
C. Prejudice against an "emotional appeal."
D. Emotion in argumentation.
1. Emotion the basis in practical issues affecting human
conduct.
2. Strong tendency of men to believe what they wish to be-
lieve.
3. ifmotions not belonging to the argument itself affect

decisions.
E. Kinds of emotional appeals.
F. Classifications of emotions.
III. Practical Suggestions for Persuasion
A. The speaker.
1. Know human nature.
2. Personality.
3. Sincerity or earnestness.
4. Modesty.
5. Self-control and reserve force.
6. Fairness.
249
B. The subject.
1. Fit audience and speaker.-
2. Handling subject-matter.
a. Brevity.
b. Simplicity.
c. Vividness.
(I) Reference to experience.
(A) Vivid experiences.
(1) Originally intense.
(2) Frequent occurrence.

(3) Frequently recollected.
(4) Recent.
(II) Concrete and specific.
'
d. Variety.
(I) Comparison and climax.
C. The audience. '
1. Adaptation to particular audience.

2. Tact.
3. Indirect appeal.
4. Responsibility; facing the truth.
5. The friendly audience.
6. The hostile audience.
7. Eight suggestions for persuasion illustrated.
I. Conviction and Persuasion in Presentation
A. The
brief and presentation. Under invention, se-
lection, and arrangement, we have considered the methods
of finding materials, of estimating their value, and of arrang-
ing them so as best to utilize their strength. The product of
our work has been embodied in a brief. It sometimes happens
that our preparation ends here; the brief itself may be the
presentation of our argument. But as a rule other prepara-
tion is required. The brief may be but the foundation-
stones and the beams which sustain and shape the building,
but which in the end are hidden from view by outward forms
that are more sightly and more useful; or it may be but an
orderly storehouse of material from which to draw whatever
PERSUASION 251
is needed for specific occasions. To achieve our purposes,

we generally need to put the materials in more pleasing
and effective rhetorical form. The brief as we have consid-
ered it so far is an impersonal thing. a full statement
It is
of "the case" as a case, adapted to no audience in particular.

It has no persuasion in itexcept what may be there inci-
dentally on account of the persuasive nature of some of the
evidence. Even when a brief is to be the final presentation
of the case, it is still usually lacking in persuasion, is largely
impersonal and simply introduces the argument without
bias, presents evidence in rigid form, and draws logical in-
ferences without fervor or emotion of any kind. For the
presentation of this kind of case we are now prepared. A
neat manuscript which follows the suggestions and rules of
the last chapter is all that is necessary.
B. Conviction When we have to argue
and persuasion.
a case in public (either orally or in print) the situation is
different. Then there is more to be done than we have yet
considered. Up to this point the work is the same for all
kinds of presentation. In the preparation of any important
argument the first thing to be done is the drawing of a com-

plete brief a full statement of the intellectual basis of the
case. In this we consider the inherent weight of evidence and
force of inference as such, as far as possible without regard
to any particular audience. Now a new element enters in.
We now have to consider persuasion.
In our earlier consideration of the general nature of the
art, we have seen that there are two aspects or methods of
approach in all argumentation: (1) conviction, or the appeal
to the reason, which is the act of inducing another to accept
the truth of an idea or proposition; and (2) persuasion, or
the appeal to the emotions, which is the act of influencing
another by affecting his feelings. We have further seen that
both are usually essential to effectiveness. Certain elements
of persuasion must be considered in preparing to present any
case either oral or written to any general audience. There is
no an audience of human beings to whom it is
stich thing as
safe to present any case withoiit giving thought to the Hkes
and disUkes, prejudices, experiences, and habits of the people
to be addressed. How much conviction and how much per-
suasion to use must be determined by circumstances. In
an intercollegiate debate, the element of persuasion is slight.
It is usually no more than tact and vigor in the work of con-
viction. The lawyer before the jury needs a judicious mix-
ture of both. Danton before the French convention made
his appeal almost wholly to the turbulent passions of a pas-
sionate mob. But though the relative amounts of the two
elements may vary, both are almost always necessary for
success.
C. Selecting parts of case for each particular audience:
conviction. If we have a complete brief of the case pre-
pared with no particular audience in mind there is one other
step to take before we prepare a persuasive presentation for a
given audience. That is: sort out those parts of the brief,
those phases of the case, which you wish to present to this
particular audience. Not only will you perhaps want to
present the same material differently to different audiences
but you will want to present different material to different
audiences. Do not waste time and tire an audience by prov-
ing elaborately a point which to this particular audience needs
no proof. Do not give a long detailed introduction (suitable
to an uninformed audience) to an audience already familiar
with the facts. In other words, do not make a brief and then
present it as drawn to all audiences. Take the appropriate
parts for each audience. For instance, suppose you wish to
have a new policy adopted in your university. After careful
investigation and gathering of evidence you prepare a com-
plete brief in support of the proposed policy. If the decision
rests with a single officer or small committee this brief may
be submitted in full either with or without comment. But
suppose you must gain the support of a number of different
bodies by presenting the merits of your plan orally to them.
PERSUASION 253
Suppose a group of audiences taken from this list: senior

class, athletic council,whole student body, faculty, board of
trustees, state legislature. One of these groups may admit
points which will have to be substantiated (with varying
degrees of thoroughness) before other bodies. Introductory
material needed in a student meeting might be superfluous
before faculty or legislature
or vice versa. In this way
"the case" as briefed must be changed and adapted to fit
each separate audience approached. An audience before
which a complete and properly drawn brief may profitably
be used as the outline of an oral argument is rarely if ever
found.
The most important work of conviction is about done
when the brief is completed. When the materials have been
gathered and arranged, it only remains to put the proof in
words that will impress it clearly and forcibly on the under-
standing of those we would convince. To be able to do this,
obviously the first requisite is a knowledge of rhetoric. The
effect of well-arranged and well-chosen proofs is often neu-
tralized by confused and halting English. The man who
cannot express himself is always a weakling in argumentation.
Then, in addition to the general principles of rhetoric,
there are certain adaptations of these rhetorical principles
to the peculiar work of argumentation.
A general treatment of rhetorical forms lies beyond the
necessary limits of this book. The principles that are pecu-
liar to arguinentative composition will be treated in the fol-
lowing chapters on the introduction, the discussion, and the
conclusion.
II. The Natuee of Persuasion

A. Persuasion defined. Persuasion has been defined
as the art of influencing another by affecting his feelings or
emotions. In the past text-books on rhetoric and argumenta-
tion have for the most part made this statement, and left
the student with little further help. While it is impossible


in this book to give a thorough treatment of this subject,
it is possible, we beHeve, to give considerable assistance by
presenting a new definition. Winans ventures such a new '
definition, as follows: "Persuasion is the process of inducing

others to give fair, favorable, or undivided attention to propo-
^
sitions." In discussing this definition Professor Winans
quotes in substantiation and approval many of the leading
psychologists. We quote one such:
" We now need a principle by means of which we can sys-
tematize the suggestions for persuasion drawn from common

experience. do we Why will to do or not to do? We turn
^
to Professor James;
"'What holds attention determines action. ... It seems
as if we ought to look for the secret of an idea's impulsive-
ness ... in the urgency with which it is able to compel atten-
tion and dominate in consciousness. Let it once so dominate,

let no other ideas succeed in displacing it, and whatever motor
effects belong to it by nature will inevitably occur. . . .
In short, one does not see any case in which the steadfast
occupancy of consciousness does not appear to be the prime
condition^ of impulsive power. It is still more obviously
the prime condition of inhibitive power. What checks our
impulses is the mere thinking of reasons to the contrary
it is their bare presence in the mind which gives the veto,
and makes acts, otherwise seductive, impossible to perform.

If we could only forget our scruples, our doubts, our fears,
*
what exultant energy we should for a while display!'"
B. Persuasion in almost all argumentation. The ulti-
mate aim of most argumentation is to make others act as we
desire, to influence the conduct of others, to make others
,
' Public Speaking, p. 256. The quotations from this book found in this
chapter are used with the kind permission of Professor Winans and the
Century Company. Every teacher of argumentation should read in full
Winans' chapters on "Influencing Conduct" and "Persuasion and Belief."
2 Ibid., pp. 253-257. ^ Briefer Course, pp. 448-452.
* Winans, pp. 253-4.
PERSUASION 255
forget their scruples, doubts, fears, etc., in so far as these

keep them from giving fair, favorable, and undivided atten-
tion to our proposition. We have seen already that persua-
sion in some degree is practically always necessary in influenc-
ing the actions of others. He who goes before any audience
of human beings and attempts to get favorable action on a
proposition ignoring all considerations of persuasion is fore-
doomed to defeat. The only situation that ofiFersan opportu-
nity for exceptions to this statement is that in which the
majority of the people present are at the start favorable to
the action sought â which no discussion is re-
situation in
quired at all. In fact even in such a case if a speech is made
and no attention paid to the persuasive elements in the situa-
tion, the case may well be lost. Men are often turned away
from their original intention by a speaker who talks tact-
lessly (i. e., not persuasively) in favor of "their side." There
is much erroneous talk nowadays about educated people,
trained inteillects, intelligent citizens, etc., being superior
to persuasion, and basing their opinions, votes, decisions,
on "facts" and logic and pure reason. There is no such thing
as an audience that will come to decisions on "propositions of
policy" on purely logical grounds. A simple question of fact
unassociated with human conduct may be decided that way.
anyone wishes to test this statement let him go before an
If
educated group, an audience of trained intellects, with a case
based on sound evidence and reasoning and present his case
in a way calculated to be displeasing to his audience. Go
before a college or university faculty, for instance, and "rub
them the wrong way," stand with thumbs in the arm-holes
of your vest, chew gum, use slang, make ill-bred personal
references to members present or absent and see how many

votes you will get even though these things have nothing
whatever to do with the real strength of your case. None
of these things could possibly be said to have any "proba-
tive value." The ease is lot because its persuasive side was
neglected.

C. Prejudice against an " emotional appeal." The case
of the "intellectual" who resolutely refuses to be moved by
any emotional appeal is interesting. Have you ever heard
such a one declare that he wiU never vote (in faculty meeting
for instance) for any measure that is presented with an ap-
peal to emotions? Consider what this means. If he is to be
taken at his word, it means that in such a case his decision
will always be an emotional one
^based on his prejudice
against what he thinks is an "appeal to the emotions"
when he recognizes it. He has decided in advance to exclude
from consideration the intellectual value of .the case and
render a purely emotional decision! But of course he is not
to be taken seriously, because if the persuasion (emotional
appeal) is well handled, he will be pleased. The presenta-
tion will fit his prejudices, his' tastes will be complied with,
agreeable ideas will be held up, and he will vote joyfully
(emotionally) and on the way home wiU pronounce vigor-
ously (emotionally) that that is the way he likes (emotion
again) to see a matter presented! Such a man is one of the
many people who have a wrong idea of the meaning of per-
It is thought
suasion, persuasive case, emotional appeal, etc.
that there something unworthy and cheap about persua-
is

sion and emotion that a persuasive case is always an appeal
to base emotions and passions. Of course this is quite con-
trary to fact. Says Winans on this point "Let us get i"^
clearly in mind that we are not dealing with an artificial

or unusual problem. When you induce a man to join your
party, or buy an automobile, or improve his habits, or go
fishing with you, or pay his bills, or open his mind to the
possibility that the Germans, or the English, are weU-mean-

ing men, you are persuading him. Persuasion is as familiar
as living, and you will recognize at once its means, such as
arguments, motives, suggestions, personal infiuence, tact."
"Persuasion is sometimes spoken of as altogether a matter
of '
appealing to emotion.' The phrase proves misleading.
Public Speaking, pp. 261-252.
PERSUASION 257
It taken by some to refer to pathos only, or to an arousal

is
of the more violent feelings; or at best as an appeal to some

large emotion, such as patriotism. Again, the word appeal
is misunderstood as meaning direct, fer^'id exhortation only.
It is true that persuasion is quite largely concerned with

emotion. In persuasion we wish to allay such emotions as
will keep proposed action in mind, such as
hostility to the
dislike for the means or the end, or desire for other ends;
and we wish to awaken such emotions as will win for the pro-
posed action favorable attention." ^
D. Emotion in argumentation. The place of emotion in
argumentation has been best stated by Professor Winans in
the following paragraphs.^
I. "Let us notice, first, that in dealing with those practical
issues that directly affect human conduct, the very basis of argu-
ment is emotion; or as we noted in the preceding chapter, the
major premise of such an argument is the expression of an
emotion. If we argue that the square of the hypotenuse of a
right triangle is equal to the sum of the squares of the other
two sides, we have pure reasoning, free from emotion; but
when we take up the proposition that Congress should pass
the immigration bill, . involving an illiteracy test, over the
President's veto, we are constantly dealing with emotions.
We must assume first the emotion of patriotism, or that all de-
sire the good of the country. As we proceed we find ourselves
meeting with emotions involved in the interests of labor and
of corporations, with self-interest and the love of justice,
with race prejudices and loyalties, with the sentiment that
America should remain the home of the oppressed, with pity
for those who have had no opportunity for education, and
with a reluctance on the part of many to pass a measure over
President Wilson's veto. If we looked beneath the surface
of newspaper discussion, we might find certain religious
feelings playing an active part in the settlement of this issue.
The fact that some of these feelings ought not to influence
' Public Speaking, p. 257. lyj pp
_
304-310.
our judgment of the question, and the fact that none of them
should be permitted to put us in such a state that we cannot
reason justly, do not change the facts that an argument on
the issue impinges upon emotion at every point, that some of
these emotions are necessary tp a proper solution, and that
any one or several of them, good and bad, may be domi-
nating the minds of your hearers as you address them. The
question selected is far from an ejctreme instance, as you will
see if you think for a moment of such questions as intercol-
legiate athletics, modern dancing, woman's suffrage, and
blame for the European war.
2. "In the second place, we notice with regard to the in-
fluence of emotion on argument, the strong tendency of men to
believe what they wish to believe.^ '
Will and belief are undoubt-
edly common products of the same deeper lying forces.
Whatever appeals to us strongly enough to tempt us to de-
sire to believe, by the very same appeal compels belief.'
Experience declares, 'A man convinced against his will is
of the same opinion still.' Almost as famous is the saying
attributed to a Scotchman, 'I am quite open to convic-
tion, Sandy, but I should like to see the man who can con-
vince me.' This tendency to believe what we wish to believe
is encouraged by the fact that, with reference to questions
at all debatable, there are reasons, usually good reasons,
in support of either alternative. One can arrive at a decision
only by weighing the opposing arguments. Now, if he wishes
to arrive at a certain conclusion, the arguments for it seem
weighty and those in opposition very light. He is likely to
refuse credence to witnesses and authorities against the de-
sired conclusion. He may even refuse to listen to opposing
arguments; or he may listen in an attempt to be
fair, but
with a subconscious determination to discredit what he hears,

saying all the while. That is not true; That is not important,
or That is insuflScient. In other words, he refuses fair at-
tention. . . .
' Pillsbury, Psychology of Reasoning, p. 54.

PERSUASION 259
"But frequently I am told by my students, 'Men ought

not to be influenced in their thinking by their emotions and
prejudices.' No one is stricter with other people's thinking
than your sophomore. He himself is open-minded in regard
which he has a purely intellectual inter-
to those subjects in
est; but hear him argue on 'activities,' women's suffrage,
or rehgion At any rate, the question is not how men should
!
think, but how they do think. These are the words of a

practical idealist, Woodrow Wilson:^
"As I look back upon the past of^the South, it seems to me to

contain that best of dynamic forces, the force of emotion. We talk
a great deal about being governed by mind, by intellect, by intelli-
gence, in this boastful day of ours; but as a matter of fact, I don't
believe that oneman out of a thousand is governed by his mind.
"'Men, no matter what their training, are governed by their
passions, and the most we can hope to accomplish is to keep the
handsome passions in the majority.'
" After all, are we not much too scornful of emotions? It is
true that men are often governed by unjustified emotions;

but it is also true that they are often led astray by false logic.
There are more men who feel truly than there are who reason
justly. Even Huxley, who held up the ideal of a mind which
is a 'cold logic engine,' wished men to have strong emotions,
though well controlled. So eminent a scientist as Baldwin

^
has written:
"'Neither will logic satisfy our moral or aesthetic demands, for

the logically true is often immoral and hideous. It is well, therefore,
to write large the truth that logical consistency is not the whole of
reality, and that the revolt of the heart against fact is often as
legitimate a measure of the true in this shifting universe as is the
cold denial given by rational conviction to the vagaries of casual
feeling.'"
' From a speech to the New York Southern Society in 1910, fotind in
Wood's After-Dinner Speeches, p. 46.
* Elements oj Psychology, p. 262.
3. " In the third place, we may notice that emotions not
belonging to the argument itself, affect decisions. These may
arise from the occasion. The audience may be enthusiastic
or bored, good-natured or angry. Again, emotions may arise
from the relation of speaker and audience. They may feel great
respect for him, or be pleased by his manner, his friendliness
and good humor; or they may dislike him and feel resentment
or suspicion. We must consider what manner of men we ad-
dress, what feelings move them, and how opposition may be
abated and a mood of friendliness and candor established."
Perhaps the terms negative persuasion and positive per-
suasion will be helpful, the former indicating consideration
of the things one must refrain from doing in order not to de-
tract from the value of his intellectual or logical case, and
the latter indicating consideration of the things one must do
affirmatively in order to overcome prejudices, to get a fair
hearing for his case, or to enforce his logic and add to the
influence of his intellectual case. From this point of view
negative persuasion is always necessary, positive persuasion
very often necessary and, if well done, always helpful.^
E. Kinds of emotional appeal. All those who wish to
practice argumentation successfully before any class of
audience must practice persuasion of some kind to a greater
or less extent. The question then naturally arises. If we must
practice persuasion and "appeal to emotion," what are our
opportunities?
What emotion or emotions shall we appeal to? What
emotion shall we arouse "in regard to our action" in order
"to win attention to it" ? Many writers have offered more
or less complete classifications of emotions from which the
student is presumably supposed to select the emotion which
fits his case. A few such lists are offered here as suggestive
and perhaps even serviceable in a practical way in some situa-
tions. Aristotle^ mentions: anger and mildness; friendship
1 See ante, B., p. 254 and C, p. 256
^ The Rhetoric of Artistolle, Jebb translation, p. xxv.
:
PERSUASION 261
and enmity; fear and boldness; shame and shamelessness;

gratitude (or favor) and ingratitude; pity and indignation;
envy and emulation. Whately ' discusses the different kinds
of appeals as follows
"For in order that the Will may be influenced, two things
are requisite; viz.: 1, that the proposed Object should appear
desirable; and 2, that the Means suggested should be proved
to be conducive to the attainment of that object; and this
last, evidently must depend on a process of Reasoning. . . .
"Persuasion, therefore, depends on, Argument (to

first.
prove the expediency of the Means proposed), and secondly,

what is usually called Exhortation, i. e., the excitement of
men to adopt those Means, by representing the end as suffi-
ciently desirable. happen, indeed, not infrequently,
It will
that the one or the other of these objects will have been al-
ready, either wholly or in part, accomplished; so that the
other shall be the only one that it is requisite to insist on;
mz.: sometimes the hearers will be sufficiently intent on the
pursuit of the End, and will be in doubt only as to tha means
of attaining and sometimes, again, they will have no doubt
it;
on that be indifferent, or not sufficiently

point, but will
ardent, with respect to the proposed End, and will need to
be stimulated by Exhortations. Not sufficiently ardent, I
have said, because it will not so often happen that the object
in question will be one to which they are totally indifferent,
as that they will practically at least, not reckon it, or not
feel it, to be worth the requisite pains. . . .
"Aristotle, and many other writers, have spoken of ap-

peals to the passions as an unfair mode of influencing the
hearers. . . . But Aristotle by no means overlooked the
necessity with a view to Persuasion, properly so termed, of
calling into actionsome motive that may influence the Will;
it is whenever he speaks with reprobation of an
plain that
appeal to the Passions, his meaning is, the excitement of such
feelings as ought not to influence the decision of the question
' Pages 128-131.
in hand. A desire to do justice, may be called, in Dr. Camp-
bell's wide acceptation of the term, a 'Passion' or 'Affec-
tion'; this is what ought to influence a Judge; and no one
would ever censure a Pleader for striving to excite and
heighten this desire; but it the decision be influenced by an
appeal to Anger, Pity, etc., the feelings thus excited being
such as ought not to have operated, the Judge miist be
allowed to have been unduly biassed. And that this is
Aristotle's meaning is evident from his characterizing the
introduction of such topics as 'foreign to the matter in hand.'
It is evident, also, that as the motives which ought to operate
will be different in different cases, the same may be objection-
able and not fairly admissible, in one case, which in another
would be perfectly allowable.
" An instance occurs in Thucydides* in which this is very
judiciously and neatly pointed out; in the debate respecting
the Mityleneans, who had been subdued after a revolt, Cleon
is introduced contending for the justice of inflicting on them
capital punishment; to which Diodorus is made to reply, that

the Athenians are not sitting in judgment on the offenders,
but in deliberation as to their own interest; and ought there-
fore to consider, not the right they may have to put the re-
volters to death, but the expediency or inexpediency of such
a procedure.
" In judicial cases, on the contrary, any appeal to the per-
sonal interests of the Judge, or even to public expediency,
would be irrelevant. In framing laws indeed, and (which
comes to the same thing) giving those decisions which are to
operate as Precedents, the public good is the object to be
pursued; but in the mere administering of the established
laws, it is inadmissible.
" There are many feelings, again, which it is evident should
in no case be allowed to operate; as Envy, thirst for Revenge,
etc., the excitement of which by the orator is to be reprobated
as an unfair artifice; but

it is not the less necessary to be well
acquainted with their nature, in order to allay them when

PERSUASION 263
previously existing in the hearers, or to counteract the efforts

of an adversary in. producing or directing them. It is evident,
indeed, that all the weaknesses, as well as the powers, of the
human mind, and all the arts by which the Sophist takes
advantage of these weaknesses, must be familiarly known by a

perfect Orator; who, though he may be of such a character as
to disdain employing such arts, must not want the ability
to do so, or he would not be prepared to counteract them.
An acquaintance with the nature of poisons is necessary to
him who would administer antidotes."
F. Classification of the emotions. Professor W. C. Robin-
son ^ has given a classification of the emotions that it is some-
times helpful to have in mind. "That fundamental principle
out of which all noble impulses arise is the tendency of hu-
man nature toward perfection. Perfection is predicable
. . .
of human nature as to its action, as to its character, and as

to its attainment. A man is perfect as to action when he
duty; as to character, when his predominant ideas
fulfils his
and impulses are pure and virtuous; as to attainment, when

he possesses the highest happiness which human nature is
able to enjoy. And thus in actual life the fundamental tend-
ency toward perfection manifests itseH in three subordinate
tendencies; the tendency toward duty, the tendency toward
virtue, and the tendency toward happiness. } . .
"These natural dispositions render the heart susceptible

to certain impulses, each of which corresponds to some one
of the many formswhich the ideas of duty, virtue, and
in
happiness are presented to the mind. The idea of duty yet
to be fulfilled awakens zeal; of duty heretofore performed,
complacency; of duty which another had omitted, anger; of
duty as discharged by another, approbation. The idea of
virtue as an attribute of character engenders admiration;
as exemplified in individuals, good will, esteem, friendship,
or even love for them and emulation of their excellence; as
contrasted with vice, abhorrence of the vice itself and aver-
' Forensic Oratory, pp. 14, 15. ' Italics ours.
sion or contempt toward those in whose character depravity
is manifested. The idea of happiness as possible, begets
courage, desire, and hope; as unattainable, despair; as al-
ready possessed, joy; as derived from others, gratitude; as
endangered, fear; as denied to others, pity; as prevented or
destroyed by others, indignation. These are the universal
impulses to which all men are subject. These are the weapons
of the orator to which no human heart can ever be invul-
nerable."
Winans^ mentions particularly fairness, the appeal for fair
play; desire for approval and admiration; rivalry, the desire
to emulate, to equal, or to surpass others; and fear, dread of
unpleasant consequences, public disapproval, dangers of the
wrong course.
III. Practical Suggestions for Persuasion
The purpose of this chapter so far has been to present,

as well as space would allow, what may be called the
theory of persuasion to get the student to understand
broadly the nature and function of persuasion, and to
eradicate, if possible, erroneous beliefs in regard to this
subject. The remainder of the chapter purposes to present
some These will be arranged
brief practical suggestions.
under three heads: those primarily applicable to the speaker
himself, those that have to do with the audience, and
those that apply to the subject. While of course all of the
suggestions are for the use of the speaker, it is convenient
to group them according as they have to do with him per-
sonally, his relation to the audience (which usually includes
his relation to the occasion), and his relation to the subject.
This division is Baker and Huntington ^
not strictly new.
use one much like it. "Broadly speaking, the means by
which a speaker aims to produce action is by winning sym-

pathy for himself or his subject usually both. Need to
1 Pages 261-263. ^ (Revised Edition), p. 294.
PERSUASION 265
establishand maintain such a sympathetic relationship

between speaker and audience may come from any one or all
of three sources: the nature of the subject: the relation of the au-
dience to it; and the relation of the speaker to subject or audi-
ence." Foster ^ gives the sources of persuasion as the man,
the subject, and the occasion, and refers to Daniel Webster's
famous discussion of eloquence.
"True eloquence, indeed, does not consist in speech. It cannot

be brought from far. Labor and learning may toil for it; but they
will toil in vain. Words and phrases may be marshalled in every
way; but they cannot compass it. It must exist in the man, in the
subject, and in the occasion. Affected passion, intense expression,
the pomp of declamation, all may aspire after itthey cannot
reach it. It comes, if it come at all, like the outbreaking of a foun-
tain from the earth, or the bursting forth of volcanic fires, with
'
spontaneous, original, native force."
While it is true that there can be no true eloquence with-

out persuasion, there can, of course, be persuasion without
real eloquence, and all speakers who wish to achieve results
must pay attention to problems in persuasion even though
they disclaim any desire for eloquence.
A. The Know human nature. The first
speaker. 1.
requisite for a speaker who would persuade men is a knowl-

edge of human nature. One of the prime qualities of effec-
tiveness is adaptation to the audience. To get such adapta-
tion a speaker or writer must know the peculiarities of the
men he addresses. However, such knowledge alone will not
enable him to persuade. If he does not understand human
nature in general, he is powerless to reach the emotions which
he knows are before him. He must know how men in general
think and act; when a man is best persuaded by silence and
when he needs to be reassured; when to wait and when to
Page 265ff.
^ Webster's speech on John Adams, delivered at Boston, August i, 1826.
Quoted, Clark and Blanchard, p. 10.
strike. Such knowledge is not gained from books; it comes
only from contact with men and close study of their habits
of mind. The master of persuasion is never a recluse.
2. Personality. Closely akin to the persuasive powers
arising from the knowledge of human nature, are the influences
that come from the personality of the speaker or writer. The
influence of personality is felt most strongly in oratory; but
personal character shows itself in print as well, and wherever
it goes it persuades, favorably or unfavorably. Every qual-
ity of mind or heart that may make enemies or make friends
isa proper part of persuasive power. Says Foster ^ on this
topic: "The power of a speaker to draw a whole audience
into the circle of his influence, and to hold them as if en-
tranced until his last word, is more easily felt than defined.
This power may be called personal magnetism. It is the
sum total of all the speaker's attributes, ^his physical, men-
tal, and moral characteristics, raised to their highest power,
and working together for a definite object. In this respect,
more than in any other, an orator is born, not made. Yet all
that a man does to keep his body well formed and strong and
healthy, all that he does to make his thought keen and deep
and sound, and all that he does to make his conduct right as
God gives him to see the right, contribute to personal mag-
netism. A great and good speaker must first be a great
and good man."
3. Sincerity or earnestness. Among the definite qualities
that may be mentioned as particularly desirable in argumen-
tative persuasion, the first is sincerity or earnestness. No
man be persuaded by any one who he thinks is trying to
will
deceive him or play with his convictions for personal ends.
A suspicious audience is the hardest kind to handle, and
undoubtedly an audience does not require much to make it
suspicious. Sometimes the hearers have occasion to suspect
that a speaker is positively dishonest and designing; but
more qften they believe simply that the speaker is arguing

' Foster, pp. 273, 274.
PERSUASION 267
for argument's sake or "to be worthy of his hire," and that

he really has no interest or confidence in his cause. Such
suspicion is seriously damaging to persuasive power. Lyman
Abbott gives some excellent advice in an open letter ^ as fol-
lows: "When he rises to speak he must forget himself, pray
to be delivered from the ambition to be eloquent by an am-
bition to win a result; be careless of admiration and covetous
of practical fruits in his auditors' lives. Without this moral
preparation he will be a mere declaimer: with it he may be
an effective speaker. And whether he is what men call an
orator or not is a matter of no consequence." Enthusiasm
in an audience can be roused only by enthusiasm in the
speaker, and earnest conviction is begotten only by a belief
in the earnestness of him who persuades. " One has only to
examine the great speeches from Demosthenes to Webster
to see how earnestly the orators have in all parts of their
work impressed their sincerity on their audiences: one has
but to study the wrecked careers among orators to realize
that sincerity is the chief essential in persuasion. Without
it all else, in the long run, goes for naught." ^ Consequently
no great orator, no effective writer, neglects to be sure at
every step that those in his audience have confidence in
the honesty and earnestness of his endeavors. Hence it is,
that the following exordium is an example of one of the most
common methods of introduction. It is taken from the
speech of Sir James Mcintosh in behalf of Jean Peltier before
the Court of the King's Bench,. February, 1803, and shows
how necessary a man, of even so great eloquence, thought it
to be that his audience believe in his sincerity.
"I must begin with observing though I know myself tdo

that,
and good nature of
well to ascribe to anything but to the kindness
my learned friend, the attorney-general, the unmerited praises
which he has been pleased to bestow on me, yet, I will venture to
' Quoted in Brander Matthews' Notes on Speech Making, p. 91.
^ Baker and Huntington, p. 302.
,

say, he has done me no more than justice in supposing that in this
place and on this occasion, where I exercise the functions of an
inferior minister of justice, an inferior minister, indeed, but a
minister of justice still, I am incapable of lending myself to the pas-
sions of any and that I will not make the proceedings of
client, this
court subservient to any political purpose." '
4. Modesty. Another element of persuasion is a quality

in the speaker or writer that may be termed modesty. Mod-
esty, in this connection, does not mean an attitude of subser-
vience or self-suspicion. Indeed, a speaker should feel and
(with modesty) exhibit the feeling that he is competent,
prepared, knows what he is talking about. Self-respect,
self-confidence, authority, and leadership are perfectly con-
sistent with true modesty. Proper modesty does not require
that a speaker apologize for his poor abilities, his "inadequacy
to the task before him," etc. A good rule to follow in public
speaking of any kind is "never apologize, never offer ex-
cuses." If it is true that you are "totally unprepared," know
nothing about the subject, do not attempt to make a speech
if it is not true, do not lie about it. "Excuses and apologies
are sometimes prompted by conceit, often they are dishonest,
usually of no interest to the audience, and altogether bad.
There but one speech in a hundred which may well begin
is
with excuses; and there are few that begin in any other way."^

There is such a thing even in public discussionas false
modesty, and it is a detriment to him who plays with
it. Self-confidence and manly courage are perfectly con-
sistent with every attribute of real modesty. True modesty
requires simply, that the man should be made secondary to
the subject. If it be an arguer's purpose to display his own
abilities and dazzle his audience, conceit is no hindrance;
but be his aim to win his case, it is different. If he makes
if it
it evident that he thinlfs he is himself more important than
what he has to say, the men whom he is addressing wiU read-

1 Howell's State Trials, Vol. 28, p. 566. " Foster, p. 268.

PERSUASION 269
ily share his disrespect for the cause he represents, and, how-
ever much they may envy his briUiancy, they will be likely
to give their allegiance elsewhere. Furthermore, an audience
has a natural tendency to doubt the modesty of a speaker.
For the moment he is on a plane a little above his auditors;
he stands as their leader in thought and action. Now men
in an audience are willing Ji^r be led, but they object to being
driven. They will actept leadership, but they will rebel
against dictation, and they are quick to notice any assump-
tion of superiority or command. The line between leader-
ship and between equality and assumed superi-
dictation,
ority, is the dead-line of friendship with the audience, and a
speaker who crosses the line has lost much of the power of
persuasion. This is the essence of the art of persuasion;
the relation of the speaker to his audience and of the toriter to
his reader must always be an attitude of leadership.
5. Self-control and reserve force. Closely akin to mod-
esty is self-control and reserve. The speaker who loses self-
control before an audience is sure to distract attention from his
case to himself and so lose the very heart of persuasion
and he is likely to ofifend in a positive way as well. "A lack
of self-control is the besetting sin of very vigorous and en-
thusiastic speakers. These men often work themselves up
to a state of such excitement that they (a) exaggerate, (b)
say things they had not planned or wanted to say, (c) for-
get to say what they wanted to say, and (d) display feelings
which they should have restrained. Any newspaper reporter
will tell you how general is the fault of poor self-control.
Public men, because of it, make speeches for which they are
sorry and sometimes, we regret to state, they brand a true
report of such an address as a lie. Newspapers are blamed
for 'misstatements' which in reality are the true records of
utterances made without self-control." ^ This must be not
taken to mean that vigor and enthusiasm are in essence
undesirable. Enough of these to give the impression that
1 Robinson, F.B., p. 144.
the speaker really and vitally means what he says, is decidedly
worth while. But enthusiasm must not be allowed to " run
away" with the speaker; it must be controlled. We instinct-
ively like the man who can control himself and seems always
to have much power held in reserve. When a speaker gives
the impression that he has expended his last thought and
ultimate emotion he has lost his power to lead to persuade.
The audience feel he has and are as competent
they have all
to lead as he. A sense that there is much more that might

be said; deeper emotions that are controlled in order that
calm thought may prevail, has a very persuasive effect.
"Reserved which tells for much in all kinds of com-
force,
position, cannot be overestimated as an instrument of per-
suasion. Webster's words, 'It is, sir, as I have said, a
small college, and yet there are those who love it,' together
with his manifest effort to repress his emotion, did more for
Dartmouth College than could have been effected by hours
of direct appeal." ^ This truth which seems to be ignored
by so many poor and mediocre speakers, who always try
deliberately to work themselves and their hearers into a pas-
sion, is emphasized by aU recognized writers on persuasibn.
Says Foster,^ " Behind his most impassioned speech he must
have reserve force. He must have such command of self that
his hearers will believe his convictions to be the result of
calm, vigorous thinking, and his strongest emotions to be
under the control of his intellect. A speaker who is overcome
by his feelings may stimulate his audience to a brief response,
but the more enduring persuasion results from a masterful
expression of firm conviction, which is felt to be deliberate
and just in spite of a speaker's strong feelings."
There is no
worse fault in public speaking than that of talking always in
a ringing, emotion laden voice. The speaker who falls into
this habit has little chance of being listened to and no chance
of influencing intelligent people. When you underline every
word on a page you emphasize none of them. A comment
1 HUl, p. 395. 2 Foster, p. 271.
PERSUASION 271
which explains very well this danger of lack of reserve force

is that of Baker and Huntington. "Because exhibition
of emotion is often an easy way of moving other people to
act as we wish, it has been abused as a means of persuasion.
Expression of strong emotion is really dangerous unless one's
hearers are in full sympathy with it; they will feel in it, es-
pecially if highly refined, something a little repellent because
too uncontrolled. Moreover, frequent dependence on this
method of persuasion weakens its effect. An audience,
seeing that the speaker seems to feel readily any emotion,
begins to doubt the genuineness of this feeUng, wondering
whether it is at best more than perhaps unconscious acting
of a high order. If it decides that the display of emotion is
really but acting, it may admire the man as an actor; it will
not long do his bidding. . . .
" For a speaker to say to himself during the preparation of

his address: 'This idea gives me a chance for a stirring burst
of emotion, therefore here I will let my audience see how
moved I am' has the theatric about it, and may lead to fail-
ure. It is safer in planning persuasion to trust to relating

one's ideas to motives operant in the audience and to de-
picting conditions which should arouse emotion. If it kindles
in the very words of a speaker, if in spite of his efforts to the
contrary it overmasters him, he will be very persuasive, but
if it does not arise in these ways, a note of insincerity will
probably spoil its effect. A student should remark here the

difference between the art of the orator and the art of the
actor. The success of the actor is complete if his audience
feels: 'This is the perfect simulation of anger, grief, mirth,
misery.' For the orator that judgment is the doom of his
persuasive work. His audience must be swept out of its
critical self-control into participation in the anger, grief,
mirth, or misery, so complete as to take action in consequence

of it. The orator has a special act in mind as the end of his
^
persuasion; the actor has not."
' Baker and Huntington, pp. 333-335.
6. Fairness is happily a quality that most audiences delight
to find in a speaker. Do not try to take unsportsmanlike
advantages of your opponent. Be fair and honest with him
as well as with your audience. Quote him correctly, answer
what he really said. Be honest and fair in all representations
of his case or his statements in detail. "Fairness is itself
persuasive. Do not attempt to conceal important facts
which make against your position. Give your opponent all
possible credit; concede all that you can honestly concede.
Grant him everything but the one point which you must
establish. Present his case with manifest fairness. Present
it better than he can present it; and, if you can honestly do so,
make it even more forcible against your own contentions.

If you cannot state your opponent's case, you do not know it;
if you do not know it, you cannot hope to refute it; and if you
dare not state it, you acknowledge that you deserve defeat at
the start. Give your opponent credit for good faith, and thus
escape personalities. Save your time and your energy for re-
futing his arguments rather than himself." ^ .
B. The subject. 1. Must fit speaker and audience. Not

much detailed discussion of persuasion is required under
this head. The subjects for most serious arguments are pre-
scribed, and naturally fit the occasion and the speaker. Thus
the greatest consideration is taken care of. To make persua-
sion easy the subject should fit the audience and the speaker.
Because in actual life we^ usually argue on a given subject
with those who are interested and responsible, and because
we usually argue about something that interests us or con-
cerning which we are responsible, this special point is taken
care of. Of course you have an almost impossible situation
from the standpoint of persuasion when you are talking about
a subject that dpes not fit either yourself or your audience.
Do not attempt to argue any subject that will seem to your
audience ill suited to your age, experience, station in life,
etc. And do not argue with any audience on a subject con-
' Foster, pp. 269-270.
PERSUASION 273
ceming which you cannot find (or readily create) in them a

vital feeling of interest or responsibility.
2. Handling subject-matter. Assuming now that you have
a subject that is persuasively appropriate to yourself and your
audience, what practical suggestions can be made for your
guidance in handling the subject-matter? Four qualities
to be aimed at in order to get maximum persuasion out of
the handling of the subject-matter are: brevity, simplicity,
vividness, and variety.
a. Brevity. Appropriate brevity not by is attained,
leaving out material that should be used, but by omitting
all unnecessary remarks. It is a relative rather than an abso-
lute quality. The proper length for any given speech will
depend upon many circumstances. Brevity is violated when
one talks simply to fill up time, or because he does not know
how to quit, or because he cannot drop one point when he has
said enough on it. The use of unnecessary words or sentences
constitutes a breach of the law of brevity. The shortest
explanation that will explain, the shortest allusion that
will awaken the is the most
desired memories or associations,
persuasive. Wasting time with unnecessary talking irritates
an audience and greatly hinders persuasion. Hill ^ gives a
pointed warning when he says, "It is in exordiums and pero-
rations that a young writer often fails he does not know how :
to get at his subject or how to get away from it. He should

beware of putting in a word of introduction that is not nec-
essary to prepare the way for his argument, and of adding a
word at the end that is not necessary to enforce his conclu-
sion. 'Is he never going to begin?' 'Will he never have
done?' are questions equally fatal." We have shown al-
ready how closely related are persuasion and attention. In-
deed Winans says,^ "Persuasion is the process of inducing
others to give fair, favorable, or undivided attention to prop-
ositions." Herbert Spencer ^ after commenting on numerous
1 Hill, A. S., p. 388. 2 Page 256.
^ Philosophy of Style, pp. 6-8.


maxims of rhetoric goes on as follows (italics not in the orig-
inal) :
" On seeking for some clue to the law underlying these
current maxims, we may see shadowed forth in many of

them, the importance of economizing the reader's or hearer's
attention. To so present ideas that they may be apprehended
vnth the least possible mental effort, is the desideratum towards
which most of the rules above quoted point. When we
condemn writing that is wordy, or confused, or intricate
when we praise this style as easy, and blame that as fatiguing,
we consciously or unconsciously assume this desideratum
as our standard of judgment. Regarding language as an
apparatus of symbols for the conveyance of thought, we may
say that, as in a mechanical apparatus, the more simple and
the better arranged in its parts, the greater will be the effect
produced. is absorbed by
In either case, whatever force
the machine deducted from the result. A reader or listener
is
has at each moment but a limited amount of mental power

available. To recognize and interpret the symbols presented
to him, requires part of this power; to arrange and combine
the images suggested, requires a further part; and only that
part which remains can be used for realizing the thought con-
veyed. Hence, the more time and attention it takes to re-
ceive and understand each sentence, the less time and at-
tention can be given to the contained idea, and the less vividly
will that idea be conceived.
"How truly language must be regarded as a hindrance to
thought, though the necessary instrument of it, we shall
clearly perceive on remembering the comparative force with
which simple ideas are communicated by signs. To say
'Leave the room' is less expressive than to point to the door.
Placing a finger on the lips is more forcible than whispering
'Do not speak,' A beck of the hand is better than 'Come
here.' No phrase can convey the idea of surprise so vividly
as opening the eyes and raising the^ eyebrows. A shrug of the
shoulders would lose much by translation into words. Again,
it may be remarked that when oral language is employed,
PERSUASION 275
the strongest effects' are produced by interjections, which con-

dense entire sentences into syllables. And ia other cases, where
custom allows us to express thoughts by single words, as in
Beware, Heigho, Fudge, much force would be lost by expand-
ing them into specific propositions. Hence, carrying out the
metaphor that language is the vehicle of thought, there seems
reason to think that in all cases the friction and inertia of
the vehicle deduct from its efficiency; and that in compo-
sition, the chief, if not the sole thing to be done, is to re-
duce this friction and inertia to the smallest possible amount.

Let us then inquire whether economy of the recijiient's at-
tention is not the secret of effect, alike in the right choice and
collocation of words, in the best arrangement of clauses in a
sentence, in the proper order of its principal and subordinate
propositions, in the judicious use of simile, metaphor and
other figures of speech and even in the rhythmical sequence
of syllables."
b. Simplicity. . The first five definitions of simplicity
given in Webster's dictionary show how in practically every
shade of meaning of the word, simplicity as a rhetorical
quality must aid persuasion by economizing attention. The
definitions are: " 1. The quality or state of being simple, un-
mixed, or uncompounded. 2. The quality or state of being
not complex or of consisting of few parts. 3. Artlessness
of mind; freedom from cunning or duplicity. 4. Freedom
from artificial ornament, pretentious style or luxury; plain-

ness. 5. Freedom from subtlety or abstruseness; clearness."
Simplicity in rhetoric means all these things: unmixed, not
complex, free from cunning, duplicity, artificial ornament,
pretentiousness, subtlety, and abstruseness. The absence
of such simplicity both in composition and delivery lies at
the bottom of the greatest fault known in public speaking,
that is artificial, ornate, bombastic style which results in a
speech which is an and not a communication. This
exhibition
indirectness which a sort of parading of voice and vocabu-
is
lary ringing, long drawn, emotionally false cadences in

voice, and high flowing, ponderous periods in language,
is absolutely inconsistent with thought. A mentality that is
alive and active at the moment of utterance cannot use this

sort of medium. So this fault is most common in declama-
tion or in the speaking of those who have learned to speak
largely by declamatory practice. The common custom of
choosing only the perorations of great speeches (the parts in
which emotion was at its height with the audience prepared
for it
a tense emotional setting ready) for declamatory
practice, in a flat, uninteresting, absolutely non-emotional
atmosphere, by a boy who often cannot grasp the mighty
thoughts of the orator, is a fruitful source of this kind of
hollow, declamatory, meaningless speaking. The result
is a show rather than a conversation. "Such speakers display
their powerful voices and teeming vocabularies before an
audience. They do not present
live thoughts to an audience.
They do not reason with an audience. There is no contact.

It is aU detached, impersonal, indirect; literally "sound and
fury signifying nothing." After such an experience the lis-
teners may say (if their taste is low) "What a fine speech!"
They willnot say "Let us march against Phillip!"
Simplicity is akin to sincerity. The speaker or writer who
is with simplicity.
really sincere usually treats his subject
In having any one good quality aids us in getting the
fact,
others. False ornament, the ringing alliterative adjectives,
and trite figures of speech, which always hinder communi-
cation of thought, are usually the concrete offenses against
simplicity. Such hollow rhetoric should be eliminated what-
ever the cost. There can be no speech or manuscript that
will not be improved by such cutting
regardless of the
nature of what is left. Hardress O'Grady, of the University
of London, in a little volume ^ whose keynote is sincerity
gives much good advice and suggestion on this topic. To
quote: "Although the form and style be excellent, there can
be no good writing if the subject-matter is unreal to the
' Matter, Form, and Style.

PERSUASION 277
writer. No man can write honestly aboUt subjects of which

he has no experience. His comments will strike the reader
as unreal, affected, or priggish, or they will be mere imita-
tions of some author read shortly before the work was
done. Form and style are essential for the proper pres-
. . .
entation of the subject, to interest the reader, to please him,

and to keep his attention to the end. But form and style are
of no avail if there is no reality in the subject-matter. There-
fore the subject must be alive to the writer, it must be im-
portant to him, for otherwise it will not live and become im-
portant to the reader." ^ "Is it alive? is it interesting.'' is
it plain and honest truth? has ita root in you? Do not be

afraid to give yourself away. People will respect you all the
more for writing plainly and very sincerely. If the subject
interests you, with careful handling and sincere writing it
will interest others. An engineer, a motorist, an architect,
a schoolmaster, a scientist, will interest his audience very
much in a highly technical description if he is enthusiastic
about it, and uses plain, clear, 'fuU-of-blood' language.
Great politicians have often held-=-or shall I say gripped?
audiences that were really hostile to their opinions because
their speeches came from their very hearts. They had a root
in themselves." ^ "Since I feel that style is sincerity, all
this book has been about style. ... Go through your
writing with a blue pencil, and see what you can cross out as
unnecessary. Beware of set phrases which have been
. . .
used so often that they have become stale or commonplace,

and have lost their original meaning. Beware of catchwords.
Beware of the sentence which sounds pretty or clever. Is
it true? Finally, ask yourself of every part and of the whole.
Is this honest thinking? honest description? am I sincere?
is it true? Is it true?" ' "Precision," says Phelps in discuss-
ing this topic,* "is the most effective tiest of affected style
' MaUer, Farm, and Style, p. 11. Ibid., p. 27.

' Ibid., p. 121.
* English Style in Public Discourse, pages 115, 116.
as distinct from genuine style. In affected style, expression
is estranged from thought. Apply the test of precision, and

the mask drops. . . . Apply to any form of affectation in
style the query, 'What precisely does the writer mean?' and
the glamour of affected excellence disappears."
c. Vividness. "Deductions," says Cardinal Newman,^
"have no power of persuasion. The heart is commonly
reached, not through reason, but through the imagination,
by means of direct impressions, by the testimony of facts
and events, by history, by description." If we would jper-
suade by means of direct impressions, facts, events, descrip-
tions, we must present such material vividly. Vividness is
an essential quality of all good persuasive work, either oral
or written. Vivid means strong, bright, animated, lifelike.
To get vividness we must have material capable of vivid
presentation; so we must keep this quality in mind when
choosing facts, evidence, anecdotes, etc. "The chief source of
brevity and vividness dramatically is selection. That is, a
dramatist does not give all the details of the lives of his char-
acters or of their conversations, but selects those parts which
are most significant for his purpose. Similarly a speaker,
in making any direct appeal to the emotions, should give only
the essential or striking features of that which moves him or
is intended to move his hearers." ^ Of course only that can
be vivid which is understood. A reference to anything with
which your audience is unfamiliar, instead of enforcing your
case by calling up a vivid image only hinders your case by
distracting the hearer's attention. While the man in the au-
dience is wondering whom you meant, or trying to recall the
historical fact to which you refer, he is paying no attention
to what you are saying. The reference must be instantly
intelligible or nothing is gained and much may be lost by
distracting attention.
(I) Reference to experience. Phillips, in his excellent
1 Discussions and Arguments, quoted by A. S. Hill, p. 394.
^ Baker and Huntington, p. 338.
:
PERSUASION 279
chapter on The Principle of Reference to Experience ^ sums

up as follows: "If, then, the coming into the life of
this all
the listener is a means to successful speaking, it logically fol-
lows that the more closely the reference touches the life, the
greater the effectiveness, or, to state it formally as a working
principle:
" The more the speaker brings his idea vnthin the vivid experi-
ence of the listener, the more likely vMl he attain his end, and,
obversely:
" The less the speaker brings his idea vdthin the vivid experi-
ence of the listener, the less likely will he attain his end."
(A) Vivid experiences. "This being so, the problem
of the speaker is the determination of the relative value of ex-
periences their comparative vividness, and the principles
that govern this may now be stated
" (1) An experience will be vivid to the listener in the degree
that it is originally intense, that is, in the degree the initial
experience engraved itself upon his memory. . . .
" (2) An experience will be vivid in the degree that it is
experienced frequently. You could describe the house that

you had lived in daily, for years, better than the house of an
acquaintance that you had visited but once. . . .
frequently recollected. A war veteran served through the cam-

paign but once. Yet his battles, sieges, fortunes, have all
their original intensity, through the frequency of recollec-

tion. Week after week, year after year, he retells them, and
thereby keeps his mental pictures fresh. . . .

recent. Other things equal, an experience has power accord-
ing to its nearness in time. We can recall this morning's
breakfast with greater distinctness than that of a year ago.
The raging headache of yesterday arouses deeper feeling than
that of last month.
" Including the foregoing in one statement, we have: An ex-
' Effective Speaking, p. 33ff.
perience will be vivid in the degree that it is originally intense,
and frequently recollected."
recent, frequent in recurrence,
(II) The concrete and specific is always more vivid than
the abstract and general. Note the increasing vividness in

the following series vegetation, vegetable, radish, white rad-
:
ish, long white radish, big long white radish, a white radish
four inches long, a withered white radish four inches long;
flower, rose, yellow rose. Consumption- is more specific than
disease; disease than indisposition, drunkenness than dissipa-
tion. SaysLamont, ^ "the right word is that which pre-
. . .
sents the idea most precisely. The sentence, 'The horse is

coming down the street,' is not so precise, not so vivid as
'The horse is galloping down the street.' The reason is that
'coming' is a general word, covering all kinds of locomotion;
the horse may be walking, trotting, or pacing all included
under 'coming,' which conveys the notion rather hazily.
'Galloping,' however, describes but one gait and thus forms
in the mind a more sharply defined picture. 'Galloping'
we call a specific word because it specifies the idea exactly.
From this example it is evident that one secret of a vivid and
interesting, as opposed to a colorless and dull, style, is to
employ, whenever possible, a specific rather than a general
word. The difference in effect is shown in the following pas-
sages :
General. All at once I saw two figures; one a man who was com-
ing east, and the other a girl who was coming down a cross street.
Well, sir, the two came together naturally enough at the corner;
and then came the unpleasant part of the thing, for the man
walked over the child and left her making a noise on the ground.
It does not sound very bad, but it was disagreeable to see.
Specific. All at once I saw two figures one a little man who was
:
stumping along eastward at a good walk, and the other a girl of

maybe eight or ten who was running as hard as she was able down
a cross street. Well, sir, the two ran into one another naturally
' Lament, English Composition, pp. 340, 341.
PERSUASION 281
enough at the corner; and then came the horrible part of the thing;
for the man trampled calmly over the child's body and left her
screaming on the ground. It sounds nothing to hear, but it was
heUish to see."
"Do not write 'quite a distance' when you can just as well
write 'twelve miles,' nor 'rude habitations' when you mean
'adobe huts,' nor 'intoxicating liquor' when you mean
'Kentucky bourbon.' Let your trees be maples or syca-
mores or live-oaks, and your birds towhees or blue-jays or
vireos. Give your characters a name, your incidents a date,
and even your sunsets a geographical location. Macaulay
understood well the value of this device. The Spectator is
'served up every morning with the bohea and rolls.' When
young men rank went into the navy, Mulgrave, Dorset,
of '
Rochester, andmany others, left the playhouses and the Mall

for hammocks and salt pork.' Another man might have
written Whenever the Mahrattas threatened an incursion,
:
'
the inhabitants fled for their lives.' But Macaulay writes:

'
Wherever their kettledrums were heard, the peasant threw
his bag of rice on his shoulder, hid his small savings in his
girdle, and fled with his wife and children to the mountains

or the jungles to the milder neighborhood of the hyena
and the tiger.'" ^
d. Variety is the life of speech. "Deadly monotony"
is a familiar term that is full of meaning. Monotony always
tends to put an audience to sleep; it dulls interest and kills
attention. Monotony of voice, of rhythm, of sentence struc-
ture, ofparagraph organization, in words, in the use of evi-

dence and illustration in fact monotony of any kind tires
and alienates the audience and makes persuasion difficult or
impossible. Avoid monotony by securing, first, variety of
material; second, variety of phrase, sentence, paragraph, etc.
Such material spoken with the mind alert, with a "lively
sense of communication" will necessarily insure a varied de-
' Newcomer, Elements of Rhetoric, p. 238.

livery. "Seek ye first a variety of thought, and variety of
delivery will be added unto you." The different qualities
of persuasion, as has been said, are of course intermingled.
Having some of them helps one to get the others. It is a
universal law. "To him that hath shall be given." He
who has simplicity and vividness will usually have variety
also without taking special thought to obtain it.
(I) Comparison and climax. Two closely associated rhe-

torical methods that aid in securing the quality of variety (as
well as the quality of vividness) are comparison and climax.
The student is doubtless familiar with these as explained in
all modern books on rhetoric and composition. The thor-
oughness of Whately's paragraphs written in 1846 may give
a deeper understanding. "Comparison is one powerful
means of exciting or heightening any emotion: viz.: by pre-
senting a parallel between the case in hand and some other
that is calculated to call forth such emotions; taking care of
course to represent the present case as stronger than the one
it is compared with, and such as ought to affect us more
powerfully.
"When several successive steps of this kind are employed
to raise the feelings gradually to the highest pitch (which is
the principal employment of what Rhetoricians call the Cli-

max), a far stronger effect is produced than by the mere
presentation of the most striking object at once. It is ob-
served by all travellers who have visited the Alps, or other
stupendous mountains, that they form a very inadequate
notion of the vastness of the greater ones, till they ascend
some of the less elevated (which yet are huge mountains),
and thence view the others still towering above them. And
the mind, no less than the eye, cannot so well take in and do
justice to any vast object at a single glance, as by several

successive approaches and repeated comparisons. Thus in
the well-known Climax of Cicero in the Oration against
Verres, shocked as the Romans were likely to be at the bare
mention of the crucifixion of one of their citizens, the sue-
PERSUASION 283
cessive steps by which he brings them to the contemplation

of such an event, were calculated to work up their feelings to
a much higher pitch: 'It is an outrage to bind a Roman
citizen; to scourge him is an atrocious crime; to put him to
death is almost parricide; but to crucify him what shall I
call it?'
"It is observed, accordingly, by Aristotle, in speaking of
Panegyric, that the person whom we would hold up to ad-
miration, should always be compared, and advantageously
compared, if possible, with those that are already illustrious,
but if not, at least with some person whom he excels: to excel,
being in itself, he says, a ground of admiration. The same
rule will apply, as has been said, to all other feelings as well
as to Admiration Anger, or Pity, for instance, are more effec-
:
tually excited if we produce cases such as would call forth

those passions, and which, though similar to those before us,
are not so strong; and so with respect to the rest." ^
C. The audience. 1. Adaptation to a particular audi-
ence. Know your audience and adapt your speech to your

audience. This, in summary, is the whole theory of handling
an audience, but it may be well to be somewhat more detailed
and specific. By knowing your audience is meant that you
should know as accurately as possible the interests and prej-
udices of each audience in regard to the subject you are to
present to them, and to the occasion on which you speak.
Do not deliver the same speech to six different types of au-
diences to whom you have to present the same subject. Dis-
cover how these audiences differ one from the other and adapt
your speech to each particular audience. In order to do this,
consider carefully what ideas in your speech ivill most forcibly
affect the emotions of your particular hearers or readers. There
are in every question certain phases of it that have a particu-
lar interest for any particular audience. The workingmen of
Liverpool in 1863 were most interested in the industrial side
of the slavery question, and Beecher showed his consummate
Whately, R., p. 142.
tact in choosing this as the one phase to be treated above all
others at the mass-meeting in Philharmonic Hall. would It

have been folly to have discussed the question from the
standpoint of American patriotism. On the other hand,
before a council of clergymen in the United States, it would
have been the immorality of " man owning man" that would
have been the theme of persuasion. It often happens that
speakers and writers treat their subjects from too many points
of view. They turn the q'uestion over and examine it on
every side, when the men whom they address are moved in
mind or heart hy only one aspect of it all. Intellect may be
the same in every audience, varying only in the degree of its
keenness; but the emotional interests of audiences differ
widely in their very nature. In any subject there are only
certain phases that can touch these varying emotions, and it is
a fundamental duty of one who would persuade, to consider

well what these interesting phases are. Then his appeals
willbe well directed toward the vulnerable points, and his
blows will be of some effect on the will of his audience.
2. Tact. The quality that lies at the basis of adaptation
is tact. The tactful person easily adapts his remarks to his
audience. Do not misunderstand what is meant by tact. It
does not mean hypocrisy, flattery, servility, obsequiousness.
There is nothing underhanded or deceitful about it. It is
nearer to politeness, consideration for the feelings of others,

good manners. Your despiser of tact uses a sledge hammer
for all purposes whether the task at hand properly requires
a tack hammer or a pile driver. He is usually as incapable of
great force as he is of delicate touch. He is an unskilled
workman a bungler who tries to make up for his lack of
intelligence and politeness by ill-bred boasting of his honesty
and good Of course tact is no proper substitute for
intentions.
careful preparation and honest convictions, but it is the most
powerful ally of preparation and purpose. To decry tact
because some clever people rely on it to the exclusion of other
means is silly. It is like decrying education because educated

PERSUASION 285
criminals are more dangerous than others. Intelligence is,

of course,a more dangerous adversary than stupidity it is
also a more effective champion.
Early in this book we said that persuasion might be likened
to the engine of an automobile, conviction to the steering
gear. In the following extract, talent means practically that
which iscovered in argumentation by the word conviction
evidence, logic, fact,
the general worth and truth of your
case; tact means persuasion, the power of making your case
effective, of finding a way to get your truth accepted by
those to whom you present it. "Talent is something, but
tact is everything. Talent is serious, sober, grave, and
respectable; tact is all that, and more too. It is not a sixth
sense, but it is the life of all the five. It is the open eye, the
quick ear, the judging taste, the keen smell, and the lively
touch; it is the interpreter of all riddles, the surmounter of
all difficulties, the remover of all obstacles. It is useful in
all places, and at all times; it is it shows
useful in solitude, for
a man his way into the world; it is useful in society, for it
shows him his way through the world.
"Talent is power, tact is skill; talent is weight, tact is
momentum; talent knows what to do, tact knows how to do it-
talent makes a man respectable, tact will make him respected;
talent is wealth* tact is ready money. . . .
"Take them to the bar, and let them shake their learned
curls at each other in legal rivalry. Talent sees its way
clearly, but tact is first at its journey's end. Talent has many
a compliment from the bench, but tact touches fees from
attorneys and clients. Talent speaks learnedly and logically,
tact triumphantly. Talent makes the world wonder that it
gets on no faster, tact excites astonishment that it gets on so
fast. And the secret is, that tact has no weight to carry; it
makes no false steps; it hits the right nail on the head; it loses
no time; it takes all hints; and, by keeping its eye on the
weathercock, is ready to take advantage of every wind that
blows.
286 ARGUMENTATION AND DERATE
"Take them into the church.' Talent has always something
worth hearing, tact is sure of abundance of hearers; . . .
talent convinces, tact converts. . . .
" Talent has the ear of the house, hut tact wins Us heart and
has its votes: talent is fit for employment, but tact is fitted
for it. . . . It has served an invisible and extemporary

apprenticeship: it wants no drilling; it never ranks in the
awkward squad; it has no left hand, no deaf ear, no blind
side. on no looks of wondrous wisdom, it has no air

It puts
of profundity, but plays with the details of place as dexter-
ously as a well-taught hand flourishes over the keys of the
pianoforte. It has all the air of .commonplace, and all the
^
force and power of genius."
3. Indirect appeal. The value of what is called the "in-
direct appeal " has often been discussed. It is probably one
of the best and safest "thumb rules" ever applied to the
problem of persuasion. Stated succinctly, it is Never avow :
in so many words your purpose to arouse any particular

emotion. The reasons for this rule have been set forth by
many writers, but none have surpassed the discussion of
Whately, which follows in full:
"The first and most important point to be observed in
eveiy address to any Passion, Sentiment, Feeling, etc., is
(as has been already hinted), that it should not be introduced
as such, and plainly avowed; otherwise the effect wUl be, in
great measure, if not entirely, lost. This circumstance forms
a remarkable distinction between the head now under con-
sideration, and that of Argumentation (conviction). When
engaged in Reasoning, properly so called, our purpose not
only need not be concealed, but may (as I have said), without
prejudice to the effect, be distinctly declared: on the other
hand, even when the Feelings we wish to excite are such as
ought to operate, so that there is no reason to be ashamed of
the endeavours thus to influence the hearer, still our purpose
' "Tact and Talent," The London Atlas. Quoted by Clark and Blanchard,
pp. 110, 111.

PERSUASION 287
and drift should be, if not absolutely concealed, yet not

openly declared, and made prominent. Whether the motives
which the orator is endeavouring to call into action be suit-
able or unsuitable to the occasion,
such as it is right, or

wrong, for the bearer to act upon, the same rule will hold
good. In the latter case it is plain, that the speaker who is
seeking to bias unfairly the minds of the audience, wiU be
the more likely to succeed by going to work clandestinely,
in order that his hearers may not be on their guard and pre-
pare and fortify their minds against the impression he wishes
to produce.
In the other case, ^where the motives dwelt on
are such as ought to be present, and strongly to operate,
men are not likely to be pleased with the idea that they need
to have these motives urged upon them, and that they are
not already sufficiently under the influence of such sentiments
as the occasion calls for. A man may indeed be convinced
that he is in such a predicament; and may ultimately feel
obliged to the Orator for exciting or strengthening such
sentiments; but while he confesses this, he cannot but feel
a degree of mortification in making the confession, and a
kind of jealousy of the apparent assumption of superiority,
in a speaker,who seems to say, 'Now I will exhort you to feel
as you ought on this occasion;' 'I will endeavour to inspire
you with such noble, and generous, and amiable sentiments
as you ought to entertain;' which is, in effect, the tone of
him who avows the purpose of Exhortation. The mind is
sure to revolt from the humiliation of being thus moulded
and fashioned in respect to its feelings, at the pleasure of
another; and is apt, perversely, to resist the influence of such
a discipline.
"Onthe other hand, there is no such implied superiority
in avowing the intention of convincing the understanding.
Men know, and (what is more to the purpose) feel, that he
who presents to their minds a new and cogent train of Ar-
gument, does not necessarily possess or assume any offensive
superiority; but may, by merely having devoted a particular
attention to the point in question, succeed in setting before
them Arguments and Explanations which have not occurred
to themselves. And even if the arguments adduced, and the
conclusions drawn, should be opposite to those with which
they had formerly been satisfied, still there is nothing in this
so humiliating, as in that which seems to amount to the
imputation of a moral deficiency.
"It is true that Sermons not unfrequently prove popular,
which consist avowedly and almost exclusively of Exhorta-
tion, strictly so called, în which the design of influencing
the sentiments and feelings is not only apparent, but prom-
inent throughout; but it is to be feared, that those who are
the most pleased with such discourses, are more apt to apply
these Exhortations to their neighbours than to themselves;
and that each bestows his commendation rather from the
consideration that such admonitions are much needed, and
must be generally useful, than from finding them thus useful
to himself.
"When indeed the speaker has made some progress in
exciting the feelings required, and has in great measure
gained" possession of his audience, a direct and distinct
Exhortation to adopt the conduct recommended will often
prove very effectual; but never can it be needful or advisable
to tell them some do) that you are going to exhort them.
(as
"It will, happen that the excitement of
indeed, sometimes
a certain feeling will depend, in some measure, on a process of
Reasoning; e. g., it may be requisite to prove, where there is a
doubt on the subject, that the person so recommended to the
Pity, Gratitude, etc., of the hearers, is really an object de-
serving of these sentiments; but even then, it will almost
always be the case, that the chief point to be accomplished
shall be to raise those feelings to the requisite height, after
the understanding is convinced that the occasion calls for
them. And this is to be effected not by Argument, properly
so called, but by presenting the circumstances in such a point
of view, and so fixing and detaining the attention upon them,
PERSUASION 289
that corresponding sentiments and emotions shall gradually,

and as it were spontaneously, arise.
"Sermons would probably have more effect, if, instead of
being, as they frequently are, directly hortatory, they were
more in a didactic form; occupied chiefly in explaining some
transaction related, or doctrine laid down, in Scripture.
The generality of hearers are too much familiarized to direct
exhortation to feel it adequately :they are led to the same
if
point obliquely, as it were, and induced to dwell with interest

for a considerable time on some point, closely, though in-
cidentally, connected with the most awful and important
truths, a very slight application to themselves might make
a greater impression than the most vehement appeal in the
outset. Often indeed they would themselves make this
application unconsciously; and if on any this procedure made
no impression, can hardly be expected that anything else
it
would. To use a homely illustration, a moderate charge of

powder will have more effect in splitting a rock, if we begin
by deep boring, and introducing the charge into the very heart
^
of it, than ten times the quantity, exploded on the surface."
4. Responsibility: Facing the truth. The thing that can
and should be done, directly, openly, bluntly, is to tell the audi-
ence of their own responsibility. There is no need here for indi-
rectness. You are not talking about what feeling should stir
them. You do not say " I propose to arouse a feeling of guilt,
or sympathy, or love or hate," but "you are responsible for
this situation and I propose to prove it to you." "This is
the truth and you must face it." "There are the facts.
^
It's up to you. What are you going to do?" Says Winans
on this point: "It is often very difficult to bring home to an

audience the feeling that they are personally responsible for
the matter in hand. The preacher who levels a sermon at
the head of an erring deacon is congratulated by that very
deacon, who chuckles 'to think how Brother Smith got
scored this morning.' The preacher is continually finding
' Whately. pp. 136-138. Winans, pp. 265-268.
it necessary to say, '
If the coat fits you, put it on.' The citi-
zen who attacks a municipal abuse finds dozens to 'sympa-

'thize' and say, '
Yes, yes, why doesn't somebody attend to
that? ' for one to step forward and say,' Ihave come to help.'
Very likely the priest and the Levite who passed the injured
man by, said, 'Too bad! Somebody should care for him,
and clean out those bandits too; but my business in Jericho
won't wait.' We can readily see that the speaker's task is
to get people to face their obligation squarely, to give it at-
tention when other matters of business and pleasure are
taking their minds. He must make them see that the public
nuisance, the grafting city administration, the violation of
tenement-house laws, the endangered honor of the university,
are the personal responsibility, not only of all of his hearers,
but of each of them; not something that 'they' should at-
tend to, but something that xinofficial John Smith should
attend to.
"The most obvious thing to do is to declare bluntly the
individual responsibility of each one present. But audiences
are rather hardened to this; we are all told of innumerable
imperative duties as men and citizens, as members of this
body and that. At least a new and interesting way of bring-
ing home the responsibility is needed, especially when one's
hearers are not yet aroused over the situation. . . .
"An important way of awakening the sense of responsibility,

which also enlists pride, is to give one's hearers something
definite to do, whether that something be really important
work in a position of trust, or merely signing a petition, or
standing up to be counted. Get them at least to commit
themselves publicly to your cause so that the public will
expect action from them. Get as many as feasible serving
on committees to do and report upon them.
specific tasks
Men of real efficiency may be interested in a cause just by the
chance to do work well; they like to make things go. Other
men may be enlisted by being made to feel that they are
needed. . . .
PERSUASION 291
"It is important to prevent people from deceiving them-

selves with excuses. Professor James, in discussing attention
and will, puts stress upon the difficulty we often have in keep-
ing attention upon the right action, seeing clearly that a
duty isa duty and that an evU action is an evil action. . . .
It is sometimes the speaker's business to compel his audience

to face unpleasant facts as real, and in particular to prevent
their putting them away by calling them by other names. . .
"The part of the persuader in helping or compelling others

to accept and stick to the right conception, labeled with the
right name, is plain enough. He should not permit his
hearers to call rudeness or destructiveness/wn, penuriousness
caring for one's own household, indolence weariness or illness,
snobbishness refinement, lies excuses, bigotry religion, or to
suffer from the two delusions from which an Oxford don says
his little world suffers,
having no opinions and calling it
balanced mind, and expressing no opinions and calling it
moderation.
"Dr. Wiley tells a story of a member of a certain Middle
West legislature who sought an appropriation of $100,000
for the protection of public health; but could secure only
$5,000. One morning he put upon the desk of each legislator
before the opening of the session, a fable which ran something
like this: 'A sick mother with a baby is told by a physician
that she has tuberculosis and that she should seek a higher
altitude. Lack of means prevents her going. She applies
to the state government and is told that not a dollar is avail-
able to save the mother and her child from death. At the
same time a farmer observes- that one of his hogs has cholera
symptoms. He sends a telegram, collect, to the government.
The inspector comes next day, treats the hog with serum
and cures it. Moral: Be a hog! The $100,000 appropriation
'
was promptly granted. The legislators saw from this vivid

presentation of the case that what they had variously called
economy, common-sense, business is business, etc., was really
putting the hog above the child."

5. The friendly audience. Audiences may be, of course,
friendly, neutral, or hostile to the speaker or his cause. The
problem of persuasion is obviously comparatively easy with
friendly hearers, fairly difficult with the neutral group, and
hardest with the hostile audience. Read the following and
note the contrast due to the different circumstances under
which these two speeches were delivered. This is the elo-
quent conclusion of one of Henry Ward Beecher's sermons
in the pulpit of the Plymouth Church, Brooklyn:
"We are children of God in proportion as we are in sympathy

with those who are around about us, and in proportion as we bear
with each other. How sacred is man, for whom Christ died! And
how ruthlessly do we treat him Oh, my brother, oh, my sister, oh,
!
father and mother, you are of me, and I am of you We have the !
same temptations. We are walking to the same sounds. We are

upon the same journey, out of darkness toward Hght; out of bondage
toward liberty; out of sin toward holiness; out of earth toward
heaven; out of self toward God. Let us clasp hands. Let us cover
each other's faults. Let us pray more and criticise less. Let us
love more and hate less. Let us bear more and smite less. And
by and by, when we stand in the unthralled land, in pure Hght,
made as the angels of God, we will pity ourselves for every stone
that we threw, but we shall not be sorry for any tear that we shed,
or any hour of patient endurance that we experienced for another.
Not the songs that you sang, not the verses that you wrote, not
the monuments that you buUt, not the money that you amassed,
but what you did for one of Christ's little ones, in that hour will be
your joy and your glory above everything else.
" 'Brethren, this is a sermon that ought to have an application
to-day, on your way home, in your houses, and in your business to-
morrow. From this time forth, see that you are better men your-
selves, and see that your betterment is turned to the account of
somebody else. And consider yourselves as growing in grace in
proportion as you grow in patience and helpfulness. Consider
yourselves as growing in piety and as growing toward God in pro-
portion as you grow in sympathy for men.'" '
' Plymouth Pidpit, Eighth Series, March-September, 1872, p. 246.

PERSUASION 293
6. The hostUe audience. With this, contrast the follow-

ing appeal by the same speaker to a hostile public meeting
in Liverpool, England. Mr. Beecher had already made sev-
eral speeches in the cities in England in behalf of the North-
ern interests in the Civil War, and this was his greatest effort.
Liverpool was the recognized headquarters of the Southern
sympathizers in England; so that the audience that confronted
him was largely hostile, and he was compelled to fight for a
hearing in the face of hisses, catcalls, and every form of in-
decent interruption. Mr. Beecher began:
"For more than twenty-five years I have been made perfectly

familiar with popular assemblies in all parts of my country except
the extreme South. There has not for the whole of that time been
a single day of my when it would have been safe for me to go
life
south of Mason and Dixon's line in my own country, and all for
one reason: my solemn, earnest, persistent testimony against that
which I consider to be the most atrocious thing under the sun the
system of American slavery in a great free republic. (Cheers.) I
have passed through that early period when right of free speech was
denied to me. Again and again I have attempted to address au-
diences that, for no other crime than that of free speech, visited
me with all manner of contumelious epithets; and now since I have
been in England, although I have met with greater kindness and
courtesy on the part of most than I deserved, yet, on the other
hand, I perceive that the Southern influence prevails to some
extent in England. (Applause and uproar.) It is my old acquaint-

ance; I understand it perfectly (laughter)
and I have always
held it to be an unfailing truth that where a man had a cause that
would bear examination he was perfectly willing to have it spoken
about. (Applause.) And when in Manchester I saw those huge
placards, 'Who is Henry Ward Beecher.?' (laughter, cries of 'Quite
right,'and applause), and when in Liverpool I was told that there
were those blood-red placards, purporting to say what Henry Ward
Beecher has said, and calling upon Englishmen to suppress free
speech, I tell you what I thought. I thought simply this, 'I am
glad of it.' (Laughter.) Why? Because if they had felt perfectly
secure, that you are the minions of the South and the slaves of
I

slavery, they would have been perfectly still. (Applause and up-
roar.) And, therefore, when I saw so much nervous apprehension

that, if I were permitted to speakt (hisses and applause) when
I found they were afraid to have me speak^(hisses, laughter, and
"No, no!") when I found that they considered my speaking dam-
(applause) when I found that they appealed
aging to their cause
from facts and reasonings to mob law (applause and uproar)
said,no man need tell me what the heart and secret counsel of these
men are. They tremble and are afraid. (Applause, laughter, hisses,
"No, no!" and a voice, "New York mob.") Now, personally, it is
a matter of very little consequence to me whether I speak here to-
night or not. (Laughter and cheers.) But one thing is very cer-
tain, if you do permit me to speak here to-night, you will hear very
plain talking. (Applause and hisses.) You will not find a man
that dared to speak about Great Britain three thousand miles off,
and then is afraid to speak to Great Britain when he stands on her
shores. (Immense applause and hisses.) And if I do not mistake the
tone and temper of Englishmen, they had rather have a man who
opposes them in a manly way (applause from all parts of the
hall) than a sneak that agrees with them in an unmanly way.
(Applause and Bravo!") Now, if I can carry you with me by
'
sound convictions, I shall be immensely glad (applause); but if

I cannot carry you with me by facts and sound arguments, I do
not wish you to go with me at all; and all that I ask is simply
FAIR PLAY. (Applause, and a voice. "You shall have it, too.")
"Those of you who are kind enough to wish to favor my speak-
ing, and you will observe that my voice is slightly husky from
having spoken almost every night in succession for some time

past, :those who wish to hear me will do me the kindness simply
to sit still; and I and my friends the Secessionists will make all the
'
noise. (Laughter.)"
It is striking indeed that these two speeches were from the

same lips. They are both strong emotional appeals, and the
power of each depends, in no small degree, upon the fitness
for the time and place. In the case of the sermon, Mr.
Beecher spoke to an audience gathered on a quiet Sabbath
' Patriotic Addresses, Beecher, p. 516.
PERSUASION 295
day, in a consecrated edifice, in whose "dim religious light"

were felt all the sacred influences of architecture and of music.
The minds of his hearers were open to high thoughts and
ready to meet in close communion of sympathy and feeling
with the orator. So he might well touch the chords of mutual
love and of aspiration. In Liverpool, before a strange au-
dience in a strange hall, his coming heralded by scurilous
placards and threats against his life, the orator was com-
pelled to fight for even the privilege of speech itself. To have
addressed such a crowd in terms of "holiness" and "tempta-
tion" would have been to raise a riot. On the other hand, if
the pastor of the Plymouth pulpit had appealed to his con-
gregation for "fair play," he would have bean charged with
insanity.
Beecher's speech in Liverpool also affords a good illustra-
tion of the need of knowing the character and 'previous opinions
of an audience. His audience was largely made up of laboring
men. They were struggling from day to day to make an hon-
est living, and their standard of value was wages; they com-
monly estimated ideas in terms of .pounds, shillings, and
pence. The master of persuasion knew their thoughts and
directed his appeal accordingly. He founded his reasoning
on the basis of the benefits to English industry and wages,
from the freeing of the Southern slaves. English industry,
he said, needs not cotton, but consumers; slaves are not con-
sumers, but make them free, and they become the patrons
of British cotton and linen, machines, and books. Further-
more, he spoke in terms that would reach and stir a work-
ing man.
"It is a necessity of every manufacturing and commercial people

that their customers should be very wealthy and intelligent. Let
us put the subject before you in the familiar light of your own
local experience. To whom do the tradesmen of Liverpool sell the
most goods at the highest profit? To the ignorant and poor, or'to
the educated and prosperous? (A voice, 'To the Southerners.'
Laughter.) The poor man buys simply for his body; he buys food,
he buys clothing, he buys fuel, he buys lodging. His rule is to buy
the least and the cheapest that he can; he brings away as little as
he can; and he buys for the least he can. . . .
"A savage is a man of one story, and that one story a cellar.
When a man begins to be civilized, he raises another story. When
you christianize and civilize the man, you put story upon story, for
you develop faculty after faculty, and you have to supply every
story with your productions. The savage is a man one story deep,
the civilized man is thirty stories deep. (Applause.) Now, if you
go to a lodging-house where there are three or four men, your sales
to them may, no doubt, be worth something; but if you go to a
lodging-house like some of those which I saw in Edinburgh, which
seem to contain about twenty stories ('Oh, oh!' and interruption),
every story of which is full, and all who occupy buy of you which
is the better customer, the man who is drawn out or the man who
is pinched up?" '
7. Eight suggestions for persuasion illustrated. This

Liverpool speech is generally used as the basis of discussion
of the problem of handling a hostile audience or of per-
suasion in general. Baker and Huntington discuss eight sug-
gestions for persuasion, which are summarized as follows ^ :
" 1 Ascertain the habits of mind of your proposed audience.

.
"2. Determine the special interests and the idiosyncrasies

of your audience.
"3. Connect lower with higher motives.
"4. Remember that the larger the audience the higher the
motives to which appeal may be made.
"5. Startling an audience may rout indifference or effec-
tively emphasize.
"6. Let the nature of your task determine the order of
your persuasion.
" 7. Unify the persuasion for some definite purpose.
"8. Be flexible; adapt the work to unexpected exigencies."
After this discussion they show how Beecher in this speech
exemplified all of these suggestions (symbols not in the origi-
^ Patriotic Addresses, Beecher, p. 519.

' The Principles of Argumentation, p. 331.
PERSUASION 297
nal). "Of course, masterly persuasion uses one or more of

these suggestions as experience and intuition prompt.
Beecher's Speech at Liverpool shows skillful recognition of all
of them. (1) Beecher planned it on the idea that an English

audience habitually likes fair play, courage, independence,
and good nature. He asked for the first because he could
offer the other three in exchange. (2) He constantly sought
to show the audience the connection between his subject
and their personal interests. (3) He knew that it is safest
to appeal to high motives, and that when lower motives are
used they must lead into higher. (4) His experience told
him that in so large an audience as his he might well connect
his special appeal with the highest motives. (5) He startled
his audience more than once by his frankness, his courage,
or his swift turning of the tables. (6-7) The persuasion of
each division worked toward a purpose which is stated first
in the last paragraphs of the address. (8) Nearly every page
illustrates his skill in grappling with conditions which could
not have been foreseen. Indeed, as an illustration of success-
ful coping with problems of persuasion raised by the nature
of the subject, the relation of the speaker to it and to the
audience, and the relation of the audience to the subject,
^
the Speech at Liverpool should be studied from end to end."
' The Principles of Argumentation, p. 330.
CHAPTER 12
THE INTRODUCTION
OUTLINE
I. The function of the introduction.
A. Conviction.
1. Definition.
a. By authority.
b. Etymology.
c. Context.
d. Analogy.
e. Illustration.
f. Exclusion.
g. Analysis.
2. Explanation, issues,* and partition.
a. Direct or inverted order.

b. Illustration of the three parts.
c. Two or more issues : parallel partition.
d. Issues emphasized.
e. Excluding irrelevant matter.
B. Persuasion.
1. Calm, courteous, conversational.
2. Do not detract from your theme.
3. Strange or hostile audiences.
4. Never lose temper.
5. Inattentive audience.
I. The function of the introduction is to prepare the way

for the work of the discussion proper. This duty of the in-
troduction is twofold. Both an intellectual and an emotional
approach to the problem must usually be made in the intro-
duction. The intellect must be prepared, so that all the proofs
may have their fullest effect; the emotions, in order that the
speaker or writer may from the first be brought into har-
298
THE INTRODUCTION 299
monious and sympathetic relations with his audience. So

the introduction must contain the proper approach to both
conviction and persuasion. Cifero said the purpose of the
introduction is to render the audience "benevolos, attentos,
dociles" well disposed, attentive, ready to be influenced.
But it should be remembered, in connection with this much
quoted remark that Cicero divided speeches into six parts

(introduction, narration, proposition, proof, refutation, con-
clusion). By introduction he meant only the opening re-
marks whose function is almost purely persuasive. The work
in conviction to be accomplished in the introduction as we
understand it, Cicero took up under "narration and proposi-
tion." Some modern writers have given a threefold division
of the function of the introduction. Professor F. B. Robinson ^
gives as the purpose of the introduction, " (A) to put the au-
dience in a state of favorable feeling; (B) to arouse interest
and secure attention; and (C) to prepare the audience to
understand the message." It will be noticed that the first of
these aims at persuasion, the second at persuasion and con-
viction, and the third at conviction. Pattee ^ says "the work
of the introduction is threefold: (1) to conciliate the audience;
(2) to explain the subject; and (3) to outline the discussion."
The first of these is a work in persuasion, the second and third
have to do with conviction. We shall discuss the function of
the introduction under the familiar division of conviction
and persuasion, as explained earlier in this book,' using ap-
propriate subdivisions under each.
A. Conviction. We have seen that, with respect to
conviction, it is the duty of the introduction to give all the in-
formaiion necessary for an understanding of the discussion;

also that the parts usually necessary for the accomplishment
of this purpose are, briefly: (1) a definition of terms; (2) an
explanation of the question in such a way as to lead up to (3)
the issues, and (4) the partition or statement of the points
to be proved in the discussion.
1 Page 31. " Page 28. ' See ch. 1.
1. Definition ^ in argumentation serves two purposes.
It serves, first, to enable the writer, in the beginning of his
work meaning of the ques-
in preparation, to find gut the real
tion. Secondly, it serves to make
meaning clear to the
the
reader or hearer. In the execution of the former of these two
purposes the definitions do not need to be expressed at all;
it is sufficient that the investigator find and understand them
himself. But in presenting his proofs to others, the arguer

must consider the methods he will need to use, in order to
make his definitions effective with the persons he is seeking
to convince. To present a definition forcibly is not always
easy. A
mere dictionary definition, which we have seen to
be of or no value in finding out the meaning of the ques-
little
tion, is of even less value in the work of presentation. If a

person does not understand the meaning of a word or phrase,
as used in a proposition, his confusion will not usually be
cleared by the quotation mere sentence from a diction-
of a
ary. In the such a definition is nearly always
first place,
too short and too compact to be grasped in its full meaning,

in the short time given for the statement of it. Moreover,
probably not be convincing. If the person who is being
it will
argued with is to be made to accept fully the definition, he

must be persuaded of its reasonableness; he must be made to
see why the term means what the disputant says, and so be
brought to accept it without doubt or qualification. It is
for these reasons that we find all the best argumentative
writers and speakers taxing the resources of their ingenuity
and forcible methods of presenting their
for interesting, clear,
definitions. The following are some of the most common
and effective methods used.
a. By authority. The arguments from authority, which
have already considered elsewhere,^ may be used with good
effect in the explanation of definitions. We have seen that
a dictionary statement is of little value; but there are few
' See ante, p. 186, quotation from Bodkin.
' See chapter 6, Evidence, p. 99.

ways of defining -more persuasive with an audience, than

to quote to them an explanation
of the term, as given by
some recognized speciaUst in that branch of affairs with
which the word or phrase is concerned. The quotation,
however, should not usually be short or dogmatic in form,
"fitshould be an explanation rather than a mere sentence
statement. Also, care should be taken, as in any argument
from authority, that the reliability of the person quoted is
fully recognized, so that the definition may have the full

force of expert evidence. In using this method, also, it is
usually desirable to explain the quotation, either before or
after reading it, in order to be sure that it is understood and
accepted by the persons addressed. It will be noticed in
the selection that follows, that the speaker, after citing his
definition, goes on at considerable length to comment on the
reasonableness of the statements of his authority, and to
show the bearing on the question before the
of the definition
court. The from the speech by Mr. William
illustration is
A. Beach before a military commission in Washington, D. C,
1865. He is here defining the term "military law," quoting
from O'Brien's American Military Law (pp. 26-27) :
'"
Military law may be defined to be a body of rules and ordinances
prescribed by competent authority for the government of the
military state considered as a distinct community. . . . The gen-
erallaw claims supreme and undisputed jurisdiction over all. The
military law puts forth no such pretensions. It aims solely to
enforce on the soldier the additional duties he has assumed. It
constitutes tribunals for the trial of breaches of military duty only.
It attempts not to regulate or adjust the civil rights of those who
fall under its cognizance, nor does it affect to redress civil injuries
or private wrongs, unless they be, in some degree, connected with
the safety and good order of the military state as having a tendency
its peace and quiet.
to disturb Civil injuries or private wrongs, not
immediately related to the rights of a soldier as such, are left, like
his civil rights, to the redress of the general or common law.' . . .
"Your Honors perceive how completely the extract justifies my

reasoning. It will impress Your Honors with its obvious propriety.
It assigns to Courts like yourselves their true position. It enables
them to accomplish their full office, without interference with the
ordinary tribunals of the country.It disturbs none of the relations
of civil life. you exclusively the field of military disci-
It assigns to
pline and efficiency. It maintains a wise harmony between the
necessity which called you into existence and the functions you
'
should exercise."
b. By etymological derivation. The meaning of a term

may often be made clear, by tracing the etymological deriva-
word or the history of the development of its mean-
tion of the
ing. This method is, perhaps, not so common as many others,
for ambiguity in a word does not, in argumentation, usually
arise from any confusion of its common meanings such as
might be removed by a study of its life history. But wher-
ever this method may be used it is always effective, because
such an explanation is logical and clear. John Quincy Adams,
in his Sixteenth Lecture on Rhetoric and Oratory at Har-
vard University in 1807, thus defined the word "passion":
"There is, however, a more restricted sense in which the term

'passion' is used, and of which the precisest idea will be formed by
tracing its etymology. In this sense it is equivalent to sufferance,
distress, anguish. In this sense it has emphatically been applied to
it must be con-
the last sufferings of the Saviour; and to this sense
finedwhen we are inquiring into those pathetic powers of oratory
which awaken the sympathies of the audience. These very words
themselves, "pathetic' and "sympathy,' are both derived from the
Greek 7raP09, of which the Latin passio is merely a translation.
And the meaning, universally annexed to them, has kept closer to
their original derivation than the Latin term." ^
Blackstone, in Chapter XXVII of his Commentaries, de-

fines "heirlooms" by this method:
"Heirlooms are such goods and personal chattels as, contrary to

the nature of chattels, shall go by special custom to the heir along
' Oreat Speeches by Great Lawyers, p. 459.
" J. Q. Adam's Lectures, Vol. I, pp. 380, 381.

with the inheritance, and not the executor of the last proprietor.
The termination, loom, Saxon origin, in which language it
is of
signifies a limb or member; so that an heirloom is nothing else but
a limb or member of the inheritance." '
c. From context. The meaning

of a term often depends
upon the way which
used in connection with certain
in it is
other terms, in the same sentence or paragraph. Under such

conditions, the best way to define the terms is to explain
fully how they are connected with one another. Such an
explanation is sure to be forcible, if the reasoning is sound,
for it shows the person addressed just why the term means
what is alleged. An excellent illustration of this method was
given by Daniel Webster in his speech before the Supreme
Court in the case of Ogden vs. Saunders, 1807. Mr. Webster
ishere defining the word "contracts":
"The most conclusive argument, perhaps, arises from the con-

nection in which the clause stands. The words of the prohibition,
so far as it applies to civil rights, or right of property, are, that 'no
State shall coin money, emit bills of credit, make anything but
gold and silver coin a tender in the payment of debts, or pass any
law impairing the obligation of contracts.' The parts of the
. . .
prohibition are connected by the subject-matter, and ought, there-

fore, to be construed together. Taking the words thus together,
according to their natural connection, how is it possible to give a
more limited construction to the term 'contracts,' in the last branch
of the sentence, than to the word 'debts,' in that immediately
preceding? Can a State make anything but gold and silver a tender
in payment of futurfe de.bts? This nobody pretends. But what
ground is there for a distinction.'' No State shall make anything
but gold and silver a tender in the payment of debts, either existing
or future, but that contracts spoken of are subsisting contracts only.
*
Such a distinction seems to us wholly arbitrary."
d. By analogy. It is sometimes effective to show an

analogy between the terms to be defined and some other term
' Chase's Blackstone, p. 536.
" The Wcyrks of Daniel Webster, Vol. VI, p. 38.


whose meaning is better known. By comparing the ambigu-
ous phrase with some standards with which the audience are
well acquainted from their everyday experience, the ambi-
guity is Mr. Seward, in his defence of William
removed.
Freeman before the Cayuga Oyer and Terminer, Auburn,
N. Y., 1846, defined "insanity" by the method of analogy
as follows:
"Although my definition would not perhaps be strictly accurate,

I should pronounce insanity to be a derangement of the mind,
character, and conduct resulting from bodily disease. I take this
word 'derangement,' because it is one in common everyday use.
We all understand what is meant when it is said that anything is
ranged or arranged. The houses on a street are ranged, if built
upon a straight line. The fences on your farms are ranged. A
tower, if justly built, is ranged; that is, it is ranged by the plummet.
It rises in a perpendicular range from the earth. A file of men
marching in a straight line are in range. 'Range yourselves, men,'
though not exactly artistical, is not an uncommon word of com-
mand. Now what do we mean when we use the word '(deranged '?
Manifestly that a thing is not ranged, is not arranged, is out of
range. If the houses on the street be built irregularly, they are
deranged. If the fences be inclined to the right or left, they are
deranged. If there be an unequal pressure on either side, the tower
will lean, that is, it will be deranged. So if a man be insane. There
was a regular line which he was pursuing, not the same line which
you or I follow, for all men pursue different lines, and every sane
man has his own peculiar path. All these paths are straight, and
all are ranged, though all divergent. ... If the fond mother be-
comes the murderer of her offspring, it is easy to see that she is de-
ranged. If the pious man, whose steps were firm and whose path-
way led straight to Heaven, sinks without temptation into criminal
debasement, it is easy to see that he is deranged. But in cases
where no natural instinct or elevated principle throws its light
upon our research, it is often the most difficult and delicate of all
human investigations to determine when a person is deranged.
"We have two tests. First, to compare the individual aftej the
supposed derangement with himself as he was before. Second, to
compare his course with those ordinary lines of human lite which

we expect sane persons of equal intelligence and similarly situated

to pursue." '
e. By illustration. One of the most copimon ways of ex-

plaining a term is to give illustrations of the interpretation
put upon it. The method lies in its
greatest virtue of such a
vividness. A person will commonly remember a concrete
example long after he has forgotten the statement of a prin-
ciple. WiUiam Pinckney, in his defense of John Hodges
before the Circuit Court of Maryland, at the opening of his
speech gave an extended definition of "treason." The fol-
lowing is an excerpt from the first part of his explanation:
"It may be affirmed as an universal proposition that criminal

intention is the essence of every species of crime. . . .
"Take the case of a man who, in time of war, is charged with the
defense of an important fortress or castle, which he surrenders to
an incompetent force. What more effectual means could he have
adopted to aid the enemy than the delivery of this fortress? The
books will tell you that if he was bribed to this desertion of his duty,
if he did it with a view to benefit the enemy, he is guilty of treason.
But if pusillanimity was the cause, or if it arose from a false calcu-

lation of his own means, or the force of the enemy, he is not a
traitor. You may banish him with ignominy from the ranks which
he has disgraced, or try him by martial law as a coward or a fool;
but he has committed no treason.
"Suppose a powerful force to invade the country, to which re-
sistance is hopeless. They levy contributions, they do not proclaim
that they will hang me if I neglect to comply with this order, but
they threaten plunder and desolation. I know they have the power
to execute that threat, and I pomply accordingly. Now the paying
of money or the furnishing of provisions is an assistance; it is
'giving aid and comfort' much more effectually than the delivery
of a few prisoners or a deserter. Yet no man will call this treason,
because there is no evidence of hostility to the interests of the
country. The authorities say it is not treason." -
' Works of William H. Seward, Vol. I, p. 425.

^ Great Speeches by Great Lawyers, p. 38.


f. By exclusion. The meaning of a term is often ambig-
uous because it is commonly understood to include more than
it really ought to include. Various attributes, closely con-
nected with the attributes properly implied in the term,
may easily become confused with the term itseK. The con-
fusion may arise from the misrepresentation of an opponent,
orthe
common difficulty ^from a careless confusion of
ideas. In either case, the term is most satisfactorily defined
by drawing the line of distinction between the essential and
the unessential attributes, and by excluding the ideas that
are extraneous, thus leaving the term to include only its
natural and proper intent. An excellent example is found in

the speech by James T. Brady in defence of the Savannah
privateers, before the Circuit Court of the United States.
Mr. Brady is here defining the term "piracy":
"What are the circumstances, what are the acts, that, in view
of the law, amount to piracy? You will understand me that,
for the present, I entirely exclude from your consideration any of
the particular circumstances which are supposed to give to the
actual crime perpetrated a public character, lifting it out of the
penal law that you administer, and out of the regions of private
erime, into a field of quite different considerations. They are,
undoubtedly, that the act done shall be with intent of depriving
the person who is in possession of property, as its owner, or as the
representative of that owner, of that property. There must
. . .
be actual violence, or the presence or exhibition of power and in-

tent to use violence, which produces the surrender and delivery
of the property. Such are the ingredients of robbery and piracy.
And, gentlemen, these two ingredients are all; and you must rob
one or the other of them of this, their poison, or the crime is com-
pletely proved, when the fact of the spoliation, with these ingredients,
shall have been proved. The use that the robber or the pirate in-
tends to make of retaliation, by way of injury, by way of provoca-
tion, by way of any other occasion or motive that seems justifiable
to his own conscience to any form whatever of the higher law, has
nothing to do with the completeness of the crime." '
' Great Speeches by Great Larmiers, p. 381.

g. By analysis. Any definition, by whatever method* be-

fore can be presented, requires that the term be analyzed
it
and the attributes essential to its meaning determined upon.

The name "analysis," as denoting one of the modes of pre-
senting a definition, does not mean that any more careful
preliminary analysis of the terms by the writer or speaker is
required than is necessary in any other case. It means only
that a definition is often best presented by directly explaining
to the audience what these essential attributes are, as they
have been found by analysis. The method here called by the
name "analysis" consists, then, in explaining the attributes
that are properly impUed in the term. For example, Mr.
Beach, in defense of Samuel North, defined "crime" as fol-
lows:
"It will be conceded that all crime, punishable by human au-

thority, consists in the violation of some rule of conduct declared
and published by some competent source. The principle is funda-
mental. It underlies the administration of criminal justice by all
tribunals, whether mihtary or civil. To constitute offense there

must be law existing and law violated; and the law which declares
it must be proclaimed and public. If it exist in the form of positive
enactment, it must be published. If it be customary law, it must

be general, uniform, acknowledged. The citizen cannot be en-
trapped into crime. He must be notified of the demands of society
in all the departments of its action, whether of peace or war, before
obedience can be exacted, and disobedience punished. In a govern-
ment of laws those acts only are criminal which the law condemns;
and publicity is one of its material requisites. The idea of secret
statutes, withheld from the subject whose conduct they are to
regulate, is hostile to every principle of just government, and
'
excite* the sternest indignation."
There are, of course, other ways in which a definition may

be presented; the foregoing are simply examples of some of
the most desirable methods. The choice of method depends
entirely upon the circumstances,
on the intelligence of the
' Great Speeches by Great Latoyers, p. 453.
audience, the nature of the question, and the nature of the
term itself.
2. Explanation, issues, and partition. In considering

the presentation of the remaining parts of the introduction,
viz., the explanation of the question, the issues, and the par-
tition, In this part
the three parts are best treated together.
of the presentation one should give practically without
change whatever parts are needed of the brief already pre-
pared. If the student does not have the discussion of brief
drawing clearly in mind, he should refer, at this point, to the
directions given for the introduction to a brief. In any in-
troduction the explanation, the issues, and the partition must
be very closely related: the explanation of the question must
make the problem clear in such a way as to lead up to the
issues, and make them seem the only natural outgrowth from
the very nature of the case. It must cover a narration of
whatever facts (in the history of the case) are necessary for
an understanding of the discussion. It must show the kind

of question being dealt with what standards must be used
in deciding it. This will lead clearly to a statement of the
issues, which will be the questions which must be decided
way. The par-
in order to decide this question in the right
manner, must be made to seem the natural
tition, in like
outgrowth from the issues. The purpose of the partition is,
to make the persons to be convinced understand just how the
proofs of the disputant meet the issues of the case, and es-
tablish his side of them. Consequently, the value of the par-
tition depends largely upon its close and evident relation to
the statement of the issues; sometimes the points of the is-
sues are identical with the points of the partition. ^

a. Direct or inverted order. The more clearly your
audience understands in advance ^ât you believe the issues
to be, what you think the question really involves, what you
propose to prove, what your plan of campaign is, the more
easily they can follow you. Let them see the road ahead
and know where you pro'pose to take themunless you know
they will not like the road. If they are sure to be unwilling
travellers, if they are afraid to follow this path, disinclined to
reach the destination you have in mind, lead them to it

gradually, logically, persuasively without frightening them
or antagonizing them in advance.^ Where ignorance is bliss,
'tis a partition. Professor Raymond M. Alden

folly to state
discusses this point under the heading "Two Methods of
Approach." ^ "In a sense, of course, the debater has choice
of more than one method in constructing his Introduction.
He may state definitely not only the side of the case which
he wishes to support, but the sort of proof which he intends to
offer in supporting it. He may take the audience into his
confidence, and tell them just what the plan of his speech is
to be, in order that they may follow it as he proceeds and see

that he does just what he proposed to do. Under ordinary
circumstances, this method has great advantages. . Yet
. .
there may be cases where a different plan is advisable. When

the cause to be defended is an extremely unpopular one,

when the audience must be won if at all by slow and care-
ful degrees, or when the proof to be presented is of such a
nature as not to be appreciated until all the evidence is in,
then the debater may adopt a more wary course. He may
not explain the nature of his argument at the outset, per-
haps not even admit which side he intends to establish; but
may open up the question as though he had little interest
in deciding it one way or the other, and then lead

in either
his hearers on by paths that they have not foreseen, until
he brings them, unexpectedly perhaps, to the point which he
wished them to reach. Such a plan requires skill, but is
occasionally of no little value. The Introduction, then, either
may or may
not conclude with a clear statement of the plan
of the speaker's argument."
b. An illustration of the presentation of the three parts
of the introduction here under consideration is found in the
' See pp. 232, 234, on "inverted order.''
2 Alden, R. M., The Art of Debate, pp. 139, 140.


speech of David Dudley Field in the case of the United States
vs. Cruikshank, 2 Otto. In this case Mr. Field's clients were
indicted for acts declared to be criminal by the so-called
Enforcement Act, passed by Congress in 1870. He is here
trying to prove that this Enforcement Act is unconstitutional.
He said:
"Let us reduce and formulate the question, if we can, so as to

separate the incidental from the essential, in order that our atten-
tion may be withdrawn from all other considerations than that of
the one fundamental and permanent theory, upon which this legis-
lation must stand, if it stands at all."
He then quoted and briefly explained the thirteenth, four-

teenth, and fifteenth amendments to the Constitution.
Continuing, he said:
"Professing to act under the authority of these amendments.

Congress has passed five acts, four only of which were in existence
at the time of the indictment now under consideration: one called
the Civil Rights Act, passed April 9, 1866; the second called the
Enforcement Act, passed May 31, 1870; the third, amending this,
passed February 28, 1871; and a fourth act, passed April 20, 1871."
He then quoted the terms of these acts and explained their

provisions. Continuing:
"By authority of this legislation ninety-seven persons were in-

dicted together in the Circuit Coiirt of the United States for the
District of Louisiana, and three of them, the present defendants,
were found guilty upon the first sixteen counts. The indictment
was found under the 6th and 7th sections of the Enforcement Act,
sixteen counts being for simple conspiracy under the 6th section,
and the other sixteen being for conspiracy, with overt acts resulting
in murder.''
He then explained the sixteen counts on which his clients had

been indicted. Continuing:

"This indictment, or that portion of it upon which these defend-

ants have been convicted, is supposed to be justified by the 6th
section of the Enforcement Act, and that section is said to rest upon
the late amendments. In considering the question, whether it is
or is not supported by them, I assume, what cannot be disputed,
that before the late amendments this section, and the same may
be said of the other sections, would have been beyond the com-
petency of Congress. The point of contention, therefore, is whether
the amendments have conferred the power."
This last contains thestatement of the issue of the case.

It is to be observed how carefully, step by step, Mr. Field
leads up to this statement, so that its accuracy is clearly and
fully understood by the court. It only remains for him to
complete his introduction by the statement of the partition.
After a word of explanation, connecting the issue with the
points of the partition, he finished as follows:
"My argument, therefore, will consist of an endeavor to establish

the following two propositions:
"I. The natural interpretation of the language of the new
amendments does not justify the present legislation.
"II. If the natural interpretation did justify it, yet, as the lan-
guage is susceptible of a different one, the latter must be preferred
as that alone in which it was understood by the people."
c. Two or more issues

parallel partition. In the intro-
duction given above, the circumstances of the case made it
necessary to have the explanation of the question long and
detailed,
and as is common in cases at law the explanation
took the form of a narration of events. Also the nature of
the case made it possible to reduce the question to a single
issue. This is not always possible. More often as in most

cases dealing with public policies ^the issues are two or
three in number.
It is to be noticed, in such cases, that the points of the par-
tition may correspond exactly with the points of the issues.
This is frequently desirable. It is a particularly clear method


because it makes the relation between the issues and the
partition so evident. But it must be remembered that the
two parts are not identical; The issues are merely a state-
ment of the points on which the controvery must turn, and so
are unprejudiced in nature; the partition, on the other hand,
is the statement of the points the disputant means to estab
lish in proving his side of the case. They are closely related,
but not the same.
d. The issues emphasized. In the example given above,
the issues are presented in the form of a bare statement.
But often this is not sufficient. Usually, the critical point or
points need to be emphasized, and so presented rhetorically,
that they will be impressed on the attention and the memory
of the audience. For example, Mr. Jeremiah Black, in his
argument in the case of Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2, presented
the issue of the case briefly and forcibly as follows:
"The case before you presents but a single point, and that an
exceedingly plain one. . . . Keeping the character of the charges
in mind, let us come at once to the simple question upon which
the court below divided in opinion: Had the commissioners juris-
diction were they invested with legal authority to try the relaters
and put them to death for the oflfence of which they were accused.'
We answer, no; and, therefore, the whole proceeding from beginning
to end was utterly null and void. On the other hand, it is absolutely
necessary for those who oppose us to assert, as they do assert, that
the commissioners had complete legal jurisdiction both of the
subject-matter and of the parties, so that their judgment upon the
law and the facts is absolutely conclusive and binding, not subject
to correction nor open to inquiry in any court whatever. Of these
two opposite views, you must adopt one or the other; for there is
no middle ground on which you can possibly stand."
e. Excluding extraneous matter. One very common

method of presenting the issues (as well as
an important step
toward finding them) consists in excluding extraneous,
irrelevant, or mutually admitted matter. It is the error of

THE INTRODUCTION- 313
confusing other kindred questions with the question really

in hand that most often makes necessary a careful definition
of the issues; and this confusion may very effectively be
cleared away by explaining in the introduction what these
kindred questions are, and just why they ought to be excluded
from consideration. Burke, in his speech in the House of
Commons on the Marriage Act, 1781, made clear the issue
of the debate by excluding irrelevant matter. The bill in
question provided that the power of marrying, without
consent of parents, should not exist for persons under twenty-
one years of age. Mr. Burke, in his introduction, said:
"The question is not now, whether the law ought to acknowledge

and protect such a state of life as minority, nor whether the con-
tinuance, which is fixed for that state, be not improperly prolonged
in the law of England. Neither of these in general is questioned.
The only question whether matrimony is to be taken out of the
is,
general rule, and whether the minors of both sexes, without the
consent of their parents, ought to have a capacity of contracting
the matrimonial, whilst they have not the capacity of contracting
any other engagement." '
B. Persuasion. The function of conviction in the

introduction is to prepare the minds of the audience for an
understanding of the proof to beoffered laterin theargument.
The function of persuasion is to prepare the way for "favor-
able attention," or more strongly, to create a "will to believe."
The emotions an audience need to be prepared no less
of
than their intellect. A man's emotions cannot be wildly and
roughly attacked anj'' more than his reason; if the audience is
antagonistic to the speaker or out of harmony with him,
his emotional appeals will be unavailing. Consequently,
before a speaker can control these moving impulses of his
audience, he must establish with them close relations of
sympathetic attention. He must bring them into close
sympathy with himself so that whatever moves him may be
' Burke's Speeches, p. 402.
transmitted easily to them. Here, in the introduction, the
speaker often first touches on that emotion which he wishes
most to affect in his later efforts, and so prepares it for
stronger appeals that are to come. Persuasion in the intro-

duction is also a very valuable help in preparing for the work
of conviction in the discussion. If an audience is inattentive
or hostile to a speaker, much of his proof may pass by with-

out effect; so, in order to make his audience listen and do
justice to his demonstrations in the discussion, he must
interest them in his cause, and create in them a vdllingness
to be convinced.In general, then, persuasion in the intro-
duction must bring the thought and feeling of the audience
into working harmony with the speaker or writer.
The discussion of persuasion given in the last chapter will
not be repeated here. Practically everything said there is
Our
especially applicable to persuasion in the introduction.
purpose here is to make a few fundamental suggestions by
way of emphasis and practical guidance, and give a few ex-
amples of introductory remarks. The persuasive work' of the
introduction is of utmost importance. A bad impression may

prevent a fair hearing may prevent any hearing at all.
Every suggestion made in the last chapter should be taken
particularly to heart when planning introductions.
1. Calm, courteous, conversational. In the first place,
whenever possible, start with a reasonably calm, courteous,

conversational mode, in both "composition and delivery."
Even though the occasion will demand a great show of force
before you are through, always repress it in the beginning,
except in those rare instances (usually cases in which others
have just spoken before you) in which such an ernotional
tension is reached that the audience as well as the speaker
feels the demand for indignant protest, denunciation, or
some form of recognition of the emotional demands of the
moment. At such a time nothing is more disgusting than
a cold, spineless, deliberate "don't get excited " attitude,
which springs from either hypocrisy or inability to grasp the
significance of the things that havebeen said. " The pretence of

indifference is no than the pretence of feeling." ^
less insincere
Probably, however, more speakers make a poor first impres-
sion on account of a loud, insistent, false, hollow, emotional,
"speechifying," opening than for any other one reason. A
very good plan for a speaker who is to deliver a prepared
speech, is to begin always with a few impromptu sentences,
spoken directly to the audience before him, concerning some-

thing that fits the particular occasion, such as a reference
to remarks made by the chairman in introducing the speaker.
It ought to be easy for anyone to utter such sentences di-
rectly in conversational mode, and once started, thus to con-
tinue without falling into indirectness. Being calm, courte-
ous, End. conversational does not mean necessarily being too
quiet
or even being quiet at all. It is possible*to speak very
loudly, in a calm, courteous, conversational manner. Direct-
ness is the best of the conversational mannei", and it is possi-
ble to be perfectly direct and as loud as need be.
2. Do not detract from your theme. For preparing intro-
ductions to different types of audiences, consider the fun-
damental principles of persuasion as given in the last chapter.
The interest, attention, friendly support, of audiences may
be won in various ways. The most important definite
warning to be given is Do nothing to take interest and attention
:
away from your theme. Do not kill present interest by as-

suming that it does not exist and trying to create it in an
artificial way. Do not think you have to be funny in order
to get the attention of an intelligent audience. Many
speakers who ought to know better permanently alienate
audiences by acting on this offensive assumption.
Bradbury ^ gives some excellent advice. "The first few
sentences which a speaker utters before an audience, receive
more universal and closer attention than anything which he
may thereafter say on that particular occasion, no matter
' Winans, p. 109.
' The Structure of an Effective Public Speech, Harry B. Bradbury, pp. 16-19.
how successful his oration may be. This is a psychological
fact which is easy to explain. Curiosity is one of the pre-
dominant characteristics of practically everybody. . . .
So when a new speaker is introduced and begins to talk, the

duUest and least attentive person in the audience listens, out
of sheer curiosity, to hear what this new speaker has to offer.
This, then, is the very best opportunity the man on "the plat-
form will have to chain the attention of his audience to the
subject which he has in mind. How foolish to waste such a
golden opportunity. What unadulterated folly to throw
away this wonderful chance by actually directing the atten-
tion of the audience to some topic away from the main one
which the speaker wishes to press home and as to which he
desires to have the audience accept and act upon his rec-
ommendation. /How unwise, then, to start a serious subject
with a funny story. Just to the extent that the story has
succeeded, exactly to that extent has the attention of the
audience been distracted from the serious matter in hand,
and it has been made that much harder again to focus their
attention on this matter. They will wait for further funny
stories and unless they are forthcoming there is a mental
resentment, which requires Herculean efforts and marked
ability to overcome, to the extent of again directing intel-
ligent attention to the serious questions under discussion.
It is barely possible that the point of a funny story may con-
tain the very essence of the serious argument and thus form
a good introduction. But this rarely happens and the prac-
tice is dangerous.
" Then if the funny introductory effort fails
This is a calam- !
ity greater than the inexperienced can possibly understand.

The golden opportunity of taking advantage of that fresh
bloom of keen attention is withered and dead. More than
that, the speaker must not overcome a feeling of resentment
and disgust, before he can secure attention for the serious
portions of his subject.
"Wit and humor have their places on the public platform,

even in serious speeches, but they must be used sparingly,

and never in the form of a digressive funny story as part of
the introductory sentences. The sole use of such anecdotes
is to illustrate and make more forceful a serious argument."
3. Strange or hostile audiences. It sometimes happens

that the speaker or writer is a stranger to those whom he
addresses. Under such circumstances his first duty is to
create some bond of fellow-feeling with his audience. Here
modesty is clearly one indispensable quality. To this should
be added, when possible, the bonds of some common interest
or common emotion; again, an appeal may well be made for
a charitable hearing and iov fair flay. Sometimes the au-
dience is worse than a stranger; it may be an enemy. To
handle an audience that is hostile at the outset, is the most
diflScult task with which an arguer is ever confronted. It
calls for a rare combination of courage and patience, of
modesty and self-confidence, of tact and determination.
The emotions best appealed to under such conditions are
commonly those of honesty, courtesy, or a desire for fair
play.The skill needed on such an occasion is well illustrated
in Beecher's Liverpool speech already discussed.^ A similar
plea, full of dignity, courage, and firm modesty, is found in
the opening words of William Pinckney's speech in the Mary-
land Assembly, in 1788, in behalf of a petition for the relief
of oppressed slaves :
"Before I proceed to deliver my sentiments on the subject-matter

of the report under consideration, I must entreat the members of
this House to hear me with patience, and not to condemn what I
may happen to advance in support of the opinion I have formed,
until they shall have heard me out. I am conscious, sir, that upon
this occasion, I have long-established principles to combat and
deep-rooted prejudices to defeat; that I have fears and apprehen-
sions to silence, which the acts of former legislatures have sanc-
tioned, and that (what is equivalent to a host of difiSculties) the
popular impressions are against me. But if I am honored with
See Ch. 11.
the same indulgent attention which the House has been pleased to
do not despair of sur-
afford me, on past subjects of deliberation, I
mounting all these obstacles, in the common cause of justice,
humanity, and policy." '
4. Wever lose temper. If prejudice has been created by

the appeals of a preceding speaker, these prejudices must,
as far as possible, be mitigated in the introduction, for such
an unfavorable attitude may nullify the effect of all proof or
persuasion, as long as the vision of the audience is thus dis-
torted. At such a time, the "retort courteous," ridicule,

sarcasm, or even invective are good weapons of defense.
Whatever weapon of reply is chosen, there is one precaution
that must always be remembered: the disjmtant must never
permit himself to lose his temper in the smallest degree. This
temptation is sure to arise in the heat of any earnest dis-
cussion where persuasion plays any great part, and it is a
temptation that must be always repressed, for ill temper in
discussion hurts only him who uses it. There are few better
models of personal retort in the history of oratory than can
be found in Webster's famous Reply to Hayne, in the debate
on the Foote Resolution. Another illustration of the great
senator's power in personal debate is found in his reply to
Calhoun on the 22d of March, 1838. Humor, sarcasm, and
defiance are wielded with power, yet all is courteous and
firmly dignified.
"Mr. President: I came rather late to the Senate this morning,

and, happening to meet a friend on the Avenue, I was admonished
to hasten my steps, as 'the war was to be" carried into Africa,' and
I was expected to be annihilated. I lost no time in following the
it would be awkward for one to be annihilated
advice. Sir, since
without knowing anything about it.
"Well, Sir, the war has been carried into Africa. The honorable
member has made an expedition into regions as remote from the
subject of this debate as the orb of Jupiter from that of our earth.
1 Eloquence of the United States, Vol. V, p. 92. E. and H. Clark.

He tariflF, of slavery, and of the late war.

has spoken of the Of all
this I do not complain. On the contrary, if it be his pleasure to
allude to all or any of these topics, for any purpose whatever, I
am ready at all times to hear him.
"Sir, this carrying the war into Africa, which has become so
common a phrase among us, is, indeed, imitating a great example;
but an example which is not always followed with success. In
it is
the every man, though he be a man of talent and genius,

first place,
is not a Scipio; and in the next place, as I recollect this part of Ro-

man and Carthaginian history, the gentleman may be more
accurate, but as I recollect it, when Scipio resolved upon carrying
the war into Africa, Hannibal was not at home. Now, Sir, I am'
very little like Hannibal, but I am at home; and when Scipio
Africanus South Carolinieosis brings the war into my territories,
I shall not leave their defence to Asdrubal, nor Sjrphax, nor anybody
else. I meet him on the shore, at his landing, and propose but one
contest.
"Concurritur; horse
Momento cita mors venit, aut victoria laeta." '
5. Inattentive audience. A hostile audience is less com-

mon than an inattentive one. It is well-nigh impossible to
convince an audience whose minds are wandering away from
the subject or who are carelessly half-listening. At the very
beginning, if any such danger is present, and it is unfor-

tunately a common danger, the attention of the audience
must be roused and centred on the topic of the hour. For
this reason, probably the most common of all forms of per-
suasive introduction is that which emy hasizes the imforta nce
of the question in discussion. There are many ways of arousing
interest in an audience. It may be shown that the question
is (a) of great inherent importance; that it is of a peculiar sig-
nificance because of its (b) relation to current events and con-

ditions; that it one of the growing problems of the future;
is (c)
or, perhaps, (d) that it has some especially close bearing on

the interests of the 'particular audience. A good example is
1 The Works of Daniel Webster, Vol. IV, p. 500.

found in the introduction of Charles James Fox to one of his

speeches on the East India Bill:
"I did not intend. Sir, to have said anything in addition to that
which has been aheady urged so ably in favor of the resolution
now agitated. In my own opinion, its propriety and necessity
are completely and substantially established. A few particulars,
suggested in the course of the debate by gentlemen on the other
side of the House, may be thought, however, to merit some animad-
version. And, once for all, let no man complain of strong language.
Things are now arrived at such a crisis as renders it impossible to
speak without warmth. Delicacy and reserve are criminal where
the interests of Englishmen are at hazard. . . .
"This, at least, has made such an impression on my mind that

I never felt so much anxiety; I never addressed this House imder
such a pressure of impending mischief; I never trembled so much
for public liberty as I now do. The question before the House
involves the rights of Parliament in all their consequences and
extent. These rights are the basis of our Constitution, and form
the spirit of whatever discriminates the government of a free
country. And have not these been threatened and assaulted.''"
In Burke's masterful introduction to his speech on "Con-

ciliationwith America," all of the four ways just mentioned
(for emphasizing the importance of a question) are skillfully
used. Consider the following, his last paragraph before
stating his proposition:
"To and repose to an empire so great and so dis-

restore order
tracted as ours, merely in the attempt, an undertaking that
is,
would ennoble the flights of the highest genius, and obtain pardon
for the efforts of the meanest understanding. Struggling a good
while with these thoughts, by degrees I felt myself more firm. I
derived, at length, some confidence from what in other circum-
stances usually produces timidity. I grew less anxious, even from
the idea of my own insignificance. For, judging of what you are by
what you ought to be, I persuaded myself that you would not
reject a reasonable proposition because it had nothing but its reason
' The World's Orators (England), pp. 317, 318.

to recommend it. On the other hand, being totally destitute oâll

shadow of influence, natural or adventitious, I was very sure that,
if my proposition were futile or dangerous, if it were weakly con-
ceived or improperly timed, there was nothing ejrterior to it, of
power to awe, dazzle, or delude you. You will see it just as it
is, and you will treat it just as it deserves." '
EXERCISE . CHAPTER 12
INTRODUdTION
1. Write a complete introduction, following the suggestions

of this chapter for each of the three speeches on the
campus topic, mentioned in the chapter on Briefing and
Outlining.
2. Chose a proposition on which men divide with very strong
prejudice, and write an introduction on the same side
of your proposition for each of two different audiences,
one of which shall be strongly prejudiced in your favor,
and the other strongly pi;ejudiced against you.
3. Hand in a complete introduction to your original forensic.
' Burke's Speech on Conciliation with America, edited by Albert S. Cook,
pp. 6, 7.
CHAPTER 13
THE DISCUSSION
OUTLESTE
A. The principles of composition in the discussion.

B. Relation of discussion to brief.
C. Variety in the discussion.
1. The forms of support.
a. Restatement.
b. General illustrations.
c. Specific instance.
d. Testimony.
e. Reasoning.
D. Showing relations in the discussion.
E. Methods of emphasis in the discussion.
1. Digression.
2. Iteration.
3. Rhetorical question.
F. Unity and coherence in the discussion.
1. Three aids.
a. Transitions.
b. Summaries.
c. Partitions.
2. Combined summary and partition.
A. Principles of composition in the discussion. The

work of presenting the proof in the discussion, is largely a
matter of applying the principles of composition to the mate-
rials already in hand. If the proofs have been well selected
and arranged, to make them accomplish their purpose re-
quires only the use of words that will effectively convey them
to the minds of others. So that the next requisite for forceful
presentation is a working knowledge of Aetoric in general.
322
THE DISCUSSION 323
B. Relation of the discussion to the brief. Perhaps the

most important question to be dealt with in planning the dis-
cussion is the question of the proper relation of the finished
composition to the brief. How closely shall the brief be
followed in the final presentation? Shall the exact words of
the brief be repeated? In answering this question there are
two extremes that are generally to be avoided. On the one
hand, rhetorical embellishment may destroy all the advantage
gained by a good arrangement. On the other hand, the bare
bones of the brief may be exposed so rudely as to be offen-
sive. Of these two faults the beginner undoubtedly tends
toward the latter; he does not take pains enough to make his
dish enticing or even palatable. The speech or the finished
composition is too often a mere repetition of heads and sub-
heads, with; the addition of a few conjunctions and a trite
phrase here and there. This defect, while far more pardon-
able than that of the speaker who talks at random and buries
what little he has to say in the confusion of vague and form-
less rhetoric, should be very carefully guarded against, be-
cause it is much more likely to occur. There is little danger
that after a student has prepared a good brief he will fall back
on formless rhetoric in the discussion. In presenting an
argument to an audience, the great thing for the author of a
good brief to guard against is slavery to the brief. Adapt
the discussion to the audience. Feel free to change the order
of points,^ to leave out part of the proof that is not required
for a particular audience, and in every way possible suit
the proofi to the audience according to all the principles dis-
cussed in chapter 11. (See also discussion of persuasion
and audience in chapter 6.) If the brief has been really well
done, the discussion cannot be very bad unless the speaker
fail miserably in persuasion, either positive or negative.
C. Variety in the discussion. One of the rhetorical
elements most commonly lacking, and most needed in the
'
See Rule 6 for brief drawing, chapter 10, and discussion of direct or in-
verted order, chapter 12.
:

discussion, is variety. It is sometimes assumed that less
variety in presentation is desirable in argumentation than

in most of the other forms of composition or oratory. It is
said that in a story or in a demonstrative oration,-' since the

purpose of the writer or speaker is to please, variety is indis-
pensable; but that in argumentation, since the appeal is
only to the reason, variety is superfluous. This is funda-
mentally wrong. The appeal in argumentation is not simply
to the reason. Argumentation that amounts to anything
(except in very rare cases, such as we find in mathematics)
is concerned with both conviction and persuasion. All the
relief, refreshment, pleasure, interest, and attention that
will result from variety in presentation cannot but help your

case with any audience. The point to be remembered hete
is that in argument we must strive deliberately to get variety.
In other forms of address there may be sufficient variety in

the very subject-matter to give it interest; but in most
elaborate arguments, the natural coldness of logic needs to be
dressed more attractively to hold attention. It is easy, in
presenting proof after proof, to fall into some formula of
statement or some "stereotyped" method of arrangement.
This habit should be carefully avoided, and variety in word,
phrase, and manner should be sought from the beginning.
1. The forms of support. Some excellent suggestions that
willbe helpful in gaining variety and avoiding stereotyped
methods of presenting argument will be found in Phillips'
Effective Speaking, particularly his discussion of the four
forms of support, Chapters VIII to XVI, inclusive. We
quote two of his keynote paragraphs
"Assertions May Demand Support. We make assertions
desiring some result. We wish the listener to see our idea
clearly, or to feel it, or to believe it, to act upon it, or to find
pleasure in it. Or we may seek some combination of these

Ends. If the utterance of the assertion alone attains our
1
" The purpose of demonstrative oratory is
'
to charm the senses with
words that are fit and adequate.' " Ringwalt, p. 24.

THE DISCUSSION 325
desiredEnd further remark is a waste of time and energy.

If,however, the assertion does not achieve its purpose then,
as shown in preceding chapters, it must have support
Cumulation. As experience attests that few assertions, iso-
lated, are effective, the main business of the speaker is the
supporting of assertions, and his great concern is how to sup-
port them so as to achieve the desired End with the least
expenditure of time and effort.
" The Four Forms of Support. If now, we examine the
characteristics of the matter used to support assertions (Cu-
mulation) we find that it consists of four kinds. These may be
na-med (a) Restatement, (b) General Illustration, (c) Specific
Instance, (d) Testimony. Thus, we may say (Assertion),
'Greece had great men,' and continue, 'She had master
minds.' This is Restatement. We have said the same thing
over again in different words. We go on, 'She had orators,
philosophers, poets.' This is a General Illustration. We
have supported the assertion by presenting some of its
general features. We proceed, 'She had Demosthenes,
Machines, Aristotle, Plato, Homer, Sophocles.' This is
Specific Instance. We have strengthened our original as-
sertion by actual cases. Finally, we say, 'Macaulay says:
"Her intellectual empire is imperishable.'" This is Testi-
mony. We have supported our assertion by corroboration." ^
(e) Reasoning may well be added to Phillips' classification

of the- forms of support. If a speaker points out certain
evidence from which it must be inferred that Greece had
great men he is supporting his assertion in a way not covered
by any of the four forms mentioned. This fifth form is,
of course, very commonly used in argumentation.
D. Showing relations in the discussion. In order to
convince, it is 'not sufficient that the materials of the proof
be well arranged in the mind of the speaker; the arrangement
must be made clear to the audience. Variety and smoothness
do not require that the relative importance of the points of
' Phillips, pp. 88, 89.
the brief, or their connection with one another, be obscured.
In fact, inspoken discourse, even more care needs to be
taken in the final presentation than in the brief itself, to
make clear the importance and the mutual relation of the
points. In the brief, the indenting of the headings and sub-
headings and the use of the symbols, show to the eye how the
evidence and arguments are related to one another and to
the whole question, and distinguish between the important
and the incidental parts. But in spoken and in full manu-
script presentation, where there are not headings or subhead-
ings, these relations must be made evident by words; the large
and vital facts must be enforced by repetition, by illustration,
by direct explanation of their significance, or by some other
of the many possible methods of emphasis; the relation of one
piece of evidence to another must be fully explained, and the
purpose and effect of various arguments must be made evi-
dent to the reader or hearer.
E. Methodsof emphasis in the discussion. 1. Digres-
sion. Three methods of bringing out the, importance of cer-

tain material which are particularly useful in presenting ar-
guments, may well be mentioned and illustrated. The first
such method of gaining emphasis is by digressing in the middle
of an argument to explain the significance of a piece of evidence.
The following selection is taken from the speech by William
C. Plunkett in the case of Rex vs. Forbes and others. The
defendants were on trial for participation in a riot.' They
were charged with hurling bottles and other missiles at the
Lord-lieutenant of Ireland in a public theater.
"When I state that a bottle was thrown at the king's representa-

tive, and that implements of violence were flung at his person, such
is the state of the public mind that it is listened to as if it were a
mere bagatelle, a jeu d' esprit, a trifle of which the Lord Lieutenant
need not take any notice, and which is below the attention of the
government and the law officers. Why, gentlemen of the jury,
are we awake? Can we be insensible to the effect of such occur-
rences upon the honor and safety of the country? Can we reflect,

THE DISCUSSION 327
without indignation, that such an outrage should be committed

in a civilized country against the person of his majesty's repre-
sentative, because he had the presumption, in opposition to a
desperate gang, to execute the parting injunctions of the king in a
manner not calculated to give offence or excite animosity? " '
2. Iteration. The persistent repetition, of a word or phrase,

may also be forcibly used to impress an idea on a reader's
memory. This dfevice is well illustrated in the following
passage from Matthew Arnold:
"The practical genius of our people could not but urge irresistibly
to the production of a real prose style, because for the purposes
of modern life the old English prose, the prose of Milton and Taylor,
is cumbersome, unavailable, impossible. A style of regularity,
uniformity, precision, balance, was wanted. These are the quali-
ties of a serviceable prose style. Poetry was a different logic, as
Coleridge said, from prose. But there is no doubt that a style of
regularity, uniformity, precision, balance, will acquire a j'et stronger
hold upon the mind of a nation if it is adopted in poetry as well as
in prose, and so comes to govern both. This is what happened in
France. To the practical, modern, and social genius of the French
a true prose was indispensable. They produced one of conspicuous
excellence, supremely powerful and influential in the last century,
the first to come and standing at first alone, a modern prose. French
prose is marked in the highest degree by the qualities of regularity,
uniformity, precision, balance. With little opposition from any
deep-seated and imperious poetic instincts, the French made their
poetry also conform to the law which was moulding their prose.
French poetry became marked with the qualities of regularity,
uniformity, precision, balance. Our literature required a
. . .
prose which conformed to the true law of prose; and that it might
acquire this the more surely, it compelled poetry, as in France, to
conform itself to the law of prose likewise. . . . Poetry, or rather
the use of verse, entered in a remarkable degree, during the (eight-
eenth) century, into the whole of the daily life of the civilized
classes; and the poetry of the century was a perpetual school of the
' Great Speeches by Great Lawyers, p. 638.


qualities requisite for a good prose, qualities of regularity, uni-

formity, precision, balance."
3. Rhetorical question. There are few methods of making
a vivid impression on the attention and memory of an au-

dience, more forcible than the use of the so-called rhetorical
question. The rhetorical question is one in which the answer
is implied in the form and delivery of the question; as, for
example, "Is the United States a republic or a despotism?"

The value of this device lies largely in the effect of variety
and incisiveness which it imparts and the dire tness it assists
in attaining. For what is probably the most perfect and
elaborate use of the rhetorical question to be found in Ameri-
can oratory see Carl Schurz's great speech on "General
Amnesty," ^ delivered in the United States Senate, Janu-
ary 30, 1872. The following illustration is from Webster's
speech in the case of Ogden vs. Saunders:
"We come before the court alleging the law to be void and un-
constitutional; they stop the inquiry by opposing to us the law
itself. Is this logical.'' ... Is it not obvious, that, supposing the
act of New York to be a part of the contract, the question still
remains as undecided as ever. What is a law, or

that act? Is it
is it a nullity? a thing of force, or a thing of no force? Suppose the
parties to have contemplated this act, what did they contemplate?
its words only, or its legal effect? its words, or the force which the
Constitution of the United States allows to it? If the parties con-
templated any law, they contemplated all the law that bore on their
contract, the aggregate of all the statute and constitutional provi-
F. Unity and coherence in the discussion. In addition

to the suggestions for gaining variety and emphasis, in the
discussion it is well to say a word about the special necessity
'Gemmg, The Working Principles of Rhetonc, p. 304.
^To be found in many collections. See Ringwalt's Modem American
Oratory, pp. 93-130. Or Baker's Forms of Public Address, p. 353.
3 The Worlcs of Daniel Webster, Vol. VI, p. 30.
THE DISCUSSION 329
for coherence and unity in this part of our argument. Em-

phasis puts stress upon the significant points of the proof.
However, as we have already seen, to be convincing, a speaker
or writer must make his audience or readers accept, not this
point or that, but his whole case. In order thus to estabhsh
the proposition as a whole, in presenting the proof the differ-
ent elements must be firmly bound together in one. Someone
has said that there is "more force in a stone than in a hand-
ful of sand." See to it that your case is a stone a "pudding-
stone" perhaps, but still a single stone capable of being
thrown at an enemy with some accuracy and force, or of
being used to block his advance with some effect. The in-
troduction and the conclusion are of great service in gaining
this unity; but it is dangerous to leave this work entirely to
these external aids. There must be coherence and unity
within the proof, as well as ropes and bands without. To
depend for unity entirely upon the partition at the beginning
and the summary at the end, is likely to make it seem arti-
ficial and forced; to gain an effect that is natural and con-
vincing, the unity must be made evident in the proof itself.

1. Three valuable aids in getting unity and coherence in
the proof itself, are : (a) transitions, (b) summaries, (c) parti-
tions. It not true that these devices are desirable in every

is
piece of argumentation. Often the proofs are of such a nature,

their connection with one another is so obvious, that sum-
maries and partitions within the proof are unnecessary;
sometimes these devices are positively undesirable, because
they give an air of exactness and formality that is inappro-
priate. The practice of such methods may easily be carried
to an extreme; but the common danger is that of deficiency
rather than of excess.
a. Transition. A speaker leading an audience along new
paths, needs to keep in close touch with them, lest they lose
the way and become confused. By the use of transitional
phrases, sentences, and paragraphs he holds them always
under a firm control, and is enabled to guide them carefully,


so that the way is constantly opening ahead at each step.
John Ward, in his System of Oratory, explains a transition
as follows:
"A transition, therefore, is a form of speech by which the
speaker in a few words tells what he has said
his hearers both
already and what he next designs to say. Where a discourse con-
sists of several parts this is often very proper in passing from
one to another, especially when the parts are of a considerable
length; for it assists the hearers to carry the series of the
discourse in their mind, which is a great advantage to the
memory. It is likewise a great relief to the attention to be
told when an argument is finished and what is to be expected
1
next."
Mr. Ward also gives an excellent illustration of the use of
the simple transition:
"Cicero, as I have had occasion to observe formerly, di-
vides his oration for the Manilian law into three parts, and
proposes to speak, first of the nature of the war against King
Mithridates, then of its greatness, and lastly of the choice of -a
general. And whfen he has gone thro' the first head, which is
pretty long, he connects it with the second, by this short

transition: Having shown the nature of the war, I shall now
speak a few things of its greatness. And again, at the conclu-
sion of his second head, he reminds his hearers- of his method
in the following manner: I think I have sufidently shewn the
necessity of this war from the nature of it, and the danger of it
from its greatness. What remains is to speak concerning the
^
choice of a general, proper to be intrusted with it."
b. Summaiy. The use of the summaries within the dis-
cussion contributes to unity and coherence, by gathering
together proofs that are closely associated, and relating them
clearly to the whole proposition. They bring the materials
thus summarized into one single strong point, instead of
a number of scattered and incomplete points. Also the sum-
' John Ward, A System of Oratory, Vol. I, p. 290.
2 Ibid., Vol. I, p. 291.

THE DISCUSSION 331
mary contributes to clearness, by closing up the division of

the proof that is completed, and making it evident that a
new line of argument is to be undertaken. Finally, these
occasional summaries help greatly in making intelligible the
final summary in the conclusion.
In the report of the Civil Service Commission of 1871, is
an example of the short, simple, and direct style of

excellent
summary that is most effective for use within the proof it-
self:
"These are some of the serious and threatening evils of the

present practice of treating the inferior posts of administration as
party prizes. It exasperates party spirit and perverts the election.
It tends to fill the public service with incapacity and corruption,
destroying its reputation and repelling good men. It entices Con-
gress to desert the duties to which it is especially designated by
the Constitution, and tempts the Executive to perilous intrigue." '
The writer then takes up a new line of argument (refuta-

tion) with the following introductory sentence:
"The arguments by which the present pernicious practice is
justified seem to us wholly unsound." ^
c. Partition. Internal partitions perform much the same

office as the external partition of the introduction. They
turn the attention in the desired direction and explain what will
be done next, so that the audience can follow the line of
thought that is to come. Webster showed his mastery of the
art of being clear by his frequent use of this kind of partition.
No better model can be found than the following, taken from
his speech before the Supreme Court in the case of Luther
vs. Borden et al.:

"Having thus, may it please your honors, attempted to state
the questions as they arise, and having referred to what has taken
1 George William Curtis, Orations and Addresses, Vol. II, p. 43.


place in Rhode Island, I shall present what further I have to say
in three propositions :
"1. I say, first, that the matters offered to be proved by the

below are not of judicial cognizance; and proof
plaintiff in the court
of them, therefore,was properly rejected by the court.
"2. If all these matters could be, and had been, legally proved,
they would have constituted no defence, because they show nothing
but an illegal attempt to overthrow the government of Rhode
Island.
"3. No proof was offered by the plaintiff to show that, in fact,
another government had gone into operation, by which the Charter
government had become displaced." '
2. The summary and partition are very effective in combi-

nation ; the summary showing what has been done, and the
partition what remains to be done, establish beyond a doubt
the unity of the demonstration, and give to the readers a clear
understanding of what is being accomplished. This combi-
nation should, however, be used with judgment, for it is the
most formal of all the methods of transition. most
It is
properly used where the proof is very long, and where the
quality most to be sought for is that of logical perfection.
For example, it is most appropriate in such an effort as that
of Webster before the Supreme Court in the case of Gibbons
vs. Ogden:
"I contend, therefore, in conclusion on power

this point, that the
of Congress over these high branches of commercial regulation is
shown to be exclusive, by considering what was wished and in-
tended to be done, when the convention for forming the Constitu-
tion was called; by what was understood, in the State conventions,
to have been accomplished by the instrument; by the prohibitions
on the and the express exception relative to inspection laws;
States,
by the nature of the power itself; by the terms used, as connected
with the nature of the power; by the subsequent understanding
and practice, both of Congress and the States; by the grant of ex-
clusive admiralty jurisdiction to the federal government; by the
1 The Works of Daniel Webster, Vol. VI, p. 236.

THE DISCUSSION 333
manifest danger of the opposite doctrine, and the ruinous conse-

quences to which it directly leads. But I contend, in the
. . .
second place, that whether the grant were to be regarded as wholly

void or not,it must, at least, be inoperative, when the rights claimed
under it come in collision with other rights, enjoyed and secured

under the laws of the United States; and such collision, I maintain,
'
clearly exists in this case."
THE DISCUSSION
1. Hand in complete discussion of one of the speeches men-

tioned in Exercise 1 of the last chapter.
2. Write a complete discussion for the favorable audience
mentioned in Exercise 2 of the last chapter.
3. Write a complete discussion for the hostile audience
mentioned in Exercise 2 of the last chapter.
4. Hand in the complete discussion for your original forensic.
> The Works of Daniel Webster, Vol. VI, pp. 18, 19.
CHAPTER 14
THE CONCLUSION
OUTLINE
I. The purpose of the conclusion.
A. Conviction.
1. Summarize.
a. Variety.
(I) Formal.
(II) Informal.
Sometimes persuasive.
(Ill)
2. Amplify and diminish. '
B. Persuasion.
1. Well disposed toward speaker or writer.
2. Final stirring of favorable emotions.
I. The purpose of the conclusion. Twenty-two cen-

turies ago Aristotle ^ said that the object of the epilogue or
conclusion was four-fold: (1) to conciliate the audience in
them against his adversary;
favor of the speaker and to excite
(2) to amplify and diminish; (3) to rouse the emotions; and
(4) to recapitulate. Time has not changed the truth of his
statement; these are to-day the offices of the conclusion.
Clearly, two of these are primarily concerned with convic-
tion and two with persuasion. To recapitulate and to "am-
plify and diminish" are desirable, in order to make complete
the intellectual approach; to gain sympathy and to rouse the
feelings are desirable, in order successfully to make the emo-
tional approach.
A. Conviction. 1. Summarize. In argumentation the
first object of the conclusion is to recapitulate or summarize.
The concluding summary is generally necessary in order to
' Rhetoric. Jebb Translation, p. 198.
334

THE CONCLUSION 335
make the proof clear and forcible. In the first place the points
made in the discussion must finally be gathered together into
a single point in order to convince the audience of the strength
of the demonstration as a whole; again, the various points
must be repeated and emphasized, in order to impress them
on the memory of the audience.
a. The summary may take a variety of forms, with varying
degrees of length and formality. In nearly all student ar-
gumentation the summary needs to be careful and detailed;
the main heads of the proof must be repeated, and usually
many of the subordinate points of the evidence. Rhetori-
cally, the summary may take the form of a plain recapitu-
lation, or it may be amplified by explanation and enforce-
ment.
(I) Formal. Gardiner ^ has a suggestive paragraph favor-
ing short, decisive conclusions
a type that might well be
used except when there is a definite reason for using another
kind.
One of the best examples of a simple recapitulation is
found in the conclusion of Webster's speech in the case of
Ogden vs. Saunders:
"To recapitulate what has been said, we maintain, first, that

the Constitution, by its grants to Congress and its prohibitions
on the states, has sought to establish one uniform standard of.
value, or medium of payment. Second, that, by like means, it
has endeavored to provide for one uniform mode of discharging

debts, when they are to be discharged without payment. Third,
that these objects are connected, and that the first loses much of
its importance, if the last, also, be not accomplished. Fourth,
that, reading the grant to Congress, and the prohibition on the
States together, the inference is strong that the Constitution in-
tended to confer an exclusive power to pass bankrupt laws on Con-
gress. Fifth, that the prohibition in the tenth section reaches to
all contracts, existing or future, in the same way that the other
prohibition, in the same section, extends to all debts, existing or
' The Making of Arguments, p. 187.


future. Sixth, that, upon any other construction, one great politi-
cal object of the Constitution will fail of its accomplishment." '
(II) Informal. Usually, however, the summary is less
formal than the above in its phrasing, and less abrupt, in its
ending. The more common style is such as that in Burke's

speech, on a bill for shortening the duration of Parliaments :;
"Thus, in my opinion, the shortness of a triennial sitting would

have the following ill effects: it would make the member more
shamelessly and shockingly corrupt, it would increase his depend-
ence on those who could best support him at his election, it would
wrack and tear to pieces the fortunes of those who stood upon their
own fortunes and their private interest; it would make the electors
infinitely more venal, and it would make the whole body of the
people who are, whether they have votes or not, concerned in elec-
tions, more lawless, more idle, more debauched; it would utterly
destroy the sobriety, the industry, the integrity, the simplicity of
all the people, and undermine, I am much afraid, the deepest and
best laid foundations of the commonwealth." ^
(III) Sometimes largely persuasive. While discussing

summaries, it may be well to observe that under certain cir-.
cumstances formal recapitulations may be largely persuasive.

It is if ever, true that a great argument
of course rarely,
closes with a recapitulation that is mainly persuasive. The
conclusion of Wendell Phillips' speech on Daniel O'Connell
is a persuasive summary:
"For thirty restless and turbulent years he stood in front of

them, and said, 'Remember, he that commits a crime helps the
enemy.' And during that long and fearful struggle, I do not re-
member one of his followers ever being convicted of a political
offense, and during this period crimes of violence were very rare.
There is no such record in our history. Neither in classic nor in
modern times can the man be produced who held a million of people
' The Works of Daniel Webster, Vol. VI, p. 40.

^ The Speeches of Edmund Burke, p. 400.
THE CONCLUSION 337
in his right hand so passive. was due to the consistency and

It
unity of a character that had hardly a flaw. I do not forget your
soldiers, orators, or poets any of your leaders. But when I con-
sider O'Connell's personal disinterestedness, his rare, brave
fidelity to every cause his principles covered, no matter how un-
popular, or how embarrassing to his main purpose, that clear far-
reaching vision, and true heart which, on most moral and political
questions, set him so much ahead of his times; his eloquence, almost
equally effective in the courts, in the senate, and before the masses;
that sagacity which set at naught the malignant vigilance of the
whole imperial bar, watching thirty years for a misstep; when I
remember that he invented his vast success, bearing in mind its
nature; when I see the sobriety and moderation with which he used
his measureless power, and the lofty, generous purpose of his whole

life, I am ready to affirm that he was, all things considered, the
greatest man the Irish race ever produced." '
2. " Amplify and diminish " is the name given to the prac-
tice of magnifying the importance of certain points in the
discussion, and belittling the importance of others. In doing
this, a disputant may diminish certain of his own proofs and
amplify certain others, his purpose being to bring out the
force of the greater points, by contrast with the lesser. But
usually, the practice consists in diminishing, not one's own
proof, but the proof of an opponent. In such a case, its
effectiveness consists in the direct contrasting of the argu-
ments on the opposite sides. The decision of any question
is determined by a comparison, in the minds of those ad-
dressed, of the relative weight of the proofs of the two arguers,

so that a disputant may help his cause just as truly, by di-
minishing the weight of the proof against him, as by adding
to that of his own. In almost any question, there are usually
some phases of it that are favorable to one side, and others
that are favorable to the other side; on certain points, the
facts support the affirmative, on others, they support the
negative. So, the beliefs of the audience or readers about the
' Bingwalt, iihderii American Oratory, pp. 218, 219.


proposition, as a whole, will be determined largely by their
opinions as to which phase, or what points, are really impor-
tant. Clearly, then, it would be the policy of the affirmative
to persuade the audience that the points established in favor
of the proposition were of more importance than the points
established against it. In this way the affirmative could
weaken its opponents, by belittling the significance of the
points they had proved and magnifying the significance of
its own it could by a direct attack
points, just as surely as
upon their arguments or evidence. This is one of the most
common kinds of amplifying and diminishing. It may,
.
however, take various forms; it may consist in a contrasting

of the results of two opposite policies, a contrasting of the
evidence of the two sides, or a contrasting of the motives of the
two parties; but in all these the purpose is the same, viz.;
to compare the two proofs as a whole, and show the prepond-
erance of the one over the other. In student debates, where
Jl
both the materials of the discussion and the time are narrowly
limited, so that the conflict of the opposing proofs is peculiarly
direct, to amplify and diminish is especially effective.
Mr. Evarts, in his argument in the case of the Savannah
Privateers, uses this artifice, diminishing the case of the de-
fense and amplifying his own case in prosecution:
"And now, here is your duty, here your post of fidelity, not
against law, not against the least right under the law, but to sus-
tain, by whatever sacrifice there may be of sentiment or of feeling,
the law and the Constitution. I need not say to you, gentlemen,
that if, on a which admits no diversity of opinion,
state of facts
with these opposite forces arrayed, as they now are, before you
the Constitution of the United States, the laws of the United States,
the commission of this learned court, derived from the government
of the United States, the venire and impanelling of this jury, made
under the laws and by the authority of the United States, on our
side; met, on their side, by nothing on behalf of the prisoners, but
the commission, the power, the right, the authority of the rebel
government, proceeding from Jefferson Davis you are asked by
THE CONCLUSION 339
the law, or under the law, or against the law, in some form, to
recognize this power, and thus to say that the vigor, the judgment,
the sense, and the duty of a jury, to confine themselves to their
responsibility on the facts of the case, are worthless and yielding
before impressions of a discursive and loose and general nature.
Be sure of it, gentlemen, that, on what I suppose to be the facts
concerning this particular transaction, a verdict of acquittal is
nothing but a determination that our government and its authority,

in the premises of this trial, for the purposes of your verdict, are
met and overthrown by the protection thrown around the prisoners
by the government of the Confederate States of America, actual
i
or incipient."
B. Persuasion. 1. Well disposed toward speaker or

writer. The necessity of an appeal for sympathy,^ in the
conclusion, is too obvious to need explanation. When the
speech is over, or the essay is time has come for
finished, the
the hearer or reader to act or deliberate on action; he must,
then, be favorably disposed in his feelings toward the speaker
or writer, in order to give his side a fair and favorable considera-
tion. All the labors of persuasion, in the introduction and in
the discussion, may be lost, if the emotions aroused there are
allowed to lapse at the end. The sympathy for the speaker
and which has already been stirred, must be left
his subject,
active in the minds of the audience, when he at length sub-
mits his case to their hands for judgment.
The conclusion reaps the harvest of sympathy, sowed in the
earlier parts of the argument. Aristotle suggests that this
last effort of persuasion may be an appeal by the speaker for
favor for himself and his cause, or it may be an attack on the
character or cause of an opponent. A good use of these
methods, in combination, is found in the argument of Ser-
geant Prentiss in defense of Edward C. Wilkinson, who was
on trial for In the beginning of the selection he di-
murder.
rectly attacks the instigator of the trial, and later, the chief
' Great Speeches by Great Lavyyers,. p. 420.

^ See discussion of persuasion in chapter 11.


witnesses for the prosecution, closing with a brief appeal for
sympathy for himseK:
"But there is a murderer; and, strange to say, his name appears

upon the indictment, not as a criminal, but as a prosecutor. His
garments are wet with the blood of those upon whose deaths you
hold this solemn inquest. Yonder he sits, allaying for a moment
the hunger of that fierce vulture, conscience, by casting before it
the food of pretended regret, and false but apparent eagerness for
justice. He hopes to appease the manes of his slaughtered vic-

tims victims to his falsehood and treachery ^by sacrificing upon
their graves a hecatomb of innocent men. By base misrepresenta-
tions of the conduct of the defendants, he induced his imprudent
friends to attempt a vindication of his pretended wrongs by violence
and bloodshed. . . .
"Upon his head rests not only all the blood shed in this un-
fortunate strife, but also the soul-killing crime of perjury; for,
surely as he lives, did the words of craft and falsehood fall from
his lips, ere they hardly loosened from the Holy Volume. But I

dismiss him, and do consign him to the furies ^trusting, in all
charity, that the terrible punishment he must sufl'er from the scor-
pion lash of a guilty conscience will be considered in his last account.
"Johnson and Oldham, too, are murderers at heart. But I shall
make to them no appeal. There is no chord in their bosoms which
can render back music to the touch of feeling. They have both
perjured themselves. The former cut up the truth as coolly as if
he had been carving meat in his own stall. The latter, on the con-
trary, was no longer the bold and hot-blooded knight, but the
shrinking pale-faced witness. Cowering beneath your stern and
indignant gaze, marked you not how 'his coward lip did from its
colors fly'; and how his quailing eye sought from floor to rafter
protection from each honest glance. . . .

"Gentlemen oi the jury: I shall detain you no longer. . . .
I had hoped, when the evidence was closed, that the common-
wealth's attorney might have found it in accordance with his duty
and his feelings to have entered at once a nolle prosequi. Could the
genius of 'Old Kentucky' have spoken, such would have been her
mandate. Blushing with shame at the inhospitable conduct of a
portion of her sons, she would have hastened to make reparation.
THE CONCLUSION 341
"Gentlemen: Let her sentiments be spoken by you. Let your

verdict take character from the noble State which you in part
represent. Without leaving your box, announce to the world that
here the defence of one's own person is no crime, and that the
protection of a brother's life is the subject of approbation rather
than of punishment.
"Gentlemen of the Jury: I return you my most profound and
sincere thanks for the kindness with which you have listened to
me, a stranger, pleading the cause of strangers. Your generous
and indulgent treatment I shall ever remember with the most
grateful emotions. In full confidence that you, by your sense of
humanity and justice, will supply the many defects in my feeble
advocacy, I now resign into your hands the fate of my clients. As
you shall do unto them, so, under like circumstances, may it be
done unto you." '
2. Final stirring of favorable emotions. But gaining sym-

pathy for one's not the whole of persuasion. The emo-
self is
tions, which, as we have seen, are the mainsprings of action,

must be given a final stimulus. It is, however, not safe to
leave all appeal to the emotions to be made in the conclusion;
the feelings must be stirred in the introduction, and kept
constantly active through all the discussion. But there the
work of persuasion is only begun; in order to bring the
emotions finally into play, they must be wrought to the high-
est pitch of all at the close, and directed to the desired end.
Consequently, in any great oration, it is in th peroration
that we most
find the impassioned eloquence; it is here that
the orator spends his powers freely in the final appeal. The
conclusion must complete, and give carrying force to the work
of persuasion, as it does to the work of conviction.
The emotions are so many, and the possible ways of stir-
ring them so varied, that examples are not, perhaps, of great
value. To gain such power requires a study of the whole
field of the persuasive art a study of human nature, a study
of audiences, a study of the world's oratory. Finally, to
' Great Speeches by Great Lawyers, pp. 121-123.

develop the fruits of study into real power, demands, in the
words of Demosthenes, "Practice! practice! practice!"
To choose examples of persuasion in the conclusion, in-
volves discrimination among many of the most brilliant
.
passages in the world's oratory. The following, from the

speech by Grattan on the "Declaration of Irish Right," is
not given as, in any sense, the best; it is simply an excellent

illustration of one kind :
"I might, as a constituent, come to your bar and demand my

liberty. I do call upon you by the laws of the land, and their viola-
tion; by the instruction of eighteen centuries; by the arms, inspira-
tion, and providence of the present movement
tell us the rule by
which we shall go; assert the law of Ireland; declare the liberty of
the land I will not be answered by a public lie, in the shape of an
!
amendment; nor, speaking for the subject's freedom, am I to hear

of faction. I wish for nothing but to breathe in this our island, in
common with my fellow-subjects, the air of liberty. I have no am-
bition, unless it be to break your chains and contemplate your
glory. I never shall be satisfied so long as the meanest cottager in
Ireland has a link of the British chain clanking to his rags. He
may be naked, he shall not be in irons. And I do see the time at
hand; the spirit has gone forth; the declaration of right is planted,
and though great men should fall off, the cause will live; and
though he who utters this should die, yet the immortal fire shall
outlast the organ that conveys it, and the breath of liberty, like
the word of the holy man, will not die with the prophet, but survive
him." 1
An emotional conclusion of a very different sort was that

used by Phillips Brooks in his speech in behalf of the Chil-
dren's Aid Society.
"I sometimes think how would be if multitude were taken

it
away and we saw which often loses itself in

in its simplicity that
the large variety in which it is manifested to us. Suppose there
were but one needy child in all the world. Suppose every child
from China to Peru were wrapped in the soft care and tender luxury
' Hardwicke, History of Oratory and Orators, p. 138.
THE CONCLUSION 343
which belong to, children in their parents' arms. Suppose every

babe were cooing itself to rest in its mother's embrace, and every
little boy were looking up into the face of a father's sympathy for
the first manifestation of a truth that was to make him strong.

Then suppose that somewhere, anywhere, upon our earth, there
came one cry of a poor, wronged, needy child. Can you not be
sure that all humanity would lift itself up and never be satisfied
until that child was aided? Is it less pathetic, is it less appealing,
because they are here by the million instead of one or two? If one
of those little creatures that the doctor read to us about had stood
alone in all the generations of humanity, how infinitely pathetic it
would have been! How you all would have stood up and said,
'Where is that child? Where is that child? Life shall not be life
to us until we have relieved it, until those poor limbs have been
straightened and those arms made strong, until those bleared eyes
have been taught to see, and that voice has sung some of the first
beginnings of the song of life.' Well, there are hundreds and
thousands and millions of them. They look up to you from the
gutter as you walk the street. They look into the face of the good,
kind judge as he sits upon his bench. They come stretching out
their poor sick arms to the doctors in the hospitals, and you can
help them. You can help them. Help them just as you would if
there were only one of them, by giving your sympathy, your bless-
ing, your loud praise, and your large contributions to the Children's
Aid Society." '
THE CONCLUSION
1. Write conclusions for each of the speeches on the campus
topic mentioned in earlier chapters.
2. Write the conclusion to the speech to the favorable au-
dience mentioned in the last two chapters.
3. Write the conclusion to the speech for the hostile audience
mentioned in the last two chapters.
4. Hand in the complete conclusion to your original forensic.
' Essays and Addresses, quoted by Deriney, Duncan, and McTCinney,
Argumentation and Debate, pp. 114, 115.
CHAPTER 15
REFUTATION
OUTLINE
A. The nature of refutation.
B. What to refute.
1. Answering too much.
a. Three objections.
(I) Loss of time and energy.
(II) Confusion.
Undue importance to parts of opponent's
(III) case.
Answering too little.
2.
3. Answering yourself: "straw men."
C. Three fundamental requirements.

1. Research.
2. Reasoning.
3. Rhetoric.
D. Position of refutation.
E. Basic rule for all refutation.
F. Methods of refutation.
1. Tests of evidence.
2. Attacks on forms of arguments.
3. Exposing fallacies.
4. Special rhetorical devices.

a. Reductio ad absurdum.
b. Dilemma.
(I) More than two horns.
(II) Faulty disjunction.
c. Residues.
(I) Disjunction must be exhaustive.
d. Turning the tables.
A. The nature of refutation. Refutation consists in

the destruction of opposing proofs. As suggested in this
344
REFUTATION 345
definition, refutation is, in form, destructive rather than

constructive; but in its purposes and results it is no less
serviceable than positive proof. With respect to any given
proposition, there are always two contrary beliefs that a
person may hold: he may believe that the proposition is
true or that it is not true. Consequently, if we can induce
him to reject the opposite of what we uphold, we are thereby
preparing him to accept our own views. Negative argu-
ment pure and simple is rarely, if ever, sufiBcient; for belief
is always essentially positive in nature, so that to destroy
without building up will not serve out purpose. Refutation,
therefore, is properly auxiliary and supplementary to posi-
tive proof. In our attempt to convince or persuade any man,
we must realize that he will, almost surely, have in his own
mind many preconceived ideas and preestablished opinions
about the matter and that many of those ideas
in discussion,
and opinions are be antagonistic to what we are
liable to
trying to make him believe. In such circumstances, our
success must often depend upon our ability to destroy these
hostile conceptions, thus preparing the way for the accept-
ance of our own contentions. The necessity for such de-
structive effort is, of course, peculiarly pressing in any form
of disputation where the arguer is confronted by some def-
inite opponents, as in debate, or perhaps in a newspaper
controversy; for here, the audience or readers are con-
sciously balancing the two sides of the question, and they
must be made to see with perfect clearness, that one side
overthrows and destroys the other. But in any form of ar-
-gumentative discussion there are always opponents of some
kind, either real or imaginary, and they must be mastered
before we can hope to make others fully accept our own be-
liefs.
B. What to refute. The partial or complete destruction

of such opposing opinions and arguments often calls for a
keener insight and a more adroit attack, than does any of
the positive work of construction. It therefore becomes of

346 ARGUMEMTATION AND DEBATE

the importance to decide what, and how much, one
first
ought to refute. Concerning this question John Quincy

Adams, in his Lectures on Rhetoric and Oratory (Lecture
XXII), 1 says:
"There are three very common errors in the management
of controversy against which I think it proper here to guard
you, and from which I hope you will hereafter very sedulously
guard yourselves. The first may be termed answering too
much; the second answering too little; and the third answering
yourself, and not your opponent."
1. Answering too much. Speaking of the first of these
mistakes, he says:
"You answer too much when you make
it an invariable
principle to reply to everything which has been or could

be said by your antagonist on the other side. ... If you
contend against a diffuse speaker, who has wasted hour after
hour in a lingering lapse of words, which had little or no
bearing upon the proper question between you, it is incum-
bent upon you to discriminate between that part of his dis-
course which was pertinent, and that which was superfluous.
Nor is it less necessary to detect the artifice of an adversary,
who purposely mingles a flood of extraneous matter with the
controversy, for the sake of disguising the weakness of his
cause. In the former of these two cases, if you undertake to
answer everything that has been said, you charge yourself
with all the tediousness of your adversary, and double the
measure by an equal burden of your own. In the latter you
promote the cause of your antagonist by making yourself
the dupe of his stratagem. If, then, you have an opponent
whose redundancies arise only from his weakness, whose
standard of oratory is time, and whose measure of eloquence
if in arithmetical proportion to the multitude of his words,
your general rule should be to pass over all his general, un-
appropriate declamation in silence; to take no more notice
of it than if it had never been spoken. But if you see that
' Volume II, pp. 82, 83.
REFUTATION 347
the external matter is obtruded upon the subject with design

to mislead your attention, and upon objects different
fix it
from that which is you should so far take

really at issue,
notice of it as to point out the artifice, and derive from it an
argument of the most powerful efficacy to your own side."
a. Three objections to answering too much. Answering
too many of the lesser arguments of an opponent should be
avoided for the following three excellent and practical rea-
sons (I) In the first place, it involves a loss of time and energy.
:
.This is particularly true in the case of the arguments of an

opponent who wastes himself in " a lingering lapse of words,"
which have little or no bearing upon the proper question.
But it is also true, even when the efforts of an opponent are
well directed at the points in issue. The greater part of the
materials in any proof are, as we have seen, only secondary
in nature; they are of force merely because they tend to
establish some larger, more vital fact. The important thing
is, to reach and overthrow these more significant and critical
parts of the proof: if they can be destroyed, the secondary
facts fall with them. To sink a battle-ship does not demand
that every foot of its armor be twisted and torn, that every
turret and smoke-stack be demolished; one or two well-
aimed shots are enough. It is only necessary that the vul-
nerable spot be well chosen, and that the aim be sure. Con-
sequently it should be the purpose of the debater, in his
refutation, to let the lesser points of his opponent pass un-
heeded, and to give his attention only to vital elements.
(II) In the second place, answering too much results in con-
fusion. To attempt to refute too many petty arguments,

weakens the discrimination between the important and the
unimportant, which is always necessary in argumentation, if
we are to make a distinct and lasting impression. Emphasis,
as a means to clearness and force, is just as desirable in
refutation as elsewhere, and emphasis cannot be attained, if
attention is given alike to the great and the small paints.
(III) In the third place, answering too much gives undue


dignity and importance to many points of the other side. In-
significant proofs are better left insignificant. To bring
them anew to the attention of the audience, and give them
the compliment of a serious reply, helps, rather than hinders,
an opponent. One way to dispose of a foolish or trivial point
is illustrated by Cicero in his defense of Q. Ligarius :
"When Tubero, in his accusation of Ligarius before Caesar,

had made it part of his charge, that Ligarius was in Africa
during some part of the civil war between Csesar and Pompey;
Cicero in his answer, not thinking it deserved a serious reply,
contents himself with barely mentioning it ironically. For
thus he begins his defense of Ligarius, Caesar, my kinsman
Tubero has laid before you a new crime, and till this day un-
^
heard of, that Q. Ligarius was in Africa."
2. Answering too
little. Of the second fault, which con-
sists in answering too little, Mr. Adams says:
"The second error in controversy, against which I am
anxious of warning you,is that of answering too little. It is
not unfrequently found united with that against which I
have last admonished you. When too much of our strength
is lavished upon the outworks, the citadel is left proportion-
ately defenceless. If we say too much upon points extrinsic
to the cause, we shall seldom say enough upon those on which
it hinges. To avoid this fault, therefore, it is as essential to
ascertain which are the strong parts of your adversary's
argument as it is to escape the opposite error of excess. To
this effect it is also a duty of the first impression to obtain a
control over your own prejudices and feelings. Nothing is
so sure to blind us to the real validity of the reasons alleged

against us, as our passions. It is so much easier to despise,
than to answer an opponent's argument, that wherever we
can indulge our contempt, we are apt to forget that it is not
refutation." ^ Sarcasm and scorn may be aids to refutation,
but they are not substitutes for it. In refutation, then, the
' John Ward, A System of Oratory, Vol. II, p. 366.
' Adams, Lectures on Rhetoric and Oratory, Vol. II, p. 88.

REFUTATION 349
first essential is what are the few vital points

to understand
your adversary's case, pick out
of the other side; to analyze
his "strong parts," and answer them.
3. Answering yourself: "Straw men": Concerning the
last and very common error, which consists in "answering
yourself," the comment made by Mr. Adams cannot be over-
emphasized:
"But the most inexcusable of all the errors in confutation
is that of answering yourself, instead of your adversary,
which is done whenever you suppress, or mutilate, or obscure,
or misstate, his reasoning, and then reply not to his positions,
but to those which you have substituted in their stead. This
practice is often the result of misapprehension, when a dis-
putant mistakes the point of the argument urged by his
adversary; but it often arises also from design, in which case
it should be clearly detected and indignantly exposed. The
duty of a disputant is fairly to take and fully to repel the
idea of his opponent, and not his own. To misrepresent the
meaning of your antagonist evinces a want of candor which
the auditory seldom fail to perceive, and which engages their
feelings in his favor. When involved in controversy, then,
never start against yourself frivolous objections for the sake
of showing how easily you can answer them. Quinctilian
relates an anecdote of the poet Accius, which every contro-
versial writer or speaker will do well to remember. Accius
was a writer of tragedies, and being once asked why he^ whose
dialogue Was celebrated for its energy, did not engage in the
practice of the bar, answered, because in his tragedies he
could make his characters say what he pleased; but that at the
bar he should have to contend with persons who would say
anything but what he pleased. There can be no possible
advantage in supposing our antagonist a fool. The most
probable effect of such an imagination is to prove ourselves
^
so."
The words of Accius should be observed by every student
' Lectures on Rhetoric and Oratory, Vol. 11, pp. 90, 91.
of argumentation. It is easy to set up "straw men" and
knock them down, but it is dangerous and contemptible.
To suggest possible arguments, unless you are sure, either'
that they have already been advanced, or that they must be
advanced by the other side, is foolish. If the arguments are
jvorth while, do not help your adversary by suggesting them;
if they are not worth while, it is a waste of time to notice
them. Furthermore, it gives an opponent the opportunity

to ridicule the effort, by admitting or ignoring the points
thus suggested.
C. Three fundamental requirements. Refutation has the
same three fundamental requirements as positive argument.
It must not be presumed that refutation is a separate and
distinct kind of argumentation. To refute demands skill in
the three Rs of argumentation: research, reasoning, and
rhetoric.
1. Research. "The first principle of refutation is, then:
Know all the ramifications of the discussion in which you take
part. Preparedness on both sides of the case is the first
essential of strong refutation." One needs adequate in-

^
formation to refute an opponent. The man who is informed

on a question in controversy can best correct the mistakes of
an adversary. Thorough knowledge of all phases of the
question is needed, and since, in Webster's phrase, " acquisi-
tion is never extemporaneous," a wise debater will not rely
on readiness of tongue alone in this department of argumenta-

tion. Being "quick with a gun" is of little use when one has

no gun at all or an unloaded one.
2. Reasoning. Sound reasoning, straight thinking, is
needed in refutation. Any slip here when one is "correcting"
the reasoning of others is doubly disastrous. Clear thinking
(and common honesty) will keep you from "answering your-
self," will enable you to show your readers or hearers just
what you are refuting. Only straight thinking will keep your
shots true. Often most careful analysis of an opposing ar-
' Baker and Huntington, Principles of Argumentation, p. 171.

REFUTATION 351
gument needed in order to pick out the exact point to be

is
refuted, or to show the exact clash of discussion. Sometimes

throwing the argument into the form of a syllogism will make
strikingly clear the basic structure of a confused argument.
Lincoln used this device against Douglas in the debate at
Galesburg:
"Now, remembering the provision of the Constitution which I

have read, affirming that that instrument is the supreme law of
the land; that the judges of every state shall be bound by it, any
law or constitution of any state to the contrary notwithstanding;
that the right of property in a slave is affirmed in that Constitution,
is made, formed into, and cannot be separated from it without
breaking it; durable as the instrument, part of the instrument,

what and even syllogistic argument from it? I
follows as a short
think it follows, submit to the consideration of men capable
and I
of argumenting, whether as I state it, in syllogistic form the argu-
ment has any fault in it.'
"Nothing in the constitution or laws of any state can destroy a

right distinctly and expressly affirmed in the Constitution of the
United States.
"The right of property in a slave is distinctly and expressly
affirmed in the Constitution of the United States.
" Therefore, nothing in the constitution or laws of any state can
destroy the right of property in a slave.

"I believe that no fault can be pointed out in that argument;
assuming the truth of the premises, the conclusion, so far as I have
capacity at all to understand it, follows inevitably. There is a
fault in it, as I think, but the fault is not in the reasoning; the false-
hood, in fact, a fault in the premises. I believe that the right
is
of property in a slave is not distinctly and expressly affirmed in
the Constitution, and Judge Douglas thinks it is." '
3. Rhetoric. Lastly, all that goes to make effective ex-

pression, rhetoric oral or written, is of unusual importance
in refutation. Careless, inaccurate, disorganized style, or a
weak and listless delivery, will counteract the good offices
' Quoted from Foster's Argumentation, pp. 183, 184.
of both thorough knowledge and sound reasoning. Fact is
the bullet, reasoning is the aim, and expression (we trust no
untoward application of our figure will be made) is the force

that drives the bullet to its mark.
D. Position of refutation. With respect to the method
of handling refutation, a common word of advice is, to fol-
low up refutation with positive proof. This suggestion,
,
however, is of a general nature and is open to exceptions.

But it must not be forgotten that refutation is destructive;
it demolishes, but does not buUd up. To make men act or
thoroughly believe, it is not enough to make them see there is
no reason why they should not be convinced; they must be
made to see that there is a positive reason why they should
be convinced. Consequently, pure refutation is weak and
lacks the strongest elements of conviction; it is a necessary
help, but is not sufficient in itself. It is, therefore, generally
an anti-climax to place refutation at the. end of the discus-
sion, or at the end of any important division of the argument.
Positive proof rather than refutation should be given the
most emphatic place.
This leads to the matter of the arrangement of refutation.
With respect to the strength and the weakness of the points
of refutation, the same rules apply as in positive proof; the
emphatic places are the beginning and the end. If, then, the
answer to be made is strong, it may well be put first or to-
ward the last. Weaker answers are best hidden in the mid-
dle. However, it often happens that an opponent makes a
point or presents some idea, which must be overthrovm before
the speaker or writer can proceed with his own proof. In such
circumstances, clearly the answer to the point must be made
at the very beginning. Doubt often arises as to whether it is
best to make the answer a distinct point in the discussion,
or to introduce it merely as an incident to some other point.
This depends upon the importance of the argument to be
answered, and so is a question of personal judgment in each
particular case. In general, however, such answers are best
REFUTATION 353
given in connection with those parts of one's own proof with

which they are naturally associated. In fact, they should
always be considered wherever they happen to arise in the
course of one's own argument, except where there is a pecu-
liar, definite reason (such as extreme importance of the point
made or effective challenge of previous speaker) for setting

this rule aside. Then usually such refutation should be given
before constructive argument. It is therefore true in gen-
eral that, with the exception of the most vital of the proofs
of the opposition, refutation is best made as the occasion for
theanswer arises in the course of one's own demonstration.
These individual points that may be taken up as they arise
are sometimes called "special refutation." But if the answer
to an opponent's argument under the circumstances, of
is,
such importance as to make any large part of the question

depend upon it, there should be no hesitation in making it
one of the main points of the proof, and emphasizing it as such.
Such a main point may be taken up wherever it most logi-
cally fits into the case. These large fundamental points
that make an important part of the case are sometimes
called "general refutation."
E. Basic rule for
all refutation. Before taking up any
of the particularmethods there is one principle of refutation
that should be emphasized. Always make perfectly clear to the
audience or reader, just what is the point that is to be attacked,
and the nature of the attack to be made. Show what you are
going to refute, and how you are going to refute Repeat
it.
what your opponent has said and then say that you will
show this to be false, irrelevant, unimportant, untrustworthy,
etc., as the case may be. The statement to which objection
is made should always be distinctly stated at the start, and its
place in the case its relation to main points, issues, or prop-
osition should be clearly shown. This statement should be
supplemented, while the reply is being presented, by what-
ever explanations are necessary, in order to make evident
the purposes and results of the answer. It must be made


clear that there are two opposing arguments which directly
meet, and that one overthrows the other. The force of ref-
utation is destructive, and it cannot achieve its full effect
unless the audience understands just what is to he destroyed,

and just how the refutation accomplished the destruction.
A study of forensic and deliberative oratory shows the
painstaking care to observe this rule used by the ablest speak-
ersand writers. The is an example of Webster's
following
method in forensic refutation, a model of clearness in intro-
ducing refutation. The quotation is from his speech in the
case of Ogden vs. Saunters:
"Here we meet the opposite arguments, stated on different occa-

sions in different terms, but usually summed up in this, that the
law itself is a part of the contract, and therefore cannot impair it.
What does it mean? Let us seek for clear ideas. It does not mean
that the law gives any particular construction to the terms of the
contract, or that it makes the promise, or the consideration, or the
time of performance, other than is expressed in the instrument
itself. It can only mean that it is to be taken as a part of the con-
tract or understanding of the parties, that the contract itself shall
be enforced by such laws and regulations respecting remedy and
for the enforcement of contracts as are in being in the State where
it is made at the time of entering into it. This is meant, or nothing
very clearly intelligible is meant, by saying the law is part of the
contract. . . .
"Against this we contend :^-

" 1st. That, if the proposition were true, the consequence would
not follow.
"2nd. That the proposition itself cannot be maintained." i
To take an illustration from a deliberative oration: Web-

ster, in replying to Calhoun in the Senate, on the question of
the protective tariff, divided his speech into five parts, cor-
responding to the five main points of his opponent. The
following are the sentences introductory to these parts re-
spectively :
> The Works of Daniel Webster, Vol. VI, p. 29.

REFUTATION 355
"I. In treating of protection, or protective duties, the first prop-

osition of the honorable member is, that all duties laid on imports
on exports; that they are a toll paid for going to market.
really fall
"II. Another opinion of the honorable member is, that increased
production brings about expansion of the currency, and that such
increase makes a further increase necessary. His idea is, that, if
some goods are imported, the amount of exports still keeping up,
the whole export being thus paid for by the import, specie must be
brought to settle the balance; that this increase of specie gives new
powers to the banks to discount; that the banks thereupon make
large issues, till the mass of currency becomes redundant and
swollen; tha:t this swollen currency augments the price of articles of
our own manufacture, and makes it necessary to raise prices still
higher, and this creates a demand for the imposition of new duties.
This, as I understand it, is the honorable member's train of thought.
"III. There a third general idea of the honorable gentleman,

is
upon which I would make a few observations. It is, that the South
and West are the great consumers of the products of the manufac-
tures of the North and East; that the capacity of the South to con-
sume depends on her great staples; and that the sale of these
depends mainly on a foreign market.
"IV. A fourth sentiment of the honorable member b, that the
removal of all duties increases the exportation of articles manu-
factured at home.
"V. Finally, the honorable member is of the opinion that the
whole system of protection was prostrated, and is prostrated, cut
up, root and branch, and exterminated forever, by the State inter-
position of South Carolina." '
F. Methods of refutation. Refutation is the destruc-

tion of opposing proofs. Any method by which the proof of
an opponent may be weakened or destroyed is a "method of
refutation." There are four different sets of such methods in
argumentation. It must be borne in mind, however, that
these are not mutually exclusive lists. In many points they
practically coincide, being simply different names for the
same things, because these things are looked at from differ-
The Works of Daniel Webster, Vol. IV, pp. 528-538.

ent standpoints. We have considered three of these sets
under evidence, forms of argument, and fallacies. The fourth
is "special rhetorical devices." It is needless to do more
than mention the first three here.
1. Tests of evidence. Showing that the evidence presented

by an opponent is unsound in some way fails to meet the

proper tests of such evidence is effective refutation. (See
Chapter 6.)
2. Attack on the forms of arguments. Demonstrating the
weakness of any argument by the use of the tests discussed

in Chapter 7 is also an excellent method of refuting an ad-
versary.
3. Fallacies. When we expose a fallacy in another's ar-
gument we are using a very common and very effective
method of refuting him. (See Chapter 8.)
4. Special rhetorical devices. The fourth list of special
rhetorical devices, not found in any of these other lists,
is usually given separately as an enumeration of the methods

of refutation. These devices are (a) reductio ad dbsurdum,
(b) dilemma, and (d) turning the tables.
(c) residues,
a. Reductio ad absurdtmi. One of the most commonly

used methods of refutation is that of reducing an argument
to an absurdity, or, as it is named, the reductio ad absurdum.
The refuter adopts for the moment the line of argument of
his opponent; then, by carrying it out to its logical conclu-
sion, shows that it results in an absurdity. For example,
"When a lawyer asserted in court that a corporation can
make no oral contract because it has no tongue, the judge
exposed the fallacy by saying, simply, "Then, according
to your own argument, a corporation could not make a writ-
ten contract because it has no hand.'" ^
Cicero uses this method in the following:
"Nor, if Publius Crassus was both an orator and a lawyer, is
the knowledge of the civil law for that reason included in the
Foster, p. 177.

REFUTATION 357
power of speaking. For if any man, who, while excelling in any art
or science, has acquired another, shall hold that his additional
knowledge is a part of that in which he previously excelled, we may,
by such a mode of argument, pretend that to play well at tennis is
a part of the knowledge of civil law, because Publius Mucins was
skilled in both." '
Macaulay makes striking use of this device:
" Many politicians of our time are in the habit of laying it down
as a self-evident proposition, that no people ought to be free till
they are fit to use their freedom. The maxim is worthy of the
who resolved not to go into the water until
fool in the old story,
he had learned to swim. If men are to wait for liberty until they
become wise and good in slavery, they may indeed wait forever." ^
This method is effective because of its simplicity and di-

rectness; it also has in it an element of ridicule that is per-
suasive against an opponent. William Ellery Channing, in
a reply to Henry Clay on the slavery question, used this
method as follows:
"But this property, we are told, is not to be questioned on

account of its long duration. 'Two hundred years of legislation
have sanctioned and sanctified negro slaves as property.' Nothing
but respect for the speaker could repress criticism on this unhappy
phraseology. We will trust it escaped him without thought. But
to confine ourselves to the argument from duration; how obvious
the reply! Is injustice changed into justice by the practice of ages?
Is my victim made a righteous prey because I have bowed him
to the earth till rise.'' For more than two hundred years
he cannot
heretics were burned, and not by mobs, not by Lynch law, but by
the decrees of councils, at the instigation of theologians, and with
the sanction of the laws and religions of nations; and was this a
reason for keeping up the fires, that they had burned two hundred
years? In the Eastern world, successive despots, not for two hun-
dred years, but for twice two thousand, have claimed the right of
life and death over millions, and, with no law but their own will,
' Quoted by Foster, p. 177. ^ Quoted by Foster, p. 178.

iave beheaded, bowstrung, starved, tortured unhappy men without
number who have incurred their wrath; and does the lapse of so
many centuries sanctity murder and ferocious power?"
Again:
"But the great argument remains. It is said that this property

must not be questioned, because it is by law. 'That is
established
property which the law declares Thus human law
to he property.' '
is made supreme, decisive, in a question of morals. Thus the idea

of an eternal, immutable justice is set at naught. Thus the great
rule of human life is made to be the ordinance of interested men.
But there is a higher tribunal, a throne of equal justice, immovable
by the conspiracy of all human legislatures. 'That is property
which the law declares to be property.' Then the laws have only
to declare you, or me, or Mr. Clay, to be property, and we become
chattels and are bound to bear the yoke! Does not even man's
moral nature repel this doctrine too intuitively to leave time or
need for argument?" '
b. The dilemma is one of the oldest of all known rhetorical

forms. As a method of refutation, it consists in reducing an
issue to an alternative, and then shovnng that both members
of the alternative are untenable. These two members are
called the "horns of the dilemma." The refuter says in sub-
stance: "Now, with respect to this point at issue, there are
two and only two possibilities, viz., A and B. But A is not
true, and B is not true; consequently your contention fails."
In order to make the dilemma conclusive, obviously two
things are necessary (I) The horns of the dilemma must in-
:
clude all the possibilities in the case, i. e., the alternative must
be exact. (II) Both members of the alternative must be destroyed.
James Wilson, speaking in the convention for the province
of Pennsylvania, in vindication of the colonies, January,
1775, used the dilemma as follows:
"In the first place, then, I say that the persons who allege that
' The italics are by Mr. Clay.

2 The Works of William E. Channing, V. D., Vol. V, pp. 48, 49.

REFUTATION 359
those employed to alter the charter and constitution of Massachu-

setts Bay act by virtue of a commission from his majesty for that
purpose, speak improperly, and contrary to the truth of the case.
I say they do not act by virtue of such commission; I say it is im-
possible they can act by virtue of such a commission. What is
called a commission either contains particular directions for the

purpose mentioned, or it contains no such particular directions. In
either case can those, who act for that purpose, act by virtue of a
commission.'' In one case, what is called a commission is void; it
has no legal existence; it can communicate no authority. In the
other case, it extends not to the purpose mentioned. The latter
^
point is too plain to be insisted on: I (will) prove the former."
Jeremiah S. Black, in defense of the right of trial by jury,

thus attacked the contention of his opponents, which was
that the law of nations was binding in the trial of the cause
in question:
"Ôur friends on the other side are quite conscious that when
they deny the binding obligation of the Constitution they, must put
some other system of law in its place. Their brief gives us notice
that, while the Constitution, and the acts of Congress, and Magna
Ckarta, and the common law, and all the rules of natural justice
shall remain under foot, they will try American citizens according
to the law of nations! But the law of nations takes no notice of the
subject. If that system did contain a special provision that a
government might hang one of its own citizens without a judge or
jury, it would still be corfipetent for the American people to say,
as they have said, that no such thing should ever be done here.
That is my answer to the law of nations." ^
(I) More than two horns. Sometimes the possibilities

with respect to the point in issue cannot be reduced to two.
There may be a choice offered of any one of three or more
possible conditions, or courses of action. In such a case, to
state the issue in the form of a dilemma, presenting a single
alternative, would not be an exact disjunction, and so would
' Eloquence of the United States, Vol. V, p. 56. E. and H. Clark.
" Great Speeches by Great Laiiryers, p. 507.

be fallacious; to be truthful it is always necessary to state
all the possibilities of choice, whatever their number. When
more than two be considered, the method
possibilities are to
is, properly speaking, not a dilemma; but the modus operandi
is similar. Webster, in his argument in the case of the Prov-

idence Railroad Co. vs. City of Boston, made a division into
three possibilities. Mr. Webster is here contending against
the proposition that a certain street or piece of land is a pub-
lic highway:
"If this street, or land, or whatever it may be, has become and
now is a public highway, it must have become so in one of three
ways, and to these points I particularly call your honors' attention.
"1st. It must have become a highway by having been
either
regularly laid out according to usage and law; or
"2d. By dedication as such by those having the power to dedicate
it, and acceptance and adoption so far as they are required; or
"3d. As a highway by long user, without the existence of proof

of any original laying out, or dedication.
"It is not pretended by any one that the land in question is a
highway, upon the last of these grounds. I shall therefore confine
myself to the consideration of the other two questions; namely,
'Was there ever a formal and regular laying out of a street here?
or was there ever a regular and sufficient dedication and accept-
ance?'" '
(II) If the disjunction of the dilemma

is faulty an opening
is an opponent which may result in great discomfiture

left for
to the author of the defective dilemma.

"Thus Lincoln, in his speech on the Dred Scott Decision,
refused to accept either of the horns of the dilemma presented
by Douglas. Lincoln said of Douglas:
"He finds the Republicans insisting that the Declaration of

Independence includes men, black as well as white, and forthwith
all
he boldly denies that itincludes negroes at all, and proceeds to

argue gravely that all who contend it does, do so only because
> Works of Daniel Webster, Vol. VI, p. 186.
REFUTATION 361
they want to vote, to eat, and sleep, and marry with negroes. He
will have it that they cannot be consistent else. Now I protest
against the counterfeit logic which concludes that because I do not
want a black woman for a slave, I must necessarily want her for a
wife. I need not have her for either. I can just leave her alone." '
c. The method of residues, like that of the dilemma, is
founded upon a division of the point in question into parts.

The difference is that in the dilemma all the parts are de-
stroyed, whereas, in the method of residues, one of the parts
is left standing. By the method of residues, the matter in
dispute is divided into two or more sections, which include
all the possibilities in the case; then all but one of these are
demolished, the one left standing being the aspect of the is-
sue which the refuter wishes to establish. "There are,"

says the refuter, "three possibihties, A, B, and C. But A
and B are false, consequently the presumption is that C is
true." This method is not, strictly speaking, a method

of refuting. It is rather a method of using refutation: the
ultimate purpose of the speaker or writer is not destructive,
but constructive; he destroys some of the parts into which

he divides the question, in order that he may establish the
remaining part. He uses refutation to accomplish his end;
but the end itself is constructive proof.
(I) Division must be exhaustive. The first requisite in us-
ing the method of residues is, that the division of the whole into
parts shall be exhaustive. The strength of the method de-
pends entirely upon the assumption, that aU the possibilities
in the case are destroyed save one. If, then, the disputant
omits, in his division, to mention one of the possibilities, he
has proved nothing, for it still remains uncertain which pos-
sibihty is true,
the one he seeks to establish or the one he
failed to mention. Again, in order to make the work com-
plete, it is necessary that the resi(|uary part be enforced by
positive demonstration. The refuting of all but one of the
1 Foster., pp. 182, 183.


possibilities, leaves a presumption that the remaining pos-
sibility is true; but there may veW be a suspicion that even
this last part too is false, or that there is some fallacy in the
division. Consequently, to be at all convincing the residuary

part must be enforced by positive proof.
An excellent example of the use of the method of resi-
dues, is that found in Thomas H. Huxley's Lectures
on Evolution, delivered in New York in 1876. Professor
Huxley was here endeavoring to establish the theory of evo-
lution, as the true theory respecting past history of the uni-
verse. In his first lecture he divided the question into three
possible hypotheses as follows:
"So far as I know, there are only three hypotheses which ever
have been entertained, or which well can be entertained, respecting
the past history of Nature. I will, in the first place, state the
hypotheses, and then I will consider what evidence bearing upon
them is in our possession, and by what light of criticism that evi-
dence is to be interpreted.
"Upon the first hypothesis, the assumption is, that phenomena
of Nature similar to those exhibited by the present world have
always existed; in other words, that the universe has existed from
all eternity in what may be broadly termed its present condition.
"The second hypothesis is, that the present state of things has
had only a limited duration; and that, at some period in the past, a
condition of the world, essentially similar to that which we now
know, came into existence, without any precedent condition from
'which it could have naturally proceeded. The assumption that
successive states of Nature have arisen, each without any relation
of natural causation to an antecedent state, is a mere modification
of this second hypothesis.
"The third hypothesis also assumes that the present state of
things has had but a limited duration; but it supposes that this
state has been evolved by a natural process from an antecedent
state, and that from another, and so on; and, on this hypothesis,
the attempt to assign any limit to the series of past changes is,
'
usually, given up."
' Popular Science Monthly, Vol. X, p. 44.

REFUTATION 363
He then proceeded, in his series of lectures, to overthrow

the first two thirdthe theory of
hj^potheses, leaving the

evolution standing as the residuary part, and finally he
supported this theory by positive proof of its probability.
Burke, in his speech on Conciliation with America,^ used
the method of residues. He began:
"Sir, if I were capable of engaging you to an equal attention, I

would state, that as far as I am capable of discerning, there are
but three ways of proceeding relative to this stubborn spirit which
prevails in your Colonies, and disturbs your government. These

are: to change that spirit, as inconvenient, by removing the
causes; to prosecute it as criminal; or, to comply with it as neces-
sary. would not be guilty of an imperfect enumeration; I can

I
think of but these three. Another has indeed been started, that of
giving up the Colonies; but it met so slight a reception that I do
not think myself obliged to dwell a great while upon it. It is nothing
but a little sally of anger, like the frowardness of peevish children,
who, when they cannot get all they would have, are resolved to
take nothing."
He then considered the first two ways at length and proved

them impracticable, and concluded:
"If then the removal of the causes of this spirit of American

liberty be, for the greater part, or rather entirely impracticable;
if the ideas of criminal process be inapplicable, or if applicable
are in the highest degree inexpedient, what way yet remains? No
way is open, but the third and last, to comply with the American
spirit as necessary; or, if you please, to submit to it as a necessary
evil." 2
" Turning the tables " is simply showing that some-

d.
thing presented by your opponent really supports your case
and not his. It is "stealing his thunder." To turn the argu-
ment of an opponent against him is not often possible. But
circumstances sometimes give the opportunity. A piece of
1 Cook's edition, pp. 30, 31. ^ Ibid., pp. 38, 39.


testimony may
be used by a writer, when he has not fully
considered all may be put upon it.
the interpretations that
It not infrequently happens that evidence, or an arguriient, is
introduced to give support to some particular point, and,
in its bearing on that phase of the question, the evidence may
be favorable to the speaker or writer who introduces it; but
as the discussion proceeds, it may turn out that, with respect
to some other phase of the question, the evidence or the ar-
gument may be interpreted in another way, adversely to its
inventor. The effect of such an unexpected turn of affairs
is obvious; the opponent is "hoist with his own petard."
The very manner of introducing the proof adds to its effect-

iveness. Webster, in the Girard Will Case, used this method
in attacking one of the proofs of the defendants :
"The arguments of my learned friend, may it please your honors,

in relation to the Jewish laws as tolerated by the statutes, go to
maintain my very proposition; that is, that no school for the in-
struction of youth in any system which is in any way derogatory to
the Christian religion, or for the teaching of doctrines that are in
any way contrary to the Christian religion is, or ever was, regarded
as a charity by the courts. It is true that the statutes of Toleration
regarded a devise for the maintenance of poor Jewish children, to
give them food and raiment and lodging, as a charity. But a devise
for the teaching of the Jewish religion to poor children, that should
come into the Court of Chancery, would not be regarded as a
charity, or entitled to any peculiar from the court."
privileges '
Lincoln "turned the tables" admirably in his speech at

Cooper Union in February, 1860.
"Some you delight to flaunt in our faces the warning against

of
by Washington in his Farewell Address. Less
sectional parties given
than eight years before Washington gave that warning he had, as
President of the United States, approved and signed an act of
Congress enforcing the prohibition of slavery in the Northwestern
Territory, which act embodied the policy of the government, upon
1 The Works of Daniel Webster, Vol. VI, p. 166.

REFUTATION 365
that subject, up to and at the very moment he penned that warning;

and about one year after he penned it, he wrote Lafayette that he
considered that prohibition a wise measure, expressing in the same
connection his hope that we should at some time have a confederacy
of free states.
"Bearing this in mind and seeing that sectionalism has since
arisenupon this same subject, is that warning a weapon in your
hands against us or in our hands against you? Could Washington
himself speak, would he cast the blame of that sectionalism upon
us who upon you who repudiate it?
sustain his policy, or We re-
spect that warning of Washington and we commend it to you,
together with his example pointing to the right application of it." ^
REFUTATION
Hand in if possible three examples of poor refutation which
answers too much, too little, or answers "straw men,"
taken from current periodicals, lectures, text-books, etc.
Hand in two original examples of each of the four special
rhetorical devices for refutation.
' Quoted by Foster, p. 189.
PART III. DEBATE
CHAPTER 16
THE NATURE OF DEBATE
OUTLINE
A. Defini^îon.
B. Relation to argumentation.
C. The work of preparation.
D. "Coriteat Debates" and debates in "Real Life."
1. The immediate purpose of each type.
2. Getting nearer to the truth.

3. Three types of decisions.
a. The juryman's vote.
b. The legislator's vote.
c. The critic's vote.
4. Sport or game.
5. Convictions.
6. Preparation of contest debates.
E. The aflBrmative case.
F. The negative case. Four types.
1. Pure refutation.
2. Defense of present.
3. Adjustment.
4. Counter proposition.
a. State clearly.
b. Actually counter.
G. Personal attitude and bearing.
1. Personal tone.
2. Self-control.
3. Sarcasm and ridicule.
4. Personal inconsistency.
A. Definition. In the preceding chapters the principles

that have been set forth apply equally to written and to
367
a

spoken argumentation. But in that form of discussion com-
monly known as debate, which consists in, a direct oral ar-
gumentative contest between two opposing sides, on a definite
question, at a definite time, some of these principles must un-
dergo slight adaptations, and to them must be added other
new principles.
B. Relation to argumentation. A good argumentative
essayist not necessarily a good debater, any more than a
is
good writer is necessarily a good speaker. To begin with, a

debater in addition to knowing the principles of argumenta-
tion must know something of the arts of public speech; he may
not be positively eloquent, but he must know how to express
himself before an audience with a reasonable degree of ease
and force. But public speaking is not all. A man who can
write and memorize and deliver a good argumentative address
is not necessarily a good debater. The latter must have all
the skill of the former, and in addition, he must Icnow how to
conduct his case on the platform. He must know the "rules of
the game," and must be able to meet the many situations
in offense and defense as they arise in the contest. In other
words, the debater, in addition to being a good speaker, must
be something of a general. In polemic warfare there are am-
buscades, unexpected reenforcements for the enemy, and
critical situations of various kinds some of which cannot be
foreseen. To meet these contingencies and master them
demands a clear head, quick judgment, firm decision, and
a certain amount of bold self-confidence. There is, moreover,
a strategy of debate which must be learned by study and
experience. How to open the battle, when to use light
cavalry and when to use artillery, when to attack, when to
give way, how to plan an ambuscade, how to retreat
knowledge of these things belongs no less to the debater
than to the military commander.
C. The work of preparation for debate is often very
different in many ways from that for written argument. In
preliminary reading, attention must be given to matters that
THE NATURE OF DEBATE 369
might under other conditions safely be neglected. In selecting

evidence, the choice must often be determined by the special
conditions; evidence that is good in an essay, is often in-
effective in spoken argument. In outlining the case, the
choice of the main headings and the arrangement of the points
must be planned, with regard to the exigencies and the
strategy of the contest. Then, also, preparation for the
refutation of an opponent's arguments must be much more
thorough. To attempt to make fixed and inexorable rules
for many of these processes would be a mistake; uniformity
of method in many phases of debating is undesirable, as well
as impossible. Consequently, the principles in the following
chapters are for the most part general rather than specific.
Further, it should be understood that debate is not a form
of argumentation entirely separate and distinct from other
forms. Every principle enunciated in the preceding chapters,
on argumentation in general, has full force in debate. The
suggestions to be given are merely additional.
D. " Contest debates " and debates in "real life." ' Let
us understand perfectly what is meant by debating. Broadly
speaking, wherever in this book we refer to debating, we

mean real debating the actual discussion of actual problems
in real life. It is as training for this sort of debating that a
course in debate should be conducted. (Indeed, the training
for the debates of real life is the ultimate purpose of the formal
contest debate.) But before proceeding to a careful consid-
eration of the general principles of debating, which are the same
in both "contest" and "real life" debates, let us consider
For full discussion of this topic see as follows in the Quarterly Journal
of Public Speaking: Editorial "A disconcerted editor and others," by J. M.
O'Neill, Vol. I, No. "Debating as related to non-academic life,'"
1, p. 79;
by W. H. Davis, Vol. I, No. 2, p. 105; Editorial by J. M. O'Neill, "Able
non-debaters," Vol. I, No. 2, p. 201; Editorial by J. M. O'Neill, "Judges
again,'' Vol. I, No. 3, p. 305; "Is debating primarily a game?" by W. H.
Davis, Vol. II, No. 2, p. 171; Editorial by J. M. O'Neill, "Game or Counter-
feit Presentment," Vol. II, No. 2, p. 193; Some of the material used in this
chapter was first published in these editorials. J. M. O'N.
some of the limitations of contest debating. There are cer-
tain differences in attending circumstances, between con-
tests and real life, which necessitate a different conception as
to the immediate purpose of the contests and proper manner
of judging them.
. 1. The immediate purpose of each type. The broad ob-
jects back of contest debating are properly the training and
valuable experience received by each one participating, the
reward of merit to students who excel in class work and
trials, the setting of good examples of debating before large
bodies of students, etc. But the immediate purpose of the

debaters in any given contest is, and should be, to demon-
strate their superior ability (in debate) over their opponents.
Keeping this truth in mind will help to clear up many dif-
ficultiesand misconceptions in regard to contest debating.
The immediate purpose of any debate in real life, on the
other hand, is to bring about the light settlement of the ques-
tion. The judges should be concerned with nothing else.
The decision in "real life" should be on "the case" not
on the ability of the debaters concerned. In contest debating
such a purpose is obviously not aimed at, and therefore a
decision on "the case" is highly undesirable. Here the deci-
sion should always be on the comparative ability of the debaters
on the opposing teams. This statement does not mean that
in regard to the principles of argumentation already discussed
(or the additional principles of debating presented in this
section), there is any fundamental difference in real life and
in contest debates. But in one situation debating is to be
judged, in the other the question is to be settled. The same
rules and principles apply to the debating in both situations.
As far as the debaters and audience are concerned the con-
test should be conducted exactly as though the audience were
But the judges should award the debate
to settle the question.
to the team that has done the work better to the better

debaters not to the team they agree with as to the merits
of the case.
2. " Getting nearer to the truth " poor basis for contest
decision. A decision for an affirmative team should not
mean that the affirmative team "got nearer to the truth" as
it is sometimes put. It should mean that the affirmative team
is on the whole composed of better debaters than the negative
team. The trouble with the other basis for decisions is that
before the judges can determine which side is right which
side gets nearer the truth they must necessarily determine
what is right what the truth Of course the truth to any
is.
judge is the side of the question that he happens to believe

in. Surely, then, a team that argues directly away from the
truth has no chance against a team that argues for the truth,
no matter how feebly. So the result, in any case so judged,
must be that each judge will vote for the team that upholds
the side of the question that he happens to favor. Then the
decision records simply the private opinions of the judges on
the question discussed. Anyone interested in these opinions
could probably get them by mail at a great saving of time and
money. It is neither right nor complimentary to the judges
to expect them to have no opinions on the questions debated,
or to expect the debaters under the limitations of a contest
debate to change the opinions of the judges. The proper
question to be answered by the award "Which institution
is,
has the better debating team?" Each judge should know

enough about debating (regardless of his knowledge or opin-
ions in economics, politics, theology, etc.) to give an expert
opinion on the comparative ability of the opposing teams,
entirely aside from his private opinion on the question de-
bated, either before or after the deabte. Of course, judges
should be chosen who know enough about real debating to
know that skill does not consist in glibness of tongue, trickery
of phraseology, nor superficiality of thought.
3. Three types of decisions. What are the possible
types of There are three. A judge may conceiv-
decisions.''
ably vote in any one of three difPerent ways. He may. give

a "juryman's vote," a "legislator's vote," or a "critic's vote.'
a. The juryman's vote. A juryman is supposed to exclude
from his consideration all except the evidence duly admitted

in a given trial, and to vote on that regardless of his preju-
dices, convictions, evidence privately gained, or real feeling
as to right or wrong. His question is not "Is this defendant
really guilty?" but "Is this defendant guilty according to
the law and evidence advanced here in this trial?" Is this
the type of vote we want from a judge in an intercollegiate
debate? Decidedly not. First, the side having the burden
of proof would be almost sure to lose, simply because- the time
allowed is too short to prove the cases undertaken by the af-
firmatives in intercollegiate debate. There is time enough
for a good discussion, time enough for some fine training and
experience, time enough for a keen game, but not to prove
the case to jurymen who exclude all but the evidence of-
fered on that occasion. Second, it is bad to aim at this type
of decision, because it is practically impossible to get this atti-
tude of mind on the part of the judges. Even if men do some-
times perform this feat in the courtroom (when aided by the
rigidity of procedure, the rulings of the judge, the oaths, and
the immediate, recognized, important results of their deci-
sions) it is absurd to expect it in intercollegiate debate. So
the decision will be simply the juryman's opinion of the
merits of the question, his old opinions, perhaps strengthened
or weakened but essentially unchanged by the debate. So
his decision means nothing as far as the given contest is
concerned. The result is usually the same actually as that

discussed next ^the legislator's vote.
b. The legislator's vote is supposed to be strictly on the

merits of the question (as seen by himself or by a constituency
which has instructed him, usually the former). He is not
confined to the evidence offered in a given debate in the
house, but relies on all the information that he has. He
thinks (or is supposed to think) of what he has read, what
he has experienced, what he has heard elsewhere, and "all
things considered" he votes as he believes on the question.
THE NATURE OF DEBATE 373,
It is neither the case made out by one side, nor the skill of
the debaters in the discussion that determines his vote.

He believes so and so, and votes accordingly. It is self-
evident that such a registering of the judge's private beliefs

on the question is of no use in intercollegiate debate. It
has nothing to do with the work of the teams, and is usually
unrelated to what was done in the debate, because of the
impossibility of actually reversing a judge's opinion on a big
question in the time allowed.
c. The critic's vote. The other possibility (as far as we
know the only other one) is a critic's vote, or expert's vote,
giving expert opinion as to the comparative excellence of the
debating done. Such a judge knowing well all the limita-
tions of formal contest debating says when the contest is
over which side has the better team. This type of decision
is the only correct one. It is the orJy one that can be won
or lost by the debaters. Political creeds, social philosophies,
have nothing to do with it. The team doing the best work
not the team lucky enough to fit in with the beliefs of the
judges, gets the prize. Such decisions encourage good
genuine discussions, and discourage jockeying for judges and
aiming cases at the known predilections of the members of
the board. Of course, such critics' decisions should when-
ever possible be given by experts in debating. No one should
be called on to judge a debate who is unfamiliar with the
nature of such contests. Judges should be chosen as care-
fully as referees and umpires, and on same general grounds.
Of course, decisions should always be rendered by ballot
without consultation. The debating should all be done by
the team. The judges should judge without discussions.
(See Appendix C for sample ballot with instructions to
judges.)
4. Sport or game. The custom has grown in recent
years of referring to contest debating as a sport or a game}
This seems to us a proper thing because essentially true.
^ See footnote at beginning of this chapter.
This conception helps us to keep the right attitude toward it,
helps judges to decide on proper grounds, and frees us from

much cant and hypocrisy.
5. Another point on which
Convictions of the debaters.
there has been some confusion has been the question of the
convictions of debaters. There has been of late years much
careless talking on this point by people who have not under-
stood the conditions governing intercollegiate debates. They
fail to realize that the purpose of these contests is to afford
opportunity for keen competition and training for the discus-
sions of real life. The fear that a young man is morally in-
jured by debating on the side of the question which does not

coincide with his convictions has very little basis.
It is not the proper business of the colleges to turn out

"young men with ardent convictions on the side of the right,"
so far as the particular kind of questions usually used in in-
tercollegiate debates is concerned. 'VVhich is the "side of the
right" in the armament question? the tariff question? the
recall of judicial decisions? the ship-subsidy question? gov-
ernment ownership of railroads? Those who have college
debating in charge in the class room or as an extra-curricular
activity should not be, professionally, advocates of either
side. Sir Roger's judicial attitude is altogether better. It
is our business rather to see that that which "might be
said on both sides," be it little or much, is discovered,
analyzed, organized, and presented clearly, honestly, intel-
ligently.
It certainly is the duty of the colleges to turn out "young
men who can make a good argument" on either side of such
questions without regard to their convictions. Whether a
man idll argue against his convictions in actual life, where
the "merits of the question" are really to be decided, is a
very different thing. Surely he must be mentally capable of
doing it. To be able to argue well on one side of these eco-
nomic and political questions, a man must be capable of ar-
guing on the other side. Argument that is worth while has an
intellectual basis. is built upon facts and intelligent

It
inferences rather than on ardent convictions. Skill in the
use of the facts and inferences available may be gained on
either side of a question without regard to convictions. In-
struction and practice in debate should give young men this
skill. And where these matters are properly handled, stress
is not laid on getting the speaker to think rightly in regard
to the merits of either side of these questions but to think

accurately on both sides. Stress is laid on getting the student
to investigate thoroughly (which includes impartially), to
choose evidence wisely, to organize his case logically, and to
discuss it intelligently. While students are studying and
practicing for the purpose of gaining facility in these things,
the less attention paid to ardent convictions the better.
Requiring a student to present the best possible case for the
side of a political or economic question in which he thinks he
doesn't believe is to be highly recommended as an educative
process. If only all our lawmakers could be compelled to
undergo severe training in just this exercise how much
would be for them to distinguish facts from preju-
easier it
dices, and to learn to draw intelligent inferences from the
former and to disregard the latter. This is "vocational
training for conscienceless politics" in the same way that
studying pharmacy prepares students to become poisoners,
that athletics prepares for all sorts of physical violence,
and that medical colleges prepare for quackery and mal-
practice.
Of course we grant that the debater who can add to the
intellectual preparation mentioned above, real conviction
and emotional enthusiasm will have a better chance to show
his powers on the platform. We like him to have, whenever
possible (and appropriate), that true eloquence which Web-
ster says laborand learning toil for in vain. So in making
up contest teams in debate the convictions of the debaters,
when they have convictions, are probably always considered
^not, however, for the purpose of safe-guarding morals.
Since the triangular system (allowing each college to have a
team on each side) is almost universal now, it probably very
rarely happens that a student who has ardent convictions
talks against them in an intercollegiate contest. But it
would not undermine his moral character if he did.
6. The preparation of contest debates should be thorough.
Debaters who rely on glib talking to the exclusion of thor-
ough knowledge will be defeated in well-judged contests.
Debaters should know and follow the principles of argumen-
tation. Intelligent and effective debating follows them every-
where. The only coaching allowed should be done by* well-
trained teachers of argumentation and debate, and should

be confined to criticism and suggestion never going to ac-
tual work in getting up the debate. Students who do not
know already how to prepare a debate^who are not ac-
quainted with principles and conventions of argumentation
and debate should not be on debating teams. Supervision
and criticism by regular teachers ought to be good. Special
coaching by men hired for that purpose is usually bad. It
is well to have debates arranged in triangular leagues so
that each institution will have one team on each side of the
question. Then practice debates ^fuU debates can be had
frequently. This is the best possible preparation for the plat-
form. Speeches should not be written at all under these cir-
cumstances. The debaters should use an outline only, which

will grow and change as the case develops. Debaters so pre-
pared will be at home on the platform in the debate and
audiences will be spared that almost universally stupid pro-
duction a memorized speech in a debate.
E. The affirmative case. The work of the affii-mative
in a debate somewhat from that of the negative. The
differs
affirmative has the burden of proof in all properly worded
questions. The affirmative case then must establish the
affirmative of all issues all potential issues not admitted
by the negative. The question should be analyzed to find the
issues (see chapter 4). Then a partition should be decided
upon that will back up the affirmative of all issues on which

there is a fight.
F. The negative case. Four types. The negative, on
other hand, has a somewhat different problem. Sometime,
somehow, the negative mxist block at least one issue. This is
essential for any negative case. But as it is difficult to tell
just how effectively (in the opinion of others) one has suc-
ceeded in blocking any given issue, the negative usually wants
to put up as strong a case as the circumstances will allow not
as weak a case as will actually block the affirmative. The
negative usually fights on each possible issue that allows a
good chance of opposition. This gives an impression of
greater strength in the negative case as a whole. Viewed
from this standpoint there are four types of negative cases
possible.
1. Pure refutation. The first, and weakest, negative is
a case of pure refutation. The negative simply attacks what

the affirmative offers and seeks to destroy it without taking
any responsibility for " the situation." It in effect says to the
affirmative, "You are wrong, that's all. We are not saying
what is right, but your proposition is no good." It is simple
denial. It is simply resting on their presumption and trying
by pure refutation to prevent the affirmative from estabUsh-
ing a Tprima fade case. Such case, is, of course, only permis-
sible when it can be made out beyond any question. Where
it is possible to show the affirmative is hopelessly wrong that
may be all that is necessary for the time being. This type
should never be used when there is any good or truth at all
in the affirmative contentions. It is practically never found
in contest debating.
2. Defense of the present. The second type of negative is
a positive "defense of the present" (in addition to refutation
of course). The affirmative is wrong because no change is
needed at all. There is nothing wrong in the present situa-
tion. No crime has been committed. There is no graft, no
inefficiency. "Whatever is is right." This is little better
than pure refutation of the affirmative, but does have the
added element of actually defending the negati^'e presump-
tions. This might be called a "stand pat" case.
3. Adjustment. The third case is one of adjustment,
repairs, some changes, but not an adoption of the affirmative

ease. It is a liberal view of the situation, ready to make what
changes are necessary. Admitting the present is not perfect,
but still denying that the aflSrmative is right, it substantially
defends, the present. This is a very common type of nega-
tive in contest debating and everywhere else. This case is
also cumulative, adding "repairs" to "defense" and "ref-
utation."
4. Counter proposition. The most radical case possible
for a negative is that of a counter proposition. This is ad-
mitting that there is a situation which demands remedy,
admitting a cause for action, but advocating a different
remedy. The counter proposition is the most daring and
radical case. There are two principles that must always be
lived up to in this case (a) The counter proposition must be
:
stated with perfect clearness. The negative has to take the

burden of proof on this proposition, and and clear-
for safety
ness the proposition must be carefully worded and stated,
(b) A counter proposition must be counter. It must be in-
consistent with the proposition of the affirmative. If the
affirmative can say, "We
have no objection to the theory
proposed by the negative, but it does not answer our case,"
then the counter proposition is useless. It must, in order to
be any good, be antagonistic to that which the affirmative
case is advocating. It is an "affirmative defense" in legal
phrase, and must effectively negative the affirmative, as the
"affirmative defense" of insanity is a complete negative in
a murder trial. Here the defense takes the burden of proof
and has to prove insanity, while the prosecution takes the
viewpoint of the presumption of sanity, and becomes for the
time a negative. This situation must be paralleled in general
argumentation when we are using a counter proposition.
It is the duty of the negative to clash with the affirmative,

therefore if the counter proposition is su.^h that the affirma-
tive can accept it the negative is responsible for the failure
to meet. It is not enough that the counter proposition be
different; it must be vitally inconsistent with the affirmative

plan.
G. Personal attitude and bearing. Personality counts
for a great deal in debate,and problems in personal bearing
and personal attitude siiggest themselves generally through-
out the whole course of the debate. It is deemed well, there-
fore, to present here, before taking up the different parts of
the debate, certain considerations and illustrations of personal
attitude and bearing in debate.
1. The personal tone to be cultivated in debate is a serious
matter, and a matter concerning which many flagrant mis-
takes are made. The personal element in debate is large.
There the speaker usually stands as the immediate sponsor
for all that he says and does; he is an advocate, personally
responsible for every opinion he advances: the man and the
cause are inextricably bound together. This condition of
affairs has two results; the first is, that the audience will be
greatly influenced by the personality of the speaker; the
second, that there is a temptation to attack an opponent for
his personality as well as for the principles he advocates.
The two main purposes of a debater are to win sympathy for
himself and his cause and to discountenance his opponent
and the opposing cause. But two pur-
uilfortunately these
poses may conflict with each other. and Sarcasm, ridicule,
even personalities are undoubtedly admissible and helpful,
under certain circumstances and when properly handled, in
discrediting an opponent; but inappropriately introduced or
improperly handled, they are as harmful in discrediting the
man who uses them. These are dangerous weapons, treach-
erously two-edged a blow well directed will cut and
: maim an
enemy, but a slip or a blunder will surely turn the blow against
its author. With respect to personalities, i. e., attacks on the
-

character or actions of a man, Shakespeare offers a good
motto :
". . . Beware
.
Of entrance to a quarrel; but, being in,

Bear't that the opposed may beware of thee."
An audience always sympathizes with the man who sticks to

the question and treats his "friends of the other side" with
courtesy and good humor; if a case cannot be won on its
merits, rarely can it be won by resort to personalities. On

the other hand, an audience invariably respects a man who
can defend himself, and who has in him the spirit of fight
that resents a foul blow. A debater must never give ground,
even if his opponent resorts to weapons that he himseK scorns
to use. In repelling such a personal attack there is one tempt-
ation, the temptation to answer abuse with abuse. The
man who has the quarrel forced on him has the sympathy of
the audience at the start, and, if he is wise, he will take care
to retain that sympathy by keeping his dignity and self-
control. If he descends to the level chosen by his assailant,
and combats poison with poison, he has thrown away his

advantage and must fight on even terms. A model of per-
sonal tone may be found in Lincoln's conduct of his debate
with Douglas. Fully to appreciate his good-humored self-
control and his simple, but resolute, dignity, requires the
reading of the speeches of Senator Douglas, filled as they are
with misrepresentation and personal abuse. In his speech at
Springfield, July 17, Mr. Lincoln said:
"Having made that speech with the most kindly feeling toward
Judge Douglas, as manifested therein, I was gratified when I found
that he had carefully examined it and had detected no error of
fact, nor any inference against him, nor any misrepresentations, of
which he thought fit to complain. In neither of the two speeches
I have mentioned did he make any such complaint. I will thank
any one who will inform me that he, in his speech to-day, pointed
out anything I had stated, respecting him, as being erroneous. I

presume there is no such thing. I have reason to be gratified that

the care and caution used in that speech left it so that he, most of
all others interested in discovering error, has not been able to point
out one thing against him which he could say was wrong. He seizes
upon the doctrines he supposes to be included in that speech, and
declares that upon them will turn the issue of this campaign. He
then quotes, or attempts to quote, from my speech. I will not say
that he wilfully misquotes, but he does fail to quote accurately. His
attempt at quoting is from a passage which I believe I can quote
accurately from memory. I shall make the quotation now, with
some comments upon it, as I have already said, in order that the
judge shall be left entirely without excuse for misrepresenting me.
I do so now, as I hope, for the last time. I do this in great caution,
in order that he repeats his misrepresentations, it shall be plain
if
to a11 that he does so wilfully. If, after all, he still persists, I shall
be compelled to reconstruct the course I haVe marked out for myself,

and draw upon such humble resources as I have for a new course,
better suited to the real exigencies of the case. I set out, in this
campaign, with the intention of conducting it strictly as a gentle-
man, in substance at least, if not in the outside polish. The latter
I shall never be, but that which constitutes the inside of a gentle-
man I hope I understand, and am not less inclined to practise than
others. It was my purpose and expectation that this canvass would
be conducted upon principle, and with fairness upon both sides,
and it shall not be my fault if this purpose and expectation shall
'
be given up.
Later, in his opening speech in the sixth joint debate, at

Quincy, October 13, he said:
"He reminds me of the fact that he entered upon this canvass

with the purpose to treat me courteously; that touched me some-
what. It sets me was aware, when it was first agreed
thinking. I
that Judge Douglas and I were to have these seven joint discus-
sions, that they were the successive acts of a drama perhaps I
should say, to be enacted not merely in the face of audiences like
this, but in the face of the nation, and to some extent by my relation
to him, and not from anything in myself, in the face of the world;
' Lincoln-Douglas Debates, p. 58.
and I am
anxious that they should be conducted with dignity and
in the good temper which should be befitting the vast audience
before which it was conducted. But when Judge Douglas got home
from Washington and made his first speech in Chicago, the evening
afterward I made some sort of reply to it. His second speech was
made at Bloomington, in which he commented upon my speech
at Chicago, and said that I had used language ingeniously contrived
to conceal my words to that effect. Now, I under-
intentions, or
stand that this an imputation upon my veracity and candor.
is
I do not know what the Judge understood by it; but in our first
discussion at Ottawa he led off by charging a bargain, somewhat

corrupt in character, upon Trumbull and myself that we had en-
tered into a bargain, one of the terms of which was that Trumbull
was to abolitionize the old Democratic party, and I (Lincoln) was

to abolitionize the old Whig party I pretending to be as good an
old-line Whig as ever. Judge Douglas may not understand that
he implicated my truthfulness and my honor when he said I was
doing one thing and pretending another; and I misunderstood him
if he thought he was treating me in a dignified way, as a man of
honor and truth, as he now claims he was disposed to treat me.

Even after that time, at Galesburgh, when he brings forward an
extract from a speech made at Charleston, to prove that I was trying

to play a double part that I was trying to cheat the public, and
get votes upon one set of principles at one place and upon another

set of principles at another place I do not understand but that he
impeached my honor, my veracity, and my candor, and because he
does this, I do not understand that I am bound, if I see a truthful
ground for it, to keep my hands off him. As soon as I learned that
Judge Douglas was disposed to treat me in this way, I signified in
one of my speeches that I should be driven to draw upon whatever
of humble resources I might have to adopt a new course with him.
I was not entirely sure that I should be able to hold my own with
him, but I at least had the purpose made to do as well as I could
upon him; and now I say that I will not be the first to cry 'hold.'
I think it originated with the Judge, and when he quits, I probably
will. But I shall not ask any favors at all. He asks me, or rather
he asks the audience, if I wish to push this matter to the point of
personal difficulty. I tell him, no. He did not nâke a mistake in
one of his early speeches, when he called me an 'ainiable' man,

though perhaps he did when he called me an 'intelligent' man. It

really hurts me very much to suppose that I have wronged anybody
on earth. I again tell him, no! I very much prefer, when this can-
vass shall be over, however it may result, that we at least part with-
out any bitter recollections of personal diflSculties.
"The Judge, in his concluding speech at Galesburg, says that
I was pushing this matter to a personal difficulty, to avoid the
responsibility for the enormity of my principles. I say to the Judge
and this audience now, that I will again state our principles as well
as I hastily can in all their enormity, and if the Judge hereafter
chooses to confine himself to a war upon these principles, he will
probably not find me departing from the same course." '
With these models of personal dignity contrast the follow-

ing extract from the speech by Senator Pettit in the debate in
the Senate on the Fugitive Slave Law, June 26, 1854 :
"Now, sir, to give this clause of the Declaration of Independence

any other construction than that which I have given it, is an evi-
dent, a self-evident, a palpable lie. What is the language? That
"all men Are they created equally tall, equally
are created equal.'
broad, equally long, equally short? Are they created politically .
equal? Are they created physically equal? Are they created men-
tally equal? Are they created morally equal? ... I ask the chair,
then, whether the Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. Sumner), with
his odium on his lips, is the equal of his revolutionary sires? Is he
the equal of Adams, of Hancock, of Warren, who was the first
martyr iii the great cause of liberty, of freedom, and of union? Is he
the equal of these men? I had rather ask you, Mr. President, for
I think y(iu would answer 'no,' and he might answer 'yes.' . . .
I ask that Senator, then, or I ask you, sir, whether that Senator is
the equal of the late lamented Daniel Webster, who preceded him
here long years ago? ... I believe as a mere mental man and

I speak of him in no other capacity Webster had not his equal on
this continent, if he had in Europe or on any other continent. Is
that Senator his equal? He might as well say that the jackal is the
equal of the lion, or that the buzzard is the equal of the eagle.
"When you, sir (addressing Mr. Sumner) find no man beneath
you; those who are near you your own class of men can
when
find man beneath you; when you shall claim as your equal the
no
man who rolls in the gutter, whom God has deprived in his own
organization and creation of all mental power and capacity; when
you shall claim that he who wallows in the gutter with the vilest
and most worthless is your equal, then your interpretation of the
doctrine is true. Let me go farther. If the Almighty ever intended
to create the Senator the equal with the mighty and lamented
Webster, I must say that he made a gross blunder and a most
egregious mistake. Sir, I am inclined to believe that, in a
. . .
moral point of view, that Senator cannot find one beneath himself,
taking his own declaration to-day. He who will swear here in this
body, appealing to God for the truth of what he says, to support
the Constitution of the Union, and then boldly proclaim that he
willnot do it, has sunk, in my estimation, to a depth of humiliation
and degradation which it would not be enviable for the veriest serf
or the lowest of God's creatures to occupy. It may be in that point
of view the Senator regards all others as his equal; but there are
some who are not willing to regard that Senator as their equal, and
who will never be coerced into any such admission." ^
2. Self-control. The difference between these two

speeches is the difference between gentlemanly self-control
and coarse vituperation. A debater must never allow himself,
no matter how great the provocation, to be carried over the
bounds that confine the gentleman; coarseness, even though
it appear but for a moment, is always harmful. Coarseness
in debate is most often a matter of loss of temper. A man of
low character may be expected to show forth his nature at
any time; but for any high-minded man, the thing that
usually brings him to grief is the loss of his temper. Good
humor is a great asset in any controversy. He who loses his
temper in a debate, loses his best defense. One can be in-
dignant, offended, disgusted, without loss of temper. Any
loss of control, any exhibition of anger and peevishness is
almost sure to detract. A

debater should learn how to be
"severe and parliamentary at the same time."
' Congressional Debates, Vol. i88. Part II, p. 1518.
3. Sarcasm and ridicule. Good humor is even more nec-

essary if one is to use sarcasm or ridicule. The line must not
be drawn so strictly against these weapons as against per-
sonalities pure and simple. Sarcasm in a skilful hand is a
formidable weapon, and ridicule can often wia a point where
nothing else would avail. But it must always be remembered
that these are light arms. They are fine- wrought, flexible
foils, and they must be wielded with a light hand. They
are not suited for the slashing and cutting of broad-sword
play. To fence with them a man must be quick, light of
hand, and, above all, cool and self-controlled. Some men
cannot use sarcasm and ridicule at all, and no man can afford
to use them carelessly. Ill temper in the use of these weapons
is both careless and clumsy. It always results in a wild aim
and looks like foul play. Sarcasm and ridicule are most
effective when directed against conceit and affectation.
A speaker who allows his conceit to rise to the surface, or
who assumes a tone of grandiloquence or bombast, has ex-
posed a weak spot in his armor. And there is no weapon
that will so readily find the spot and strike through it as one
of these light side-arms of forensic combat. The following
is one of the best illustrations of the use of ridicule that can
be found in American oratory. It is so interesting and so

worthy of study with respect to its general tone, its vivid
rhetoric, and its telling choice of figures of speech as to justify
the giving of the passage nearly in full. A certain General
Crary, on February 14, 1840, in the debate in the House on
the Cumberland Road Bill, attacked General William Henry
Harrison for alleged deficiencies as a military commander,
severely criticising his conduct of the battle of Tippecanoe
and of various other campaigns. Thomas Corwin of Ohio
replied in a speech of which the following is a part. Mr.
Crary was so overwhelmed that John Quincy Adams, a few
days after, referred to him as "the late Mr. Crary."
"In all other countries, and in all former times, a gentleman who
would either speak or be listened to on the subject of war, involving
subtle criticisms and strategy, and careful reviews of marches, sieges,
battles, regular and casual, and irregular onslaughts, would be
required to show, first, that he had studied much, investigated
fully, and digested the science and history of his subject. But here,
sir, no such painful preparation is required; witness the gentleman
from Michigan! He has announced to the House that he is a militia

general on the peace establishment! That he is a lawyer we know,
tolerably well read in Tidd's 'Practice' and Espinasse's 'Nisi Prius.'
These studies, so happily adapted to the subject of war, with an
appointment in the militia in time of peace, furnish him at once
with all the knowledge necessary to discourse to us, as from high
authority, upon all the mysteries of the 'trade of death.' Again,
Mr. Speaker, it must occur to every one, that we, to whom these
questions are submitted and these military criticisms are addressed,
being all colonels at least, and most of us, like the gentleman him-
self, brigadiers, are, of all conceivable tribunals, best qualified to
decide any nice points connected with military science. I hope
the House will not be alarmed with the impression that I am about
to discuss one or the other of the military questions now before us
at length, but I wish to submit a remark or two, by way of preparing
us for a proper appreciation of the merits of the discourse we have
heard. I trust we are all brother-officers, that the gentleman from
Michigan, and the two hundred and forty colonels or generals of
this honorable House, will receive what I have to say as coming
from an old brother in arms, and addressed to them, in a spirit of
candor,
" 'Such as becometh comrades free.
Reposing after victory.'
"Sir, we all know the

military studies of the military gentleman
from Michigan before he was promoted. I take it to be beyond a
reasonable doubt that he had perused with great care the title page
of 'Baron Steuben.' Nay, I go further; as the gentleman has in-
cidentally assured us that he is prone to look into musty and neg-
lected volumes, I venture to assert, without vouching in the least
from personal knowledge, that he has prosecuted his researches so
far as to be able to know that the rear rank stands right behind the
front. This, I think, is fairly inferable from what I understood him
to say of the two lines of encampment at Tippecanoe. Thus we see,
Mr. Speaker, that the gentleman from Michigan, being a militia
THE NATVRE OF DEBATE 387
general, as he has told us, his brother officers, in that simple state-
ment has revealed the glorious history of toils, privations, sacrifices,
and bloody scenes, through which, we know from experience and
observation, a militia officer, in time of peace, is sure to pass. We
all in fancy now from Michigan in that most
see the gentleman
dangerous and glorious event in the life of a militia general on the

peace establishment a parade day! That day, for which all the
other days of his life seem to have been made. We can see the

troops in motion umbrellas, hoes, and axe-handles, and other like
deadly implements of war, overshadowing all the fields, when lo!
the leader of the hosts approaches!
" 'Far off his coming shines!'
His plume, which, after the fashion of the great Bourbon, is of

awful length, reads its baleful history in the bereaved necks and
bosoms of forty neighboring henroosts. Like the great Suwaroff,
he seems somewhat careless in forms or points of dress; hence his
epaulettes may be on his shoulders, back, or sides, but still gleaming,
gloriously gleaming in the sun. Mounted he is, too, let it not be
forgotten. Need I describe to the colonels and generals of this
honorable House the steeds which heroes bestride on these occa-
sions? No! I see the memory of other days is with you. You see
before you the gentleman from Michigan, mounted on his crop-
eared, bushy-tailed mare, the singular obliquity of whose hinder
limbs is best described by that most expressive phrase, 'sickle

hams' for height just fourteen hands, 'all told'; yes, sir, there
you see his 'steed that laughs at the shaking of the spear'; that is
his war horse, 'whose neck is clothed in thunder.' Mr. Speaker,
we have glowing descriptions in history of Alexander the Great
and his war horse Bucephalus, at the head of the invincible Mace-
donian phalanx; but sir, such are the improvements of modern times,
that every one must see that our militia general, with his crop-eared
mare with bushy tail and sickle hams, would totally frighten off a
battle fidd a hundred Alexanders. But, sir, to the history of the
parade day. The general, thus mounted and equipped, is in the
field and ready for action. On the eve of some desperate enterprise,
such as giving order to shoulder arms, it may be, there occurs a

crisis, one of those accidents of war, which no sagacity could foresee
nor prevent. A cloud rises and passes over the sun! Here is an


occasion for the display of that greatest of all traits in the history
of a commander the tact which enables him to seize upon and
turn to good account unlooked-for events as they arise. Now for
the caution wherewith the Roman Fabius foiled the skill and
courage of Hannibal! A retreat is ordered, and troftps and general,
in a twinkling, are found safely bivouacked in a neighboring' gro-
'
cery."
With respect to all three' of the methods mentioned above,

viz., personalities, sarcasm, and ridicule, it is to be remarked
that they are only occasional weapons. They
are not sub-
stitutes for proof or for the substance of argument. They
are merely auxiliaries. It is often easier to malign or laugh
at an opponent than to answer him, but it does not accom-
plish the same end.
4.Personal inconsistency. The charge of personal in-
sistency belongs in debate more truly than elsewhere. As
we have already seen, in debate the speakers generally stand
as personally responsible advocates of the opinions they
espouse. Consequently, if it can be shown that a speaker
is inconsistent in his opinions, the shot often strikes home.
If it is proved that a speaker upholds views that he formerly

condemned, or that his actions belie his words, his motives
are clearly impeached and his sincerity or veracity is at least
open to suspicion. This charge may be used as a means of
ridicule, making light of the pretended earnestness of an
opponent, or it may be, used as the foundation of a serious
charge of fraud or hyprocrisy. Lincoln used it in his speech
at Chicago, July 10, to ridicule an excess of oratorical enthu-
siasm on the part of Senator Douglas. Speaking of the
Dred Scott Decision, he said:
"The sacredness that Judge Douglas throws around this decision,

is a degree of sacredness that has never been before thrown around
any other decision. I have never heard of such a thing. But. . .
Judge Douglas will have it that all hands must take this extraor-
' Hardwicke, History of Oratory and Orators, pp. 368-371.


been able to lay my hands on those proceedings, but I have seen
them, and I cannot be mistaken in their character. At that time,
sir, the Senator from Massachusetts entertained the very sentiments
in relation to the tariff which the South now entertains. We next

find the Senator from Massachusetts expressing his opinion on the
tariff as a member of the House of Representatives from the city
of Boston in 1824. On that occasion, sir, the gentleman assumed a

position which commanded the respect and admiration of his coun-
try. He stood forth the powerful and fearless champion of free
trade. He met, in that conflict, the advocates of restriction and
monopoly, and they 'fled from before his face.' With a profound
sagacity, a fulness of knowledge, and a richness of illustration that
has never been surpassed, he maintained and established the prin-
ciples of commercial freedom on a foundation never to be
shaken. . Then it was that he erected to free trade a beautiful
. .
and enduring monument, and 'inscribed the marble with his name.'
It is with pain and regret that I now go forward to the next great
era in the political life of that gentleman, when he was found upon
the floor supporting, advocating, and finally voting for the tariff of
1828 that 'bill of abominations.' By that act, sir, the Senator
from Massachusetts has destroyed the labors of his whole hfe, and
given a wound to the cause of free trade, never to be healed. Sir,
when I recollect the position which that gentleman once occupied,
and that which he now holds in public estimation, in relation to
this subject, it is not at all surprising that the tariff should be
hateful to his ears. Sir, if I had erected to my own fame so proud a
monument as that which the gentleman built in 1824, and I could
have been tempted to destroy it my own hands, I should hate
with
the voice that should ring 'the accursed tariff' in my ears. I doubt
not the gentleman feels very much in relation to the tariff as a
certain knight did to 'instinct,' and with him would be disposed to
exclaim
"'Ah, no more of that Hal, and thou lov'st me.'" ^
It is evident that in some kinds of debate this particular

form of attack finds no place. In intercollegiate debate, or
before a jury, it is rarely opportune, because the personal
' Debates in Congress, Vol. VI, Part I, p. 49. Gales and Seaton, Washing-
ton, 1830.


been able to lay my hands on those proceedings, but I have seen
them, and I cannot be mistaken in their character. At that time,
sir, the Senator from Massachusetts entertained the very sentiments
in relation to the tariff which the South now entertains. We next

find the Senator from Massachusetts expressing his opinion on the
tariff as a member of the House of Representatives from the city
of Boston in 1824. On that occasion, sir, the gentleman assumed a

position which commanded the respect and admiration of his coun-
try. He stood forth the powerful and fearless champion of free
trade. He met, in that conflict, the advocates of restriction and
monopoly, and they 'fled from before his face.' With a profound
sagacity, a fulness of knowledge, and a richness of illustration that
has never been surpassed, he maintained and established the prin-
ciples of commercial freedom on a foundation never to be
shaken. . Then it was that he erected to free trade a beautiful
. .
and enduring monument, and 'inscribed the marble with his name.'
It is with pain and regret that I now go forward to the next great
era in the political life of that gentleman, when he was found upon
the floor supporting, advocating, and finally voting for the tariff of
1828 that 'bill of abominations.' By that act, sir, the Senator
from Massachusetts has destroyed the labors of his whole hfe, and
given a wound to the cause of free trade, never to be healed. Sir,
when I recollect the position which that gentleman once occupied,
and that which he now holds in public estimation, in relation to
this subject, it is not at all surprising that the tariff should be
hateful to his ears. Sir, if I had erected to my own fame so proud a
monument as that which the gentleman built in 1824, and I could
have been tempted to destroy it my own hands, I should hate
with
the voice that should ring 'the accursed tariff' in my ears. I doubt
not the gentleman feels very much in relation to the tariff as a
certain knight did to 'instinct,' and with him would be disposed to
exclaim
"'Ah, no more of that Hal, and thou lov'st me.'" ^
It is evident that in some kinds of debate this particular

form of attack finds no place. In intercollegiate debate, or
before a jury, it is rarely opportune, because the personal
' Debates in Congress, Vol. VI, Part I, p. 49. Gales and Seaton, Washing-
ton, 1830.
opinions of the speakers ia these situations have httle "to

do with the case." The speakers are merely instruments of
competition or of justice, in presenting whatever is to be said
on either side of the question, and so are not open to personal
attacks.
CHAPTER 17
THE MAIN SPEECHES
OUTLINE
A. Main speeches and brief.
B. Preparatory practice.
C. Divisions of debate.
1. The introduction.
a. First affirmative.
b. First negative.
(I) Adapt to circumstances.
c. Definitions.
d. Issues.
e. Partition.
2. The discussion.
a. Main heads.
b. Repetition.
c. Summaries and partitions.
d. Asking questions.
(I) To get definite answers.
(II) To waste time.
(III) To force into a dilemma.
3. The conclusion.
a. Strategy.
b. Summary.
c. Balanced summary.
A. Main speeches and brief. The main speeches in

any debate should not be planned until after a complete
brief of the case has been prepared. The brief should, of
course, be one, not threci even if there are three speakers.
This is true both of contest debates and actual debates in the
affairs of hfe. There should be one complete brief of the
case. Then this brief should be divided as seems best among
392

THE MAIN SPEECHES 393
whatever number of speakers is to present the case. Each

speaker should take his section and prepare an outhne of it,
and talk from the The brief should not be taken as the
outline.
necessary outline of the case. Speeches delivered from a good
brief as an outline are apt to be wooden and tiresome.
B. Preparatory practice. The practice in preparation
for contest debate should consist of numerous debates be-
tween opposing teams. The now almost universal plan of
triangular debates makes this feasible, as each institution
has a team on each side. Each team should try all possible

schemes of attack and defense always covering in. some way
or other the case as briefed, but using as many different kinds
of outlines as can be invented. A speaker who is at all fluent
and quick-witted should rarely even write a manuscript in
preparation for a debate. He should debate from an outline
as often as possible and learn to adapt his remarks to what-
ever form the discussion takes. Probably, if slow-minded and
halting speakers must go into contest debates, they will have
to write and memorize their arguments, but this is hardly
worth calhng debating, and should always be given little
credit by judges of contest debates. In class work in de-
bates no student should ever write a manuscript.^ Briefs
and outlines should be the only " paper basis" for class
debates.
C. Divisions of the debate. The debate should be one
should have absolute unity. It should be fundamentally
the same if by one or two or three speakers. We,
delivered
therefore, discuss the main speeches here from the stand-
point of introduction, discussion, and conclusion, not from
that of first, second, and third speaker. If there are three
speakers, the first usually gives the introduction and part
of the discussion, the second more of the discussion, and the
third the rest of the discussion and the conclusion. The situa-
' Please note that this is not saying that practice in written argumentation
is not valuable. It is; and should be indulged in before students take a
course in debating. It is not the best preparation for a debate.

tion will not be essentially different with one or two or even
four speakers on a side.
1. The Introduction
a. First aflBrmative. In a debate to have the first speech
is a privilege. This privilege, which arises from the influence
of the speech upon the remainder of the debate, is twofold.
First, the speaker has an opportunity to rnake the first im-
pression on the audience; and, secondly, he has an opportu-
nity to direct the course of the debate. This, then, is the duty
of a speaker opening a debate, whom, for convenience, we
wiU call the "first speaker on the aflirmative," viz, to win a
fair hearing for himself and his side of the proposition. Posi-
tive persuasion to win sympathy is usually dangerous here,
but what we have called negative persuasion is of the
utmost importance. Avoid giving an unfavorable impres-
sion. Be clear, calm, reasonable, fair to opponents, accurate
and thorough in explanations. In this manner explain the
case, set forth the issues, accept the burden of proof, out-
line your case as far as seems advisable, and then start the
argument. It often happens in debate that there is one
method of analyzing and discussing the question that is ad-
vantageous to the affirmative, and another method that is
advantageous to the negative. Consequently, to force an
opponent to discuss the question according to your plan,
to compel him to fight you on your own grounds, is a point
won. To return to a military comparison, in war it is a great
advantage to be able to have the choice of position; and this
advantage generally goes to the army that is first on the field.
A well-prepared, aggressive first speaker can so explain the
origin and history of the question, and so present the issues,
as to compel his opponent to accept his analysis of the case,
provided of course that he presents a fair and legitimate
interpretation, but a weak or apologetic opening affirmative
may well miss this opportunity, and allow the negative
practically to control the discussion. By such an opening
the affirmative can lose its chief advantage over the negative.
The affirmative should remember that the proposition, and
the burden of proving it, is theirs; it is their case. They have
a right (within the limits of legitimate interpretation), to
establish it as they see fit. To allow the negative to take this
opportunity away from them is an indication of great incom-
petence. Rhetorically, an opening speaker should use a grac-
ful and finished, but never ornate or "high-flown," diction.
His general tone should be conciliatory. Above all, his ex-
position should be lucid and interesting, avoiding fine dis-
tinctions and technicalities in explaining the question.
b. First negative. The duty of the speaker in opposition,
who may be on the negative," is
called the "first speaker
clear. He may adopt the same tone and rhetorical style as

the opening speaker, clear, smooth, and conciliatory; or he
may under some circumstances, take a diflferent attitude, an
attitude of open belUgerency from the start. But he must,
whatever the method, attempt to counteract the influence of
his opponent who has introduced the debate. This is a diffi-
cult task, calling for tact and aggressive force. Sometimes,
though not often in contest debating, his opponent will have
excited the audience against him, or will have won their
sympathy for himself; then the speaker must counteract
these effects by the use of sarcasm, wit, invective, or what-
ever resources he may command. If the opening speaker
has seemed to establish an interpretation of the question
unfavorable to the negative, he must offer battle at the very
start, and overthrow this interpretation by showing that,
"the preceding speaker has misread history and misunder-
stood the facts," that he has "failed to present the real
issues involved," or " unfortimately failed to grasp the real
question," etc. Whatever the situation he finds left by his
opponent, he must adapt himself to it and attempt to change
it to his own advantage. He must take matters as he finds
them. The one thing that he must not do is to ignore what
has been said. He must not take the platform and start
his case as if nothing had been said. He is the second speaker
in the discussion, and unless he can adapt his speech to what
has been said, he is a very poor debater, whatever else he
may be. At such a time, a lecture or an essay is worse then
nothing. The whole value of the introduction of a first
speaker on the negative, depends on its adaptation to the
circumstances. Somehow he must recognize the interpreta-
tion of the first affirmative and either accept it as satisfac-
tory, or challenge it as unsound. If the latter, he must
proceed at once to show why unsound and to explain the in-
terpretation of the negative.
An illustration directly in point may be taken from the
famous Lincoln-Douglas debates of 1858. The circum-
stances of this controversy are well known. It occurred
during the most intense period of the slavery struggle,
just before the opening of the War of the Rebellion, The
country was stirred to a passionate interest, by the fight
in Congress over the admission of Kansas into the Union,
by the between slavery and anti-slavery factions in
conflict
that state, and by the Dred Scott decision, just declared by
the Supreme Court. Lincoln and Douglas were rival candi-
dates for an Illinois senatorship. They were recognized rep-
resentatives of the two great political factions of the North,
and the whole country soon became the spectators of the
contest. Douglas, in his opening speech at Chicago, July 9,
1858,had mentioned, "An unholy and unnatural alliance,"
and had advocated popular sovereignty, "the right of the
people of each territory to decide for themselves whether
slavery shall or shall not exist within their limits."
In Lin-
coln's replyhe "turned the tables" on Judge Douglas in a
typical Lincoln introduction leading up to the main issue.
"My fellow-citizens: On yesterday evening, the occasion of

the reception given
upon
them. During the course of his remarks my name was mentioned

in such a way as, I suppose, renders it at least nor improper that
I should make some sort of reply to
him. I shall not attempt to
follow him which he addressed the assembled
in the precise order in
multitude upon that occasion, though I shall perhaps do so in the
main.
"There was one question to which he asked the attention of the
crowd, which I deem of somewhat less importance at least of
propriety for me to dwell
upon than the others, which he brought
in near the close of his speech, and which I think it would not be en-
tirely proper for me to omit attending to, and yet if I were not to
givesome attention to it now, I should probably forget it altogether.
While I am upon this subject, allow me to say that I do not intend
to indulge in that inconvenient mode sometimes adopted in public
speaking, of reading from documents; but I shall depart from that
rule so far as to read a little scrap from his speech which notices
this first topic of which I shall
speak that is, provided I can find
it in the paper.
" 'I have made up my mind to appeal to the people against the
combination that has been made against me! the Republican leaders
have formed an alliance, an unholy and unnatural alliance, with a
portion of unscrupulous federal ofiBce-holders. I intend to fight
that allied army wherever I meet them. I know they deny the al-
liance, but yet these men who are trying to divide the Democratic
party for the purpose of electing a Republican Senator in my place,
are just as much the agents and tools of the supporters of Mr.
Lincoln. Hence I shall deal with this allied army just as the Rus-
sians dealt with the allied forces at Sebastopol that is, the Rus-
sians did not stop to inquire,when they fired a broadside, whether
it an Englishman, a Frenchman, or a Turk. Nor will I stop to
hit
inquire, nor shall I hesitate, whether my blows shall hit these
RepubUcan leaders or their allies, who are holding the federal offices
and yet acting in concert with them.'
"Well, now, gentlemen, is not that very alarming? Just to think
of it! right at the outset of his canvass, I, a poor, kind, amiable
gentleman, I am to be slain in this way. Why, my friend, the
Judge, is not only, as it turns out, not a dead lion, nor even a living
one he is the rugged Russian Bear!
"But if they will have it for he says that we deny it ^that

there is any such alliance, as he says there is and I don't propose
hanging very much upon this question of veracity but if he will

have it that there is such an alliance that the Administration men
and we are allied and we stand in the attitude of English, French
and Turk, he occupying the position of the Russians, in that case,
I beg that he will indulge us while we barely suggest to him that
these allies took Sebastopol. . . .
"Popular sovereignty! everlasting popular sovereignty! Let us

for a moment inquire into this vast matter of popular sovereignty,"
etc.!
(I) Adaptation to circumstances. We have said, that the

value of the introduction of a first speaker on the negative
depends upon the adaptation to circumstances. This is also
true of the introduction to any speech, after the opening
speech. The very essence of debate, as contrasted with
simple written argumentation, consists in seeing situations
and meeting them. A series of arguments on a proposition
does not necessarily constitute a debate. A debater who
demonstrates and argues regardless of what the opposition
is doing, is like who
lunges right and left without
a fencer
looking at his opponent. Very seldom is it safe to enter the
discussion without taking notice of what has been said and
done by preceding speakers, or without laying some founda-
tion of sympathy and understanding with the audience.
For example, contrast the two following introductions.
They are both from the same man, Senator Robert Y. Hayne
of South Carolina. They were both delivered in the same
debate, the debate in the Senate in 1830, on the famous
Foote Resolution. But there is this difference: the first is the
introduction to Mr. Hayne's opening speech; the second is
part of the introduction to a second speech, delivered at a
later stage of the discussion, after he had been attacked and
his position assailed by such senators as Benton and Webster.
The contrast shows the difference in tone and method adapted
to the different situations.
' Lincoln-Douglas Debates, pp. 14, 15.

Mr. Hayne's opening speech began as follows:
"It has been said, and correctly said, by more than one gentle-
man, that resolutions of inquiry were usually suffered to pass with-
OTit opposition. The parliamentary practice in this respect was
certainly founded in good sense and sound policy, which regarded
such resolutions as intended merely to elicit information, and there-
fore entitled to favor. But I carmot give my assent to the proposi-
tion so broadly laid down by some gentlemen, that because nobody
stands committed by a vote for inquiry, that,' therefore, every
resolution proposing an inquiry, no matter on what subject, must
pass almost as a matter of course, and that, to discuss or oppose
such resolutions, is unparliamentary. The true distinction seems
to be this: where information is desired as the basis of legislation,
or where the policy of any measure, or the principles it involves,
are really questionable,it was always proper to send the subject
to a committee for investigation; but where all the material facts

are already known, and there is fixed and settled opinion in respect
to the policy to be pursued, inquiry was unnecessary, and ought
to be refused. No one, he thought, could doubt the correctness of
the position assumed by the gentleman from Missouri, that no
inquiry ought ever to be instituted as to the expediency of doing
'a great and acknowledged wrong.' I do not mean, however, to
intimate an opinion that such is the character of this resolution.
The application of these rules to the case before us will decide my
vote, and every Senator can apply them for himself to the decision
of the question, whether the inquiry now called for should be
granted or refused. With that decision, whatever it may be, I
shall be contented.
"I have not risen, however, Mr. President, for the purpose of
discussing the propriety of instituting the inquiry recommended by
the resolution, but to offer a few remarks on another and much
more important question, to which gentlemen have alluded in the
course of this debate I mean the policy which ought to be pursued
in relation to the public lands. Every gentleman who has had a
two or three years, or even for the last
seat in Congress for the last
two or three weeks, must be convinced of the great and growing
importance of this question. More than half of our time has been
taken up with the discussion of propositions connected with the
,
400 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE '
public lands; more than half of our acts embrace provisions growing
out of this fruitful source. Day after day the changes are rung
on from the grave inquiry into the right of the new
this topic,
States to the absolute sovereignty and property in the soil, down
to the grant of a preemption of a few quarter sections to actual
settlers. In the language of a great orator in relation to another
'vexed question,' we may truly say, 'that year after year we have
been lashed round the miserable circle of occasional arguments and
temporary expedients!' No gentleman can fail to perceive that
this is a question no longer to be evaded; it must be met fairly
and fearlessly met. A question that is pressed upon us in so many
ways; that intrudes in such a variety of shapes; involving so deeply
the feelings and interests of a large portion of the Union; insinuating
itself into almost every question of public policy, and tinging the
whole course of our legislation, cannot be put aside or laid asleep.

We cannot long avoid it; we must meet and overcome it, or it will
overcome us. Let us, then, be prepared to encounter it in a spirit
of wisdom and of justice, and endeavor to prepare our own minds
and the minds of the people for a just and enlightened decision.
The object of the remarks I am about to offer is merely to call public
attention to the question, to throw out a few crude and undigested
thoughts, as food for reflection, in order to prepare the public mind
for the adoption, at no distant day, of some fixed and settled policy
in relation to the public lands. I believe that, out of the western
country, there no subject in the whole-range of our legislation
is
less understood, and in relation to which there exists so many

errors, and such unhappy prejudices and misconception.
"There may be said to be two great parties in this country, who
entertain very opposite opinions in relation to the character of the
policy which the Government has heretofore pursued, in relation
to the public lands, as well as to that which ought, hereafter, to be

pursued."
The introduction to his second speech, in part, was:
"When I took occasion, two days ago, to throw out some ideas
with respect to the policy of the Government in relation to the
pubUc lands, nothing certainly could have been farther from my
' Debates in Congress, Vol. VI, Part I, pp. 21-32.
thoughts than that I should be compelled again to throw myself

upon the indulgence of the Senate. Little did I expect to be called
upon to meet such an argument as was yesterday urged by the
gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Webster). Sir, I questioned
no man's opinions; I impeached no man's motives; I charged no
party, or State, or section of country, with hostiUty to any other;
but ventured, I thought in a becoming spirit, to put forth my own
sentiments in relation to a great national question of public policy.
Such was my course. The gentleman from Missouri (Mr. Benton),
it is true, had charged upon the Eastern States an early and con-
tinued hostility towards the West, and referred to a number of

historical facts and documents in support of that charge. Now,
sir, how have these different arguments been met.'' The honorable
gentleman from Massachusetts, after deliberating a whole night
upon his course, comes into this chamber to vindicate New England,
and, instead of making up his issue with the gentleman from Mis-
souri, on the charges which he had preferred, chooses to consider
me as the author of those charges, and, losing sight entirely of that
gentleman, selects me as his adversary, and pours out all the vials
of his mighty wrath upon my devoted head. Nor is he willing to
stop there. He goes on to assail th6 institutions and policy of the
South, and calls in question the principles and conduct of the State
which I have the honor to represent. When I find a gentleman of
mature age and experience, of acknowledged talents and profound
sagacity, pursuing a course like this, declining the contest offered
from the West, and making war upon the unoffending South, I
must believe, I am bound to believe, he has some object in view
that he has not ventured to disclose. Why is this? Has the gentle-
man discovered in former controversies with the gentleman from
Missouri that he is overmatched by that Senator? And does he
hope for a more easy victory over a more feeble adversary? Has
the gentleman's distempered fancy been disturbed by gloomy fore-
bodings of 'new alliances to be formed,' at which he hinted? Has
the ghost of the murdered Coalition come back, like the ghost of
Banquo, to 'sear the eye-balls" of the gentleman, and will it not
'down at his bidding'? Are dark visions of broken hopes, and
honors lost forever, still floating before his heated imagination?
Sir, if it be his object to thrust me between the gentleman from
Missouri and himself, in order to rescue the East from the contest
ithas provoked with the West, he shall not be gratified. Sir, I will
not be dragged into the defence of my friend from Missouri. The
South shall not be forced into a conflict not its own. The gentleman
from Missouri is able to fight his own battles. The gallant West
needs no aid from the South to repel any attack which may be
made on them from any quarter. Let the gentleman from Massa-
chusetts controvert the facts and arguments of the gentleman from

Missouri if he can; and if he win the victory, let him wear its
honors: I shall not deprive him of his laurels." '
c. Definition of terms in tlie introduction is especially

important in debate. We have seen that the purpose of
all preliminary definition is to enable the reader or hearer
readily to comprehend the terms used in the discussion. In
written argumentation, if the reader runs across a word or
phrase that he does not understand, he can pause and think
it over till he does understand, or he can even lay aside the
essay for a time until he can find out the meaning elsewhere.
But in spoken discourse it is different. The audience must
catch the meaning of every phrase and every idea as it falls
from the lips of the speaker, or they will not get it at all,
and the effect of the whole argument will be lost. Conse-
quently, the greatest care must be taken that no term is lef69 1270 Tm(h
sented, and they will be likely to remember it; but an au-

dience, left free to judge things according to their own pre-
vious knowledge and preconceived opinions, cannot be relied
on to judge rightly as to what is worth remembering. For
these reasons the issues should always be presented in the in-
troduction in some form, and further, it is wise to repeat them
in various forms in the discussion, keeping them always clearly
before the audience.
e. Partition in debate. The desirability of the partition
isalways a matter of judgment, depending entirely on the
circumstances. It always contributes to clearness; but it is
sometimes unwise to reveal in detail to the enemy the line
of attack you intend to pursue. There is no ethical considera-
tion that demands a full statement of plan at the very outset.
When to divulge matter should be determined by the cir-
cumstances. The interests of the audience and of your own

side should determine ^not the interests of your opponents.
The only thing demanded by ethics and good sportsmanship
is that you give your opponents time to ansiver each point,
provided they are prepared. You are under no obligation

to give them time to prepare an answer. This would only
encourage lazy and careless preparation. Each side should
be ready for anything the other side can say ând should
be given a fair chance to show they are ready. Sometimes
a distinct partition is impossible; for example, in the
Lincoln-Douglas debates a definite partition would have
been awkward and inappropriate, for no particular question
was under discussion, the debates being informal and ex-
temporaneous, and really but a running fight. In general a
partition of some kind is desirable, unless there is some objec-
tion to it, such as those suggested above. A partition need
not be formal in character; it does not necessarily imply a
division of the proof into three, four, or five parts, stating
exactly what is to be proved. The partition may be very
cursory and informal, merely suggesting for the sake of clear-
ness the general course to be followed in the discussion; for


example, in the following, taken from the introduction to
Charles Sumner's speech in the Senate, May 19 and 20, 1856,
on the "BiU for the Admission of Kansas into the Union,"
Mr. Sumner makes a partition, which adds greatly to the
clearness and force of the speech, but which, at the same
time, has no air of formality and reveals nothing of the char-
acter of the arguments to follow:
"Such is the Crime and such the criminal which it is my duty
to expose; and, by the God, this duty shall be done

blessings of
completely to the end. But this will not be enough. The Apologies,
which, with strange hardihood are offered for the Crime, must be
torn away, so that it shall stand forth without a single rag or fig-leaf
to cover its vileness. And, finally, the True Remedy must be
shown. The subject is complex in relations, as it is transcendent
in importance; and yet, if I am honored by your attention, I hope
to present it clearly in all its parts, while I conduct you to the
inevitable conclusion that Kansas must be admitted at once, with
her present Constitution, as a State of this Union, and give a new
star to the blue field of our National Flag. And here I derive
satisfactionfrom the thought that the cause is so strong in itself
as to bear even the infirmities of its advocates; nor can it require
anything beyond that simpUeity of treatment and moderation of
manner which I desire to cultivate. Its true character is such
that, Uke Hercules, it will conquer just so soon as it is recognized.
"My task will be divided under three different heads: first, THE
CRIME AGAINST KANSAS, in its origin and extent; secondly,
THE APOLOGIES FOR THE CRIME; and, thirdly, THE TRUE
REMEDY." 1
2. The Discussion
a. Main heads. In drawing a brief for use in debate, par-
ticular care should be taken in the selection of the main heads.
Not only should the question be divided accurately and
logically, but also attention should be given to the forms of
statement of the headings. These main headings are sure to
be the objective points of the attack of the other side, and
' Works of Charles Sumner, Vol. IV, pp. 143, 144.

they must be made strong enough to stand the shock. If an

opponent can force you to take back a phrase, or to acknowl-.
edge an exaggeration in any of your fundamental proposi-
tions, he has scored a point, and the audience will always
give him credit for it, often more credit than he really de-
serves. must never be
Carejessness or rhetorical flourish
permitted to make a main heading say either more or less
than exactly what is meant. Intrenchments are not built
because they look well, but because they can be held against
attack;main headings are not made because they sound well,
but because they offer definite points of resistance to an
opponent.
Senator Douglas, in the debates mentioned above, with
his habitually bombastic style of oratory, made many wild
charges and assertions. Often the point he aimed to establish
was valid, but, through carelessness or over-excitement, he
exaggerated. He had an able opponent, and every blunder
and every exaggeration was laid bare, much to his discom-
fiture and humiliation. Lincoln, on the other hand, as he
himself admitted in the discussion, prepared with sedulous
care the statement of every important proposition he ad-
vanced. His propositions were attacked and his attitude was
repeatedly misrepresented by Senator Douglas, but reply was
difficult; he had only to read the exact words of his former
speeches and reiterate his statements, thus at the same time

reenforcing his own position and exposing the trickery of his
opponent. For example, in the following selection Lincoln
replies to such an attack on one of his fundamental proposi-
tions:
"Out
of this Judge Douglas builds up his beautiful fabrication
of my
purpose to introduce a perfect, social, and political equality
between the white and black races. His assertion that I made an
'especial objection' ... to the decision (the Dred Scott decision)
on this account is untrue in point of fact.
"Now, while I am upon this subject, and as Henry Clay has

been alluded to, I desire to place mj'self in connection with Mr.


Clay as nearly right before this people as may be. I am quite aware
what the Judge's object is here by all these allusions. He knows
that we are before an audience, having strong sympathies south-
ward by relationship, place of birth, and so on. He desires to place
me in an extremely abolition attitude. He read upon a former
occasion, and alludes without reading to-day, to a portion of a
speech which I delivered in Chicago. In his quotations from that
speech, as he has made them upon former occasions, the extracts
were taken in such a way as, I suppose, brings them within the
definition of
what is called garbling taking portions of a speech
which, when taken by themselves, do not present the entire sense
of the speaker as expressed at the time. I propose, therefore, out
of that same speech to show how one portion of it which he skipped
over (taking an extract before and an extract after) will give a
different idea, and the true idea I ititended to convey. . . .
"Allow me briefly to present one extract from a speech of

. . .
mine, more than a year ago, at Springfield, in discussing this very

same question, soon after Judge Douglas took his ground that ne-
groes were not included in the Declaration of Independence :
" 'I think the authors of that notable instrument intended to

include all men, but they did not mean to declare all men equal
in all respects.They did not mean to say all men were equal in
color, size, intellect, moral development, or social capacity. They
defined with tolerable distinctness in what they did consider all

men created equal equal in certain inalienable rights, among which
are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. This they said, and
this they meant. They did not mean to assert the obvious untruth,
that all men were actually enjoying that equality, or yet, that
they were about to confer it immediately upon them. In fact,

they had no power to confer such a boon. They meant simply to
declare the right, so that the enforcement of it might follow as fast
as circumstances should permit.
" 'They meant to set up a standard maxim for free society which
should be familiar to all: constantly looked to, constantly labored
for, and even, though never perfectly attained, constantly approxi-
mated, and thereby constantly spreading and deepening its in-
fluence, and augmenting the happiness and value of life to all
people, of all colors, everywhere.'
"There again are the sentiments I have expressed in regard to

the Declaration of Independence upon a former occasion senti-

ments which have been put in print and read wherever anybody
cared to know what so humble an individual as myself chose to
'
say in regard to it."
b. Repetition. Another evidence of the skill of these

two debaters is found in the constant repetition by both, of
sentences and phrases containing their main propositions.
In speech after speech, and many times over in each speech.
Senator Douglas, repeated his cry of "popular sovereignty,
the right of the people of a State to settle the question of
slavery for themselves," and his demand for "obedience to
the decision of the highest tribunal in the land, the Supreme
Court." Lincoln we find reiterating with equal persistence
his statements that "a house divided against itself cannot
stand; this government cannot endure permanently half
slaveand half free"; that "slavery is wrong"; that "slavery
must be put where it was put at the foundation of the govern-
ment, in the course of ultimate extinction." It is well to bear
in mind in preparing a case, the desirability of this repetition
in oral debate. An audience cannot turn back to compare
statements and refresh memory. The speaker must by
various devices "keep his case up " clearly before the audience
all the time. Repetition is one of the most serviceable of
such devices. Every main heading should, as far as possible,
be stated in such rhetorical form that it can be easily and
forcibly repeated; it should be stated briefly and in clear and
simple language. Sometimes it is effective to compress the
idea into a single word or phrase; as, for illustration, Charles
Sumner did in his speech in the Senate on the " Crime against
Kansas," a speech referred to above:
"And with this exposure I takemy leave of the Crime against

Kansas. Emerging from all the blackness of this Crime, where we
seem to have been lost, as in a savage wood, and turning our back
upon it, as upon desolation and death, from which, while others


have suffered, we have escaped, I come now to THE APOLOGIES
which the Crime has found. . . .
"They are four in number, and fourfold in character. The first

is the Apology tyrannical; the second, the Apology imbecile; the
third, the Apology absurd; and the fourth, the Apology infamous;
that is all. Tyranny, imbecility, absurdity, and infamy all unite to
dance, like the weird sisters, about this Crime.
"The Apology tyrannical is founded on the mistaken act of Gov-
ernor Reeder, in authenticating the Usurping Legislature," etc.
Again, later in his speech, he said:
"As the Apologies were fourfold, so are the proposed Remedies

fourfold; and they range themselves in natural order, under designa-
tions which so truly disclose their character as even to supersede
argument. First, we have the Remedy of Tyranny; next, the Remedy
of Folly; next, the Remedy of Injustice and Civil War; and fourthly,
the Remedy of Justice and Peace. There are four caskets; and you
are to determine which shall be opened by Senatorial votes.
"There is the Remedy qf Tyranny, which, like its complement,

the Apology of Tyranny, though espoused on this floor, especially

by the Senator from Illinois, proceeds from the President, and is
embodied in a special message," etc'
This method has the virtue of vividness. Each of the

phrases chosen is and likely to stick in the memory;
striking
it can be readily repeated and almost turned into a sort of
war-cry. But care must be taken in choosing the phrase, to

see that it is appropriate and that it expresses the full mean-
ing of the speaker. Furthermore, the audience must always
be made to understand just what the phrase implies; the
word "heading" always suggests a name rather than a
'
proposition, and is liable to be vague or ambiguous if left
unexplained. Mr. Summer, in the speech quoted above, was
careful, in every case, to state in fair and full language the
exact proposition he intended to attack or support; for ex-
ample, after stating, as quoted above, the four apologies made
' Works of Charles Sumner, Vol. VI, pp. 184 and 185.

TEE MAIN SPEECHES 409
by his opponents, naming them,, respectively, "the apology

tyrannical, the apology imbecile, the apology absurd, and
the apology infamous," he goes on to explain the meaning
of each name as follows:
"Next comes the Apology imbecile, which is founded on the al-

legedwant of power in the President to arrest this Crime. It is
openly asserted, that, under existing laws, the Chief Magistrate
has no authority to interfere in Kansas for this purpose. . . .
"Next comes the Apology absurd, which is, indeed, in the nature
of pretext. It is alleged that a small printed pamphlet, containing
the '
Encampment and Regi-
Constitution and Ritual of the Grand
'
ments of the Kansas Legion,' was taken from the person of one
George F. Warren, who attempted to avoid detection by chewing
it. The oaths and grandiose titles of the pretended legion are also
set forth, and this poor mummery of a secret society, which existed
only on paper, is gravely introduced on this floor, in order to ex-
tenuate the Crime against Kansas. It has been paraded in more
than one speech, and even stuffed into the report of the Com-
mittee," etc'
c. Summaries and partitions. The desirability and proper

use of summaries and partitions in the discussion, has been
already treated in the chapters on Presentation. ^ But it
should be said here, in addition, that the best opportunity

and the greatest demand for using these artifices is found in
debate. Something of this kind is necessary to bring order
out of chaos. In the confusion of argument, answer, and
rejoinder, of evidence and counter evidence, of big things and
little things, crowded together and following one another in
rapid succession, the effect on the audience easily becomes

kaleidoscopic; they see the combinations of shapes and colors
tossing about before their eyes, but there is nothing in par-
ticular to be impressed by, or to remember. These defects
can be avoided in large measure by the
in
question and impress them clearly upon the attention and
memory. Furthermore, used in conjunction with partitions,
they keep the audience always informed just where they are
and where they are to be led next. At every turn in the course
of the debate there are many roads branching out in various
directions. A summary or a partition, or the two in combina-
tion, makes clear to the listener that he has reached the
end of one road and put it behind him, and that he is now
to turn in a certain new direction for a time. Particularly
when, some point has been discussed back and
in debate,
forth for a time between the opposing sides, it is almost
necessary to summarize what has been said on each side,
to compare the opposing proofs, and make clear what you
would have the audience believe is the result of it all. It is
only in this way that matters can be brought to some con-
clusion, and the audience made ready to turn their attention
elsewhere.
d. Asking questions. A common stratagem of debate is
the asking of questions. By not meant the figure of

this is
speech known as the "rhetorical question." The stratagem

consists rather in directly asking questions that really call for
an answer. This is usually engaged in during the give and
take of the discussion. The purposes of resorting to this
stratagem are three: (I) To compel an opponent to take a
definite position on some issue: (II) to tempt him to waste
time on him into a dilemma,
trivial matters, or (III) to force
where he may be caught whichever way he answers.
(I) To get definite answers. To accomplish the first of
these aims, the value of a question is obvious. A debater often
encounters an opponent whose power lies less in his ability
to prove an issue than in his ability to evade it. Such an
opponent is facile in shifting ground and can readily becloud
the point in dispute. He is like a cuttlefish that squirts the
water full of a black excretion and escapes in the darkness. In
exposing and cornering such a man, there is hardly a better
way to "pin him down" than to compress the point in issue
into a single, clear, direct question and demand an answer.

The question, of course, needs to be framed in such a way
that cannot be readily evaded or distorted from its intended
it
meaning; also, in asking the question, it should be presented

in such a forcible and imperative manner that a failure to
a.nswer will be unsafe. But, with these precautions, in the
face of a question clearly worded and strongly put, an oppo-
nent will find it difficult to evade the issue.
(II) To waste time. To propound questions for an oppo-
nent to waste time upon is good under some circum-
tactics
stances, and the is a good test
disposition of such a question
of a debater's ability. A question put with an air of taunt or
challenge is a great temptation; an inexperienced or impul-
sive debater may often be drawn into the trap of answering
at any cost. This trick is sometimes tried in intercollegiate
debate, where the time is limited and a waste of even a minute
is a serious matter. A debater should realize the nature of
this stratagem, not only in order to be able to try it himself,
'
but in order to be able to appreciate it when he is the intended
victim. There is one rule that is truly a golden rule for an
inexperienced debater, "Stick to the point." There are three
ways of evading such questions. One way is to ignore them,
a method which is sometimes not safe if the questions have
been well presented, and if the audience seems to be impressed
with them. Another is to avoid them by evasive ambiguous
answers, a method which calls for much tact and shrewdness.
The third, is to expose them by explaining the motives of the
propounder of the questions, to show that the questions are
not important, but merely intended as snares.
(III) To force into a dilemma. The third purpose that
may be served by the asking of a question is that of forcing
an opponent into a dilemma, where he may be caught, how-
ever he answers. Lincoln, with great shrewdness, drove
Senator Douglas into such a situation in the joint debates
in 1858. Briefly, the circumstances were these: Lincoln
assumed at the start a position of hostility to the Dred Scott


Decision, which declared, in substance, that Congress had no
power to exclude slavery from any of the territories. Senator
Douglas attacked Mr. Lincoln bitterly for his position in the
matter, declaring that any decision of the Supreme Court
was final and sacred, and that any man who rejected or de-
nounced such a decision was "unpatriotic, disloyal, revolu-
tionary," etc. It also happened that Mr. Lincoln had charged
Senator Douglas with being concerned with certain other
Democrats in a conspiracy to "nationalize slavery." He gave
evidence tending to expose such a conspiracy, and showed that
but one thing was wanted to make it complete, viz., a decision
of the Supreme Court, declaring that a state of the Union
could not exclude slavery from its limits; and he further-
more charged Senator Douglas with planning and working
to procure such a decision. Under the circumstances, Mr.
Lincoln propounded the following question " If the Supreme
:
Court of the United States shall decide that States cannot

exclude slavery from their limits, are you in favor of acquies-
ing in it, adopting it, and following it as a rule of political
action.''" Senator Douglas was caught. If he answered in
the affirmative, he seemed to substantiate the charge of con-
spiracy to get such a decision, and gave Mr. Lincoln an
opportunity to drive home his attack; on the other hand, if
he answered in the negative, he was committing the very act
which he had denounced in Mr. Lincoln as unpatriotic, revo-
lutionary and heretical, viz., opposing a decision of the
Supreme Court. But one course was open, and the wily
debater adopted it; he evaded the question. In his speech
at Freeport, August 27, he said:
"The third question which Mr. Lincoln presented is, if the

Supreme Court of the United States shall decide that a State of
this Union cannot exclude slavery from its own limits, will I submit
to it? I am amazed that Lincoln should ask such a question. ('A
schoolboy knows better.') Yes, a schoolboy does know better.
Mr. Lincoln's object is to cast an imputation upon the Supreme
Court. He knows that there never was but one man in America,
.
claiming any degree of intelligence or decency, who ever for a mo-

ment pretended such a thing. It is true that the Washington
Union, in an article published on the 17th of last December, did
put forth that doctrine, and I denounced the article on the floor
of the Senate in a speech which Mr. Lincoln now pretends was
against the President. The Union had claimed that slavery had a
right to go into the free states, and that any provision in the con-
stitution or laws of the free States to the contrary were null and
void. I denounced it in the Senate, as I said before, and I was the
first man who did. Lincoln's friends, Trumbull, and Seward, and
Hale, and Wilson, and the whole black Republican side of the
Senate, were silent. They left it to me to denounce it. And what
was the reply made to me on that occasion? Mr. Toombs of
Georgia got up and undertook to lecture me on the ground that
I ought not to have deemed the article worthy of notice, and ought
not to have replied to it; that there was not one man, woman, or
child south of the Potomac, in any slave State, who did not repu-
diate any such pretension. Mr. Lincoln knows that that reply was
made on the spot, aind yet he now asks this question. He might as
well ask me, suppose Mr. Lincoln should steal a horse, would I
sanction it; and it would be as genteel in me to ask him, in the
event he stole a horse, what ought to be done with him. He casts
an imputation upon the Supreme Court of the United States by
supposing that they would violate the Constitution of the United
States. I tell him that such a thing is not possible. It would be
an act of moral treason that no man on the bench could ever de-
scend to. Mr. Lincoln himself would never in his partisan feelings
so far forget what was right as to be guilty of such an act." ^
3. The Conclusion
With respect to the conclusion, little needs to be said more
than has already been said in the book on Presentation.
The importance of the conclusion in debate is obvious. It
is undoubtedly an advantage to be so placed as to be able
to direct the course of things to come; but it is a greater ad-

vantage to be so placed as to be able to review and sum up the
things that are past. To the last speaker is given the oppor-
tunity of leaving his interpretation of the facts, and his sum-
mary of the important points, fresh in the minds of his au-
dience. So that a closing speaker is even better situated than
an opening speaker, to obtain the acceptance of Ms method
of dividing the question and his statement of the issues; that
is, he is in such a position that he can finally persuade the
audience to look at the question through his eyes. Moreover,

on any contested point he has the privilege of the last word.
a. Strategy in conclusion. Oftentimes a speaker, if he
knows beforehand that he is to have the privileges of the final
reply, can with good effect hold some of his fire till the end
and surprise the enemy with new evidence when reenforce-
ment is badly needed. This is a bit of strategy that can be
practiced in many situations. For example, in intercollegiate
debate, or any similar prearranged contest where the number
and order of speakers is fixed, it is not unusual that one side
keeps back its best refutation of some point in the discussion
tiU its last speech. By this means the opposing side may
perhaps be led to think that the point has been conceded and
so be tempted to keep silence themselves. Again, it is a wise
stratagem when a speaker feels that he has the weaker end
of the proof on a point: if he reveals his answer too early, his
opponents may make a rejoinder arid lay bare the weakness;
but by waiting till later he shelters the weakest parts of his
case. When it is necessary to fight with crippled soldiers in
the ranks, they should be given the most protected positions.
It will, however, be kept clearly in mind that what is said in
this paragraph, when applied to rebuttal speeches, refers
only to answers that are to be made to opponents' arguments;
for it is generally conceded that a debater ought not to introduce
new positive arguments in his rebuttal. But one has a perfect

right to answer arguments when he pleases.
b. Summarizing. From the viewpoint of conviction, the
firstduty of a speaker who closes the argument for his side
of the case, is to summarize the whole proof. We have al-
ready spoken several times of the confusion natural to de-
bate, a confusion arising from the rapid succession of argu-

ments and evidence, and from the conflicts, crossings, and
interminglings of the proofs and ideas of both sides. We
refer to it again only to emphasize the value of concluding
summaries. After people have listened for any consid-
erable time, to the presentation of a mass of heterogeneous
facts and ideas, they need to have their conceptions of the
case as a whole straightened out again, and to have their
memories refreshed with a new understanding of the points
that are important. The auditors cannot be relied on to carry
in mind to the end the things that are vital; their vision is
sure to become clouded by details, and they turn with relief
to a man who will clear up matters and set them right. For
this reason the hearers can be counted on to give careful
attention to a concluding summary, and so they are more
likely to remember it than almost anything else in the debate.
The desirability of the summary is made greater by the fact
that, in the debate, the proof of either side is scattered along
through the discussion; it consequently becomes necessary,
if the proof is to be properly unified, that these broken threads
be woven together at the end by a summary. In some cir-

cumstances a mere recapitulation by the last speaker is not
enough. In debates where there is "team-work," it is often
desirable that each speaker in his conclusion should summa-
rize what has preceded. This keeps the hearers always in
close touch with the proof, and gives them an understanding
of just what is being accomplished at each forward step; then
when the end is finally reached, the case, as a whole, is em-
bedded in their minds, and the final much more
summary is
and effective.
intelligible The mistake may easily be made of
making a summary too long or too detailed. To be effective
it needs always to be direct, incisive, and as brief as is consistent
with clearness. To be diffuse or tediously technical destroys
the aggressive force that is indispensable. Any kind of
rec apitulation must be as sharp, as firm, and as bold as the
blows of the hammer. Such a conclusion is exemplified in
the following per oratio n of a speech by Sir Robert Peel, in the
debate in the House of Commons on the bill relieving the dis-
abilities of the Jews. It is especially to be noticed for its skil-
ful repetition and emphasis of the central idea of the whole
speech, viz., forgiveness and reparation for past wrongs:
"It is for these reasons because I believe it to be in conformity

with the enlarged and comprehensive spirit of the British Con-
stitution that these disqualifications should no longer exist; be-
cause I rejoice in the opportunity of making reparation for the
injuries and persecutions of former times; because I think the Jew
has fairly earned the privileges which it is proposed to extend to
him, by patience and forbearance, by tried fidelity and loyalty;
but above all, because I am a member of a Christian people, because
I am a member of a Christian legislature, I will perform an act
which I believe to be in strict conformity with the spirit and pre-
cepts of the Christian religion. We are commanded by that re-
ligion, as the condition of our own forgiveness to forgive those who
have trespassed against us. That duty is not in this case imposed
upon us; but there is another duty as sacred in point of moral
obligation, and more trying to human pride, namely, that we should
forgive those against whom we have trespassed. Sir, I shall give
my cordial support to the bill before the House." '
c. Balanced summary. Of all the forms of summaries

that may beused, the most effective in debate is "the bal-
anced summary," that which in an earlier part we have
called "amplifying and diminishing." The distinguishing
characteristic of debate is the directness of conflict between
the opposing sides. The audience is kept constantly balanc-
ing one argument against another and swaying back and
forth with the struggle of the contending factions. Conse-
quently in the end their judgment is always relative. It is
not that one side is strong or weak, but that it is on the whole
stronger or weaker than the other. So it is clearly wiser to
assist the audience in this comparison and try to make them
see the relative strength of the two sides as you wish them
1 World's Orators (England), Part III, p. 211.
to make the comparison by themselves, according to what-

ever standards may happen to be uppermost in their minds.
Sometimes, if a speaker feels that he has the weaker side of the
proof, it is more politic for him to leave his hearers in uncer-
tainty, and to cover up the logical conclusion that would

result from such a comparison. This is good tactics, for ex-
ample, when a man adopts a policy of obstruction, i. e., when
he finds that he has not a strong positive case, and so resorts
to the trick of lying in wait and throwing up objections
against his opponent. If all his objections were carefully
analyzed and logically summed up, they would not really
amount to much; so his only hope lies in the general discredit
he may throw upon In such a situa-
the proof against him.
tion he would suffer by a contrast of point with point, and
he would gain by leaving matters in confusion. This is, of
course, a great confession of weakness and is very danger-
ous with opponents good enough to recognize and expose it.
But, assuming that a speaker has a fair side of the argument,
to amplify and diminish is advisable. It makes the proof com-
plete and presents definitely a statement of the conclusion
that must be drawn. It is a final charge, where all the forces
of your own side are gathered together and thrown directly
against the enemy. A good illustration of its effectiveness
is found in the conclusion of Senator Douglas's speech at
Chicago, July 9, 1858:
"Thus you see, my fellow-citizens, that the issues between Mr.

Lincoln and myself, as respective candidates for the U. S. Senate,
as made up, are direct, unequivocal, and irreconcilable. He goes
for uniformity in our domestic institutions, for a war of sections,
until one or the other shall be subdued. I go for the great principle
of the Kansas-Nebraska bill, the right of the people to decide for
themselves.
"On the other point, Mr. Lincoln goes for a warfare 'on the
Supreme Court of the United States, because of their judicial
decision in the Dred Scott case. I yield obedience to the decision
of that court to the final determination of the highest judicial


tribunal known to our constitution. He objects to the Dred Scott
decision because it does not put the negro in the possession of the
rights of citizenship on an equality with the white man. I am op-
posed to negro equality. I repeat that this nation is a white people

a people composed of European descendants a people that have
established this government for themselves and their posterity, and
I am in favor of preserving not only the purity of the blood, but the
purity of the government from any mixture or amalgamation with
inferior races. I have seen the effects of this mixture of superior

and inferior races this amalgamation of white men and Indians
and negroes; we have seen it in Mexico, in Central America, in
South America, and in all the Spanish-American States, and its
result has been degeneration, demoralization, and degradation below
the capacity for self-government.
"I amopposed to taking any step that recognizes the negro
man or the Indian as the equal of the white man. I am opposed to
giving him a voice in the administration of the government. I
would extend to the negro, and the Indian, and to all dependent
races every right, every privilege, and every immunity consistent
with the safety and welfare of the white races; but equality they
never should have, either political or social, or in any other respect
whatever.
"My friends, you see that the issues are distinctly drawn. I
stand by the same platform that I have so often proclaimed to
you and to the people of Illinois heretofore. I stand by the Demo-
cratic organization, yield obedience to its usages, and support its
regular nominations. I indorse and approve the Cincinnati plat-
form, and I adhere to and intend to carry out, as part of that plat-
form, the great principle of self-government, which recognizes the
right of the people in each State and Territory to decide for them-
selves their domestic institutions.In other words, if the Lecompton
issue shall arise again, you have only to turn back and see where
you have found me during the last six months, and then rest as-
sured that you will find me in the same position, battling for the
same principle, and vindicating it from assault, from whatever
quarter it may come, so long as I have the power to do it." '
In this summary the speaker has stated with fair accuracy

' Lincoln- Douglas Debates, pp. 12, 13.
the points of difference between him and his opponent, but

he has so stated them as to present his own side always in
the better Ught. He places the arguments side by side, but
he states the points in a manner favorable to himself; and at
the close he drives home the fact and the idea that lies at the
foundation of his own case, thus leaving in the minds of his
hearers an impression that, on the whole, their votes and
their support should be given to his cause.
CHAPTER 18
BEBUTTAL SPEECHES
OUTLINE
A. Rebuttal explained.
B. No new constructive points.
C. The preparation of rebuttal.
1. Must be prepared in advance.
2. Memorized preparation.
3. Know the other side.

4. Be ready for surprises.
D. Effect of time limit.
E. Answer whole case.
1. Find fundamental points.
2. Show audience.
F. Have a clear and careful method.
G. Be fair to opponents.
A. Rebuttal explained. General refutation has already

been defined as the destruction of opposing proofs. It is
either evidence or argument presented, not for the purpose
of directly advancing your own case, but of blocking or
destroying the case of your opponent. It is now the almost
universal practice in contest debating (and is very common
in actual debates in assemblies of various sorts) to provide for
special second speeches to be made after the main cases have
been presented, for the purpose of presenting such material.
Such speeches are called rebuttal speeches. In law rebuttal
is "the giving of evidence on the part of a plaintiff (affirma-
tive) to destroy the effect of evidence introduced by the

defendant (negative) in the same suit." (Webster's Diet.)
In some debates, both contest and real, this legal precedent
is more closely followed, and the affirmative only has rebuttal
speeches. Of course, allspeakers on both sides may have
420
REBUTTAL SPEECHES 421
more or less refutation in the main speeches. Since the order

of speaking and the nature of negative cases gives the nega-
tive speakers superior opportunities for refutation in the main
speeches, it is well to give the affirmative some compensating
advantages in rebuttal. So even where both sides have equal
rebuttal speeches, the negative leads in rebuttal, giving the
affirmative the last rebuttal speech. Refutation is the broader
term (as we use them) and rebuttal is the refutation that is
given in a special speech which has properly no (or very

little) constructive material in it.
B. No new constructive points of importance should be

allowed in the rebuttal' speeches. Only such material as can
be used against the opponents' case should be permitted. It
has already been suggested that it is well in a debate where
a man may speak more than once to hold material in reserve
for rebuttal. It is, of course, possible to repeat or refer to
arguments and evidence already given, but such repetition
or reference must be subordinate to rebuttal and used de-
structively, not constructively. But the repetition of old
materials is never quite so strong as the production of new.
So that it is sometimes good strategy, even at the cost of
taking something away from the strength of a first speech,
to hold back some good evidence as a reserve. But the judges
of contest debates should always penalize debaters who sim-
ply repeat or continue their main speeches during the time
allowed for rebuttal. All that has been saJd concerning
refutation in* argumentation (in chapter 15) applies to re-
buttal speechs in debate. It is not repeated here, not because
it is less important, but because it has been sufficiently dis-
cussed in that chapter. Refutation is the very essence of

debate, and the power to refute well is one to be sought by a
debater as earnestly as he would seek any single power that
a public speaker may hope to possess.
C. The preparation of rebuttal should be very carefully
done. This does not mean, however, that rebuttal speeches
should be memorized, or even written out.
The rebuttal must be prepared in advance. The mate-
1.
rialout of which to fashion rebuttal speeches should be care-
fully gathered and arranged for rapid use. Many contest de-
baters fail in this phase of their work. In debate, rebuttal is no
less important than positive proof; in intercollegiate debates it
is most often the rebuttal that is any discussion it

decisive; in
is the "last speech" that is coveted; Webster's famous Reply
to Hayne was almost pure And it is very sel-
refutation.
dom impromptu. Good rebuttal
that successful refutation is
speeches are practically always extempore, not impromptu,

nor memorized. An anecdote in point is told concerning
one of the most brilliant advocates of the English bar. This
lawyer was one day arguing an important case before one of
the highest tribunals of the country. In the course of the
trial he was made the object of an attack, personal and politi-
cal in nature, from his opponent, the attorney for the prose-
cution. The attack was bitter, but forcible and persuasive.
It seemed to be unexpected by any one; the court was sur-
prised, but manifestly affected. The advocate arose to make
reply, and in his introduction, with perfect calmness and
great eloquence, he answered every charge, retrieved the
lost favor of the court, and overpowered his assailant with an
irresistible invective. After this trial was finished, one of the

judges a personal friend expressed his surprise and ad-
miration at the extraordinary eloquence of the reply, declar-
ing the retort to be one of the most brilliant passages ever
heard in an English court of law, and added,* that he had
never believed such impromptu oratory to be within the lim-
its of human powers. In answer to these congratulations, the
advocate invited the justice to accompany him to his law

chambers. Entering his library, he walked to a desk, opened
a drawer, and took from it a manuscript; it was his speech of
the morning written out in full, nearly word for word as he
had delivered it. He had foreseen a contingency that nobody

else had expected or deemed possible, and had made ready to
meet the situation. He won because he had prepared in
advance. And the circumstances of his situation made -
practically memorized preparation proper.

2. Memorized preparation, however, should rarely be at-
tempted by beginners, especially in contest debating. There
is, danger that the opposition will
in the first place, too great

not say just what you are prepared to answer and there is
in debate no greater exhibition of stupidity, no greater indica-
tion of weakness, than is afforded by a memorized rebuttal
that does not fit. Preparation of material to meet extem-
poraneously any stand taken by the opposition is good
preparation. Anything else is weak and dangerous. Daniel
Webster declared that all the material of his Reply to Hayne
had been gathered, and waiting in his desk for months before
the debate. Speaking of Senator Hayne, he said to a friend:
"If he had tried to make a speech to fit my notes, he could
not have hit it better. No man is ever inspired with the
occasion; I never was." Mere words and gestures do not
make refutation any more than they make positive proof.
There must be just as much evidence in the one as in the
other. Rebuttal demands as careful a choice of weapons
and as accurate a method of handling them as any other
kind of proof. Invention, selection, and arrangement de-
mand as much preliminary planning here, as elsewhere.
3. Know the other side. Clearly, the primary necessity
in preparing refutation is to know just what points we may
be called upon to answer; we must have a clear and accurate

understanding of the points our opponents need to establish,
and of the methods they may adopt in the attempt. Would
any capable general ever lay the plans for a battle without
first considering the position of his enemy, his location, his
points of strength and weakness? As we have .discovered

earlier, the selecting of the main heads of brief in debate,
depends very largely upon what the opposition may be able
to "do about it." Those points must be chosen for em-
phasis, points that hit hardest and straightest at the necessary
proofs of the other side (when we are able to tell in advance
what such necessary proof will be) ; and at the same time we
must remember that these main heads will surely be attacked?
and we must take up a position that is defensible against
assault. All this means a study and comparison of the two
sides of the question, so as to find out what arguments need
to be attacked, and, on the other hand, how one's own ar-
guments may be best defended against the particular attack
the other side will have to make.
4. Be ready for surprises. But it is rarely possible to
foresee every argument that an opponent may advance. No
two persons reason Just alike: an opponent may well look
at the question from some peculiar standpoint, or, as more
often happens, he may plan a surprise. Then, too, there are
many minor questions that are raised in such a discussion,
which it is hardly worth while trying to anticipate, or which
escape notice in preparation. Commonly, these minor points
, are best left unanswered; but sometimes circumstances make
them worth notice. Whatever the reason, it is certain that
all the incidents of a debate cannot be foreseen; we must
always expect the unexpected. A successful debater must

always be ready to meet strange situations, and to manufac-
ture more or less of refutation and of proof on the scene of
action. Now, a disputant who has read only on those phases
of the question that are of interest to him, or who undertakes
only those parts of the discussion that he treats in his own
proof, is helpless in such circumstances. He has no resources
to draw upon. If the discussion were in writing, he might
think it over, consult new authorities,and plan his answer;
but in debate there is no such opportunity. He must act
at once. He is in the predicament of a military expedition
that sets out on a long campaign, with a day's rations and
no base of supplies. When a debater is thus surprised, his
only hope must lie in having a thorough knowledge of the
question as a whole, and in all its details, a knowledge so
thorough as to be ready at the call of any exigency. Further-
more, a broad understanding of the foundations and general
conditions of the question is necessary, in order to be able

to estimate rightly the force and bearing of arguments
that are made by opponents. A superficial preparation
always distorts the mental vision of a speaker, and confuses
in his mind the real issues in the discussion. But debate de-
mands an especially clear perception and quick judgment of
what is vital; the debater must think as quickly and act as
decisively as the broker on the exchange; superficial in-
formation or a confused understanding mean as sure disaster
in the one case as in the other. A debater in action must be
able, when any argument or any evidence is brought against
him, to estimate in a few seconds just what the matter
amounts to, how it is related to his own case, how much to
say about it, and where in what part of his speech to an-
swer it. Here a stock of ready-made arguments becomes useless.
Only a deep understanding of the subject to the very bottom can
give the clear, ready insight, and the steady judgment that alone
avails.
D. Effect of time limit. These foregoing suggestions are
especially applicable in preparation for school or college de-
bates. There the limitations of time are very stringent: not
the smallest fraction of a minute can be lost in confusion or
unnecessary deliberation; the answer must be in the debater's
head as soon as the argument has left his opponent's lips.
This necessity for such preparation, important everywhere,
here intensified by the circumstances, constitutes one of the
most valuable phases of contest debating.
E. Answer whole case. Too much emphasis cannot be
given to the remarks in chapter 15 concerning what to answer
in refutation. It is probably worth while here to discuss this
question with particular reference to the rebuttal speeches in
formal debate. The great fundamental principle which
should guide the preparation of all rebuttal speeches is: An-
swer the whole case of the other side. One of the fatal weak-
nesses in the power of any debater, and a weakness that is
almost invariably displayed by a beginner, is the weakness
of attacking only a part, of an opponent's proof. It is easiest,
in refutation to pick out the weak points of the opposition
and attack them, leaving the more formidable points stand-
ing: it demands less careful preparation, and a less accurate
analysis of the case of the other side; and it often seems to
make the on the audience. Consequently
greatest impression
there is a temptation to pick up the more obvious errors of an
opponent and dramatically expose them, or to seize upon
some foolish word or phrase and ridicule it; it brings a laugh
or a burst of applause, whereas, in an attempt to refute any
of the stronger proofs, success is not so easy, for the audience,
feeling that there are two sides to the issue, are not so readily
convinced. But in the end, the audience will probably adhere
to the man who has made them believe that his case, as a
whole, is the stronger. Consequently, to achieve final success,
the debater must endeavor to make them see, not that he has
destroyed an argument here and there, but that he has over-
whelmed the proof against him, in its entirety.
Find the fundamental points. In order to make an
1.
attack upon the whole case of the other side, two. things are nec-
essary. In the first place, the speaker must analyze the entire
proof of his opponents and pick out the few basic points in it.
It is necessary to determine upon the few fundamental
points of an opponent's proof, for the same reason that it is
necessary to determine upon those of one's own. It is nec-
essary for the sake of clearness; to give the same attention to
the large and the small points of the other side perplexes a
hearer in his undertsanding of the question as a whole. It
is necessary for the sake of emphasis; it is only by neglecting
or slighting trivial facts and dwelling upon the important
ones, that the vital points of the question can be brought out
into a clear light. It is necessary for the sake of saving time;
rebuttal speeches are usually short, and definitely limited.
To give attention to the facts of secondary importance is to
waste part of these precious minutes. If the vital points
of an opponent's contentions are destroyed, his subordinate
points fall with them and so do not need special rebuttal.
These main contentions must be answered if an opponent

is to be defeated at all, and, if they are answered, to do more is
superfluous.
2.Show audience that these points cover the case. But
not enough for a debater merely to pick out in his own
it is
mind the important points of the other side, and proceed to

refute them, he must, in the second place, make it clear to the
audience that in answering these points he is meeting the whole
case against him that these are the foundations of the oppos-
ing case. To give the rebuttal its full effect requires that the
audience be made to see that the speaker is attacking the
entire proof in opposition, and that, if he succeeds, he has
won his case. To do this requires that the arguments to be
answered shall be stated clearly beforehand, and that they
shall be explained in such a way as to make it evident that in
them is contained the whole case of the other side. It is very
often desirable, as a means of making it evident that the
whole case of the other side is being attacked, to analyze
openly before the audience the proof of an opponent, and
explain just what argument as a whole amounts to. For
his
might well begin in some such
instance, a speaker in rebuttal
manner as this: "Everything of any importance that my
opponent has had to say on this question may be reduced to
these three propositions, viz., first, etc., second, etc., third;"
"my opponent's case, as far as it has been presented to us
can be stated in his own words, as follows," etc. In some
such way the audience may be made to have faith in the
speaker's sincerity, and in the importance of his efforts in
rebuttal, and so be made ready to acknowledge the full force
of his refutation.
For example, Webster, in his Reply to Hayne in the debate
on the Foote Resolution, devoted the body of his speech to
the refutation of Senator Hayne's theory of states' rights
under the Constitution. Before entering on this task, he
set forth in full the case presented by Senator Hayne, stating


all the essential propositions of his doctrine, and making it
evident that taken together they embraced, everything that

demanded refutation:
"There yet remains to be performed by far the most grave and

important duty, which I feel to be devolved on me by this occasion.
It is to state, and to defend, what I conceive to be the true principles
of the constitution under which we are here assembled. I might
well have desired that so weighty a task should have fallen into
other and abler hands. I could have wished that it should have
been executed by those whose character and experience give weight
and influence to their opinions, such as cannot possibly belong to
mine. But, sir, I have met the occasion, not sought it; and I shall
proceed to state my own sentiments, without challenging for them
any particular regard, with studied plainness, and as much precision
as possible.
"I understand the honorable gentleman from. South Carolina to
maintain, that it is a right of the State Legislatures to interfere,
whenever, in their judgment, this Government transcends its con-
and to arrest the operation of its laws.
stitutional limits,
"I understand him to maintain this right, as a right existing under
the constitution; not as a right to overthrow it, on the ground of
extreme necessity, such as would justify violent revolution.
"I understand him to maintain an authority, on the part of the
states, thus to interfere, for the purpose of correcting the exercise
of power by the General Government, of checking it, and of com-
peUing it to conform to their opinion of the extent of its powers.
"I understand him to maintain that the ultimate power of judg-
ing of the constitutional extent of its own authority is not lodged
exclusively in the General Government, or any branch
of it; but
that, on the contrary, the States may lawfully decide for them-
selves, and each state for itself, whether in a given case, the act
of the General Government transcends its power.
"I understand him to insist that, if the exigency of the case, in
the opinion of any State Government, require it, such State Gov-
ernment may, by its own sovereign authority, annul an act of the
General Government, which it deems plainly and palpably un-
'
constitutional."
' Congressional Debates, Vol. VI, Part I, pp. 72, 73.
F. Have a clear and careful method. The natural tend-

ency of young debaters in rebuttal is toward carelessness of
method. It is true, even of more experienced men, that
speakers who are very careful in arranging and presenting
their original proofs, when they come to the work of refuta-
tion, forget themselves and degenerate into a weak informal-
ity, wandering from the point and mixing up their materials
without regard for clearness of statement, the proper arrange-
ment of evidence, ot the natural sequence of the proofs.
Rebuttal isno more informal than any ot;her kind of demon-
stration, and requires just as much care in presentation.
The materials for it must be selected as judiciously, arranged
as logically, and stated as clearly. A young debater does well
to watch himself consciously tiU he has formed firm habits
of the right kind.
G. Be fair to opponents. The final word in regard to
rebuttal speeches is: Be fair, courteous, good humored, and
honest in dealing loith the opposing case.State the opposing
arguments fairly. Do
not color them to suit yourself by
rephrasing, or substituting, or inserting words not used by
your antagonist. In the use of charts and maps, in asking to
examine evidence, in giving them an opportunity to examine
your evidence, be courteous. You will hurt your own case,
and make your audience uncomfortable by being churlish
and ill-tempered. It is probably not necessary to advocate
and advise common honesty. An honest man will be an
honest debater. Manufacturing evidence, garbling quota-
tions, misstating facts these things
falsifying references,
"
are not strategy," and "part of the game." They are simply

cheap dishonesty plain lies. No self-respecting debater
will indulge insuch practices. In contest debating when the
stupid or dishonest are detected in such practices, permanent
disbarment from platform activities should be the minimum
penalty.
CHAPTER 19
DELIVEKr
OUTLINE
A. Oral presentation in debate.
B. Pour methods.
1. Reading.
2. Memorizing.
a. Place for memorized speeches.
b. Writing as a preparation.
3. Impromptu.
4. Extemporaneous.
a. Advantages.
(I) Flexibihty of speech.

(II) Fit mood of audience.
(III) Physical advantage.
(IV) Use of inspiration from audience.
b. Dangers.
(I) Exaggeration.
(II) Repetition of substance.
(III) Monotony of form.
c. Dangers may be overcome.
d. Combining memoriter and extempore: "Block Sys-
tem."
e. Specific suggestions for extemporaneous debating.
(I) Notes.
(II) Outlines.
(III) Charts.
(IV) Platform hints.
(V) Practice.
A. Oral presentation in debate. All that has to do with

oral delivery is importance in debate. To know how
of great
to investigate a problem, gather and arrange argument and
430
DELIVERY 431
evidence, and write a convincing and persuasive speech does

not make one a debater. A good debater must be able to do
all this, and in addition must be able to speak well in public
must be able to present his case oraUy to an audience.
In getting ready for this final and crucial part of his work,
the fundamental question the debater has to meet is: "How
much shall I write How far
shall I put my preparation into
written form?" an important question: habits ill-
This is
formed in this particular have been responsible for the fail-

.ures of many preachers, lecturers, and advocates. On the
other hand, correct habits are equally potent for success.
Moreover, every beginner should realize that strength or
weakness in this respect is truly a matter of habit, for practices
adopted early grow fast and soon become difficult to aban-
don. Even at the cost of hard work and discouraging fail-
ures, a young debater should begin right.
B. Four methods. When we come to consider this ques-
tion, we methods: (1) reading
find there are four possible
manuscript, (2) delivering a written manuscript from memory,
(3) impromptu speaking without any previous preparation
whatever, (4) extempore speaking from notes or outline.
1. Reading. The first method, that of writing out a com-
plete speech, and reading it verbatim, should never be followed

by a debater in contest debating or in actual controversy
in court or assembly. It is contrary to the purpose and spirit
of debate. A debate is two-sided; it consists of the clash and
interplay of the opponents. Without mutual adaptation and
adjustment there can be no real debate. Two written ar-
guments on opposite sides of a question do not constitute a
debate. But not only this, not only does this method pre-
clude meeting an opponent, but it also shuts one away from
the audience. There can be little, if any, contact with the
audience. The inter-communication between speaker and
hearer that gives vitality to the speech is absolutely pre-
cluded. There may be occasions on which a man is justified
in reading a manuscript to an audience, but such an occasion
is never found in debate. Any one who has ever heard a
preacher read his sermons, sentence by sentence, from a
manuscript, need not be told that in the scrimmage of a de-
bate such a practice would be fatal. This method lacks all
the spontaneity, all the power of adaptation to circumstances,
all the aggressiveness that is essential.
Memorizing. The second method, that of delivering a
2.
written speech from memory has, of course, most of the

disadvantages of the reading method. Considered as a
method to be adopted permanently and for regular use,
memorizing must undoubtedly be condemned. The most
obvious defect of such a practice is the lack of adaptability
to circumstances. We have already seen that a large element
of debating power lies in the ability to appreciate and grapple
with situations; but a speaker who has learned the sentences
he is to deliver is powerless if anything unexpected arises, or"
if his written speech does not happen to fit the occasion.
Again, the memoriter method involves a great and largely

useless physical strain. It demands the most severe mental
and nervous exertion in committing the speech, in worrying
over the chances of forgetting, and in delivery. One's energy
should be more intelligently expended in debate. So serious
a strain does it require, that a continuance of such practices
tends to diminish spontaneity and quickness of thought,
which gradually impairs the fineness and clearness of the
whole mind. Memorizing also prevents, in a great degree, the
necessary closeness of contact between speaker and audience.
It demands a remarkable degree of elocutionary skiU to in-
fuse into committed passages the variety and the spontaneity
of extempore speaking. The memoriter speaker all too easily

becomes an actor, posing and soliloquizing an attitude fatal
to power in. debate, for it destroys the leadership which we
have seen is indispensable in the work of persuasion. Then,
too, all the inspiration that should come from the reflex
action of the audience is lost. The declaimer, instead of
being stirred and directed by any manifestations of thought

DELIVERY 433
or emotion on the part of his hearers, is Hable to be confused

by such influences, and is constantly fearful of their appear-
ance. Memorized debating is too likely to be an exhibition,
not a communication. There is probably little danger to-day
that debaters will read manuscripts, but the evil of memo-
rized speeches still Teachers and coaches should
continues.
insist that debaters refrain from memorizing even perhaps
from writing speeches. Many college debaters are handi-
capped by being allowed to get the habit of memorizing.
This means that they never reach their full power. They are
like healthy men who wear always appliances meant for
cripples, for fear that they may sometime need them. The
result is a chronicweakness that makes the artificial support
necessary. Any who has intelligence enough to have
person
a right to hope to be a debater, has intelligence enough to
learn how to debate extemporaneously. Would-be debaters
should compel themselves to learn the best method and
teachers should tolerate no other method in practice.
a. Place for memorized speeches. It must be clearly un-
stood that we are not saying here that there are no proper
occasions whatever for memorized speeches. Indeed, there

are many that call for such^ or at least on which such
speeches are perfectly appropriate. But these are never
debates. They are rather great formal demonstrative oc-
casions of some sort, at which experienced speakers are called
on for the "oration of the day." Experienced speakers are
more safe in memorized speaking. It is very difficult for a
young speaker who has not had extensive platform experi-
ence, to deliver a memorized speech with that directness

that sense of communication which is the very soul of ef-
fective speaking. An experienced judge can usually tell the
exact point at which a young speaker turns from extempore

to memoriter speaking and this is almost without exception
a change from better to worse. Experienced speakers when
not debating may use memorized speeches. Debaters and
beginners should avoid this method.
b. Writing speeches as part of the preparation of a debate
is soinetimes an excellent thing. Often it is dangerous. It
is good for the debater who has the courage to throw the
manuscript into the waste basket (or file it away), as soon as
he has it as he wants it in form, length, etc. When this stage
is reached an outline of the manuscript should be made
and the manuscript put out of sight and kept there. Then
the speaking in practice should be from the outUne without
any attempt to recall the words of the manuscript. Of course,
it is true here as elsewhere, that the practice of writing is a
great benefit to any speaker who is strong enough to be
master of what he has written. Of course, a complete and
accurate brief should always be written as the basis of any
debate. Especially to a debater in the early stages of his ca-
reer, the writing of briefs, and, sometimes, finished speeches,
is of the greatest value. Enough has already been said in the
preceding parts of this book to make it evident that argumen-
tation is a distinct art with rules and methods peculiar to
itself. Upon the understanding of these methods and the ob-
servation of these rules success depends, and in bringing one's
self to comprehend these various principles, and to develop
habits in conformity with them, the practice of writing is
very valuable. In preparing a careful and detailed brief,
which shall present all of his proof in its full strength to a

reader, a student must at every step, from the statement of
the proposition to the final summaiy, be conscious of the prin-
ciples he is following and of his reasons for doing so; he has
time and opportunity to realize just why he introduces his
proof in a certain way, why he selects certain evidence, why
he arranges his material in accordance with a certain plan.
Furthermore, what is written can be subsequently examined
for defects and virtues. In this way a student can detect his
weaknesses and set himself to remedy them. Finally, a per-
son who is writing thinks more closely and concisely, and
uses more exact language than one who is speaking, and so
develops the qualities of straightforward, logical reasoning.
DELIVERY 435
and of clear, accurate use of words. It does not follow that

a debater should write he says, or that he should always
all
keep up the practice of writing as a means of self-training.

Study and experience gradually turn these qualities men-
tioned above into habits of mind, and the' habits once formed
are a permanent asset. But, for the debater in the formative
period of his career, the regular writing of briefs and manu-
scripts is invaluable.
3. Impromptu. Little need be said about the third meth-

od, impromptu speaking without any previous preparation
whatever. This is not likely in a debate unless it happens

to be unavoidable as is sometimes the case in real life never,
of course, in contest debating. The power of impromptu
speech is not to be disparaged, and it is undoubtedly true
that many veteran speakers can debate a proposition with
very brief preparation and from a very few notes; but such
powers are begotten of long practice and self-cultivation; for
a beginner to make such men the models for his own early
efforts is foolhardy, and always has unfortunate results. To
make such a venture at the start, would be like attempting
to learn to swim by jumping into mid-ocean at the first
lesson; the well-nigh certain result is to be lost in a flood of
bad habits. From such beginnings are produced the ram-
bling, incoherent, inconclusive speakers that are always in-
ferior ormediocre in debate. The weakness of such arguers
is that they are wholly lacking in the element of form: they
never learn how to conserve their strength to spend it to some

purpose; they waste their forces because they have never
learned how to marshal and direct them.
4. Extemporaneous speaking should undoubtedly be the
ideal of the debater. A distinction should always be made
between extemporaneous speaking and impromptu speaking.
An impromtu speech is wholly unpremeditated; the speaker
rises on the moment and talks off-hand, not having delib-
erated on the subject at all. But "extemporaneous," as the

term is now used, is a name applied to any speech for which
the language and details of rhetorical form have not been
previously prepared. But the more fundamental preparation
must have been exhaustive. Extemporaneous speaking is
the highest type, the most difficult, most efifective, and de-
mands the most thorough preparation. The speaker is al-
ways assumed to be prepared on the question, and he may or
may not use notes or outline.
a. The advantages of this extempore method are many
and great: (I) The first advantage
and first in order of im-
portance
the power of adaptation the flexibility which
is
it gives to the speaker. The debater who depends for-his lan-
guage upon nothing but his ever present power of making up
his words as he goes, can at any time omit any of his ideas or
arguments that the circumstances make unnecessary; he
can put into his proof anything that an unexpected turn of
affairs requires; he can, if expedient, adopt a wholly new line
of demonstration. (II) Furthermore, the extemporizer can
fit himself to the mood of his audience: if he sees they do not

understand a point, he can stop to explain and enforce it
upon them; if they seem personally hostile or inattentive, he
can resort to persuasion to remedy the situation. At all
times, he can hold his position as leader of the assembly both
in thought and in feeling. He can reason with his audience.
(Ill) Then, too, extemporizing carries with it great physical
advantages. "The voice of the speaker is deeper, stronger,
and more flexible, and the effort required to produce it much
less. The head being held erect, there no constriction of
is
the throat, the lungs are fully expanded, and the respiratory
muscles are free to perform their functions." ^ (IV) Again,
the inspiration of sympathy from the audience comes with its full
power only to the extemporizer. William Pitt truly said that

"eloquence is not in the man; it is in the assembly." The re-
sponse of hearer to speaker may disturb a declaimer but it gives
added strength to the extemporizer, helping him to mount
to eloquence with a greater boldness and self-confidence.
' Buckley, Extemporaneous Oratory, p. 13.
DELIVERY 437
b. The dangers of extemporaneous speaking should be

borne in mind as well as the great benefits that flow from it.
There are three that a young speaker needs particularly to
guard against. (I) The first is exaggeration. The youthful ora-
tor, to whom word and idea usually come with tantalizing dif-
ficulty, when at length he begins to feel the flow of words com-
ing fulland free to his lips, is too liable to be caught up in the
onward rush and carried much further than he intends swoUen ;
by the rising enthusiasm, the tide of eloquence mounts higher

and higher till it sweeps over the bounds of accuracy, even of
truthftdness, and turns into a flood of hyperbole. Then it is
that a speaker makes statements that he is afterward forced
to take back, calls his opponent bad names, and in genera]
forgets his self-control. Lord Chatham, with all his long
experience and constant practice, said that he did not dare
to speak extemporaneously with a state secret lurking in his
mind, "for in the Sibylline frenzy of his oratory he knew not
what he said." -^
A common form of misrepresentation con-
sists in stating a speaker has in his
evidence carelessly. If
mind the general nature and effect of certain facts, but has
not decided just how to put them into words, he finds him-
self sorely tempted to color the facts with a little rhetorical
flourish, to make a "few" into a "great many," to augment

"a score" into "hundreds," or to transform "often" into
"always." Such exaggeration may, with constant practice,
become something of a habit, so that the tendency should be
repressed at the start.
(II) A second danger is that of awkward repetition of sub-
stance. The danger of repeating ideas, of rambling around
and covering the same point a number of times, ought to be
obviated by careful planning and outlining. This kind of
repetition should not be a common fault in extemporaneous
speaking. a speaker permits himself to become indolent
If
in his choice of phrases, however, he will surely find that
certain combinations of words will be constantly coming to
' Matthews, Orators and Oratory, p. 109.
his lips till they become tiresome. This often results in a
confusion of thoughts one stock phrase
: is made to represent
several different ideas; two ideas that are similar but not
exactly alike are both expressed in these same hackneyed
terms, simply because the speaker is too careless to know the
distinction, or has the habit of stating things with only
approximate truth. This danger, of course, threatens partic-
ularly a speaker whose range of words is small; and for such
a man the fault may be overcome by resorting to the dic-
tionary, to the reading of good literature and good orations,
or to any expedient for the increase of the vocabulary. The
same fault appears in the awkward repetition of introductory
and transitional phrases, such as: "Let us next consider,"
"My next point is," "In the next place," "Along this same
line," "Thus we see," etc. A speaker composing as he goes,
does not realize how often these phrases are reiterated; but
it is noticeable to the audience.
(Ill) A that of monotony of form- ^the fault
third danger is
of explaining or reasoning out everything in the same way.
It is very easy to adopt a sort of logical formula in accordance
with which argument after argument is unfolded. A certain
mode of reasoning in his own mind is peculiar to the speaker,
and when before an audience it is natural to explain the
matter to others just as he explained it to himself. The effect
of such repetition is much the same as that which a reader
gets from page after page of syllogisms in a treatise on formal
logic. The reasoning is clear and accurate, but uninteresting
and tiresome.
c. Dangers may be overcome. Such dangers as these,
though they must surely be met, should not be a source of dis-

couragement. The dangers attendant upon other methods of
public speaking are equally numerous and usually far more
formidable. The young extemporizer to whom the beginning
seems hard, may well bear in mind an example cited by Dr.
Buckley from Mr. Gilchrist's Life of Richard Cobden:
"I saw Richard Cobden sitting beside John Bright in the
DELIVERY 439
House of Commons. Perhaps no more persuasive speaker,

whose power depended largely upon a clear and earnest
statement of facts, has ever sat in the British Parliament.
Speaking of the Treaty of Commerce with France in 1860,
Mr. Gladstone six years later said, 'I don't believe that the
man breathed upon earth at that epoch, or now breathes
upon earth, that could have effected that great measure with
the single exception of Mr. Cobden.'
"His was the triumph of the pure extemporizer. In 1864
he wrote to Mr. Delane, editor of the London Times:
"
' It is known that I am
not in the habit of writing a word
beforehand of what I speak in public. Like other speakers,
practice has given me as perfect self-possession in the pres-
ence of an audience as if I were writing in my closet. Now
my ever constant and overruling thought while addressing a

public meeting the only necessity which long experience of
the arts of the controversialist has impressed upon my mind
is to avoid the possibility of being misrepresented, and
prevent my opponents from raising a false issue, a trick as old

as Aristotle.'
"Yet this master persuader of hard-headed business men
was nervous and confused in his first speech; in fact, he
practically broke down, and the chairman had to apologize
for him. For some time afterward he was so discouraged by
his maiden effort that if he had been allowed to follow the
bent of his inclination, he would never again have appeared
^
as a public speaker."
d. Combining memoriter and extempore: "Block sys-
tem." It is possible to combine some memorizing with
extemporaneous speaking; and under some conditions the
combination may be effective. The peroration of an otherwise
extempore speech may sometimes be memorized with good
results. A beginner may find this a helpful means of weaning
himself from declamation, and taking on the strength of ex-
temporaneous speech. And even an experienced speaker may
' Buckley, Extemporaneous Oratory, pp. 369, 370.
memorize certain passages which require deUcate treatment
of any kind, the preparation of which he does not wish to
leave to the moment of utterance. Such passages may be in-
terspersed through an extemporaneous speech without losing
the advantages of this method. Some people advocate mem-
orizing most of the introduction and conclusion and extempo-
rizing the discussion. This is close to what has been called

"the block system" that is, practically the whole debate is
memorized in sections. The different sections may be shifted
to suit the demands of the occasion, or some of them may be
dropped out. This method gives a certain kind of flexibility,
but the speaker is after all declaiming memorized material
most of the time. This is bad from the standpoint of debat-
ing. Some memorized passages may be used if there is need,
provided they are not the greater part of the speech, and
provided the speaker can keep from leaning too much on
such helps. But as a permanent practice, by which the at-
tempt is made to mix the two and deceive an audience into
thinking the whole to be extempore, this method is likely to
be a failure. An excellent criticism is given by Dr. James
M. Buckley, in his book on Extemporaneous Oratory for Pro-
fessional and Amateur Speakers:
"A joint use of the extemporaneous and the recitative has
marked advantages, and is to be commended to those who
cannot trust themselves wholly to the former. But it is
extremely difficult to adjust it gracefully and forcefully.
Transitions of style are usually obvious, extemporized por-
tions being spoken more swiftly or more slowly than the re-
cited. Emphasis and accent are different, and gesticulation
undergoes a noticeable change. The reciter is prone to pro-
ceed more rapidly than when he extemporizes; at other times,
according to the strength of his memory or his excitability
when uttering words not previously prepared, he may speak
more slowly. A lawyer delivered a Fourth of July oration,
in preparation for which he had composed perhaps ten epi-
grams and half as many paragraphs, some consisting of at
DELIVERY 441
least three times that number of sentences, and had com-

mitted these to memory, expecting to extemporize the con-
nective tissue. What he had learned he recited perfectly;
what he extemporized he delivered under shght embarrass-
ment, and his course resembled that of a man crossing a
bridge, some of the planks of which were weak and others
strong. He fairly leaped when he came to one of his com-
mitted paragraphs, and it was obvious that he rejoiced in
spirit, but more than once his hesitation and awkwardness
'
were pitiable."
e. Specific suggestions to be followed in all debating, par-
ticularly in extemporaneous debating, and which have not
already been made, are contained in the following paragraphs:
(I) Notes. We have said that in extemporaneous speak-
ing a speaker may or may not use notes. For a beginner in

any kind of oratory it is desirable that some notes be used, if
the speech is to be one of any length or intricacy. The prej-
udice that still exists in some places against the use of notes
by a speaker should be disregarded. It is founded on false
standards and a misconception of a speaker's purpose. The
speaker should be trying to convey thought effectively to
the audience not trying to exhibit his power of memory or
other personal qualities. When
a speaker has an important
case to present to an audience very foolish to use much
it is
of his energy in remembering matters that can better be

carried on a card or two. Especially young speakers should
always relieve themselves of the worry and strain of memo-
rized delivery and carry an outline and notes to the platform.
They should not even attempt to carry a memorized outline
of any length. It takes a mature mind and much experience,
to enable a man to carry the complete outline of a speech, in
such a way as to guard against the forgetting of points, on
the one hand, and wandering from the subject, on the other.
And particularly in debate, where the situation is ever chang-
ing and where so much depends upon the circumstances of
' Buckley, Extemporaneous Oratory, pp. 25, iS.
the moment, it is doubtful if even a veteran can work effect-
ively without notes. Outlines and notes should be used in

intercollegiate and other contest and practice debates for the
purpose of bringing the experience as close as possible to
actual debates in real life, and of giving the best training for
these. Long and detailed arguments are not presented in
courts, legislatures, hearings, etc., without notes. Our de-
bates should be as close as possible to the best of these dis-
cussions.
(II) Outlines. A
complete brief should never be used
as an outline of a speech. After the brief is completed a
short outline should be made up for any speech, using such
parts of the brief as are needed. The outline should be pre-
pared with a particular audience, occasion, time limit, etc.,
in view. The brief ignores all these. The outline should take
up points, present material, in whatever order seems best
for a particular situation, absolutely regardless of the order
followed in the brief or of the rules of brief drawing. And
finally, the outline should be capable of alteration and should
be adjusted to the occasion just before the speaker takes
the platform. For instance, in an intercollegiate debate a
speaker should follow carefully all that is said before his
turn comes and should make whatever changes in his out-
lines are demanded by the changing situation. Points may
be dropped out, put in, or re-arranged. The outline should
be short, typewritten, with wide spacing (to allow for
changes), on 4 x 6 cards. With the outline, but preferably
on other cards, should be all quotations and statistics to be
used. A debater should never present memorized quotations
(except very short ones) or memorized statistics, to an au-
dience. It is foolish to burden the memory this way. It is
careless, for one is and can

likely to forget. It is artificial
have no excuse other than that of being an attempt to meet

a prejudice against notes, or of showing off one's memory.
Judges are likely to be suspicious of memorized quotations
and statistics. We have heard debaters reel off identical

DELIVERY 443
figures or quotations at two different places in the same

speeches. Allwere memorized and the wrong set came out,
and the debaters went on with their declamation, with no
thought of what they were saying. Use a short and flexible
outline, and use notes for all quotations and statistics.
(III) Charts. Use charts and diagrams to hang up before
the audience on these conditions (A) that there is no under-

:
standing to the contrary with your opponents; (B) that you

are willing to leave the chart up after you use it in order that
your opponents may use it as they wish; (never put up a
chart and then take it down before your opponent has a
chance to use it) (C) that you can make certain important
;
things clearer in less time with a chart than without it. When
these conditions are present there is no reason why charts
and diagrams should not be used. A slight warning may well
be given, however, for contest debates. Charts are much
more dangerous for a negative team than for an aflSrmative,
because the latter has the last opportunity to discuss the
chart before the audience. If a negative hangs up a chart,
and the affirmative puts off refutation of it till the last speech
(as they have a perfect right to do) the negative has no
chance to answer. Unless the negative feels sure of the chart,
it is better not to use one.
(IV) Platfonn hints. It is impossible in this book to

discuss platform speaking at any length. Various suggestions
have been given by the way. All would-be debaters should
learn how to be effective speakers. Regular courses of in-
struction in speaking are the best means of getting the right
start. Actual practice with real audiences is the only means
of getting real proficiency in the art.
(V) Practice. A regular course in practical debating

actual speaking in regular debates, with personal criticism
by a competent instructor is the proper means to use in
getting started right as a debater.Continued practice after
one knows what to try to do, is the only way to become
skilful. Extended practice before one knows what to do is
likely to produce more harm than good. It develops the
habit of loose, rambling, superficial, assertive talking, which
is the antithesis of intelligent debating. So-called debates on
big questions, for which only a few hours are spent in prep-
aration are wholly evil as far as learning to debate is concerned.
With this warning in mind, we may well follow the advice
given by a friend to Edward Everett Hale at the opening of
his career. "If you want to be a good public speaker, when-
ever anyone is fool enough to ask you to speak, you be fool
enough to do it."
APPENDIX
A. Bibliography.
B. Pleading.
C. Instructions to Judges with Sample Ballot
D. Rules for Legal Brief Drawing.
E. 1. Material for a Short Brief.
2. Material for a Long Brief.
APPENDIX A
BIBLIOGBAPHT
References to the following Publications are made in footnotes in

the text
Adams, J. Q., Lectures on Rhetoric and Oratory, Cambridge, Mass.,

Hilliard & Metcalf, 1810.
Alden, R. M., The Art of Debate, New York, Henry Holt & Co.,
1900.
Aristotle, Rhetoric, Jebb's Translation, Cambridge, England,
University JPress, 1909.
Baker, G. P., The Forms of Public Address, New York, Henry
Holt & Co., 1904.
Baker, G. P., and Huntington, H. B., The Principles of Argumenta-
tion (Revised Edition), New York, Ginn & Co., 1905.
Baldwin, J. M., Elements of Psychology, New York, Holt, 1891.
Ballantine, H. W., The Apportionment of Proof, and the Burden
of Rebuttal, Law Notes, December, 1912.
Beecher, H. W., Plymouth Pulpit, 8th Series, New York, March-
Sept., 1872.
Beecher, H. W., Patriotic Addresses, New York, 1891.
Best, On Evidence, Chamberlayne's Ed., Boston, Boston Book
Co., 1908.
Bodkin, R. C, How to Reason, Dublin, Browne & Nolan, 1907.
445
446 APPENDIX A
Bode, B. H., An Outline of Logic, New York, Henry Holt & Co.,
1910.
Bradbury, H. B., The Structure of an Effective Public Speech,
Greenfield, Mass., T Vlorey & Son?, 1915.
Brooks, Phillips, Essays and Addresses, New York, 1894.
Buckley, Extemporaneous Oratory, Eaton & Main, 1898.
Burke, Edmund, Speech on Conciliation with America, Cook's
Edition, New York, Longmans, Green & Co., 1896.
Channing, W. E., Works, Boston, G. G. Channing, 1849.
Chase's Blackstone.
Clark, E. and H., Eloquence of the United States, Middletown,
Conn., 1827.
Clark, S. H., and Blanchard, Y. M., Practical Public Speaking, New
York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1899.
Collins, J. C, Jonathan Swift, London, 1893.
Congressional Debates.
Creighton, J. E., Introductory Logic, New York, Macmillan Co.,
1907.
Curtis, G.W., Orations and Addresses, New York, Harper, 1893.
Debates in Congress, Washington, Gales & Seaton, 1830.
Denney, J. V., Duncan, C. S., and McKinney, F. C, Argumenta-
tion and Debate, New York, American Book Company,
1910.
Foster, W. T., Argumentation and Debating, New York, Hougliton-
Mifflin Co., 1908.
Gardiner, J. H., The Making of Arguments, New York, Ginn Ss Co.,
1912.
Genung, J. F., Practical Rhetoric, Boston, Ginn & Co., 1896.
Genung, J. F., The Working Principles of Rhetoric, Boston, Giim,
1961.
Gough, H. B., Formulas for the Special Issue, The Public Speaking
Review, Vol. 3, No. 3.
Great Speeches by Great Lawyers, W. L. Snyder, New York,
Baker, Voorhis & Co., 1904.
Greenleaf, On Evidence, Thirteenth Edition.
Hardwieke, History of Oratory and Orators, New York, G. P. Put-
nam Sons, 1896.
Hibben, Logic, Deductive and Inductive, New York, Charles Scrib-
ner's Sons, 1905.
BIBLIOGRAPHY . 447
Hill, A. S., Principles of Rhetoric (Revised Edition), New York,

American Book Co., 1895.
Howell's State Trials.
Hughes, On Evidence.
Hyslop, J. H., Elements of Logic, New York, Charles Scribner's
Sons, 1901.
James, William, Psychology, Briefer Course, New York, Henry Holt
& Co., 1913.
Jevons, W. S., New York, Macmillan Co., 1913.
Lessons in Logic,
Ketcham, V. A., Argumentation and Debate, New York, Macmillan
Co., 1914.
Lamb, Charles, Essays of Elia, London, J. M. Dent & Co., 1897.
Lamont, Hammond, English Composition, New York, Charles
Scribner's Sons, 1907.
Lincoln-Douglas Debates, Columbus, Ohio, FoUett, Foster & Co.,
1860.
Matthews, W., Oratory and Orators, S. C. Griggs & Co., Chicago,
1879.
Matthews, Brander, Notes on Speech Making, New York, Long-
mans, Green & Co., 1901.
Maxcyi C. L., The Brief, New York, Houghton-Mifflin Co., 1916.
Mill, System of Logic, New York, Harper, 1874.
Minto, Logic, Inductive and Deduetivfi, London, 1893.
Newcomer, A. G., Elements of Rhetoric, New York, Henry Holt
& Co., 1906.
O'Grady, Hardress, Matter, Form, and Style, New York, Button,
1913.
Pattee, G. K., Practical Argumentation, New York, The Century
Co. (Revised Edition), 1916.
Pelsma, J. R., The Special Issues, Public Speaking Review, Vol. 3,
No. 3.
Phelps, Austin, English Style in Public Discourse, New York,

Charles Scribner's Sons, 1912.
Phillips, A. E., Effective Speaking, Chicago, The Newton Co.,
1910.
Quarterly Journal of Public Speaking, Chicago, University of
Chicago Press, 1915-
Ringwalt, R. C, Modern American Oratory, New York, Henry
Holt & Co.. 1898.
448 APPENDIX A
Robinson, F. B., Effective Public Speaking, Chicago, LaSalle
Extension University, 1915.
Robinson, Lewis, M. D., Everyday Cruelty, Fortnightly Review,
July, 1894.
Robinson, W. C, Forensic Oratory, Boston, Little, Brown & Co.,
1893.
Seward, William H., Works, Boston, 1887.
Sidgwick, A., The Process of Argument, London, 1893.
Stephen, H. J., OnPleading, Edited by Samuel Williston, Cam-
bridge, Mass., The Harvard Law Review Publishing Associa-.
tion, 1895.
Spencer, Herbert, Philosophy of Style.
Sumner, Charles, Works, Boston, Lee and Sheppard, 1872.
Thayer, J. B., Preliminary Treatise on Evidence, Boston, Little,
Brown & Co., 1898.
Ward, John, System of Oratory, London, 1759.
Webster, Daniel, Works, Boston, Little Brown & Co., 1851.
Whateley, Richard, Elements of Rhetoric (Reprint), Louisville,
Ky., John T. Morton & Company.
Wilson, Woodrow, Speech to the New York Southern Society, 1910,
in Wood's After-Dinner Speeches.
Winans, J. A., Public Speaking, New York, The Century Co., 1915.
World's Orators, New York, G. P. Putnam Sons, 1900.
APPENDIX B
PLEADING
This brief statement presents " in a general view, the nature

of the process of pleading,and the manner of coming to
issue," in common is adapted from the first part
law. This
of Chapter I of Stephen on Pleading, edited by Samuel
Williston, Cambridge, Mass.: The Harvard Law Review
Publishing Association, 1895. It is given here in the belief
that it will aid students in gaining an understanding of the
doctrine of issues, and it will make clear certain references in
the text in the chapters on "Issues" and "Burden of Proof."
1. Plaintiff (Affirmative) makes declaration of his cause of

action states the nature and quality of his case.
2. Defendant (Negative) answers either:
a. Demurrer. Even supposing facts to be true, denies
plaintiff in point of law has rights he claims.
Tender of issue in law, necessarily accepted by
plaintiff.
or
b. Plea.
(1) Dilatory.
.(a) To the jurisdiction of the court denies
jurisdiction.
(b) In suspension of action shows some
ground for not proceeding with suit
now.
(c) shows declaration im-
In abatement
does not deny right
properly drawn
of action itself.
(2) Peremptory bar of the action denies

in
right of action altogether.
449
:
450 APPENDIX B
(a) Traverse denies all or some essential

part of the averments of fact in the
declaration. Tender of issue of fact
(which plaintiff must accept or demur
to the traverse as insufficient in law),
which raises an mwe in law which is
necessarily accepted.
(b) Confession and avoidance
admits facts
of declaration but alleges new facts
which obviate or repel their legal
effect.
At this point if the defendant has demurred or pleaded by
xoay of traverse the parties are now at issue either on the law
or on the facts involved. If the defendant take either of the
other possibilities a dilatory plea or a plea of way of con-
fession and avoidance, then the
3. Plaintiff answers
a. Demurrer tender issue in law as above,
b. Replication,
(1) Traverse tender of fact as above,

issue
(2) Confession and avoidance.
"If the replication be by way of traverse, it is necessary

(as in the case of the plea) that it should tender issue. So,
if the plaintiff demur, an issue in law is necessarily tendered;
and, in either case, the ultimate result is a joinder in issue;
upon the same principles as above explained with respect
to the plea. But if the replication be in confession and
avoidance, the defendant may then, in his turn, either demur,
or, by a pleading, traverse, or confess and avoid, its allega-
tions. If such pleading take place, it is called the rejoinder.
"In the same manner, and subject to the same law of pro-
ceeding, viz., that of demurring, or traversing, or pleading in
confession and avoidance, is conducted all the subsequent
altercation, to which the nature of the case may lead; and the
order and denominations of the alternate allegations of fact

PLEADING 451
(or pleadings) throughout the whole series, are as follows:

declaration, plea, replication, rejoinder, surrejoinder, rebutter
and surrebutter. After the surrebutter, the pleadings have
no distinctive names; for beyond that stage they are very
seldom found to extend.
"To whatever length of series the pleadings may happen
to lead, it is obvious that by adherence to the plan here de-
scribed, one of the parties must at some pefriod of the proc-
ess, more or less remote, be brought either to demur or to
traverse; for, as no case can involve an inexhaustible store of
new relevant matter, there must somewhere be a limit to
pleading in the way of confession and avoidance. . . .
"As the parties will at length arrive at demurrer or trav-

erse, so, whenever a traverse is at length produced, it comprises
a tender of issue (as in the above examples) and a demurrer ;
also necessarily involves a tender of issue; the consequence of

which is, in either case, a joinder in issue, exactly upon the
same principle as above explained with respect to the plea;
so that the parties arrive at issue, after a longer series of plead-
ings, precisely in the same manner as when the process termi-
nates at the earliest possible state. Such is, in a general
view, the nature of the process of pleading, and the manner
^
of coming to issue."
' Stephen on Pleading, Williston's edition, pp. 60-64.
APPENDIX C
judges' ballot with instructions
The following instructions to judges should be printed or

typewritten on the ballot given to each judge at the opening
of the debate, and a copy of this should be sent to each one
with the invitation to act as judge.
The annual inter-collegiate debate. TJni-
VEESITT OF , affirmative. UNIVERSITY OF ,
negative.
Friday, March , 19 .
Resolved: etc.
Instructions
To the Judge:
You are called here as one who understands debating, to
give an opinion as to the comparative ability in debate
shown
by the teams taking part in this contest. Your question is

which team shows a higher average skill in debating not sim-
ply which presents the stronger evidence, nor which side you
agree with either before or after the debate. Ability in de-
bate, or skiU in debate, covers knowledge of available ma-
terial, analysis, reasoning, rhetoric, proper debate tactics,
and ability to talk to an audience. You are the sole judge

as to what weight shall be given to these various elements.
Copies of these ballots are to be preserved for the guidance
and instruction of the contestants and others who are to
452
:
JUDGES' BALLOT WITH INSTRUCTIONS 453
follow them. Therefore in giving your reasons for your

decision please be as specific as possible.
Ballot
It is my decision that the debate should be awarded to the

team for the following reasons
(ample space should be left here on ballot.)
(Signed) Judge.

APPENDIX D
RULES FOB LEGAL BRIEF DRAWING
This very complete set of rules for legal brief drawing

appears as an appendix to Problems in Contracts, ^ by Dean
H. W. Ballantine of the University of Illinois Law School,
formerly Professor of Law in the University of Wisconsin.
A comparison of these rules with those given in chapter 10
willshow the difference between legal brief drawing and brief
drawing on general argumentation.
Directions for Briefmaking
"The following twenty-one rules cover the work of drawing

outline or skeleton briefs. Each rule here should be strictly
observed. Students should memorize these rules as stated
and should understand the reasons for them.
General Rules
1. Divide the brief into three parts, marked respectively
introduction, argument, and conclusion.
Arrange the arguments in the brief in logical order in
2.
the form of headings and subheadings.

3. State each heading and subheading or argument in the
form of assertions or propositions of fact or law, not of mere

vague topics.
4. Let each heading and subheading or argument contain
but a single assertion or proposition, in order to insure con-

densation and careful analysis.
5. Arrange every coordinate series of statements in order
' (Rochester, N. Y.: Lawyers Cooperative Publishing Co., 1916.)
454
RULES FOR LEGAL BRIEF DRAWING 455.
of climax, unless this violates time order in expository matter

or logical order in argumentative matter.
6. Indicate the relation between the headings and subhead-
ings by me.ans of margins, and letters, numbers, or other
symbols. ,
7. Let no heading or subheading be marked with more
than one symbol.

8. Indicate accurately all references, citations, and sources
of information relied upon in the brief under the proper
heading or subheading.
Rules for Introduction

9. In the first part of the introduction give all the facts
and information necessary for an understanding of the case.

Distinguish the main issues by briefly stating admitted mat-
ter, excluding irrelevant matter, and contrasting the principal
contentions of the one side with those of the other; thus

showing the essential points to be established or overthrown.
10. At the end of the introduction make a terse statement
of the precise issues presented by the case which the court
must decide, and of the divisions and order in which they
will be taken up.
11. Let the introduction contain only statements, the
truth of which must be acknowledged by both sides for the
purposes of the argument.
Rules for Argument

12. Let the argument proper state the gist of all the reasons
and authorities relied upon in the case.
13. In the argument let each main heading read as an af-
firmation of or as a reason for one of the issues to be estab-
lished.
14. Let each subheading, or series of subheadings, read as
a reason for the truth of the heading above it.
15. Support the main propositions or arguments by enough
subordinate propositions to give the various reasons for the
456 APPENDIX D
main contentions, and in like manner support the subordinate
propositions, if there are further points to be made.
16. Cite cases and authorities under the specific subordi-
nate propositions which they sustain.
17. Use great care to make the propositions of the argu-
ment as concise, cogent, and pointed as, possible. Avoid
glittering generalities, platitudes, repetitions, and trite or
sweeping assertions, which carry no thought or conviction.
18. A careful analysis and a logical argument of a case on
principle, supported by two or three strong cases on the
essential points is the way to win. Beware of too many cases
or of any case which does not hit the nail on the head. The
court has only limited time and patience.
19. Objections to be refuted should be dealt with as they
arise. Hold your opponent strictly to the proof of his case.
20. In phrasing refutation the heading should state clearly

the argument to be answered.
Rule for Conclusion

21. The conclusion should contain a summary of the
essential points of the argument.
" Note The skeleton brief here suggested is intended as the
:
mere iron framework or outline guide of a complete written

or oral argument. The training in the observance of these
rules will compel searching analysis, conciseness, thorough-
ness and a clear order and method of treatment which should
appeal at once to any court. The complete argument may
be readily built up upon this framework, with such attri-
butes of style, emphasis, elaboration, illustration, and per-
suasion as may be appropriate.
"I am
indebted for the substance of several of these rules
to a forthcoming work on Argumentation by my colleague.
Professor J.M. O'Neill. For illustrations of outline briefs
W. T. Foster, Argumentation and Debating, Chap. 9,
see also
and App. IV and V, pp. 359, 371."
APPENDIX E. 1
MATERIAL FOB A SHORT BRIEF
A Neglected Industry
(From the Boston Transcript)

The value of the goat as a domestic animal and a beneficial
factor in the agricultural industry has at various times been
discussed in these columns. Our belief in that value has been
based on the habits of the animal and its natural adaptation
to the conditions to be found in our farming sections, espe-
cially in New England. According to our Washington
despatches, already published, a similar condition has been
borne in upon the minds of some of our federal authorities.
The bureau of statistics of the department of commerce and
labor shows that we have been importing goat skins from va-
rious countries during the past decade ait the rate of fifty
millions a year. This shows the extent of the market for one
of the items in the goat's potential value.
But the department has also been impressed by consular
testimony with respect to the worth of the flesh as an addi-
tion to the meat supply of the country and suggests that for
such a pvirpose alone goat raising would be a profitable in-
dustry. We are somewhat inchned to doubt that, but the
main question does not depend upon proof of it. The meat
is certainly wholesome. We
have scriptural authority and
precedent for that and doubtless it would be popular were its
use more common. But why not, suggests the bureau, keep
within our own country the twenty-five millions that we pay
for the skins alone? Then there are the fleeces, for which
there is a steady and growing demand. To grow these at their
best no doubt requires care, as it does to produce almost
anything of good quality, but there is warrant for exercising
it in the fact that it pays.
457
458 APPENDIX E
Thus in a direct inventory we
meat for the eater,
find
fleeces for raiment, and skins and other goods, with
for shoes
possibly a side line of very digestible milk for infants and
invalids. But that is only a part and perhaps not the most
important part of the case that can be made out in favor of
the more general use of these too much neglected animals.
The goat has been represented as having a fondness for tin
cans and old junk of various kinds as articles of diet. This
is giving him more credit or more criticism than he deserves.
While his appetite is healthy and his digestion excellent, he

is purely a vegetarian, though within that limitation he is
very thorough. There is hardly a New England farm of

average size on which a flock of goats could not be kept for
nothing during seven or eight months in the year. From the
time that the leaves appear on the trees and undergrowth
in the spring until they depart in the fall, the goat will take
care of himself if let alone.
It is for this reason that he is able to render a great service.
Not only does he country but in doing so he en-
live off the
riches instead of impoverishes it He is a browser rather than
a grazer, preferring leaves to grass, and supports abounding
life on what the farmer not only does not need but does not
want. He forces back the constantly invading army of brush

and if the flock is large enough it will clean out growths about
the trees of the forest and improve conditions generally.
They are natural foresters, a fact that has been recognized
by those in charge of some of the western reserves, where
they nave been kept to eat fire lanes for long distances. If
goats were stationed in sufficient numbers in the woodlands
of Massachusetts we should not suffer from forest fires to the
extent that has been our portion for some years past, because
they would leave little for the fire to feed upon. What other
servants can the farmer find that will iVôrk diligently through
the productive, season to improve his land, protect his forests,
and keep themselves?
APPENDIX E. 2
material fob a long brief
Samuel W. McCall on Reciprocity with Canada

House of Representatives, Friday, April 21, 1911
(From the Congressional Record)
Mr. Chairman: In arising to close -the debate in behalf of

those members upon this side of the House who believe in the
policy of the present bill, I desire to say that I think the
House is to be congratulated upon the, illuminating discussion
to which has had an opportunity to listen. The speeches
it
delivered upon both sides of the question and upon both sides
of the aisle
have been worthy of the subject a subject which,
as was said by the gentleman from Illinois yesterday, is one
of the most important .ever before the American Congress.
The bill has important international aspects and features of
an economic character that call for the careful consideration
of every mem'ber. It does not make an appeal for the use of
the heroics of the hustings, but for the best thought each one
of us is capable of giving it.
with great interest to the speech of the gentleman

I listened

from Maine [Mr. Hinds] the first speech that he has had an
opportunity to deliver in this House, of which he has been
almost the directing agency for nearly twenty years. It was
a speech beautiful in structure, such a speech as is made out
of a full mind, and it was entirely worthy of the subject
which he discussed. I say that, although I pi'ofoundly dis-
believe in the conclusions which he maintained. I regretted
to notice, however, the pessimistic tone that the gentleman
adopted with reference to the American farmer. But it is not
strange that, having been in a position where for twenty
459
460 APPENDIX E
years he could not escape from listening to the debates, he
should have caught the minor key in which the praises of the
fanner are usually sung upon this floor.
According to his eulogists here, the American farmer is a
very serious minded individual, with his wife and numerous

progeny gathered about him and I observe that these eulo-
gists usually bless him with a bountiful offspring
desperately
and with great solemnity endeavoring to cling to a precarious
existence. These orators lament over his rugged qualities,
they almost brood over his virtues, and as for his faults, he
has none, for he is a being to whom it is impossible to sin.
Mr. Chairman, I havfe had some experience with the Amer-
ican farmer. I have seen him in his native lair. It was my
great good fortune to live for a number of years in my boy-
hood upon one of those glorious farms in northwestern Illinois
a $200-an-acre farm, as the gentleman from Indiana called

it one of those prairie farms, not the flat farms that you have
farther to the west, but where you have the billows of the
prairie tumbling about you. One of those farms which, when
they are under cultivation, present a scene of pastoral beauty
and of fertility such as can scarcely be found anywhere in the
world. I have seen farmers actually burn corn for fuel, as
has been so dramatically stated in this debate. Why, it has
been presented here, as if it showed the destitution of the
American farmer and his straitened circumstances that he
actually burned corn for fuel. I have seen him burn corn.
Sometimes he would overcrop with one grain and could not
sell it profitably, but he was pretty sure to get even on some
other grain; and instead of brooding over the burning of corn,

more probably the farmer would sit cheerily smoking his pipe
in the light of its blazing fire and his sons would rejoice that
they did not have to chop wood.
The American farmer is not the sad-eyed monstrosity,
always staring destiny in the face, that we have had painted
here. The farmers, as I knew them, were a prosperous,
independent, and happy race of men. I have known many
MATERIAL FOR A LONG BRIEF 461
farmers, and I have known some men even on Wall Street,

and I have made up my mind that they both belong to the
same race, and that there is about as much human nature in
the one class as in the other. I have sometimes thought
that if the numbers were reversed and that if we had 5,000,000
voters on Wall Street and only a few hundred farmers, our
statesmen would sing the homely virtues of J. P. Morgan and
his crew and would bestow upon them some of these lugu-
brious eulogiums of which the American farmer has been so
long the patient victim. And their worst enemy could hardly
wish them a harder fate.
Now,
it is argued against this bill and I do not propose
to weary the House with a repetition of the statistics we

have heard that just as the opening up of the Western
States depressed agriculture in New England so the open-
ing up of our markets to Canadian produce will have the
same effect upon the agriculture of the country, and es-
pecially upon the agriculture of the West. There is no sim-
ilarity whatever between the two cases. From 1870 to
1890, you will remember, we built railroads simply for the
sake of building railroads. We threw, sometimes in a single
year, many thousands of miles of railroad across the most fer-
tile land on the face of the globe, land that was uninhabited.
Railroads went in advance of civilization, and in order to get

business they sent their agents all over Europe stimulating
immigration; and it so happened that the financial and com-
mercial depression from 1873 to 1878 threw hundreds of
thousands of men out of employment in the East, and they
found places upon the western farms. We had brought under
cultivation, and their produce thrown upon our markets
almost, as it were, in a day, gi'cat and fertile states of this
Union, and in order to permit the farmers to live, the rail-
roads gave them unnaturally low rates to the markets of the
country and to those abroad.
It was said by Prof. Meyer that a bushel of wheat could
be carried more cheaply from Chicago to Liverpool than from
462 APPENDIX, E
Budapest to Prague, a distance in a straight line of only 175

miles. A man in Illinois could get into the markets of Boston
more cheaply than a man who lived in Worcester County in
Massachusetts. The result of this abnormally low rate was
practically to transport the prairies of the West into the sub-
urbs ofNew York and Boston. And, of course, agriculture
was depressed in New England, not merely from that cir-
cumstance, but because of the conditions there which were
adverse to agriculture as it was then conducted.
I saw agriculture not only in the West, but when I was a
young boy my father sent me to New England to school, and
I had an opportunity there to see how they farmed in New
England. In the West a farmer could turn a furrow for a
mile, if his farm went that far, without taking his hand from
the plow: but in New England the farmer would urge his
horses, and more often his oxen, for a few feet and then would
have to turn out for a stump or stone. He would try to select
smooth little patches upon the hillside. While a New Eng-
land hillside, with its alternation of little rye fields and corn-
fields and pasture and meadow and woodland, presents a very
beautiful mosaic to the eye, it certainly is not favorable to
agriculture. And it was inevitable that under the adverse
natural conditions and with the antiquated methods which
the New England farmers employed they could not compete
with the rich and fertile prairie lands of the West.
Now, how is it with Canada? Why, there is, as I have said,
no parallel between the two cases. Champlain laid the foun-
dations of Port Royal and Quebec before the Pilgrims landed
upon Plymouth Rock. That country is as old as this
country.
For one hundred and fifty yearsit has been a part of the
wealthiest empire in the world, and yet to-day it has less than
8,000,000 people, and instead of capitalists putting in their
money, thrusting railroads across the cold fields of Canada,
Canada has been compelled largely to build her railroads out
of her own treasury, and although she has given enormous
land grants and vast sums of money she to-day has only
about 25,000 miles of railroads in the whole Dominion.
Canada has not the slightest advantage over the West in
fertility or in aptitude for agriculture. The advantage is
all the other way. The part of Canada gentlemen fear is a
country of a single crop. A single crop will sack the soil.
The farms in the Canadian northwest are scarcely habitable
for a good many months in the year. Agriculture in our West
can be carried on under far better conditions than there.
The lands there are not so cheap as they were in the West
when it was settled. Rich prairie land sold in the United
States for $5 and less an acre. I happen to know a case where
a very intelligent business man of New England desired to
buy a half section of unbroken land for each of his two sons.
He bought it nearly two years ago, selecting it with great
judgment and care, and he was compelled to pay the Can-
adian Pacific Railroad Co. $25 an acre, and another young
man bought some land two weeks afterwards and it had
risen to $30 an acre; and that prairie land has since been going
up in price. These young gentlemen who started out to
build their fortunes found that they had to pay a very high
price for their horses, had to hire a man to look after their
farms in the winter, began with a drought and a poor crop,
and at the present time they still have their fortunes to
acquire.
But suppose our young men do go to Canada, and many
of them have already gone there. Why, the state of Iowa,
that wonderful agricultural state, during the last decade lost
in population. Does that mean that it declined in prosperity.''
Not at all. one of the greatest, and is destined to con-
It is
tinue to be one of the greatest, and richest agricultural regions

in the world. But young men have gone from Iowa because
they could get more land in Canada than at home. The land
of their own state was all taken up. Su{)pose they shall found
upon the eastern slopes of the Canadian Rockies a newer and
a fairer Iowa? Who is there who will not wish them God-
464 APPENDIX E
speed? They go there to wm their fortunes, just as their
fathers made their fortunes, by selling in the open markets of
the world; and if they deserve to prosper and if the country
is so favorable to agriculture, they will repeat the prosperity
of their fathers.
The gentleman from Maine [Mr. Hinds], in the course of
Germany,
his speech, alluded to the agricultural conditions in
and Bismarck estabhshed agricultural duties
to the fact that
there. I fancy that Bismarck did not establish agricultural
duties so much for the sake of agriculture as to placate the
powerful agrarian element and establish generally in Germany
the policy of protection. But they have had, ever since the
time of Bismarck, high protection upon agricultural products
in Germany.
Let us see what the effect has been. There is this singular
law, pointed out by Prof. Fawcett, of Cambridge University,
England, that while in a great many articles of common use
the demand does not increase the price, yet in the case of
agricultural products the demand does increase the price,
and he reached that conclusion upon a line of argument
something like this:
A man may be producing manufactures of cotton or flax
or some other article in which labor is the chief element of
production, and if there is a demand for twice as many goods

of the kind he makes, he doubles the size of his factory and
can manufacture even more cheaply than he could before.
But in a country like Germany, which normally supports its
population, when you come to increase that population under
the stimulus of protection, by building up great. manufac-
turing cities and making a strain upon the resources of the
soil, there is a greater demand for agricultural produce than
the farmer normally has raised. Now, there are in every

country some lands that ordinarily are not cultivated be-
causes prices do not*make it profitable to cultivate them.
They are called valueless, but when you raise the price of farm
products it pays to till the best of these lands, and the higher

the price the poorer the land it will pay to cultivate. There
is an "oscillating margin," upon which you may or may not
be able profitably to raise farm produce, according as farm
produce is high or low. The man who cultivates must get
prices that will warrant him in doing so. These prices enable
the man who has fertile land to make still more money, and
the increased demand for agricultural produce drives people
into the cultivation of lands previously unprofitable, and in
order to induce them to do it they must of necessity be paid
a higher price for their produce.
Now, let us see what has happened in Germany, which
relatively to us has a very large population per square mile
and which, with a growing population, has had high protec-
tion in agriculture for a great many years. The growing
demand for foodstuffs has greatly increased prices. I no-
ticed the other day an address made by the chancellor of
the German Empire, who is a rigid and uncompromising
protectionist. At a meeting of the National Society of Ag-
riculture he said:
I am especially grateful to the president
That is, the president of that society
many farm products

for his frank admission that the prices of
have in the past year reached an unhealthy height, burdening
in a deplorable manner a great number of people.
That comes from the chancellor of the German Empire

with reference to this artificial increase in the price of food.
He declares that it burdens in a deplorable manner a great
number of people.
Let us look further at the situation in Germany. The
agrarian element there, who own the land, are a very power-
ful element. They not only enjoy high and unnatural prices
for the common but they have great power
articles of food,
in directing the German Empire. As you all know the state
owns the railroads. At a certain time of the year the sugar-
466 APPENDIX E
bearing lands along the Elbe make special demands for ag-
ricultural labor, and so used to be the custom at that time
it
of the year for laborers living along the Oder to go and help
in the harvest of these sugar-bearing lands, where they would
get better wages, and then when the harvesting was over to
come back again. The German railroads gave them excursion
rates. Those agrarians who lived along the Oder made a
complaint to the German Government in effect that they
had a natural right to employ the labor of their locality, and
that for the Government to give these laborers excursion
rates made it necessary for the agrarians to pay higher wages
to their men; and although the minister of finance admitted
that it was a good thing for the German laborer, although it
gave him more money temporarily, although it enabled an
untraveled class to get away from home and to see another
part of the Empire and have their outlook broadened, yet the
Government yielded to the demand of the agrarian element
and refused longer to sell the excursion tickets.
The gentleman from Maine [Mr. Hindsl alluded to the
law called the Gregory King law, by which he showed that
as the supply of an article of common use increased at an
arithmetical ratio, the price decreased at practically a ge-
ometrical ratio.
That is, you increase the surplus of a necessary article and
you depress the price out of all proportion to the amount by
which you increase the surplus. It readily occurred to me
that there is a reverse to that law, and the other side is illus-
trated in the case of Germany. If you decrease below the
natural demand the supply of an article of common use in
an arithmetical ratio, you increase the price of that article
in practically a geometrical ratio. I think there is no escape
from that conclusion.
Then about the static equilibrium of which he spoke, in
nations between agriculture and manufactures. It is a very
good thing if you can secure the equilibrium naturally, but it
is a very bad thing to pay too much for it. Suppose there is a
nation that has coal mines, iron mines, water powers, great
facihties for manufacturing, and a poor soil. Is it wise for
her to take her people from the operation of the great natural
resources and facilities for manufacturing with which she
has been blessed and put them to the cultivation of an infertile
soil? Is it not better for them to work the mines, to build up
manufactures, and exchange their products with some other
nation that does not have these resources but has a fertile
soil?
Carry it out to extremes on this theory and every household
should maintain an equilibrium, and each should have its
own blacksmith, its own shoemaker, and its own spinner.

The law of modem trade is for men and nations to do the
things they are best fitted to do and to exchange products
with each other.
I paid close attention to the argument of the gentleman
from Maine, because I have a high respect for him and be-
cause I was greatly attracted by his speech. There is one
other thing to which I wish to call attention. He referred to
the British Tariff Commission, and quoted them as in favor,
practically, of reenacting the corn laws. That would strike
an ordinary man as an admission almost from the Cobden
Club itself in favor of the policy which the gentleman from
Maine was advocating. I thought from its name, as very
likely the gentleman from Maine thought, that it must be a
royal commission, or if not a royal commission it must be a
sort of government commission. I have looked it up', and in

HazelVs Annual, which tells you briefly everything about
the Empire, you will find the British Tariff Commission
tabula,ted with other similar organizations. On the one side
it frankly states the organizations against Mr. Chamberlain's
proposal, which was to tax food coming into England, and
there we have the Free Trade League and the Cobden Club
and others. In the other column they have catalogued the
organizations for Mr. Chamberlain's proposal, and among
them is the tariff commission, established by Joseph Cham-

468 APPENDIX E
berlain in the beginning of 1904 in order to push along his

particular ideas. That is practically the protective-tariff
league of the British Empire, and if you read the names you
will find there a collection of gentlemen, some of them very
comfortable manufacturers, who are deeply concerned, as
are the manufacturers in this country, for the poor farmer.
I could construct a tariff commission like that here, and
it would be a commission of more eminent abiUty. I would
put the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Cannon], my distin-
guished, and I may say my illustrious, friend at the head;
I would put the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Dalzell]
upon it; I would give a place upon it to the gentleman from
Michigan [Mr. Fordney]; and then I would add to it the sec-
retary of the American Protective Tariff League and of the
Home Market Club of Massachusetts. And we should have
a fine collection of gentlemen, of great ability and great
knowledge; but if I wanted to hold forth anything they said
in favor of protection as an admission of an ancient enemy
to protection I think some of our narrow-minded partisans
on the other side would reserve the right to object.
This whole discussion has revolved about the price of
wheat. But first I wish to say a word about the price of
land. I do not think the effect of this legislation is going to
be to decrease the price of land, but to keep it from going
up too rapidly in value. So far as competition with Canada
is concerned, if North Dakota, which has a longer summer
and a shorter winter than Canada, can be a part of the same

agricultural domain and can compete with Kansas and
Iowa and Oklahoma and those wonderfully rich lands to-
ward the South, lands as fertile as those in Campania, where,
as Virgil said
Summer borrows months beyond her own;

Twice the teeming flocks are fruitful,
Twice the laden orchards groan
if North Dakota can compete with lands like those, what

has she to fear from the more frosty Alberta? What has
Minnesota to fear from Manitoba when she can prosper
side by side with Iowa and Nebraska?
The debate has been chiefly about the farmer, and I
have wondered whether he was really so much agitated
over this bill as we have been led to believe. I have won-
dered, since in 1865 patriotism was the pretext which certain
great interests employed to terminate the Elgin treaty,
whether after all there was not something masked behind
the farmer here. People have been industriously sending
telegrams to members. Evidently there has been a great
campaign of education, and the suspicion that the farmer
was being put where he did not deserve to be has reminded
me of that old fort near Panama which was captured from the
Spaniards by Morgan and his buccaneers, and it is said the
way they captured it was to drive in advance of their charg-
ing columns the nuns and the sisters of charity. The
Spaniards did not wish to fire upon these good women and so
the buccaneers captured the fortress. I do not wish to say
that there have been any other gentlemen behind the Ameri-
can farmer, but I have had just a suspicion that there were
some interests behind him pushing him to the front to take
the brunt of the fire or to silence it.
But this whole question revolves about wheat, and it
seems to me that we can decide it upon wheat alone. I think
there is no doubt that in any country which exports a consid-
erable surplus of wheat the price is fixed in the market that
takes the surplus. We have been for many years one of the
great granaries of the world, selling in the open market, and
our wheat has sold on a parity and is selling to-day on a par-
ity, freights being adjusted, with the wheat of Argentina,
of Australia, of Canada, of India, and Russia. Although it

would seem hardly necessary to quote an authority upon so
clear a proposition, I have here Prof. Dondlinger's interesting
book on wheat. He has evidently written with great sym-
pathy for the farmer, and he lays down this proposition:
470 APPENDIX E
As soon as a country has a surplus for ejqjort and receives
more for exported wheat than the home price, plus the ex-
porting, the export will increase, the home price will rise,
production and the price is no longer fixed

will increase,
within the country. The country which buys the export
may thus fix the price of wheat for the country which pro-
duces it. . It is as a consumer of the world surplus that
. .
England has held a position of such commanding importance

in fixing the price of wheat.
Gentlemen present here some discrepancies in the price

of wheat upon one side of the line and the other. I can find
similar discrepancies between neighboring towns in South
Dakota. It depends upon elevator facilities, it depends upon
competition in buying, and you can find those differences in
towns in the same state. They are simply little backward
whirls and eddies, that you will find in the most rapid onrushing
stream. They are simply the exceptions that prove the rule.
The man in North Dakota does not compete with the
man across the line in Manitoba directly, but he competes
with him 4,000 miles away in the Liverpool market. We
have an exportable surplus of something like 100,000,000
bushels a year, and Canada has an exportable surplus of,
perhaps, half that amount, and those surpluses are both

taken by the Liverpool market. It makes no difference
whether the wheat is swept from Canadian or American
threshing floors, when it goes to Liverpool, according to its
quality, one kind brings the same price as the other. And
so we witness this spectacle on account of the high tariff
wall; we see these two broad, golden rivers of wheat flowing
in parallel lines upon either side of the boundary and seeking
the level of a common market. It seems to me quite beyond
our capacity to understand that any other law can operate
where we export such an enormous volume of this necessary
article, not controlled by a trust, than that the price is fixed
in the country which takes the surplus.

Let us take the reverse of that, and we have an illustra-

tion to prove the truth of this rule. Take sugar. We do not
produce as much sugar as we consume. We consume some
3,500,000 tons every year, and we need to import a great deal
from the outside world. Some years ago we had before this
House a proposition to give a preferential duty of 20 per cent
to Cuban sugar over other sugars. It was alleged here that
the Cubans, for whom we designed this arrangement, would
get no benefit at all, but that it would go to the Sugar Trust,
and what do we see? We see precisely the result that the
advocates of that reciprocity bill pointed out at that time.
The sugar market of the world is Hamburg. The price
of sugar in New York is the Hamburg price plus the freight
across the ocean plus the full duty into New York. And the
Cuban planters, providing they show reasonable intelligence
and do not glut the market at a given time, can reckon on
the Hamburg price with the freight and full duty added.
Since we have to make up our deficiency in the production
of sugar by large importations, our home price is the world's
or Hamburg with the duty added, and there is a
^price
parity in price between Hamburg and Cuba and Sumatra

when the differences in duties and freights are con-
sidered.
I read this morning in the New York Sun an article upon
sugar written, I believe, by Mr. Robinson, one of the most
accomplished economic writers upon the American press.
He took importations from Sumatra and from some other
countries and he carried out the prices into thousandths, and
then an importation from Cuba, which had a preferential
duty. When they were finally landed in New York they all
appeared at precisely the same price, each paying its freight
and particular duty. The price is adjusted, although I am
not quoting him as an authority upon that, with reference
to theHamburg price.
What is going to happen to wheat if this bill passes?
Gentlemen say, if the effect is not to decrease the price of
472 APPENDIX E
bread, why do we want to pass the bill, and if it is going

to decrease the price of bread, it will injure the American
farmer, and they repeat this very ancient tariff riddle. I
will tellyou what I think will happen. We are going to
reach just the same condition in regard to wheat as we are
in to-day in regard to sugar. When we cease to raise as
much as we consume, and when we shall have to bring
wheat in from other nations for our own consumption, then
we shall see the law I have been talking about illustrated
from the reverse side.
Instead of our exporting at the world's price to Liver-

pool, paying our freight, we shall buy at the world's price
at Liverpool and pay in addition the freight and the cost of
overcoming any other obstacles in order to get into our own
market; and when you reach that point the tariff for the
first time
this tariff that has looked so magnificent upon
the statute books to the American farmer ^will become
operative to increase the price of wheat above the world's
price. Now, is there any American farmer who would
desire to add to the price he is getting in Liverpool 25 cents
a bushel of tariff plus the freight rate from Liverpool.'' He
has prospered on wheat growing on the basis of prices in
the markets of the world. Do you imagine that when the
time of our scarcity comes and when we are not raising
as much as we consume that the American farmer will de-
sire to have this price artificially raised in order that he
may make more money? He certainly will make as much

then if the tariff is not on as he does now.
A great deal has been said about the Elgin treaty. It has
been argued that it was unfavorable to the United States.
Let me call your attention to this circumstance, that in 1850
the trade going both ways between Canada and the United
States only amounted to about $5,000,000 a year. This
treaty was put in force in 1855 and remained in force for
eleven years, and yet in that time it covered nearly a half
bilHon of trade between the two countries. Why, it practi-
cally created trade between Canada and the United States,

and Canada for a generation after we abrogated that treaty
stood in our antechambers asking that we make another
reciprocity arrangement with her. She continued to do so
for thirty years, until at last Sir Wilfrid Laurier said, "No
more pilgrimages to Washington."
Sir John Macdonald made it the fundamental policy of
his party to have reciprocity with the United States and,
at the same time, incidental protection. And when he came
into power, about 1880, for, I think, the second or third time,
he established the policy of protection for Canada and at-
tempted to secure a reciprocity treaty. That policy of pro-
tection had the effect of stimulating Canadian manufacture,
and in 1893 Sir Wilfrid Laurier, the present prime minister,
said that "If you give us Liberals power we will destroy
protection, which is a sham and a delusion and a robbery,"
showing that there was complete reciprocity in poUtical
rhetoric and that he had gotten that "free of all duty" from
the Democratic Party in the United States.
Sir Wilfrid Laurier three years afterwards was intrusted
with power. He is a sound and sagacious statesman, and I
wish to call the attention of my enthusiastic friends upon the
other side of the aisle to the fact that he has done nothing
whatever to reduce protective duties in Canada except sim-
ply to create the British preferential. And I trust that his
sound sense and moderation wiU be imitated by gentlemen
upon the other side if they ever have the responsibility of
dealing with the tremendous industries of the United States.
I think it is not necessary to say anything upon the most-
favored-nation aspect of this treaty. We heard a great deal
about it when the question was discussed in the last Congress,
and the fact that that objection has not been urged by gentle-
men in the present debate is pretty conclusive evidence that
there was no foundation whatever for their former conten-
tion. I think, also, the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Howland]
has finally disposed of the argument, or, rather, the objec-
474 APPENDIX G
tion, that we should not have reciprocity in competitive
articles.
I am rather surprised to find gentlemen representing

border states of the Union opposed to this treaty. A high-
tariff wall, however beneficial it may be to a country as a
whole, throws a very deep shadow. People can only trade

upon one side of the wall. They are shut out from their
neighbors upon the oiher side. If the men in North Da-
kota would look at this a little more broadly, they would
see that would be far better for their state, for the farmers
it
there, to trade across the line and acquire farms across the
line and not be upon the outer rim of the country where the
circulation of the trade current is feeble, as is that of the blood
in the extremities of the body. I would suggest that they
should not want to continue to be the extremities of the body
politic, but that they might more profitably wish to annex
Canada industrially, so that they might trade and extend
their farms to the north as well as to the south.
Now, it has been denied that the policy of reciprocity,
such as this bill presents, is a Republican policy. We have
had it shown in this debate that the administration of Pres-
ident Grant, who was a pretty good Republican and did
not come from New England, negotiated a reciprocity treaty
upon the lines of the Elgin treaty. We have seen that Gar-
field, afterwards President, was in favor of the Elgin treaty.
We had it asserted upon the authority of Mr. Curtis that Mr.

McKinley was in favor of the policy. Certainly the amend-
ment proposed by Mr. Blaine tended strongly to show that he
was in favor of the policy.
And now I want to quote from a very distinguished man,
a man who was governor of a leading state and who has
since succeeded a great statesman as the political leader
of his state. I refer to Albert B. Cummins, who was at the
time governor of Iowa. I am going to quote from a speech
of Gov. Cummins, made to the Boston Merchants' Associa-
tion on December 10, 1903. I will not read all of the extract.
because it is somewhat long, but I will read what he says in

conclusion:
Suppose we could to-night add Canada, from ocean to

ocean and from her southern line to the North Pole, to the
territory of the United States, so that when some cour-
ageous American explorer plants the banner of the Republic
upon the axis of the world and its beautiful folds fill with
the air of the North it will proclaim the eternal sovereignty
of the United States. How many are there here or else-
. . .
where who would look upon this accession of power and popu-
lation upon land and lake and sea as a misfortune to our
country or a blow inflicted upon her prosperity?
I go further and eliminate national pride. How many
banks would fail on that account? How many factories
would close because the Stars and Stripes were flying over
this vast domain? What acre would be worth less? What
man would be without work or receive less compensa-
tion? . . .
Matk am not dreaming of annexation, nor am I

you, I
advocating free trade with Canada, for the former is more
remote than ever before, and the latter is wholly imprac-
ticable. I have used the figure only to show that we can
safely draw nearer to our neighbor and safely enter upon
the negotiation of a reciprocal treaty."
I commend that to the attention of some of our agricultural

friends from the West.
Mr. Chairman, it appears from some of the arguments
made in this House, and from some of the arguments that
are advanced in Canada, that this bill is to be mutually de-
structive to the agriculture of both countries, and that the
deplorable condition of the American farmer under it is only
to be equaled by the wretched squalor which the Canadian
farmer will have to face. As the gentleman from Minnesota
[Mr. Nye] so eloquently said yesterday, this bill presents a
great ethical question. It presents an enlightened policy.
476 APPENDIX E
The President of the United States is simply asking this
country to obey the laws of nature, which no great nation
can violate with impunity.
Here these two countrieslie side by side for over 3,700
miles.The lines of trade naturally run north and south,

and we are attempting to force them to run east and
west.
And it is the policy of justice. Remember that during
the last dozen years our balance of trade against Canada
has been nearly $1,009,000,000. She is buying of us this
very year more than $250,000,000 in value, and 70 per cent
of that trade goes there absolutely free of duty. Her av-
erage duty against the goods that we send her is only half as
much as the average duty that we impose against her; and
of thisyou may be certain, that after this bill shall pass the
average duty of the United States against Canada will still
be higher than the average of the duties levied by Canada
against the United States.
The President is recognizing the laws of nature. The
fact that that country buys from us nearly twice as much as
she does from all the other nations of the world shows most
powerfully how the ties of nature are drawing us commer-
cially together. It is not wise to try to float upstream. We
should permit the laws of nature to work without obstruc-
tion, and they will work, for the benefit of both countries.
The size of our planet is dwindling every year. The dis-
covery of all of the lands of the world, the wonderful inven-
tions of the last century, the railroad and the telephone
and the telegraph make this world to-day as small, compared
with the world of the time of Columbus, as one of Jupiter's
satellites is as compared with Jupiter. We are rapidly grow-
ing smaller, and here is this great neighbor of ours that is
industrially a part of the United States. I say it is wise for

us to recognize that fact and to pass this bill. It does not go
far enough, but it takes a long step in the right direction.
I regret that I have only three minutes more. It is argued
MATERIAL FOR A LONG BRIEF ill
in effect by the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. Lenroot]

in his very able speec^:
Add this farmer's free list to this bill. Load it to the gun-
wales with amendments and sink it if you can.
Consider for a moment the sort of a measure this bill
would become. Here is a proposition to carry out an in-

ternational agreement. The first section of the act says
that flour shall be admitted at a certain rate of duty from
Canada when Canada shall admit flour at the same rate
coming from this country, and the same thing with regard
to meat and other articles.
The trade is carefully carried out in the first article. Then,
in the fourth article, with contemptuous levity we say that
all these things, coming from all the rest of the world, for
which Canadian statesmen have paid a consideration to get

a reduction of duty upon them, shall come into our markets
free of duty. Webster said, "Politics should cease at the
water's edge"; but this would be playing politics upon an
international scale. It would trea.t with levity the negotia-
tions between the Canadian commissioners and the President
of the United States. It would attest, at the same time, their
inability to make a bargain and the ability of the President
of the United States to drive a hard bargain, because, with-
out any consideration whatever, in a subsequent section, we
freely give better terms to the rest of the world.
Now, Mr. Chairman, if I may have just two or three
minutes more, the boundary line between these two countries

stretches, as I have said, for 3,700 miles. There is no modern
fort along that line. After the war of 1812, by the Rush-
Bagehot treaty, we agreed to have no further armaments
upon the Great Lakes, although two of the chief battles of
that war had been fought upon them. Great cities, with
billions of dollars of property, with fabulous wealth, have
grown up along that boundary. They are not defended by a
single gun, but there are no cities in all the world that are
more safe, because they are fortified and guarded by the good
478 APPENDIX E
sense, the common interests, and the friendly sentiments of

two great nations. We have and guns along
forts, it i^ true,
that but they are antiquated and the survivals of a time
line,
long past. And we have made the dreams of the poets come
true for the boys wage mimic wars in the crumbling embra-
sures of the forts, the birds build their nests in the hps of the
cannon, and little children play upon them and clasp their
silent throats. We can just as safely dismantle the tariff
forts between the two countries. Canada is one with us in
sentiment. She is one with us in all the strongest ties that
can draw nations together; and I trust that this side of the
House will vie with that side of the House and support the
President of the United States in the enlightened and civil-
ized policy proposed by this bill.
INDEX
Amphibology, fallacy of, 174
Abbott, L., 267 Amplify and diminish in conclusion,
Accent, fallacy of, 174 337
Accident, fallacies of, 183 Amplifying and diminishing, 416
, fallacy of converse, 187 Analogy, 162
, fallacy of, simple, 186 definition by, 303
, fallacy of, specific, 184 false, 167
Accuracy of statement of witness, , figurative, 162
109 , kinds of, 162
Actual issues, 46, 47 , literal, 164
Adams, J. J., 302, 346, 348, 349 Analysis and exposition in rebuttal,
Adaptation to audience, 212, 252, 427
283 , definition by, 307
to audience, in introduction, 314 Ancestors of argumentation, 11
to circumstances, negative, first Answering too little, 348
398 too much, 346
Adjustment, negative case, 378 too much, three objections, 347
Admissibility of evidence, 85 349
yourself,
Admissions, 106 Answer whole case in rebuttal, 425
Admitted issues, 48 Antecedent, defined, 123
matter in brief, 229 denying
, the, fallacy of, 180
Advantages of extempore method, probability, 139
436 probability, methods of attack
Affirmative case and the issues, 376 on, 142
case debate, 376
in A posteriori argument, 146
defense, 378 35, Appeal, emotional, kind of, 260
, debate, 394
first, in A priori argument, 140, 141
Affirming the consequent, fallacy, Arguing in a circle, fallacy, 190

180 Argumentation and logic, 9, 1 15
A fortiori argument, 159, 160 and the forms composition, 10 of
Agreement, method of, 124 conviction and persuasion S-7

, in,
Aids to unity and coherence in dis- defined, 1

cussion, 329 emotion 257
, in,
Alden, R. M., 11, 309 four processes 7

, in,
Ambiguity in propositions, 28 , debate, 368

relation to
Ambiguous middle, 177, 184 science or 10

, art,
use of terms, 182 sources 11

, of,
479
480 INDEX
Argument by generalization, 155 Audience, friendly, 292
defined, 83
, , hostile, 293
from analogy, 162 , inattentive, introduction, 319
from authority, 100 74, 99, - --. suggestions for persuasion, 283
from cause to 139 effect, , well disposed, 339
from to cause, 146
effect Authority, argunrent from, 74, 99,
from to effect 149 effect, 100
from example, 155 , definition by, 300
from example, cause and effect , test of, 112
in, 168
from
, 146 sign,
B
231
in brief,
Arguments and evidence, 74 Baker, G. P.,5, 94, 328
forms
, 114-115
of, outline, Baker and Huntington, 94, 264, 267,
from analogy, methods of at- 271, 278, 296, 297, 350
167
tack, Balance summary, 416
, 115
in logic, Baldwin, J. M., 259
, kinds of, outline, 114-115 Ballantine, H. W., 37, 211
Argumentum ad hominem, 190 Basic rule for all refutation, 353
ad ignorantiam, 193 Beach, W. A., in North case, 307
ad judicium, 193 , on military law, 301
adpojmlum, 190 Beecher, H. W., 283, 292, 293-296
ad verecundiam, 193 Begging the question fallacy, 188
Aristotle, 260, 334 Belief and will, 258
Arnold, M., 327 Behefs of debates, 374
Arrangement, 8 Best, W. M., 82, 83, 88, 90, 91, 92,
, function of, 197 93, 95, 105, 106
Asking questions in debate, 410 Black, F. S., in Molineux case, 143
Assertion, form of proposition, 27 in ex parte Milligan, 312
Assertions and support, 324 on right to by
, trial jury, 63, 359
Assimilation, 77 Blackstone's commentaries, 302
Association of phenomena and gen- Block system of presentation, 439
eralization, 153 Bode, B. H., 9, 15, 116, 135, 181
of phenomena in the past, 152 Bodkin, R. C, 177, 186, 300
of phenomena, methods of at- Bradbury, H. B., 315
tack, 154 Brady, J. T., in case of Savannah
Assumption of unproved premise, privateers, 306
fallacy, 189 Brevity, 273
Assumptio non probata, 189 Brief, admitted matter, 229
Attack on forms of arguments, ref- and main speeches, 392
utation, 356 and outline, 211
Audience, adaptation to, 212, 252, andpresentation, 250
283 and simple propositions, 30
INDEX 481
Brief, clash of opinion in, 229 Burke, on Irish Catholics, 160

climax 219
, in, , on the Marriage act, 313
conclusion, 237
,
complete sample, 240

,
complete statements, 216

,
coordinate subheadings, 231

, Calmness in introduction, 314
defined, 208
, Campbell, G., 102
discussion, 231
, Card form for note, 72
divisions 214
, of, system, gathering material, 71
documentation 221
, in, Case, affirmative in debate, 376
drawing and outlining, 208
'
, negative, four types, 377
drawing, 210 legal, Casual evidence, 93, 107
drawing, 213 rules, Categorical proposition, 176
headings and subheadings, 216
, syllogism, 176
introduction, 222
, Cause adequate to produce effect,
impersonal, 209
is 143
,and partition
issues 224 in, and connection complete,
effect
main headings, 231
; 149
order 219
, in, argument from example, 168
in
, column, 237
parallel capable being cause, 148
of real
purposes 208
, of, defined, 123
,
references 221
, in, to 139
effect,
refutation 234, 235
, in, Channing, W. E., in reply to Clay,
, relation
of discussion 323 to, 357-358
, 219
relations in, , on slavery, 156
, statements, 217
single Characteristics of good propositions,
subheadings, 231
, 27
symbols 220
, in, Charts in presentation, 443
Brooks, P., 342 Chatham, Lord, 437
Brown, D. P., in Holmes case, 150 Choate, R., in Dalton case, 110
Buckley, J. M., 436, 438, 439, 440 Cicero, 299, 348, 356
Burden of proof, 33 Circulus in probanda, 90
of proof and negative evidence, Circumstantial evidence, 40, 88,
95 89
and 51 issues, Clark and Blanchard, 286
law, 34in Clash opinion 43 of in issues,
propositions, 29
in opinion 229 of in brief,
summary, 38
, Classification of emotions, 263
rebuttal, 35
of 171 of fallacies,
of rebuttal, defined, 37 Clearness refutation, 353 in
Burke, on conciliation with
E., Climax and comparison, 282
America, 155, 320, 363 219 in brief,
on duration of Parliaments, 336 Coarseness debate, 384
, in
482 INDEX
Cohereince, 201 Converse accident fallacy, 187
and emphasis, 204 Conversion, fallacy of illogical, 173
discussion, 328
in Conviction and persuasion, 251
summary 203
, of, and persuasion and the 53 issues,
Collins, J. C, 109 and persuasion argumenta- in

Combined memorizing and extempo- 3-7
tion,
raneous, 439, 440 and persuasion evidence, 81 in

Comparison and climax, 282 and persuasion presentation, in
Complete sample brief, 240 250
statements in
, 216 brief, Conviction in conclusion, 334
Complex 45 issues, , in introduction, 299
question 194 fallacy, Convictions of debates, 374
Composition, fallacy, 183 Coordinate subheadings in brief, 231
, 322
principles of, in discussion, Corwin, T., on General Crary, 385
Conclusion, 199, 334 Counter proposition, 36
amplify and diminish, 337
, proposition and
,
issues, 51
conviction 334
, in, proposition; negative
, case, 378
237
in brief, Courtesy in introduction, 314
in debate, 413 Creighton, J. E., 9, 15, 116, 120, 135,
irrelevant
, 190 fallacy, 136, 137, 171, 173, 183, 193
persuasion 339
, in, Critic's note in contest debate, 372,
purpose 334
, of, 373
, emotions
stirring 341 in, Curtis, G. W., 331
summaries 334
, in,
D
presumptions, 40
,
Concomitant variations, method of, Dangers of extempore speaking, 437

129 Davis, W. H., 369
Concrete and specific, 280 Debatable propositions, 30
' and specific propositions, 29 Debate, affirmative case in, 376
Confusion in refutation, 347 367
defined, 8,
Connection, in coherence, 202 , 404
discussion,
, of cause and effect complete, 142 , 393
divisions,
Conscious practice, 78 , 403
ethics in,
Consequent, affirming the, fallacy, negative 395
, first in,
180 introduction, 394

,
defined, 123
, , 402
issues in,
, 194
false, fallacy, main heads 404
, in,
Contest debates, 369 memorized, 432

,
debates, S3 decision, methods

-r-, presentation, 431
of
debates, preparation of, 376 nature
, 367
of, outline,
Context, definition from, 303 , 403

partition in,
Conversational mode in introduc- personality 379
, in,
tion, 314 preparation 368

, for,
INDEX 483
Debate, preparatory practice for, 393 Denney, Duncan, and McKinney,

presentation 430
, in, 343
questions 410
, in, Denying the antecedent, fallacy of,
reading manuscript 431
, in, 180
, to argumentation, 368
relation Detract interest from theme in intro-
Debaters' 374
beliefs, duction, 315
374
con^'ictions, Difference, method of, 125
374
opinions, Digression, for emphasis, 326
Debate, sarcasm and ridicule, 385 Dilemma, 356, 357
Debates, contest, 369 , more than two hours, 359
decision 370
, in, Direct evidence, 88
judging, 370, 371
,
or inverted 308 order,
preparation of contest, 376
, Discussion, 322
the, outline,
purpose 370
, of, unity
, 200
in the,
, 384
self-control in, coherence 328
, in,
sport or game, 373

, emphasis 326
, in,
types of
, 371
decisions, 231
in brief,
Decision contest debate, 53
in debate, 404
in
debates, 370
in partitions 329, 331, 332
, in,
Declarations against interest, 106 , composition

principle of 322 in,
Deduction, 117 , 325

relations in,
Defense of present, negative case, 377 , to
relation 323 brief,
Definition by analogy, 303 summaries and partition 409

, in,
by 307
analysis, summaries
, 330, 332
in, 329,
by authority, 300 , 329, 332
transitions in,
by etymological derivation, 302 unity 328
, in,
by 306
exclusion, variety 323
, in,
by 305
illustration, Disjunction, dilemma, 360
faulty, of
from context, 303 imperfect
, 181fallacy,
introduction, 300, 402
in Disjunction syllogism, 181
171
of fallacies, Disputable presumptions, 40
terms, 24
of Distribution of terms, 183
purposes 300
, of, of term, defined, 133
summary steps 26
, of in, Division exhaustive, in method of
Deliberate perversion of the truth, residues, 361
110 fallacy 183
, of,
Delivery impromptu, 436 Divisions 214

of brief,
, manuscript, 431 of the debate, 393
, memorized, 432 Documentation in notes, 72
, notes in, 441 , in brief, 221
, outlines, 430 of sources, 100
, outline in, 442 Double propositions, 27
Demosthenes, 342 Duty of going forward, 34, 36

484 INDEX
E Evidence, direct, 88
Earnestness in persuasion, 266

, exceptionally valuable kinds of,
Efifect to cause, 146 106

to cause, methods of attack on , 97
expert, 96,
arguments from, 148 hearsay,
, 92 89, 91,
to cause not part of a priori ar- hearsay 105
, test,
gument, 141 231

in brief,
to eflFect, 149 , 89
indirect, 88,
to effect diagram, 150 general argumentation, 85
in
to effect, methods of attack, 152 83-85
in law,
Eight suggestions for persuasion, 296 kinds 88-101
, of,
Elevation of primary elements, 202 nature 81

, ofj
Emotion appeal, kinds of, 260 negative,

, 107
94, 95, 96,
appeal, prejudice against, 256 opinion,
, 98 96, 97,
argumentation, 257
in opinion
, 112
test of,
Emotions, classification of, 263 ordinary, 97
, 96,
conclusion, 341
in , 91
original, 89,
Emphasis, 204 , 80-81
outline,
and coherence, 204 , 92
personal, 90,
digression, 326
, persuasion and conviction
, in, 81
, 327
iteration, , 94
positive,
methods 205
, of, pre-appointed, 93
methods in discussion, 326
, of, presumptive,
,
, 89 40, 41,
Emphatic places, 205 , 107
real, 90, 92,
English composition, 10 relevancy 85

, of,
Enthymemes, 135 second hand, 92

, 91,
Equivocation, defined, 184 sources 86
, of,
, 182
fallacies of, , 101-112
tests of,
Ethics in debate, 403 , 112
test of expert,
in rebuttal, 429
, . sources
tests of 107 of,
Etymological derivation, definition undesigned, 107

,
by, 302 , 91
unoriginal,
Evarts, W. M., in case of Savannah unwritten, 90
,
Privateers, 338 , 90
written,
Evidence, admissibility of, 85 Exaggeration, thoughtless, 109
and arguments, 74 Example, argumeiit from, 155
, 107
casual, 93, Excluding extraneous matter, 312
circumstantial,
, 89 41, 88, Exclusion, definition by, 306
consistent with human nature
, Exhortation, 261
and experience, 101 Experience, reference to, 278
consistent with 104 itself, Experiences, vivid, 279
consistent with known 103 facts, Expert evidence, 96, 97
, defined, 82 testimony, 96, 97
INDEX 485
Expert vote in debate, 373 Fallacy, ignoring the question, 190

, witnesses, test of, 112 , major, 177
illjcit
Explanation in introduction, 308 , minor, 178

illicit
Exposition and analysis in rebuttal, imperfect disjunction, 181

,
427 irrelevant conclusion, 190,

,
Extemporaneous presentation, 435 negative premises, 178

,
Extempore method, advantages of, obversion, 172

,
436 of composition, 183

rebuttal, 422 183
division,
speaking, dangers of, 437 particular premises, 179
,
Extraneous matter, 312 simple accident, 186

,
simple non sequitur, 194

,
undistributed middle, 177

,
Facing the truth, persuasion, 289 False analogy, 167

"Fact" witnesses, tests of, 107 cause fallacy, 194
Fairness in persuasion, 272 consequent fallacy, 194
in rebuttal, 429 Field, D. D., in U, S. vs. Cruik-
Fair specimens, 161 shank, 310
Fallacies, classification of, 171 Figurative analogy, 162
, 171
definition, Finding the 58-67 issues,
formal, 176
, affirmative
First debate, 394 in
hermeneutic, 171
, negative, adaptation to circum-
First
, 176
logical, 171, 398 stances,
, 182
material, negative debate, 395 in
equivocation, 182
of Formal 176 fallacies,
presumption, 188
of summaries, 335
, 170-171
outline, Form 54 of issues,
, 356
refutation, Forms support, 324 of
, 172
rhetorical, 171, Formulatingthe proposition, 20-21
Fallacy, accent, 174 Foster, W. T., 17, 18, 27, 265, 266,
affirming the consequent, 180
, 270, 272, 351, 356, 357, 361,
268,
amphibology, 174
, 365
arguing a
, in 190 Four processes
circle, argumentation, 7 in
assumption unproved prem- terms,
, of 176 fallacy,
ise, 189 types negative 377 of case,
begging the question, 188
, Fox, C. on East India 320
J., Bill,
complex question, 194

, Friendly audience, 292
converse accident, 187
, Function law evidence, 84 of of
conversion, 173
,
the inttoduction, 298 of
denying the antecedent, 180
,
87 of witnesses,
, cause, 194
false Fundamental points 426 in rebuttal,
, consequent, 194
false Funny introduction, 315-
stories in
four terms, 176
, 316
486 INDEX
Hostile audience, 293
Game or sport, debate, 373

, introduction, 317
Hughes, on evidence, 89
Gardiner, J. H., 19, 335
Gathering material, 68-79
Human nature and experience, evi-
dence consistent with, 101
General illustration, form of support,
325
known for persuasion, 265
Huxley, T. H., on evolution, 362
Generalization, 155
and association phenomena, Hypothetical propositions, 179
of
syllogism, 179
153
from a instance, 161, 166
single
Hyslop, H., 116, 123, J. 18, 171, 181,
, and argumentative,
illustrative
182, 183, 184, 187, 188
157
implied, 153
methods of attack, 160
,
Ignoraniio
Ignoring the question
190
190
elenchi,
fallacy,
General 353
refutation,
to reading, 75
specific in
minor
major 177
Illicit fallacy,
178 fallacy,
Genung, 159, 328
J. F., 94,
Illustration and argumentative ex-
"Getting nearer to the truth,'' in
amples of generalization, 157
contest debates, 371
Illustration, definition by, 305
Gough, H. B., 56
Imperfect disjunction fallacy, 181
Grattan, on Declaration of Irish
Right, 342
induction, 121
Impersonal, brief, 209
Great Speeches by Great Lawyers,
Implied generalization, 153
101, 103, 111, 151, 302, 305, 306,
Impromptu debating, 435
307, 327, 339, 341, 359
Inattentive audience, introduction,
Greenleaf, on evidence, 39, 82, 89,
319
92, 94, 95
Inconsistency in debate, 388
H personal, contest debate, 390
, in
Hale, E. E., 444 Indirect appeal, 286
Hardwicke, H., 342 evidence, 89 88,
Hayne, R. Y., on Foote Resolution, Induction, 117
389, 398-102 imperfect, 121
Headings and subheadings, in brief, kinds 120 of,
216 methods 123 of,
Hearsay evidence, 89, 91, 92 121

perfect,
evidence
, test of, 105 Inference, essence 118 of,
Henry, P., confiscation of British object induction and deduc-

of in
Debts, 101 tion, 119
Hermeneutic fallacies, 171 process induction and de-
of in
Hibben, J. G., 120 duction, 118
Hill, A. S., 157, 270, 273, 278 Inferences in quantitative relations,
Honesty in rebuttal, 429 134
INDEX 487
Informal summaries, 336 Issues, primary, 45, 46, 47

Interesting propositions, 31 subordinate,
, 47 45, 46,
Interest, undue in case, 110 summary method
, of of finding,
Internal summaries, 409 66
Interpretation, errors in, 171 terminology, 45
,
Introducing refutation, 353 theory 43

, of,
Introduction and unity, 199 two or more,

, parallel partition,
conversational mode, 314 311
conviction 299 in, 42
the, outline,
debate, 394 admitted, 48
300, 402
definition in, and afiirmative and negative, 51
,
detract from theme, 315 and burden 51

of proof,
explanation 308 in, and conviction and persuasion, 53
function 298 of, and counter proposition, 51
audiences, 317
hostile and partition 224in brief,
inattentive audience, 319 and proposition, 50 _
and
issues 308
partition, Iteration, emphasis, 327
316
stories in,
strange audience, 317
temper 318 in,
298
the, outline, James, W., 254, 291
to 222
brief, Jevous, W. S., 9, 10, 15, 116, 131,
Invention, 7 133, 174, 176, 178, 179, 184
and 68
selection, Joint method, 126
summarized, 66 Judging debate, 53, 370, 371
Inverted or direct order, 308 expert judge, 373
Irrelevant conclusion fallacy, 190 the 373
critic's vote,
Issue, complex, 45 the juryman's vote, 372

47
actual, 46, the vote, 372
legislator's
51
potential, 47, 48, three types 371
of decisions,
45
single, Judgment, defined, 15
56
stock, Juryman's vote, 371, 372
and winning and 53 losing,
Issues 43
defined,
emphasized, 312
finding 58
, the, Ketcham, V. A., 27
form 54
, of, Kinds of arguments, outline, 114-
debate, 402
in 115
general
in 44 discussion, in 138
rhetoric,
introduction, 308
in emotional appeal, 260
law, 43
in evidence, 88-101
necessity knowing, 49
, of induction, 120
, number of, 54 summaries, 335
488 INDEX
Know other side in rebuttal, 423 Maxcy, C. L., 210, 211, 232
Known effect due to other cause, 148 Memorized delivery, 432
facts, evidence consistent with, rebuttal, 423
103 speeches, place for, 433
in debate, 376
Memorizing in debate, 432
Lamb, C, Popular Fallacies, 158 Memory of witness, 108
Lament, H., 280 Merits of the question, 53
Law, brief drawing in, 210 Method, joint, 126
evidence, 83-85
of in gathering material, 70
function 84 of, in rebuttal, 429
source argumentation, 11
of of agreement, 124
Legal brief drawing, 210 of concomitant variations, 128
Legislator's vote, 371, 372 of difference, 125
Lincoln, A., at Cooper Union, 364 of residues, 128, 361
Lincoln-Douglas debates, 351. 360, Methods of attack on antecedent
380, 381, 389, 396, 403, 405, 407, probability, 142
411, 417 attack arguments from anal-
of
Lists of propositions, 32 ogy, 167
Literal analogy, 164 association phenomena, 154
of
Logic and argumentation, 9, 115 attack on arguments from
of
9
defined, to
effect 148
cause,
or
science 9-10 art, attack on
of to effect effect ar-
source argumentation,
of 11 gument, 152
Logical fallacies, 171, 176 attack on
of 160
generalization^
Loss of time in refutation, 347 emphasis, 205
of
emphasis
of 326
in discussion,
M induction, 123
of
presentation debate, 431
of in
Mcintosh, Sir J., in Peltier case, 267 presenting
of 300 definitions,
Macaulay, T. B., 357 355

of refutation,
Main headings in brief, 231 Middle, ambiguous, 184 177,
heads in debate, 404 undistributed, 177
,
points, 43 ^ term, 132

defined,
speeches and 392 brief, Mill, J. S., 185, 191
speeches, 392
outline, Minor premise defined, 132
Major premise, defined, 132 term, defined, 132
term, defined, 132 Minto, on analogy, 164
Marshall, J., in McCulIoch vs. Mary- Modesty in persuasion, 268
land, 156 Monotony, 281
Material fallacies, 182 of form in extempore speaking,
gathering, 68-79 438
Matthews, B., 267 Morally qualified witness, 110
INDEX 489
Mutual dependence of induction and Opinion, clash of in brief, 229

deduction, 120 evidence, 96, 97, 98
- evidence, test of, 112
N Opinions, as evidence, 74
Natural presumptions, 41
of debaters, 374
Opportunity for getting the truth,
Nature of evidence, 81
persuasion, 253
of
111
344
of refutation,
Oral presentation in debate, 430
style, 11
Negative adjustment, 378
case,
counter proposition, 378
case,
Oratory, source of argumentation, 11
defense
case, present, 377of
Order, direct or inverted, 308
in coherence, 201

case, four types, 377 of headings in brief, 219

case, pure refutation, 377
evidence, 94, 95, 96, 107
Ordinary evidence, 96, 97
Original evidence, 89, 91
, persuasion, 260 Outline from brief, 211-212
premises fallacy, 178
use 442
propositions, 29 of presentation, 441,
testimony, 94
New arguments in rebuttal, 414
Newcomer, A. G., 281
Parallel column brief, 237
New constructive points in rebuttal,
Particular premises, fallacy, 179
421
and 54
English dictionary, 5 Partition
and 224
issues,
issues in brief,
Newman, J. H., 83, 172, 278
and subordinate 47 issues,
Newspaper reading, 75 debate, 403
in
Ntm sequilur, 194
introduction, 308
in
North, Rex vs. Forbes, 102
J. H., in
,
to
parallel 311 issues,
Note book system gathering mate- and summaries in discussion, 409

rial, 71
329, 331, 322
in discussions,
taking system, gathering ma-
Patee, G. K., 19, 299
terial, 70
Peel, Sir R., on disabilities of the
Notes, use of in presentation, 441
Jews, 416
Number of issues, 54
56
Pelsma, J. R.,
Perfect induction, 121

O Personal attitude in debate, 379
Object of inference in induction and evidence, 92 90,
deduction, 119 inconsistency, 388

Obversion, fallacy of illogical, 172 tone in debate, 379
O'Grady, H., 276, 277 PersonaUty, 78, 266
Opening speech in debate, 394 debate, 379
in
speech, negative, 395 Persuasion and conviction, 251
Operation of other causes, 144 and conviction, and the issues, 53
490 INDEX
Persuasion and conviction in argu- Practice, debates, 376, 393
mentation, 3-7 in debate, 443
and conviction in evidence, 81 Pre-appointed evidence, 93
and conviction presentation, in Prejudice against emotional appeal,
250 256
, 253
defined, Prejudiced propositions, 28
eight suggestions 296
, for, witnesses, 87
argumentation, 254
in Preliminary reading, 69
conclusion, 339
in Preparation, advance of rebuttal,
the introduction, 313
in 422
nature 253
, of, of contest debates, 376
negative and
, 260 positive, of rebuttal, 421
, 249-250
outline, for debate, 368
, suggestions
practical 264 for, for debate, writing as, 434
suggestions regard to the
, in Preparatory practice in debate, 393
speaker, 265 Presentation, 8
the
. 272
subject, and the 250 brief,
Persuasive summaries, 336 charts 443

, in,
Petitio principii, 188 conviction and persuasion

, in,
Pettit, Senator, on Fugitive Slave 250

Law, 383 , extemporaneous, 435
Phelps, A., 277 impromptu, 435
,
Phenomenon, defined, 124 debate, 430

in
Phillips, A. E., 278, 324 notes 441
. in,
Phillips, W., on Daniel O'Connell, , suggestions

specific 441 for,
336 use of outline 441, 442

, in,
.Pillsbury, W. B., 258 Presumption, 188

fallacies of,
Pinckney, W., in Hodges case, 305 propositions, 29
in
, in Maryland Assembly, 317 Presumptions, 41 artificial,
Pitt, W., 436 conclusive, 40

,
Plan to follow in gathering material, disputable, 40

,
75 , 41
legal,
Platform hints, 443 natural, 41

,
Plunkett, W. C, in Rex vs. Forbes, 40

of fact,
326 of law, 40 39,
Position of refutation, '352 Presumptive evidence, 40, 41, 89
Positive evidence, 40, 94 Prima facie case,' 34, 35, 37, 39
persuasion, 260 35
facie case, defined,
Post hoc, ergo propter hoc, 194 Primary elements, elevation of, 202
Potential issue, 47, 48, 51 47
issues, 45, 46,
Practical suggestions for persuasion, Principles of composition in the

264 discussion, 322
Practice and assimilation, 78 Probability, antecedent, 139
INDEX 491
Process of inference in induction and Propositions, unprejudiced, 28

deduction, 118 Pure refutation, negative case, 377
Proof, defined, 82 Purposes of brief , 208
positive and refutation, 352
,
of conclusion, 334
Proposition and 50 issues, of debating, 370
, 27
assertion,
, 176
categorical,
counter, and
, 51 issues, Quality, fallacies of equivocation,
defined, 15
, 183
disjunctive, 181
, , of evidence, test of, 101
double, 27
, Quantitative relations, inferences in,
formulating
, 20-21the, 134
a
, in 16
club, Quantity, fallacies in equivocation,
court law, 16
, in of 183
deliberative assembly, 17
, in Quarterly Journal of Public Speak-
public discussions, 17
, in ing, 369
Propositions, advantage of, to Question, begging the, fallacy, 188
bearer and speaker, 18 complex,
, 194
fallacy,
ambiguity 28
, in, ignoring
, 190
the, fallacy,
as subjects of argumentation, 14
, , 21-22
real,
and simple, 30
brief , 328
rhetorical,
burden of proof, 29
, Questions debate, 410
in
characteristics of good, 27
, , answers, 410
for definite
, 18
classifications of, to force dilemma, 411
,
concrete and
, 29 specific, to waste time, 411
,
debatable, 30
, Quinctilian, 349
hypothetical, 179
, Quotations and statistics in de-
, 31
interesting, livery, 442, 443
, 32
list of,
R
necessity, 16
.
negative, 29
, Reading manuscript, in debate, 431
not always expressed, 18 newspaper, 75
,
19
of fact, preliminary, 69
,
policy, 19
of Real evidence, 90, 92, 107
prejudiced, 28
,
" Real life " debates, 369
presumptions 49 in, , question, 21-22
,
, 27
single, Reason and emotion, in argumenta-
simple and
, 30 brief, tion, 3
simple and concrete, 29
,
Newman's
, 82
definition of,
testing 23
, the, Reasoning, form support, 325
of
two at once, 36
, , 350
refutation,
two-sided, 30
, , 9
science of,
, unambiguous, 28 , 136
syllogistic,
492 INDEX
Rebuttal and refutation, 420-421 References, outline of, 344
answer whole 425
, case, position 352
, of,
, time
effect of 425 limit, pure, negative
, case, 377
, 429
ethics in, , reasoning, 350
explained, 420
, , research, 350
exposition and analysis 427
, in, , rhetoric, 351
extempore, 422
,

, rhetorical devices, 356
, 429
fairness in, . special, 353
fundamental points 426
, in, , statement of, 353
law, 420
in , strategy in, 414
know other
, 423 side, , straw men, 349
memorized, 423
, , tests of evidence, 356
method 429
, in, . three requirements of, 350
new arguments 414
, in, , turning the tables, 363
new points 421
, in, Refute, what to, 345
, 420
outline, Reid, on analogy, 165
preparation 421
, of, Relation of discussion to brief, 323
prepared advance, 422
, in Relations in brief, 219
strategy 421
, in, in discussion, 325
, 424
surprises in, Relevancy of evidence, 85
, points
vital 426 in, "Repairs" case, negative, 378
Redfield,H. S., 210 Repetition, in discussion, 407
Reductio ad absurdum, 356 , in extempore speaking, 437
Reference to experience, 278 Requirements, three, of refutation,
References in brief, 221 350
material used, 72
in Research, 350 refutation,
Refutation and positive 352 Reserve proof,269 force,
and 420-421
rebuttal, Residues, method of refutation,
answering too
, 348 356, 361
little,
answering too much, 346

, division exhaustive, 361 ,
answering
, 349 method induction, 128
yourself, , of,
attack on forms arguments, Responsibility, persuasion, 289

, of
356 Restatement, form support, 325 of
basic
, 353
rule for Rhetorical
all, 356 devices, refutation,
clearness 353
, in, 172 fallacies, 171,
confusion 347
, in, importance,
principles, special
, 356
fallacies, in argument, 206
, 353
general, three 198 principles, great,
234, 235
in brief, question, 328
introducing, 353
, Rhetoric, kinds arguments 138 of in,
, time, 347
loss of reasoning, 351
methods 355
, of, source argumentation, 11 of
nature 344
, of, Ridicule debate, 385 in
INDEX 493
Ringwalt, R. C, 328, 337 Special refutation, 353

Bisk of the proposition, 34 Specific accident, fallacy of, 184
Robinson, F. B., 237, 269, 299 and concrete propositions, 29
L., 158
,
and concrete terms, 280

, W. C, 45, 263 form

instance, support, 325 of
Rule, basic for all refutation, 353 Specimens, enough observed, 161
Rules for brief drawing, 213 respect
fair in point of in issue,
of the syllogism, 131 161
Speech style, 11
Spencer, H., 273

Sample brief, complete, 240 Sport or game, debate, 373
Sarcasm in debate, 385 Standard dictionary, 5
in refutation, 348 "Stand pat" case, 378
Schurz, C, 328 Statement, defined, 15
Science or art, argumentation, 10 of refutation, 353
Secondary elements, subordination Statistics and quotations, in de-
of, 201 livery, 442-443
Second-hand evidence, 91, 92 Stephen on Pleading, 20
Selection, 7, 69 Stephens, Sir J. F., 158, 190
Self-control in debate, 384 Stirring emotions, in conclusion, 341
in persuasion, 269 Stock issues, 56
Seward, W., in Freeman case, 147, Stories in the introduction, 315-316
304 Strange audience, introduction, 317
Shifting on the burden of proof, 35, 37 Strategy in conclusion, 414
Sidgwick, A., 116, 138, 139, 142 in rebuttal, 421
Sign, argument from, 146 Straw men, 349
kinds of argument from, 146 Style, oral, 11
Simple non sequitur fallacy, 194 Subheadings, in brief, 231
and brief propositions, 30 Subject-matter, handling, for per-
accident, fallacies, 186 suasion, 273
Simplicity, in persuasion, 275 Subject, persuasion suggestions, 272
Sincerity, in persuasion, 266 Subjects, for argumentation, 14
Single, characteristic of good propo- Subordinate issues, 45, 46, 47
sition, 27 Subordination of secondary ele-
Single issues, 45 ments, 201
45
issue, Substitute argument, from cause to
statements in brief, 217 effect, 141
Skill of debaters, 53 Suggestions, eight, for persuasion,
Sorites, 133 296
Sources, documentation of, 100 for persuasion, in regard to au-
of argumentation, 11 dience, 283
of evidence, 86 for persuasion, in regard to sub-
of material, 75 ject, 272
494 INDEX
Suggestions for presentation, 441 Tests of ordinary witnesses, 107
,
practical, for persuasion, 264 quality evidence, 101
of of
Summaries and partitions, in dis- of sources of evidence, 107
cussion, 409 Thayer, J. B., 33, 37, 39, 40, 41, 83,
formal, 335
, 84, 90, 91, 97, 99
in conclusion, 334, 415 Theory of issues, 43
in discussion, 329, 330, 332 Thoughtless exaggeration, 109
informal, 336
, Three fundamental requirements of
, 409
internal, refutation, 350
kinds 335
, of, objections to answering too
persuasive, 336
,
much, 347
Summary, balanced, 416 Time limit, efiFect of, in rebuttal, 425
arguments, from example, 166
of Transitions in discussion, 329, 332
coherence, 203
of Turning the tables, 356, 363
Sumner, C, on Crime against Two propositions at once, 36
Kansas, 404, 407 Two-sided propositions, 30
Support, forms of, 324 Types of negative case, 377
Surprises, in rebuttal, 424
Syllogism, categorical, 176 U
131
defined,
Unambiguous propositions, 28
181
disjunctive,
Undesigned evidence, 107
hypothetical, 179 Undistributed middle, fallacy, 177
131
rules of,
Undue interest in case, 110
weakness in general argumen-
of
Unity in composition, 198
tation, 137
Syllogistic reasoning, 136
in discussion, 328
Unoriginal evidence, 91
Symbols, in brief, 220
Unprejudiced propositions, 28
Unwritten evidence, 90
Tact, 284
and 285talent,
Temper, debate, 384
in Variations, method of concomitant,
introduction, 318
in ,
129
Term, defined, 15 Variety, in persuasion, 281
Terminology, in issues, 45 , in discussion, 323
Testimony, expert, 96, 97 Vital points, in rebuttal, 426

form support, 325
of Vividness, in persuasion, 278
negative, 94 Vivid experiences, 279
94
of silence,
Testing the proposition, 23
W
Tests of evidence, 101-112 Ward, J., 50, 189, 330, 348
of evidence, refutation, 356 Weakness of syllogism, in general-
of expert witnesses, 112 argumentation, 137
INDEX 495
Webster, D., 350 Wilson, J., in Pennsylvania conven-

,1n Dartmouth College 270 case, tion, 358
Gibbons Ogden, 332
, in vs. Wilson, W., 259
Girard Will
, in 364 case, Winans, J., 9, 46, 254, 256, 257, 264,
Luther Borden, 331
, in vs. 59, 273, 289, 315
in Ogden Saunders, 190, 303,
, vs. Winning and losing, and the issues,
328, 335, 354 53
Prov. R. R. Boston, 360
, in vs. Wirt, William, in Gibbons vs. Ogden,
Reply to Calhoun, 318, 354
, in 61
Reply to Hayne,
, in 318, 422, Witness, accuracy of statement of,
423, 427 109

White Murder
in case, 62, 93, expert, 97
, 96,
191
104, 108, 140, expert,
, 112
test of,
on eloquence, 265 Witness, memory 108 of,
Well disposed, audience toward mentally

, 108
qualified,
speaker, 339 morally
, 110
qualified,
Whately, R., 4, 155, 162, 186, 261, opportunity getting the truth,
, for
282, 283, 286, 289 111
What plan to follow in gathering ordinary, 96
,
material, 75 Witnesses, "fact," 107

tests of,
to look for in gathering material, function, 87
,
73 ordinary,
, 107
tests of,
to refute, 345 physically
, 107
qualified,
Where to look in gathering material, prejudiced, 87
,
75 Writing as preparation for debate,

Wilkinson, E. C, in Prentiss case, 434
339 speeches for debate, 393
Will and belief, 258 Written evidence, 90
Williston, S., 20
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was to be attached to rival authorities." This is an extremely interesting

upon thoroughgoing intelligence, and should not, in academic

In regard to the content and method of certain chapters,

it necessary for some teachers to omit some portions of this

The growing recognition of the importance of Argumenta-

PART II. ARGUMENTATION

PART III. DEBATE

DEFINITIONS AND RELATIONS

A. Argumentation defined. Argumentation is the art of

what is expedient; and, wherever in the home or on the

wherever active-minded men with opinions meet, there is

other. The subject has been divided into considerations of

Now modern psychologists are telling us that this old divi-

psychologically there no difference between winning assent

to a thesis dealing with an unemotional matter of fact, and

4 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE

men diflfer and emotional con-

diflSculties, since usage varies; yet there seems to be no good

DEFINITIONS AND RELATIONS 5

includes changing the mental attitude by removing preju-

"Those to whom the term persuasion means inducing to

tude, and changing emotional attitude is included in the

tween writer and reader; persuasion aims to prepare the way

iora sequor. Certain knowledge that lack of exercise is ruining

as to his benefit. Then, too, he will probably find .that the

H. No Of course there are no dis-

tion, at is a specialized form of argumen-

will be well to have clearly in mind the relation of argumenta-

J. Argumentation and logic. Argumentation has been

it seems substantially correct and sufficiient to say, that logic

is a science in so far as it merely investigates the necessary

principles and forms of thought, and thus teaches us to un-

sponding art. Logic teaches us to know, argumentation to do.

of the four forms of composition. The art of argumentation,

an audience with the hearer and the opponent always in mind.

PART II. ARGUMENTATION

A. Subjects must be propositions.

II. Formulating the Proposition

A. The problem of formulating the proposition.

A. A list of desirable characteristics:

I. The Theory of Propositions

immediate predecessor, tell what its advocates

the whole an exposition of the nature and workings of this

' Jevons, p. 17. ' Jevons, p. 16.