RULE 22, Sec 1

DOMINGO NEYPES vs. COURT OF APPEALS

Petitioners Domingo Neypes, et.al filed an action for annulment of judgment and titles of land
and/or reconveyance and/or reversion with preliminary injunction against the Bureau of Forest
Development, Bureau of Lands, Land Bank of the Philippines and the heirs of Bernardo del
Mundo, namely, Fe, Corazon, Josefa, Salvador and Carmen.

Trial court dismissed petitioners complaint on the ground that the action had already prescribed:
February 12, 1998

Petitioners allegedly received a copy of the order of dismissal: March 3, 1998

Filed a motion for reconsideration: March 18, 1998 (15th day after receipt)

MFR dismissed by RTC: July 1, 1998

Petitioners received dismissal of MFR: July 22, 1998

Petitioners filed a notice of appeal: July 27, 1998 (5 days after receipt of dismissal of MFR)

Appeal fees paid: August 3, 1998

On August 4, 1998, the court a quo denied the notice of appeal, holding that it was filed eight
days late. This was received by petitioners on July 31, 1998. Petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration but this too was denied in an order dated September 3, 1998.

Petitioners claimed that they had seasonably filed their notice of appeal. They argued that the
15-day reglementary period to appeal started to run only on July 22, 1998 since this was the day
they received the final order of the trial court denying their motion for reconsideration. When they
filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998, only five days had elapsed and they were well within
the reglementary period for appeal.

The Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed the petition. It ruled that the 15-day period to appeal should
have been reckoned from March 3, 1998 or the day they received the February 12, 1998 order
dismissing their complaint.

ISSUE: What should be deemed as the "final order," receipt of which triggers the start of the 15-
day reglementary period to appeal: the February 12, 1998 order dismissing the complaint or the
July 1, 1998 order dismissing the MR?

The period to appeal is fixed by both statute and procedural rules. Rule 41, Section 3 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure states:

SEC. 3. Period of ordinary appeal. The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from
the notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is
required, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days
from the notice of judgment or final order.

Based on the foregoing, an appeal should be taken within 15 days from the notice of judgment or
final order appealed from. A final judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving
nothing more for the court to do with respect to it. It is an adjudication on the merits which,
considering the evidence presented at the trial, declares categorically what the rights and
obligations of the parties are; or it may be an order or judgment that dismisses an action.

As already mentioned, petitioners argue that the order of July 1, 1998 denying their motion for
reconsideration should be construed as the "final order," not the February 12, 1998 order which
dismissed their complaint. Since they received their copy of the denial of their motion for
reconsideration only on July 22, 1998, the 15-day reglementary period to appeal had not yet
lapsed when they filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998.

In the recent case of Quelnan v. VHF Philippines, Inc, we reversed the trial court and declared
that it was the denial of the motion for reconsideration of an order of dismissal of a
complaint which constituted the final order as it was what ended the issues raised there.

This pronouncement was reiterated in the more recent case of Apuyan v. Haldeman et al. where
we again considered the order denying petitioner Apuyans motion for reconsideration as the final
order which finally disposed of the issues involved in the case.

Based on the aforementioned cases, we sustain petitioners view that the order dated July
1, 1998 denying their motion for reconsideration was the final order contemplated in the
Rules.

We now come to the next question: if July 1, 1998 was the start of the 15-day reglementary
period to appeal, did petitioners in fact file their notice of appeal on time?

According to the trial court, the MR only interrupted the running of the 15-day appeal period. It
ruled that petitioners, having filed their MR on the last day of the 15-day reglementary period to
appeal, had only one (1) day left to file the notice of appeal upon receipt of the notice of denial of
their MR. Petitioners, however, argue that they were entitled under the Rules to a fresh period of
15 days from receipt of the "final order" or the order dismissing their motion for reconsideration.

To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to
appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within
which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the
order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration.

The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of
the order denying the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or
any final order or resolution.

We thus hold that petitioners seasonably filed their notice of appeal within the fresh period of 15
days, counted from July 22, 1998 (the date of receipt of notice denying their motion for
reconsideration).

To recapitulate, a party litigant may either file his notice of appeal within 15 days from receipt of
the Regional Trial Courts decision or file it within 15 days from receipt of the order (the "final
order") denying his motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. Obviously, the new 15-day
period may be availed of only if either motion is filed; otherwise, the decision becomes final and
executory after the lapse of the original appeal period provided in Rule 41, Section 3.