G.R. No.

205800 September 10, 2014

MICROSOFT CORPORATION and ADOBE vs. SAMIR FARAJALLAH.

Facts: Microsoft Corporation is the owner of all rights including copyright

relating to all versions and editions of Microsoft software3 and the
corresponding users manuals, and the registered owner of the "Microsoft"
"MS DOS" trademarks in the Philippines. Adobe Systems Incorporated is the
owner of all rights including copyright relating to all versions and editions of
Adobe Software.

Petitioners claim that in September 2009, they were informed that New Fields
was unlawfully reproducing and using unlicensed versions of their software.

An application for search warrants was filed by Padilla on 20 May 2010,

before Judge Amor Reyes in her capacity as Executive Judge of the RTC.
Search Warrant Nos. 10-15912 and 10-15913 were issued on the same
date.10

On 6 June 2010, New Fields filed a motion seeking to quash one of the two
warrants served contending that it failed to comply with the mandatory 3-day
notice rule under the Rules of Court. The RTC issued an order quashing both
warrants and likewise denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. The CA
denied the petition for certiorari.

Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in ruling

Held: Yes. The court overturns the rulings of RTC and CA since there was
grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts.

The court ruled that strict compliance with the three-day notice rule may be
relaxed in this case. However, we sustain petitioners contention that there
was probable cause for issuance of a warrant, and the RTC and CA should
have upheld the validity of both warrants.

LEVI STRAUSS & CO. & LEVI STRAUSS (PHILS.), INC., V. CLINTON
APPARELLE, INC., G.R. No. 138900, September 20, 2005
Facts:
. The Dockers and Design trademark was first used in the Philippines by
LSPI, a domestic corporation engaged in the manufacture, sale and
distribution of various products bearing trademarks owned by LS & Co.
 LS & Co. and LSPI discovered the presence in the local market of jeans
under the brand name Paddocks using a device which is substantially, if
not exactly, similar to the Dockers and Design trademark owned by and
registered in the name of LS & Co., without its consent. Based on their
information and belief, they added, Clinton Apparelle manufactured and
continues to manufacture such Paddocks jeans and other apparel.
Petitioner filed a complaint for trademark infringement against the
defendant.

Issue: Whether or not a likelihood of confusion exists which constitutes

trademark infringement.

Ruling:
No. The gravamen of infringement is likelihood of confusion which
might cause mistake and deception in the mind of the purchasing public.
Through Holistic Test, it can be said that Paddocks logo is not confusingly
similar to Dockers logo. Paddocks is wholly different from Dockers and by
mere pronouncing the two marks, it could hardly be said that it will provoke a
confusion, as to mistake one for the other. All told, absent likelihood of
confusion, Clinton Apparalle is not liable for infringement.

SAHAR VS. WARNER LAMBERT

Facts:
Warner Lambert is the registered owner of 3 Philippine Patents which
cover the pharmaceutical substance Atorvastatin (valid until April 29, 2009),
Atorvastatin Calcium and Atorvastatin Calcium in crystalline form. Atorvastatin
blocks the production of bad cholesterol and increases the level of good
cholesterol. Pfizer is the exclusive licensee of Warner Lambert to import,
market, distribute and sell products covered by the patents. Pfizer was issued
Certificates of Registration by BFAD in order to sell and promote the products
in the Philippines. In 2005, Pfizer discovered that Sahar also applied for CPR
by the FDA for Atorvastatin Calcium, imported from Pakistan, under the name
of Atopitar. Atopitar, just like Lipitor (Warner Lamberts brand name) is in
crystalline form. Several demands were made for Sahar to cease and desist
the selling and distributing of the said product. However, Sahar contended
that the patent over Atorvastatin Calcium had already expired and that it can
now be freely distributed. The petitioners filed a Complaint for Patent
Infringement, Damages and Injunction with applications for TRO and/or Writs
of Preliminary Injunction. The RTC denied the issuance of writ of preliminary
injunction because it would be a premature disposition of the main case. On
appeal, the CA annulled and set aside the orders of RTC and issued a writ of
preliminary injunction.

Issue: Whether or not the CA was correct in issuing a writ of preliminary

injunction enjoining Sahar during the pendency of the civil case

Held:
The case is dismissed for being moot and academic. During the
pendency of this petition, the RTC issued a judgment on Civil Case No. 08-
424. RTC dismissed the case on the ground of lack of cause of action. The
CA reversed such ruling and found Sahar liable for patent infringement and
that the writ of preliminary injunction be made permanent. Since the writ of
preliminary injunction is but an incident of the patent infringement case which
has already been resolved by the CA, ruling on whether it was proper would
have no practical effect. The merits of the CAs decision would not be tackled
as it is not the matter herein appealed.

G.R. No. 209843, March 25, 2015

TAIWAN KOLIN CORPORATION, LTD., Petitioner, v. KOLIN ELECTRONICS

CO., INC., Respondent.

Facts: Taiwan Kolin filed a trademark application for the use of KOLIN on a
combination of goods. Respondent Kolin Electronics Co., Inc. (Kolin
Electronics) opposed petitioners application. As argued, the mark Taiwan
Kolin seeks to register is identical, if not confusingly similar, with its KOLIN
registered mark covering the following products: automatic voltage regulator,
converter, recharger, stereo booster, AC-DC regulated power supply, step-
down transformer, and PA amplified AC-DC.

Kolin Electronics argued that the products are not only closely-related
because they fall under the same classification, but also because they are
inherently similar for being electronic products and are plugged into electric
sockets and perform a useful function.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to its trademark registration of

KOLIN over its specific goods of television sets and DVD players.

Ruling: Yes, petitioner is entitled to its trademark registration of KOLIN. The

products are not related and the use of the trademark KOLIN on them would
not likely cause confusion. To confer exclusive use of a trademark, emphasis
should be on the similarity or relatedness of the goods and/or services
involved and not on the arbitrary classification or general description of their
properties or characteristics.
First, products classified under Class 9 can be further classified into
five categories. Accordingly, the goods covered by the competing marks
between Taiwan Kolin and Kolin Electronics fall under different categories.
Taiwan Kolins goods are categorized as audio visual equipment, while Kolin
Electronics goods fall under devices for controlling the distribution and use of
electricity. Thus, it is erroneous to assume that all electronic products are
closely related and that the coverage of one electronic product necessarily
precludes the registration of a similar mark over another.
Second, the ordinarily intelligent buyer is not likely to be confused. The
distinct visual and aural differences between the two trademarks KOLIN,
although appear to be minimal, are sufficient to distinguish between one
brand or another. The casual buyer is predisposed to be more cautious,
discriminating, and would prefer to mull over his purchase because the
products involved are various kind of electronic products which are relatively
luxury items and not considered affordable. They are not ordinarily
consumable items such as soy sauce or soap which are of minimal cost.
Hence, confusion is less likely.

OTB Solar vs IPO

Facts:
Petitioner OTB Solar BV, a foreign corporation, submitted before the
Intellectual Property Office (IPO) Philippines an application for a patent of its
invention entitled Method and Apparatus for Applying a Coating on a
Substrate. In the said application, the Sapalo and Velez Law Offices were
named as the agent or representative of petitioner in the Philippines.
Petitioner paid the corresponding fees for the said patent application.
Petitioner requested that a substantive examination be conducted relative to
the application. The IPO acknowledged the patent application of petitioner. It
likewise advised the latter to submit a Power of Attorney/Appointment of
Resident Agent duly signed by the applicant within two months. Petitioner
requested for an extension twice. Subsequently, the IPO sent Examiner's
Paper No. 10 requiring petitioner to complete its requirements relative to the
patent application. It also reiterated its demand for petitioner to submit the
Power of Attorney/Appointment of Resident Agent duly signed by the applicant
in order to avoid abandonment of the patent application. Due to the failure to
comply, a Notice of Withdrawn Application was issued by IPO Records Officer
II which deemed petitioner's patent application withdrawn. Petitioner filed a
request for revival but was denied by the record officer II. The Director of
Bureau of patents also denied the request, which was sustained by the
Director General of IPO.

Issue:
Whether the untimely submission by the applicant-appellant of the requested
duly signed power of attorney/appointment of resident agent should merit the
declaration of a patent application as withdrawn
Ruling:
Yes. The failure to submit the requested document would fall squarely
under failure to submit a complete proposed response within the prescribed
period, as required by Rule 930. An application deemed withdrawn for failure
to prosecute may be revived as a pending application within a period of four
(4) months from the mailing date of the notice of withdrawal if it is shown to
the satisfaction of the Director that the failure was due to fraud, accident,
mistake or excusable negligence. A petition to revive an application deemed
withdrawn must be accompanied by (1) a showing of the cause of the failure
to prosecute, (2) a complete proposed response, and (3) the required fee. An
application not revived in accordance with this rule shall be deemed forfeited.
RAPPLER, INC. V. ANDRES BAUTISTA

G.R. No. 222702 April 5, 2016

FACTS

Rappler, Inc. signed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) to sponsor the

Presidential and Vice-Presidential debates. Alleging that it is being
discriminated particularly as regards the MOA provisions on live audio
broadcast via online streaming, Rappler argued that the MOA granted radio
stations the right to simultaneously broadcast live the audio of the debates,
even if the radio stations are not obliged to perform any obligation under the
MOA. However, the right to broadcast by online live streaming the audio of the
debates is denied to the petitioner and other online media entities which also
have the capacity to live stream the audio of the debates.

Rappler filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition against COMELEC

Chairman Andres Bautista to nullify MOA provisions on the ground of violating
the fundamental rights protected under the Constitution.

ISSUE: Whether petitioner has the right to live stream the debates.

RULING: Yes, Rappler has the right to live stream the debates
because the exercise to do so is its contractual right under the
MOA. Under the MOA, as long as it complies with the copyright
conditions for the debates, it can live stream the debates.

The conditions are:

> THE SOURCE IS CLEARLY INDICATED.

> THERE WILL BE NO ALTERATION, WHICH MEANS THAT THE

STREAMING WILL INCLUDE THE PROPRIETARY GRAPHICS USED BY
THE LEAD NETWORKS.

> IF PETITIONER OPTS FOR A CLEAN FEED WITHOUT THE

PROPRIETARY GRAPHICS USED BY THE LEAD NETWORKS, IN ORDER
FOR PETITIONER TO LAYER ITS OWN PROPRIETARY GRAPHICS AND
TEXT ON THE SAME, THEN PETITIONER WILL HAVE TO NEGOTIATE
SEPARATELY WITH THE LEAD NETWORKS.

> SIMILARLY, IF PETITIONER WANTS TO ALTER THE DEBATE AUDIO BY

DELETING THE ADVERTISEMENTS, PETITIONER WILL ALSO HAVE TO
NEGOTIATE WITH THE LEAD NETWORKS.

WILLAWARE PRODUCTS CORPORATION VS. JERICHRIS

MANUFACTURING CORPORATION
G.R. No. 195549
Facts:
The respondent filed a complaint for damages for unfair competition to
enjoin the respondents from manufacturing and distributing plastic-made
automotive parts which are similar to that of the respondent. In 2000, the
respondent discovered that the petitioner was manufacturing and distributing
automotive parts with exactly the same design, same material and colors as
that of respondents but at a lower price. The respondent also alleged that
some of the respondents employees transferred to petitioners business
which thereby led to the familiarity of its products. The petitioners countered
that respondent had no exclusive right to use, manufacture and sell these
products as he has no patent over these. RTC ruled in favor of the
respondent. CA affirmed RTCs decision with modification on actual damages.
Hence, this petition.

Issue: WoN petitioner committed acts amounting to unfair competition under

Article 28 of the Civil Code

Held:
Yes. Article 28 of the Civil Code applies in the case and not RA 8293
because the product is not patented. Article 28 seeks to prevent the use of
unjust, oppressive or high-handed methods which may deprive others of a fair
chance to engage in business or to earn a living. Two characteristics must be
present in order to qualify for unfair competition. One is that it must involve an
injury to a competitor or trade rival and the other is that it must involve an act
which is characterized as contrary to good conscience or shocking to judicial
sensibilities or otherwise unlawful. Both of these are present in this case. Both
parties are trade rivals engaged in the sale of plastic-made automotive parts.
The acts of petitioner of employing the respondents for employees,
deliberately copying respondents products and selling these products are
contrary to good conscience. It is evident that petitioner is engaged in unfair
competition when he suddenly shifter his business from manufacturing
kitchenware to plastic-made automotive parts, in enticing the employees of
the respondent to transfer to his business and trying to discover the trade
secrets of the respondent.

ZUNECA PHARMACEUTICAL, AKRAM ARAIN AND/OR VENUS ARAIN,

M.D. DBA ZUNECA PHARMACEUTICAL, Petitioners, v. NATRAPHARM,
INC., Respondent.

Respondent manufactures and sells a medicine bearing the generic name

"CITICOLINE," which is marketed by respondent under its registered
trademark "ZYNAPSE," that enjoys protection for a term of 10 years.
Respondent obtained from the Bureau of Food and Drugs (BFAD) all
necessary permits and licenses to register, list and sell its "ZYNAPSE"
medicine in its various forms and dosages.

Petitioners have been selling a medicine imported from Lahore, Pakistan

bearing the generic name "CARBAMAZEPINE," under the brand name
"ZYNAPS," which trademark is however not registered with the IPO.
"ZYNAPS" is pronounced exactly like "ZYNAPSE.

Respondent claimed that the drug CARBAMAZEPINE has one documented

serious and disfiguring side-effect called "Stevens-Johnson Syndrome," and
that the sale of the medicines "ZYNAPSE" and "ZYNAPS" in the same
drugstores will give rise to medicine switching.

Issue :Whether or not there was a Trademark infringement.

Ruling :No.The court ruled that neither party is, at this point, entitled to any
injunctive solace. Plaintiff, while admittedly the holder of a registered
trademark under the IPC, may not invoke ascendancy or superiority of its
certificate of trademark registration over the certificate of product registration
of the BFAD of the defendants, as the latter certificate is evidence of its "prior
use". Parenthetically, the plaintiff would have been entitled to an injunction as
against any or all third persons in respect of its registered mark under normal
conditions, that is, in the event wherein Section 159.1 would not be invoked
by such third person. Such is the case however in this litigation. Section 159
of the IPC explicitly curtails the registrant's rights by providing for limitations
on those rights as against a "prior user" under Section 159.

GEMMA ONG vs PP (G.R. No. 169440 Nov 23, 2011)

FACTS: Petitioner Gemma Ong a.k.a. Maria Teresa Gemma Catacutan

(Gemma) was charged before the RTC for Infringement under Section 155 of
The IPO for selling of counterfeit Marlboro cigarettes which had caused
confusion, deceiving the public that such cigarettes were Marlboro cigarettes
and those of the Telengtan Brothers and Sons, Inc., without the accused
seeking their permit or authority to manufacture and distribute the same.

A search warrant was issued and a substantial number of fake locally made
and imported fake cigarettes bearing the Marlboro brand, were confiscated.

She denied that she is the Gemma Ong accused in this case. Gemma
averred that when she posted her bond and signed her certificate of
arraignment, she did so under her real name Maria Teresa Gemma
Catacutan, as opposed to the signatures in the Inventory and Certification in
the Conduct of Search (search documents), which she denied signing. She
claimed that she was not able to bring up her defense of mistaken identity
early on as she did not know when the proper time to raise it.

The RTC convicted Gemma of the crime as charged and the Court of Appeals
affirmed the conviction.

ISSUE: WON Gemma's guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt in light of
her alleged mistaken identity.

HELD: Gemma is guilty of violating Section 155 of Republic Act No. 8293 or
the Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines. The prosecution was able to
establish that the trademark Marlboro was not only valid for being neither
generic nor descriptive, it was also exclusively owned by PMPI, as evidenced
by the certificates of registration issued by the Intellectual Property Office of
the Department of Trade and Industry. Gemma also failed to establish her
claim for mistaken identity.
TORRES vs. PEREZ

Facts:

Petitioner and respondents, previous business partners, had a

misunderstanding and falling out which led to the petitioner filing a complaint
against respondents for violation of Unfair Competition. RTC Makati and
prosecutor found probable cause for the issuance of warrant of arrest. DOJ,
however, reversed the finding of existence of probable cause. Prosecutor
moved to withdraw the information but RTC Judge denied it. CA found the
RTC judge committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the prosecutors
motion. The Court held that there was no probable cause and affirmed the
assailed CA decisions.

Issue: Whether or not there exists probable cause to indict respondents for
unfair competition.

Held: No. There was no probable cause to indict respondents, because the
crime of unfair competition was not committed.

When Judge Untalan denied the Motion to Dismiss and/or Withdraw

Information filed by the prosecution and thereby sustained the position of
petitioner, his error lay in the fact that his focus on the crime of unfair
competition was unwarranted. In this case, much more important than the
issue of protection of intellectual property is the change of ownership of SCC.
The arguments of petitioner have no basis, because respondents are the
exclusive owners of SCC, of which she is no longer a partner.

Based on the findings of fact of the CA and the DOJ, respondents have
completed the payments of the share of petitioner in the partnership affairs.
Having bought her out of SCC, respondents were already its exclusive owners
who, as such, had the right to use the Naturals brand.

The criminal complaint for unfair competition against respondents cannot

prosper, for the elements of the crime were not present. The key elements of
unfair competition are deception, passing off and fraud upon the public. No
deception can be imagined to have been foisted on the public through
different vendor codes,