Art 246-266 Cases
Art 246-266 Cases
Art 246-266 Cases
197807
Plaintiff-Appellee,
Present:
DECISION
This is an appeal from the May 14, 2010 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03289, which affirmed the January 18, 2008 Decision[2] of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 18 in Manila, in Criminal Case No. 02-200106 for
Murder and Criminal Case No. 02-200107 for Frustrated Murder.
The Facts
During her arraignment, the accused gave a negative plea to both charges.
At the trial, the prosecution presented the following witnesses: Donna Maniego
(Maniego), Violeta Sicor (Sicor), Police Officer 3 Ricardo M. Alateit (PO3 Alateit), and
PO3 Ronaldo Samson (PO3 Samson).
On February 24, 2002, at about 1:30 p.m, Maniego was in front of her banana cue
store on Lakandula Street, Tondo, Manila. She was seated alongside her mother, Sicor,
inside the sidecar of a motorcycle. Without warning, the accused approached her and
punched her face several times. The accused turned on Sicor, grabbed her and stabbed
her in the middle of her buttocks with a small knife. Maniego got out of the sidecar and
ran to the barangay hall for help. Upon finding that the barangay chairman was not
around, Maniego went to check on her common-law spouse, Jondel Santiago
(Santiago), at the house of Santiagos mother.[4] On her way there, she saw the
accused stab Santiago four (4) times from a distance of five (5) to six (6) meters. The
distance between where Maniego was punched and where Santiago was stabbed was
about nine (9) meters.[5] Maniego then saw the accused flee the scene of the crime
carrying a knife and heading towards Juan Luna Street. Seeing that Santiago was
mortally hurt, Maniego rushed Santiago to Gat Andres Bonifacio Hospital but he later
expired. While Maniego was at the hospital, she saw the accused, who was being
treated after an angry crowd mauled her. Maniego informed the policeman who was
escorting the accused that it was the latter who had stabbed and killed Santiago.[6]
After receiving the information from Maniego, the accused was arrested and brought
to police headquarters.[7]
On cross-examination, Maniego testified that she had known the accused for almost
ten years and had a close relationship with her. She stated that the accused got angry
with her when she eloped with Santiago.[8]
Sicor, Maniegos mother, corroborated Maniegos testimony. She saw the accused
punch Maniego several times while they were inside the sidecar on February 24,
2002. The accused then grabbed her and stabbed her in her buttocks with a small
knife. She said that after she was stabbed, two sidecar boys came to her aid and
brought her to the hospital. She added that she was released from the hospital two
hours after receiving treatment.[9]
PO3 Alateit testified that on the day of the incident, he was riding his motorcycle on
his way home. While he was on the corner of Juan Luna and Moriones Streets, it was
reported to him that a stabbing incident had taken place. He headed towards an area
where a crowd was causing a commotion. He then saw a woman who looked like a
lesbian running towards him. Her head was bloodied. He handcuffed the injured
woman after he was informed that she had stabbed someone. At the time of her arrest,
a sharp object fell from the womans waist. He confiscated the item and brought the
woman to the police station and to Gat Andres Bonifacio Hospital. He identified the
woman as the accused.[10]
Both the prosecution and the defense stipulated that Senior Police Officer 2 Edison
Bertoldo was the police investigator in the case against the accused and that he
prepared the following:
The last witness for the prosecution, PO3 Samson, testified that on the date of the
incident, he was assigned at the Western Police District Crime Laboratory Division. He
presented before the court the sharp object used in stabbing the victim (Exhibit M)
and the Request for Laboratory Examination (Exhibit M-1).[12]
For their part, the defense offered the testimonies of the accused and Dr. Mario Lato.
Chiefly relying on denial as her defense, the accused claimed that on the date of the
stabbing incident, she confronted Maniego and asked her if it was true that she had
been spreading the rumor that the accused was insane. Maniego answered in the
affirmative. Angered, the accused slapped Maniego and left, leaving Santiago, Sicor,
and Maniego in pursuit. Santiago then hit her with a lead pipe. Since she needed
medical treatment after the attack, she was brought to Gat Andres Bonifacio Medical
Hospital by her mother and a barangay kagawad.[13]
At the police station, the accused denied killing Santiago. She averred that nothing
was found on her body when she was frisked. She said that the knife recovered by PO3
Alateit was not hers and that there were other people in the area where it was found.
She added that she had an argument only with Maniego, not with Sicor or
Santiago.[14]
Dr. Mario Lato testified that on February 24, 2002, he treated the accused, who had a
laceration on the head which was possibly caused by a hard object such as a pipe. He
said that the accused sustained a two-centimeter laceration in her mid-pectoral
area.[15]
Ruling of the Trial Court
On January 18, 2008, the RTC convicted the accused of Murder in Crim. Case No. 02-
200106 and Less Serious Physical Injuries in Crim. Case No. 02-200107. The
dispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads:
SO ORDERED.[16]
On appeal, accused-appellant faulted the trial court for not considering the
inconsistencies and contradictions in the testimony of prosecution witness Maniego.
She also averred that the same witness credibility was improperly appreciated, as the
judge who heard the case was different from the one who rendered the decision.
The CA affirmed the findings of the RTC. The appellate court ruled that the
totality of the prosecutions evidence showed that accused-appellants guilt was proved
beyond reasonable doubt. It added that accused-appellant failed to show any ill
motive on the part of the prosecution witnesses to falsely testify against her. The
dispositive portion of the May 14, 2010 CA Decision reads:
The Issues
I
Whether the CA erred in finding accused-appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt
II
Whether the CA erred in giving credence to the testimony of the
prosecutions witness despite patent inconsistencies
III
Whether the CA erred in finding that the killing of the victim was
attended by treachery
The defense also calls attention to the fact that Maniego testified before Judge Romulo
A. Lopez, while the Decision was penned by Judge Myra Garcia-Fernandez.[18] It is
further contended that Maniego did not actually witness Santiago being stabbed,
because she admitted in court that she found out that Santiago had been stabbed when
she was already at the hospital attending to her injured mother.
Moreover, it is pointed out by the defense that the victim was 58 in height and of
average built while accused-appellant is only 411. It is, thus, incredible that she could
have inflicted fatal wounds on the victim.
Lastly, the defense argues that the prosecution was unable to prove that the killing of
Santiago was accompanied by treachery. Assuming that accused-appellant did stab the
victim, the defense claims that it was not proved that she deliberately and consciously
adopted her mode of attack. The encounter was even preceded by a confrontation
between accused-appellant and Maniego, and it was Sicor and Santiago who followed
accused-appellant after the confrontation. The stabbing incident should have been
considered as having occurred in the spur of the moment.
Our Ruling
The elements of murder that the prosecution must establish are (1) that a person was
killed; (2) that the accused killed him or her; (3) that the killing was attended by any
of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC); and (4) that the killing is not parricide or infanticide.[19]
The prosecution was able to clearly establish that Santiago was killed and that it was
accused-appellant who killed him as there was an eyewitness to the crime. Santiagos
killing was attended by the qualifying circumstance of treachery as testified to by the
prosecution eyewitness, Maniego. Paragraph 16, Art. 14 of the RPC defines treachery
as the direct employment of means, methods, or forms in the execution of the crime
against persons which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk
to the offender arising from the defense which the offended party might make.
Maniegos testimony proved the presence of treachery in this case, as follows:
Q What did you do after Cecilia Lagman punched you in your face?
A I went outside of the side car x x x, and I went to the barangay hall to
ask help x x x.
xxxx
Q And in what place was that where Cecilia Lagman suddenly stabbed
Jondel Mari Santiago?
Q When you saw Cecilia Lagman stabbed Jondel Santiago how far were
you?
xxxx
Q And what was the reaction of Jondel Santiago when he was stabbed
by Cecilia Lagman?
A Nabigla po kasi hindi naman niya alam na sasaksakin siya eh. [He
was shocked because he did not know he was going to be
stabbed.]
Q What part of the body of Jondel Santiago was hit when he was
stabbed?
A One at the chest and two at the back and one at the neck. x x x
Q x x x [I]f the person who boxed you on the face is in court, will you be
able to identify her?
A Yes x x x.
xxxx
Q x x x [I]f the person whom you saw stabbed Jondel Santiago four
times is in court will you be able to identify him or her?
In order for treachery to be properly appreciated, two elements must be present: (1)
at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and (2) the
accused consciously and deliberately adopted the particular means, methods, or forms
of attack employed by him.[21] The essence of treachery is that the attack is
deliberate and without warning, done in a swift and unexpected way, affording the
hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape.[22] These
elements were present when accused-appellant stabbed Santiago. We quote with
approval the appellate courts finding on the presence of treachery:
In the case at bar, the victim was caught off guard when appellant, without
warning, stabbed him four times successively leaving the latter no
chance at all to evade the knife thrusts and defend himself from
appellants onslaught. Thus, there is no denying that appellants act of
suddenly stabbing the victim leaving the latter no room for defense is a
clear case of treachery.[23] x x x
On the other allegation of accused-appellant, We have earlier held that the fact that the
judge who rendered judgment was not the one who heard the witnesses does not
adversely affect the validity of conviction.[26] That the trial judge who rendered
judgment was not the one who had the occasion to observe the demeanor of the
witnesses during trial but merely relied on the records of the case does not render the
judgment erroneous, especially where the evidence on record is sufficient to support
its conclusion.[27]
Alibi as a Defense
We modify the conviction of accused-appellant with regard to Criminal Case No. 02-
200107. Originally charged with frustrated murder, accused-appellant was convicted
of less serious physical injuries in Criminal Case No. 02-200107. The RTC reasoned
that the stabbing injury sustained by Sicor was not on a vital part of the body and she
was able to leave the hospital two hours after receiving medical treatment. The RTC
properly ruled that the crime committed was not frustrated murder as it was not
shown that there was intent to kill.[29] However, while the RTC correctly ruled that
the accused-appellant is not guilty of frustrated murder in Criminal Case No. 02-
200107, the records do not support a conviction for less serious physical injuries.
Art. 265 of the RPC provides, Any person who shall inflict upon another physical
injuries not described [as serious physical injuries] but which shall incapacitate the
offended party for labor for ten (10) days or more, or shall require medical attendance
for the same period, shall be guilty of less serious physical injuries and shall suffer the
penalty of arresto mayor. Nothing in the records, however, supports the finding that
Sicor was incapacitated for labor for ten (10) days or more or that she required
medical attention for the same period. After the wound on her buttocks was treated,
Sicor was released two hours after she was admitted to the hospital.[30] She later
returned to the hospital for the removal of the suture on her wound, according to the
RTC, after a certain period of time.[31] The Medico-Legal Report on Sicor (Exhibit H)
does not indicate how many days of medical treatment her injury would need.[32]
Sicor, however, testified that she lost two (2) days of work on account of the injury she
sustained.[33] The testimony of her attending physician, Dr. Christian Dennis
Cendeno, on the other hand, was dispensed with following a stipulation by the parties
on his testimony.[34] The prosecution was, therefore, unable to establish that the
injury sustained by Sicor falls under less serious physical injuries absent the
requirement that her injury required medical attention for 10 days or incapacitated
her for the same period.
The Court can, thus, only convict accused-appellant of slight physical injuries. Under
par. 1, Art. 266 of the RPC, the penalty for slight physical injuries is arresto menor
when the offender has inflicted physical injuries which shall incapacitate the offended
party for labor from one to nine days, or shall require medical attendance during the
same period. There being no modifying circumstances to be appreciated, and in
accordance with par. 1 of Art. 64,[35] accused-appellant should be meted a penalty of
imprisonment of arresto menor in its medium period, which has a duration of eleven
(11) to twenty (20) days under Art. 76 of the RPC.
Pecuniary Liability
The CA affirmed the award of PhP 50,000 as civil indemnity in Criminal Case No. 02-
200106 and PhP 25,000 as temperate damages in Criminal Case No. 02-200106.
When death occurs due to a crime, the following may be recovered: (1)
civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim; (2) actual or
compensatory damages; (3) moral damages; (4) exemplary damages;
(5) attorneys fees and expenses of litigation; and (6) interest, in
proper cases. In People v. Tubongbanua, interest at the rate of six
percent (6%) was ordered to be applied on the award of damages. This
rule would be subsequently applied by the Court in several cases such
as Mendoza v. People, People v. Buban, People v. Guevarra, and People
v. Regalario. Thus, we likewise adopt this rule in the instant case.
Interest of six percent (6%) per annum should be imposed on the
award of civil indemnity and all damages, i.e., actual or compensatory
damages, moral damages and exemplary damages, from the date of
finality of judgment until fully paid.
In accordance with the rules cited above, We modify the award of damages. In line with
prevailing jurisprudence,[37] the award of civil indemnity ex delicto of PhP 50,000 in
favor of the heirs of Santiago is in order. Moral damages of PhP 50,000 and PhP
30,000 in exemplary damages, with an interest of six percent (6%) per annum, are
also proper.[38]
We delete the award of PhP 25,000 in temperate damages to Sicor, since only slight
physical injuries were committed and no proof of medical expenses was presented
during trial.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The CA Decision in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03289
finding accused-appellant guilty of Murder in Criminal Case No. 02-200106 is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Accused-appellant is ordered to indemnify the
heirs of the late Jondel Mari Davantes Santiago the sum of PhP 50,000 as civil
indemnity, PhP 50,000 as moral damages, PhP 30,000 as exemplary damages, and
interest on all damages at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of
judgment until fully paid. With respect to Criminal Case No. 02-200107, accused-
appellant is convicted of SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES and is sentenced to twenty
(20) days of arresto menor. The award of temperate damages is DELETED.
SO ORDERED.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
For a measly five- or ten-peso tip that a 10-year-old child would need for lunch money,
a known acquaintance of their family would destroy a child's dignity by having illicit
carnal knowledge of her. This case involves an act that is so dastardly that it is
punished by Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code as statutory rape which carries a
sentence of reclusion perpetua.
We are asked to review the Court of Appeals decision1 in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 02955.
This decision affirmed the conviction of the accused-appellant for statutory rape under
Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code and imposed the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.
That on or about November 29, 2005, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the offended party,
(AAA), who is under twelve (12) years old.
Contrary to law.
Upon arraignment, Rodrigo Gutierez pleaded "not guilty." Trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution presented the victim, AAA, who was then 10 years old and a Grade 2
student at Camp 7 Elementary School in Baguio City. She testified that on November
29, 2005, she went home from school at around 12 noon to have lunch.3 On the way
home, she met Rodrigo at his house. He brought her to his room and laid her down on
the bed. He then raised her skirt and removed her panties. He pulled down his pants
and then inserted his penis into her vagina.4
According to AAA, Rodrigo stayed on top of her for a long time, and when he withdrew
his penis, white liquid came out. He then gave her five pesos (P5.00) before she went
back to school.5
AAA went back to school at about 2:10 p.m. Her adviser, Agustina Chapap, asked her
where she came from because she was tardy. AAA initially did not answer. When
asked again why she was tardy, AAA admitted she came from "Uncle Rod." She also
admitted that she went there to ask for money. Chapap then brought AAA to Rona
Ambaken, AAA's previous teacher. Together, they brought AAA to the principal's
office. AAA was brought to the comfort room where Ambaken inspected her panties.
The principal was able to confirm that AAA was touched since AAA's private organ
was swelling. Her underwear was also wet.6
Another teacher, Jason Dalisdis, then brought AAA to Baguio General Hospital where
her underwear was again inspected. Dr. Anvic Pascua also examined her. On the way
to the hospital, Dalisdis passed by the barangay hall and the police station to report
the incident.7
AAA also disclosed during trial that the accused-appellant had done the same thing to
her about 10 times on separate occasions. After each act, he would give her ten
(P10.00) or five (P5.00) pesos.8
The prosecution also presented Dr. Asuncion Ogues as an expert witness. Dr. Ogues
was the superior of Dr. Pascua who examined AAA. Dr. Ogues testified based on the
medical certificate issued by the examining physician that there was blunt force
penetrating trauma that could have been caused by sexual abuse. She also stated that
there was another medico-legal certificate issued by Dr. Carag, surgical resident of the
Department of Surgery of Baguio General Hospital, showing findings of some
hematoma in AAA's legs.9
In his defense, Rodrigo denied that AAA went to his house at 12 noon on November 29,
2005 and claimed he was already at work at 1:30 p.m. He has known AAA for a long
time since his family rented the house of AAA's grandfather from 2001 to 2004.10
When the police came and asked him if he knew AAA, he answered in the affirmative.
He was then brought to Baguio General Hospital where he was told that AAA identified
him as the one who raped her.11
Rodrigo admitted that he had a relationship with AAA's sister, and they even lived
together as common-law spouses.12 He also admitted that a similar complaint was filed
against him by AAA's mother when AAA was eight years old, but they settled the case
at the barangay level.13
On July 4, 2007, the trial court rendered a judgment14 finding Rodrigo guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of statutory rape and imposing on him the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. He was additionally required to indemnify the offended party P50,000.00
moral damages and P25,000.00 exemplary damages with costs of suit.
Rodrigo appealed15 to the Court of Appeals claiming that AAA's testimony fell short of
the requirement of the law on the quantum of evidence required. He argued that she
did not cry for help when her family's house was just nearby, which was cause for
reasonable doubt that the trial court failed to appreciate.
On February 28, 2013, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision16 affirming the
conviction.
On March 11, 2013, Rodrigo filed a notice of appeal17 with the appellate court, which
was given due course in a resolution18 dated March 15, 2013.
In the resolution19 of September 9, 2013, this court required the parties to submit
their respective supplemental briefs, if they so desired. Both parties, however,
manifested that they were dispensing with the filing of a supplemental brief as their
arguments were already substantially and exhaustively discussed in their respective
briefs filed before the appellate court.
The only issue to be resolved by this court is whether the prosecution was able to
prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused-appellant was guilty of statutory rape
punishable under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code.
Rape is defined in Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, which states:
1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
d. When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even
though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.
xxxx
Statutory rape is committed when (1) the offended party is under 12 years of age and
(2) the accused has carnal knowledge of her, regardless of whether there was force,
threat or intimidation; whether the victim was deprived of reason or consciousness; or
whether it was done through fraud or grave abuse of authority. It is enough that the
age of the victim is proven and that there was sexual intercourse.
People v. Teodoro20 explained the elements of statutory rape committed under Article
266-A, paragraph (1) (d):
Rape under paragraph 3 of this article is termed statutory rape as it departs from the
usual modes of committing rape. What the law punishes in statutory rape is carnal
knowledge of a woman below twelve (12) years old. Thus, force, intimidation and
physical evidence of injury are not relevant considerations; the only subject of inquiry
is the age of the woman and whether carnal knowledge took place. The law presumes
that the victim does not and cannot have a will of her own on account of her tender
years; the child's consent is immaterial because of her presumed incapacity to discern
good from evil. (Emphasis supplied)
The defense did not dispute the fact that AAA was 10 years old at the time of the
incident. Her birth certificate was presented before the trial court.21 What is critical in
this case, therefore, is whether there is a showing that Rodrigo had carnal knowledge
of AAA.
In the testimony of AAA, she narrated that on November 29, 2005, she met Rodrigo in
his house, thus:
A: Yes, Ma'am.
Q: And, was that the first time you entered the room?
Q: After entering the room, what did Uncle Rod tell you?
A: He laid me down, Ma'am.
COURT:
Q: Where?
PROS. BERNABE:
Q: Who were the persons inside the room aside from you and Uncle Rod?
A: He raised up my skirt.
A: No, Ma'am.
Q: After pulling down your panty until your ankle, what happened?
Q: After pulling down his short pants, what did Uncle Rod do?
Q: You also mentioned AAA that Uncle Rod inserted his penis to your vagina, could you
point to the "ari" of Uncle Rod?
A: (The witness pointed to a portion where the private part of the elder brother was
standing.)
Q: Was it painful when Uncle Rod inserted his penis inside your vagina?
A: Yes, Ma'am.
Q: Did you cry when Uncle Rod inserted his penis inside your vagina?
A: Yes, Ma'am.
A: Yes, Ma'am.
Q: And after he withdrew his penis inside your vagina, what happened?
A: There is some white liquid that came out of his penis, Ma'am.22
As shown by her testimony, AAA was able to narrate in a clear and categorical manner
the ordeal that was done to her. As a child-victim who has taken significant risks in
coming to court, her testimony deserves full weight and credence. People v. Veloso23
stated that:
In a litany of cases, this Court has ruled that the testimonies of child-victims of rape
are to be given full weight and credence. Reason and experience dictate that a girl of
tender years, who barely understands sex and sexuality, is unlikely to impute to any
man a crime so serious as rape, if what she claims is not true. Her candid narration of
how she was raped bears the earmarks of credibility, especially if no ill will-as in this
case-motivates her to testify falsely against the accused. It is well-settled that when a
woman, more so when she is a minor, says she has been raped, she says in effect all
that is required to prove the ravishment. The accused may thus be convicted solely on
her testimony-provided it is credible, natural, convincing and consistent with human
nature and the normal course of things.24
AAA's ordeal was supported by the testimonies of her teachers whose concern for her
led to the discovery of the crime. The medical certificate presented in court, together
with the testimonies of the physicians, is consistent with the finding that she was
sexually abused.
Rodrigo asserted that AAA's failure to cry out for help shows reasonable
doubt.1wphi1 He noted that her house was just near his house where the incident
happened.
This argument is so feeble that it could only have been put up out of desperation.
Rodrigo was referred to by the child-victim as "Uncle Rod." He admitted that AAA's
family had known him for a long time. Rodrigo had the trust and respect that any
elder in the family of AAA had. Instead of providing the moral guidance that his status
allowed him, he took advantage of AAA's youthful innocence to satiate his illicit carnal
desires. To cover this up and seemingly justify his actions, he gave his child-victim the
measly sum of five pesos. Rodrigo knew that what he did was wrong; AAA would have
probably doubted whether such act was normal among adults.
With his moral ascendancy, it would not be unreasonable to assume that even the
child-victim's desire for help would be muffled by her fear of her "Uncle Rod." To a
young 10-year-old, the ordinary world can be daunting. To be so young and silently
aware that one is the victim of such callous depravation by Rodrigo, who she could
have expected to take care of her, can create the kind of lasting fear that diminishes
the development of her own person and her own convictions.
In any case, whether she cried for help is immaterial in a charge of statutory rape
since "[t]he law presumes that such a victim, on account of her tender age, does not
and cannot have a will of her own."25
Beyond reasonable doubt, Rodrigo Gutierez raped AAA, a minor who was only 10
years of age, on November 29, 2005.
Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code requires that the penalty of reclusion
perpetua shall be imposed in cases of rape stated in the first paragraph of Article 266-
A where there are no aggravating or qualifying circumstances present. The lower
courts correctly imposed this penalty.
It is settled that the award of civil indemnity is mandatory upon a finding that rape
was committed, along with the award of moral and exemplary damages.26 In People v.
Degay,27 the accused-appellant was found guilty of raping his nine-year-old neighbor.
This court did not hesitate to increase the award of civil indemnity and moral damages
from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00. In People v. Gambao,28 we have also increased the
award of civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages to P100,000.00
each.
Due to the utter heinousness of the crime involved in this case, we, therefore, exercise
our judicial prerogative and increase the damages to P100,000.00 as civil indemnity,
P100,000.00 as moral damages, and P100,000.00 as exemplary damages.
There are not enough words to condemn the depravity that one adult can do to a child-
victim. The many years that Rodrigo Gutierez will, by law, serve in prison will, of
course, not make up for the wrong and the injury that he has so selfishly and callously
caused and with utter disregard for what truly makes us human: that we care,
nurture, and protect our children because we hope that they can make their world
better than ours. All this was lost on Rodrigo Gutierez. The five pesos that he gave on
every occasion that he defiled his child-victim simply underscores the ignominy of his
act.
SO ORDERED
DECISION
On appeal is the October 22, 2010 Decision3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CR-H.C. No. 03832 which affirmed with modification the July 3, 2008 Decision4 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Antipolo City, Branch 73 finding appellant Joel
Crisostomo y Malliar guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of rape by sexual
assault and one count of statutory rape.
That, on or about the 8th day of April, 1999, in the City of Antipolo, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd
designs, did then and there commit an act of sexual assault by using a lighted cigarette
as an instrument or object and [inserting] the same into the genital orifice of "AAA,"6 a
minor who is six (6) years of age, thereby causing the labia majora of the vagina of
said minor to suffer a third degree burn, against her will and consent.
Contrary to law.
Contrary to law.
That, on or about the 8th day of April, 1999, in the City of Antipolo, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd
designs and by means of force, violence and intimidation, did, then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge [of] "AAA", a minor who is six (6)
years of age; that on the same occasion that the Accused raped said minor, the accused
did, then and there burn her buttocks by the use of a lighted cigarette, against her will
and consent.
Contrary to law.
Factual Antecedents
The victim in these cases[,] "AAA[,]" testified that at noon time of April 8, 1999, she
was x x x playing x x x with her playmates whereupon she wandered by the house of
accused which x x x was just below their house. "AAA" clarified during her cross-
examination that there was a vulcanizing shop owned by her father located in their
house x x x and where accused was employed. While "AAA" was at the house of
accused, she claimed that her genitals and buttocks were burned with a lighted
cigarette by the said accused. "AAA" testified further that her clothes were taken off by
the same accused who also took his clothes off after which he allegedly placed himself
on top of her, inserted his penis and proceeded to have illicit carnal knowledge [of] the
then six (6) year old girl. (TSN May 29, 2001, pp. 5-9; TSN Aug. 7, 2001, pp. 10-12.)
"BBB," father of "AAA," presented in court his daughters birth certificate (Exhibit "B")
which stated that she was born on April 4, 1993 (TSN Sept. 25, 2001, p. 4). On the
other hand, Dr. Emmanuel Reyes the Medico-Legal Officer who examined "AAA"
identified his Medico-Legal Report (Exhibit "M") and testified that the victim indeed
had two (2) third degree burns in the perianal region. Dr. Reyes testified that it was
possible that the said burns were caused by a lighted cigarette stick being forced on
the victims skin. Moreover, Dr. Reyes confirmed that there was a loss of virginity on
the part of the victim and that the same could have been done 24 hours from the time
of his examination which was also on April 8, 1999. (TSN Nov. 7, 2001 pp. 11-17)
"CCC" [aunt of "AAA"] testified that x x x she x x x assisted the mother of "AAA" in
bringing the victim to the Pasig General Hospital and thereafter to Camp Crame where
a doctor also examined "AAA" and confirmed that the latter was indeed a victim of
rape. "CCC" testified that they then proceeded to the Womens [D]esk to file the instant
complaint against the accused. (TSN August 5, 2003 pp. 4-8)
On the other hand, accused denied the allegation of rape against him. Accused
presented his brother-in-law Rogelio Oletin who testified that he was tending the store
located at the house of accused when the latter supposedly arrived from work at 10:00
[a.m.] of April 8, 1999 and slept until 5:00 [p.m.] of the same day. According to
Rogelio that is the usual routine of accused as the latter worked in the night shift
schedule as vulcanizer in the vulcanizing shop owned by the victims father. (TSN
February 3, 2006 pp. 6-8)
When accused testified on November 17, 2006, he essentially confirmed the testimony
of his brother-in-law that it was impossible for him to have raped "AAA" on the date
and time stated in the information as his night shift work schedule just would not
permit such an incident to occur. Accused added that he knew of no reason why the
family of the private complainant would pin the crime against him. (TSN Nov. 17,
2006 pp. 9-11 & 14)
In an effort to explain the burn marks on the delicate parts of "AAAs" body, the
defense presented a supposed playmate of "AAA" in the person of Mary Pabuayan.
According to Mary, she was then 7 years old when she and two other playmates
together with "AAA" and Joel "Liit" the son of accused were burning worms near a
santol tree in their neighborhood on a Good Friday in the year 1999. This Joel "Liit"
supposedly lighted a straw which inadvertently burned the anal portion of "AAAs"
body. Marys exact words were to the effect that "napatakan ang puwit ni "AAA"."8
On July 3, 2008, the RTC rendered its Decision finding appellant guilty of three counts
of rape, viz:
SO ORDERED.9
Aggrieved, appellant filed a Notice of Appeal10 which was given due course by the trial
court in its Order11 dated February 2, 2009.
In his Brief filed before the CA, appellant raised the following assignment of error:
Appellant claimed that the trial court gravely erred when it lent full credence to the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.1awp++i1 In particular, appellant insisted
that the trial court erred in finding "AAAs" testimony credible considering that she
was unsure whether a match, rod or a cigarette stick, was used in burning her private
parts.13 Appellant argued that "AAA" never showed signs of shock, distress, or anxiety
despite her alleged traumatic experience.14 Appellant also alleged that "CCCs"
testimony should be disregarded as she was not even present when the rape incidents
happened.15 He opined that "CCC" influenced her niece, "AAA," to file the suit against
him which bespoke of ill-motive on her part. Appellant concluded that these
"inconsistencies and contradictions" are enough to set aside the verdict of conviction
imposed upon by the RTC.16
However, the CA gave short shrift to appellants arguments. The CA rendered its
Decision disposing as follows:
ACCORDINGLY, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The assailed July 3, 2008 Decision
is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as to the penalties imposed, and to be read
thus:
"1. For Criminal Case Nos. 99-16235 and 99-16236, Joel Crisostomo is hereby
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from ten17 (8)
years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four
(4) months of Reclusion Temporal, as maximum, and ordered to pay AAA Thirty
Thousand pesos (P30,000.00) as civil indemnity, Thirty Thousand pesos (P30,000.00)
as moral damages, and Fifteen Thousand pesos (P15,000.00) as exemplary damages,
all for each count of rape by sexual assault; and
(2) For Criminal Case No. 99-16237, Joel Crisostomo is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of Reclusion Perpetua without eligibility of parole, and ordered to pay AAA
Seventy-Five Thousand pesos (P75,000.00) as civil indemnity, Fifty Thousand pesos
(P50,000.00) as moral damages, and Thirty Thousand pesos (P30,000.00) as
exemplary damages, and all the costs of suit."
SO ORDERED.18
Hence, this appeal19 which the CA gave due course in its Resolution20 of January 6,
2011. In a Resolution21 dated June 15, 2011, this Court required the parties to file
their respective supplemental briefs. In its Manifestation and Motion,22 the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG) informed this Court that it will no longer file a
Supplemental Brief because it had already exhaustively discussed and refuted all the
arguments of the appellant in its brief filed before the CA. Appellant likewise filed a
Manifestation In Lieu of Supplemental Brief23 praying that the case be deemed
submitted for decision based on the pleadings submitted.
Our Ruling
The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, correctly found appellant guilty of two counts of rape
by sexual assault and one count of rape by sexual intercourse. Article 266-A of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC) provides:
1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
d. When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even
though none of the circumstances mentioned above should be present;
When the offended party is under 12 years of age, the crime committed is "termed
statutory rape as it departs from the usual modes of committing rape. What the law
punishes is carnal knowledge of a woman below 12 years of age. Thus, the only subject
of inquiry is the age of the woman and whether carnal knowledge took place. The law
presumes that the victim does not and cannot have a will of her own on account of her
tender years."24 In this case, the prosecution satisfactorily established all the elements
of statutory rape. "AAA" testified that on April 8, 1999, appellant took off her clothes
and made her lie down. Appellant also removed his clothes, placed himself on top of
"AAA," inserted his penis into her vagina, and proceeded to have carnal knowledge of
her. At the time of the rape, "AAA" was only six years of age. Her birth certificate
showed that she was born on April 4, 1993. "AAAs" testimony was corroborated by Dr.
Emmanuel Reyes who found "AAA" to have fresh and bleeding hymenal lacerations.
Likewise, the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt appellants guilt for two
counts of rape by sexual assault.1wphi1 Records show that appellant inserted a lit
cigarette stick into "AAAs" genital orifice causing her labia majora to suffer a 3rd
degree burn. Appellant likewise inserted a lit cigarette stick into "AAAs" anal orifice
causing 3rd degree burns in her perianal region.
We agree with the CA that "AAAs" "uncertainty" on whether it was a match, rod or a
cigarette stick that was inserted into her private parts, did not lessen her credibility.
Such "uncertainty" is so inconsequential and does not diminish the fact that an
instrument or object was inserted into her private parts. This is the essence of rape by
sexual assault. "[T]he gravamen of the crime of rape by sexual assault x x x is the
insertion of the penis into another persons mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or
object, into another persons genital or anal orifice."25 In any event, "inconsistencies in
a rape victims testimony do not impair her credibility, especially if the inconsistencies
refer to trivial matters that do not alter the essential fact of the commission of rape."26
We also held in People v. Piosang27 that
"[t]estimonies of child-victims are normally given full weight and credit, since when a
girl, particularly if she is a minor, says that she has been raped, she says in effect all
that is necessary to show that rape has in fact been committed. When the offended
party is of tender age and immature, courts are inclined to give credit to her account
of what transpired, considering not only her relative vulnerability but also the shame
to which she would be exposed if the matter to which she testified is not true. Youth
and immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity. Considering her tender
age, AAA could not have invented a horrible story. x x x "
Moreover, appellants argument that "AAA" did not manifest any stress or anxiety
considering her traumatic experience is purely speculative and bereft of any legal
basis. Besides, it is settled that people react differently when confronted with a
startling experience. There is no standard behavioral response when one is confronted
with a traumatic experience. Some may show signs of stress; but others may act
nonchalantly. Nevertheless, "AAAs" reaction does not in any way prove the innocence
of appellant. As correctly pointed out by the OSG, regardless of "AAAs" reactions, it did
not diminish the fact that she was raped by appellant or that a crime was committed.28
We also agree with the CA that "CCCs" efforts to hale appellant to the court should not
be equated with ill-motive on her part. On the contrary, we find "CCCs" efforts to seek
justice for her niece who was raped more in accord with the norms of society. At any
rate, even if we disregard "CCCs" testimony, appellants conviction would still stand.
We agree with the observation of the OSG that "CCCs" "testimony actually had no great
impact on the case. In truth, her testimony [was] composed mainly of the fact that she
was the one who accompanied the mother of "AAA" in bringing "AAA" to the Pasig
General Hospital and thereafter to Camp Crame and later on to the Womens desk."29
On the other hand, appellants alibi and denial are weak defenses especially when
weighed against "AAAs" positive identification of him as the malefactor. Appellant did
not even attempt to show that it was physically impossible for him to be at the crime
scene at the time of its commission. In fact, he admitted that he lived just four houses
away from the house of "AAA". His denial is also unsubstantiated hence the same is
self-serving and deserves no consideration or weight. The RTC properly disregarded
the testimony of Rogelio Oletin (Oletin), appellants brother-in-law, who claimed that
appellant was at his house at the time of the incident. As appellant already admitted,
his house is near the house of "AAA" hence there was no physical impossibility for him
to be present at the crime scene. Also, the RTC observed that Oletins testimony did not
"prove beneficial to the defense. Suffice it to state that the private prosecutor correctly
noted that the said witness was always smiling and laughing when answering
questions propounded to him as if making a mockery of the proceedings which his own
brother-in-law was facing."30
Pursuant to Article 266-B of the RPC, the penalty for statutory rape (Criminal Case
No. 99-16237) is death when the victim is a child below seven years old. There is no
dispute that at the time the rape was committed on April 8, 1999, "AAA" was only six
years old, having been born on April 4, 1993. However, pursuant to Republic Act No.
9346,31 the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed on the appellant but
without eligibility for parole.32 The CA thus correctly imposed the said penalty on
appellant.
On the other hand, rape by sexual assault committed against a child below seven years
old is punishable by reclusion temporal.33 Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
and there being no other aggravating or mitigating circumstance, the proper
imposable penalty shall be prision mayor34 as minimum, to reclusion temporal,35 as
maximum. The CA thus correctly imposed the penalty of eight (8) years and one (1)
day ofprision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of
reclusion temporal, as maximum, for each count of sexual assault.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The October 22, 2010 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03832 which affirmed with modification the July 3,
2008 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, Branch 73 finding appellant
Joel Crisostomo y Malliar guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of rape by
sexual assault and one count of statutory rape is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS
that the award of moral damages in Criminal Case No. 99-16237 (statutory rape) is
increased to P75,000.00 and the award of exemplary damages in Criminal Case No.
99-16235 and Criminal Case No. 99-16236 (rape by sexual assault) is increased to
P30,000.00 for each count. In addition, interest is imposed on all damages awarded at
the rate of 6% per annum from date of finality of judgment until fully paid.
SO ORDERED
CORONA, C.J.,
- versus - Chairperson,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO, and
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.
DECISION
For our review is the March 21, 2007 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CR HC No. 00234 which affirmed appellants conviction for murder in Criminal
Case No. 2162-M-2000 and rape in Criminal Case No. 2308-M-2000.
Appellant Conrado Laog y Ramin was charged with murder before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 11, of Malolos, Bulacan. The Information,[2] which was
docketed as Criminal Case No. 2162-M-2000, alleged:
That on or about the 6th day of June, 2000, in the municipality of San
Rafael, province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a lead
pipe and with intent to kill one Jennifer Patawaran-Rosal, did then and
there wil[l]fully, unlawfully and feloniously, with evident
premeditation, abuse of superior strength and treachery, attack,
assault and hit with the said lead pipe the said Jennifer Patawaran-
Rosal, thereby inflicting upon said Jennifer Patawaran-Rosal serious
physical injuries which directly caused her death.
Contrary to law.
He was likewise charged before the same court with the crime of rape of AAA.[3] The
second Information,[4] which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 2308-M-2000,
alleged:
That on or about the 6th day of June, 2000, in the municipality of San
Rafael, province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd designs, by
means of force, violence and intimidation, that is, by attacking and
hitting with a lead pipe one [AAA] which resulted [in] her incurring
serious physical injuries that almost caused her death, and while in
such defenseless situation, did then and there have carnal knowledge
of said [AAA] against her will and consent.
Contrary to law.
When arraigned, appellant pleaded not guilty to both charges. The two cases were
thereafter tried jointly because they arose from the same incident.
The prosecution presented as its principal witness AAA, the rape victim who
was 19 years old at the time of the incident. Her testimony was corroborated by her
grandfather BBB, Dr. Ivan Richard Viray, and her neighbor CCC.
AAA testified that at around six oclock in the evening of June 6, 2000, she and her
friend, Jennifer Patawaran-Rosal, were walking along the rice paddies on their way to
apply for work at a canteen near the National Highway in Sampaloc, San Rafael,
Bulacan. Suddenly, appellant, who was holding an ice pick and a lead pipe, waylaid
them and forcibly brought them to a grassy area at the back of a concrete wall.
Without warning, appellant struck AAA in the head with the lead pipe causing her to
feel dizzy and to fall down. When Jennifer saw this, she cried out for help but appellant
also hit her on the head with the lead pipe, knocking her down. Appellant stabbed
Jennifer several times with the ice pick and thereafter covered her body with thick
grass.[5] Appellant then turned to AAA. He hit AAA in the head several times more
with the lead pipe and stabbed her on the face. While AAA was in such defenseless
position, appellant pulled down her jogging pants, removed her panty, and pulled up
her blouse and bra. He then went on top of her, sucked her breasts and inserted his
penis into her vagina. After raping AAA, appellant also covered her with grass. At that
point, AAA passed out.[6]
When AAA regained consciousness, it was nighttime and raining hard. She
crawled until she reached her uncles farm at daybreak on June 8, 2000.[7] When she
saw him, she waved at him for help. Her uncle, BBB, and a certain Nano then brought
her to Carpa Hospital in Baliuag, Bulacan where she stayed for more than three weeks.
She later learned that Jennifer had died.[8]
During cross-examination, AAA explained that she did not try to run away when
appellant accosted them because she trusted appellant who was her uncle by affinity.
She said that she never thought he would harm them.[9]
BBB testified that on June 8, 2000, at about six oclock in the morning, he was at his
rice field at Sampaloc, San Rafael, Bulacan when he saw a woman waving a hand and
then fell down. The woman was about 200 meters away from him when he saw her
waving to him, and he did not mind her. However, when she was about 100 meters
away from him, he recognized the woman as AAA, his granddaughter. He immediately
approached her and saw that her face was swollen, with her hair covering her face,
and her clothes all wet. He asked AAA what happened to her, and AAA uttered, Si Tata
Coni referring to appellant who is his son-in-law.[10] With the help of his neighbor, he
brought AAA home.[11] AAA was later brought to Carpa Hospital in Baliuag, Bulacan
where she recuperated for three weeks.
CCC, neighbor of AAA and Jennifer, testified that sometime after June 6, 2000, she
visited AAA at the hospital and asked AAA about the whereabouts of Jennifer. AAA
told her to look for Jennifer somewhere at Buenavista. She sought the assistance of
Barangay Officials and they went to Buenavista where they found Jennifers cadaver
covered with grass and already bloated.[12]
Meanwhile, Dr. Ivan Richard Viray, a medico-legal officer of the Province of Bulacan,
conducted the autopsy on the remains of Jennifer. His findings are as follows:
the body is in advanced stage of decomposition[;] eyeballs and to[n]gue
were protru[d]ed; the lips and abdomen are swollen; desquamation and
bursting of bullae and denudation of the epidermis in the head, trunks
and on the upper extremities[;] [f]rothy fluid and maggots coming
from the nose, mouth, genital region and at the site of wounds, three
(3) lacerations at the head[;] two (2) stab wounds at the
submandibular region[;] four [4] punctured wounds at the chest of the
victim[.]
cause of death of the victim was hemorrhagic shock as result of stab
wounds [in] the head and trunk.[13]
The prosecution and the defense also stipulated on the testimony of Elizabeth
Patawaran, Jennifers mother, as to the civil aspect of Criminal Case No. 2162-M-2000.
It was stipulated that she spent P25,000 for Jennifers funeral and burial.[14]
Appellant, on the other hand, denied the charges against him. Appellant
testified that he was at home cooking dinner around the time the crimes were
committed. With him were his children, Ronnie, Jay, Oliver and Conrado, Jr. and his
nephew, Rey Laog. At around seven oclock, he was arrested by the police officers of
San Rafael, Bulacan. He learned that his wife had reported him to the police after he
went wild that same night and struck with a lead pipe a man whom he saw talking to
his wife inside their house. When he was already incarcerated, he learned that he was
being charged with murder and rape.[15]
Appellant further testified that AAA and Jennifer frequently went to his nipa hut
whenever they would ask for rice or money. He claimed that in the evening of June 5,
2000, AAA and Jennifer slept in his nipa hut but they left the following morning at
around seven oclock. An hour later, he left his house to have his scythe repaired.
However, he was not able to do so because that was the time when he went wild after
seeing his wife with another man. He admitted that his nipa hut is more or less only
100 meters away from the scene of the crime.[16]
The defense also presented appellants nephew, Rey Laog, who testified that he went to
appellants house on June 5, 2000, at around three oclock in the afternoon, and saw
AAA and Jennifer there. He recalled seeing AAA and Jennifer before at his uncles
house about seven times because AAA and his uncle had an illicit affair. He further
testified that appellant arrived before midnight on June 5, 2000 and slept with AAA.
The following morning, at around six oclock, AAA and Jennifer went home. He and
appellant meanwhile left the house together. Appellant was going to San Rafael to have
his scythe repaired while he proceeded to his house in Pinakpinakan, San Rafael,
Bulacan.[17]
After trial, the RTC rendered a Joint Decision[18] on June 30, 2003 finding appellant
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of both crimes. The dispositive portion of the RTC
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in Crim. Case No. 2162-M-2000, this court finds the
accused Conrado Laog GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Murder
under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and hereby
sentences him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay
the heirs of Jennifer Patawaran, the following sums of money:
a. P60,000.00 as civil indemnity;
b. P50,000.00 as moral damages;
c. P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
WHEREFORE, in Crim. Case No. 2308-M-2000, this Court hereby finds
the accused Conrado Laog GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Rape
under Art. 266-A par. (a) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and
hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and
to pay the private complainant the following sums of money.
a. P50,000.00 as civil indemnity;
b. P50,000.00 as moral damages;
c. P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.[19]
Appellant appealed his conviction to this Court. But conformably with our
pronouncement in People v. Mateo,[20] the case was referred to the CA for
appropriate action and disposition.
In a Decision dated March 21, 2007, the CA affirmed with modification the trial courts
judgment. The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant Appeal is DISMISSED. The assailed Joint
Decision, dated June 30, 2003, of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos,
Bulacan, Branch 11, in Criminal Case Nos. 2162-M-2000 & 2308-M-
2000, is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. In Criminal Case
[No.] 2162-M-2000, Accused-Appellant is further ordered to pay the
heirs of Jennifer Patawaran [an] additional P25,000.00 as actual
damages. The exemplary damages awarded by the Trial Court in 2162-
M-2000 & 2308-M-2000 are hereby reduced to P25,000.00 each.
SO ORDERED.[21]
Appellant is now before this Court assailing the CAs affirmance of his conviction for
both crimes of rape and murder. In a Resolution[22] dated August 22, 2007, we
required the parties to submit their respective Supplemental Briefs, if they so desire.
However, the parties submitted separate Manifestations in lieu of Supplemental
Briefs, adopting the arguments in their respective briefs filed in the CA. Appellant had
raised the following errors allegedly committed by the trial court:
I
xxxx
Fiscal:
Q: And what happened to you when you were hit with the lead pipe by
Conrado Laog?
A: I fell down (nabuwal) because I felt dizzy, sir.
Court:
Q: How about Jennifer, where was she when you heard her crying?
A: She was standing on the rice puddies, (sic), Your Honor.
Fiscal:
Q: And what was Conrado Laog doing?
A: He approached Jennifer, sir.
Q: When Conrado Laog came back to you, what did you do, if any?
A: He hit me with the pipe several times, sir.
Q: For how long did the accused Conrado Laog insert his penis into your
vagina?
A: For quite sometime, sir.
x x x x[28]
On the other hand, appellant merely interposed the defense of denial and alibi. He
claimed that at the time of the incident, he was at his house with his children and
nephew cooking dinner. His defense, however, cannot prevail over the straightforward
and credible testimony of AAA who positively identified him as the perpetrator of the
murder and rape. Time and again, we have held that positive identification of the
accused, when categorical and consistent and without any showing of ill motive on the
part of the eyewitness testifying, should prevail over the alibi and denial of the
appellant whose testimony is not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence.[29]
AAA was firm and unrelenting in pointing to appellant as the one who attacked her
and Jennifer, stabbing the latter to death before raping AAA. It should be noted that
AAA knew appellant well since they were relatives by affinity. As correctly held by the
CA, with AAAs familiarity and proximity with the appellant during the commission of
the crime, her identification of appellant could not be doubted or mistaken. In fact,
AAA, upon encountering appellant, did not run away as she never thought her own
uncle would harm her and her friend. Moreover, the most natural reaction of victims
of violence is to strive to see the appearance of the perpetrators of the crime and
observe the manner in which the crime is being committed.[30] There is no evidence
to show any improper motive on the part of AAA to testify falsely against appellant or
to falsely implicate him in the commission of a crime. Thus, the logical conclusion is
that the testimony is worthy of full faith and credence.[31]
In People v. Nieto,[32] we reiterated that --
It is an established jurisprudential rule that a mere denial, without any
strong evidence to support it, can scarcely overcome the positive
declaration by the victim of the identity and involvement of appellant
in the crimes attributed to him. The defense of alibi is likewise
unavailing. Firstly, alibi is the weakest of all defenses, because it is
easy to concoct and difficult to disprove. Unless substantiated by clear
and convincing proof, such defense is negative, self-serving, and
undeserving of any weight in law. Secondly, alibi is unacceptable when
there is a positive identification of the accused by a credible
witness. Lastly, in order that alibi might prosper, it is not enough to
prove that the accused has been somewhere else during the
commission of the crime; it must also be shown that it would have been
impossible for him to be anywhere within the vicinity of the crime
scene.
Appellant does not dispute that he was near the vicinity of the crime on the evening of
June 6, 2000. In fact, during his cross-examination, appellant admitted that his house
was more or less only 100 meters from the crime scene. Thus, his defense of alibi is not
worthy of any credit for the added reason that he has not shown that it was physically
impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission.
In view of the credible testimony of AAA, appellants defenses of denial and
alibi deserve no consideration. We stress that these weak defenses cannot stand
against the positive identification and categorical testimony of a rape victim.[33]
Appellant attempts to discredit AAA's accusation of rape by pointing out that while
she testified on being very weak that she even passed out after she was raped by
appellant, she nevertheless stated that when she crawled her way to her grandfather's
farm she was wearing her clothes. Appellant also contends that the prosecution should
have presented the physician who examined AAA to prove her allegations that she
was beaten and raped by appellant.
We are not persuaded.
Based on AAAs account, appellant did not undress her completely -- her blouse
and bra were merely lifted up (nililis) while her undergarments were just pulled down,
which therefore explains why she still had her clothes on when she crawled to her
grandfathers farm. Nonetheless, this matter raised by appellant is a minor detail
which had nothing to do with the elements of the crime of rape. Discrepancies
referring only to minor details and collateral matters -- not to the central fact of the
crime -- do not affect the veracity or detract from the essential credibility of witnesses
declarations, as long as these are coherent and intrinsically believable on the
whole.[34] For a discrepancy or inconsistency in the testimony of a witness to serve
as a basis for acquittal, it must establish beyond doubt the innocence of the appellant
for the crime charged.[35] It cannot be overemphasized that the credibility of a rape
victim is not diminished, let alone impaired, by minor inconsistencies in her
testimony.[36]
As to the fact that the physician who examined AAA at the hospital did not
testify during the trial, we find this not fatal to the prosecutions case.
It must be underscored that the foremost consideration in the prosecution of
rape is the victims testimony and not the findings of the medico-legal officer. In fact, a
medical examination of the victim is not indispensable in a prosecution for rape; the
victims testimony alone, if credible, is sufficient to convict.[37] Thus we have ruled
that a medical examination of the victim, as well as the medical certificate, is merely
corroborative in character and is not an indispensable element for conviction in rape.
What is important is that the testimony of private complainant about the incident is
clear, unequivocal and credible,[38] as what we find in this case.
While we concur with the trial courts conclusion that appellant indeed was the one
who raped AAA and killed Jennifer, we find that appellant should not have been
convicted of the separate crimes of murder and rape. An appeal in a criminal case
opens the entire case for review on any question, including one not raised by the
parties.[39] The facts alleged and proven clearly show that the crime committed by
appellant is rape with homicide, a special complex crime provided under Article 266-
B, paragraph 5 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No.
8353.[40]
In People v. Larraaga,[41] this Court explained the concept of a special complex
crime, as follows:
A discussion on the nature of special complex crime is
imperative. Where the law provides a single penalty for two or more
component offenses, the resulting crime is called a special complex
crime. Some of the special complex crimes under the Revised Penal
Code are (1) robbery with homicide, (2) robbery with rape, (3)
kidnapping with serious physical injuries, (4) kidnapping with
murder or homicide, and (5) rape with homicide. In a special
complex crime, the prosecution must necessarily prove each of the
component offenses with the same precision that would be
necessary if they were made the subject of separate complaints. As
earlier mentioned, R.A. No. 7659 amended Article 267 of the Revised
Penal Code by adding thereto this provision: When the victim is killed
or dies as a consequence of the detention, or is raped, or is subjected to
torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be
imposed;[] and that this provision gives rise to a special complex
crime. In the cases at bar, particularly Criminal Case No. CBU-45303,
the Information specifically alleges that the victim Marijoy was raped
on the occasion and in connection with her detention and was killed
subsequent thereto and on the occasion thereof. Considering that the
prosecution was able to prove each of the component offenses,
appellants should be convicted of the special complex crime of
kidnapping and serious illegal detention with homicide and rape. x x
x[42] (Emphasis supplied.)
A special complex crime, or more properly, a composite crime, has its own definition and
special penalty in the Revised Penal Code, as amended. Justice Regalado, in his Separate
Opinion in the case of People v. Barros,[43] explained that composite crimes are neither of
the same legal basis as nor subject to the rules on complex crimes in Article 48 [of the
Revised Penal Code], since they do not consist of a single act giving rise to two or more
grave or less grave felonies [compound crimes] nor do they involve an offense being a
necessary means to commit another [complex crime proper]. However, just like the
regular complex crimes and the present case of aggravated illegal possession of
firearms, only a single penalty is imposed for each of such composite crimes although
composed of two or more offenses.[44]
Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides only a single penalty
for the composite acts of rape and the killing committed by reason or on the occasion
of the rape.
ART. 266-B. Penalties. Rape under paragraph 1 of the next
preceding article shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
Whenever the rape is committed with the use of a deadly
weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion
perpetua to death.
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has
become insane, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
When the rape is attempted and a homicide is committed by
reason or on the occasion thereof, the penalty shall be reclusion
perpetua to death.
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, homicide is
committed, the penalty shall be death.
x x x x (Emphasis supplied.)
Considering that the prosecution in this case was able to prove both the rape of AAA
and the killing of Jennifer both perpetrated by appellant, he is liable for rape with
homicide under the above provision. There is no doubt that appellant killed Jennifer to
prevent her from aiding AAA or calling for help once she is able to run away, and also
to silence her completely so she may not witness the rape of AAA, the original intent of
appellant. His carnal desire having been satiated, appellant purposely covered AAAs
body with grass, as he did earlier with Jennifers body, so that it may not be easily
noticed or seen by passersby. Appellant indeed thought that the savage blows he had
inflicted on AAA were enough to cause her death as with Jennifer. But AAA survived
and appellants barbaric deeds were soon enough discovered.
The facts established showed that the constitutive elements of rape with homicide
were consummated, and it is immaterial that the person killed in this case is someone
other than the woman victim of the rape. An analogy may be drawn from our rulings
in cases of robbery with homicide, where the component acts of homicide, physical
injuries and other offenses have been committed by reason or on the occasion of
robbery. In People v. De Leon,[45] we expounded on the special complex crime of
robbery with homicide, as follows:
In robbery with homicide, the original criminal design of the
malefactor is to commit robbery, with homicide perpetrated on the
occasion or by reason of the robbery. The intent to commit robbery
must precede the taking of human life. The homicide may take place
before, during or after the robbery. It is only the result obtained,
without reference or distinction as to the circumstances, causes or
modes or persons intervening in the commission of the crime that has
to be taken into consideration. There is no such felony of robbery with
homicide through reckless imprudence or simple negligence. The
constitutive elements of the crime, namely, robbery with homicide,
must be consummated.
It is immaterial that the death would supervene by mere
accident; or that the victim of homicide is other than the victim of
robbery, or that two or more persons are killed, or that aside from
the homicide, rape, intentional mutilation, or usurpation of authority,
is committed by reason or on the occasion of the crime. Likewise
immaterial is the fact that the victim of homicide is one of the robbers;
the felony would still be robbery with homicide. Once a homicide is
committed by or on the occasion of the robbery, the felony
committed is robbery with homicide. All the felonies committed by
reason of or on the occasion of the robbery are integrated into one
and indivisible felony of robbery with homicide. The word homicide
is used in its generic sense. Homicide, thus, includes murder, parricide,
and infanticide.[46] (Emphasis supplied.)
In the special complex crime of rape with homicide, the term homicide is to be
understood in its generic sense, and includes murder and slight physical injuries
committed by reason or on occasion of the rape.[47] Hence, even if any or all of the
circumstances (treachery, abuse of superior strength and evident premeditation)
alleged in the information have been duly established by the prosecution, the same
would not qualify the killing to murder and the crime committed by appellant is still
rape with homicide. As in the case of robbery with homicide, the aggravating
circumstance of treachery is to be considered as a generic aggravating circumstance
only. Thus we ruled in People v. Macabales[48]
Finally, appellants contend that the trial court erred in
concluding that the aggravating circumstance of treachery is present.
They aver that treachery applies to crimes against persons and not to
crimes against property. However, we find that the trial court in this
case correctly characterized treachery as a generic aggravating,
rather than qualifying, circumstance. Miguel was rendered helpless by
appellants in defending himself when his arms were held by two of the
attackers before he was stabbed with a knife by appellant Macabales,
as their other companions surrounded them. In People v. Salvatierra,
we ruled that when alevosia (treachery) obtains in the special complex
crime of robbery with homicide, such treachery is to be regarded as a
generic aggravating circumstance. Robbery with homicide is a
composite crime with its own definition and special penalty in the
Revised Penal Code. There is no special complex crime of robbery
with murder under the Revised Penal Code. Here, treachery forms
part of the circumstances proven concerning the actual commission
of the complex crime. Logically it could not qualify the homicide to
murder but, as generic aggravating circumstance, it helps
determine the penalty to be imposed.[49] (Emphasis supplied.)
The aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength is considered whenever
there is notorious inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor that is
plainly and obviously advantageous to the aggressor and purposely selected or taken
advantage of to facilitate the commission of the crime.[50] It is taken into account
whenever the aggressor purposely used excessive force that is out of proportion to the
means of defense available to the person attacked.[51]
In this case, as personally witnessed by AAA, appellant struck Jennifer in the head
with a lead pipe then stabbed her repeatedly until she was dead. Clearly, the manner
by which appellant had brutally slain Jennifer with a lethal weapon, by first hitting
her in the head with a lead pipe to render her defenseless and vulnerable before
stabbing her repeatedly, unmistakably showed that appellant intentionally used
excessive force out of proportion to the means of defense available to his unarmed
victim. As aptly observed by the appellate court:
It has long been established that an attack made by a man with a
deadly weapon upon an unarmed and defenseless woman constitutes
the circumstance of abuse of that superiority which his sex and the
weapon used in the act afforded him, and from which the woman was
unable to defend herself. Unlike in treachery, where the victim is not
given the opportunity to defend himself or repel the aggression, taking
advantage of superior strength does not mean that the victim was
completely defenseless. Abuse of superiority is determined by the
excess of the aggressors natural strength over that of the victim,
considering the momentary position of both and the employment of
means weakening the defense, although not annulling it. By
deliberately employing deadly weapons, an ice pick and a lead pipe,
[a]ccused-[a]ppellant clearly took advantage of the superiority which
his strength, sex and weapon gave him over his unarmed victim. The
accused-appellants sudden attack caught the victim off-guard
rendering her defenseless.[52]
Abuse of superior strength in this case therefore is merely a generic aggravating
circumstance to be considered in the imposition of the penalty. The penalty provided
in Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, is death. However, in view of
the passage on June 24, 2006 of R.A. No. 9346, entitled An Act Prohibiting the
Imposition of the Death Penalty in the Philippines the Court is mandated to impose on
the appellant the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole.[53]
The aggravating/qualifying circumstances of abuse of superior strength and use of
deadly weapon have greater relevance insofar as the civil aspect of this case is
concerned. While the trial court and CA were correct in holding that both the victim of
the killing (Jennifer) and the rape victim (AAA) are entitled to the award of
exemplary damages, the basis for such award needs further clarification.
Articles 2229 and 2230 of the Civil Code provide:
Art. 2229. Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by
way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to the
moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.
xxxx
Q Do you know a person by the name of [AAA]?
A Yes, sir.
xxxx
xxxx
It must be noted that, in the said cases, the Court used as basis
Article 2229, rather than Article 2230, to justify the award of
exemplary damages. Indeed, to borrow Justice Carpio Morales words
in her separate opinion in People of the Philippines v. Dante Gragasin y
Par, [t]he application of Article 2230 of the Civil Code strictissimi juris
in such cases, as in the present one, defeats the underlying public
policy behind the award of exemplary damagesto set a public example
or correction for the public good.[57] (Emphasis supplied.)
In this case, the brutal manner by which appellant carried out his lustful design
against his niece-in-law who never had an inkling that her own uncle would do any
harm to her and her friend, justified the award of exemplary damages. Appellants
sudden and fierce attack on AAA -- hitting her several times on the head with a lead
pipe before stabbing her face until she fell down, hurriedly lifting her bra and blouse
and pulling down her undergarments, raping her while she was in such a defenseless
position, covering her body with grasses and abandoning her to die in a grassy field --
was truly despicable and outrageous. Such vicious assault was made even more
reprehensible as it also victimized Jennifer, who sustained more stab wounds and
beatings, causing her violent death. Article 2229 of the Civil Code allows the award of
exemplary damages in order to deter the commission of similar acts and to allow the
courts to forestall behavior that would pose grave and deleterious consequences to
society.[58] In line with current jurisprudence, the amount of P30,000 each for AAA
and the heirs of Jennifer as exemplary damages was correctly awarded by the trial
court.
We also affirm the trial court and CA in ordering appellant to pay the heirs of
Jennifer Patawaran-Rosal the amounts of P50,000 as moral damages. In cases of
murder and homicide, the award of moral damages is mandatory, without need of
allegation and proof other than the death of the victim.[59] Anent the award of civil
indemnity, the same is increased to P75,000 to conform with recent
jurisprudence.[60] As to expenses incurred for the funeral and burial of Jennifer, the
CA correctly awarded her heirs the amount of P25,000 as actual damages, said
amount having been stipulated by the parties during the trial.
Lastly, we affirm the award of P50,000 to AAA as civil indemnity for the crime of rape,
as well as the award of P50,000 as moral damages. Civil indemnity ex delicto is
mandatory upon a finding of the fact of rape while moral damages are awarded upon
such finding without need of further proof, because it is assumed that a rape victim
has actually suffered moral injuries entitling the victim to such award.[61]
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The March 21,
2007 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00234 is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS. Accused-appellant Conrado Laog y Ramin is hereby found GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of Rape With Homicide under Article 266-B of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 8353, and is accordingly sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole.
Accused-appellant is hereby ordered to pay the heirs of Jennifer Patawaran-
Rosal P75,000 as civil indemnity ex delicto, P50,000 as moral damages, P25,000 as
actual damages and P30,000 as exemplary damages. He is further ordered to pay to
the victim AAA the sums of P50,000 as civil indemnity ex delicto, P50,000 as moral
damages and P30,000 as exemplary damages.
With costs against the accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Under review is the conviction of Edmundo Villaflores for rape with homicide
by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 128, in Caloocan City based on
circumstantial evidence. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the conviction with
modification on February 22, 2007.[1]
The victim was Marita,[2] a girl who was born on October 29, 1994 based on
her certificate of live birth.[3] When her very young life was snuffed out by
strangulation on July 2, 1999, she was only four years and eight months old.[4] She
had been playing at the rear of their residence in Bagong Silang, Caloocan City in the
morning of July 2, 1999 when Julia, her mother, first noticed her missing from
home.[5] By noontime, because Marita had not turned up, Julia called her husband
Manito at his workplace in Pasig City, and told him about Marita being missing.[6]
Manito rushed home and arrived there at about 2 pm,[7] and immediately he and
Julia went in search of their daughter until 11 pm, inquiring from house to house in
the vicinity. They did not find her.[8] At 6 am of the next day, Manito reported to the
police that Marita was missing.[9] In her desperation, Julia sought out a clairvoyant
(manghuhula) in an adjacent barangay, and the latter hinted that Marita might be
found only five houses away from their own. Following the clairvoyants direction, they
found Maritas lifeless body covered with a blue and yellow sack[10] inside the comfort
room of an abandoned house about five structures away from their own house.[11]
Her face was black and blue, and bloody.[12] She had been tortured and strangled till
death.
The ensuing police investigation led to two witnesses, Aldrin Bautista and Jovy
Solidum, who indicated that Villaflores might be the culprit who had raped and killed
Marita.[13] The police thus arrested Villaflores at around 5 pm of July 3, 1999 just as
he was alighting from a vehicle.[14]
On July 7, 1999, the City Prosecutor of Caloocan City filed in the RTC the
information charging Villaflores with rape with homicide committed as follows:[15]
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Arraigned on August 19, 1999, Villaflores pleaded not guilty to the crime
charged.[16]
Two (2) witnesses, Aldrin Bautista and Jovie Solidum, came forward
and narrated that at about 10:00 oclock in the morning of July 2,
1999, they saw Edmundo Villaflores, known in the neighborhood by his
Batman tag and a neighbor of the [victims family], leading Marita by
the hand (umakay sa bata). At about noon time they were at Batmans
house where they used shabu for a while. Both Aldrin and Jovie are
drug users. Aldrin sports a sputnik tattoo mark on his body while Jovie
belongs to the T.C.G. (through crusher gangster). While in Batmans
place, although he did not see Marita, Jovie presumed that Batman
was hiding the child at the back of the house. Jovie related that about
3:00 oclock in the afternoon of the same day, he heard cries of a child
as he passed by the house of Batman (Narinig ko pong umiiyak ang
batang babae at umuungol). At about 7:00 oclock in the evening, Jovie
saw again Batman carrying a yellow sack towards a vacant house. He
thought that the child must have been in the sack because it appeared
heavy. It was the sack that he saw earlier in the house of Batman.
Among the first to respond to the report that the dead body of a child
was found was SPO2 PROTACIO MAGTAJAS, investigator at Sub-
station 6 Bagong Silang, Caloocan City who was dispatched by Police
Chief Inspector Alfredo Corpuz. His OIC, SPO2 Arsenio Nacis called the
SOCO Team and on different vehicles they proceeded to Bagong Silang,
Phase 9 arriving there at about 2 o:clock in the afternoon of July 3,
1999. They saw the body of the child at the back portion of an
abandoned house where he himself recovered pieces of evidence such
as the nylon rope (Exhibit N) and the yellow sack inside the comfort
room. The child appeared black and blue, (kawawa yong bata wasak
ang mukha). He saw blood stains on her lips and when he removed the
sack covering her body, he also saw blood stains in her vagina. The
yellow sack that he was referring to when brought out in court had
already a greenish and fleshy color. The sack was no longer in the same
condition when recovered, saying, when asked by the Court: medyo buo
pa, hindi pa ho ganyang sira-sira. There was another sack, colored
blue, which was used to cover the face of the child while the yellow
sack was at the back of the victim. He forgot about the blue sack when
SOCO Team arrived because they were the ones who brought the body
to the funeral parlor. He had already interviewed some person when
the SOCO Team arrived composed of Inspector Abraham Pelotin, their
team leader, and 2 other members. He was the one who took the
statement of the wife of Edmundo Villaflores, Erlinda, and turned over
the pieces of evidence to Police Officer SPO2 Arsenio Nacis who placed
a tag to mark the items. When the SOCO Team arrived, a separate
investigation was conducted by Inspector Pelotin.
Exhibit V and the second sketch dated July 3, 1999 with SOCO report
047-99 marked as Exhibit W.
POSTMORTEM FINDINGS:
There were multiple deep laceration at the hymen and the vestibule
was abraded and markedly congested while the posterior fourchette
was likewise lacerated and markedly congested, too. It could have been
caused by an insertion of blunt object like a human penis. The cause of
death was asphyxia by strangulation, in laymans term, sinakal sa
pamamagitan ng tali. The external injuries could have been caused by
contact with a blunt object like a piece of wood. The abrasion could
have also been caused by a hard and rough surface. He prepared the
Medico Legal Report No. M-250-99 of the victim, Marita _____ marked
as Exhibit H and sub-markings. He issued the death certificate marked
as Exhibit E. The anatomical sketch representing the body of the
victim was marked as Exhibit I and sub-markings. The sketch of the
head of the victim was marked Exhibit J. The injuries on the head
could have been caused by hard and blunt object while other injuries
were caused by coming in contact with a hard or rough surface. There
were also punctured wounds which could have been caused by a
barbecue stick or anything pointed. The ligature mark was congested
and depressed.
On re-direct he said that Aldrin and Jovie often went in and out of his
house. His bathroom is in front of his house.
SO ORDERED.
SO ORDERED.
Issues
Villaflores now reiterates that the RTC and the CA gravely erred in finding him
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape with homicide because the State did not
discharge its burden to prove beyond reasonable doubt every fact and circumstance
constituting the crime charged.
In contrast, the Office of the Solicitor General counters that the guilt of
Villaflores for rape with homicide was established beyond reasonable doubt through
circumstantial evidence.
Ruling
We sustain Villaflores conviction.
I
Nature of rape with homicide
as a composite crime, explained
The felony of rape with homicide is a composite crime. A composite crime, also
known as a special complex crime, is composed of two or more crimes that the law
treats as a single indivisible and unique offense for being the product of a single
criminal impulse. It is a specific crime with a specific penalty provided by law, and
differs from a compound or complex crime under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code,
which states:
There are distinctions between a composite crime, on the one hand, and a
complex or compound crime under Article 48, supra, on the other hand. In a
composite crime, the composition of the offenses is fixed by law; in a complex or
compound crime, the combination of the offenses is not specified but generalized, that
is, grave and/or less grave, or one offense being the necessary means to commit the
other. For a composite crime, the penalty for the specified combination of crimes is
specific; for a complex or compound crime, the penalty is that corresponding to the
most serious offense, to be imposed in the maximum period. A light felony that
accompanies a composite crime is absorbed; a light felony that accompanies the
commission of a complex or compound crime may be the subject of a separate
information.
The law on rape quoted herein thus defines and sets forth the composite
crimes of attempted rape with homicide and rape with homicide. In both composite
crimes, the homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion of rape. As can be
noted, each of said composite crimes is punished with a single penalty, the former with
reclusion perpetua to death, and the latter with death.
The phrases by reason of the rape and on the occasion of the rape are crucial in
determining whether the crime is a composite crime or a complex or compound crime.
The phrase by reason of the rape obviously conveys the notion that the killing is due to
the rape, the offense the offender originally designed to commit. The victim of the rape
is also the victim of the killing. The indivisibility of the homicide and the rape
(attempted or consummated) is clear and admits of no doubt. In contrast, the import
of the phrase on the occasion of the rape may not be as easy to determine. To
understand what homicide may be covered by the phrase on the occasion of the rape, a
resort to the meaning the framers of the law intended to convey thereby is helpful.
Indeed, during the floor deliberations of the Senate on Republic Act No. 8353, the
legislative intent on the import of the phrase on the occasion of the rape to refer to a
killing that occurs immediately before or after, or during the commission itself of the
attempted or consummated rape, where the victim of the homicide may be a person
other than the rape victim herself for as long as the killing is linked to the rape,
became evident, viz:
Senator Enrile. x x x
I would like to find out, first of all, Mr. President, what is the
meaning of the phrase appearing in line 24, or on the occasion?
So, the instance which was brought up by the good senator from
Cagayan where, let us say, the offender is fleeing the place or is
apprehended by the police and he commits homicide, I think would be
examples where the phrase on the occasion thereof would apply. But
the principal intent, Mr. President, is rape.[19]
II
The State discharged its burden of
proving the rape with homicide
beyond reasonable doubt
As with all criminal prosecutions, the State carried the burden of proving all
the elements of rape and homicide beyond reasonable doubt in order to warrant the
conviction of Villaflores for the rape with homicide charged in the information.[20]
The State must thus prove the concurrence of the following facts, namely: (a) that
Villaflores had carnal knowledge of Marita; (b) that he consummated the carnal
knowledge without the consent of Marita; and (c) that he killed Marita by reason of
the rape.
Under Article 266-A, supra, rape is always committed when the accused has
carnal knowledge of a female under 12 years of age. The crime is commonly called
statutory rape, because a female of that age is deemed incapable of giving consent to
the carnal knowledge. Maritas Certificate of Live Birth (Exhibit K) disclosed that she
was born on October 29, 1994, indicating her age to be only four years and eight
months at the time of the commission of the crime on July 2, 1999. As such, carnal
knowledge of her by Villaflores would constitute statutory rape.
We have often conceded the difficulty of proving the commission of rape when
only the victim is left to testify on the circumstances of its commission. The difficulty
heightens and complicates when the crime is rape with homicide, because there may
usually be no living witnesses if the rape victim is herself killed. Yet, the situation is
not always hopeless for the State, for the Rules of Court also allows circumstantial
evidence to establish the commission of the crime as well as the identity of the
culprit.[21] Direct evidence proves a fact in issue directly without any reasoning or
inferences being drawn on the part of the factfinder; in contrast, circumstantial
evidence indirectly proves a fact in issue, such that the factfinder must draw an
inference or reason from circumstantial evidence.[22] To be clear, then,
circumstantial evidence may be resorted to when to insist on direct testimony would
ultimately lead to setting a felon free.[23]
The Rules of Court makes no distinction between direct evidence of a fact and
evidence of circumstances from which the existence of a fact may be inferred; hence,
no greater degree of certainty is required when the evidence is circumstantial than
when it is direct. In either case, the trier of fact must be convinced beyond a
reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused.[24] Nor has the quantity of
circumstances sufficient to convict an accused been fixed as to be reduced into some
definite standard to be followed in every instance. Thus, the Court said in People v.
Modesto:[25]
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven;
and
In resolving to convict Villaflores, both the RTC and the CA considered several
circumstances, which when appreciated together and not piece by piece, according to
the CA,[27] were seen as strands which create a pattern when interwoven, and
formed an unbroken chain that led to the reasonable conclusion that Villaflores, to the
exclusion of all others, was guilty of rape with homicide.
We note that the RTC and the CA disbelieved the exculpating testimony of
Borcillo. They justifiably did so. For one, after he stated during direct examination that
Villaflores was only his neighbor,[39] it soon came to be revealed during his cross-
examination that he was really a son of Villaflores own sister.[40] Borcillo might have
concealed their close blood relationship to bolster the credibility of his testimony
favoring his uncle, but we cannot tolerate his blatant attempt to mislead the courts
about a fact relevant to the correct adjudication of guilt or innocence. Borcillo
deserved no credence as a witness. Also, Borcillos implicating Solidum and Bautista in
the crime, and exculpating his uncle were justly met with skepticism. Had Borcillos
incrimination of Solidum and Bautista been factually true, Villaflores could have easily
validated his alibi of having run an errand for an aunt about a kilometer away from
the place of the crime on that morning of July 2, 1999. Yet, the alibi could not stand,
both because the alleged aunt did not even come forward to substantiate the alibi, and
because the Defense did not demonstrate the physical impossibility for Villaflores to be
at the place where the crime was committed at the time it was committed.
2006 of Republic Act No. 9346.[41] Nonetheless, we have also to specify in the
judgment that Villaflores shall not be eligible for parole, considering that Section 3 of
Republic Act No. 9346 expressly holds persons whose sentences will be reduced to
reclusion perpetua by reason of this Act not eligible for parole under Act No. 4103
(Indeterminate Sentence Law), as amended.
Pursuant to the Civil Code, exemplary damages may be imposed in a criminal case as
part of the civil liability when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating
circumstances.[42] The Civil Code permits such award by way of example or
correction for the public good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or
compensatory damages.[43] Granting exemplary damages is not dependent on
whether the aggravating circumstance is actually appreciated or not to increase the
penalty. As such, the Court recognizes the entitlement of the heirs of Marita to
exemplary damages as a way of correction for the public good. For the purpose,
SO ORDERED.
DECISION
This is an Appeal1 from the Decision2 of the Court of Appeals in CAG .R. CR No. 32275
dated August 11, 2010 affirming the conviction of accused-appellant Leonardo
Cataytay y Silvano for the crime of rape.
Accused-appellant Cataytay was charged of said crime m an Information dated
September 9, 2003:
That on or about the 7th day of September 2003, in the City of Mandaluyong,
Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, with lewd designs[,] and by means of force and intimidation, did, then and
there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously have carnal knowledge [of AAA],3 19 years
of age but with a mental age of a 5 year old, hence, a retardate, or demented, which is
known to accused at the time of the commission of the offense, against her will and
consent and to her damage and prejudice.4
BBB (AAAs mother) testified that she knew accused-appellant Cataytay as her
neighbor in their compound in Mandaluyong City. Accusedappellant was a shoe
repairman who had a shop six houses away from BBBs house.5
On September 7, 2003, at around 6:30 p.m., BBB left AAA in their house to look for
BBBs youngest daughter. Thirty minutes later, when she reached the bridge near
Block 37, her neighbor, Lito, told her that there was a problem, and brought her to the
barangay outpost. AAA and the accused appellant were already at the outpost. Lito
told the persons at the outpost that she was the mother of the victim. When BBB saw
AAA, the latter told her, "Mommy, ni-rape po ako." BBB asked her who raped her. AAA
responded by pointing to accused-appellant. During the interviews made by the
barangay officials, AAA narrated howshe was raped by accused appellant, which
ended when a certain "Mimi" knocked at the door. When accused-appellant answered
the knock, Mimi told the former that she will shout if he does not leave the house. AAA
went out of the house and sought help from their neighbors. One of their neighbors,
Amelita Morante, called the barangayofficials at the outpost.6
On cross-examination, BBB confirmed that AAA was the victim in a rape case in 1999
against a certain Norberto Lerit. BBB admitted that she did not personally witness the
alleged rape committed by the accused appellant.9
When AAA appeared as the second witness for the prosecution, the prosecution
manifested that by merely looking at her, it was apparent that she was mentally
retardate.10 AAA, who was crying while being asked questions, testified that she was
raped by accused-appellant by inserting his penis into her, despite her protestations.
After the deed, she was given money by accused-appellant. She knew the accused-
appellant before the incident as a shoe repairman.11
DSWD Social Worker Arlene Gampal testified that she referred AAA to the National
Center for Mental Health (NCMH) for psychological examination. She also conducted a
Social Case Study upon AAA in relation to the incident of sexual abuse at the hands of
the accused.12 NCMH Psychologist Susan Sabado was presented as a prosecution
witness, but her testimony was dispensed with when the defense agreed to a
stipulation regarding her expertise and that the tests conducted on AAA affirmed that
the latter had a mental capacity of a seven-year-old child.13
Police Chief Inspector (PC/Insp.) Bonnie Chua, the medico-legal officer who examined
AAA on September 8, 2003 was likewise presented as a prosecution witness. The
defense agreedto a stipulation that the findings of the examination were consistent
with recent sexual intercourse.14
For the defense, accused-appellant testified that on September 7, 2003, at around 7:00
p.m., he was in his house together with his brother, feeding his four-year-old daughter.
Hethen went out and proceeded to a videokebar, which was around 20 meters from his
house.15 He stayed at the videoke bar for less than 15 minutes, as barangay officers
suddenly arrived and arrested him. Upon asking why he was being arrested, the
officers told him that he was the suspect in the rape of AAA. He was brought to the
Barangay Hall, where he denied the accusations against him. He estimated that the
house of BBB was more or less 50 meters away from his house,16 and that it would
take more orless a one minute walk from the videokebar to the house of AAA.17
Accused-appellant admitted that by merely looking at AAA, he could tell that she has a
mental disability.18
Accused-appellants brother, Jose Fresco Cataytay (Jose), testified that at 6:30 p.m. of
September 7, 2003,accused-appellant was inside their house feeding his daughter. At
around 7:00 p.m., accused-appellant told Jose that he will go to the videoke bar, which
was around 30 meters away from their house. Accused-appellant stayed in the videoke
bar for 5 to 10 minutes, then went back to their house and watched television. Accused
appellant was arrested that night within the vicinity of their house by the barangay
tanods. He estimated that AAAs house is 20 to 30 meters away from the videokebar,
and that it would take less than five minutes to reach the house of AAA from the
videokebar.19
Alicia Panaguitol (Alicia), a neighbor of AAA and accused appellant, testified that she
lives two meters away from AAAs house and 60 meters away from that of accused-
appellant. She was inside her house at around 7:00 p.m. of September 7, 2003, during
which time she heard AAA shouting that she was raped. She asked AAA who raped
her. AAA replied "Pilay," apparently referring to their neighbor who was called Jun
Pilay. Alicia saw Jun Pilay run from AAAs house towards a dark area.20
On February 5, 2009, the RTC rendered its Judgment finding accused appellant guilty
as charged, and disposing of the case as follows:
The case was elevated to the Court of Appeals, where it was docketed as CA-G.R. CR
No. 32275. On August 11, 2010, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the instant appeal is DENIED. The decision
appealed from is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS that an additional award of
P75,000.00 as civil indemnity is granted to the victim and the award of exemplary
damages of P75,000.00 is reduced to P30,000.00. The penalty of imprisonment to be
served is simply reclusion perpetua.22
Hence, this appeal, where accused-appellant Cataytay adopted his Appellants Brief
with the Court of Appeals, which contained the following assignment of errors:
II
In his appellants brief, accused-appellant claims that BBBs testimony concerning the
details of the commission of the rape as narrated by AAA is hearsay and therefore has
no probative value. Accused-appellant also points out that the Psychological
Evaluation Report dated May 25, 1999 and Psychological Report dated June 29, 2009
illustrate that AAA can be easily influenced.
At the outset, we agree with accused-appellant that the details concerning the manner
of the commission of the rape, which was merely narrated by AAA at the barangay
outpost, is hearsay and cannot be considered by this Court. A witness can testify only
on the facts that she knows of his own personal knowledge, or more precisely, those
which are derived from her own perception.24 A witness may not testify on what she
merely learned, read or heard from others because such testimony is considered
hearsay and may not be received as proof of the truth of what she has learned, read or
heard.25
Notwithstanding the inadmissibility ofthe details of the rape which BBB merely heard
from AAAs narration,we nevertheless find no reason to disturb the findings of fact of
the trial court. Despite lacking certain details concerning the manner in which AAA
was allegedly raped, the trial court, taking into consideration the mental incapacity of
AAA and qualifying her to be a child witness,26 found her testimony to be credible and
convincing:
Q- Uulitin ko sa iyo yung unang tinanong ko sayo ha, bakit ka nandito sa office ni
Judge, para ano?
A - Para magsumbong.
A - Leonardo Cataytay.
INTERPRETER:
COURT:
INTERPRETER:
Witness pointed to the male person seated in the first row of the gallery, wearing white
t-shirt, who when asked to identify himself, answered to the name of LEONARDO
CATAYTAY Y SILVANO.
PROS. LAZARO:
A- Ni-rape po ako.
Q- Anong sinabi mo sa kanya nung ni-rape ka niya, anong sinabi mo kay Leonardo?
A- Ayaw ko na po.
A- Wala po.
A- Opo.
A- Pera po.
A- Hindi po.27
AAAs mental condition may have prevented her from delving into the specifics of the
assault in her testimony almost three years later, unlike the way she narrated the
same when she was asked at the barangay outpost merely minutes after the incident.
However, as we have ruled in a litany of cases, when a woman, more so if she isa
minor, says she has been raped, she says, in effect, all that is necessary toprove that
rape was committed. Youth and, as is more applicablein the case at bar, immaturity
are generally badges of truth.28 Furthermore, the report of PC/Insp. Chua that the
findings of the physical examination were consistent with recent sexual intercourse,
provide additional corroboration to the testimonies of AAA and BBB. It should be
noted that this report was stipulated upon by the prosecution and the defense.
We have pronounced time and again that both denial and alibi are inherently weak
defenses which cannot prevail over the positive and credible testimony of the
prosecution witness thatthe accused committed the crime. Thus, as between a
categorical testimony which has a ring of truth on one hand, and a mere denial and
alibi on the other, the former is generally held to prevail.29 For the defense of alibi to
prosper, it must be sufficiently convincing as to preclude any doubt onthe physical
impossibility of the presence of the accused at the locus criminisor its immediate
vicinity at the time of the incident.30 In the case at bar, accused-appellant and his
brother, second defense witness Jose, claim thatthe former was taking care of his
daughter in his house at around 7:00 p.m. of September 7, 2003. He then went out and
proceeded to a videokebar, which was merely 20 meters away from his house.
Accused-appellant and his brother admitted that their house was merely 50 meters
away, or around a one-minute walk, from the house of AAA, where the alleged incident
occurred. Accused-appellant was therefore clearly in the immediate vicinity of the
locus criminisat the time of the commission of the crime, and thus accused-appellants
defense of alibi must fail.1wphi1
Other than alibi and denial, accused-appellant presented the testimony of Alicia, a
neighbor of AAA and accused-appellant, to prove that another person raped AAA.
However, the record is clear that AAA positively identified accused-appellant asthe
culprit both at the barangay outpost minutes after the incident, and in open court. It is
furthermore axiomatic that when it comes to evaluating the credibility of the
testimonies of the witnesses, great respect is accorded to the findings of the trial judge
who is in a better position to observe the demeanor, facial expression, and manner of
testifying of witnesses, and to decide who among them is telling the truth.31 The trial
court, which was able to carefully observe the testimony of Alicia, was not adequately
convinced by her allegations.
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even
though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present. (Emphasis supplied)
In the case at bar, AAA was clinically diagnosed to have mental retardation with the
mental capacity of a seven-year old child.34 The prosecution and the defense agreed
tostipulate on the conclusion of the psychologist that the "mental age of the victim
whose chronological age at the time of the commission of the offense is nineteen (19)
years old x x x is that of a seven (7) year old child."35 Accused-appellant is therefore
criminally liable for rape under paragraph 1(b) of Article 266-A of the Revised Penal
Code. The appropriate penalty is provided for by Article 266-B, which relevantly
provides:
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of
the following aggravating/qualifying circumstances:
xxxx
10. When the offender knew of the mental disability, emotional disorder and/or
physical handicap of the offended party at the time of the commission of the crime.
As regards accused-appellants civil liability, the RTC ordered him to pay AAA in the
amount of P75,000.00 asmoral damages and P75,000.00 as exemplary damages. The
Court of Appeals modified the trial courts decision by granting the additional award of
P75,000.00 as civil indemnity and reducing the award of exemplary damages to
P30,000.00. In accordance, however, toPeople v. Lumaho,38 where the penalty for the
crime committed is death which cannot be imposed because of Republic Act No. 9346,
we increase the amounts of indemnity and damages to be imposed as follows:
P100,000.00 as civil indemnity; P100,000.00 as moral damages; and P100,000.00 as
exemplary damages. In addition, we impose 6% interest per annum from finality of
judgment until fully paid.39
WHEREFORE, the present appeal is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CRNo. 32275 dated August 11, 2010 is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION increasing the amounts of indemnity and damages to be imposed as
follows: P100,000.00 as civil indemnity; P100,000.00 as moral damages; and
P100,000.00 as exemplary damages. All amounts are furthermore subject to interest
at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of this judgment until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
Appellant Jerry Obogne was charged with the crime of rape in an Information that
reads as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
That on or about the 29th day of July 2002, in the afternoon, in barangay Ogbong,
municipality of Viga, province of Catanduanes, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of
the Honorable Court, the said accused by means of force and intimidation, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously x x x succeeded in having carnal knowledge of AAA,1 a
12year old mentally retarded person, to the damage and prejudice of the said AAA.2
When arraigned on December 17, 2004, appellant entered a plea of not guilty.3 On
March 13, 2008, the Regional Trial Court of Virac, Catanduanes, Branch 43, rendered
a Judgment,4viz:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, judgment is, hereby, rendered finding Jerry Obogne guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of simple rape committed against AAA and, hereby,
sentences him to suffer a penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify AAA the
amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and
P25,000.00 as exemplary damages; and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.5
The trial court did not consider AAAs mental retardation as a qualifying
circumstance considering that the Information failed to allege that appellant knew of
AAAs mental disability.
Aggrieved, appellant appealed to the Court of Appeals.6 In its Decision7 of March 28,
2011, the appellate court affirmed the trial courts ruling with modifications,
viz:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Judgment, dated March 13, 2008, of the
Regional Trial Court of Virac, Catanduanes, Branch 34,8 in Criminal Case No. 3303, is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that accusedappellant is further ordered to pay
AAA the additional amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity apart from the award of
P50,000.00 as moral damages and of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.9
In a Resolution10 dated February 15, 2012, we required both parties to file their
Supplemental Briefs. However, they opted to adopt the briefs they filed before the
Court of Appeals as their Supplemental Briefs.11
Appellant argues that the testimony of AAA deserves no credence because she was
incapable of intelligently making known her perception to others by reason of her
mental disability.
Sec. 20. Witnesses; their qualifications. Except as provided in the next succeeding
section, all persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their
perception to others, may be witnesses.
xxxx
(a) Those whose mental condition, at the time of their production for examination, is
such that they are incapable of intelligently making known their perception to others;
(b) Children whose mental maturity is such as to render them incapable of perceiving
the facts respecting which they are examined and of relating them truthfully.
In this case, AAA is totally qualified to take the witness stand notwithstanding her
mental condition. As correctly observed by the trial
court:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
When AAA was presented on November 14, 2006, defense counsel manifested his
objection and called the Courts attention to Rule 130, Section 21 of the Rules of Court,
which lists down persons who cannot be witnesses; i.e. those whose mental condition,
at the time of their production for examination, is such that they are incapable of
intelligently making known their perception to others x x x.
During the continuation of AAAs testimony x x x she was able to recall what
[appellant] did to her x x x.
AAA recalled that while she was playing, [appellant] saw her and asked her to go
with him because he would give her a sugar cane. [Appellant] brought AAA to his
house and while inside, he removed her panty, and then inserted his penis into her
vagina and he got the knife and then he took a sugar cane and then he gave it to her
and then she went home.
xxxx
This Court finds AAA a very credible witness, even in her mental
condition. Contrary to defense counsels objection that AAA was not capable of
intelligently making known her perception to others, AAA managed to recount the
ordeal she had gone through in the hands of the accused, though in a soft voice and
halting manner x x x.
AAAs simple account of her ordeal clearly reflects sincerity and truthfulness.
In the same vein, the appellate court found AAA qualified to take the witness stand,
viz:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Our own evaluation of the records reveals that AAA was shown to be able to
perceive, to make known her perception to others and to remember traumatic
incidents. Her narration of the incident of rape given in the following manner is
worthy of note:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
xxxx
Appellants assertion that the trial court and the appellate court should have
considered his alibi must likewise fail. For alibi to prosper, it must not only be shown
that appellant was at another place at the time of the commission of the crime but that
it was also impossible for him to be present at the crime scene. In this case, appellant
attempted to show that he was at barangay Ananong at the time of the rape
incident. However, as found by the trial court, the distance between barangay
Ananong and barangay Ogbong is only four kilometers and could be traversed in one
hour or even less.14
Finally, the trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly found appellant guilty of
simple rape and properly imposed upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua
pursuant to Article 266B, par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code. The trial court correctly
ruled that AAAs mental disability could not be considered as a qualifying
circumstance because the Information failed to allege that appellant knew of such
mental condition at the time of the commission of the crime. As held in People v.
Limio:15
By itself, the fact that the offended party in a rape case is a mental retardate does not
call for the imposition of the death penalty, unless knowledge by the offender of such
mental disability is specifically alleged and adequately proved by the prosecution.
For the AntiRape Law of 1997, now embodied in Article 266B of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC) expressly provides that the death penalty shall also be imposed if the
crime of rape is committed with the qualifying circumstance of (10) when the
offender knew of the mental disability, emotional disorder and/or physical handicap of
the offended party at the time of the commission of the crime. Said knowledge x x x
qualifies rape as a heinous offense. Absent said circumstance, which must be proved
by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt, the conviction of appellant for qualified
rape under Art. 266B (10), RPC, could not be sustained, although the offender may
be held liable for simple rape and sentenced to reclusion perpetua.16
xxxx
[T]he mere fact that the rape victim is a mental retardate does not automatically
merit the imposition of the death penalty. Under Article 266B (10) of the Revised
Penal Code, knowledge by the offender of the mental disability, emotional disorder, or
physical handicap at the time of the commission of the rape is the qualifying
circumstance that sanctions the imposition of the death penalty. As such this
circumstance must be formally alleged in the information and duly proved by the
prosecution.
Rule 110 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure requires both qualifying and
aggravating circumstances to be alleged with specificity in the information. x x x But
in the absence of a specific or particular allegation in the information that the
appellant knew of her mental disability or retardation, as well as lack of adequate
proof that appellant knew of this fact, Article 266B (10), RPC, could not be properly
applied x x x
Hence, the appellant can only be convicted of simple rape, as defined under Article
266A of the [Revised] Penal Code, for which the imposable penalty is reclusion
perpetua.17
However, it must be mentioned that appellant is not eligible for parole pursuant to
Section 318 of Republic Act No. 9346.19
The awards of P50,000.00 as moral damages and P50,000.00 as civil indemnity are
likewise proper. However, the award of exemplary damages must be increased to
P30,000.00 in line with prevailing jurisprudence.20 Also, interest at the rate of 6% per
annum shall be imposed from date of finality of this judgment until fully paid.
WHEREFORE, the March 28, 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CR
H.C. No. 03270 finding appellant Jerry Obogne guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of simple rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua
and to pay AAA civil indemnity of P50,000.00 and moral damages of P50,000.00 is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS that appellant is not eligible for parole; the
amount of exemplary damages is increased to P30,000.00; and all damages awarded
shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum from date of finality of this judgment
until fully paid.
SO ORDERED
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Ne!
Sorry Ne. Patawarin mo ko. Dala lang ng kalasingan kaya ko nagawa ang
ganung bagay. Sana po wala ng ibang makaalam nito lalu na si Ate Cindy
mo. Ayokong masira na naman ang pamilya ko at mga buhay natin. Paki tapon
muna to pag tapos mong basahin.5cralawlawlibrary
At around 5:00 in the afternoon of that same date, AAA related to appellants
wife the rape incident.6 And on 1 June 2009, AAA, accompanied by her father,
reported the incident to the police and she executed a sworn statement
detailing the rape.7cralawred
Appellant admitted that AAA is his sister but he proffered the defense of alibi
and claimed that he was staying in Alfonso, Cavite on 14 May 2009 and only
went back to his house in Dasmarias on 26 May 2009. Appellant vehemently
denied the accusation against him and speculated that AAA resented him
because he was strict with his sister. Appellant also denied writing the apology
letter and presented his specimen handwriting in court.8cralawred
After evaluating the evidence, the trial court found appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and meted out the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. The dispositive portion of the decision
reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused MICHAEL JOSON y ROGANDO guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape as defined in Article 266-A
paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Republic Act No. 7610, and
hereby sentences the accused to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and
the said accused is hereby ordered to indemnify the victim by way of moral
damages in the amount of Php50,000.00, civil indemnity ex-delicto in the
amount of Php50,000.00 and exemplary damages in the amount of
Php25,000.00.9cralawlawlibrary
The trial court found credible the testimony of AAA. It noted that appellant
even wrote to the victim that he was sorry for what he has done. The trial court
considered the letter as admission against appellants interest.
In his Appeal Brief, appellant maintains that the prosecution failed to prove all
the elements of rape as defined under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code,
particularly the elements of force, threat or intimidation. Appellant argues that
AAA did not allege that she was threatened by appellant with the use of any
firearm or any bladed weapon nor did appellant say anything to threaten or
intimidate her. With respect to moral ascendancy, appellant contends that the
Court in a recent case did not consider a brother as one of those close kin who
has moral ascendancy over a victim that would substitute for force and
intimidation. Appellant further points out that there was no showing of any
resistance on the part of AAA to his alleged sexual advances.
For a charge of rape under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, the prosecution must prove that: (1) the offender had carnal
knowledge of a woman; and (2) he accomplished this act through force, threat
or intimidation, when she was deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or
when she was under 12 years of age or was demented.14cralawred
AAA gave a complete account of her ordeal in the hands of her own brother, to
wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Q: Do you know one Michael Joson?
A: Opo.
Q: Why do you know him?
A: He is my brother.
Q: Is he inside the courtroom?
A: Opo.
Q: Please point to him. (Witness points to a man wearing a yellow tshirt,
who when asked what his name is, answered Michael Joson.)
Q: On May 14, 2009, around 1:00 oclock in the afternoon, where were you?
A: Nasa bahay po.
Q: What were you doing in your house?
A: Tulog po.
Q: What time did you wake up?
A: Sa tingin ko po mga 1:00 oclock.
Q: Will you please tell this Honorable Court the reason why you woke up
early?
A: Hinuhubaran po niya ako.
Q: Who are you referring to?
A: Ng kapatid ko.
Q: He was undressing you? So what did you do while he was undressing you,
while you were lying or sleeping? Thats why you were awakened?
A: Opo.
Q: So what happened next when you felt that he was undressing you?
A: Pumalag po ako, kasi hinihigpitan po niya ako sa braso ko.
Q: So what else did you do?
A: Sabi po niya kasi, wag daw po ako maingay.
Q: Who was your companion in the house, aside from your brother?
Who else was there in the house?
A: Wala po.
Q: Where were they?
A: Yung asawa niya po, umuwi sa kanila.
Q: What about your parents, where were they?
A: Yung tatay ko po, nagtatrabaho.
Q: Your mother?
A: Patay na po.
Q: What happened next when you were told not to shout?
A: Hinubaran niya po yung ibaba ko, tapos pumatong po siya sa ibabaw ko
tapos pinaghahalikan niya ko.
Q: Was he able to undress you?
A: Opo.
Q: Totally?
A: Opo.
Q: Thereafter, what did you do?
A: Pinaghahalikan niya po ako.
Q: What were you doing?
A: Umiiyak lang po ako.
Q: What about the accused, what did he do to you?
A: Pumatong po siya sa ibabaw ko.
Q: He went on top of you? Thereafter what did the accused do next?
A: Pilit niya pong ipinapasok ang ari niya sa ari ko.
Q: Was he able to insert his penis?
A: Opo.
Q: For how long?
A: Matagal po.
Q: How did you feel when his organ was inside your organ?
A: Masakit po.
Q: And what (sic) you trying to do while his organ was inside?
A: Umiiyak lang po ako.
Q: After that, what happened next?
A: Pinaghahalikan niya pa rin po ako, tapos tumayo po siya sandali tapos
humiga po uli siya. Natulog po.
Q: What about you, you went to sleep also?
A: Hindi po, umiiyak lang po ako.
Q: The following day, in the morning, were you not able to sleep after that
incident?
A: Hindi po.
Q: What did you do?
A: Doon lang po, umiiyak lang po.
Q: What about the accused?
A: Doon lang din po siya.
Q: Beside you?
A: Opo.
Q: And what happened next, at 6:00 oclock in the morning or 7:00 oclock?
A: May iniwan po siyang sulat.
Q: Where did he go, if you know?
A: Sa trabaho po.
Q: What was the letter all about?
A: Humihingi po siya ng sorry.15
cralawlawlibrary
Her testimony has established all the elements of rape required under Article
266-A of the Revised Penal Code. First, appellant had carnal knowledge of the
victim. AAA positively identified her own brother as the assailant. She was
likewise unwavering in her narration that appellant inserted his penis into her
vagina. Second, appellant employed threat, force and intimidation to satisfy his
lust. At this juncture, we quote with approval the ruling of the Court of Appeals
on this point:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The Supreme Court has, time and again, ruled that the force or violence that is
required in rape cases is relative; when applied, it need not be overpowering or
irresistible. That it enables the offender to consummate his purpose is enough.
The parties relative age, size and strength should be taken into account in
evaluating the existence of the element of force in the crime of rape. The degree
of force which may not suffice when the victim is an adult may be more than
enough if employed against a person of tender age.
xxxx
Besides, physical resistance is not the sole test to determine whether a woman
voluntarily succumbed to the lust of an accused. Rape victims show no uniform
reaction. Some may offer strong resistance while others may be too intimidated
to offer any resistance at all. After all, resistance is not an element of rape and
its absence does not denigrate AAAs claim that the accused-appellant
consummated his bestial act.16cralawlawlibrary
The fact remains that Myra positively testified in court that her brother
sexually molested her in the morning of February 21, 1996. The accused-
appellant was her older brother who had definitely moral ascendancy over
her. He, being the eldest had definitely moral ascendancy over her. He, being
the eldest among the children since both of their parents were dead, the
accused-appellant stood as guardian of the siblings. Thus, when the
complainant was roused from her sleep to accompany the accused-appellant to
buy bread, the complainant obediently followed him. To the accused-appellant,
this was highly improbable that the complainant would entertain his plea to go
out with him at such an unholy hour or even allegedly knowing fully well that
the latter had taken shabu and liquor. There is nothing incredible with the
complainants story. Notwithstanding the time or the physical condition of her
brother, Myra certainly did not expect that he had other ill motives against her.
It certainly is not normal for a brother to take out his lust on his sister. Myra
also testified that she did not resist his advances for fear of her life as her
brother had two (2) fan knives poking at her as she was being raped. More
importantly, the moral ascendancy and influence the accused-appellant has
over the complainant sufficiently substitute for the force and intimidation
required in rape.18cralawlawlibrary
Moreover, the RTC, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals found AAAs testimony
credible. The trial court, having the opportunity to observe the witnesses and
their demeanor during the trial, can best assess the credibility of the witnesses
and their testimonies. Thus, the trial courts findings are accorded great
respect unless the trial court has overlooked or misconstrued some substantial
facts, which if considered might affect the result of the case.19cralawred
With respect to appellants defense of denial and alibi, it is an oft- repeated rule
that positive identification where categorical and consistent and without any
showing of ill-motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter
prevails over a denial which, if not substantiated by clear and convincing
evidence is negative and self-serving evidence undeserving of weight in
law. They cannot be given greater evidentiary value over the testimony of
credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters.20cralawred
All damages awarded shall earn legal interest at the rate of 6% per annum from
the date of finality of judgment until fully paid.22cralawred
cralawlawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the Court of Appeals' decision dated 31 August 2012 finding
appellant Michael Joson y Rogando guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape and
sentencing him to reclusion perpetua is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
The civil indemnity awarded is increased to P100,000.00; moral damages to
P100,000.00; and the exemplary damages to P100,000.00. The award of
damages shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of
finality of the judgment until fully paid.
SO ORDERED
DECISION
Before this Court is the appeal of the Decision dated April 29, 2009 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G,R. CR.-H. C. No. 00361-MIN,1 which affirmed the Consolidated
Decision2 dated December 23, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 7,
Tubod, Lanao del Norte in Criminal Case Nos. 118-07-2005 and 159-07-2005 to 166-
07-2005, acquitting accused-appellant Vicente Candellada of the charge of attempted
rape but finding him guilty of eight counts of rape.
Accused-appellant was charged with attempted rape before the RTC under the
following Information, docketed as Criminal Case No. 118-07-2005:
That on or about December 28, 2004, at about 7:00 o'clock in the evening at x x x,
Lanao del Norte, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, who is father of AAA3, a 14-year-old minor, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with lewd design, and who was under the
influence of liquor, wanted to have sexual intercourse with said AAA, but the latter
strongly refused, so that accused got mad and boxed, and battered AAA, by the use of a
piece of wood, but did not perform all the acts of execution which should have
produced the crime of Rape as a consequence by reason of the fact that AAA, shouted
for help and the people of x x x, Lanao del Norte, were able to apprehend the aforesaid
accused.4
That on or about date at x x x, Lanao del Norte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, through force, threats and
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have (sic) carnal
knowledge upon AAA, the accuseds own daughter, a minor 14 years of age, against
her will and consent, which sexual abuse by the accused debases, degrades or demeans
the intrinsic worth and dignity of said child as a human being.
CONTRARY to and in VIOLATION of R.A. 8353, otherwise known as the Anti-Rape Law
in relation to R.A. 7610 otherwise known as the Anti-Child Abuse Law.
Accused-appellant was arraigned on May 17, 2005 with the assistance of counsel. He
pleaded not guilty to the charges against him.13
During pre-trial, the defense admitted that accused-appellant is the father of private
complainant AAA and that AAA was 15 years of age at the time of the commission of
the crimes charged and/or filing of the cases.14
The evidence for the prosecution presented the following version of events:
AAA was born in Davao on January 10, 1990. She was 15 years old when she testified
before the RTC on August 24, 2005.23
AAA was the second of three daughters of accused-appellant and his deceased first
wife. AAA lived with accused-appellant and the latters second wife, while AAAs two
sisters lived with accused-appellants mother. While they were still living in Davao,
accused-appellant impregnated AAA. When AAA was already five months pregnant,
accused-appellant brought her with him to Lanao del Norte. Accused-appellant and
AAA arrived in Lanao del Norte on May 30, 2004.24
While they were staying at Geminas old house, accused-appellant had intercourse
with AAA many times, but AAA could only remember eight specific dates, i.e., on May
30, 2004; June 2, 2004; June 12, 2004; July 10, 2004; August 13, 2004; November 5,
2004; December 15, 2004; and December 25, 2004. When asked to explain what
"intercourse" meant, AAA stated that accused-appellant inserted his penis into her
vagina. AAA further testified that she consistently resisted accused-appellants bestial
acts but he threatened to stab her with a knife. Lastly, AAA narrated that she
delivered a baby boy with Geminas help on September 24, 2004, but the baby died
four days later, on September 28, 2004.26
According to Gemina, since accused-appellant and AAA arrived in Lanao del Norte, the
two lived as husband and wife. However, sometime in December 2004, a drunk
accused-appellant already admitted to Geminas husband that AAA was his (accused-
appellants) daughter. Gemina further testified that the mauling incident that took
place on December 28, 2004 was already the fourth time she saw accused-appellant
maltreating AAA.29
After conducting a physical examination of AAA on December 29, 2004, Dr. Magtagad
observed hematoma, contusions, and abrasions on different parts of AAAs body,
which were caused by a blunt object, possibly a piece of wood.30 Dr. Magtagad
estimated that AAAs injuries would heal in five to seven days. AAA did not mention
being raped by accused-appellant to Dr. Magtagad.
SPO4 Bastigue, SPO3 Caroro, and DSWD Officer Yaral were assigned to AAAs case.
They were initially investigating only the mauling of AAA, but during the course of
their investigation, AAA claimed that she had been raped by accused-appellant at least
eight times.31 In their Joint Affidavit though, SPO4 Bastigue, SPO3 Caroro, and DSWD
Officer Yaral reported only the mauling of AAA and did not mention her being raped
by accused-appellant. SPO4 Bastigue reasoned on the witness stand that maybe the
investigator merely forgot to include the rapes in the Joint Affidavit.
Accused-appellant acknowledged that AAA is his daughter with his deceased first
wife.32 Accused-appellant stated that AAA was born on January 10 but since he was
unschooled, he could not remember the exact year of AAAs birth.
Accused-appellant outright called AAA a liar. He denied raping AAA eight times
between May 30, 2004 to December 25, 2004. He also asserted that he could not have
made an attempt to rape AAA on December 28, 2004 as he was already in jail by that
time. Accused-appellant claimed that he was already arrested on December 23, 2004,
a Tuesday, after he struck AAA.34
The RTC found that there was not enough evidence to prove accusedappellants
culpability for the charge of attempted rape on December 28, 2004. Citing Article 6 of
the Revised Penal Code,35 the RTC pointed out that the overt acts committed by
accused-appellant resulted only in AAAs physical injuries that took five to seven days
to heal and slight physical injuries were not necessarily included in the charge of
attempted rape. As for the charge of eight counts of consummated rape, the RTC
pronounced that "AAAs down-to-earth testimony was convincing and straightforward
that she was abused by her father in x x x Lanao del Norte."36 In the end, the RTC
adjudged:
1. For failure of the prosecution to establish the guilt of accused beyond reasonable
doubt in Crim. Case No. 118-07-2005, for attempted rape in relation with Republic Act
No. 9262, acquits him thereof;
4. The Bureau of Jail Management and Penology warden of Tubod, Lanao de Norte is
ordered to deliver the living body of accused to the National Penitentiary, Muntinlupa
City, Metro Manila within 15 days from the promulgation of the decision.37
The records of the eight rape cases were then forwarded to the Court of Appeals for
appellate review.
In his Brief, accused-appellant contended that the RTC erred in finding him guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of eight counts of rape. AAAs short and simple answers
during her testimony "were short of a mere allegation." Despite remembering the dates
of the alleged crimes, AAA could not vividly describe how she was molested. AAA
merely repeated that on all eight occasions, accused-appellant had intercourse with
her by inserting his penis into her vagina. AAAs uniform manner of describing the
alleged rapes created a strong suspicion that her testimony had been coached,
rehearsed, or contrived. Accused-appellant also labeled AAAs testimony incredible
because according to AAA, accused-appellant immediately inserted his penis into her
vagina without even taking off their undergarments. Thus, accused-appellant argued
that the presumption of innocence accorded to accused-appellant must prevail, for it
could not be overcome by mere suspicion, conjecture, or probability. The standard has
always been proof beyond reasonable doubt.38
Plaintiff-appellee, for its part, maintained that the RTC judgment of conviction against
accused-appellant was consistent with prevailing jurisprudence. However, it prayed
that the sentence imposed upon accused-appellant be modified in accordance with
Republic Act No. 9346, An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of the Death Penalty in the
Philippines.39
In its Decision dated April 29, 2009, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of
conviction against accused-appellant but modified the sentence and award of damages:
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision of the court a quo is modified, and
after taking into account the qualified aggravating circumstances of minority of the
victim and her relationship with accused-appellant Vicente Candellada, he (Vicente
Candellada) is DIRECTED and ORDERED to serve the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua
without the eligibility for parole for each rape committed under Criminal Cases Nos.
159-07-2005, 160-07-2005, 161-07-2005, 162-07-2005, 163-07-2005, 164-07-2005,
165-07-2005, and 166-07-2005. Accused-appellant Vicente Candellada is further
DIRECTED and ORDERED to pay AAA the following for each rape committed:
Accused-appellant insists that the RTC erred in convicting him despite the failure of
the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
There is no merit in the appeal.
Qualified rape is defined and punished under the following provisions of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended:
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even
though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.
xxxx
xxxx
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of
the following aggravating/qualifying circumstances:
1) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent,
ascendant, stepparent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third
civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.
For a conviction of qualified rape, the prosecution must allege and prove the ordinary
elements of (1) sexual congress, (2) with a woman, (3) by force and without consent;
and in order to warrant the imposition of the death penalty, the additional elements
that (4) the victim is under eighteen years of age at the time of the rape, and (5) the
offender is a parent (whether legitimate, illegitimate or adopted) of the victim.40
The fourth and fifth elements, minority and relationship, were admitted by accused-
appellant during the pre-trial conference.
The existence of the first three elements was established by AAAs testimony.
Relevant are the pronouncements of the Court in People v. Manjares41 that:
In a prosecution for rape, the accused may be convicted solely on the basis of the
testimony of the victim that is credible, convincing, and consistent with human nature
and the normal course of things, as in this case. There is a plethora of cases which tend
to disfavor the accused in a rape case by holding that when a woman declares that she
has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape has been
committed and, where her testimony passes the test of credibility, the accused can be
convicted on the basis thereof. Furthermore, the Court has repeatedly declared that it
takes a certain amount of psychological depravity for a young woman to concoct a
story which would put her own father to jail for the rest of his remaining life and drag
the rest of the family including herself to a lifetime of shame. For this reason, courts
are inclined to give credit to the straightforward and consistent testimony of a minor
victim in criminal prosecutions for rape. (Citations omitted.)
The Court will not disturb the finding of the RTC, affirmed by the Court of Appeals, that
AAAs testimony deserves full faith and credence. In resolving rape cases, primordial
consideration is given to the credibility of the victims testimony. The settled rule is
that the trial court's conclusions on the credibility of witnesses in rape cases are
generally accorded great weight and respect, and at times, even finality. Having seen
and heard the witnesses themselves and observed their behavior and manner of
testifying, the trial court stood in a much better position to decide the question of
credibility. Findings of the trial court on such matters are binding and conclusive on
the appellate court, unless some facts or circumstances of weight and substance have
been overlooked, misapprehended or misinterpreted.42 No such facts or circumstances
exist in the present case.
The uniform way by which AAA described the eight rape incidents does not
necessarily mean that her testimony was coached, rehearsed, and contrived. Also,
AAAs failure to mention that accused-appellant removed their undergarments prior
to the rape does not destroy the credibility of AAAs entire testimony. Rape victims do
not cherish keeping in their memory an accurate account of the manner in which they
were sexually violated. Thus, errorless recollection of a harrowing experience cannot
be expected of a witness, especially when she is recounting details from an experience
so humiliating and painful as rape.43 In addition, bearing in mind that AAA had been
repeatedly raped by accused-appellant for a period of time (beginning in Davao, which
resulted in AAAs pregnancy), it is not surprising for AAA to recall each incident in
much the same way. What is important is that AAA had categorically testified that on
eight specific dates, her father, accused-appellant, armed with a knife, successfully
had sexual intercourse with her by inserting his penis into her vagina.
It is noteworthy to mention that even if accused-appellant did not use a knife or made
threats to AAA, accused-appellant would still be guilty of raping AAA, for in rape
committed by a close kin, such as the victim's father, stepfather, uncle, or the
common-law spouse of her mother, it is not necessary that actual force or intimidation
be employed; moral influence or ascendancy takes the place of violence or
intimidation.44
Although Gemina did not personally witness the rapes of AAA by accused-appellant,
she did confirm that accused-appellant had introduced AAA as his wife; and when
Gemina stayed a week with accused-appellant and AAA at the old house, Gemina
observed that the two apparently lived as husband and wife. Accused-appellants
imprudence in representing himself as AAAs husband to the public lends credence to
AAAs assertions that accused-appellant took perverted liberties with her in private.
Accused-appellants denial and alibi deserve scant consideration.1wphi1 No
jurisprudence in criminal law is more settled than that alibi is the weakest of all
defenses, for it is easy to contrive and difficult to disprove, and for which reason it is
generally rejected. It has been consistently held that denial and alibi are the most
common defenses in rape cases. Denial could not prevail over complainant's direct,
positive and categorical assertion. As between a positive and categorical testimony
which has the ring of truth, on one hand, and a bare denial, on the other, the former is
generally held to prevail.45
With the guilt of accused-appellant for the eight rapes already established beyond
reasonable doubt, the Court of Appeals was correct in imposing the penalty of
reclusion perpetua, without eligibility of parole, instead of death, for each count of
rape, pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346.
Section 2 of Republic Act No. 9346 imposes the penalty of reclusion perpetua in lieu of
death, when the law violated makes use of the nomenclature of the penalties of the
Revised Penal Code. Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9346 further provides that persons
convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences will be
reduced to reclusion perpetua, shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4103,
otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended.46
As for the damages, the Court affirms the award to AAA of P75,000.00 civil indemnity
and P75,000.00 moral damages for each count of rape. However, in line with
jurisprudence,47 the Court increases the amount of exemplary damages awarded to
AAA from P25,000.00 to P30,000.00 for each count of rape; and imposes an interest of
6% per annum on the aggregate amount of damages awarded from finality of this
judgment until full payment thereof.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00361-MIN
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the amount of exemplary damages awarded to
AAA shall be increased to P30,000.00 for each count of rape, and all damages awarded
shall be subject to interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of
this Decision until fully paid. No costs.
SO ORDERED
Assailed before this Court is the November 24, 2009 Decision1 of the Court or Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03162 which affirmed with modifications the November
26, 2007 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) or Gumaca, Quezon, Branch 62
finding appellant Marciano Cial y Lorena guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of qualified rape.
On February 5, 2004, appellant was charged with the crime of rape. The Information3
reads as follows:
That the commission of the rape was attended by the qualifying circumstances of
minority, the victim being less than 18 years old, and relationship, the accused being
the common-law husband of complainants mother.
Contrary to law.
During his arraignment on June 29, 2004, appellant pleaded not guilty.5 After pre-
trial, trial on the merits ensued.
"AAA" is one of the six (6) children born to "BBB" and "CCC." After "CCC" died, "BBB"
cohabited with appellant Marciano Cial (also known as "Onot"). Appellant and "BBB"
have two (2) children.
In 2002, "AAA", then thirteen (13) years old, was a Grade I pupil and was residing
with her family and appellant in x x x Quezon Province. "AAA" calls appellant "Papa."
Sometime in December 2002, appellant called "AAA" and told her to go to the bedroom
inside their house. Once inside, appellant took off "AAAs" shorts and panty and spread
her legs. Appellant pulled his pants down to his thighs and inserted his penis into the
little girls vagina. "AAA" felt intense pain but she did not try to struggle because
appellant had a bolo on his waist. After satiating his lust, appellant threatened to kill
"AAA" and her family if she reported the incident to anyone. At that time, "AAAs"
maternal grandmother was in the house but was unaware that "AAA" was being
ravished.
xxxx
Unable to endure the torment, "AAA" confided her ordeal to her mother. But "AAAs"
mother did not believe her. "AAA" ran away from home and went to her maternal
uncles house. There, she disclosed her harrowing experience to her mothers siblings.
Her uncle appeared to be angered by appellants wrong doing. But nonetheless, her
uncle allowed appellant to bring her home when appellant fetched her.
For fear that she might be raped again, "AAA" ran away and went to the house of her
aunt. Her aunt helped her file the complaint against her stepfather.
On March 19, 2003, "AAA" was brought to Doa Marta Memorial District Hospital in
Atimonan, Quezon where she was physically examined by Dr. Arnulfo Imperial. Dr.
Imperial issued a Medico-Legal Report which essentially states that:
1) she was negative to pubic hair; there was a negative physical injury at the pubic
area, with normal external genitalia;
2) the hymen has an old laceration on the 12 oclock and 5oclock positions, introitus
admits one examining finger with ease; and
According to Dr. Imperial, the negative result for pubic hair as indicated in his report
means that the victim has not yet fully developed her secondary characteristics which
usually manifests during puberty. Dr. Imperial explained that the easy insertion of one
finger into her vagina means that the child was no longer a virgin and that it would be
difficult to insert even the tip of the little finger into the private part of a virgin as she
would have suffered pain. On the absence of spermatozoa on the victims genitals, Dr.
Imperial explained that a sperm has a life span of three (3) days. The lapse of almost
four months from the time of the rape would naturally yield negative results for
spermatozoa.
On April 7, 2003, "AAA" and her aunt sought the assistance of the Crisis Center for
Women at Gumaca, Quezon. "AAA" was admitted to the said center and still continued
to reside therein at the time of her testimony.7
As to be expected, appellant denied the charge. He alleged that he treated "AAA" as his
own daughter. He also claimed that "AAAs" aunt fabricated the charge because
appellant called her a thief.
The trial court lent credence to the testimony of "AAA" especially considering that the
same is corroborated by the medical findings. On the other hand, the RTC found
appellants defense not only "laughable" and "sickening" but also completely untrue.8
The court a quo also found the qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship
to be present. Thus, on November 26, 2007, the RTC rendered its Decision finding
appellant guilty of qualified rape. Considering, however, the proscription on the
imposition of the death penalty, the trial court instead sentenced appellant to
reclusion perpetua.
WHEREFORE, accused Marciano Cial is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of rape and he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and the
complainant "AAA" is awarded moral and exemplary damages in the amount of Fifty
Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos.
SO ORDERED.9
Appellant appealed to the CA but the appellate court found the appeal to be without
merit and dismissed the same. The appellate court thus affirmed the RTC finding
appellant guilty of qualified rape but with modifications as to the damages, viz:
FOR THESE REASONS, the decision dated November 26, 2007 of the RTC is
AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:
SO ORDERED.10
The CA found that the elements of rape have been duly established. "AAAs" testimony
proved that appellant had carnal knowledge of her against her will and without her
consent. The examining doctor corroborated "AAAs" narration by testifying that the
hymenal lacerations could have been possibly caused by an erect penis. The CA
disregarded appellants contention that he could not have raped "AAA" in the presence
of "AAAs" grandmother as "lust is no respecter of time and place."11 Moreover, the
appellate court found that the prosecution satisfactorily established "AAAs" minority
as well as the qualifying circumstance of relationship, appellant being the common-law
husband of "AAAs" mother.
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THECIRCUMSTANCES
CLEARLY POINTING TO THE INNOCENCE OF THEACCUSED-APPELLANT.
II
Appellant argues that if he indeed raped "AAA" in the manner that she narrated, it
would be improbable for "AAAs" maternal grandmother not to have noticed the same.
Appellant also claims that it was illogical for "AAAs" uncle to allow "AAA" to return
home after learning about the alleged rape incident. Appellant also insists that the
examining physician was unsure as to what actually caused "AAAs" hymenal
lacerations.
Our Ruling
In this appeal, appellant assails the factual findings of the trial court and the
credibility it lent to the testimony of the victim. As a general rule, however, this Court
accords great respect to the factual findings of the RTC, especially when affirmed by
the CA. We find no cogent reason to depart from this rule.
Time and again, we have held that when it comes to the issue of credibility of the
victim or the prosecution witnesses, the findings of the trial courts carry great weight
and respect and, generally, the appellate courts will not overturn the said findings
unless the trial court overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or
circumstances of weight and substance which will alter the assailed decision or affect
the result of the case. This is so because trial courts are in the best position to
ascertain and measure the sincerity and spontaneity of witnesses through their actual
observation of the witnesses manner of testifying, her furtive glance, blush of
unconscious shame, hesitation, flippant or sneering tone, calmness, sigh, or the scant
or full realization of an oath all of which are useful aids for an accurate
determination of a witness honesty and sincerity. Trial judges, therefore, can better
determine if such witnesses are telling the truth, being in the ideal position to weigh
conflicting testimonies. Again, unless certain facts of substance and value were
overlooked which, if considered, might affect the result of the case, its assessment
must be respected, for it had the opportunity to observe the conduct and demeanor of
the witnesses while testifying and detect if they were lying. The rule finds an even
more stringent application where the said findings are sustained by the Court of
Appeals. (Citations omitted.)13
Besides, it would not be amiss to point out that "AAA" was only 13 years of age when
she testified in court.14
Testimonies of child-victims are normally given full weight and credit, since when a
girl, particularly if she is a minor, says that she has been raped, she says in effect all
that is necessary to show that rape has in fact been committed. When the offended
party is of tender age and immature, courts are inclined to give credit to her account
of what transpired, considering not only her relative vulnerability but also the shame
to which she would be exposed if the matter to which she testified is not true. Youth
and immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity. Considering her tender
age, AAA could not have invented a horrible story. x x x15
We are not persuaded by appellants argument that if he indeed raped "AAA" inside
their house, then "AAAs" maternal grandmother would have noticed the same. It is
settled jurisprudence that rape can be committed even in places where people
congregate. As held by the CA, "lust is no respecter of time and place."16 Thus, the
presence of "AAAs" grandmother would not negate the commission of the rape;
neither would it prove appellants innocence.
There is also no merit to appellants contention that it was irrational for "AAAs" uncle
to allow her to return home even after learning about the rape incident. The
considerations or reasons which impelled "AAAs" uncle to allow her to return home
are immaterial to the rape charge. Such have no bearing on appellants guilt.
We find however that both the trial court and the CA erred in convicting appellant of
the crime of qualified rape. According to both courts, the twin qualifying
circumstances of minority and relationship attended the commission of the crime. We
rule otherwise.
In its Formal Offer of Evidence,18 the prosecution mentioned "AAAs" Certificate of Live
Birth. Also attached to the Folder of Exhibits marked as Exhibit "B" is "AAAs"
Certificate of Live Birth showing that "AAA" was born on October 31, 1991. However,
upon closer scrutiny, we note that the said Certificate of Live Birth was never
presented or offered during the trial of the case. During the March 28, 2006 hearing,
the prosecution manifested before the RTC that it will be presenting "AAAs" Certificate
of Live Birth at the next setting. In its Order19 dated June 27, 2006, the trial court
reset the hearing of the case to allow the prosecution to present evidence with respect
to "AAAs" Certificate of Live Birth. However, up until the prosecution rested its case,
nobody was presented to testify on "AAAs" Certificate of Live Birth. Records show that
the prosecution presented only "AAA" and Dr. Imperial as its witnesses. Dr. Imperial
never testified on "AAAs" age. On the other hand, "AAA" even testified on the witness
stand that she does not know her age, viz:
The same is true with respect to the other qualifying circumstance of relationship. The
prosecution likewise miserably failed to establish "AAAs" relationship with the
appellant. Although the Information alleged that appellant is the common-law husband
of "AAAs" mother, "AAA" referred to appellant as her step-father.
Q. What do you mean step father, what is his relation to your mother?
xxxx
Q. Were you still small or big when he [became] the husband of your mother?
A. Papa, maam.
Q. Is this Onot whom you called Papa inside this room now?
A. Yes, maam. (Witness pointed to the bald man who when asked his name responded
that he is Marciano Cial).
Q. You identified yourself Mr. Witness as married. You are married to the mother of
"AAA"?A. Yes, Your Honor.
xxxx
Q. So, you mean to say that you are the step father of "AAA"?
A. Yes, sir.22
x x x Also. given that Marciano and AAA's mother were not legally married, the
qualifying circumstance that the accused is the common-law husband of the victim's
mother may be properly appreciated.25
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The November 24, 2009Decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03162 is MODIFIED. Appellant Marciano Cia! y
Lorena is hereby found guilty of rape and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua. Appellant is ordered to pay "AAA" the amounts of P50,000.00 as
civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary
damages. All damages awarded shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum from
date of finality of this judgment until fully paid.
SO ORDERED
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
The subject of this appeal is the Decision1 dated 24 August 2009 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03371 affirming the Decision2 dated 30 April 2008 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Paraaque City, Branch 260, in Criminal Cases Nos.
03-0763 to 03-0765, finding herein appellant Manolito Lucena y Velasquez alias
"Machete" guilty beyond reasonable doubt of three counts of rape, thereby sentencing
him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count and ordering him to pay
AAA3 the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages and P50,000.00 as civil indemnity
also for each count.
Three (3) similarly worded Informations,4 all dated 24 June 2003 allege:
That on or about the 28th day of April 2003, in the City of Paraaque, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named [appellant], a
Barangay Tanod Volunteer, who took advantage of his position to facilitate the
commission of the crime, by means of force, threat or intimidation and with the use of
a gun did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of
the complainant AAA, a minor, 17 years of age, against her will and consent.
(Emphasis and italics supplied).
The appellant, assisted by counsel de oficio, pleaded NOT GUILTY to all the charges
against him.5 Thereafter, the cases were jointly tried.
The prosecution presented AAA, the victim herself; and Dr. Merle Tan (Dr. Tan) of the
Child Protection Unit, University of the Philippines Philippine General Hospital (UP-
PGH), who examined the victim.
AAA was then brought by the two (2) barangay tanods within the vicinity of the San
Dionisio Barangay Hall. Afterwards, one of them alighted from the tricycle and went
inside the barangay hall. The appellant, on the other hand, stayed in the tricycle to
guard AAA. After a while, the barangay tanod, the one who went inside the barangay
hall, returned. But, the appellant told the former that he will just be the one to bring
AAA back to her house.8
But, instead of escorting AAA back to her house, the appellant brought her to Kabuboy
Bridge in San Dionisio, Paraaque City. While on their way, the appellant threatened
AAA that he would kill her once she resists or jumps off the tricycle. Upon arrival, the
appellant ordered AAA to alight from the tricycle. AAA asked the appellant what he
would do with her but the former did not respond. The appellant then took out the
backseat of the tricycle and positioned it in a grassy area. He subsequently pointed a
gun at AAA and commanded her to lie down and to take off her clothes. The appellant
later put the gun down on the ground and inserted his penis into AAAs vagina despite
the latters plea not to rape her. Satisfied, the appellant stopped. But, after a short
while, or after about five (5) minutes, the appellant, once again, inserted his penis into
AAAs vagina. Thereafter, he stopped. On the third time, the appellant inserted again
his penis into AAAs vagina. Fulfilling his bestial desire, the appellant stopped and
finally ordered AAA to dress up. The appellant even threatened AAA that he would kill
her should she tell anyone about what happened between them.9
The appellant, thereafter, directed AAA to board the tricycle. He then brought AAA in
front of a school in Paraaque City. But, before allowing AAA to get off, the appellant
repeated his threat to kill her should she tell anyone about the incident.10
The following day, AAA took the courage to seek the assistance of their barangay
kagawad, who simply advised her to just proceed to the barangay hall to lodge her
complaint against the appellant. AAA and her mother subsequently went to PGH,
where she was subjected to physical examination by Dr. Tan,11 which resulted in the
following findings:
HYMEN Tanner Stage 3, healing laceration[s] 3 and 5 oclock area with petechiae,
fresh laceration at 9 oclock area with eccymosi at 8-10 oclock area, Type of Hymen:
Crescentic
xxxx
xxxx
IMPRESSIONS!Disclosure of sexual abuse.
AAA also went to the Coastal Road Police Headquarters, where she executed her
sworn statement accusing the appellant of rape. AAA was able to identify the appellant
as her assailant because the former was wearing a jacket emblazoned with "Barangay
Police," as well as a Barangay Identification Card, at the time of the incident.13
The appellant and Rodel Corpuz (Corpuz) took the witness stand for the defense.
In the course of Corpuzs direct examination, however, the parties made the following
stipulations: (1) that the [herein appellant] was the assigned barangay radio operator
on that date, [28 April 2003], and he stayed at the barangay hall from 12:00 midnight
to 5:00 a.m.; (2) that the witness was there up to 12:00 midnight, but at about past
12:00, he left and returned after two (2) hours, at 2:00 oclock a.m.; and (3) that when
he woke up at 5:00 oclock in the morning, the [appellant] was still there. With these
stipulations, Corpuzs testimony was dispensed with.14
The appellant, for his part, could only muster the defenses of denial and alibi. He, thus,
offered a different version of the story.
On 28 April 2003, the appellant claimed that he was on duty as a radio operator at the
barangay hall. His task as such was to receive complaints from the residents of the
barangay, as well as to receive calls from fellow barangay officials who are in need of
assistance. On the same day, he received a call from his companion, who is also a
barangay tanod. He cannot, however, recall any unusual incident that transpired on
that day.15
The appellant admitted that he knew AAA as the one who lodged a complaint against
him but he denied that he knew her personally. He also vehemently denied the
following: (1) that he raped AAA; (2) that he was one of those barangay tanods who
apprehended AAA for violating the curfew ordinance of their barangay; and (3) that
he was the one driving the tricycle in going to the barangay hall. Instead, the appellant
claimed that after 12:00 midnight of 28 April 2003, he went home already. In fact, he
was shocked when he was arrested on 25 September 2003 as he did not commit any
crime.16
In its Decision dated 30 April 2008, the trial court, giving credence to the categorical,
straightforward and positive testimony of AAA, coupled with the medical findings of
sexual abuse, convicted the appellant of three (3) counts of rape as defined and
penalized under paragraph 1(a) of Article 266-A, in relation to Article 266-B, of the
Revised Penal Code of the Philippines, as amended. The trial court, thus, decreed:
The appellant appealed18 the trial courts Decision to the Court of Appeals with the
following assignment of errors:
I.
II.
After a thorough study of the records, the Court of Appeals rendered its now assailed
Decision dated 24 August 2009 sustaining appellants conviction for three (3) counts
of rape, as well as the damages awarded to AAA. In doing so, the Court of Appeals
explained that the facts revealed that the appellant succeeded thrice in inserting his
penis into AAAs vagina. The said three (3) penetrations happened one after another
at an interval of five (5) minutes, wherein the appellant would take a rest after
satiating his lust and after regaining his strength would again rape AAA. Undoubtedly,
the appellant decided to commit those separate and distinct acts of sexual assault on
AAA. Thus, his conviction for three (3) counts of rape is irrefutable.20
Both parties in their manifestations22 before this Court adopted their respective
appeal briefs23 filed with the Court of Appeals in lieu of Supplemental Briefs.
In his Brief, the appellant contends that the prosecution failed to prove that force or
intimidation attended the commission of rape. Records revealed that AAA did not even
attempt to resist his alleged sexual advances over her person. Instead, AAA opted to
remain passive throughout her ordeal despite the fact that during the three (3)
episodes of their sexual intercourse he was unarmed and she, thus, had all the
opportunity to escape, which she never did. These reactions of AAA were contrary to
human experience, thus, cast serious doubts on the veracity of her testimony and on
her credibility as a witness.
The appellant similarly argues that the result of AAAs medical examination is quite
disturbing as it appears that her anal orifice was also penetrated by a hard object
though nothing was said to this effect in her testimony.
The appellant likewise avers that he cannot be convicted of three counts of rape. The
intervening period of five (5) minutes between each penetration does not necessarily
prove that he decided to commit three separate acts of rape. He maintains that what is
of prime importance is that he was motivated by a single criminal intent.
With the foregoing, the appellant believes that his guilt was not proven beyond
reasonable doubt; hence, his acquittal is inevitable.
This Court holds otherwise. The conviction of the appellant, thus, stands but the
damages awarded in favor AAA must be modified.
Primarily, in reviewing rape cases, this Court is guided with three settled principles:
(1) an accusation of rape can be made with facility and while the accusation is difficult
to prove, it is even more difficult for the person accused, although innocent, to
disprove; (2) considering the intrinsic nature of the crime, only two persons being
usually involved, the testimony of the complainant should be scrutinized with great
caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merit,
and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the
defense.24
Rape is a serious transgression with grave consequences both for the accused and the
complainant. Following the above principles, this Court is duty-bound to conduct a
thorough and exhaustive evaluation of a judgment of conviction for rape.25
After a careful scrutiny of the entire records, however, this Court finds no justifiable
reason to reverse the rulings of the lower courts.
All the Informations in this case charged the appellant with rape under paragraph
1(a), Article 266-A, in relation to paragraph 2, Article 266-B, of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended. These provisions specifically state:
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even
though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.
xxxx
ART. 266-B. Penalties. Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be
punished by reclusion perpetua.
Whenever the rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more
persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death. (Emphasis supplied).
The force and violence required in rape cases is relative and need not be overpowering
or irresistible when applied. For rape to exist, it is not necessary that the force or
intimidation be so great or be of such character as could not be resisted it is only
necessary that the force or intimidation be sufficient to consummate the purpose
which the accused had in mind.27 Further, it should be viewed from the perception and
judgment of the victim at the time of the commission of the crime. What is vital is that
the force or intimidation be of such degree as to cow the unprotected and vulnerable
victim into submission. Force is sufficient if it produces fear in the victim, such as
when the latter is threatened with death.28
In the case at bench, as can be gleaned from the transcript of stenographic notes and
as observed by the trial court, which the Court of Appeals sustained, AAAs
categorical, straightforward and positive testimony revealed that the appellant was
armed with a gun and the same was pointed at her while she was ordered to lie down
and to take off her clothes, to which she acceded because of fear for her life and
personal safety. The appellant then put the gun down on the ground and successfully
inserted his penis into AAAs vagina, not only once but thrice. This happened despite
AAAs plea not to rape her. And, after satisfying his lust, the appellant threatened
AAA that he would kill her should she tell anyone about the incident. This same threat
of killing AAA was first made by the appellant while the former was still inside the
tricycle on their way to Kabuboy Bridge.29 It cannot be denied, therefore, that force
and intimidation were employed by the appellant upon AAA in order to achieve his
depraved desires.
While it is true that the appellant had already put the gun down on the ground the
moment he inserted his penis into AAAs vagina and was actually unarmed on those
three (3) episodes of sexual intercourse, the same does not necessarily take away the
fear of being killed that had already been instilled in the mind of AAA. Emphasis must
be given to the fact that the gun was still within appellants reach, therefore, he could
still make good of his threat on AAA at anytime the latter would show any resistance
to his evil desires. AAAs lack of physical resistance, therefore, is understandable and
would not in any way discredit her testimony.
It must be borne in mind that when a rape victim becomes paralyzed with fear, she
cannot be expected to think and act coherently. Further, as has been consistently held
by this Court, physical resistance is not an essential element of rape and need not be
established when intimidation is exercised upon the victim, and, the latter submits
herself, against her will, to the rapists embrace because of fear for her life and
personal safety. The victims failure to shout or offer tenacious resistance did not
make voluntary her submission to the criminal acts of her aggressor. It bears
stressing that not every rape victim can be expected to act with reason or in
conformity with the usual expectations of everyone. The workings of a human mind
placed under emotional stress are unpredictable; people react differently. Some may
shout, some may faint, while others may be shocked into insensibility.30
In his attempt to ruin AAAs credibility in order to exculpate himself from all the
charges, the appellant puts stress on the portion of the result of AAAs medical
examination disclosing that even her anal orifice was also penetrated by a hard object,
which she never mentioned in her testimony.
To the mind of this Court, such argument is flimsy and totally misplaced. It would not
even work to appellants advantage and would not in any way cast doubt on the
veracity of AAAs testimony. As this Court has previously stated, a medical
examination and a medical certificate, albeit corroborative of the commission of rape,
are not indispensable to a successful prosecution for rape.31 Moreover, even though
AAA made no mention of any anal penetration, such omission would not change the
fact that she was, indeed, raped by the appellant. As succinctly found by both lower
courts, AAA categorically, straightforwardly, clearly and positively narrated her
harrowing experience in the hands of the appellant. She recounted in detail how the
appellant took advantage of her by bringing her to Kabuboy Bridge, where nobody was
present; commanding her to lie down and undress herself at a point of a gun; and
successfully inserting his penis into her vagina, not only once but thrice. AAA stated
that after the first penetration the appellant stopped. After about five minutes,
however, the appellant, once again, inserted his penis into her vagina. Thereafter, the
appellant stopped. For the third and last time, the appellant again inserted his penis
into her vagina. This narration was consistent with the rest of the medical findings
showing fresh hymenal lacerations on AAAs vagina, which according to Dr. Tan is a
clear evidence of "blunt force or penetrating trauma" - a disclosure of sexual abuse.
For his ultimate defense, the appellant puts forward denial and alibi.1wphi1 Notably,
these defenses are totally inconsistent with his line of argument that the rape was
committed without force or intimidation thereby implying that the sexual intercourse
between him and AAA was consensual.
Time and again, this Court has viewed denial and alibi as inherently weak defenses,
unless supported by clear and convincing evidence, the same cannot prevail over the
positive declarations of the victim who, in a simple and straightforward manner,
convincingly identified the appellant as the defiler of her chastity.32 Simply put, the
positive assertions of AAA that he raped her are entitled to greater weight. While
denial and alibi are legitimate defenses in rape cases, bare assertions to this effect
cannot overcome the categorical testimony of the victim,33 as in this case.
Also, appellants alibi that on the night the rape incident happened, he was at the
barangay hall doing his job as radio operator and at 12:00 midnight he already went
home, failed to sufficiently establish that it was physically impossible for him to be at
the scene of the crime when it was committed. Moreover, the corroborating testimony
of defense witness Corpuz that the appellant left at about past 12:00 midnight, almost
the same time the rape incident happened, and then returned after two (2) hours,
even bolster the possibility of the appellants presence at the scene of the crime.
This Court also notes that the appellant failed to show any ill-motive on the part of
AAA to testify falsely against him. This bolsters the veracity of AAAs accusation since
no woman would concoct a tale that would tarnish her reputation, bring humiliation
and disgrace to herself and her family, and submit herself to the rigors, shame, and
stigma attendant to the prosecution of rape, unless she is motivated by her quest to
seek justice for the crime committed against her.34
In light of the foregoing, it is beyond any cavil of doubt that the appellants guilt for the
crime of rape has been proven beyond reasonable doubt.
As to the number of rapes committed. The appellant, citing People v. Aaron (Aaron
Case),35 insists that he cannot be convicted of three (3) counts of rape despite the
three (3) penetrations because he was motivated by a single criminal intent. This
Court finds this contention fallacious.
In the Aaron Case, the accused inserted his penis into the victims vagina; he then
withdrew it and ordered the latter to lie down on the floor and, for the second time, he
inserted again his penis into the victims vagina; the accused, thereafter, stood up and
commanded the victim to lie near the headboard of the makeshift bed and, for the
third time, he inserted again his penis into the victims vagina and continued making
pumping motions. From these sets of facts, this Court convicted the accused therein
for only one count of rape despite the three successful penetrations because there is no
indication in the records from which it can be inferred that the accused decided to
commit those separate and distinct acts of sexual assault other than his lustful desire
to change positions inside the room where the crime was committed. This Court, thus,
viewed that the three penetrations occurred during one continuing act of rape in
which the accused was obviously motivated by a single criminal intent.
The circumstances in the present case, however, are far different from the Aaron Case.
Here, we quote with approval the observations of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed
that of the trial court, to wit:
We agree with the trial court that the [herein appellant] should be convicted of three
(3) counts of rape.1wphi1 It appears from the facts that the [appellant] thrice
succeeded in inserting his penis into the private part of [AAA]. The three (3)
penetrations occurred one after the other at an interval of five (5) minutes wherein
the [appellant] would rest after satiating his lust upon his victim and, after he has
regained his strength, he would again rape [AAA]. Hence, it can be clearly inferred
from the foregoing that when the [appellant] decided to commit those separate and
distinct acts of sexual assault upon [AAA], he was not motivated by a single impulse[,]
but rather by several criminal intent. Hence, his conviction for three (3) counts of
rape is indubitable.36 (Emphasis supplied).
This Court sustains the findings of both lower courts that, indeed, the three insertions
into AAA were in satiation of successive but distinct criminal carnality. Therefore, the
appellants conviction for three counts of rape is proper.
As to penalty. The second paragraph of Art. 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, provides that "[w]henever the rape is committed with the use of a deadly
weapon x x x the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death." As it was properly
alleged and proved that the appellant used a gun in order to consummate his evil
desires, thus, both lower courts correctly imposed upon him the penalty of reclusion
perpetua for each count of rape.
In addition, this Court deems it proper to award exemplary damages in favor of AAA.
The award of exemplary damages is justified under Article 2230 of the Civil Code if
there is an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying.39 In this case,
since the qualifying circumstance of the use of a deadly weapon was present in the
commission of the crime, exemplary damages in the amount of P30,000.00, for each
count of rape, is awarded in favor of AAA. Moreover, in line with recent jurisprudence,
the interest at the rate of 6% per annum shall be imposed on all damages awarded
from the date of the finality of this judgment until fully paid.40
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-
H.C. No. 03371 dated 24 August 2009 finding herein appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of three counts of rape is hereby AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATIONS that: (1) the exemplary damages in the amount of P30,000.00, for
each count of rape, is awarded in favor of AAA; and (2) the appellant is ordered to pay
AAA the interest on all damages at the legal rate of 6% per annum from the date of
finality of this judgment.
SO ORDERED.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
This is a Petition for Review2 assailing the Court of Appeals August 28, 2013 Decision3
affirming Ricaldes conviction for rape through sexual assault and January 15, 2014
Resolution4 denying reconsideration.
That on or about January 31, 2002, in the Municipality of Sta. Rosa, Province of
Laguna, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused
Richard Ricalde, prompted with lewd design, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously inserting [sic] his penis into the anus of XXX who was then ten (10)
years of age against his will and consent, to his damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.5
Ricalde pleaded not guilty during his arraignment on August 21, 2002.6 The
prosecution presented the victim (XXX),7 his mother, and the medico-legal as
witnesses, while the defense presented Ricalde as its sole witness.8
On January 30, 2002, XXX requested his mother to pick up Ricalde at McDonalds Bel-
Air, Sta. Rosa at past 8:00 p.m.9 Ricalde, then 31 years old,10 is a distant relative and
textmate of XXX, then 10 years old.11
After dinner, XXXs mother told Ricalde to spend the night at their house as it was
late.12 He slept on the sofa while XXX slept on the living room floor.13
It was around 2:00 a.m. when XXX awoke as "he felt pain in his anus and stomach and
something inserted in his anus."14 He saw that Ricalde "fondled his penis."15 When
Ricalde returned to the sofa, XXX ran toward his mothers room to tell her what
happened.16 He also told his mother that Ricalde played with his sexual organ.17
XXXs mother armed herself with a knife for self-defense when she confronted Ricalde
about the incident, but he remained silent.18 She asked him to leave.19
XXXs mother then accompanied XXX to the barangay hall where they were directed
to report the incident to the Sta. Rosa police station.20 The police referred them to the
municipal health center for medical examination.21 Dr. Roy Camarillo examined22
XXX and found no signs of recent trauma in his anal orifice23 that was also
"NEGATIVE for [s]permatozoa."24
On February 4, 2002, XXX and his mother executed their sworn statements at the
Sta. Rosa police station, leading to the criminal complaint filed against Ricalde.25
Ricalde denied the accusations.26 He testified that he met XXX during the 2001 town
fiesta of Calaca, Batangas and learned that XXXs mother is the cousin of his cousin
Arlan Ricalde.27 He and XXX became textmates, and XXX invited him to his house.28
On January 30, 2002, XXXs mother picked him up to sleep at their house.29 He slept
at 10:00 p.m. on the living room sofa while XXX slept on the floor.30 He denied the
alleged rape through sexual assault.31
The Regional Trial Court in its Decision32 dated June 20, 2011 found Ricalde guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of rape through sexual assault:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds accused Richard Ricalde guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of rape by sexual assault and, accordingly, sentences him to suffer
the penalty of imprisonment ranging from four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1)
day of prision correccional as minimum, to eight (8) years of prision mayor as
maximum. Accused is ordered to pay [XXX] the sums of 50,000.00 as moral damages
and 50,000.00 as civil indemnity.
SO ORDERED.33
The Court of Appeals in its Decision34 dated August 28, 2013 affirmed the conviction
with the modification of lowering the amounts of damages awarded:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 20 June 2011 of Branch 34 of the Regional Trial
Court of Calamba, Laguna, in Crim. Case No. 11906-B, is AFFIRMED but with
MODIFICATION as to the award of damages. Accused-appellant RICHARD RICALDE is
ordered to pay the victim civil indemnity in the amount of Thirty Thousand
(30,000.00) Pesos and moral damages likewise in the amount of Thirty Thousand
(30,000.00) Pesos, both with interest at the legal rate of six (6%) percent per annum
from the date of finality of this judgment until fully paid.35
Petitioner argues the existence of reasonable doubt in his favor. First, the medico-legal
testified that he found "no physical signs or external signs of recent trauma [in XXXs]
anus,"37 or any trace of spermatozoa.38 He contends that physical evidence "ranks high
in [the courts] hierarchy of trustworthy evidence." 39
Second, XXX did not categorically say that a penis was inserted into his anal orifice, or
that he saw a penis or any object being inserted into his anal orifice.40 XXX was also
able to immediately push him away.41 Thus, no push and pull movement happened
that would explain XXXs alleged stomach ache.42 Petitioner submits that the alleged
stomach ache was an attempt to aggravate the charge against him.43
Petitioner argues that XXXs inconsistent testimony raises reasonable doubt on his
guilt.44 XXX claimed that he immediately pushed petitioner away, but in another
instance, he testified as follows: "I felt that he was inserting his penis inside my anus
because I was even able to hold his penis. He was also playing with my penis."45 XXX
also stated in his salaysay that "the penis reached only the periphery of his anal
orifice."46
Third, XXX testified that after he had pushed petitioner away, he saw that petitioner
was wearing pants with the zipper open.47 Petitioner submits that performing anal
coitus while wearing pants with an open zipper poses a challenge the risk of injuring
the sexual organ or having pubic hair entangled in the zipper. 48 Petitioner argues that
the court must consider every circumstance favoring the innocence of an accused.49
Assuming he committed an offense, petitioner contends that the court should have
applied the "variance doctrine" in People v. Sumingwa,50 and the court would have
found him guilty for the lesser offense of acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of
the Revised Penal Code.51 The petition then enumerated circumstances showing
possible homosexual affections between petitioner and XXX.52 These include the fact
that they were textmates and that petitioner played with XXXs penis.53
Petitioner argues that this masturbation could have caused an irritation that XXX
mistook as penetration.54 XXX could also have mistaken the "overreaching fingers as
a male organ trying to enter his [anus]."55 Assuming these acts took place, these would
only be considered as acts of lasciviousness.56
The People of the Philippines counters that the prosecution proved beyond reasonable
doubt all elements of the crime charged.
Lastly, the prosecution established all elements of rape through sexual assault based
on XXXs clear and categorical testimony.64 Petitioners defense of mere denial cannot
outweigh positive testimony.65 Consequently, petitioners contention that the incident
only amounts to acts of lasciviousness lacks merit.66
The issue before us for resolution is whether the prosecution proved beyond
reasonable doubt petitioner Richard Ricaldes guilt for the crime of rape through
sexual assault.
The Anti-Rape Law of 199767 classified rape as a crime against persons68 and amended
the Revised Penal Code to include Article 266-A on rape through sexual assault:
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even
though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present;
Rape under the second paragraph of Article 266-A is also known as "instrument or
object rape,"69 "gender-free rape,"70 or "homosexual rape."71 The gravamen of rape
through sexual assault is "the insertion of the penis into another persons mouth or
anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into another persons genital or anal
orifice."72
Jurisprudence holds that "the findings of the trial court, its calibration of the
testimonies of the witnesses, and its assessment of the probative weight thereof, as
well as its conclusions anchored on said findings are accorded respect if not conclusive
effect."73
The trial court found that XXXs "straightforward, unequivocal and convincing
testimony"74 sufficiently proved that petitioner committed an act of sexual assault by
inserting his penis into XXXs anal orifice.75 There was no showing of ill motive on the
part of XXX to falsely accuse petitioner.76 The Court of Appeals accorded great weight
to the trial courts findings and affirmed petitioners conviction.77
No cogent reason exists for this court to overturn the lower courts findings.
This court has also held that "[l]eeway should be given to witnesses who are minors,
especially when they are relating past incidents of abuse."81
Petitioner contends that XXX did not categorically say that a penis was inserted into
his anal orifice, or that he saw a penis or any object being inserted into his anal orifice.
The trial court also quoted portions of the transcript of XXXs testimony in that he
"felt something was inserted in [his] anus."84
Q: That early morning of January 31, 2002, while you were sleeping at your house, do
you recall any unusual incident that happened to you?
....
Q: When you said that you felt something was inserted in your anus, what did you do?
A: I felt that he was inserting his penis inside my anus because I was even able to hold
his penis. He was also playing with my penis.
Q: So when you said he was inserting his penis to your anus and he was even playing
with your private part, who is this person you are referring to as "he"?
A: Richard, sir.85
In People v. Soria,86 this court discussed that a victim need not identify what was
inserted into his or her genital or anal orifice for the court to find that rape through
sexual assault was committed:
We find it inconsequential that "AAA" could not specifically identify the particular
instrument or object that was inserted into her genital. What is important and
relevant is that indeed something was inserted into her vagina. To require "AAA" to
identify the instrument or object that was inserted into her vagina would be contrary
to the fundamental tenets of due process.87
Second, petitioners reliance on the medico-legals finding of no recent trauma in
XXXs anal orifice, or any trace of spermatozoa, lacks merit. The absence of
spermatozoa in XXXs anal orifice does not negate the possibility of an erection and
penetration. This result does not contradict the positive testimony of XXX that the
lower courts found credible, natural, and consistent with human nature.
This court has explained the merely corroborative character of expert testimony and
the possibility of convictions for rape based on the victims credible lone testimony.88
In any case, the medico-legal explained that his negative finding of trauma in the anal
orifice does not remove the possibility of an insertion considering the flexibility of the
sphincter:
Q: Now, a while ago you testified that he was sodomized and your findings states [sic]
that you did not find any congestion or abrasion, can you explain to this court why you
stated in your findings that you did not find any congestion or abrasion?
In Sumingwa, the accused in Criminal Case Nos. 1649 and 1654 was charged with
qualified rape but was convicted for the lesser offense of acts of lasciviousness
committed against a child under Article III, Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 761091
since "there was no penetration, or even an attempt to insert [the accuseds] penis into
[the victims] vagina."92
In the instant case, no variance exists between what was charged and what was
proven during trial. The prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt all elements
of the crime of rape through sexual assault.
XXX testified that he "felt something was inserted [into his] anus."93 The slightest
penetration into ones sexual organ distinguishes an act of lasciviousness from the
crime of rape. People v. Bonaagua94 discussed this distinction:
It must be emphasized, however, that like in the crime of rape whereby the slightest
penetration of the male organ or even its slightest contact with the outer lip or the
labia majora of the vagina already consummates the crime, in like manner, if the
tongue, in an act of cunnilingus, touches the outer lip of the vagina, the act should also
be considered as already consummating the crime of rape through sexual assault, not
the crime of acts of lasciviousness. Notwithstanding, in the present case, such logical
interpretation could not be applied. It must be pointed out that the victim testified that
Ireno only touched her private part and licked it, but did not insert his finger in her
vagina. This testimony of the victim, however, is open to various interpretation, since
it cannot be identified what specific part of the vagina was defiled by Ireno. Thus, in
conformity with the principle that the guilt of an accused must be proven beyond
reasonable doubt, the statement cannot be the basis for convicting Ireno with the
crime of rape through sexual assault.95 (Emphasis supplied)
People v. Bonaagua considers a womans private organ since most if not all existing
jurisprudence on rape involves a woman victim. Nevertheless, this interpretation can
apply by analogy when the victim is a man in that the slightest penetration to the
victims anal orifice consummates the crime of rape through sexual assault.
The gravamen of the crime is the violation of the victims dignity. The degree of
penetration is not important. Rape is an "assault on human dignity."96
The classifications of rape in Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code are relevant only
insofar as these define the manners of commission of rape. However, it does not mean
that one manner is less heinous or wrong than the other. Whether rape is committed
by nonconsensual carnal knowledge of a woman or by insertion of the penis into the
mouth of another person, the damage to the victims dignity is incalculable. Child
sexual abuse in general has been associated with negative psychological impacts such
as trauma, sustained fearfulness, anxiety, self-destructive behavior, emotional pain,
impaired sense of self, and interpersonal difficulties. Hence, one experience of sexual
abuse should not be trivialized just because it was committed in a relatively unusual
manner.
"The prime purpose of [a] criminal action is to punish the offender in order to deter
him and others from committing the same or similar offense, to isolate him from
society, reform and rehabilitate him or, in general, to maintain social order." Crimes
are punished as retribution so that society would understand that the act punished
was wrong.
Imposing different penalties for different manners of committing rape creates a
message that one experience of rape is relatively trivial or less serious than another. It
attaches different levels of wrongfulness to equally degrading acts. Rape, in whatever
manner, is a desecration of a persons will and body. In terms of penalties, treating one
manner of committing rape as greater or less in heinousness than another may be of
doubtful constitutionality.
However, the discriminatory treatment of these two acts with the same result was not
raised in this case. Acknowledging that every presumption must be accorded in favor
of accused in criminal cases, we have no choice but to impose a lesser penalty for rape
committed by inserting the penis into the mouth of the victim.98 (Citations omitted)
We affirm petitioners conviction but modify the penalty imposed by the lower court to
the penalty under Article III, Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 7610 known as the
"Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination
Act":99
SEC. 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. Children, whether male or female,
who for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of
any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are
deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpertua shall be
imposed upon the following:
....
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child
exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse: Provided, That when the
victim is under twelve (12) years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under
Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the
Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as the case maybe: Provided, That
the penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age
shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period; (Emphasis supplied)
The Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 7610 defines "lascivious
conduct": [T]he intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of the
genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the introduction of any object
into the genitalia, anus or mouth, of any person, whether of the same or opposite sex,
with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual
desire of any person, bestiality, masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the genitals or
pubic area of a person.100
In People v. Chingh,101 the accused was charged with rape "for inserting his fingers
and afterwards his penis into the private part of his minor victim[.]"102 The Court of
Appeals found the accused guilty of two counts of rape: statutory rape and rape
through sexual assault.103 This court modified the penalty imposed for rape through
sexual assault to the penalty provided in Article III, Section 5(b) of Republic Act No.
7610, discussing as follows:
It is undisputed that at the time of the commission of the sexual abuse, VVV was ten
(10) years old. This calls for the application of R.A. No. 7610, or "The Special
Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act,"
which defines sexual abuse of children and prescribes the penalty therefor in Section
5(b), Article III, to wit:
....
In this case, the offended party was ten years old at the time of the commission of the
offense. Pursuant to the above-quoted provision of law, Armando was aptly prosecuted
under paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No.
8353, for Rape Through Sexual Assault. However, instead of applying the penalty
prescribed therein, which is prision mayor, considering that VVV was below 12 years
of age, and considering further that Armandos act of inserting his finger in VVVs
private part undeniably amounted to lascivious conduct, the appropriate imposable
penalty should be that provided in Section 5 (b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, which is
reclusion temporal in its medium period.
The Court is not unmindful to the fact that the accused who commits acts of
lasciviousness under Article 366, in relation to Section 5 (b), Article III of R.A. No.
7610, suffers the more severe penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period than
the one who commits Rape Through Sexual Assault, which is merely punishable by
prision mayor. This is undeniably unfair to the child victim. To be sure, it was not the
intention of the framers of R.A. No. 8353 to have disallowed the applicability of R.A.
No. 7610 to sexual abuses committed to children. Despite the passage of R.A. No.
8353, R.A. No. 7610 is still good law, which must be applied when the victims are
children or those "persons below eighteen (18) years of age or those over but are
unable to fully take care of themselves or protect themselves from abuse, neglect,
cruelty, exploitation or discrimination because of a physical or mental disability or
condition."104 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
Thus, "for Rape Through Sexual Assault under paragraph 2, Article 266-A, [the
accused Chingh was] sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of twelve (12)
years, ten (10) months and twenty-one (21) days of reclusion temporal, as minimum,
to fifteen (15) years, six (6) months, and twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal, as
maximum."105
The imposable penalty under Republic Act No. 7610, Section 5(b) "for lascivious
conduct when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion temporal
in its medium period." This penalty is higher than the imposable penalty of prision
correccional for acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code.
In enacting Republic Act No. 7610, the legislature intended to impose a higher penalty
when the victi m is a child.
The fact that XXX was only 10 years old when the incident happened was established
by his birth certificate, and this was admitted by the defense.106 His age of 10 years old
was alleged in the Information.107 The higher penalty under Republic Act No. 7610, as
discussed in People v. Chingh, applies in this case.
Having sex with a 10-year-old is child abuse and is punished by a special law (Republic
Act No. 7610). It is a progression from the Revised Penal Code to provide greater
protection for children. Justice Velasco suggests that this is not so. He anchors his
view on his interpretation that Republic Act No. 7610 requires a showing that apart
from the actual coerced sexual act on the 10-year-old, the child must also be exploited
by prostitution or by other sexual acts. This view is inaccurate on grounds of verba
legis and ratione legis.
The first paragraph of Article III, Section 5 of Republic Act No. 7610 clearly provides
that "children . . . who . . . due to the coercion . . . of any adult . . . indulge in sexual
intercourse . . . are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual
abuse." The label "children exploited in . . . other sexual abuse" inheres in a child who
has been the subject of coercion and sexual intercourse.
Thus, paragraph (b) refers to a specification only as to who is liable and the penalty to
be imposed. The person who engages in sexual intercourse with a child already
coerced is liable.
It does not make sense for the law not to consider rape of a child as child abuse. The
proposal of Justice Velasco implies that there has to be other acts of a sexual nature
other than the rape itself that will characterize rape as child abuse. One count of rape
is not enough. Child abuse, in his view, is not yet present with one count of rape.
Rape is rape. Rape of a child is clearly, definitely, and universally child abuse.
Justice Velasco further observes that the right to due process of the accused will be
violated should we impose the penalty under Republic Act No. 7610. I disagree.
The Information was clear about the facts constitutive of the offense. The facts
constitutive of the offense will suggest the crime punishable by law. The principle is
that ignorantia legis non excusat. With the facts clearly laid out in the Information, the
law which punishes the offense should already be clear and the accused put on notice
of the charges against him.
Additionally, there is no argument that the accused was not represented by counsel.
Clear from the records is the entry and active participation of his lawyer up to and
including this appeal.
This court has stated that "jurisprudence from 2001 up to the present yields the
information that the prevailing amount awarded as civil indemnity to victims of
simple rape committed by means other than penile insertion is P30,000."109
This statement considered the prevailing situation in our jurisprudence where victims
of rape are all women.1wphi1 However, as in this case, men can also become victims
of rape through sexual assault, and this can involve penile insertion.
WHEREFORE, the Court of Appeals Decision in CA-G.R. C.R. No. 34387 dated August
28, 2013 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that for rape through sexual assault
under Article 266-A, paragraph 2, accused-appellant Richard Ricalde is sentenced to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years, ten (10) months and twenty-
one (21) days of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to fifteen (15) years, six (6) months
and twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal, as maximum. He is ordered to pay the
victim civil indemnity in the amount of P30,000.00 and moral damages likewise in the
amount of P30,000.00, both with interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum from the
date of finality of this judgment until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner,
Present:
BRION,
PERALTA,** and
PEREZ, JJ.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Promulgated:
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the 26 November 2009 Decision2
and 22 June 2010 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 31354. The
Court of Appeals affirmed with modifications the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
San Carlos City, Pangasinan, Branch 56 (trial court), finding Jojit Garingarao
(Garingarao) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of acts of lasciviousness in
relation to Republic Act No. 7610 (RA 7610).4
The facts of the case, as can be gleaned from the decision of the Court of Appeals, are
as follows:
On 28 October 2003, AAA5 was brought to the Virgen Milagrosa Medical Center by her
father BBB and mother CCC due to fever and abdominal pain. Dr. George Morante (Dr.
Morante), the attending physician, recommended that AAA be confined at the hospital
for further observation. AAA was admitted at the hospital and confined at a private
room where she and her parents stayed for the night.
On 29 October 2003, BBB left the hospital to go to Lingayen, Pangasinan to process his
daughters Medicare papers. He arrived at Lingayen at around 8:00 a.m. and left the
place an hour later. CCC also left the hospital that same morning to attend to their
store at Urbiztondo, Pangasinan, leaving AAA alone in her room.
When BBB returned to the hospital, AAA told him that she wanted to go home. Dr.
Morante advised against it but due to AAAs insistence, he allowed AAA to be
discharged from the hospital with instructions that she should continue her
medications. When AAA and her parents arrived at their house around 11:30 a.m.,
AAA cried and told her parents that Garingarao sexually abused her. They all went
back to the hospital and reported the incident to Dr. Morante. They inquired from the
nurses station and learned that Garingarao was the nurse on duty on that day.
On 20 January 2004, the City Prosecutor filed an Information against Garingarao for
acts of lasciviousness in relation to RA 7610, as follows:
That on or about the 29th day of October 2003, at Virgen Milagrosa University
Hospital, San Carlos City, Pangasinan, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd designs, did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously touched the breast of AAA, 16 years
of age, touched her genitalia, and inserted his finger into her vagina, to the
damage and prejudice of said AAA who suffered psychological and emotional
disturbance, anxiety, sleeplessness and humiliation.
During the trial, AAA testified that on 29 October 2003, between 7:00 a.m. and 8:00
a.m., Garingarao, who was wearing a white uniform, entered her room and asked if she
already took her medicines and if she was still experiencing pains. AAA replied that
her stomach was no longer painful. Garingarao then lifted AAAs bra and touched her
left breast. Embarrassed, AAA asked Garingarao what he was doing. Garingarao
replied that he was just examining her. Garingarao then left the room and returned 15
to 30 minutes later with a stethoscope. Garingarao told AAA that he would examine
her again. Garingarao lifted AAAs shirt, pressed the stethoscope to her stomach and
touched her two nipples. Garingarao then lifted AAAs pajama and underwear and
pressed the lower part of her abdomen. Garingarao then slid his finger inside AAAs
private part. AAA instinctively crossed her legs and again asked Garingarao what he
was doing. She asked him to stop and informed him she had her monthly period.
Garingarao ignored AAA and continued to insert his finger inside her private part.
Garingarao only stopped when he saw that AAA really had her monthly period. He
went inside the bathroom of the private room, washed his hands, applied alcohol and
left. When BBB arrived at the hospital, AAA insisted on going home. She only narrated
the incident to her parents when they got home and they went back to the hospital to
report the incident to Dr. Morante.
Dr. Morante testified on AAAs confinement to and discharge from the hospital.
The prosecution presented the following documents before the trial court:
(a) AAAs birth certificate to establish that she was 16 years old at the time of
the incident;
(b) AAAs medical records establishing her confinement to and discharge from
Virgen Milagrosa Medical Center;
(c) the schedule of duties of the nurses at the hospital showing that Garingarao
was on duty from 12:00 a.m. to 8:00 a.m. on 29 October 2003;
(d) a certificate from the Department of Education Division Office showing that
BBB was present at the office from 8:00 a.m. to 9:00 a.m. on 29 October 2003;
(f) the incident report filed by AAAs parents with the police; and
For the defense, Garingarao gave a different version of the incident. Garingarao
alleged that on 29 October 2003, he and his nursing aide Edmundo Tamayo (Tamayo)
went inside AAAs room to administer her medicines and check her vital signs. BBB
then accused them of not administering the medicines properly and on time.
Garingarao told BBB that they should not be told how to administer the medicines
because they knew what they were doing and that they would be accountable should
anything happen to AAA. A heated argument ensued between BBB and Garingarao.
BBB told Garingarao he was an arrogant nurse. Garingarao replied that if BBB had any
complaint, he could report the matter to the hospital. Garingarao denied that he
inserted his finger into AAAs private part and that he fondled her breasts. Garingarao
alleged that the filing of the case was motivated by the argument he had with BBB.
Tamayo testified that he was with Garingarao when they went to AAAs room between
7:00 a.m. and 8:00 a.m. of 29 October 2003. He alleged that BBB was present and he
accused Garingarao of not administering the medications properly. Tamayo alleged
that Garingarao and BBB had an argument. Tamayo stated that he would always
accompany Garingarao whenever the latter would visit the rooms of the patients.
In its Decision7 dated 5 November 2007, the trial court found Garingarao guilty as
charged. The trial court gave credence to the testimony of AAA over Garingaraos
denial. The trial court ruled that Garingarao was positively identified by AAA as the
person who entered her room, touched her breasts and inserted his finger into her
private part. The trial court also found that the prosecution was able to establish that
BBB and CCC were not in the room when Garingarao went inside.
The trial court found as baseless Garingaraos defense that the case was only motivated
by the argument he had with BBB. The trial court ruled that it was illogical for BBB to
convince his daughter to fabricate a story of sexual abuse just to get even at
Garingarao over a heated argument.
The accused is ordered to pay to the minor victim [AAA] P20,000.00 as moral
damages and P10,000.00 as fine.
SO ORDERED.8
In its 26 November 2009 Decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts
decision with modifications.
The Court of Appeals ruled that while Garingarao was charged for acts of
lasciviousness in relation to RA 7610, he should be convicted under RA 7610 because
AAA was 16 years old when the crime was committed. The Court of Appeals ruled that
under Section 5(b) of RA 7610, the offender shall be charged with rape or lascivious
conduct under the Revised Penal Code (RPC) only if the victim is below 12 years old;
otherwise, the provisions of RA 7610 shall prevail.
The Court of Appeals ruled that based on the evidence on record and the testimony of
AAA, the decision of the trial court has to be affirmed. The Court of Appeals ruled that
under Section 2(h) of the Rules and Regulations on the Reporting and Investigation of
Child Abuse Cases, the introduction of any object into the genitalia of the offended
party as well as the intentional touching of her breasts when done with the intent to
sexually gratify the offender qualify as a lascivious act. AAAs testimony established
that Garingarao committed the lascivious acts.
The Court of Appeals found no reason for AAA or her family to fabricate the charges
against Garingarao. The Court of Appeals ruled that Garingaraos claim that the case
was filed so that BBB could get even with him because of the argument they had was
too shallow to be given consideration. The Court of Appeals likewise rejected
Garingaraos defense of denial which could not prevail over the positive testimony of
AAA.
The Court of Appeals modified the penalty imposed by the trial court. The Court of
Appeals ruled that the duration of reclusion temporal in its maximum period should be
17 years, 4 months and 1 day to 20 years and not 14 years and 8 months as imposed
by the trial court. The Court of Appeals also raised the award of moral damages and
fine, which was deemed as civil indemnity, to conform with recent jurisprudence.
SO ORDERED.9
Garingarao filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 22 June 2010 Resolution, the
Court of Appeals denied the motion.
The Issue
The only issue in this case is whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible
error in affirming with modifications the trial courts decision.
Garingarao alleges that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial courts
decision finding him guilty of acts of lasciviousness in relation to RA 7610. Garingarao
insists that it was physically impossible for him to commit the acts charged against
him because there were many patients and hospital employees around. He alleges that
AAAs room was well lighted and that he had an assistant when the incident allegedly
occurred. Garingarao further alleges that, assuming the charges were correct, there
was only one incident when he allegedly touched AAA and as such, he should have
been convicted only of acts of lasciviousness and not of violation of RA 7610.
We do not agree.
Credibility of Witnesses
The Court has ruled that in case of acts of lasciviousness, the lone testimony of the
offended party, if credible, is sufficient to establish the guilt of the accused.10 In this
case, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found the testimony of AAA credible
over Garingaraos defense of denial and alibi. It is a settled rule that denial is a weak
defense as against the positive identification by the victim.11 Both denial and alibi are
inherently weak defenses and constitute self-serving negative evidence which cannot
be accorded greater evidentiary weight than the positive declaration by a credible
witness.12 Garingaraos defense of denial and alibi must fail over the positive and
straightforward testimony of AAA on the incident. Further, like the trial court and the
Court of Appeals, we find incredible Garingaraos defense that the case was an offshoot
of a heated argument he had with AAAs father over the manner Garingarao was giving
AAAs medications. It is hard to believe that AAAs parents would expose her to a public
trial if the charges were not true.13 In addition, the prosecution was able to establish
that, contrary to Garingaraos allegation, both BBB and CCC were not in AAAs room at
the time of the incident.
Violation of RA 7610
Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. - Children, whether male
or female, who for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the
coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in
prostitution and other sexual abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua
shall be imposed upon the following:
(a) x x x
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with
a child exploited in prostitution or subject to other sexual abuse; Provided,
That when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age, the perpetrators shall
be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3 for rape and Article 336 of Act
No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious conduct,
as the case may be; Provided, That the penalty for lascivious conduct when the
victim is under twelve (12) yeas of age shall be reclusion temporal in its
medium period, x x x
(c) x x x
The elements of sexual abuse under Section 5, Article III of RA 7610 are the following:
Under Section 32, Article XIII of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 7610,
lascivious conduct is defined as follows:
In this case, the prosecution established that Garingarao touched AAAs breasts and
inserted his finger into her private part for his sexual gratification. Garingarao used
his influence as a nurse by pretending that his actions were part of the physical
examination he was doing. Garingarao persisted on what he was doing despite AAAs
objections. AAA twice asked Garingarao what he was doing and he answered that he
was just examining her.
The Court has ruled that a child is deemed subject to other sexual abuse when the
child is the victim of lascivious conduct under the coercion or influence of any adult.16
In lascivious conduct under the coercion or influence of any adult, there must be some
form of compulsion equivalent to intimidation which subdues the free exercise of the
offended partys free will.17 In this case, Garingarao coerced AAA into submitting to his
lascivious acts by pretending that he was examining her.
Garingarao insists that, assuming that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
were true, he should not be convicted of violation of RA 7610 because the incident
happened only once. Garingarao alleges that the single incident would not suffice to
hold him liable under RA 7610.
The Court has already ruled that it is inconsequential that sexual abuse under RA
7610 occurred only once.18 Section 3(b) of RA 7610 provides that the abuse may be
habitual or not.19 Hence, the fact that the offense occurred only once is enough to hold
Garingarao liable for acts of lasciviousness under RA 7610.
SO ORDERED.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Not every instance of the laying of hands on a child constitutes the crime of child
abuse under Section 10 (a) of Republic Act No. 7610.1 Only when the laying of hands is
shown beyond reasonable doubt to be intended by the accused to debase, degrade or
demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of the child as a human being should it be
punished as child abuse. Otherwise, it is punished under the Revised Penal Code.
The Case
On June 22, 2005,2 the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the conviction of the petitioner
for the crime of child abuse under Section 10 (a) of Republic Act No. 7610.
Antecedents
On June 26, 2000, the Prosecutors Office of Legazpi City charged the petitioner in the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Legazpi City with child abuse, an act in violation of
Section 10(a) of Republic Act No. 7610, alleging as follows:
That on or about the 11th day of May 2000, in the City of Legazpi Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit on the person of JAYSON DELA
CRUZ, a twelve year-old,
Grade VI pupil of MABA Institute, Legazpi City, acts of physical abuse and/or
maltreatment by striking said JAYSON DELA CRUZ with his palm hitting the latter at
his back and by slapping said minor hitting his left cheek and uttering derogatory
remarks to the latters family to wit: "Mga hayop kamo, para dayo kamo digdi, Iharap
mo dito ama mo" (You all animals, you are all strangers here. Bring your father here),
which acts of the accused are prejudicial to the childs development and which demean
the intrinsic worth and dignity of the said child as a human being.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
The Prosecution showed that on May 11, 2002, Jayson Dela Cruz (Jayson) and
Roldan, his older brother, both minors, joined the evening procession for the Santo
Nio at Oro Site in Legazpi City; that when the procession passed in front of the
petitioners house, the latters daughter Mary Ann Rose, also a minor, threw stones at
Jayson and called him "sissy"; that the petitioner confronted Jayson and Roldan and
called them names like "strangers" and "animals"; that the petitioner struck Jayson at
the back with his hand, and slapped Jayson on the face;4 that the petitioner then went
to the brothers house and challenged Rolando dela Cruz, their father, to a fight, but
Rolando did not come out of the house to take on the petitioner; that Rolando later
brought Jayson to the Legazpi City Police Station and reported the incident; that
Jayson also underwent medical treatment at the Bicol Regional Training and Teaching
Hospital;5 that the doctors who examined Jayson issued two medical certificates
attesting that Jayson suffered the following contusions, to wit: (1) contusion .5 x 2.5
scapular area, left; and (2) +1x1 cm. contusion left zygomatic area and contusion .5 x
2.33 cm. scapular area, left.6
On his part, the petitioner denied having physically abused or maltreated Jayson. He
explained that he only talked with Jayson and Roldan after Mary Ann Rose and
Cherrylyn, his minor daughters, had told him about Jayson and Roldans throwing
stones at them and about Jaysons burning Cherrylyns hair. He denied shouting
invectives at and challenging Rolando to a fight, insisting that he only told Rolando to
restrain his sons from harming his daughters.7
To corroborate the petitioners testimony, Mary Ann Rose testified that her father did
not hit or slap but only confronted Jayson, asking why Jayson had called her
daughters "Kimi" and why he had burned Cherrlyns hair. Mary Ann Rose denied
throwing stones at Jayson and calling him a "sissy." She insisted that it was instead
Jayson who had pelted her with stones during the procession. She described the
petitioner as a loving and protective father.8
After trial, the RTC found and declared the petitioner guilty of child abuse as charged,
to wit:9
SO ORDERED.
Ruling of the CA
On appeal, the petitioner assailed the credibility of the Prosecution witnesses by citing
their inconsistencies. He contended that the RTC overlooked or disregarded material
facts and circumstances in the records that would have led to a favorable judgment for
him. He attacked the lack of credibility of the witnesses presented against him, citing
the failure of the complaining brothers to react to the incident, which was unnatural
and contrary to human experience.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision dated October 20, 2003 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 9 of Legazpi City is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION in that accused-appellant George Bongalon is sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision
correccional, as minimum term, to six (6) years, eight (8) months and 1 day of prision
mayor as the maximum term.
SO ORDERED.
Issues
The petitioner has come to the Court via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court.11
The petitioner asserts that he was not guilty of the crime charged; and that even
assuming that he was guilty, his liability should be mitigated because he had merely
acted to protect her two minor daughters.
At the outset, we should observe that the petitioner has adopted the wrong remedy in
assailing the CAs affirmance of his conviction. His proper recourse from the
affirmance of his conviction was an appeal taken in due course. Hence, he should have
filed a petition for review on certiorari. Instead, he wrongly brought a petition for
certiorari. We explained why in People v. Court of Appeals:12
The special civil action for certiorari is intended for the correction of errors of
jurisdiction only or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. Its principal office is only to keep the inferior court within the parameters
of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing such a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. As observed in Land Bank of the
Philippines v. Court of Appeals, et al. "the special civil action for certiorari is a remedy
designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. The
raison detre for the rule is when a court exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed
while so engaged does not deprived it of the jurisdiction being exercised when the
error is committed. If it did, every error committed by a court would deprive it of its
jurisdiction and every erroneous judgment would be a void judgment. In such a
scenario, the administration of justice would not survive. Hence, where the issue or
question involved affects the wisdom or legal soundness of the decisionnot the
jurisdiction of the court to render said decisionthe same is beyond the province of a
special civil action for certiorari. The proper recourse of the aggrieved party from a
decision of the Court of Appeals is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Revised Rules of Court.
It is of no consequence that the petitioner alleges grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the CA in his petition. The allegation of grave abuse of discretion no more warrants
the granting of due course to the petition as one for certiorari if appeal was available
as a proper and adequate remedy. At any rate, a reading of his presentation of the
issues in his petition indicates that he thereby imputes to the CA errors of judgment,
not errors of jurisdiction. He mentions instances attendant during the commission of
the crime that he claims were really constitutive of justifying and mitigating
circumstances; and specifies reasons why he believes Republic Act No. 7610 favors his
innocence rather than his guilt for the crime charged.13 The errors he thereby
underscores in the petition concerned only the CAs appreciation and assessment of
the evidence on record, which really are errors of judgment, not of jurisdiction.
Even if we were to treat the petition as one brought under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, it would still be defective due to its being filed beyond the period provided by
law. Section 2 of Rule 45 requires the filing of the petition within 15 days from the
notice of judgment to be appealed. However, the petitioner received a copy of the CAs
decision on July 15, 2005,14 but filed the petition only on September 12, 2005,15 or
well beyond the period prescribed by the Rules of Court.
The law under which the petitioner was charged, tried and found guilty of violating is
Section 10 (a), Article VI of Republic Act No. 7610, which relevantly states:
Section 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation and other Conditions
Prejudicial to the Childs Development.
(a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty or exploitation
or be responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the childs development including
those covered by Article 59 of Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended, but not
covered by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall suffer the penalty of prision
mayor in its minimum period.
xxxx
Child abuse, the crime charged, is defined by Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. 7610, as
follows:
xxxx
(b) "Child Abuse" refers to the maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of the child
which includes any of the following:
(1) Psychological and physical abuse, neglect, cruelty, sexual abuse and emotional
maltreatment;
(2) Any act by deeds or words which debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth
and dignity of a child as a human being;
(3) Unreasonable deprivation of his basic needs for survival, such as food and shelter;
or
xxxx
Although we affirm the factual findings of fact by the RTC and the CA to the effect that
the petitioner struck Jayson at the back with his hand and slapped Jayson on the face,
we disagree with their holding that his acts constituted child abuse within the purview
of the above-quoted provisions. The records did not establish beyond reasonable doubt
that his laying of hands on Jayson had been intended to debase the "intrinsic worth
and dignity" of Jayson as a human being, or that he had thereby intended to humiliate
or embarrass Jayson. The records showed the laying of hands on Jayson to have been
done at the spur of the moment and in anger, indicative of his being then overwhelmed
by his fatherly concern for the personal safety of his own minor daughters who had
just suffered harm at the hands of Jayson and Roldan. With the loss of his self-control,
he lacked that specific intent to debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic worth and
dignity of a child as a human being that was so essential in the crime of child abuse.
It is not trite to remind that under the well-recognized doctrine of pro reo every doubt
is resolved in favor of the petitioner as the accused. Thus, the Court should consider all
possible circumstances in his favor.18
Considering that Jaysons physical injury required five to seven days of medical
attention,19 the petitioner was liable for slight physical injuries under Article 266 (1)
of the Revised Penal Code, to wit:
Article 266. Slight physical injuries and maltreatment. The crime of slight physical
injuries shall be punished:
1. By arresto menor when the offender has inflicted physical injuries which shall
incapacitate the offended party for labor from one to nine days, or shall require
medical attendance during the same period.
xxxx
The penalty for slight physical injuries is arresto menor, which ranges from one day to
30 days of imprisonment.20 In imposing the correct penalty, however, we have to
consider the mitigating circumstance of passion or obfuscation under Article 13 (6) of
the Revised Penal Code,21 because the petitioner lost his reason and self-control,
thereby diminishing the exercise of his will power.22 Passion or obfuscation may
lawfully arise from causes existing only in the honest belief of the accused.23 It is
relevant to mention, too, that in passion or obfuscation, the offender suffers a
diminution of intelligence and intent. With his having acted under the belief that
Jayson and Roldan had thrown stones at his two minor daughters, and that Jayson
had burned Cherrlyns hair, the petitioner was entitled to the mitigating circumstance
of passion. Arresto menor is prescribed in its minimum period (i.e., one day to 10
days) in the absence of any aggravating circumstance that offset the mitigating
circumstance of passion. Accordingly, with the Indeterminate Sentence Law being
inapplicable due to the penalty imposed not exceeding one year,24 the petitioner shall
suffer a straight penalty of 10 days of arresto menor.
The award of moral damages to Jayson is appropriate. Such damages are granted in
criminal cases resulting in physical injuries.25 The amount of P5,000.00 fixed by the
lower courts as moral damages is consistent with the current jurisprudence.26
WHEREFORE, we SET ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals; and ENTER a new
judgment: (a) finding petitioner George Bongalon GUlLTY beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES under paragraph 1, Article 266, of the
Revised Penal Code; (b) sentencing him to suffer the penalty of 10 days of arresto
menor; and (c) ordering him to pay Jayson Dela Cruz the amount of P5,000.00 as
moral damages, plus the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is to resolve an appeal from the Decision1 dated August 4, 2010 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 03725 affirming with modification the Decision2
dated October 8, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 194, Paraaque City,
finding appellant Dina Dulay guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape
under Article 266-A. No. 1 (a) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) as amended by
Republic Act (R.A.) 8353 as a co-principal by indispensable cooperation.
Private complainant AAA3 was 12 years old when the whole incident happened. AAA's
sister introduced the appellant to AAA as someone who is nice. Thereafter, appellant
convinced AAA to accompany her at a wake at GI San Dionisio, Paraaque City. Before
going to the said wake, they went to a casino to look for appellant's boyfriend, but since
he was not there, they went to Sto. Nio at Don Galo. However, appellant's boyfriend
was also not there. When they went to Bulungan Fish Port along the coastal road to
ask for some fish, they saw appellant's boyfriend. Afterwards, AAA, appellant and the
latter's boyfriend proceeded to the Kubuhan located at the back of the Bulungan Fish
Port. When they reached the Kubuhan, appellant suddenly pulled AAA inside a room
where a man known by the name "Speed" was waiting. AAA saw "Speed" give money to
appellant and heard "Speed" tell appellant to look for a younger girl. Thereafter,
"Speed" wielded a knife and tied AAA's hands to the papag and raped her. AAA asked
for appellant's help when she saw the latter peeping into the room while she was being
raped, but appellant did not do so. After the rape, "Speed" and appellant told AAA not
to tell anyone what had happened or else they would get back at her.
AAA went to San Pedro, Laguna after the incident and told her sister what happened
and the latter informed their mother about it. AAA, her sister and mother, filed a
complaint at Barangay San Dionisio. Thereafter, the barangay officials of San Dionisio
referred the complaint to the police station.
The Paraaque City Police Office (Women's and Children Concern Desk) asked the
assistance of the Child Protection Unit of the Philippine General Hospital, upon which
the latter assigned the case to Dr. Merle Tan. Consequently, with the consent of AAA
and her mother, and in the presence of a social worker of the Department of Social
Welfare and Development (DSWD), Dr. Tan conducted the requisite interview and
physical examination on AAA. Later on, Dr. Tan issued a Medico-Legal Report4 stating
that there was no evident injury in the body of AAA, but medical evaluation cannot
exclude sexual abuse. During her testimony, Dr. Tan explained that such impression
or conclusion pertains to the ano-genital examination and also stated that she found
multiple abrasions on the back portion of the body of AAA.5
That on or about the 3rd day of July 2005, in the City of Paraaque, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring
and confederating together with one alias "Speed," whose true name and identity and
present whereabouts is still unknown, and both of them mutually helping and aiding
one another, the herein accused Dina P. Dulay having delivered and offered for a fee
complainant AAA, 12 year old minor, to accused alias "Speed," who with lewd design
and by means of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge on said minor complainant AAA against her will
and without her consent, which act is prejudicial to the normal growth and
development of the said child.
CONTRARY TO LAW.6
With the assistance of counsel de oficio, on August 3, 2005, appellant entered a plea of
not guilty.7 Therafter, trial on the merits ensued.
To support the above allegations, the prosecution presented the testimonies of AAA
and Dr. Merle Tan. On the other hand, the defense presented the sole testimony of
appellant which can be summarized as follows:
Appellant met AAA a few days before June 2005 when the latter was introduced to
her by her cousin Eglay Akmad during the wake of a relative of AAA at Palanyag. The
cousin of appellant was AAA's neighbor at Palanyag. Around 1 o'clock in the morning
of July 3, 2005, appellant averred that she was at La Huerta, at the Bulungan Fish
Port in Paraaque City with her cousin Eglay and stayed there for about thirty (30)
minutes. They then proceeded to the house of appellant's cousin in Palanyag. In the
said house, appellant saw "Speed" and two (2) other male persons. She also saw AAA
who was engaged in a conversation with "Speed" and his two (2) companions. She
asked AAA what she was doing there and the latter said that it was none of her
business ("wala kang pakialam sa akin"). Because of the response of AAA, appellant
left the house and went home to General Trias, Cavite.
On October 8, 2008, the RTC found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of rape as co-principal by indispensable cooperation. The dispositive portion of
the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, finding Accused Danilo guilty beyond reasonable doubt for rape as a co-
principal by indispensable cooperation, she is hereby sentenced to suffer an
imprisonment of Reclusion Perpetua under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code
and to pay the offended party the amount of P 50,000.00 by way of damages.
The period of her detention shall be considered part of the service of her sentence.
SO ORDERED.8
Not satisfied with the judgment of the trial court, the appellant brought the case to the
CA. The latter, on August 4, 2010, promulgated its decision affirming the ruling of the
RTC with a modification on the award of damages, thus:
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision of the court a quo is AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that the accused-appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua and ordered to indemnify the offended party the sum of Fifty
Thousand Pesos (P 50,000.00) as civil indemnity, Fifty Thousand Pesos (P 50,000.00)
as moral damages and Twenty-Five Thousand Pesos (P 25,000.00) as exemplary
damages.
SO ORDERED.9
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING FULL WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO
THE TESTIMONY OF THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT AAA.10
The Office of the Solicitor General, representing the appellee, refutes the above
assignment of errors by stating the following arguments:
I.
CONSPIRACY WAS CLEARLY ESTABLISHED IN THIS CASE.
II.
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN BELIEVING THE TESTIMONY OF PRIVATE
COMPLAINANT.
III.
An appeal in a criminal case throws the whole case wide open for review and the
reviewing tribunal can correct errors, though unassigned in the appealed judgment, or
even reverse the trial court's decision on the basis of grounds other than those that the
parties raised as errors.12
The appellant in this case was charged in the Information as having committed the
crime of Rape under Article 266-A, No. 1 (a) of the RPC, as amended by R.A. 8353 in
relation to Section 5 (b) of R.A. 7610. She was eventually convicted by the trial court
of the crime of rape as a co-principal by indispensable cooperation and was sentenced
to suffer imprisonment of reclusion perpetua as provided under Article 266-B of the
RPC.
To cooperate means to desire or wish in common a thing. But that common will or
purpose does not necessarily mean previous understanding, for it can be explained or
inferred from the circumstances of each case. The cooperation must be indispensable,
that is, without which the commission of the crime would not have been accomplished.
xxx
xxxx
The proven facts and circumstances obtaining in this case fall squarely on the above-
cited example. It will be noted that the cooperation of the accused-appellant consisted
in performing an act which is different from the act of execution of the crime
committed by the rapist. Accused-appellant cooperated in the perpetration of the
crime of rape committed by "Speed" by acts without which the crime would not have
been consummated, since she prepared the way for the perpetration thereof,
convinced the victim to go with her under the guise of looking for her boyfriend and
upon arrival at the kubuhan, she pulled the victim inside a room where "Speed" was
waiting, delivered the victim to him, and then after receiving some amount of money
from "Speed" she settled in another room together with her boyfriend so that "Speed"
might freely consummate the rape with violence and intimidation, as he did.13
However, this Court is of another view and does not subscribe to the findings of the
trial court, as sustained by the CA that appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt as
co-principal by indispensable cooperation in the crime of rape.
Under the Revised Penal Code,14 an accused may be considered a principal by direct
participation, by inducement, or by indispensable cooperation. To be a principal by
indispensable cooperation, one must participate in the criminal resolution, a
conspiracy or unity in criminal purpose and cooperation in the commission of the
offense by performing another act without which it would not have been
accomplished.15 Nothing in the evidence presented by the prosecution does it show
that the acts committed by appellant are indispensable in the commission of the crime
of rape. The events narrated by the CA, from the time appellant convinced AAA to go
with her until appellant received money from the man who allegedly raped AAA, are
not indispensable in the crime of rape. Anyone could have accompanied AAA and
offered the latter's services in exchange for money and AAA could still have been
raped. Even AAA could have offered her own services in exchange for monetary
consideration and still end up being raped. Thus, this disproves the indispensable
aspect of the appellant in the crime of rape. It must be remembered that in the
Information, as well as in the testimony of AAA, she was delivered and offered for a fee
by appellant, thereafter, she was raped by "Speed." Thus:
PROS. R. GARCIA: Now, what happened after you met this Dina Dulay?
xxxx
Q: You went to the bulungan, what happened when you reached the fish port or
bulungan, AAA?
Q: And, when you said pumunta kami, who was then your companion in going to that
kubuhan?
A: No, Sir.
xxxx
Q: What made you say AAA that accused here Dina Dulay had you raped at the
kubuhan?
Q: Now, do you know how much this Dina Dulay was paid by that person who was you
said raped you?
A: Pera, Sir.
Q: Aside from seeing a guy giving money to Dina Dulay, did you hear any conversation
between this Dina Dulay and that man who gave money to her?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Can you tell this Honorable Court AAA, what was that conversation you heard
between this Dina Dulay and the person who gave money to her?
xxxx
PROS. R. GARCIA:
Q: Okay. After that conversation and the giving of money to Dina Dulay, what
happened to you and the man?
A: At the Kubuhan, Sir. Q: Can you describe to this Honorable Court how you were
raped by that person?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: And, how did you feel at that time when the organ of this man was inserted into
your organ?
Q: And, how did you react when as you said you were being raped by this person?
Q: For how long did you stay in that kubuhan with this man? May isang oras ba kayo
doon?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: Now, tell us how AAA many times did this person insert his penis into your organ?
It must be clear that this Court respects the findings of the trial court that AAA was
indeed raped by considering the credibility of the testimony of AAA. The rule is that
factual findings of the trial court and its evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and
their testimonies are entitled to great respect and will not be disturbed on appeal.18
However, the review of a criminal case opens up the case in its entirety. The totality of
the evidence presented by both the prosecution and the defense are weighed, thus,
avoiding general conclusions based on isolated pieces of evidence.19 In the case of rape,
a review begins with the reality that rape is a very serious accusation that is painful to
make; at the same time, it is a charge that is not hard to lay against another by one
with malice in her mind. Because of the private nature of the crime that justifies the
acceptance of the lone testimony of a credible victim to convict, it is not easy for the
accused, although innocent, to disprove his guilt. These realities compel this Court to
approach with great caution and to scrutinize the statements of a victim on whose sole
testimony conviction or acquittal depends.20
In this light, while this Court does not find appellant to have committed the crime of
rape as a principal by indispensable cooperation, she is still guilty of violation of
Section 5 (a) of R.A. 7610, or the Special Protection of Children Against Abuse,
Exploitation and Discrimination Act, which states that:
Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. Children, whether male or
female, who for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or
influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be
imposed upon the following:
(a) Those who engage in or promote, facilitate or induce child prostitution which
include, but are not limited to, the following:
(5) Giving monetary consideration goods or other pecuniary benefit to a child with
intent to engage such child in prostitution.21
2. the act is done through, but not limited to, the following means:
As alleged in the Information and proven through the testimony of AAA, appellant
facilitated or induced child prostitution. Children, whether male or female, who for
money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any
adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are
deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.24 Thus, the act
of apellant in convincing AAA, who was 12 years old at that time, to go with her and
thereafter, offer her for sex to a man in exchange for money makes her liable under
the above-mentioned law. The purpose of the law is to provide special protection to
children from all forms of abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation and discrimination, and
other conditions prejudicial to their development.25 A child exploited in prostitution
may seem to "consent" to what is being done to her or him and may appear not to
complain. However, we have held that a child who is "a person below eighteen years of
age or those unable to fully take care of themselves or protect themselves from abuse,
neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination because of their age or mental
disability or condition" is incapable of giving rational consent26 to any lascivious act or
sexual intercourse.
It must be noted that in the Information, it was alleged that appellant was accused of
Rape under Article 266-A, No. 1 (a) of the RPC, as amended by R.A. 8353 in relation to
Section 5 (b) of R.A. 7610, and then went on to enumerate the elements of Section 5
(a) of R.A. 7610 in its body. The Information partly reads:
x x x the herein accused Dina P. Dulay having delivered and offered for a fee
complainant AAA, 12 year old minor, to accused alias "Speed," who with lewd design
and by means of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge on said minor complainant AAA against her will
and without her consent x x x 27
Undoubtedly, the above-quoted falls under Section 5 (a) of R.A. 7610, the appellant
acting as a procurer of a child and inducing the latter into prostitution. It must be
remembered that the character of the crime is not determined by the caption or
preamble of the information nor from the specification of the provision of law alleged
to have been violated, they may be conclusions of law, but by the recital of the ultimate
facts and circumstances in the complaint or information.28 The sufficiency of an
information is not negated by an incomplete or defective designation of the crime in
the caption or other parts of the information but by the narration of facts and
circumstances which adequately depicts a crime and sufficiently apprises the accused
of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.291wphi1
To dispute the allegation and the evidence presented by the prosecution, appellant
merely interposes the defense of denial. It is well settled that denial is essentially the
weakest form of defense and it can never overcome an affirmative testimony,
particularly when it comes from the mouth of a credible witness.30
Anent the penalty, for violation of the provisions of Section 5, Article III of R.A. 7610,
the penalty prescribed is reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion
perpetua. Therefore, in the absence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the
proper imposable penalty is reclusion temporal in its maximum period, the medium of
the penalty prescribed by the law.31 Notwithstanding that R.A. 7610 is a special law,
appellant may enjoy the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.32 Since the
penalty provided in R.A. 7610 is taken from the range of penalties in the Revised
Penal Code, it is covered by the first clause of Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence
Law.33 Thus, appellant is entitled to a maximum term which should be within the
range of the proper imposable penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period
(ranging from 17 years, 4 months and 1 day to 20 years) and a minimum term to be
taken within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the law: prision
mayor in its medium period to reclusion temporal in its minimum period (ranging
from 8 years and 1 day to 14 years and 8 months).34
As to the award of damages, the same must be consistent with the objective of R.A.
7610 to afford children special protection against abuse, exploitation and
discrimination and with the principle that every person who contrary to law, willfully
or negligently causes damage to another shall indemnify the latter for the same.35
Therefore, civil indemnity to the child is proper in a case involving violation of Section
5 (a), Article III of R.A. 7610. This is also in compliance with Article 100 of the RPC
which states that every person criminally liable is civilly liable. Hence, the amount of P
50,000.00 civil indemnity ex delicto as awarded in cases of violation of Section 5 (b),
Article III of R.A. 761036 shall also be the same in cases of violation of Section 5 (a),
Article III of R.A. 7610.
SO ORDERED.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The petitioner, a public schoolteacher, was charged with and found guilty of child
abuse, a violation of Republic Act No. 7610.1 The victim was her own Grade 1 pupil
whom she physically maltreated for having accidentally bumped her knee while she
was drowsing off on a bamboo sofa as he entered the classroom. Her maltreatment left
him with physical injuries, as duly certified by a physician.
Whether or not the petitioner thereby committed child abuse is the question that this
appeal must determine, in light of the Court's pronouncement in Bongalon v. People of
the Philippines2 that:
Not every instance of the laying of hands on a child constitutes the crime of child
abuse under Section 10 (a) of Republic Act No. 7610. Only when the laying of hands is
shown beyond reasonable doubt to be intended by the accused to debase, degrade or
demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of the child as a human being should it be
punished as child abuse. Otherwise, it is punished under the Revised Penal Code.
Antecedents
The State, through the Office ofthe Solicitor General, summed up the factual
antecedents in its comment,3 as follows:
On February 13, 1996, seven yearold Michael Ryan Gonzales, then a Grade 1 pupil at
Pughanan Elementary School located in the Municipality of Lambunao, Iloilo, was
hurriedly entering his classroom when he accidentally bumped the knee of his
teacher, petitioner Felina Rosaldes, who was then asleep on a bamboo sofa (TSN,
March 14, 1997, pp. 5-6). Roused from sleep, petitioner asked Michael Ryan to
apologize to her. When Michael did not obey but instead proceeded to his seat (TSN,
March 14, 1997, p. 6), petitioner went to Michael and pinched him on his thigh. Then,
she held him up by his armpits and pushed him to the floor. As he fell, Michael Ryans
body hit a desk. As a result, he lost consciousness. Petitioner proceeded topick Michael
Ryan up by his ears and repeatedly slammed him down on the floor. Michael Ryan
cried (TSN, March 14, 1997, p. 6; TSN, November 13, 1997, p. 7).
After the incident, petitioner proceeded to teach her class. During lunch break,
Michael Ryan, accompanied by two of his classmates, Louella Loredo and Jonalyn
Gonzales, went home crying and told his mother about the incident (TSN, March 14,
1997, p. 7). His mother and his Aunt Evangeline Gonzales reported the incident to
their Barangay Captain, Gonzalo Larroza (TSN, February 1, 1999, p. 4) who advised
them to have Michael Ryan examined by a doctor. Michael Ryans aunt and Barangay
Councilman Ernesto Ligante brought him to the Dr. Ricardo Y. Ladrido Hospital where
he was examined by Dr. Teresita Castigador. They, likewise, reported the incident to
the Police Station (TSN, July 27, 1997, p. 6; TSN, February 1, 1999, p. 4).
1. Petechiae and tenderness of both external ears 1x2 cm. and 1x1 cm.;
The petitioner was criminally charged with child abusein the Regional Trial Court in
Iloilo City (RTC), and the case was assigned to Branch 27 of that court. The
information alleged as follows: The Provincial Prosecutor of Iloilo, upon approval and
Directive of the Deputy OMBUDSMAN for the Visayas accuses FELINA ROSALDES of
the crime of VIOLATION OF CHILD ABUSE LAW
(Section 10 (a) of R.A. 7610), committed as follows:
That on or about the 13th day of February 1996, in the Municipality of Lambunao,
Province of Iloilo, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, being a public school teacher in Grade 1 of Pughanan
Elementary School, with a Salary Grade below 26, under the DECS, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously maltreat her pupil Michael Ryan Gonzales, a
seven year old child, by pinching him on different parts of his body, and thereafter
slumping him to the ground, thereby causing Michael Ryan Gonzales to lose his
consciousness and has suffered injuries on different parts of his body.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
On June 26, 2003, the RTC rendered judgment convicting the petitioner of child
abuse,5 disposing as follows:
SO ORDERED.6
On appeal, the CA affirmed the conviction of the petitioner through its assailed
decision promulgated on May 11, 2005,7 with a modification of the penalty, viz:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered by us DISMISSING
the appeal filed in this case and AFFIRMING the decision rendered on June 26, 2003
by the court a quo in Criminal Case No. 46893 with the MODIFICATION that the
accusedappellant is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years,
two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as the minimum of it, to ten
(10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as the maximum thereof.
IT IS SO ORDERED.8
The Court of Appeals erred in convicting the petitioner by holding that the acts of the
petitioner constitute child abuse penalized under Section 10 (a) of Republic Act No.
7610[,] and notunder the Revised Penal Code.
II
The Court of Appeals erred in convicting the petitioner by holding that petitioners
constitutional right to due process and her right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against her was not violated when the essential elements of the
crime charged were not properly recited in the information.10
Countering, the State, through the OSG, insists that the issues the petitioner is raising
are mainly factual and, therefore, not reviewable under the mode of appeal chosen;
that the affirmance of her conviction by the CA was in accord with the pertinent law
and jurisprudence, and supported by the overwhelming evidence of the trial; and that
the information charging her with child abuse was sufficient in form and substance.11
First of all, the State correctly contends that the petitioner could raise only questions
of law in her present recourse. Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the appeal is
limited to questionsof law. The immediate implication of the limitation is to have the
findings of fact by the CA, which affirmed the findings of fact by the trial court,
conclude the Court by virtue of its not being a trier of fact. As such, the Court cannot
analyze or weigh the evidence all over again.
It is true that the limitation of the review to errors of law admits of exceptions. Under
Section 4, Rule 3 of the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court, the following situations
are the exceptions in which the Court may review findings of fact by the lower courts,
to wit: (a) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmise and
conjecture; (b) the inference made is manifestly mistaken; (c) there is grave abuse of
discretion; (d) the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (e) the findings of
fact are conflicting; (f) the collegial appellate courts went beyond the issues of the
case, and their findings are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee;
(g) the findings of fact of the collegial appellate courts are contrary to those of the trial
court; (h) said findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on
which they are based; (i) the facts set forth in the petition aswell as in the petitioners
main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; (j) the findings of fact of
the collegial appellate courts are premised on the supposed evidence, but are
contradicted by the evidence on record; and (k) all other similar and exceptional cases
warranting a review of the lower courts findings of fact. A further exception is
recognized when the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed
bythe parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.12 Yet,
none of the exceptions applies herein.
Secondly, the petitioner contends that she did not deliberately inflict the physical
injuries suffered by MichaelRyan to maltreat or malign him in a manner that would
debase, demean or degrade his dignity. She characterizes her maltreatment as anact
of discipline that she as a school teacher could reasonably do towards the development
of the child. She insists that her act further came under the doctrine of in loco
parentis.
Article 233. The person exercising substitute parental authority shall have the same
authority over the person of the child as the parents.
In no case shall the school administrator, teacher or individual engaged in child care
exercising special parental authority inflict corporal punishment upon the child. (n)
Proof of the severe results of the petitioners physical maltreatment of Michael Ryan
was provided by Dr. Teresita Castigador, the Medico-Legal Officer of the Dr. Ricardo Y.
Ladrido Memorial Hospital in Iloilo who examined the victim at about 1:00 oclock in
the afternoon of February 13, 1996, barely three hours from the timethe boy had
sustained his injuries. Her Medical Report stated as follows:
1. Petechiae and tenderness of both external ears 1x2 cm. and 1x1 cm.;
A petechiae (wound no. 1), according to Dr. Castigador is a discoloration of the skin
caused by the extravasation of blood beneath it. She opined that the petechiae and
tenderness of the ears of the victim could have been caused by pinching. As to the
lumbar pain and tenderness at the third and fourth level of the vertebrae (wound no.
2), the doctor testified that during her examination of the victim the latter felt pain
when she put pressure on the said area. She stated that this could be caused by
pressure or contact with a hard object. Wound No. 3 is located on the victimsleft inner
thigh. According to her this could not have been caused by ordinary pinching with
pressure. Wound No. 4 is located on the upper part of the left thigh. Dr. Castigador
testified that she noticed that the boy was limping as he walked.14
xxxx
(b) "Child abuse" refers to the maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of the child
which includes any of the following:
(1) Psychological and physical abuse, neglect, cruelty, sexual abuse and emotional
maltreatment;
(2) Any act by deeds or words which debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth
and dignity of a child as a human being;
(3) Unreasonable deprivation of his basic needs for survival, such as food and shelter;
or
xxxx
In the crime charged against the petitioner, therefore, the maltreatment may consist
of an act by deedsor by wordsthat debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth
and dignity of a child as a human being. The act need not be habitual. The CA
concluded that the petitioner "went overboard in disciplining Michael Ryan, a helpless
and weak 7-year old boy, when she pinched hard Michael Ryan on the left thigh and
when she held him in the armpits and threw him on the floor[; and as] the boy fell
down, his body hit the desk causing him to lose consciousness [but instead] of feeling a
sense of remorse, the accused-appellant further held the boy up by his ears and
pushed him down on the floor."15 On her part, the trial judge said that the physical pain
experienced by the victim had been aggravated by an emotional trauma that caused
him to stop going to school altogether out of fear of the petitioner, compelling his
parents to transfer him to another school where he had to adjust again.16 Such
established circumstances proved beyond reasonable doubt thatthe petitioner was
guilty of child abuse by deeds that degraded and demeaned the intrinsic worth and
dignity of Michael Ryan as a human being.
It was also shown that Michael Ryans physical maltreatment by the petitioner was
neither her first or only maltreatment of a child. Prosecution witness Louella Loredo
revealed on cross examination that she had also experienced the petitioners
cruelty.17 The petitioner was also convicted by the RTC in Iloilo City (Branch 39) in
Criminal Case No. 348921 for maltreatment of another childnamed Dariel Legayada.18
Such previous incidents manifested that the petitioner had "a propensity for violence,"
as the trial judge stated in her decision of June 26, 2003.19
Thirdly, the petitioner submits that the information charging her with child abuse was
insufficient in form and substance, in that the essential elements of the crime charged
were not properly alleged therein; and that her constitutional and statutory right to
due process of law was consequently violated.
The information explicitly averred the offense of child abusecharged against the
petitioner in the context of the statutory definition of child abuse found in Section 3
(b) of Republic Act No. 7610, supra, and thus complied with the requirements of
Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court. Moreover, the Court should no longer
entertain the petitioners challenge against the sufficiency of the information in form
and substance. Her last chance to pose the challenge was prior to the time she pleaded
to the information through a motion to quash on the ground that the information did
not conform substantially to the prescribed form, or did not charge an offense. She did
not do so, resulting in her waiver of the challenge.
Fourthly, the RTC did not grant civil damages as civil liability ex delictobecause no
evidence had been adduced thereon.20 The CA saw nothing wrong with the omission by
the trial court. The explanation tendered by the trial judge for the omission was
misplaced, however, because even without proof of the actual expenses, or testimony
on the victims feelings, the lower courts still had the authority to define and allow
civil liability arising from the offense and the means to fix their extent. The child
abuse surely inflicted on Michael Ryan physical and emotional trauma as well as
moral injury. It cannot also be denied that his parents necessarily spent for his
treatment. We hold that both lower courts committed a plain error that demands
correction by the Court. Indeed, as the Court pointed out in Bacolod v. People,21 it was
"imperative that the courts prescribe the proper penalties when convicting the
accused, and determine the civil liability to be imposed on the accused, unless there
has been a reservation of the action to recover civil liability or a waiver of its
recovery," explaining the reason for doing so in the following manner:
It is not amiss to stress that both the RTC and the CA disregarded their express
mandate under Section 2, Rule 120 of the Rules of Courtto have the judgment, if it was
of conviction, state: "(1) the legal qualification of the offense constituted by the acts
committed by the accused and the aggravating or mitigating circumstances which
attended its commission; (2) the participation ofthe accused in the offense, whether as
principal, accomplice, or accessory after the fact; (3) the penalty imposed upon the
accused; and (4) the civil liability or damages caused by his wrongful act or omission
to be recovered from the accused by the offended party, if there is any, unless the
enforcement of the civil liability by a separate civil action has been reserved or
waived." Their disregard compels us to actas we now do lest the Court be unreasonably
seen as tolerant of their omission. That the Spouses Cogtas did not themselves seek
the correction of the omission by an appeal is no hindrance to this action because the
Court, as the final reviewing tribunal, has not only the authority but also the duty to
correct at any time a matter of law and justice.1wphi1
We also pointedly remind all trial and appellate courts to avoid omitting reliefs that
the parties are properly entitled to by law or in equity under the established facts.
Their judgments will not be worthy of the name unless they thereby fully determine
the rights and obligations of the litigants. It cannot be otherwise, for only by a full
determination of such rights and obligations would they betrue to the judicial office of
administering justice and equity for all. Courts should then be alert and cautious in
their rendition of judgments of conviction in criminal cases. They should prescribe the
legal penalties, which is what the Constitution and the law require and expect them to
do. Their prescription of the wrong penalties will be invalid and ineffectual for being
done without jurisdiction or in manifest grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. They should also determine and set the civil liability ex delictoof the
accused, in order to do justice to the complaining victims who are always entitled to
them. The Rules of Court mandates them to do so unless the enforcement of the civil
liability by separate actions has been reserved or waived.22
Moral damages should be awarded to assuage the moral and emotional sufferings of
the victim, and in that respect the Court believes and holds that P20,000.00 is
reasonable. The victim was likewise entitled to exemplary damages, considering that
Article 2230 of the Civil Code authorizes such damages if at least one aggravating
circumstance attended the commission of the crime. The child abuse committed by the
petitioner was aggravated her being a public school teacher, a factor in raising the
penalty to its maximum period pursuantto Section 31(e) of Republic Act No. 7610.
The amount of P20,000.00 as exemplary damages is imposed on in order to set an
example for the public good and as a deterrent to other public school teachers who
violate the ban imposed by Article 233 of the Family Code, supra, against the infliction
of corporal punishment on children under their substitute parental authority. The lack
of proof of the actual expenses for the victims treatmentshould not hinder the
granting of a measure of compensation in the formof temperate damages, which,
according to Article 2224 of the Civil Code, may be recovered when some pecuniary
loss has been suffered butits amount cannot be proved with certainty. There being no
question aboutthe injuries sustained requiring medical treatment, temperate damages
ofat least P20,000.00 are warranted, for it would be inequitable not to recognize the
need for the treatment. Lastly, interest of 6% per annum shall be charged on all the
items of civil liability, to be reckoned from the finality of this decision until full
payment.
The penalty for the child abusecommitted by the petitioner is that prescribed in
Section 10(a) of Republic Act No. 7610, viz:
Section 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation and Other Conditions
Prejudicial to the Child's Development.
(a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty or exploitation
or to be responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the child's development
including those covered by Atiicle 59 of Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended, but
not covered by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall suffer the penalty of prision
mayor in its minimum period.
xxxx
The CA revised the penalty fixed by the R TC by imposing the indeterminate penalty of
four years, two months and one day of prision correccional, as minimum, to 10 years
and one day of prision mayor, as the maximum, on the ground that the offense was
aggravated by the petitioner being a public schoolteacher.23 It cited Section 3 l(e) of
Republic Act No. 7610, which commands that the penalty provided in the Act "shall be
imposed in its maximum period if the offender is a public officer or employee." Her
being a public schoolteacher was alleged in the information and established by
evidence as well as admitted by her. The revised penalty was erroneous, however,
because Section 10 (a) of Republic Act No. 7610 punishes the crime committed by the
petitioner with prision mayor in its minimum period, whose three periods are six
years and one day to six years and eight months, for the minimum period; six years,
eight months and one day to seven years and four months, for the medium period; and
seven years, four months and one day to eight years, for the maximum period. The
maximum of the indeterminate sentence should come from the maximum period,
therefore, and the Court fixes it at seven years, four months and one day of prision
mayor. The minimum of the indeterminate sentence should come from prision
correccional in the maximum period, the penalty next lower than prision mayor in its
minimum period, whose range is from four years, two months and one day to six
years.1wphi1 Accordingly, the minimum of the indeterminate sentence is four years,
nine months and 11 days, and the maximum is seven years, four months and one day
of prision mayor.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on May 11, 2005, subject
to the MODIFICATIONS that: (a) the petitioner shall suffer the indeterminate penalty
of four (4) years, nine (9) months and eleven (11) days of prision correccional, as
minimum, to seven (7) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of pr is ion mayor, as
the maximum; (b) the petitioner shall pay to Michael Ryan Gonzales P20,000.00 as
moral damages, P20,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P20,000.00 as temperate
damages, plus interest at the rate of 6% per annum on each item of the civil liability
reckoned from the finality of this decision until full payment; and (c) the petitioner
shall pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
NORMA A. DEL SOCORRO, for and in behalf of her minor child RODERIGO NORJO
VAN WILSEM, Petitioner, !vs.!ERNST JOHAN BRINKMAN VAN WILSEM,
Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court seeking to reverse and set aside the Orders1 dated February 19, 2010 and
September 1, 2010, respectively, of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City (RTC-Cebu),
which dismissed the criminal case entitled People of the Philippines v. Ernst Johan
Brinkman Van Wilsem, docketed as Criminal Case No. CBU-85503, for violation of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262, otherwise known as the Anti-Violence Against Women
and Their Children Act of 2004.
Petitioner Norma A. Del Socorro and respondent Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem
contracted marriage in Holland on September 25, 1990.2 On January 19, 1994, they
were blessed with a son named Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem, who at the time of the
filing of the instant petition was sixteen (16) years of age.3
Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended on July 19, 1995 by virtue of a Divorce
Decree issued by the appropriate Court of Holland.4 At that time, their son was only
eighteen (18) months old.5 Thereafter, petitioner and her son came home to the
Philippines.6
On August 28, 2009, petitioner, through her counsel, sent a letter demanding for
support from respondent. However, respondent refused to receive the letter.12
Because of the foregoing circumstances, petitioner filed a complaint affidavit with the
Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu City against respondent for violation of Section 5,
paragraph E(2) of R.A. No. 9262 for the latters unjust refusal to support his minor
child with petitioner.13 Respondent submitted his counter-affidavit thereto, to which
petitioner also submitted her reply-affidavit.14 Thereafter, the Provincial Prosecutor of
Cebu City issued a Resolution recommending the filing of an information for the crime
charged against herein respondent.
The information, which was filed with the RTC-Cebu and raffled to Branch 20 thereof,
states that:
That sometime in the year 1995 and up to the present, more or less, in the
Municipality of Minglanilla, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and deliberately deprive, refuse and still continue to deprive his son
RODERIGO NORJO VAN WILSEM, a fourteen (14) year old minor, of financial support
legally due him, resulting in economic abuse to the victim. CONTRARY TO LAW.15
Upon motion and after notice and hearing, the RTC-Cebu issued a Hold Departure
Order against respondent.16 Consequently, respondent was arrested and,
subsequently, posted bail.17 Petitioner also filed a Motion/Application of Permanent
Protection Order to which respondent filed his Opposition.18 Pending the resolution
thereof, respondent was arraigned.19 Subsequently, without the RTC-Cebu having
resolved the application of the protection order, respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss
on the ground of: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged; and (2) prescription
of the crime charged.20
On February 19, 2010, the RTC-Cebu issued the herein assailed Order,21 dismissing the
instant criminal case against respondent on the ground that the facts charged in the
information do not constitute an offense with respect to the respondent who is an
alien, the dispositive part of which states:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds that the facts charged in the information do not
constitute an offense with respect to the accused, he being an alien, and accordingly,
orders this case DISMISSED.
The bail bond posted by accused Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem for his provisional
liberty is hereby cancelled (sic) and ordered released.
SO ORDERED.
On September 1, 2010, the lower court issued an Order25 denying petitioners Motion
for Reconsideration and reiterating its previous ruling. Thus:
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Cebu City, Philippines, September 1, 2010.26
Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari raising the following issues:
1. Whether or not a foreign national has an obligation to support his minor child under
Philippine law; and
2. Whether or not a foreign national can be held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262
for his unjustified failure to support his minor child.27
At the outset, let it be emphasized that We are taking cognizance of the instant petition
despite the fact that the same was directly lodged with the Supreme Court, consistent
with the ruling in Republic v. Sunvar Realty Development Corporation,28 which lays
down the instances when a ruling of the trial court may be brought on appeal directly
to the Supreme Court without violating the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, to wit:
x x x Nevertheless, the Rules do not prohibit any of the parties from filing a Rule 45
Petition with this Court, in case only questions of law are raised or involved. This latter
situation was one that petitioners found themselves in when they filed the instant
Petition to raise only questions of law. In Republic v. Malabanan, the Court clarified
the three modes of appeal from decisions of the RTC, to wit: (1) by ordinary appeal or
appeal by writ of error under Rule 41, whereby judgment was rendered in a civil or
criminal action by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction; (2) by a petition
for review under Rule 42, whereby judgment was rendered by the RTC in the exercise
of its appellate jurisdiction; and (3) by a petition for review on certiorari before the
Supreme Court under Rule 45. "The first mode of appeal is taken to the [Court of
Appeals] on questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law. The second mode of
appeal is brought to the CA on questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and
law. The third mode of appealis elevated to the Supreme Court only on questions of
law." (Emphasis supplied)
There is a question of law when the issue does not call for an examination of the
probative value of the evidence presented or of the truth or falsehood of the facts being
admitted, and the doubt concerns the correct application of law and jurisprudence on
the matter. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on
the given set of circumstances.29
Indeed, the issues submitted to us for resolution involve questions of law the
response thereto concerns the correct application of law and jurisprudence on a given
set of facts, i.e.,whether or not a foreign national has an obligation to support his
minor child under Philippine law; and whether or not he can be held criminally liable
under R.A. No. 9262 for his unjustified failure to do so.
It cannot be negated, moreover, that the instant petition highlights a novel question of
law concerning the liability of a foreign national who allegedly commits acts and
omissions punishable under special criminal laws, specifically in relation to family
rights and duties. The inimitability of the factual milieu of the present case, therefore,
deserves a definitive ruling by this Court, which will eventually serve as a guidepost
for future cases. Furthermore, dismissing the instant petition and remanding the same
to the CA would only waste the time, effort and resources of the courts. Thus, in the
present case, considerations of efficiency and economy in the administration of justice
should prevail over the observance of the hierarchy of courts.
Now, on the matter of the substantive issues, We find the petition meritorious.
Nonetheless, we do not fully agree with petitioners contentions.
To determine whether or not a person is criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262, it is
imperative that the legal obligation to support exists.
Petitioner invokes Article 19530 of the Family Code, which provides the parents
obligation to support his child. Petitioner contends that notwithstanding the existence
of a divorce decree issued in relation to Article 26 of the Family Code,31 respondent is
not excused from complying with his obligation to support his minor child with
petitioner.
On the other hand, respondent contends that there is no sufficient and clear basis
presented by petitioner that she, as well as her minor son, are entitled to financial
support.32 Respondent also added that by reason of the Divorce Decree, he is not
obligated topetitioner for any financial support.33
On this point, we agree with respondent that petitioner cannot rely on Article 19534 of
the New Civil Code in demanding support from respondent, who is a foreign citizen,
since Article 1535 of the New Civil Code stresses the principle of nationality. In other
words, insofar as Philippine laws are concerned, specifically the provisions of the
Family Code on support, the same only applies to Filipino citizens. By analogy, the
same principle applies to foreigners such that they are governed by their national law
with respect to family rights and duties.36
The obligation to give support to a child is a matter that falls under family rights and
duties. Since the respondent is a citizen of Holland or the Netherlands, we agree with
the RTC-Cebu that he is subject to the laws of his country, not to Philippinelaw, as to
whether he is obliged to give support to his child, as well as the consequences of his
failure to do so.37
Furthermore, being still aliens, they are not in position to invoke the provisions of the
Civil Code of the Philippines, for that Code cleaves to the principle that family rights
and duties are governed by their personal law, i.e.,the laws of the nation to which they
belong even when staying in a foreign country (cf. Civil Code, Article 15).39
It is incumbent upon respondent to plead and prove that the national law of the
Netherlands does not impose upon the parents the obligation to support their child
(either before, during or after the issuance of a divorce decree), because Llorente v.
Court of Appeals,42 has already enunciated that:
True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not
authorized to takejudicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and
proved.43
In view of respondents failure to prove the national law of the Netherlands in his
favor, the doctrine of processual presumption shall govern. Under this doctrine, if the
foreign law involved is not properly pleaded and proved, our courts will presume that
the foreign law is the same as our local or domestic or internal law.44 Thus, since the
law of the Netherlands as regards the obligation to support has not been properly
pleaded and proved in the instant case, it is presumed to be the same with Philippine
law, which enforces the obligation of parents to support their children and penalizing
the non-compliance therewith.
Moreover, while in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera,45 the Court held that a divorce obtained in a
foreign land as well as its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines in view of
the nationality principle on the matter of status of persons, the Divorce Covenant
presented by respondent does not completely show that he is notliable to give support
to his son after the divorce decree was issued. Emphasis is placed on petitioners
allegation that under the second page of the aforesaid covenant, respondents
obligation to support his child is specifically stated,46 which was not disputed by
respondent.
We likewise agree with petitioner that notwithstanding that the national law of
respondent states that parents have no obligation to support their children or that
such obligation is not punishable by law, said law would still not find applicability,in
light of the ruling in Bank of America, NT and SA v. American Realty Corporation,47 to
wit:
In the instant case, assuming arguendo that the English Law on the matter were
properly pleaded and proved in accordance with Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court and the jurisprudence laid down in Yao Kee, et al. vs. Sy-Gonzales, said foreign
law would still not find applicability.
Thus, when the foreign law, judgment or contract is contrary to a sound and
established public policy of the forum, the said foreign law, judgment or order shall not
be applied.
Additionally, prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those
which have for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be
rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or
conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.
The public policy sought to be protected in the instant case is the principle imbedded in
our jurisdiction proscribing the splitting up of a single cause of action.
If two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of
one or a judgment upon the merits in any one is available as a ground for the dismissal
of the others. Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when its application would
work undeniable injustice to the citizens or residents of the forum. To give justice is
the most important function of law; hence, a law, or judgment or contract that is
obviously unjust negates the fundamental principles of Conflict of Laws.48
Applying the foregoing, even if the laws of the Netherlands neither enforce a parents
obligation to support his child nor penalize the noncompliance therewith, such
obligation is still duly enforceable in the Philippines because it would be of great
injustice to the child to be denied of financial support when the latter is entitled
thereto.
As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled that she should no
longerbe considered marriedto the alien spouse. Further, she should not be required to
perform her marital duties and obligations. It held:
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be
considered still married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations
under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be
obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to
private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible
rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own
country if the ends of justice are to be served. (Emphasis added)50
Based on the foregoing legal precepts, we find that respondent may be made liable
under Section 5(e) and (i) of R.A. No. 9262 for unjustly refusing or failing to give
support topetitioners son, to wit:
SECTION 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children.- The crime of violence
against women and their children is committed through any of the following acts:
xxxx
(e) Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child to engage in conduct
which the woman or her child has the right to desist from or desist from conduct
which the woman or her child has the right to engage in, or attempting to restrict or
restricting the woman's or her child's freedom of movement or conduct by force or
threat of force, physical or other harm or threat of physical or other harm, or
intimidation directed against the woman or child. This shall include, butnot limited to,
the following acts committed with the purpose or effect of controlling or restricting the
woman's or her child's movement or conduct:
xxxx
(2) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her children of financial support
legally due her or her family, or deliberately providing the woman's children
insufficient financial support; x x x x
(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman
or her child, including, but not limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and
denial of financial support or custody of minor childrenof access to the woman's
child/children.51
Under the aforesaid special law, the deprivation or denial of financial support to the
child is considered anact of violence against women and children.
Finally, we do not agree with respondents argument that granting, but not admitting,
that there is a legal basis for charging violation of R.A. No. 9262 in the instant case,
the criminal liability has been extinguished on the ground of prescription of crime52
under Section 24 of R.A. No. 9262, which provides that:
SECTION 24. Prescriptive Period. Acts falling under Sections 5(a) to 5(f) shall
prescribe in twenty (20) years. Acts falling under Sections 5(g) to 5(I) shall prescribe
in ten (10) years.
The act of denying support to a child under Section 5(e)(2) and (i) of R.A. No. 9262 is
a continuing offense,53 which started in 1995 but is still ongoing at present.
Accordingly, the crime charged in the instant case has clearly not prescribed.
Given, however, that the issue on whether respondent has provided support to
petitioners child calls for an examination of the probative value of the evidence
presented, and the truth and falsehood of facts being admitted, we hereby remand the
determination of this issue to the RTC-Cebu which has jurisdiction over the case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders dated February 19, 2010 and
September 1, 2010, respectively, of the Regional Trial Court of the City of Cebu are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the same court to
conduct further proceedings based on the merits of the case.
SO ORDERED
Admitting she killed her husband, appellant anchors her prayer for acquittal on a
novel theory -- the battered woman syndrome (BWS), which allegedly constitutes self-
defense. Under the proven facts, however, she is not entitled to complete exoneration
because there was no unlawful aggression -- no immediate and unexpected attack on
her by her batterer-husband at the time she shot him.
Absent unlawful aggression, there can be no self-defense, complete or incomplete.
But all is not lost. The severe beatings repeatedly inflicted on appellant
constituted a form of cumulative provocation that broke down her psychological
resistance and self-control. This psychological paralysis she suffered diminished her
will power, thereby entitling her to the mitigating factor under paragraphs 9 and 10 of
Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code.
In addition, appellant should also be credited with the extenuating circumstance
of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as to have naturally produced passion
and obfuscation. The acute battering she suffered that fatal night in the hands of her
batterer-spouse, in spite of the fact that she was eight months pregnant with their
child, overwhelmed her and put her in the aforesaid emotional and mental state,
which overcame her reason and impelled her to vindicate her life and her unborn
childs.
Considering the presence of these two mitigating circumstances arising from
BWS, as well as the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, she may now apply for
and be released from custody on parole, because she has already served the minimum
period of her penalty while under detention during the pendency of this case.
The Case
For automatic review before this Court is the September 25, 1998 Decision[1] of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Ormoc City (Branch 35) in Criminal Case No. 5016-0,
finding Marivic Genosa guilty beyond reasonable doubt of parricide. The decretal
portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, after all the foregoing being duly considered, the Court finds the
accused, Marivic Genosa y Isidro, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Parricide as provided under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code as restored by Sec.
5, RA No. 7659, and after finding treachery as a generic aggravating circumstance
and none of mitigating circumstance, hereby sentences the accused with the penalty of
DEATH.
The Court likewise penalizes the accused to pay the heirs of the deceased the sum of
fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00), Philippine currency as indemnity and another sum
of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00), Philippine currency as moral damages.[2]
Cadaveric spasm.
Fracture, open, depressed, circular located at the occipital bone of the head,
resulting [in] laceration of the brain, spontaneous rupture of the blood
vessels on the posterior surface of the brain, laceration of the dura and
meningeal vessels producing severe intracranial hemorrhage.
Blisters at both extrem[i]ties, anterior chest, posterior chest, trunk w/ shedding of the
epidermis.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) summarizes the prosecutions version of
the facts in this wise:
Appellant and Ben Genosa were united in marriage on November 19, 1983 in Ormoc
City. Thereafter, they lived with the parents of Ben in their house at Isabel, Leyte. For
a time, Bens younger brother, Alex, and his wife lived with them too. Sometime in
1995, however, appellant and Ben rented from Steban Matiga a house at Barangay
Bilwang, Isabel, Leyte where they lived with their two children, namely: John Marben
and Earl Pierre.
On November 15, 1995, Ben and Arturo Basobas went to a cockfight after receiving
their salary. They each had two (2) bottles of beer before heading home. Arturo would
pass Bens house before reaching his. When they arrived at the house of Ben, he found
out that appellant had gone to Isabel, Leyte to look for him. Ben went inside his house,
while Arturo went to a store across it, waiting until 9:00 in the evening for the masiao
runner to place a bet. Arturo did not see appellant arrive but on his way home passing
the side of the Genosas rented house, he heard her say I wont hesitate to kill you to
which Ben replied Why kill me when I am innocent? That was the last time Arturo saw
Ben alive. Arturo also noticed that since then, the Genosas rented house appeared
uninhabited and was always closed.
On November 16, 1995, appellant asked Erlinda Paderog, her close friend and
neighbor living about fifty (50) meters from her house, to look after her pig because
she was going to Cebu for a pregnancy check-up. Appellant likewise asked Erlinda to
sell her motorcycle to their neighbor Ronnie Dayandayan who unfortunately had no
money to buy it.
That same day, about 12:15 in the afternoon, Joseph Valida was waiting for a bus
going to Ormoc when he saw appellant going out of their house with her two kids in
tow, each one carrying a bag, locking the gate and taking her children to the waiting
area where he was. Joseph lived about fifty (50) meters behind the Genosas rented
house. Joseph, appellant and her children rode the same bus to Ormoc. They had no
conversation as Joseph noticed that appellant did not want to talk to him.
On November 18, 1995, the neighbors of Steban Matiga told him about the foul odor
emanating from his house being rented by Ben and appellant. Steban went there to
find out the cause of the stench but the house was locked from the inside. Since he did
not have a duplicate key with him, Steban destroyed the gate padlock with a borrowed
steel saw. He was able to get inside through the kitchen door but only after destroying
a window to reach a hook that locked it. Alone, Steban went inside the unlocked
bedroom where the offensive smell was coming from. There, he saw the lifeless body of
Ben lying on his side on the bed covered with a blanket. He was only in his briefs with
injuries at the back of his head. Seeing this, Steban went out of the house and sent
word to the mother of Ben about his sons misfortune. Later that day, Iluminada
Genosa, the mother of Ben, identified the dead body as that of [her] son.
Meanwhile, in the morning of the same day, SPO3 Leo Acodesin, then assigned at the
police station at Isabel, Leyte, received a report regarding the foul smell at the
Genosas rented house. Together with SPO1 Millares, SPO1 Colon, and Dr. Refelina
Cerillo, SPO3 Acodesin proceeded to the house and went inside the bedroom where
they found the dead body of Ben lying on his side wrapped with a bedsheet. There was
blood at the nape of Ben who only had his briefs on. SPO3 Acodesin found in one corner
at the side of an aparador a metal pipe about two (2) meters from where Ben was,
leaning against a wall. The metal pipe measured three (3) feet and six (6) inches long
with a diameter of one and half (1 1/2) inches. It had an open end without a stop valve
with a red stain at one end. The bedroom was not in disarray.
About 10:00 that same morning, the cadaver of Ben, because of its stench, had to be
taken outside at the back of the house before the postmortem examination was
conducted by Dr. Cerillo in the presence of the police. A municipal health officer at
Isabel, Leyte responsible for medico-legal cases, Dr. Cerillo found that Ben had been
dead for two to three days and his body was already decomposing. The postmortem
examination of Dr. Cerillo yielded the findings quoted in the Information for parricide
later filed against appellant. She concluded that the cause of Bens death was
cardiopulmonary arrest secondary to severe intracranial hemorrhage due to a
depressed fracture of the occipital [bone].
Appellant admitted killing Ben. She testified that going home after work on
November 15, 1995, she got worried that her husband who was not home yet might
have gone gambling since it was a payday. With her cousin Ecel Arao, appellant went
to look for Ben at the marketplace and taverns at Isabel, Leyte but did not find him
there. They found Ben drunk upon their return at the Genosas house. Ecel went home
despite appellants request for her to sleep in their house.
Then, Ben purportedly nagged appellant for following him, even challenging her to a
fight. She allegedly ignored him and instead attended to their children who were doing
their homework. Apparently disappointed with her reaction, Ben switched off the light
and, with the use of a chopping knife, cut the television antenna or wire to keep her
from watching television. According to appellant, Ben was about to attack her so she
ran to the bedroom, but he got hold of her hands and whirled her around. She fell on
the side of the bed and screamed for help. Ben left. At this point, appellant packed his
clothes because she wanted him to leave. Seeing his packed clothes upon his return
home, Ben allegedly flew into a rage, dragged appellant outside of the bedroom
towards a drawer holding her by the neck, and told her You might as well be killed so
nobody would nag me. Appellant testified that she was aware that there was a gun
inside the drawer but since Ben did not have the key to it, he got a three-inch long
blade cutter from his wallet. She however, smashed the arm of Ben with a pipe,
causing him to drop the blade and his wallet. Appellant then smashed Ben at his nape
with the pipe as he was about to pick up the blade and his wallet. She thereafter ran
inside the bedroom.
Appellant, however, insisted that she ended the life of her husband by shooting him.
She supposedly distorted the drawer where the gun was and shot Ben. He did not die
on the spot, though, but in the bedroom.[7] (Citations omitted)
2. Marivic and Ben had known each other since elementary school; they were
neighbors in Bilwang; they were classmates; and they were third degree cousins. Both
sets of parents were against their relationship, but Ben was persistent and tried to
stop other suitors from courting her. Their closeness developed as he was her constant
partner at fiestas.
3. After their marriage, they lived first in the home of Bens parents, together with
Bens brother, Alex, in Isabel, Leyte. In the first year of marriage, Marivic and Ben
lived happily. But apparently, soon thereafter, the couple would quarrel often and
their fights would become violent.
4. Bens brother, Alex, testified for the prosecution that he could not remember when
Ben and Marivic married. He said that when Ben and Marivic quarreled, generally
when Ben would come home drunk, Marivic would inflict injuries on him. He said that
in one incident in 1993 he saw Marivic holding a kitchen knife after Ben had shouted
for help as his left hand was covered with blood. Marivic left the house but after a
week, she returned apparently having asked for Bens forgiveness. In another incident
in May 22, 1994, early morning, Alex and his father apparently rushed to Bens aid
again and saw blood from Bens forehead and Marivic holding an empty bottle. Ben and
Marivic reconciled after Marivic had apparently again asked for Bens forgiveness.
Mrs. Iluminada Genosa, Marivics mother-in-law, testified too, saying that Ben and
Marivic married in 1986 or 1985 more or less here in Fatima, Ormoc City. She said as
the marriage went along, Marivic became already very demanding. Mrs. Iluminada
Genosa said that after the birth of Marivics two sons, there were three (3)
misunderstandings. The first was when Marivic stabbed Ben with a table knife
through his left arm; the second incident was on November 15, 1994, when Marivic
struck Ben on the forehead using a sharp instrument until the eye was also affected. It
was wounded and also the ear and her husband went to Ben to help; and the third
incident was in 1995 when the couple had already transferred to the house in Bilwang
and she saw that Bens hand was plastered as the bone cracked.
Both mother and son claimed they brought Ben to a Pasar clinic for medical
intervention.
5. Arturo Basobas, a co-worker of Ben, testified that on November 15, 1995 After we
collected our salary, we went to the cock-fighting place of ISCO. They stayed there for
three (3) hours, after which they went to Uniloks and drank beer allegedly only two
(2) bottles each. After drinking they bought barbeque and went to the Genosa
residence. Marivic was not there. He stayed a while talking with Ben, after which he
went across the road to wait for the runner and the usher of the masiao game because
during that time, the hearing on masiao numbers was rampant. I was waiting for the
ushers and runners so that I can place my bet. On his way home at about 9:00 in the
evening, he heard the Genosas arguing. They were quarreling loudly. Outside their
house was one Fredo who is used by Ben to feed his fighting cocks. Basobas testimony
on the root of the quarrel, conveniently overheard by him was Marivic saying I will
never hesitate to kill you, whilst Ben replied Why kill me when I am innocent. Basobas
thought they were joking.
He did not hear them quarreling while he was across the road from the Genosa
residence. Basobas admitted that he and Ben were always at the cockpits every
Saturday and Sunday. He claims that he once told Ben before when he was stricken
with a bottle by Marivic Genosa that he should leave her and that Ben would always
take her back after she would leave him so many times.
Basobas could not remember when Marivic had hit Ben, but it was a long time that
they had been quarreling. He said Ben even had a wound on the right forehead. He had
known the couple for only one (1) year.
6. Marivic testified that after the first year of marriage, Ben became cruel to her and
was a habitual drinker. She said he provoked her, he would slap her, sometimes he
would pin her down on the bed, and sometimes beat her.
These incidents happened several times and she would often run home to her parents,
but Ben would follow her and seek her out, promising to change and would ask for her
forgiveness. She said after she would be beaten, she would seek medical help from Dr.
Dino Caing, Dr. Lucero and Dra. Cerillo. These doctors would enter the injuries
inflicted upon her by Ben into their reports. Marivic said Ben would beat her or
quarrel with her every time he was drunk, at least three times a week.
7. In her defense, witnesses who were not so closely related to Marivic, testified as to
the abuse and violence she received at the hands of Ben.
7.1. Mr. Joe Barrientos, a fisherman, who was a [neighbor] of the Genosas, testified
that on November 15, 1995, he overheard a quarrel between Ben and Marivic. Marivic
was shouting for help and through the open jalousies, he saw the spouses grappling
with each other. Ben had Marivic in a choke hold. He did not do anything, but had
come voluntarily to testify. (Please note this was the same night as that testified to by
Arturo Busabos.[8])
7.2. Mr. Junnie Barrientos, also a fisherman, and the brother of Mr. Joe Barrientos,
testified that he heard his neighbor Marivic shouting on the night of November 15,
1995. He peeped through the window of his hut which is located beside the Genosa
house and saw the spouses grappling with each other then Ben Genosa was holding
with his both hands the neck of the accused, Marivic Genosa. He said after a while,
Marivic was able to extricate he[r]self and enter the room of the children. After that,
he went back to work as he was to go fishing that evening. He returned at 8:00 the
next morning. (Again, please note that this was the same night as that testified to by
Arturo Basobas).
7.3. Mr. Teodoro Sarabia was a former neighbor of the Genosas while they were living
in Isabel, Leyte. His house was located about fifty (50) meters from theirs. Marivic is
his niece and he knew them to be living together for 13 or 14 years. He said the couple
was always quarreling. Marivic confided in him that Ben would pawn items and then
would use the money to gamble. One time, he went to their house and they were
quarreling. Ben was so angry, but would be pacified if somebody would come. He
testified that while Ben was alive he used to gamble and when he became drunk, he
would go to our house and he will say, Teody because that was what he used to call me,
mokimas ta, which means lets go and look for a whore. Mr. Sarabia further testified
that Ben would box his wife and I would see bruises and one time she ran to me, I
noticed a wound (the witness pointed to his right breast) as according to her a knife
was stricken to her. Mr. Sarabia also said that once he saw Ben had been injured too.
He said he voluntarily testified only that morning.
7.4. Miss Ecel Arano, an 18-year old student, who is a cousin of Marivic, testified that
in the afternoon of November 15, 1995, Marivic went to her house and asked her help
to look for Ben. They searched in the market place, several taverns and some other
places, but could not find him. She accompanied Marivic home. Marivic wanted her to
sleep with her in the Genosa house because she might be battered by her husband.
When they got to the Genosa house at about 7:00 in the evening, Miss Arano said that
her husband was already there and was drunk. Miss Arano knew he was drunk
because of his staggering walking and I can also detect his face. Marivic entered the
house and she heard them quarrel noisily. (Again, please note that this is the same
night as that testified to by Arturo Basobas) Miss Arano testified that this was not the
first time Marivic had asked her to sleep in the house as Marivic would be afraid every
time her husband would come home drunk. At one time when she did sleep over, she
was awakened at 10:00 in the evening when Ben arrived because the couple were very
noisy in the sala and I had heard something was broken like a vase. She said Marivic
ran into her room and they locked the door. When Ben couldnt get in he got a chair and
a knife and showed us the knife through the window grill and he scared us. She said
that Marivic shouted for help, but no one came. On cross-examination, she said that
when she left Marivics house on November 15, 1995, the couple were still quarreling.
7.5. Dr. Dino Caing, a physician testified that he and Marivic were co-employees at
PHILPHOS, Isabel, Leyte. Marivic was his patient many times and had also received
treatment from other doctors. Dr. Caing testified that from July 6, 1989 until
November 9, 1995, there were six (6) episodes of physical injuries inflicted upon
Marivic. These injuries were reported in his Out-Patient Chart at the PHILPHOS
Hospital. The prosecution admitted the qualifications of Dr. Caing and considered him
an expert witness.
xxxxxxxxx
Dr. Caings clinical history of the tension headache and hypertention of Marivic on
twenty-three (23) separate occasions was marked at Exhibits 2 and 2-B. The OPD
Chart of Marivic at the Philphos Clinic which reflected all the consultations made by
Marivic and the six (6) incidents of physical injuries reported was marked as Exhibit
3.
On cross-examination, Dr. Caing said that he is not a psychiatrist, he could not say
whether the injuries were directly related to the crime committed. He said it is only a
psychiatrist who is qualified to examine the psychological make-up of the patient,
whether she is capable of committing a crime or not.
7.6 Mr. Panfilo Tero, the barangay captain in the place where the Genosas resided,
testified that about two (2) months before Ben died, Marivic went to his office past
8:00 in the evening. She sought his help to settle or confront the Genosa couple who
were experiencing family troubles. He told Marivic to return in the morning, but he did
not hear from her again and assumed that they might have settled with each other or
they might have forgiven with each other.
xxxxxxxxx
Marivic said she did not provoke her husband when she got home that night it was her
husband who began the provocation. Marivic said she was frightened that her husband
would hurt her and she wanted to make sure she would deliver her baby safely. In fact,
Marivic had to be admitted later at the Rizal Medical Centre as she was suffering from
eclampsia and hypertension, and the baby was born prematurely on December 1,
1995.
Marivic testified that during her marriage she had tried to leave her husband at least
five (5) times, but that Ben would always follow her and they would reconcile. Marivic
said that the reason why Ben was violent and abusive towards her that night was
because he was crazy about his recent girlfriend, Lulu x x x Rubillos.
On cross-examination, Marivic insisted she shot Ben with a gun; she said that he died
in the bedroom; that their quarrels could be heard by anyone passing their house; that
Basobas lied in his testimony; that she left for Manila the next day, November 16,
1995; that she did not bother anyone in Manila, rented herself a room, and got herself
a job as a field researcher under the alias Marvelous Isidro; she did not tell anyone
that she was leaving Leyte, she just wanted to have a safe delivery of her baby; and
that she was arrested in San Pablo, Laguna.
Answering questions from the Court, Marivic said that she threw the gun away; that
she did not know what happened to the pipe she used to smash him once; that she was
wounded by Ben on her wrist with the bolo; and that two (2) hours after she was
whirled by Ben, he kicked her ass and dragged her towards the drawer when he saw
that she had packed his things.
9. The body of Ben Genosa was found on November 18, 1995 after an investigation
was made of the foul odor emitting from the Genosa residence. This fact was testified
to by all the prosecution witnesses and some defense witnesses during the trial.
10. Dra. Refelina Y. Cerillo, a physician, was the Municipal Health Officer of Isabel,
Leyte at the time of the incident, and among her responsibilities as such was to take
charge of all medico-legal cases, such as the examination of cadavers and the autopsy
of cadavers. Dra. Cerillo is not a forensic pathologist. She merely took the medical
board exams and passed in 1986. She was called by the police to go to the Genosa
residence and when she got there, she saw some police officer and neighbor around.
She saw Ben Genosa, covered by a blanket, lying in a semi-prone position with his back
to the door. He was wearing only a brief.
xxxxxxxxx
Dra. Cerillo said that there is only one injury and that is the injury involving the
skeletal area of the head which she described as a fracture. And that based on her
examination, Ben had been dead 2 or 3 days. Dra. Cerillo did not testify as to what
caused his death.
11. The Information, dated November 14, 1996, filed against Marivic Genosa charged
her with the crime of PARRICIDE committed with intent to kill, with treachery and
evidence premeditation, x x x wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, hit
and wound x x x her legitimate husband, with the use of a hard deadly weapon x x x
which caused his death.
12. Trial took place on 7 and 14 April 1997, 14 May 1997, 21 July 1997, 17, 22 and
23 September 1997, 12 November 1997, 15 and 16 December 1997, 22 May 1998,
and 5 and 6 August 1998.
13. On 23 September 1998, or only fifty (50) days from the day of the last trial date,
the Hon. Fortunito L. Madrona, Presiding Judge, RTC-Branch 35, Ormoc City, rendered
a JUDGMENT finding Marivic guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide,
and further found treachery as an aggravating circumstance, thus sentencing her to
the ultimate penalty of DEATH.
14. The case was elevated to this Honorable Court upon automatic review and, under
date of 24 January 2000, Marivics trial lawyer, Atty. Gil Marvel P. Tabucanon, filed a
Motion to Withdraw as counsel, attaching thereto, as a precautionary measure, two
(2) drafts of Appellants Briefs he had prepared for Marivic which, for reasons of her
own, were not conformed to by her.
The Honorable Court allowed the withdrawal of Atty. Tabucanon and permitted the
entry of appearance of undersigned counsel.
15. Without the knowledge of counsel, Marivic Genosa wrote a letter dated 20
January 2000, to the Chief Justice, coursing the same through Atty. Teresita G.
Dimaisip, Deputy Clerk of Court of Chief Judicial Records Office, wherein she
submitted her Brief without counsels to the Court.
16. In the meantime, under date of 17 February 2000, and stamp-received by the
Honorable Court on 19 February 2000, undersigned counsel filed an URGENT
OMNIBUS MOTION praying that the Honorable Court allow the exhumation of Ben
Genosa and the re-examination of the cause of his death; allow the examination of
Marivic Genosa by qualified psychologists and psychiatrists to determine her state of
mind at the time she killed her husband; and finally, to allow a partial re-opening of
the case a quo to take the testimony of said psychologists and psychiatrists.
Attached to the URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION was a letter of Dr. Raquel Fortun, then
the only qualified forensic pathologist in the country, who opined that the description
of the death wound (as culled from the post-mortem findings, Exhibit A) is more akin
to a gunshot wound than a beating with a lead pipe.
17. In a RESOLUTION dated 29 September 2000, the Honorable Court partly granted
Marivics URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION and remanded the case to the trial court for the
reception of expert psychological and/or psychiatric opinion on the battered woman
syndrome plea, within ninety (90) days from notice, and, thereafter to forthwith
report to this Court the proceedings taken, together with the copies of the TSN and
relevant documentary evidence, if any, submitted.
18. On 15 January 2001, Dra. Natividad A. Dayan appeared and testified before the
Hon. Fortunito L. Madrona, RTC-Branch 35, Ormoc City.
Immediately before Dra. Dayan was sworn, the Court a quo asked if she had
interviewed Marivic Genosa. Dra. Dayan informed the Court that interviews were done
at the Penal Institution in 1999, but that the clinical interviews and psychological
assessment were done at her clinic.
Dra. Dayan testified that she has been a clinical psychologist for twenty (20) years
with her own private clinic and connected presently to the De La Salle University as a
professor. Before this, she was the Head of the Psychology Department of the
Assumption College; a member of the faculty of Psychology at the Ateneo de Manila
University and St. Josephs College; and was the counseling psychologist of the
National Defense College. She has an AB in Psychology from the University of the
Philippines, a Master of Arts in Clinical [Counseling], Psychology from the Ateneo, and
a PhD from the U.P. She was the past president of the Psychological Association of the
Philippines and is a member of the American Psychological Association. She is the
secretary of the International Council of Psychologists from about 68 countries; a
member of the Forensic Psychology Association; and a member of the ASEAN
[Counseling] Association. She is actively involved with the Philippine Judicial
Academy, recently lecturing on the socio-demographic and psychological profile of
families involved in domestic violence and nullity cases. She was with the Davide
Commission doing research about Military Psychology. She has written a book entitled
Energy Global Psychology (together with Drs. Allan Tan and Allan Bernardo). The
Genosa case is the first time she has testified as an expert on battered women as this is
the first case of that nature.
Dra. Dayan testified that for the research she conducted, on the socio-demographic
and psychological profile of families involved in domestic violence, and nullity cases,
she looked at about 500 cases over a period of ten (10) years and discovered that
there are lots of variables that cause all of this marital conflicts, from domestic
violence to infidelity, to psychiatric disorder.
xxxxxxxxx
Dra. Dayan testified that in her studies, the battered woman usually has a very low
opinion of herself. She has a self-defeating and self-sacrificing characteristics. x x x
they usually think very lowly of themselves and so when the violence would happen,
they usually think that they provoke it, that they were the one who precipitated the
violence, they provoke their spouse to be physically, verbally and even sexually
abusive to them. Dra. Dayan said that usually a battered x x x comes from a
dysfunctional family or from broken homes.
Dra. Dayan said that the batterer, just like the battered woman, also has a very low
opinion of himself. But then emerges to have superiority complex and it comes out as
being very arrogant, very hostile, very aggressive and very angry. They also had (sic)
a very low tolerance for frustrations. A lot of times they are involved in vices like
gambling, drinking and drugs. And they become violent. The batterer also usually
comes from a dysfunctional family which over-pampers them and makes them feel
entitled to do anything. Also, they see often how their parents abused each other so
there is a lot of modeling of aggression in the family.
Dra. Dayan testified that there are a lot of reasons why a battered woman does not
leave her husband: poverty, self-blame and guilt that she provoked the violence, the
cycle itself which makes her hope her husband will change, the belief in her obligations
to keep the family intact at all costs for the sake of the children.
xxxxxxxxx
Dra. Dayan said that abused wives react differently to the violence: some leave the
house, or lock themselves in another room, or sometimes try to fight back triggering
physical violence on both of them. She said that in a normal marital relationship,
abuses also happen, but these are not consistent, not chronic, are not happening day in
[and] day out. In an abnormal marital relationship, the abuse occurs day in and day
out, is long lasting and even would cause hospitalization on the victim and even death
on the victim.
xxxxxxxxx
Dra. Dayan said that as a result of the battery of psychological tests she administered,
it was her opinion that Marivic fits the profile of a battered woman because inspite of
her feeling of self-confidence which we can see at times there are really feeling (sic) of
loss, such feelings of humiliation which she sees herself as damaged and as a broken
person. And at the same time she still has the imprint of all the abuses that she had
experienced in the past.
xxxxxxxxx
Dra. Dayan said Marivic thought of herself as a loving wife and did not even consider
filing for nullity or legal separation inspite of the abuses. It was at the time of the
tragedy that Marivic then thought of herself as a victim.
xxxxxxxxx
19. On 9 February 2001, Dr. Alfredo Pajarillo, a physician, who has since passed
away, appeared and testified before RTC-Branch 35, Ormoc City.
Dr. Pajarillo was a Diplomate of the Philippine Board of Psychiatry; a Fellow of the
Philippine Board of Psychiatry and a Fellow of the Philippine Psychiatry Association.
He was in the practice of psychiatry for thirty-eight (38) years. Prior to being in
private practice, he was connected with the Veterans Memorial Medical Centre where
he gained his training on psychiatry and neurology. After that, he was called to active
duty in the Armed Forces of the Philippines, assigned to the V. Luna Medical Center
for twenty six (26) years. Prior to his retirement from government service, he
obtained the rank of Brigadier General. He obtained his medical degree from the
University of Santo Tomas. He was also a member of the World Association of Military
Surgeons; the Quezon City Medical Society; the Cagayan Medical Society; and the
Philippine Association of Military Surgeons.
He authored The Comparative Analysis of Nervous Breakdown in the Philippine
Military Academy from the Period 1954 1978 which was presented twice in
international congresses. He also authored The Mental Health of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines 2000, which was likewise published internationally and locally. He had
a medical textbook published on the use of Prasepam on a Parke-Davis grant; was the
first to use Enanthate (siquiline), on an E.R. Squibb grant; and he published the use of
the drug Zopiclom in 1985-86.
Dr. Pajarillo explained that psychiatry deals with the functional disorder of the mind
and neurology deals with the ailment of the brain and spinal cord enlarged.
Psychology, on the other hand, is a bachelor degree and a doctorate degree; while one
has to finish medicine to become a specialist in psychiatry.
Even only in his 7th year as a resident in V. Luna Medical Centre, Dr. Pajarillo had
already encountered a suit involving violent family relations, and testified in a case in
1964. In the Armed Forces of the Philippines, violent family disputes abound, and he
has seen probably ten to twenty thousand cases. In those days, the primordial
intention of therapy was reconciliation. As a result of his experience with domestic
violence cases, he became a consultant of the Battered Woman Office in Quezon City
under Atty. Nenita Deproza.
As such consultant, he had seen around forty (40) cases of severe domestic violence,
where there is physical abuse: such as slapping, pushing, verbal abuse, battering and
boxing a woman even to an unconscious state such that the woman is sometimes
confined. The affliction of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder depends on the vulnerability
of the victim. Dr. Pajarillo said that if the victim is not very healthy, perhaps one
episode of violence may induce the disorder; if the psychological stamina and
physiologic constitutional stamina of the victim is stronger, it will take more repetitive
trauma to precipitate the post-traumatic stress disorder and this x x x is very
dangerous.
xxxxxxxxx
Dr. Pajarillo explained that with neurotic anxiety, the victim relives the beating or
trauma as if it were real, although she is not actually being beaten at that time. She
thinks of nothing but the suffering.
xxxxxxxxx
A woman who suffers battery has a tendency to become neurotic, her emotional tone
is unstable, and she is irritable and restless. She tends to become hard-headed and
persistent. She has higher sensitivity and her self-world is damaged.
Dr. Pajarillo said that an abnormal family background relates to an individuals illness,
such as the deprivation of the continuous care and love of the parents. As to the
batterer, he normally internalizes what is around him within the environment. And it
becomes his own personality. He is very competitive; he is aiming high all the time; he
is so macho; he shows his strong faade but in it there are doubts in himself and prone
to act without thinking.
xxxxxxxxx
Dr. Pajarillo emphasized that even though without the presence of the precipator (sic)
or the one who administered the battering, that re-experiencing of the trauma
occurred (sic) because the individual cannot control it. It will just come up in her mind
or in his mind.
xxxxxxxxx
Dr. Pajarillo said that a woman suffering post traumatic stress disorder try to defend
themselves, and primarily with knives. Usually pointed weapons or any weapon that is
available in the immediate surrounding or in a hospital x x x because that abound in
the household. He said a victim resorts to weapons when she has reached the lowest
rock bottom of her life and there is no other recourse left on her but to act decisively.
xxxxxxxxx
Dr. Pajarillo testified that he met Marivic Genosa in his office in an interview he
conducted for two (2) hours and seventeen (17) minutes. He used the psychological
evaluation and social case studies as a help in forming his diagnosis. He came out with
a Psychiatric Report, dated 22 January 2001.
xxxxxxxxx
On cross-examination by the private prosecutor, Dr. Pajarillo said that at the time she
killed her husband Marivicc mental condition was that she was re-experiencing the
trauma. He said that we are trying to explain scientifically that the re-experiencing of
the trauma is not controlled by Marivic. It will just come in flashes and probably at
that point in time that things happened when the re-experiencing of the trauma
flashed in her mind. At the time he interviewed Marivic she was more subdued, she
was not super alert anymore x x x she is mentally stress (sic) because of the
predicament she is involved.
xxxxxxxxx
20. No rebuttal evidence or testimony was presented by either the private or the
public prosecutor. Thus, in accord with the Resolution of this Honorable Court, the
records of the partially re-opened trial a quo were elevated.[9]
Finding the proffered theory of self-defense untenable, the RTC gave credence to
the prosecution evidence that appellant had killed the deceased while he was in bed
sleeping. Further, the trial court appreciated the generic aggravating circumstance of
treachery, because Ben Genosa was supposedly defenseless when he was killed -- lying
in bed asleep when Marivic smashed him with a pipe at the back of his head.
The capital penalty having been imposed, the case was elevated to this Court for
automatic review.
Supervening Circumstances
On February 19, 2000, appellant filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion praying that
this Court allow (1) the exhumation of Ben Genosa and the reexamination of the cause
of his death; (2) the examination of appellant by qualified psychologists and
psychiatrists to determine her state of mind at the time she had killed her spouse; and
(3) the inclusion of the said experts reports in the records of the case for purposes of
the automatic review or, in the alternative, a partial reopening of the case for the
lower court to admit the experts testimonies.
On September 29, 2000, this Court issued a Resolution granting in part appellants
Motion, remanding the case to the trial court for the reception of expert psychological
and/or psychiatric opinion on the battered woman syndrome plea; and requiring the
lower court to report thereafter to this Court the proceedings taken as well as to
submit copies of the TSN and additional evidence, if any.
Acting on the Courts Resolution, the trial judge authorized the examination of
Marivic by two clinical psychologists, Drs. Natividad Dayan[10] and Alfredo
Pajarillo,[11] supposedly experts on domestic violence. Their testimonies, along with
their documentary evidence, were then presented to and admitted by the lower court
before finally being submitted to this Court to form part of the records of the case.[12]
The Issues
Appellant assigns the following alleged errors of the trial court for this Courts
consideration:
1. The trial court gravely erred in promulgating an obviously hasty decision without
reflecting on the evidence adduced as to self-defense.
2. The trial court gravely erred in finding as a fact that Ben and Marivic Genosa were
legally married and that she was therefore liable for parricide.
3. The trial court gravely erred finding the cause of death to be by beating with a pipe.
4. The trial court gravely erred in ignoring and disregarding evidence adduced from
impartial and unbiased witnesses that Ben Genosa was a drunk, a gambler, a
womanizer and wife-beater; and further gravely erred in concluding that Ben Genosa
was a battered husband.
5. The trial court gravely erred in not requiring testimony from the children of
Marivic Genosa.
6. The trial court gravely erred in concluding that Marivics flight to Manila and her
subsequent apologies were indicia of guilt, instead of a clear attempt to save the life of
her unborn child.
7. The trial court gravely erred in concluding that there was an aggravating
circumstance of treachery.
8. The trial court gravely erred in refusing to re-evaluate the traditional elements in
determining the existence of self-defense and defense of foetus in this case, thereby
erroneously convicting Marivic Genosa of the crime of parricide and condemning her
to the ultimate penalty of death.[13]
In the main, the following are the essential legal issues: (1) whether appellant
acted in self-defense and in defense of her fetus; and (2) whether treachery attended
the killing of Ben Genosa.
The Courts Ruling
The first six assigned errors raised by appellant are factual in nature, if not
collateral to the resolution of the principal issues. As consistently held by this Court,
the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies are
entitled to a high degree of respect and will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence
of any showing that the trial judge gravely abused his discretion or overlooked,
misunderstood or misapplied material facts or circumstances of weight and substance
that could affect the outcome of the case.[14]
In appellants first six assigned items, we find no grave abuse of discretion,
reversible error or misappreciation of material facts that would reverse or modify the
trial courts disposition of the case. In any event, we will now briefly dispose of these
alleged errors of the trial court.
First, we do not agree that the lower court promulgated an obviously hasty
decision without reflecting on the evidence adduced as to self-defense. We note that in
his 17-page Decision, Judge Fortunito L. Madrona summarized the testimonies of both
the prosecution and the defense witnesses and -- on the basis of those and of the
documentary evidence on record -- made his evaluation, findings and conclusions. He
wrote a 3-page discourse assessing the testimony and the self-defense theory of the
accused. While she, or even this Court, may not agree with the trial judges conclusions,
we cannot peremptorily conclude, absent substantial evidence, that he failed to reflect
on the evidence presented.
Neither do we find the appealed Decision to have been made in an obviously hasty
manner. The Information had been filed with the lower court on November 14, 1996.
Thereafter, trial began and at least 13 hearings were held for over a year. It took the
trial judge about two months from the conclusion of trial to promulgate his judgment.
That he conducted the trial and resolved the case with dispatch should not be taken
against him, much less used to condemn him for being unduly hasty. If at all, the
dispatch with which he handled the case should be lauded. In any case, we find his
actions in substantial compliance with his constitutional obligation.[15]
Second, the lower court did not err in finding as a fact that Ben Genosa and
appellant had been legally married, despite the non-presentation of their marriage
contract. In People v. Malabago,[16] this Court held:
The key element in parricide is the relationship of the offender with the victim. In the
case of parricide of a spouse, the best proof of the relationship between the accused
and the deceased is the marriage certificate. In the absence of a marriage certificate,
however, oral evidence of the fact of marriage may be considered by the trial court if
such proof is not objected to.
Two of the prosecution witnesses -- namely, the mother and the brother of
appellants deceased spouse -- attested in court that Ben had been married to
Marivic.[17] The defense raised no objection to these testimonies. Moreover, during
her direct examination, appellant herself made a judicial admission of her marriage to
Ben.[18] Axiomatic is the rule that a judicial admission is conclusive upon the party
making it, except only when there is a showing that (1) the admission was made
through a palpable mistake, or (2) no admission was in fact made.[19] Other than
merely attacking the non-presentation of the marriage contract, the defense offered no
proof that the admission made by appellant in court as to the fact of her marriage to
the deceased was made through a palpable mistake.
Third, under the circumstances of this case, the specific or direct cause of Bens
death -- whether by a gunshot or by beating with a pipe -- has no legal consequence. As
the Court elucidated in its September 29, 2000 Resolution, [c]onsidering that the
appellant has admitted the fact of killing her husband and the acts of hitting his nape
with a metal pipe and of shooting him at the back of his head, the Court believes that
exhumation is unnecessary, if not immaterial, to determine which of said acts actually
caused the victims death. Determining which of these admitted acts caused the death
is not dispositive of the guilt or defense of appellant.
Fourth, we cannot fault the trial court for not fully appreciating evidence that Ben was
a drunk, gambler, womanizer and wife-beater. Until this case came to us for automatic
review, appellant had not raised the novel defense of battered woman syndrome, for which
such evidence may have been relevant. Her theory of self-defense was then the crucial
issue before the trial court. As will be discussed shortly, the legal requisites of self-defense
under prevailing jurisprudence ostensibly appear inconsistent with the surrounding facts
that led to the death of the victim. Hence, his personal character, especially his past
behavior, did not constitute vital evidence at the time.
Fifth, the trial court surely committed no error in not requiring testimony from
appellants children. As correctly elucidated by the solicitor general, all criminal
actions are prosecuted under the direction and control of the public prosecutor, in
whom lies the discretion to determine which witnesses and evidence are necessary to
present.[20] As the former further points out, neither the trial court nor the
prosecution prevented appellant from presenting her children as witnesses. Thus, she
cannot now fault the lower court for not requiring them to testify.
Finally, merely collateral or corroborative is the matter of whether the flight of
Marivic to Manila and her subsequent apologies to her brother-in-law are indicia of her
guilt or are attempts to save the life of her unborn child. Any reversible error as to the
trial courts appreciation of these circumstances has little bearing on the final
resolution of the case.
Appellant admits killing Ben Genosa but, to avoid criminal liability, invokes self-
defense and/or defense of her unborn child. When the accused admits killing the
victim, it is incumbent upon her to prove any claimed justifying circumstance by clear
and convincing evidence.[21] Well-settled is the rule that in criminal cases, self-
defense (and similarly, defense of a stranger or third person) shifts the burden of
proof from the prosecution to the defense.[22]
The Battered Woman Syndrome
In claiming self-defense, appellant raises the novel theory of the battered woman
syndrome. While new in Philippine jurisprudence, the concept has been recognized in
foreign jurisdictions as a form of self-defense or, at the least, incomplete self-
defense.[23] By appreciating evidence that a victim or defendant is afflicted with the
syndrome, foreign courts convey their understanding of the justifiably fearful state of
mind of a person who has been cyclically abused and controlled over a period of
time.[24]
A battered woman has been defined as a woman who is repeatedly subjected to
any forceful physical or psychological behavior by a man in order to coerce her to do
something he wants her to do without concern for her rights. Battered women include
wives or women in any form of intimate relationship with men. Furthermore, in order
to be classified as a battered woman, the couple must go through the battering cycle at
least twice. Any woman may find herself in an abusive relationship with a man once. If
it occurs a second time, and she remains in the situation, she is defined as a battered
woman.[25]
Battered women exhibit common personality traits, such as low self-esteem,
traditional beliefs about the home, the family and the female sex role; emotional
dependence upon the dominant male; the tendency to accept responsibility for the
batterers actions; and false hopes that the relationship will improve.[26]
More graphically, the battered woman syndrome is characterized by the so-called
cycle of violence,[27] which has three phases: (1) the tension-building phase; (2) the
acute battering incident; and (3) the tranquil, loving (or, at least, nonviolent)
phase.[28]
During the tension-building phase, minor battering occurs -- it could be verbal or
slight physical abuse or another form of hostile behavior. The woman usually tries to
pacify the batterer through a show of kind, nurturing behavior; or by simply staying
out of his way. What actually happens is that she allows herself to be abused in ways
that, to her, are comparatively minor. All she wants is to prevent the escalation of the
violence exhibited by the batterer. This wish, however, proves to be double-edged,
because her placatory and passive behavior legitimizes his belief that he has the right
to abuse her in the first place.
However, the techniques adopted by the woman in her effort to placate him are
not usually successful, and the verbal and/or physical abuse worsens. Each partner
senses the imminent loss of control and the growing tension and despair. Exhausted
from the persistent stress, the battered woman soon withdraws emotionally. But the
more she becomes emotionally unavailable, the more the batterer becomes angry,
oppressive and abusive. Often, at some unpredictable point, the violence spirals out of
control and leads to an acute battering incident.[29]
The acute battering incident is said to be characterized by brutality,
destructiveness and, sometimes, death. The battered woman deems this incident as
unpredictable, yet also inevitable. During this phase, she has no control; only the
batterer may put an end to the violence. Its nature can be as unpredictable as the time
of its explosion, and so are his reasons for ending it. The battered woman usually
realizes that she cannot reason with him, and that resistance would only exacerbate
her condition.
At this stage, she has a sense of detachment from the attack and the terrible pain,
although she may later clearly remember every detail. Her apparent passivity in the
face of acute violence may be rationalized thus: the batterer is almost always much
stronger physically, and she knows from her past painful experience that it is futile to
fight back. Acute battering incidents are often very savage and out of control, such
that innocent bystanders or intervenors are likely to get hurt.[30]
The final phase of the cycle of violence begins when the acute battering incident
ends. During this tranquil period, the couple experience profound relief. On the one
hand, the batterer may show a tender and nurturing behavior towards his partner. He
knows that he has been viciously cruel and tries to make up for it, begging for her
forgiveness and promising never to beat her again. On the other hand, the battered
woman also tries to convince herself that the battery will never happen again; that her
partner will change for the better; and that this good, gentle and caring man is the real
person whom she loves.
A battered woman usually believes that she is the sole anchor of the emotional
stability of the batterer. Sensing his isolation and despair, she feels responsible for his
well-being. The truth, though, is that the chances of his reforming, or seeking or
receiving professional help, are very slim, especially if she remains with him.
Generally, only after she leaves him does he seek professional help as a way of getting
her back. Yet, it is in this phase of remorseful reconciliation that she is most
thoroughly tormented psychologically.
The illusion of absolute interdependency is well-entrenched in a battered womans
psyche. In this phase, she and her batterer are indeed emotionally dependent on each
other -- she for his nurturant behavior, he for her forgiveness. Underneath this
miserable cycle of tension, violence and forgiveness, each partner may believe that it
is better to die than to be separated. Neither one may really feel independent, capable
of functioning without the other.[31]
History of Abuse
in the Present Case
To show the history of violence inflicted upon appellant, the defense presented
several witnesses. She herself described her heart-rending experience as follows:
ATTY. TABUCANON
Q How did you describe your marriage with Ben Genosa?
A In the first year, I lived with him happily but in the subsequent year he was
cruel to me and a behavior of habitual drinker.
Q You said that in the subsequent year of your marriage, your husband was
abusive to you and cruel. In what way was this abusive and cruelty
manifested to you?
A He always provoke me in everything, he always slap me and sometimes he
pinned me down on the bed and sometimes beat me.
Q How many times did this happen?
A Several times already.
Q What did you do when these things happen to you?
A I went away to my mother and I ran to my father and we separate each
other.
Q What was the action of Ben Genosa towards you leaving home?
A He is following me, after that he sought after me.
Q What will happen when he follow you?
A He said he changed, he asked for forgiveness and I was convinced and after
that I go to him and he said sorry.
Q During those times that you were the recipient of such cruelty and abusive
behavior by your husband, were you able to see a doctor?
A Yes, sir.
Q Who are these doctors?
A The company physician, Dr. Dino Caing, Dr. Lucero and Dra. Cerillo.
xxxxxxxxx
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q By the way Doctor, were you able to physical examine the accused
sometime in the month of November, 1995 when this incident
happened?
A As per record, yes.
Q What was the date?
A It was on November 6, 1995.
Q So, did you actually see the accused physically?
A Yes, sir.
Q On November 6, 1995, will you please tell this Honorable Court, was the
patient pregnant?
A Yes, sir.
Q Being a doctor, can you more engage at what stage of pregnancy was she?
A Eight (8) months pregnant.
Q So in other words, it was an advance stage of pregnancy?
A Yes, sir.
Q What was your November 6, 1995 examination, was it an examination
about her pregnancy or for some other findings?
A No, she was admitted for hypertension headache which complicates her
pregnancy.
Q When you said admitted, meaning she was confined?
A Yes, sir.
Q For how many days?
A One day.
Q Where?
A At PHILPHOS Hospital.
xxxxxxxxx
Q Lets go back to the clinical history of Marivic Genosa. You said that you
were able to examine her personally on November 6, 1995 and she was
8 months pregnant.
What is this all about?
A Because she has this problem of tension headache secondary to
hypertension and I think I have a record here, also the same period from
1989 to 1995, she had a consultation for twenty-three (23) times.
Q For what?
A Tension headache.
Q Can we say that specially during the latter consultation, that the patient
had hypertension?
A The patient definitely had hypertension. It was refractory to our
treatment. She does not response when the medication was given to her,
because tension headache is more or less stress related and emotional in
nature.
Q What did you deduce of tension headache when you said is emotional in
nature?
A From what I deduced as part of our physical examination of the patient is
the family history in line of giving the root cause of what is causing this
disease. So, from the moment you ask to the patient all comes from the
domestic problem.
Q You mean problem in her household?
A Probably.
Q Can family trouble cause elevation of blood pressure, Doctor?
A Yes, if it is emotionally related and stressful it can cause increases in
hypertension which is unfortunately does not response to the
medication.
Q In November 6, 1995, the date of the incident, did you take the blood
pressure of the accused?
A On November 6, 1995 consultation, the blood pressure was 180/120.
Q Is this considered hypertension?
A Yes, sir, severe.
Q Considering that she was 8 months pregnant, you mean this is dangerous
level of blood pressure?
A It was dangerous to the child or to the fetus. [34]
Another defense witness, Teodoro Sarabia, a former neighbor of the Genosas in
Isabel, Leyte, testified that he had seen the couple quarreling several times; and that
on some occasions Marivic would run to him with bruises, confiding that the injuries
were inflicted upon her by Ben.[35]
Ecel Arano also testified[36] that for a number of times she had been asked by
Marivic to sleep at the Genosa house, because the latter feared that Ben would come
home drunk and hurt her. On one occasion that Ecel did sleep over, she was awakened
about ten oclock at night, because the couple were very noisy and I heard something
was broken like a vase. Then Marivic came running into Ecels room and locked the
door. Ben showed up by the window grill atop a chair, scaring them with a knife.
On the afternoon of November 15, 1995, Marivic again asked her help -- this time
to find Ben -- but they were unable to. They returned to the Genosa home, where they
found him already drunk. Again afraid that he might hurt her, Marivic asked her to
sleep at their house. Seeing his state of drunkenness, Ecel hesitated; and when she
heard the couple start arguing, she decided to leave.
On that same night that culminated in the death of Ben Genosa, at least three
other witnesses saw or heard the couple quarreling.[37] Marivic relates in detail the
following backdrop of the fateful night when life was snuffed out of him, showing in the
process a vivid picture of his cruelty towards her:
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q Please tell this Court, can you recall the incident in November 15, 1995 in
the evening?
A Whole morning and in the afternoon, I was in the office working then after
office hours, I boarded the service bus and went to Bilwang. When I
reached Bilwang, I immediately asked my son, where was his father,
then my second child said, he was not home yet. I was worried because
that was payday, I was anticipating that he was gambling. So while
waiting for him, my eldest son arrived from school, I prepared dinner for
my children.
Q This is evening of November 15, 1995?
A Yes, sir.
Q What time did Ben Genosa arrive?
A When he arrived, I was not there, I was in Isabel looking for him.
Q So when he arrived you were in Isabel looking for him?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you come back to your house?
A Yes, sir.
Q By the way, where was your conjugal residence situated this time?
A Bilwang.
Q Is this your house or you are renting?
A Renting.
Q What time were you able to come back in your residence at Bilwang?
A I went back around almost 8:00 oclock.
Q What happened when you arrived in your residence?
A When I arrived home with my cousin Ecel whom I requested to sleep with
me at that time because I had fears that he was again drunk and I was
worried that he would again beat me so I requested my cousin to sleep
with me, but she resisted because she had fears that the same thing will
happen again last year.
Q Who was this cousin of yours who you requested to sleep with you?
A Ecel Arao, the one who testified.
Q Did Ecel sleep with you in your house on that evening?
A No, because she expressed fears, she said her father would not allow her
because of Ben.
Q During this period November 15, 1995, were you pregnant?
A Yes, 8 months.
Q How advance was your pregnancy?
A Eight (8) months.
Q Was the baby subsequently born?
A Yes, sir.
Q Whats the name of the baby you were carrying at that time?
A Marie Bianca.
Q What time were you able to meet personally your husband?
A Yes, sir.
Q What time?
A When I arrived home, he was there already in his usual behavior.
Q Will you tell this Court what was his disposition?
A He was drunk again, he was yelling in his usual unruly behavior.
Q What was he yelling all about?
A His usual attitude when he got drunk.
Q You said that when you arrived, he was drunk and yelling at you? What
else did he do if any?
A He is nagging at me for following him and he dared me to quarrel him.
Q What was the cause of his nagging or quarreling at you if you know?
A He was angry at me because I was following x x x him, looking for him. I
was just worried he might be overly drunk and he would beat me again.
Q You said that he was yelling at you, what else, did he do to you if any?
A He was nagging at me at that time and I just ignore him because I want to
avoid trouble for fear that he will beat me again. Perhaps he was
disappointed because I just ignore him of his provocation and he switch
off the light and I said to him, why did you switch off the light when the
children were there. At that time I was also attending to my children
who were doing their assignments. He was angry with me for not
answering his challenge, so he went to the kitchen and [got] a bolo and
cut the antenna wire to stop me from watching television.
Q What did he do with the bolo?
A He cut the antenna wire to keep me from watching T.V.
Q What else happened after he cut the wire?
A He switch off the light and the children were shouting because they were
scared and he was already holding the bolo.
Q How do you described this bolo?
A 1 1/2 feet.
Q What was the bolo used for usually?
A For chopping meat.
Q You said the children were scared, what else happened as Ben was carrying
that bolo?
A He was about to attack me so I run to the room.
Q What do you mean that he was about to attack you?
A When I attempt to run he held my hands and he whirled me and I fell to the
bedside.
Q So when he whirled you, what happened to you?
A I screamed for help and then he left.
Q You said earlier that he whirled you and you fell on the bedside?
A Yes, sir.
Q You screamed for help and he left, do you know where he was going?
A Outside perhaps to drink more.
Q When he left what did you do in that particular time?
A I packed all his clothes.
Q What was your reason in packing his clothes?
A I wanted him to leave us.
Q During this time, where were your children, what were their reactions?
A After a couple of hours, he went back again and he got angry with me for
packing his clothes, then he dragged me again of the bedroom holding
my neck.
Q You said that when Ben came back to your house, he dragged you? How did
he drag you?
COURT INTERPRETER:
The witness demonstrated to the Court by using her right hand flexed
forcibly in her front neck)
A And he dragged me towards the door backward.
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q Where did he bring you?
A Outside the bedroom and he wanted to get something and then he kept on
shouting at me that you might as well be killed so there will be nobody to
nag me.
Q So you said that he dragged you towards the drawer?
A Yes, sir.
Q What is there in the drawer?
A I was aware that it was a gun.
COURT INTERPRETER:
(At this juncture the witness started crying).
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q Were you actually brought to the drawer?
A Yes, sir.
Q What happened when you were brought to that drawer?
A He dragged me towards the drawer and he was about to open the drawer
but he could not open it because he did not have the key then he pulled
his wallet which contained a blade about 3 inches long and I was aware
that he was going to kill me and I smashed his arm and then the wallet
and the blade fell. The one he used to open the drawer I saw, it was a pipe
about that long, and when he was about to pick-up the wallet and the
blade, I smashed him then I ran to the other room, and on that very
moment everything on my mind was to pity on myself, then the feeling I
had on that very moment was the same when I was admitted in
PHILPHOS Clinic, I was about to vomit.
COURT INTERPRETER:
(The witness at this juncture is crying intensely).
xxxxxxxxx
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q Talking of drawer, is this drawer outside your room?
A Outside.
Q In what part of the house?
A Dining.
Q Where were the children during that time?
A My children were already asleep.
Q You mean they were inside the room?
A Yes, sir.
Q You said that he dropped the blade, for the record will you please describe
this blade about 3 inches long, how does it look like?
A Three (3) inches long and 1/2 inch wide.
Q Is it a flexible blade?
A Its a cutter.
Q How do you describe the blade, is it sharp both edges?
A Yes, because he once used it to me.
Q How did he do it?
A He wanted to cut my throat.
Q With the same blade?
A Yes, sir, that was the object used when he intimidate me. [38]
In addition, Dra. Natividad Dayan was called by the RTC to testify as an expert
witness to assist it in understanding the psyche of a battered person. She had met with
Marivic Genosa for five sessions totaling about seventeen hours. Based on their talks,
the former briefly related the latters ordeal to the court a quo as follows:
Q: What can you say, that you found Marivic as a battered wife? Could you in
laymans term describe to this Court what her life was like as said to
you?
A: What I remember happened then was it was more than ten years, that she
was suffering emotional anguish. There were a lot of instances of abuses,
to emotional abuse, to verbal abuse and to physical abuse. The husband
had a very meager income, she was the one who was practically the
bread earner of the family. The husband was involved in a lot of vices,
going out with barkadas, drinking, even womanizing being involved in
cockfight and going home very angry and which will trigger a lot of
physical abuse. She also had the experience a lot of taunting from the
husband for the reason that the husband even accused her of infidelity,
the husband was saying that the child she was carrying was not his own.
So she was very angry, she was at the same time very depressed because
she was also aware, almost like living in purgatory or even hell when it
was happening day in and day out. [39]
In cross-examining Dra. Dayan, the public prosecutor not merely elicited, but
wittingly or unwittingly put forward, additional supporting evidence as shown below:
Q In your first encounter with the appellant in this case in 1999, where you
talked to her about three hours, what was the most relevant information
did you gather?
A The most relevant information was the tragedy that happened. The most
important information were escalating abuses that she had experienced
during her marital life.
Q Before you met her in 1999 for three hours, we presume that you already
knew of the facts of the case or at least you have substantial knowledge
of the facts of the case?
A I believe I had an idea of the case, but I do not know whether I can consider
them as substantial.
xxxxxxxxx
Q Did you gather an information from Marivic that on the side of her husband
they were fond of battering their wives?
A I also heard that from her?
Q You heard that from her?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you ask for a complete example who are the relatives of her husband
that were fond of battering their wives?
A What I remember that there were brothers of her husband who are also
battering their wives.
Q Did she not inform you that there was an instance that she stayed in a hotel
in Ormoc where her husband followed her and battered [her] several
times in that room?
A She told me about that.
Q Did she inform you in what hotel in Ormoc?
A Sir, I could not remember but I was told that she was battered in that room.
Q Several times in that room?
A Yes, sir. What I remember was that there is no problem about being
battered, it really happened.
Q Being an expert witness, our jurisprudence is not complete on saying this
matter. I think that is the first time that we have this in the Philippines,
what is your opinion?
A Sir, my opinion is, she is really a battered wife and in this kind happened, it
was really a self-defense. I also believe that there had been provocation
and I also believe that she became a disordered person. She had to suffer
anxiety reaction because of all the battering that happened and so she
became an abnormal person who had lost shes not during the time and
that is why it happened because of all the physical battering, emotional
battering, all the psychological abuses that she had experienced from
her husband.
Q I do believe that she is a battered wife. Was she extremely battered?
A Sir, it is an extreme form of battering. Yes.[40]
Parenthetically, the credibility of appellant was demonstrated as follows:
Q And you also said that you administered [the] objective personality test,
what x x x [is this] all about?
A The objective personality test is the Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory.
The purpose of that test is to find out about the lying prone[ne]ss of the
person.
Q What do you mean by that?
A Meaning, am I dealing with a client who is telling me the truth, or is she
someone who can exaggerate or x x x [will] tell a lie[?]
Q And what did you discover on the basis of this objective personality test?
A She was a person who passed the honesty test. Meaning she is a person
that I can trust. That the data that Im gathering from her are the
truth.[41]
The other expert witness presented by the defense, Dr. Alfredo Pajarillo, testified
on his Psychiatric Report,[42] which was based on his interview and examination of
Marivic Genosa. The Report said that during the first three years of her marriage to
Ben, everything looked good -- the atmosphere was fine, normal and happy -- until Ben
started to be attracted to other girls and was also enticed in[to] gambling[,] especially
cockfighting. x x x. At the same time Ben was often joining his barkada in drinking
sprees.
The drinking sprees of Ben greatly changed the attitude he showed toward his
family, particularly to his wife. The Report continued: At first, it was verbal and
emotional abuses but as time passed, he became physically abusive. Marivic claimed
that the viciousness of her husband was progressive every time he got drunk. It was a
painful ordeal Marivic had to anticipate whenever she suspected that her husband
went for a drinking [spree]. They had been married for twelve years[;] and practically
more than eight years, she was battered and maltreated relentlessly and mercilessly
by her husband whenever he was drunk.
Marivic sought the help of her mother-in-law, but her efforts were in vain. Further
quoting from the Report, [s]he also sought the advice and help of close relatives and
well-meaning friends in spite of her feeling ashamed of what was happening to her. But
incessant battering became more and more frequent and more severe. x x x.[43]
From the totality of evidence presented, there is indeed no doubt in the Courts
mind that Appellant Marivic Genosa was a severely abused person.
Effect of Battery on Appellant
Because of the recurring cycles of violence experienced by the abused woman, her
state of mind metamorphoses. In determining her state of mind, we cannot rely merely
on the judgment of an ordinary, reasonable person who is evaluating the events
immediately surrounding the incident. A Canadian court has aptly pointed out that
expert evidence on the psychological effect of battering on wives and common law
partners are both relevant and necessary. How can the mental state of the appellant
be appreciated without it? The average member of the public may ask: Why would a
woman put up with this kind of treatment? Why should she continue to live with such
a man? How could she love a partner who beat her to the point of requiring
hospitalization? We would expect the woman to pack her bags and go. Where is her
self-respect? Why does she not cut loose and make a new life for herself? Such is the
reaction of the average person confronted with the so-called battered wife
syndrome.[44]
To understand the syndrome properly, however, ones viewpoint should not be
drawn from that of an ordinary, reasonable person. What goes on in the mind of a
person who has been subjected to repeated, severe beatings may not be consistent
with -- nay, comprehensible to -- those who have not been through a similar
experience. Expert opinion is essential to clarify and refute common myths and
misconceptions about battered women.[45]
The theory of BWS formulated by Lenore Walker, as well as her research on
domestic violence, has had a significant impact in the United States and the United
Kingdom on the treatment and prosecution of cases, in which a battered woman is
charged with the killing of her violent partner. The psychologist explains that the
cyclical nature of the violence inflicted upon the battered woman immobilizes the
latters ability to act decisively in her own interests, making her feel trapped in the
relationship with no means of escape.[46] In her years of research, Dr. Walker found
that the abuse often escalates at the point of separation and battered women are in
greater danger of dying then.[47]
Corroborating these research findings, Dra. Dayan said that the battered woman
usually has a very low opinion of herself. She has x x x self-defeating and self-
sacrificing characteristics. x x x [W]hen the violence would happen, they usually
think that they provoke[d] it, that they were the one[s] who precipitated the
violence[; that] they provoke[d] their spouse to be physically, verbally and even
sexually abusive to them.[48]
According to Dra. Dayan, there are a lot of reasons why a battered woman does
not readily leave an abusive partner -- poverty, self-blame and guilt arising from the
latters belief that she provoked the violence, that she has an obligation to keep the
family intact at all cost for the sake of their children, and that she is the only hope for
her spouse to change.[49]
The testimony of another expert witness, Dr. Pajarillo, is also helpful. He had
previously testified in suits involving violent family relations, having evaluated
probably ten to twenty thousand violent family disputes within the Armed Forces of
the Philippines, wherein such cases abounded. As a result of his experience with
domestic violence cases, he became a consultant of the Battered Woman Office in
Quezon City. As such, he got involved in about forty (40) cases of severe domestic
violence, in which the physical abuse on the woman would sometimes even lead to her
loss of consciousness.[50]
Dr. Pajarillo explained that overwhelming brutality, trauma could result in
posttraumatic stress disorder, a form of anxiety neurosis or neurologic anxietism.[51]
After being repeatedly and severely abused, battered persons may believe that they
are essentially helpless, lacking power to change their situation. x x x [A]cute
battering incidents can have the effect of stimulating the development of coping
responses to the trauma at the expense of the victims ability to muster an active
response to try to escape further trauma. Furthermore, x x x the victim ceases to
believe that anything she can do will have a predictable positive effect.[52]
A study[53] conducted by Martin Seligman, a psychologist at the University of
Pennsylvania, found that even if a person has control over a situation, but believes
that she does not, she will be more likely to respond to that situation with coping
responses rather than trying to escape. He said that it was the cognitive aspect -- the
individuals thoughts -- that proved all-important. He referred to this phenomenon as
learned helplessness. [T]he truth or facts of a situation turn out to be less important
than the individuals set of beliefs or perceptions concerning the situation. Battered
women dont attempt to leave the battering situation, even when it may seem to
outsiders that escape is possible, because they cannot predict their own safety; they
believe that nothing they or anyone else does will alter their terrible
circumstances.[54]
Thus, just as the battered woman believes that she is somehow responsible for the
violent behavior of her partner, she also believes that he is capable of killing her, and
that there is no escape.[55] Battered women feel unsafe, suffer from pervasive
anxiety, and usually fail to leave the relationship.[56] Unless a shelter is available, she
stays with her husband, not only because she typically lacks a means of self-support,
but also because she fears that if she leaves she would be found and hurt even
more.[57]
In the instant case, we meticulously scoured the records for specific evidence
establishing that appellant, due to the repeated abuse she had suffered from her
spouse over a long period of time, became afflicted with the battered woman
syndrome. We, however, failed to find sufficient evidence that would support such a
conclusion. More specifically, we failed to find ample evidence that would confirm the
presence of the essential characteristics of BWS.
The defense fell short of proving all three phases of the cycle of violence
supposedly characterizing the relationship of Ben and Marivic Genosa. No doubt there
were acute battering incidents. In relating to the court a quo how the fatal incident
that led to the death of Ben started, Marivic perfectly described the tension-building
phase of the cycle. She was able to explain in adequate detail the typical
characteristics of this stage. However, that single incident does not prove the
existence of the syndrome. In other words, she failed to prove that in at least another
battering episode in the past, she had gone through a similar pattern.
How did the tension between the partners usually arise or build up prior to acute
battering? How did Marivic normally respond to Bens relatively minor abuses? What
means did she employ to try to prevent the situation from developing into the next
(more violent) stage?
Neither did appellant proffer sufficient evidence in regard to the third phase of
the cycle. She simply mentioned that she would usually run away to her mothers or
fathers house;[58] that Ben would seek her out, ask for her forgiveness and promise to
change; and that believing his words, she would return to their common abode.
Did she ever feel that she provoked the violent incidents between her and her
spouse? Did she believe that she was the only hope for Ben to reform? And that she
was the sole support of his emotional stability and well-being? Conversely, how
dependent was she on him? Did she feel helpless and trapped in their relationship?
Did both of them regard death as preferable to separation?
In sum, the defense failed to elicit from appellant herself her factual experiences
and thoughts that would clearly and fully demonstrate the essential characteristics of
the syndrome.
The Court appreciates the ratiocinations given by the expert witnesses for the
defense. Indeed, they were able to explain fully, albeit merely theoretically and
scientifically, how the personality of the battered woman usually evolved or
deteriorated as a result of repeated and severe beatings inflicted upon her by her
partner or spouse. They corroborated each others testimonies, which were culled from
their numerous studies of hundreds of actual cases. However, they failed to present in
court the factual experiences and thoughts that appellant had related to them -- if at
all -- based on which they concluded that she had BWS.
We emphasize that in criminal cases, all the elements of a modifying circumstance
must be proven in order to be appreciated. To repeat, the records lack supporting
evidence that would establish all the essentials of the battered woman syndrome as
manifested specifically in the case of the Genosas.
BWS as Self-Defense
In any event, the existence of the syndrome in a relationship does not in itself
establish the legal right of the woman to kill her abusive partner. Evidence must still
be considered in the context of self-defense.[59]
From the expert opinions discussed earlier, the Court reckons further that crucial
to the BWS defense is the state of mind of the battered woman at the time of the
offense[60] -- she must have actually feared imminent harm from her batterer and
honestly believed in the need to kill him in order to save her life.
Settled in our jurisprudence, however, is the rule that the one who resorts to self-
defense must face a real threat on ones life; and the peril sought to be avoided must be
imminent and actual, not merely imaginary.[61] Thus, the Revised Penal Code
provides the following requisites and effect of self-defense:[62]
Art. 11. Justifying circumstances. -- The following do not incur any criminal liability:
1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the following
circumstances concur;
In any event, all is not lost for appellant. While she did not raise any other
modifying circumstances that would alter her penalty, we deem it proper to evaluate
and appreciate in her favor circumstances that mitigate her criminal liability. It is a
hornbook doctrine that an appeal in a criminal case opens it wholly for review on any
issue, including that which has not been raised by the parties.[69]
From several psychological tests she had administered to Marivic, Dra. Dayan, in
her Psychological Evaluation Report dated November 29, 2000, opined as follows:
This is a classic case of a Battered Woman Syndrome. The repeated battering Marivic
experienced with her husband constitutes a form of [cumulative] provocation which
broke down her psychological resistance and natural self-control. It is very clear that
she developed heightened sensitivity to sight of impending danger her husband posed
continuously. Marivic truly experienced at the hands of her abuser husband a state of
psychological paralysis which can only be ended by an act of violence on her part. [70]
Dr. Pajarillo corroborates the findings of Dra. Dayan. He explained that the effect
of repetitious pain taking, repetitious battering, [and] repetitious maltreatment as
well as the severity and the prolonged administration of the battering is posttraumatic
stress disorder.[71] Expounding thereon, he said:
Q What causes the trauma, Mr. Witness?
A What causes the trauma is probably the repetitious battering. Second, the
severity of the battering. Third, the prolonged administration of
battering or the prolonged commission of the battering and the
psychological and constitutional stamina of the victim and another one
is the public and social support available to the victim. If nobody is
interceding, the more she will go to that disorder....
xxxxxxxxx
Q You referred a while ago to severity. What are the qualifications in terms of
severity of the postraumatic stress disorder, Dr. Pajarillo?
A The severity is the most severe continuously to trig[g]er this
post[t]raumatic stress disorder is injury to the head, banging of the head
like that. It is usually the very very severe stimulus that precipitate this
post[t]raumatic stress disorder. Others are suffocating the victim like
holding a pillow on the face, strangulating the individual, suffocating the
individual, and boxing the individual. In this situation therefore, the
victim is heightened to painful stimulus, like for example she is
pregnant, she is very susceptible because the woman will not only
protect herself, she is also to protect the fetus. So the anxiety is
heightened to the end [sic] degree.
Q But in terms of the gravity of the disorder, Mr. Witness, how do you
classify?
A We classify the disorder as [acute], or chronic or delayed or [a]typical.
Q Can you please describe this pre[-]classification you called delayed or
[atypical]?
A The acute is the one that usually require only one battering and the
individual will manifest now a severe emotional instability, higher
irritability remorse, restlessness, and fear and probably in most [acute]
cases the first thing will be happened to the individual will be thinking of
suicide.
Q And in chronic cases, Mr. Witness?
A The chronic cases is this repetitious battering, repetitious maltreatment,
any prolonged, it is longer than six (6) months. The [acute] is only the
first day to six (6) months. After this six (6) months you become
chronic. It is stated in the book specifically that after six (6) months is
chronic. The [a]typical one is the repetitious battering but the individual
who is abnormal and then become normal. This is how you get neurosis
from neurotic personality of these cases of post[t]raumatic stress
disorder. [72]
Answering the questions propounded by the trial judge, the expert witness
clarified further:
Q But just the same[,] neurosis especially on battered woman syndrome x x x
affects x x x his or her mental capacity?
A Yes, your Honor.
Q As you were saying[,] it x x x obfuscated her rationality?
A Of course obfuscated.[73]
In sum, the cyclical nature and the severity of the violence inflicted upon
appellant resulted in cumulative provocation which broke down her psychological
resistance and natural self-control, psychological paralysis, and difficulty in
concentrating or impairment of memory.
Based on the explanations of the expert witnesses, such manifestations were
analogous to an illness that diminished the exercise by appellant of her will power
without, however, depriving her of consciousness of her acts. There was, thus, a
resulting diminution of her freedom of action, intelligence or intent. Pursuant to
paragraphs 9[74] and 10[75] of Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code, this
circumstance should be taken in her favor and considered as a mitigating factor. [76]
In addition, we also find in favor of appellant the extenuating circumstance of
having acted upon an impulse so powerful as to have naturally produced passion and
obfuscation. It has been held that this state of mind is present when a crime is
committed as a result of an uncontrollable burst of passion provoked by prior unjust or
improper acts or by a legitimate stimulus so powerful as to overcome reason.[77] To
appreciate this circumstance, the following requisites should concur: (1) there is an
act, both unlawful and sufficient to produce such a condition of mind; and (2) this act
is not far removed from the commission of the crime by a considerable length of time,
during which the accused might recover her normal equanimity.[78]
Here, an acute battering incident, wherein Ben Genosa was the unlawful
aggressor, preceded his being killed by Marivic. He had further threatened to kill her
while dragging her by the neck towards a cabinet in which he had kept a gun. It should
also be recalled that she was eight months pregnant at the time. The attempt on her
life was likewise on that of her fetus.[79] His abusive and violent acts, an aggression
which was directed at the lives of both Marivic and her unborn child, naturally
produced passion and obfuscation overcoming her reason. Even though she was able
to retreat to a separate room, her emotional and mental state continued. According to
her, she felt her blood pressure rise; she was filled with feelings of self-pity and of fear
that she and her baby were about to die. In a fit of indignation, she pried open the
cabinet drawer where Ben kept a gun, then she took the weapon and used it to shoot
him.
The confluence of these events brings us to the conclusion that there was no
considerable period of time within which Marivic could have recovered her normal
equanimity. Helpful is Dr. Pajarillos testimony[80] that with neurotic anxiety -- a
psychological effect on a victim of overwhelming brutality [or] trauma -- the victim
relives the beating or trauma as if it were real, although she is not actually being
beaten at the time. She cannot control re-experiencing the whole thing, the most
vicious and the trauma that she suffered. She thinks of nothing but the suffering. Such
reliving which is beyond the control of a person under similar circumstances, must
have been what Marivic experienced during the brief time interval and prevented her
from recovering her normal equanimity. Accordingly, she should further be credited
with the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation.
It should be clarified that these two circumstances -- psychological paralysis as
well as passion and obfuscation -- did not arise from the same set of facts.
On the one hand, the first circumstance arose from the cyclical nature and the
severity of the battery inflicted by the batterer-spouse upon appellant. That is, the
repeated beatings over a period of time resulted in her psychological paralysis, which
was analogous to an illness diminishing the exercise of her will power without
depriving her of consciousness of her acts.
The second circumstance, on the other hand, resulted from the violent aggression
he had inflicted on her prior to the killing. That the incident occurred when she was
eight months pregnant with their child was deemed by her as an attempt not only on
her life, but likewise on that of their unborn child. Such perception naturally produced
passion and obfuscation on her part.
Second Legal Issue:
Treachery
There is treachery when one commits any of the crimes against persons by
employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof without risk to oneself
arising from the defense that the offended party might make.[81] In order to qualify
an act as treacherous, the circumstances invoked must be proven as indubitably as
the killing itself; they cannot be deduced from mere inferences, or conjectures, which
have no place in the appreciation of evidence.[82] Because of the gravity of the
resulting offense, treachery must be proved as conclusively as the killing itself.[83]
Ruling that treachery was present in the instant case, the trial court imposed the
penalty of death upon appellant. It inferred this qualifying circumstances merely from
the fact that the lifeless body of Ben had been found lying in bed with an open,
depressed, circular fracture located at the back of his head. As to exactly how and
when he had been fatally attacked, however, the prosecution failed to establish
indubitably. Only the following testimony of appellant leads us to the events
surrounding his death:
Q You said that when Ben came back to your house, he dragged you? How did
he drag you?
COURT:
The witness demonstrated to the Court by using her right hand flexed
forcibly in her front neck)
A And he dragged me towards the door backward.
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q Where did he bring you?
A Outside the bedroom and he wanted to get something and then he kept on
shouting at me that you might as well be killed so there will be nobody to
nag me
Q So you said that he dragged you towards the drawer?
A Yes, sir.
Q What is there in the drawer?
A I was aware that it was a gun.
COURT INTERPRETER
(At this juncture the witness started crying)
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q Were you actually brought to the drawer?
A Yes, sir.
Q What happened when you were brought to that drawer?
A He dragged me towards the drawer and he was about to open the drawer
but he could not open it because he did not have the key then he pulled
his wallet which contained a blade about 3 inches long and I was aware
that he was going to kill me and I smashed his arm and then the wallet
and the blade fell. The one he used to open the drawer I saw, it was a pipe
about that long, and when he was about to pick-up the wallet and the
blade, I smashed him then I ran to the other room, and on that very
moment everything on my mind was to pity on myself, then the feeling I
had on that very moment was the same when I was admitted in
PHILPHOS Clinic, I was about to vomit.
COURT INTERPRETER
(The witness at this juncture is crying intensely).
xxxxxxxxx
Q You said that he dropped the blade, for the record will you please describe
this blade about 3 inches long, how does it look like?
A Three (3) inches long and inch wide.
Q It is a flexible blade?
A Its a cutter.
Q How do you describe the blade, is it sharp both edges?
A Yes, because he once used it to me.
Q How did he do it?
A He wanted to cut my throat.
Q With the same blade?
A Yes, sir, that was the object used when he intimidate me.
xxxxxxxxx
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q You said that this blade fell from his grip, is it correct?
A Yes, because I smashed him.
Q What happened?
A Ben tried to pick-up the wallet and the blade, I pick-up the pipe and I
smashed him and I ran to the other room.
Q What else happened?
A When I was in the other room, I felt the same thing like what happened
before when I was admitted in PHILPHOS Clinic, I was about to vomit. I
know my blood pressure was raised. I was frightened I was about to die
because of my blood pressure.
COURT INTERPRETER:
(Upon the answer of the witness getting the pipe and smashed him, the
witness at the same time pointed at the back of her neck or the nape).
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q You said you went to the room, what else happened?
A Considering all the physical sufferings that Ive been through with him, I
took pity on myself and I felt I was about to die also because of my blood
pressure and the baby, so I got that gun and I shot him.
COURT
/to Atty. Tabucanon
Q You shot him?
A Yes, I distorted the drawer.[84]
The above testimony is insufficient to establish the presence of treachery. There
is no showing of the victims position relative to appellants at the time of the shooting.
Besides, equally axiomatic is the rule that when a killing is preceded by an argument
or a quarrel, treachery cannot be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance, because
the deceased may be said to have been forewarned and to have anticipated aggression
from the assailant.[85]
Moreover, in order to appreciate alevosia, the method of assault adopted by the
aggressor must have been consciously and deliberately chosen for the specific purpose
of accomplishing the unlawful act without risk from any defense that might be put up
by the party attacked.[86] There is no showing, though, that the present appellant
intentionally chose a specific means of successfully attacking her husband without any
risk to herself from any retaliatory act that he might make. To the contrary, it appears
that the thought of using the gun occurred to her only at about the same moment when
she decided to kill her batterer-spouse. In the absence of any convincing proof that she
consciously and deliberately employed the method by which she committed the crime
in order to ensure its execution, this Court resolves the doubt in her favor.[87]
Proper Penalty
The penalty for parricide imposed by Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code is
reclusion perpetua to death. Since two mitigating circumstances and no aggravating
circumstance have been found to have attended the commission of the offense, the
penalty shall be lowered by one (1) degree, pursuant to Article 64 of paragraph 5[88]
of the same Code.[89] The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period is
imposable, considering that two mitigating circumstances are to be taken into account
in reducing the penalty by one degree, and no other modifying circumstances were
shown to have attended the commission of the offense.[90] Under the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the minimum of the penalty shall be within the range of that which is
next lower in degree -- prision mayor -- and the maximum shall be within the range of
the medium period of reclusion temporal.
Considering all the circumstances of the instant case, we deem it just and proper
to impose the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period, or six (6) years and one
(1) day in prison as minimum; to reclusion temporal in its medium period, or 14 years
8 months and 1 day as maximum. Noting that appellant has already served the
minimum period, she may now apply for and be released from detention on parole.[91]
Epilogue
Being a novel concept in our jurisprudence, the battered woman syndrome was
neither easy nor simple to analyze and recognize vis--vis the given set of facts in the
present case. The Court agonized on how to apply the theory as a modern-day reality.
It took great effort beyond the normal manner in which decisions are made -- on the
basis of existing law and jurisprudence applicable to the proven facts. To give a just
and proper resolution of the case, it endeavored to take a good look at studies
conducted here and abroad in order to understand the intricacies of the syndrome and
the distinct personality of the chronically abused person. Certainly, the Court has
learned much. And definitely, the solicitor general and appellants counsel, Atty.
Katrina Legarda, have helped it in such learning process.
While our hearts empathize with recurrently battered persons, we can only work
within the limits of law, jurisprudence and given facts. We cannot make or invent
them. Neither can we amend the Revised Penal Code. Only Congress, in its wisdom,
may do so.
The Court, however, is not discounting the possibility of self-defense arising from
the battered woman syndrome. We now sum up our main points. First, each of the
phases of the cycle of violence must be proven to have characterized at least two
battering episodes between the appellant and her intimate partner. Second, the final
acute battering episode preceding the killing of the batterer must have produced in the
battered persons mind an actual fear of an imminent harm from her batterer and an
honest belief that she needed to use force in order to save her life. Third, at the time of
the killing, the batterer must have posed probable -- not necessarily immediate and
actual -- grave harm to the accused, based on the history of violence perpetrated by
the former against the latter. Taken altogether, these circumstances could satisfy the
requisites of self-defense. Under the existing facts of the present case, however, not all
of these elements were duly established.
WHEREFORE, the conviction of Appellant Marivic Genosa for parricide is hereby
AFFIRMED. However, there being two (2) mitigating circumstances and no
aggravating circumstance attending her commission of the offense, her penalty is
REDUCED to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum; to 14 years,
8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum.
Inasmuch as appellant has been detained for more than the minimum penalty hereby
imposed upon her, the director of the Bureau of Corrections may immediately RELEASE
her from custody upon due determination that she is eligible for parole, unless she is
being held for some other lawful cause. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
DECISION
SERENO, C.J.:
While this Court has recently faced questions on the criminal liability of fraternity
members for hazing, this case presents novel questions on the extent of liability of
schools and school authorities under Republic Act No. 8049, or the Anti-Hazing Law.
The responsibility given to an academic institution for the welfare of its students has
been characterized by law and judicial doctrine as a form of special parental authority
and responsibility.1 This responsibility has been amplified by the enactment of the
Anti-Hazing Law, in that the failure by school authorities to take any action to prevent
the offenses as provided by the law exposes them to criminal liability as accomplices in
the criminal acts. Thus, the institution and its officers cannot stand idly by in the face
of patently criminal acts committed within their sphere of responsibility. They bear
the commensurate duty to ensure that the crimes covered by the Anti-Hazing Law are
not committed.
It was within this legal framework that the school authorities of the Philippine
Merchant Marine Academy (PMMA) were criminally charged before the
Sandiganbayan as accomplices to hazing under the Anti-Hazing Law. Before they were
arraigned, the Sandiganbayan quashed2 the Information against them on the basis of
the dismissal of the criminal case against the principal accused and, the failure to
include in the Information the material averments required by the Anti-Hazing Law.
Consequently, this Petition was filed before this Court questioning the
Sandiganbayans quashal of the Information.
The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) probed the death of Balidoy. After months
of investigation, it forwarded its findings7 to the provincial prosecutor of Zambales for
the preliminary investigation and possible criminal prosecution of those involved in
the orientation and indoctrination of the PMMA Class of 2005.8 Subsequently, the
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Zambales issued a Resolution9 finding probable
cause to charge the following as principals to the crime of hazing: Aldwin Alvarez
(Alvarez), Leotharius C. Montez (Montez), Rudence G. Reyes (Reyes), and Jed
Nicholas S. Simpas (Simpas) collectively, Alvarez et al. A criminal case against
Alvarez et al. was then filed with the Regional Trial Court of Iba, Zambales (RTC
Zambales).
The Assistant Provincial Prosecutor also endorsed to the Deputy Ombudsman for the
Military the finding of probable cause to charge the following school authorities as
accomplices to hazing: Rear Admiral (RADM) Virginio R. Aris (Aris), Lieutenant
Senior Grade (LTSG.) Dominador D. Bayabos (Bayabos), Lieutenant Junior Grade
(LTJG.) Gerry P. Doctor (Doctor), LTJG. Manny Ferrer (Ferrer), LTJG. Kruzaldo
Mabborang (Mabborang), LTJG. Ronald G. Magsino (Magsino), Ensign (ENS.) Dennis
Velasco (Velasco), and ENS. Dominador Operio (Operio) collectively, respondents.
The Ombudsman Investigator agreed with the findings of the Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor. The matter was thus ordered re-docketed for the purpose of conducting
the proper administrative proceedings against respondents for grave misconduct and
abuse of authority.10 The Office of the Special Prosecutor eventually filed with the
Sandiganbayan a criminal case charging respondents as accomplices to the crime of
hazing.11chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Meanwhile, the RTCZambales issued an Order dismissing the Information against the
principal accused, Alvarez et al.12 The Order was later entered in the Book of Entries of
Judgment.
Bayabos, Ferrer, Magsino, Doctor, and Operio (collectively, Bayabos et al.) filed a
Motion to Quash the Information.13 They argued that the Information did not contain
all the essential elements of the offense. They also pointed out that there was no
allegation that the purported act had been made a prerequisite for admission to the
PMMA, especially considering that the victim had already been accepted in the
academy. Moreover, they stressed that there was no averment in the Information that
the PMMA was a fraternity, a sorority, or an organization. Also underscored was the
absence in the Information of any assertion that the alleged hazing was not part of the
physical, mental, and psychological testing and training procedure and practices to
determine and enhance the physical, mental and psychological fitness of prospective
regular members. Furthermore, they emphasized that there was no allegation that
they were given prior written notice of the hazing and that they had permitted the
activity.
As a final point, Bayabos et al. argued that the case against the principal accused had
already been dismissed with finality by the RTC. There being no more principals with
whom they could have cooperated in the execution of the offense, they asserted that
the case against them must be dismissed.
The Special Prosecutor opposed14 the motion of Bayabos et al. He insisted that the
Information alleged the material facts that would sufficiently establish the presence of
the essential ingredients of the crime of accomplice to hazing. He also stressed that
there was nothing in the law requiring that the principals must be prosecuted first
before a case could be filed against the accomplices. The Comment/Opposition of the
Special Prosecutor was, however, silent on the issue of whether the Information
contained an allegation that the supposed hazing had been made a prerequisite for
admission to the PMMA, and whether the academy was considered an organization
within the meaning of the Anti-Hazing Law.
Six days before Bayabos et al. were set to be arraigned,15 the Sandiganbayan issued
the assailed Resolution (SB Resolution I) quashing the Information and dismissing the
criminal case against them. According to the court, the fact that the charge against the
principal accused Alvarez et al. was dismissed with finality favorably carried with it
the indictment against those charged as accomplices, whose criminal responsibility
was subordinate to that of the former. It stressed that before there can be an
accomplice, there must be a principal by direct participation, the latter being the
originator of the criminal design. In this case, as there were no principal perpetrators
to speak of, necessarily, there was no one else with whom they could have cooperated
in the execution of the crime of hazing. In view of the dismissal of the case against the
principals, the court ruled that the Information charging Bayabos et al. as accomplices
could no longer stand on its own.
In any event, the Sandiganbayan found that the Information charged no offense, and
that the allegations therein were mere conclusions of law. It also stressed that there
was no averment that the alleged hazing was not part of the physical, mental and
psychological testing and training procedure and practices to determine and enhance
the physical, mental and psychological fitness of prospective regular members of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP),
pursuant to Section 1 of the law.16 It must be noted, though, that the Sandiganbayan
did not make any categorical determination that the PMMA was considered an
organization within the meaning of the Anti-Hazing Law.
Six months after the Sandiganbayan issued its Resolution dismissing the criminal case
against Bayabos et al., the accused Velasco surrendered and then filed his own Motion
to Quash,17 adopting the grounds raised by that court. His arraignment was set on 14
August 2006.18 However, on 3 August 2006, the Sandiganbayan issued another
Resolution (SB Resolution II) dismissing the case against him. According to the court,
since Velasco was similarly situated as Bayabos et al., the Information against him
must likewise be quashed in light of the reasoning laid out in SB Resolution I. In the
same Resolution, the Sandiganbayan ex proprio motu dismissed the case against Aris
and Mabborang (collectively, Velasco et al.), explaining that they, too, had been
charged under the same Information for the same offense.19 It is unclear from the
records20 whether the accused Aris and Mabborang surrendered or were arrested, or
whether the Order of Arrest21 was recalled prior to the dismissal of the case.
Aggrieved, the Office of the Ombudsman, through the Special Prosecutor, filed with
this Court on 13 March 2006 a Petition assailing SB Resolution I and, on 16 October
2006, another Petition challenging SB Resolution II.
The Issues
The Special Prosecutor asks this Court to address a number of legal issues. After a
thorough evaluation of the Petitions, however, we cull the threshold issues needing to
be addressed by this Court as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
4. Whether the prosecution of respondents for the crime of accomplice to hazing
can proceed in spite of the dismissal with finality of the case against the
principal accused!
5. Whether the Information filed against respondents contains all the material
averments for the prosecution of the crime of accomplice to hazing under the
Anti-Hazing Law
Our Ruling
With regard to the first issue, we agree with petitioner that the Sandiganbayan erred
when it dismissed outright the case against respondents, on the sole ground that the
case against the purported principals had already been dismissed. It is a settled rule
that the case against those charged as accomplices is not ipso facto dismissed in the
absence of trial of the purported principals; the dismissal of the case against the latter;
or even the latters acquittal, especially when the occurrence of the crime has in fact
been established.22 In People v. Rafael,23 the Supreme Court En Banc reasoned thus:
The corresponding responsibilities of the principal, accomplice, and accessory are
distinct from each other. As long as the commission of the offense can be duly
established in evidence, the determination of the liability of the accomplice or
accessory can proceed independently of that of the principal. Accordingly, so long as
the commission of the crime can be duly proven, the trial of those charged as
accomplices to determine their criminal liability can proceed independently of that of
the alleged principal.24chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
We note in the present case that Bayabos et al. merely presented the Order of Entry of
Judgment25 dismissing the case against Alvarez et al. Nowhere is it mentioned in the
order that the case was dismissed against the alleged principals, because no crime had
been committed. In fact, it does not cite the trial courts reason for dismissing the case.
Hence, the Sandiganbayan committed an error when it simply relied on the Order of
Entry of Judgment without so much as scrutinizing the reason for the dismissal of the
case against the purported principals.
Section 14, Article III of the Constitution, recognizes the right of the accused to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against them. As a manifestation of
this constitutional right, the Rules of Court requires that the information charging
persons with an offense be sufficient. One of the key components of a sufficient
information is the statement of the acts or omissions constituting the offense
charged, subject of the complaint.26 The information must also be crafted in a language
ordinary and concise enough to enable persons of common understanding to know the
offense being charged against them.27 This approach is intended to allow them to
suitably prepare for their defense, as they are presumed to have no independent
knowledge of the facts constituting the offense they have purportedly committed.28
The information need not be in the same kind of language used in the law relied
upon.29chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
At any time before entering a plea, an accused may assail the information filed with
the court based on the grounds enumerated in Section 3, Rule 117 of the Rules of
Court, one of which is the claim that the facts charged do not constitute an offense. In
assessing whether an information must be quashed on that ground, the basic test30 is
to determine if the facts averred would establish the presence of the essential
elements of the crime as defined in the law. The information is examined without
consideration of the truth or veracity of the claims therein, as these are more properly
proven or controverted during the trial. In the appraisal of the information, matters
aliunde are not taken into account.
The term organization shall include any club or the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, Philippine National Police, Philippine Military Academy, or officer
and cadet corp of the Citizen's Military Training and Citizen's Army Training. The
physical, mental and psychological testing and training procedure and practices to
determine and enhance the physical, mental and psychological fitness of prospective
regular members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National
Police as approved by the Secretary of National Defense and the National Police
Commission duly recommended by the Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines
and the Director General of the Philippine National Police shall not be considered as
hazing for the purposes of this Act.
Sec. 4. x x x x.
The school authorities including faculty members who consent to the hazing or who
have actual knowledge thereof, but failed to take any action to prevent the same
from occurring shall be punished as accomplices for the acts of hazing committed by
the perpetrators. (Emphasis supplied)
The crime of hazing is thus committed when the following essential elements are
established: (1) a person is placed in some embarrassing or humiliating situation or
subjected to physical or psychological suffering or injury; and (2) these acts were
employed as a prerequisite for the persons admission or entry into an organization. In
the crime of hazing, the crucial ingredient distinguishing it from the crimes against
persons defined under Title Eight of the Revised Penal Code is the infliction by a
person of physical or psychological suffering on another in furtherance of the latters
admission or entry into an organization.
In the case of school authorities and faculty members who have had no direct
participation in the act, they may nonetheless be charged as accomplices if it is shown
that (1) hazing, as established by the above elements, occurred; (2) the accused are
school authorities or faculty members; and (3) they consented to or failed to take
preventive action against hazing in spite actual knowledge thereof.
First, we reject the contention of respondents that PMMA should not be considered an
organization. Under the Anti-Hazing Law, the breadth of the term organization
includes but is not limited to groups, teams, fraternities, sororities, citizen army
training corps, educational institutions, clubs, societies, cooperatives, companies,
partnerships, corporations, the PNP, and the AFP.31 Attached to the Department of
Transportation and Communications,32 the PMMA is a government-owned educational
institution33 established for the primary purpose of producing efficient and well-
trained merchant marine officers.34 Clearly, it is included in the term organization
within the meaning of the law.
We also disagree with the Sandiganbayan ruling that the quashal of the Information
was warranted for failure to allege that the purported acts were not covered by the
exemption relating to the duly recommended and approved testing and training
procedure and practices for prospective regular members of the AFP and the PNP.
This exemption is an affirmative defense in, not an essential element of, the crime of
accomplice to hazing. It is an assertion that must be properly claimed by the accused,
not by the prosecution. The reason for this rule is that the accused carry the burden of
proof in establishing by clear and convincing evidence that they have satisfied the
requirements thereof.35 Thus, the prosecutions failure to point out in the Information
that the exception is inapplicable would not justify the quashal of that Information.
Nevertheless, we find albeit for a different reason that the Motion to Quash must be
granted, as the Information does not include all the material facts constituting the
crime of accomplice to hazing. The Information charging respondents reads as
follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The undersigned Assistant Special Prosecutor, Office of the Special Prosecutor, hereby
accuses [RADM] Virginio R. Aris, [LTSG.] Dominador D. BAYABOS, [LTJG.] Manny G.
Ferrer, [LTJG.] Ronald G. Magsino, [LTJG.] Kruzaldo G. Mabborang, [LTJG.] Gerry P.
Doctor, [ENS.] Dominador B. Operio, Jr., and [ENS.] Dennis S. Velasco, as accomplices
for Violation of R.A. 8049 (Anti-Hazing Law), committed as
follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
That during the period from the 2nd of May 2001 up to the 3rd of May 2001, inside the
campus of the Philippine Merchant Marine Academy (PMMA), in the Municipality of
San Narciso, Province of Zambales, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court accused RADM Virginio R. Aris, President of PMMA with [Salary
Grade (SG) 29]; LTSG. Dominador D. BAYABOS, Commandant of the Cadets; (LTJG.)
Manny G. Ferrer, 1st Batallion Officer; LTJG. Ronald G. Magsino, Security Officer;
LTJG. Kruzaldo G. Mabborang, 2nd Battalion Officer; LTJG. Gerry P. Doctor, Batl.
Mast.; ENS. Dominador B. Operio, Jr., 1st Battalion Company Officer; and ENS. Dennis
S. Velasco, Mess Officer, all public officers, conspiring, confederating and mutually
helping one another, committing the offense in relation to office and while in the
performance of their duties as such public officers being the school authorities and/or
faculty members did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally, consent or
have actual knowledge of the hazing perpetrated by the principal accused, all First
Class Midshipmen, against probationary midshipman FERNANDO BALIDOy, JR.
during the schools Indoctrination and Orientation; and, fail to take any action to
prevent the occurrence of the hazing and the infliction of psychological and physical
injuries against said FERNANDO BALIDOy, JR. thereby causing the instantaneous
death of the latter, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said FERNANDO
BALIDOy, JR.36
As can be gleaned from the above, the indictment merely states that psychological
pain and physical injuries were inflicted on the victim. There is no allegation that the
purported acts were employed as a prerequisite for admission or entry into the
organization. Failure to aver this crucial ingredient would prevent the successful
prosecution of the criminal responsibility of the accused, either as principal or as
accomplice, for the crime of hazing. Plain reference to a technical term37 in this case,
hazing is insufficient and incomplete, as it is but a characterization of the acts
allegedly committed and thus a mere conclusion of law. Section 6, Rule 110 of the
Rules of Court, expressly states that the information must include, inter alia, both the
designation of the offense given by the statute and the acts or omissions complained
of as constituting the offense. The Special Prosecutors belated argument38 in his
Petition before this Court that the successful completion of the indoctrination and
orientation program was used as a prerequisite for continued admission to the
academy i.e., attainment of active midshipman status does not cure this defect in
the Information. Thus, the Information must be quashed, as the ultimate facts it
presents do not constitute the crime of accomplice to hazing.
Finally, we reject the Special Prosecutors claim that the Sandiganbayan should just
have ordered the filing of another information or the correction of the defect by
amendment, instead of dismissing the case outright.39 Indeed, Section 4, Rule 117 of
the Rules of Court, provides that if a motion to quash is based on the ground that the
facts charged do not constitute an offense, the court shall give the prosecution a
chance to correct the defect by amendment. However, the provision also states that if
the prosecution fails to make the amendment, the motion shall be granted. Here, we
point out that the Special Prosecutor insisted in his Comment on the Motion to Quash40
that there was no defect in the Information. Neither has he filed a new information
after the motion was sustained, pursuant to Section 5, Rule 117. Thus, the
Sandiganbayan was correct in ordering the quashal of the Information and the
eventual dismissal of the case.
This does not mean, however, that the Special Prosecutor is now precluded from filing
another information. Section 6, Rule 117, specifically states that an order sustaining a
motion to quash would not bar another prosecution. That is, of course, unless
respondents are able to prove that the criminal action or liability has been
extinguished, or that double jeopardy has already attached.
Given the foregoing, the Court no longer sees the necessity to pass upon the other
issues raised by petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari in G.R. No. 171222 is hereby
DENIED and the petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 174786, DISMISSED. The
dismissal of the case in Sandiganbayan Resolutions dated 27 January 2006 and 3
August 2006 in Criminal Case No. 28339 are thus AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Before this Court is the final appeal1 of Aurelio Jastiva from his conviction for the
crime of rape in Criminal Case No. 12772, entitled "People of the Philippines v. Aurelio
Jastiva," by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 9, in Dipolog City on September 1,
2009,2 which the Court of Appeals affirmed with slight modification through its
Decision3 promulgated on August 31, 2011 in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00754-MIN.
Gathered from the records of the case, the facts are as follows:
On September 29, 2004, appellant Jastiva was charged in the RTC with rape penalized
under Article 266-A in relation to Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, under the following information:
That in the evening, on or about the 3rd day of August, (sic) 2004, in x x x,
Zamboanga del Norte, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused,
armed with a knife, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously succeed in having sexual intercourse with one [AAA4], a
67-year-old married, against her will and without her consent.
With the assistance of counsel, appellant Jastiva pleaded "not guilty" to the crime
charged when he was arraigned on November 26, 2004.6
The prosecution presented the following witnesses, namely (i) AAA,7 the private
offended party, 69 years old, married, a farmer, and a resident of Sitio WWW,
Poblacion YYY, Municipality of ZZZ, Zamboanga del Norte; (ii) BBB,8 the husband of
AAA, 74 years old, a farmer, and a resident of Sitio WWW, Poblacion YYY,
Municipality of ZZZ, Zamboanga del Norte; (iii) Dr. Domiciano Talaboc,9 Municipal
Health Officer, ZZZ Rural Health office, Zamboanga del Norte; (iv) Celedonio Paul T.
Payla, Jr.,10 Barangay Kagawad, Poblacion YYY, Municipality of ZZZ, Zamboanga del
Norte; and (v) Police Officer (PO) 3 Alfredo Esmade,11 Desk Officer, PNP Dapitan City,
Zamboanga del Norte; and several pieces of documentary evidence,12 specifically: (i)
the Medical Certificate13 of AAA dated August 5, 2004 issued by the Office of the
Municipal Health Officer; (ii) the Barangay Blotter;14 (iii) a Certification15 of the
Excerpt from the Record Book of Dapitan City Police Station; and (iv) the Affidavit16 of
BBB.
As summarized by the Court of Appeals, the prosecution tried to establish from the
preceding enumerated testimonial and documentary pieces of evidence that
On August 3, 2004, then [6717]-year old AAA was drying corn in their small barn
("kamalig") in a farmland located at [Sitio XXX], Zamboanga del Norte, when her
husband[,] BBB[,] left her alone. BBB spent that night in their permanent residence at
[Sitio WWW] because their daughter has (sic) no companion.
At about 11:00 x x x in the evening, AAA was fast asleep when a certain man she later
identified as accused-appellant Aurelio Jastiva covered her mouth, threatened her
with a knife and told her not to scream because he will have sexual intercourse with
her. AAA grabbed accused-appellants hand and felt the blade of the knife he held.
Thereafter, accused-appellant removed AAAs underwear. However, he cannot
proceed with his lewd design because his penis was not yet erected (sic), accused-
appellant therefore toyed with AAAs sexual organ by licking it. Accused-appellant
then made his way up and tried to suck AAAs tongue. The latter evaded her
assaulters sexual advances by closing her lips tightly and in the process wounded the
same through her teeth. Once done, accused-appellant held his penis and inserted it to
(sic) AAAs vagina. After fulfilling his sexual desire and before AAA could stand up,
accused-appellant tapped AAAs shoulder and said "Salamat" (Thank [y]ou).
AAA stood up and opened the door to let accused-appellant out. When the latter passed
through (sic) AAA, it was then that the (sic) AAA clearly recognized, through the
illumination of the moon, that it was their (sic) neighbor accused-appellant who
abused her. Engulfed with fear, AAA immediately closed the door because she thought
that accused-appellant might go (sic) back and kill her. AAA later learned that
accused-appellant destroyed a particular rack in their kitchen to enter the small barn.
AAA was no longer able to sleep after the incident.
At about 5:00 x x x in the morning of the next day, AAA relayed her ordeal to her
neighbor Corazon Mokot and her husband BBB. The latter immediately told her that
they will bring the matter to the attention of the authorities.
On August 5, 2004, they [AAA and BBB] went to the Barangay Hall of Barangay [YYY]
to report the incident. Barangay Kagawad Celedonio Paul Payla, Jr., the officer-on-
duty wrote a barangay blotter about the incident. On the same day, AAA was medically
examined by Dr. Domiciano Talaboc, the Municipal Health Officer of the Municipality
of [ZZZ]. The Medical Certificate dated August 5, 2004 revealed that AAAs labia
majora and labia minora on both sides showed signs of irritation and are reddish in
color, in addition to a partial separation of tissues noted between the labium. AAAs
vaginal opening also showed signs of irritation and are (sic) reddish in color. The same
also stated that AAA sustained multiple scratches at both her upper and lower lips.
On August 6, 2004, assisted by Police Inspector and Chief of Police of the Philippine
National Police, [ZZZ] Police Station of Zamboanga del Norte, AAA filed a Complaint
for Rape against accused-appellant. A warrant for the arrest of accused-appellant was
subsequently issued and on August 29, 2004, accused-appellant was apprehended by
the police authorities.18 (Citations omitted.)
To counter the evidence summarized above, the defense offered the testimonies of the
following witnesses: (i) Gloria Ordas (Ordas),19 48 years old, housekeeper, and a
resident of Villahermosa, Municipality of ZZZ, Zamboanga del Norte; (ii) Vilma Jastiva
(Vilma),20 the common-law wife of appellant Jastiva, 56 years old, laundry woman,
and a resident of Sitio XXX, Poblacion YYY, Municipality of ZZZ, Zamboanga del Norte;
(iii) Merlyn Jastiva (Merlyn),21 the daughter of appellant Jastiva, 25 years old, and
also a resident of Sitio XXX, Poblacion YYY, Municipality of ZZZ, Zamboanga del
Norte; and (iv) appellant Jastiva,22 54 years old, and a resident of Sitio XXX,
Poblacion YYY, Municipality of ZZZ, Zamboanga del Norte. And the defense formally
offered a single documentary evidence the Medical Certificate of AAA.
According to the defense, appellant Jastiva, 49 years old at the time of the incident,
could not have committed the crime because on the date and time thereof, he was at
home sleeping. Likewise, as digested by the Court of Appeals, the testimonies of
appellant Jastiva, Vilma and Merlyn, common-law wife and daughter of appellant
Jastiva, respectively, as well as Ordas, a friend of Merlyn, were offered to show that
At around 11:00 x x x in the evening, the time the alleged incident happened, accused-
appellant was fast asleep with his wife. This fact was corroborated by Vilma.
Merlyn also corroborated his fathers story that he was sleeping at the time of the
incident because their house has only one door and nobody can go out without waking
the other members of the family. Merlyn narrated that his father could not have left
the house unnoticed because their feet were blocking the door. Merlyn does not
remember waking on the day of the incident. Thus, accused-appellant could not have
gone outside their house. This fact was also confirmed by Gloria who visited and
eventually spent the night with the Jastivas on August 3, 2004. Gloria recounted that
she was sleepless that night and she clearly saw that accused-appellant was sleeping
at around 11:00 x x x on that evening.23 (Citations omitted.)
After trial and upon evaluation of the evidence on record, the RTC found appellant
Jastiva guilty of the crime charged. The dispositive of the Decision dated and
promulgated on September 1, 2009 states:
Being a detention prisoner, Aurelio Jastiva is entitled to the full benefit of his
preventive detention.24 (Citations omitted.)
In his Brief,26 appellant Jastiva particularly argued the following points, (i) that "[t]he
identity of the appellant was not established," x x x "considering that the private
complainant herself admitted that the room where the alleged incident happened was
dark;" (ii) that "the witness could not possibly identify the real culprit" because she
testified that "she only saw his back, albeit the alleged moonlight;" (iii) that "private
complainant even opened the door for her rapist to let the latter go out of her house x
x x private complainant had all the opportunity to shout for help but she did not do so;"
(iv) that the private complainants two conflicting statements in her sworn affidavit
that appellant Jastiva removed her panty and inserted his penis in her vagina vis--
vis her testimony in open court that appellant Jastiva removed her panty but first
sucked her vagina to make his penis erect, and then inserted his penis into her vagina
seriously cast doubts on her credibility; (v) that "[t]he testimony of the private
complainant failed to show any force or intimidation exerted upon her person" as
appellant Jastiva was still able to engage in sexual foreplay with leisure prior to the
actual sexual intercourse; (vi) that "[t]he absence of rape is further bolstered by the
medial (sic) findings x x x the medical certificate states, among other things, that no
sign of irritation at the external genitalia; external genitalia appeared multiparous
with corrugated skin folds x x x;" and (vii) that his defense of alibi and denial should
be given great weight in view of the weakness of the evidence of the prosecution.27
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) for appellee People of the Philippines,
rebutted the foregoing points with the two basic counter-arguments: (i) that "[b]ased
on the x x x testimonies [of AAA], there is no doubt that the victim positively
identified appellant as the individual who raped her on the night of August 3, 2004 x x
x positive identification, when categorical and consistent and without ill motive on the
part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter, prevails over alibi and denial;"28 and
(ii) that "[t]he act of holding a knife is by itself strongly suggestive of force or at least
intimidation, and threatening the victim with a knife is sufficient to bring her into
submission x x x. Inasmuch as intimidation is addressed to the victims mind,
response thereto and the effect thereof cannot be measured by any hard and fast rule
such that it must be viewed in the context of the victims perception and judgment not
only at the time of the commission of the crime but also at the time immediately
thereafter.
On August 31, 2011, the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision affirming the
decision of the RTC albeit with a slight modification, i.e., that appellant Jastiva be
further required to pay interest on all damages awarded to AAA. The fallo of the Court
of Appeals decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED in all respects except that accused-
appellant Aurelio Jastiva is further ordered to pay AAA interest on all damages
awarded at the legal rate of 6% per annum from the finality of this Decision.30 (Citation
omitted.)
In affirming the conviction of appellant Jastiva, the Court of Appeals held that the
elements of the crime of rape as defined under paragraph 1 of Article 266-A of the
Revised Penal Code were established by the prosecution, that is, "[a]ccused-appellant
had carnal knowledge of AAA through intimidation as shown by her sordid experience
x x x"31 coupled with the positive identification of appellant Jastiva by AAA as her
tormentor. On the issue that the RTC erred in giving weight to AAAs testimony that
she saw her assailants face; hence, she could positively identify appellant Jastiva, the
Court of Appeals stated that
Accused-appellant however[,] maintains that the trial court erred in heavily relying
on AAAs positive identification because her testimony on this matter is dubious
considering that AAA herself admitted that the small barn, where the alleged incident
happened, was dark, hence[,] she could not have identified him. Accused-appellant
added that AAA could not have seen him due to the illumination of the moon when he
went out of the small barn because AAA testified that she only saw his back through
the window when he was going towards his house.
True, the place where the incident happened was dark[,] which prevented AAA from
recognizing accused-appellant as the author of her honors ravishment. But it was not
only through the window when AAA saw accused-appellant but also when he passed
through her upon going out the door of the small barn. This put AAA in a position to
clearly see accused-appellant. AAAs testimony on this point is revealing:
Q: And you also said that you were the one who opened the door to let him go out, is
that correct?
A: Yes, sir. I was afraid if he will stay longer, he will kill me.
xxxx
Mrs. Witness, you stated that you were the one who unlocked the door to let Aurelio
Jastiva got (sic) out form (sic) your house. So when he passed the door, you saw him,
clearly, isnt it?
A: Yes, maam.
Q: You stated that the room was dark. How were you able to see him?
A: When the door was opened, he was illuminated by a moonlight.
Q: So, it was Aurelio Jastiva who left your house when you opened the door?
A: Yes, maam.
A: Yes, maam.
xxxx
Now when you saw the person who came out from your house, did you see exactly his
face?
A: Yes, sir. In fact, when he walked away, I even looked at him over the window.
Q: Why (sic) was he walking towards you or walking away from you?
Q: So in other words, his back was directed towards you while the front of his body was
directed to where he was going?
A: After he passed the door, I saw him. When he already walked away, what I only saw
was his back.
A: Yes, sir. Inside the house was dark but when he came out, there was a moonlight, so
I saw him clearly.32
And on the various points above-quoted anent the supposed failure of the trial court to
prove appellant Jastivas guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the Court of Appeals had this
to say:
Accused-appellant next asserts that the case of People v. Castro is on all fours with the
instant case. He claims that if indeed AAA saw him as [her] attacker, she should have
mentioned distinguishing features or physical appearance on his body to recognize
him.
We do not agree.
Accused-appellant next posits that AAAs testimony below failed to show any force or
intimidation exerted upon her. Accused-appellant stated that what further erodes the
credibility of AAA is her testimony that accused-appellant appeared to have indulged
in "sexual foreplay" first, i.e.[,] he sucked AAAs vagina and then went up to kiss her,
which does not happen in rape cases. Usually, according to accused-appellant, a rapist
is pressed with (sic) time so as not to be caught in flagrante delicto; thus, a rapist
would not leisurely engage in sexual intercourse with his victim being in consonance
with reason and common experience.
We still disagree.
For one, the "sexual foreplay" referred to by accused-appellant was not improbable
considering that as testified to by AAA, accused-appellant was not yet erected (sic) at
that time. For another, there is a sufficient reason to believe why accused-appellant
did this because he may have been aware that BBB, AAAs husband, was not around on
that night. Certainly and more likely, accused-appellant would not have acted upon his
lewd design had he known that BBB was there in the small barn with AAA. In addition
to this was accused-appellants testimony that aside from the fact that he knows AAA
very much, he also knows that sometimes AAAs family would stay in their small barn
in Barangay XXX and sometimes in their permanent residence in Barangay ZZZ.33
(Citations omitted.)
As to the damages awarded by the RTC to AAA, though the Court of Appeals affirmed
the same, however, in the dispositive portion of the decision, it further imposed upon
appellant Jastiva the need to pay interest on all the damages due at the legal rate of
6% per annum from the finality of its decision the Court of Appeals anchored its
directive upon this Courts decisions in People v. Galvez34 and People v. Abella.35
On September 9, 2011, appellant Jastiva filed a Notice of Appeal before the Court of
Appeals. In a Resolution dated October 4, 2011, the appellate court resolved to grant
the same and ordered its Judicial Records Division to elevate the records of the case to
this Court.
Hence, this appeal under Rule 44 of the Rules of Court, as amended, wherein appellant
Jastiva essentially prays for his acquittal based on reasonable doubt.
Appellant Jastiva reiterates his assignment of errors in the Court of Appeals, viz:
I.
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED BY GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE
TESTIMONY OF THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT THAT SHE RECOGNIZED THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT WHEN HE WENT OUT OF THE HOUSE OF THE PRIVATE
COMPLAINANT.
II.
From her testimony, it would appear that accused-appellant indulge (sic) into (sic)
foreplay in raping AAA. This is highly unbelievable. Normally, a rapist, who is pressed
for time so as not to be caught in flagrante, would not leisurely engage in sexual
intercourse with his victim, as what actually happened in this case.38
And in his Supplemental Brief39 filed before this Court, appellant Jastiva continues to
insist that his guilt had not been proven beyond reasonable doubt. He argues further
that AAAs claim that he indulged in sexual foreplay prior to having sexual
intercourse with her is unbelievable and contrary to the normal conduct of a rapist, to
wit:
The manner by which AAA was allegedly raped is incredible. From her testimony, it
would appear that accused-appellant indulge (sic) into (sic) foreplay in raping AAA.
This is highly unbelievable. Normally, a rapist, who is pressed for time so as not to be
caught in flagrante, would not leisurely engage in sexual intercourse with his victim,
as what actually happened in this case.
xxxx
With utmost due respect to the Court of Appeals, we beg to disagree with its findings
that the "sexual foreplay" was not improbable considering that accused-appellant may
have been aware that AAAs husband was not around on the night of the alleged rape.
With all due respect, there was no evidence showing that the accused-appellant was
indeed aware of the fact that AAAs husband was not around at that night so that [the]
accused-appellant can do the sexual foreplay without fear of having (sic) caught.
Apparently, the Court of Appeals made a conclusion which was not present in evidence
x x x it merely made a conclusion that the accused-appellant "may have been aware
that AAAs husband was not around during the night of rape" thereby the accused-
appellant could have resorted to sexual foreplay. Why would the accused-appellant
resort to sexual foreplay knowing that the husband of AAA might arrive anytime of
the night?
The postulation therefore that the accused-appellant could resort to sexual foreplay is
possible because he is aware that BBB was not around at the night of the alleged rape
cannot be taken against the accused-appellants resulting in his conviction especially
so if there is no evidence that indeed accused-appellant was aware of the absence of
BBB. The said theory is merely a suspicion not supported by evidence. It is hornbook
doctrine that suspicions and speculations can never be the basis of conviction in a
criminal case. Courts must ensure that the conviction of the accused rests firmly on
sufficient and competent evidence, and not the results of passion and prejudice.
We humbly submit that the foregoing evidence leads to one conclusion, that is, the
guilt of the accused-appellant has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt there
being doubt as to who the real culprit was.40 (Citations omitted.)
On March 29, 2012, appellee People manifested that it will no longer file a
Supplemental Brief as it had already refuted thoroughly in its Appellees Brief all the
assignments of error raised by appellant Jastiva filed before the Court of Appeals.
The principal issue in this case, therefore, is whether or not the prosecution was able
to prove the guilt of appellant Jastiva beyond reasonable doubt on the basis of the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and the documentary evidence presented.
Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code defines the crime of rape, viz:
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
From the above-quoted provision of law, the elements of rape (under paragraph 1,
subparagraph a) are as follows: (1) that the offender is a man; (2) that the offender
had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (3) that such act is accomplished by using
force, (threat) or intimidation.41
The RTC and the Court of Appeals were one in finding that appellant Jastiva had
carnal knowledge of AAA against the latters will through force and intimidation.
Despite his vigorous protestations, this Court agrees in the finding that the crime of
rape committed by appellant Jastiva against AAA was proved by the prosecution
beyond reasonable doubt on the basis of the following:
b) AAAs positive identification of appellant Jastiva as the one who raped her;
c) The physical evidence consistent with AAAs assertion that she was raped; and
d) The absence of ill motive on the part of AAA in filing the complaint against
appellant Jastiva.
Firstly, the appeal of appellant Jastiva centers on the credibility of AAA, the main
prosecution witness. But credibility of a witness is the sole province of the RTC being
the trial court in this case. Basic is the rule that the findings of fact of the trial court on
matters of credibility of witnesses are generally conclusive on this Court, which is not
a trier of facts. Such conclusiveness derives from the trial courts having the first-
hand opportunity to observe the demeanor and manner of the victim when he/she
testified at the trial.42 Undeniably, the calibration of the testimony of a witness, and
the assessment of the probative weight thereof, are virtually left, almost entirely, to
the trial court which has the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witness at
the stand. Unless there are substantial matters that might have been overlooked or
discarded, generally, the findings of the trial court as to the credibility of a witness will
not be disturbed on appeal.43 The foregoing is especially true when such findings are
affirmed by the appellate court. In this case, with appellant Jastiva not showing that
the RTC and the Court of Appeals overlooked any fact or material of consequence that
could have altered the outcome had they taken it into consideration, this Court will not
disturb on appeal the RTCs findings of fact, but must fully accept the same.
At this point, it is worthy to recall the three guiding principles in rape prosecutions:
(1) an accusation of rape is easy to make, and difficult to prove, but it is even more
difficult to disprove; (2) bearing in mind the intrinsic nature of the crime, the
testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with utmost care and caution; and
(3) the evidence of the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits; and cannot
draw strength from the weakness of the defense. So, when a woman says that she has
been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that the crime of rape was
committed. In a long line of cases, this Court has held that if the testimony of the rape
victim is accurate and credible, a conviction for rape may issue upon the sole basis of
the victims testimony. This is because no decent and sensible woman will publicly
admit to being raped and, thus, run the risk of public contempt unless she is, in fact, a
rape victim.44
In this case, appellant Jastiva insistently makes an issue out of AAAs failure to shout
for help or struggle against him, which for him does nothing but erode her credibility.
This Court, however, does not agree. It does not follow that because AAA failed to
shout for help or struggle against her attacker means that she could not have been
raped. The force, violence, or intimidation in rape is a relative term, depending not
only on the age, size, and strength of the parties but also on their relationship with
each other.45 And physical resistance need not be established in rape when
intimidation is exercised upon the victim and the latter submits herself against her
will to the rapists advances because of fear for her life and personal safety.46 Record
disclose that in this case, AAA was already 67 years of age when she was raped in the
dark by appellant Jastiva who was armed with a knife. Justifiably, a woman of such
advanced age could only recoil in fear and succumb into submission. In any case, with
such shocking and horrifying experience, it would not be reasonable to impose upon
AAA any standard form of reaction. Time and again, this Court has recognized that
different people react differently to a given situation involving a startling
occurrence.47 The workings of the human mind placed under emotional stress are
unpredictable, and people react differently - some may shout, others may faint, and
still others may be shocked into insensibility even if there may be a few who may
openly welcome the intrusion.48
More to the point, physical resistance is not the sole test to determine whether a
woman involuntarily succumbed to the lust of an accused.49 Some may offer strong
resistance while others may be too intimidated to offer any resistance at all,50 just like
what happened in this case. Thus, the law does not impose a burden on the rape victim
to prove resistance. What needs only to be proved by the prosecution is the use of force
or intimidation by the accused in having sexual intercourse with the victim51 which
it did in the case at bar.
The preceding paragraphs altogether, the testimony of AAA was shown to be credible,
natural, convincing and consistent with human nature; and the fact that AAA is
already of advanced age lends more credence to her protestations of rape and inspires
the thought that this case was filed for the genuine reason of seeking justice.
Secondly, the circumstances after the commission of the rape testified to by AAA
sufficed to establish the ability of the latter to identify appellant Jastiva as the
perpetrator of the crime. Appellant Jastivas assertions that the cover of darkness and
lack of lighting inside the "kamalig" where the crime took place, utterly diminished
AAAs ability to identify him or anyone for that matter, is downright specious. AAA
never claimed to have seen her attacker inside the "kamalig." What AAA testified to
was the fact that she saw appellant Jastiva when he walked past her by the open door
of the "kamalig" and his face was finally illuminated by the moonlight. As explained by
the RTC
In not a few cases, though, the High Court held that an accused need not always be
identified under a perfect or near perfect visibility. This was demonstrated in People v.
Villaruel with the Supreme Court saying that
Our cases have held that wicklamps, flashlight, even moonlight and starlight may, in
proper situations, be sufficient illumination, making the attack on the credibility of
witnesses solely on this ground unmeritorious.
The ruling in People v. Pueblas, citing the earlier ruling in People v. Vacal, is even
more to the point, thus:
[I]f identification of persons is possible even by the light of stars, with more reason
that one could identify persons by moonlight.52 (Citations and emphases omitted.)
From the above, the RTC correctly held that "the Court is not disposed to doubt the
evidenced ability of the complainant to identify her rapist especially because her
familiarity of the latter could easily be strengthened by the fact that the accused is her
neighbor living some 100 meters away from the crime scene."53
2) Multiple scratches noted at both upper and lower lips, towards the inner folds.
xxxx
5) On internal examination, both labia majora and labia minora on both sides showed
signs of irritation, reddish in color, and partial separation of tissues between labia
majora and labia minora on both sides was noted with more separation on the right
side.55
is consistent with AAAs assertion that appellant Jastiva succeeded in having sexual
intercourse with her.
And, fourthly, worth noting is the fact that appellant Jastiva did not allege, much less
show, that AAA was prompted by improper or malicious motives to impute upon him
such a serious charge. This being so, the categorical and positive identification of
appellant Jastiva prevails over the latters plain alibi and bare denial.
Moreover, such prevarication was devoid of any persuasion due to its being easily and
conveniently resorted to, and due to denial being generally weaker than and not
prevailing over the positive assertions of an eyewitness. It has been held that for the
defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove the following: (i) that he was
present at another place at the time of the perpetration of the crime; and (ii) that it
was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime during its
commission. Physical impossibility involves the distance and the facility of access
between the crime scene and the location of the accused when the crime was
committed; the accused must demonstrate that he was so far away and could not have
been physically present at the crime scene and its immediate vicinity when the crime
was committed.56
Here, appellant Jastiva utterly failed to satisfy the above-quoted requirements. From
the testimonies of the witnesses, it was shown that the distance between AAAs
farmhouse and appellant Jastivas house was only 150 meters, more or less.57
Certainly, 150 meters is not too far as to preclude the presence of appellant Jastiva at
the farmhouse of AAA. That he presented witnesses to attest to his presence at his
own home around the time the rape was said to have been committed did not help him
one bit. If truth be told, the testimonies of his wife and daughter were more deleterious
to his defense because they contradicted each others account on material points
relative to the circumstances of that fateful night. Appellant Jastivas common-law
wife, Vilma, testified that:
Q: Mrs. Witness, how are you related with (sic) Aurelio Jastiva?
A: My husband, sir.
A: In our house.
xxxx
Q: How about Aurelio Jastiva, where was he on August 3, 2004 at around 11:00 x x x
in the evening?
A: He was still in our house because during the time we had a visitor in our house.
A: Gloria Ordas.
Q: Why can you say that Aurelio Jastiva was in your house at that time?
Q: Now, Aurelio Jastiva is charged of alleged Rape which allegedly happened on August
3, 2004 at around 11:00 x x x in the evening, what can you say about that?
A: I have no knowledge about that old woman who was raped because she was lying.
A: Because I have no knowledge about that incident considering that we are on a far
place.58 (Emphasis supplied.)
On the other hand, the testimony of appellant Jastivas daughter, Merlyn, is quite
informative:
Q: Merlyn Jastiva, how are you related with the accused Aurelio Jastiva?
A: He is my father, sir.
A: At home, sir.
xxxx
Q: Where was Aurelio Jastiva in the evening of August 3, 2004?
Q: At about 11:00 x x x in the evening of that day, August 3, 2004 where was Aurelio
Jastiva?
A: At home sleeping.
Q: Why can you say that during that time Aurelio Jastiva was in your house?
A: Because I was sleeping with my parents. I know that my father slept beside my
mother.
Q: Will you be able to notice if your father went out of your house in that evening of
August 3, 2004?
Q: Did he go out of the house in that evening of August 3, 2004 at about 11:00 x x x in
the evening?
But when she was cross-examined, Merlyn revealed that her father did not actually
sleep beside her mother; thus, contradicting her earlier declaration that her father
slept beside her mother, and she (Merlyn) slept with them, viz:
Q: You said earlier that your brothers used to go out even at night. Now, during that
time was any of your brothers was (sic) out during that night?
A: We, women are sleeping near the door and the other siblings in the other corner of
the house.
A: Yes, maam.
A: Yes maam.
xxxx
Q: And your father is just sleeping far from the door? From the women?
The aforequoted testimonies highlighted the fact that appellant Jastiva could have
slipped in and out of their house undetected by Vilma and Merlyn. Such scenario is all
the more likely as appellant Jastiva himself admitted upon questioning by the RTC
that he actually slept in another room; hence, his wife and daughter had no way of
being sure if he was inside their house or not, to wit:
Q: How about the "kamalig". How far is the kamalig to your house?
Q: Meaning, all of you were at your house at [Poblacion YYY], [ZZZ], Zamboanga del
Norte on August 3, 2004?
A: Yes maam.
Q: And the dimension of the house is 8x12 with only one room?
Q: So, the sala and the other room is used for sleeping?
A: Yes, maam.
Q: All the nine (9) of you were asleep in that one (1) room?
A: No your Honor. Only my wife together with our youngest sleep in that room.
Q: How about the other six (6) children of yours? Where do they sleep?
Appellant Jastiva further tries to interject reasonable doubt by pointing out that
AAAs claim that he indulged in sexual foreplay prior to having sexual intercourse
with her is unbelievable and contrary to the normal conduct of a rapist, i.e., that
"[n]ormally, a rapist, who is pressed for time so as not to be caught in flagrante, would
not leisurely engage in sexual intercourse with his victim, as what actually happened
in this case."62 He reasons that he could not have engaged in sexual foreplay because
he could not have known that AAA would be all alone in the farmhouse on the night in
question.
Case law, however, shows numerous instances of rape committed under indirect and
audacious circumstances.63 The lust of a lecherous man respects neither time nor
place. Neither the crampness of the room, nor the presence of people therein, nor the
high risk of being caught, has been held sufficient and effective obstacle to deter the
commission of rape.64
Also, appellant Jastivas objections are without basis, and at best, merely lip service.
During his cross-examination, he admitted that he knew AAA; in fact, he
acknowledged that she could easily identify him, to wit:
Q: And the residence of [AAA] is also at [Poblacion YYY], [ZZZ], Zamboanga del Norte?
A: Yes, maam. We are only apart by a rice field which is about more or less 150
meters.
xxxx
A: Yes, maam.
And when the RTC propounded clarificatory questions, appellant Jastiva disclosed
that he knew pretty well the routine of the spouses AAA and BBB, viz:
Q: You mentioned about "kamalig" or barn. Is that where [AAA] and her family live?
Q: How about when they do not work in the field, where does [AAA] live?
A: Yes, maam.
xxxx
Q: How far is the residence of [AAA] from [WWW] to your residence at [YYY], [ZZZ],
Z.N.?
All told, this Court is convinced beyond reasonable doubt that appellant Jastiva
committed the crime of rape by having carnal knowledge of AAA using force and
intimidation. Under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, the proper penalty to be
imposed is:
Art. 266-B. Penalties. Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be
punished by reclusion perpetua.
Whenever the rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more
persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
But the imposition of death penalty has been prohibited by Republic Act No. 9346,
entitled "An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines;" thus,
the RTC, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, properly imposed upon appellant Jastiva
the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Relative to the award of damages, the RTC correctly awarded P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages. Civil indemnity is in the nature of
actual and compensatory damages, and is obligatory upon conviction of rape. As to
moral damages, it is automatically awarded to rape victims without the necessity of
proof, for it is assumed that they suffered moral injuries entitling them to such award.
Similarly, the Court of Appeals fittingly imposed interest on all damages awarded to
AAA, the private offended party, at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum from
the date of the finality of this Court's decision in conformity with present
jurisprudence.67
This Court notes, however, that both the RTC and Court of Appeals overlooked the
award of exemplary damages. Being corrective in nature, exemplary damages can be
awarded even in the absence of an aggravating circumstance if the circumstances of
the case show the highly reprehensible or outrageous conduct of the offender.68 Thus,
this Court deems it necessary to modify the civil liability of appellant Jastiva to
include exemplary damages for the vindication of the sense of indignity and
humiliation suffered by AAA, a woman of advanced age, and to set a public example, to
serve as deterrent to those who abuse the elderly, and to protect the latter from sexual
assaults.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated August 31, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR.-H.C. No. 00754-MIN is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellant Aurelio Jastiva
is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of simple rape and is sentenced
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and ordered to pay AAA the amounts of
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as
exemplary damages. Appellant Aurelio Jastiva is further ordered to pay legal interest
on all damages awarded in this case at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from
the date of finality of this decision until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
DECISION
"Among the duties assumed by the husband are his duties to love, cherish and protect
his wife, to give her a home, to provide her with the comforts and the necessities of life
within his means, to treat her kindly and not cruelly or inhumanely. He is bound to
honor her x x x; it is his duty not only to maintain and support her, but also to protect
her from oppression and wrong."1
REYES, J.:
Husbands do not have property rights over their wives' bodies. Sexual intercourse,
albeit within the realm of marriage, if not consensual, is rape. This is the clear State
policy expressly legislated in Section 266-A of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as
amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8353 or the Anti-Rape Law of 1997.
The Case
This is an automatic review2 of the Decision3 dated July 9, 2008 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00353, which affirmed the Judgment4 dated April
1, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 19, in
Criminal Case Nos. 99-668 and 99-669 convicting him to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua for each count.
The Facts
Accused-appellant and his wife, KKK,5 were married on October 18, 1975. They Ii ved
together since then and raised their four (4) children6 as they put up several
businesses over the years.
On June 11, 1999, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cagayan de Oro City issued a
Joint Resolution,8 finding probable cause for grave threats, less serious physical
injuries and rape and recommending that the appropriate criminal information be
filed against the accused-appellant.
On July 16, 1999, two Informations for rape were filed before the RTC respectively
docketed as Criminal Case No. 99-6689 and Criminal Case No. 99-669.10 The
Information in Criminal Case No. 99-668 charged the accused-appellant as follows:
That on or about 10:30 in the evening more or less, of October 9, 1998, at Gusa,
Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused by means of force upon person did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with the private complainant, her
[sic] wife, against the latter[']s will.
That on or about 10:30 in the evening more or less, of October 10, 1998, at Gusa,
Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused by means of force upon person did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with the private complainant, her
[sic] wife, against the latter's will.
The accused-appellant was arrested upon a warrant issued on July 21, 1999.11 On
August 18, 1999, the accused-appellant filed a Motion for Reinvestigation,12 which
was denied by the trial court in an Order13 dated August 19, 1999. On even date, the
accused-appellant was arraigned and he entered a plea of not guilty to both charges.14
On January 10, 2000, the prosecution filed a Motion to Admit Amended Information15
averring that the name of the private complainant was omitted in the original
informations for rape. The motion also stated that KKK, thru a Supplemental Affidavit
dated November 15, 1999,16 attested that the true dates of commission of the crime
are October 16, 1998 and October 1 7, 1998 thereby modifying the dates stated in her
previous complaint-affidavit. The motion was granted on January 18, 2000.17
Accordingly, the criminal informations were amended as follows:
That on or about October 16, 1998 at Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused by means of
force upon person did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge with the private complainant, his wife, [KKK], against the latter's will.
That on or about October 17, 1998 at Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused by means of
force upon person did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge with the private complainant, his wife, [KKK], against the latter's will.
The accused-appellant was thereafter re-arraigned. He maintained his not guilty plea
to both indictments and a joint trial of the two cases forthwith ensued.
The prosecution's theory was anchored on the testimonies of KKK, and her daughters
MMM and 000, which, together with pertinent physical evidence, depicted the
following events:
KKK met the accused-appellant at the farm of her parents where his father was one of
the laborers. They got married after a year of courtship.20 When their first child,
MMM, was born, KKK and the accused-appellant put up a sari-sari store.21 Later on,
they engaged in several other businesses -trucking, rice mill and hardware. KKK
managed the businesses except for the rice mill, which, ideally, was under the
accused-appellant's supervision with the help of a trusted employee. In reality,
however, he merely assisted in the rice mill business by occasionally driving one of the
trucks to haul goods.22
She wanted to provide a comfortable life for their children; he, on the other hand, did
not acquiesce with that objective.25
In 1994, KKK and the accused-appellant bought a lot and built a house in Villa
Ernesto, Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City.26 Three of the children transferred residence
therein while KKK, the accused-appellant and one of their sons stayed in Dangcagan,
Bukidnon. She shuttled between the two places regularly and sometimes he
accompanied her.27 In 1998, KKK stayed in Gusa, Cagayan De Oro City most of the
days of the week.28 On Wednesdays, she went to Dangcagan, Bukidnon to procure
supplies for the family store and then returned to Cagayan de Oro City on the same
day.29
Conjugal intimacy did not really cause marital problems between KKK and the
accused-appellant. It was, in fact, both frequent and fulfilling. He treated her well and
she, of course, responded with equal degree of enthusiasm.30 However, in 1997, he
started to be brutal in bed. He would immediately remove her panties and, sans any
foreplay, insert her penis in her vagina. His abridged method of lovemaking was
physically painful for her so she would resist his sexual ambush but he would threaten
her into submission.31
In 1998, KKK and the accused-appellant started quarrelling usually upon his
complaint that she failed to attend to him. She was preoccupied with financial
problems in their businesses and a bank loan. He wanted KKK to stay at home because
"a woman must stay in the house and only good in bed (sic) x x x." She disobeyed his
wishes and focused on her goal of providing a good future for the children.32
Four days before the subject rape incidents or on October 12, 1998, KKK and the
accused-appellant slept together in Cebu City where the graduation rites of their eldest
daughter were held. By October 14, 1998, the three of them were already back in
Cagayan de Oro City.33
On October 16, 1998, the accused-appellant, his wife KKK and their children went
about their nightly routine. The family store in their residence was closed at about
9:00 p.m. before supper was taken. Afterwards, KKK and the children went to the
girls' bedroom at the mezzanine of the house to pray the rosary while the accused-
appellant watched television in the living room.34 OOO and MMM then prepared their
beds. Soon after, the accused-appellant fetched KKK and bid her to come with him to
their conjugal bedroom in the third floor of the house. KKK complied.35
Once in the bedroom, KKK changed into a daster and fixed the matrimonial bed but
she did not lie thereon with the accused-appellant and instead, rested separately in a
cot near the bed. Her reclusive behavior prompted him to ask angrily: "[W]hy are you
lying on the c{o]t[?]", and to instantaneously order: "You transfer here [to] our bed."36
KKK insisted to stay on the cot and explained that she had headache and abdominal
pain due to her forthcoming menstruation. Her reasons did not appease him and he got
angrier. He rose from the bed, lifted the cot and threw it against the wall causing KKK
to fall on the floor. Terrified, KKK stood up from where she fell, took her pillow and
transferred to the bed.37
The accused-appellant then lay beside KKK and not before long, expressed his desire
to copulate with her by tapping his fingers on her lap. She politely declined by warding
off his hand and reiterating that she was not feeling well.38
The accused-appellant again asserted his sexual yearning and when KKK tried to
resist by holding on to her panties, he pulled them down so forcefully they tore on the
sides.39 KKK stayed defiant by refusing to bend her legs.40
The accused-appellant then raised KKK's daster,41 stretched her legs apart and rested
his own legs on them. She tried to wrestle him away but he held her hands and
succeeded in penetrating her. As he was carrying out his carnal desires, KKK
continued to protest by desperately shouting: "[D]on 't do that to me because I'm not
feeling well."42
With a concrete wall on one side and a mere wooden partition on the other enclosing
the spouses' bedroom,43 KKK's pleas were audible in the children's bedroom where
MMM lay awake.
Upon hearing her mother crying and hysterically shouting: "Eddie, don't do that to me,
have pity on me,"44 MMM woke up 000 who prodded her to go to their parents' room.45
MMM hurriedly climbed upstairs, vigorously knocked on the door of her parents'
bedroom and inquired: "Pa, why is it that Mama is crying?"46 The accused-appellant
then quickly put on his briefs and shirt, partly opened the door and said: "[D]on 't
interfere because this is a family trouble," before closing it again.47 Since she heard her
mother continue to cry, MMM ignored his father's admonition, knocked at the
bedroom door again, and then kicked it.48 A furious accused-appellant opened the door
wider and rebuked MMM once more: "Don't interfere us. Go downstairs because this is
family trouble!" Upon seeing KKK crouching and crying on top of the bed, MMM boldly
entered the room, approached her mother and asked: "Ma, why are you crying?"
before asking her father: "Pa, what happened to Mama why is it that her underwear is
torn[?]"49
When MMM received no definite answers to her questions, she helped her mother get
up in order to bring her to the girls' bedroom. KKK then picked up her tom underwear
and covered herself with a blanket.50 However, their breakout from the room was not
easy. To prevent KKK from leaving, the accused-appellant blocked the doorway by
extending his arm towards the knob. He commanded KKK to "[S]tay here, you sleep in
our room," when the trembling KKK pleaded: "Eddie, allow me to go out." He then held
KKK's hands but she pulled them back. Determined to get away, MMM leaned against
door and embraced her mother tightly as they pushed their way out.51
In their bedroom, the girls gave their mother some water and queried her as to what
happened.52 KKK relayed: "[Y]our father is an animal, a beast; he forced me to have
sex with him when I'm not feeling well." The girls then locked the door and let her
rest."53
The accused-appellant's aggression recurred the following night. After closing the
family store on October 17, 1998, KKK and the children took their supper. The
accused-appellant did not join them since, according to him, he already ate dinner
elsewhere. After resting for a short while, KKK and the children proceeded to the girls'
bedroom and prayed the rosary. KKK decided to spend the night in the room's small
bed and the girls were already fixing the beddings when the accused-appellant
entered.
"Why are you sleeping in the room of our children", he asked KKK, who responded that
she preferred to sleep with the children.54 He then scoffed: "Its alright if you will not go
with me, anyway, there are women that could be paid [P] 1,000.00." She dismissed his
comment by turning her head away after retorting: "So be it." After that, he left the
room.55
He returned 15 minutes later56 and when KKK still refused to go with him, he became
infuriated. He lifted her from the bed and attempted to carry her out of the room as he
exclaimed: "Why will you sleep here[?] Lets go to our bedroom." When she defied him,
he grabbed her short pants causing them to tear apart.57 At this point, MMM
interfered, "Pa, don't do that to Mama because we are in front of you."58
The presence of his children apparently did not pacify the accused-appellant who
yelled, "[E]ven in front of you, I can have sex of your mother [sic J because I'm the
head of the family." He then ordered his daughters to leave the room. Frightened, the
girls obliged and went to the staircase where they subsequently heard the pleas of
their helpless mother resonate with the creaking bed.59
The episodes in the bedroom were no less disturbing. The accused-appellant forcibly
pulled KKK's short pants and panties. He paid no heed as she begged, "[D]on 't do that
to me, my body is still aching and also my abdomen and I cannot do what you wanted
me to do [sic]. I cannot withstand sex."60
After removing his own short pants and briefs, he flexed her legs, held her hands,
mounted her and forced himself inside her. Once gratified, the accused-appellant put
on his short pants and briefs, stood up, and went out of the room laughing as he
conceitedly uttered: "[I]t s nice, that is what you deserve because you are [a] flirt or
fond of sex." He then retreated to the masters' bedroom.61
Sensing that the commotion in their bedroom has ceased, MMM and OOO scurried
upstairs but found the door locked. MMM pulled out a jalousie window, inserted her
arm, reached for the doorknob inside and disengaged its lock. Upon entering the room,
MMM and OOO found their mother crouched on the bed with her hair disheveled. The
girls asked: "Ma, what happened to you, why are you crying?" KKK replied: "[Y}our
father is a beast and animal, he again forced me to have sex with him even if I don't
feel well. "62
The defense spun a different tale. The accused-appellant's father owned a land
adjacent to that of KKK's father. He came to know KKK because she brought food for
her father's laborers. When they got married on October 18, 1975, he was a high
school graduate while she was an elementary graduate.
Their humble educational background did not deter them from pursuing a comfortable
life. Through their joint hard work and efforts, the couple gradually acquired personal
properties and established their own businesses that included a rice mill managed by
the accused-appellant. He also drove their trucks that hauled coffee, copra, or com.63
The accused-appellant denied raping his wife on October 16 and 17, 1998. He claimed
that on those dates he was in Dangcagan, Bukidnon, peeling com. On October 7, his
truck met an accident somewhere in Angeles Ranch, Maluko, Manolo Fortich,
Bukidnon. He left the truck by the roadside because he had to attend MMM's
graduation in Cebu on October 12 with KKK. When they returned to Bukidnon on
October 14, he asked KKK and MMM to proceed to Cagayan de Oro City and just leave
him behind so he can take care of the truck and buy some com.64
Ryle Equia (Equia), the spouses' driver from January 1996 until June 1999
corroborated the above claims. According to him, on October 16, 1998, the accused-
appellant was within the vicinity of the rice mill's loading area in Dangcagan,
Bukidnon, cleaning a pick-up truck. On October 17, 1998, he and the accused-
appellant were in Dangcagan, Bukidnon, loading sacks of com into the truck. They
finished loading at 3 :00 p.m. The accused-appellant then instructed Equia to proceed
to Maluko, Manolo Fortich, Bukidnon while the former attended a fiesta in New Cebu,
Kianggat, Dangcagan, Bukidnon. At around 4:00 p.m., Equia, together with a helper
and a mechanic, left for Maluko in order to tow the stalled truck left there by the
accused-appellant in October 7 and thereafter, bring it to Cagayan de Oro City together
with the separate truck loaded with com.
They arrived in Maluko at 7:00 p.m. and it took them three hours to turn the truck
around and hoist it to the towing bar of the other truck. At around 10:00 p.m., the
accused-appellant arrived in Maluko. The four of them then proceeded to Cagayan de
Oro City where they arrived at 3 :00 a.m. of October 18, 1998. The accused-appellant
went to Gusa while the other three men brought the damaged truck to Cugman.65
The accused-appellant asserted that KKK merely fabricated the rape charges as her
revenge because he took over the control and management of their businesses as well
as the possession of their pick-up truck in January 1999. The accused-appellant was
provoked to do so when she failed to account for their bank deposits and business
earnings. The entries in their bank account showed the balance of P3,190,539.83 on
October 31, 1996 but after only a month or on November 30, 1996, the amount
dwindled to a measly P9,894.88.66 Her failure to immediately report to the police also
belies her rape allegations.67
Bebs,69 KKK's cousin and a cashier in their Bukidnon store, gave the accused-
appellant several love letters purportedly addressed to Bebs but were actually
intended for KKK.70
KKK had more than ten paramours some of whom the accused-appellant came to
know as: Arsenio, Jong-Jong, Joy or Joey, somebody from the military or the
Philippine National Police, another one is a government employee, a certain Fernandez
and three other priests.71 Several persons told him about the paramours of his wife but
he never confronted her or them about it because he trusted her.72
What further confirmed his suspicions was the statement made by OOO on November
2, 1998. At that time, OOO was listening loudly to a cassette player. Since he wanted to
watch a television program, he asked OOO to tum down the volume of the cassette
player. She got annoyed, unplugged the player, spinned around and hit the accused-
appellant's head with the socket. His head bled. An altercation between the accused-
appellant and KKK thereafter followed because the latter took OOO's side. During the
argument, OOO blurted out that KKK was better off without the accused-appellant
because she had somebody young, handsome, and a businessman unlike the accused-
appellant who smelled bad, and was old, and ugly.73
KKK also wanted their property divided between them with three-fourths thereof
going to her and one-fourth to the accused-appellant. However, the separation did not
push through because the accused-appellant's parents intervened.74 Thereafter, KKK
pursued legal separation from the accused-appellant by initiating Barangay Case No.
00588-99 before the Office of Lupong Tagapamayapa of Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City and
thereafter obtaining a Certificate to File Action dated February 18, 1999.75
In its Judgment76 dated April 1, 2002, the RTC sustained the version proffered by the
prosecution by giving greater weight and credence to the spontaneous and
straightforward testimonies of the prosecution's witnesses. The trial court also upheld
as sincere and genuine the two daughters' testimonies, as it is not natural in our
culture for daughters to testify against their own father for a crime such as rape if the
same was not truly committed.
The trial court rejected the version of the defense and found unbelievable the accused-
appellant's accusations of extra-marital affairs and money squandering against KKK.
The trial court shelved the accused-appellant's alibi for being premised on inconsistent
testimonies and the contradicting declarations of the other defense witness, Equia, as
to the accused-appellant's actual whereabouts on October 16, 1998. Accordingly, the
RTC ruling disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds accused Edgar Jumawan "GUILTY" beyond
reasonable doubt of the two (2) separate charges of rape and hereby sentences him to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each, to pay complainant [P]50,000.00 in
each case as moral damages, indemnify complainant the sum of (P]75,000.00 in each
case, [P]50,000.00 as exemplary damages and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.77
Ruling of the CA
In its Decision78 dated July 9, 2008, the CA affirmed in toto the RTC ruling. The CA
held that Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, sanctioned the
amendment of the original informations. Further, the accused-appellant was not
prejudiced by the amendment because he was re-arraigned with respect to the
amended informations.
The CA found that the prosecution, through the straightforward testimony of the
victim herself and the corroborative declarations of MMM and OOO, was able to
establish, beyond reasonable doubt, all the elements of rape under R.A. No. 8353. The
accused-appellant had carnal knowledge of KKK by using force and intimidation.
The CA also ruled that KKK's failure to submit herself to medical examination did not
negate the commission of the crime because a medical certificate is not necessary to
prove rape.
The CA rejected the accused-appellant's argument that since he and KKK are husband
and wife with mutual obligations of and right to sexual intercourse, there must be
convincing physical evidence or manifestations of the alleged force and intimidation
used upon KKK such as bruises. The CA explained that physical showing of external
injures is not indispensable to prosecute and convict a person for rape; what is
necessary is that the victim was forced to have sexual intercourse with the accused.
In addition, the CA noted that the fact that KKK and the accused-appellant are spouses
only reinforces the truthfulness of KKK's accusations because no wife in her right
mind would accuse her husband of having raped her if it were not true.
The delay in the filing of the rape complaint was sufficiently explained by KKK when
she stated that she only found out that a wife may charge his husband with rape when
the fiscal investigating her separate complaint for grave threats and physical injuries
told her about it.
Finally, the CA dismissed the accused-appellant's alibi for lack of convincing evidence
that it was physically impossible for him to be at his residence in Cagayan de Oro City
at the time of the commission of the crimes, considering that Dangcagan, Bukidnon,
the place where he allegedly was, is only about four or five hours away. Accordingly,
the decretal portion of the decision read:
Hence, the present review. In the Court Resolution80 dated July 6, 2009, the Court
notified the parties that, if they so desire, they may file their respective supplemental
briefs. In a Manifestation and Motion81 dated September 4, 2009, the appellee,
through the Office of the Solicitor General, expressed that it intends to adopt its Brief
before the CA. On April 16, 2012, the accused-appellant, through counsel, filed his
Supplemental Brief, arguing that he was not in Cagayan de Oro City when the alleged
rape incidents took place, and the presence of force, threat or intimidation is negated
by: (a) KKK's voluntary act of going with him to the conjugal bedroom on October 16,
1998; (b) KKK's failure to put up resistance or seek help from police authorities; and (
c) the absence of a medical certificate and of blood traces in KKK's panties.82
Our Ruling
The evolution of rape laws is actually traced to two ancient English practices of 'bride
capture' whereby a man conquered a woman through rape and 'stealing an heiress'
whereby a man abducted a woman and married her.83
The rape laws then were intended not to redress the violation of the woman's chastity
but rather to punish the act of obtaining the heiress' property by forcible marriage84 or
to protect a man's valuable interest in his wife's chastity or her daughter's virginity.85
If a man raped an unmarried virgin, he was guilty of stealing her father's property and
if a man raped his wife, he was merely using his property.86
Women were subjugated in laws and society as objects or goods and such treatment
was justified under three ideologies.
Under the chattel theory prevalent during the 6th century, a woman was the property
of her father until she marries to become the property of her husband.87 If a man
abducted an unmarried woman, he had to pay the owner, and later buy her from the
owner; buying and marrying a wife were synonymous.88
From the 11th century to the 16th century, a woman lost her identity upon marriage
and the law denied her political power and status under the feudal doctrine of
coverture.89
A husband had the right to chastise his wife and beat her if she misbehaved, allowing
him to bring order within the family.90
This was supplanted by the marital unity theory, which espoused a similar concept.
Upon marrying, the woman becomes one with her husband. She had no right to make a
contract, sue another, own personal property or write a will.91
[T]he husband cannot be guilty of a rape committed by himself upon his lawful wife,
for by their mutual matrimonial consent and contract the wife hath given up herself in
this kind unto her husband, which she cannot retract.92
The rule was observed in common law countries such as the United States of America
(USA) and England. It gives legal immunity to a man who forcibly sexually assaults his
wife, an act which would be rape if committed against a woman not his wife.93 In those
jurisdictions, rape is traditionally defined as "the forcible penetration of the body of a
woman who is not the wife of the perpetrator."94
The first case in the USA that applied the marital exemption rule was Commonwealth
v. Fogerty95 promulgated in 1857. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
pronounced that it would always be a defense in rape to show marriage to the victim.
Several other courts adhered to a similar rationale with all of them citing Hale's theory
as basis.96
The rule was formally codified in the Penal Code of New York in 1909. A husband was
endowed with absolute immunity from prosecution for the rape of his wife.97 The
privilege was personal and pertained to him alone. He had the marital right to rape his
wife but he will be liable when he aids or abets another person in raping her.98
In the 1970s, the rule was challenged by women's movements in the USA demanding
for its abolition for being violative of married women's right to be equally protected
under rape laws.99
In 1978, the rule was qualified by the Legislature in New York by proscribing the
application of the rule in cases where the husband and wife are living apart pursuant
to a court order "which by its terms or in its effects requires such living apart," or a
decree, judgment or written agreement of separation.100
In 1983, the marital exemption rule was abandoned in New York when the Court of
Appeals of New York declared the same unconstitutional in People v. Liberta101 for
lack of rational basis in distinguishing between marital rape and non-marital rape. The
decision, which also renounced Hale's irrevocable implied consent theory, ratiocinated
as follows:
We find that there is no rational basis for distinguishing between marital rape and
nonmarital rape. The various rationales which have been asserted in defense of the
exemption are either based upon archaic notions about the consent and property
rights incident to marriage or are simply unable to withstand even the slightest
scrutiny. We therefore declare the marital exemption for rape in the New York statute
to be unconstitutional.
The other traditional justifications for the marital exemption were the common-law
doctrines that a woman was the property of her husband and that the legal existence
of the woman was "incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband x x x." Both
these doctrines, of course, have long been rejected in this State. Indeed, "[nowhere] in
the common-law world - [or] in any modem society - is a woman regarded as chattel or
demeaned by denial of a separate legal identity and the dignity associated with
recognition as a whole human being x x x."102 (Citations omitted)
By 1993, marital rape was a crime in all 50 states, with 17 of them, as well as the
District of Columbia, outlawing the act without exemptions. Meanwhile, the 33 other
states granted some exemptions to a husband from prosecution such as when the wife
is mentally or physically impaired, unconscious, asleep, or legally unable to consent.103
Interestingly, no documented case on marital rape has ever reached this Court until
now. It appears, however, that the old provisions of rape under Article 335 of the RPC
adhered to Hale's irrevocable implied consent theory, albeit in a limited form.
According to Chief Justice Ramon C. Aquino,104 a husband may not be guilty of rape
under Article 335 of Act No. 3815 but, in case there is legal separation, the husband
should be held guilty of rape if he forces his wife to submit to sexual intercourse.105
In 1981, the Philippines joined 180 countries in ratifying the United Nations
Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (UN-
CEDAW).106 Hailed as the first international women's bill of rights, the CEDAW is the
first major instrument that contains a ban on all forms of discrimination against
women. The Philippines assumed the role of promoting gender equality and women's
empowerment as a vital element in addressing global concerns.107 The country also
committed, among others, to condemn discrimination against women in all its forms,
and agreed to pursue, by all appropriate means and without delay, a policy of
eliminating discrimination against women and, to this end, undertook:
(a) To embody the principle of the equality of men and women in their national
constitutions or other appropriate legislation if not yet incorporated therein and to
ensure, through law and other appropriate means, the practical realization of this
principle;
(b) To adopt appropriate legislative and other measures, including sanctions where
appropriate, prohibiting all discrimination against women;
xxxx
(g) To repeal all national penal provisions which constitute discrimination against
women.108
Sec. 11. The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full
respect for human rights.
xxxx
Sec. 14. The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall ensure
the fundamental equality before the law of women and men. The Philippines also
acceded to adopt and implement the generally accepted principles of international law
such as the CEDA W and its allied issuances, viz:
The Legislature then pursued the enactment of laws to propagate gender equality. In
1997, R.A. No. 8353 eradicated the stereotype concept of rape in Article 335 of the
RPC.109 The law reclassified rape as a crime against person and removed it from the
ambit of crimes against chastity. More particular to the present case, and perhaps the
law's most progressive proviso is the 2nd paragraph of Section 2 thereof recognizing
the reality of marital rape and criminalizing its perpetration, viz:
Article 266-C. Effect of Pardon. - The subsequent valid marriage between the offended
party shall extinguish the criminal action or the penalty imposed.
In case it is the legal husband who is the offender, the subsequent forgiveness by the
wife as the offended party shall extinguish the criminal action or the penalty:
Provided, That the crime shall not be extinguished or the penalty shall not be abated if
the marriage is void ab initio.
Read together with Section 1 of the law, which unqualifiedly uses the term "man" in
defining rape, it is unmistakable that R.A. No. 8353 penalizes the crime without
regard to the rapist's legal relationship with his victim, thus:
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even
though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.
The explicit intent to outlaw marital rape is deducible from the records of the
deliberations of the 10th Congress on the law's progenitor's, House Bill No. 6265 and
Senate Bill No. 650. In spite of qualms on tagging the crime as 'marital rape' due to
conservative Filipino impressions on marriage, the consensus of our lawmakers was
clearly to include and penalize marital rape under the general definition of 'rape,' viz:
of clarification in the House version on Anti-Rape Bill, House Bill No. 6265, we never
agreed to marital rape. But under Article 266-C, it says here: "In case it is the legal
husband who is the offender... " Does this presuppose that there is now marital rape? x
x x.
MR. LARA: x x x [I]n this jurisdiction, well, I only have a limited, very limited 17
years of private practice in the legal profession, Madam Speaker, and I believe that I
can put at stake my license as a lawyer in this jurisdiction there is no law that
prohibits a husband from being sued by the wife for rape. Even jurisprudence, we don't
have any jurisprudence that prohibits a wife from suing a husband. That is why even if
we don't provide in this bill expanding the definition of crime that is now being
presented for approval, Madam Speaker, even if we don't provide here for marital
rape, even if we don't provide for sexual rape, there is the right of the wife to go
against the husband. The wife can sue the husband for marital rape and she cannot be
prevented from doing so because in this jurisdiction there is no law that prohibits her
from doing so. This is why we had to put second paragraph of 266-C because it is the
belief of many of us. x x x, that if it is true that in this jurisdiction there is marital rape
even if we don't provide it here, then we must provide for something that will unify
and keep the cohesion of the family together that is why we have the second
paragraph.
MR. DAMASING: Madam Speaker, Your Honor, under the House version specifically
House Bill No. 6265 our provision on a husband forcing the wife is not marital rape, it
is marital sexual assault.
MR. DAMASING: But here it is marital rape because there is no crime of sexual
assault. So, Your Honor, direct to the point, under Article 266-C, is it our
understanding that in the second paragraph, quote: "In case it is the legal husband who
is the offender, this refers to marital rape filed against the husband? Is that correct?
MR. LARA: No, Madam Speaker, not entirely, no. The answer is no.
MR. DAMASING: So if the husband is guilty of sexual assault, what do you call- it?
MR. DAMASING: There is no crime of sexual assault, Your Honor, we have already
stated that. Because under 1 and 2 it is all denominated as rape, there is no crime of
sexual assault. That is why I am sorry that our House version which provided for
sexual assault was not carried by the Senate version because all sexual crimes under
this bicameral conference committee report are all now denominated as rape whether
the penalty is from reclusion perpetua to death or whether the penalty is only prision
mayor. So there is marital rape, Your Honor, is that correct?
xxxx
HON. APOSTOL: In our version, we did not mention marital rape but marital rape is not
excluded.
HON. ROCO: Yeah. No. But I think there is also no specific mention.
HON. APOSTOL: No. No. No. Silent lang 'yung marital rape.
xxxx
HON. ROCO: xx x [I]f we can retain the effect of pardon, then this marital rape can be
implicitly contained in the second paragraph. x x x So marital rape actually was in the
House version x x x. But it was not another definition of rape. You will notice, it only
says, that because you are the lawful husband does not mean that you cannot commit
rape. Theoretically, I mean, you can beat up your wife until she's blue. And if the wife
complains she was raped, I guess that, I mean, you just cannot raise the defense x x
x[:] I am the husband. But where in the marriage contract does it say that I can beat
you up? That's all it means. That is why if we stop referring to it as marital rape,
acceptance is easy. Because parang ang marital rape, married na nga kami. I cannot
have sex. No, what it is saying is you're [the] husband but you cannot beat me up. x x
x. That's why to me it's not alarming. It was just a way of saying you're [the] husband,
you cannot say when I am charged with rape x x x.
PRESIDING OFFICER SHAHAN!: All right, so how do you propose it if we put it in[?]
HON. ROCO: x x x [A]ll we are saying [is] that if you are the lawful husband does not
mean you can have carnal knowledge by force[,] threat or intimidation or by depriving
your wife reason, a grave abuse of authority, I don't know how that cannot apply. Di ba
yung, or putting an instrument into the, yun ang sinasabi ko lang, it is not meant to
have another classification of rape. It is all the same definition x x x.
xxxx
HON.ROCO: What is 266-F? x x x. Now if we can retain 266-F x x x, we can say that
this rule is implicit already in the first proviso. It implies na there is an instance when
a husband can be charged [with] rape x x x.
HON. ROCO: Otherwise, we are silent na. So parang i-delete natin ito. But it is
understood that this rule of evidence is now transport[ed], put into 266-F, the effect of
pardon.
PRESIDING OFFICER APOSTOL: We will retain this effect of pardon. We will remove
marital rape.
HON. ROCO: No, yun ang, oo we will remove this one on page 3 but we will retain the
one on page 8, the effect of pardon. x x x [I]t is inferred but we leave it because after
all it is just a rule of evidence. But I think we should understand that a husband cannot
beat at his wife to have sex. Di ha? I think that should be made clear. x x x.
xxxx
HON. ROCO: x x x [W]e are not defining a crime of marital rape. All we are saying is
that if you're [the] legal husband, Jesus Christ, don't beat up to have sex. I almost
want, you are my wife, why do you have to beat me up.
So, ganoon. So, if we both justify it that way in the Report as inferred in proviso, I
mean, we can face up, I hope, to the women and they would understand that it is half
achieved.
HON. ZAMORA: I think, Raul, as long as we understand that we are not defining or
creating a new crime but instead, we are just defining a rule of evidence. x x x.
HON. ROCO: Then, in which case we may just want to clarify as a rule of evidence the
fact that he is husband is not, does not negate.111
CHAIRMAN LARA: x x x We all agree on the substance of the point in discussion. The
only disagreement now is where to place it. Let us clear this matter. There are two
suggestions now on marital rape. One is that it is rape if it is done with force or
intimidation or any of the circumstances that would define rape x x x immaterial. The
fact that the husband and wife are separated does not come into the picture. So even if
they are living under one roof x x x for as long as the attendant circumstances of the
traditional rape is present, then that is rape.112
The paradigm shift on marital rape in the Philippine jurisdiction is further affirmed by
R.A. No. 9262,114 which regards rape within marriage as a form of sexual violence that
may be committed by a man against his wife within or outside the family abode, viz:
Violence against women and their children refers to any act or a series of acts
committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a
woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with
whom he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate,
within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in. physical,
sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such
acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty. It
includes, but is not limited to, the following acts:
Statistical figures confirm the above characterization. Emotional and other forms of
non-personal violence are the most common type of spousal violence accounting for
23% incidence among ever-married women. One in seven ever-married women
experienced physical violence by their husbands while eight percent (8%) experienced
sexual violence.115
The crux of the accused-appellant's plea for acquittal mirrors the irrevocable implied
consent theory. In his appeal brief before the CA, he posits that the two incidents of
sexual intercourse, which gave rise to the criminal charges for rape, were
theoretically consensual, obligatory even, because he and the victim, KKK, were a
legally married and cohabiting couple. He argues that consent to copulation is
presumed between cohabiting husband and wife unless the contrary is proved.
The accused-appellant further claims that this case should be viewed and treated
differently from ordinary rape cases and that the standards for determining the
presence of consent or lack thereof must be adjusted on the ground that sexual
community is a mutual right and obligation between husband and wife.116
The ancient customs and ideologies from which the irrevocable implied consent theory
evolved have already been superseded by modem global principles on the equality of
rights between men and women and respect for human dignity established in various
international conventions, such as the CEDAW. The Philippines, as State Party to the
CEDAW, recognized that a change in the traditional role of men as well as the role of
women in society and in the family is needed to achieve full equality between them.
Accordingly, the country vowed to take all appropriate measures to modify the social
and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with a view to achieving the
elimination of prejudices, customs and all other practices which are based on the idea
of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for
men and women.117 One of such measures is R.A. No 8353 insofar as it eradicated the
archaic notion that marital rape cannot exist because a husband has absolute
proprietary rights over his wife's body and thus her consent to every act of sexual
intimacy with him is always obligatory or at least, presumed.
For the purposes of this Declaration, the term "violence against women" means any act
of gender-based violence that results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual or
psychological harm or suffering to women, including threats of such acts, coercion or
arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or in private life.
Article 2
Violence against women shall be understood to encompass, but not be limited to, the
following:
(a) Physical, sexual and psychological violence occurring in the family, including
battering, sexual abuse of female children in the household, dowry-related violence,
marital rape, female genital mutilation and other traditional practices harmful to
women, non-spousal violence and violence related to exploitation;119 (Emphasis ours)
Clearly, it is now acknowledged that rape, as a form of sexual violence, exists within
marriage. A man who penetrates her wife without her consent or against her will
commits sexual violence upon her, and the Philippines, as a State Party to the CEDA W
and its accompanying Declaration, defines and penalizes the act as rape under R.A.
No. 8353.
It is true that the Family Code,122 obligates the spouses to love one another but this
rule sanctions affection and sexual intimacy, as expressions of love, that are both
spontaneous and mutual123 and not the kind which is unilaterally exacted by force or
coercion.
Further, the delicate and reverent nature of sexual intimacy between a husband and
wife excludes cruelty and coercion. Sexual intimacy brings spouses wholeness and
oneness. It is a gift and a participation in the mystery of creation. It is a deep sense of
spiritual communion. It is a function which enlivens the hope of procreation and
ensures the continuation of family relations. It is an expressive interest in each other's
feelings at a time it is needed by the other and it can go a long way in deepening
marital relationship.124 When it is egoistically utilized to despoil marital union in order
to advance a felonious urge for coitus by force, violence or intimidation, the Court will
step in to protect its lofty purpose, vindicate justice and protect our laws and State
policies. Besides, a husband who feels aggrieved by his indifferent or uninterested
wife's absolute refusal to engage in sexual intimacy may legally seek the court's
intervention to declare her psychologically incapacitated to fulfill an essential marital
obligation.125 But he cannot and should not demand sexual intimacy from her
coercively or violently.
Moreover, to treat marital rape cases differently from non-marital rape cases in terms
of the elements that constitute the crime and in the rules for their proof, infringes on
the equal protection clause. The Constitutional right to equal protection of the laws126
ordains that similar subjects should not be treated differently, so as to give undue
favor to some and unjustly discriminate against others; no person or class of persons
shall be denied the same protection of laws, which is enjoyed, by other persons or
other classes in like circumstances.127
As above discussed, the definition of rape in Section 1 of R.A. No. 8353 pertains to: (a)
rape, as traditionally known; (b) sexual assault; and (c) marital rape or that where the
victim is the perpetrator's own spouse. The single definition for all three forms of the
crime shows that the law does not distinguish between rape committed in wedlock and
those committed without a marriage. Hence, the law affords protection to women
raped by their husband and those raped by any other man alike.
Further, the Court adheres to and hereby adopts the rationale in Liberta in rejecting
the argument akin to those raised by herein accused-appellant. A marriage license
should not be viewed as a license for a husband to forcibly rape his wife with impunity.
A married woman has the same right to control her own body, as does an unmarried
woman.128 She can give or withhold her consent to a sexual intercourse with her
husband and he cannot unlawfully wrestle such consent from her in case she refuses.
Lastly, the human rights of women include their right to have control over and decide
freely and responsibly on matters related to their sexuality, including sexual and
reproductive health, free of coercion, discrimination and violence.129 Women do not
divest themselves of such right by contracting marriage for the simple reason that
human rights are inalienable.130
In fine, since the law does not separately categorize marital rape and non-marital rape
nor provide for different definition or elements for either, the Court, tasked to
interpret and apply what the law dictates, cannot trudge the forbidden sphere of
judicial legislation and unlawfully divert from what the law sets forth. Neither can the
Court frame distinct or stricter evidentiary rules for marital rape cases as it would
inequitably burden its victims and unreasonably and irrationally classify them
differently from the victims of non-marital rape.
Indeed, there exists no legal or rational reason for the Court to apply the law and the
evidentiary rules on rape any differently if the aggressor is the woman's own legal
husband. The elements and quantum of proof that support a moral certainty of guilt in
rape cases should apply uniformly regardless of the legal relationship between the
accused and his accuser.
Thus, the Court meticulously reviewed the present case in accordance with the
established legal principles and evidentiary policies in the prosecution and resolution
of rape cases and found that no reversible error can be imputed to the conviction
meted the accused-appellant.
The evidence for the prosecution was!based on credible witnesses who gave!equally
credible testimonies
In rape cases, the conviction of the accused rests heavily on the credibility of the
victim. Hence, the strict mandate that all courts must examine thoroughly the
testimony of the offended party. While the accused in a rape case may be convicted
solely on the testimony of the complaining witness, courts are, nonetheless, duty-
bound to establish that their reliance on the victim's testimony is justified. Courts
must ensure that the testimony is credible, convincing, and otherwise consistent with
human nature. If the testimony of the complainant meets the test of credibility, the
accused may be convicted on the basis thereof.131
It is settled that the evaluation by the trial court of the credibility of witnesses and
their testimonies are entitled to the highest respect. This is in view of its inimitable
opportunity to directly observe the witnesses and their deportment, conduct and
attitude, especially during cross-examination. Thus, unless it is shown that its
evaluation was tainted with arbitrariness or certain facts of substance and value have
been plainly overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied, the same will not be disturbed
on appeal.132
After approximating the perspective of the trial court thru a meticulous scrutiny of
the entire records of the trial proceedings and the transcript of each witnesses'
testimony, the Court found no justification to disturb its findings.
Rather, the Court observed that KKK and her testimony were both credible and
spontaneous. Hailed to the witness stand on six separate occasions, KKK never
wavered neither did her statements vacillate between uncertainty and certitude. She
remained consistent, categorical, straightforward, and candid during the rigorous
cross-examination and on rebuttal examination, she was able to convincingly explain
and debunk the allegations of the defense.
She vividly recounted how the accused-appellant forced her to have sex with him
despite her refusal on October 16, 1998. He initially ordered her to sleep beside him in
their conjugal bed by violently throwing the cot where she was resting. In order not to
aggravate his temper, KKK obeyed. On the bed, he insinuated for them to have sex.
When she rejected his advances due to abdominal pain and headache, his request for
intimacy transformed into a stubborn demand. Unyielding, KKK held her panties but
the accused-appellant forcibly pulled them down. The tug caused the small clothing to
tear apart. She reiterated that she was not feeling well and begged him to stop. But no
amount of resistance or begging subdued him. He flexed her two legs apart, gripped
her hands, mounted her, rested his own legs on hers and inserted his penis into her
vagina. She continued pleading but he never desisted.133
Her accurate recollection of the second rape incident on October 1 7, 1998 is likewise
unmistakable. After the appalling episode in the conjugal bedroom the previous night,
KKK decided to sleep in the children's bedroom. While her daughters were fixing the
beddings, the accused-appellant barged into the room and berated her for refusing to
go with him to their conjugal bedroom. When KKK insisted to stay in the children's
bedroom, the accused-appellant got angry and pulled her up. MMM's attempt to pacify
the accused-appellant further enraged him. He reminded them that as the head of the
family he could do whatever he wants with his wife. To demonstrate his role as
patriarch, he ordered the children to go out of the room and thereafter proceeded to
force KKK into sexual intercourse. He forcibly pulled down her short pants and
panties as KKK begged "Dont do that to me, my body is still aching and also my
abdomen and I cannot do what you wanted me to do. I cannot withstand sex."134 But
her pleas fell on deaf ears. The accused-appellant removed his shorts and briefs,
spread KKK's legs apart, held her hands, mounted her and inserted his penis into her
vagina. After gratifying himself, he got dressed, left the room as he chuckled: "Its nice,
that is what you deserve because you are [a] flirt or fond of sex."135
Entrenched is the rule that in the prosecution of rape cases, the essential element that
must be proved is the absence of the victim's consent to the sexual congress.136
Under the law, consent is absent when: (a) it was wrestled from the victim by force,
threat or intimidation, fraudulent machinations or grave abuse of authority; or (b) the
victim is incapable of giving free and voluntary consent because he/she is deprived of
reason or otherwise unconscious or that the offended party is under 12 years of age or
is demented.
(Direct Examination)
ATTY. LARGO:
Q So, while you were already lying on the bed together with your husband, do you
remember what happened?
A He put his hand on my lap and asked me to have sex with him but I warded off his
hand.
Q Can you demonstrate to this Court how did he use his hand?
A Yes. "witness demonstrating on how the accused used his finger by touching or
knocking her lap which means that he wanted to have sex."
A I warded off his hand and refused because I was not feeling well. (at this juncture the
witness is sobbing)
Q So, what did your husband do when you refused him to have sex with you?
A He insisted and he pulled my pantie forcibly, that is why my pantie [sic] was tom.
Q Why, what did you do when he started to pull your pantie [sic]?
A I resisted and tried to hold my pantie [sic] but I failed, because he is so strong.
xx xx
Q So, when your pantie [sic] was tom by your husband, what else did he do?
A He succeeded in having sex with me because he held my two hands no matter how I
wrestled but I failed because he is stronger than me.
COURT: Make it of record that the witness is sobbing while she is giving her testimony.
Q So, what did you do when your husband already stretched your two legs and rode on
you and held your two hands?
A I told him, "don't do that because I'm not feeling well and my whole body is aching."
Q Did you say that in the manner you are saying now?
xxxx
xxxx
Q Was your husband able to consummate his desire?
xxxx
(Cross-Examination)
ATTY. AMARGA;
Q Every time you have sex with your husband it was your husband normally remove
your panty?
A Yes, Sir.
Q It was not unusual for your husband then to remove your panty because according to
you he normally do that if he have sex with you?
A Yes, Sir.
Q And finally according to you your husband have sex with you?
A Yes, Sir because he forcibly used me in spite of holding my panty because I don't
want to have sex with him at that time.
Q You did not spread your legs at that time when he removed your panty?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Meaning, your position of your legs was normal during that time?
xxxx
Q At that time when your husband allegedly removed your panty he also remove your
nightgown?
A No, Sir.
Q And he did pull out your duster [sic] towards your face?
Q In other words your face was covered when he raised your duster [sic]?
ATTY. LARGO
Q So, after your children went out of the room, what transpired?
A He successfully having sex with me because he pulled my short pant and pantie
forcible.
Q So, what did you say when he forcibly pulled your short and pantie?
A I told him, "don't do that to me, my body is still aching and also my abdomen and I
cannot do what you wanted me to do. I cannot withstand sex."
A It was tom.
Q And after your short and pantie was pulled down by your husband, what did he do?
A He also removed his short and brief and flexed my two legs and mounted on me and
succeeded in having sex with me.139
The accused-appellant forced his wife when he knowingly overpowered her by gripping
her hands, flexing her legs and then resting his own legs thereon in order to facilitate
the consummation of his much-desired non-consensual sexual intercourse.
Records also show that the accused-appellant employed sufficient intimidation upon
KKK. His actuations prior to the actual moment of the felonious coitus revealed that
he imposed his distorted sense of moral authority on his wife. He furiously demanded
for her to lay with him on the bed and thereafter coerced her to indulge his sexual
craving.
The fury the accused-appellant exhibited when KKK refused to sleep with him on their
bed, when she insisted to sleep in the children's bedroom and the fact that he exercises
dominance over her as husband all cowed KKK into submission.
The fact that KKK voluntarily went with the accused-appellant to their conjugal
bedroom on October 16, 1998 cannot be stretched to mean that she consented to the
forced sexual intercourse that ensued. The accused-appellant was KKK's husband and
hence it was customary for her to sleep in the conjugal bedroom. No consent can be
deduced from such act of KKK because at that juncture there were no indications that
sexual intercourse was about to take place. The issue of consent was still irrelevant
since the act for which the same is legally required did not exist yet or at least unclear
to the person from whom the consent was desired. The significant point when consent
must be given is at that time when it is clear to the victim that her aggressor is
soliciting sexual congress. In this case, that point is when the accused-appellant
tapped his fingers on her lap, a gesture KKK comprehended to be an invitation for a
sexual intercourse, which she refused.
We cannot give credence to the accused-appellant's argument that KKK should have
hit him to convey that she was resisting his sexual onslaught. Resistance is not an
element of rape and the law does not impose upon the victim the burden to prove
resistance140 much more requires her to raise a specific kind thereof.
At any rate, KKK put up persistent, audible and intelligible resistance for the accused-
appellant to recognize that she seriously did not assent to a sexual congress. She held
on to her panties to prevent him from undressing her, she refused to bend her legs and
she repeatedly shouted and begged for him to stop.
The accused-appellant's assertion that MMM and OOO's testimonies lacked probative
value as they did not witness the actual rape is bereft of merit. It must be stressed that
rape is essentially committed in relative isolation, thus, it is usually only the victim
who can testify with regard to the fact of the forced sexual intercourse.148 Hence, the
probative value of MMM and OOO's testimonies rest not on whether they actually
witnessed the rape but on whether their declarations were in harmony with KKK's
narration of the circumstances, preceding, subsequent to and concurrent with, the
rape incidents.
MMM and OOO's testimonies substantiated significant points in KKK's narration.
MMM heard KKK shouting and crying: "Eddie, dont do that to me, have pity on me"149
on the night of October 16, 1998 shortly after KKK and the accused-appellant went to
their conjugal bedroom. When MMM went upstairs to check on her mother, the
accused-appellant admonished her for meddling. Frustrated to aid her mother who
persistently cried, MMM kicked the door so hard the accused-appellant was prompted
to open it and rebuke MMM once more. OOO heard all these commotion from the room
downstairs.
MMM then saw her mother crouched on the bed, crying, with her hair disheveled
while her tom panty lay on the floor. After a brief struggle with the accused-appellant,
MMM and KKK were finally able to escape and retreat to the children's bedroom
where KKK narrated to her daughters: "[Y]our father is an animal, a beast; he forced
me to have sex with him when I'm not feeling well. "
KKK gave a similar narration to MMM and OOO the following night after the accused-
appellant barged inside the children's bedroom. The couple had an argument and when
MMM tried to interfere, the accused-appellant ordered her and OOO to get out after
bragging that he can have sex with his wife even in front of the children because he is
the head of the family. The girls then stayed by the staircase where they afterwards
heard their mother helplessly crying and shouting for the accused-appellant to stop.
Indeed, the testimonies of KKK, MMM and OOO coherently depicted that the accused-
appellant, through the use of force and intimidation, had non-consensual and forced
carnal knowledge of his wife, KKK on the nights of October 16 and 17, 1998.
KKK's helpless screams and pleas from inside the bedroom coupled with her verbal
and physical resistance were clear manifestations of coercion. Her appearance when
MMM saw her on the bed after the accused appellant opened the door on October 16,
1998, her conduct towards the accused-appellant on her way out of the room, and her
categorical outcry to her children after the two bedroom episodes - all generate the
conclusion that the sexual acts that occurred were against her will.
The testimonies of KKK and her daughters cannot be discredited merely because they
failed to report the rape incidents to the police authorities or that KKK belatedly filed
the rape charges. Delay or vacillation by the victims in reporting sexual assaults does
not necessarily impair their credibility if such delay is satisfactorily explained.150
At that time, KKK and her daughters were not aware that a husband forcing his wife
to submit to sexual intercourse is considered rape. In fact, KKK only found out that
she could sue his husband for rape when Prosecutor Benjamin Tabique, Jr.
(Prosecutor Tabique) told her about it when she filed the separate charges for grave
threats and physical injuries against the accused-appellant.151
It must be noted that the incidents occurred a year into the effectivity of R.A. No. 8353
abolishing marital exemption in rape cases hence it is understandable that it was not
yet known to a layman as opposed to legal professionals like Prosecutor Tabique. In
addition, fear of reprisal thru social humiliation which is the common factor that deter
rape victims from reporting the crime to the authorities is more cumbersome in
marital rape cases. This is in view of the popular yet outdated belief that it is the wife's
absolute obligation to submit to her husband's carnal desires. A husband raping his
own wife is often dismissed as a peculiar occurrence or trivialized as simple domestic
trouble.
Unfamiliarity with or lack of knowledge of the law criminalizing marital rape, the
stigma and public scrutiny that could have befallen KKK and her family had the
intervention of police authorities or even the neighbors been sought, are acceptable
explanations for the failure or delay in reporting the subject rape incidents.
The failure of the prosecution to present KKK's complaint-affidavit for rape is not fatal
in view of the credible, candid and positive testimony of KKK on the witness stand.
Testimonial evidence carries more weight than the affidavit since it underwent the
rudiments of a direct, cross, re-direct and re-cross examinations. Affidavits or
statements taken ex parte are generally considered incomplete and inaccurate. Thus,
by nature, they are inferior to testimony given in court.152
The ill motive, which the accused-appellant imputed to KKK, does not inspire belief as
it is riddled with loopholes generated by incongruent and flimsy evidence. The
prosecution was able to establish that the P3 Million deposit in the spouses' bank
account was the proceeds of their loan from the Bank of Philippine Islands (BPI).
Exhibit J, which is a BPI ML instruction sheet dated October 31, 1996 in the amount of
P3,149,840.63 is the same amount the accused-appellant claimed to have entrusted to
her wife. Although the accused-appellant denied being aware of such loan, he admitted
that approximately P3 Million was spent for the construction of their house. These
pieces of evidence effectively belie the accused appellant's allegation that KKK could
not account for the money deposited in the bank.153
Anent, KKK's alleged extra-marital affairs, the accused-appellant failed to explain how
Bebs could be his wife KKK when the letter-sender greeted Bebs a "happy birthday" on
October 28 while KKK's birthday is June 23. The accused-appellant also did not
present Bebs herself, being a more competent witness to the existence of the alleged
love letters for KKK. He likewise failed, despite promise to do so, to present the
original copies of such love letters neither did he substantiate KKK's supposed extra-
marital affairs by presenting witnesses who could corroborate his claims. Further, the
Court finds it unbelievable that an able man would not have the temerity to confront
his wife who has fooled around with 10 men - some of whom he has even met. The
accused-appellant's erratic statements on the witness stand are inconsistent with the
theory of extra-marital romance making it reasonable to infer that he merely made up
those malicious stories as a desperate ploy to extricate himself out of this legal
quandary.
At best, the basis of the alleged illicit affairs of KKK were the accused-appellant's
unfounded suspicions that hold no evidentiary weight in law and thus incompetent to
destroy KKK's credibility and that of her testimony. In sum, the defense failed to
present sufficiently convincing evidence that KKK is a mere vindictive wife who is
harassing the accused-appellant with fabricated rape charges.
Alibi
It must be stressed that in raising the irrevocable implied consent theory as defense,
the accused-appellant has essentially admitted the facts of sexual intercourse
embodied in the two criminal informations for rape. This admission is inconsistent
with the defense of alibi and any discussion thereon will thus be irrelevant.
Alibi is one of the weakest defenses not only because it is inherently frail and
unreliable, but also because it is easy to fabricate and difficult to check or rebut. It
cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accused by eyewitnesses who had
no improper motive to testify falsely.154
For the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove not only that he was at
some other place at the time of the commission of the crime, but also that it was
physically impossible for him to be at the locus delicti or within its immediate vicinity.
Physical impossibility refers not only to the geographical distance between the place
where the accused was and the place where the crime was committed when the crime
transpired, but more importantly, the facility of access between the two places.155
Even granting in arguendo that the accused-appellant had indeed attended a fiesta in
Dangcagan, Bukidnon or was hauling com with Equia on the dates of commission of the
crime, the same will not easily exonerate him. The accused-appellant failed to adduce
clear and convincing evidence that it was physically impossible for him to be at his
residence in Cagayan de Oro City at the time of the commission of the crime.
Dangcagan, Bukidnon can be traversed by about four or five hours from Cagayan de
Oro City, and even less by private vehicle which was available to the accused appellant
at any time.156 Thus, it was not physically impossible for him to be at the situs criminis
at the dates and times when the two rape incidents were committed.
Between the accused-appellant's alibi and denial, and the positive identification and
credible testimony of the victim, and her two daughters, the Court must give weight to
the latter, especially in the absence of ill motive on their part to falsely testify against
the accused-appellant.
Conclusion
Penalties
The Court affirms the penalty of reclusion perpetua, for each count of rape, meted
upon the accused-appellant for being in accord with Article 266-A in relation to 266-B
of the RPC. Further, he shall not be eligible for parole pursuant to Section 3 of R.A. No.
9346, which states that "persons convicted of offenses punished with reclusion
perpetua, or whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua, by reason of this
Act, shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4180, otherwise known as the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended."157
The Court sustains the moral damages awarded in the amount of P50,000.00. Moral
damages are granted to rape victims without need of proof other than the fact of rape
under the assumption that the victim suffered moral injuries from the experience she
underwent.158
The award of civil indemnity is proper; it is mandatory upon the finding that rape took
place.1wphi1 Considering that the crime committed is simple rape, there being no
qualifying circumstances attendant in its commission, the appropriate amount is
P50,000.00159 and not P75,000.00 as awarded by the RTC.
To serve as an example for public good and in order to deter a similar form of domestic
violence, an award of P30,000.00 as exemplary damages is imperative.160
The damages awarded shall earn legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per
annum to be reckoned from the date of finality of this judgment until fully paid.161
A Final Note
Husbands are once again reminded that marriage is not a license to forcibly rape their
wives. A husband does not own his wife's body by reason of marriage. By marrying,
she does not divest herself of the human right to an exclusive autonomy over her own
body and thus, she can lawfully opt to give or withhold her consent to marital coitus. A
husband aggrieved by his wife's unremitting refusal to engage in sexual intercourse
cannot resort to felonious force or coercion to make her yield. He can seek succor
before the Family Courts that can determine whether her refusal constitutes
psychological incapacity justifying an annulment of the marriage.
Sexual intimacy is an integral part of marriage because it is the spiritual and biological
communion that achieves the marital purpose of procreation. It entails mutual love
and self-giving and as such it contemplates only mutual sexual cooperation and never
sexual coercion or imposition.
The Court is aware that despite the noble intentions of the herein pronouncement,
menacing personalities may use this as a tool to harass innocent husbands. In this
regard, let it be stressed that safeguards in the criminal justice system are in place to
spot and scrutinize fabricated or false marital rape complaints and any person who
institutes untrue and malicious charges will be made answerable under the pertinent
provisions of the RPC and/or other laws.
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the Decision dated July 9, 2008 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00353 is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS. Accused-appellant Edgar Jumawan is found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of RAPE and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua for each count, without eligibility for parole. He is further ordered
to pay the victim, KKK, the amounts of PS0,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as
moral damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, for each count of rape. The
award of damages shall earn legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum
from the finality of this judgment until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari questioning the Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) dated June 6, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00422-MIN. The CA reversed
and set aside the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Kapatagan, Lanao del
Norte, Branch 21, dated February 28, 2006 in Criminal Case No. 21-1211, and
acquitted private respondents Raymund Carampatana, Joefhel Oporto, and Moises
Alquizola of the crime of rape for the prosecution's failure to prove their guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
In a Second Amended Information dated June 23, 2004, private respondents
Carampatana, Oporto and Alquizola werecharged, together with Christian John Lim,
Emmanuel dela Cruz, Samuel Rudinas, Jansen Roda, Harold Batoctoy, and Joseph
Villame, for allegedly raping AAA,3 to wit:
That on or about 10:30 oclock in the evening of March 25, 2004 at Alsons Palace,
Maranding, Lala, Lanao del Norte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
HonorableCourt, the above-named accused conspiring, confederating and mutually
helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with lewd
designs forcefully drunk AAA, a 16-year-old minor, with an intoxicating liquor and
once intoxicated, brought said AAA at about dawn of March 26, 2004 at Alquizola
Lodging house, Maranding, Lala, Lanao del Norte and also within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, and once inside said lodging house, accused RAYMUND
CARAMPATANA and JOEPHEL OPORTO took turns in having carnal knowledge
against the will of AAA while accused MOISES ALQUIZOLA, with lewd designs, kissed
her against her will and consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
Upon arraignment, accused, assisted by their respective counsels, entered a plea of not
guilty to the offense charged.5
Following pre-trial,6 trial on the merits ensued. Accused Christian John Lim, however,
remains at-large.
On March 25, 2004, around 8:00 a.m., AAA attended her high school graduation
ceremony. Afterwards, they had a luncheon party at their house in Maranding, Lala,
Lanao del Norte. AAA then asked permission from her mother to go to the Maranding
Stage Plaza because she and her bandmates had to perform for an election campaign.
She went home at around 4:00 p.m. from the plaza. At about 7:00 p.m., AAA told her
father that she would be attending a graduation dinner party with her friends. AAA,
together with Lim, Oporto, and Carampatana, ate dinner at the house of one Mark
Gemeno at Purok, Bulahan, Maranding. After eating, Lim invited them to go to Alsons
Palace, which was merely a walking distance away from Gemenos house. Outside the
Alsons Palace, they were greeted by Aldrin Montesco, Junver Alquizola, and Cherry
Mae Fiel. After a while, they went inside and proceeded to a bedroom on the second
floor where they again saw Montesco with Harold Batoctoy, Jansen Roda, Emmanuel
dela Cruz, Samuel Rudinas, a certain Diego, and one Angelo. Rudinas suggested that
they have a drinking session to celebrate their graduation, to which the rest agreed.
They all contributed and it was Joseph Villame who bought the drinks two (2) bottles
of Emperador Brandy. Then they arranged themselves in a circle for the drinking
spree. Two (2) glasses were being passed around: one glass containing the sweetener
(Pepsi) and the other glass containing the liquor. At first, AAA refused to drink
because she had never tried hard liquor before. During the session, they shared their
problems with each other. When it was AAAs turn, she became emotional and started
crying. It was then that she took her first shot. The glasses were passed around and
she consumed more or less five (5) glasses of Emperador Brandy. Thereafter, she felt
dizzy so she laid her head down on Oportos lap. Oporto then started kissing her head
and they would remove her baseball cap. This angered her so she told them to stop,
and simply tried to hide her face with the cap. But they just laughed at her. Then, Roda
also kissed her. At that time, AAA was already sleepy, but they still forced her to take
another shot. They helped her stand up and make her drink. She even heard Lim say,
"Hubuga na, hubuga na," (You make her drunk, you make her drunk). She likewise
heard someone say, "You drink it, you drink it." She leaned on Oportos lap again, then
she fell asleep. They woke her up and Lim gave her the Emperador Brandy bottle to
drink the remaining liquor inside. She tried to refuse but they insisted, so she drank
directly from the bottle. Again, she fell asleep.
The next thing she knew, Roda and Batoctoy were carrying her down the stairs, and
then she was asleep again. When she regained consciousness, she saw that she was
already at the Alquizola Lodging House. She recognized that place because she had
been there before. She would thereafter fall back asleep and wake up again. And
during one of the times that she was conscious, she saw Oporto on top of her, kissing
her on different parts of her body, and having intercourse with her. She started
crying. She tried to resist when she felt pain in her genitals. She also saw
Carampatana and Moises Alquizola inside the room, watching as Oporto abused her. At
one point, AAA woke up while Carampatana was inserting his penis into her private
organ. She cried and told him to stop. Alquizola then joined and started to kiss her. For
the last time, she fell unconscious.
When she woke up, it was already 7:00a.m. of the next day. She was all alone. Her
body felt heavy and exhausted. She found herself with her shirt on but without her
lower garments. The upper half of her body was on top of the bed but her feet were on
the floor. There were also red stains on her shirt. After dressing up, she hailed a
trisikad and went home. When AAA reached their house, her father was waiting for
her and was already furious. When she told them that she was raped, her mother
started hitting her. They brought her to the Lala Police Station to make a report.
Thereafter, they proceeded to the district hospital for her medical examination.
Dr. Cyrus Acusta of the Kapatagan District Hospital examined AAA in the morning of
March 26, 2004, and found an old hymenal laceration at 5 oclock position and
hyperemia or redness at the posterior fornices. The vaginal smear likewise revealed
the presence of sperm.
On the other hand, accused denied that they raped AAA. According to the defense
witnesses, in the evening of March 25, 2004, Oporto, Carampatana, Lim, and AAA had
dinner at Gemenos house. Gemeno then invited Oporto to attend the graduation party
hosted by Montesco at Alsons Palace, owned by the latters family. When they reached
the place, Oporto told Montesco that they had to leave for Barangay Tenazas to fetch
one Arcie Ariola. At about 11:30 p.m., Oporto and Carampatana returned to Alsons
Palace but could not find AAA and Lim. The party subsequently ended, but the group
agreed to celebrate further. AAA, Rudinas, Dela Cruz, Lim, and Oporto contributed for
two (2) bottles of Emperador Brandy and one (1) liter of Pepsi. Several persons were
in the room at that time: AAA, Carampatana, Oporto, Dela Cruz, Rudinas, Roda,
Batoctoy, Villame, and Lim. Also present but did not join the drinking were Gemeno,
Montesco, Angelo Ugnabia, Al Jalil Diego, Mohamad Janisah Manalao, one Caga, and a
certain Bantulan. Gemeno told AAA not to drink but the latter did not listen and
instead told him not to tell her aunt. During the drinking session, AAA rested on
Oportos lap. She even showed her scorpion tattoo on her buttocks. And when her legs
grazed Batoctoys crotch, she remarked, "What was that, penis?" Roda then
approached AAA to kiss her, and the latter kissed him back. Oporto did the sameand
AAA also kissed him. After Oporto, Roda and AAA kissed each other again.
Meanwhile, earlier that evening, at around 9:00 p.m., Moises Alquizola was at the
Alquizola Lodging House drinking beer with his cousin, Junver, and Fiel. They stopped
drinking at around midnight. Fiel then requested Alquizola to accompany her to
Alsons Palace to see her friends there. They proceeded to the second floor and there
they saw AAA lying on Oportos lap. Fiel told AAA to go home because her mother
might get angry. AAA could not look her in the eye, just shook her head, and said, "I
just stay here." Alquizola and Fiel then went back to the lodging house. After thirty
minutes, they went to Alsons Palace again,and saw AAA and Oporto kissing each
other. AAA was lying on his lap while holding his neck. Subsequently, they went back
to the lodging house to resume drinking.
After drinking, Batoctoy offered to bring AAA home. But she refused and instead
instructed them to take her to the Alquizola Lodging House because she has a big
problem. AAA, Lim, and Carampatana rode a motorcycle to the lodging house. When
they arrived, AAA approached Alquizola and told him, "Kuya, I want to sleep here for
the meantime." Alquizola then opened Room No. 4 where AAA, Oporto, and
Carampatana stayed. There were two beds inside, a single bed and a double-sized bed.
AAA lay down on the single bed and looked at Carampatana. The latter approached
her and they kissed. He then removed her shirt and AAA voluntarily raised her hands
to give way. Carampatana likewise removed her brassiere. All the while, Oporto was at
the foot of the bed. Thereafter, Oporto also removed her pants. AAA even lifted her
buttocks to make it easier for him to pull her underwear down. Oporto then went to
AAA and kissed her on the lips. Carampatana, on the other hand, placed himself in
between AAAs legs and had intercourse with her. When he finished, he put on his
shorts and went back to Alsons Palace to get some sleep. When he left, Oporto and
AAA were still kissing. Alquizola then entered the room. When AAA saw him, she said,
"Come Kuya, embrace me because I have a problem." Alquizola thus started kissing
AAAs breasts. Oporto stood up and opened his pants. AAA held his penis and
performed fellatio on him. Then Oporto and Alquizola changed positions. Oporto
proceeded to have sexual intercourse with AAA. During that time, AAA was moaning
and calling his name. Afterwards, Oporto went outside and slept with Alquizola on the
carpet. Oporto then had intercourse with AAA two more times. At 3:00 a.m., he went
back to Alsons Palace to sleep. At around 6:00 a.m., Oporto and Carampatana went
back to the lodging house. They tried to wake AAA up, but she did not move so they
just left and went home. Alquizola had gone outside but he came back before 7:00 a.m.
However, AAA was no longer there when he arrived.
On February 28, 2006, the RTC found private respondents Carampatana, Oporto and
Alquizola guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape. It, however, acquitted
Dela Cruz, Rudinas, Roda, Batoctoy, and Villame for failure of the prosecution to prove
their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
b) Finding accused Joefhel Oporto GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged, and the court hereby sentences him to suffer a prison term of six (6) years
and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to twelve (12) years also of prision
mayor as maximum; to pay AAA the sum of P50,000.00 as moral damages and
another amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity;
d) Finding accused Emmanuel dela Cruz, Samuel Rudinas, Jansen Roda, Harold
Batoctoy and Joseph Villame NOT GUILTY of the crime charged for failure of the
prosecution to prove their guilt therefor beyond reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the
Court acquits them of said charge; and e) Ordering accused Carampatana, Oporto and
Alquizola to pay, jointly and severally, the amount of P50,000.00 as attorneys fees
and expenses of litigations; and the costs of suit.
The full period of the preventive imprisonment of accused Carampatana, Oporto and
Alquizola shall be credited to them and deducted from their prison terms provided
they comply with the requirements of Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code.
Let the records of this case be sent to the archive files without prejudice on the
prosecution to prosecute the case against accused Christian John Lim as soon as he is
apprehended.
SO ORDERED.7
Aggrieved by the RTC Decision, private respondents brought the case to the CA. On
June 6, 2008, the appellate court rendered the assailed Decision reversing the trial
courts ruling and, consequently, acquitted private respondents. The decretal portion
of said decision reads:
SO ORDERED.8
In sum, the CA found that the prosecution failed to prove private respondents guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. It gave more credence to the version of the defense and
ruled that AAA consented to the sexual congress. She was wide awake and aware of
what private respondents were doing before the intercourse. She never showed any
physical resistance, never shouted for help, and never fought against her alleged
ravishers. The appellate court further relied on the medical report which showed the
presence of an old hymenal laceration on AAAs genitalia, giving the impression that
she has had some carnal knowledge with a man before. The CA also stressed that
AAAs mothers unusual reaction of hitting her when she discovered what happened to
her daughter was more consistent with that of a parent who found out that her child
just had premarital sex rather than one who was sexually assaulted.
On July 29, 2008, AAA, through her private counsel, filed a Petition for Certiorari9
under Rule 65, questioning the CA Decision which reversed private respondents
conviction and ardently contending that the same was made with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
The private respondents present the following arguments in their Comment dated
November 7, 2008 to assail the petition:
I.
II.
III.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed its own Comment on April 1, 2009. It
assigns the following errors:
I.
II.
THE APPELLATE DECISION OF ACQUITTAL IS NULL AND VOID FOR HAVING BEEN
RENDERED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS
OF JURISDICTION, AN EXCEPTION TO THE PRINCIPLE OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY.12
At the onset, the Court stresses that rules of procedure are meant to be tools to
facilitate a fair and orderly conduct of proceedings. Strict adherence thereto must not
get in the way of achieving substantial justice. As long as their purpose is sufficiently
met and no violation of due process and fair play takes place, the rules should be
liberally construed.13 Liberal construction of the rules is the controlling principle to
effect substantial justice. The relaxation or suspension of procedural rules, or the
exemption of a case from their operation, is warranted when compelling reasons exist
or when the purpose of justice requires it. Thus, litigations should, as much as possible,
be decided on their merits and not on sheer technicalities.14
As a general rule, the prosecution cannot appeal or bring error proceedings from a
judgment rendered in favor of the defendant in a criminal case. The reason is that a
judgment of acquittal is immediately final and executory, and the prosecution is
barred from appealing lest the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy be
violated.15 Section 21, Article III of the Constitution provides:
Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under
either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.
Despite acquittal, however, either the offended party or the accused may appeal, but
only with respect to the civil aspect of the decision. Or, said judgment of acquittal may
be assailed through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
showing that the lower court, in acquitting the accused, committed not merely
reversible errors of judgment, but also exercised grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction, or a denial of due process, thereby rendering the
assailed judgment null and void.16 If there is grave abuse of discretion, granting
petitioners prayer is not tantamount to putting private respondents in double
jeopardy.17
As to the party with the proper legal standing to bring the action, the Court said in
People v. Santiago:18
It is well-settled that in criminal cases where the offended party is the State, the
interest of the private complainant or the private offended party is limited to the civil
liability. Thus, in the prosecution of the offense, the complainant's role is limited to
that of a witness for the prosecution. If a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court
or if there is an acquittal, an appeal therefrom on the criminal aspect may be
undertaken only by the State through the Solicitor General. Only the Solicitor General
may represent the People of the Philippines on appeal. The private offended party or
complainant may not take such appeal. However, the said offended party or
complainant may appeal the civil aspect despite the acquittal of the accused.
In a special civil action for certiorari filed under Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court wherein it is alleged that the trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction or on other jurisdictional grounds, the rules state
that the petition may be filed by the person aggrieved. In such case, the aggrieved
parties are the State and the private offended party or complainant. The complainant
has an interest in the civil aspect of the case so he may file such special civil action
questioning the decision or action of the respondent court on jurisdictional grounds. In
so doing, complainant should not bring the action in the name of the People of the
Philippines. The action may be prosecuted in [the] name of said complainant.19 Private
respondents argue that the action should have been filed by the State through the
OSG. True, in criminal cases, the acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case
against him can only be appealed by the Solicitor General, acting on behalf of the State.
This is because the authority to represent the State in appeals of criminal cases before
the Supreme Court and the CA is solely vested in the OSG.20
Here, AAA filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, albeit at the instance of her
private counsel, primarily imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CA
when it acquitted private respondents. As the aggrieved party, AAA clearly has the
right to bring the action in her name and maintain the criminal prosecution. She has
an immense interest in obtaining justice in the case precisely because she is the
subject of the violation. Further, as held in Dela Rosa v. CA,21 where the Court
sustained the private offended partys right in a criminal case to file a special civil
action for certiorari to question the validity of the judgment of dismissal and ruled that
the Solicitor Generals intervention was not necessary, the recourse of the
complainant to the Court is proper since it was brought in her own name and not in
that of the People of the Philippines. In any event, the OSG joins petitioners cause in
its Comment,22 thereby fulfilling the requirement that all criminal actions shall be
prosecuted under the direction and control of the public prosecutor.23
Private respondents further claim that even assuming, merely for the sake of
argument, that AAA can file the special civil action for certiorari without violating
their right against double jeopardy, still, it must be dismissed for petitioners failure to
previously file a motion for reconsideration. True, a motion for reconsideration is a
condicio sine qua non for the filing of a petition for certiorari. Its purpose is for the
court to have an opportunity to correct any actual or perceived error attributed to it
by reexamination of the legal and factual circumstances of the case. This rule,
however, is not absolute and admits well-defined exceptions, such as: (a) where the
order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction; (b) where the
questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon
by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court;
(c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any
further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or
the subject matter of the action is perishable; (d) where, under the circumstances, a
motion for reconsideration would be useless; (e) where petitioner was deprived of due
process and there is extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in a criminal case, relief
from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial court is
improbable; (g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due
process; (h) where the proceedings were ex parte or in which the petitioner had no
opportunity to object; and (i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or where
public interest is involved.24
Here, petitioners case amply falls within the exception. AAA raises the same
questions as those raised and passed upon in the lower court, essentially revolving on
the guilt of the private respondents. There is also an urgent necessity to resolve the
issues, for any further delay would prejudice the interests, not only of the petitioner,
but likewise that of the Government. And, as will soon be discussed, the CA decision is
a patent nullity for lack of due process and for having been rendered with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
For the writ of certiorari to issue, the respondent court must be shown to have acted
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. An acquittal
is considered tainted with grave abuse of discretion when it is shown that the
prosecutions right to due process was violated or that the trial conducted was a sham.
The burden is on the petitioner to clearly demonstrate and establish that the
respondent court blatantly abused its authority such as to deprive itself of its very
power to dispense justice.25
AAA claims in her petition that the CA, in evident display of grave abuse of judicial
discretion, totally disregarded her testimony as well as the trial courts findings of
fact, thereby adopting hook, line, and sinker, the private respondents narration of
facts.
The term "grave abuse of discretion" has a specific meaning. An act of a court or
tribunal can only be considered as with grave abuse of discretion when such act is
done in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. It must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive
duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic
manner by reason of passion and hostility.26 There is grave abuse of discretion when
the disputed act of the lower court goes beyond the limits of discretion thus effecting
an injustice.27
The Court finds that the petitioner has sufficiently discharged the burden of proving
that the respondent appellate court committed grave abuse of discretion in acquitting
private respondents.
It appears that in reaching its judgment, the CA merely relied on the evidence
presented by the defense and utterly disregarded that of the prosecution. At first, it
may seem that its narration of the facts28 of the case was meticulously culled from the
evidence of both parties. But a more careful perusal will reveal that it was simply
lifted, if not altogether parroted, from the testimonies of the accused, especially that of
Oporto,29 Carampatana,30 and Alquizola,31 the accused-appellants in the case before it.
The appellate court merely echoed the private respondents testimonies, particularly
those as to the specific events that transpired during the crucial period - from the
dinner at Gemenos house to the following morning at the Alquizola Lodging House. As
a result, it presented the private respondents account and allegations as though these
were the established facts of the case, which it later conveniently utilized to support
its ruling of acquittal.
Due process requires that, in reaching a decision, a tribunal must consider the entire
evidence presented, regardless of the party who offered the same.32 It simply cannot
acknowledge that of one party and turn a blind eye to that of the other. It cannot
appreciate one partys cause and brush the other aside. This rule becomes particularly
significant in this case because the parties tendered contradicting versions of the
incident. The victim is crying rape but the accused are saying it was a consensual
sexual rendezvous. Thus, the CAs blatant disregard of material prosecution evidence
and outward bias in favor of that of the defense constitutes grave abuse of discretion
resulting in violation of petitioners right to due process.33
Moreover, the CA likewise easily swept under the rug the observations of the RTC and
made its own flimsy findings to justify its decision of acquittal.
First, the appellate court held that AAA was, in fact, conscious during the whole
ordeal. The fact that she never showed any physical resistance, never cried out for
help, and never fought against the private respondents, bolsters the claim of the latter
that the sexual acts were indeed consensual.
But the CA seemed to forget that AAA was heavily intoxicated at the time of the
assault. Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) provides:
1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
a. Through force, threat or intimidation;
d. When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even
though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present;
Under the aforecited provision, the elements of rape are: (1) the offender had carnal
knowledge of the victim; and (2) such act was accomplished through force or
intimidation; or when the victim is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or
when the victim is under twelve years of age.34 Here, the accused intentionally made
AAA consume hard liquor more than she could handle. They still forced her to drink
even when she was already obviously inebriated. They never denied having sexual
intercourse with AAA, but the latter was clearly deprived of reason or unconscious at
the time the private respondents ravished her. The CA, however, readily concluded
that she agreed to the sexual act simply because she did not shout or offer any
physical resistance, disregarding her testimony that she was rendered weak and dizzy
by intoxication, thereby facilitating the commission of the crime.35 The appellate court
never provided any reason why AAAs testimony should deserve scant or no weight at
all, or why it cannot be accorded any credence. In reviewing rape cases, the lone
testimony of the victim is and should be, by itself, sufficient to warrant a judgment of
conviction if found to be credible. Also, it has been established that when a woman
declares that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to mean that
she has been raped, and where her testimony passes the test of credibility, the accused
can be convicted on that basis alone. This is because from the nature of the offense, the
sole evidence that can usually be offered to establish the guilt of the accused is the
complainants testimony itself.36 The trial court correctly ruled that if AAA was not
truthful to her accusation, she would not have opened herself to the rough and tumble
of a public trial. AAA was certainly not enjoying the prying eyes of those who were
listening as she narrated her harrowing experience.37
AAA positively identified the private respondents as the ones who violated her. She
tried to resist, but because of the presence of alcohol, her assaulters still prevailed. The
RTC found AAAs testimony simple and candid, indicating that she was telling the
truth. The trial court likewise observed that her answers to the lengthy and
humiliating questions were simple and straightforward, negating the possibility of a
rehearsed testimony.38 Thus:
xxxx
Q: Now, you said also when the Court asked you that you went asleep, when did you
regain your consciousness?
A: They woke me up and wanted me to drink the remaining wine inside the bottle of
Emperador Brandy.
xxxx
Q: What do you mean that they hide you (sic) to drink the remaining contained (sic) of
the bottle of Emperador Brandy?
A: They gave me the bottle, sir, and I was trying to refuse but they insisted.
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Can you remember the person or persons who was or who were carrying you?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Who?
Q: If you can still remember, how did Jansen Roda and Harold Batoctoy carry you?
xxxx
A: When we entered the room and the light was switch (sic) on, I was awakened by the
flash of light.
Q: Do you have any idea, where were you when you were awakened that (sic) flash of
light.
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Where?
xxxx
Q: When you regained your consciousness from the flash of light, what happened?
A: Yes, sir.
xxxx
Q: What was you (sic) reaction when you found that Joefhel Oporto was on top of you?
Q: What did Joefhel Oporto do, when you (sic) those words?
A: He was kissing on the different part (sic) of my body then he sexually abused me.
ATTY. GENERALAO: We want to make it on record, Your Honor, that the witness is
crying.
xxxx
COURT: Continue.
ATTY. GENERALAO: Aside from Joefhel Oporto was found (sic) on top of you, who else
was there inside that room?
xxxx
Q: Then, when again did you or when again did you wake up?
A: When I feel (sic)pain something inside my private part (sic), I saw Raymund
Carampatana, sir.
Q: On top of you?
Q: At that point, who else was inside that room when you found Raymund
Carampatana?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Where in particular?
A: In my face, sir.
Q: Now, before you went asleep again (sic), what did you feel when you said that you
feel (sic) something in your private part when you saw Raymund Carampatana?
A: Yes, sir.
A: I woke up at about 7:00 oclock a.m in the next (sic) day, sir.39
On the other hand, the RTC was not convinced with the explanation of the defense. It
noted that their account of the events was seemingly unusual and incredible.40
Besides, the defense of consensual copulation was belatedly invoked and seemed to
have been a last ditch effort to avoid culpability. The accused never mentioned about
the same at the pre-trial stage. The trial court only came to know about it when it was
their turn to take the witness stand, catching the court by surprise.41 More
importantly, it must be emphasized that when the accused in a rape case claims that
the sexual intercourse between him and the complainant was consensual, as in this
case, the burden of evidence shifts to him, such that he is now enjoined to adduce
sufficient evidence to prove the relationship. Being an affirmative defense that needs
convincing proof, it must be established with sufficient evidence that the intercourse
was indeed consensual.42 Generally, the burden of proof is upon the prosecution to
establish each and every element of the crime and that it is the accused who is
responsible for its commission. This is because in criminal cases, conviction must rest
on a moral certainty of guilt.43 Burden of evidence is that logical necessity which rests
on a party at any particular time during the trial to create a prima facie case in his
favor or to overthrow one when created against him. A prima facie case arises when
the party having the burden of proof has produced evidence sufficient to support a
finding and adjudication for him of the issue in litigation.44 However, when the accused
alleges consensual sexual congress, he needs convincing proof such as love notes,
mementos, and credible witnesses attesting to the romantic or sexual relationship
between the offender and his supposed victim. Having admitted to carnal knowledge of
the complainant, the burden now shifts to the accused to prove his defense by
substantial evidence.45
Here, the accused themselves admitted to having carnal knowledge of AAA but
unfortunately failed to discharge the burden required of them. Carampatana narrated
that upon reaching the room at the lodging house, AAA lay down on the bed and looked
at him. He then approached her and they kissed. He removed her shirt and brassiere.
Thereafter, Oporto also removed AAAs lower garments and then went to kiss AAA.
Carampatana then placed himself in between AAAs legs and had intercourse with
her.46 On the other hand, Oporto himself testified that he had sexual intercourse with
AAA three times. While Carampatana was removing AAAs shirt and brassiere, Oporto
was watching at the foot of the bed. Then he removed her pants and underwear, and
AAA even lifted her buttocks to make it easier for him to pull the clothes down. When
Carampatana left after having sexual intercourse with AAA, according to Oporto, he
then stood up, opened his pants, and took out his penis so that AAA could perform
fellatio on him. Then he proceeded to have sexual intercourse with AAA. Afterwards,
Oporto went outside and slept with Alquizola on the carpet. After a few minutes, he
woke up and went back to the room and again had intercourse with AAA. He went back
to sleep and after some time, he woke up to the sound of AAA vomitting. Shortly
thereafter, he made love with AAA for the third and last time.47 Despite said
shameless admission, however, the accused failed to sufficiently prove that the lack of
any physical resistance on AAAs part amounts to approval or permission. They failed
to show that AAA had sexual intercourse with them out of her own volition, and not
simply because she was seriously intoxicated at that time, and therefore could not
have given a valid and intelligent consent to the sexual act.
The RTC also noticed that Fiel, one of the defense witnesses, was showy and
exaggerated when testifying, even flashing a thumbs-up to some of the accused after
her testimony, an indication of a rehearsed witness.48 To be believed, the testimony
must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness; it must be credible in
itself such as the common experience and observation of mankind can approve as
probable under the attending circumstances.49
When it comes to credibility, the trial court's assessment deserves great weight, and is
even conclusive and binding, if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact
or circumstance of weight and influence. The reason is obvious. Having the full
opportunity to observe directly the witnesses deportment and manner of testifying,
the trial court is in a better position than the appellate court to properly evaluate
testimonial evidence.50 Matters of credibility are addressed basically to the trial judge
who is in a better position than the appellate court to appreciate the weight and
evidentiary value of the testimonies of witnesses who have personally appeared before
him.51 The appellate courts are far detached from the details and drama during trial
and have to rely solely on the records of the case in its review. On the matter of
credence and credibility of witnesses, therefore, the Court acknowledges said
limitations and recognizes the advantage of the trial court whose findings must be
given due deference.52 Since the CA and the private respondents failed to show any
palpable error, arbitrariness, or capriciousness on the findings of fact of the trial
court, these findings deserve great weight and are deemed conclusive and binding.53
The CA continued, belaboring on the fact that the examining physician found old
hymenal laceration on AAAs private organ. The lack of a fresh hymenal laceration,
which is expected to be present when the alleged sexual encounter is involuntary,
could mean that AAA actually consented to the fornication. According to Dr. Acusta,
when sex is consensual, the vagina becomes lubricated and the insertion of the penis
will not cause any laceration. It presumed that complainant, therefore, was no longer
innocent considering the presence of old hymenal laceration that could have resulted
from her previous sexual encounters. The defense, however, failed to show that AAA
was sexually promiscuous and known for organizing or even joining sex orgies. It must
be noted that AAA was a minor, barely 17 years old at the time of the incident, having
just graduated from high school on that same day. In a similar case,54 the Court held: x
x x Indeed, no woman would have consented to have sexual intercourse with two men
or three, according to Antonio Gallardo in the presence of each other, unless she
were a prostitute or as morally debased as one. Certainly, the record before Us
contains no indication that Farmacita, a 14-year old, first-year high school student,
can be so characterized. On the contrary, her testimony in court evinced the simplicity
and candor peculiar to her youth. In fact, appellants could not even suggest any reason
why Farmacita would falsely impute to them the commission of the crime charged.55
No woman, especially one of tender age, would concoct a story of defloration, allow an
examination of her private parts, and be subjected to public trial and humiliation if her
claim were not true.56 And even if she were indeed highly promiscuous at such a young
age, the same could still not prove that no rape was actually committed. Even a
complainant who was a woman of loose morals could still be the victim of rape. Even a
prostitute may be a victim of rape. The victims moral character in rape is immaterial
where, as in this case, it is shown that the victim was deprived of reason or was
rendered unconscious through intoxication to enable the private respondents to have
sex with her. Moreover, the essence of rape is the carnal knowledge of a woman
against her consent.57 A freshly broken hymen is not one of its essential elements.
Even if the hymen of the victim was still intact, the possibility of rape cannot be ruled
out. Penetration of the penis by entry into the lips of the vagina, even without rupture
or laceration of the hymen, is enough to justify a conviction for rape. To repeat,
rupture of the hymen or laceration of any part of the womans genitalia is not
indispensable to a conviction for rape.58 Neither does AAAs mothers act of hitting her
after learning about the rape prove anything. It is a truism that "the workings of the
human mind when placed under emotional stress are unpredictable, and the people
react differently."59 Different people react differently to a given type of situation, and
there is no standard form of behavioral response when one is confronted with a
strange, startling or frightful experience.60 At most, it merely indicates the frustration
and dismay of a mother upon learning that her daughter had been defiled after
partying late the night before. It is a settled rule that when there is no showing that
private complainant was impelled by improper motive in making the accusation
against the accused, her complaint is entitled to full faith and credence.61 So if AAA in
fact consented to the sexual act, why did she still need to immediately tell her parents
about it when she could have just kept it to herself? Why did she ever have to shout
rape? She was not caught in the act of making love with any of the private
respondents,62 nor was she shown to have been in a relationship with any of them of
which her family disapproved.63 She never became pregnant as a result of the deed.
And if AAA cried rape to save her reputation, why would she have to drag the private
respondents into the case and identify them as her rapists? Absent any circumstance
indicating the contrary, she brought the charge against the private respondents
simply because she was, in fact, violated and she wants to obtain justice. Her zeal in
prosecuting the case, even after the CA had already acquitted the private respondents,
evinces the truth that she merely seeks justice for her honor that has been debased.64
Unfortunately, the CA chose to ignore these telling pieces of evidence. Its findings are
against the logic and effect of the facts as presented by AAA in support of her
complaint,65 contrary to common human experience, and in utter disregard of the
relevant laws and jurisprudence on the crime of rape.
Lastly, the trial court pronounced that Alquizola was not part of the conspiracy
because his participation in the crime was uncertain,66 citing People v. Lobrigo.67 It
found that his participation was not in furtherance of the plan, if any, to commit the
crime of rape.68 The Court, however, finds that the RTC erred in ruling that Alquizolas
liability is not of a conspirator, but that of a mere accomplice. To establish conspiracy,
it is not essential that there be proof as to previous agreement to commit a crime, it
being sufficient that the malefactors shall have acted in concert pursuant to the same
objective. Conspiracy is proved if there is convincing evidence to sustain a finding that
the malefactors committed an offense in furtherance of a common objective pursued in
concert.69 Proof of conspiracy need not even rest on direct evidence, as the same may
be inferred from the collective conduct of the parties before, during or after the
commission of the crime indicating a common understanding among them with
respect to the commission of the offense.70
We note that the testimonies of witnesses with respect to Gregorio's and Dominador's
participation in the crime conflict on material points.
Doubt exists as to whether Gregorio and Dominador were carrying weapons during the
mauling and whether they participated in the mauling by more than just boxing the
victim. Noel stated that they did not, Domingo stated that they did.
While [it] is true that it was only Leo Amoroso who actually ravished the victim based
on the testimony of the private complainant that Amoroso succeeded in inserting his
penis to her private parts and that Reynaldo dela Torre and Ritchie Bisaya merely
kissed her and fondled her private parts, accused [D]ela Torre can likewise be held
liable for the bestial acts of Amoroso as it is quite apparent that the three of them
conspired and mutually helped one another in raping the young victim.
[W]hile [Dela Torre] did not have carnal knowledge with [AAA], his tacit and
spontaneous participation and cooperation of pulling her towards the parked jeep,
molesting her and doing nothing to prevent the commission of the rape, made him a
co-conspirator. As such, he was properly adjudged as a principal in the commission of
the crime.73
Here, unlike in the foregoing case of Lobrigo, Alquizolas participation in the crime is
not at all uncertain. As the caretaker of the Alquizola Lodging House, he provided a
room so the rape could be accomplished with ease and furtiveness. He was likewise
inside the room, intently watching, while Oporto and Carampatana sexually abused
AAA. He did not do anything to stop the bestial acts of his companions. He even
admitted to kissing AAAs lips, breasts, and other parts of her body. Indubitably, there
was conspiracy among Carampatana, Oporto, and Alquizola to sexually abuse AAA.
Hence, the act of any one was the act of all, and each of them, Alquizola including, is
equally guilty of the crime of rape. While it is true that the RTC found Alquizola guilty
as mere accomplice, when he appealed from the decision of the trial court,74 he waived
the constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy and threw the whole case open to
the review of the appellate court, which is then called upon to render such judgment as
law and justice dictate, whether favorable or unfavorable to the accused-appellant.75
Finally, the Court notes that although the prosecution filed only a single Information,
it, however, actually charged the accused of several rapes. As a general rule, a
complaint or information must charge only one offense, otherwise, the same is
defective.76 The rationale behind this rule prohibiting duplicitous complaints or
informations is to give the accused the necessary knowledge of the charge against him
and enable him to sufficiently prepare for his defense. The State should not heap upon
the accused two or more charges which might confuse him in his defense.77 Non-
compliance with this rule is a ground78 for quashing the duplicitous complaint or
information under Rule117 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure and the accused may
raise the same in a motion to quash before he enters his plea,79 otherwise, the defect is
deemed waived.80 The accused herein, however, cannot avail of this defense simply
because they did not file a motion to quash questioning the validity of the Information
during their arraignment. Thus, they are deemed to have waived their right to
question the same. Also, where the allegations of the acts imputed to the accused are
merely different counts specifying the acts of perpetration of the same crime, as in the
instant case, there is no duplicity to speak of.81 There is likewise no violation of the
right of the accused to be informed of the charges against them because the
Information, in fact, stated that they "took turns in having carnal knowledge against
the will of AAA" on March 25, 2004.82 Further, allegations made and the evidence
presented to support the same reveal that AAA was indeed raped and defiled several
times. Here, according to the accused themselves, after undressing AAA, Carampatana
positioned himself in between her legs and had intercourse with her. On the other
hand, Oporto admitted that he had sexual intercourse with AAA three times. When
two or more offenses are charged in a single complaint or information but the accused
fails to object to it before trial, the court may convict him of as many offenses as are
charged and proved, and impose upon him the proper penalty for each offense.83
Carampatana, Oporto, and Alquizola can then be held liable for more than one crime of
rape, or a total of four (4) counts in all, with conspiracy extant among the three of
them during the commission of each of the four violations. Each of the accused shall
thus be held liable for every act of rape committed by the other. But while Oporto
himself testified that he inserted his sexual organ into AAAs mouth, the Court cannot
convict him of rape through sexual assault therefor because the same was not
included in the Information. This is, however, without prejudice to the filing of a case
of rape through sexual assault as long as prescription has not yet set in.
Anent the appropriate penalty to be imposed, rape committed by two or more persons
is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death under Article 266-B of the RPC. But in
view of the presence of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender and the
absence of an aggravating circumstance to offset the same, the lighter penalty of
reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon them,84 for each count. With regard to
Oporto, appreciating in his favor the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority,
the proper imposable penalty upon him is reclusion temporal, being the penalty next
lower to reclusion perpetua to death. Being a divisible penalty, the Indeterminate
Sentence Law is applicable. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, Oporto can be
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty the minimum of which shall be within the
range of prision mayor(the penalty next lower in degree to reclusion temporal) and
the maximum of which shall be within the range of reclusion temporal in its minimum
period, there being the ordinary mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, and
there being no aggravating circumstance. 85 With that, the Court shall impose the
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from six (6) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor as minimum to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as
maximum, for each count of rape committed. 86 However, Oporto shall be entitled to
appropriate disposition under Section 51, R.A. No. 9344,87which extends even to one
who has exceeded the age limit of twenty-one (21) years, so long as he committed the
crime when he was still a child,88 and provides for the confinement of convicted
children as follows:89
Sec. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural Camps and Other Training
Facilities. A child in conflict with the law may, after conviction and upon order of the
court, be made to serve his/her sentence, in lieu of confinement in a regular penal
institution, in an agricultural camp and other training facilities that may be
established, maintained, supervised and controlled by the BUCOR, in coordination with
the DSWD.
Hence, in the proper execution of judgment by the lower court, the foregoing provision
should be taken into consideration by the judge in order to accord children in conflict
with the law, who have already gone beyond twenty-one (21) years of age, the proper
treatment envisioned by law.
As to their civil liability, all of them shall pay AAA the amount of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity and another P50,000.00 as moral damages, in each case. Exemplary
damages of P30,000.00 shall likewise be imposed by way of an example and to deter
others from committing the same bestial acts.
The Court hereby ORDERS the accused-respondents to pay AAA, jointly and severally,
the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and
P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, for each of the four (4) counts of rape. The case is
REMANDED to the court of origin for its appropriate action in accordance with Section
51 of Republic Act No. 9344. Let the records of this case be forwarded to the court of
origin for the execution of judgment.
SO ORDERED.