Union Carbide Labor Union V Union Carbide Philippines
Union Carbide Labor Union V Union Carbide Philippines
Union Carbide Labor Union V Union Carbide Philippines
SYLLABUS
DECISION
MELO , J : p
". . . Complainants Agapito Duro, Alfredo Torio, and Rustico Javillonar, were
dismissed from their employment after an application for clearance to terminate
them was approved by the Secretary of Labor on December 19, 1972.
Respondent's application for clearance was premised on "willful violation of
Company regulations, gross insubordination and refusal to submit to a Company
investigation . . ."
Prior events leading to the dismissal of complainants are recited in the Arbitrator's
decision, which we quote:
'It appears that the Company is operating on three (3) shifts namely:
morning, afternoon and night shifts. The workers in the third shift normally
work from Monday to Saturday, the last working day being Friday or forty
(40) hours a week or from Monday to Friday.
On May 4, 1973, the Arbitrator rendered a decision ordering the reinstatement with
backwages of the complainants. On June 8, 1973, the National Labor Relations
Commission dismissed respondent company's appeal for having been filed out of time. A
motion for reconsideration which was treated as an appeal was then filed by respondent
company before the Secretary of Labor, resulting in the modification of the Arbitrator's
decision by awarding complainants separation pay. A motion for reconsideration
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2016 cdasiaonline.com
subsequently filed by the petitioner was denied for lack of merit.
Hence, this petition.
The main issue in this case is whether or not the complainants could be validly dismissed
from their employment on the ground of insubordination for refusing to comply with the
new work schedule. cdll
Petitioner alleges that the change in the company's working schedule violated the existing
Collective Bargaining Agreement of the parties. Hence, complainants cannot be dismissed
since their refusal to comply with the re-scheduled working hours was based on a
provision of the Collective Bargaining Agreement. Petitioner further contends that the
dismissal of the complainants violated Section 9, Article II of the 1973 Constitution which
provides "the right of workers to self-organization, collective bargaining, security of tenure
and just and humane conditions of work."
The petition has no merit.
Although Article XIX of the CBA provides for the duration of the agreement, which We
quote:
"This agreement shall become effective on September 1, 1971 and shall remain in
full force and effect without change until August 31, 1974. Unless the parties
hereto agree otherwise, negotiation for renewal, or renewal and modification, or a
new agreement may not be initiated before July 1, 1974."
this does not necessarily mean that the company can no longer change its working
schedule, for Section 2, Article II of the same CBA expressly provides that:
"SECTION 2. In the exercise of its functions of management, the COMPANY
shall have the sole and exclusive right and power, among other things, to direct
the operations and the working force of its business in all respects; to be the sole
judge in determining the capacity or fitness of an employee for the position or job
to which he has been assigned; to schedule the hours of work, shifts and work
schedules; to require work to be done in excess of eight hours or on Sundays or
holidays as the exigencies of the service may require; to plan, schedule, direct,
curtail and control factory operations and schedules of production; to introduce
and install new or improved production methods or facilities; to designate the
work and the employees to perform it; to select and hire new employees; to train
new employees and improve the skill and ability of employees; to make rules and
regulations governing conduct and safety; to transfer employees from one job to
another or from one shift to another; to classify or reclassify employees; and to
make such changes in the duties of its employees as the COMPANY may see fit
or convenient for the proper conduct of its business."
Verily and wisely, management retained the prerogative, whenever exigencies of the
service so require, to change the working hours of its employees. And as long as such
prerogative is exercised in good faith for the advancement of the employer's interest and
not for the purpose of defeating or circumventing the rights of the employees under
special laws or under valid agreements, this Court will uphold such exercise (San Miguel
Brewery Sales Force Union (PTGWO) vs. Ople, 170 SCRA 25 [1989]). LLphil
Thus, in the case of Abbott Laboratories (Phil.), Inc. vs. NLRC (154 SCRA 713 [1987]), We
ruled:
Further, the incident complained of took place sometime in 1972, so there is no violation
of the 1973 Constitution to speak of because the guarantee of security of tenure
embodied under Section 9, Article II may not be given a retroactive effect. It is the basic
norm that provisions of the fundamental law should be given prospective application only,
unless legislative intent for its retroactive application is so provided.
As pointed out by Justice Isagani Cruz, to wit:
"Finally, it should be observed that the provisions of the Constitution should be
given only a prospective application unless the contrary is clearly intended. Were
the rule otherwise, rights already acquired or vested might be unduly disturbed or
withdrawn even in the absence of an unmistakable intention to place them within
the scope of the Constitution." (p. 10, Constitutional Law, Isagani Cruz, 1991
Edition).
We agree with the findings arrived at by both Arbitrator and the Secretary of Labor that
there is no unfair labor practice in this case. Neither was there gross and habitual neglect
of complainants' duties. Nor did the act of complainants in refusing to follow the new
working hours amount to serious misconduct or willful disobedience to the orders of
respondent company. cdrep