G.R. No.

L-44546 January 29, 1988 defendant Rustico Adille; in her second marriage with one
Procopio Asejo, her children were herein plaintiffs, now,
ADILE vs. CA sometime in 1939, said Felisa sold the property in pacto de retro
to certain 3rd persons, period of repurchase being 3 years, but
SARMIENTO, J.: she died in 1942 without being able to redeem and after her
death, but during the period of redemption, herein defendant
In issue herein are property and property rights, a familiar repurchased, by himself alone, and after that, he executed a
subject of controversy and a wellspring of enormous conflict that deed of extra-judicial partition representing himself to be the
has led not only to protracted legal entanglements but to even only heir and child of his mother Felisa with the consequence
more bitter consequences, like strained relationships and even that he was able to secure title in his name alone also, so that
the forfeiture of lives. It is a question that likewise reflects a OCT. No. 21137 in the name of his mother was transferred to his
tragic commentary on prevailing social and cultural values and name, that was in 1955; that was why after some efforts of
institutions, where, as one observer notes, wealth and its compromise had failed, his half-brothers and sisters, herein
accumulation are the basis of self-fulfillment and where property plaintiffs, filed present case for partition with accounting on the
is held as sacred as life itself. "It is in the defense of his position that he was only a trustee on an implied trust when he
property," says this modern thinker, that one "will mobilize his redeemed,-and this is the evidence, but as it also turned out that
deepest protective devices, and anybody that threatens his one of plaintiffs, Emeteria Asejo was occupying a portion,
possessions will arouse his most passionate enmity." defendant counterclaimed for her to vacate that,

The task of this Court, however, is not to judge the wisdom of Well then, after hearing the evidence, trial Judge sustained
values; the burden of reconstructing the social order is defendant in his position that he was and became absolute
shouldered by the political leadership-and the people owner, he was not a trustee, and therefore, dismissed case and
themselves. also condemned plaintiff occupant, Emeteria to vacate; it is
because of this that plaintiffs have come here and contend that
The parties have come to this Court for relief and accordingly,
trial court erred in:
our responsibility is to give them that relief pursuant to the
decree of law. I. ... declaring the defendant absolute owner of the property;
II. ... not ordering the partition of the property; and
The antecedent facts are quoted from the decision appealed
from: III. ... ordering one of the plaintiffs who is in possession of the
portion of the property to vacate the land, p. 1 Appellant's brief
... [T]he land in question Lot 14694 of Cadastral Survey of Albay
which can be reduced to simple question of whether or not on
located in Legaspi City with an area of some 11,325 sq. m.
the basis of evidence and law, judgment appealed from should
originally belonged to one Felisa Alzul as her own private
be maintained.
property; she married twice in her lifetime; the first, with one
Bernabe Adille, with whom she had as an only child, herein The respondent Court of appeals reversed the trial Court, and
ruled for the plaintiffs-appellants, the private respondents co-owners to contribute to the expenses of preservation of the
herein. The petitioner now appeals, by way of certiorari, from the thing or right owned in common and to the taxes. Any one of the
Court's decision. latter may exempt himself from this obligation by renouncing so
much of his undivided interest as may be equivalent to his share
We required the private respondents to file a comment and of
thereafter, having given due course to the petition, directed the
parties to file their briefs. Only the petitioner, however, filed a the expenses and taxes. No such waiver shall be made if it is
brief, and the private respondents having failed to file one, we prejudicial to the co- ownership.
declared the case submitted for decision.
The result is that the property remains to be in a condition of co-
The petition raises a purely legal issue: May a co-owner acquire ownership. While a vendee a retro, under Article 1613 of the
exclusive ownership over the property held in common? Code, "may not be compelled to consent to a partial
redemption," the redemption by one co-heir or co-owner of the
Essentially, it is the petitioner's contention that the property property in its totality does not vest in him ownership over it.
subject of dispute devolved upon him upon the failure of his co- Failure on the part of all the co-owners to redeem it entitles the
heirs to join him in its redemption within the period required by vendee a retro to retain the property and consolidate title
law. He relies on the provisions of Article 1515 of the old Civil 7
Article 1613 of the present Code, giving the vendee a retro the thereto in his name. But the provision does not give to the
right to demand redemption of the entire property. redeeming co-owner the right to the entire property. It does not
provide for a mode of terminating a co-ownership.
There is no merit in this petition.
Neither does the fact that the petitioner had succeeded in
The right of repurchase may be exercised by a co-owner with securing title over the parcel in his name terminate the existing
5 co-ownership. While his half-brothers and sisters are, as we said,
aspect to his share alone. While the records show that the liable to him for reimbursement as and for their shares in
petitioner redeemed the property in its entirety, shouldering the redemption expenses, he cannot claim exclusive right to the
expenses therefor, that did not make him the owner of all of it. In property owned in common. Registration of property is not a
other words, it did not put to end the existing state of co- means of acquiring ownership. It operates as a mere notice of
ownership. existing title, that is, if there is one.

Necessary expenses may be incurred by one co-owner, subject The petitioner must then be said to be a trustee of the property
to his right to collect reimbursement from the remaining co- on behalf of the private respondents. The Civil Code states:
6
owners. There is no doubt that redemption of property entails
ART. 1456. If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the
a necessary expense. Under the Civil Code:
person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an
implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the
ART. 488. Each co-owner shall have a right to compel the other
property comes.
We agree with the respondent Court of Appeals that fraud repudiation (of the co-ownership). The act of repudiation, in turn
attended the registration of the property. The petitioner's is subject to certain conditions: (1) a co-owner repudiates the co-
pretension that he was the sole heir to the land in the affidavit of ownership; (2) such an act of repudiation is clearly made known
extrajudicial settlement he executed preliminary to the to the other co-owners; (3) the evidence thereon is clear and
registration thereof betrays a clear effort on his part to defraud conclusive, and (4) he has been in possession through open,
his brothers and sisters and to exercise sole dominion over the continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the property
property. The aforequoted provision therefore applies. 9
for the period required by law.
It is the view of the respondent Court that the petitioner, in
taking over the property, did so either on behalf of his co-heirs, The instant case shows that the petitioner had not complied with
in which event, he had constituted himself a negotiorum gestor these requisites. We are not convinced that he had repudiated
under Article 2144 of the Civil Code, or for his exclusive benefit, the co-ownership; on the contrary, he had deliberately kept the
in which case, he is guilty of fraud, and must act as trustee, the private respondents in the dark by feigning sole heirship over
private respondents being the beneficiaries, under the Article the estate under dispute. He cannot therefore be said to have
1456. The evidence, of course, points to the second alternative "made known" his efforts to deny the co-ownership. Moreover,
the petitioner having asserted claims of exclusive ownership one of the private respondents, Emeteria Asejo, is occupying a
over the property and having acted in fraud of his co-heirs. He portion of the land up to the present, yet, the petitioner has not
cannot therefore be said to have assume the mere management taken pains to eject her therefrom. As a matter of fact, he sought
of the property abandoned by his co-heirs, the situation Article to recover possession of that portion Emeteria is occupying only
2144 of the Code contemplates. In any case, as the respondent as a counterclaim, and only after the private respondents had
Court itself affirms, the result would be the same whether it is first sought judicial relief.
one or the other. The petitioner would remain liable to the
Private respondents, his co-heirs. It is true that registration under the Torrens system is
10
constructive notice of title, but it has likewise been our
This Court is not unaware of the well-established principle that
holding that the Torrens title does not furnish a shield for fraud.
prescription bars any demand on property (owned in common)
11
held by another (co-owner) following the required number of It is therefore no argument to say that the act of registration
years. In that event, the party in possession acquires title to the is equivalent to notice of repudiation, assuming there was one,
8 notwithstanding the long-standing rule that registration operates
property and the state of co-ownership is ended . In the case
as a universal notice of title.
at bar, the property was registered in 1955 by the petitioner,
solely in his name, while the claim of the private respondents For the same reason, we cannot dismiss the private respondents'
was presented in 1974. Has prescription then, set in? claims commenced in 1974 over the estate registered in 1955.
While actions to enforce a constructive trust prescribes in ten
We hold in the negative. Prescription, as a mode of terminating a
12
relation of co-ownership, must have been preceded by years, reckoned from the date of the registration of the
 13 Moreover, and as a rule, prescription is an affirmative defense
property, we, as we said, are not prepared to count the period
that must be pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the
from such a date in this case. We note the petitioner's sub rosa
17
efforts to get hold of the property exclusively for himself answer otherwise it is deemed waived, and here, the
beginning with his fraudulent misrepresentation in his unilateral 18
affidavit of extrajudicial settlement that he is "the only heir and petitioner never raised that defense. There are recognized
child of his mother Feliza with the consequence that he was able exceptions to this rule, but the petitioner has not shown why
14 they apply.
to secure title in his name also." Accordingly, we hold that the
right of the private respondents commenced from the time they WHEREFORE, there being no reversible error committed by the
15 respondent Court of Appeals, the petition is DENIED. The
actually discovered the petitioner's act of defraudation. Decision sought to be reviewed is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. No
According to the respondent Court of Appeals, they "came to pronouncement as to costs.
know [of it] apparently only during the progress of the litigation."
16 SO ORDERED.
Hence, prescription is not a bar.