168 OXFAM BRIEFING PAPER 16 APRIL 2013

Suzanne Ouedraogo, 60, lives in Fanka village, Burkina Faso, and receives cash-for-work as part of the 2012 Sahel food crisis response.
Photo: Pablo Tosco/Intermon Oxfam.

LEARNING THE
LESSONS?
Assessing the response to the 2012 food crisis in the Sahel to build resilience for
the future

In 2012, the Sahel was once again hit by a severe food crisis affecting
more than 18 million people. The regions governments, donors and aid
agencies were determined to avoid mistakes made in the response to
previous crises. But while their response was better in many respects,
there were still some critical shortcomings. The poorest families and
communities suffered most, as deep-seated inequalities made some
people far more vulnerable than others. While continuing to address the
enormous humanitarian and recovery needs in the region, we also must
all learn the lessons from the 2012 response and develop a new model
that will allow better prevention and management of future crises. The
growing momentum around the concept of resilience offers considerable
potential to achieve this, but only if all actors work together to turn
rhetoric into action that brings lasting improvements for the poorest
communities across the Sahel.

with
www.oxfam.org contributions
from
SUMMARY
In 2012, the Sahel region of West and Central Africa was once again hit by a
severe food crisis as drought reduced food production, drove up food prices
and exposed millions of already chronically vulnerable people to another year
of hardship and hunger.

At its peak, over 18 million people across nine countries were affected, and
more than 1 million childrens lives were at risk because households could not
obtain enough food. In Chad, women were forced to dig in anthills to find
grains, while across the region, hundreds of thousands of families were forced
to cut down their meals to just one a day.

The crisis was certainly on a large scale, but it should not have been Weve only harvested
unexpected. Recurrent drought has become a feature of the Sahels four sacks of millet this
changing climate, and the 2012 crisis came shortly after similar drought- year, compared with the
related crises in 2010 and 2005, as well as a food price crisis in 2008. Many 20 we can get in a
normal year. But its a
communities are now chronically vulnerable230,000 children die of causes
long time since we had
related to undernutrition1 even in a good harvest year2so even relatively a normal year. We go
small shocks can have huge impacts. from one catastrophe to
another, because of
The humanitarian response to previous crises in the Sahel and, more either too much water or
recently, in the Horn of Africa had been widely criticised as too little, too too little.
late. At the start of 2012, when the crisis began to unfold, many Ramata Zore, Taffogo, Centre-
governments, donors and aid agencies were determined not to make the Nord region, Burkina Faso, April
2012)
same mistakes again. They were resolved not only to making a more
effective response to this crisis, but also to doing more to help communities
build their resilience in the face of inevitable future shocks and crises.

This report considers how governments, donors and agencies performed in

their response to the 2012 crisis, and the lessons that must be learned to
improve future responses. It draws on extensive interviews with Oxfam staff,
other agencies, donors and government officials; focus groups with
communities in three countries; the views of civil society organisations in six
countries; and the latest research on food security and resilience in the region.

The analysis reveals that, although the 2012 response was better in many
respects than the response to previous crises, there were still some significant
shortcomings that need to be addressed.

Mixed performance
Looking back at the 2012 response gives no grounds for complacency. While
the early warning systems provided the information needed for an early
response, there was still disagreement about the likely severity of the crisis.
Some donors, such as the European Communitys Humanitarian Office
(ECHO), acted earlier than in previous years, but overall, donor funding was
no more timely than before. By the beginning of July 2012 and the peak of the
crisis, the UN appeal remained just under 50 per cent funded.3

2
Unlike in earlier crises, most governments in the region did react to the early
warning signs: Niger, for example, appealed for support six months earlier than
it did during the 2010 crisis. Yet significant technical, financial and political
barriers remained, and support provided by donors and international NGOs
failed to strengthen national capacity and leadership of the response. In
Senegal, for instance, the domestic focus on the presidential elections
prevented an early response; elsewhere, national governments were often
marginal players, with donor funding largely bypassing state systems.

So, despite some improvements, millions of people still did not get the help
they needed. On the one hand, more children received treatment for acute
undernutrition in the region than ever before, and the World Food Programme
(WFP) alone reaching between 5 and 6 million people with food and nutritional
assistance. On the other hand, 5.6 million people did not receive the seeds,
tools and fertiliser they needed to plant for the next harvest, making it even
harder for them to recover from the crisis and build up some reserves to
mitigate the impacts of the next crisis.

Getting it right next time round

In 2013, the first priority is to recognise that the crisis is not over. Across the
Sahel region, 10 million people still urgently need help to feed their families
and rebuild their livelihoods. However, as of 5 April, the UN appeal for 2013
was just 24 per cent funded. The international community is still failing these
people unless it takes urgent action to deliver aid that is swift, sufficient and
sustained.

That is the most immediate priority. But governments, donors and aid What we learnt from
agencies must also get better at preventing and managing future crises. The repeated, massive
humanitarian
concept of resilience offers potential to do this, but only if it looks beyond the
immediate causes of recurrent crises. interventions in the
region is: it is imperative
All of those involved in dealing with food insecurity in the regionincluding to change the way we
respond to the crises in
Oxfammust use existing know-how to help communities build resilience as
the Sahel.
effectively and sustainably as possible. It is vital to increase investment in
David Gressly, UN Regional
small-scale agriculture, local and national food reserves, and social Humanitarian Coordinator4
protection programmes, as well as scaling up efforts to prevent and treat
undernutrition. It is also necessary to tackle key structural challenges that
weakened the 2012 response, just as they did previous responses. This report
recommends that action is taken to address three such challenges:
Develop a shared understanding of vulnerability to food insecurity so that
support is targeted to the poorest and responses can be launched rapidly;
Break down barriers between humanitarian and development actors so that
long-term and emergency programmes effectively support each other;
Invest in strengthening the capacity of national and local actors so that
governments can deliver large-scale, sustained support to their citizens.

3
Yet that cannot be all. Ultimately, governments, donors and aid agencies
must also tackle the inequalities that lie at the heart of crises present and The leadership of our
past, which make some people much more vulnerable than others. These regional organisations
must be recognised.
entrenched inequalities also prevent the benefits of economic growth
These organisations
reaching millions of people, particularly women, who are often socially and must in return commit to
economically marginalised and politically excluded. mobilising their own
resources to implement
Helping the Sahels poorest communities escape the vicious cycle of hunger their policies and
and poverty will be no easy task in the face of enormous challenges such as harmonise their
climate change, resource scarcity, population growth, urbanisation, and interventions at all
growing insecurity, with the crisis in Mali underlining the potential levels. Nowhere in
consequences of exclusion and under-development. But it can and must be the world has resilience
achieved, and 2013 provides a critical opportunity for a breakthrough. been achieved
National governments, regional bodies, donors, UN agencies, and national exclusively through
development co-
and international NGOs all have a responsibility to help communities in the
operation. That is why
Sahel to seize this opportunity.
we are asking the co-
operation agencies to
develop an approach
that supports our action,
standing behind us and
with us.
Mamadou Cissokho, Roppa
Honorary President and Civil
Society Representative to AGIR
Sahel5

4
1 INTRODUCTION
In 2012, the Sahel region faced an extreme food crisis, affecting more than 18
million people in nine countries at its peak.6 Some 8 million people faced
severe food insecurity. Households across the region struggled to obtain
enough food to survive. One million children under the age of five were at risk
of dying from undernutrition.7

Food crises are not a new phenomenon in the Sahel. The region has a history
of drought, food insecurity and undernutrition. It has long had one of the
highest poverty rates in the world.8

Despite recent economic growth in some of the countries affected by the crisis,
the benefits are not reaching the most vulnerable and marginalised
communities. Notwithstanding a move towards urbanisation, populations in the
Sahel remain largely ruraldepending on traditional crop-based agricultural
and/or pastoral livelihoods. Even within rural areas, inequalities are
increasing.9 The outcomes from baseline surveys for the Household Economy
Approach10 (HEA) indicate a growing gap between rich and poor. For example,
in the Dosso district of Niger the survey revealed that wealthy household
income was almost 10 times greater than a typical very poor household.11 For
the poorest households, the situation is getting worse: population growth is
making it harder to produce enough food to meet their needs each year; the
weather-related impacts of climate change threaten to exacerbate the problem;
high and rising food prices are putting even basic foodstuffs out of reach of
many families; and governments have not invested sufficiently in policies to
support the poorest and most vulnerable citizens. As a result, even slight
reductions in rainfall or production are enough to reduce poor households
access to sufficient food, prompting a crisis. Coping mechanisms on which
communities have relied for generations, such as migrating herds to seek
better pasture elsewhere, no longer provide an adequate answer as herds are
depleted and pastureland reduced. Any reserves poor households had have
run desperately short as they had already faced three major drought-related
food crises in the past seven yearsin 2005, 2010 and 2012as well as the
food price crisis in 2008.

The response by national governments and aid agencies to food crises, in the
Sahel and elsewhere, has been generally poor. The responses to the 2005
and 2010 crises in the Sahel were heavily criticised as being too little, too
late.12 There was also widespread criticism of the dangerous delay in the
response to the 2011 East Africa food crisis, which resulted in the unnecessary
loss of lives and irreparable damage to livelihoods.13

The persistently high levels of need in the Sahel, coupled with an increasingly
fragile context, mean that a business-as-usual approach to responding to food
crises is no longer an option. National governments, donors, UN agencies and
NGOs are calling for a new collective approach to tackling vulnerability and
managing risk in the region. The shared goal must be to deliver effective
5
responses to crises, while at the same time addressing the underlying social,
economic and political factors that make some communities, households and
individuals more vulnerable than others during a crisis.

Structure of the report

The rest of this report is divided into four sections. Section 2 examines the
impact of the 2012 crisis and its causes. Section 3 assesses the extent to
which collectively we were able to overcame past shortcomings and deliver a
better response in 2012. Section 4 looks at how key structural challenges that
emerged from the 2012 response can be overcome as part of a broader
agenda to help communities build their resilience. While the concept of
resilience covers the broad range of shocks and stresses populations may
face, this section focuses on the potential of resilience building measure to
tackle chronic food insecurity in the region. Section 5 sets out
recommendations for action by governments, donors and aid agencies.

Methodology

The analysis presented here is drawn from a wide range of sources, including
interviews with Oxfam staff and more than 30 external bodiesUN agencies,
donors and government departmentsheld between September and
December 2012. It also reflects the views of communities expressed during
focus group discussions and via questionnaires in Burkina Faso (June 2012),
Chad (October 2012) and Niger (December 2012). It draws on the
perspectives of civil society groups in six countries and, in particular, their
analysis of the Charter for Food Crisis Prevention and Management produced
by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), as well as
numerous official documents and specific research on the response.14 Finally,
the report reflects the latest thinking around food security and resilience in the
region.

6
2 THE IMPACT OF THE
CRISIS AND ITS CAUSES
Compared with other recent crises in the Sahel, the food and nutritional crisis
in 2012 was exceptional because of the number of people and countries
affected. The regional dimension of the crisis meant that there were few
options for support from neighbouring countries to help deal with its worst
impacts. Limited food supplies were available on local markets, and the
possibility of migration to seek pasture or alternative sources of income was
reduced.

The triggers: reduced food production and soaring food prices

The first warnings of a potential crisis in the region came in November 2011
when it was confirmed that there would be below-average production for the
201112 harvest. In the end, production was 26 per cent lower than the
previous years bumper harvest and 3 per cent lower than the five-year
average, albeit with variation from country to country.15

Reduced production meant many food stocks were already depleted by the Weve only harvested
beginning of 2012. For some communities in the Gura region of Chad, for four sacks of millet this
example, this harvest only provided enough food for two months. This left year, compared with the
them with no food stocks for as much as 10 months until the next main 20 we can get in a
normal year. But its a
harvest towards the end of 2012.16
long time since we had
a normal year. We go
The hardships initially triggered by the poor harvests were exacerbated by
from one catastrophe to
soaring food prices. The impact of production deficits across the region, as another, because of
well as rising fuel prices and the impact of insecurity on market functioning, either too much water or
was further compounded by a lack of transparency around stock availability too little.
and speculation.17 Many of the poorest households in the region rely heavily Ramata Zore, Taffogo, Centre-
on local markets for food. Even druing a normal year, families can spend Nord region, Burkina Faso, April
2012
more than 60 per cent of household income on purchasing food to survive.18

By the second half of 2011, food prices across the region were already well
above the five-year average, and continued to rise throughout 2012. As Figure
1 shows, the price of a 100kg bag of millet in the Nigerien capital, Niamey,
rose from 16,000 CFA francs in September 2011 to 28,000 CFA francs in
September 2012. In Bamako, Mali, food prices more than doubledthe
regional situation compounded by domestic political instability and insecurity in
the north of the country. These staggering price increases meant that many of
the poorest households could no longer afford to buy enough food.

7
Figure 1: The fluctuating price of 100kg of millet (December 2006 to
November 2012)
35,000

30,000

25,000
Niamey
Ouagadougou
20,000
Bamako

15,000

10,000
Dec 06 Dec 08 Dec 10

Sources: Afrique Verte, ACF

The underlying cause: rising vulnerability We have reduced the

number of meals daily,
It is the widespread chronic poverty in the region that makes the poorest and women are digging
communities and families highly susceptible to shocks such as reduced in anthills to recover
harvests or higher food prices. According to the Human Development Index, cereals grainsa
three Sahelian countriesNiger, Chad and Maliare among the worlds practice which our
10 poorest. But rising inequality between the richest and poorest households community has not had
within countries is also a key factor hampering human development.19 While to resort for a very long
there is some prospect of an improved economic outlook in some countries, time.
the dividends of economic growth are not being distributed evenly across all Woman from Azoza village,
Chad, November 2011
social groups. For example, the discovery of oil stocks on Chadian territory
is yet to make a significant difference for the majority of the population. While
80 per cent of electricity is consumed in the capital (Ndjamena), on average
across the country just 34 per cent have access to electricity.20 In such
contexts of marginalisation and inequality, the poorest and most vulnerable
families often have difficulty sufficiently claiming their rights and triggering real
change. The ability of the poorest families to cope with shocks is being further
undermined by the frequency and intensity of crises in the region. With each
crisis, people lose more of their assets and are forced to resort to extreme
coping mechanismssuch as taking on debt at high interest rates or reducing
food consumption to just one meal a day. Many communities do not have time
to recover from one crisis before a new one hits. A survey conducted by the
Emergency Capacity Building (ECB) Project in Niger in 2012 showed that one
third of the population affected by the current food crisis were still paying off
debts incurred during the 2010 crisis.21 When even relatively moderate shocks
such as the fall in agricultural production in 2011 hit families that are already
vulnerable, many have no alternative sources of support.

This situation is made all the more precarious because of climate change and
population growth. In East Africa, the link between climate change and the
latest food crisis has already been confirmed by a group of scientists, with
climate models indicating that climate change is responsible for between 24
8
per cent and 99 per cent of the risk of failure of the long rains.22 In the Sahel,
the combination of rising temperatures and greater variability in rainfall as a
result of climate change is likely to continue to shorten growing seasons and
reduce crop yields. According to the Agrhymet Regional Centre,23 a 3C rise in
temperate could result in a 1525 per cent drop in millet and sorghum yields,
and a 5 per cent drop in maize yields, in Burkina Faso and Niger by 2080,
compared with the average for the second half of the 20th century.24 Every
year, the population in the Sahel region increases by another 3 per cent, which
makes it harder to fill the gap between supply and demand at each harvest.25

Complicating factors: political instability and global economic crisis

The food security situation in the Sahel has been further compromised by
political instability. The crises in Libya and Cte dIvoire considerably reduced
opportunities for migrant workers, cutting off a vital source of additional income
for 3 million people, many of whom were heavily reliant on support from family
members working in neighbouring countries.26 The conflict in Mali forced
nearly 375,000 people to flee, seeking refuge elsewhere in the country or in
neighbouring Burkina Faso, Mauritania or Niger.27 Far from their homes, many
of these people have had to rely on the generosity of communities already
struggling to get enough to eat because of the food crisis.

The impact: critical food security needs and undernutrition The 2012 food crisis
has affected us all. In
The 2012 food crisis in the Sahel led to a significant deterioration in food the 1992 crisis,
security and an increase in mortality for undernourished children across the communities opened up
region. According to the Cadre Harmonis (CH), the framework for analysing their grain stores to
and classifying food security in the region, at the peak of the crisis in mid- refugees. This time,
those hosting refugees
2012, certain areasincluding parts of Mauritania, northern Mali and the
simply cant help them.
Sahel band in Chadfaced extreme food insecurity, just one category
Mayor of Deou, Sahel region,
away from famine, while vast swathes of the region were in a critical Burkina Faso, June 2012
28

situation (see Figure 2).

Figure 2: June 2012 Food Security Outlook according to the Cadre

Harmonisthe West African system for classifying food insecurity.

Source: Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET)

9
Levels of undernutrition in the region are generally high all year round. In an
average year, 1015 per cent of children suffer from Global Acute Malnutrition
(GAM)the sum of those suffering from severe and moderate acute
malnutrition.29 The 2012 food crisis considerably worsened the situation,
surpassing emergency thresholds in many areas, as shown in Figure 3.30 The
number of those needing treatment for undernutritionconsistently high in the
regionwas 20 per cent higher in 2012 than in 2011, equalling the numbers
needing treatment during the 2010 crisis.31
Figure 3: Global acute malnutrition rates as a percentage of children
sampled in different areas of the Sahel, 2011 and 2012

20

15

10
MAM

5 SAM

0
Jun 2011 Jul 2012 May 2011 Jul 2012 Aug-Sep May-Jul
2011 2012
Mauritania Niger Chad - Sahel Band
Source: UNICEF presentation to Regional Food Security and Nutrition Working Group, October 2012

The hardest hit: the poorest women and children A lot of men leave the
village for the Salamat,
Women and children are the hardest hit during food crises. The systematic where they can find
marginalisation of womeneconomically, socially and politicallyand jobs. But a poor woman
discriminatory norms and practices mean that they have less access to land, like me does not have
these opportunities. My
credit, agricultural inputs and other means of generating income.32 Within the
children and I are at the
household, women tend to eat last and least, and their limited access to mercy of the crisiswe
quality nutrition is exacerbated during a food crisis. In addition, a survey will have to try and
conducted by the government of Chad in the Barh el Gazel region in 2011 survive whatever
showed that female-headed households were almost twice as likely to suffer happens to us.
from food insecurity as male-headed households.33 Khadidja Khazali, widow with
seven children, Chad, November
2011

10
3 ASSESSING THE 2012
RESPONSE
As initial warnings of the potential human impact of the 2012 crisis emerged,
considerable national, regional and international resources were mobilised in a
large-scale response. Governments in the region acknowledged the crisis
earlier than ever and developed ambitious response plans. The UN launched
appeals at the beginning of 2012, and updated requirements in June to call for
$1.6bn. Over the course of the year, 70 per cent of these appeals were
funded, and almost $500m was donated for response interventions outside the
scope of the appeals.34 Thanks to the efforts of the UN World Food
Programme (WFP), between 5 and 6 million people received food and
nutritional assistance. Collective efforts meant that more than 920,000 children
were treated for undernutritiona record in the Sahel.35 By the end of 2012,
Oxfam had provided assistance to more than 1 million people in the region.36

Drawing directly on analyses carried out by NGOs of the responses to the

2005 and 2010 Sahel crises and the 2011 East Africa crisis, and the
recommendations from related reports,37 this paper focuses on assessing four
areas of the response: leadership and co-ordination; food security analysis and
early warning; mobilising funding and the donor response; and, most
importantly, reaching those in need with appropriate assistance.

These are by no means the only criteria by which to judge the effectiveness of
a response; as such, this assessment does not seek to cover every possible
element of the 2012 crisis. These criteria do, however, represent critical
components that usually determine the timeliness and effectiveness of a
response and have been found lacking in the response to previous crises. For
instance, evidence clearly indicates that more lives can be saved and
livelihoods protected if:
national governments are willing and able to respond, with support from the
international community;
strong food security analysis tools and early warning systems are in place;
decisive action is taken by donors on the basis of early warnings to provide
early and flexible funding for integrated responses;
programmes are started and scaled up at the earliest sign of a crisis.

The analysis aims to address this key question: to what extent did lessons
learned from past responses inform and improve the quality of the
humanitarian response to the 2012 Sahel crisis?

11
3.1 LEADERSHIP AND CO-
ORDINATION
Poor leadership and weak co-ordination were among the biggest impediments to
effective response in past crises.38 Thanks to the Charter for Food Crisis
Prevention and Management in the Sahel and West Africa, a strong regional
framework was in place to help cement leadership and co-ordination for the 2012
crisis response. The Charter was formally adopted as the crisis was unfolding, in
February 2012, by countries within the Economic Community of West African
States (ECOWAS), as well as Chad and Mauritania. It sets out the responsibilities
of national and international actors alike,39 and states that national governments
are responsible for leading and planning responses, developing systems for food
security and nutrition analysis and early warning, and providing an overarching co-
ordination structure for the response. In accordance with best practice, the
international aid community should provide support when national capacities are
overwhelmed, ensure that their work is aligned with national strategies and, where
possible, provide long-term assistance via national budgets.

National government leadership

In general, national governments across the Sahel demonstrated an

unprecedented willingness to deal with food insecurity in 2012. This is partly
attributable to a change in the domestic political context, with some countries
undergoing a change in leadership that contributed to a greater commitment to
tackle food security issues. In a number of countries, official acknowledgement
of the crisis came significantly earlier, compared with previous crises. Niger
first called for international support in September 201140a full six months
earlier than during the 2010 crisis.41 However, factors ranging from elections to
security threats affected the trajectory of decision-making in a number of
countries. Senegals appeal for international assistance came only in April
2012 after presidential elections had been concluded and a new leader
inaugurated,42 while the political and security crisis in Mali prevented the
government from delivering a more proactive response.

Early appeals gave governments a window of opportunity to develop response

plans, many of which were wider-ranging than before and sought to provide
more assistance than in the past. Mauritania launched Plan EMEL (Hope) at
the end of 2011;43 in Niger, a contingency plan had been put in place following
the 2005 crisis, which provided the basis for the response in 2011-12.44 While
the very existence of such plans signalled progress, the limited technical and
financial capacity of national institutions frequently undermined leadership of
the response and limited the opportunities for co-ordination.45 National plans
often lacked the detailed guidance required to direct the response. In Burkina
Faso, for example, civil society groups criticised their governments national
plan for lacking details on the relative importance of each type of support (food
security, nutrition and non-food assistance).46 Insufficient detail within plans
meant that they did not necessarily inform the priorities adopted by some
international organisations. In Chad, civil society groups found that inadequate
co-ordination prevented technical recommendations from being taken up by
decision-makers at a ministerial level.47

12
Regional and African Union leadership
We underline the
At a technical level, food security was prioritised at the regional level by inadequacy, or even the
ECOWAS and the Permanent Inter-State Committee for the Fight Against insignificance, of the
Drought in the Sahel (CILSS). In contrast to previous responses, and with support provided in view
of the severity of the
the exception of Burkina Faso and Mali, ECOWAS was successful in
crisis and the extent of
encouraging its member governments to respect regional trade the vulnerability faced
commitments and not place restrictions on trade flows.49 However, by rural and peri-urban
engagement with the crisis at the highest political level in ECOWAS could populations. Equally,
have been stronger; it remained a marginal issue on the African Unions there was an
agenda.50 unacceptable delay
before interventions
The damage caused by a lack of effective leadership, and confusion about began, particularly
the roles and responsibilities of different humanitarian actors at the regional targeted food
and international levels, was especially apparent during the protracted distributions, which are
negotiations around a donor conference. The conference was initially still to begin.
Declaration by civil society group
proposed in March 2012 by the African Union Peace and Security Council, Consortium for the Right to
supported by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Food on theperformance of their
48
(OCHA) and ECHO. Many agencies believed that the conference could build governent, 24 August 2012
momentum in the donor community and lead to firm financial commitments.
Yet month after month, those involved gave new reasons for postponing the
conference, which ultimately never took place.

International support to national governments

Within international organisations, some positive steps were taken to improve

the quality of international co-ordination and leadership. The appointment of
the first OCHA Regional Humanitarian Coordinator in April 2012 injected new
dynamism and provided a much-needed framework for co-ordination between
humanitarian leadership teams in affected countries. On the whole, however,
international co-ordination structures were established too slowly and could
have done more to build on existing national capacity.

Despite strong preparedness planning and surge capacity, OCHAs internal

processes slowed efforts to quickly establish a presence in new countries of
operation (establishing new teams and co-ordination structures in Burkina
Faso, Mali and Mauritania took months rather than weeks). These delays
meant that funding appeals for these countries were only launched in June
2012, just before the crisis peaked, narrowing the window of opportunity for
resource mobilisation and, critically, an effective response.51 Finally, in some
countries, co-ordination structures could have been developed with greater
sensitivity to existing national capacity. For example, in Burkina Faso, OCHA
decided to create parallel cluster systems, despite government-led structures
already being in place. Time and resources would have been better spent
reinforcing an existing and more sustainable system.52

While it is clear that UN procedures can be streamlined and simplified to

improve the speed and effectiveness of responses to future crises, there is a
fundamental lesson here: establishing international structures from the ground
up will necessarily be slow; an alternative, national-led model for leadership
and response needs to be put in place and supported wherever possible.

13
Figure 4: Response timeline
Early warning and Government International
analysis appeals begin mobilisation
Aug
2011
According to Food Crisis
Prevention Network
Sep (FCPN), initial projections
Niger
2011 suggest lower than
average 2011-2012
harvest
Oct
2011
EU is first donor to
The FCPN confirms low issue a press release
Nov production and declares a warning of looming
Mauritania
2011 risk of food and nutritional hunger crisis in Sahel
insecurity if nothing done and commits additional
money
Dec Chad UN preparedness plan
2011 Mali finalised
Famine Early Warning
Systems Network (FEWS
NET) analysis released
Jan
suggests that community
2012
coping mechanisms will
suffice to overcome the
crisis
UN Regional
Feb
Response Strategy
2012
finalised
Mar
Burkina
2012
At FCPN meeting,
commonly agreed maps Senegal
Apr Regional Humanitarian
projecting food insecurity
2012 The Gambia Co-ordinator appointed
for June not officially
endorsed
May
2012
FEWSNET underlines that
there is a high risk of Clusters established.
Jun
escalation of food security Final UN appeals
2012
levels at start of growing released
season

Most donors, UN agencies and international NGOs faced similar challenges in

their approach to the funding and delivery of programmes. In interviews,
officials from national governments expressed frustration about the failure of
UN agencies and international NGOs to either consult them on or inform them
about key decisions.53 Similar frustrations were expressed about donor
policiesgovernment officials complained about the perceived lack of
transparency around the criteria donors used to determine whether they would
deliver assistance via states. Even in countries that had considerable
14
institutional capacity and political will to conduct an effective response, only
limited international funding was provided directly to the government. In Niger,
for example, where the government is widely considered to have a strong
commitment to tackling food insecurity, less than a quarter of funding for the
response went via the state.54

International NGOs also sometimes struggled to live up to the principle of working

with local partners. Oxfams team in Mauritania made deliberate efforts to
integrate their two key local partnersthe Association pour la Cooperation, la
Recherche et le Developpement (ACORD) and the Association Mauritanienne
pour lAuto-Developpement (AMAD) into all major strategic decision-making
processes and launched a specific coaching programme. However, a sustained
commitment to strengthening the capacity of local partners was not systematically
applied across Oxfams programmes, or the humanitarian sector as a whole.

Investing in national institutions and supporting the development of national

civil society organisations to mitigate the impacts of a crisis and respond to
humanitarian needs must be a core priority for all humanitarian actors in the
region. The massive shift in disaster response models in parts of Asia
moving away from internationally-led responses and towards strong and
effective national preparedness, co-ordination and responsedemonstrates
that change is possible. While this may prove challenging in contexts where
institutions are still weak, government financial resources are scarce or
humanitarian needs potentially politically contested, it should nonetheless still
be a major objective in the longer term.

3.2 FOOD SECURITY ANALYSIS AND

EARLY WARNING
Decisive, collective action based on information gathered through early
warning systems is critical to the quality and effectiveness of a response. In
practice, though, early warning information does not always trigger an early
response; decision makers often struggle when faced with numerous and, at
times, conflicting sources of early warning information, delaying vital decisions
until there is greater certainty.

Early warning systems strengthened

In the Sahel, several early warning systems have been developed at

community, national and regional levels. For example, Action Contre la Faim
(ACF) has been providing technical support to partners in the region to
develop an innovative early warning system based on the analysis of
geographic information. The system monitors the relative abundance or
scarcity of biomass in an area as a proxy for the availability of pasture, and
generates maps to identify the most vulnerable areas at the end of the rainy
season. It is now widely used by humanitarian actors and in the national early
warning systems of Mali and Niger. In October 2011, just before confirmation
that harvests would be below average, a map was developed through this
system (see Figure 5) that clearly indicated the scale of the unfolding crisis.

15
Figure 5: ACFs geographic information based system for early warning

Source: ACF

At a community level, early warning systems can directly inform local

programme responses. PASISAT, an early warning system established by
Oxfam in the Gura region of Chad, produced its first warnings about the
impending crisis in September 2011. Its analysis was subsequently used by
other NGOs and local authorities to inform their plans. National governments
across the region have set up systems that rely strongly on input by UN
agencies, NGOs and communities. Given the regional dimensions of food
insecurity, a CILSS-led initiative strengthened linkages between national early
warning systems and the regional food security and early warning framework.
In the course of the crisis, further efforts were made to harmonise and
consolidate food security analysis according to the common Cadre
Harmonis methodology.

Thanks to the strong systems in place, warnings of the 2012 Sahel crisis were
issued early, enabling indicators of potential shocks to be analysed according
to the vulnerability of specific populations. This allowed different food security
scenarios to be effectively predicted and appropriate interventions identified.
The first warnings issued by UN agencies came as early as November 2011.
By the beginning of 2012, a regional response strategy had been finalised. On
15 February 2012, heads of UN agencies and donors made a collective appeal
for the Sahel, stressing that humanitarian action could wait no longer.55 These
strong calls for action were made possible by good co-operation between key
food security and nutrition actors in the region.

Conflicting information on the severity of the crisis

However, despite strong early warnings of the impending crisis, and good
collaboration among food security actors in the region, there were significant
challenges in interpreting early warning information and using it to guide swift
action. From the first warnings, differing analyses of vulnerabilities emerged,
16
and there were difficulties in achieving consensus between the various
organisations involved. The well-respected Famine Early Warning Systems
Network (FEWS NET), funded by the United States Agency for International
Development (USAID), suggested that communities could rely on markets and
standard coping mechanisms to overcome shortfalls in production, but this did
not turn out to be the case.56 FEWS NET published its own food security
assessments that presented a more positive picture of the regional context,
while also participating in joint exercises to map food security needs led by
CILSS. For some donors, particularly those without a strong presence in the
region, these different assessments created confusion about the likely severity
of the crisis.

In contrast, there was common consensus over the nutritional situation in the
region. As early as February 2012, a regional working group comprising the
major UN agencies, key donors and international NGOs estimated that more
than 1 million children under five were at risk of severe acute malnutrition
(SAM). The working group developed a plan to scale up capacity and respond
urgently to these needs. A similar diagnosis was also presented by CILSS at a
meeting in April 2012.

3.3 MOBILISING FUNDING AND THE

DONOR RESPONSE
The scale and timing of funding, and the mechanisms for its delivery, have
huge implications for the quality of any response. Funding mechanisms need
to be sufficiently flexible to allow programmes to tackle the underlying causes
of vulnerability, as well as promote linkages between emergency responses
and long-term development programmes. Humanitarian funding should cover
the full duration of a crisis across all key sectors. The response to previous
food crises in the Sahel and East Africa fell far short of best practice in this
area.

Early funding commitments

Following the delayed response to the East Africa food crisis in 2011, there
was great interest in whether the response to the Sahel crisis in 2012 would be
timelier. As already noted, some donors initially reacted quickly to early
warnings of the crisis. The first contribution came in November 2011, when
ECHO provided $13m in addition to existing financial commitments to the
region.57 By mid-February 2012, donors had committed approximately
$250m.58 In comparison, less than a quarter of this amount had been raised by
the equivalent stage in response to the 2010 Sahel crisis.59

However, a more detailed comparison of funding mobilisation across the three

most recent major food crisesSahel 2012, East Africa 2011 and Sahel
2010shows that the improvement in donor response may not have been as
great as it first seemed, as Figure 6 shows.

17
Figure 6: Comparison of the cumulative percentage of funding
committed month by month to UN appeals60

100
Sahel 2010
80
% appeal funded

East Africa
60 2011

40 Sahel 2012

20

0
Start Mar Jun Sep Dec

Month of crisis
Source: UN Financial Tracking Service

Figure 6 shows that funding commitments for the Sahel crisis in 2012 came
earlier than those for the 2011 East Africa crisis, which saw a huge
mobilisation of funds only once a famine was declared. However, it also shows
that apart from the early months, the 2012 crisis did not see a significantly
earlier response than the 2010 Sahel food crisis overall.61 By the peak of the
crisis at the beginning of July, approximately half of the total resources
requested$800mwas still to be committed to the UN appeals.62

Limitations of current funding mechanisms

Despite the outcry provoked by the slow funding response to the 2011 East
Africa crisis, in 2012, most donors still appeared reluctant to make funding
decisions on the basis of probability or risk.63 In interviews, donors pointed to
uncertainty about the severity of the crisis as a key inhibiting factor. Rather
than taking a no regrets optionlow-cost interventions that could have had a
beneficial impact regardless of the final scenariothey preferred to wait for
certainty. Others blamed delays in the publication of the finalised funding
appeals, which doubled the total funding requested just weeks before the crisis
reached its peak.64

As is frequently the case in response to slow-onset crises, it proved difficult to

secure adequate funding for all sectors in the 2012 response, which
constrained the ability to comprehensively address peoples needs. While UN
appeals do not reflect the totality of aid, or where national governments are
directing their resources, their performance is a good indicator of where there
were shortfalls. There was relatively generous support for food security and
nutrition programmes in the appeals, receiving 77 per cent and 71 per cent of
requested funds respectively. However, critical but frequently neglected
sectors received significantly less funding, including water, sanitation and
hygiene (WASH) (51 per cent), early recovery (34 per cent) and education (16
per cent).65 Underfunding of the agricultural component of the food security
sector meant that, by June 2012, 5.6 million people had not received the
18
seeds, tools and fertiliser needed for the planting season. This meant that
people affected by the crisis were not able to adequately prepare for the next
harvest, further limiting their chances of recovery.66

Many donors now recognise the limitations of current practice, and are taking
measures to adapt funding mechanisms to better suit the operational context.
Some donors, such as the Swedish and Spanish governments, had already
established more flexible long-term funding mechanisms that allowed a more
timely response to those in need across the Sahel in 2012.67 During the crisis,
some donors tried to introduce additional flexibility in their funding to allow
partners to better meet evolving needs. While more ambitious donor
approachessuch as seeking to blend humanitarian and development funding
or design flexible programmeswere occasionally piloted, they were not fully
integrated into the response.68

3.4 REACHING THOSE IN NEED AND

DELIVERING APPROPRIATE
ASSISTANCE
Effective leadership and co-ordination, timely decision-making informed by
early warning and food security analysis, and appropriate donor funding should
provide a firm foundation from which assistance can be delivered in good time
to those most in need. That assistance should save lives and livelihoods, and,
wherever possible, make a sustainable difference to the lives of those
receiving it. This sustained impact of programmes should be the ultimate
measure of the effectiveness of humanitarian responses. However, there is a
need for greater investment in systems that can provide meaningful measures
of impact and effectiveness.69 Improving the quality of information
management and impact assessment should be a priority.

In the absence of robust evidence demonstrating the impact of the response

across the region, this analysis considers a range of factors broadly
recognised as characterising a good response. Factors typically referred to
when assessing response performance include:
reaching the most vulnerable in all geographical areas;
providing assistance on the scale required in a timely and sustained
manner;
ensuring that programmes are designed and delivered in a way that
responds to needs.

Evaluations of previous responses show some critical shortcomings on each of

these factors. The bulk of interventions did not begin until the peak of the
crisis. There were difficulties in targeting, an over-reliance on food assistance,
and weak co-ordination between emergency efforts and development
programming.70

19
Coverage: did the response reach enough people?

Thanks to OCHAs concerted efforts to improve the quality of monitoring in

2012, more complete data are available. The data reveal that the response
was more extensive than in previous crises, but was still not sufficient to meet
the needs of all those affected. For nutrition, deliberate efforts to scale up the
treatment of severe acute undernutrition led to the number of children treated
almost doubling compared with 2010.71 On food assistance, 75 per cent of
those targeted received the assistance they requireda respectable figure,
but one which nonetheless indicates that further progress can be made. In
contrast, coverage in the WASH sector was clearly inadequate, with just 35
per cent of those requiring support receiving it.72

Many agencies acknowledge that the geographic reach of the response could
have been improved. Over recent years, agencies in Chad, for example, had
deliberately sought to shift their operational presence towards the poor and
highly vulnerable populations in the Sahelian band. As a result, the needs of
populations in these areas were largely well covered. However, border
regions, where security was challenging, were less well covered.73 Some NGO
staff interviewed for this report observed that need is not the only factor that
determines decisions about the timing and location of programmes: access,
security and logistics are also major considerations.74

Targeting: did the response reach the most vulnerable groups?

While the need to focus on vulnerable families and marginalised groups is

increasingly acknowledged, government officials from the region conceded
that this was one of the greatest challenges they faced in the response.75 Very
few social protection programmes were already in place to provide a basis for
scale-up, and governments often lacked the capacity or detailed household
information to do more than identify vulnerable regions in the targeting of
interventions. International agencies did make efforts to specifically target
marginalised groups, including numerous examples of programmes for
women, children and pastoralists.

However, the introduction of new programmes did not in itself lead to improved
targeting of assistance to the most vulnerable. The Food and Agriculture
Organization of the United Nations (FAO), for example, introduced a deliberate
focus on women in view of their potential to boost overall agricultural
production.76 However, an analysis of the implementation of the FAOs
programme in Senegal revealed that the predominant role of men within
agricultural production in the country also resulted in them receiving a
disproportionate amount of assistance. A failure to take steps to compensate
for this in the design of the programme meant that only 10 per cent of support
provided went to women farmers.77 Oxfam too encountered challenges in
working with pastoralist groups. On initial assessment, Oxfams work with
pastoralist communities in North Dakoro, Niger, on effective coping
mechanisms during drought appeared successful in encouraging the timely
destocking of herds. However, an aid effectiveness study showed that the
programme did not lead to any difference in behaviour when compared to
other pastoralist communities. The study recommended a review of
approaches.78

20
Programming: did the different approaches adopted meet peoples
needs?

There are some good examples of early interventions by UN agencies and

NGOs. Quick impact interventionssuch as the provision of seeds, cash
transfers, and destockinghelped populations meet their food security needs
and protect their assets at an early phase of the crisis, before having to resort
to negative coping strategies like selling assets or taking on debt.79 An Oxfam
study of a series of cash transfers in Niger in November 2011 showed that
families who received cash increased their food consumption and relied less
on credit to buy food, thereby reducing their vulnerability.80 In June 2012
usually the phase in Sahel food crises during which needs are greatest, as
families coping mechanisms are exhaustedthe numbers facing food
insecurity in Niger and Burkina Faso appear to have decreased. While it is
possible that this was due to a correction in statistical methodology, UN reports
published at the time suggest that it could also reflect the impact of successful
early action.81

There were also some notable advances in ensuring that humanitarian

responses did not undermine longer-term work to improve food security. The
dominance of in-kind food aid in the response was significantly reduced
compared with previous responses.82 The WFP, for example, launched its
largest cash response ever.83 Oxfam used market analysis tools and
mechanisms to ensure that markets could support cash transfers, and there
was an increase in the use of local food purchasing.

In areas where there had been strong investment in local food reserves (see
Box 1), these often played a critical role in mitigating the worst impacts of the
crisisdemonstrating the potential of reserves as a first line of defence.
However, some civil society organisations criticised the lack of information on
the availability of national stocks, and the inappropriate rules guiding their
use.84 There is clearly progress to be made in integrating such reserves into
national response plans, and further developing a regional approach through
ECOWAS.

Box 1: Investing in food reserves to mitigate the crisis

An Oxfam questionnaire filled out by communities on the role of local food

reserves conducted in Burkina Faso in June 2012 underlined the contribution that
food reserves can make to reducing the impact of shocks. All of the 59
respondents stated that local reserves improved the food and nutrition situation of
their households, citing greater proximity, availability and affordability of food
among the benefits. Furthermore, 95 per cent of respondents said that emigration
from their communities had decreased as a result, and almost half stated that
their living conditions and sense of stability had improved.

While there were some clear examples of UN agencies and international

NGOs taking flexible approaches to ensure that their programmes met
communities needs, further improvements are needed in a number of areas.
Despite evidence underlining the potential benefits, early interventions did not
take place at scale. Further improvements could also be made with regard to
21
the timeliness of the response. In many cases, for international NGOs, there
was a considerable time lag between a funding commitment being made and
the actual delivery of assistance.85 For example, difficulties in scaling up a
humanitarian programme with a strong development focus led to delays in
Oxfams programme in the Kayes region of southern Mali. The programme
only began in April/May, months later than initially planned. Restrictions on the
duration of funding available for crisis response had obvious implications for
the duration and ambition of programmes. Oxfam, for example, integrated
recovery phase activities within its response strategies from the outset, but a
lack of funding for this final phase limited what it was able to achieve.

Further efforts need to be made to evaluate the quality of interventions and

their broader impacts. For example, the impact of cash-based interventions,
particularly on price inflation, still needs to be more thoroughly assessed. ACF
will seek to work with others in the region involved in nutrition interventions to
assess whether the significant increase in the number of beneficiaries reached
was matched by an improvement in the quality of support.

In spite of the clear relationship between food and nutrition crises and
underlying causes of vulnerability, programmes that genuinely combined
humanitarian and development activities were still rare. In interviews, staff from
UN agencies highlighted some programmes that had been developed in light
of previous crises that could promote more sustainable resource use and
tackle the root causes of food insecurity, but noted that these were not
necessarily driven by an underlying objective of strengthening resilience or
linked to possible emergency interventions.

In internal assessments, staff from Oxfam acknowledged that, while their

organisation provided life-saving assistance to hundreds of thousands of
people and delivered a better response than previously, some aspects of the
response could still be improved on. Despite efforts to integrate emergency
and long-term programme teams, and build the humanitarian capacity of
permanent staff, divisions remained. In some cases, emergency programmes
had to be launched in new areas, with logistics, partnerships and relationships
with communities all having to be built from scratch, because longer-term
development programming had not targeted areas with the most vulnerable
communities.

3.5 THE VERDICT?

The humanitarian response to the 2012 food crisis in the Sahel region was
bigger and, in some key respects, better than the response to previous crises
in the Sahel and elsewhere. National governments were more willing to take
the lead on food security issues; there was an exceptionally early and vocal
warning of the forthcoming crisis; the foundations for an effective national and
regional food security analysis framework were already in place; funding for
the response was significant (all the more welcome in the context of increasing
cuts in aid from traditional donors); and the response saved hundreds of
thousands of lives and livelihoods.

22
Nevertheless, these improvements still did not produce a response on the
scale required to meet the enormous needs. Achieving a truly effective
response demands a different approach to addressing vulnerability and
managing crisesmaking piecemeal improvements to existing systems will
not be enough for a region facing an ever growing threat from climate change
and population growth. This paper has identified three persistent weaknesses
on the part of humanitarian actors across all four areas of the response that
substantially reduced their collective impact. These weaknesses must be
addressed, not only to improve the quality of future responses but also to help
build the resilience of the people whose livelihoods and lives may be at risk
every year:
1. There is still insufficient understanding of the nature and scale of
vulnerability and a reluctance to respond on the basis of risk. In the
2012 crisis, this contributed to different messages being given about the
likely severity of the crisis. Some donors waited for more certainty before
making firm commitments, and programming could have further integrated
risk analysis and management.
2. There is still a divide between humanitarian and development
approaches, perpetuated by funding mechanisms, co-ordination systems
and organisational structures within individual agencies. In 2012, this meant
that flexible funding was not available in sufficient quantities at an early
enough stage, and that humanitarian interventions and longer-term
programmes did not sufficiently support each other. Most importantly, this
represented a significant barrier for international assistance to address the
root causes of vulnerability alongside meeting peoples immediate needs.
3. Limitations in national capacity and leadership were underlined by the
way in which governments in the region were marginalised; they received
inadequate support from the international community, highlighting the need
for renewed emphasis on institutional support. In 2012, shortcomings in
national government responses weakened co-ordination, meant some
responses were not driven by an overall plan, and ultimately undermined
the quality and reach of assistance provided.

23
4 ADDRESSING
STRUCTURAL CHALLENGES
TO BUILD RESILIENCE
Some 10 million people across the Sahel remain in a highly precarious
situation and will require assistance throughout 2013 and beyond to help them
recover from the 2012 crisis.86 Although the 2012/13 harvests were generally
favourable, food prices have not yet returned to their pre-crisis levels. As of the
beginning of March 2013, a 100kg bag of millet in Niamey cost 25,000 CFA
francsonly 3,000 less than the price in September 2012 and 3,500 more
than in March the previous year.87 Undernutrition also remains at critical levels:
across the region, 1.4 million children are expected to suffer from SAM and
another 3.6 million from moderate acute malnutrition (MAM) (see Figure 7).88

The severity of the situation is further compounded by the recent crisis in Mali;
almost 450,000 people are still displaced. As a result, opportunities for
livelihoods have been reduced, and overall humanitarian needs in the region
increased. While the conflict risks diverting domestic and international political
attention from pressing regional food security concerns, it should in fact be
shining a spotlight on the need to address the longer-term drivers of fragility
and political exclusion faced by all countries in the Sahel.

Action must be taken now to commit funds early, and to support the steady
recovery of households and communities across the region affected by the
2012 food crisis. At the time of this papers publication (April 2013), the window
for assistance is closing, if agriculture support is to reach people in time to
support preparations for the main harvest.89 Programmes tackling
undernutrition require adequate preparation and planning with government
partners.

At the same time, many organisations working in the region have long
acknowledged that simply making an emergency response to frequent crises is
not enough, and interventions must increasingly focus on addressing the root
causes of food insecurity and undernutrition. The desire to deliver progress on
resilience-building in the Sahel is palpable at national, regional and global
levels. The UN Strategy for the Sahel includes resilience-building as one of
three shared objectives for all humanitarian partners.

However, in spite of this momentum, and the recognition of the importance of

recovery, Oxfam is concerned that the positive rhetoric is masking limited
change on the ground. At the beginning of 2013, the UN estimated that
$1.66bn was needed to meet the Sahels ongoing humanitarian and recovery
needs and start building the foundations for resilience. As of 5 April 2013, just
24 per cent of this requirement has been provided.90

24
Figure 7: Expected severe acute malnutrition burden in 2013

Source: UN Sahel Regional Strategy 2013

Building resilience in the Sahel

When key governments, donors and other food security actors met at the end
of 2012 as part of the EUs Global Alliance for Resilience Initiative (AGIR
Sahel), they agreed on a definition of resilience: the capacity of vulnerable
households, families and systems to face uncertainty and the risk of shocks, to
withstand and respond effectively to shocks, as well as to recover and adapt in
a sustainable manner.91

The current emphasis on building resilience in the Sahel offers an window of

We know that every
opportunity to strengthen support to communities so that they are better time a crisis hits, 80 per
equipped to face the shocks and stresses they encounter on a regular basis. cent of the most
While resilience as a concept seeks to address the broad range of affected come from the
vulnerabilities populations could face, in this paper, we focus specifically on 20 per cent poorest,
how resilience could contribute to tackling food inscurity in the region. most vulnerable people.
Resilienceif it translates into increased access to basic services and new These are people with
programming that targets the most vulnerablesignals a potential way out the least access to the
of the state of permanent emergency in the region, where even in a non- corridors of power.
Kristalina Georgieva, EU
crisis year, up to 230,000 children die of causes related to undernutrition.93 Commissioner for International
Cooperation, Humanitarian Aid
Over the past year, progress has been made in developing policies and and Crisis Response.92

frameworks supporting efforts to build resilience. Nationally, governments

are evaluating their responses and reflecting on future food security policies.
Regionally, ECOWAS has launched its Zero Hunger initiative.94 Globally, the
AGIR Sahel Framework, launched in May 2012, aims to bring key actors
together to develop a holistic vision for resilience in the region.95 In 2013, these
frameworks must be translated into concrete action, building on existing
policies and initiatives that can strengthen resilience if implemented more
widely. Examples of these include:

25
 Implementing existing national and regional food and agricultural
policies, such as the ECOWAS Agricultural Policy and National Agricultural
Investment Plans, and meeting the 2003 Maputo Declaration commitment
to invest at least 10 per cent of national budgets on agricultural
development.96 This must include the use of a comprehensive targeting
system to allocate resources to the poorest producers across geographic
regions,97 and move away from a traditional focus on a limited range of
export crops towards supporting small-scale producers, particularly women
farmers. According to the FAO, providing women with the same access to
resources as men could increase agricultural yields by 20-30 per cent,
allowing a further 100150 million people to escape from hunger.98
Supporting the rollout of the regional food reserve strategy, agreed by
ECOWAS agriculture ministers in September 2010 in Abidjan. Regionally
and nationally, reserves can boost availability of stocks and support
government responses to meet citizens immediate food needs during
deficit periods. At a local level, food reserves can play a critical role as a
first line of defencehelping producers get a better price for their products
in times of surplus and sustaining regular access to food in times of deficit.
Expanding safety nets and social protection schemes can ensure that
the most vulnerable households have a minimum level of income to meet
essential needs in the event of price increases or any other shock. If
combined with appropriate training or support for saving, transfers can also
help communities develop additional sources of income or reserve funds,
reducing their susceptibility to shocks in the future. Insurance schemes that
pay communities dividends in the case of shocks can offer similar benefits.
Developing nutrition-sensitive programmes through a multi-sectoral
programming approach that integrates efforts to reduce and prevent
undernutrition within interventions focused on food security, support to
livelihoods and agriculture, education, water and sanitation, health, gender
and care practices.
Enhancing the quality and coverage of, and access to, integrated
programmes to manage undernutritionparticularly through strengthening
national health systems and strengthening preparedness and response
plans to seasonal peaks.

Investing in these programmes and policies is essential, but must also form
part of a broader transformative approach to building resilience and tackling
the pervasive inequality and marginalisation faced by the poorest and most
vulnerable communities and households in the Sahel. It also means
addressing new realities: the pressures of population growth and climate
change, which pose questions about the sustainability of certain rural
livelihoods, and the challenges posed by an increasingly urbanised population.
Finally, it means learning from the experiences of the 2012 response, and
tackling the three structural challenges that underpinned weaknesses in that
response: developing a deeper understanding of vulnerability; breaking down
the humanitarian/development divide; and strengthening national and local
capacity to build resilience. These three challenges are discussed in more
detail in the following subsections.

26
4.1 DEVELOPING AN
UNDERSTANDING OF
VULNERABILITY
Despite agreement on the definition of resilience within the EUs AGIR Sahel
Framework, there is still no shared understanding of what resilience and
vulnerability really mean, or of how the concepts should be applied.

A first priority in the region must be a political commitment at the highest The ambition is very
level within national governments and regional institutions to identify, support challenging as it means
and transfer resources to the poorest and most vulnerable communities, that we engage, within
households and individuals, including through the provision of basic public the next 20 years, to
reduce by at least two-
services. This requires a deeper and commonly shared understanding of the
thirds the number of
role of vulnerability within resilience to better inform humanitarian and people who suffer from
development activities by governments and aid agencies alike. food and nutritional
insecurity due to
At present, there is no shared view among the regions political leaders structural constraints.
about the extent of vulnerability and its implications for policy-making. Such However, I am
disagreement came most noticeably to the fore during a regional meeting of convinced that with
organisations working on food security in Ouagadougou in December everyones
2012.100 During the meeting, ECOWAS and others sought to soften the determination we will go
language describing the severity of the 2012 crisis. This reawakened fears even beyond this target
that the increased willingness to deal with food security shown by some objective.
Beyon Luc Adolphe Tiao, Prime
leaders during the crisis may have been short-lived. Reaching a shared Minister of Burkina Faso99
understanding of vulnerability will not be easy; however, the AGIR Sahel
Secretariat can provide much-needed support to facilitate dialogue and broker
an agreement.

Progress at a political level can be reinforced by progress at the technical

level, where work has already begun around mapping vulnerability. A
CILSS/FEWS NET initiative was launched in 2012 to develop a food security
toolkit for national early warning systems in the region. It will continue to play a
critical role in strengthening analytical capacity at the national level, and
improving joint vulnerability mapping. Further investments in research tools for
food security analysis, such as the Household Economy Approach (HEA), can
provide both greater insights into how families are likely to respond to shocks
and a more robust understanding of the factors contributing to increased
resilience (see Box 2 for information on Oxfams research on resilience in
Niger).

The ultimate goal will be to develop more appropriate programming responses

and state policies that focus on supporting and equipping the most vulnerable
communities, households and individuals to manage and mitigate the impact of
shocks and stresses. Such responses will also provide much-needed evidence
on which to develop new long-range development approaches that specifically
address the factors directly contributing to vulnerability.

27
4.2 BREAKING DOWN THE
HUMANITARIAN/DEVELOPMENT
DIVIDE
Reforming the architecture of aid, and breaking down the barriers between
humanitarian and development institutions and practices, is vital if the
international aid community is to make good on its commitment to build
resilience in the Sahel. UN agencies and international NGOs need to adapt
their internal systems and adopt new ways of working to develop and
implement programming that can meet emergency as well as longer-term
needs, with joint risk analysis and common resilience objectives.

NGO efforts

Oxfam has been reflecting on how and where they should operate in the
region to be best positioned to tackle chronic food insecurity and vulnerability.
Plans are being developed for new resilience programmes that integrate
development and humanitarian perspectives and expertise. It will seek to
ensure that future operational presence is increasingly determined by
vulnerability mappings, enabling a stronger focus on the needs of the most
vulnerable communities and households. Joint meetings are taking place
across teams from different regions that face similar challenges in resilience
programming. Proposals are being developed for the internal changes that will
be needed at every level to make a new programming model possible.

Box 2: Putting resilience into practice

Oxfams programme in Niger commissioned research to improve understanding

of resilience in agropastoral communities. Through focus group discussions with
community members, the research team identified key benchmarks for
resilienceas defined by the communityand the areas of intervention they
believe would best increase their capacity to withstand shocks. This methodology
will be used to inform future resilience programming approaches.
The first such programme has just been launched in Ouallam region, and hopes
to include an ambitious set of interventions aiming to increase the capacity of
households and communities to better cope with future shocks and stresses. This
could include support for local-level early warning systems and food reserves,
and promoting more sustainable use of resources. Humanitarian capacity will be
embedded in the programme to allow for scale-up if required. Advocacy work is a
central component of the approach, ensuring that if the project delivers on its
objectives, government actors and other interested parties can help bring the
project to scale.

Donors contributions

NGO efforts to adapt programming approaches are just part of the solution:
donors need to take similar steps and commit to making much-needed
changes to financing mechanisms, as well as providing funding for resilience-
building. This does not necessarily mean giving more moneyindeed, in the

28
long term, it could save money. For example, one study in Kenya showed that
resilience-building activities cost $1bn less on average each year than a
delayed humanitarian response.101 Given that humanitarian funding accounts
for less than 10 per cent of global international aid, and lacks the required
long-term timeframe, the majority of this money will have to come from
development budgets.102 So far, only a handful of donors have provided clear
commitments on how they intend to increase the focus of their funding on
resilience in the region (see Box 3).103 Within the AGIR Sahel initiative, further
details on the priorities and additional funding required for resilience are only
likely to be agreed by the end of 2013.104

While longer-term resilience plans are being developed, donors should

investigate interim solutions to ensure that proposed resilience-building
measures are funded this year. Donors should also integrate innovative
financing mechanisms more consistently within their responses to boost
synergies between humanitarian and development interventions, and facilitate
early interventions as well as timely responses. Mechanisms such as
contingency funds (that allow for a margin of flexibility within programme
response to adapt to changing circumstances) or crisis modifiers (that allow for
emergency funds to be used within an ongoing development programme) have
proven useful in ensuring that assistance can be adapted to beneficiaries
changing needs.

Box 3: USAID becomes first donor to issue programming guidance on

resilience

In December 2012, USAID became the first donor to release policy and
105
programme guidance on building resilience. The guidance outlines a promising
commitment to link short-term humanitarian response with longer-term
development programming by creating joint planning cells, as well as making new
investments based on an in-depth analysis of chronic vulnerability. In its first
phase, the programme will focus on resilience needs in Burkina Faso and Niger
countries where USAID is already engaged in both development and emergency
work, and where greater collaboration across these arms of work, with a focus on
resilience, could deliver real dividends

4.3 STRENGTHENING NATIONAL

AND LOCAL CAPACITY TO BUILD
RESILIENCE
Successfully building resilience in the region will be dependent on the extent to
which governments can develop national policies and, critically, equip
institutions with the resources and technical expertise needed for
implementation. Nationally and locally owned policies are required to bring
about change at a sufficient scale and for the timescales needed to effectively
build resilience (see Box 4 for one example).106

29
 Box 4: The 3Ns initiative

The government of Nigers 3Ns initiative (Les Nigriens Nourrissent les

Nigriens, which translates as Nigeriens feed Nigeriens) demonstrates how
107
governments can develop plans that support resilience. It integrates
interventions across several key sectors, including food security, nutrition and
water, into a single vision that forms part of the governments overall national
development strategy. A commission has been set up to oversee the initiative,
working closely with relevant ministries.
It is important that the political will demonstrated by the government is converted
into results. The challenge is to ensure that the plan is rolled out at the local level,
and that capacity at all levels is sufficient to enable timely implementation. The
government should also ensure a greater focus on, and funding for, the specific
resilience elements within the plan (including social protection, local food
reserves, and early warning system).

Strong national leadership on resilience and strengthening capacity to deliver The leadership of our
programmes and core public services at scale should be integral to efforts to regional organisations
promote good governance and develop greater accountability to citizens. In must be recognised.
spite of persistent food insecurity, governments in the Sahel (with a few These organisations
exceptions) have so far been reluctant to invest their limited but growing must in return commit to
resources into key sectors such as agriculture and social protection. Even mobilising their own
resources to implement
where there is relatively strong investment in agriculture, policies often support
their policies and
export crops managed by large businesses rather than small-scale food harmonise their
producers. interventions at all
levels. Nowhere in
Efforts to raise the voice of poor and marginalised communities and civil the world has resilience
society organisations working for greater social justice can play a pivotal role in been achieved
delivering reform (see Box 5). They will be critical in determining whether exclusively through
governments succeed in effectively building resilience and responding to development co-
crises while prioritising the needs of the most vulnerable groups. Such operation. That is why
approaches will form a central pillar of strategies for building resilience in the we are asking the co-
region, as well as working more closely with local authorities and NGOs to operation agencies to
develop an approach
boost local ownership and capacity to deliver.
that supports our action,
standing behind us and
with us.
Box 5: Civil society monitoring for better food security policies Mamadou Cissokho, Roppa
Honorary President and Civil
Society Representative to AGIR
During 2012, Oxfam helped to bring together civil society groups in six countries Sahel108
across the Sahel to monitor the extent to which West African governments had
implemented their commitments in the Charter for Food Crisis Prevention and
Management. National reports based on the information gathered highlighted
strengths and weaknesses in food security analysis, co-ordination mechanisms,
and government response plans, and were used to try and strengthen national
performance.
In Niger, for example, civil society groups were requested to brief
parliamentarians in the National Assembly, which led to a specific parliamentary
group being established to monitor the implementation of the Charters
obligations in Niger. A regional synthesis report was presented to the FCPN,
alongside calls to establish more regular and systemic monitoring, with civil
society organisations continuing to play a key role.

30
Supporting national governments

International and regional organisations also have a key role to play in

strengthening state institutional capacity at both national and local levels, and
encouraging governments to actively seek civil society engagement.

Donors can do more to support and incentivise change through their long-term
investments and their ways of working during crises. Recent experience in the
region suggests that the international aid community has not yet established
effective ways of working with fragile states.109 If efforts to build resilience are
to be successful, this must be addressed. Currently, the potential for progress
is undermined by a vicious circle of inaction: where states lack capacity and
donors decide not to invest in state structures, governance-related problems
remain entrenched.

The donor community can take a first step towards escaping this negative
cycle by changing the way they provide funding to national governments. In
accordance with aid effectiveness principles,110 providing resources via the
state should be the preferred mechanism for disbursement of development
funds, promoting greater national capacity and ownership. Any conditionalities
imposed should be limited to criteria of accountability and the desired food
security outcomes that assistance should be used to achieve. If such
conditions are not yet in place, donors should be clear about the changes
governments would need to make in order to qualify for this assistance
directly incentivising better governance.

Beyond providing an increasing proportion of aid via state budgets and

structures, donors can also provide more consistent and generous support
focused on building the capacity of local and national actors for effective food
crisis management and prevention. They can also demonstrate their support
for progressive policies and national leadership by providing generous financial
backing when required (as in the case of the Niger National Development
Plan, which received donor pledges of $4.8bn in November 2012).111

During a crisis response, the humanitarian principles of independence,

impartiality and neutrality, and the need to provide assistance quickly to those
who need it most, may prevent international organisations from working
exclusively within state structures. However, with the right commitment, ways
of working can nonetheless be adapted to support state capacity. Some
innovative practices are already being explored. In Niger, a committee
established under the National Food Crisis Management and Prevention
Agency has successfully encouraged donors to provide more funding directly
to the government. In interviews conducted for this report, the Nigerien
government expressed satisfaction about the increased autonomy that the
system has allowed, while donors felt confident in the degree of oversight they
could exercise via the committee.112 Such systems can provide a critical
stepping stone as part of efforts to increase national government leadership.

UN agencies can also do more to ensure that ways of working support existing
national capacity and systems. Since the 2012 response, teams from OCHA
across the Sahel region have begun to shift their approachfor instance,
adapting the annual calendar for UN appeals to accommodate new information
from government harvest predictions, and examining ways in which the UN
31
cluster system113 can be more supportive of national capacity.114 Preparedness
measures should also be designed to build on national systems, while
enabling quicker and more efficient programme scale-up when a crisis
response is required.

32
5 CONCLUSION
With 10 million people still threatened by hunger in the aftermath of the 2012
food crisis in the Sahel, and a growing consensus that humanitarian What we learnt from
response alone will not break the cycle of crisis eroding any development repeated, massive
humanitarian
gains, 2013 is a critical year for establishing and strengthening the
interventions in the
foundations for resilience-building in the region. Lessons learned from the region is: it is imperative
2012 response highlight three areas in which the international community to change the way we
must work closely with national and regional partners to improve their respond to the crises in
collective performance: the Sahel.
UN Regional Humanitarian
1. Developing a deeper understanding of vulnerability as the basis for new Coordinator, David Gressly
115

programming approaches and working together to proactively respond to

and mitigate risk;
2. reforming the aid architecture by breaking down the humanitarian
development divide;
3. strengthening national capacityincluding civil societyand promoting
greater accountability for efforts to build resilience.

Governments, regional institutions, UN agencies and NGOs must work

together to better support recovery now and begin making the additional
investments necessary to strengthen the future resilience of communities
across the Sahel. Donors must make immediate commitments to provide
funding for both recovery and resilience, and all humanitarian actors must work
together to overcome the structural challenges to finally deliver the change that
is needed.

RECOMMENDATIONS
Develop a deeper and shared understanding of resilience
National governments and ECOWAS should demonstrate stronger
political will to deliver pro-poor development strategies, committing to
targeting and transferring resources to support the poorest and most
vulnerable people, with the support of the international aid community.
All actors must seek to develop a deeper understanding of what makes
poor people more vulnerable to shocks and stresses and what builds their
resilience, conducting gender- and child-sensitive analyses as a basis for
developing appropriate pro-poor policy solutions and resilience measures.
They should develop new programming approaches and public service
provisions that are better targeted to the specific needs of the most
vulnerable and disadvantaged groups, such as children under five, women
and pastoralists. The AGIR Sahel Framework should be used to establish
greater political consensus and ensure that future national and regional
policies are driven by those considerations.

33
 Governments across the region should work together with key regional
actors to develop more effective food security analyses based on early
warning systems that fully integrate understanding of risk and vulnerability.
Specifically, they should:
o continue to develop the Cadre Harmonis as a standard region-wide
basis for projections of food insecurity;
o advocate and fundraise for the development of HEA baselines and
outcome analysis across the region to assist better understanding of
vulnerabilities, of needs in times of shock, and better response
targeting.

Break down the humanitarian-development divide

Donors should fast-track the development of resilience strategies and plans
for more integrated approaches across the humanitarian-development
continuum. These strategies and plans should:
o support national resilience plans and actively seek to strengthen
national and local capacities, including civil society;
o integrate concepts of risk and vulnerability into funding decisions
and programming, and include innovative funding mechanisms and
support for key pro-resilience policies such as safety nets and food
reserves;
o set out plans to deliver internal change to fulfil these ambitions.
Agencies seeking to address immediate needs and root causes of food
and nutrition crises must review their current programming approaches in
order to:
o develop a single flexible programme that bridges the humanitarian-
development divide and place concepts of risk and vulnerability at
the heart of programmes, undertaking the organisational changes
required to make this happen;
o provide focused support to communities that fosters innovation,
experimentation, adaptation to climate change and diversification of
livelihoods;
o mobilise civil society and affected communities to influence
government decision-making, and hold duty-bearers to account.
The UN Regional Humanitarian Coordinator for the Sahel should seek
to play an important role in efforts to mobilise the wider UN system to be
proactive in supporting resilience. At a national level, the
Humanitarian/Resident Coordinators should commit to working with
national governments to convene all key actorsat all levels and across
the humanitarian-development continuumto create an effective platform
from which to help build resilience.

Build national and local capacity to deliver resilience

Governments across the region should work with others to develop
resilience plans and frameworks that include a specific focus on:
o developing programmes to support small-scale farmers and
pastoralistswith goals of sustainability and long-term resilience;
34
 o seeking to overcome barriers that prevent women farmers benefiting
from agricultural programmes;
o establishing or scaling up social protection;
o providing additional support to set up or reinforce local food
reserves;
o prioritising effective undernutrition prevention programmes and put
in place integrated programmes that tackle its underlying causes.
Donors should respect commitments made under the Paris and Accra
Declarations on Aid Effectiveness, and actively seek appropriate ways of
increasing aid that is disbursed through state budgets to reinforce national
and local ownership and capacity.
UN agencies and international NGOs should take stock of approaches
used so far during emergency and development programmes to establish
more effective measures for reinforcing capacity through long-term
partnerships. They should also work together with national governments,
local bodies and civil society groups to develop country preparedness plans
for responding to future food crises, including steps to accelerate scale-up
of the response.
OCHA should seek to align its funding mechanisms with national response
plans as far as possible and introduce multi-annual UN appeals as a
standard tool to improve forward planning and predictability of humanitarian
assistance. Additional national-level funding mechanisms, such as
emergency response funds, should also be considered as a potential
additional source of funding for local NGOs.

35
NOTES
Links last accessed March 2013 unless otherwise specified
1
Malnutrition is used in more common terminology to refer to under nutrition. In this report, we chosen to use the term under
nutrition, since manutrition can also refer to over nutrition or obesity. There are a number of different types of under
nutrition: acute (severe or moderate), chronic, weight deficiency relative to age (underweight) and vitamin and mineral
deficient.

2 IASC (2012) Plan de reponse face a la crise alimentaire et nutritionnelle au Sahel,

http://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/CAP/2012_FSN_Sahel_Strategy_Paper_FR.pdf

3 OCHA (2012) Sahel Crisis: Funding Status as of 2 July 2012, as according to UN FTS
http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/FundingUpdates%2004JUILLET2012.pdf

4 UNOCHA (2012) Humanitarian Actors request 1.6 billion dollars for harmonized response to the needs of Sahelian
populations in 2013 http://reliefweb.int/report/mali/humanitarian-actors-request-16-billion-dollars-harmonized-response-
needs-sahelian

5 OECD (2012) op. cit.

6 Countries affected included: Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Gambia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria and Senegal.

7 UN (2012) Sahel Regional Strategy 2013, p.16

http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/SahelStrategy2013_Dec2012.pdf

8 UN (2011) The Millennium Development Goals Report 2011, New York: United Nations
http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/11_MDG%20Report_EN.pdf (last accessed 3 December 2012)

9 Save the Children (2009), Understanding Household Economy in Rural Niger, p.96
http://www.savethechildren.org.uk/resources/online-library/understanding-household-economy-in-rural-niger

10 FEWS NET (n.d.) Household Economy Analysis (HEA) Framework http://www.fews.net/pages/livelihoods-HEA.aspx

11 Save the Children (2009), op. cit., p.20

12 Oxfam International (2010) Hunger in the Sahel: A permanent emergency? Oxford: Oxfam International
http://www.oxfam.org/en/policy/hunger-sahel-permanent-emergency

13 D. Hillier and B. Dempsey (2012) A Dangerous Delay: The cost of late response to early warnings in the 2011 drought in
the Horn of Africa, Oxford: Oxfam International http://policy-practice.oxfam.org.uk/publications/a-dangerous-delay-the-cost-
of-late-response-to-early-warnings-in-the-2011-droug-203389

14 APESS et al (2012) Food for Thought: A Civil Society Assessment on the State of Play of the Implementation of the
Charter for Food Crisis Prevention and Management in the Sahel and West Africa, Oxford: Oxfam International, APESS
(Association pour la Promotion de lElevage au Sahel et en Savane), CNCPRT (National Dialogue Council for the Rural
Producers of Chad), CONGAD, Consortium Droit lAlimentation et Souveraint Alimentaire, CSSA (Food Security
Monitoring Committee in Mauritania), FOSC (CSO Forum of Mali), SPONG (Permanent Secretariat of Non-Governmental
Organisations in Burkina Faso), ROPPA (Network of Peasant Organizations and Producers in West Africa) and Rseau
Bilital Maroob.

15 Food Crisis Prevention Network (2012) Compte rendu des travaux, 1213 April 2012,
http://www.oecd.org/fr/csao/evenements/50488663.pdf

16 PASISAT (Projet dAppui a lAmlioration du Systme dInformation sur la Scurit Alimentaire au Tchad) (2011), Bulletin
Trimestriel Numro 1, October

17 J-D. Crola (2012) Sahel markets under pressure, Oxford: Oxfam International http://www.oxfam.org/en/grow/policy/sahel-
markets-under-pressure

18 P. Gubbels (2011) Escaping the Hunger Cycle: Pathways to Resilience in the Sahel, Sahel Working Group http://policy-
practice.oxfam.org.uk/publications/escaping-the-hunger-cycle-pathways-to-resilience-in-the-sahel-146171. Assessing the
2010 Sahel response, Gubbels identifies seven areas for an improved future response. These include: (i) preventing,
preparing and planning for better responses; (ii) adapting donor policies and practices; (iii) speeding up and improving
humanitarian response; (iv) strengthening resilience and incomes; (v) scaling up nutrition programmes; (vi) strengthening
capacity of regional and national institutions; and (vii) strengthening the capacity of civil society, local NGOs, local
government and communities. Oxfams 2012 report, A Dangerous Delay (Hillier and Dempsey, 2012, op. cit.) has two
areas of recommendation: (i) manage the risks, not the crisis; and (ii) earlier drought response, including national political
leadership, more agile and flexible funding and better programming by the international aid community (including long-term
development interventions adapted to the context, preventative humanitarian action and the internal systems to support
these).

19 UNDP (2013) The Human Development Report 2013The Rise of the South: Human Progress in a Diverse World, p. 31
http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr2013/download/

20 A. Thurston (2012) Chad: oil, electricity, and inequality, Sahel blog, 21 September
http://sahelblog.wordpress.com/2012/09/21/chad-oil-electricity-and-inequality/

21 Emergency Capacity Building (ECB) Project (2012) Niger communities say they will run out of food before next harvest,
joint ECB / ACAPs study shows, 21 March http://www.ecbproject.org/news/latest-news-library/post/162-niger-communities-
say-they-will-run-out-of-food-before-next-harvest-joint-ecb---acaps-study-shows

22 M. Marshall (2013) Humanitarian disaster blamed on climate change, New Scientist, 1 March
www.newscientist.com/article/dn23229-humanitarian-disaster-blamed-on-climate-change.html

36
23
Agrhymet Regional Centre website http://www.agrhymet.ne/eng/index.html

24 Oxfam (2012) An internal note on climate change, drought and food insecurity in the Sahel, unpublished

25 European Commission (2012a) ECHO Factsheet: Sahel Food & Nutrition Crisis,
http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/aid/countries/factsheets/sahel_en.pdf

26 IASC (2012) op. cit.

27 C. Baudot (2013) Malis Conflict Refugees: Responding to a growing crisis, Oxfam Briefing Paper 167, Oxford: Oxfam
International http://policy-practice.oxfam.org.uk/publications/malis-conflict-refugees-responding-to-a-growing-crisis-266392

28 Interview conducted in framework of an Oxfam Assessment Mission to Ferrario and Damba camps and surrounding areas,
6-9 June 2012.

29 Global acute malnutrition (GAM) combines the percentage of children suffering from moderate acute malnutrition and those
suffering from severe acute malnutrition (SAM). See ACF, Types of acute malnutrition
http://www.actionagainsthunger.org.uk/what-we-do/about-acute-malnutrition/types-of-acute-malnutrition/

30 According to the World Health Organization, more than 15 per cent of a population suffering from moderate acute
malnutrition, or more than 3 per cent from severe acute malnutrition, is considered as a critical or emergency threshold.
31
UN (2012) op. cit, p. 15

32 Oxfam GB (2012) Construire des Approches Sensibles au Genre pour Combattre la Crise Alimentaire et Soutenir la
Rsilience dans le Sahel, unpublished working document

33 78.4% of female headed households in Bahr El Ghazal were in a situation of food insecurity, compared to just 44.8% for
male-headed households. Government of Chad (2011) Evaluation de la Securite Alimentaire des Mnages dans la Bande
Sahelienne Ouest du Tchad, Republique du Tchad, Ministere de lAgriculture, VAM, PAM, p.12.
34 UN (2012) op. cit., p.10

35 UNICEF (2012), Situation Nutritionnelle dans la region, 28 February 2013,

http://wca.humanitarianresponse.info/fr/document/pr%C3%A9sentations-fsn-du-28-fevrier-2013

36 Oxfam reached just over 1 million people, Action Contre la Faim 300,000 people.

37 Gubbels (2011) op. cit.; Hillier and Dempsey (2012) op. cit.

38 Gubbels (2011) p. 39

39 Charter for Food Crisis Prevention and Management in the Sahel and West Africa
(http://www.oecd.org/swac/publications/41276585.pdf). The Charter was adopted by national governments, regional
organisations, financial and technical partners and civil society groups. It provides an important set of commitments to
measure performance.
40
Le Niger sonne l'alarme sur la menace terroriste et l'inscurit alimentaire, Speech by President of Niger, 23 September
2011 http://www.un.org/apps/newsFr/storyF.asp?NewsID=26422&Cr=Niger&Cr1

41 Gubbels (2011) op. cit., p. 51. In response to the crisis in 2010, an international appeal for assistance in Niger was only
made in March 2010.

42 AllAfrica (2012) Sngal: Macky Sall appelle laide pour le monde rural, 3 April,
http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201204040015.html

43 Comit de Suivi de la Securit Alimentaire Mauritanie (2012) Diagnostic rapide sur lapplication de la Charte de prvention
et de gestion des crises alimentaires en Mauritanie, p. 8

44 Consortium sur le Droit lAlimentation (2012) Diagnostic rapide sur lapplication de la Charte de prvention et de gestion
des crises alimentaires au Niger, p. 5

45 APESS et al (2012) op. cit.

46 ibid., p. 8
47
ibid., p. 7
48
I. Diori (2012) Le consortium Droit lalimentation fait des recommandations au gouvernement, Alternative Niger, 24
August, http://www.alternativeniger.org/spip.php?article584
49 APESS et al (2012) op. cit., p. 10

50 For example, the 41st Ordinary Session of the ECOWAS Authority of Heads of State & Government, which took place on
28-29 June in Cte dIvoire, did not prioritise discussion of the food crisis, even as it was reaching its peak. The final
communiqu from the meeting included just two paragraphs referencing food security, one on the crisis itself and the
second on the EUs AGIR Sahel initiative (http://www.emansion.gov.lr/doc/Final-Communique%20-%2041st-Ordinary-
Session-ECOWAS-Heads-of-State%20and-Government.pdf).

51 A regional response plan had been developed at the beginning of the year, prior to national appeals being developed and
finalised. While this provided an initial indication of funding required, in some cases it captured just 50 per cent of the final
needs. For example, for Burkina Faso, the regional response plan requested $47m, a figure that was subsequently revised
in the appeal to $85m. For Mali, the figures rose from $72m to $149m.
52
Interviews with NGO staff, SeptemberNovember 2012

53 Interviews with national government officials, SeptemberNovember 2012

54 Dispositif National de Prvention et de Gestion des Crises et Catastrophes (2012) Etat de mise en oeuvre des actions du
volet alimentaire du plan de soutien 2011-2012, 21 September

55 WFP (2012) Urgent call for united action in the Sahel region of West Africa, 15 February http://www.wfp.org/news/news-

37
 release/urgent-call-united-action-inthe-sahel-region-west-africa

56 FEWS NET (2012), West Africa Food Security Outlook: January-September 2012,
http://www.fews.net/docs/Publications/west_OL_2012_01_EN_final2.pdf

57 European Commission (2011) Looming hunger crisis in Sahel: European Commission acts now to save lives, press
release, 18 November, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-11-1374_en.htm?locale=en

58 For a breakdown of early commitments, see USAID (2012) FactSheet No.1, Fiscal Year (FY) 2013: SahelFood
Insecurity and Complex Emergency,

59 UN Financial Tracking Service, http://fts.unocha.org/

60 It is important to note that concerns have been raised about the degree to which the UN Financial Tracking Service
accurately captures all funding flows. In the future, improvements should be made to ensure that better quality information
is available. For the time being, it provides an adequate indicator for overall trends in funding for each crisis.

61 It is important to recognise that, in 2012, a much greater quantity of financial assistance (approximately double) was
provided compared with 2010. This is in line with overall estimates of need, which in 2012 were approximately double those
estimated for 2010.

62 OCHA (2012) Sahel Crisis: Funding Status as of 2nd July 2012, as according to UN FTS,
http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/FundingUpdates%2004JUILLET2012.pdf. According to the UN
Financial Tracking Service, approximately $800m had already been contributed to the appeal, leaving a gap of $800m.
However, additional commitments of $200m had already been made outside the UN appeal.

63 Hiller and Dempsey (2012) op. cit., p. 16

64 Authors interviews with donors and agencies, Dakar, OctoberNovember 2012

65 UN Financial Tracking Service, Sahel Crisis Funding Summary

https://docs.google.com/spreadsheet/pub?key=0AiHzO7bP7kUtdFFPQnc4TDdBcnRmVHU4Z1JRT3paQkE&single=true&
gid=5&output=html (last accessed 3 December 2012)
66 UN (2012) Sahel Sector Performance IndicatorsJanuary to June 2012

67 Agreement between SIDA and Oxfam International on support of a humanitarian rapid response mechanism for Africa, 1
April 2011 to 30 June 2012. See also Intermon Oxfam (2012) Crisis Alimentaria en el Sahel: Prevenir o curar, p. 13,
http://www.intermonoxfam.org/sites/default/files/documentos/files/Informe_respuesta_cooperacion_espa%C3%B1ola_Sah
el.pdf

68 For example, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) used an informal crisis modifier, using the
Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) to provide a new humanitarian dimension to a pre-existing USAID
development programme in Senegal.

69 Additional information may also be made available over the course of the year, with some national governments and UN
agencies intending to publish reports on the response.

70 Gubbels (2011) op. cit., p. 51

71 According the UN Preparedness Strategy prepared at the end of 2011, just over 512,000 children were treated for severe
acute undernutrition during the 2010 response, compared to the 926,880 treated in 2012.These figures cover the same set
of countries, with the exception of Gambia, which is only included in 2012 figures.

72 UN (2012) Sahel Regional Strategy 2013, p. 15

73 Authors interviews with UN officials, Chad and Niger, SeptemberNovember 2012

74 Authors interviews with NGOs, SeptemberNovember 2012

75 URD Resilience Workshop, La resilience: du concept global aux specificites saheliennes, Dakar, 26-27 February 2013.

76 FAO (2012) La crise alimentaire et nutritionnelle du Sahel : lurgence dappuyer la rsilience des populations vulnrables.
Cadre stratgique de rponse rgionale. Burkina Faso, Cameroun, Gambie, Mali, Mauritanie, Niger, Sngal et Tchad, p.
21, http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/user_upload/sahel/docs/DocProg%20FAO%20SAHEL%20FR.pdf

77 Oxfam (2012) Construire des Approches Sensibles au Genre pour Combattre la Crise Alimentaire et Soutenir la Rsilience
dans le Sahel, p. 24, unpublished document.

78 R. Fuller (2012) Effectiveness Review: Livestock Commercialisation for Pastoralist Communities in North Dakoro, Niger,
Oxford: Oxfam http://policy-practice.oxfam.org.uk/publications/effectiveness-review-livestock-commercialisation-for-
pastoralist-communities-in-262466

79 F. Grnewald and J. Paul (2012) From Early Warning to Reinforcing Resilience: Lessons Learned from the 2011-2012
Sahel Response: A report for the IASC Principles,
http://ochanet.unocha.org/p/Documents/Lesson%20Learning%20Review.%20Early%20Action%20and%20Resilience%20i
n%20the%20Sahel.pdf

80 Oxfam America (2012) Do Early Cash-Based Interventions in a Food Crisis Enhance Resilience? Experience from Niger,
draft discussion paper

81 FAO-WFP (2012) Food Security and Humanitarian Implications in West Africa and the Sahel, Joint Note, June 2012
http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Joint%2520WFP_FAO_Note_June_2012-EN%2520%282%29.pdf.
While it is difficult to be certain about the reasons for this,, and the reliability of the figures has been questioned, UN reports
suggest that the reduction in the number of people affected resulted from prompt and effective early interventions by
governments and partners.

82 The fact that nine countries in the region were affected by the crisis meant that some food had to be purchased beyond the
region to prevent too much pressure on the local market.

38
83 IRIN (2012) Sahel : what went right in the crisis response? 24 October http://www.irinnews.org/report/96632/SAHEL-What-
went-right-in-the-crisis-response

84 APESS et al (2012) op. cit., p. 10

85 Interviews with NGO staff (SeptemberNovember) provided a number of examples of lags between the signing of a funding
contract and the delivery of assistance to beneficiaries. One example was given where an organisation took months to plan
the response, including conducting market assessments and targetingwhich could have all been done before the final
green light on funding was given. In other cases, confusion about donor requirements and the possibility of backdating
agreements meant that programmes were only launched once funding had been fully secured.

86 UN (2012) Sahel Regional Strategy 2013, p. 6

87 Afrique Verte (2013) Point sur la situation alimentaire au Sahel: Suivi de Campagne no. 143, March

88 European Commission (2012a) op cit.

89 Food Security and Nutrition Working Group, Donor AlertSahel Summit, 20 February 2013

90 $403 million provided of the $1,698m requested. OCHA (2013) Sahel Crisis 2013: Funding status as of 05 April 2013,
http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Sahel%20Funding%20Status%205%20April%202013.pdf

91 Definition agreed at the December 2012 meeting of the AGIR Sahel initiative in Ouagadougou,
http://www.oecd.org/swac/topics/agir.htm

92 OECD (2012) Launching Ceremony of AGIR Sahel-West Africa, Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, 4-8 December,
http://www.oecd.org/site/sahelandwestafricaweek2012/agirlaunchingceremony.htm

93 IASC (2012) Response Plan for a Food Security and Nutrition Crisis in the Sahel, Inter-Agency Standing Committee
http://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/CAP/2012_FSN_Sahel_Strategy_Paper_FR.pdf

94 ECOWAS (2012) Note dorientation stratgiqueVers une scurit alimentaire de proximit en Afrique de lOuest : Faim
Zro en Afrique de lOuest

95 European Commission (2012b) Dclaration commune sur le renforcement de la rsilience pour faire face la crise
alimentaire au Sahel, 18 June, http://ec.europa.eu/echo/news/2012/sahel_conference_2012_fr.htm

96 African Union Declaration 7, Assembly/AU/Decl.4- 11 (II), 10-12 July 2003, Maputo

http://www.nepad.org/system/files/Maputo%20Declaration.pdf

97 Oxfam et al (2012) Food Crisis in the Sahel: Five steps to break the hunger cycle in 2012, Joint Agency Issue Briefing, p.
7, Oxfam International http://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/ib-food-crisis-sahel-31052012-en.pdf

98 FAO (2011) The State of Food and Agriculture : Women in agricultureClosing the gender gap for development,
http://www.fao.org/docrep/013/i2050e/i2050e.pdf

99 OECD (2012) Launching Ceremony of AGIR Sahel-West Africa, op. cit.

100 Interviews with NGOs and donors, December 2012

101 C. C. Venton, C. Fitzgibbon, T. Shitarek, L. Coulter and O. Dooley (2012) The Economics of Early Response and Disaster
Resilience: Lessons from Kenya and Ethiopia, http://reliefweb.int/report/kenya/economics-early-response-and-disaster-
resilience-lessons-kenya-and-ethiopia
102
Global Humanitarian Assistance (n.d.) Datastore, http://www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/data-guides/datastore

103 At the December meeting of AGIR Sahel, The European Union announced it would be contributing 500m euros for
resilience in the Sahel over three years (2012-2014). USAID was expected to announce precise funding commitments for
resilience in Burkina Faso and Niger in April 2013.

104 Global Alliance for Resilience InitiativeSahel and West Africa (AGIR) Joint Statement, Ouagadougou 6 December 2013,
http://www.oecd.org/swac/topics/EN_Declaration_Ouagadougou_CD.pdf, p.4

USAID, Resilience Week, http://transition.usaid.gov/resilience/

106 ECOWAS (2012) op. cit., p. 11

107 Le Hub Rural (n.d.) Linitiative 3 N ( les Nigriens nourrissent les Nigriens ): un engagement politique pour mettre les
Nigriens labri de la famine et de la soif, http://www.hubrural.org/L-initiative-3-N-les-Nigeriens.html

108 OECD (2012) op. cit.

109 P. Gubbels (2011), op. cit., p.9

110 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005), http://www.unrol.org/files/34428351.pdf; Accra Agenda for Action (2008),
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/ACCRAEXT/Resources/4700790-1217425866038/AAA-4-SEPTEMBER-FINAL-
16h00.pdf

111 A. Thurston (2012) Niger secures $4.8 billion for security and developmentis this a regional model?, Sahel blog, 16
November, http://sahelblog.wordpress.com/2012/11/16/niger-secures-4-8-billion-for-security-and-development-is-this-a-
regional-model/
112 Authors interviews in Niger, November 2012
113
UNOCHA (n.d.) Cluster Coordination, United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs,
http://www.unocha.org/what-we-do/coordination-tools/cluster-coordination

114 Interviews with UN agencies, SeptemberNovember 2012

115 UNOCHA (2012) Humanitarian Actors request 1.6 billion dollars for harmonized response to the needs of Sahelian
populations in 2013, http://reliefweb.int/report/mali/humanitarian-actors-request-16-billion-dollars-harmonized-response-
needs-sahelian

39
 Oxfam International April 2013

This paper was written by Elise Ford. Oxfam acknowledge the assistance of
Steve Cockburnas well, as the numerous inputs and advice provided by staff
across the organisation. Oxfam would also like to thank ACF and Save the
Children for their important contributions, in particular Martin Morand, Anais
Lafite and Leah Finnegan. We also like to acknowledge the contribution of
Steven Salazar for the funding analysis. The paper is part of a series of reports
written to inform public debate on development and humanitarian policy issues.
For further information on the issues raised in this report please e-mail
[email protected]

This publication is copyright but the text may be used free of charge for the
purposes of advocacy, campaigning, education, and research, provided that the
source is acknowledged in full. The copyright holder requests that all such use
be registered with them for impact assessment purposes. For copying in any
other circumstances, or for re-use in other publications, or for translation or
adaptation, permission must be secured and a fee may be charged. E-mail
[email protected].

The information in this publication is correct at the time of going to press.

Published by Oxfam GB for Oxfam International under ISBN 978-1-78077-282-0

in April 2013. Oxfam GB, Oxfam House, John Smith Drive, Cowley, Oxford, OX4
2JY, UK.

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